International Crisis Management: The Approach of European States (Governance and Change in the Global Era)

International Crisis Management

The period since the end of the Cold War has seen a shift in the rationale behind strategic defence in Europe from defending territory to collective security, force projection and crisis management. Crisis management relates to exceptional situations in international politics when preventive measures have failed and it is a response to a perceived threat. It has become essential to achieving and maintaining national security and, in the aftermath of the Iraq war, the process leading to the decision to participate in such an operation has acquired greater significance. Marc Houben discusses the preconditions and constraints that nine European states place on their participation in such operations and the consequences of a decision as to whether to participate for the effectiveness of the coalition of states and the eventual outcome of an operation.The objective of the book is to provide a comparative analysis of executive–legislature relations in the security domain and the changes that have occurred in the last two decades. It therefore provides a theoretical framework for the process of European security cooperation to help the reader to understand the complexities of the decision-making process in each country. This informative book will be essential reading for students of international relations, economics, European politics and comparative studies.

Marc Houben holds master’s degrees in philosophy and information management and a doctorate in social sciences. He has written about issues in philosophy, public policy, strategy and security and saw action in several crisis management operations as an officer in the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps.

Routledge Studies in Governance and Change in the Global Era

1. New Socialisms Futures beyond Globalization Edited by Robert Albritton, John Bell, Shannon Bell and Richard Westra 2. International Crisis Management The Approach of European States Marc Houben Other titles in this series include: States against Markets Edited by Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache Political Ecology Edited by David Bell, Lessa Fawcett, Roger Keil and Peter Penz Health Reform Edited by Daniel Drache and Terry Sullivan Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City Edited by Engin F. Isin Between the Market and the Public Domain Redrawing the Line Edited by Daniel Drache

International Crisis Management The approach of European states

Marc Houben

First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park,Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Marc Houben This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Houben, Marc, 1967– International crisis management: the approach of European states / Marc Houben Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Europe,Western–Foreign relations–1989–. 2. Europe,Western–Foreign relations–Decision making. 3. National security–Europe,Western. 4. Europe,Western–Politics and government. 5.Administrative procedure–Europe,Western. 6. International relations. 7. Crisis management. I.Title JZ1570.A5H68 2005 327.4–dc22 2004013407 ISBN 0-203-00126-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0–415–35455–2 (Print edition)

For my parents

Contents

List of illustrations Preface and acknowledgments List of abbreviations Declaring war

x xii xvi xx

PART I

Problem definition and framework of analysis

1

1

3

Introduction and plan of the book 1.1 The double political problem of international crisis management 3 1.2 Preconditions versus ‘criteria for intervention’ 4 1.3 Research questions and methodology 5 1.4 Defining the key terms: ambiguities and conundrums 8

2

Elements of change

12

2.1 The twin processes of normalisation and domestication 13 2.2 The process and principles of self-organisation 15 2.3 On the nature of the crisis 18 3

Three propositions 3.1 States are sovereign but only marginally free 21 3.2 The imperative of cooperation 23 3.3 All states are constrained 25

21

viii

Contents

PART II

The case studies: a comparative analysis

29

4

31

Changing the rules: Belgium and the Netherlands 4.1 Belgium 31 4.2 The Netherlands 55 4.3 Concluding remarks 78

5

The imperative of consensus: Denmark and Norway

80

5.1 Denmark 80 5.2 Norway 99 5.3 Concluding remarks 116 6

The dominant government: the United Kingdom, France and Spain 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4

7

119

The United Kingdom 119 France 142 Spain 163 Concluding remarks 182

The dominant parliament: Germany and Italy

185

7.1 Germany 185 7.2 Italy 205 7.3 Concluding remarks 225 PART III

Comparative analysis and conclusions

227

8

229

National preconditions and multinational action 8.1 Nature and characteristics of the national decision-making process 229 8.2 Do participation decisions fit a general pattern? 231 8.3 How and why do states impose preconditions on their participation? 233 8.4 National preconditions and the consequences for multinational action 240

9

The relation between government and Parliament 9.1 Binding the government 244

243

Contents ix 9.2 Obtaining and sustaining political support 246 9.3 Does the national decision-making process improve if preconditions are formalised? 247 9.4 Parliamentary scrutiny and evaluation 252 9.5 Parliament as a democratic learning mechanism 256 Annex: the review framework of the Netherlands Notes Bibliography Index

259 265 285 311

Illustrations

Figures 1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1

Early warning and early action The declining effectiveness of national security policy Four significant relations The relation between constraints and mechanisms Command structure of the Belgian armed forces Command structure of the Dutch armed forces Command structure of the Danish armed forces Command structure of the Norwegian armed forces Command structure of the British armed forces Command structure of the French armed forces Command structure of the Spanish armed forces Command structure of the German armed forces

4 16 18 27 37 59 84 106 128 147 176 189

Tables 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3

Belgian parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation Belgian parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation Dutch parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation Danish parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation Norwegian parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation British parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation French parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation French parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation

46 55 77 98 116 141 152 162

Illustrations 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 9.1 9.2 9.3

Spanish parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation Spanish parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation German parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation German parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation Italian parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation Italian parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation Relative levels of parliamentary involvement in the decision-making process and evaluation Parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation Parliamentary controls and accountability

xi 171 182 193 204 222 224 245 248 255

Preface and acknowledgments

This book presents an inquiry into the politics of international crisis management, viewed from a European perspective. It does not attempt a historical description of international crisis management in general or of any specific aspect of international crisis management in particular. It is, rather, an effort to develop a way of looking at and thinking about international cooperation in crisis management operations – in short, a theoretical framework. Considering the inevitable shortcomings of any theory, I cannot express better what Samuel Huntington said almost half a century ago: Understanding requires theory; theory requires abstraction; and abstraction requires the simplification and ordering of reality. No theory can explain all facts, and at times the reader of this book may feel that its concepts and distinctions are drawn too sharply and precisely and are too far removed from reality. Obviously, the real world is one of blends, irrationalities and incongruities: actual personalities, institutions and beliefs do not fit into neat logical categories. Yet neat logical categories are necessary if man is to think profitably about the real world in which he lives and to derive from it lessons for broader application and use. (Huntington 1959: vii) Conceptions and practices of defence and achieving security have changed over time. In fifty years, conceptions of defence have changed from defending territory to collective security, force projection and crisis management. Crisis management is one of four broad approaches to achieving and maintaining security; conflict prevention, protection and force projection being the other three. Crisis management relates to exceptional situations in international politics when preventive measures have failed and as such it is a response to an actual threat. Quite often this threat does not pose a direct danger to the territory or sovereignty of a European state, hence there is no compelling security imperative for a state to involve itself in a crisis and hence the term ‘wars of choice’. In less than two decades, international crisis management has become a permanent feature of international relations and consequently of national security policy. An important assumption underlying any ‘European’

Preface and acknowledgments xiii approach to international crisis management is that international crises often pose a double political problem: Western European states have to arrive at a common position about what needs to be done about the crisis, and they have to organise themselves in such a way that, as a collective, they are effective. None of them is able to deal with an international crisis unilaterally in a meaningful and effective way. Differences in exposure to threats and commitment to collective responses account for wide divergences between nations. As a consequence, national preconditions and constraints for participation play a crucial role. It is extremely rare that a country will give a blank cheque and participate unconditionally. National preconditions and constraints shape the way a country participates in such a collective undertaking. This study provides a comparative analysis of the national preconditions and constraints for participation in an international crisis management operation of nine European states, as well as the consequences of this behaviour for the effectiveness of the coalition of states and the outcome of the operation. It should not come as a surprise that preconditioning national participation does indeed have severe negative consequences for the effectiveness of the coalition of states. The predicament of Europe is that the national constraints jointly determine (indeed limit) the set of political-military options available at the aggregate level, instead of cancelling each other out. Constraints and preconditions are often dynamic and situation-dependent; this study analyses the political mechanisms of how they change. The conclusion is that European security cooperation in crisis management operations is as much about ‘constraint management’ as it is about leadership, political will and capabilities. Improving our understanding of the dynamics of constraint and control will help us to understand the dynamics of cooperation. Deciphering parts of the ‘source code’ of the European security policy may give us the necessary information to devise the tools to improve both the dynamics of cooperation and the security policy. A crucial aspect of the articulation of national preconditions for participation is the relationship between a government and its country’s parliament. In some countries, participation in international crisis management operations has escaped parliamentary control. In others, parliamentary involvement has increased over the decades of a country’s involvement in international crisis management. National constitutions are clear about the declaration of war (in the majority of countries a prerogative of Parliament), but they do not always contain a reference to the use of force in situations other than war. Consequently, the government can play a dominant role, based on tradition and executive prerogatives. The objective of this book is to offer a comparative analysis of executive–legislature relations in the security domain and the changes that have occurred in the last two decades. A central issue is to establish to what extent the legal-political rules and parliamentary conventions shaping the national decision-making process have developed in step with what I have called the ‘normalisation’ and ‘domestication’ of international crisis management.The research was concluded on 1 January 2004.

xiv Preface and acknowledgments The design of this research project reflects an itinerary that began in The Hague in February 2000 and ended three years later in Basra, Iraq. In between, the research led me to Prague, Brussels, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Bonn, Berlin, Paris, Madrid, Rome and finally back to Brussels. In all these places, I met people who were willing to discuss the questions I put to them and share their time, thoughts and expertise with me. Many of them have become friends, and I am glad to have the opportunity to thank them here. Instrumental in the design of the project was Dr Willem van Eekelen, former member of the Dutch Senate and former secretary-general of the Western European Union (WEU). On secondment to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was fortunate to work with Pieter de Gooijer, director of the Department for European Integration and Aldrik Gierveld, coordinator of the IGC task force. An intensive period of fieldwork followed. In Oslo, I was fortunate to work with Professor Rolf Tamnes, eminent historian and director of the Institutt for Forsvarstudien (IFS). He not only offered an intellectual home from home, but his short and sharp lectures on Norwegian foreign and security policy saved me a lot of time and were invaluable for the final version of the country chapter on Norway. In Copenhagen, Professor Bertel Heurlin, research director of the Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), allowed me to work and use the fantastic library facilities freely and made sure that I became in no time well connected with the Danish foreign and security policy establishment. In London, I was welcomed at Arundel House, headquarters of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) by Klaus Becher, senior consulting fellow. In Bonn, Professor Ludger Kühnhardt and Dr Franz-Josef Meiers of the Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) have been instrumental in my understanding of the position of Germany in Europe and its international roles and responsibilities. In Berlin, I could tap into the impressive resources of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Dr Peter Schmidt, Forschungsgruppenleiter and expert on German security policy, welcomed me and proved to be a valuable source of information. In Paris, I spent two very instructive months at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique under the expert guidance of its director, François Heisbourg, and Yves Boyer, directeur-adjoint. In Madrid, I found an invaluable ally in Rafaël Bardají, deputy director of the Royal Elcano Institute for International and Strategic Studies, when organising an intensive yet time-efficient series of interviews. In Rome, Dr Ettore Greco, deputy director of the Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and General (retd), now Professor, Carlo Jean have been most helpful in guiding me to the right people, institutions and literature. Mrs Gé Verwoerd, librarian at the Netherlands Defence College (Rijswijk), has been most helpful in getting hold of literature and checking references. Mrs Louise Punt worked wonders with the language. The research on literature has been complemented by a great number of interviews, 180 in total. I have benefited and learned a great deal from these people. I have used only a few of these conversations as a direct reference, so

Preface and acknowledgments xv many of them remain unnamed, but their thoughts, opinions and doubts provided the background information and direction as to how to ‘read’ national policies. I owe them more than I can express here. Of the people who commented on earlier drafts of parts of this study, warm thanks go to Peter Viggo Jacobsen, Ingemar Dörfer, Sören Christiansen, Julien Saunière, Britta Bjerg Jensen, Torunn Laugen, Iver B. Neumann, Dirk Peters, Félix Arteaga, Francesco Clementucci, Daniele Cabras, Germano Dottori, Joop Nijssen, David Chuter, Humphry Crum-Ewing, Victor Windt, Elizabeth Pond, Kees Homan, Jan-Geert Siccama, Alfred van Staden and Herman van Gunsteren. None of those mentioned above should be held accountable for any errors in this study.The responsibility is mine alone. My intellectual base for the last three years has been the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).The intellectual turbulence, the emphasis on applied policy, the academic rigour and its closeness to but independence from the great European and Atlantic institutions render it a perfect place for watching, reflecting and thinking ahead for Europe. Peter Ludlow, founding director of CEPS, allowed me to establish the European Security Forum (in collaboration with the IISS in London) and to initiate a research programme into European security and defence policy. I am grateful to CEO Karel Lannoo and to the director, Daniel Gros, for their support; to my colleagues Ben Crum, Nicholas Whyte (now with the International Crisis Group), Marius Vahl and Nathalie Tocci, not least as a sounding board for my own work but also for the many issues we have discussed over the past years; and to Michael Emerson, who, as team supervisor, made us think together. Finally, I should mention my intellectual debt to the outstanding work by Jon Elster, especially his Ulysses Unbound. His ground-breaking work has led to the creation of a new field of study: constraint theory.The book presented here can be considered an exercise in the application of constraint theory to international relations. For financial and material support, my gratitude goes to the Dutch minister of defence, in this case the First Sea Lord of the Royal Netherlands Navy. It is a rare case, I am often told, for an organisation like the Dutch Navy to so generously provide the financial and material backing for such an extensive and long-term research project. While recording with pleasure my gratitude to the Dutch Navy, I wish to make clear that no part of this work has been reviewed or submitted for clearance or approval by the ministry. Officialdom has therefore had no influence on its contents; nor has anyone in an official position expressed any wish for such influence. This project has been a fascinating voyage of inquiry, and my wife and children made it a thoroughly enjoyable one too. M.H. Brussels and Basra November 2003–April 2004

Abbreviations

AA AIV AP ARK ARRC AWACS BK BVerfG CAS CCMC CDS CDU CEMA CEPS CFSP CHEM CHOD CIMIC CIS CJTF COI COIA CSCE CSU DAB DAS DFID DG DGAP DIB DICOD DPKO

Auswärtiges Amt Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken The Associated Press General Accounting Office Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Airborne Warning and Control System Bundeskanzleramt Bundesverfassungsgericht close air support Civilian Crisis Management Committee chief of the defence staff Christlich-Demokratische Union chef d’état-major des armées Centre for European Policy Studies Common Foreign and Security Policy Centre des Hautes Études Militaires Chief of Defence civil–military cooperation Commonwealth of Independent States Combined Joint Task Force Commando Operativo Interforce Centre Opérationnel Interarmées Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Christlich-Soziale Union Directie Algemene Beleidszaken Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques Department for Foreign and International Development directorate-general Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik Danish International Brigade Délégation à l’Information et à la Communication de la Défense Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Abbreviations xvii DRC DSACEUR DUPI EAPC EBRD EC ECJ ECMM EEC EMA ETA ESDP EU EV FAC FAZ FCO FDP FED FRS FT GAC GDP GSZ G7 G8 HCDC HTK IAI ICISS ICTY Ifor IFRI IGC IHEDN IHT IFS IICK IISS Interfet IP IPU ISAF JCR

Democratic Republic of Congo Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe Danish Institute of International Affairs Euro-Atlantic Planning Council European Bank for Reconstruction and Development European Commission European Court of Justice European Community Monitoring Mission European Economic Communities état-major des armées Euskadi ta Askatasuna European Security and Defence Policy European Union European Voice foreign affairs committee Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Foreign and Commonwealth Office Freie Demokratische Partei Fondation pour les Études de Défense Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique Financial Times General Affairs Council gross domestic product ground safety zone Group of Seven largest industrialised countries Group of Seven largest industrialised countries plus Russia House of Commons Defence Select Committee Handelingen der Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal Instituto Affari Internazionali International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Implementation Force Institut Française des Relations Internationales Intergovernmental Conference (EU) Institut pour les Haut Études de Défense Nationale International Herald-Tribune Institute for Defence Studies Independent International Commission on Kosovo Institute for International and Strategic Studies International Force in East Timor Internationale Politik Iraq Planning Unit International Security Assistance Force Journal of Conflict Resolution

xviii Abbreviations JCS JEMAD JIC JRRF JUJEM Kfor KRK KSK MFA MoD MONUC NAC NACC NATO NEO NGO NOK NORCAPS NRC OMP OSCE PfP PJHQ PKO PSO P-5 RF RIMA RUSI SACEUR SDP SDR SEGENPOL SFIR Sfor SHAPE SHIRBRIG SP SWP SZ TCBU TEU TF UK

joint chiefs of staff Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa Joint Intelligence Committee Joint Rapid Reaction Force Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor (Joint Chiefs of Staff) Kosovo Force Krisenreaktionskräfte Kommando Spezialkräfte Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Defence Mission des Nations Unies au Congo North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Cooperation Council North Atlantic Treaty Organisation non-combatant evacuation operation non-governmental organisation Norwegian kroner Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant – Handelsblad operation de maintien de la paix Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe partnership for peace Permanent Joint Headquarters peacekeeping operation peace support operation five permanent members of the UN Security Council reserve funds Régiment d’Infanterie de Marine Royal United Services Institute Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Strategic Defence Review Secretaría de Politica de Defensa Stabilisation Force Iraq Stabilisation Force [NATO, Bosnia] Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade [UN] Stability Pact Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Süddeutsche Zeitung Temporary Parliamentary Committee on Deployment Decisions Treaty on European Union task force United Kingdom

Abbreviations xix UN[O] UNAMIR UNHCR UNIFIL UNMEE UNMIH UNMIKUN Unosom Unpredep Unprofor UNSAS UNSC UNTAC UNTAES USA WEU WSJ WTO ZEI

United Nations [Organisation] UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea United Nations Mission in Haiti Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Operation in Somalia United Nations Preventive Deployment Force United Nations Protection Force UN Stand-by Arrangements System United Nations Security Council UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium United States of America Western European Union Wall Street Journal World Trade Organization Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung

Declaring war

Article 167, Belgian constitution The King … determines the state of war and the cessation of hostilities. He notifies the Houses as soon as State interests and security permit and he adds those messages deemed appropriate. Article 19, Danish constitution … Except for purposes of defence against an armed attack upon the Realm or Danish forces the King shall not use military force against any foreign state without the consent of the Parliament. Any measure which the King may take in pursuance of this provision shall immediately be submitted to the Parliament … . Article 96, Dutch constitution A declaration that the Kingdom is in a state of war shall not be made without the prior approval of the States General. Article 35, French constitution Parliament authorises the declaration of war. Article 26, German constitution Activities tending and undertaken with the intent to disturb peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, are unconstitutional. They shall be made a punishable offence … . Article 78, Italian constitution The Houses declare the State of War and confer the necessary powers on the government.

Declaring war xxi Article 26, Norwegian constitution The King has the right to call up troops, to engage in hostilities in defence of the Realm and to make peace, to conclude and denounce conventions, to send and to receive diplomatic envoys. Article 63, Spanish constitution It is incumbent upon the King, following authorization by the Cortes Generales, to declare war and to make peace.

Part I

Problem definition and framework of analysis

1

Introduction and plan of the book

How and why do European states precondition their participation in international crisis management operations? And what are the costs and consequences of that behaviour? The bulk of this book consists of a comparative analysis of these preconditions, constraints and requirements. An important working assumption is that national preconditions and constraints not only shape the contribution that individual states make but also determine the outcome and effectiveness of the coalition of states involved in a crisis management operation.This study offers both a description of the actual preconditions and constraints and an analysis of the consequences of that behaviour.

1.1

The double political problem of international crisis management

International crisis management is a complex and controversial affair. This complexity is caused partly by the nature of the crisis and partly by the nature of the actor. The actor in our case consists of a group or collective of European states. To them, every international crisis poses a multiple set of problems rolled into one. The first, external, problem is what to do about the crisis, what is objectively required to address the crisis. This problem relates to the type of policy instruments that are required and available and the perceived urgency of the problem. The second, internal, problem is the problem of self-organisation of the states involved: how do we organise ourselves to be effective? And how can we mobilise enough political will and distribute risks and tasks? Although the process of selforganisation has been institutionalised over the years through NATO, the UN and increasingly the EU, the power to decide whether or not to participate in a collective effort remains with the nation-state. International crisis management is dominated by the logic of intergovernmental cooperation. The so-called ‘paradox of conflict prevention’ sums up this problem. The earlier an intervention takes place, the higher are the chances of success and the less costly the intervention is likely to be but the more difficult it is to

4

Problem definition and framework of analysis

Figure 1.1 Early warning and early action Source:After Elster (2000), adapted by the author.

rally enough political will to do it. Differences of opinion concerning the urgency of the problem, risk and threat perceptions and the national interests at stake make it extremely difficult to arrive quickly at a common position on instrumentation, etc. There is usually a divergence in the willingness among states to mobilise and apply adequate resources. The result is that the point at which enough political will is mobilised to manage a crisis usually comes after the point at which the crisis can be controlled. The consequence is that any European collective of states, because of the way their self-organisation currently works, is most likely to react in a crisis management mode. Another obstacle to collective action is that the actors are under a different degree of threat or are exposed to certain risks to a different degree. In such cases, collective action means not only that the actors must overcome the problem of free-riding (e.g. states unwilling to contribute because they are not directly threatened), but also – and this is a great deal harder – that they must manage to negotiate the distribution of tasks among themselves. It is evident that these two sets of problems are related.The success that states have with their selforganisation determines the chance of success or the outcome of their collective effort, i.e. the operation.The focus of this book is on the second question – the self-organising part – based on the assumption that, if we understand the dynamics of self-organisation better, this understanding may ultimately contribute to higher levels of effectiveness of that collective effort. This analysis cuts across what some may consider to be ‘unrelated realms’. The point is to explain participation as a contribution to collective actions, hence there is no reason to parcel theory according to the boundaries of substantive problems.The conviction of Hardin, when confronted with a similar issue, was that ‘the generalisation of the explanation of participation leads to a greater power in dealing with any particular realm of participation in actions for the collective benefit’ (Hardin 1982: xiii–xiv).

1.2

Preconditions versus ‘criteria for intervention’

The pertinence and complexities of voluntary involvement in international crises stand out clearly in the concerns voiced by the British Prime Minister in a

Introduction and plan of the book 5 seminal speech before the Economic Club of Chicago in 1999. ‘The most pressing foreign policy problem we face’, said PM Blair, ‘is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts’ (Blair 1999a).The crucial question that Mr Blair was seeking to answer was how one decides whether to intervene militarily and, if so, when.According to Mr Blair, five major considerations provide clues to a possible answer: First, are we sure of our case? … Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? … Third, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? … And finally, do we have national interests involved? (ibid.) The Prime Minster uses ‘we’ to refer to the (responsible) international community. His questions are important and pertinent, but he does not pose questions pertaining to the organisation of the effort. Mr Blair refers to establishing parameters for the desirability, feasibility and effectiveness of crisis management efforts. In short, it is about the identification and articulation of the criteria for success. Many scholars and statesmen have attempted to codify first principles or requirements for success. Contributions to this end have been made by Craig and George (1990), O’Hanlon (1997) and Regan (2002). Although they assert that ‘every crisis writes its own script’, their approach is characterised by an exhaustive analysis of successful and unsuccessful crisis management efforts and the deduction of a number of best practices, criteria or first principles from them. The following quotation from O’Hanlon illustrates this approach: intervention for humanitarian purposes should not be attempted in countries or regions where it could make wider war involving major powers likely … humanitarian interventions should not seek to defeat very strong armies supported by mass movements … interventions should usually not be undertaken in highly populous countries unless an indigenous security force can be quickly salvaged and enlisted in policing work. (O’Hanlon 1997: 50–1)

1.3

Research questions and methodology

This study looks at international crisis management from the national perspective through the lens of the preconditions that states impose on their participation. How can a collective of states, institutionalised or not, be effective and achieve a meaningful outcome if its main contributors are making their contributions subject to a variety of more or less stringent conditions? How does this national behaviour affect the effectiveness of the coalition of states involved in the crisis management operation? The research is organised around three questions.

6

Problem definition and framework of analysis

1

How and why do states precondition their participation in international crisis management operations? What are the consequences of states preconditioning their participation for the effectiveness of the coalition of states and the outcome of the operation? Does the quality of the national decision making improve if a government formalises the preconditions for participation?

2

3

The national ‘answers’ to the first question have enabled us to compile a comparative overview of preconditions and constraints that European nationstates place on their participation in a collective undertaking. This process resulted in a European catalogue of preconditions and constraints. I have tried to abstract from the results obtained in the country studies and explore to what extent the findings could be generalised; formulating an answer to the second and third questions thus had to proceed more indirectly. Regarding the methodology used in this research, the work of sociologist Gaston Bouthoul must be mentioned. His work can be considered a classic attempt at a scientific definition of the problems of war.1 The study of war should be based, according to Bouthoul, on a methodology that includes a description of material facts, a description of psychic behaviour, a ‘first-level’ explanation (corresponding to historians’ explanation of specific wars), and a ‘second-level’ explanation (comprising opinions and theories on war in general). This approach can be profitably juxtaposed for international crisis management operations. Applied to participation decisions, first-level explanations relate to the reasons, motives and arguments why a government did or did not participate in an international crisis management operation. It has been very difficult, and often impossible, to identify the ‘real’ motives of a government or of individual politicians when embarking upon a certain course of action. In most cases, there is an amalgam of widely varying reasons. In order to be able to construe a snapshot of these amalgams of motives and reasons, we analysed parliamentary debates, the debate in the public domain and interviews given by politicians and attempted to reconstruct the decision process and thus the context of that particular decision. Concerning the second-level explanations, we have tried to arrive at a number of explanations that are sufficiently general to explain the causes of some of the patterns in international relations in a world that is turbulent, chaotic and complex rather than stable, ordered and just. These answers are called ‘mechanisms’, and a catalogue of mechanisms has been developed as an analytical tool for describing the relation between and impact of national preconditions on international crisis management efforts. Instead of aiming for a ‘grand unifying theory’ explaining national behaviour in European crisis management, a limited number of basic mechanisms, which can be combined indefinitely, can account for most of the complexity we experience and observe. However, this study does not attempt to psychoanalyse the state or to

Introduction and plan of the book 7 offer a sociological explanation for the foreign policy behaviour of a country. But an important place is given to certain socio-political phenomena such as dominant collective memories. Although it is impossible to quantify the impact and role of these political-psychological mechanisms in the political decision process, they cannot be ignored. The analysis of the myths, images and clichés that countries entertain of each other is essential if one is to even begin to understand international politics (cf. Heuser and Buffet 1998). Although the relevance of the nation-state both as a political entity and as a unit of analysis has been declared to be ‘in decline’ (Creveld), to have ‘ended’ (Guéhenno) or even to be ‘dead’ (Toynbee), when it comes to analysing international crisis management, we have no other option than to concentrate on the nation-state. International crisis management is an intergovernmental affair, despite the emergence of security regimes, regional modes of security governance and the EU taking on a more prominent role in the security domain. Nine European countries are compared in this study: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom. The selection of these countries is based on geographical representation; their level of activity and recent experiences with international crisis management operations; the objective importance of the country for European security; and finally the type of political system (presidential versus parliamentary). Neutral states like Austria and Ireland were thus less attractive to include. This work consists basically of two parts: an empirical part and an analytical part. The empirical part consists of nine country studies, in which the national preconditions and constraints for participation are described, categorised and compared. Each country study follows a more or less similar structure of introduction, basic features of the political system, political culture and relevant collective memory, the administration supporting the government, the national decision-making process and a number of relevant case studies, i.e. operations. The countries are grouped into three pairs and one threesome. Their grouping is based on a feature that has special significance for this study: the Netherlands and Belgium form a pair because of the de facto change of political rules and practice; Denmark and Norway because of the imperative of consensus; France, the United Kingdom and Spain because of the dominant role of the executive in the national decision-making process; and Italy and Germany because of the dominant role of their parliaments in the national decision-making process. The analytical part consists of a comparison of the empirical findings, followed by general conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence. The sources used for this study are very diverse: texts of laws and treaties; press statements from political parties; departments and ministers; parliamentary records; government publications; magazine and newspaper articles; media interviews; and interviews conducted by the author. Excellent primary sources have been the reports resulting from two parliamentary inquiries conducted in Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium, the report by the

8

Problem definition and framework of analysis

Parliamentary Committee into the events in Rwanda leading to the massacre of ten paratroopers in Kigali describes in great detail the omissions, shortcomings and failures within the national decision-making process in Belgium.The report by the Dutch Temporary Commission Deployment Decisions (Point of Departure: The Hague) provides an excellent analysis of Dutch governmental decision making in the 1990s, with an emphasis on the decisions leading to the participation in the operations in former Yugoslavia.

1.4 Defining the key terms: ambiguities and conundrums This study makes continual reference to the concepts of ‘crisis’, ‘crisis management’ and ‘crisis management operations’ – terms that are often used but rarely explained. This section attempts to describe and delineate these concepts, despite the considerable ambiguities and controversy surrounding them. In the language of international law, ‘intervention’ and ‘aggression’ are legally defined, but many other central concepts and notions in the vocabulary of foreign policy makers are not, e.g. ‘crisis’, ‘crisis management’, ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘terrorism’. It may be helpful, in defining the concept of crisis, to contrast two fundamentally different approaches. These positions represent the extremes of a spectrum and can be dubbed the ‘realist’ and the ‘constructivist’ position. Realists seek to identify objective, normative and absolute criteria that would qualify a state of affairs as a ‘crisis’. A good example of this approach is provided by Brecher and Wilkenfeld, who differentiate between two levels of analysis: an international crisis (objectively defined by two necessary conditions); and a foreign policy crisis (a crisis for an individual state).2 An international crisis is defined by two necessary and sufficient conditions: 1

2

a change in type and/or increase in intensity of disruptive, i.e. hostile, verbal or physical interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities; that in turn destabilises their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system – global, dominant and/or subsystem. (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997/2000: 4–5)

A foreign policy crisis is defined as: a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities. (ibid.: 3) Thus a state of affairs is defined as a crisis if it meets the necessary and sufficient conditions described above. The Taiwan Straits crisis (1954) and the Cuban missile crisis (1962) both meet these demands. This type of crisis

Introduction and plan of the book 9 would roughly coincide with Professor Freedman’s notion of a ‘war of necessity’, a situation that cannot be ignored by a state as it touches that state’s vital interests directly. The constructivists, inspired by the crises of the 1990s, take a completely different line. Their position can be summed up as ‘a crisis is a crisis only when it is conceived as a crisis’, which is irrespective of the presence of certain necessary and sufficient conditions. This constructivist position is explained by the American philosopher John Searle (1995: 1): ‘there are portions of the real world that are only facts by human agreement’. He calls the facts that depend on human agreement ‘institutional facts’, as they require human institutions for their existence. The non-institutional facts are ‘brute facts’. Examples of brute facts are ‘Mount Everest has snow and ice near the summit’ and ‘hydrogen atoms have one electron’. Brute facts are totally independent of human opinions. Institutional facts exist only because we believe them to exist, e.g. ‘the meeting is adjourned’, or ‘war is hereby declared’. The basic form that these institutional facts take is ‘X counts as Y in context C’ (Searle 1995: 28) and, following Searle, constructivists argue that a ‘crisis’ does not exist in absolute, objective terms (i.e. as a brute fact as the realist position seems to suggest). A crisis is a social construct that comes into existence only by human agreement, i.e. as an institutional fact. A crisis must be defined as a crisis, or ‘X counts as Y in context C’. Searle asserts that ‘there are no institutional facts without brute facts’ (ibid.: 56). This becomes visible when a security situation deteriorates and a conflict threatens to destabilise a whole region because the effects and consequences of the crisis transcend the boundaries of the conflict zone. The origins, causes and nature of such crises can be diverse: massive human rights violations, ethnic cleansing, or a fight for control over resources. It is impossible to deny what is happening (the brute facts), and one can only differ about the scale and about what must be done. Still, a crisis is very much in the eye of the beholder. A local conflict that does not touch upon the vital interests of major European powers is unlikely to mobilise enough political will for a foreign intervention and thus is not likely to become defined as a crisis. The recent tensions between Denmark and Russia over a Chechen conference being held in Copenhagen and whether a Chechen leader should be handed over to the Russian authorities may be viewed as a crisis in Denmark, but these are not translated by NATO, for example, as a crisis in institutional terms. If the international community characterised a mass violation of human rights as genocide, i.e. when a social reality is successfully translated into an institutional fact, it appeals to the responsibility of the great powers to stop it. It is only after genocide is institutionally defined as genocide that we expect the great powers to act. The shift from inter-state interaction and violence to intra-state interaction, the fact that violence often takes place between sub-state and non-state actors (which are less easy to define as adversaries), and the change from a narrow to a broad concept of security have consequences for the concept of crisis. A crisis is not necessarily a military crisis and is not necessarily limited

10

Problem definition and framework of analysis

to situations in which the vital interests of a state are violated. Both the realist and constructivist approaches can coexist. There are situations that touch directly and unambiguously the vital interests of a state, which correspond neatly to the sufficient and necessary conditions outlined by Brecher and Wilkenfeld. On the other hand, there is a large category of local conflicts that will remain ‘off the radar screen’ if they continue to be perceived as local conflicts. Only when such a state of affairs is ‘translated as an institutional fact’, i.e. as an international crisis, will the international community be mobilised into action. Nor does consensus exist with regard to the definition and classification of international military operations. Many European countries reviewed in this study use their own terminology and categories – peace operations, peace support operations, external operations, crisis response operations – while other nations refer to operations short of war. Although usually preceded by the adjective ‘military’, crisis management refers to coordinated (and institutionalised) efforts aimed at and intended to redress a situation conceived as intolerable and unjust, and in which the use of force cannot be excluded. In this study, one generic term, namely ‘international crisis management operations’, is used to denote the whole range of UN operations (peacekeeping under chapter VI and peace enforcing under chapter VII of the UN charter), NATO operations and operations by ad hoc coalitions. The term does not include special forces operations, operations following from the invocation of article V of the NATO charter, or relief operations after a natural catastrophe. These latter operations are hors categorie because the ‘normal’ national decisionmaking procedures are not applicable to these circumstances. This classification is informed by the fact that, over the past decade, the concept of peacekeeping has evolved conceptually and practically. The crucial difference was that, in an operation under chapter VI, the conflicting parties consent to the intervention, and hence the mandate of the intervening force would be restricted, whereas in an operation under chapter VII, the conflicting parties do not consent, and the intervening force has a wider mandate. In the so-called second generation operations this has changed; the mandate of the intervening force has widened considerably, whether the conflicting parties consent or not. Thus, to some observers, it is not clear where ‘robust’ peacekeeping ends and where peace enforcing begins. All participating countries insist on robust rules of engagement, heavy weapons and the right to use violence for any UN operation. The formal difference between a deployment under chapter VI or VII has de facto become irrelevant. The current view is that troops must be deployed within a multinational framework and must be able to work in the whole ‘spectrum of violence’, from a relatively benign environment to flashes of escalated violence resembling outright war.The direct consequence is what we will call the dominant functional perspective. If and when a crisis erupts, many governments will seek the international organisation that best ‘fits’ the problem, in other words that is institutionally best equipped to deal with the situation on the ground.

Introduction and plan of the book 11 This shift was evident after the failure of Unprofor (the UN Protection Force) in the mid-1990s in the clear preference expressed by states generally for NATO in the event of robust operations and for the UN for peacekeeping operations. However, there is no standard solution: the crisis determines the institution favoured by the international community to deal with it. An important question is whether international crisis management includes the war on terrorism. In this study, international military operations dealing with a terrorist threat (e.g. the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq) are considered crisis management operations. The (normative) issue of whether the military is the best instrument available to deal with such contingencies falls outside the scope of this study.

2

Elements of change

Participation in international crisis management operations on the scale we witnessed in the 1990s is a new political phenomenon.The concept of ‘crisis’ has entered international politics as a situation jenseits von Krieg und Frieden: where there is a crisis, there is no war and there is no peace. It is in this ambiguous space that the practice of crisis management takes place. In that sense, international crisis management signals the end of an important political dichotomy. The notion of ‘crisis’ differs widely from our classical perception of war as the great exception to the normal political state of affairs. This does not mean that crisis and crisis management have become regular or everyday political phenomena, but the tendency to routinisation is undeniable. An important question faced by governments and democracies is whether this change from crisis management as the politics of exception to crisis management as part of regular politics may require different political arrangements: in the relation between the executive and legislative branches of government, for example, and regarding questions such as whether more stringent policy coordination is required, whether we need better communication and interaction with the public, and whether we need different modes of intergovernmental cooperation. Answers to these questions as they emerged from the national domain are presented in the country studies, in which these changes are documented and explained. In the 1950s, Huntington could write that ‘the aim of national security policy is to enhance the safety of the nation’s social, economic and political institutions against threats arising from other independent states’ (Huntington 1959: 1). Fifty years later, states have to deal with threats not only from independent states but also from determined groups and individuals. International terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may set off a guaranteed ‘supply chain of instability’.3 This poses a legal problem, as a state of war is only declared by sovereign states to other sovereign states. War exists in a relation between sovereign states. Under international law, there is no legal requirement for states to formally announce their intention to use force or to declare war. It is possible for countries to engage in an armed conflict without acknowledging that they are formally at war. The ‘wars’ after the Second World War were not declared.4 During the Suez campaign (1956), a British secretary of state declared: ‘there is

Elements of change 13 no state of war, but there is a state of conflict’ (Rozenberg 2001). Although Operation Corporate, the British campaign to win back the Falkland Islands, was commonly referred to as the ‘Falklands War’, the government’s position was that Britain was not at war with Argentina. At the height of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the secretary-general of NATO, Javier Solana, stated:‘NATO is not at war with the former Republic of Yugoslavia’ (ibid.). We can only guess at the reasons behind the reluctance to formally declare war. One reason is that war, as an instrument in the hands of sovereign states, was formally delegitimised by the UN in the 1940s. Another reason is that it is the prerogative of the national parliament to declare war. By avoiding a declaration of war, the executive avoids having to go to parliament for its consent. This is true in particular for countries with a strong executive, like Britain and France. Engaging in warlike activities without declaring it has had three important consequences: 1 2

3

It has led to the political and cultural normalisation of war and the use of force, as war is no longer considered the great exception. It has fuelled the demand for ‘politically correct wars’, as the warlike activities must fit the legal, cultural and moral frameworks orienting and governing our day-to-day activities. If war is conceived as the ultimate zero-sum game (with one loser and one victor), crisis management is increasingly becoming a non-zero-sum game, not a game creating win–win situations, but its negative variant: a situation in which both the intervening parties and the people of the target country are losers.

The crises we face today hardly allow any party to claim victory; at best, a crisis is not lost. Illustrative of this phenomenon is the guarded reaction by European government officials when the Kosovo campaign started: many heads of government in Europe had to explain that war had not been declared.The words that were used instead were ‘offensive’, ‘air attacks’, ‘forward defence’ and ‘integrated military action’. Although Operation Allied Force can be classified as a peaceenforcing operation, the level and intensity of violence used easily approached warlike situations. Not declaring war forces us to validate the use of force and to give (somehow) a meaning to an exceptional event using our everyday cultural, legal and moral standards. Not declaring war but engaging in warlike actions – for all the obvious and good reasons that politicians and governments may have for not declaring war – may have a lasting impact on the nature of international relations and the way politics are conducted.

2.1

The twin processes of normalisation and domestication

International crises have acquired, as a consequence of the above-mentioned changes, a new meaning and relevance in the international political system. As

14

Problem definition and framework of analysis

crises have lost their exceptional character they have become the new ‘normality’. This has a political and practical dimension (the political dimension will be dealt with in the remainder of the book; the practical dimension will be dealt with here).The practical dimension consists of the adaptation of policy instruments to this new normality.The complex of developments – the emergence of an ‘active’ security policy, rapid response, flexibility – has had a profound impact on the shape of the armed forces in Europe. On a general level, it can be observed that the armed forces have been made to fit the new security environment. Their default setting changed from being garrisoned either at home or in Germany as part of NATO’s forward defence force to being virtually permanently deployed under the aegis of NATO, the UN or in the framework of an ad hoc coalition. These changes occurred along three axes: the orientation of the armed forces changed from an ‘enemy’ orientation to ‘crisis’ orientation.5 The enemy has been replaced by neutral-sounding ‘threats’ and ‘risks’. Risks are anonymous, abstract, faceless, almost without identity; risks may materialise unpredictably, at random, and will affect one’s security situation negatively; they are not random ‘things’. In the case of a ‘threat’, one assumes an intention or willingness to hurt. These changes evidently affect the way the role of the armed forces is defined. One can insure oneself against risks, and in many cases the armed forces are seen as a sort of insurance policy. But in this changed and uncertain security environment we cannot be sure whether that insurance policy is any longer appropriate. The second axis is the change from a ‘territorial’ to an ‘expeditionary’ orientation. A territorial orientation is based on the conviction that the security of a state lies at home, that the security of a state and its territorial integrity must be defended at its borders. This territorial orientation is reflected in Home Guard-type armed forces, as we find them in Scandinavian countries. The crises that European states have faced since the 1990s made it clear that faraway crises could have a profound impact on international political and economic stability and hence, on the domestic scene. Globalisation, chaos theory and non-linearity found their way into strategic thinking and defence planning, and the need for light, flexible, agile and highly mobile units was recognised. The distinction between ‘wars of necessity’ and these ‘wars of choice’ is based on the presence and absence, respectively, of a compelling security imperative to act or participate. Participation in a crisis management operation for which no compelling security imperatives exist demands a higher-quality justification to the domestic audience, i.e. the national parliament and the public at large. Hence the discourse on national interest has been complemented by a discourse in which national responsibility plays a key role. The fundamental change that is taking place is what Hanrieder calls the process of domestication: ‘by extending domestic political processes and their corresponding attitudes into the international environment, the nationstate has eroded traditional aspects of international politics’ (cited in Little and Smith 1991: 151). The internationalisation of domestic politics (the

Elements of change 15 inward–outward movement), observed by Hanrieder, is complemented by a movement in the opposite direction: international politics is increasingly domesticated, including crisis management operations. This movement is partly a consequence of the process of globalisation.6 Obtaining and sustaining domestic consensus has become an increasingly important precondition for a country’s involvement in an international crisis management operation, but this has not led to identical levels of consensus in the nine countries reviewed in this study, due to different political systems and traditions. But in all countries there is a visible trend towards broader political support or even consensus. Some countries have already adapted their system to accommodate this enhanced requirement of consensus, while other countries are still in the process of change. In a recent study, Damrosh makes two interesting propositions: ‘democratic parliaments do play active roles in determining the scope and terms of national commitments to multinational peace operations’, and ‘parliamentary participation should not be an impediment to effective military action, but could serve a constructive function in building public support for such engagements and signalling depth of commitment’ (cited in Ku and Jacobson 2002: 58). Her study charts how national parliaments can play an active role and how the processes of obtaining and sustaining national consensus work.

2.2

The process and principles of self-organisation

As interdependence increases, the effectiveness of the foreign and security policy of an individual nation-state will decline. Nations must therefore combine with others. The key decisional units remain the nation-state, and the primacy of the national interest continues to be the key operational value of the system. In spite of the imposition of stricter coordination requirements, the structure of the system continues to be an impediment to the realisation of effective coordination and aggravates the severity of the disorder crisis. If European states are to live and work together in an interdependent world, they will need to focus less on state-centred interests and more on systemcentred interests.The demands for coordinated interaction are increasing. When European states are confronted with a crisis, they all go through an almost parallel process of national decision making. They will move forward in continuous consultation with each other, and somewhere along the line a collective or grouping of states will emerge. This can be a grouping of states within an institution or outside an institution, e.g. a coalition of the willing. Such a collective, when it emerges, becomes a political actor in its own right. Often, such a collective does not yet have a single voice or a single policy, but the contours of the properties start to emerge. Jervis (1997) qualifies these emerging properties as important system effects. Building on Jervis, Crozier and others, we can explore how these system effects can play a role in understanding the process of self-organisation in Europe, i.e. of European countries organising themselves when confronted with an international crisis. Crozier (1980)

16

Problem definition and framework of analysis

Figure 2.1 The declining effectiveness of national security policy

observed that a group of actors, when faced with a problem for which they have to organise themselves, have basically three options: 1

2

3

It proves impossible to accommodate or neutralise the constraints of the actors, and the problem is ignored (the aggregate of the actors’ constraints determines the outcome at the aggregate level). A solution follows the political logic of the problem and the capacities of the individual actors. This is when a coalition of the willing emerges. Bargaining will develop empirically along lines corresponding to the structure of the problem and to the individual and social strengths and capacities of players. A solution along the lines and capabilities of an organisation like NATO or the EU. An organisation already in charge will handle uncertainty according to its own capacities, i.e. it will develop a game that will be its contingent solution.

Crozier stresses the importance of risk and uncertainty reduction: uncertainty … is the basic resource of any kind of bargaining. … People are unequal before the uncertainties of the problem.Those who can cope with them because of their situation, their resources, or their competence have an advantage. The logical structure of the problems as embodied by individual or collective actors thus unavoidably becomes a structured field. (Crozier 1980: 8) Characteristic of the structured (i.e. non-neutral) field is that its various elements behave in a coordinated and interdependent manner (ibid.: 115). Organisations are not ‘natural’ phenomena whose existence is a given of nature. They are human constructs, sometimes developed only halfconsciously by man to solve problems of collective action. An organisation enables relatively autonomous social actors pursuing diverse and in a certain

Elements of change 17 sense always conflicting interests to cooperate in the production of a collective good (cf. ibid.: 3–4). However, as will become clear later on, an important consequence of individual nations stipulating or imposing preconditions on their involvement is that it can have a serious constraining effect on others. Because our goal is to understand the (political) logic of multinational security cooperation, we cannot consider the national dynamics in isolation. Crozier contends that the behaviour, decisions and actions of individual states can only be explained in the light of their relation to the behaviour, expectations and decisions of other states; their relation to the crisis; to the emerging collective of states and the relation between the emerging collective and the crisis.Thus four relations are significant for the individual state. 1

2

3

4

The relation between the national actor and the crisis.This is determined by the idea or opinion that a government develops about what to do about the crisis, the national interest at stake, the contribution it can make, the risks that are involved, its responsibility towards third parties and the obligations it has. The relation between the individual actors possibly involved in crisis management. The behaviour, decisions and actions of one state will depend on the behaviour and position of other states (the whole set of bilateral relations). France will not act without consulting Germany and Britain. Britain will act without consulting its European partners only if it acts in tandem with the USA.The willingness of Belgium, for example, may depend on the willingness of, say, France to engage itself. The relation between the individual actor and the emerging collective of states, or system. When does a loose group of states become a collective? Jervis cites the emerging properties of the collective as the critical threshold, after which one can speak of a system of states. In international crisis management, the same phenomenon occurs: at a certain moment it is possible to identify a grouping or coalition of states that is willing to engage itself and to do something. This emerging grouping constitutes a new, albeit composite, actor that operates on the international scene. It is an actor or entity with a voice and with which individual states have a relationship and interact. The relation between the collective or system of states and the crisis.This is important because as soon as a grouping comes into existence and acquires an identity and a voice, it will need to define its position and relationship to the crisis.

This study is limited to the participation of European states in international crisis management operations. For European states, it is impossible to neglect its ‘integrated European context’.7 The European integration process exerts an all-pervasive influence on the public policy behaviour of both the members and the (European) non-members of the European

18

Problem definition and framework of analysis

Figure 2.2 Four significant relations

Union. Even if there has been no formal transfer of powers or sovereignty to ‘Brussels’, the fact that countries form a group with other countries makes a difference to their behaviour. EU membership is normative, even without formal transfer of competences. European security policy is currently under-governed and under-coordinated, but as a collective good it is increasingly desired.

2.3

On the nature of the crisis

Part of the complexity of international crisis management is a direct consequence of the nature of the problem. The characteristics of a crisis influence the ability of states to deal with it more or less effectively. Although the international community is confronted with a variety of crises, it is possible to deduce a number of common features from the crises which the world faced in the 1990s.8 Rothschild sums up a number of crucial characteristics of postCold War conflicts: they are more ‘visible’ to [Western] public opinion, at least in the case of Bosnia and Chechnya; they are more repugnant, in that they have led to ethnic extermination (Rwanda, Bosnia) and to famine (Somalia); they constitute a more profound challenge to the incipient institutions of international order, in that they have demonstrated the powerlessness of even a relatively united ‘international community’, undivided by the superpower competition. (Rothschild 1995: 86) Rothschild identifies an increased visibility, repugnance, the magnitude of the challenge and the increasing powerlessness of the international community as dimensions of international crises that make the problem less easy to solve. When discussing the nature of a crisis, one runs the risk of awakening an old (philosophical) debate about the nature of war. Many theorists, practitioners and others will argue that the nature of war is in its essence an unchangeable phenomenon. We are here concerned with a number of common features in the manifestation of the crisis, as it occurs and the way we perceive and experience the crisis at hand. From a rich harvest of literature, five features that are common to most crises can be distilled.9

Elements of change 19 1

2

3

4

They are multidimensional in their manifestation. It is very rare for a crisis to be a singular or one-dimensional phenomenon. In most cases, a crisis will manifestly have many facets or dimensions.The crises in the Balkans were not solely crises from a military point of view; they were a mixture of interrelated economic, social, ecological, security and military aspects.The consequence is that any policy to deal with such a crisis must be comprehensive and encompass the different aspects. They are indirect and direct in their consequences. Direct consequences are obviously the victims of war, the economic losses, the people displaced, the environment damaged, society disrupted, the rule of law shocked. Indirect consequences of crises include flows of refugees creating social unrest because they disrupt a fragile ethnic or economic balance; borders that must be closed because of economic sanctions against the targeted country and the consequences thereof for adjacent countries; and the general instability of regional cooperative mechanisms. They are geographically diffuse. Modern crises are evidently not easily contained. For reasons more thoroughly elaborated below, modern crises have a propensity to spill over into other states because many of them are intra-state crises, with front lines roughly following ethnic dividing lines, which do not coincide with frontiers between nation-states. This is true in particular when ethnic lines run through several classical (i.e. Westphalian) states. If and when such an ethnically fuelled crisis is about to erupt, the international community will have to brace itself and get ready for a protracted and very complex crisis. They are asymmetrical. Symmetry as a concept, in biology as well as in crystallography, refers to a correspondence of body parts in size, shape and relative position on opposite sides of a dividing plane or distributed around a central point or axis. This concept has found its way into the realm of military strategy too.10 It would go beyond the scope of this study to give a full exposé of what (a)symmetry can consist of, of its effects and of what the success factors are in a crisis in which the relation between the opponents is asymmetrical. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to say that in today’s crises, Western armed forces may come across opponents whose ways of waging war are fundamentally different, not corresponding to the Western way of warfare, thus rendering orthodox policy instruments less effective. Van Creveld formulated the so-called law of declining asymmetry in an attempt to explain the ineffectiveness of the Israeli Defence Forces during the first Intifada. War is by definition a two-sided activity. It is also an imitative activity in which, given sufficient time, the two sides will learn from each other and tend to start resembling each other.Thus he who fights the weak will himself become weak; he who by ‘fighting’ the weak behaves like a coward will end up turning into one, suffering one humiliation after another and losing the will to fight (cf. van Creveld 1998: 352). It is not evident that this mechanism is operating in international crisis management, but it

20

5

Problem definition and framework of analysis could explain part of its reflexivity, in which ‘the act of playing the game has a way of changing the rules’ (Gleick 1987: 24). They are uncertain and unpredictable in their developments. Modern crises are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability. The non-linear development of a crisis calls for new approaches and new thinking. Because of the multidimensionality of the conflict, the conflict dynamics are different, i.e. have become far more complex.The dynamics of a military engagement in which two armies are opposing each other is relatively simple to understand.The socio-political and security dynamics of the Kosovo conflict are far more difficult to comprehend.The conclusion is that any engagement in a crisis will alter the crisis and may also alter the crisis dynamics. Not becoming a party to the conflict may be well-meant advice to peacekeepers, but in most cases the third party becomes a party to the conflict as soon as the international community has conceived a plan to intervene, even when it is still on paper.

3

Three propositions

In politics, people never try to bind themselves, only to bind others. (Jens Aarup Seip)

The widening and deepening of the process of European integration increasingly links European states to each other. Europe is, with regard to its security policy, in a twilight zone: states are together and at the same time they are not together, and profound uncertainties exist about the willingness and ability of individual states to participate. This situation qualifies in a crucial manner the political (and to some extent strategic) condition of the European nationstate. This condition is determined by three propositions: (1) states are sovereign, but they are only marginally free; (2) the imperative of cooperation; and (3) all states are constrained.

3.1

States are sovereign but only marginally free

The decision to participate in an international crisis management operation is a sovereign decision, but the freedom of action of a national government is very limited, especially in a crisis situation. International norms, conventions, expectations and actions by other states and actors have an impact on – and in some cases decide – the decision and action that a government will or can take. In the case of European countries, sovereignty has changed colour: from the sovereign right to act to the sovereign right to opt out of a common or collective action. The sovereignty of the nation-state nevertheless remains the most fundamental premise of international relations and politics, as it implies a whole set of powers and responsibilities. A sovereign state can sign treaties, declare war and make peace; it can invoke its right to non-intervention in its political and social affairs; and it has a seat in the UN.A lively debate has taken place over the centuries on the meaning and content of sovereignty and, as one scholar has remarked: ‘it is doubtful whether any single word has ever caused so much intellectual confusion and international lawlessness’ (Akehurst 1984: 15).According to Akehurst: when international lawyers say that a state is sovereign, all they really mean is that it is independent, that is, that it is not a dependency of some

22

Problem definition and framework of analysis other state. They do not mean that it is in any way above the law. … Sovereignty is not a legal term with a fixed meaning, but a wholly emotive term. (ibid.: 15–16)

National sovereignty and sovereign rights have been worshipped throughout the ages. Akehurst’s description of ‘sovereignty as independence’ is useful because it allows us to grasp the changes that have occurred and to assess to what extent national independence has ‘shrunk’ in recent years.11 Although national sovereignty is eroded by the powers of globalisation, national sovereignty and the perception of sovereignty are decisively influenced by the historical path that a state has followed to become a sovereign state. Small and young states usually guard their newly won sovereignty with great jealousy and suspicion. Notions and interpretations of sovereignty thus result from widely varying historical legacies. In the case of Germany, for example, it was only through its integration into the Atlantic and European communities after the Second World War that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) regained its identity and sovereignty. The ‘anchoring’ of the FRG to the West was the essential condition for its international legitimacy. Gnesotto observed that In France, where the model of the independent nation-state is still one of the great myths on which national identity is founded, the question of sovereignty has gradually become identified with the notion of military power. Autonomy of decision-making in this domain is a dogma that has a very wide measure of support in France, reinforced by France’s status as a nuclear power and the conviction that such decision-making cannot be shared. (Gnesotto 1991: 7) Ten years later, the same author wonders ‘how to reconcile national sovereignty and political integration’. This question must be seen in the light of an assessment of the obstacles that prevent the development of a common European security and defence policy. Her conclusion is that ‘national sovereignty is still, or is still perceived to be an essential constraint for future European political integration. The veto right in CFSP and ESDP remains unquestionable for most of the member states’ (Gnesotto 2002). National sovereignty remains essential, albeit in the negative sense of veto power.12 Sovereignty and independence cannot be used interchangeably with ‘freedom’. We usually understand freedom as the national freedom to act or the national sphere of manoeuvre. Our claim is that the national freedom of Western European countries to act is only marginal. This is the direct consequence of the fact that they are part of international regimes, institutions, organisations and systems, and they are subjected to certain ‘modes’ of governance and hence follow certain norms.13 Although the differences between a system and an organisation or an institution and a regime are important, these

Three propositions

23

notions all express one crucial distinction, namely that of structured versus unstructured, normative behaviour versus free behaviour. Hence Western European states are not free in the sense of having the liberty to do whatever they want to do. In principle they can do what they want to do, but this freedom is increasingly subjected to an ever-growing web of international codes, norms and rules. The sphere in which European states operate and act is therefore a far cry from the ‘anarchical society’ that classical writers have used as their point of departure.14 In today’s world, interdependent states share not only their security but also their vulnerability. Sovereignty has thus become the freedom to say ‘no’, to abstain or to withdraw from collective action, to ‘opt out’ of a collective process.15

3.2

The imperative of cooperation

Throughout the Cold War,Western Europe depended on American power to deter a possible Soviet attack. After the Cold War, Western European states started to develop a collective self-help security system. Today, European states, when facing an international crisis, are forced to cooperate if they want to deal with that crisis in an effective and meaningful way. No Western European state has either the ‘depth’ or the ‘breadth’ of capabilities required to act unilaterally in a meaningful and effective way. Exceptions to this rule are the interventions of France in the Ivory Coast and a number of other African countries.These operations had the nature of security assistance and followed from obligations enshrined in bilateral security agreements. Another recent exception was the intervention by the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone.The scale of this operation was very small. While the reasons for adopting a multinational response may vary, the aim is usually to accomplish an objective that a nation is either unwilling or unable to achieve unilaterally. Depending on the circumstances, there will be different degrees of national interests at stake, and this in turn determines the strength and nature of each nation’s contribution to the multinational operation and the cohesion of the alliance or coalition itself. In its report on The Lessons of Kosovo, the Defence Select Committee of the House of Commons gives a number of reasons why multinationality may in some cases be the preferred or the sole option: The political advantages of multinational co-operation include sharing of political risks, demonstrating collective intent and … bringing greater international pressure to bear on an adversary than a single nation would be able to do on its own. The military advantages are that co-operation adds both depth (strength in numbers) and breadth (additional capabilities) to a force, as well as providing access to national or regional logistic infrastructures and, in certain circumstances, access to high value information and intelligence. (HCDC 2000b: xxxi)

24

Problem definition and framework of analysis

Western Europe forms an interdependent and reciprocal system of states.16 There are at least five reasons that underpin and stimulate multilateral security cooperation between European states. 1

2

3

4

5

Economies of scale. Since the Cold War, spending on defence has been significantly reduced. Compared with the level of defence spending in 1989, defence budgets in Western Europe in 2000 were 25 percent lower on average (source: IISS, The Military Balance, 2001). The net result was a substantial decrease in the scale of military capabilities. A second major change that most European countries went through was the professionalisation of their armed forces and the abolition (in some cases suspension) of conscription. In 2004, most European countries, with the exception of Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, have transformed their armed forces into professional forces. Paradoxically, the aim of the transformation was to increase the operational output of the armed forces. So, although the (total) volume of units, soldiers, tanks, etc. has gone down, the number of soldiers that can actually be rapidly deployed has gone up. Obtaining broad (political and public) support. It is necessary for a government to have broad political and public support if it contemplates sending soldiers abroad. A multinational approach obviates any allegations that an intervention only serves the national interest. It ensures that the people on whose behalf the intervention takes place perceive the intervention as disinterested help on the part of the national states carrying out the intervention. Another perspective on multinationality is that a multinational approach may facilitate national decision making. An emerging multinational coalition is a political force that has an influence on the domestic scene of the countries involved. Public support for an action is not and cannot be limited to the national domain. Today, ‘virtual’ communities come into existence and try to influence policies regarding a given crisis. Although it is often asserted that people are instinctively humanitarian and politically ‘left’, public support is not a given. A multinational approach to international concerns often has a conducive effect on the obtaining and sustaining of public support for an action or policy. Risk sharing leads to the reduction of risks. It is probably superfluous to say that international crisis management operations are a risky business. Crises do not always develop logically and may spiral out of control. Spreading the risks may lead to risk reduction, bringing down the perceived risks to a politically acceptable level. Multinationality facilitates national decision making.A collective of states functions as a political agent when the collective, as a collective, can influence the decisions of individual governments. For example, the collective of states calls upon the responsibility and solidarity of individual states.These demands from outside may facilitate decision making at home. Multilateral cooperation is a good in itself.There are two contrasting views of multinational security cooperation: the first view is the ‘minimal winning

Three propositions

25

coalition’, which states that the coalition must comprise only those countries that are absolutely necessary to win the war;17 the other view is that the coalition of states must be as broad as possible to ensure the widest possible public support. At the same time, multinationality implies an inherent weakness in decisiveness and tenacity. An investigation by the House of Commons Select Committee clearly reveals the dilemma: To have launched an all-out air attack against Serbia on 24 March [1999] would have destroyed the cohesion of the Alliance. But, the Alliance’s graduated approach to the air campaign evidently failed to convince Milosevic that subsequent escalation of the campaign would happen. (House of Commons Defence Committee 2000: cxxii) The European view is decidedly in favour of broad coalitions.

3.3

All states are constrained

The proposition that ‘all states are constrained’ consists of two parts: first, the decision to participate in an international crisis management operation is a decision made within certain constraints;18 second, a government will try to satisfy these constraints in the best possible way. The notion of ‘constraint’ is interchangeable with ‘precondition’, because a (national) precondition for participation can become a factual constraint for the collective of states, e.g. the precondition of a UN mandate to legitimise the operation has the effect of a constraint as it closes off all options and actions without such a mandate. The requirement that a country must have a direct national interest at stake if it is to engage itself closes off all options not involving a national interest. It then depends on the interpretation of the interest at stake whether or not a country will engage itself.The consent of parliament must be considered in a similar vein: a government can only participate in those operations sanctioned by parliament. These preconditions/constraints vary a great deal: one can distinguish between legal constraints, political constraints, resource constraints, etc. Some of these are situation-specific, while others are systemic; some constraints are formal or ‘hard’, while others are ‘soft’. However, constraints should not be regarded as fixed, static phenomena. They are highly relative, situation-dependent and dynamic.A country can be forced to reinterpret its national interest, to weigh the evil of an absent UN mandate against humanitarian urgency, etc. Under pressure, constraints will change. Resource constraints like the available military units, logistics or transport capabilities cannot usually change overnight unless additional capacity is created, either by purchase or lease, or by calling up reserve forces. In general, governments continuously assess and reassess the weight they give to certain preconditions in response to a changing situation. Crozier (1980) shows that constraints also represent considerable bargaining power. This phenomenon is operative in the sphere of international relations too:

26

Problem definition and framework of analysis even in … situations of dependence and constraint, men do not adapt themselves passively to circumstances. … Thus some regulation or formal procedure, which appears at first sight as a constraint, can be diverted from its original intention and used as a protective device against the superior. An ‘aggressive’ angry behavior, for example, which may appear to be the impulsive expression of an emotional instinct in the individual, can be used as an instrument to win himself respect and to impose his point of view in an unstructured and potentially conflictual situation. (ibid.: 18)

States will bargain with other states – cooperation and bargaining in international crisis management operations go hand in hand. Governments will try to satisfy the preconditions to the best of their abilities and possibilities in the given circumstances, and they will do so in the process of negotiating constraints and bargaining with other states. This will to a large extent determine its cooperative behaviour. Part of international crisis management is thus the bargaining about national preconditions before entering the collective endeavour.The set of constraints is both reactive and dynamic. Each situation will generate a unique constellation of constraints. How these change is important, as multinational cooperation is very much a matter of changing the relative values of the constraints of the individual actors. It is possible to identify a number of patterns in the way constraints change. Elster has called these patterns ‘mechanisms’. A mechanism is ‘a specific causal pattern that can be recognised after the event but rarely foreseen’ (Elster 1993: 3).The distinctive feature of a mechanism is ‘not that it can be universally applied to predict and control social events’ but that it embodies: a causal chain that is sufficiently general and precise to enable us to locate it in widely different settings. It is less than a theory, but a great deal more than a description, since it can serve as a model for understanding other cases not yet encountered. (ibid.: 5) International crisis management is as much a strategic affair as it is a social event between the actors involved. Because our psychological and sociological knowledge of international crisis management falls short of being able to propose a theory, we cannot do more than draw up a list of mechanisms or, in the words of Elster ‘causal patterns that are sufficiently precise and general to allow us to subsume apparently different events under the same heading’ (ibid.: 135). Elster describes the relation between a constraint and a mechanism as ‘any action may be seen as the outcome of two successive filters, the first being made up of the structural constraints of the situation and the second of the mechanism by which one action is selected among those that satisfy all the constraints’ (ibid.: 95).We will use this powerful image in the description and analysis of the twin processes of cooperation and bargaining in international crisis management.

Three propositions

27

Figure 3.1 The relation between constraints and mechanisms Source: Elster (1995).

A state will participate in an international crisis management operation if its preconditions for participation are satisfied. This is at stake in the process of bargaining before the participation decision can formally be taken. In this process, the preconditions are articulated and validated, and the strategy by which these preconditions are articulated and validated has been described as a mechanism. It is important to see that the choice of mechanism is not a conscious, deliberate choice. It is possible to witness a country changing its position, but it is only by looking back that we see how, for example, a country adjusted its policy aims to the means it had for achieving them.19 States will thus go for a course of action that will satisfy most of its preconditions/ constraints, but the choice of mechanism can be identified only in retrospect. States are not (entirely) free to choose their preferred course of action. The international context may and will dictate a certain course of action and hence dictate how much value a country can attach to a precondition. Given this information, it becomes clear that the relation between the national government and its parliament is of primordial importance.This relation is in its essence a relation of constraint. National parliaments ‘constrain’ their respective governments in the sense that they can exert influence on the way a government goes about policy making and the implementation of that policy. These constraints can be formal, e.g. the form of a constitutional obligation or convention to seek parliamentary consent, or informal, e.g. in the form of a political custom to seek as much political support. In any case, the parliament plays a significant role in the articulation and validation of national constraints. Often it is the parliament that decides when a constraint is sufficiently satisfied or accommodated. Europe faces the challenge that Jean Monnet observed after the Second World War: ‘How does one produce appropriate forms of decision-making for a context which affects everyone more and more but lacks any contractual basis?’ It seems that this classic problem has never left us, and we have yet to find an adequate answer.

Part II

The case studies A comparative analysis

4

Changing the rules Belgium and the Netherlands

4.1

Belgium Belgian foreign policy is in the first place a continuation of domestic policy with other means. (Rik Coolsaet) Parliament should be involved in the national decision-making process before, during and after all future UN operations. (Guy Verhofstadt, prime minister)

The preconditions and constraints for Belgian participation in international crisis management operations find their origin partially in the social and political condition of society, in the complex political structure of the state and in the self-image(s) of the Belgians. Some social and political aspects relevant to the foreign and security policy of Belgium are discussed below. •

Belgium is a small and vulnerable country. The idea that Belgium is a small, vulnerable country is deeply rooted in society and widely shared by the different political parties. Throughout history, the country has served as a battleground, refuge, corridor, occupation zone, etc. for the imperial behaviour of France and Germany. After 1989, these feelings of exposure and vulnerability took on a different character as the dangers connected with globalisation, inter-ethnic conflicts, refugees, drug trafficking, biotechnology, etc. gave Belgium a renewed sense of vulnerability.20 Deep down, Belgium suffers from the classical small-state syndrome, which would call for a turning away from the world. It is safe to say that there is in Belgium a firmly suppressed, residual tendency to isolationism. The political significance of this force is very small, but this self-image of vulnerability has made possible a broad consensus on the European project of integration. The historical manifestation of Belgium’s vulnerability has been being dragged into wars between France and Germany. The only way to avoid this vulnerability is integration into multilateral structures. This conviction is reflected in the idea that the EU should integrate not only in the fields of agriculture and economy but also in

32

•

•

The case studies: a comparative analysis the field of foreign and security policy. There is no consensus as to what this EU policy should be, but there is a consensus that an Alleingang (‘pursuing a course of its own’) of the reunited Germany or of France as part of this unavoidable alternation of Franco-German competition and cooperation can only be avoided through European integration.21 The Belgian reflex has remained the same: turning to Europe, wholeheartedly and with dedication. Belgium is complex and complicated. The fact that Belgium is a case of sui generis federalism is clearly indicated by the complexity of its state structures. Classical federalism, a state form that brings unity in diversity, is certainly not the case in Belgium. The opposite is true, as Witte writes: ‘A very complicated growth process, characterised by many difficulties in achieving equilibrium, caused the centralised unitary state to be hollowed out progressively by regionalised institutions. A system, completely opaque to outsiders, with a great variety of institutions, where symmetry is often absent, has been born’ (Witte et al. 1997: 431, my translation). This all-pervasive truth is accepted by politicians from both Flanders and Wallonia as a first political principle. It determines their political reflexes, actions and strategies as well as the government’s scope for manoeuvring in the international domain. If asked ‘What is Belgium?’ one could answer: ‘Belgium is that multiple equilibrium of complex political arrangements aimed at keeping the different communities together’.22 ‘Everything for Europe. Europe for Belgium.’ There is no country in Europe whose foreign and security policy is so interwoven with its European policy as it is in Belgium.The motto seems to be ‘if it is good for Europe, it is good for Belgium’. Europe is considered to be the political ‘guarantor’ of the interests of small states, and it provides a power that prevents Belgium from disintegrating. Raising the defence budget, for example, is only possible if it is necessary to meet a European norm. Belgium seems more sensitive to criticism (and praise) from the European Union than from NATO.23 The line of argument behind Belgian participation in the euro can be illustrated by the following: in joining the euro, Belgium delegated its sovereignty regarding its monetary policy but, because the great European powers did the same, Belgium gained in relative autonomy and influence.The renewed sense of a supranational dimension of Europe is perceived to be a guarantee for the small states. In particular to the Flemish – advocates of more power for the regions – a Europe organised on a regional basis seemed a good recipe for the further transfer of federal prerogatives to the communities of Flanders and Wallonia. The adaptation of the external relations decision structure to the federal design of the Belgian state serves as a good example of the impact of domestic processes on foreign policies. Paraphrasing an old First World War slogan, Belgium’s relation to the European Union can be summed up as ‘Everything for Europe. Europe for Belgium.’24

Belgium and the Netherlands 33 Basic features of the Belgian political system It is a basic understanding among all political operators on the Belgian scene that unpacking or disturbing one of these political equilibria may set off a chain reaction with far greater consequences than initially intended. This understanding largely determines political behaviour in Belgium and sets certain limits to its possible external actions. Three characteristics are of particular relevance and will be discussed here: (1) pacification politics; (2) the ‘holy’ rule of consensus; and (3) the core cabinet. Pacification politics Despite the very complex social and cultural make-up of the country, Belgium enjoys political stability.The primary aim of pacification politics is to prevent conflicts from escalating by seeking to defuse them. Potential conflicts must be depoliticised before they can be dealt with. Many top politicians in Belgium confirm that conflict de-escalation has priority over problem solving (cf. Dewachter 2001: 139). The question of whether solutions are adequate becomes a secondary concern. The consequence is that Belgian politics are characterised by great prudence and a highly developed sense of compromise. It will not come as a surprise that these domestic considerations – some of existential magnitude – prove to be enormously inhibitive to the decision of whether or not to get involved in ‘other people’s wars’. The ‘holy’ rule of consensus Former Prime Minister Wilfried Martens said that the first and foremost condition for such a decision is that ‘in Belgium the holy rule of consensus applies’. Political leadership and statesmanship do not come naturally in Belgium. The best way for a Belgian politician to show his statesman-like capabilities is to acquire a profile as a European leader. Belgium has had (with minor exceptions) coalition governments since 1917. One of the essentials of this type of government is decision making by consultation and agreement. According to former Prime Minister Martens, ‘the proceedings of a cabinet meeting in Belgium differ fundamentally from those in other countries. At our place, the deeply entrenched, quasi-constitutional habit governs that the government decides on the basis of unanimity’ (cited in Dewachter 1995: 176).The cabinet of ministers thus functions as an interagency decision centre where decisions are taken under the leadership of the prime minister. Closely related to establishing consensus is the way policy is coordinated. The members of a minister’s personal cabinet function as a brains trust providing general and specific support.They deal with problem identification, problem formulation, policy design and choice of policy. This staff manages, coordinates and innovates. Jean Luc Dehaene said that a weak minister with a good cabinet can succeed, that a strong minister with a weak cabinet will fail, and that a strong minister with a strong cabinet can move mountains. Civil

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

servants in the departments do not play a significant role in the decisionmaking process. They are largely absent. Belgium ‘escaped’ the considerable powers wielded by a bureaucracy like the civil service in Britain, as one Belgian commentator put it. In all important dossiers, the cabinet members of various ministers are intensely involved in the ‘moving and shaking’ of bringing an issue forward, that is towards a consensual position. The core cabinet Before the 1990s cabinets were much larger, so there was an inherent need for a flexible directorate within the cabinet. During his tenure as prime minister (heading two successive cabinets from 1992 to 1999) Jean-Luc Dehaene reorganised the size and structure of the cabinet.The number of cabinet ministers is now constitutionally limited to fifteen, and the prime minister has a maximum of four vice-prime ministers coming from different parties. The core cabinet will address a great variety of issues and questions, from appointing top civil servants to social policy, Africa and constitutional reform. The core cabinet in its ‘purest’ form consists of the prime minister and his four vice-prime ministers. The meetings are very intensive but informal, and they take place once a week (usually on a Friday) and whenever the situation demands. It is widely considered to be the most important political body in Belgium. In the first Verhofstadt government, the coalition consisted of Liberals, Socialists and Greens. Because of the linguistic divide, each party came in a Flemish and a Francophone variant, and each placed its own policy accents in certain dossiers. The Flemish Greens (AGALEV) did not have a statutory vice-prime minister but, by way of compensation, their top minister was placed on an equal footing with the other vice-prime ministers (but without the formal rank) and was present at all meetings of the core cabinet. On the advantages and disadvantages of having a core cabinet, former Prime Minister Martens commented: ‘the core cabinet sets the policies of the government’ (Dewachter 2001: 217).According to Willy Claes: In the core [cabinet] we sought solutions for complex and delicate problems which probably in the cabinet of ministers, which, because it is greater in numbers and has more distant relations between the members, never would have had any chance of success. Certainly, the resulting equations à la Belge were never examples of efficiency, logic and transparency and certainly, the technique of linking as many dossiers as necessary was often practised to bring ‘salvation’. (ibid.: 219) According to Guy Tegenbos, the advantages of the core cabinet are that it ‘provides an efficient mechanism to take decisions in a routine and peaceful manner’. But the disadvantages are numerous too: ‘it requires centralisation of all decisions in the hands of five supermen. It reduces the responsibility of

Belgium and the Netherlands 35 other ministers. … It requires a cloud of secrecy … and coalition partners [must] be able to sell the compromises as ‘victories’ to their respective electorates’ (cited in De Standaard, 4 September 97).The decision to participate in an international crisis management operation and the modalities for participation are taken by the core cabinet. The constitutional framework Belgium is a constitutional monarchy. Article 29 of the country’s constitution stipulates that ‘executive power is in the hands of the King’, but this article must be understood in relation to Article 63, which stipulates that ‘The person of the King is sacred; his Ministers are responsible’. All further mention of the king in the constitution assumes the intervention and responsibility of cabinet ministers. The king is, by virtue of Article 68 of the constitution, commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He decides on the state of war and the cessation of hostilities. On the basis of the same article, the government is obliged to provide Parliament with adequate information about these matters, for example, the deployment of the armed forces, as soon as the interest and security of the state permit. In addition, the government is bound by the regular political and budgetary parliamentary checks.Thus, with respect to declaring war, the Belgian constitution is exceptional: the Belgian government can declare war without first seeking the consent of Parliament. The federal executive is responsible for the country’s foreign policy. The powers of the federal government are the powers conferred on it by the constitution, which does not confer specific powers on the government but on the ministers ‘convened in the council of ministers’. As chief executive body of the federal government, it is the responsibility of the council of ministers to make and implement policy in federal affairs; to execute decisions of the federal legislature; to direct the federal government, the federal police, defence and the external relations of Belgium; and to implement foreign policy in federal matters.25 A distinction must be made between the government in general and the council of ministers. The council is composed of those members of the government who are ministers. In an increasing number of cases, the council acts as an independent body that takes fundamental policy decisions and ensures coordination of policy. A crucial new development in the process of federalisation has been the delegation of powers to the Flemish and Walloon communities, who thus can implement their ‘own’ foreign policies. This trend is increasing in both strength and scope, it is therefore fair to say that Belgium is effectively de-federalising elements of its foreign policy.26 Outward coherence in its external relations will increasingly become an issue. The federal government will represent Belgium in external matters when this is prescribed by the constitution or a special law. The federal government must also represent ‘Belgium’ at the request of one of the two communities that needs such a representation for its foreign policy.

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

The Belgian foreign and security policy apparatus Belgian foreign policy is, in the words of Professor Rik Coolsaet, ‘the classic story of a very small group of people that shape it’. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) directs the foreign policy of the federal government. As security and defence policy are an integral part of foreign policy, the minister of defence will always consult his colleague at foreign affairs, as well as the prime minister. Three important weekly meetings are instrumental in the internal coordination of foreign and security policy. The first is the so-called ‘political-military’ meeting, hosted by the MFA. This meeting serves as a forum for airing and discussing views on NATO and the EU and, where the need arises, to coordinate points of view and policy between the departments. Depending on the subject, the centre of gravity will shift between departments. In an emerging crisis, emphasis may be placed on the militarytechnical aspects of the issue, and the Ministry of Defence will have the lead. On the other hand, if a dossier such as NATO enlargement is on the agenda, the meeting will be dominated by the MFA to prepare for a ministerial summit. The normal weekly frequency of the meetings can be increased if necessary.The second is the so-called ‘black and white’ meeting, at which the Africa dossier is discussed; this meeting is usually dominated by matters of international cooperation, political support, etc. Third, there is the coordination meeting, at which the state of play of current operations is discussed and actions are coordinated. The Belgian Ministry of Defence consists of a very small civilian administration. The core is made up of the personal cabinet of the minister, which pursuant to a federal law is limited to a maximum of eight counsellors. The cabinet of the minister of defence is composed of administrative and (military) technical members, headed by a major-general. Most of the civilian counsellors are political nominees. The military-technical component is chiefly concerned with liaison between the minister and the defence staff and manages the flow of documents and information. There are three important forums for the coordination and implementation of defence policy.The first is the twice-monthly informal meeting between the minister and the chief of defence, who, assisted by their most important counsellors, discuss all relevant dossiers and issues. The second is the High Council for Defence, chaired by the minister of defence. Here all important issues in the defence domain are discussed. Members of the council are the chief of defence, vice-chief of defence, assistant chiefs of staff, directors-general and the so-called ‘component’ commanders (army, navy, air force, medical). This meeting allows for discussion and policy coordination and ensures support for the implementation of the policy. The third forum is the meeting of the board of directors, which is subordinate to the High Council and discusses policy implementation.This meeting is chaired by the chief of defence. The chief of defence is the highest military authority in the country. He is the military adviser to the government, responsible for the implementation of Belgian defence policy and the administration of the Ministry of Defence. He

Belgium and the Netherlands 37 prepares and proposes policy objectives, the tasks to be fulfilled and the structures required to execute them. He allocates money and personnel and prioritises the objectives. The chief of defence presents all proposals to the minister at the High Council for Defence meeting. The chief of defence acts in a double capacity as military adviser to the minister and as commander of operationally deployed forces. As adviser, he puts forward proposals regarding the objectives, missions, formations, conditions for deployment and means and personnel required for the task. It is in his capacity as commander of the deployed force that he is responsible for deployment and training of the armed forces. The defence staff has a single, unitary structure and consists of five departments, each directed by an assistant chief of staff and four directoratesgeneral headed by a director-general. The four ‘component’ commanders (army, navy, air force and medical) report to the Chief of Defence (CHOD). Belgian security and defence policy A nation’s security and defence policy is generally the product of its history, and Belgium’s peculiar history has given it three basic propositions that have informed its security policy since the Second World War. The first proposition is that Belgium aspired to an Atlantic Europe. During the dark years of the Cold War, ‘Europe was never an alternative to NATO because none of the large European countries was prepared or able to give Belgium the security guarantee it got in the framework of NATO or the US’ (Lelie, in Reychler et al.

Figure 4.1 Command structure of the Belgian armed forces Note: * Command operations. Source: Belgian Ministry of Defence (2002).

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

1993: 251). The second proposition is that a French–German directorate must have a counterweight, e.g. the United Kingdom, but preferably should be bound up in a supranational approach to international security. Besides being Atlantic, the security organisation should be supranational. During the 1960s, the Belgian government became convinced that only supranational arrangements were in the interests of small states. Institutionalised decision-making procedures guarantee a voice and a vote in a collective policy that they would never achieve outside these arrangements. The third proposition concerns the image abroad. Belgian governments have consistently been concerned about the Belgian image abroad and have been working hard to be perceived as a loyal ally. Former Defence Minister Mark Eyskens explained the rationale: ‘If Belgium becomes an ambiguous ally, it will be fully marginalised and will not be taken seriously’ (ibid.: 248).What is understood by ‘loyal’ becomes clear in the following statement: ‘A low political profile … coupled with a steadily growing defence budget rewarded the country with the image of a loyal ally until the beginning of the 1980s’ (Coolsaet 1998: 431). In exchange for a loyal attitude towards NATO’s demands and expectations, successive Belgian ministers have insisted that Belgium should be informed and have a voice in the decision-making process.27 Current Belgian security policy is based on the principles of deterrence, stability and solidarity. The goals of this policy are to prevent general war in Europe and the protection of human rights and the values of democracy. This justifies Belgian efforts to construct a peaceful international order. The main tasks of the armed forces are to defend the vital interests of the nation and to protect the essential values of Belgian society. The basic operating principle – solidarity – has been translated in NATO into practical collective defence arrangements.The result is a sense of equal security among members, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national capacities.The Belgian armed forces must therefore be ready to participate in the spirit of solidarity to ensure collective security in Europe; to contribute to international crisis management; to contribute to the security of the national territory, including its air space and territorial waters; to give assistance to the nation; and to participate in humanitarian missions. A fundamental tenet of Belgian security policy is to support the development of a European security and defence policy. Belgium actively strives for further integration and deepening of the European Union, which has not only been a source of economic and social well being but has also contributed to greater stability within Western Europe. Belgium wants to develop an ‘armed’ pillar within the EU and to reinforce the European pillar within NATO. The Belgian government has taken remarkable steps to further this ambition. Prime Minister Verhofstadt wrote a letter to the French president and the British prime minister in July 2002 ‘to re-launch the idea of a European defence and rekindle the Saint-Malo spirit’ (cited in Haine 2003). Mr Verhofstadt proposes a number of longer-term projects: the establishment of a European headquarters, the creation of a European armaments agency and the development of a mutual security guarantee. His views on European

Belgium and the Netherlands 39 defence and the shape of transatlantic relations are one and the same. Recently, PM Verhofstadt pleaded for a ‘New Atlanticism’, based on two pillars, a European and an American pillar.‘Since 11 September we realise that the world cannot be ordered by a single super power, we have to evolve to a world in which continental power blocs are in dialogue, each with its own identity but with the same goal: a stable world’ (Verhofstadt 2003). Profile of the Belgian armed forces Belgium has professional armed forces with a planned strength of 35,000 active duty personnel in four functional components: land, air, navy and medical. In 2001, Belgian soldiers participated with others in Kfor and Sfor II and were observers and mine clearers from Pakistan to the Middle East.28 The Belgian military effort is traditionally concentrated on the country’s role within the Atlantic alliance’s integrated structure. Belgium’s defence expenditure represents 1.3 percent of GDP, while the actual budget reached 1 percent of GDP and has been declining steadily since 1980.29 These figures are the lowest in NATO, with the exception of Luxembourg. The country’s historical specialisation and the linguistic balance have a determining impact on the ability of its armed forces to play an international role. Just as a nation’s defence policy is the product of its history, so are the structure and capabilities of its armed forces. Neutrality and Africa determined the structure and capabilities of the ‘old’ Belgian armed forces, the country adopting a policy of neutrality from its independence in 1830. This policy failed twice, in 1914 and 1940. The armed forces have subsequently been adapted to make possible their integration into NATO structures (since 1949). The consequences are land-heavy armed forces, with a small navy that focuses on minesweeping operations in the English Channel and an air force structured around F-16 fighter squadrons and C-130 transport aircraft. Despite a pronounced leaning towards NATO, there are two elements in the Belgian armed forces that are not primarily designed for operations in Central Europe: the Para-Commando Brigade, which is on standby to leave the country within 72 hours after the decision to deploy has been taken; and the 15 Transport Wing, with its eleven C-130H Hercules and two Airbus 310 aircraft in particular.These elements have been deployed in Central Africa on several occasions in the past. It is a constitutional requirement of the Belgian armed forces that they maintain a linguistic balance of 60 percent neerlandophone and 40 percent francophone.This balance was conceived as an economic instrument to influence labour policy in the communities by allocating more jobs to the then poor Flanders than to the then richer Wallonia. The socio-economic situation in Flanders has changed considerably, and the balance between the poor north and the rich south has been reversed. Flanders has become affluent, so its young men do not consider the army as a career of preference.The result is a recruitment gap in Flanders and a linguistic balance of approximately 50–50. Anyone suggesting

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the obvious will find that it is extremely hard to change the system, because it is a politicised issue.The basic characteristic of Belgium discussed in the early part of this chapter, namely that it consists of a series of fragile political, social, cultural, economic, financial, linguistic and educational arrangements between the communities makes it almost impossible to obtain political consensus to formally and fundamentally change the 60–40 linguistic balance anytime soon. Adaptation and restructuring of the armed forces The Belgian armed forces at the beginning of the twenty-first century are in relatively poor shape; years of neglect and underfunding having left them unbalanced, with obsolete equipment.30 There are three causes. First, Belgium enjoys a very high level of security from a geostrategic perspective, which does not engender any feelings of urgency to adapt and transform the military. Second, most of the available political energy has been directed to domestic processes (the creation of the federal state).Third, defence is a very unpopular domain to fund, its budget being slashed year after year.The Belgium government formulated a strategic plan for the adaptation and modernisation of the armed forces for the period 2000–2015 that aims at a fundamental reorganisation, a new structure and a new personnel policy. In the new structure, a central chief of the armed forces or chief of the defence staff will be the crucial player responsible for directing the armed forces. After reorganisation, Belgium will be able to deploy one task-oriented and modulated brigade supported by elements of the navy, the air force and medical command and can rotate it once. In addition, it can concurrently address a crisis in Africa.These are one-off events and cannot be sustained. The ambition is for a sustainable level of 1,000 deployed soldiers. Deployment of the armed forces in peacetime, in combined and joint forces, within an international framework is the most likely scenario for the future. According to a former chief of defence,Willy Herteleer: although we cannot be sure about the future we need to be careful, peacekeeping operations can have a high intensity, too. Therefore, the fighting capacity must not be lost. Perhaps less heavy and easily deployable, supported by a flexible permanent logistics Belgium must be able to have recourse to destructive firepower, in any case for self-protection.31 The Belgian armed forces have no fixed scenarios or predetermined roles to play.32 They must be flexible and able to respond to a variety of demands and tasks, including the so-called ‘aid to the nation’, when military assistance is required at home.The one exception is a pre-designated role of the Belgian army in Central Africa, where the Belgian armed forces are required to be capable of executing a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).This would require the deployment of para-commando units and C-130s for strategic transport. However, the Belgian government has chosen the path of multilateral security cooperation. Integration of its armed forces into multinational

Belgium and the Netherlands 41 military frameworks is sought for a variety of reasons: the political argument is that cooperation leads to (more) integration, which is a stated political aim of Belgium; the economic argument is that it saves money and increases output. The economic argument dominates, as a former ambassador to NATO stated: ‘Not only is a strictly national defence strategy dangerous from the political viewpoint, it has quite simply become prohibitive in economic terms as well’ (Derycke 1996). But integration is also sought as a pretext for slashing the defence budget. The militarytechnical argument is that the scale of some weapons systems is now actually beyond the reach and requirement of countries like Belgium, which makes it desirable to pool resources, e.g. to support and run technical maintenance facilities and to operate big weapons systems in collaboration with other countries (e.g. the Belgium–Luxembourg transport vessel). Other important multinational military frameworks in which Belgium participates are the Eurocorps, the Belgium–Luxembourg infantry unit, Admiral Benelux (the Belgium–Netherlands navy) and the Air Deployable Task Force (Benelux). Foreign Affairs Minister Louis Michel is a confirmed integrationist: ‘Everyone may have come to the conclusion intellectually and politically that it is useful and even necessary to increase the defence budget, but as you know, there is no political majority for it [in Belgium]. I see a solution in a European defence policy, with a rationalised use of our means’ (cited in De Standaard, 29 August 2002). Parliament The true cauldrons of power in Belgium are the political parties,33 yet, paradoxically, there are no national political parties in Belgium. The four main political families (Socialists, Liberals, Social Democrats and Greens) all have wings on each side of the linguistic divide.The constitution does not refer to political parties, but the mechanics of a parliamentary monarchy are impossible without political parties. The claim that without the consent of the political parties nothing gets done is perhaps too strong, and the real picture is more complex and has more stakeholders effectively playing the power game, e.g. the industrial elite, the nobility and the royal family (cf. Dewachter 2001). Furthermore, this is something of a reflexive phenomenon: on the one hand, political parties share in the distribution of raw political power, whereas on the other hand, the traditional cleavages in Belgian society have been transformed into political movements and have shaped political and social life. The Belgian parliament is bicameral: a Chamber of Representatives and the Senate. The Chamber of Representatives is the main political forum, while the Senate fulfils the role of a chambre de réflection. The Chamber of Representatives has 212 members, elected directly by the people. The Senate consists of fifty directly elected members, 106 members elected by provincial councils, twenty-five coopted members, and Prince Filip, Prince

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Laurent and Princess Astrid, who are senators by right. Both houses of parliament have legislative powers as well as the power of executive action. Oversight of the government is carried out by Parliament. Although since the constitutional reform of 1993 the two chambers no longer have exactly the same powers, they do share considerable powers. Legislative power is vested exclusively in the Chamber of Representatives, while government oversight and law making are shared powers. The constitution classifies federal matters into three groups: (1) matters decided exclusively by the Chamber; (2) matters that the Chamber decides and on which the Senate reflects; and (3) matters in which Chamber and Senate are equally qualified. Only the Chamber of Representatives has the power to give or withdraw its confidence in the government. It can withdraw its confidence in the government at any moment, on any matter, on any decision, but after doing so it must act ‘deliberatively and constructively’.The Senate used its right to conduct parliamentary inquiries in 1997 to conduct an inquiry into the 1994 events in Rwanda. It is remarkable that in its work the Senate places the emphasis on current if not ‘hot’ political issues. Belgian senators are very active interpellating, putting questions to the respective ministers and summoning them to the Senate for debates. Currently, the Senate seems less interested in its traditional role. Because of the extent of ‘double matter’ (and hence duplication of work in Senate and Chamber), proposals have been launched to abolish the Senate, among others by current Prime Minister Verhofstadt. The foreign affairs committees Parliamentary committees are bodies that prepare the work of the plenary assemblies; they are not a substitute for the plenary assemblies. Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies have a foreign affairs committee (FAC), and their meetings in both houses are open to members of parliament, committee staff, ministers and their officials, members of the European Parliament, and secretaries and staff of political groups. The committees meet behind closed doors, and their discussions are confidential. The minutes are not distributed and are only accessible to the chairman of the plenary and the members of the committees (Cassese 1981: 55). Salmon gives a candid account of the practice of the Belgian foreign affairs committees. A few citations characterise an atmosphere and practice of ‘semi-confidentiality’. Individual committee members are forbidden to make public statements. On the other hand, the positions taken by ministers and their civil servants may in principle be made public.These shed some light on the committees’ proceedings. It is quite common for a minister to be reminded in public of what he has said or promised in a committee, so the confidential nature of what is said in committee meetings should not be exaggerated. A parliamentarian cannot be forced to maintain secrecy, and there is more than one who makes no pretence of doing so. The press regularly refers to what goes on inside the

Belgium and the Netherlands 43 committees. Ministers know this and never reveal secrets to the committees. In this atmosphere of semi-confidentiality, it is considered to be gross misconduct and irresponsibility on a foreign minister’s part to reveal secrets to an FAC. Salmon concludes that ‘the absence of publicity given to the work of the FAC therefore has more drawbacks than advantages’ (cited in Cassese 1981: 55). The defence committees (of both chambers) deal with regular defence-related questions and issues, such as personnel and materials, budget, the closure of bases and the relocation of units.They do not play an important role in the decision-making process concerning participation in international crisis management operations. Parliamentary control International agreements, external affairs and international representation are ‘double matters’: both the Senate and the Chamber have an identical mandate and right to get involved.The FACs serve the function, as perceived by one of their members, of an instrument from which the government can seek support; because the opposition is present, the minister of defence can ‘demine’ a potential politically sensitive situation. According to those involved, this practice prevents all kinds of useless questions that can lead to a slowdown in/of the political process; it is a pro-active way of working. During an operation, the government will give the committees sensitive information, but in a somewhat peculiar way. Slides are shown on an overhead projector and members can take notes, but these do not have the status of official documents. Members do not have the chance to verify the truth of the information provided or to ascertain whether the information given is complete. There is no standardised process for the political evaluation of participation in international crisis management operations. The minister of defence sometimes asks parliamentarians from both Senate and Chamber to accompany him on a sort of inspection tour for the purpose of evaluating projects on the ground, but there is no methodical political evaluation of the decision and the action by Parliament. The dominant mechanism for accountability and evaluation runs via the political parties. That is where ministers are scrutinised and the ‘political bill’ will be made up. The system of formal ministerial accountability is not well developed in the Belgian political system. De jure accountability and political practice do not converge. As we have indicated before, participation decisions are considered to be so highly sensitive that they can only be taken on the basis of consensus. Formally, the decision is taken by the core cabinet, made up of the coalition parties. It is impossible to point to one individual minister as being responsible.This leads to an all-or-nothing situation for Parliament. It can send the entire government home or accept its apologies. Most often in this complex country Parliament will accept the apologies. Sharing confidential information with Parliament is another contentious issue. After Rwanda, the government promised that it would give more

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information, including sensitive information, to Parliament, and it does so via a special senatorial committee. Actually, the government is using the committee as a vehicle to ‘de-mine’ potential politically dangerous situations. The effect is a paradox of confidence: by taking Parliament into its confidence, the government perverts Parliament’s right and ability to scrutinise the executive. There is no formally structured, legally binding evaluation of participation in either of the two houses. If individual members have questions, they can raise them and the minister will answer them orally or in written form. It is to be expected that, if something goes seriously wrong, a parliamentary commission of inquiry will be established with a specific mandate. Although the plenary can be regarded as a standing commission of inquiry, there is no specific standing committee tasked to do so when Belgium has participated in an international crisis management operation. The parliamentary Rwanda inquiry deserves to be mentioned because of its political impact. When in 1994 ten Belgian soldiers died in the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) operation, which proved to be ‘ill prepared, poorly executed and badly managed’, a parliamentary commission of inquiry under the co-chairmanship of then Senators Verhofstadt and Mahoux was set up. Months of agonising soul searching followed. The report of the Rwanda Commission documents an appalling picture of institutionalised incompetence and presented extensive recommendations to ameliorate the situation. One of the most fundamental recommendations was that the government must lay down a number of fixed rules for participation of our country in future UN peace-keeping operations, and must ensure the application and the evaluation of these rules. With the drafting of these rules and criteria one must take guidance from recommendations done in previous evaluation accounts. (chapter 14, section 2.7) Within two months of the Rwanda Commission presenting its recommendations to the Senate, Prime Minister Jean Luc Dehaene presented a policy paper on ‘Belgian Participation in Peace Support Operations’ to the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives. This policy paper is the first attempt by a Belgian government to construct – on the basis of the Rwanda Commission report – a comprehensive and clear review framework consisting of principles and policy guidelines, aimed at structuring the decision-making process. These rules apply not only to UN operations but also to operations led by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the case of actions within a NATO framework, political control is assured by the rules of the organisation, which provide that political decisions must be made by the North Atlantic Council on the basis of consensus. A direct consequence of the recommendations of the Rwanda Commission was the institution of the Senate Special Committee on

Belgium and the Netherlands 45 Participation in International Operations. This sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee is not a standing committee but one that can be activated if the need arises. The Rwanda Commission recommended that the government make more information available to the representatives. This could be done via a combined senatorial–parliamentary committee, in which a representation of senators and parliamentarians would be informed on the basis of confidentiality. This recommendation was rejected by a number of representatives, who objected that it would be impossible for them to check whether the information was accurate and included all relevant facts. The big problem here was that giving confidential information to a representative would de facto silence him, because he would then no longer be able to control the government and ask the right questions while ignoring the confidential information he had been given. For this reason, the Chamber of Representatives objected to its participating in a special senatorial–parliamentary committee. The consequence was that it became a senate-only committee. However, the government uses the committee for the purpose intended by the Rwanda Commission: to make more information available and to establish a platform for dialogue and discussion and build consensus. Today, the status of the special committee is considered a constitutional ‘anomaly’. The committee has not developed into an important clearing house for executive decisions. It consists of members of all political parties represented in the Senate, including the opposition. It meets behind closed doors before the government decides whether or not to participate in an international operation. The minister of defence and the minister of foreign affairs use this committee to explain their position, to seek political support for it and to try to win people over to their view. The government can use this committee to brief others on the state of play in an operation. If an operation is terminated and is perceived to be successful, the politicians prefer to go to the plenary session of either Senate or Chamber of Representatives to disclose this political fact. The final control mechanism of Parliament, the power of the purse, is held with only marginal effect. Parliament can veto the state budget as a whole, but it has no power over individual budget lines.The budget line for international operations for 2002 was €25 million, but for some years now the actual costs have been around €50 million.The defence budget has never been adjusted to cover these costs, and the necessary resources must be found elsewhere in this budget.34 This has detrimental consequences for the ongoing transformation process, and the cumulative effect can only be either a protracted transformation process or incomplete transformation. The minister of defence does not need to go to Parliament to request (or seek its consent for) additional financial resources for participation in an international crisis management operation as long as he is able to find the money to pay for it within his own budget. Deploying 1,000 soldiers is seen as a target for both operational (sustainability) and budgetary reasons.

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Table 4.1 Belgian parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation Before the operation

During the operation

After the operation

Parliament is informed, not consulted, usually after the decision as to whether or not to participate has been taken in the core cabinet.

Parliament is briefed on a need-to-know basis at irregular intervals. There is no structured, regular exchange of views.

Parliament is not involved in the evaluation. Parliamentarians cite a ‘lack of a culture of evaluation’ and ‘shortages of manpower’ as the main reasons.



Public opinion On two issues in the security domain Belgium enjoys consensus:35 its membership of NATO and the EU taking on more defence responsibility. On the second issue, Prime Minister Verhofstadt has personally involved himself in promoting the ‘deepening’ of the European Union and the move towards effective federalism and political union in security and defence matters. During the 1990s, Belgium was in the lucky circumstance that different political parties with different arguments and motives pointed towards the same course of action. The political left (with the exception of the extreme left) was generally in favour of international activism because of the humanitarian content of the policies concerned. The political right (with the exception of the extreme right) subscribed to these views but complemented them with considerations of realpolitik: maintenance of a balance of power, solidarity and loyalty.This sentiment was felt throughout society. Both arguments and motivations pointed towards active engagement in international affairs, and this policy stance manifested itself in participation in international crisis management operations. However, ‘humanitarianism’ is not as strongly developed in Belgium as it is in the Scandinavian countries, and there are no activist political parties calling for more Belgian military involvement to serve humanitarian purposes. In general, Belgian popular opinion is not activist and not in favour of political and military ‘adventures’.36 The prime minister was certainly not encouraged to adopt a ‘front-line attitude’ in the First Gulf War, and the picture had not changed dramatically in 2003. In a survey published by Time, 68 percent of the Belgian population was against the war, and only 23 percent would support a war if it was sanctioned by the UN.37 The Belgian government decided to stay out.The position deteriorated internationally because of a combination of bad-judgement and miscommunication: the veto in NATO; the idea of Defence Minister Flahaut to close Belgian ports and air space to US transports (an idea briefly supported by Louis Michel); and the genocide law, originally meant to bring those responsible for the Rwanda genocide to justice, was ‘misused’ to press charges against George Bush Sr and Colin

Belgium and the Netherlands 47 Powell. All in all, this was enough for The Wall Steet Journal to declare Belgium a ‘hostile country’ (24 June 2003). Executive stability and survivability The complexity and fragile stability of the nation-state inhibit the Belgian government from taking great political risks in its foreign policy. The federal government is extremely cautious, even risk averse, when it comes to risk sharing in international crisis management.An example is the negative reaction to a British request to be supplied with ammunition during the Gulf War (1991).38 Another example is the security guarantees that were demanded before Belgium was willing to act as lead nation for the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) operation in eastern Slavonia. Although the Belgian government is committed to ambitious solidarity in the foreign policy domain, it will seek ways to contribute in a mode that will be relatively free of risk. This is a domestic requirement: participation must not constitute a political risk to the stability of the coalition at home. A threefold risk assessment is made: (a) The risk of physical harm to the deployed soldiers. The consequence of Rwanda is a considerable reluctance on the part of the political elite to take part in another ill-conceived foreign adventure risking the lives of Belgian soldiers. (b) The risk to the mission and the dangers of political-military entrapment.This is a general principle, which means that Belgium does not favour ad hoc coalitions to address international crises. In a NATO context, Belgium aims to provide around 2 percent of the total manpower required. In an EU context, this is 3 percent. Within these frameworks Belgium feels secure: it has established political-diplomatic channels; it is clear what is expected from Belgium; and Belgium is connected with or guaranteed the right intelligence. In an ad hoc coalition, Belgium does not know what it is expected to do and what percentage of the burden to take. It is not sure of its political and diplomatic access, and the same goes for intelligence.This leads to reluctance instead of engagement and commitment. In a similar vein, Belgium opposes contact group formats. Belgium does not find it acceptable that all important decisions are taken on the basis of previous bilateral, trilateral or so-called ‘contact group’ configurations. ‘The crisis in the former Yugoslavia has shown that decision-making by such arrangements does not lead to increased efficiency’ (Derycke 1996). The mechanism at work seems to be that government coalitions can become too heterogeneous to be decisive. If this is the case, the participation decision is a function of the domestic implications of the participation. If the risks involved are great and the coalition at home is unstable (as it was during Verhofstadt I), then Belgium will either abstain from participating or will make a low-risk contribution. In other words, the stability of the executive determines (1) the ‘scope’ of any possible Belgian contribution and (2) the mix and type of policy instruments. Traditionally, transport planes and hospitals, minesweepers and humanitarian assistance have been the preferred instruments for the various Belgian governments; the deployment of a para-commando contingent is an entirely different matter.

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Recent operations Belgium did not, with the exception of a handful of observers, participate in any UN operation until the beginning of the 1990s. This absence was largely due to the fact that relations between Belgium and the UN had been strained since the independence of Congo in the early 1960s. Belgium received considerable criticism in UN circles for its handling of the decolonisation of Congo. This changed after the Cold War ended, and crucial for Belgium was the period in 1991–92 when it was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Its membership forced Belgium into an active role, and the UN mission in Somalia was to be the catalyst: US pressure to have Belgium on board in Somalia because ‘helping America’ was perceived as a favour that would be returned some day; and the simple fact that Unosom (UN Operation in Somalia) brought Belgium back into Africa. Belgium had the possibility of gaining and showing its real-life experience on the ground again. A third source of pressure for a policy reversal came from the military, which felt that it was time for Belgium to take part in the ‘new military business’. There was a certain political willingness in the Belgian government to react affirmatively to the request from the UN to engage itself in Africa, one reason, and not the least, being that Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene and Foreign Minister Willy Claes hoped that it would give Belgium the right profile. Claes especially was very forthcoming in this respect, although personal ambition may have played a role.39 The first ‘real’ mission was Unosom in Somalia in 1992. Since then, Belgium has had 1,000 soldiers deployed on a permanent basis.The most significant participation decisions from a Belgian point of view are the Gulf War (1991), Unosom (1992), UNAMIR (1994), UNTAES (1996–98), Allied Force (1999) and the decision not to participate in MONUC (Mission des Nations Unies au Congo) (2001–02). Participation in the Gulf War (1991)40 Belgian military participation in the various actions (the embargo, the defence of Saudi Arabia and the liberation of Kuwait) was the subject of intense debate in political circles and in the media. The Belgian government sent a frigate, three minehunters and a logistic support vessel to the Gulf. Throughout the operations, Belgium favoured a ‘logic of peace’ and avoided direct contact with the adversary but was willing to ‘help allies who have chosen to participate in offensive operations on the ground’.41 This consistent position met with resistance, even irritation, in the international press. In September 1990, a public debate ensued and the government initially communicated its intention to send combat aircraft to the Gulf. It soon became clear that these aircraft were not fitted with electronic protection equipment. The Security Council imposed the air embargo on 25 September 1990 (resolution 670). The following day, the government decided not to commit any aircraft but announced on the same day that the frigate Wandelaar was to be sent to the Gulf to take part in enforcing the naval embargo under Western European

Belgium and the Netherlands 49 Union (WEU) operational control. On 12 January 1991, the government repeated to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Representatives that Belgium agreed to its warships operating within the framework of the WEU on condition that they would not participate in operations involving direct contact with the potential adversary. With this proviso, ships could take part in support operations, such as anti-mine operations or the protection of such operations, and the evacuations of casualties or refugees, in zones specified by the government.They could also participate in the protection, coordination and control of maritime traffic and in the enforcement of the embargo imposed on Iraq and the occupied territory of Kuwait. The frigate Wandelaar, relieved by the Wielingen in January 1991, helped to enforce the embargo in the Gulf of Oman. In addition, Belgium deployed air force units to defend Turkey and naval assets to the Mediterranean.Turkey was not attacked, but this deterrent action made possible an immediate reaction in the event of aggression.The Belgian aircraft were based 300 kilometres from the Iraqi border, but the limitation imposed by the Belgian government on their use was clear: they were allowed to respond only in the event of direct attack, in other words in self-defence. If Turkey was attacked, the North Atlantic Council would meet and state a new mission. During the Gulf crisis, Belgium offered various forms of humanitarian aid to the Gulf populations and logistic support to member countries in the coalition. Front-line states received material aid in the form of milk, sugar, cereals and blankets. Financial aid was given and refugees transported. The countries of the coalition were given material aid and logistic support in the form of transport and transit facilities, medical aid, etc. Despite these efforts, the government was criticised both in Belgium and abroad for a matter of logistic support – its refusal to deliver ammunition to Britain.When Great Britain made an official request to the Belgian government for the delivery of 100,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, this request was refused by the ad hoc ministerial committee. This decision was motivated by the fact that apparently Saddam Hussein was holding Belgian hostages and the Belgian government considered it an inopportune moment for delivery. On 14 February 1990, Mr Coëme declared: ‘We could not give Saddam Hussein a pretext for not releasing the Belgian hostages’ (cited in Van Beveren, in Gnesotto and Roper 1992: 12). An article in Le Soir in February 1991 made a comparison between the contributions by the then twelve European Community countries to operations in the Gulf. Three categories were distinguished. The first comprised the countries directly involved in the military operations: Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands (the latter with its two frigates and a support vessel under American command in the Gulf). Then there were those who were involved to a moderate degree: Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain. These countries made bases available for use by the allies, provided logistic support and participated in the naval embargo ‘outside the immediate war zone’. Le Soir summed up their attitude as ‘aimed at a presence on the ground but without getting involved

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

in the military operations’. Last, there were the countries that provided no troops but did make financial contributions: Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg. Although Belgium did not display the ‘cynicism of the small’, its domestic constraints on going beyond logistic support and humanitarian assistance were simply too strong. Three factors are of particular relevance: the Belgian armed forces were still conscript-based; the soaring federal budget deficit; and the political energy and attention required for the reform of the constitution and the creation of a federal state. Add to that the Belgian hostages taken by Iraq in the early stages of the crisis and the picture is clear why any direct involvement of Belgian forces in the military action was considered unwise. Unosom/Restore Hope (1992/93) The decision to participate in the UN operations in Somalia was a complex matter. This is not strange or typically Belgian but followed from the developments in Somalia and within the UN. The Belgian government had already decided at an early stage of the operation to commit troops to the UN. However, rapidly deteriorating (security) conditions forced the UN to reinforce the initial peacekeeping mission by initiating a military operation with a robust mandate. This was the Unified Task Force, or UNITAF, while its American name was Restore Hope. This military operation was going to be conducted by UN members under US leadership and command. As soon as UNITAF could guarantee the security of UN personnel, the UN would restart the supply of humanitarian aid. The second UN operation, Unosom II, was tasked to take over the tasks of both UNITAF and Unosom I. The mandate of Unosom I was inter alia ‘to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance, including enforcement measures, taking over tasks launched by UNITAF’. These tasks were to ‘restore peace, stability, law and order, prevent resumption of violence’. Unosom II ended in March 1995. These rapid developments were mirrored in Belgium. At a meeting in London in September 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked Minister of Foreign Affairs Willy Claes to consider a Belgian contribution to Unosom, but at that time there were already signs of a deteriorating security situation. Boutros-Ghali thought of Belgium ‘because of its experience with African matters and because of the good reports of Belgian soldiers in Croatia’ (Tobback 1994: 16). The government decided to commit a contingent of 550 military personnel for participation in Unosom I. The blue helmets were ready for departure soon afterwards but, because of the rapidly deteriorating situation, the paratroopers were put on hold. In early December, the Belgian paras were still in Belgium. In resolution 794, the Security Council members gave a multinational force the mandate for a military intervention with a purely humanitarian goal.The mission was to be carried out by a member state or a number of member states under the leadership of the USA. The mission’s aim was ‘to create security conditions for

Belgium and the Netherlands 51 the aid and relief operations’ to save the victims of the famine. Defence Minister Delcroix informed Parliament and the press that, if Belgian paras were be asked to participate in this operation, which was a fundamentally different operation from that originally foreseen, the dossier would again be taken to the government. At the beginning of December 1992, the government decided in principle to send troops to Somalia, within the framework of resolution 794, to advance the creation of a secure environment for humanitarian operations. The Belgian paratroopers finally departed on 12 December 1992. Minister of Foreign Affairs Claes informed the press that the duration of the participation must not exceed one year. Professor Luc de Vos expressed the then existing communis opinio concerning the risks of the operation: Somalia is not the same as Yugoslavia. Somalia is a country with a number of small colonial wars, where Belgians can do the job. Somalia is a country of savannah, of small cities and villages. That requires a different strategy than Yugoslavia. … In Somalia the risks are therefore limited. (from an interview in Het Laatste Nieuws 2002) On 10 December, the Belgian Senate debated participation.The humanitarian argument dominated in the debate. MP Van Rompaey formulated it as follows:‘The military operation can be justified by the moral duty to help and assist NGO volunteers. … Some sort of Marshall Plan for Somalia by the United Nations would lead to sustainable recovery’.42 Belgium was prepared to participate in Unosom because it brought Belgium back to Africa, while notions of ‘moral duty’ and humanitarian considerations contributed to the feeling of a just humanitarian intervention, which justified the risks. UNAMIR (1994) The UN mission to Rwanda is a dark episode in Belgium’s national history. After a confused political process, it was decided to deploy 370 paratroopers to Kigali in November 1993. They were withdrawn in April 1994 after ten had been brutally killed. UNAMIR is emblematic of a process of compromising military imperatives with political and financial considerations (marchandage). In Kigali, serious flaws in internal UN mechanisms in designing the operation and Belgium’s ill-preparedness reinforced each other, thus sowing the seeds for the dramatic outcome. Of the many things that went wrong, the key factor was the number of troops deployed. The chief of defence, General Charlier, had indicated that the mission required the deployment of at least 800 soldiers. The Rwanda Commission concluded that at the time Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene had one overriding political consideration: ensuring Belgium’s accession to European Monetary Union, which meant that he had to meet stringent financial and budgetary criteria. Moreover, 1993 was

52

The case studies: a comparative analysis

the first year in which Belgium had become a fully fledged federal state with its first federal budget. Laying this budget on the table, which would be necessary if the government were to endorse the 800-men option, was asking for serious political trouble because it might well jeopardise the new political and constitutional constellation. Since meeting the Maastricht criteria became an overriding concern, the government had to reduce the costs of the deployment. The conclusion of the Rwanda Commission is crystal clear: ‘The decisive restraint on the overall size of the mission was financing.’ As a result, the personnel ceiling was very seriously scaled back. The personal account of Colonel Luc Marchal, commander of the Belgian contingent, is a cynical story of the impossibility of making the operation work with this number of soldiers (Marchal 2001). UNTAES (1996–98) In the middle of the 1990s, with the crisis in the Balkans reaching a tragic climax with the failure of Unprofor, the USA and European NATO members asked Belgium to become the lead nation for Operation UNTAES. Although this operation was considered a sideshow to the main NATO effort in Sfor, NATO allies were convinced that eastern Slavonia could develop into a thorn in the side that NATO could easily do without. The mission of UNTAES was the peaceful reintegration of the region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Sirmium into the republic of Croatia. The mission was based on chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations, which implied that force could be used to ensure freedom of movement and to implement the mission.43 The force commander, Belgian LieutenantGeneral Schoups, had the necessary means at his disposal to enforce the mission: infantry, artillery, tanks and close air support by NATO. Four battalions were to be deployed, namely the Belgian battalion with 640 men, a Pakistani battalion with 970 troops, a Russian battalion with 920 men and a Jordanian battalion with 860 troops. In addition, troops from Argentina, Ukraine (a helicopter squadron), Polish military police, Czech, Slovenian and Indonesian troops were deployed in the area, altogether some 5,000 men. The experience of Rwanda was still very fresh, and the Belgian political elite was not exactly keen on taking such a risk. It formulated a number of preconditions before it was prepared to assume the responsibility of lead nation. Belgian diplomats in both NATO and the UN negotiated hard and intensely to make sure the mandate contained the right clauses and legal status, e.g. under chapter VII. Moreover, a number of tactical considerations had to be met. In case of an emergency, the Belgian government demanded a security guarantee that NATO/Sfor would come to the assistance of UNTAES forces. Second, it demanded close air support (CAS) from NATO/Sfor as well as guarantees for medical evacuation.This was formalised in the mandate as ‘member states are authorised, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to take all necessary measures, including close air

Belgium and the Netherlands 53 support to defend or help withdraw UNTAES’ (Security Council resolution 1037). Third, the rules of engagement had to be extremely robust, and a definitive timeline was set. Meanwhile, Belgium looked for reliable partners. In the end, only Russia was prepared to dispatch a contingent of ground forces to eastern Slavonia, and Belgian diplomats had to draft the UN mandate for the operation with their Russian partners. ‘We felt terribly lonely’, said a senior Belgian diplomat when describing his feelings of that period. ‘All our partners rushed to Bosnia, wanting to participate in Sfor [50,000 soldiers], because that was where the Americans would be and we were going to be out there, on our own.’44 Operation Allied Force (1999) The parliamentary debate on Belgian participation in the air campaign to oust Slobodan Milosevic took place on 25 March 1999, one day after hostilities had commenced.45 Defence Minister Poncelet informed the plenary of the Chamber of the reasons why the Belgian government was participating with F-16 fighter planes and explained that the decision was a logical consequence of the decision that had been taken in the core cabinet on 2 March 1999.The latter was an affirmation of Belgian participation in the NATO air campaign. MPs voiced their support for the government but at the same time expressed their apprehension about the democratic deficit. And they stated in no uncertain terms that they did not agree to participation of ground troops in the war. They wanted explicit demarcations of the size and nature of the Belgian engagement. Defence Minister Poncelet assured Parliament in these terms: We will not make war in Kosovo. The Atlantic Alliance has not declared war on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.The Atlantic Alliance will use military means to impose a peace agreement on a region of the world where humanitarian law is violated, where human rights are being violated, where there is a situation involving thousands and thousands of political refugees. (from the Annales des Séances Plénières, 25 March 1999) If the situation had deteriorated, the government would have had to go back to Parliament, have another debate and probably a vote. Non-participation in MONUC (Congo) Belgium rallied international support for the Lusaka peace process in 1999 and 2000. Foreign Minister Louis Michel proved a tireless proponent of UN action in Central Africa, but any substantial Belgian military contribution to the UN operation in Congo was debarred by one of the recommendations of the Rwanda Commission. The effect of this clause

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

spurred several parliamentarians into action to ask for a revision of the clause. In a recent parliamentary debate, Prime Minister Verhofstadt defended the position of the government: We maintain the recommendations by the Rwanda Commission. … The Commission concludes that it is not desirable to participate militarily in UN interventions in countries with which Belgium has colonial ties. … But this should not condemn us to doing nothing.46 The credibility of Belgian efforts was called into question (mainly by Belgian politicians) because of this bind. Supporting a peace process without actively supporting the peacekeeping operation was considered detrimental to the credibility of Belgian foreign policy in general and its Africa policy in particular. ISAF/Enduring Freedom (2002) Belgium participated in the Enduring Freedom operation with C-130 transport planes, which were used to transport strategic goods. The Second Gulf War (2003) Belgium did not participate in the US-led coalition to oust Saddam Hussein. Instead, it was one of the most vocal opponents of the war. Foreign minister Louis Michel, one of the most visible political actors, always insisted that ‘the logic of peace’ should prevail over ‘the logic of war’. From this evidence, we can draw the conclusion that the (external) legitimacy of an operation is a crucial precondition for the Belgian government to contemplate participation. Domestic support is a sine qua non. ‘Rwanda’ has led to a certain reluctance to get involved militarily in crisis management operations. As a consequence, Belgium will demand extensive security guarantees if it is to involve itself on the ground and thus impose constraints on the collective of states. In general, Belgium is ready and willing to contribute with humanitarian aid and air transport. There are two serious reservations. The first is that Belgium will not deploy soldiers in its former colonies in Africa. The second reservation is that of resource constraints, both financial and manpower. The costs entailed by participation in international crisis management are hotly debated and easily politicised. Belgium is politically willing, technically able and financially prepared to sustain the deployment of a maximum of 1,000 soldiers. The price of this ambition is that it undercuts the ongoing transformation process. For the time being, the minister of defence fails to convince cabinet colleagues to divert money from domestic policies to foreign policy objectives. The only option that he or she has to increase defence spending is to use the European card.

Belgium and the Netherlands 55 Table 4.2 Belgian parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operations Belgium

Parliamentary involvement (high, low, none)

Initiator (executive or Parliament)

Predominant influence (Parliament or executive)

Before

During

After

First Gulf War

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

Unosom (Somalia)

low

low

low

exec.

exec.

UNAMIR (Rwanda)

low

low

high

exec.

exec.

Unprofor (former Yugoslavia)

none

low

low

exec.

exec.

Kfor/Sfor

low

low

low

exec.

exec.

Allied Force (Kosovo)

none

low

low

exec.

exec.

ISAF/Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)

low

low

low

exec.

exec.

MONUC

high

low

n/a

exec.

exec.

Second Gulf War

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

exec.

SFIR (2003/04)

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

exec.

Note: n/a not applicable. 

4.2

The Netherlands The new Dutch offer can’t be a blank cheque. (Relus ter Beek, former Dutch minister of defence)47

A central element in the self-image of the Netherlands is national pride in its tolerance and liberal attitude, which is reflected in policies that have attracted worldwide attention (both praise and scorn) on soft drugs, euthanasia, abortion and gay marriage. For some, these policies are a sure sign of a loss of fundamental values, which inevitably leads to the disintegration of society; for others, they confirm the role of the Netherlands as a country at the vanguard of social policies. The Netherlands has also fostered this role of precursor, or ‘guiding’ country, in its external relations. The Netherlands was one of the leading voices in the protests against euro-missiles; it championed human

56

The case studies: a comparative analysis

rights, with Max van der Stoel as a very successful High Commissioner on National Minorities for the OSCE; and it has engaged itself heavily in development cooperation. The Netherlands has been a confirmed and committed international activist, but the country is changing.48 A string of scandals in public life started to explode at the turn of the century, forcing the government to take a primarily internal orientation. These domestic upheavals may illustrate the decreasing relevance of the traditional qualifications for Dutch politics: sobriety, steadiness, even being boring. One national taboo that has been broken is the failure to integrate ethnic minorities into Dutch society. Paul Scheffer’s article on the ‘multicultural drama’ of Dutch society brought the failing integration policy to the surface.49 Minorities in Dutch society are still largely un-integrated and apart from mainstream society, despite the best intentions of politicians at various levels.These domestic upheavals may affect the Dutch ability to play a guiding role in international matters. Since the 1960s, the Netherlands has aimed to make a significant contribution to international peacekeeping operations.50 Since the end of the Cold War, it has deployed many thousands of UN peacekeepers. These efforts have given the Netherlands international prestige and a certain standing in the world but have also resulted in the loss of lives and illusions and some very bitter experiences. The Srebrenica debacle is one of the handful of events that shaped the face of Dutch foreign policy in the 1990s. Its aftermath shook the political establishment to its core; its consequences have reverberated in the Dutch political system ever since and led to the fall of the second ‘purple’ administration in 2002, seven years after the fall of the UN’s so-called safe area.51 As a consequence of decades of international activism, the national decision-making process concerning participation in international crisis management operations was called into question relatively early – since the beginning of the 1980s. Srebrenica not only ‘constituted a blow to the Dutch self-image’, it was also a ‘sobering experience’ that further ‘pragmatised’ Dutch foreign policy (Both 2000: 48). Events in the enclave and the consequences of the fall provided the impetus for a review of the national decision-making process and information exchange within government. At the turn of the twenty-first century, a unique set of political arrangements emerged that structures the national political process prior, during and after participation in an international crisis management operation. Basic features of the Dutch political system The promotion of the international rule of law is enshrined in the Dutch constitution. Article 90 stipulates that ‘The Government shall promote the development of the international rule of law’. This means that the government sets itself the task in its foreign policy of advancing and furthering the international rule of law.52 This obligation materialises most visibly in the tasks of the Dutch armed forces: the protection of the integrity of its own and allied territory (including the Dutch Antilles and Aruba); the advancement of

Belgium and the Netherlands 57 the international rule of law and (international) stability; and support for the civil authorities regarding law enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, both nationally and internationally (cf. Ministry of Defence 2000). The major actors that formulate, execute and control the country’s external relations are the prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of defence (including the defence staff), and Parliament.53 In this section, we will briefly outline the distribution of power and the mechanisms for policy coordination. The government – consisting of the queen plus her cabinet ministers – has supreme command over the armed forces (article 98, section 2 of the constitution). The government can declare war and make peace only with the prior consent of the States General. The constitutional role of the prime minister is that of primus inter pares: he is chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of general affairs, which is the smallest of all departments in the Netherlands.The Netherlands has a history of coalition cabinets, which determines the role of the prime minister; he is much more a broker and coordinator than a leader.54 His role in the foreign policy domain is consequently limited and weaker than in other democratic systems. Two general trends reinforce the role of the prime minister in the foreign policy domain. The first is that of an increasing fragmentation of foreign policy. Technical departments, traditionally subjected to coordination by the Department of Foreign Affairs, increasingly develop their own international and European networks. The increasingly technical nature of issues makes it more and more difficult for diplomats, who traditionally take pride in being generalists, to handle them. The Office of the Prime Minister is increasingly becoming a counterforce as its role of integrator and coordinator shapes up. The second trend is that the European dimension of foreign policy has greatly enhanced the role of the prime minister in foreign policy through the European Council of Heads of State and Heads of Government. However, despite the increasing importance of the prime minister, the principal role in foreign policy is played by the minister of foreign affairs, who is formally in charge of the overall direction, integration and coordination of Dutch foreign policy. To absorb post-Cold War changes in the security domain, the Directorate for Security Policy was instituted in 1995.55 This directorate maintains links with permanent NATO and EU representations and manages bilateral relation with the USA. Defence policy is an integral part of national security policy. All international aspects are dealt with by the ministers of defence and foreign affairs on a joint basis. All letters to Parliament on security and defence issues are in principle co-signed by the two ministers. The Ministry of Defence is traditionally regarded as a ‘technical’ department and the minister of defence as the custodian of the defence budget and arbiter of procurement plans. From a policy point of view, the minister of defence was considered to be a junior partner of the minister of foreign affairs but, in the last decade, this junior position has developed and the defence portfolio (once described as a ‘headache’ portfolio) has increased in political weight. Participation in

58

The case studies: a comparative analysis

international crisis management operations has proliferated; the recent development of a European Security and Defence Policy and increased turbulence in the international system in general may have made the position of the minister of defence more important, but it is still an unpopular job, at least in the Netherlands. The division of responsibilities at the top of the ministry is straightforward: the minister has overall responsibility for policy, while the state secretary (subordinate to the minister) is usually responsible for procurement policy, personnel policy and such other portfolios as the two politicians agree. The civil administration in the Ministry of Defence is headed by a secretary-general, who is responsible for policy formulation and preparation. From a policy perspective, the key directorate in the ministry is the Directorate for General Policy Affairs [Directie Algemene Beleidszaken] (DAB). This directorate deals with all political aspects of Dutch security and defence policy, the political implications of international cooperation, and defence industrial projects, e.g. the joint strike fighter. Counsellors from this directorate represent the Ministry of Defence in meetings with other departments and accompany the minister on trips abroad. The chief of the defence staff (CDS) is an important political actor.56 He wears two hats, as military adviser to the government, albeit via the minister of defence, and as the operational commander of forces that are deployed abroad. A special commission was installed in 2001 to review the existing top structure of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence and to make recommendations. This commission scrutinised the functioning of the top echelon of the Ministry of Defence and the defence staff and their interaction. Its recommendations have been accepted politically, and their implementation started in earnest in 2003.The main conclusion of the report was that the position of the chief of defence must be reinforced. A central and joint headquarters will be at his disposal to control all operations of the Dutch armed forces. This joint operations centre serves as a key node in channelling and dispersing information to and from the deployed units to the chief of defence and/or the minister and his counsellors. Here a daily briefing/update is held, which is in principle open to civil servants from all relevant departments. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a permanent liaison here. Dutch security and defence policy Throughout the Cold War, the Netherlands was a so-called ‘staunch ally’, very Atlanticist and unwavering in its support for the USA. Clingendael director Alfred van Staden offers an explanation for this support:‘The Dutch hoped to capitalise on their reputation for loyalty to the Alliance by developing American support for the containment of the regional ambitions of the larger Western European nations, first and foremost of France, which it suspected of striving for regional leadership’ (van Staden 1997: 93). A momentous change during the 1990s was the turn to Europe in the defence field. It has become increasingly clear that the shifting geopolitical priorities of the USA place a

Belgium and the Netherlands 59

Figure 4.2 Command structure of the Dutch armed forces Source: Commission commander-in-chief (2002).

heavier burden and greater responsibility on its European partners. In 1995, the government asserted that: The European Allies must bear a greater responsibility for peace and security. The Alliance is well served by this. … A common foreign and security policy and eventually a common defence policy are, moreover, essential components of the process of political unification in Europe … the Netherlands opts for more intensive European defence cooperation. As a consequence, our armed forces will be increasingly interwoven with the armed forces of our neighbours. (source: National Budget 1995: 7) The Dutch government thus seeks to satisfy multiple demands: it turns to Europe without damaging the Atlantic Alliance, and increasingly it seeks possibilities to integrate military units, services and tasks into multinational formations. In 1995, a joint Belgian–Dutch naval staff started operations from the naval base in Den Helder, and the German–Dutch Army Corps, based in Münster, came into existence. The White Paper presented in 2000 was the product of a lengthy process of political deliberation and rounds of public consultation. The contours of the international order were becoming clearer by that time, as were the needs and demands for modern, rapidly deployable, flexible and multi-role armed forces. The end of the massive overhaul of the army is in sight, conscription has been suspended (not abolished), and the Air Mobile Brigade is operational and deployable.57 Key words that characterise the armed forces are mobility, flexibility, interoperability, multifunctionality; key words in security analyses are (un)predictability, threats, risks, stability. When it comes to European integration, the Netherlands is cautious and

60

The case studies: a comparative analysis

firmly guards its transatlantic link. In the European Union domain, the Dutch take up their responsibility but – unlike the Belgians – do not speak out very strongly in favour of the Europeanisation of defence. However, the Netherlands has embraced the new and extended security agenda and the rhetoric that goes with it. That discourse is dominated by conflict prevention, a comprehensive approach, security cooperation and risk management. On the more rhetorical level of political declarations, we see that the Netherlands remains firmly loyal to NATO as the cornerstone of European security but that, in its de facto approach to international crisis and stability, it is much more in line with the EU than it asserts at the political level. At the turn of the century, the armed forces had more or less absorbed the changes of the end of the Cold War. The Dutch armed forces have been professionalised and are capable of deploying on a global scale. The current round of budget cuts coincides with the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission Franssen, which called for a further integration of staff into a joint central staff and a new personnel policy, which opens all joint job slots to all military and civil personnel. This requires a thorough reorganisation of service staff.The first chapter of the White Paper presented in 2000 is titled ‘An Active Security Policy’. Dutch security policy ‘is not limited to the security of the Netherlands and Allied territory, it is also aimed at the advancement of the international rule of law and respect for human rights’.58 An active security policy can be shaped by participation in international crisis management operations. This notion is a categorical description of all ‘voluntary’ operations not resulting from an allied or other political commitment (NATO, OSCE, UN, EU). The Dutch government goes even further and defines what it calls an ‘ambition level’. This is a level of participation that is both operationally sustainable and financially affordable. Initially, the mark was placed on the ability to conduct and sustain simultaneous participation in four crisis management operations with units the size of an infantry battalion, or the equivalent, a squadron of F-16s or two frigates. Compared with the Netherlands’ defence expenditure, international standards and the size of the armed forces, this level is relatively high. In 2002, the ambition level was adjusted without much political fuss to three concurrent participations. According to Alfred van Staden, participation in international missions is ‘unmistakeably driven by humanitarian impulses, [but] the Netherlands also tried to use this participation as a vehicle for enhancing its international prestige’ (van Staden et al. 1997: 89). To sum up, Dutch defence policy is an active policy, with a strong emphasis on bilateral and multilateral security cooperation; it is aimed at stimulating European security cooperation without diminishing the Atlantic Alliance. The armed forces are technologically and operationally competent and are increasingly integrated into multinational military frameworks.The current reorganisation process is aimed at centralising and slimming down the top structure of the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces and should result in a unitary, multi-service structure.

Belgium and the Netherlands 61 The national decision-making process The formal responsibility for decisions to participate in an international crisis management operation lies with the Dutch government.The decision is made by the Council of Ministers, with the prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs and defence as key actors. The chief of defence acts as military adviser to the government, albeit via the minister of defence. Parliament is informed as early as possible, and a structured sequence of consultations will follow. This practice is quite an advanced system in political terms. Policy coordination of national participation in international crisis management operations has increased in intensity over the years. In the early 1990s, the informal circuit and ‘ad hockery’ dominated. Later, more formal meetings and working groups were formed. A relatively recent creation (2001) is the permanent working group ‘peace operations’ made up of representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the Office of the Prime Minister and the defence staff. This working group meets weekly and is the main governmental vehicle for policy integration and coordination. In the decision-making procedure that is currently followed, the government informs Parliament as soon as it receives a formal request for participation in an international crisis management operation by sending a socalled article 100 (constitution) letter to Parliament signed by the minister of defence and the minister of foreign affairs. This letter is always followed by a letter setting out the position that the government is intending to take, which boils down to either ‘we intend to participate’ or ‘we do not intend to participate’. On the basis of this second letter, Parliament can put oral and/or written questions to the minister, and a public debate will be held.This debate allows the ministers to present and defend their case and allows all political parties to put forward their party positions. This is a rather intense period, because informal consultations and exchanges of information complement the formal procedure. Another important characteristic is the fact that the Dutch have a strong preference for consensual decision making. An often-used label is the socalled ‘polder model’, which essentially stands for a (social) practice, a way of organising social processes for taking difficult decisions. Key to this model are the extensive rounds of consultation and the fact that all parties can have their say and will be listened to.59 In this model, the method of taking a decision (‘by all’) often seems to be perceived as more important than the substance of the decision. Dutch people are allergic to decisions that are taken unilaterally and enforced on them without an opportunity to express their opinions on the matter.The downside is that the political system almost grinds to a halt when important, far-reaching and often painful decisions must be taken.Vision is one thing, but implementing a vision requires leadership, and that quality does not come naturally in the Low Countries. Decisions with great societal impact have dragged on for years, if not decades: the enlargement of Schiphol Airport, the High-Speed Train and the so-called ‘Betuwelijn’, a rail link from the port of Rotterdam to the German

62

The case studies: a comparative analysis

hinterland. International perceptions are generally that the Dutch have been highly successful in recent decades. The danger is complacency.60 Paul Scheffer is very critical in his diagnosis of Dutch society. It is a society with much ‘overdue maintenance’, where ‘tolerance is associated with a growing sloppiness of the constitutional state’, where consensus – the idea that democracy means that many have to be brought into the discussion – has become as ‘incompetence to take difficult decisions, in short synonymous with administrative stagnation’ (Scheffer, in Koch amd Scheffer 1996: 31). The benefits of the past may have become the obstacles of the future. Parliamentary involvement: the development of a practice61 If the Dutch government contemplates participating in an international crisis management operation, it is bound to follow a predetermined procedure. Its relation with Parliament is structured by a so-called ‘review framework’ (Toetsingskader), which consists of a set of ‘points of consideration’ to focus the decision making, clarify the motives for participation and establish the boundaries of the mandate that the government will obtain from Parliament. This framework is not unique – Belgium has introduced a similar one – but the political practice of pre-structured consultations is unique.We believe that in order to appreciate the full significance of this framework, a brief description of its genesis is required. Unique to the Dutch case is that the first version of the framework was evaluated for its political effects and significance by a parliamentary committee of inquiry. The review framework came into existence after a debate that has been taking place on and off for over twenty years. During this time, different issues and questions have propelled the debate, which was launched in the late 1970s when the Dutch government contemplated participating in the UN peacekeeping force in south Lebanon (UNIFIL). After some internal deliberations, the government took a formal decision to participate in the operation with one armoured infantry battalion, consisting (mainly) of conscripted soldiers. All preparatory work on the side of the government was conducted under strict confidentiality ‘in order to prevent unrest and panic’.The cabinet informed Parliament via a letter in which it gave the motive for its positive reply to the request of the secretary-general: Time and again the wish has been expressed that the Netherlands should play an active role in the United Nations. [The cabinet] considers this [affirmative] decision to be an obligation to the international community. (States General, 1978) Parliamentarians felt overwhelmed by the unilateral nature of the decision and the ‘businesslike’ manner in which they had been informed. A fierce and lengthy debate ensued that revolved around two issues: (1) the question of (voluntary) deployment of conscripted soldiers; and (2) the government’s duty

Belgium and the Netherlands 63 to inform Parliament, the procedure that should have been followed and the information the government should have given to Parliament. MPs accused the government of neglecting the tacit agreement that Parliament should be informed as quickly as possible. The minister of foreign affairs defended himself by saying that ‘speed was of the essence’, hence he had been unable to consult Parliament. The irritation of Parliament did not subside, and four parliamentary motions were tabled. The most significant was the one tabled by MP Brinkhorst (Democrats ’66), who considered the way the government had taken the UNIFIL decision ‘annoying’ and ‘not beneficial’ for the trust between government and Parliament and asked the government from now on ‘not to take decisions regarding the participation of the Netherlands in a UN peacekeeping operation until after consultation with Parliament’.62 Reacting to this turmoil, the minister of defence asked the Defence Advisory Council to advise the government on the relevant problems related to participation in UN peacekeeping operations. A year later, the council presented its report to the government.63 The council expressed its surprise that the letter from the ministers of defence and foreign affairs tasking the Defence Advisory Council to undertake its inquiry did not contain any reference to ‘criteria by which a governmental decision can be reviewed’ (ADA 1980: 57). According to the council, it is advisable to formulate such criteria because they can play a dual role: in the deliberation process before the government takes a formal decision and as benchmarks in the parliamentary oversight process. The council also issued a warning: the introduction of criteria must not be regarded as a preconditioning of the basic willingness to contribute to a UN peacekeeping operation. The council formulated seven criteria that serve as parameters in the process of deciding whether to participate in a UN peacekeeping operation.64 In its reaction to the report, the government subscribed to these criteria in principle.65 The debate boiled down to two issues: (1) the deployment of conscripted soldiers in non-UN missions; and (2) the non-voluntary deployment of conscripts in UN missions. Both questions remain unresolved, but the government did state that the ‘voluntary principle’ would be the guiding light, because it would contribute to the ‘maximum motivation required to bring the assigned tasks to a good end’.66 A parliamentary reaction was inevitable. MP Ton Frinking (Christian Democrats) filed a motion stating that ‘it is desirable, that Parliament can form its opinion in a timely fashion on the non-voluntary deployment of conscripted soldiers outside the Netherlands on active duty, where the Netherlands has no obligations and the nature and circumstances of the deployment are such that special guarantees must be given’. Frinking asked the government ‘prior to the effectuation of such a decision, to present this decision for discussion to Parliament’.67 At the end of the 1980s, it had become political practice for the government to consult Parliament on the basis of a letter sent by the government to Parliament, in which the government specified and explained the mission and circumstances, the personnel

64

The case studies: a comparative analysis

and materials to be deployed, and the financial consequences. The government did inform Parliament, not only about major developments in big operations like Cambodia or the former Yugoslavia but also about the deployment of lesser numbers of personnel and materials. The next point of crystallisation was the Defence White Paper of 1991. The aim of this White Paper was to take stock of the monumental changes at the end of the Cold War. The minister of defence stated that ‘whether the Netherlands participates in a military action outside the NATO treaty area, and with what means, must be decided on a case-by-case basis. … Vital interests of the Netherlands and of Allies must be at stake’ (Ministry of Defence 1991: 30).This White Paper was extensively debated in Parliament (a debate that coincided with the First Gulf War).The possibility of deployment in the Gulf War sparked off the discussion on the conditions under which the Netherlands could participate in out-of-area operations. Labour MP Maarten van Traa raised the question of what are ‘vital interests’ and made the point that participation in out-of-area operations was acceptable only under strict conditions and must follow from the need to secure the international rule of law. In a subsequent motion he spelled out the ‘strict criteria’ that must be met. Participation in an international framework should be allowed only if the deployment is based on a Security Council resolution (if in UN framework); in the case of direct aggression, takes place ex art. 51 of the UN charter; in the case of UN peacekeeping outside the framework of the UN, if all parties involved agree; serves to deter a massive violation of basic human rights in the frame of a humanitarian crisis operation. (from the Defence White Paper 1991) In January 1993, another Defence White Paper was presented. During the ensuing parliamentary debate, the criteria for Dutch participation in peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations cropped up again. Defence Minister ter Beek answered that he considered the formulation of ‘rigid criteria’ a bridge too far:‘there is no such thing as a simple yardstick that would approve the deployment of the armed forces in one case and not in another. … Strict criteria will become a tight straightjacket.’68 Ter Beek preferred to speak of ‘elements of political decision making’ instead of ‘criteria’.The content of the debate was formally changed into ‘parliamentary involvement in the decision to deploy military units’ when ter Beek and his foreign affairs colleague Kooijmans sent a letter to Parliament in January 1994 on this topic.69 The ministers referred explicitly to the experiences of the Gulf War. The letter proposed a procedure by which government informs Parliament in writing before taking a formal decision.The letter worked out the institutional (political and legal) framework and also the operational aspects, the mission and the financial consequences. This letter generated a major debate, which dragged on for months. In December 1994, six MPs from various parties signed a

Belgium and the Netherlands 65 motion in which they ‘request the government to prepare a procedure, which lays down the right of formal consent for Parliament in the case of deployment of military units’.70 The main proponent of this motion was MP van Middelkoop. The debate gained additional momentum from the debate on the Dutch contribution to the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) and on the criteria for deployment of those units.Van Middelkoop pointed to the extreme difficulty of formulating criteria that can be used to review a deployment decision. The government shares the wish of Parliament to ‘increase the structure and level of review of a customary practice, taking into account the number and diversity of deployment possibilities and the changed composition of the armed forces’.71 With regard to the merit of parliamentary involvement, the minister of defence remarked that: such a right [of consent] can best be developed on the basis of an existing parliamentary practice, meaning that Parliament actually has a right of dissent. Developing customary law means that the Netherlands can respond quickly and constructively to various requests to deploy soldiers to maintain international law, while Parliament retains all its rights. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001a) Van Middelkoop asked the ministers of defence and foreign affairs to formulate a ‘review framework’ consisting of a set of points for consideration (‘criteria’ was considered an unsuitable term, since it might – incorrectly – seem to imply automaticity) that will enable Parliament to review the deployment decision proposed by the government. The two ministers promised a policy paper, which was to include a review framework.72 During the early months of 1995, the situation in the UN enclaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina worsened, and in July Srebrenica fell. The debate on parliamentary involvement picked up momentum, and the ministers of defence and foreign affairs had their review framework ready in June 1995. The aim of the framework was to come to a closer agreement on the involvement of Parliament in the decision-making process regarding the deployment of military units and thus to ‘structure’ the relation between government and Parliament.The letter from the two ministers ended with an indication of the limitations of the review framework and how it should be used: ‘The abovementioned points for consideration are nothing more than an aid for the creation of a deliberate, well-balanced political and military judgement on the basis of specific characteristics of each and every case. These [points] don’t lend themselves to mechanical application.This list needs to be updated from time to time to accommodate current conditions and circumstances and lessons and experiences.’73 The review framework mentions fourteen different ‘points for consideration’ divided into two broad categories: political desirability and military feasibility. The points in the political desirability category are aimed at answering the question ‘what political aims are being pursued with the deployment of Dutch soldiers?’

66

The case studies: a comparative analysis

In order to prepare itself for a debate with Parliament, the government asked the Advisory Council on Peace and Security to prepare a commentary on the review framework before it faced Parliament in November 1995. This commentary was presented in October.74 The report identified two distinct responsibilities and motivations: the government wants to retain sufficient flexibility to react quickly and decisively, while Parliament wants to be involved to the maximum extent possible.The advisory council also observed that the review framework has a dual function: on the one hand a list of points for consideration that aids the post hoc review process of a cabinet decision, fitting the established custom of information and consultation; on the other hand, the request to arrive at a procedure in which Parliament has to give its formal consent to Dutch participation in international operations, fitting the desire of Parliament to be maximally involved. (AVV 1995a: 4) The next important step was the establishment of a Temporary Parliamentary Committee on Deployment Decisions (we will designate it by its Dutch abbreviation,TCBU).75 This committee, chaired by MP Bert Bakker, started work in 1999 and presented its conclusions and recommendations at the end of 2000. The TCBU was tasked to investigate the Dutch decision-making process, with specific attention to participation decisions in international crisis management operations. The research question as it was specified by the TCBU itself in a letter to the Speaker of the House was ‘to make an analysis of the political decision making regarding the participation in peace operations, and the decisions regarding the continuation, termination and evaluation of peace operations, including in any case an examination of the deployments to former Yugoslavia’.76 The final report offers a wealth of information and gives us a view behind the normally closed doors of departments, the cabinet and parliamentary committees. It also gives, and this is more important for this research, a political analysis and evaluation of the functioning and effects of the review framework that was introduced in 1995. The report describes how the Dutch government took its decisions to participate in international crisis operations and how it structured (shaped) its relation with and position vis-à-vis Parliament. The recommendations of the TCBU have led to a revision of the existing review framework.77 The committee concluded that ‘taking the development of the review framework into account, it is primarily meant as a means to structure the consultations between government and Parliament. In addition, it serves to anchor the quality of the decision making’ (TCBU (I) 2000: 459). The review framework has three uses: (1) in the decision-making process within departments and the cabinet; (2) in the process of accountability of ministers to Parliament; and (3) in the evaluation of deployment decisions by Parliament (ibid.: 459).

Box 4.1 Points for consideration from the review framework 1995 (HTK 1994–95, 23 591, No. 5) Political desirability 1. Deployment of military units will take place if it is in the interest of the Netherlands and/or the advancement of the international rule of law; 2. Deployment must be in accordance with international law and must be based preferably on a clear UN mandate or mandate of another international organisation; 3. … factors like solidarity, credibility and the sharing and distribution of responsibility, burdens and risks play a role; 4. … a multinational approach has our preference, to ensure the willingness to take part in international operations in the long run; 5. Deployment … is never automatic. The Dutch government decides on a case-by-case basis on participation in an international operation.There must be enough public and parliamentary support.

[Military] feasibility 6. The aim of an international operation, written in the political mandate, must be translated into a concrete military mission; 7. The government [must] assess whether the political and military goals of the operation can be reasonably met. Operational characteristics of the conflict play an important role in that respect; 8. Adequate political and public support is necessary … the burden of an international operation be carried solely by small states. … This can be prevented by spreading the participation over a group of states. Another possibility is to arrange for the relief of the units … and reasonable sharing of the financial burden; 9. Determine the units which … are available; 10. The Dutch units must operate in a clear chain of command … ; 11. The risks for the deployable personnel must be assessed as accurately as possible … ; 12. The rules of engagement … must be formulated unambiguously … [and] must make an effective execution of the mission possible … ; 13. Adequate financial accommodation of the operation … must be guaranteed; 14. Every affirmative commitment to a participation must contain a term [duration]. After expiry the Dutch participation will be terminated or require a new decision.

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

An important finding of the committee concerns evidence of the perceived utility of the review framework.The committee interviewed people who had used the review framework directly, either as a parliamentarian, official or cabinet minister. The officials converge on the utility of the framework.78 According to Minister of Defence Frank de Grave, ‘the review framework is a very well-known concept, all officials involved in the decision-making and preparation process know it and use it, it serves as a guide’. The deputy chief of the defence staff qualified it as ‘almost a railway timetable, on the basis of which the politicians are informed about the advice of the CDS’.The director of the main planning department of the ministry of defence considers it an ‘important improvement of the decision-making process. It is conscientiously used … and contributes to thorough decision making’. Parliamentarians share the opinion of the utility of the review framework. GreenLeft MP Vos qualifies the framework as ‘crucial’ and cites the availability of information as a key factor in justifying participation for the GreenLeft Party. Commenting on the decisions concerning air operations over the former Republic of Yugoslavia, she stated that ‘we found that the government had given us good information about those matters [risk levels, mandate, objectives, etc.] and that we could give a judgement about the decisions’ (ibid.: 470). Although the TCBU observed that there was no integral application of the review framework, it believed that it does serve as a guiding principle, primarily for the process of accounting for the decision to deploy the armed forces. The review framework is also an accounting device in the direction of the cabinet and Parliament and an aid in the decision-making process throughout the preparation for and the sustaining and conclusion of a participation. The framework serves in all these phases as a guide. At the start of the decisionmaking process, it primarily provides guidance for the collection of information and the provision of information to politicians and Parliament. During the phase of actually deciding about and agreeing on a deployment, as well as during the phase of sustaining the deployment, the framework serves as a guide to account for a decision or extension (ibid.: 476). Recapitulating, it can be said that the evidence collected by the committee points to two significant aspects. The first is that the ‘structuring effect’ of the review framework is a positive counterforce against improvisation and ‘ad hockery’; it serves as an instrument to build common ground and enhance a common understanding among a group of varied stakeholders. The second aspect in which the decision-making process has been improved is on substance.The introduction of the review framework has had a positive effect on the ability of the government to make decisions on a thorough basis because it gives orientation and direction to the work of the officials involved in the preparation of the decision. It contributes to the creation of broad political and public support because it enhances the transparency of the decision: the government must account for its decision in advance, before formally taking it. The review framework also facilitates the

Belgium and the Netherlands 69 evaluation by Parliament of the decision and action after the operation has been concluded. In July 2001, Parliament adopted a revised review framework.The revisions were based on the conclusions and recommendations of the TCBU as well as on the conclusions of the report by the AVV published in 1995. The framework 2001 sets out the preconditions and requirements to be attached by the Dutch government to participation in any international crisis management operation.The way in which these preconditions are formulated is important: not ‘tick-in-the-box’ criteria but open questions or issues that must be addressed in the decision-making process. A second important change that has been absorbed in this revised framework is the amendment of the constitution, which was the last step in the evolution of executive–legislature relations. A new Article 100 has been created providing that the government must ‘inform the States General prior to committing the armed forces for maintaining or promoting the international rule of law’. This includes giving prior information about the deployment of the armed forces for humanitarian assistance in an armed conflict (paragraph 1).The formalisation of this amendment is pending. It is important to note that the government is obliged to inform and not that it is required to seek consent. This remains a constitutional convention. Parliament can thus crown its achievements for more parliamentary involvement in the decision-making process to deploy the armed forces. It has the material right of consent and a unique tool at its disposal that contributes positively to the thoroughness, transparency and accountability of politically sensitive and important decisions. During the same time frame, the General Accounting Office (ARK) presented its report, ‘Lessons from Peacekeeping Operations’.This report gave additional impetus to structuring and institutionalising the process of evaluation of completed operations.79 The ARK reviewed five completed and three ongoing missions and concluded that the evaluation process within the Ministry of Defence left much to be desired.This resulted in the creation of a ‘lessons learned’ bureau within the defence staff, and the CDS ordered that all operations must be evaluated. From then on, the learning curve climbed upwards. Former Defence Minister Frank de Grave acted on recommendations of one of the Srebrenica investigations and established a comprehensive framework directing all activities such as debriefings, evaluations and postdeployment care. In 1999, the defence minister reported that from then on a multidisciplinary team would conduct the evaluations. At the same time, a deadline was introduced for every operation: Parliament must receive a first evaluation within six months after completion of the operation. Assessment The political effects of formalising these points of consideration in a review framework are considerable. Although the parliamentary committee (TCBU) concluded that the review framework of 1995 ‘gave insufficient structure to

70

The case studies: a comparative analysis

the debate between government and Parliament and hence contributed too little to ensuring the quality of the decision making’ (TCBU (I) 2000: 491), evidence from political practice with the revised review framework from 2001 suggests that these omissions have been repaired. The main objective of the review framework 2001 remains that of structuring the political decision process, i.e. the relation between government and Parliament, their debate and the process of information exchange. Second, the political decision-making process has become relatively open and transparent. In principle, all political meetings between government and Parliament are open to the public, and all information is available to the press and the public. Third, the Dutch constellation of powers and players is unique in the respect that Parliament has the material right to consent to a government decision on participation in international crisis management operations. The way in which government and Parliament co-shape the decision points to a unique constitutional figure, that of ‘material co-responsibility’, a situation in which Parliament and government align their different responsibilities behind a common position. This information suggests that formalising a review framework of conditions and requirements has the effect of making it serve as an instrument for building common ground and common understanding among the stakeholders in the decision-making process. Concerning the role and function of a formalised review framework, we note the following.The review framework is used by different categories of people for different purposes at different times. The first function of the framework is that of thoroughness. Officials in the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs preparing the decision use it to make sure that they build a strong case and that a thorough decision is being made. ‘Thorough’ in this context means careful, not only ensuring that the decision is based on the best information available and looking at the question from every possible angle but also preventing rash decisions. At the same time, we see that a formalised review framework greatly enhances the transparency of the governmental decision process. Cabinet ministers who have to defend the government decision in Parliament use the review framework to explain, give reasons for and substantiate the government’s motives, arguments, considerations and justifications for participation. Parliament has a constitutional interest in guarding the integrity of the government and the accountability of ministers. The debates analysed show that Parliament uses the framework to analyse and scrutinise decisions that have been made and to deal with the question of accountability. For Parliament, the third function of the review framework is that it serves as an instrument for enhancing the process of assigning ministerial accountability. This issue is usually addressed ex post facto, after the operation has ended. In summary, we observe three different functions (thoroughness, transparency, accountability) and three different groups of users (officials, cabinet ministers, Parliament). We also note that the review framework is used at three different moments in the decision-making process: ex ante (officials), the moment of making the decision (cabinet) and ex post (Parliament).

Belgium and the Netherlands 71 Since the introduction of the review framework, Parliament has been receiving objectively more and better information from the government before, during and after an operation. The government has become far more aware of the dangers of international crisis management operations, but the pressure of Parliament is positive in the sense that, for example, the government now carries out risk analyses much more thoroughly and professionally than it did ten years ago. It is remarkable, and perhaps this is an unintended consequence that, while the increased involvement of Parliament was initially intended ‘to put a brake’ on the enthusiasm of the government in deploying the armed forces, it has actually given Parliament wider scope for spurring the government into action, which it has subsequently proceeded to do. The government is now obliged to explain its position of non-participation in cases with a high profile, e.g. MONUC. Public opinion80 Dutch public opinion attracted world attention during the first half of the 1980s with mass resistance to the deployment of forty-eight cruise missiles on Dutch soil. Hundreds of thousands joined the street protests against these weapons. Richard Eichenberg, in an article in International Security, pointed out how sensitive successive Dutch governments were to public opinion. He concluded that ‘What seems to be unique about the Dutch case is not the level of public scepticism of security policies but the comparatively strong impact that opinions have had on Dutch governments’ (Eichenberg 1993: 145). The impact of public opinion on foreign policy in the Netherlands is indeed relatively strong. As in most countries, foreign policy used to be the business of a small, liberal and aristocratic elite, but this ended with the Second World War. Ultimately, the international factors that acted on Dutch foreign policy proved to be stronger than domestic public opinion. An explanation can be found in the fact that the Netherlands has had coalition governments for decades. This has shaped the political culture of consensual decision making, resulting in Dutch political culture being characterised by the absence of leadership. Prime ministers know that they have to ‘befriend’ their coalition partners in order to get their common policy programmes realised. Journalists Joustra and van Venetië describe the role of the prime minister as follows: You may be powerful, but don’t say it aloud. It is not surprising that Prime Ministers belittle their own job. Prime Minister Lubbers described himself as the coordinator who, ‘now and then helped a minister’, and ‘the jump starter of necessary policy’. (Joustra and van Venetië 1993: 25) It is the ‘fiction of collegiality that makes leadership possible’, writes political scientist van den Berg (cited in ibid.: 25).This lack of leadership or conviction about the way leadership should be executed leads to another conviction: that

72 The case studies: a comparative analysis it is not possible to actively build public support. Unlike their British and French counterparts, who firmly believe that public opinion can be made, Dutch political leaders sometimes seem to think that public opinion is a political given, and that their ability to influence it is marginal. Recent operations In this section, we will review a number of deployment decisions that reveal the changes in how government approaches the decision to deploy the armed forces.81 Participation in UNAMIC/UNTAC (Cambodia, 1992) The motives of the Dutch government for participation in the UNAMIC/ UNTAC (UN Advance Mission in Cambodia/UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia) missions consisted of general objectives of foreign policy, the wish to contribute to international peace and stability and to promote the international rule of law.82 The ministers of defence and foreign affairs pointed out that participation would mean giving a positive signal to Southeast Asia.The criteria and preconditions on which the decision for Dutch participation was based were not explicitly mentioned in the official recommendations and in letters from government to Parliament. Bureaucratic decision making was highly influenced by the preceding political decision making, most notably by the Defence White Paper of 1991. The ‘ambition level’ mentioned in this document had to be realised. In a letter to Parliament, the ministers of defence and foreign affairs cited ‘careful deliberations’ to motivate the informal Dutch offer but did not specify any individual criteria on which they had based their deliberations.The duration of the deployment was not a criterion. Neither was the location within the area of operations a political issue in the Netherlands.The increasing risks during the operation did not lead to renewed deliberation within the Ministry of Defence over the deployment.The same went for the fact that part of the mandate, disarming the Khmer Rouge, could not be carried out. Although the risks attached to the mission were extensively reviewed, they were not put together in a single integrated risk analysis.83 The Parliamentary Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees were briefed behind closed doors. A marine battalion was offered for the whole duration of the operation, which was limited by the UN Security Council to eighteen months. The decision to participate for the whole duration of the operation had broad support in Parliament. The operational aspects of the deployment were evaluated by the Ministry of Defence, not by Parliament.This evaluation was intended primarily for internal use and was not made available to Parliament. Participation in Unprofor (1993 onwards) The main motive for Dutch participation in the Unprofor operation was to make a contribution to a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the former

Belgium and the Netherlands 73 Yugoslavia. Additional reasons and motives were allied solidarity, humanitarian motives and European security interests (TCBU (I) 2000: 398–9). The Netherlands participated with a signals unit, a transport unit and an infantry unit. When the Dutch government informally notified the UN secretariat at the end of 1991 that it was ready for a contribution to the (yet to be mandated) UN operation in Yugoslavia, the main precondition was the consent of all parties involved in the conflict. In their letter to Parliament concerning the deployment of the signals unit, the ministers of defence and foreign affairs touched only indirectly upon the need for military feasibility of the operation. The emphasis of the decision was on the political desirability of being engaged in the search for a peaceful solution of the conflict in Croatia. In the decision-making process concerning the transport unit, the risks of the deployment formed the most important criterion. For Parliament, too, assessment of the risks was tantamount. The decision-making process concerning the infantry unit did not include a review based on singular, unambiguous criteria.The reason for this was that for a long time it remained unclear under what mandate (implementation of peace accord or humanitarian assistance in a war situation), within which international organisation (UN or NATO), for which tasks and at what location this battalion would be deployed. In the end, the unit was deployed to take part in the execution of Security Council resolutions regarding safe areas. The concept of safe areas remained unclear, and this lack of clarity contributed to a lack of explicit deliberations. The decision was made under pressure of circumstances and international relations. Participation in Ifor and Sfor (1995 onwards) The main motive for the Dutch government’s participation in the Implementation Force (Ifor) was that it considered a successful implementation of the Dayton Agreement to be of the utmost importance for the humanitarian situation and stability in the region. The credibility of NATO was an additional motive. In November 1995, Defence Minister Voorhoeve formulated six preconditions for Dutch participation in Ifor in BosniaHerzegovina: (1) a viable, realistic agreement, including control of the weapons of the conflicting parties; (2) a clear and realistic mandate for Ifor; (3) adequate political leadership; (4) adequate troop levels and NATO aircraft; (5) a clear chain of command; and (6) Ifor may not be dispersed over Bosnia. Official documents show that crucial criteria for Dutch participation in Ifor were a clear UN mandate, a single and integrated chain of command (no ‘double keys’), an adequate structure for the participation of third countries, enough participating third countries – especially the United States – adequate financial accommodation, and robust rules of engagement. The mandate and the rules of engagement had not been validated at the moment when cabinet and Parliament began their decision-making process. Parliament signalled its

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

agreement, expecting the UN Security Council resolution to be substantially adequate (TCBU (I) 2000: 397). Participation in UNFICYP The TCBU concluded that there were only two conditions that were of real interest as regards the motives for participation. The first condition was that UNIFCYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) must be a UN operation. For this reason, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted on participating when it became clear that the UK had difficulties in accepting the Dutch contribution. The second condition was that the Dutch participation must be sufficiently visible. The national press accused the government of peddling its armed forces. Participation in Operation Allied Force (1999) The main motive for participating in this operation was the situation in Kosovo. The government was convinced that the atrocities must stop. Other motives for participating were the credibility of NATO and allied solidarity (TCBU (I) 2000: 391). In addition to the principle of proportionality of the contribution, the government formulated four preconditions for its participation, i.e. for its agreement to the issue of the so-called Activation Order (Actord) that would set the operation in motion: 1 2 3 4

The decision must be made by NATO as a whole. The largest possible majority of allies must participate in an air campaign, should there be one. There should be maximum use of all diplomatic and political means and instruments in all phases of the air operation. Continuous political control during the whole process of each phase of the military operation must be ensured, and implications for decision making in the subsequent phase(s) must be accounted for.

Participation in the UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) Decision making for UNMEE was ‘Bakker-proof ’, so an excited minister of defence claimed, meaning that the decision-making process followed in detail the recommendations made by the TCBU. The letter to Parliament was thorough, comprehensive and detailed. There was broad parliamentary support for the operation. Parliament had the ability to inform itself to a great extent, and it was briefed regularly during the operation. Parliament was also involved in operational details. Having learned from the bitter experiences of the failed peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, the pendulum had swung to the other side: force protection became issue number one, and Parliament took an extraordinary interest in the risk

Belgium and the Netherlands 75 analyses provided before the mission. Prior to the deployment of a marine battalion, a heated debate took place in Parliament for weeks on end. The debate revolved around security guarantees in the event of an unforeseen escalation of hostilities (the minister of defence had an informal guarantee from his American counterpart, but nothing hard, i.e. in writing); the participation of a ‘big power’ was also one of the points for consideration (Canada was found to be participating and stood in as a big power – the minister of foreign affairs defended his position by saying ‘Canada is a big country’); and, finally, the deployment of Apache helicopters as additional protection for the marine battalion was also mooted. The chief of the defence staff had ‘no military reasons’ to deploy the Apaches or take additional precautionary measures. The UN likewise did not see the need for these helicopters and did not allow the Apaches to be positioned in the UN area of operations, but Parliament insisted, and the minister of defence went along with the opinion of Parliament and deployed the Apaches to Djibouti.84 After the operation, an evaluation was carried out by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was subsequently debated in Parliament. The main points of ex post attention were the extra costs and alleged ill will in the cooperation between the three services. Participation in Essential Harvest and non-participation in MONUC (2001) In the early summer of 2001, the Dutch government needed to decide on participation in two operations. It had received requests from the UN via the DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) to participate in the UN operation in the Congo and via NATO channels to participate in NATO’s Operation Essential Harvest, aimed at disarming Albanian rebels in Macedonia. The way in which the Dutch government implemented the revised review framework becomes clear in the letter of the government informing Parliament about its decision not to participate in the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).The ministers state that: This decision resulted from the application of the criteria in the review framework for deployment of military units, including the conclusions Parliament has drawn after the recommendations of the Temporary Parliamentary Committee on Deployment Decisions. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001b) The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo was created by the Security Council in November 1999. Its primary task was to ensure observance of the Lusaka Agreements (July 1999). MONUC was mandated under chapter VII of the UN charter to take, within its area of operations and within its capabilities, necessary action to protect UN personnel and material and, as far as possible, the seriously threatened civilian population. When the

76

The case studies: a comparative analysis

DPKO sent out a general request to member states to contribute observers to MONUC, the Dutch delegation at the UN reacted that (pending the debate in Parliament) the Dutch government would not participate. Although the government was not willing to contribute militarily, it expressed its willingness to support MONUC on another basis, e.g. financially or materially. According to the government, the predominant bottlenecks were the feasibility of the political and military objectives, the risks to the deployed soldiers, the participating countries and the inability to exert influence. Regarding the feasibility of political and military objectives, the government was very clear: the mission lacked a clear and feasible mandate. Also, the mission of MONUC was formulated in very general terms, while the elaborated operational plans were subjected to continual change. The conflict in the DRC was very complex, so the chances of ‘spoilers’ were great and the will for peace among the parties was not evident. The design of the operation was not in line with the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. The secretariat of the UN seemed to have started from a ‘best case’ scenario instead of a ‘worst case’ scenario. MONUC lacked sufficient military information to draft a plan of action for the verification of the withdrawal of foreign troops. The reasoning of the government hinges on three factors: risks, participating countries and influence. Unarmed military observers are vulnerable, which was a serious concern in view of the fragile security situation. In its presentation (in February 2001), the DPKO mentioned that the tasks of the military units would be to support and protect (civilian) UN personnel. However, so the government stated, in the circumstances active protection or evacuation was not possible. The units would thus not be able to ensure credible selfdefence. Moreover, there were insufficient guarantees in case of calamities, or situations in which units needed to be extracted. With regard to the participating countries, the government stated that the UN secretariat had received positive replies from Uruguay, Senegal, Morocco and Tunisia. The government considered the composition of MONUC to be too uniform (i.e. no big European powers or the USA). A feasible mission was said to require not only a clear and feasible mandate and robust rules of engagement but also units able to execute such a mandate. The government was not convinced of a level of influence corresponding to the level of the contribution, considering the specifics of the mandate, its implementation and the duration of the operation. All in all, the Dutch government decided to abstain from participation. To make the case for participation in NATO’s Operation Essential Harvest, the government followed the revised review framework. The letter to Parliament (dated 17 August 2001) was ‘by the book’ and provides a thorough, detailed and comprehensive overview of the context of the conflict, previous mediation attempts, the humanitarian situation, the economic state of the country, the legal basis of the operation, the military feasibility, and a risk analysis.

Belgium and the Netherlands 77 The Second Gulf War (2003) The Dutch government decided to support the USA politically but to abstain from military involvement in the hostilities to oust Saddam Hussein.This stance was often misperceived, both at home and abroad, but the Netherlands did take on international responsibility and deployed a battalion-size unit in the wake of the hostilities (July 2003) to assist the coalition forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority in their task to rebuild Iraq (Stabilization Force in Iraq). Table 4.3 Dutch parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation The Netherlands

Parliamentary involvement (high, low, none)

Initiator (executive or Parliament)

Predominant influence (executive or Parliament)

Before

During

After

UNIFIL

none

none

high*

exec.

exec.

First Gulf War

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

UNTAC (Cambodia)

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

Unprofor (former Yugoslavia)

high

high

high

exec.

parl.

Kfor/Sfor

high

high

high

exec.

exec.

UNMIH (Haiti)

high

low

high

exec.

exec.

Allied Force (Kosovo)

high

low

high

exec.

exec.

TF Fox (NATO: Macedonia)

high

high

high

exec.

exec.

UNMEE

high

high

high

exec.

exec.

ISAF (Afghanistan)

high

high

n/k

exec.

exec.

Enduring Freedom

high

high

n/k

exec.

exec.

Second Gulf War

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

exec.

SFIR (2003/04)

high

high

n/k

exec.

exec.

Notes: n/a not applicable; n/k not known. * The motion by MP Brinkhorst initiated the process leading to the review framework.

78

4.3

The case studies: a comparative analysis

Changing the rules: concluding remarks

Belgium and the Netherlands share an important foreign policy experience: both countries suffered in the mid-1990s from a major war trauma in their foreign policy. In both cases, this led to a parliamentary inquiry, and in both cases the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry came up with far-reaching recommendations that changed the then existing political practice and the national decision-making process. Implementation of the recommendations ‘changed the rules’, since it entailed a shift of power from government to Parliament. In both cases, there was a de facto increase in parliamentary involvement in and influence on the national decision-making process. The impact of Srebrenica and Rwanda on the respective foreign policies of the two countries has been quite different. In Belgium, it led to a certain reluctance to become involved in international affairs, whereas the Netherlands was spurred into action to make up for or compensate for this ‘failure’, as it was perceived by many. However, the international aspirations of the Netherlands are of a different magnitude from those of Belgium. The Dutch Parliament acquired the material right of consent when it comes to the decision to deploy the armed forces, which the Belgian Parliament has not. In Belgium, a special senate committee was set up to oversee the government in the domain of international operations, but parliamentary involvement in the decision-making process in Belgium is limited. The core cabinet, in which all coalition parties are represented, is the key executive body.The Belgian Parliament is not very well informed; nor does it engage in a systematic and consistent evaluation of government actions and decisions ex post facto. Parliamentarians cite a lack of a ‘culture of evaluation’ and a lack of staff as the main reasons. Both Belgium and the Netherlands formalised a review framework, that lays down a number of preconditions, principles and policy guidelines for participation in an international crisis management operation. The Dutch government proposed a set of preconditions for participation (‘points for consideration’), which was adopted by Parliament in October 1995 and revised in 2001. In Belgium, a similar review framework was introduced in early 1997, three months after the Rwanda Commission had submitted its report to Parliament. In Belgium, there is a direct relation between Rwanda and the review framework, which in the case of the Netherlands does not exist. The Dutch review framework is the culmination of a political debate initiated in 1979, when a discussion erupted as to whether conscript soldiers could be deployed during the UNIFIL operation. Both review frameworks aim to structure the relations between the executive and the legislature while deliberating participation. In the Dutch practice, the review framework has four broad functions. First, it serves as a vehicle for building common understanding of a complex matter among different (political) stakeholders. Second, it enhances the thoroughness of the preparation of the decision and directs the attention and focus of government officials preparing the letter to Parliament. Third, it has increased the transparency of

Belgium and the Netherlands 79 the decision-making process.The minister has to make clear to Parliament not only what his position is but also on which arguments he has based this position. Fourth, it helps Parliament in assigning and answering the question of accountability. Parliament has a sort of standing order to evaluate every participation, and the ministers of defence and foreign affairs are obliged to send a letter to Parliament presenting their formal evaluation. This enables Parliament to conduct its own post hoc evaluation of the operations. The Dutch government has been very careful in phrasing the review framework – it does not formally pre-commit the government to any precondition – whereas the Belgian government has been more outspoken in its wording of the preconditions. It states unambiguously that Belgian troops will not be deployed in its former colonies.This is a hard precondition, which was subsequently perceived to be detrimental to Belgian interests.85 The Dutch government is afraid to make the preconditions hard on paper, the ‘hardness’ of the precondition depending on the situation. With regard to the type of contribution that both governments (can) make to international crisis management operations, it is self-evident that intrinsic constraints such as the size and composition of the armed forces are key factors in what a government can and will do. Another consideration is related to the stability of the ruling coalition. The first Verhofstadt government was a coalition of six parties, and its ability to absorb external shocks proved to be quite small (i.e. less than, say, the governments in the Netherlands, which are generally made up of two or three parties). Thus, the larger the coalition, the more pertinent the issue of regime survival will be. The first Verhofstadt government showed that the scope of Belgian participation in or contribution to international crisis management operations was an inverse function of the risk that such participation would pose to the government of the day.86 Belgium thus follows a decidedly risk-avoiding strategy, the preferred policy option being to make relatively low-risk contributions. The Netherlands is well aware of where the (operational and political) risks lie and will demand a whole set of intra-alliance or intra-coalition security guarantees before it is willing to commit itself, but usually it does commit itself.

5

The imperative of consensus Denmark and Norway

5.1

Denmark Danish participation in specific peace support operations is not a given … a number of political and military factors will shape the decision on whether or not Denmark will participate. (Defence for the Future, Report from the Defence Committee, 1997)

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the country’s newly won selfconfidence, international recognition and substantially improved security situation have made Denmark adopt an assertive and even activist line in foreign policy. However, there is a certain ambivalence in this position. It is the tension between humility and a more martial, imperial posture. Knudsen (1992) points to this ambivalence in an interesting essay explaining ‘Why Denmark needs two national anthems’.The more populist ‘A Lovely Country Is Ours’ praises the virtues of Danish landscapes and expresses a humble atmosphere of respect for everyday Danish life. The royalist and martial ‘King Christian’ stresses the martial and royal virtues of the Danish people. In the eyes of popular Denmark,‘King Christian’ is too martial, too self-assertive, but to conservative circles, ‘A Lovely Country’ exudes too much humility, too little pride and power. So the anthems are played and sung at official events in alternation according to a delicate etiquette worked out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘King Christian’ is played during state visits, naval visits, military sports arrangements and events attended by a member of a foreign and/or the Danish government. The solution of maintaining two anthems signals a certain duality of the soul in Danish experience: human, pure and unspoiled on the one side, and more martial and imperial on the other side. It is considered to be a ‘very Danish solution’, demonstrating both the ambivalent state culture and the strong national willingness to compromise within a consensual democracy. The Danish self-image is very much that of a small state.The Danes realise that their country’s geographical and demographic size determines the political role and the magnitude of responsibilities that they can take up and thus

Denmark and Norway 81 determines their foreign policy reflexes. This perception of Denmark as the small state lacking any real options for ‘going it alone’ in foreign affairs remains widespread. In the mid-1960s, Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup concluded that ‘It is self-evident that particularly a small country has to follow the rules of the game … the larger a state is, and the greater its economic and military power, the greater is its independent influence on world politics’ (cited in Holm 1989: 179). ‘Smallness’ in many ways equals ‘vulnerability’. Hence the external relations of Denmark contain a strong component of seeking and sustaining good relations with strong allies or integration into multilateral structures. A third salient characteristic is the desire to project the Danish way of doing things upon the international scene. This aspect emerged after the end of the Cold War and is felt throughout society. Hedetoft describes it as ‘a Danish variant of weltoffener Patriotismus, fighting with more traditional attitudes, discourses, and meanings for dominance and public spaces’ (Hedetoft 1997: 23). The orthodox Danish fear of meddling in international affairs has been partly replaced by confidence and practical activism. The decision to create an international brigade for use in NATO and UN crisis management efforts as from 1995, which was taken in the autumn of 1993 as a follow-up to Denmark’s symbolic contribution to the Gulf War and its more substantive participation in the former Yugoslavia, is a clear confirmation of this line of thinking. However, Denmark’s geopolitical condition is dualistic. On the one hand, it has enjoyed an isolated position, relatively secure and far away from the centre of Europe, where wars were usually fought. On the other hand, precisely because Denmark is located on the periphery of Europe, it is in a vulnerable position. Located at the gates of the Baltic Sea and with frontiers difficult to defend, Denmark historically oscillated between the extremes of isolation and the sorrow of structural vulnerability.The demise of the Soviet Union and the developments that followed constituted a new foreign policy universe for Denmark. As the front line disappeared, Denmark ceased to be a front-line state. This front-line position implied nervousness, caution and vigilance (the closest Soviet air bases were only four minutes away), but its location at the mouth of the Baltic approaches made Denmark of extreme strategic interest to both the Warsaw Pact and NATO.87 The second change was the creation of the new Baltic states, which Denmark readily and wholeheartedly ‘adopted’. To these small states, Denmark could be something of an older brother providing assistance and guidance. It committed enormous resources to the Baltic states, integrating military units and establishing a Baltic Defence College. The developments in the individual countries run parallel to a consolidation of bilateral and multilateral contacts and agreements. In effect, a new regionalisation may take place in the north of Europe: the so-called ‘Nordic dimension’ could be augmented by a ‘Baltic dimension’.The conclusion is that today Denmark enjoys an unprecedentedly high level of direct security. It has moved in from the periphery and closer to the core of Europe.

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These changes have enabled Denmark to evolve from a security importer to a net security exporter.88 However, there are clouds on the horizon; using the words of Bertel Heurlin:‘the Cold War left Denmark in better shape than ever and that is precisely the reason why problems are emerging’.89 Basic features of the Danish political system Denmark is a constitutional monarchy.The constitution of June 1953 provides for a unicameral legislature, the Folketinget, with 179 members (including two members from the Faroe Islands and two from Greenland). The prime minister heads the government, which is further composed of cabinet ministers who run the various departments. The monarch signs acts passed by the Folketinget upon the recommendation of the cabinet sitting as a council of state. To become law, acts must also be countersigned by at least one cabinet member. When the cabinet is confronted with a vote of no confidence, it must resign. In addition to establishing unicameralism, the 1953 constitution mandates popular referenda (used for example to secure public approval for Denmark’s entry into the EEC) and postulates the creation of an ombudsman. Elections are held on the basis of proportional representation, each political party gaining seats in Parliament, or in the city council, in proportion to its strength among the voters.Voter turnout in national elections approaches 90 percent. As a result, the national government is usually composed of a coalition of parties (no party enjoying an overall majority), and the government must piece together a majority for each item of legislation (Denmark has not seen a one-party majority government since 1909). Despite the splintering of parties, Denmark has enjoyed stable government, holding new elections on average once every three years. Traditionally, the conduct of foreign policy is the prerogative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Attempts to change the balance in favour of the legislature have been blocked, and concerns have been aired that the quality of foreign policy would deteriorate if Parliament became too involved in foreign policy decisions. The national decision-making process The working procedures of the cabinet are without formal rules or procedures, which means that working methods depend heavily on the personality of the prime minister, who has a small cabinet of fifteen non-politically appointed counsellors.The crucial government players in foreign and security policy are the prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of defence and the chief of defence in his capacity as military adviser to the minister of defence. The minister of foreign affairs acts as primus inter pares when it comes to coordinating the bureaucratic machinery leading to a common government position to present to Parliament. According to one observer ‘an outstanding feature of the modern Danish public sector is its relatively weak mechanisms of intersectoral coordination. … The administra-

Denmark and Norway 83 tive coordination between ministries is mostly based on ad hoc committees or by informal meetings’ (Knudsen 1992: 284). From the moment a request for participation in an international crisis management operation has been received, e.g. from the secretary-general of the UN, until the moment when Parliament formally decides, the political process usually proceeds through the following steps. The first step is for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence to collect and assess all available information concerning the conflict, the threats, the political context, etc. The next step is to come to an interdepartmentally coordinated and shared position. This position, which includes a recommendation, is then formally presented to the prime minister. After the prime minister and his advisers have been consulted, the common position (possibly revised) is then sent as a formal proposal, including a recommendation to the government’s Foreign Policy Committee (a cabinet committee) for comment and consultation. Aspects that the government will touch upon in its proposal are the mission, the mandate, the rules of engagement, political conditions in the area, the government’s rationale for Danish involvement, political considerations and interests, evacuation policy, risks (land mines, diseases, etc.), and the specifics of the numbers of soldiers to be deployed and their equipment. The Foreign Policy Committee consists exclusively of cabinet members: the prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs, defence, environment, economic affairs and home affairs.90 After being approved by this committee, the proposal is sent to Parliament. The proposal includes all relevant arguments and references. The minister of foreign affairs will send the proposal and recommendation to Parliament, or more precisely to the most enigmatic of all parliamentary committees: the Foreign Affairs Committee (Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn or Nævn). The Nævn is a key parliamentary committee. It usually meets at the request of the government, but it can also meet at the request of one of its members (of parliament).The committee secretariat is housed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not in Parliament, and the secretary of the committee is present at all its meetings. The Nævn never takes a vote: the chairman listens to the comments and consults its members, and the government uses it as a sounding board. The proposal will be debated and explained here, but the committee’s main function is to advise the government.The government may then send an (amended) recommendation to Parliament for the first reading. The recommendation is subsequently scrutinised in the Defence Committee. Parliamentarians put forward their questions, remarks and concerns in this committee, and answers are provided by the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly, coordinated by the latter. After receiving answers to all questions, the Defence Committee will send a written report including a recommendation back to Parliament for the second reading. The final step is that Parliament decides by vote. If time is tight, government and Parliament are capable of rushing a proposal through, first and second readings taking place within twenty-four hours.91

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Figure 5.1 Command structure of the Danish armed forces Note: *Operational and Logistics Command. Source: Danish Ministry of Defence (2002).

Under article 19 of the constitution, the government is obliged to seek the consent of Parliament when it considers participating in any operation where the use of force is likely to exceed that of self-defence. However, the government is not obliged to seek parliamentary consent when it contemplates sending a small number of military observers for example. The constitutional custom that has developed over the last ten years is that the government will seek the consent of Parliament when it considers participating in an operation with a large number of troops, for example in the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Legally and formally, the government needs to take this decision only to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Knudsen observed that, in Denmark’s political culture, the general practice is to seek maximum agreement before taking any political decisions. These characteristics of Scandinavian political culture go perhaps much deeper than the parliamentary scene. … Danish agrarian society … has a tradition of some kind of collective decision-making processes. … This has meant a decision-making culture involving bargaining and compromising. (Knudsen 1992: 289) The Ministry of Defence is a small department, with a staff of 150, and is the administrative apparatus of the minister of defence. It is manned by a mix of civilian and military personnel. The chief of defence, who with his general staff is located outside Copenhagen (Vedbæk), is the military adviser to the

Denmark and Norway 85 minister of defence. The most relevant departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the Security Department and the UN Department. Counsellors within the Office of the Prime Minister are usually recruited from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Parliament Article 19 of the Constitutional Act of Denmark (June 1953) stipulates that ‘the King shall not use military force against any foreign state without the consent of the Folketinget’. This clause has been interpreted as constituting a formal requirement for the Danish government to seek the consent of Parliament before deploying or committing armed forces abroad. This usually does not apply when the government contemplates deploying very small numbers in observer missions all over the world, but for every substantial deployment the government will seek the consent of the Folketinget. This need is reinforced by the profound experience of having been a front-line state for many years, which makes Danish officials unwilling to deploy troops that are inadequately equipped or too lightly armed. Whenever Danish soldiers are deployed, even on a UN peacekeeping mission, they are ready and equipped for high-intensity war, and they are prepared (if required) to use violence in excess of self-defence. The same article also stipulates the creation of a Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), ‘which the government shall consult before making any decision of major importance to foreign policy’.This constitutional requirement was met as early as 1923 by the establishment of the FAC. This committee is a key factor in the whole Danish decision-making process, even though it only has an advisory function and cannot make decisions on behalf of Parliament. Contrary to other committees, its work is secret; the agenda is also secret, and this secrecy is closely guarded. The committee is used by the government to present its policy to Parliament, and its primary function is consensus building. The members of the committee are elected from among the senior members of the major parties and, despite its peculiar formal status (the committee is not acting on behalf of Parliament), the committee is in fact used as a parliamentary oversight organ (Svensson 1988: 28–32). The committee has been subjected to criticism because of the mandatory secrecy of its proceedings. However, voting (if need be) on participation will be done in a plenary session of Parliament. In addition to the Foreign Affairs Committee, there are the (normal) External Policy Committee and the Defence Committee, which are ordinary standing committees of the Folketinget. These committees deal mainly with cooperation with developing countries and defence matters, respectively, but they also deal with issues of international affairs and foreign and defence policy, which may lead to decisions in the form of a parliamentary resolution or a law – decisions that cannot be prepared by the FAC. In the field of foreign policy, the External Policy Committee is considered less important

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than the Foreign Affairs Committee (the Nævn), while the Defence Committee plays an important role in reviewing and questioning government proposals, for example the proposal to participate in an international crisis management operation. Denmark has a strong tradition of consensual politics, which (in this field) goes back to the early years after the Second World War. Evidence from many sources warrants the conclusion that consensus is a vital condition for Danish participation in any international crisis management operation. The internal consensus on security policy became a high priority in Danish politics.This goal could only be achieved by close and compromise-seeking cooperation between the political parties. … The desire to maintain consensus was prompted by the need to formulate a NATO policy with a broad appeal. (Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament 1993: 9) Denmark fits the wider trend of increasing parliamentary involvement in foreign and security policy,92 although Holm does not think very much of the efforts made by Parliament to increase its powers of scrutiny. Consider the following three quotes: ‘It seems that the debacle over Danish security policy has been more a fight for power and policy than a fight for changes giving Parliament more structural control over governmental decision-making and implementation in security policy’ (Holm 1989: 192); ‘In the trade-off between access to information and demands for secrecy Parliament has, however, almost consistently accepted secrecy’ (ibid.: 193), and ‘Parliament has refrained from structural changes in the way it is informed’ (ibid.: 194).93 Parliamentary control A salient mechanism in Danish politics is the fact that the main political parties sign up to a multi-year ‘Defence Agreement’. Such a political agreement among political parties, whether they are in power or not, is a rather special phenomenon. The Defence Agreement covering the period 2000–04 has been agreed by six out of eight political parties (representing about 80 percent of parliamentarians). The parties behind the agreement have a somewhat privileged position when it comes to access to information, being informed concerning important security issues such as participation in a crisis management operation. The government will informally consult the leaders of the parties supporting the Defence Agreement even before submitting a proposal to the Nævn. The Defence Agreement is not linked in time to general elections. It will stand and be honoured by any incoming government.The main reason to engage the political parties in a process leading to a multi-year commitment is to create a broad parliamentary majority with respect to the definition and determination of the medium- to long-term goals of the armed forces. This multi-year agreement is prepared and drafted

Denmark and Norway 87 by the Ministry of Defence and subsequently adapted in the light of the political discussions. Among other things, it deals with the budget for the armed forces, procurement issues, aims, tasks and personnel issues. The advantages of this procedure are evident: budgetary stability, predictability and continuity in the implementation of defence and security policies, which are essential for the defence procurement system, which is a costly and long-term affair. For the purposes of the additional costs of participations in international operations, a special budget line has been created: for the period 2000–04, the parties have agreed on a maximum of 572 million kroner per annum.There is also considerable financial flexibility, as the Ministry of Defence may carry forward up to 4 percent over/underspending to the next financial year within the period of the agreement (Defence Agreement 2000–04: 32–3). There is therefore no need for the government to go to Parliament for additional money as long as the costs of UN operations do not exceed the 4 percent threshold of overspending. This set-up has two advantages. The first is budgetary continuity for the armed forces, as the expenditure levels are known years in advance. The second is that the Defence Agreement provides something of an instrument for parliamentary control. It is a political agreement, and the parties to the agreement (including the parties in government) expect the agreement to be respected.94 The government has maintained its constitutional competence in foreign policy making, but it is and remains politically responsible to the Folketinget, which acquired a more specific influence on foreign policy making through the establishment of parliamentary committees. The existing consensus on foreign policy and especially on participation in crisis management operations makes for relatively strong and stable political coalitions, which survive after the operation has been executed. Apparently, there is no strongly felt need in Parliament to evaluate the participation and the decision to participate. The impact of public opinion When assessing the relevance of public opinion as a political factor, we need to distinguish three types of consensus. The first is the social consensus on broad issues in foreign and security policy. This consensus is a post-Second World War phenomenon in Denmark. The period before 1940 witnessed a strong polarisation on defence policies and considerable disagreement on security policies. After Denmark joined NATO in 1949, a broad agreement developed in Danish society that effectively replaced polarisation and politicisation. Due-Nielsen and Petersen partially explain this by ‘the low priority of foreign policy issues among voters, except perhaps, for questions of national sovereignty. … Foreign policy is seen as abstract, distant or perhaps impossible to influence’ (Due-Nielsen and Petersen 1995: 21). Differentiated public attitudes can be positioned on the right–left dimension and are more or less in accordance with attitudes to domestic political issues like taxes and welfare. On the right, ‘we find a pro-defence, pro-alliance, pro-economic attitude, an

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Atlantic and Western European orientation … scepticism to … globalisation. On the left we find pacifism, anti-Americanism, hostility towards the European Community, positive feelings towards third world countries’ (ibid.). The second type of consensus relates to that particular type of public consultation, the national referendum. As a general proposition, public participation in important political questions can be said to be of vital importance in Denmark. The constitutional obligation of the government to consult Parliament is part of the involvement of the population. Over the years, the custom has grown for the government to consult the public, even if there is no legal obligation to do so. As a result, national referenda have gained a certain, some say a dubious, centre-stage role in getting important foreign policy decisions implemented. The indifferent public opinion of the Cold War has been replaced by an active, informed and vocal public opinion, which has consequently become a factor of influence in Danish foreign and security policy. The third type of consensus relates to the level of popular support for government proposals and actions in the international security field. Public support is regarded as a crucial precondition for a positive response to a request to participate in an international crisis management operation. Polls held in the 1990s show consistently favourable results. As an example, 45 percent of the Danish public was in favour of sending Danish soldiers to Albania in 1997 (Operation Alba) (Heurlin and Mouritzen 1998: 155).This is remarkable, because Operation Alba was de facto the first European coalition of the willing operating with the consent of the UN but outside any multilateral framework.95 The positive attitude towards Danish participation in UN peacekeeping operations even increased in the period 1994 to 1998 from 69 to 86 percent in favour of Danish participation (Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999: 217). Public support for Danish participation in the NATO bombings in Serbia was around 65 percent, but 55 percent of the population disagreed that NATO should be able to decide to bomb without approval from the UN (Heurlin and Mouritzen 2000: 245).96 Danish foreign policy: long trends and recent changes By and large, Danish foreign policy has always been a function of its environment. Denmark cannot afford the luxury of adhering to fixed ideas and morals: it needs to be flexible, adaptable and pragmatic. Flexibility, adaptability and pragmatism are the qualities used most often to characterise Danish foreign policy, but some long-term trends are also visible.A study of Danish diplomatic history reveals a recurrence of themes throughout the ages, e.g. an emphasis on a commercial policy, aloofness from regional power politics, non- or anti-militarism, and neutralist abstentionism and internationalism. The basic mechanism remains constant: the small, vulnerable state responds to its environment with a policy of neutralism and abstentionism; the Protestant/ Lutheran state reacts to its environment with a dose of moralism and a policy of humanitarian imperialism.The expression of solidarity with other human beings is a strong driver of

Denmark and Norway 89 Danish foreign policy. Niels-Jørgen Nehring, a former director of the Danish Institute for International Affairs (DUPI), calls it ‘the extension of values strategy’. It is the export of domestic values, the export of elements that constitute specific Danishness. In the words of former Foreign Minister Henning Christophersen: Danish foreign policy is not only a question of safeguarding immediate specific interests … be they of an economic or political nature. Our foreign policy is also built upon a range of ideals or value-norms, which mirror domestic ideals and values, i.e., the requirements that we in the course of time have formulated to the development of Danish society. … It is, for instance, in our own interest that a more just and equal economic world order can be attained, as this – besides corresponding to our own ideal requirements – is also a precondition for a stable economic development in the long run. (cited in Heurlin and Mouritzen 1980: 170–1) It is in this perspective that the history of Danish Aid (DANIDA) represents a distinct foreign policy tradition and a specific brand of Danish international commitment. International humanitarianism (or humanitarian activism) comes naturally to the Danes and is regarded as an extrapolation of Danish domestic policy and values.97 It is a conviction shared by most Danish political parties that international development policy, which Danes see as conflict prevention at its best, is the best form of security policy.98 Until recently, Denmark spent more on development aid per capita than any other country in the world. Traditionally, Danish Third World assistance has been concentrated on relatively few countries, but Denmark is increasingly attaching conditions to its assistance: good governance, responsible governments, human rights, etc. After the Cold War, a league of new democracies emerged in the former Communist bloc, which had implications for the orientation of Danish aid. Gradually, the traditional poverty orientation prevailing in Third World countries shifted to a proximity doctrine: the highest priority should be given to countries that are geographically nearest to Denmark, in practice those with beaches on the Baltic Sea (cf. Mouritzen 1997: 42–3). Thus Poland is given a higher priority than Romania, even if Romania is the poorer of the two. The changes in Danish foreign policy can best be illustrated using two vignettes: ‘balancing and adaptation’ and ‘innovation and activism’. The geographical position of Denmark at a crossroads between East and West as well as between North and South in Europe called for a policy of balance between contesting or opposing power blocs as the most appropriate means to confront the security risks existing at any given time. Denmark reacted to its environment by balancing competing claims and by domestic adaptation to its environment. Being a small country, Denmark had little scope to influence or shape its strategic security environment and, placed at the mouth of the Baltic, neighbour of the largest Baltic power, Russia, it must always

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include the geographic factor in any assessment of its security position. The second vignette became visible after the end of the Cold War introduced a radical change in the geopolitical position of Denmark: no longer a crossroads but firmly at the heart of the new Europe. Since the early 1990s, Denmark has been innovative in its foreign and security policy and has gone as far as proclaiming a policy of active internationalism. Innovative was its turn to the region, with increased attention to the Baltic states. Danish active internationalism was in many ways a reaction to a changing, modernising and globalising world. Denmark was confronted by a new security environment (old fears and concerns abated); it shifted from an industry-based society to an information society; but its special position was undermined by the new geopolitical constellation. The Danish government quickly realised that if the policy of active internationalism was to merit its label, it would have to entail more than just rhetorical changes. To be successful, Danish foreign policy must comprise independent – and not primarily reactive – initiatives. It should imply thinking in global terms, a broad conception of security, democracy and solidarity; it should be inclusive rather than focus exclusively on Danish citizens; it should involve a consideration of the types of means at the disposal of a small state. In particular, resources based on knowledge, ability and professionalism seemed central; it was necessary to work out a more sophisticated strategy in which a Danish strategy vis-à-vis Europe must be the focal point. Such a policy cluster is closely linked to humanitarian activism. A case could be made that humanitarian activism spilled over into another sector of Danish foreign policy making.The point made by Heurlin (1996) is that this ‘universalisation’ of security policy also left Denmark in a weakened situation, while it seemed to outline possibilities for a new foreign policy activism. The situation changed from one dominated by geographical exposure to one dominated by political exposure. Denmark is now positioned in a process that could expose its national policy to a more direct challenge. This could involve giving up specific, narrow concerns and may be the price that Denmark has to pay in order not to be marginalised in the inevitable stratification that would follow the creation in Europe of an EU core surrounded by a number of concentric circles (ibid.: 182). The conclusion may well be that, if Denmark continues to opt out of the security and defence policy of an increasingly assertive European Union, Denmark’s active internationalism is a mere exceptional interlude in a much more powerful undercurrent of balancing competing claims and a continuous adaptation to its environment. Danish security policy Politically, the decade between 1979 and 1989 was one of the more turbulent decades in Danish history. The central tenet in its security policy in this period was formed by Danish reservations within NATO.99 In the 1990s, its

Denmark and Norway 91 policy was markedly different. Freed from a set of particularly restraining givens, Denmark could breath again. Intertwined with Denmark’s NATO policy is its position vis-à-vis the United States. Denmark has traditionally always taken a very Atlanticist approach. It insists on the premise that the USA is the caretaker of security in Europe and has at least three good reasons why good relations with the USA remain a prime foreign policy objective: (1) Denmark needs the USA as the main guarantor of security in Europe; (2) Denmark is extremely dependent on Germany in the economic and political spheres and sees the USA as a security balancer in Europe that can help Denmark to shape its policy towards Germany; and (3) the security of Greenland. Good bilateral relations with the USA are essentially good neighbourly relations. The defence of Denmark rests traditionally on two pillars. The first is the total defence concept underlying the defence of Denmark, which in addition to the armed forces includes the police and civil defence. Blueprints for the conversion of Danish society to crisis and war conditions are highly developed and kept up-to-date in pace with changes in society. A central element in this pillar is conscription. As we will see, the conscript issue is closely related to the issue of the professionalisation of the armed forces. Denmark has chosen to keep conscription: first, as a recruitment base for soldiers willing to be deployed on international crisis management missions; second, to avert the danger of the armed forces becoming a state within a state (conscription is seen as a natural and important bond between the army and civil society); and, third, to train young men who can be called up in the event of a large-scale conflict.The second pillar is international engagement and the acceptance of a broader concept of security. To this end, part of the Danish armed forces have been transformed into a high-readiness force, the Danish International Brigade (DIB). The prime mission of this brigade, established in 1997, is participation in crisis management operations under a UN or OSCE banner. The DIB consists of 4,500 soldiers, and up to 1,500 can be deployed, but a deployment of 1,000 is the level that Denmark can sustain. To a significant degree, the changes in Danish security policy are the result of dramatic changes in perceptions of threat since the end of the Cold War. In a report in April 1992, a high-level committee chaired by the minister of defence argued that political and economic destabilisation had replaced the old threat. The greatest security risks in Europe, so the report said, lay in the growth of authoritarianism and the rise of adventuristic foreign policies. However, the major long-term threats were from adjacent parts of the Third World in the form of weapons proliferation, Islamic fundamentalism, population explosion, a growing poverty gap between North and South, immigration pressure against Europe, and environmental threats. In Danish eyes, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia embodied the very essence of the new European security problems. Accordingly, a broad consensus has evolved that security policy should increasingly be shifted from territorial defence to efforts to contribute to the solution of this new kind of security

92 The case studies: a comparative analysis problem.The Danish government therefore introduced the concept of ‘strategic divisibility’.There are crises that threaten the security of Denmark directly, and there are crises that threaten Denmark indirectly due to their possible destabilising effect on international security. This distinction created a ‘second leg’ for Danish security policy to stand on. One of the main conclusions of the 1997 Defence Commission was that a shift in policy and resources allocation was taking place from direct security to indirect security. ‘International stability’ became an important flag on the ship of Danish foreign policy.The decision to transform the armed forces was taken partly parallel to, and partly as a consequence of, this rethinking process and policy analysis. During the 1990s, Denmark became enormously active in international peacekeeping.100 The increased need for peacekeeping troops and the enhanced utility of the Danish armed forces required for this purpose led the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ‘rediscover’ its armed forces as a foreign policy instrument (after decades of a territorially oriented posture). Denmark quickly realised that its national stability depended greatly on international stability, both political and economic. The Danish government decided early in the 1990s to transform its armed forces in two important ways: a change from a territorially based organisation to an expeditionary-oriented organisation; and the transformation of the armed forces into a relevant instrument in the conduct of a new kind of foreign policy: international activism. This meant a de facto functional expansion of the mission of the armed forces compared with the Cold War period. Denmark’s turn to Europe, whether forced or voluntary, is closely linked to the issue of freedom of action. Bertel Heurlin points to the fact that, after the ‘hurray years’ of the early post-Cold War period, Denmark started to realise that ‘the former privileges of sanctuary have gone’. The perception of Denmark as part of a Nordic low-tension area enabled the country to have a low level of military expenditure compared with its NATO allies and neutral Nordic countries.This privilege has gone. A second important issue concerns the implications of the opt-out. In what has come to be known as the ‘national compromise’, the Danish government has opted out of the process of European integration in four areas of concern: EU citizenship; the third phase of EMU (the euro); defence cooperation; and the ‘communitisation’ of justice and home affairs. In the long run, the opt-outs seem to be irreconcilable with the current activist policy of Denmark in foreign affairs and are leading to a growing unease in political circles. Foreign Minister Helveg Petersen gives a number of reasons why Denmark should engage itself in the EU developments in foreign and security policy: First, we need it [the EU] for reasons of security … second … to produce common solutions to common problems … more and more policy problems have international aspects that demand international action … thirdly, we need the Union to promote our values and defend our interests at the global level. (cited in Larsen 1999b: 43)

Denmark and Norway 93 The main problem is that the government has not been able to convince the population of the validity of these reasons. The consequences may be profound. Denmark will not participate in EU crisis management efforts (civil and military), although the EU is likely to develop the necessary capabilities to take over tasks and missions from the UN and/or NATO. The freedom of action for Denmark will thus decrease. If Denmark wishes to continue its activist line in foreign and security policy, it has to find alternative ways and means to be active and engage the world in the fashion in which it wants. Ironically, the EU is not developing in the direction the Danes dreaded when they opted out, namely the creation of a standing European army under the command of Germany, France and the UK, with France having the upper hand inspired by ideas of la gloire and national interest, intervening all over the world. Instead, the EU is developing its civilian and military crisis management capabilities in parallel and will come into action with a combination of national instruments; it is thus becoming excellently poised for a sustainable solution. This is exactly the kind of set-up the Danes are dreaming of, especially if the EU secures UN approval. In the current situation, it is in Denmark’s interests to keep NATO as the main producer and provider of security in Europe. The problem is that it is unsure whether the USA is willing to use NATO as a tool to provide security. In the current situation, with the fight against terrorism, the USA has no intentions of using NATO, since it would give member states the opportunity to question the legitimacy of the operation. A worst-case scenario from the Danish perspective would consist of three interlocking elements: (1) NATO loses power (no USA, no NATO); (2) coalitions of the willing form on an ad hoc basis; and (3) the EU becomes a major security actor.The key issue is then what Denmark can offer and what options are left open for the country. Politicians and officials alike fear that Denmark could be left on the sidelines and the adventure of active internationalism remain merely a footnote in Danish history. Recent operations A corvette to the Gulf: Danish participation in the Gulf War As a response to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in August 1990, the UN Security Council adopted several resolutions. The question of deploying Danish military forces to the Gulf became relevant when, on 25 August 1990, the Security Council adopted resolution 665, asking all states to assist the states cooperating with Kuwait to ensure strict implementation of the embargo. The Danish Parliament decided on 31 August to send the corvette Olfert Fischer to the Persian Gulf for this purpose. It had instructions not to become involved in the war, only to help enforce the embargo. It was accompanied by a Norwegian supply ship and received host nation support from friendly Gulf states. The Olfert Fischer was to operate in a very large

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multinational force, relying on American intelligence and air defence by the coalition. One Danish researcher holds the opinion that ‘Danish politicians would never have considered the deployment of a military vessel without all these favourable circumstances’ (Schmidt 1994: 36). Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen wanted it to be deployed without restrictions in terms of rules of engagement,101 and the vessel should have been capable of fulfilling its mission but, according to one spokesman for the ministry, the question of command was never considered a key issue.The final solution to the command issue was determined by the conditions attached by the Social Democrats to their support for the motion authorising the ship’s deployment. They demanded that the Danish contribution would not take part in any NATO or WEU coordination but would be under Danish command. The final status was that Denmark acted nationally on a UN mandate, with close bilateral cooperation with NATO countries. It was essential for the Danish parliamentary majority supporting the Olfert Fischer decision that this decision and the contribution itself were made within a UN framework, as distinct from a regional arrangement (cf. Mouritzen, in Mouritzen et al. 1996: 78). The Danish response to the crisis was decided on 27–28 August 1990 in the Foreign Affairs Committee (Nævn). Hans Hækkerup, the Social Democrat spokesman at the time, described the decision-making process of the committee as consensus seeking. He and others were later criticised for changing the social democratic security policy overnight by accepting the deployment of a Danish warship (Sørensen, cited in Schmidt 1994: 25). Admitting that the decision was reached without long debate, Hækkerup answered that ‘the question of our effort in the Gulf was too important to be decided by a fragile majority in the Folketinget and/or the population without consulting a large minority’ (Hækkerup, cited in ibid.). In many respects, the decision to send the Olfert Fischer to participate in the embargo operations in the Persian Gulf was a fundamental political decision. First, from a perspective of decision ‘mechanics’, the potential negative political implications were such that the government was able to get the decision to deploy the Olfert Fischer through the committee without needing formal consent from the Folketinget. Second, Ellemann-Jensen, the assertive minister of foreign affairs, was committed to changing the Danish image of ‘footnote country’ and proving to the world how credible and reliable Denmark could be in security policy. According to Mouritzen, ‘the main concern seems to have been “Erscheinung” – in particular how Denmark’s role was perceived in influential circles … it was probably important to lay a distance to Denmark’s footnote policy in NATO during the 1980s and the image it had created. … The status and prestige factor was probably stronger than the “new world order” factor in producing Danish participation’ (Mouritzen, in Mouritzen et al. 1996: 79). It was indeed something of a revolution in Danish security policy: it was the first Danish naval operation outside Europe (Denmark had traditionally opposed out-of-area NATO operations).

Denmark and Norway 95 Tanks to Tuzla: Danish participation in operations in the Balkans Initially, Denmark simply ignored the crisis in Yugoslavia and, when the government did react, its reaction was determined by the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, in which Denmark depended on Germany for influence. There being no particular (national) interest involved, Denmark followed the EC line. After the recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992, and with the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 727 on peacekeeping (UN protected areas), Denmark sent 900 peacekeeping infantry soldiers to Croatia to participate in Unprofor I. It deployed its forces in April 1992, together with 14,000 other troops from twenty-five countries, of which Denmark’s contribution was the highest in terms of troops per capita. This decision was virtually unopposed in Denmark, there being no really significant disagreement among the Danish political parties. It was discussed only in the Foreign Affairs Committee. The international climate and the ‘concerned mass media’ were such that it was not difficult for the minister of foreign affairs to rally a broad consensus in favour of participation. Only one issue threatened the consensus on the policy towards Yugoslavia: the question of whether Danish conscripts or professional soldiers could be ordered to war zones when there was no effective cease-fire. When the first Danish troops were sent to Croatia, a majority in the Folketinget decided that troops in war zones should be deployed on a voluntary basis. A hesitant public opinion supported the principle of voluntarism, but also the decision to deploy the troops. The absence of firm public support for the use of armed force left the politicians with the task of coming up with a coherent policy. The foreign policy spokesman of the Social Democrats summed up the position of the government: ‘we must be able to explain our objectives, do everything in our power to protect the men on the ground, and show that what we do is in accordance with the expectations of other countries’ (Fich, cited in Schmidt 1994: 27). The war in the former Yugoslavia led to a gradual stepping up of Denmark’s international involvement. By joining the European Community’s monitoring mission, Denmark for the first time took part in peacekeeping outside the UN, although the country had participated in UN peacekeeping for forty years. In the spring of 1992, a reinforced infantry battalion was sent to the Serb-occupied Krajina region in Croatia to participate in the UN Protection Force (Unprofor I). In the autumn of the same year, there followed the deployment of a headquarters company to support the new UN Protection Force (Unprofor II) headquarters at Kiseljak in BosniaHerzegovina.This was the first time since the Congo operation that a Danish unit had been sent to an area before the main hostilities had ended, which led to the political demand that all participating personnel should be volunteers. At the beginning of 1993, there followed the command of the Nordic UN protective deployment operation in Macedonia, and in September of the same year a Leopard main battle tank squadron and air force forward air controllers

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were deployed as part of the Nordic battalion to protect the Bosnian government-controlled Tuzla enclave in northern Bosnia.The navy participated with a corvette in the embargo support operations in the Adriatic Sea against Serbia–Montenegro. F-16s to Kosovo: Danish participation in Operation Allied Force102 When the focus of attention shifted from Bosnia to Kosovo in 1998, ‘Denmark adopted a “follow the leader” position’ and showed no hesitation whatsoever when it came to the use of strong wording to urge the former Yugoslavia to pursue another policy (Møller 1999: 6). Jakobsen qualifies Denmark’s Kosovo policy as ‘reactive and supportive’ (Jakobsen 2000: 66). During the crisis, Denmark played ‘hardball’, consequently rejecting proposals for pauses in the bombing to allow new negotiations to start. ‘Danish policy simply mirrored US policy’ (ibid.: 68). Niels Helveg Petersen, foreign minister at the time, made the case for action even without a UN mandate using the following reasons: ‘We must find ways which enhance the ability of the UN to deal with violations of international peace and security and other serious branches of international law. Failure to act on such challenges is morally indefensible and betrays the principles in the UN charter. Violations and breaches must be met convincingly with resolve and with legitimacy of international law. The UN Security Council will usually provide legitimacy. That is how it should be. Disagreement in the Security Council about a particular line of action must, however, never lead to paralysis of the international community’ (cited in Heurlin et al. 1999: 153). On 8 October 1998, a resolution was passed in Parliament to contribute to ‘a NATO deployment in the western Balkans’ with four F-16 aircraft and 115 personnel.The aircraft and soldiers were deployed to Italy, and command was transferred to the integrated NATO command chain. Public opinion was very supportive of this decision, and the consensus on security broadened. In an opinion poll conducted on 27 June 1998, 46 percent were in favour of NATO intervention with a UN mandate, 27 percent were in favour of a NATO intervention without a UN mandate, and 9 percent were against; 66 percent were in favour of Danish participation, 15 percent against (Heurlin and Mouritzen 1999: 223). Enduring Freedom and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) (2002) Denmark participated in the operations in and around Afghanistan with F-16s (ISAF) and in Enduring Freedom with a light reconnaissance unit, a medical platoon, a civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) unit, a munitions and mineclearing unit, a special forces detachment and liaison personnel. The decision to participate both in Enduring Freedom and ISAF was taken quickly and without much political debate. The first units where deployed to Afghanistan in early 2002.

Denmark and Norway 97 The Second Gulf War (2003) Participation in the US-led coalition to oust Saddam Hussein has been the most contentious decision the administration led by Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen has yet taken. The decision to send a submarine (the Saelen), a corvette (the Olfert Fischer) and a unit of 380 soldiers to aid the allied forces took the opposition by surprise. ‘We are confronted with a fait accompli’, claimed the Social Democrat opposition leader Mogens Lykketoft in a Danish daily. The main proponents of Danish participation have been Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller and the prime minister himself. A growing rift is becoming visible as to the arguments used to justify Danish participation. Stig Møller is firmly locked into the WMD path of reasoning, whereas the prime minister said in a recent Op-Ed that: we have an obligation to help. We cannot just sail under a flag of convenience and let others fight for freedom and peace.There has in fact been too much of that kind in the past in Denmark. If we mean anything seriously about our democratic values, then we should also be ready to make a small contribution to the international coalition. (Fogh Rasmussen in Berlingske Tidene, 26 March 2003) However, the prime minister was also tapping into a classical stratum in Danish foreign and security policy when he stated that ‘the decision was based on a sober-minded analysis of what is Denmark’s long-term security interests’: Who can after all guarantee Denmark’s security? Germany? France? No, on the present stage of the development of European cooperation, we Europeans cannot ensure our own security. … It was first when the Americans used their political and military force in connection with this matter [the Balkans] that the peace was obtained. … The Americans sacrificed thousands of human lives and large material resources to stop the carnage and create peace. (ibid.) In the wake of the crisis, the Danish government is under increasing pressure regarding the justification of its participation. As the current Danish government violated the principle of consensus, this action is likely to have consequences. However, what the exact political costs will be remains unclear for the moment.103 In any case, Denmark, a country whose armed forces where once described as ‘the military band playing on the lawn of the White House’, has gained a better place in the sun, especially when its conductor was received by the resident of the White House. However, Denmark is in danger of over-stretching: the government recently proposed to take the lead of a Danish ‘Iraq’ brigade but had to withdraw its proposal when the sheer magnitude of the undertaking became clear.

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Table 5.1 Danish parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation Denmark

Parliamentary involvement (high, low, none)

Initiator (executive or Parliament)

Predominant influence (executive or Parliament)

Before

During

After

UNIFIL

none

none

high

1

exec.

exec.

First Gulf War

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

Unprofor (former Yugoslavia)

high

high

low

exec.

exec.

Kfor/Sfor

high

high

low

exec.

exec.

Allied Force (Kosovo)

high

low

low

exec.

exec.

UNMEE

high

low

low

exec.

exec.

ISAF (Afghanistan)

high

high

n/k

exec.

exec.

Enduring 2 Freedom

low

low

n/k

exec.

exec.

Second Gulf War

low

low

n/k

exec.

exec.

SFIR (2003/04)

high

n/k

n/k

exec.

n/k

3

Notes: n/a not applicable; n/k not known. 1

Parliament insisted on pulling out.

2

The Danish contribution consisted of special forces elements.

3

The Danish contribution consisted of a submarine, a corvette and an army unit.



This evidence makes it clear that Denmark’s options in the security policy domain are limited by four hard constraints: 1 2 3 4

the constitutional constraint of having to obtain parliamentary approval for the deployment of the armed forces; the political constraint of not being able to participate in EU-led operations (Petersberg missions); the strong desire for a UN mandate to ensure the legitimacy of international action; and limited resources, which put a cap on the participation of Denmark to 1,000 soldiers (maximum 1,500) deployed at a sustainable rate.

Denmark does not have any strategic lift capacity, which imposes geographical limits on the deployability of Danish forces. However, this restriction is valid for large contingents only. Smaller contingents are deployed worldwide. The

Denmark and Norway 99 Danish government has expressed its desire to deploy its forces without any strings attached (i.e. enforced restrictions on their use), but in practice it maintains firm control over the contingent from Copenhagen.104 In recent operations, Denmark has maintained operational command over the deployed forces and imposed quite severe restrictions on the forces deployed. The type of restriction varies from case to case: geographical restrictions (Danish troops were not allowed to go to certain parts of the area of operations); restrictions concerning the tasks and mission (e.g. apprehending war criminals in Bosnia, deploying tanks in Sarajevo); and restrictions concerning the organisation and employment of the forces (i.e. refusing to deploy more than one company outside the area of responsibility).

5.2

Norway It is the government’s view that in the new security environment it is of fundamental importance for Norway’s security that we enhance our ability to get actively engaged in international military operations. (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2000) For a small country … consensus is a conditio sine qua non for an ability to play a role in foreign affairs. (Olav Riste 2001: 10)

To characterise Norway as a ‘small power’ is controversial, at least in Norway. Not its smallness is contested but the mere fact that it is perceived as a power. The identity of Norway has been shaped over the centuries as being ‘part of ’ but also ‘apart from’ the international community. This being apart from the big world is manifested in what has been described as ‘the Norwegian brand of isolationism’ (Riste 2001: 4). Norway did not want any Grosse Politik, it wanted to be left in peace. An anthropological explanation can be found in the distribution of skills and means of existence over the population. The Norwegians are (traditionally) a people of peasant farmers and seafarers, the peasant being the introverted, suspicious pessimist of the valleys (in the east), and the seafarer the mercurial, humorous, irresponsible fisherman and sailor of the north and west.The common denominator that binds the two together is their Lutheran Christianity, with its emphasis on duty, hard work and austerity and its strong condemnation of the abuse of alcohol and a liberal sex life. It is this combination of the god-fearing, hardworking, earthbound peasant and the internationalist, seafaring, missionary man of the world that is at the heart of this ambivalence of strong internationalist humanitarian concerns and the desire to be left alone that will be described below.105 A defining element of the Norwegian self-image is that of being a different country [Annerledeslandet].This idea appeared initially as the title of a poem by Rolf Jacobsen but acquired political significance in the 1990s, especially in the

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

EU debate in 1994. Sociologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen recounts that the term: depicted Norway as a unique country which ought not to be contaminated by the standardisation resulting from EU membership. In the rhetoric surrounding the term, the wholesomeness and cleanness of the Norwegian countryside and vast uninhabited areas were emphasised, as well as the continued viability of small local communities scattered around the country. (Eriksen 1998) This ‘difference’ is in some cases interpreted as ‘special’: Norway has a special role to play in leading the world up the straight and narrow path towards a peace based on international justice and humanitarian values.This motivation has remained remarkably stable over the years and is illustrative (to some extent) of the collective self-esteem of Norway. Henrik Ibsen’s Brand is a telling story of these ambiguities of the Norwegian soul.The introvert/extrovert ambivalence influences Norway’s foreign policy orientation to this day. The continuing dilemma combines ‘the wish to build fences around the country’s self-determination’; the ‘missionary impulse’ as an attempt ‘to influence the international environment from the outside; and active participation in power politics as the result of a determination to exert international influence from within’ (Riste 2001: 275). Norway’s foreign policy is to some extent the struggle to answer this dilemma. The days of self-chosen isolation are long gone. Norway cannot escape the world, and Norwegian politicians seem to have made the switch from viewing an engagement with the world in negative terms to seeing the opportunities of a possible international engagement of Norway. ‘If we play our cards right, we can make a difference in a small way’, declared Foreign Minister Jagland in an explanation of the main lines and tendencies of Norway’s foreign policy to the members of the Storting in March 2001. The foreign minister was clear in his ambition: Norway wants to make a difference and has many reasons to do so: it wants to safeguard its national interests; it wants to contribute to building Europe and promoting common European interests; and it wants to make a difference in taking responsibility for other people in other parts of the world. Norway wants to put its action where its mouth is. ‘Making a difference’ means engagement, broad and deep, global and long-term. Norway has therefore significantly stepped up its international activities since the 1994 referendum in which the population voted against EU membership.106 It has strengthened its foreign policy and reinforced its efforts on ‘nearly all fronts in order to promote Norway’s interests abroad’.107 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Norway is more active than ever: it is taking part in eight peacekeeping operations; it was the lead nation in Kfor and provided the commander of the operation in 2001; it spends 0.9 percent of its GDP on development aid; and it has held a seat on the UN

Denmark and Norway 101 Security Council. Objectively, Norway has a lot to lose and a lot to worry about. Its geostrategic environment may have improved after the Soviet Union dissolved, but the disappearance of NATO’s ‘northern flank’ undermined Norway’s claim to be regarded as a ‘special case’. The country became the security ‘Cinderella’ of the greater Europe as Foreign Minister Jan Petersen expressed it (Petersen 1999). Norway has acquired one of the world’s largest economic zones – a vast maritime area containing oil and gas reserves as well as some of the richest fisheries.The management of those resources, as well as the handling of the concomitant border dispute with Russia in the strategically sensitive Barents Sea, make up for the claim that Norway has ‘more foreign policy per capita than any other nation’, as a journalist once exclaimed. The concerns stemming from its material interests in its direct environment are clear, legitimate and large. There is some anxiety in Norway’s security circles that the end of the Cold War left Norway politically exposed: its relation with Russia especially is the cause of much political worry. Its relation with Russia is complex, multifaceted and never easy. Norway shares a complex geostrategic and geo-economic space with Russia, a complexity caused by the ecological fragility of the area, the riches of the resources and unresolved issues surrounding the Svalbard archipelago. The multiple asymmetry (power, economy, democracy) between Norway and Russia causes considerable anxiety in Norwegian decision makers, who perceive the existence of a ‘security gap’ of sorts.The Norwegian government tries to neutralise this gap by stepping up its regional cooperation – rapprochement with the EU, activism in the UN and super-loyalty in NATO – with modest results. Norway’s political commitment to the region is thus informed by clear political and practical motives. Regional cooperation between the Nordic states has never been a natural given; nor has it been easy, not in the Cold War, when interests differed, and not now when policy orientations differ. Johan Jørgen Holst explained in the 1970s how and why the four Nordic countries followed four different roads to ensure their security (Holst 1973). Unfortunately, asymmetrical institutional developments have prevented the Nordic countries from converging their security policies into one common track: Denmark, Finland and Sweden are now EU members; Norway is not. Norway and Denmark are NATO members, Sweden and Finland are not. The centripetal force of the European Union’s developing crisis management and conflict prevention capacity is so strong that no air is left for any Nordic security arrangement to credibly survive. Although politically and rhetorically important, regional security cooperation is dead. Only the extension to the Baltic states is pursued with vigour and imagination. And NATO’s and the EU’s enlargement with the Baltic states will make Norway’s predicament even more precarious. Thus, according to a former top Ministry of Foreign Affairs official,‘regional cooperation did not develop at home’. Instead, it developed abroad, for example in the Balkans, where the Nordic countries successfully pooled their resources in a multinational military framework. Of all the Nordic countries, Norway is the one that stands to gain most from

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regional cooperation: politically (closeness to and involvement in the EU) and practically (pooling resources and achieving economies of scale in the procurement and management of expensive resources).108 In addition, motives linked to regional politics like the integration of the Baltic states into a regionally concerted security policy play a role.109 From a security perspective, it is clear that integrating Norwegian units into a military formation earmarked for deployment by the EU (e.g. the Nordic Brigade, a joint initiative of all four Nordic countries) will bring Norway closer to the EU. Basic features of the Norwegian political system Norway is a constitutional monarchy in which legislative power lies with Parliament (the Storting). Parliamentary elections are mandatory every four years, with no right of dissolution mid-term. Norway adheres to the principle of parliamentary rule. The government is accountable to Parliament and dependent on retaining its confidence. A number of constitutional practices govern the relations between Parliament and the government, and any deviation from these conventions will have political consequences, which may go as far as requiring the resignation of a single minister or even the entire government. The majority in Parliament determines which party or party coalition will have the power of government. This does not always mean that a majority will back a sitting government, but a government cannot continue to rule if a majority opposes it. If Parliament confronts the government with a vote of no confidence, it must resign. In a critical situation, the government may call a vote of confidence, and in doing so, threaten to step down if Parliament does not accept its proposal on a specific issue. The Norwegian electoral system is based on proportional representation in multi-member constituencies.Voters vote directly for representatives for their constituencies by casting a vote for one of many electoral lists put up in that constituency. The political dividing line runs between the Labour Party and the Socialist Party on the one side and all other parties on the other. After thirty years of minority governments, the Nordic emphasis on consensus is well entrenched in the Storting’s legislative process.110 Any administration needs the support of the Storting for its programme, and minority governments often adjust their proposals in order to remain in office.The prime minister, formally appointed by the king following consultations with different party leaders, chooses a cabinet that is likely either to represent an agreement between coalition parties or to reflect internal divisions in the ruling party. Ministers have a fairly free hand within their own departments and may appoint junior ministers or state secretaries to exercise closer political control of the departments. While they are in office, ministers do not sit as members of the Storting. Governments exercise a large amount of patronage, not least in appointments to indirectly state-controlled organisations and state companies. The Labour Party in particular has often been accused of favouring the party faithful.

Denmark and Norway 103 The Storting has four important responsibilities: to pass laws and to amend or repeal existing laws; to fix the annual revenue and expenditure of the state; to supervise the government and the public administration; and to authorise plans and guidelines for the activities of the state. When deliberating legislation, the Storting separates into two chambers. Most of the business laid before the Storting and the Odelsting is first prepared by a committee and discussed in separate party groups. Norwegian parliamentary politics has a consensual tradition, and minority governments usually have legislative understandings with different opposition parties according to the issues under debate. Because of the conflicting interests the centre-right parties represent, they have generally found cooperation difficult, both in government and in opposition. As we will see below, the issue of consensus is so strong that no government will send Norwegian forces abroad without the explicit consent of Parliament. However, these legislative understandings are increasingly negotiated on a case-by-case basis. The moves the government is required to make to get legislation adopted are sometimes described as ‘slalom politics’. The administration Traditionally, Norway has had a strong executive, the most prestigious government ministries being those of finance, industry, shipping, petroleum and energy, and foreign affairs. The government has been given a broad mandate to set or determine foreign policy aims and to execute the proposed policy, and it is the classic mission of any Ministry of Foreign Affairs to maximise its country’s influence in the world. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs started in 1905 as a very small department, and the Department of Commerce was to some extent included in this ministry. Material interests dominated the conduct of foreign policy during the early years of the century, but the First World War gave an impetus to extensive reform of the ministry.The increased workload resulting from the war meant an expansion of personnel and budgets, although much of this expansion was meant to be temporary, to be undone upon the return to ‘normality’. However, as the situation at the end of the war showed little resemblance to prewar conditions, reforms were needed. Norway has a traditional division of tasks between the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Defence Ministry. The former used to concentrate on the UN and the overall political picture, and the latter was the typical NATOoriented club.111 Norway traditionally places a strong emphasis on the non-defence aspects of crisis management.This used to be the domain of the UN, where the Foreign Office had the lead. It is not yet clear which ministry will corner EU security policy. The Ministry of Defence is going through a process of massive changes, mostly induced by the changes made in a NATO context, otherwise the result of rebalancing Norway’s position vis-à-vis Russia and the implications for Norwegian territorial defence. A big debate that took place within the Norwegian administration over the last decade was the

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debate about substantial versus symbolic (and dispersed) participation. ‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants Norwegian flags all over the world’, complained a Ministry of Defence official in an interview, ‘and we have to do it.’The Ministry of Defence has argued for years that Norway should concentrate its efforts and contribute only when it can make a difference, instead of contributing symbolically to too many operations around the world. This fight was apparently won by the Ministry of Defence. The role of the Ministry of Defence is based on the tasks that the minister of defence performs in the political and administrative system, the nature of which is constitutional, political and administrative. Essentially, the ministry is the secretariat of the minister of defence, who formulates Norway’s defence and security policy, prepares guidelines for the activities of the armed forces, and plans, administers and supervises these activities. It is the minister’s task to lay down basic principles governing the organisation, personnel administration and financial management of its subordinate agencies and to ensure, through rational management systems, that resources are used effectively. The minister of defence is constitutionally answerable to Parliament for all activities carried out by the agencies for which he has responsibility. This means that the ministry, as part of the executive branch of government, performs an overall supervisory function. The armed forces and the chief of defence The position of the Norwegian chief of defence is institutionally interesting, because his mandate assigns him a position of responsibility not only vis-à-vis the government but also towards the public.The Norwegian chief of defence is the principal military adviser to the minister of defence and has the independence and the mandate ‘to speak freely’ and to inform the general public. This makes his office one of the centres of gravity within the Norwegian government when it comes to the implementation of security and defence policy. He can express his opinions in newspaper articles and interviews, even if his opinion has political consequences.This part of the mandate has historical roots, going back to 9 May 1940, the day that Germany invaded Norway. Germany had an easy victory, so it was concluded on the Norwegian side, and the fact that Norway was not ready to defend itself was held to be due to the fact that Parliament did not listen enough to the military advisers. To rectify this for once and for all, Parliament decided on an unusually broad mandate for the chief of defence, who has many powers. First, he has general command, meaning in effect that he is commander-in-chief, although constitutionally, the Council of State plus the king are commander-in-chief. Materially, this role is delegated to the chief of defence via the minister of defence. Second, he controls the resources and is responsible for the allocation of the defence budget. However, he is not the sole holder of this power: the Storting can also allocate parts of the defence budget and, when decisions on large procurement projects have to be taken, these will be taken in close

Denmark and Norway 105 consultation with all relevant actors in the Extended Foreign Relations Committee. Third, the chief of defence is wholly independent and is physically located outside the organisation of the Ministry of Defence, which is wholly civilian.The chief of defence has a huge staff and, because ‘nobody can sack him for speaking out’, he plays an important and powerful role in the debate on participation in crisis management operations. He is the military head of the armed forces’ military organisation with responsibility for longterm military planning and formulating budget proposals. He is in charge of proposing cost-effective, result-oriented solutions based on the goals, political guidelines and general framework laid down by the Ministry of Defence, and for ensuring, in his contacts with the civil defence and emergency planning directorate, that adequate plans exist for logistic support in the overall defence concept. He is also responsible for operational and executive management and for ensuring that current activities are carried out properly. It is his task to see to it that the military organisation of the armed forces functions in a resultoriented, cost-effective, rational manner to achieve the end products defined for the armed forces in peacetime. It is also his duty to present the year’s accounts together with a comprehensive statement of the armed forces’ activities and operational capabilities, in relation to the current defence concept and selected strategies. The chief of defence is also commander of Defence Command Norway and is in that function a direct subordinate to the minister of defence.112 In this capacity, he assigns priorities and manages the resources of the armed forces as a whole. All operational, force generation and support activities are placed in this context. He has overall command of all elements within his area of responsibility, an authority he exercises directly over the chief of staff and the Joint Operational Headquarters in Stavanger. The headquarters of Defence Command Norway is organised as a joint staff and four service staffs (army, navy, air force and home guard). The joint staff consists of a central staff, special staffs and branch staffs. The task of the central staff is to conduct long-term general strategic planning, structural development and resource use on behalf of the chief of defence.To this end, the central staff has coordinating authority over the other staffs at the headquarters. The chain of command is thus integrated and unified. The state of the armed forces is less positive. Report No. 45 (2000–2001) by the government to the Storting was honest to the point of being blunt: the armed forces are in a deep, long-lasting structural crisis.113 The report marked the start of one of the greatest reorganisations ever to take place in the public sector. The Cold War had left its indelible marks on the Norwegian armed forces: their size, structure, orientation and equipment were tailored to the East–West confrontation. Norway faced the 1990s with this obsolete security complex, and the result was that the missions assigned to the armed forces far outstripped the resources allocated to them.The whole system came rapidly to a standstill as a result of obsolete equipment, the drain on emergency stores, maintenance arrears in buildings and other facilities, and the decline in training

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Figure 5.2 Command structure of the Norwegian armed forces Source: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence (2002).

and exercise levels. Parliament adopted a resolution supporting the majority of the top-level measures in the government’s programme for restructuring the armed forces, in which the most important changes were reducing the size of the armed forces by 5,000 to approximately 17,000 men by 2005 and reduction of defence spending by approximately NOK 2 billion by the end of the restructuring period. Parliament agreed to invest in the procurement of new equipment to meet the new threats of a new era. The Parliamentary Defence Compromise of spring of 2002 struck a balance between the missions of the armed forces and the resources that would be allocated. At the same time, it was decided that large-scale changes needed to be made to the forces’ wartime establishment in order to create modern, flexible, high-quality forces suited to the present and future tasks they would face. Thus, it was thought, the new armed forces would be better suited to Norway’s role as a NATO partner and reflect the demands that NATO might place on Norway as a member nation. Norwegian foreign and security policy Norway, as did Denmark, occupied a central place during the Cold War, so it is therefore not a surprise that the end of the Cold War meant a radical break with the security policies of the past.The end of the Cold War meant the end of being a ‘special case’, as the relative geostrategic importance of Norway to its allies was reduced. Paradoxically or not, Norway did not return to its state of nature (blissful isolation) but was left in a sensitive corner of the world with an unruly, unstable and crumbling superpower as its near neighbour.This gave rise to a certain anxiety in the Norwegian policy elite, which is mostly called the fear of marginalisation, but one wonders whether this points out the right angle of the problem.114 The core problem was that Norway feared to be ‘left alone’ in a huge and multiply asymmetric geostrategic space.

Denmark and Norway 107 Adaptation and reorientation in a fundamentally changed geostrategic setting does not come easy and generally does not come cheap: ‘Incremental budgeting, bureaucratic routines, history, and inertia make them move slowly, but inexorably’ (Dörfer 1997: 35). The need for an active foreign and security policy was felt throughout the political spectrum.‘With the need for collective security to help defend northern Norway and with the emphasis on building common security throughout Europe, Norway had to be “willing to contribute to security, stability and possibly collective military defence in other parts of Europe”’ (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence 1993–94: 9). If nothing else, this was ‘a quid pro quo for the readiness of allies to make a similar commitment to northern Europe’ (Archer and Sogner 1998: 132). The strategic calculation is straightforward: Norway will face more complex risks and potential challenges in the future, and the challenges are no longer necessarily associated with one particular counterpart or a certain type of conflict. It is Norway’s ambition to contribute more to international crisis management operations. ‘Lilliputs and Gulliver: small states in a great power alliance’ is the telling title of an article by Johan Jørgen Holst. The Lilliputs of this world benefit if the Gullivers stick to the rules and solve their conflicts according to these rules. It is therefore only natural that small states seek part of their security in international law, and it is in their legitimate interest to strive to make these international institutions as strong as possible. Norway’s enthusiasm for the United Nations thus has a security component. This orientation towards multilateral structures is a very ‘normal’ attitude for small states to adopt. Norway turned to NATO and the UN after 1989, and it turned to the EU after 1994. It should not be surprising that Norway wants to be as close to the EU as possible. Liberal institutionalism is, according to Archer and Sogner ‘very much a Nordic approach to the international security dilemma’ (Archer and Sogner 1998), because it involves stressing the need for a collective approach to security threats, and thus an emphasis on a multilateral institutional response that does not just involve military action. The preferences of Nordic governments changed once the system was transformed from a bipolar distribution of capabilities to a multipolar one. For Norway, as for any other small state, multilateralism in its security relations is an essential element of maintaining its overall security position.115 There has also been considerable opposition to this activist stance:‘Traditionalists maintain that Norway should participate in international operations only when it is directly important to Norwegian security, and that the meagre new resources allocated to Norwegian defence should be devoted to the territorial defence of the nation’ (Dörfer 1997: 39). Former State Secretary Espen Barth Eide portrays Norway’s policy after the referendum of 1994 as one of ‘eager adaptation’ to the EU (Eide 1996). Although a majority rejected membership in the referendum of 20 November 1994, there is today a broad political consensus supporting the government’s policy of adaptation, be it in matters relating to economic policy, security policy, or the justice and home affairs pillar of the EU. According to Eide, the rationale behind this ‘European turn’ is quite clear:

108

The case studies: a comparative analysis It is … far from improbable that the [NATO] forces earmarked for Norway will already be deployed elsewhere on the planet when they are most needed. … If Norway is to compensate for the reduction of the US production of forces for Norway, European forces will have to be involved. (Eide 1996: 87–8)

According to parliamentary sources, the main motive for this willingness to contribute to security, stability and possibly military defence in other parts of Europe is (apart from the humanitarian concerns mentioned above): ‘to ensure that we will receive assistance if the need should occur’; and because ‘it is of fundamental importance for the armed forces’ legitimacy that it can be demonstrated that defence spending gives us [Norway] capabilities that can also be used to prevent or solve actual crises, and not only as an insurance against a threat that appears unlikely to emerge in the short term’.116 The almost a priori willingness of Norway to take part in an international crisis management operation can be explained by both international humanitarian considerations and realpolitik arguments. The national decision-making process When it comes to decision making, Norway has three ‘centres of gravity’: the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The chief of defence is also an important actor. Policy coordination is done mainly on an ad hoc basis.There are several standing inter-agency working groups, but when it comes to the decision to participate in an international crisis management operation, policy coordination takes place as the need arises. If it is a UN operation, then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as lead agency, but if it is a NATO operation, then the Ministry of Defence acts as lead agency. The Office of the Prime Minister serves as a central nexus for policy coordination. Characteristic of the Norwegian foreign policy-making process is the active participation of Parliament. Although there is no constitutional basis for any formal involvement of the Storting in the decision to deploy Norwegian armed forces, it is an established custom to consult Parliament prior to the deployment, and the government will usually follow the outcome of the round of consultations with Parliament. Recently, participation in the UNIFIL operation in Lebanon was suspended at the request of Parliament, this move being necessary in order to free resources for participation in the Kfor mission in Kosovo. However, the Storting does not have a formal right to consent when it comes to the decision to participate in an international crisis management operation. Two articles of the constitution are crucial. Article 25 provides that ‘The Territorial Army must never, without the consent of Parliament, be used outside Norway’s borders’. This article was determined (and qualified) by the historical circumstances at the time when it

Denmark and Norway 109 was conceived (the nineteenth century).The aim of the article was to prevent the Swedish king from sending Norwegian forces abroad without Norwegian consent.Today, an exception is for NATO operations. A salient aspect of parliamentary involvement is the active role of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, more precisely the ‘Extended Committee for Foreign Affairs’, abbreviated as ‘the Extended’. It is composed of the regular standing Committee on Foreign Affairs plus the president and vice-president of the Storting, the chairman of the Committee on Defence Affairs, and up to seven other members appointed by the Storting with due regard to the strength of the political parties. The practice of close consultations with this committee as a means of securing parliamentary support stems from the wish to lift foreign policy above party politics, and to maintain the widest possible consensus in matters of security policy.This desire provided a new motivation for what must now be regarded as a firmly established custom.The special character and status of this committee, and in particular the fact that it can meet at any time, even if the Storting is not in session, gives it a unique role. However, this system has its dangers. The meetings of the committee are kept confidential, as are the minutes, which are only formally declassified after thirty years. One of the flaws of this system is that, if the government deems its duty to inform the people’s representatives to have been fulfilled through consultations with the committee, this may lead to a reduced flow of information to the Storting as a whole and consequently to the public. The bonds of confidentiality may make the members of the committee accomplices in the government’s policy while effectively barring junior members of the Storting from insight into that policy.The system may also blur the constitutional responsibility for important policy decisions and limit not only the government’s right to govern but also its duty to do so. On the other hand, the system also offers many advantages, as enumerated by one student of legislature–executive relations: The committee is kept continuously informed of a greater number of issues than the whole Storting. This provides a closer control of the government’s foreign policy. … The committee is also informed of the government’s intentions at such an early stage that it – or the Storting – can intervene and influence policy in advance of negotiations with foreign powers. … Perhaps the greatest advantage of the discussion on foreign affairs in the committee on foreign affairs is that it makes possible a synchronisation of parliamentary and governmental policy. In foreign policy there is always a third, extremely important and often dangerous party: foreign powers. It is therefore of decisive importance that government and Storting stand together in the effective protection of the nation’s interests abroad. (Colban, cited in Riste 1982)117 Norwegian researchers, Nustad and Thune, speak of an accountability gap in the Norwegian parliamentary system when it comes to accountability for the

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use of force in an international military operation (Ku and Jacobson 2002: 154–76). Norway is traditionally very secretive about its security policy. That these natural reflexes have not yet died out is illustrated by an event prior to the Kosovo war, when a parliamentarian called for a plenary debate on Norwegian participation in the air campaign. After some deliberations, it was decided to cancel this debate ‘because it was considered to be unwise to inform Milosevic about possible Norwegian doubts on participating’.118 Public opinion and public participation ‘Public opinion on national security is fickle in Northern Europe’, says Ingemar Dörfer, an expert on Nordic security.‘Since the end of the Cold War, the erratic nature of public opinion in Northern Europe has been shown again and again’ (Dörfer 1997: 4).The Norwegian public was consulted about joining the European Union twice. Eriksen writes that ‘Norwegian Labour governments have tried to coax their voters into joining the European Community/Union twice’.119 It is remarkable that in this very egalitarian society, the distinction between elitist and populist thinking provides a better explanation than the classical left–right political distinction. A strong undercurrent running through Norwegian society is the aforementioned humanitarian consideration. This feeling transcends the ‘normal’ differences between political parties. The parties do differ on the question of how the humanitarian argument is to be played out in the political debate: the political left makes the humanitarian argument explicit and insists that a deployment decision of the government should be based on this argument, whereas the political right will cite realist political arguments as their overriding concern. It is quite paradoxical that a number of important social and organisational changes in the defence domain could take place without much public debate. The establishment of the Telemark Battalion in 1993 took place without any public debate at all.The remarkable fact is that it was the consequence of new security and defence policy (and thinking) revolving around active participation in peacemaking as well as peacekeeping operations and required the use of conscripts abroad (which has been the subject of litigation). The Telemark project challenged the traditional aims of the armed forces (e.g. traditional budgeting priorities, training routines). It also challenged the principle of operating under a mandate from the UN.120 The participation in Operation Allied Force illustrates that fact. Curiously enough, the parliamentary debate did not start until nearly six months after the campaign began. The debate centred on the role of the UN Security Council. As in so many other European countries, the debate revolved around the supportability of a campaign without an explicit UN Security Council mandate and probably not in accordance with international law. Critics and sceptics of Norwegian participation in international operations, and of military intervention by the international community in general, can be roughly divided into two camps: the ‘anti-globalists/pacifists’, who are against intervention and the use of force;

Denmark and Norway 111 and the ‘Norway first-ers’, who oppose the use of the military abroad because it may degrade Norwegian security and defence and is problematic from a conscription perspective. It is fair to conclude that the traditional consensus on security policy in Norway exists because of a genuine interest in the matter as well as a lack of popular interest. Learning from past operations In the period between 1993 and 2002, the Norwegian government produced a considerable number of publications in which it elaborated the preconditions and constraints for participation in international crisis management operations.121 These documents have been adopted by Parliament but have never been integrated into a single coherent framework.This section will give an overview of the most important principles and policy guidelines as formalised by the government. In addition, the preconditions and principles are enumerated under a separate heading. It is reassuring that the field experiences of operations in Africa and the Balkans were evaluated shortly after the operations ended. The point of departure for this overview is the conclusion drawn by the Norwegian Defence Commission in 1999: Norwegian participation in military activities outside Norway will become … a requirement for Norway in order to be considered a credible co-operation partner. It will also be a measure of Norway’s effort in a burden-sharing perspective, and an important arena for exerting influence, building competence, and developing interoperability. (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence 1998–99: 21) The Norwegian government has formulated, over a period of ten years, a comprehensive list of aims, principles and preconditions that shape and guide the decision-making process. Most of the principles are aimed at ensuring military effectiveness, but an overriding concern for all parties involved is personnel security. The Norwegian government will go to great lengths and great costs to do everything that is reasonable to protect the lives of Norwegian soldiers. To ensure the political desirability of the participation, it is also important to take account of the requesting party. For Norway, it makes a difference whether the OSCE or the USA asks Norway to participate.With respect to geographical conditions and locations, there seems to be a consensus not to go to places that are ‘unnatural’ to Norwegians, or situations and locations that are at too great a distance from the natural Norwegian habitat (a temperate maritime climate). Some interviewees used phrases like ‘it is not natural for Norwegian forces to take part in a high-intensity conflict in the jungle’.122 This distinction between what is considered ‘natural’ and what not highlights an important point. It is not a hard constraint, but a de facto geographical limit is placed on the deployment of Norwegian forces. It should be emphasised that this restriction refers only to the Norwegian battalion that

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may have to engage in military action. It does not refer to the small teams of Norwegian observers that are continually being deployed around the globe. As for the political desirability of taking part in international crisis management operations, the government must observe a very strong consensus rule: it will simply not deploy troops abroad without backing from the Storting. This ensures a high degree of parliamentary influence in the decision-making process. Parliamentarians were generally pleased with the amount of information they received from the government, either from the minister of defence or from the minister of foreign affairs.The principles and preconditions for participations are felt to serve two functions.The first is that they serve as a guide for staff officers in the joint staff, which uses this framework to structure the process of collecting, assessing and analysing intelligence prior to a decision. Because of his independent position, the set of principles formalised in Report 38 provide the chief of defence with a powerful tool: his ‘no’ has an uncharacteristically heavy weight. Second, the principles form a political instrument for the debate in Parliament. Its structure contributes to a common understanding of all parties involved in the decision-making process: the cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Storting. It serves as a structure for clarification and discussion. Recent operations Since 1947, Norway has participated in more than thirty peace operations and has deployed more than 55,000 soldiers (peacekeepers and military observers) to areas like Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Albania, Lebanon, Egypt, El Salvador, East Timor, South Korea and Iraq. In 2000, Norway participated in no less than eight different operations. The operation that consumed the most resources was UNIFIL, and it was this operation that, according to a Ministry of Defence official, came to stand for ‘twenty years involvement, twenty years of ineffectiveness’. Here, the Norwegians learned their first lesson: if the units that are deployed are too small, they become an obstacle, not a force multiplier. The main deployment decisions that Norway has taken since 1989 to involve itself in crisis management operations are Unprofor, Ifor, Kfor and SFIR. The Gulf War Norway contributed the coastguard vessel Andenes and a medical company to the multinational ‘rainbow alliance’. The decision to participate was taken almost without parliamentary debate. Public reaction was not strong. Norway’s contribution to the Gulf War was largely symbolic, but it was considered important to have the Norwegian flag on the line of flags of the Alliance, but on the other hand, the conflict was seen as ‘hot’ and ‘militarily aggressive’, and therefore the Norwegian forces were to remain outside the direct fighting. This mechanism of being there, showing solidarity but not

Denmark and Norway 113 getting entangled in any direct military confrontation, continued throughout the early 1990s. UN operations (Unprofor) Traditionally, Norwegian parliamentarians have been united in their desire to participate in UN missions. It was a consensus typical of many Western European states throughout the 1990s. The political left was in favour of participation because of the humanitarian aim and content of the operation, while the political right supported participation, in addition to the humanitarian argument, on the basis of ‘realist’ considerations (national interest, international solidarity, etc.). Norway took part in the UN operations in the Balkans, eagerly and generously, but also with a certain naivete, which they were to lose later on. This is illustrated by their preferred choice of units. In order to prevent Norwegian soldiers from ending up in the front line and facing a ‘hot’ and aggressive conflict, the government decided to send support troops rather than ‘fighting’ soldiers.The Norwegian contribution consisted of medical companies with ambulances and field hospitals and a transport element. Ironically, the Norwegian soldiers ended up doing the most dangerous jobs of all: driving ambulances and trucks through ‘front lines’ and free territory made them at one stage virtually fair game to the conflicting parties. Slippery roads and difficult and often dangerous working conditions actually put these drivers in the most vulnerable position of all the units involved. The operations in the Balkans were the first ‘dangerous’ missions in which Norway had taken part, and the Balkan experience changed the Norwegian attitude to being engaged in ‘hot, military operations’. It exposed Norwegian soldiers for many years to a challenging environment, and many of the operational experiences were taken home, institutionalised and incorporated into the government’s general security thinking. Operation Allied Force (Kosovo) Norway’s participation in Operation Allied Force is remarkable for three reasons: (1) for the first time since the Second World War, Norway sent fighter planes into a warlike situation, although Norway’s prime minister never referred to this operation as ‘war’ but always as a ‘military operation’; (2) there was consensus in Parliament about the fact that Norway should take part, albeit for different reasons, which will be explained later on, so no substantial debate took place in Parliament beforehand; and (3) the main element in the strategic calculation applied by the Norwegians was that the NATO threat would be ‘enough to deter Milosevic’.This implied that no ground fighting would be needed after the air campaign. Norway agreed to send a number of fighter aircraft to the Kosovo theatre of operations. It did so together with the Danes.The Norwegian fighters were capable of one role only: air defence. Thus Norway did take part in the air campaign, but not in the bombing. The Norwegian military had its

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reasons to be sceptical about this approach, because it gave Milosevic the chance to get rid of Kosovo, and because it would not be possible to defeat Milosevic without deploying land forces – the approach taken to the air campaign obviously did not foresee such deployment. Norway was saved from a potential political crisis because it was certainly not prepared to take part in a possible ground war if the air option did not work. Norway’s decision to participate in the air campaign was again taken without much debate. The war on terrorism Norway sent six F-16 fighters to join Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and it also provided special forces, transport planes, mine-clearing teams, and three Navy ships, including a submarine. One of the Norwegian F-16s dropped a pair of laser-guided bombs on a bunker in southeast Afghanistan in a battle with renegade warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and a Norwegian spokesman subsequently said that it was probably the first time Norwegian aircraft had fired at hostile forces in combat in nearly sixty years, ‘It is certainly the first time they have released bombs against hostile forces since the Second World War. … For us, this is something very unusual’(USA Today, 28 January 2003). Norway was part of the US-led Gulf War coalition in 1991, and it sent aircraft and troops to the NATO-led bombings of Yugoslavia during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. However, Norwegian aircraft did not engage in battle in either conflict. Norway contributed not only militarily but also by leading the way in Afghan aid coordination and humanitarian activities. Government officials gave two reasons for the military involvement of Norway in Afghanistan.123 ‘First, Norway is a NATO member. Since the operation in Afghanistan is an Article Five operation under NATO, we have the obligation to assist any member of the alliance under military attack.’124 The USA requested the participation of Norwegian troops because of their expertise in small-unit operations in extremely cold and mountainous conditions. Norway contributed soldiers from the Norwegian Army Special Operations Command and provided both ground vehicles and C-130 transport aircraft to support special operations missions to the ISAF operation. Norwegian explosive ordnance disposal experts and mine-clearing vehicles are working in Kandahar.The second reason for participation is that ‘Norway has been active in trying to restore peace and security all over the world before – through the UN – and later also in the Balkans, through NATO. So we certainly have a certain tradition in contributing forces to peacekeeping operations – or even now, it is more like peace enforcement.’ Norway’s involvement in Afghanistan is not just in the military arena. Foreign Minister Jan Petersen stated that his country would work for increased international support for Afghanistan. Norway also chairs the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG), which was established in 1997 and consists of an informal group of donors focusing on coordinating international assistance efforts and ensuring the consideration of human rights in the provision of aid.

Denmark and Norway 115 The Second Gulf War (2003) Norway remained strictly neutral during the Iraq crisis, but the government has developed plans to support the postwar stabilisation force in Iraq with Norwegian troops: 500 professional soldiers from the Telemark Battalion are ready for deployment in conflict situations anywhere in the world at ten days’ notice. Thorbjørn Jagland, chairman of the Storting’s Foreign Affairs Committee, has declined to express an opinion on a possible Norwegian deployment in Iraq before he knows what such a mission might entail. ‘If the UN is kept completely out of the rebuilding phase, I think it would be difficult for Norway to contribute’, he said in a recent article in Aftenposten (‘Jagland til Irak’, 17 June 2003). SFIR (2003–04) Norway is participating with one engineer company in the reconstruction of Iraq. Norwegian officials have been adamant that Norwegian forces are not extensions of coalition forces and operate fully within the mandate established by UN Security Council resolutions 1483 and 1511. There is a firm basis in international law. Norway has set aside NOK 700 million for missions abroad in 2004. Regarding the preconditions for participation in international crisis management operations, the legitimacy of the operation is a key concern. A UN Security Council resolution is considered highly desirable but, after Kosovo, no longer ‘absolutely obligatory’. Domestically, the imperative of consensus prevails. The Norwegian government issued a string of papers during the 1990s, and these indicate an evolution in the assessment of the risks involved in international crisis management operations. Taken together, these papers identify and formulate an elaborate set of preconditions.They point for example to a position that may on the whole be qualified as risk-averse. Norway phrases the rationale and justification for involvement in international operations in terms of international obligations and humanitarian concerns, far less so in terms of material national interest.The tacit assumption is that international commitments will be reciprocated. Public opinion is considered to be a factor of influence but not a decisive one. Public opinion is relatively stable and predictable.With a distinct preference for the humanitarian aspect of the mission, the government finds itself in a position to stress the humanitarian aspect of its involvement and downplay the military component.The Norwegian armed forces are in the process of a fundamental transformation, which will not be completed before 2005. They remain conscript-based and heavily territorially oriented. In quantitative terms, their utility for international crisis management operations will therefore be limited. Participation in the ISAF and Enduring Freedom operations has so far been an unqualified success for Norway.This result has given a strong boost to the reform efforts and has increased the chances of a substantial increase in the defence budget in the short term.

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Table 5.2 Norwegian parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation Norway

Parliamentary involvement (high, low, none)

Initiator (executive or Parliament)

Predominant influence (executive or Parliament)

Before

During

After

UNIFIL

none

none

high

exec.

exec.

First Gulf War

low

low

low

exec.

exec.

Unprofor (former Yugoslavia)

high

high

low

exec.

exec.

Kfor/Sfor

high

high

low

exec.

exec.

Allied Force (Kosovo)

high

low

low

exec.

exec.

TF Fox (Macedonia)

high

low

low

exec.

exec.

ISAF 2 (Afghanistan)

low

low

n/k

exec.

exec.

Enduring 2 Freedom

low

low

n/k

exec.

exec.

Second Gulf War

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/k

SFIR (2003/04)

high

high

n/k

exec.

n/k

1

Notes: n/a not applicable; n/k not known. 1

Parliament insisted on pulling out of Lebanon.

2

Operations executed after article V of the NATO treaty was invoked.



5.3

The imperative of consensus: concluding remarks

Norway and Denmark are small countries with limited military resources. Denmark has transformed its armed forces successfully, whereas Norway has only started its process of transformation and has a significant procurement gap to fill. In spite of the resource constraints, both countries have been generous participants in UN operations since the Second World War. Military observers from both countries have been sent around the globe, and both countries sent considerable contingents to the riskier operations during the 1990s. UN peacekeeping operations were conceived as an expression of humanity and human values, not as military operations. At the end of the 1990s (Kosovo), the emphasis started to shift: the military dimension of international crisis management operations is increasingly coming to the fore, and the humanitarian dimension is increasingly less visible. The natural political consensus on the value of participating in international military operations is rapidly thinning.

Denmark and Norway 117 Both Norway and Denmark have learned many operational and strategic lessons from these operations, which have been codified in numerous reports written either by government commissions or independent defence commissions. In both countries, a well-developed idea of the necessary political and operational preconditions for participation has been voiced, codified and adopted by Parliament. However, these preconditions do not play a formal role in the political decision-making process. The most important political precondition for both countries is ensuring domestic consensus.The decision to participate in an international crisis management operation can only be taken if there is a broad political majority in favour of such participation. Consensus is built and sustained in a well-developed informal circuit, which is formally complemented by a parliamentary procedure. The precondition of consensus has two important consequences. The first is felt at the international level: the more a parliament becomes involved in a decision, the longer and more detailed the list of preconditions becomes. Moreover, both countries demand more, better and firmer security guarantees prior to and during the operation and firmly retain operational command over the national contingent while it is deployed. This control affects the mission and tasks assigned to the contingent during the operation as well as the operational area in which it is deployed. Second, the imperative of consensus may become an obstacle to the process of democratic accountability. This means not that the government is not accountable but that Parliament cannot or does not hold the government accountable. Parliament has been so much involved in the decision-making process that a healthy scrutiny of the decision inevitably also entails a scrutiny of its own performance. Parliament has become hostage to its own involvement. Both Norway and Denmark perform poorly when it comes to the post hoc evaluation of government actions and decisions. In this set-up, the decision risks being politicised to such an extent as to make the prime parliamentary responsibility the first victim. It is remarkable that in both countries a key role is reserved for the Foreign Affairs Committee (Nævn) in Denmark and the ‘Extended’ Foreign Affairs Committee in Norway. Both committees meet behind closed doors, and the minutes of the meetings remain secret for thirty years (Norway) and seventy years (Denmark). Meeting behind closed doors is the rule and meeting in public the exception.125 The decision-making process is executive-driven, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acting as coordinator. This results in a situation in which – surprisingly in these two countries – the formal transparency of the national decision-making process is relatively poor. This is aggravated by the fact that both Parliament and the public are given very limited information. Considering the mechanisms by which constraints and preconditions change, Norway usually follows a ‘conformist’ line; it wants to be considered a ‘good’ and ‘responsible’ player in the international domain. Denmark has traditionally followed systematically adapted domestic aims to the possibilities

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(or restrictions) of the international situation. Its aims have ranged from staying put during the NATO controversy in the Cold War to international activism during the 1990s. Opting out of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is becoming an increasingly important institutional constraint, but it is clear that Danish Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen wants a better place under the sun for Denmark.To that end, he reduced development assistance in favour of deployable soldiers, and he took a very firm stance on Iraq. The position taken by his government during the Iraq crisis indicates an activist and engaged policy.

6

The dominant government The United Kingdom, France and Spain

6.1

The United Kingdom The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts. (Rt Hon.Tony Blair, prime minister)

Lord Hurd, former secretary of state for foreign affairs, gave an apposite description of a dominant self-image of ‘Britain in the world’ among the British ruling class when he described Britain as ‘a medium-sized power with a developed sense of international responsibility’ and said that, in order to ensure its influence in the world, Britain should punch above its weight.126 The desire to punch above one’s weight requires vision, alertness, a quick wit, capabilities and the willingness to accept a high(er) risk level. It also requires an efficient government machine.This enables Britain to exert more influence in the UN, NATO or the EU compared with Spain or Italy. Britain’s security and defence policy has consistently reflected this view, with commitments across the globe. ‘Britain’s armed forces have become an essential political tool for the government as it seeks to maximise the country’s influence on the world stage’ is the assessment of a Financial Times journalist.127 It is a consequence of the unique path through history followed by the UK that this sense of responsibility developed as it did. Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrat spokesman on foreign affairs and defence in the House of Commons, summed up the factors and obligations that determine the foreign policy and defence commitments of the UK in the world: • • • • • •

permanent membership of the Security Council of the United Nations; membership of the G7 [G8] economic organisation; senior membership of NATO; membership of the European Union; leading member of the Commonwealth; possession of an independent nuclear deterrent, which, in turn, arises out of the relationship sometimes described as ‘special’ with the United States; and

120 •

The case studies: a comparative analysis responsibility (albeit diminishing) for UK dependent territories. (Campbell 1997: 35–6)

‘Add to that our position as an island trading nation, surrounded by the oceans with an obvious interest in free passage by sea, and you have some measure of the issues involved’ (ibid.: 36). John Baylis rightly adds that ‘the legacy of empire has produced what have been perceived to be important, continuing interests outside Europe as well’ (Baylis 1989: 31). The permanent membership of the UN Security Council weighs especially heavily, as it brings with it additional international responsibility. MEP Peter Truscott describes the relation between the privilege of a seat at the high table of power and certain obligations: Being one of the five permanent members of the Security Council gives Britain a leading role, with an opportunity to exert global influence.Yet, with this responsibility comes the obligation to take the lead in international crises. (Truscott 1998: 22) Some critics claim that the size and wealth of the UK do not merit a place at the high table, but the UK is determined to show the world that it takes its responsibilities and obligations to the world seriously. It is willing to take on difficult and dangerous tasks with vigour and imagination, and it commands the respect of its European allies and the USA, which is especially important. The consistency with which the UK is willing to engage itself internationally and to give a lead may be regarded as a salient aspect of British foreign and security policy. However, ‘giving a lead’ may be qualified in the sense of making a distinction between being the first, ‘leading the charge’, and to lead in the sense of providing overall direction, of having the overall responsibility for integrating the various elements needed to achieve the overall aim. It is clear that Britain is capable of ‘leading the charge’ and willing to do so, but whether the UK has the ability, resources and vision to take responsibility for complete system integration is another story. Quite remarkable are the attempts by Labour politicians to express their convictions in formulating a doctrine. In his speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet in 1997, Prime Minister Blair set out the ‘guiding light’ principles of a modern British foreign policy. First principle … we must … be a leading partner in Europe. … Second principle: Strong in Europe and strong with the US. There is no choice between the two. Stronger with one means stronger with the other. … Third principle: we need a strong defence, not just to defend our country, but for British influence abroad … sound defence is sound foreign policy. It is an instrument of influence. … Fourth principle: we use power and influence for a purpose: for the values and aims we believe in … the

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environment, drugs, terrorism, crime, human rights and development. … Fifth, Britain must reinforce its position as a champion of free trade throughout the world. (Blair 1997) Later, the prime minister asserted his commitment to internationalism and justified external intervention in the affairs of nation-states as part of ‘the Third Way’. In Chicago, he was blunt in outlining his commitment to intervention and claiming a moral underpinning for such acts: ‘our actions are guided by a subtler blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and interests merge’ (Blair 1999b). Deployment overseas is nothing new for British forces – the evolution from colonial policing to participation in international crisis management operations is not a long stretch.The British forces set a standard for professionalism. The formal answer to the question of preconditions and constraints is very short: there are no preconditions for the deployment of armed forces or participation in international crisis management operations. It is only by scrutinising public statements that one perceives a pattern of key considerations that crop up, some only occasionally, others more persistently. In a speech for the American Bar Association, former Foreign Minister Robin Cook spelled out six principles ‘guiding’ humanitarian intervention. He said that it is important to establish such principles, because the international community is ‘more likely to act if there are clear principles to guide us when to act’. First, any intervention, by definition, is an admission of failure of prevention.We need a strengthened culture of conflict prevention … we agreed that a ‘comprehensive approach’ integrating all the policies at our disposal is the right one for conflict prevention. … Second … the principle that armed force should only be used as a last resort. … Third, the immediate responsibility for halting violence rests with the state in which it occurs. … Fourth, when faced with an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, which a government has shown it is unwilling or unable to prevent or is actively promoting, the international community should intervene. … Fifth, any use of force should be proportionate to achieving the humanitarian purpose and carried out in accordance with humanitarian law. … Sixth, any use of force should be collective. No individual country can reserve to itself the right to act on behalf of the international community. (Cook 2000) Third Way thinking provided New Labour with a normative explanation for intervention in international crises, for direct interference in what might be considered the sovereign affairs of other nations, even without the support of the international community. The mutual interdependence of rights and responsibilities is key to the logic of New Labour’s approach to foreign

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policy.128 Nations that want rights must accept responsibilities. In office, Blair has sought to enforce such responsibilities, using force where it has been required, most obviously in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Iraq. This introduction cannot be concluded without addressing the so-called ‘special’ relationship between the UK and the USA.This relation accounts for the somewhat different position the UK has in Europe. Objectively, the UK has benefited from this close relation in the fields of (shared) intelligence, nuclear-propelled submarines (i.e. the design of reactors), pre-warning and high-level political interaction.The warmth of the relation has varied over the years, with an all-time low during the Heath government, improving under Margaret Thatcher and very healthy under Blair. The special relationship proves its worth in crisis situations. The USA usually shares its intelligence with the UK in raw form. It is fair to say that the British prime minister has, in most cases, the same intelligence as the president of the United States.129 The relationship between the USA and the UK is important to the very selfimage of the UK.The consequence is a reflexive fear of ever being out of line with the USA on any issue. Using the words of an unnamed Ministry of Defence top official:‘We are like a favourite at the court of a king or dictator, who has to resort to more and more flattery to retain his position.’ In an article in International Affairs, William Wallace claims that ‘We [the British] must confront and abandon the myth of the special relationship. … If Britain portrays itself as America’s most loyal ally, we must recognise that the counterpart to the reassertion of American leadership in the 1990s will be reassertion of British followership: not the most stirring symbol of national pride’ (Wallace 1991: 34). It seems that these comments have not lost their significance at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Basic features of the British political system The significant features of the British political system are its parliamentary conventions, the royal prerogative, the prime minister and the cabinet, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Privy Council. Each of these features will be elaborated briefly and its importance for the decision-making process assessed. Britain’s most important political arrangements are based on unwritten conventions, which are rules of behaviour for public officials working at state level. In particular, the relations between the head of state and her ministers, between ministers, between ministers and Parliament, between the two Houses, and the behaviour of officials and judges, are ruled by convention. Such conventions cannot be enforced by law, but they are generally regarded and experienced as binding rules. Not respecting them has its own sanction, which is not necessarily less effective than the involvement of a judge. Such a sanction may consist of a public outcry, for example, which will definitely follow any disregard of an important convention. Many conventions are of the utmost importance, and one would get a distorted picture of the decision-

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making process in the foreign and security domain, always regarded as matters of ‘high politics’, if one were to ignore them.The royal prerogative (or crown prerogative) is the set of powers vested in the crown but delegated to the prime minister. It is up to the crown to declare war and make peace, but this prerogative has been delegated to the prime minister, who can exercise this power without any serious involvement of Parliament whatsoever. In a furious and brilliant polemical essay, Jonathan Freedland describes the office of the British PM. He is appalled by the overweening might concentrated in the hands of Britain’s chief executive: A British Prime Minister … has inherited a king’s powers. This is not rhetoric, but constitutional fact: the bulk of the royal prerogative has been handed from the palace to Downing Street.The result is a British premier who enjoys a power scholars freely describe as absolutist, with only the most meagre restraint. On his own he can deploy troops, requisition ships and otherwise make war – a crown prerogative in which parliament, astonishingly, has no official role. (Freedland 1999: 178) In neat theories about the structure of government, the cabinet is depicted as the place where the threads of government come together and the institutions of democracy converge – Parliament, the political parties and the civil service. In the words of Walter Bagehot, who provided the first full analysis of the cabinet: The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers. … A cabinet is a combining committee – a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its origins it belongs to the one, in its functions it belongs to the other. (Bagehot 1997: 8–10) However, this theory of the buckle was always too neat to be entirely true. British cabinets are large and sometime very large (more than thirty ministers is no exception). As a consequence, the cabinet does not operate as a collegial body; smaller committees or directorates are formed to tackle specific issues. Distinction is made between junior ministers and holders of the great offices of state. ‘Waging war’, says historian Peter Hennessy, ‘is an intensely prime ministerial activity’ (Hennessy 2001: 103). In this activity, the prime minister is supported by a variety of people and institutions.Traditionally, the war cabinet is the key committee, but the Cabinet Office has gained prominence under Labour. The Cabinet Office had always been regarded as the life support system of the prime minister, but under Tony Blair its visibility, significance and pre-eminence have been raised to unprecedented levels.The basic mission

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

of the Cabinet Office is to support the prime minister in delivering his main political programmes, but it has also served as a jump starter, a think tank and a sounding board. Relatively small in numbers but placed at the centre of government, its influence cannot be overestimated. The Cabinet Office has a lot of influence on security and defence policy but less on the actual management of international crises.The mechanisms for the practical management of crises can change: in the Kosovo crisis, ministers and officials attended meetings at the Ministry of Defence twice a day. The war cabinet does not have a fixed composition; it may for example consist of the Overseas and Defence Committee of the cabinet, with or without additional members. Britain has a long tradition of such committees (and specialised sub-committees), and almost all government business is actually done there. The Blair approach has been one of ‘cross-cutting’ policies and a ‘joined-up’ approach, thus transcending regular administrative and departmental boundaries.130 The governmental (bureaucratic) machinery to execute and support these decisions is made up of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence. Whereas the former is in overall charge of directing foreign policy, the latter is responsible for executing the missions that have been decided upon. However, as a former top Ministry of Defence official remarked, ‘Whether we can intervene, how soon, and in what manner, may well be a function of defence policy decisions taken many years before’ (Hopkinson 2000: 21). The British Ministry of Defence is a very large administration employing 100,000 civilians and 210,000 soldiers. Unlike the French situation, where the French chief of defence [chef d’état-major des armées] (CEMA) ‘reigns’ over the general staff and the Ministry of Defence, power within the British Ministry of Defence is shared with layers of senior civil servants.131 According to David Chuter, ‘the British system has … a large input by civilian officials. Defence policy, and the management of the defence programme and budget, as well as the entire parliamentary side of the ministry, are dominated by career civil servants. … In Britain, the military are content to leave this [politics] to the civilians and prefer to detach themselves from the political dimension’ (cited in Howorth and Menon 1997: 112). Another factor is the rather rapid rotation of (senior) uniformed men versus the continuity of civil servants. The Ministry of Defence administers major procurement programmes and various research and development establishments.132 The administration of the services is mainly done in the services headquarters, which have been integrated in one building in Whitehall but remain effectively in control. A less well-known advisory body is the Privy Council. This once so powerful college has survived the rise of Parliament and cabinet but today deals exclusively with matters of a formal nature. The crown, on the recommendation of the prime minister, installs the members. Membership entitles members to use the title ‘The Right Honourable’. They swear a special oath of allegiance to the sovereign and are committed to keeping all information received confidential.This makes it possible for the government to inform the opposition on delicate matters ‘on Privy Council terms’. Three members

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make a quorum. All party leaders are privy councillors.When the government is contemplating doing something of great constitutional importance that poses a risk to the nation, it will call on the Privy Council. The government will then give more information to these councillors on a confidential basis, thereby creating an extra information ring. This means that the opposition is not left out in the cold but gets detailed information about the actual situation and the government’s future intentions. The party leadership is thus well informed and able to conduct opposition in an intelligent and responsible way.The procedure allows the opposition to be alert to the real issues and not make a fuss about non-issues out of ignorance. The Privy Council is thus important as a link in an information process used to construct consensus across party lines. It has led Jonathan Eyal to the conclusion that ‘the Privy Council is important as a mechanism, not as an institution’.133 The national decision-making process Policy coordination is usually done in an informal, reactive manner, utilising a number of existing and ad hoc committees to ensure a constant flow of information. A distinction is made between military/operational matters and political/strategic issues.The military/operational side is managed by the UK Defence Crisis Management Organisation.134 A central and first-line agency is the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood, with the three service headquarters in a supporting role. The PJHQ is the initial point of contact for commanders in theatre. Within the Ministry of Defence, the political assessment of a possible participation is carried out by the commitments staff under the deputy chief of the defence staff (commitments). A close liaison exists between this staff and the Ministry of Defence finance, programmes and policy staffs, both at the time of making initial recommendations about deployments and in their subsequent day-to-day management of deployments. In the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the equivalent responsibilities are exercised by the United Nations Department (UND) and/or the relevant geographical department, again in close consultation with policy and finance staffs. Requests for UK participation in international crisis management operations are initially made by the relevant organisation to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). In the case of the UN, the request would be addressed to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s UND, via the UK Mission in New York. Ministers consider all major requests collectively, in cabinet or in the Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy, where collective discussion is required. The Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Treasury staffs in particular contribute to the preparation of papers and briefings for this purpose. Minor requests, for example for minor adjustments in existing deployments, would be dealt with at official level between the two departments. The degree of subsequent interdepartmental coordination once a deployment has been approved depends primarily on the progress of the

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deployment and the extent to which it gives rise to issues, operational and financial, that need to be resolved at a high level, or interdepartmentally. In the case of deployments in the former Yugoslavia, for example, there was a continuous need for liaison at all levels, both ministerial and official, to respond to actual or potential developments on the ground and in the relevant international forums, including the UN, NATO, the (W)EU and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. This liaison is achieved by correspondence, telephone contacts and a variety of routine or ad hoc meetings. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office held frequent meetings at which the Ministry of Defence was represented; and, where appropriate, the FCO attended the frequent meetings of the MOD’s Current Operations Group and Defence Operations Executive, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The MOD, the FCO and the Cabinet Office convene meetings on a very wide range of issues, covering both matters of policy and practical matters.The Department for International Development sits in on the meetings but is not a lead agency in the security domain. The highest direction of a crisis is carried out by the war cabinet, chaired by the prime minister and advised by the chief of the defence staff. Whenever Britain goes to war, a war cabinet will be composed. The prime minister will choose the most senior and relevant members from his regular cabinet.The war cabinet will meet every day and is likely to be composed of the secretaries for defence, foreign affairs and the Home Office, the chancellor of the exchequer, the development cooperation secretary, the chief of the defence staff, the attorney general and the closest personal advisers to the PM.135 The war cabinet serves as the central point from where the situation is monitored and decisions are made as to how to move ahead, how to influence the international context, etc. It is the core entity from which the actual operation is run; it is a forum for reporting on what has been achieved, and it is also the place where the PM gives instructions and ensures that he still has the support of his colleagues.The regular cabinet meets every week, and at this meeting the PM will give a tenminute briefing on the situation.136 Within the Ministry of Defence, advice to the chief of defence is channelled primarily through the Chiefs of Staff Committee or its executive sub-committee, the Defence Operations Executive (DOE). Since the Gulf War, new crisis management facilities have been constructed – the ‘PINDAR’ bunker below Whitehall, which serves as an ‘operations room’ where current missions are monitored, and relevant information is collected and dispersed. The Ministry of Defence137 The Ministry of Defence is headed by the secretary of state for defence, who is responsible for the formulation and conduct of defence policy. Three defence ministers support the secretary of state: the minister of state for the armed forces is responsible for operational and policy issues affecting the

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armed forces; the minister for defence procurement has responsibility for the procurement of defence equipment and defence exports; and the minister for veterans has responsibility for environmental and regulatory issues, service and civilian personnel casework, public service matters and veterans’ issues. The four defence ministers are accountable to Parliament, the role of which is to approve the level of defence expenditure and to provide oversight through exposing, advising and holding the government of the day to account for its decisions. The defence ministers have two principal advisers: one military, the chief of the defence staff, and one civilian, the permanent under-secretary, neither of whom is subordinate to the other. They share responsibility for much of the department’s business, reflecting the input that both military and civilian personnel make to policy, financial, administrative and operational matters. The chief of the defence staff is the professional head of the armed forces and the principal military adviser to the secretary of state and the government. The permanent under-secretary, as the government’s principal civilian adviser on defence, has primary responsibility for policy, finance and administration in the department. As the ministry’s principal accounting officer, the permanent under-secretary is also personally accountable to Parliament for the expenditure of all public money provided for defence purposes. Managing the defence apparatus is a complex business, and ministers, military officers and civilian officials work together to provide effective direction. A number of senior committees underpin the management of defence. The four defence ministers and ten senior officials (six military and four civilian) provide the membership of these committees, in varying groupings. The most important committees in the Ministry of Defence are the Defence Council and the Defence Management Board.The Defence Council is the senior departmental committee. Chaired by the secretary of state, it provides the formal legal basis for the conduct of defence. The Defence Management Board is the highest non-ministerial committee. It is essentially the ‘corporate board’ of the MOD, providing senior-level leadership and strategic management to maximise the defence capability and the British contribution to international peace and stability. The Ministry of Defence headquarters is at the heart of policy making. It has an integrated service and civilian staff (the central staff ) .The headquarters is responsible for the four fundamental aspects of defence policy and planning. These are: 1 2

3

strategy and leadership – providing the strategic vision for defence and toplevel leadership of the three single services; setting policy – providing long-term strategic planning, defining requirements (e.g. force levels), and the formulation and dissemination of departmental level policy; corporate planning and image – management of the MOD’s planning processes, including the development of outputs and targets and undertaking the annual planning process; and

128 4

The case studies: a comparative analysis setting targets, allocating resources and measuring performance – setting realistic departmental and organisational targets, allocating resources to meet them and monitoring performance against them.

Within the Ministry of Defence headquarters, but positioned outside the central staff, are the three single service chiefs of staff: the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff. They have seats on both the Defence Council and the Defence Management Board. As the professional heads of their respective services, they are part of the top management team within the MOD headquarters, representing the interests of their respective services but taking decisions at the highest level on a corporate basis with their other senior colleagues.They are also responsible for their own services’ fighting effectiveness, efficiency and morale. The individual service chiefs and the chief of the defence staff have the right of direct access both to the secretary of state and to the prime minister. Other key senior officials are the chief of defence logistics, the chief of defence procurement and the chief scientific adviser. Defence and security policy ‘Strong defence is good foreign policy’ is typical of the British foreign and security policy orientation.The quality of its armed forces and the willingness to deploy them form a vital enabler for Britain to ‘punch above its weight’ in

Figure 6.1 Command structure of the British armed forces Source: UK Ministry of Defence (2003).

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the world.Third Way thinking and the ethical imperative (‘it is the right thing to do’) have oriented the government towards an active and internationally engaging role. Britain suffers from resource constraints: specialised personnel, substandard equipment, etc. have a negative effect on its operational ability. The UK has the capabilities and the force posture to act quickly, even ahead of international consensus. Looking back at past experiences, it is possible to see a certain pattern in the British policy preferences for its involvement in international crisis management operations. •

•

•

•

Taking the lead. Britain is in principle willing to take the lead. This willingness stems from its UN Security Council membership as well as from moral conviction. Statements coming from Downing Street and statements made by the prime minister are replete with references to his willingness to ‘give a lead’, ‘act where others cannot act’, etc. Through its capacity to lead, Britain is clearly well placed to influence the shape and substance of a multinational operation. ‘First in, first out’.The UK force posture is aimed at the ability to conduct two major or demanding operations simultaneously (involving troops on the ground). The UK has two brigades ready for this purpose. After the initial shock of an operation, the situation usually calms down. A period of ‘skill fade’ sets in, which must be avoided, because it leads to reduced readiness and requires additional time to retrain troops. The number of troops available for quick military deployment is limited.138 One Ministry of Defence official described it as follows: ‘We want to keep military deployments as short as possible. We want to avoid becoming ‘bogged down’ in a long-running mission without a clear exit strategy.’139 And, as one journalist described it, ‘Britain’s policy is to send rapid reaction forces into delicate situations quickly enough to prevent them from becoming crises, but to withdraw them when there is more stability and other countries’ troops are able to take over.’140 ‘Small is beautiful’. The British have a distinct preference for small wars and small units doing special things. Big operations requiring true strategic vision are ‘not their thing’, so it is often heard. The small commando raid requiring meticulous planning, outstanding and exceptionally well-trained men doing their duty with dash and spirit, that is the thing that every British soldier and politician dreams of. The UK suffers from relatively poor logistics. There is a combined logistics organisation, but, according to British specialists, it is way behind what it should be for modern fighting requirements. Lastly, the armed forces suffer from shortages of specialised troops, such as engineers, medical personnel, liaison officers, special intelligence officers (linguists), etc. Because of the current level of engagements, the members of the armed forces are pushed to the limit, and it is difficult to retain personnel. The necessary boldness of action. This can only be achieved by unity of purpose, clarity of political aims from the outset and the moral courage to

130

•

The case studies: a comparative analysis see things through. If these elements are not in place, the ability to act effectively will be at risk. From heavy to light, not from light to heavy. The deployed force must be equipped sufficiently robustly, and it must be able to defend itself. Arrangements to extract the force, if necessary, must be in place. It is the conviction of several top military advisers that it is very difficult to move from a light force to a heavy force but far easier to move from a heavy force to a light force.‘This painful lesson we learned during the 1990s, we are very reluctant to deploy with insufficiently strong forces’, they agree.

A momentous occasion from a policy point of view was the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) at the end of the 1990s. This review process was designed to consider how the roles, missions and capabilities of Britain’s armed forces should be adjusted to meet the new strategic realities. It found its origin in a commitment in the Labour Party’s 1997 election manifesto that it would ‘conduct a strategic defence and security review to reassess our essential security and defence needs’.141 The proposed review was to be led by foreign policy considerations, first assessing Britain’s likely overseas commitments and interests and then establishing how British forces should be structured, equipped and deployed to meet them. In the words of then secretary of state for defence, George Robertson, the review was planned as a long-term overview intended to ‘give the armed forces a coherent and stable planning basis well into the next century’. The SDR would also consider ‘how we should get the best possible output from defence resources, and the contribution that our defence effort makes to the wider economy’. In making it clear that the review would be ‘foreign policy led, not Treasury driven’, the defence secretary outlined the unprecedented cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Robin Cook set out four objectives in a mission statement for the FCO: one was that British foreign policy should ‘enhance Britain’s security by promoting international stability and fostering strong alliances’. A new ethical dimension to government policy had implications for the review and for the UK defence sector. Robin Cook announced that ‘we will not supply equipment for weapons that might be used for internal repression’. There would also be changes in the rules governing the licensing of sales of riot control vehicles, small arms and other equipment to the security forces of certain regimes. Another factor making the SDR necessary was the changing nature of the security challenges facing the UK and the rest of the world.The primary aim of Britain’s armed forces is to protect the citizens of the United Kingdom and its thirteen overseas dependencies (such as the Falklands) and to provide support in times of crisis (as in Montserrat), and to engage in collective international action to uphold the United Nations charter. Given current regional and ethnic tensions, such international demands on the British armed forces are likely to grow. On top of this, the UK is committed to keeping significant

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numbers deployed in Northern Ireland (around 17,000 troops in 2000). At the end of the 1990s, 35,000 British personnel were deployed, not only in Northern Ireland and Bosnia but also in the Gulf, the Falklands, Gibraltar, West Africa and the West Indies, as well as the largest naval deployment since the Gulf conflict. Apart from normal military duties, the armed forces play an active part in the fight against terrorism. Reliability, flexibility and maintenance were the themes of the annual White Paper in 1993. The Strategic Defence Review assigned three roles to the UK’s defence forces: 1 2 3

Protection of the territory. This ranges from patrolling territorial waters and the streets of Northern Ireland to maintaining a nuclear capability. Membership of NATO. This is to insure against external threats to the UK and its allies. Promotion of wider British interests. These include support for NATO, the Western European Union and United Nations operations in the former Yugoslavia.

Each of these roles is then allocated personnel, equipment and budgets for the next three years. The SDR showed that Britain would engage in more small-scale operations concurrently. The problem that emerged in the 1990s was that concurrent participation in several small operations is actually a highly demanding undertaking. The profile of the British forces is best understood by describing the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF), which was created to meet the need for ‘hard-hitting and flexible’ forces.The JRRF brings together all readily available forces from all three services, to form a pool from which the government can draw the right mix of forces to mount short-notice, medium-scale operations of all kinds, from disaster relief to high-intensity fighting under NATO, European, UN coalition or national sponsorship. Parliamentary involvement There is no constitutional necessity for the ruling party to reach national consensus on the deployment of the armed forces.142 If the deployment is a small one (e.g. observers), national consensus will not be important, but if it involves significant numbers of ground troops, national consensus is important from a political perspective. Political consensus is built in three different ways at three different ‘levels’.143 The first level centres on the question ‘what needs to be done?’This initial consensus is very much an elite consensus.To build it, the government follows the set procedures of the House of Commons. The prime minister makes an emergency statement to the House, usually in an adjournment debate. This signals the seriousness of the situation. This will be followed by a general debate in the House of Commons. This is important, because the prime minister wants to know not only the position of the opposition but also the opinion of the backbenchers of his own party. The second

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

level, or ‘popular’ consensus, is created by extensive and often private briefings to the media (editors and political editors of newspapers) before and during the operation. The aim is to create or harden public support for the government.This consensus is sustained in quite an intelligent way: cabinet members make speeches and appear on television to talk about it; all ministers mention it; and the government puts pressure on newspaper owners and tries to control the news. Another instrument for creating popular consensus is the transformation of military officers into media personalities. Usually smart, well spoken and well educated, they give background information and explain the message to the public. Most important commentators receive private briefings at the Ministry of Defence (usually called ‘the talking heads briefings’).144 The third level is the consensus in Parliament on the success and utility of the operation in general after the operation has ended. Ideally, there should be a general agreement that the operation was worthwhile. So the British government has virtually total liberty of action in deploying the armed forces, but convention dictates that it must keep Parliament and the nation well informed of any decision to deploy and of the progress of campaigns.145 This is achieved primarily through statements by the government to the House and in parliamentary debates.The statements are usually made by the prime minister, the secretary of state for defence or the secretary of state for foreign affairs.They can decide unilaterally whether or not to issue a statement to the House. Debates are held on the basis of a motion, of which two different types can be distinguished: a substantive motion and a motion ‘for the adjournment of the House’. Both allow discussion on a named topic, the difference being that a motion to adjourn leads to a vote on the procedural point ‘that this House do now adjourn’. It is thus not a vote on substance, whereas a debate on a substantive motion leads to a vote as to whether or not Parliament approves the government’s policy. If such a motion is introduced and defeated, the government is formally under no obligation to change its policy: the defeat indicates the view of the House without prejudice to the exercise of the royal prerogative.There will be great political pressure to take account of the House’s view, but in practice it is highly unlikely – ‘inconceivable’ according to some commentators – that the government will be defeated and has to change the course of its policy.This complex system of often informal conventions for the control and scrutiny of defence policy and the armed forces is peculiar to Britain, although to some extent it has been passed on to Commonwealth countries, such as Australia and Canada. It offers the advantages of simplicity and flexibility, but Parliament’s control over defence is more limited than the control exercised under legislation in some other leading democracies, such as Germany and the United States.The House of Commons has very few instruments available for control of and oversight over the executive.146 However, there are no formal obstacles to the House of Commons developing new instruments for control or oversight: it just has not done so. As the willingness of the British government to supply information to Parliament is limited, especially so in the sensitive areas of foreign and security

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policy, Parliament has to ask for it. An important instrument in the hands of parliamentarians is the private notice question.147 This is an oral parliamentary question asked at short notice on an urgent and important matter. The government may therefore be forced to explain its policy in what is effectively a forced statement, if it has chosen not to make a statement of its own accord. Defence ministers are subject to oral questioning approximately once a month when the House is sitting. In the 1996–97 session, which was truncated by a general election, the Ministry of Defence answered 150 oral and 1,210 written parliamentary questions from members of Parliament.148 The answers appear in the Official Report (weekly Hansard). Parliamentary questions are normally answered within ten sitting days, although there is no fixed response period. In addition, members of both Houses of Parliament can raise matters with defence ministers in personal correspondence. Defence ministers can and do refuse to comment on certain questions if these involve sensitive policy areas. Such areas include, inter alia, many aspects of nuclear policy, special forces, intelligence, foreign arms sales, operations, and research and development. An increasingly common reason for not responding is that the information required is in confidence and commercially sensitive, as large areas of the defence establishment have been outsourced. Ministers may also not answer on the grounds of the disproportionate cost of answering the question, or they can state that the information is not readily available. Refusal to respond on a specific topic is an executive practice, not a parliamentary convention, and is renewable for each particular subject on a sessional basis. Although the notorious section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, which made the disclosure of any official information an offence, was repealed in 1989, the new legislation that replaced it has many provisions which still apply criminal law to the disclosure of specific categories of information. Thus the unauthorised disclosure of information that may be damaging to the government or the interests of the state remains an offence. Moreover, in the British system there is currently no general statutory public right of access to government information. As a result, information on defence matters is far less readily available in the UK than in many other democracies, e.g. the USA, which have freedom of information legislation. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence has been criticised for being excessively secretive.149 Nevertheless, the MOD has gradually become more open over time. Since 1994, it has operated under a government code of practice on the disclosure of information. The government presents the Statement on the Defence Estimates, usually between April and July. Over the years, this policy statement has gradually become more detailed. Since 1995, the MOD has also been publishing a performance report, usually in the autumn, which sets out its view of performance against the objectives set in the previous financial year. Events may dictate the holding of further debates with defence implications. In September 1990, Parliament was recalled to debate the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf crisis for two days. Many proposals to

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improve or enhance parliamentary control over defence matters have been tabled. Todd makes a plea for greater access to defence information in order to improve the way the House treats defence: there is also the question of the doctrine of ministerial accountability. … In theory, Parliament is sovereign and therefore has the right of access to any document and response to any question from any official. In practice, conventions have grown up which have restricted such access and Parliament has not tended to exert its rights or privilege and compel ministers to allow information to be divulged. (Todd 1998: 34) A knock-on effect is that the greater openness about defence matters which has been evident over the last two decades may not only allow Parliament more properly to exercise its scrutiny and control function, but also, by forcing the Government to anticipate such scrutiny, lead to more considered policy making. (ibid.) Information is thus the indispensable preliminary to control, and British officialdom is on matters of security notoriously secretive (the standing joke is that even the menu in the canteen of the Ministry of Defence is classified). Consequently, Britain suffers from ‘a persistent problem of defence accountability’ (Cox and Kirby 1986: 25). In evidence given at a parliamentary hearing, a Mr David Greenwood testified that [the] government’s monopoly of information, and occasionally curious ways of handling it, make effective Parliamentary involvement in policy discussions difficult, so that expressions of a desire to learn the views of Parliament do not always ring true. (Cox and Kirby 1986: 25–6) It seems justifiable to conclude that the government does not supply enough official information in a timely fashion to Parliament to enable it to perform its constitutional responsibility. It is impossible for Parliament to hold ministers accountable in a transparent and informed way. But Parliament is not deterred. The Ministry of Defence is now committed to maintaining a socalled ‘annual reporting cycle’ consisting of a number of predesignated formal reports,150 which reports are submitted to Parliament in order to enhance the quality of information, transparency and accountability. Finally, an important source of information is the Annual Statement on the Defence Estimates, which funnily enough does not appear annually, as it appeared in 1996 and in 2000. During the Falklands War, between early April and mid-June 1982, there were

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fourteen statements and five debates in the House of Commons, all on motions to adjourn. Four other statements were made in the period just before the Argentinian invasion. During the Gulf War, there were seven statements and one debate, on a substantive motion.151 The House expressed its ‘full support’ for the British forces in the Gulf and ‘their contribution to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions by the multinational force’ (cf. footnote 145). In the British system, the opposition has the role of inquisitor, although this role is not well formulated. However, in times of crisis, ‘Parliament will, with rare exceptions, sink its political differences’ (George 1998: 24). The parliamentary convention to support the man in the field is strong and prevents the opposition from seriously tackling the government. Once an operation has commenced, opposition does not signal dissent from the principle of the operation. Opposition and government are united in their support of the armed forces. It is indeed a sign of great crisis when dissent is voiced while men are in the field. Even when parliamentary parties have great doubts and reservations, their opposition is quite muted. The press may go haywire, but politicians are very careful because they know that irresponsible opposition can result in a perilous situation that will affect all involved. Restraints work both ways: government is restrained in committing armed forces; opposition is restrained in withdrawing its support for the government in this crucial area. In summary, parliamentary control is a ‘fiction’ (cf. ibid.). The Second Gulf War over Iraq divided the nation to the core. The House of Commons debated Iraq three times, in late November 2002, on 26 February and during an emergency debate on 18 March 2003. The House took two votes (during the last two debates), and the outcomes showed a parliamentary rebellion that did not have anything ‘remotely comparable in the past 100 years’ (Glover, in The Guardian, 27 February 2003). In all, 121 government backbenchers voted for an amendment describing the case for war as ‘yet unproven’. In the second vote, Tony Blair won the backing of the Commons for war against Iraq but (again) at the cost of a huge backbench rebellion. A total of 139 Labour MPs voted against the government in a rebel cross-party amendment insisting that the case for war had not yet been established. The amendment was defeated by 396 votes to 217, which gave the government a majority of 179.152 The situation was so grave that the prime minister chose to speak to the nation in a special address on 20 March 2003, in which he again explained why British forces were taking part in military action in Iraq.153 In theory, Parliament does have formal powers over all government expenditure in these spheres. However, parliamentary control of expenditure has been weakened by the practice of approving defence estimates as a whole, rather than voting on individual blocks of expenditure. In this respect, the House of Commons differs a great deal from other parliaments, including the US Congress and German Bundestag, where particularly the approval of individual defence procurement projects is often a source of considerable controversy. However, this avenue for exerting influence is closed off in the

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UK because of a system where a significant part of the budget is earmarked as a ‘reserve fund’ to allow for a certain flexibility in spending public money. These reserve funds may be allocated by the prime minister without interference by Parliament. The only formal requirement is a signature by the chancellor of the exchequer. In practice, this means that the prime minister can spend money without any formal indication of how much he is going to spend.And the amount he is spending is not disclosed. The House of Commons Defence Select Committee Ministers are accountable to Parliament for government policy and the conduct of civil servants. One means of contact is via the House of Commons Defence Select Committee (HCDC) (currently one of seventeen departmental scrutiny committees of the House of Commons). It is composed of eleven members of Parliament and has a permanent staff of five. Unlike similar committees in many foreign parliaments, the Defence Select Committee does not have any formal role in legislation or control over the defence budget.154 Its formal functions are defined as monitoring the expenditure, policy and administration of the Ministry of Defence and associated public bodies, and making recommendations, although it may comment on any defence-related issue. The committee sets its own agenda and launches a series of major inquiries each year. An important document produced by the committee is the annual inquiry into the Defence White Paper. The government produces responses to committee reports in which it answers any criticisms or recommendations.The HCDC can produce follow-up reports if it feels that a matter needs further inquiry. The committee’s strength therefore lies in its ability to influence or embarrass the Ministry of Defence; the prospect of defending a decision at a public session of the committee may be a factor influencing MOD decision making. The committee has the power ‘to send for persons, papers and records’ and is given some access to classified and commercially confidential information. Most individuals do appear willingly before the Defence Select Committee, although there have been occasions when civil servants have refused to appear, at the behest of their ministers, and information has not been given in the manner the committee would have liked.155 The HCDC engages itself in what is known as a post mortem analysis after an operation has been concluded. These analyses have become standard and are conducted in considerable detail.Typical issues addressed are whether the price paid legitimised the aims and objectives, whether the laws of war were observed, how well the British armed forces performed, whether they were adequately equipped, and what lessons were learned. Recent operations The Suez affair (1956) was ‘no end of a lesson’, leaving few but indelible marks on British foreign policy. The overriding lesson of the Suez operation

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was ‘never conduct operations of this size without or against the US’ (cf. Hennessy 2001: 257). The most relevant deployment decisions taken by the British are the Falklands campaign, the First and Second Gulf Wars, Unprofor and Allied Force. The Falklands campaign156 The Falklands campaign was not an international crisis management operation but a legitimate act of self-defence. As such, the case is relatively clear-cut. Prime Minister Thatcher was unambiguous in her resolve to win back the Falkland Islands, despite advice to the contrary from trusted officials. She gave clear orders to the military to prepare a task force that could do the job, although she did go to Parliament to seek support for the course of action that the government proposed. The action was deliberated in cabinet and was debated on the famous ‘Falkland Saturday’ on 3 April 1982, when the House of Commons convened in a Saturday meeting for the first time since Suez.The reason for the prime minister to seek a vote from Parliament was to discipline and silence her own backbenchers, not primarily to seek the opinion of the Labour Party. Hennessy considers this debate to have been extraordinary, because it could not be shaped. … For once the House had to think its way through a breaking issue, as well as indulging in the inevitable criticism of an administration which had allowed such an issue to roar in from the periphery to dominate events. (Hennessy 2000: 415) As Mrs Thatcher recalled in her memoirs,‘it was the most difficult [debate] I had to face’. But she got a majority for sending the task force, albeit on a technical motion.‘I obtained the almost unanimous but grudging support of a Commons that was anxious to support the Government’s policy, while reserving judgement on the Government’s performance’, she wrote later (Thatcher 1993: 184). The First Gulf War In the Gulf crisis, Britain adopted a position of unequivocally firm support for the USA in the international arena. Britain gave its unqualified support for UN resolutions and the US-led international coalition. Its participation in the coalition had the support of most of the House of Commons as well as of the British public.157 The first Commons debate on the crisis (6–7 September 1990) produced an overwhelming vote of support for the government (437 to 31).158 Parliamentary unity was maintained until the end of hostilities. In the debate of 6–7 September, Mrs Thatcher told the Commons: ‘If Iraq’s aggression were allowed to succeed, no small state could ever feel safe again. At the very time

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when at last we can see the prospect of a world governed by the rule of law, in which the United Nations Security Council can play the role envisaged for them when they were founded, Iraq’s actions go back to the law of the jungle.’159 Both Mrs Thatcher and the foreign secretary maintained a hard line throughout the conflict. Fawcett and O’Neill point to an interesting aspect of the British attitude to the risks involved. It appeared that only Britain had airfield-breaking cluster bombs, and British pilots had to accept ‘the most dangerous, low-level attack missions often in the face of heavy Iraqi defensive fire’. The casualties and dangers of these missions were evidently very great. ‘These costs were accepted stoically as Britain’s fair share of the burden of the war, a tribulation to be borne with fortitude for the sake of national honour’ (cited in Gnesotto and Roper 1992: 149). Overall, the government found itself firmly supported. It enjoyed a bipartisan consensus on its course of action, as well as remarkably firm public support. The targets that had motivated Britain (‘no small nation can be safe’) and the creation of an international rule of law under the UN, but also considerations of national prestige, the special relationship with the USA and retaining a modest sphere of interest in the Middle East, were all met successfully. Unprofor In early 1993, Malcolm Rifkind was cautious about extending British involvement in the Bosnian conflict. He said that ‘the UK should not commit military forces to international peace enforcement operations where there was no military solution but merely public clamour for “something to be done”’. Rifkind spelled out his criteria for the deployment of the armed forces:‘We should not put them into danger unless we are satisfied that there is a real military task for them to do, a realistic prospect of their achieving it and a degree of risk to their physical safety which is not unacceptably high.’ From time to time the UK, would have to stand out publicly against the use of force and decline to contribute to international military operations because they entailed ‘openended commitments or were not in the national interest’. Because of the limited availability of forces, Britain should press for ‘explicit time limits’ to be placed on peacekeeping operations. Failing that, limits should be set on the period for which any one country should commit forces to the UN for a particular operation (cited in The Guardian, 21 January 1993). Efforts to bring an end to the civil war failed, the UN was forced to intervene, and Unprofor was established in February 1992. The mandate, to ‘create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the … crisis’, was based on the traditional concept of interposing neutral UN troops. In Bosnia, however, so it became clear, there was no peace to keep (and Unprofor’s mandate frequently changed to reflect this). The Bosnian crisis was a struggle between competing ethnic forces for territorial and political control of an emerging state. Muslims, Serbs and Croats were all fighting for control of Bosnia. Following the ongoing war, the Security

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Council invoked the enforcement powers of part of its charter and gave Unprofor the ability to return fire if fired upon and to enforce UN protected zones. Unprofor found it difficult to perform this role, and NATO was brought in to patrol the no-fly zones. Two years of dual UN–NATO military involvement followed, and differences between the two organisations arose regarding punitive actions against the offensive forces engaging UN protected areas with artillery. The tension rose when the UN abandoned one of its ‘safe areas’ to the Bosnian Serbs in August 1995. The ensuing massacres of civilians brought no significant military intervention, and the dual-key arrangement was abandoned when NATO began a sustained air and artillery offensive against the Bosnian Serbs (Operation Deliberate Force). British participation in the operations in the Balkans has been substantial. At the height of the crisis, British involvement in Bosnia was 10,000 troops. However, throughout the operations in Bosnia the government had the full support of the opposition. When in August 1992 the Major government decided to send 1,800 soldiers to Bosnia, Labour leader John Smith supported this decision (19 August 1992). When in 1995 the government decided to send 6,000 troops to Bosnia, Labour’s front bench gave the government’s decision its full support (31 May 1995), despite widespread unease among backbench Tory MPs. Allied Force According to Richardson, in his evaluation of their contribution to Operation Allied Force, the British were ‘able to translate a relatively modest military contribution into an enormous political asset because it served the desire of Britain to punch above its weight and of the United States for multilateral legitimacy’ (cited in Martin and Brawley 2000: 153). The Defence Select Committee of the House of Commons was less outspoken in its assessment, acknowledging the extremely difficult circumstances in which the operation had to take place. It became clear that the strategy of the Alliance was to a great extent constraint-driven: the need to maintain NATO unity would be a paramount consideration. … Popular support for the operation throughout NATO could not be granted. … Furthermore, the requirement to minimise allied casualties would mean it could not be achieved without the deployment of very substantial forces from the outset. … The risk-averse mentality is one which, it is widely recognised, is going to have to be factored into any future operation of a similar nature. (House of Commons 2000b: xxix) Sierra Leone Faced with the collapse of the UN mission, the British government decided to intervene unilaterally using eight naval vessels, including an aircraft carrier

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and a land force of 1,000 marines and members of the SAS.160 Prime Minister Blair said that ‘Whilst the days of being a global policeman are long gone, it does not mean you can’t show leadership and do what you can to help’ (in The Guardian, 16 May 2000).The government showed strong resolve in dealing with the crisis. Former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook made it clear that ‘Britain will not abandon its commitment to Sierra Leone’ (cited in the Daily Telegraph, 9 May 2000). Help to the beleaguered Sierra Leone government took three forms: the short-term presence of British soldiers, whose intervention had an immediate and stabilising effect; a team of ninety military advisers, mostly senior British officers, to run the Sierra Leone army, whose much longer-term commitment could last years; supplies of arms and ammunition to front-line combat troops on the government side (the most controversial part of the package). The opposition Conservative Party had been calling for a clear mission statement from the beginning. Once it got this, it pressed the government to go even further:‘We’re saying that if there is a case, on military advice, to extend the duration in order to enable the United Nations force to go into serious and effective peacekeeping, then we’d support that’, said Conservative defence spokesman Francis Maude. ‘We don’t want the government to be constrained.’ Britain committed itself to nothing less than trying to rebuild an African state that had collapsed catastrophically in the hope that legitimate government could re-establish itself there. Although that was not a short-term task, both government and opposition embraced it.161 Operations Veritas (Enduring Freedom) and Fingal (ISAF) At the time of the 11 September attacks, British armed forces were participating in the biggest concentration of UK forces in the Middle East since the Gulf War in 1991 (Exercise Saif Sareea II). A Royal Navy task force was formed with 45 Commando Group (Royal Marines) embarked. Operations in Afghanistan commenced on 7 October 2001 and were aimed against alQaeda and Taliban forces. By January 2002, a new situation had developed in Afghanistan: the Taliban had been crushed and the Bonn Agreement on the future governance of Afghanistan called for the deployment of an international force to assist the new Afghan Interim Authority with the provision of security and stability for Kabul. In a statement to the House of Commons in January 2002, the minister of defence gave evidence of the British position. He stated that Britain was prepared to take on the leadership of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The UK would provide the force commander and his headquarters. ‘The commitment is limited in numbers – up to 1,500 troops and duration – up to three months.162 After three months, we will hand over lead nation status to one of our partners.’163 On 20 June 2002, the British handed over lead nation status to Turkey.

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The Second Gulf War (Operation Telic)164 On 20 March 2003, a US-led coalition began military operations against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. Just four weeks later, the regime had been removed and most of Iraq was under coalition control.The UK contributed a total of 46,000 troops to operations in Iraq. UK decision making followed by and large the pattern and processes described earlier in this section: on most days from mid-March to the end of the campaign phase, there were ad hoc ministerial meetings attended by the secretary of state, the chief of the defence staff and the attorney general. At official level, the Cabinet Office put in place a process of interdepartmental consultation and, within the Ministry of Defence, the defence secretary normally met twice daily with the chief of Table 6.1 British parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation The United Kingdom

Suez

Parliamentary involvement (high, low, none)

Initiator (executive or Parliament)

Predominant influence (executive or Parliament)

Before

During

After

none

none

high

1

exec.

exec.

3

exec.

exec.

2

Falklands campaign

high

low

low

First Gulf War

none

none

low

exec.

exec.

Unprofor (former Yugoslavia)

none

low

low

exec.

exec.

Kfor/Sfor

none

low

low

exec.

exec.

Allied Force (Kosovo)

none

low

low

exec.

exec.

Sierra Leone

none

none

low

exec.

exec.

TF Fox (Macedonia)

none

none

low

exec.

exec.

Operation Veritas

none

none

n/k

exec.

exec.

Operation Fingal

none

none

n/k

exec.

exec.

Operation Telic

high

4

none

n/k

exec.

exec.

Notes: n/k not known. 1

The government fell.

2

House of Commons took a substantive vote.

3

House of Commons Defence Committee started its work.

4

House of Commons took two substantive votes.

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the defence staff and others in the direct chain of command for the operation. Planning for the post-conflict phase was centralised in the Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), based in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This planning unit was led by a senior FCO official and worked closely with the Cabinet Office. It included MOD military and civilian staff, and officials from the FCO, the Department for Foreign and International Development (DFID) and the Treasury; it quickly became established as an integral element of the ‘Whitehall process’. Based on this evidence, the following picture emerges. The British government remains very secretive about defence and security issues. There is no formal requirement for the prime minister to go to the House of Commons to seek its consent before deploying or committing the armed forces.165 However, parliamentary convention dictates that the men in the field must be supported.This prevents the opposition from attacking the government over a decision to deploy the armed forces. Supporting the government is the overriding responsibility of Parliament, not scrutiny and holding individual ministers to account. The role of Parliament thus differs fundamentally from that of parliaments in coalition-type governments. The House of Commons Defence Select Committee is a veritable exception. Its so-called ‘post mortem’ analysis of participation in crisis management efforts is robust and rigorous, but the government is not formally bound by its recommendations, and its activities fail to close the existing accountability gap.

6.2

France France must remain master of its destiny. General Charles de Gaulle

It is sometimes said that in France ‘everything is politics and everything is history’. And it is true: issues do easily acquire a political content and meaning (often cutting across party lines).As a result, differences of opinion often tend to be enlarged instead of reconciled, widening the gap between conflicting views and interests instead of closing it. Public discussions are aimed at principles and ideals rather than at practical results, which is not conducive to finding compromises. Thus a conflict model is a key principle in French society and civil administration. Civil servants and agencies do not cooperate but operate in a permanent state of conflict, making value-free, rational decision making virtually impossible. History traditionally feeds the national and political life. Political decisions are made with reference to historical events that may go back as far as 1,000 years. Before describing the basic features of the French political system, we will point to a number of salient characteristics that determine French foreign and security policy.These are the sense of grandeur and the importance of rank, the need for national unity and the desire to be in control.

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Grandeur and the importance of rank Often attributed to General de Gaulle, references to the ‘grandeur’, i.e. the greatness, of France have been made throughout the ages. Although the French have now stopped explicitly using the word ‘grandeur’ when referring to foreign policy – they will even suspect an element of francophobia in those foreigners talking about France seeking grandeur in its external relations – it remains a key aspect of the French self-image and perception of France’s place in the world.166 Grandeur is a complex notion with many different meanings. In French, its meaning can range from simply measurable size or ‘bigness’ to a sort of ‘grandness’ with connotations of extensiveness of influence, power or glory associated with a particular social, political or cultural phenomenon, to a much more profound sense of transcendental moral or cultural value of worthiness. The English usage of the term is usually restricted to the second of these three senses, and distortions appear in the comprehension of Gaullist aspirations in the eyes of British and American observers as a result of this perceptual gap (cf. Cerny 1980: 5). In this English usage, ‘grandeur’ as a normative concept has been used as a shorthand for the ideological content of Gaullist foreign policy, ignoring its fundamental principles. This greatness of France is not simply a search for glory but rather a necessary factor if France is not to break up. The perceived rank and status of a country determine the interpretation of its national interest. France’s status as a great power is embodied in its permanent seat in the UN Security Council and its possession of nuclear weapons. It is a precious asset of which France must show itself worthy. France counts on its exemplary behaviour to justify its status of great world power by its membership of the P5. (Stern 1998: 8). In the Defence White Paper of 1994, we read: Its [France’s] international responsibilities are a result of its obligations as a permanent member of the Security Council, of its history and of its particular calling. As a permanent member of the Security Council, France has to contribute actively, no doubt more than others, to the maintenance of world peace and the respect of international law. Being attracted to democratic values, France is all the more ambitious to promote them and, when necessary, to defend them, since it considers them as a warrant of international stability and security. Our defence policy contributes to this action. (Defence White Paper 1994: 23) If a crisis is a local conflict and France does not have any material or direct interests, it can stay out, but if a crisis is an international one, France will want to be involved because of its status and membership of the UN Security Council. Like the UK, France has to assume its responsibilities.The world must be able to count on that.

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National unity The importance of national unity is best summed up by a simple typology: ‘unity’ equals ‘strength’ equals ‘independence’, whereas ‘disunity’ equals ‘weakness’ equals ‘failure’.167 Every time in history when France was divided, it was invaded and conquered. The key question therefore has been how to remain united. There is nothing more important to the French (or more essential) than maintaining unity in its security and defence policy. Under the constitutions of the Third and Fourth Republics, power was too dispersed to allow for a united stance. The basic proposition of French domestic politics is that the actors within the French political process are unable to arrive at a consensus often enough to survive, let alone to be effective. General de Gaulle addressed this problem when crafting the constitution of the Fifth Republic and gave very wide powers to the president, enabling him to cut the Gordian knot. Being unable to reach consensus among themselves, the French have forsaken consensus and have forged national unity around the president.This makes the judgement of the president extremely important. His authority derives directly from the people because he is directly elected, bypassing party politics. The presidency can almost be conceived of as ‘a divine office’, although cynics may describe the incumbent as an elected natural monarch. The essence of the presidency is thus apolitical. Chuter presents an interesting hypothesis: ‘The chef-based paradigm of history both discourages a belief in the efficacy of a parliamentary system and helps to create a constant yearning for a decisive figure (usually with a military background) to assume the reins of power’ (Chuter 1996: 25). The schematic presentation of French history is one of ‘temporary defeats followed by salvation at the hands of a chef ’ (ibid.). France stumbles but will not fall. From this understanding of history, it becomes clear what is the core mission of the president: obtaining and maintaining national unity. The president is directly elected and is in a direct, personal dialogue with the French people. As a largely apolitical figure, he transcends petty political party interests and embodies the French republic.168 The desire not to lose control French politicians have, in general, an extremely acute sense of history: ‘we carry 1,000 years of history’ in our strategic decisions, says Minister of Foreign Affairs de Villepin. But ‘when history enters the equation, the French can become completely irrational’, says another diplomat.169 In a number of conversations with senior diplomats, it became clear that some of the emotions that are attached to certain distinct moments in time are still alive.170 ‘Vichy’, for instance, stands for ‘The traumatic experiences with the Vichy regime for example have become root causes of the feeling of vulnerability and the fear of perishing.’ The trauma of 1940 was that the French leadership perceived France to have been abandoned by its allies. A direct consequence of this was the decision after the Second World War to build a defence industry and the country’s preoccupation with strategic autonomy.

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France would never be held hostage to another country, by another country. ‘Yalta’ was another traumatic experience for the French on two counts: first, because myth has it that it was at this Black Sea resort that the decision was taken to divide Europe into two blocs; second, because the French leadership was not invited to join Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. ‘Putting Yalta behind us’ thus meant both wiping out the humiliation of being excluded and bringing to an end a bipolar world dominated by two superpowers. A very significant recent experience was the Unprofor trauma of the 1990s. This failure not only produced many operational lessons about what to do (and what not to do) and how to conduct international crisis management operations but also a set of robust policy recommendations.The French Ministry of Defence stated its policy preference for the more robust NATO framework for crisis management operations over the UN framework, and it insisted that any mission should have a clear mandate, a unified chain of command and robust rules of engagement.This points – in the case of UN operations – to a distinct preference for operations under chapter VII and not chapter VI of the UN charter.171 This change of perspective became manifest when the ISAF operation was in full swing and there was a request from UN headquarters in New York to extend the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul.This request resulted in an immediate and fiercely negative reaction from the French Ministry of Defence: ‘Afghanistan was Bosnia, only 100 times worse.’ This desire for control becomes almost self-evident when viewed in a historical light. It is a natural consequence of the aforementioned factors. The need to remain united coupled with an acute sense of its rank and corresponding responsibilities perfectly explain de Gaulle’s remark that ‘France must remain the master of its own destiny.’ Basic features of the French political system The president of the republic is the head of state and under the constitution is judge of the aims and master of the means. He enjoys unprecedented powers in what is sometimes called a ‘republican monarchy’. There is a constitutional reference to his dominant position in foreign and security policy. Normally referred to as ‘le domaine réservé’, it is sometimes referred to as ‘un jardin sécret’. The French government cannot use nuclear weapons, but the president can.172 The prime minister is appointed by the president and subsequently chooses his ministers. He or she is responsible for governing the country but is not much involved in foreign and security policy, with the exception of European affairs. There is no reference in the constitution to any division of responsibility for European affairs between president and prime minister. During the period of cohabitation, a vicious but inconclusive battle ensued about who should do what. In the end, both the president of the republic and the prime minister went to European summits, resulting in awkward situations.173 A situation of cohabitation is highly complex, because the constitution is based on the principle of a strong executive without a situation

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of cohabitation. Cohabitation goes against the idea of a strong leader. In a normal setting, without cohabitation, France is able to take quick and flexible decisions, and defence is one of the best sectors in government to demonstrate that. Yet cohabitation hardly had any effect on defence policy. Foreign policy leaves less scope for internal conflict and strife than other policy domains, because of the constitutional arrangement that the president is commander-in-chief. However, the reserved domain is not enshrined in the constitution. It may seem odd, that in a description of the French political system, such an extensive discussion of the role and place of the chief of defence (le chef d’état-major d’armées or CEMA) takes place. The position of the CEMA is remarkable, because he is the direct military adviser to the president and the operational commander of the French armed forces.174 Since it is the president who decides on the modalities of a possible intervention, the importance of the CEMA for the decision-making process cannot be overestimated. The relation of the CEMA to various politicians varies: he is an assistant to the minister of defence, the operational commander of the French armed forces and the military adviser to the government, in this case the president. He is also responsible for relations with foreign armies; he directs all missions abroad; he organises, within a framework of political cooperation, the participation of the army in cooperative military arrangements; and he conducts international negotiations. The president may be commander-in-chief, but the CEMA is responsible for all preparation and management of the armed forces. As the president is personally and strongly involved in international crisis management, the link between the CEMA and the president is very direct. Even the minister of defence is not included in this link. The CEMA is the highestranking serving military officer and in this capacity accountable only to the president, who in turn is accountable only to the French electorate at the end of his term of office. The purpose of this unusually broad mandate of the CEMA can be summed up in one word: success. Because of his mandate and his close and special relation with the president, the CEMA casts an enormous shadow over the political-military system. For the technical (military) oversight of troop deployments, the CEMA has a Joint Operations Centre (Centre Opérationnel InterArmées, COIA) at his disposal. This centre is tasked with conducting the technical military assessment of a possible intervention/participation, based on political guidance regarding the desired end state, objectives etc. Its mission comprises three functions: coordination, anticipation and synthesis. The director of the COIA is ‘sous-chef opérations’, second in rank after the CEMA and directly responsible to the CEMA. The dual role of the CEMA becomes evident in the COIA, because it is the CEMA who provides the political input to the military system. The core of the COIA consists of four ‘cells’ representing four different theatres of operations: (1) the national theatre; (2) the European theatre, including the Maghreb; (3) the African theatre; and (4) the rest of the world. These cells, headed by full colonels, monitor the day-to-day develop-

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Figure 6.2 Command structure of the French armed forces Source: French Ministry of Defence (2002).

ments in their respective areas. Their evaluations appear in a daily synthesis that is presented to the CEMA in a daily briefing. The COIA has a direct relation not only with the CEMA but also with the Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques (DAS), the key planning division in the Ministry of Defence.The DAS forwards its advice to the Comité restreint, the meeting of which is followed by a meeting of the Conseil restreinte. If a crisis develops in which France may have an interest, a crisis cell is activated. Depending on the size and complexity of the crisis, such a cell consists of ten to fifty augmentees from the whole complement of the armed forces. In addition, expert planners will join this group. Contacts have been established with national counterparts in other European countries, most notably with Germany, Great Britain and Italy.These contacts complement the formal political contacts. After the political masters have decided who will lead the operation, a well-established NATO process of sequential conferences will be gone through: the force generation conference; the donor conference; the manning conference, etc. The national decision-making process It is sometimes asserted that decision making in crisis situations is improvised: it is not top-down and is not bottom-up but a bit of both. Sometimes a government has received the proper warning signals, sometimes even early warning signals from the field. In other situations it reacts in a proactive topdown manner. Because the mandates of both the president and the CEMA are so unambiguously clear, this picture is not entirely true for the situation in France. The French government regards international crisis management not as an exclusively military or an exclusively political affair but as both.This has resulted in the co-management of international crisis management operations and streamlined policy coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.175 In normal times, the minister of defence will meet his military and civilian cabinet, including the CEMA and the sous-chef

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opérations, weekly. This meeting has a preparatory character, serving as a first line of coordination and preparation for the Comité restreint, which is the crisis management forum for the prime minister and includes all relevant cabinet ministers (defence, foreign affairs, international cooperation, treasury) and the CEMA. Its aim is to coordinate a cabinet position and reach a decision at the level of the prime minister and to prepare issues for consideration by the president.The end of Wednesday afternoon is the meeting time of the Conseil restreinte, which consists of the president and his most important cabinet ministers plus top civil servants such as the secretary-general of the Elysée Palace and the chief of the military cabinet, who acts as note taker.The Conseil restreinte is the ultimate committee where all important decisions are made. It is informal in the sense that it has never been codified as an official institution but came into existence in 1993 under President Mitterrand. No formal minutes (compte rendu) are kept of these meetings. In times of crisis, a non-permanent inter-ministerial crisis cell will be activated, on a signal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.The CEMA and the sous-chef opérations will always be represented therein. This cell has no power of decision; it monitors the situation, studies the available options and prepares various reports to support the decision making in the highest echelons. Two coordination processes run in parallel. The first is the crisis management meeting at the Quai d’Orsay, chaired by the director of the cabinet of the minister of foreign affairs. The second is the crisis management meeting at the Matignon, attended by more or less the same people.These are meetings of the top civil servants. As a general qualification, we could say that the decision process in France is flexible, unpredictable, quick, informal and fairly reactive, driven more by political instinct than by principles or a predetermined plan. Parliamentary involvement Under the constitution, a declaration of war needs to be authorised by Parliament (article 35), but the constitution does not contain any reference to decisions regarding international crisis management.176 In practice, the Assemblée Nationale does not play a role in decisions to deploy forces abroad. This decision is made by the president and executed by the CEMA. There is growing opposition to this situation, in which Parliament is deprived of its right to be consulted and to express its opinion.177 A poll presented in the Quilès report shows that only 4 percent of people polled thought it unnecessary to go to Parliament for a debate or a vote prior to committing troops to an international operation; 27 percent of those interviewed considered it necessary to inform Parliament; 22 percent considered it necessary that Parliament adopt a declaration; and 35 percent thought that Parliament needs to authorise the commitment. Another route may be article 36, which deals with the declaration of a state of emergency in the event of imminent danger or resulting from serious threat to public order either in all or part of metropolitan France or the over-

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seas departements. It could be invoked, for example, in the event of a major terrorist threat. The application of this article is decreed in the Council of Ministers (the approval of the president and the government is required), and its extension beyond twelve days may be authorised only by Parliament. Article 53 deals with the international commitments of France. This article stipulates that international treaties be submitted to Parliament, which must authorise their ratification by the president.This procedure is the general rule, which also applies to military agreements involving the engagement of troops in external operations. It appears that the practice of all governments since 1958, including those not sympathetic to the Gaullist tradition, has not challenged the very weak form of scrutiny exercised by Parliament over the security and defence policy of the French administration. Finally, article 16 of the constitution has become highly relevant, since it allows the president, if the proper functioning of the ‘constitutional public authorities’ is interrupted, to take measures that ‘stem from the desire to provide the constitutional public authorities, in the shortest possible time, with the means to carry out their duties. The Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such measures. Parliament shall convene as of right. The National Assembly shall not be dissolved during the exercise of the emergency powers.’ Although the Constitutional Council is consulted, Parliament, while admittedly in full session for the duration of the state of emergency, still has no power of scrutiny over either the decision to invoke this article or any action taken under it. Even government approval, in the form of the prime minister’s countersignature, is not required. This is a discretionary power on the part of the head of state, which earlier constitutions did not confer and which has been included to enable the legitimate government to deal with the gravest of threats. A report presented by François Lamy, a socialist member of Parliament, gives a good overview of the current status of parliamentary involvement.178 His conclusion is that the ‘deployment of French forces abroad occurs in the majority of cases without any form of parliamentary scrutiny being exercised’. Was the form of proceedings during France’s involvement in the Gulf War in 1991 ‘an isolated exception’? Operations in the former Yugoslavia (Unprofor, Ifor then Sfor), in Albania (Alba in spring 1997) and in Kosovo (Allied Force and Kfor since 1999) were instigated, executed and extended without Parliament having any say in the decisions. If there is no declaration of war, consulting Parliament with regard to military intervention outside national territory is dependent, formally, on an initiative by the prime minister, who can decide to make ‘a statement of his general policy an issue of his responsibility before the National Assembly’. He may also ask the Senate to approve such a statement (article 49, fourth indent).179 The prime minister may also make a declaration before the National Assembly, without a vote being taken subsequently (article 132 of the rules of the National Assembly). Thus on 26 March 1999, two days after bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in which France played a part) began, Lionel Jospin

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availed himself of that power for the first time on the subject of Kosovo. There was no voting in the National Assembly even when deployment of French forces in theatre was by definition a case of armed combat. More generally, it cannot be denied that Parliament is informed of the numbers and nature of troops deployed abroad. However, such information is normally given after the event (in particular at the time of voting amendments to the budget) and piecemeal (hearing of the defence minister by the members of the relevant committee or inconcise replies to oral or written questions). Furthermore, while the merits of international debate on the various operations undertaken in different parts of the world are acknowledged by the vast majority of states, back home it is normal for France to be conducting a number of military actions abroad without Parliament having a say in the matter. Parliament is not even always aware of the agreements and treaties under which such operations are conducted. These concerns sum up a number of key issues of the debate: no vote was taken in Parliament to authorise France’s contribution to the intervention or buffer forces in Kosovo or its more recent involvement in international disarmament operations in Macedonia; nor did the government give Parliament any formal commitment of responsibility. The perspective of the government during this period was that it would consult Parliament and regularly inform selected members about the progress of the operations whenever French military assets (i.e. ground forces) were going to be used for an intervention, as did in fact happen throughout the Kosovo conflict. It is remarkable that, despite these constitutional arrangements, parliamentary discipline is strong. Parliament has made it its goal to support the government. Party discipline holds Parliament back from the scrutiny and political oversight it should practise. However, this hybrid system is increasingly being challenged, and parliamentary observers sense that the interest of parliamentarians in security and defence matters is growing. They are beginning to take a more professional interest in the issue.Two official publications triggered the increasing involvement of Parliament: the Lanxade directive and the 1992 Trucy report. This latter standing committee report on the Finance Bill, written by Senator François Trucy, criticised ‘the uncertainty and anxiety raised by the way in which these operations are conducted, sometimes placing our forces in such a difficult situation that their action in the field is all the more meritorious’. Among the uncertainties he listed ‘costly operations and hypothetical finances’ that allow neither operational necessities to be satisfied nor the basic requirements of force protection to be met. As for anxieties, he denounced ‘UN deficiencies’, including badly adapted structures, a fluctuating and ill-defined political project, and, above all, the absence of clear rules of engagement (cf. Stern 1998: 31). Soon afterwards, President Mitterrand commissioned a study of French participation in peacekeeping operations from the same MP, which in 1994 resulted in a report to the prime minister, Participation de France aux Opérations de la Paix. In general, three reasons are given to justify more parliamentary involvement:

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Legal protection of soldiers needs to be guaranteed.The perception is that at the moment, this is not the case. Budgetary considerations. Crisis management operations are funded out of the budget of the Ministry of Defence or indirectly via funds allocated by the president. This has great implications for the ongoing process of restructuring, professionalisation, etc. of the armed forces, which in turn is highly important for morale and effectiveness. The policy coordination process should be improved. Many parliamentarians are of the opinion that the efforts by the government are lacking coherence. Interdepartmental coordination is especially poor. As a consequence, different ministers show up in Parliament willing to discuss various aspects of the crisis management effort without a grand strategy orienting these individual efforts.

Evaluation ex post and accountability The Assemblée is not involved in any scrutiny of foreign policy ex post. It formally has to consent to any rectification of budget law that will ensure that the bills of an international operation are paid, but that is as far as its powers extend. One parliamentarian remarked in an interview that ‘accountability is basically an alien concept in the French political system’. A factor of increasing importance is the International Criminal Court, which increasingly asks French generals to appear at hearings. This may pose a problem, so French officials say, ‘because if the ICC is looking for criminal accountability we will not comply’. The risk of being sued for action is unacceptable, according to French Ministry of Defence officials interviewed for this study. ‘If you do nothing you are not accountable, we have the choice to take fewer risks, we are never obliged to act. There is now a systemic risk of being sued for action. This is a recipe for doing nothing or doing less.’ The opinion of these officials was that accountability should be perceived as purely political and that the obligation should be one of ‘means’ not of results. Transparency is almost an alien thing in the French political decisionmaking process, and the issue has not been touched upon in connection with external affairs.The debate on more transparency in political decision making is driven forward by domestic concerns and issues, for example, the blood transfusion scandal, the mismanagement of mad cow disease (BSE) and questions of industrial risk (e.g. the explosion at a chemical plant in Toulouse). Transparency is important because citizens are directly involved, and the issue often comes into play as a side issue to other matters, e.g. the vaccination schemes and policies in the Gulf War or the issue of the use of depleted uranium in Kosovo. Transparency is also related to the question of information sharing between government and Parliament. The government does not trust Parliament with confidential information, and France therefore does not have a parliamentary intelligence committee. After a recent visit by their

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British counterparts, French politicians have now expressed their desire for such a committee, because it would improve the chances of the government being more open to the legislative. Summing up, the involvement of the Assemblée in the whole decision-making process is negligible. It does not have the right of approval or the right of initiative; nor can it operationalise the right of enquiry ex post. The issue of parliamentary involvement in the approval of the budget is another great concern. According to a former CEMA, Admiral Lanxade,‘the principal problem limiting our external interventions is their cost, which is supported by the defence budget and which represents a heavy burden in the context of strict budgetary constraints’ (Lanxade 2001: 297). In the case of UN operations, the costs are borne by two ministries. Contributions to the UN budget are paid by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the additional costs for deploying a contingent on the ground are charged to the budget of the Ministry of Defence. Examples of additional costs are technical training or training for the use of specific equipment, languages, transport costs to and from the theatre of operations, and fuel costs and the use of material, equipment, ammunition and infrastructure. No international operation and hence no UN operation is ever budgeted beforehand.180 Moreover, there is no fixed rule for deciding when and if an operation is declared to be an ‘international’ operation. Moreover, the French legal framework does not give an exact definition of the term ‘crisis’. Peace operations do not form a specific budgetary category (or budget line) for the Ministry of Defence; their costs are defrayed out of the collective budget. This makes parliamentary oversight difficult, because it is impossible to trace unspecified costs. Public opinion and foreign policy In France, there are two aspects that are of special relevance when discussing public opinion and international crisis management operations. First, there is the ‘personal’ dialogue between the president and the public. Alain Peyrefitte stated the opinion shared by most that ‘the presidency is a contract between a man and a people’. Before the start of a significant military operation, the Table 6.2 French parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation Before

During

After

Parliament is informed of the decision, usually after the decision has been taken, but is not consulted before the decision is taken.

Parliament receives sketchy information at irregular intervals (if at all).

No evaluation takes place. Evaluation would be politicised and become too controversial an issue to result in any objective conclusions.



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president usually makes a solemn declaration to the nation: President Mitterrand addressed the nation before the Gulf War, and President Chirac did so when the Kosovo campaign was launched. There is a growing awareness of the fact that properly handled communication contributes to a high degree of support from the population and the press. A second factor of importance is the group of intellectuals known as the ‘humanitarians’. There exists a peculiar Parisian microcosm of television journalists, writers, philosophers, television stars and politicians who know each other, meet at the same places and share the same codes. This results in a certain connivance and a form of self-censorship unparalleled in the Anglo-American press. This connivance between the media, politics and humanitarianism began in the 1970s with the creation of the non-governmental organisation Médicins sans Frontiers by Bernard Kouchner, Claude Malhuret and others, followed by Médicins du Monde, created by Kouchner alone.These ‘French doctors’ were also remarkable debaters, just as gifted at forcing their way onto television as onto the political scene. Thus it was that Claude Malhuret became the first secretary of state for human rights, while Bernard Kouchner was first appointed secretary of state for humanitarian action, then minister of public health and humanitarian action in 1988. Under the influence of ‘without borders’, a sheer humanitarian ideology began to spread in France, infiltrating editorial offices, government administration, schools and all sectors of public opinion. One of the most resounding examples was the proclamation in 1987 of the ‘right to humanitarian assistance and the obligation of states to contribute to it’ at a large conference gathering together of all ‘committed’ Paris’ (Smouts 1998: 36). Although it would be wrong to think of private humanitarian organisations as playing a decisive part in political decision making in France, they did create the climate. They renewed the debate and often brought pressure to bear.They have undoubtedly contributed to making humanitarian action a supplementary dimension of foreign policy. Their processes have influenced, and still influence, official thinking on the concepts of neutrality and impartiality. Again we point to the direct relation between the president and the general public: for a French president, the direct and personal relation with the public and public opinion is more important than the relation with Parliament. Hence the president will develop better (and some will add ‘more cordial’) relations with a select group of philosophers than with important parliamentarians. Important bilateral relations The most important bilateral relations in French security policy are the relations with Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA. The relation with the USA is historical, multifaceted, complex, ambivalent and never easy. The military and cultural dimensions are the dominant aspects of the relation. France is the key European NATO country in determining how close American–European relations can become. London usually backs

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American policy, while Berlin always tries to avoid having to choose between Washington and Paris. France, a bridge and sometimes an obstacle between Germany and the UK, thus tends to determine whether there will be a ‘European’ policy at all, rather than a collection of bilateral policies towards the United States. Whereas a US move is perceived by London as an incentive to act, the French response is often more reactive. More importantly, what do the other European states do? France wants to position itself vis-à-vis other (European) countries. It perceives itself in an equal role with the UK. On a cultural plane, Dominique Moïsi explains how in French eyes ‘McDominance’ has become the epitome of ‘globalisation, mondialisation and stands for great, big, vulgar, bustling with energy, more French anti-Americanism as an inferiority and a superiority complex rolled into one’. Moïsi contends that ‘In the age of globalisation, size matters. If small is beautiful and big is powerful, then medium is problematic. The internet, information technology and other trappings of the global economy can reinforce the centrality of the United States or multiply the strength of a small city-state like Singapore, but they often penalise middlesized countries like France’ (Moïsi 1998: 96). The end of the Cold War only reinforced French envy of America. The French resent the global reach of America’s power and Washington’s presumption to speak in the name of the international community. Unlike the pragmatic British or the historically guilt-ridden Germans, the French feel that they, like the United States, carry a universal message. On security matters, Paris and Washington are at once allies and competitors; France’s ambition to create a genuine European foreign and security policy, although formally welcomed by Washington, clashes with the US inclination to take the lead (ibid.: 96–8). The relationship with Germany is delicate. ‘In France, all of us … are afflicted with the “German obsession”. Some think a powerful Germany ought to be “embedded” in the Community; others … feel Germany is too powerful to be bound by a collaborative venture which it sooner or later will come to dominate’ (Vernet 1992: 658). In fact, France has very little choice. It needs the European Union to enhance its presence on the international stage and must believe that Germany, too, needs the same kind of Europe to act as ‘filter’ to a might that may once again come to appear threatening to its neighbours (ibid.). The dilemma of French foreign policy is to find a way of counterbalancing Germany within Europe.The rationale is always thought of and expressed in terms of ‘balance’, says Le Monde journalist Daniel Vernet. As Russia can no longer take on the role of counterweight in the coming decades, France counts on European integration to restrain the Germans from going it alone, whether in the monetary or the diplomatic sphere.Yet experience has shown that German diplomacy likewise needs to assert its authority from time to time; and when that happens, it does not bother with unnecessary warnings and has no hesitation in presenting its partners with a fait accompli, the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991 being the obvious example.

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French security policy During the Cold War, French ‘exceptionalism’ reigned. According to Vernet, the exceptional position of France in the international system is based on three things, all of which changed drastically with the end of the Cold War: (1) its [France’s] presence within the group of four victors over the Third Reich, and hence a political ascendancy over Germany; (2) its status as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations; and (3) the possession of a ‘nuclear dissuasion force’ (Vernet 1992: 656). France had the political guardianship of the German minor, who needed the European ‘figleaf ’ in order to take its place once more in the company of civilised nations. The status of occupying power was a ‘central plank of its “world position” – on a par with the seat on the Security Council and the bombinette’ (ibid.: 657). After German unification, Germany no longer needed French or community sponsorship to play an autonomous role in international politics. Its relation to NATO was another issue of exceptional importance. Over the two decades following its departure from the integrated military structure in 1966, France pursued a silent relationship with NATO. Military cooperation was genuine, if discreet: France showed solidarity with the Western camp at the key moment of the Cold War, but the distance that Paris kept from the Alliance’s military machinery allowed France to claim the singular status of an ally that was loyal yet independent. France opted to try to change the Alliance from within, and it had a relatively clear vision of what should emerge: a common foreign and security policy, which was intergovernmental in its mechanisms, and which would include defence. An agreement in principle on France’s reintegration into NATO was reached during the Morth Atlantic Council (NAC) ministerial meeting in June 1996 on the strengthening of the European role. The crux of the resolutions adopted at this meeting was the willingness of NATO to place its staff and command structures as well as transport and reconnaissance resources at the disposal of the WEU for military operations (cf. Schmitt 1996: 351). In its negotiations to return to NATO, France asked the USA to reconsider the distribution of command functions. Evidently, France wanted the USA to give up NATO’s Southern Command, AFSOUTH and made this a condition for its full reintegration into NATO. As the USA did not budge, full integration of France into NATO has therefore not yet occurred. France is not part of the integrated military structure of NATO, which may pose political problems for the military arm of the EU. It is evident that from this perspective, ad hoc coalitions benefit France. The primary objective of French defence policy is to defend France’s vital interests, which are defined by the president and include the French people, its territory and the freedom to exercise its sovereignty.181 At the same time, France must be able to protect its strategic interests at the international level while contributing to conflict prevention, keeping and restoring peace, and ensuring respect for international law and democratic values in the world. In these areas, France’s status as a permanent member of the United Nations

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Security Council gives it both prerogatives and responsibilities. The Defence White Paper of 1994 absorbs the shocks and changes of a post-Cold War world and the experiences of the Gulf War. An important change was the ‘defreezing’ or ‘déblocage’ of the Security Council, which authorised the United Nations to seek a more active role in global stability. France has always adhered to a comprehensive concept of security. This concept of defence implies that defence cannot be limited to military concerns. Indeed, a country’s security and stability are dependent not only on its armed forces and police but also on its social organisation, education system and social cohesion. The concept of defence is, de facto, inextricably linked with that of the nation. The sécurité civile protects the population and maintains public order and thus the continuity of the state. It is also responsible for preventing and dealing with major natural and technological hazards and the security of sensitive installations and networks. Lastly, it ensures the proper distribution of resources in times of crisis. It is generally acknowledged that France is ‘strong on ends but weak on means’. Chuter observes an ‘aching dis-equilibrium between the destiny of the nation and the means available to pursue it’ (Chuter 1996: 13–14). Obviously, the transformation of the armed forces (and the abolition of conscription) has been an important issue throughout the 1990s. The crunch point did not come until 2002, when the Gendarmerie took to the streets in protest against working conditions and pay levels. The large-scale resentment had several causes: the debate over the 35-hour working week; the professionalisation of the armed forces; the changed social relations within the military (abolition of conscription); and the changes in its external social relations; and the lack of investment in adequate equipment. The force structure of the armed forces remains too large for the defence budget which, according to some French defence experts, is ‘completely mismanaged’. The French had learned to compare themselves with the British, so France and the UK used to be on a par, but now the French know that they are no longer on a par. The British spend more in absolute terms, spend more per soldier and are more effective in spending their money. They are more effective regardless of the money they spend.The option left to France is format reduction. With reference to the posture of the French forces, it is important to note that France has permanently deployed ground forces in western Central Africa, Djibouti and Réunion and elements of its fleet in the Indian Ocean. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new international era, an era in which peacekeeping, peace enforcing and crisis response operations would be central. The traditional distinction between so-called ‘chapter VI’ operations and ‘chapter VII’ operations, referring to chapters of the UN charter, has become ‘contaminated’, both conceptually and practically. Politicians and practitioners have started using the notion of ‘chapter VI and a half ’ operations thus blurring the fundamental distinction between peacekeeping and peaceenforcement operations. Unlike many of the Anglo-Saxon countries, France holds that there is no sharp dividing line but rather a continuum from ‘chapter

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VI peacekeeping operations’ via ‘chapter VI and a half ’ to ‘chapter VII’ enforcement actions. It is for precisely this reason (i.e. that a non-coercive peacekeeping operation may at any time become a peace-enforcing operation) that France has never accepted that the General Assembly could have the power to initiate such operations (cf. Smouts 1998: 5).182 Recent operations We will successively discuss the First Gulf War, peace operations in the 1990s, France’s participation in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, its position in the war on terrorism, its abstention during the Iraq crisis (the Second Gulf War) and its involvement in Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The First Gulf War. The government went to Parliament on 16 January 1991 with a declaration, which was followed by a debate and a vote. Prime Minister Michel Rocard explained the position of the government as follows: The struggle of France is therefore a fight for the law, which is the sole durable guarantor for peace. To succeed, a number of conditions must be reconciled. First, the certainty of the legitimacy, which in this case is evidently there. Iraq has, quite simply, entered and occupied, under the pretext of an annexation, a sovereign nation.The Security Council of the UN has immediately accepted resolutions stating that fact. So it is the law on the one side and the aggression on the other side. The second condition is found in the solidarity that is at the heart of the international community. The solidarity of France is total. Determination is the third condition. It presupposes no wavering from the objective sought. (Assemblée Nationale, Séance du 16 Janvier 1991) The government used the debate to build a broad political consensus and to express its support for the deployed soldiers.The Assemblée voted 523 votes in favour of and 43 against adopting the declaration of the government. Only the ultra-right Jean-Marie Le Pen considered the Gulf War ‘un aventure inconsiderée’. Participating in the Gulf War had a profound effect on French attitudes towards external and security policy. It revealed the technical level of the country’s armed forces to be substandard (especially when compared with the USA) and led to the creation of the Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques (DAS), a planning unit within the Ministry of Defence that was to advise the minister of defence. In 1994, the White Book on Defence was produced and central directorates of military intelligence and communications were created. Militarily, the force structure had proved to be ill suited to the Gulf crisis: in practice the army structure, based on conscription, proved to be highly impractical in an operation in which no conscripts were deployed. Moreover, the

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units deployed (army and air force) had significant problems with equipment. In general, the Gulf War showed the limits of France’s military power. Heisbourg considers the Gulf War ‘a low-cost warning shot for a country which has been having some difficulty adapting to the post-Cold War era’ (Heisbourg in Gnesotto and Roper 1992: 37). Initially, the French response to the Gulf crisis was ambiguous;183 it did not know what to do in the military realm.This stance changed to a ‘remarkable single-mindedness and unmitigated solidarity’ (ibid.: 18) at the close of the land operations. This change flowed largely from the manner in which the determinants of French foreign policy interacted. The determinants identified by Heisbourg to be operative at the time were the sense of le rang (standing) or, in general, France’s capability to act as a great power by influencing events; and singularity, or French exceptionalism. The contrast with the United Kingdom was very sharp, the psychological mechanisms at play involving similar concerns about defining one’s place in the world: in Paris, the natural tendency has been to demonstrate that France is not in Washington’s pocket, whereas in London it is traditionally deemed fit to immediately demonstrate a total identity of view with the United States (cf. ibid.: 19).Two other determinants were the perceived need to express solidarity with one’s allies when the chips are down and respect for international law and order, including its United Nations dimension, along with the defence of human rights.An attitude of aloofness towards any military commitment in a distant conflict was widespread until the Gulf War itself began.This diffuse sentiment of aloofness put, according to Heisbourg: a political limit on the kind of military forces which could be sent to the Gulf: the use of conscript soldiers was considered, ab initio, as being a political impossibility in a geographically peripheral conflict, in which France and her intérêts viteaux were not directly at stake in any tangible manner. (cited in Gnesotto and Roper 1992: 21) Another change of sentiment that occurred in the process was that international institutions were no longer seen as constraints but as facilitators and initiators and an increasing ‘mutualising’ of means. Multilateralism is an institutionalised form of coordinating relations between three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct. The size of the French contribution – 12,000 ground troops – was substantially smaller than that of the British contingent (35,000); this constraint flowed from the nature of the French force structure and its refusal to send conscripts, not from a deliberate policy of limiting its contribution to the war. Peacekeeping operations The ‘second-generation’ UN deployments in the early 1990s in Cambodia, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were crucial operations for France.184 Stern reminds us not to lose sight of the issues at stake: ‘France’s participation in

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peacekeeping operations is not part of some abstract logic of collective security. It serves material and immaterial aims of national interest such as security imperatives, self-image and international prestige’ (Stern 1998: 8). Outgoing French forces (who had suffered two dead and thirty-three injured) left Cambodia with few illusions about the ability of the UN to impose peace in an unstable political context or to engineer the reconciliation of those who had suffered or been adversaries during a conflict. Since Unprofor, France will not participate without a clear chain of command, which effectively means that NATO will run the operation. France also wants to run as little risk as possible with regard to the lives of soldiers on the ground. Unprofor caused a trauma when French soldiers were used as hostages and chained to strategically important targets. When Opération Turquoise (Rwanda, 1994) was being organised by the Elysée Palace and the Quai d’Orsay for complex reasons of African policy, the first question that those concerned asked themselves was how to make it acceptable to public opinion and which medium to choose to avoid the appearance of a neo-colonial expedition (Smouts 1998: 37). According to a number of French officials, the humanitarian catastrophe that was taking place created a ‘duty to intervene’ on the part of France.This discussion of the right or duty to intervene for humanitarian reasons fuelled a very mediatised debate, which had a profound impact on the decision of the government to deploy troops to Rwanda. Operation Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999) In the French view, the Kosovo crisis endangered ‘the whole international order put in place after the Second World War’ (Martin and Brawley 2000: 119). French officials felt that their vision of the world was in some ways called into question, even threatened. If the French pushed hard for a prominent UN role in the conflict, they also saw it as an opportunity to define the place of the European Union as a security institution. At all stages of the conflict, French leaders stressed the need for the EU to play a full role. For Hubert Védrine, this meant that it should act as ‘a designer and a leader’ and not just as a ‘counter distributing subsidies for reconstruction’. France attempted to translate these sentiments into a series of immediate, mediumterm and long-term policies to be enacted through the European Union. Of all the major international crises in which France has been involved since the end of the Cold War, the conflict in Kosovo is the one that has allowed it to develop most fully a strategy of achieving security through international institutions. From the very beginning, the French government justified the war by arguing that it was a battle for a certain conception of Europe and European values, for human rights, even for European civilisation or more simply, a defence of European security and regional stability. Throughout the conflict, French leaders felt uncomfortable with the decision to bypass the United Nations and insisted that NATO’s intervention represented an exception that should never be construed as a precedent. In their view, UN sanctions for any final settlement remained absolutely indispensable. At every stage of the

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conflict, France attempted to exert its influence within the institutions involved and took full advantage of its potential veto power. Not only did French decision makers insist on seeking general UN authority for the operation, and on giving the EU a leading role, they also claimed that the allies had ‘recognised the importance of [France’s] role’ in NATO (ibid.: 122). President Chirac boasted after the conflict that ‘there was not one single target that was not agreed upon by France beforehand’ (Martin and Brawley 2000: 122).The main debate on France’s role in the Kosovo conflict took place within the political parties and among intellectuals. As expected, open opposition came from the National Front (extreme right) and from small groups on the far left. The Contact Group and the G8 played an important role throughout the conflict as an antechamber for agreements leading to legally binding decisions from the UN Security Council. Foreign Minister Védrine acknowledged that Europe’s preponderant role in solving the crisis was due above all to the coordination of ‘the four great European diplomatic powers’ and not to ‘Europe as such, as the European Union’ (ibid.: 59). French support for the war was ‘fragile and confused’ (ibid.: 124–5), and the French leadership could not take it for granted that it would automatically be followed if it adopted the sort of aggressive stance that Britain’s Tony Blair felt authorised to take. Public opinion certainly did not decide policy, but it did determine some of its limits. Le Monde Diplomatique condemned the operation, and French decision makers were very concerned about shoring up support from public opinion. The authors of the first government report on the lessons of the Kosovo conflict claimed that it ‘confirmed that public opinion plays a decisive role in the conduct of operations’. After the Kosovo conflict, the French president felt he could claim that his country’s diplomacy had scored a decisive victory by ensuring that the United Nations had found again ‘the role and the place it must have in a world organised under a rule of international law’ (interview with President Chirac,TF1, 10 June 1999). In the evaluation of the operation, a French official confessed that ‘the system’ did not admit to any mistakes, let alone accept them. A meeting shortly after the Kosovo operation looked like a ‘Sovietstyle celebration of our success’ according to a participant, ‘we celebrated the way France was able to handle the crisis, we celebrated our autonomy of decision and action and our ability to keep our full autonomy’.185 The war on terrorism In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks, France participated actively in the war against terrorism. It deployed two companies of 21 RIMA to Mazar-I-Sharif on 18 November 2001 to secure the airstrip in order to allow for humanitarian aid to be transported into the region.186 This mission ended in January 2002. France also deployed the nuclear-powered carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Indian Ocean in early December 2001 (until June 2002). The naval task force included an electronic surveillance vessel (the Bougainville) and the nuclear submarine Rubis. Six Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft were deployed in February 2002 to Manas International Airport in

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Kyrgyzstan to fly fighter and reconnaissance missions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. A total of up to 5,000 French servicemen have been sent to the region to participate in Operation Heracles in Afghanistan, and 550 servicemen participated in the ISAF operation. Their task was to provide security and order in and around Kabul and train the Second Battalion of the newly established Afghan Army.This task was concluded in February 2003.187 The Second Gulf War (2003) In the Iraq crisis, France defended the principles of respect for the rule of law and a primary role for the UN and preferred a policy of sticking to the objectives outlined by UN Security Council resolution 1441. France did not participate in the military actions to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein. The French foreign minister, de Villepin, explained the French position in a series of interviews and statements in the early months of 2003.188 The fundamental difference of opinion between France and the USA led to a serious deterioration of diplomatic and political relations. French views on key concepts differ from those of the USA, for example, the type of world order (multipolar versus unipolar), the role of the UN and the ways and means to deal with nuclear proliferation and (international) terrorism. If the UN can take on an important role in postwar Iraq, and France can engage itself in that process, reconciliation with the USA may pick up tempo.189 Operation Artemis In June 2003, the European Union launched Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Artemis was the first military operation of the EU outside Europe and was conducted in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1484 and the council’s joint action adopted on 5 June 2003.190 The resolution authorised the deployment of an interim emergency multinational force to the Ituri region in the DRC until 1 September 2003. The European military force (approximately 1,500 soldiers, predominantly French) worked in close coordination with MONUC, the UN mission in the DRC. The aim was to make a contribution to the stabilisation of the country and to improve the humanitarian situation. France acted as the ‘framework nation’ for the operation. French officers were appointed operation commander (based in Paris) and force commander. On 12 June 2003, the Security Council adopted the mission plan and made the decision to launch the operation. In a press conference, senior defence officials commented that ‘The force is operating under chapter 7 of the UN charter (peace enforcement) and has the means to protect itself, to defend itself, including against elements attacking from the outskirts of the city or further away. Although the force’s mandate is geographically limited, both Uganda and Rwanda gave their consent to the deployment of the interim force and officially they support the process. No NATO support and/or US support are planned.’191

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Table 6.3 French parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation France

Parliamentary involvement (high, low, none)

Initiator (executive or Parliament)

Predominant influence (executive or Parliament)

Before

During

After

First Gulf War

none

none

none

exec.

exec.

UNTAC (Cambodia)

none

none

none

exec.

exec.

Unprofor (former Yugoslavia)

none

none

none

exec.

exec.

Kfor/Sfor

none

none

none

exec.

exec.

Allied Force (Kosovo)

none

none

none

exec.

exec.

TF Fox (Macedonia)

none

none

none

exec.

exec.

ISAF (Afghanistan)

none

none

none

exec.

exec.

Enduring Freedom

none

none

none

exec.

exec.

Second Gulf War

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

SFIR

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Operation Artemis (Congo)

none

none

n/k

exec.

exec.

Notes: n/a not applicable; n/k not known. 

Based on the evidence presented above, a few constants in the French approach to international crisis management operations become clear. France seeks legitimacy for its actions, especially in the form of a UN mandate. Multinationality warrants objectivity to the people on whose behalf the intervention takes place. France believes that ad hoc coalitions (‘the mission determines the coalition’) will benefit France. France skilfully uses the concept of ‘inclusion’, i.e. to put (as many) French officials in the ad hoc chain of command as it possibly can. Retaining political and operational control is another overriding theme for French officials. France, like all participating countries, will try to minimise its exposure to risk in a ‘selfish’ way.192 Risk is perceived to manifest itself at two levels: the risk to the deployed soldier and the political risk of being trapped in a situation that spirals out of France’s control. France will thus insist on a controlling stake in any participation, i.e. on being involved in the conceptualisation of the operation, and in planning

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and controlling its execution.‘Paris’ will be the ultimate judge of the interpretation of the rules of engagement. The official line on preconditions and constraints for participation is that there are no preconditions. Pragmatism, ultimately, wins over principle. If French nationals must be rescued, and the UN does not sanction the operation, France will act unilaterally, diplomats assure. France ‘does not want to revert to the laws of the jungle but adheres to a pragmatic approach’, as one diplomat explained it. The only way to avoid political and military entrapment is that ‘Paris’ remains at the pinnacle of the chain of command. Operational directives as well as rules of engagement that are applicable to the French forces are made in Paris, not New York. Operational risk is weighed against the measure of control that France can exert over the mission. However, France accepts the risks connected with international crisis management operations. With a professional force this has become even more evident, but France retains the right to keep French soldiers under French instructions.

6.3

Spain Spain is willing to take on new commitments in security and defence. We believe that one of the measures of a country’s international credibility and responsibility today is its capacity to contribute to collective security and to the settlement of numerous conflicts afflicting the planet. (Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Josep Piqué, 2001)

Spain has one of the most formidable military traditions on earth – it is the birthplace of El Cid and cradle of the conquistadores. The tercios (regiments) that made up the Army of Flanders in the sixteenth century and the actions of the Spanish foreign legion in Morocco in the early twentieth century are early examples of Spain’s experience with international crisis management and the projection of power.Yet Spain published its first ever White Paper on Defence in 2000. On this occasion, the president of the government, José Maria Aznar, observed that ‘The publication of a Defence White Paper should not be an extraordinary event but rather a completely normal act’ (Ministry of Defence 2000: 12). A further indication of the momentous changes that have taken place in Spanish society is given by Defence Minister Serra Rexach when he states that ‘Spain has fully become part of modernity’ and ‘Spain is no longer “different” ’ (ibid.: 20). The publication of a White Paper on Defence can be considered an extraordinary event, as it formally signals that a number of important obstacles have been overcome. Democratic control of the armed forces has been established, the armed forces have been transformed into an indispensable tool of foreign and security policy, and they have been modernised, professionalised and made capable of power projection outside Spanish territory. Spanish forces are now firmly embedded in international military structures. Moreover, the attitude in Spanish society towards

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military interventions to support peace and humanitarian assistance missions has changed.‘For the first time’, said Defence Minister Serra Rexach,‘Spanish public opinion behaved like our European neighbours towards such a thorny issue as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo’ (ibid.). The traditional image that most people have of Spain has two sides, the liberal and tolerant versus the conservative and closed.193 However, this split image is thinning due to socio-economic and cultural changes. Politics, media and high finance have replaced Church, nobility and army as the holy trinity of social power. Since the end of dictatorship, Spain has embarked on a process of national transformation. It has built a stable and prosperous democracy, re-established its natural links with Europe, America and the Mediterranean world. In general, Spain is a respected country, not without influence. It has managed to arrive at solutions to centuries-old problems: the structure of the state, decentralisation, the construction of democracy and an institutional framework comparable with those of other countries in the Europe to which Spain belongs. This process of national transformation has been neither easy nor painless and is not yet over. While Spain was bringing its own international transition to an end, the world was embarking upon a transition from Cold War politics to be able to deal with a far more volatile and fluid environment. Spain is a European state, Atlantic in its outlook, but it is not a continental state like Germany or France, although it once aspired to be like them.Today, Madrid is closer to London and Washington in its strategic relations than it is to Paris and Berlin. Spain’s process of modernisation and adaptation Democratisation, modernisation and consolidation have been the three strategic objectives that guided Spain’s internal and external policies since Franco’s death. The fundamental changes that have taken place in Spanish society are most visible in its political arrangements and its foreign policy. Spain changed from a dictatorship into an ‘advanced’ democracy, and from a policy of isolation to being closely integrated in Euro-Atlantic institutions. It regarded participation in the European legal order as a means of improving the quality of democracy at home, and ‘Europe’ stood for ‘more and better democracy’. Joining the EC brought Spain a badly needed democratic ‘surplus’, despite its internal democratic deficit. Spanish observers credit the process of European integration as the main source for change in the Spanish state and society.194 Spain’s foreign policy behaviour is naturally guided by its national interest, but Spanish mentality plays a significant role too. At the core of this Spanish mentality are the concepts of dignity and honour, eternally embodied in the impoverished nobleman or hidalgo Don Quixote. Honour is in behaviour, and dignity is something that is essentially not one’s behaviour in one’s own eyes but held or lost in the eyes of others. Spain feels a need to be respected, and it needs this respect especially in the foreign and security domain. It wants to be a great country and wants to be taken seriously by other countries, hence its ambition to become a member of the G8.195 Spain’s sensitivity

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in this respect is extreme.We will see below that this aspect of its foreign and security policy has consequences for the Spanish contribution and operational conduct in international crisis management operations. A principal feature of Spain’s constitutional history has been its extreme instability. Between the beginning of the nineteenth century and the outbreak of the civil war in 1936, the country had seven constitutions.These were often used as weapons of aggression instead of instruments of agreement and national integration. Not surprisingly, the consolidation of democracy, stabilisation of social relations and securing of economic development consumed most of the political energy in the past two decades. At the beginning of the new century, however, Spain appears to be self-confident enough to assume its role on the world stage. It has formulated an ambitious foreign policy in which participation in international crisis management operations plays a central role. Spain has set its level of ambitions in the international domain very high, based on realism. Prime Minister Aznar: ‘We Spaniards … want Spain to attend its rightful place in the world in accordance with its history and political, economic and cultural weight’ (Ministry of Defence 2000: 11). Regular participation in international crisis management operations by Spanish armed forces has become a defining and permanent characteristic of Spanish defence policy. Joining Europe and normalising Spain’s relations with the rest of the Old Continent has been an age-long dream of Spanish modernisers. Spain’s most famous philosopher, José Ortega y Gasset, wrote in 1910 that ‘Spain is the problem and Europe is the solution’ and ‘only viewed from Europe is Spain possible’. The tensions between the centre and the regions and the autonomous entities have given Spain a quasi-federalist state structure. The (internal) territorial redistribution of power, which effectively means the progressive transfer of powers from the central state to the regions, happened in close parallel with the process of European integration. The 1990s saw the rise of the ‘nationalist’ regional parties, especially the Catalonian, Basque and Canarian parties, on the national political stage.196 This process has not yet been completed, and if Ortega y Gasset is right, the finalité politique of Spain can only be realised in concurrence with the finalité politique of the European Union.To survive in Europe Spain needs to be strong, and to be strong Spain needs to be one, i.e. it needs to be united and to have shaped the relations between the centre and the autonomous communities constructively. Geopolitical changes and national security The Spanish national security agenda is largely shaped by three issues, which consequently absorb most of the resources and political energy: (1) the fight against terrorism; (2) the possible rise of fundamentalism in Morocco and its exposure to drug traffickers and illegal immigration from North Africa; and (3) the strategic uncertainty surrounding the Spanish cities Ceuta and Melilla. Spanish vulnerability is further enhanced by its resource dependency (oil and gas).

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

Fighting ETA terrorism has been Spain’s most painful struggle for decades. The Spanish government has always resisted militarising this fight, because the army was (in the early days of ETA) still seen too much as Franco’s instrument. Deploying the armed forces against the population would be unacceptable. The law, the judicial process and the police were the preferred instruments. As a consequence, the Guardia Civil (the only military body involved in the fight against terrorism but under the control of the Ministry of the Interior) has evolved into crime fighter number one with an excellent intelligence organisation and intelligence skills and crack anti-terrorist units. The Spanish government has taken a universalist stance vis-à-vis terrorism. In its view, there can be no differentiation between local and global terrorism: terrorism is unlawful and always demands the same answer. Spain therefore expects law-abiding countries to join this fight and to cooperate, share information, etc. It has developed mechanisms for legal cooperation in the EU with Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Belgium. In addition, good bilateral relations are maintained with the USA and France, although the latter suffered in the early days from an unwillingness in Paris to become fully engaged in the fight against ETA. Spanish relations with Morocco are ancient, comprehensive, multi-layered and at the best of times extremely complex. It is plainly wrong to reduce this relation to its security dimension, because the economic dimension of the relation is more important. The key obstacle is perhaps not Moroccan policy towards Ceuta and Melilla but Moroccan policy vis-à-vis the Spanish Sahara.197 What the Spanish government fears most is the possible rise of Muslim fundamentalism beyond the control of the current ruler, King Hassan II. Having such a volatile powder keg on its doorstep causes unease and apprehension in Madrid. As a consequence, Spain tries to multilateralise its relations with North Africa and to establish adequate forums for multilateral dialogue and consultation. Prime examples are the Barcelona process (EU) and the Mediterranean dialogue (NATO). Although peninsular, Spain has always been considered relatively safe, but it is a front-line state with regard to the threats of illegal immigration and drug smuggling. Given their scope and nature, these problems extend beyond the national capabilities of Spain and call for a comprehensive and multinational solution. The outstanding disputes regarding Gibraltar, the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and the Canary Islands require constant vigilance. Morocco consistently disputes Spain’s title to Ceuta and Melilla despite the fact that both have a considerable history in Spanish hands. Here the territorial integrity of Spain could be at risk and must be constantly guarded.198 The 300-year dispute between the UK and Spain on who rules Gibraltar not only spoils bilateral relations but is in the eyes of the Spanish government also a territorial and political ‘anachronism’. Both governments have stepped up their efforts to arrive at a solution, but the 60,000 population of Gibraltar is vehemently against any proposal of a regime of joint sovereignty (UK–Spain). It is the UK they want to belong to. Gibraltar does not pose a security risk, but it

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certainly is a political ‘irritator’ of enormous dimensions. Exposure to the new threat of illegal immigration and the uncertainty surrounding Ceuta and Melilla have left Spain with a ‘security gap’. It needs allies and multilateral forums to make up for lacking national capabilities. The resource situation in Spain is another factor contributing to the country’s geostrategic vulnerability. Spain has considerable mineral resources – coal, iron, copper, gold, silver, tungsten, marble and granite – but its major shortfall is oil. Spain must import almost 100 percent of its petroleum needs. Almost all of that comes from the Middle East or North Africa. This adds to the country’s geostrategic vulnerability: it is absolutely dependent on a continuous and guaranteed flow of imported oil at a reasonable price. Most of Spain’s oil comes from countries that have short-lived regimes and volatile politics – Libya, Iran, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates – which explains the Spanish drive and efforts for resource diversification. Spain is now buying oil in Nigeria, Mexico and Venezuela. The fact that this vulnerability has political implications for Spain’s foreign policy became clear in the period after a terrorist action destroyed PanAm flight 103. The USA reacted by bombing Libya but had to fly all the way around the Iberian Peninsula from bases in the United Kingdom because neither France nor Spain was willing to allow direct flights over their national territories to protect their oil-dependent Arab alliances (Wiarda 1999: 7). Basic features of the Spanish political system Spain is often described as an ‘old nation in a young democracy’. Spanish democracy is underpinned by a modern, liberal constitution and advanced political arrangements. The constitution of 1978 is the basic charter for the country’s political organisation and was approved by referendum. Spain is a parliamentary monarchy, not a constitutional monarchy. National sovereignty resides in the Spanish people, from which the state’s powers emanate. The king, Don Juan Carlos I de Borbón, is head of state and symbol of the nation’s unity and permanence. He arbitrates and presides over the due functioning of the institutions, assumes the highest representation of the Spanish state in international relations and exercises the functions vested in him by the constitution and legislation. However, the King has no political responsibilities.199 The government exercises the executive function and regulatory authority, and it directs domestic and foreign policy, the civil and military administrations, and the defence of the state. These prerogatives are enshrined in article 97 of the constitution.200 The government is headed by a prime minister (or president of the government), who is appointed by the king following his investiture by the Congress of Deputies. He directs the government’s actions and coordinates the functions of the other members of the cabinet, without prejudice to the powers and direct responsibility of the latter in the discharge of their duties. The other members of the government (the vice-president, if there is one, and the ministers) cannot exercise any representative function other than those of their parliamentary mandate. All the members of the

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

government are appointed and removed from office by the king on the advice of the prime minister. The government is collectively answerable to the Congress of Representatives for its political actions, appearing before it weekly to account for its management. The cabinet is made up of the Council of Ministers designated by the president and is a collective body of government that meets weekly. The supreme consultative organ of the government is the Council of State. The defence policy portfolio is the responsibility of the prime minister, who has delegated this authority for normal situations to the minister of defence. This minister is responsible for the day-to-day management of the armed forces and the operations they conduct.The actual management is conducted by the chief of defence, the highest-ranking military officer in Spain (CHOD, or JEMAD in its Spanish abbreviation). The CHOD makes proposals for and implements national security policy decisions based on the guidelines received from the government via the minister of defence.The CHOD wears two hats: he chairs the committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JUJEM) and is responsible for the command of the forces deployed abroad; he is also the senior military adviser to the government. In normal situations, this means that he will advise the minister of defence, but it is not exceptional for him to give direct advice to the prime minister. On the next level down, we can observe some tension between the CHOD and the service chiefs.Although in theory the mandates and responsibilities are clearly delineated, in practice the service chiefs have direct access to the minister of defence and in the period leading up to a governmental decision they wield much influence.This makes the CHOD’s job of coordinating military policy a difficult one. The new Security Defence Review is intended to address this issue. Parliament (Cortes Generales) The state’s legislative power is vested in Parliament, which represents the Spanish people and monitors the actions and decisions of the government. The Spanish Cortes is a bicameral parliament in which the 350 representatives in the Lower House or Congress are elected by a system of proportional representation, with the provinces serving as constituencies. Representatives and senators are elected for four years, although Parliament may be dissolved early on the initiative of the prime minister. The constitution defines the Senate as the chamber of territorial representation. It is made up of 256 senators, 208 of whom are elected by direct universal suffrage (four representatives per province), while the remaining forty-eight are appointed by the legislative assemblies or the ‘autonomous communities’ (one senator per region plus one further representative for each million inhabitants in the territory in question). Seats in the Senate are assigned to the political groups based on majority, single-list criteria (the majority electoral system).This means that the Senate represents two territorial entities, a set-up that over the years has provoked a stream of demands for constitutional reform.

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The main role of Parliament in the context of foreign policy concerns the ratification of international treaties, and the main instrument that it has at its disposal to exercise control over the government is known as the censure motion or constructive vote of censure, set forth and regulated in articles 113 and 114 of the constitution. The prime minister is empowered to propose the dissolution of the legislative chambers, although he may not do so while a censure motion against the cabinet over which he presides is pending. The government must leave office after a general election, in the event of the loss of parliamentary confidence as provided for in the constitution, or on the resignation or death of the prime minister. Parliamentary oversight over Spanish participation in international crisis management operations is limited. Article 63 of the constitution states that ‘It is incumbent on the King, after authorisation by the Parliament, to declare war and make peace.’ Since article 64 provides that all acts by the king shall be countersigned by the prime minister, it can fairly be stated that this responsibility rests with the head of government, who ‘directs domestic and foreign policy, civil and military administration, and the defence of the state’ (article 97). In the event of war, the consent of the Cortes would therefore be required, but there is still a legislative vacuum, since the internal rules of the two chambers sitting together as the Cortes Generales have not yet been drawn up, and the procedure is still to be defined.201 The law does not expressly provide for military operations within the framework of an international mission, and such operations form part of the foreign policy responsibilities of the government. First, the Council of Ministers must take the formal decision (acuerdo) authorising the participation of Spanish military units in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. These decisions are normally taken on the basis of a proposal from the Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries.They specify the number of troops and types of equipment to be mobilised, as well as the initial duration of Spain’s involvement. The Defence Ministry then has the task of defining precisely which units and equipment are to be deployed. The government acts on its own initiative, but its decisions are invariably accompanied by a parliamentary debate. During all the crises that have occurred in recent years, ministers frequently addressed the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees, and several plenary sittings were held in the form of information briefings and general policy debates. The government may direct foreign policy but it is answerable to the Chamber of Representatives for its political actions. Both Houses may submit questions to the government. The prime minister has to submit his programme or a general statement of policy to the Chamber of Deputies for approval. The Chamber of Representatives may pass a motion of no confidence in the government and, if the motion is passed, the government must resign. Parliament has the power to control or supervise government policy, including foreign policy, but it has no part in the conduct of foreign policy. While members of both Houses my submit questions and proposals to the

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

government, the government is directly responsible only to the Chamber of Representatives, without any senatorial participation. The power of control is exerted by the Chamber of Representatives in plenary. Although the committees of both Houses are entitled to request information and assistance from the government and the appearance of members of the cabinet at their meetings, they have no power of control over the government, except through the plenary.Two instruments are important in this respect: 1

2

Hearings on foreign affairs. Officials, civil servants or private citizens may be called by the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) of the Chamber of Representatives to provide information. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee may request the attendance of representatives of the government to report on specific issues; both the government and the Senate FAC may decide that the hearings are to be conducted in camera. Inquiry. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee may decide to hold an inquiry, to be conducted by one or more of its members; this power of inquiry includes requests for documents and other information from the government. The Chamber of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee may request information from officials and private citizens, but inquiries have to be conducted through a special committee set up for this purpose.This happened for example in the spring of 1978, when the Chamber of Representatives FAC conducted hearings on the decolonisation of the Spanish Sahara by the Arias Navarro government of 1975–76.

In the power structure of the Spanish state, the executive has been given a preponderant role in international politics. The parliamentary institutions are relatively weak, and Spanish parliamentary culture, characterised by a consensual style of practice, has paradoxically ended up reinforcing government majorities against the opposition. The conclusion is that the Foreign Affairs Committees have acquired only a modest level of relevance. They play a very discreet role in foreign policy making by allowing a frank exchange between members of the majority and members of the minority parties. Discussions with the foreign minister and the minister for European affairs appear to be frank and open, but the actual power of the FAC to influence foreign policy is limited. Concerning the power of the purse, it is relevant to note that in the mid1990s Spain created a special budget line for peacekeeping operations to facilitate rapid deployment of the necessary resources.202 Overspending of this budget line is structural, but, as has it turned out, the budget line represents an extendable credit line (crédito ampliable). A second option is to ask for an ‘extraordinary credit’. The government did this in the case of Kosovo (Operation Allied Force). The minister of defence will present the case for approval of the credit to Parliament (which happens a few times a year).

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Table 6.4 Spanish parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation Before

During

After

The government informs Parliament after it has taken a decision, which may be followed by questions and a debate.

Parliamentarians can file questions (oral and written) and can invite the ministers of defence and/or foreign affairs to be questioned in Parliament.

Parliament has the formal power of inquiry, only used in extreme cases. In that case a special committee has to be installed. There is no standard evaluation procedure and no ‘culture of evaluation’.



Usually, all extraordinary credits (from all ministries) go in one basket and are discussed and approved by Parliament, in theory item by item. The ruling party usually enjoys an absolute majority, which allows these credits to be passed without difficulty.The executive can decide on the deployment of its armed forces, and it also has the mechanisms in place to pay for the deployment. Foreign and security policy It was when Franco died that the world began to wonder what was going to happen in Spain.What was going to happen in a country whose last encounter with democracy had ended in a bloody civil war, in a country that in terms of history, culture and geography belonged to Europe but whose influence extended across the Mediterranean and as far as Latin America? Spain did not acquire a democratic foreign policy until the beginning of 1984. In October 1984, Felipe González presented what would come to be called his ‘Decalogue’ on peace and security policy in the Congress of Deputies. This proposal was intended to form the basis for re-establishing consensus between all parliamentary forces on national security and defence policy.203 The definition of the national policy for peace and security was based on three aspects: the Atlantic Alliance (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the bilateral defence relationship with the United States.204 Four power lines have emerged in Spanish foreign and security policy since 1984: (1) relations with the Maghreb countries and the Arab world in general; (2) relations with the Americas; (3) the process of Euro-Atlantic integration; and (4) the new challenges to Spain’s territorial integrity and national security. The Mediterranean and Latin America are natural spheres of activity for Spanish foreign policy.205 Traditionally, the stability of Morocco was considered essential to Spanish security, but Algeria has moved to the foreground since a military coup interrupted the electoral process there. Spain has

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traditionally had close ties with the Maghreb countries, and its policy during the last few decades has been to create a network of economic and cultural ties that help to reduce the traditional conflicts that have overshadowed bilateral relations with Morocco. The agenda is extensive and includes military collaboration. Morocco is the main recipient of Spanish financial cooperation, and relations with Morocco were institutionalised at a high level in 1991 with the signing of a friendship and cooperation treaty in Rabat. Spain’s encouragement of a process of dialogue and cooperation in the Mediterranean crystallised in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. Latin America is a focal point for Spanish foreign policy, and during its EU presidency (2002) Spain made every effort to further the rapprochement between Europe and Latin America. Spain has been working hard in both NATO and the EU to promote a multilateral approach in this area, and NATO adopted a policy to establish a Mediterranean dialogue at its summit in Brussels in 1994.The Spanish initiative was an important change, for since the end of the Cold War the PSOE and important sectors of the government had taken the position that the security problems in the region were non-military and that therefore a nonmilitary approach was required.206 Bilateral relations with the USA are another very important part of Spanish foreign policy. After almost a century of popular suspicion, if not outright hostility, the relation with the USA has become extremely important for Spain since the turn of the twenty-first century. Two dimensions of that relation stand out: the cultural and the military. In the census of 2000, 35.3 million Americans called themselves Hispanics, saying not only that they had a common language that united them (Spanish) but also that they felt they shared a heritage rooted partly in ‘the corner of Europe that juts into the Atlantic’. The cultural dimension often tends to be reduced to the linguistic aspect, because Spanish is the first foreign language taught in American schools. Spain plays its obvious role as a bridge between Europe and America. Ever since it ‘discovered’ the Atlantic, Spain has been an Atlantic power. It is the only large European country that can claim to be profoundly Mediterranean, profoundly American and profoundly European. Spaniards and Americans have a ‘natural bridge of common understanding’, which is becoming increasingly strong.The second dominant aspect of its relation with the USA is the primacy of military relations over trade or economic relations for example. The USA sees Spain as a strategic partner in the war on terror, where Spain has resolutely sided with the USA. Nevertheless, a divergence is increasingly emerging. On the one hand, we see a Spain that has never before been so active in world affairs, and ‘never before have its activities and positions coincided to such an extent with those of the US’ (Gillespie and Youngs 2001: 154) On the other hand, public opinion polls show a high level of scepticism on the part of Spanish citizens toward the USA, its policies and its values. Today, Spaniards are, according to Sahagún, ‘much more interested in Europe and the European Union than they are in the United States’ (cited in

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ibid.). A former US ambassador to Spain, Richard Gardner, speaks of a ‘comprehension gap’ between the countries that continues to hamper the relations between the two countries: ‘our relationship has never been better, but unfortunately, our unprecedented cooperation does not reflect a deeper understanding between our two peoples’ (cited in ibid.). Spain has been constant in its support of the UN and figures in ninth place as a net contributor to the organisation’s budget. This support was the principal message of the prime minister, Felipe González, in his address to the Fortieth General Assembly session in September 1985.The king of Spain reaffirmed this in his speech before the Forty-First General Assembly session in September 1986, and before the forty-sixth plenary session on 7 October 1991.This support took the shape of Spain’s active participation in UN forces stationed in high-risk areas such as the former Yugoslavia, Angola, Namibia and Central America. UN missions gave legitimacy to the Spanish armed forces and proved an important vehicle for change, modernisation and internationalisation. Spain’s election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2002–03), at a time when the role of this organisation is being revitalised and possibly reformed, implies a recognition of the efforts made by Spain over the past few years in favour of peace and the international community, and it is evidence of the country’s increasing international influence.207 Summing up the Spanish position: Spain is a medium-sized power, not without influence and with great ambitions; and distinctly European but not continental, with an Atlantic outlook. Geopolitically placed at the crossroads of cultures and continents, its natural role is that of a bridge between Europe and the Mediterranean, between Europe and Latin America and also between the USA and the Maghreb. Defence policy After establishing democratic control of its armed forces and its entry into the integrated military command structures of NATO, two issues have dominated Spain’s security policy: the transformation of the armed forces and participation in international crisis management operations. The transformation of the armed forces The model that can count on a considerable degree of political consensus on what Spain seeks to achieve with its armed forces can be described with a few key words: smaller, better equipped, lighter, mobile, flexible. The remaining challenge is to endow this force with sufficient funds. Spain’s defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP has declined considerably throughout the 1990s, yet Spain has come a long way.208 The Spanish armed forces underwent a radical transformation in the last decade. Three pieces of legislation form the basis of the reform. The first is the report by the mixed

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

committee of the Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament, establishing the system and changeover periods for the full professionalisation of the armed forces. The second is the Armed Forces Personnel Act (1999), which established the general criteria for the new personnel regime. The Act creates a single legal framework for both permanent and temporary personnel, regulates promotions, provides for appropriate control of duties and responsibilities, and provides a channel for complaints. Third, the Armed Services Geographical Mobility Act facilitates the geographical mobility of service personnel. The swift and flexible operational capability that the new threats demand requires a reform aimed at achieving modularity in the organisation of the armed forces. Spain entered the twenty-first century with smaller but modern and professional forces, prepared for deployment in a NATO framework and multinational peacekeeping operations. In 2001, Spain had 3,500 soldiers deployed in various crisis management missions around the globe. In the debate, Spain takes a firm but not altogether uncontroversial position on role specialisation. The emergence of new technologies diminished the so far almost constant relation between a nation’s military potential and the numbers of its tanks, guns and combatants. Once a certain minimum threshold of forces has been reached, the effectiveness of an army is measured by its capabilities. Some operational capabilities are not within reach of all countries or of all national budgets considered in isolation. As a result of the sizes of the European armies, not all countries will be able to equip themselves with all types of capability. Many will have to choose a particular type of activity or capability and strive to attain such a high degree of specialisation and technological level that they will be able to remedy gaps or the deficiencies of other countries, thereby enabling Europe as a whole to configure an effective and efficient tool.209 Participation in international crisis management operations Spain’s participation in Operation Allied Force (1999) was important because it signalled that the democratic change process and security sector reform had been successfully completed.The Spanish government identified international security cooperation and international crisis management operations as arenas in which it could establish its reputation and credibility. Prime Minister José Maria Aznar expressed strong views on this matter: that what each ally is able to contribute [to an international crisis management operation] will only be useful to the extent that we can include it as an integral part of an overall strategic view, with a sole doctrine in which political will has the same importance as the renewal of equipment. Loyalty is as important in this common defence as practical operational capabilities. (Aznar 2002a)

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So what is needed is not only new equipment, meaning if required an increase in the defence budget, but also political will and loyalty to its main allies and the United States in particular. Spain has forces assigned to NATO’s standing forces Stanavforlant, Stanavformed, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, the Quick Reaction Alert and Mcmformed. Spain also participates in the Eurocorps (since 1 July 1994), Eurofor and Euromarfor and SIAF (Spanish–Italian Amphibious Force). The latter is the Spanish–Italian Amphibious Force that was created in 1997 and became fully operational in November 1998.210 Spanish forces have taken part in a wide range of UN missions discharging a variety of functions; they have provided humanitarian assistance all over the world, supervised elections and cease-fires, demobilised and disarmed paramilitary forces, and separated opposing forces.The Spanish armed forces also participated in various international coalitions, such as Operation Provide Comfort or ISAF. National decision making and policy coordination In the process of policy coordination, we see four dominant players: the presidency or La Moncloa palace, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Estado Mayor (general staff). The main strategic unit in the Ministry of Defence is the directorate known by the acronym SEGENPOL. This directorate gives the minister of defence strategic advice and is comparable in its role and function with the DAS in France. SEGENPOL consists almost exclusively of sixty to sixty-five senior military officers, and only recently has a diplomat joined as its director.The jobs are divided between the services on a 2:1:1 basis (army, navy and air force), and appointees change rapidly, since serving with SEGENPOL is considered highly unattractive. As a result, SEGENPOL is not a powerhouse in Spanish defence policy.The security directorate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is manned by career diplomats, who remain longer at their posts, and hence it has more continuity. It is the Estado Mayor’s responsibility to give the military policy ‘flesh and bones’. The presidency based at La Moncloa palace is the key powerhouse, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concentrates on the diplomatic and political framework and context of the action, and the Ministry of Defence and the general staff concentrate on nuts and bolts. Decisions are made in La Moncloa. In the think-tank community, a group known as GEES has the greatest influence in Spanish security and foreign policy circles.211 It is safe to conclude that, policy-wise, the backbone of the armed forces is not the joint staff but the three services and that the Ministry of Defence is the administrative apparatus of the armed forces. Consequently, security policy is largely made and decided outside the Ministry of Defence. The armed forces act under the authority of the president of the government and the minister of defence, through the military authorities, which together make up the operational command structure of the armed forces. The operational command structure for force employment must not only facilitate the armed forces to act jointly in dealing with a localised conflict in

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the national sphere; it must also be perfectly compatible with that of NATO in order to ensure interoperability and, if necessary, a rapid transfer of authority over Spanish military units or formations to allied commanders.The chief of the defence staff is responsible for translating the guidelines received from ‘higher authorities’, the president of the government and the minister of defence, into orders and instructions for the operational commanders of the forces. The chief of the defence staff directs the strategic management of the operations. The operational command structure has a single operations centre at its disposal that can exercise broad control and management functions and, together with others, constitute a network to enable forces to be deployed and efforts to be focused rapidly to the extent required by the dynamics of an operation. The operational command structure is based on simplicity, interoperability, joint action and integration into multinational forces. Public opinion and security policy In Spain, ‘the press has more influence than readers’, claims John Hooper (Hooper 1995: 289). Traditionally, the media enjoy a powerful position in Spain. Together with high finance and politics, they form the holy trinity of power and people attribute an enormous authority to them. El País, El Mundo and the Correo Group (a string of syndicated regional papers) are the standard bearers of the quality newspapers and have a tremendous influence over political life and in shaping public opinion.Television journals or programmes are referred to as authoritative sources. Spain does not, like France, have a small circle of philosophers; well-known Spaniards set the tone in the policy debate and in shaping public opinion.Talk shows of this nature are conspicu-

Figure 6.3 Command structure of the Spanish armed forces Source: Spanish Ministry of Defence (2000).

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ously absent. The Spanish public has long been indifferent to everything that had to do with ‘Europe’, the main reason being their attention, even absorption with the elaboration of a new constitution and the normalisation of public and political life. Only very recently has this indifference started to recede. To this day, many believe that the life of the ordinary Spaniard is hardly affected by the EU and that EU affairs should remain what they are perceived to be: highly technical matters for a very small group of specialists. On security issues, however, public opinion is starting to diverge. Since the end of the Cold War, Spanish people have felt and experienced that Spain has become a front-line state in its dealing with smuggling, trafficking and illegal immigration.They realise that an extra-national effort has to be made but also that this problem cannot be solved nationally and that a multilateral approach is the only viable solution. The Spanish population may be favourably inclined to security issues and international involvement, especially in humanitarian and peace operations, but the relation between Spanish society and the armed forces has never been that easy. However, it is stable at the turn of the century.The government has indicated that much work still needs to be done with regard to convincing the public that spending on defence is a good thing to do for Spain at this time. But not far below the surface people have uneasy feelings about the armed forces. The fear of army intervention in democratic processes did not recede after Franco’s death. On the contrary, the communal memories of civil war and dictatorship are probably major sources of apprehension. Resentment about enforced military service may have contributed too, but this disappeared when the last conscripted soldier said farewell to the army in 2003. However, it should never be forgotten that countless Spaniards received the biggest shock of their lives from their own soldiers. Just as all Americans remember where they were when they heard the news of President Kennedy’s assassination, no Spaniard will ever forget what he or she was doing on the afternoon of Monday 23 February 1981. That was when a detachment of civil guards, led by Colonel Antonio Tejero, burst into Congress and interrupted a broadcast debate on the appointment of the new prime minister. According to John Hooper, the significance of this event can hardly be overrated: the threat of military intervention had distorted almost every aspect of Spanish life, conditioning the way that politicians approached a range of issues … by the standards of Spain’s history, involvement by the army is the norm rather than the exception. (Hooper 1995: 107) Many surveys show that a strong streak of pacifism runs through current Spanish society, and there has been a visible change in public opinion on international crisis management operations. The reaction in the media to the decision to participate in the allied 1991 Gulf War effort ranged from the

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appalled to the mawkish. It was rarely mentioned that none of Spain’s three ships was actually in the Gulf, or that the government had ruled out their engaging in hostilities. Part of the reaction was no doubt caused by the shock of getting caught up in world affairs. During the 1990s, the official position changed, and Spain identified international security cooperation – participation in international crisis management operations – as an arena where one can gain credit and build up an international reputation. Spain consequently follows up its ambitions with concrete actions and has become an active participant in international crisis management. The public is generally in favour of this policy line. During the 1990s, international crisis management was ‘sold’ to the public as humanitarian operations.Today, the Spanish government finds a public opinion that is positively inclined towards the deployment of Spanish troops abroad for humanitarian operations. Recent operations Spain started contributing to operations within a UN and NATO framework in 1989. Its first participation was in the Transition Assistance Group of Namibia (UNTAG).The Spanish UNTAG contingent (comprising eight T-12 Aviocar planes, one T-10 Hercules and eighty-five men) was deployed to Namibia in January 1989. Spain has deployed observers to a score of UN operations since 1989, for example to the United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM) and the United Nations Observation Group in Central America (ONUCA), and it arranged to keep a check on the redeployment and later withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The first major unit to be deployed was the battalion that took part in Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, with the aim of protecting Kurdish refugees in Iraq. In 1991, Spain participated through the Western European Union in a multinational effort to carry out the Security Council’s resolutions regarding the war in the former Yugoslavia. It did so first in the sea and air surveillance of the embargo imposed by the Security Council on Serbia and Montenegro.212 Later, Spain contributed a contingent of 700 troops to Unprofor, primarily to protect the convoys transporting humanitarian relief. Participation in international crisis management operations was good for Spain for at least three reasons. First, these operations were seen as vehicles or a political instrument to generate public support for the armed forces because it enhanced their image. Second, it was necessary in the eyes of the then prime minister, Felipe González, to find a new role for the armed forces that was not domestically oriented. And, third, it was a vehicle for the internationalisation, modernisation and transformation of the army, especially the move from a conscript to a professional force. People came to see the armed forces as a sort of ‘peace police’.When it comes to strategic calculations in Spain, we see the following questions recurring: What are our interests and obligations in NATO, UN, OSCE or the EU? What are others doing, the interest of Spain being to be where its partners are? ‘Spain doesn’t want to be the

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Germany of Europe’, as one professor of international relations put it. Its very pro-European attitude is complemented by the close links with Washington. What is it going to cost? And what are the risks to the deployed soldiers and the risk of becoming trapped (related to the cost of the operation)? There is an ambiguity in the Spanish system in which, formally speaking, the government can do as it likes, without consulting Parliament or taking public opinion into account, while in practice it understands that it must build a constituency in support of its policy. So far, public opinion has been very generous, i.e. supportive of government policy, but the government fears that ‘if a disaster happens public opinion will turn against the government’.213 The psychological mechanism as it operates in the ‘Spanish political mind’ is that if you want to be a power, you have to play the power game in order to be recognised as a power, i.e. you have to be there ‘when the shooting starts’. Spain considers itself to be an enabling country, i.e. the country that takes the higher risks at the beginning of an operation. It regards this as the preferable option, because the political dividends are higher. The government is capable of being firm and going beyond the popular mood of the day. If a contribution does not pay in terms of political visibility and recognition, Spain will phase out, quietly and rapidly. Participation in the Gulf War Spain’s active involvement was considered crucial to safeguard its national interests: guaranteed oil supplies at a reasonable price. It was seen as a test of the European integration process and Spain’s bilateral relations with the USA, and Spain wanted to express its solidarity with its allies. Finally, there was Spain’s stake in the new world order, in which aggression does not go unpunished and in which the United Nations plays a crucial role. Notwithstanding these interests, Spain did not contribute actively, i.e. with soldiers on the ground. Instead, it contributed indirectly, by giving support to the efforts of the allies, most notably the USA. Zaldivar and Ortega explain Spain’s indirect participation with three complementary arguments: Spain’s conscript army, making it politically difficult to deploy out of area (NATO) and commit in a war; uncertain and volatile public opinion; and the precarious relation to the Maghreb countries. ‘The crisis could be expected to affect Spain’s special relationship with the Arab world, in particular its economic, political, social and cultural ties with the countries of the Maghreb’ (cited in Gnesotto and Roper 1992: 136). In the words of Prime Minister Felipe González: ‘We do not want to open the breach or to run any risk of rupture in a coalition which has produced extraordinary results’, spoken at the end of February 1991, the height of the crisis (cited in ibid.: 132). The Spanish position can be summarised in four propositions: (1) logistic support; (2) support for the USA; (3) non-participation in direct combat actions; and (4) a preference for indirect involvement in NATO. The Spanish soldiers on the ground were deployed within the framework of Operation Provide Comfort, which was a relief

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operation.214 Prior to the Gulf War, Spain saw the biggest anti-war demonstration in Europe. Polls suggested that over two-thirds of the population were against the war, the highest among the bigger European nations after Germany. Unprofor Spain participated in operations in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 with a tactical force of 1,200 soldiers, military observers and staff officers. Participation in UN operations was seen as providing democratic legitimacy for the armed forces and a vehicle for change, modernisation and internationalisation of the forces. Later, Spain contributed to Ifor and Sfor with a brigade (1,700 soldiers), a frigate, transport planes and eight F-16 fighters (from 1995 to the present). Operation Allied Force Prime Minister Aznar was a firm supporter of NATO’s military actions against Serbia in the first half of 1999, and a small number of Spanish military aircraft took part in the NATO attacks. Spain accepted over 1,000 Kosovar refugees and later contributed a modest military contingent to the postconflict settlement force in Kosovo (Kfor). Spain also maintains a substantial peacekeeping representation in Bosnia. Operation Enduring Freedom Spain opened its air space but did not provide ground forces in the initial phases of the operation. ISAF Spain deployed a battalion-size task force (700 soldiers) for operations in Kabul for a period of three months. It also provided logistics, helicopters, engineers, air transport and explosives ordnance disposal support. The Second Gulf War Nowhere in Europe has the discrepancy between government position and public opinion been as wide as in Spain (74 percent of the population were against the war, and only 13 percent would support a war with a UN mandate (source: Time). Prime Minister Aznar placed himself squarely in the American camp, while in Spain public anger and frustration prevailed – more than 3 million people participated in protest demonstrations.215 The prime minister went to the Cortes only twice for question-and-answer sessions. In such sessions, the government has unlimited time to elaborate its position, while the opposition parties get fifteen minutes each to pose questions, which

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will be duly answered by the prime minister.The Aznar government took the line that its position in support of an armed intervention in Iraq did not require parliamentary approval. Aznar took the initiative for a solidarity letter in which eight European governments expressed their solidarity with the USA.216 However, Spain did not participate directly in the hostilities; its contribution was of a humanitarian nature (although a team of specialists in nuclear, bacteriological and chemical warfare was included later). The members of the crisis cabinet pointed out that ‘The coalition does not need any extra help but it would be illogical for us not to send anything.’ The Spanish contribution to the war on Iraq consisted of a fleet of three ships and 900 soldiers (the Galicia was used to transport troops and vehicles, supported by the frigate Reina Sofia and the oil tanker Marques de la Ensenada). Defence Minister Federico Trillo had to admit that the B-52s used to bomb Baghdad could have refuelled in Spanish air space but that this activity was not dangerous. He denied that the bombers had flown directly over cities such as Bilbao, Pamplona and Barcelona.217 Consequently, all parties, with the exception of the ruling Partido Popular (PP), called for Spain’s participation in the war to be withdrawn, including the permission to use Spanish air bases and air space. The motion was rejected by the overall majority of the PP. On 18 March 2002, Prime Minister Aznar ruled out any participation in an attack or offensive mission against Iraq. However, Spain would deploy military personnel and equipment in a support capacity and provide war planes to defend Turkey (source: IISS). With regard to the constraints and preconditions that determine Spanish participation in international crisis management operations, a utilitarian pattern emerges. Key questions that will be asked are: What are our political, legal and moral obligations? What are other nations doing? What will it cost? What are the risks? Spain will do its strategic calculations and try to optimise the return of the contribution, balancing the reasons against the risks and shaping the best possible framework to get the best possible political dividends.This becomes manifest, since the government is keen to ensure that the world will actually see its efforts and sacrifice. To put it prosaically, Spain will not participate in an anti-terror campaign by doing the logistics. On the one hand, we see a principled willingness to participate, to share risks and burdens, shoulder to shoulder with its allies and friends, and on the other hand, the participation itself must be acknowledged internationally in order to earn the political credits sought so badly by the Spanish government. The time bomb that was ticking within the Spanish political system was the extreme discrepancy between the views of the political elite and public opinion on the war in Iraq, the American position and the use of force. More than 80 percent of the diputados supported the USA (‘it is taboo to be against’, as one of Spain’s leading columnists explained in a private conversation), are for the use of force and for the ‘war’ against terrorism, while 70 percent of the general public are against. This issue has reached boiling point on the streets of

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Table 6.5 Spanish parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation Spain

Parliamentary involvement (high, low, none)

Initiator (executive or Parliament)

Predominant influence (executive or Parliament)

Before

During

After

First Gulf War

none

low

none

exec.

exec.

Unprofor (former Yugoslavia)

none

low

none

exec.

exec.

Kfor/Sfor

none

low

none

exec.

exec.

Allied Force (Kosovo)

none

low

none

exec.

exec.

Enduring Freedom

none

low

none

exec.

exec.

ISAF

none

low

none

exec.

exec.

Second Gulf War

low

low

n/k

exec.

exec.

SFIR (2003/04)

low

low

n/k

exec.

exec.

Note: n/k not known. 

Madrid, with the police charging and being accused of using excessive force to disperse anti-war protesters. It is too soon to appreciate the full consequences of the Madrid bombings, but socialist Prime Minister Zapatero pulled Spanish forces out of Iraq at the earliest possible moment.

6.4

The dominant government: concluding remarks

What the United Kingdom, France and Spain have in common is that their national executives enjoy wide powers in the foreign and security policy domain. The British prime minister, the French president of the republic and the Spanish president of the government do not need to consult Parliament if they contemplate deploying their armed forces in an international crisis management operation. Although the Assemblée Nationale and the Cortes Generales declare war, as long as war is not declared the chief executive has a free hand. In the United Kingdom, declaring war and making peace are considered to be a crown prerogative.The governments in the three countries tend to inform Parliament rather than consult it, and the strings are pulled and actions coordinated from the office of the chief executive. This concentration of power enables the three governments to act decisively and take far-reaching decisions quickly. Of the three countries, the United Kingdom is the most powerful in terms of military strength. It has the most assets ready for deployment at very short notice. Only France and the UK have the means

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to implement a decision that has been taken autonomously, although there are limits to this autonomy. The resources of Spain are far more limited and therefore put Spain in a position of building coalitions before it can deploy. Formally, all three parliaments hold the power of the purse. In all three countries, this power is more or less circumvented by the executive (in this particular domain). First, all three political systems assume a parliamentary majority for the government; second, all three chief executives have access to either special funds or exceptional procedures that allow them to redirect parts of the budget. The British prime minister has access to (contingency) reserve funds; the Spanish president can use an extendable credit; and the French president can make changes to the national budget at will and have these amendments adopted later in the year. All three parliaments have powers to evaluate the decisions and actions of the government ex post facto. The Assemblée is too much politicised to play a constructive role in the entire decision-making process; since the evaluation of any governmental action or decision is always politicised, it refrains from evaluation. The Cortes does not consistently evaluate governmental actions and decisions, because of a lack of tradition, a lack of resources or the absence of a ‘culture of evaluation’. Or, to use the words of an eminent parliamentarian, because of ‘general neglect’.218 In Britain, only the Defence Select Committee balances the power of the executive. This committee was established in December 1979 and now conducts evaluations of government actions and decisions in the security policy domain on a more or less structural basis. It is free to evaluate and to organise independent hearings and to conduct visits to deployed units. The recommendations of the committee are becoming increasingly influential. However, the government is not obliged to act upon them. In France, ‘everything is politics’; even the evaluation of a decision or action has such a political charge as to make it impossible to conduct such an evaluation in a sensible way (in the sense of producing ‘lessons learned’). Evaluations are not conducted. The conclusion is that in both Spain and France parliamentary involvement in the decision-making process and in the process of evaluation ex post facto is minimal, and the power of the executive is not checked before, during or after the operation. In the United Kingdom, it is not checked until after the operation. On the point of national preconditions and constraints for participation, it is remarkable that many officials in these three countries state that there are no formal preconditions. On the point of the legitimacy of the action, France is perfectly ambiguous. On the one hand, the French government has a very strong desire to use the Security Council to legitimise any action, but on the other hand, as officials make clear, if France needs to rescue French or European nationals, it will act, even without a UN mandate. Domestic legitimacy is ensured by a legitimate executive decision. France, Spain and especially the UK follow a risk-seeking strategy, i.e. the national governments are willing and capable of taking decisions and implementing actions that are risky. Of the three, only France and the UK have the

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capabilities to put their decisions into action. Consequently, they are adamant about retaining control over the action. France is most outspoken about the use of coalitions of the willing (‘the mission makes the coalition’). It follows the principle of ‘insertion’, which dictates that France will insert as many senior officials into as many key posts as it is able to get away with. The British preference for workable solutions rather than grand plans or blueprints is well known and has not changed. Only Spain is feeling ill at ease in a coalition of the willing, but this is a consequence of the quality and size of its diplomatic corps. France and the UK have resources and networks of a different magnitude to Spain, hence a slight Spanish preference for standing multinational frameworks and channels of consultation and decision making. All three chief executives have a strong, even personal, relation with the public. They appear on television on the eve of an important event. France and the UK support this personal relationship of the chief executive with a sophisticated communication apparatus and strategies to remain in constant touch with the people. This allows the president/prime minister to lead and create public support. They are far more proactive than we have seen in countries with a coalition-type government. All three chief executives have the power to sack individual ministers and reshuffle their cabinets. The accountability of the chief executive is ‘postponed’ in the sense that the people cannot democratically oust their president/prime minister until the next general election.

7

The dominant parliament Germany and Italy

7.1

Germany The participation of the Bundeswehr in measures for securing world peace in the framework of the international community has become a central question of German foreign and security policy. (Helmut Kohl, former chancellor)

Until recently, German foreign policy, and especially the use of force and participation in international crisis management operations, was always discussed within the framework of Germany’s past. In every debate and every decision, Auschwitz, the Holocaust and German guilt cropped up and became the dominant landmarks.This culminated in a situation in which the political discourse was ‘hyper-moralised’ and politicians instrumentalised (national) shame.219 With German unification, the most intensive period of remembrance since the Second World War started. How otherwise could the Germans prove to themselves and to others that they were not striving to achieve a Fourth Reich (empire), as novelist Günter Grass had warned? Or that Germany would not embark on a Sonderweg, that Germany would resist ‘against the Western model of democracy, against the ideas of the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789’.220 The crucial question has been whether Germany would become a normal country. Markovits and Reich formulated two key preconditions for the Berlin republic to become genuinely normal. In the debate on the normalisation of its relations with the past, two memories, two histories, are pitted against each other: ‘the Nazi preoccupation with power against Bonn’s reluctance to admit its power. This debate and its outcome will … define the political identity of the Berlin Republic’ (Markovits and Reich 1997: 206). In German history, this relation to power is a struggle between power and natural order.Two of the most ambitious works of German creative genius in the nineteenth century, Goethe’s Faust and Wagner’s Ring, chart a struggle that in many ways can stand for the struggle of Germany. Faust sold his soul for world domination, and the Faust myth provides a redefinition of the German

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question: how can Germany emancipate in the foreign and security policy field without selling its soul? Finding a role for Germany in and for Europe is an existential question. It is a process that entails both the making and the finding of a role in the world.221 Markovits and Reich point to the fact that German participation in international crisis management operations has become emblematic of the broader issue of the role and place of Germany in Europe. ‘The controversy over the new role of Germany is a controversy that is first and foremost felt at home. Beneath the controversy about the new role of the German army lurk larger topics – German power, history, identity, and collective memory, the essence of the modern German Question’ (ibid.: 138). However, 11 September 2001 changed the context of this domestic debate. All of a sudden, Germans stopped referring to their past, their identity and their guilt when discussing German involvement in international crises and the use of force. For the first time, Germany did not seek justification in its past or its special position. ‘This time please without Hitler’, wrote Bernd Ulrich shortly after the attacks in the Tageszeitung. It seems as if a process had come into the open in which the legacy of constraints could finally be relegated to its proper historical role and as if Germany could undo the ‘double bind’ of international constraints and historical legacy. A legacy of constraints There is no shortage of labels that have been hung on Germany, the German identity or its foreign policy. Among the many available, the most adequate are Zivilmacht (Hanns Maull), trading nation (Hacke) and Rechtsstaat. A frequently used label to describe Germany’s geopolitical posture is that of a ‘reluctant power’ (Meiers) or in its French variant ‘la grande puissance reticente’ (Vernet). Professor Christian Hacke developed a role model concept and identified six roles that ‘define’ the German identity. Besides being a civilian power and a trading nation, four other roles determine Germany’s identity: Germany as the motor of European integration; Germany as a loyal transatlantic partner; Germany as an advocate of ‘pan-European cooperation’; and Germany as a mediator between East and West (Hacke 1997: 521–40). It is beyond the scope of this study to give a full account of the concept of civilian power but, as it is central to understanding German behaviour in the world, we will briefly outline its most important dimensions. Maull successfully adapted Norbert Elias’ notion of a process of civilisation and developed it into a workable notion for external relations. He explained the concept in a seminal article in 1991, in which he wrote that being or becoming a civilian power implies, among other things: a) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b) the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means

Germany and Italy 187 of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management. (Maull 1990: 92–3) Later he added that four elements are key to being a civilian power: first an emphasis on acting multilaterally and, whenever possible, through international institutions; second, strong normative elements in defined interests and objectives, and a belief in the validity and viability of international law; third, an obsession with stability; and fourth, an abhorrence of violence as a means to resolve conflict. (Maull 1995: 114) Such notions as ‘national’ and ‘national interest’ were a long-time taboo in German political discourse. Germany couched its interests in broadly multilateral terms and has pursued them (virtually) exclusively through multilateral, supranational institutions. Germany cannot hide from its responsibilities. The foreign minister laid out his ideas on the fundamentals of German foreign policy in a speech to the German Council on Foreign Relations. He made it clear that, although the fundamentals – geographical position, interests, values, history – remained the same, continuity and reliability in international affairs are indispensable attributes and no mere secondary virtues: [a] country cannot just opt out of the strategic potential it derives from its population, economic strength and national interests, nor can it ignore its geopolitical position. It will remain an objective power factor, whether or not it deems this politically desirable.To deny that unification has enhanced this potential would be both foolish and dishonest, sowing mistrust rather than trust. The question is therefore not whether a united Germany has more power and influence than before but how it can and should exercise that power and influence as wisely and responsibly as possible. … A stronger international commitment can mean only one thing: a commitment to strengthen multilateralism, European integration, the United Nations and regional organisations active in the international arena. (Fischer 1994) Obligation, responsibility and emancipation are key concepts in describing German foreign policy.222 These are philosophical rather than practical political concepts, but they do inform a very practical policy. The development of the philosophical content of notions like obligation, responsibility and the relation to ‘the other’ is a longstanding German tradition that includes thinkers like Immanuel Kant, Hans Georg Gadamer and Hans Jonas. Their thinking provided the broad direction of German foreign policy. It is a foreign policy that is based on well-understood obligations within the international system. Germany feels obliged to make a contribution to stability and peace

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commensurate with its political weight. This means that German strategic calculations are anchored not only in the national interest but also in the moral imperative that Germany has a duty towards peace. How this duty is operationalised is heavily conditioned by historical experiences. Basic features of the German political system The German constitution gives the Bundesländer a very strong position with considerable autonomy regarding their domestic policy. Their powers in the foreign policy field are limited, and defence policy is entirely a federal issue. Five constitutional bodies play a role in the formulation of German foreign and security policy: the presidency, the chancellor and the federal government, the Bundesrat, the Bundestag and the Federal Constitutional Court. At the top of the pyramid we find the federal president as the head of state of the Federal Republic of Germany. He is elected by the Federal Convention, a constitutional body that convenes only for this purpose. It consists of the members of the Bundestag and an equal number of members elected by the state parliaments. The federal president is elected for a term of five years by a majority of votes in the Federal Convention. He may be re-elected only once. He represents the Federation in its international relations and concludes treaties with other states on its behalf. He also accredits and receives envoys, although foreign policy as such is the responsibility of the federal government. The federal president is not the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, this power is vested in the minister of defence (article 65a of the constitution). This is, to our knowledge, the only case in Europe where a cabinet minister is commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The federal government consists of the council of federal ministers, the cabinet. The federal chancellor is chairman of the cabinet and head of government. He alone chooses the ministers and proposes them to the federal president for appointment or dismissal. He also determines the number of ministers and their responsibilities. The chancellor is in a strong position primarily due to the fact that it is he who lays down the guidelines of government policy. The federal ministers run their departments independently and on their own responsibility but within the framework of these guidelines. In a coalition government, the chancellor must also take account of agreements reached with the other party or parties in the coalition. This explains why the German system of government is often referred to as a ‘chancellor democracy’. The chancellor is the only member of the government elected by Parliament, and he alone is accountable to it. This accountability may manifest itself in a ‘constructive vote of no confidence’, the purpose of which is to ensure that opposition groups, who are in agreement only in their rejection of the government but not as regards an alternative programme, are not able to overthrow the government. A Bundestag vote of no confidence in the chancellor must at the same time be a majority vote in favour of a successor.

Germany and Italy 189

Figure 7.1 Command structure of the German armed forces

The Bundesrat is the upper house of Parliament. It represents the sixteen states and participates in the federal legislative process and administration. Unlike the senatorial system of federal states such as the United States or Switzerland, the Bundesrat does not consist of elected representatives of the people but of members of the state governments or their representatives. Depending on the size of population, states have three, four, five or six votes, which may only be cast as a block. More than half of all federal bills require the formal approval of the Bundesrat, which means that they cannot pass into law against its will.This applies especially to bills that concern the vital interests of the states. No proposed amendments to the constitution can be adopted without the Bundesrat’s consent (two-thirds majority).The Bundesrat elects its president from among the prime ministers of the sixteen states for a twelve-month term according to a fixed rotation schedule. The president of the Bundesrat exercises the powers of the federal president in the event of the latter being indisposed. The German Bundestag is the parliamentary assembly representing the people of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is elected by the people every four years. The main functions of the Bundestag are to pass laws, to elect the federal chancellor and to control the government.The Bundestag is a working rather than a debating Parliament, in contrast to the British House of Commons. It is in the parliamentary committees – whose meetings are usually not open to the public – that the extensive preparatory work for legislation is done. The Bundestag’s committees correspond to the federal government’s departments. The Budget Committee is particularly important, because it represents Parliament’s control of the budget. Except for the party leadership, parliamentarians quickly become policy specialists. Their high

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degree of expertise is a safeguard against partisan politicisation of issues. As early as the 1950s and 1960s, informal, unanimous consent procedures had replaced formal rules for organising the work of the Bundestag. Parliamentary control Parliament and government cooperate very closely. This system is supported by an enormous bureaucratic apparatus. Sometimes described as a ‘participatory bureaucracy’, this system shows a significant tendency towards the politicisation of top officials. In principle, the German government likes all parties to be in agreement with its position, so all political parties are extremely well informed about foreign and security policy matters. They are, for example, on the list of recipients of messages (‘cables’ and ‘telexes’) that are normally restricted to Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs circles. German parliamentarians are not primarily interested in controlling the government; they want to be part of the game. The opposition wants to participate and cherishes its privilege of being informed and able to exert influence.There is a common understanding that all are in the same boat, and rocking the boat may sow the seeds of a political crisis. The emphasis of the parliamentary work in the Bundestag is on the legislative process. The orientation of the Bundestag is forward; it strives to be a serious and credible actor in the decision- and policy-making process.The consequence is that the Bundestag tries to exert its influence on the government in the process of cooperation and deliberation and is therefore focused on ex ante political control; ex post scrutiny is not strongly developed and takes place only on an ad hoc basis: ‘in der Bundesrepublik gilt eine verfassungsrechtliche Doktrin von der Verantwortung für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik “Zur gesamten Hand” zwischen Bundesregierung und Bundestag’ (cf. Krause 1998: 91). Krause describes the parliamentary convention that has developed over the years as one of ‘cooperative control’ (Krause 1998: 138). The very important Foreign Affairs Committee indicates as the centre of gravity of its work ‘der Begleitung, Erörterung und Kontrolle von außenpolitischen Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung’ (Auswärtigen Ausschuß 1999: 6). In practice, the emphasis is not equally divided between ‘guidance’, ‘elaboration’ and ‘control’. Government and Parliament work together in the committee, as it were hand in hand, trying to arrive at a common position, which is an absolute requirement for participation in crisis management operations. The Bundestag must approve every proposed deployment of the Bundeswehr by a simple majority, but in cases where speed is essential, the government may decide without parliamentary consent. Parliament must be consulted immediately after the decision has been taken and has the right then to revoke the decision made by the government. Parliament voted on participation in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in favour but was not in consensus. The federal chancellor had to make it a vote of confidence to get the agreement of the Bundestag. The Bundestag is not only involved in the process leading up to a

Germany and Italy 191 decision, it can also involve itself in the evaluation of the decision and action ex post facto, as the Basic Law attributes to the Defence Committee the prerogative of inquiry. In practice, this prerogative is very seldom used.When asked privately about the reasons for not evaluating the German participation in the Kosovo operation, a very senior member of the committee replied: ‘we did not do it, because it was not politically opportune’.With this statement he did not refer to party politics but to the relation between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the government. Scrutiny of a government decision, a decision that is taken in such a close mode of cooperation, means scrutiny of Parliament. An important additional parliamentary function is that of the defence commissioner of the Bundestag (Wehrbeauftragter des Bundestages).This post is a hybrid of being an ombudsman and a parliamentary inspector-general, with a mandate enshrined in the constitution (article 45b).The defence commissioner operates independently and is not a member of the Defence Committee. His task is to protect the constitutional rights of service personnel. Every member of the armed forces has the right to complain to him directly without going through the bureaucracy. The commissioner may demand information and access to files from military units and visit any Bundeswehr facility unannounced. He submits an annual report to the Bundestag on the complaints he has received.A constitutional body that has played an important role in Germany’s external relations is the Federal Constitutional Court, located in Karlsruhe, which is the guardian of the Basic Law. It takes action only when called upon. The jurisdiction of this court is confined to a list of specified cases and situations. It is usually the opposition that submits cases to this court for a ruling on the constitutionality of a particular government action.The landmark ruling on the participation of German armed forces in international crisis management missions will be elaborated below. We conclude with a few words on German political culture, which can be characterised as consensual, cooperative and non-confrontational. This last aspect is manifested in the many mechanisms available to depoliticise an argument or to prevent issues from becoming politicised. In order to depoliticise issues, German politicians tend to take a technical rather than a political approach to problems.The number of expert committees has therefore proliferated; created by the State, they serve both technical and political purposes and are not easily controlled. In 1977, there were already 358 committees that advised the federal administration. There seems to be a tendency to use these expert committees as instruments to depoliticise issues, i.e. to reduce an essentially political issue to a merely technical problem. Hancher and Ruete have characterised West German administration as a ‘formalised regulatory or legal culture’, which they contrast with Britain’s ‘flexible bargaining culture’ (cited in Katzenstein 1987: 31). The national decision-making process The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) contains almost no reference to the deployment of troops outside Germany.

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Until the 1990s, there was consensus among the major political parties that the German armed forces would not be deployed abroad. The constitution was interpreted so as to preclude any such deployment, at least outside NATO territory. This situation changed with the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany.The country was urged to participate in international operations, and the German government was interested in satisfying these expectations.223 Consequently, the consensus among political parties dissolved and the government took the position that it could deploy armed forces directly, in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law.224 The German government had already adopted a step-by-step approach: it had deployed air transport units to UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) and UNIFIL in the 1980s, border guards to UNTAG in 1989 and medical personnel to Cambodia in 1993 (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC). The opposition initially tolerated these deployments, but this tolerance came to an abrupt end when the government, acting independently of Parliament, decided to commit troops to three more peacekeeping operations.225 All three government decisions were challenged by the opposition and brought before the Constitutional Court, which combined the three claims and made only one ruling. It found that the participation of members of the German armed forces in these three peacekeeping operations was not unconstitutional, but that the government, by taking these decisions independently, had violated the rights of Parliament, as any deployment of German forces overseas required prior approval.226 The court decided that under the constitution each single deployment of the armed forces requires the approval of Parliament, despite any existing obligation within any alliance. Although the court did not recommend a special approval procedure, it did lay down some minimum constitutional requirements for such a decision by Parliament. The use of the armed forces for humanitarian assistance is exempt from this rule, as long as the soldiers are unarmed. A further exemption applies to decisions taken by the government in a state of emergency. Government may decide that the armed forces will participate in a specific mission and that such participation must start immediately. In such cases, the approval of Parliament (a simple majority is sufficient) must be sought as soon as possible. If Parliament does not agree, the deployed troops are to be recalled immediately. Parliament does not have the right to take the initiative regarding the participation of German troops in international crisis management operations. It is not until after the government has opted for deployment that Parliament is called upon to approve, in particular, decisions on the duration of the deployment, the number of soldiers involved and the modalities of the intervention of the armed forces.227 On the face of it, the ruling seems very clear, but parliamentary practice shows that it leaves many issues unresolved: the involvement of conscripts in international crisis management operations; the duration of the deployment; the degree of parliamentary control over such involvement; and the possibility

Germany and Italy 193 Table 7.1 German parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation Before

During

After

Formal right of consent. ‘Cooperative control’: Parliament (including the opposition parties) is extremely well informed.

Right of recalling troops if and when deployed without prior approval. All political parties are extremely well informed and receive regular briefings.

Right of inquiry, but no consequent or consistent evaluation takes place.



of reconsidering an approval given by Parliament. With regard to the last question, the court has been clear: Parliament does not have the right of initiating and decisions on scale, duration or modality of involvement, are to be taken by the government. It is not feasible to interpret the ruling thus that Parliament, once it has approved participation, would completely lose control with respect to that particular involvement. There is a drive towards determining the participation in great detail so as to limit the discretion of the government to be flexible regarding the size, duration, modality, etc. of the operation. Any slight variation will require another vote of approval by Parliament. In the practical coordination of the decision-making process, the Chancellery (BKA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence play important roles. The BKA is more than a secretariat to the chancellor, but it does not have a high decision-making authority. It mirrors the federal government: all ministries have their counsellor in the BKA. Its primary responsibility is to guard the ‘Richtlinienkompetenz’: it is the prerogative of the chancellor to set the guidelines for the various ministries. Within their resorts and guidelines individual ministers are autonomous. The BKA controls and explains, interprets and intervenes if an overlap or clash occurs and if problems arise of a cross-boundary nature. The chancellor has thus more than one foreign affairs adviser. The foreign minister is not automatically the primary foreign policy adviser: the chancellor has a security counsellor, a very senior figure close to him to advise him on foreign and security policy matters. An important cabinet committee is the Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat, BSR), which serves purely as a forum for informal discussion and consensus building. The foreign policy adviser to the chancellor prepares its meetings. Outside the BSR, the chancellor uses various informal forums to consult party leaders. In the decision to deploy the armed forces, the power line is quite short, running from the BKA to Parliament (the Foreign Affairs Committee). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs deals with the overall political framework, and the Ministry of Defence is involved in the military/technical arrangements, but both have a facilitating rather than decision-making role.

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Recently, a debate has developed about reducing the constitutional constraints on the executive. The German constitution does have an emergency clause that enables the executive to decide without prior approval of Parliament, but Parliament retains the right to recall the troops. Proposals are being voiced for a so-called ‘deployment law’ (Entsendegesetz). The details of this, are unknown but the aim is to increase the span of action of the government.228 German foreign and security policy:‘Welt-Innenpolitik’ German performance in the international foreign and security policy domain has been described as reluctant. This reluctance has several sources: the constraints imposed on Germany have been described above, but another source of restraint is the rather small-minded fear of a sudden decline in domestic prosperity (losing the Mercedes!). ‘Among the lost comforts of the Cold War’, wrote Michael Stürmer, ‘was the fact that Germans were spared the moral pain which has and always will accompany any responsible use of power’ (Stürmer 1990: 246). And on this point multilateral institutions can have a softening or even ‘comforting’ effect in that they can take the sharp edge off a difficult decision. But at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the fear of the early 1990s of a renewed German assertiveness resulting in unilateralism and ‘Germanification’ of Europe had not materialised. Instead, as will be argued in this chapter, the German government has been very cautious, responsible in fact in ensuring continuity, moderation and its traditional restraint and preference for a multilateral approach to foreign policy. During the Cold War, German defence policy was almost exclusively concerned with national defence and the stability of Central Europe. Germany accepted unique restrictions on its weapons arsenal, and it relied on its allies and NATO structures to provide planning facilities and command structures. Germany joined NATO in 1955 and was barred from developing national planning and command facilities. Without exaggeration, one can state that German policy towards NATO accounted for 90 percent of German security policy during the Cold War. The remaining 10 percent was taken up by efforts towards disarmament and weapons control. Since 1945, postwar West Germany has depended on the United States for military deterrence and the liberalisation of international markets. German self-perception, which an influential part of the German political class remains eager to preserve, is that of a junior partner of the USA (cf. Hacke 1997: 521–40). The end of the Cold War unfroze international structures and let loose many conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe: the southeast rim of Europe became an arc of instability. Germany has been one of the key drivers behind NATO enlargement. ‘Germany is from now on encircled by friends’, so the Weizsäcker Commission could proudly declare in 1999 after the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to the Alliance.

Germany and Italy 195 As early as 1995, Federal President Roman Herzog recommended that the nation’s foreign policy be made more proportionate to its greater weight in world affairs but also that it articulate its interests to its neighbours more clearly and face the fact that both hard and soft power have their appropriate moments for application. Most notably, he called for courage and leadership, for governments to recognise that German and European security can no longer be maintained via chequebook diplomacy – that a commitment of life and limb may be required – and that the habit of governments simply to follow public opinion represents a weak foundation for responsible foreign policy. But the retooling of the Bundeswehr, as an instrument of foreign policy, is not just about reorganisation and structural adaptation; it is much more, as Markovits and Reich argued:‘At the heart of the matter was whether and how to redefine Germany’s power and – more important – the proper projection and deployment of this power. The debate entailed a full reconsideration of Germany’s identity to those of previous Germanys’ (Markovits and Reich 1997: 138). During the 1990s, German security policy developed gradually, step by step, from complete (military) abstinence in the Gulf War in 1991 to involvement first in a classical UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, where it supplied a field hospital (1992–93); second, in a robust UN operation under chapter VII of the UN charter (Unosom in Somalia); third, in actions requiring the use of armed force with a UN mandate; and some years later in operations not explicitly mandated by the UN Security Council (NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995 and Operation Allied Force in 1999, respectively). Deciding to take part in the Kosovo war was followed by the ‘lead nation question’ in 2001, when Germany had to decide whether or not it wanted and was able to act as lead nation in NATO’s Operation Amber Fox in Macedonia. Funnily enough, it did not take a considerable debate in the German Bundestag to decide in favour; the Germans actually seemed proud to have been asked to do it. In this light of incremental changes and ‘deepening’ contributions, the participation in the war against terrorism (with soldiers on the ground who had to obey orders no German soldier had had to obey since the end of the Second World War, as Der Spiegel put it) is not a radical change of policy. It fits the trend of change that started in the early 1990s. This process was greatly facilitated by one man: Joschka Fischer. One of the most remarkable books on German foreign policy of the last decade was the book by (then parliamentarian) Fischer, Risiko Deutschland (1994). In this book, Fischer warns against the risk that the end of the Cold War might spur national sentiments that could make Germany a new danger in Central Europe. But at the same time, unification offered a unique chance to avoid this risk by further integrating Germany into Western civilisation, the European Union and NATO.‘Europe first’ was Fischer’s motto for the foreign policy of Bonn and later Berlin. With that approach, he situates his policy in the best postwar German tradition and later himself in the tradition of Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl. Fischer is the symbol of

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the emancipation from suffocating, small-minded, postwar Germany via the revolution of 1968 to the free and open society of the twenty-first century. Fischer’s visit to Bosnia in the mid-1990s is an important political and personal turning point. In Bosnia, Fischer saw with his own eyes that the intervention by NATO troops in Macedonia had prevented a civil war. He later commented to a television hostess that ‘if [NATO intervention] had happened in 1992 in Bosnia the genocide of 250,000 people would never have happened’ (Fischer, cited in de Waard 2002: 307).This visit resulted in his famous Bosnia letter to the Green Party in 1995, which set a process in motion that resulted in the Green Party approving the proposal of the Kohl administration to deploy troops to Ifor, the NATO force in Bosnia.This decision was a turning point in the postwar history of Germany. Since 1996, Fischer (and his band of ‘Realos’ – realists) succeeded time and again in getting their party behind the policy of the government in a vote in Parliament.229 After 11 September 2001, the German government took an activist stance. As a consequence, no German government from now on can hide behind the collective memory or a culture of restraint. Chancellor Schröder (whose party traditionally has difficulties with an activist international security policy) knew how difficult it would be for German politicians to sign up to participation in the war against terrorism and made the deployment decision a vote of confidence, a move not intended, as many observers initially argued, to tie the Greens to the decision but to tie his own party, the SPD, firmly to this course of action. This happened in November 2001. In December, the Bundestag had to decide on participation in ISAF and Operation Amber Fox (Macedonia): both decisions were taken quickly and without any considerable debate. The Bundestag and the coalition parties have accepted the idea that the use of force is part of the German foreign policy toolkit. Germany has reached a point of no return. Germany regards its foreign and security policy as a ‘Welt-Innenpolitik’: not domestic policy on a global scale but a perception of a world and a global rule of law in which malefactors are brought to court. German security policy is oriented towards that frame. German strategic analysis is based on a concept of comprehensive security, a concept that assigns priority to solving conflicts by political or diplomatic means. It also attaches considerable importance to preventing crises and conflicts from arising in the first place and, should they occur anyway, from their attaining a military dimension. Since unification, German political leaders have tended to employ a broad concept of security, one that includes a political, economic, social and ecological as well as military dimension. The SPD made its views clear before it was elected to power and mainstreamed them: [Security] includes ecological and economic stability, social justice, selfsustaining development, peaceful resolution of social, ethnic, and religious conflict, the containment of mass migrations by addressing the causes, and

Germany and Italy 197 protection against international organised crime. … Security can exist only on the basis of political, economic, social, and ecological cooperation, that is, as cooperative security leading to comprehensive, non-military conflict prevention and resolution, so that the military dimension becomes less relevant. (SPD,‘Neue Perspektiven’, election manifesto, 1998) After the demise of the Soviet Union and the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, Germany suffered from a unique degree of vulnerability to many actual and potential external threats. These threats were perceived as extremely powerful incentives to seek to mitigate them. Because of its location along the former East–West divide, Germany has been particularly exposed to possible dangers emanating from the former Soviet bloc, whether they be due to internal instability, cross-border conflicts, the emergence of hostile governments, or transnational trafficking of drugs, weapons and people. The priority for the German government was clear: promote stability in Central and Eastern Europe. The German contribution was vital to both the stability of Europe as a whole and German security in particular. ‘Without stability in Central and Eastern Europe’, Defence Minister Volker Rühe argued, ‘there can be no security in Europe.’ Rühe translated his views into a ‘philosophy of stability’.The idea of a ‘transfer of stability’ is the key factor in German concern about stability, so stability in and for Europe is the foremost aim of Germany’s security policy. The basic assumption is that stability exists in regions with enduring democratic structures, where basic material needs are fulfilled, where social justice exists and human rights are respected. A security policy that merely reacts to escalating crises has only limited power to solve crises. That is why the transfer of stability is the best and most effective security policy investment, because it is from good neighbourliness and cooperation that confidence and stability will grow (cf. Rühe 1993).This philosophy of stability is based on the rejection of stability as a ‘security concept’ or military stability; instead, it represents the idea of a comprehensive multi-policy concept, an idea based on the premise that stability can be projected and that multinational organisations play a central role as instruments for this projection. Transforming and deploying the Bundeswehr We have argued that the transformation of the Bundeswehr and its deployment constitute the two most important issues of German security policy.230 These two issues transcend security logic and the security policy domain; their solutions will have far-reaching consequences and may well be a factor in determining the success or otherwise of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union. However, the transformation of the Bundeswehr is not exclusively an issue of security policy; it has become a multi-policy issue. Hence the dynamic of the answer to this problem cannot

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be explained using security logic alone. Moreover, the socio-political dynamics of this issue are far greater than the issues of organisation and management.Transforming the Bundeswehr means transforming a key instrument used by Germany to express its values and shape its foreign and security policy. Basically, it represents the transformation of Germany itself.The rise of the Berlin republic and the transformation of the Bundeswehr are part of the same political process of transformation and emancipation. A global role for the German armed forces was unthinkable in the 1990s, but it is no longer unthinkable at the beginning of a new century. The change required and still requires a fundamental psychological adjustment. The depth and breadth of the issue can be explained by elaborating various aspects: the social, technical, organisational and political dimensions. The German army used to be described as an ‘alliance’ army: it could function only within an alliance of states. Maintaining the capability to function within an alliance context is nowadays of the utmost importance. It is in the national interest to ensure the capability to work and operate in an alliance and in Europe, and to remain a credible, reliable partner. The fear of losing its Bündnisfähigkeit has become a central concern for Germany. On taking up office, the new defence minister, Rudolf Scharping, found the Bundeswehr neither ‘completely alliance-ready’ nor ‘good enough to play a proper part in the new European force’. He declared that ‘the Bundeswehr faces the danger of losing technical contact and hence its operability with major allies and partners’; that ‘the size, composition and equipment of the crisis reaction forces does not meet the rapidly growing international demands’; and that ‘the chronically underfinanced defence budget has led to an investment gap of at least 15 billion DM’ (cf. Meiers 2001). The reorganisation of the armed forces means the development of a top command structure and a joint, multi-service support apparatus (intelligence, communications and logistics). As Germany has always been embedded in alliance planning facilities, it has lacked integrated national planning and command and control facilities. A second important development has been the creation of rapid response forces. In the mid-1990s, the German government created the Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK), a unit of 1,000 men able to be deployed at short notice. It acts as the spearhead force for the crisis response forces (Krisenreaktionkräfte, KRK), which have a strength of about 53,000 and consist of naval, air and army units for follow-on actions. The social dimension of the transformation process undoubtedly lies in the question of whether to abolish conscription. Although the militarypolitical value of a conscript system was downplayed – conscripts cannot be deployed on a crisis management mission, because they are under-trained and because of sensitivities in public opinion – the German conscription question has become a social policy problem. Germany has had a great tolerance (and a very low threshold) for conscientious objectors. These could do alternative national service (or civil service) in local libraries, rest homes, etc. These institutions have by now come to rely so heavily on this

Germany and Italy 199 guaranteed cheap labour force that they claim they will be forced to close their doors if conscription should end. Ending conscription is not a matter of security policy but of social policy. The German armed forces need to restructure and to downsize significantly. Some people link general conscription to the prime role of the armed forces: to defend Germany. A conscript army is needed for that purpose. On the other hand, new demands and new tasks require a new professional level. Germany is attracting international criticism for not abolishing conscription: the secretary-general of NATO expressed his opinion in clear terms when he made the case for substantial reform of the armed forces of NATO: ‘In today’s world, we need fewer unusable conscripts. Smaller heavy metal armies. Fewer static bases. And fewer static headquarters’ (Robertson 2002b). Looking at the armed forces, the conclusion is that they have the wrong structure, are under-funded and wrongly staffed (conscripted soldiers) for crisis management operations. The political utility of the Bundeswehr for such operations is thus limited at best. Parallel to the debate on the transformation of the Bundeswehr has been the debate on its deployment.The fears expressed by distinguished sociologist Ulrich Beck illustrate this point: the old ‘domestic’ Bundeswehr was a biotope of consensus. … The new ‘global’ Bundeswehr will be exactly the opposite, a source of unquenchable strife. … The consent of the political parties to an amendment of the constitution is one thing. … Each mission will subject the country to a new internal ordeal. (Beck 1998: 148) It should not come as a surprise that the issue of preconditions for deployment has sparked off a considerable political, legal and societal debate. Over the years, considerable thought and energy has gone into devising principles, lists of criteria and ground rules for participation in out-of-area operations. As a consequence, a great many lists of criteria are available.231 The conclusion of Philippi, who studied the different politico-legal interpretations of articles 24 and 87a of the constitution, is that the out-of-area debate has been dominated by legal arguments, while the question of whether participation would make sense politically has been avoided (Philippi 1997: 179). Because participation decisions are political decisions made on the basis of political arguments, these attempts at devising a list of criteria never stand any chance of success. Nevertheless, most lists converge on a number of issues with regard to the use of armed force by the international community.232 The only issue on which members of the ruling coalition (CDU/CSU/FDP) seemed to hold differing opinions concerned the possible geographical scope of future out-of-area missions. Foreign Minister Kinkel and the Foreign Ministry maintained that Germany should be willing to participate in all UN operations, wherever they might take place. Defence Minister Rühe, on the other hand insisted that

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

Bundeswehr deployments should be limited to Europe and adjacent areas. Nevertheless, the two sides agreed that old arguments about avoiding regions where the armed forces had moved in uninvited in the past had lost much of their force. Now the participation of German ground forces in peacekeeping operations is imaginable just about anywhere on the continent as long as all the parties involved accept their presence. The one clear exception continues to be the former Yugoslavia and especially Bosnia, where the Kohl doctrine still holds sway. There, so Rühe frequently cautioned, German soldiers would only be part of the problem (cf. Duffield 1998: 211–12). While from a moral perspective German participation and involvement know no geographical boundaries, from a practical point of view the logistic deficiencies do restrain the possibilities of deployment. Recent operations The most important deployments with regard to their significance for the emancipation of German security policy are non-participation in the First Gulf War; involvement in Unosom, Allied Force and the war on terrorism; and abstention from the Second Gulf War. Abstaining in the First Gulf War In the early 1990s, Chancellor Kohl made it plain that for Bonn, Eastern European and post-Soviet affairs were the only game in town, and Germany’s refusal to take on a major military role in the Gulf War could be defended with the argument that stabilising Eastern Europe was at least as responsible a postCold War policy as ejecting Iraq from Kuwait (cf. Hodge 1998: 113). Hellmann explains the German reluctance to send troops and the willingness to ‘pay up’ with ‘a combination of alliance dependency and domestic constraints’ (Hellmann, in Bennett et al. 1997: 166). Politically, the situation was too tricky to take any risks, because the negotiations to unite the two Germanys had been concluded but had not yet been ratified. Russia not only had to ratify the unification of Germany but also had to relocate the Red Army. On top of that, the reunited country was preparing itself for its first all-German general election. These historic events absorbed not only all public attention but also significant financial resources. Hellmann applies the collective action model and concludes ‘we should have expected Germany to attempt to ride free’.The strategic calculation was quite complex, but two factors stand out: there was strong American pressure to become involved (partner in leadership), while Germany on the other hand feared trouble in Russia with the ratification of the ‘Two-plus-Four’ Treaty. It decided not to become involved in the military operations but to support them financially and logistically to the best of its abilities.233 Another major point to be made about the First Gulf War is that the Iraqi Scuds landing on Israel generated a moral dilemma among the ’68 generation.The moral claim in the sense of the direct need to help and protect

Germany and Italy 201 Israel competed with a morality that absolutely rejected war.This was the first time the ’68 generation had become aware of a paradox that would persist throughout the 1990s.234 The decision to abstain in the Gulf War was motivated predominantly by Germany’s involvement in stabilising Central and Eastern Europe.That Germany made such an enormous financial contribution (US$11.5 billion) was due to heavy US pressure:‘Germany paid up’, according to one analyst (Bennett et al. 1997: 166). Operation Unosom I 235 Germany had abstained in the Gulf War, but abstaining again in Somalia would have had disastrous consequences for the country. Chancellor Kohl argued that Germany’s international reputation was at stake:‘If Germany once again chose to stand aside, it would lose its credibility and become more and more isolated’ (Duffield 1998: 198). The cabinet decided to offer a reinforced supply and transport battalion of approximately 1,500 soldiers to the UN.The unit would have no combat role; its mission would be strictly limited to providing humanitarian assistance, and it would be deployed in areas that had been pacified by other UN forces. As a precaution, however, the battalion would contain a self-defence component. This fact alone revealed that the pacification of the deployment area could not be assumed. The Social Democrats supported the German humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia, but they argued that the planned deployment was unconstitutional and consequently appealed against the government’s decision in the Federal Constitutional Court. They argued that such a momentous step should be taken only with the full participation of Parliament. This appeal led to the famous ruling of July 1994 mentioned above, which dictated that the Bundestag would have to approve a formal bill, prepared in the appropriate committees and debated in plenary session, that authorised the mission. Operation Allied Force 236 German participation in Allied Force consolidated a number of developments that had started almost a decade before. It contributed Tornado aircraft to the coalition, sanctioned by a Red–Green coalition.The operation did not have a UN mandate. In isolation, it looks like a watershed but, as has been explained above, it fits a longer trend that started in the early 1990s. Rudolf makes the argument that Germany pursued a dual strategy of ‘supporting allied military pressure and pushing diplomatic initiatives’ (Rudolf, in Martin and Brawley 2000: 131). This dual strategy fits the trend of continuity and only incremental change. However, there are a few unique parameters in this case. Timing for example. The new Red–Green government, strongly committed to human rights, did not want to taint its reputation in the first weeks of its life and did not want to be perceived as pursuing a Sonderweg. According to Rudolf, ‘Participation was seen as the precondition for

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preserving the multilateral framework in which the Federal Republic traditionally has smoothly exercised its influence’ (Rudolf 2000: 132). The strong human rights component was another factor. The Kosovo campaign was not about oil or national interests but about saving human lives. As a consequence, there was relatively little domestic resistance, which was politically ineffective. The German reflex was to remain firmly within the multilateral forums and framework (i.e. Contact Group, NATO and EU). The central historical reference in Chancellor Schröder’s rhetoric was not Auschwitz but the rejection of the German Sonderweg: ‘participation in NATO’s fight was interpreted as an affirmation of the integration into the Western community, which was presented as part of Germany’s raison d’état’ (ibid.: 136).The operative principle was that Germany will demand a UN mandate to legitimise the action. Viewed from this perspective, Operation Allied Force is considered an exception. The lacking UN mandate was substituted by the request from the secretary-general of the UN and the fact that a very broad international majority supported the action.The main lesson that the Germans have drawn from this crisis is to give new impetus to an old European vision: a common European security and defence policy. This not only follows the political logic of the process of European integration but is also the basis for a new Atlantic relationship, based on real European strength. The war on terrorism Although Germany had already crossed its Rubicon in the Kosovo crisis, the nature of the impact of Germany’s involvement in the war against terrorism is clear: it constitutes a watershed, a point of no return, a catalyst, speeding up and consolidating changes that began in the early 1990s. The German chancellor made a number of strong statements after 11 September 2001. His statement on ‘unreserved support for the USA’ in particular met with both acclaim and criticism. His statement to the Bundestag upon his return from the United States, one month after the attacks on America (11 October), is widely seen as indicative of a change in German foreign policy. The chancellor explained why his visit to the USA was necessary and that: Germany must keep a high profile and demonstrate active solidarity in the international alliance against terrorism. Following the end of the Cold War, the re-establishment of Germany’s unity and the restoration of our full sovereignty, we must shoulder international responsibility in a new fashion. We must assume a measure of responsibility which is in keeping with our role as a key European and transatlantic partner, as well as that of a strong democracy and strong economy in the heart of Europe. … Only ten years ago no one would have expected more from Germany than secondary assistance, i.e. infrastructure or funds, in the international efforts to safeguard freedom, justice and stability … this era of German post-[Second World] War politics is over once and for all. Particularly we

Germany and Italy 203 Germans, who were able to overcome the consequences of two world wars and achieve freedom and self-determination with the help and solidarity of our American and European friends, now have an obligation to shoulder our new responsibility in full. (Schröder, statement to the Bundestag, 11 October 2001) Germany deployed troops to Afghanistan – even special forces without the public knowing about it – and assumed command, together with the Netherlands, of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) early in 2003.To that end, Germany deployed the headquarters of the German–Dutch Army Corps together with the Netherlands. Abstaining in the Second Gulf War (2003) Participating in the drive to oust Saddam Hussein would have been unconstitutional, because it was perceived as an offensive military action, which the constitution explicitly forbids (article 26). The absence of a UN mandate was crucial in this respect. Germany abstained militarily and politically from the campaign.237 Germany has accepted that the monopoly on the use of force has shifted to the UN.The issue of retooling the Bundeswehr into a usable instrument for foreign and security policy is emblematic of its current social and political condition – the tools have determined the policy targets. Discussion of the means is about German identity, values and the way Germany uses its power in the world. The trend that has emerged out of the 1990s is that German participation in international crisis management operations is gradually increasing, both in numbers and in substance: 11 September proved to be both a watershed and a catalyst. No government can any longer hide behind old reflexes, and the changes that have been set in motion since unification have been consolidated and cemented. Crucial to the German position vis-à-vis international crisis management are its concerns about the legitimacy of the operation and the risks involved. This is a consequence of a number of factors: the executive operates in a field of political friction. If something goes wrong, scores of nay-sayers will tell the chancellor ‘we told you so’ and attack his policy. The fear of political adventurism is great throughout the political spectrum. Participation in international crisis management operations is perceived as constituting a possible risk to the stability of the political system. The second factor is the power argument: Germany does not have the (power) surplus in the sense of military capacity to deal with a contingency if something goes wrong. Germany thus depends on France, the United Kingdom or the USA for backup. The issue of legitimacy, the third factor, has two aspects. The first, external, aspect is what has been called reflexive multilateralism. Germany will channel its resources and actions through multilateral forums. It will demand a UN mandate to legitimise the action and – in principle – abstain

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Table 7.2 German parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation Germany

Parliamentary involvement (high, low, none)

Initiator (executive or Parliament)

Predominant influence (executive or Parliament)

Before

During

After

First Gulf War

high

low

none

exec.

exec.

Sharp Guard

high

high

none

exec.

exec.

UNTAC (Cambodia)

high

low

none

exec.

exec.

Unprofor (former Yugoslavia)

high

high

none

exec.

exec.

Kfor/Sfor

high

high

none

exec.

exec.

Allied Force (Kosovo)

high

high

none

exec.

exec.

TF Fox (Macedonia)

high

high

none

exec.

exec.

Enduring Freedom

low

2

low

n/k

exec.

exec.

ISAF

high

high

n/k

exec.

exec.

Second Gulf War

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

SFIR (2003/04)

high

n/k

n/k

n/k

n/k

Operation Artemis (Congo)

high

n/k

n/k

exec.

n/k

1

Notes: n/a not applicable; n/k not known. 1

Germany abstained from military support.

2

Considered an article V operation (NATO), for which parliamentary approval was not necessary (Germany contributed special forces to the operation).



if such a mandate is lacking. The constraint of prior parliamentary approval enhances the domestic legitimacy of the action and ensures that Germany will not take part without sufficient political backing and public support. German security policy is thus characterised by a continuous adjustment and conformity. Germany tries to live up to the best of its abilities to the expectations, perceptions and ideas of others. The self-imposed constraints were meant to prevent Germany from becoming a danger to others and from being drawn into a war it did not want (‘no war may ever start from German soil’).

Germany and Italy 205

7.2

Italy We are a people of saints, heroes, improvisers and artful fixers; above all we are cunning. Our cunningness [furbizia] consists in believing that others will take advantage of us if we do not take advantage of them. (Gabriele Calvi, cited in Ginsborg 2001: 95)

Italy stepped into the twenty-first century as a modern and successful European democracy with a high profile in international relations. It has become, to use a well-worn expression, un paese normale. But Italy has come far. From being politically isolated, militarily defeated and economically bankrupt after the Second World War, it has transformed itself into a potent force at the core of European and Atlantic institutions. Since the end of the Cold War, the country has become increasingly assertive in the international domain. It has had a number of foreign policy successes, gaining credibility not only by its high-profile participation in international crisis management operations but also by its active and creative proposals to restore or broker peace in Libya, Algeria and perhaps surprisingly North Korea. Italian aspirations in the international sphere go as far as daring to dream of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Despite these clear ambitions, a number of very real political, structural and geopolitical constraints ‘hobble’ Italy’s quest for a better place under the sun. Many of these constraints follow directly from the post-Second World War settlements, the constitutional arrangements laid down in 1948 and the socio-economic developments in the 1950s and 1960s.238 The post-Second World War settlements constituted key parameters of Italian defence and security policy during the Cold War and to a large extent also after the Cold War. Italy had, of course, no choice but to accept these terms.The enormous effect of the terms imposed on Italian society was to profoundly change domestic strategic culture. Somehow, Italy internalised the constraints; they became as it were part of Italian political culture. Even long after it had regained control over its own territory, Italy conducted a security policy as if these constraints were still in place.When Italy renounced the pursuit of an independent security policy, it became clear that Italy, like Germany, had become a ‘civilian power’.239 Where Mussolini sought an imperial and Mediterranean solution to Italy’s economic problems, the great Italian statesman Alcide De Gasperi sought a European solution. Hence Italy became one of the founding fathers of the European Union. It was able to respond positively to the creation of the Common Market; the influx of American machinery and know-how that came with the Marshall Plan opened up new horizons for many Italian firms; and the end of protectionism, far from signifying catastrophe, revitalised Italy’s production system. Il boom was the fundamental precursor for the complete transformation of Italian society. Ginsborg sketches the pervasive character of this extraordinary process that was affecting all aspects of life: ‘culture, family life, leisure time activities, consumption habits, even the language they spoke

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

and the sexual mores’ (Ginsborg 1990: 239).The turn to Europe is something that lasted; Italians are, according to successive Eurobarometers, among the staunchest supporters of the process of European integration. The various crises that the Italian system had to endure over the years increased the demand for supra-national structures, which were seen as vehicles for repairing the inefficiencies of the system. On the other hand, European constraints were often invoked to justify otherwise unpopular fiscal and monetary measures at home. National interest and ‘fare una bella figura’ Fare una bella figura or ‘to cut a good figure’ is a common and quintessential Italian desire.Whether this desire is also operative in Italian foreign and security policy is somewhat speculative.The information presented in this section may provide substance to the idea that the motives and drivers of Italian foreign policy are in most cases the pursuit of the national interest and fare una bella figura, or both, because in many Italian eyes una bella figura is a national interest.240 During the Cold War, ‘European Union leaders got used to the idea of not having to worry about Italy’s position, simply because it did not exist’ (Lucio Carraciolo). Italy did not need to define its place in the world. It was defined by others.241 It is even fair to say that the First Republic was very much the result of the geopolitical constraints imposed on Italy during the Cold War. Four constraints were particularly significant.The first was the fact that Italy was a front-line state in the struggle against a common and clear enemy. This made it an important ally per se. The second constraint was that Italy was also divided internally (it had an ‘internal border’ dividing the country). The Christian Democrat Party was the party of ‘the West’, while the Communist Party was the party of ‘the East’ (Italy was home to the largest Communist Party in the Western world). Both the Communists and the Christian Democrats were mass parties that dominated the First Republic. The third factor that made and still makes Italy relevant to its Western allies is that it has the Holy See within its borders. The pope is a singular moral and spiritual superpower and is universally acknowledged as such. The fourth factor was the fact that national security was completely outsourced to the USA, hence Italy’s unquestioning loyalty to the USA.This constellation of powers and factors remained applicable until the early 1990s. Italy mattered because of its geopolitical condition, and its place within the international system was very much determined by exogenous factors and constraints. With the end of the Cold War, these constraints changed and Italy was suddenly confronted with the need to take up a position and to define its place and its interests in the international system. This was not an easy thing to do, because Italian postwar history had two important cultural effects: the ‘taboo-isation’ of the nation and the absence of a political culture of thinking in terms of the national interest.The state struc-

Germany and Italy 207 ture of Italy is conceived as a decentralised, unitary state. Article 5 of the constitution reads: ‘The Republic, one and indivisible, recognises and promotes local autonomy; it shall apply the fullest measure of administrative decentralisation in services dependent on the State and adjust the principles and methods of its legislation to the requirements of autonomy and decentralisation.’ There are federalist tendencies, especially in the north; Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord strives for a federal Italy in which the north and the south are conceived of as separate entities within one constitutional framework. Italians in general hold their national government in low esteem, many believing that any government, local or supranational, is better than the one located in Rome. Italians relate to their regional government and increasingly to the European level, but they do not consider the national government a layer of governance that adds value. The national government level was severely discredited in the mani pulite (clean hands) campaign. During the 1990s, Italy gradually changed its posture from being a passive member of the international organisations to actively pursuing its national interests through the UN, NATO and the EU. At the turn of the century, Italy is wide awake and its government surprisingly decisive in the foreign and security policy domain, despite its notoriously fragmented political system, its large, unstable, multi-party coalitions, the constitutional strength of Parliament and the structural weakness of the executive. Since the end of the Cold War, Italy has become more and more active in the foreign and security domain. It has changed its foreign policy discourse, and politicians have not been afraid to use the concept of ‘national interest’ to explain and justify their policies. The changes after the end of the Cold War forced Italy to rethink its foreign policy posture. During the Cold War, it had been a so-called ‘security consumer’ but, after the Cold War, Italy deliberately stepped up its activities and presence in multilateral forums. Since 1990, successive Italian governments have pursued policies that are aimed at reinforcing and functionally linking the different multilateral organisations of which Italy is a member, primarily the UN, the EU and NATO. Important bilateral relations Italy is firmly committed to Europe and works the European circuit as hard as it can, and not without success. In Italian eyes, Germany is the most important European country. Economically, it is deeply integrated into Europe, so a possible split between the Franco-German tandem and the rest would be a catastrophe. Therefore, as a general rule Rome follows Berlin, but Prime Minister Berlusconi does not play only via the centre; he also plays the wings of Europe by developing increasingly good contacts with the UK and Spain. And then there is the somewhat ambivalent relation with France. There is a fear in Italy that France, Germany and possibly the United Kingdom may create a security directorate, should ESDP ever break away from NATO. Italy is a staunch NATO ally and cultivates strong ties with the United States.

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

NATO and the USA assure Italy of ‘a place at the table’ and of the possibility of exerting influence. Italy therefore supports the creation of a pro-US caucus in Europe.242 In the war on terror and the Iraq crisis, Berlusconi has tried to play the role of one of the most reliable friends of the USA, which some observers see as a consequence of the inability to genuinely befriend Germany or France. The rationale is that, if in the event of a crisis Italy is forced to choose between France, Germany and the USA, the ability to lean to the USA is considered a political guarantee against European dominance. Instead of putting all its money and chances on Europe, Italy tries to find its niche in the Anglo-American defence system, although its troops are (technically) not ready for incorporation. Italy’s place and role in the Mediterranean is a hotly debated subject. In the 1980s, Bettino Craxi and Giulio Andreotti took a great interest in the Mediterranean and viewed the region as a distinct geopolitical unit. The Italian ruling class saw the Mediterranean as a vehicle to greater international visibility for Italy. The Mediterranean was a ticket to the world stage.243 At the end of the 1980s, this conviction eroded and died when the crises in the Balkans developed. The Balkans were regarded as the region where the national interest of Italy really lay. The stepping-stone approach no longer held, and Italy started to pursue an international role directly, unmediated by Mediterranean involvement. In general, Italy seeks an international role, not a regional one. It has important bilateral relations in the region, but it does not have a geographical vocation oriented towards the region and does not have a Mediterranean policy. Italy does have very good bilateral relations with Libya for cultural-historical reasons and for economic reasons (energy). It therefore takes an interest in the Mediterranean if and when the national interest dictates that it should do so. This interest has many dimensions: a political crisis in Libya can result in uncontrollable flows of refugees, but it can also hurt Italy’s interests in energy and trade because a substantial part of the oil industry in Libya is owned by the Italian government.244 Basic features of the Italian political system The quintessential Italy is the Italy of the families, writes Luigi Barzini. ‘Italy has often been defined, with only slight exaggeration, as nothing more than a mosaic of families’, and ‘when the interests of the coalition of families coincided with those of the State … Italy seemed to foreign observers to be a solid, efficient and powerful nation’ (Barzini 1964: 214). Crucial to the creation of a solid, efficient and powerful nation is the distribution of power in the political system and the quality of the political arrangements. A central role in this respect is taken up by the Italian constitution, which was adopted after the fascist period, in 1948. The constitution is, according to Italian constitutional specialists, ‘long (139 articles), rigid and programmatic’ (Bindi Calussi, in Maurer and Wessels 2001: 272). It is the result of many compromises and reflects the pluralist character of Italian society. It designed weak

Germany and Italy 209 institutions and strong parties.245 It was believed that the system would work because of the strength and authority injected from outside by the parties. Although parties are not directly involved in policy making, they exert significant influence by appointing ministers, secretaries and chairmen of the boards of public companies and top executives of public bodies. Cotta describes the Italian parliament as ‘a highly polycentric institution not easily amenable to majoritarian decisions and to firm leadership by cabinet’ (Cotta 1990: 76). The president of the republic is at the top of the political hierarchy, but he does not direct government policy; his main responsibility is to ensure the adequate functioning of the constitutional system. He represents the unity of the state and is therefore obliged not to fulfil his office as a party man. The president, who is chosen by Parliament, is not part of the government. The head of the government is the president of the Council of Ministers. He is appointed by the president of the republic and takes office after having obtained a vote of confidence from Parliament. The Council of Ministers, which is in principle a body operating as a collective, is in practice, as David Hine puts it, ‘not an effective centre for policy coordination, the level of collegiality has usually been extremely low, while inter-ministerial competition has always been high’ (Hine 1993: 213). The concept of ‘collective responsibility’ of cabinet members – a sine qua non of a strong parliamentary system – does not exist in Italy. Ministers cannot be held accountable to Parliament for the way public money is used. The prime minister is, at best, a primus inter pares. He is not free to dismiss errant ministers. Ministers can speak their minds freely in public without any sanction, even if they contradict government policy. ‘Leadership has to be reinvented on a daily basis’ according to John La Palombara. Leadership is often achieved through the instrumentality of delegated legislation (legislazione delegata), which authorises the government to draft certain laws. It is now generally acknowledged that the Office of the Prime Minister is too weak and should be strengthened. The Italian constitution disperses power across a range of institutions and contains few provisions that can be used to strengthen the executive. The political system is clearly intended to operate through legalism, mutual vetoes and institutional bargaining umpired by a series of non-partisan institutional guarantors. Parliament has internalised the constitutional values granting it exceptional – almost coequal – power with government on the content and detail of government legislation. Finally, fragmentation of representation in Italy – factionalised parties, divided leaderships, weak and unstable coalitions, powerful backbenchers in Parliament – make it unsurprising that the cabinet is not considered to be an effective centre of decisiveness and policy coordination. The constitution embodies a fairly standard system of representative democracy, based on two houses of Parliament, called the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate of the Republic. The Italian Parliament is based on completely co-equal cameralism. The Senate and the Chamber of

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

Representatives perform identical functions. Government must win and retain the confidence of both, legislation must pass both in the same form, and both have a full range of committees for legislation and for scrutiny and oversight. The original purpose of this was to ensure that the Chamber of Representatives really could perform the checking and revising role assigned to it. The Chamber is elected once every five years by a system of proportional representation based on multi-member constituencies. The Senate, originally elected once every seven years, later reduced to five, is elected on a regional basis through a mixed system of proportional representation and single-member constituencies. The Italian Parliament has a committee-centred structure and is in many ways a working parliament. In particular, vertical committees are empowered, under certain conditions, to adopt laws without a vote in a plenary. The pure proportional system produced a very fragmented party system with at least eight national parties represented in Parliament at any given time, and very little stability. The new electoral system, introduced in 1994, appears not to have reduced the number of parties; instead, the fragmentation seems to have increased.246 In the 1996–2000 legislature period, forty political groups were represented in Parliament under an eight-party government coalition. A classic analysis concluded that the institutional design and certain system effects had greatly reduced the performance and effectiveness of the Italian Parliament (DiPalma 1977).The original Italian system of proportional representation was an extremely ‘pure’ one, allowing small parties, even those with less than 2 percent of the votes, to be represented in the Chamber of Representatives. Such a system has the obvious advantage of safeguarding minorities and accurately reflecting public opinion. However, as was to become ever clearer in the history of the republic, it encouraged the dispersion of votes and made weak coalition government almost inevitable (Ginsborg 1990: 100). Despite these setbacks woven into the texture of the Italian political system, it is evident that the centre of constitutional gravity is with Parliament. Two important issues remain undecided. The first is the role and place of the president of the republic as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. If he is to fulfil his duty as the guarantor of the constitutional equilibrium, he has to be continuously informed. Although the president is informed via the Supreme Defence Council, no mechanism is in place that ensures a coherent and effective flow of information concerning national participation in international crisis management operations from the government to the president. A second unresolved problem is the question of individual ministerial accountability. How can Parliament identify the minister who is effectively in charge of guaranteeing the correct implementation of the formal decision taken by the Council of Ministers? The minister of foreign affairs used to have this task, but more recently and increasingly so, this task is being performed by the minister of defence, which has not always met with the approval of the Council of Ministers. Visible results of the absence of a division of tasks are

Germany and Italy 211 the often contradictory statements of the minister of defence and the minister of foreign affairs on the same subject, while the role of the prime minister in expressing the government’s position in Italy’s external relations is growing.247 Up till now, it has been difficult, if not impossible, for Parliament to hold individual ministers accountable for decisions taken, since the decree has been signed by the president of the republic and submitted by the entire Council of Ministers. The Foreign Affairs Committee When Italy was a kingdom, foreign policy was the prerogative of the king and his government, but the advent of the republic brought Parliament to the forefront, albeit more in theory than in practice, because the government and the Foreign Ministry had retained their ‘hunting rights’ over the reserve of foreign policy. In fundamental choices such as entry into NATO or the EEC, Parliament played an important role and the political parties debated in full. The Farnesina, the Italian Foreign Ministry, has often been tempted to go it alone, and 1972 was a key year in relations between it and the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC). Before that date, the Foreign Ministry dictated the agenda by suggesting items that the committee should discuss (and forbidding others). However, things changed in July 1972, when the committee decided to apply the third paragraph of article 133 of the Rules.248 This meant that the government could now only ask the FAC to delay an issue for a month at most. If the government feels that for political reasons it can give no reply, it must officially state its reasons for not doing so (article 131). If the committee makes full use of its powers, the government could not and cannot leave unwelcome questions unanswered. Concerning the flow of information between government and Parliament, it is obvious that the better the sources of information available to a parliament, the better it will exercise the kind of democratic control contemplated in the constitution. The Foreign Affairs Committee used to be the scene of a posteriori information gathering, discussion and decision but, in order to get a better grip on foreign policy, it followed two tracks: the development of alternative sources of information and enhancement of the skills of its members. Committee members therefore participated in international workshops, met foreign diplomats and politicians and leaders of political groups and joined government delegations (as observers). This led to a situation of ‘continuous oversight over foreign policy, based on an exact knowledge of the facts’ (Cassese 1981: 223). The FAC also played a role in the development of collaboration between the majority and the opposition. This proved to be of great importance for Italy. In the late 1970s, when Italy faced some fundamental decisions in its foreign policy, both the Chamber and the Senate passed similar motions in which all the democratic parties agreed on the four fundamental choices of Italian foreign

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policy: NATO, Europe, the UN and detente. On a more practical plane, the fact that the organisation and practice of the Foreign Affairs Committee were a joint responsibility helped to soften the differences between majority and opposition. Foreign and security policy It is commonly accepted that the changed security environment and postbipolar world have put more pressure on medium-sized powers to shoulder a heavier burden in international security and stability, and Italy has thus tried to live up to this call for more engagement. From being assigned a secondary role in the Cold War, guarding a possible southeastern approach by Warsaw Pact armies, the Italian willingness and capability to take on a heavier burden progressed gradually, from delivering logistic support in the Gulf War to being the main launch-pad for allied air forces during the NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999. The assessment of the geopolitical changes in the Farnesina after 1989 follows a line of thinking that was generally found in European states throughout the 1990s: the unlikelihood of a major East–West confrontation but the likelihood of an upsurge in ethnic and nationalistic tendencies, often leading to crisis and conflict. The latter made the increased exposure of the Italian peninsula abundantly clear. Geopolitically, Italy has found itself in a more vulnerable position since the end of the Cold War, its long shoreline exposing it to all types of illegal immigration from trouble-spots in the Adriatic, the Middle East and North Africa. During the Cold War, Italy refrained from any significant deployment outside its own territory and followed a policy of strict military noninvolvement outside the NATO area until 1981, when it agreed to commit forces to UN peacekeeping missions in Sinai and Lebanon. However, overseas deployments remained limited in scope, totalling only 177 personnel in 1990. This concentration on homeland deployment and defensive missions was reflected in its force structures, in the absence of an ocean-going navy, long-range bombers, rapid reaction forces or training links with former colonies. The 1990s saw a process of gradual, incremental normalisation of Italy’s foreign and security policy. Although Italian politicians still considered the image of a civilian power an important characteristic of Italy, they had no difficulties in changing course as well as the discourse and giving the national interest a central place in it. Currently, the government has defined four missions for the armed forces: (1) to defend the country’s vital interests, safeguarding national integrity and the security of the lines of communication; (2) to protect the Euro-Atlantic space, within the framework of the collective defence of NATO; (3) international crisis management; and (4) to protect the free institutions and assist the nation in case of serious national disaster and on the occasion of other exceptional or emergency situations.

Germany and Italy 213 The Ministry of Defence has identified three priority goals for the short and medium term: 1

2

3

The completion of the structural reorganisation of the armed forces. In the debate on reorganisation two issues stand out: the first is that Italy lacks the resources, political attention and decisiveness required for the successful reform and transformation of the armed forces. There are gaps in the modernisation process of the armed forces as well as in the re-equipment process. The second issue is the severe fragmentation and duplication of the internal structures of the armed forces. Too many staffs, headquarters and commissions are involved in decisions to deploy the armed forces. This fragmentation has a negative effect on the manageability and controllability of the armed forces and hence degrades the power of the chief of the defence staff. The transition from a conscription-based army to professional armed forces. The end of conscription is formally foreseen for 1 January 2007, but Defence Minister Martino is eager to move this date significantly forward (conscription is now anticipated to end as early as 2004). The adaptation of identified critical capabilities agreed upon in European and Atlantic bodies.These include mobility, sustainability, operational efficiency, protection of forces, communication, command, control, information and intelligence.249

An organising principle of Italian foreign and security policy is the fear of exclusion. In an EU context, Italian government officials often refer to the ‘founding fathers’ as if it were a political unit usable in the current political situation. A constant factor in Italian foreign politics is the fear of being excluded from the groupings, collectives and directorates that matter: NATO and the European Community immediately after the Second World War, later the G7/G8 and the various Contact Groups in the 1990s.This fear resulted in a policy in which importance was given to attendance per se in international forums.250 Strangely enough, the results have been remarkably positive, both internationally and domestically. Membership of the EU is the best thing that has happened to Italy in the last sixty years, but the ghost of being excluded came back with full force when President Bush failed to mention the Italian contribution to the war against terrorism (which is substantial), and when Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was allowed to visit the White House only well after the leaders of the Big Three had been received. Italy is a mediumsized power that has some influence in Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East but, as one well-informed observer noted: Italy is once more in the uncomfortable position of being an important but non-essential interlocutor. … Italy’s marginalisation … is actually an old issue with roots in our country’s post-World War II history, in the unbalanced relationship between foreign policy interests (scant) and

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The case studies: a comparative analysis attention to domestic pressures and balances (excessive), and in the precarious national spirit that distinguishes us. (Bonvicini 2002: 3)

The influence of the Vatican on Italian politics The influence of the Vatican on Italian politics cannot be ignored and therefore adds a unique factor to the political calculations of Italy. It is also fair to say that the role and influence of the Vatican on Italian politics has decreased over the years. John Paul II is of Polish descent and does not take the natural interest in Italian (domestic) politics that many of his Italian predecessors did. It is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to make an exact assessment of how the influence of the Vatican results in certain Italian foreign policy choices, because this influence is mostly indirect and often contingent, but Catholic politicians are found throughout the political spectrum, and their values often play a decisive role in a certain government action or decision. Relations between the Christian Democrats and the Vatican go back to the immediate postwar period, when the Christian Democrats relied very heavily on the Church’s profound permeation of Italian society and on its explicit support at election time.The debate on Italy’s entry into NATO was strongly influenced by the statement that Pope Pius XII made over the radio on Christmas Eve 1946. He made it clear that the ‘solidarity of nations’ was justified in guarding against an external threat: ‘A people which is menaced or is the victim of an unjust aggression, if it wishes to act in a Christian fashion, cannot remain in passive indifference’ (Ginsborg 1990: 158). In March 1949, the question was debated in the Chamber of Deputies. A motion put forward by the Christian Democrats to endorse membership gained the approval of almost the entire Parliament. Catholic thinking on international questions has been strongly pacifist and in favour of neutrality. The Vatican used to communicate its position actively to the Catholic community and to support both anti-war feelings and initiatives of civil society, but during the Kosovo campaign the Vatican no longer took such a high-profile public position.This made political life for the Italian government far less difficult, because contesting the moral high ground with the Vatican is a lost battle for any politician. An outstanding example of a political process with a distinct Catholic element is the peace process in Mozambique. In 1994, the two main conflict parties, Renamo and Frelimo, concluded a peace agreement that was mediated by the community of Sant’Egidio – ‘The Trastavere United Nations’ as Lemonde called it.251 Organised as a lay fraternity, Sant’Egidio has close relations with the Holy See and Pope John Paul II. The Italian government supported the peace process materially and politically: ‘it provided travel money and political cover for the participants’ (Hume 1994: 74).The 1994 peace agreement opened the way for a UN operation overseeing the truce (Onumoz). Italy provided the armed forces to back up this diplomatic success and became the de facto guarantor of

Germany and Italy 215 an achievement of ‘second track’ Catholic diplomacy. Italy could also nominate Alessandro Ajello as the high representative of the secretary-general of the UN to oversee the peace efforts. A second example is the crisis in East Timor in 2001, to which the Vatican took an active position, urging the international community to address the humanitarian emergency in which a small Catholic community was threatened.The Italian government responded affirmatively with the deployment of 600 soldiers and parachutists, transport planes and helicopters. Public opinion and foreign policy To what extent is public opinion a factor in Italian foreign and security policy? For a country in which simple answers do not exist, it is impossible to give an unambiguous answer to this question. In any case, the ‘new’ political elite seems to be quite sensitive to mood changes in society. Berlusconi for example has his own weekly poll. An important change that has occurred is that the stability of public opinion has eroded over the decades. Italian public opinion is no longer very stable or very predictable, and it shows extreme mood swings over a short period of time. An explanation for this volatility could be that the dominant cultural, moral and religious ‘mind frames’ of the last decades have disappeared or have lost their powers of inhibition, while the communications revolution has made people more susceptible to manipulation by media bombardments. Three parameters seem significant. The first is that the opinions in Italian society at large do not diverge from the moods, opinions and preferences in the rest of Western Europe. The population at large is in favour of humanitarian assistance missions and UN operations, but at best it doubts the wisdom of resorting to armed force for political reasons (e.g. Iraq). The second parameter is what can be described as the ‘Berlusconi factor’. Silvio Berlusconi is probably the greatest communicator of all postwar Italian prime ministers. Moreover, he has an enormously powerful communication apparatus at his disposal, which he uses with great skill and to great effect. Hence the prime minister is able to take a decision and to communicate it so effectively to the population that public support is instantly building. The third parameter is the influence of the Holy See. The Catholic Church still has a great influence on the Catholic part of society. The position taken by the Church with respect to armed conflicts has been consistent: one of neutrality, refraining from the use of force except in the case of an operation with a decidedly humanitarian character. The Church has been generally supportive of UN peacekeeping operations, but it condemned Italian participation in the First and Second Gulf Wars.252 The chain of command of the armed forces The president of the republic is at the top of the defence hierarchy. He is the commander-in-chief but is not responsible for the use of the armed forces: he

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cannot decide on their deployment. The president’s role is to make sure that use of the armed forces conforms to the constitution. Hence the president must be informed of all decisions concerning the possible use or deployment of armed forces. The constitution provides for the Supreme Defence Council (Consiglio Supremo della Difesa), which is a consultative body empowered to coordinate between the various institutional authorities. Another body is the Office of Military Affairs (Ufficio per gli Affari Militari), which provides a forum for technical/operational consultation. The ministers of foreign affairs and defence are principally responsible for formulating Italian foreign and security policy. The chief of the defence staff (CDS) is responsible for the armed forces from a military, technical and operational point of view. Meetings are usually called on an ad hoc basis. A national decision-making centre (Centro Decisionale Nazionale) has been established to handle crisis management, but this centre is understaffed and provides no more than a skeleton organisation. As a recent study suggests,‘the Prime Minister’s powers should be strengthened to provide him with effective command of the armed forces in the event of war or international crisis’ (Dottori and Gasparini 2001: 53). Considering the interplay between the top echelons of the armed forces and politics, it becomes clear that the armed forces’ chain of command is still too vague. On the side of the government, we find equally vague arrangements: its responsibilities have not been clearly defined. Within the armed forces, the pattern of fragmentation continues. The CDS is the head of a unified joint command and is directly responsible to the minister of defence. The CDS supports the minister of defence in formulating military policy, planning and establishing priorities in the allocation of the defence budget, and ensuring consistency and coherence between the four services (including the Carabinieri). A close observer of Italian defence policy stated that the ‘inter-service logic has not been implemented and has led to a duplication of command structures’.253 ‘The ball game is played within the armed forces’; inter-service rivalry is vicious and impedes a joint approach and a joint output. The absence of an integrated logistics command makes the coordination of logistic support nightmarish. Another factor is the size of the staff of the chief of defence. This has become so large that it has acquired a bureaucratic dynamic of its own. Consequently, it acts more like a filter (some would say obstacle) between the Defence Ministry and the three service staffs than as a centre for integration and coordination. Fragmentation goes hand in hand with the duplication of bodies and structures, both of which are major obstacles to the central command structure. Effective command and control are thus hampered by dispersed and duplicated structures. The use of force and the Italian constitution The Italian constitutional system is conceived for war and peace. The use of force in actions other than war, e.g. international crisis management, present

Germany and Italy 217 both in theory and in practice a constitutional problem. The Italian constitution is unambiguous when it stipulates in article 78 that Parliament declares the state of war and that it will convey extraordinary powers to the government in the case of war. But when no war is declared, Parliament cannot convey these extraordinary powers. The consequence is that the government is compelled to manage the use of force according to peace regulations, a state of affairs that is becoming increasingly difficult to accept. It is left undecided, for example, whether penal war law is applicable. In some cases it has been declared applicable (e.g. for the operations in Afghanistan), but in others it has not (e.g. those in the Balkans), and the soldiers are deployed under peace regulations.The legal status of the soldiers deployed is one of the three major issues in the decision whether or not to participate. The constitutional basis for participation in military operations abroad is found in articles 10 and 11 of the constitution. Article 10 stipulates that ‘Italy’s legal system shall conform with the generally recognised principles of international law.’ Article 11 stipulates that ‘Italy shall repudiate war as … a means for settling international disputes’ but that ‘it shall promote and encourage international organisations’ whose aim is to ‘ensure peace and justice between nations’. With regard to the responsibilities of the executive, article 1 of the law of 18 February 1997 provides that ‘The Minister for Defence … shall act upon decisions in the defence and security sphere adopted by the government, subject to scrutiny by the High Council for Defence, and approved by Parliament.’ Finally, article 81 provides that ‘The Houses vote on the budgets’; if the government wants to add expenditures, ‘the means for covering them must be set forth’.This set of provisions provides the framework in which the various institutions of the republic exercise their powers. In practice, there is no formalised procedure for the precise application of the law. Given the above-described characteristics of the Italian political system and the sensitivity of this type of decision, one would expect decisions to be reached only with great difficulty. In practice, almost the opposite is true. In the sphere of national security policy, the executive has de facto supremacy, which supremely manifests itself in the decision to deploy Italian troops. The use of force in situations other than war must always be connected to international treaties and international organisations. The true power of Parliament is to refuse or accept a treaty. Government decisions are always conditioned by the decisions taken collectively. A minister will say ‘I am executing an international agreement’, implying ‘do not accuse me of committing an unconstitutional act’. However, because international crisis management is not constitutionally regulated, the political practice is not constant but somewhat confused. In some cases, the government will deploy forces without a previous debate in Parliament; in other cases, it will go to Parliament beforehand. Government decisions in general are conditioned rather by political reasoning than by legal arguments. From a political and social perspective, Italian participation in the collective use of armed force is an ambivalent affair. On the one hand, both the political

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centre left and the centre right regard it as a test of Italy’s international reliability and an opportunity to gain and maintain credibility in NATO and EU circles and especially vis-à-vis the USA. On the other hand, great care is taken domestically to prove that such an action is not unconstitutional. This means that the action itself is usually couched in ‘humanitarian’ or politically neutral terms, avoiding terminology associated with war, aggression and force. Consequently, the First Gulf War was an ‘international policing operation’, the Kosovo air campaign an ‘integrated defence operation’ and its domestic legitimacy enhanced because a humanitarian operation (Arcobaleno) was launched in parallel. Rumour has it that American spokespeople were asked not to mention the actual bombings by Italian fighter jets in Kosovo to avoid stirring up a domestic debate.254 Any turn away from the constitution (in whatever direction) is likely to meet with a massive and uncontrollable protest movement. In Italian politics, there is nothing special about the fact that Italy’s international actions must remain within wide margins of the constitution. The national decision-making process At the heart of the decision to participate in an international crisis management operation we find three elements: the decision to participate; the funding of the mission (Parliament has to approve the funding and must renew its approval every six months255); and the legal status of the troops, i.e. whether ‘penal war law’ or ‘peace law’ applies. Both codes were drafted during the fascist era. In Operation Enduring Freedom war law applied, but the troops active in the Balkans are deployed under peace law.The Somali experience made it clear that under peace law the government had no legal instruments to punish/discipline soldiers. War law provides such disciplinary mechanisms. Initially, war law was controversial because it contained the death penalty but, when this clause had been changed into life imprisonment, its application became democratically acceptable. The government communicates its official position to Parliament in a plenary debate in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, usually on the same day. This debate is used by the government to explain the political context of the operation, the mission and the tasks of the Italian contingent, and other known modalities of the operation, including the costs and the legal status of the troops. Parliament uses this debate to put questions to the government, usually represented by the foreign affairs and defence ministers, and, if it is really important, the president of the Council of Ministers. It serves as an occasion to ‘test the waters’ and to develop a feel for the political support in both Houses. If the operation takes place within a UN framework, a majority will usually be prepared to support government policy. If not within the UN, a majority is less certain. The chairmen of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees in the Senate and the House have a special position in the sense that, when the government wants to communicate confidential information, it will use the presidents as its interlocutors. Then it

Germany and Italy 219 is up to the presidents to decide whether or not to pass it on to the rest of the committee members. Usually this happens only in oral form, not written. On a different plane, but nonetheless politically significant, is the experience with the operation in Somalia in the early 1990s.This operation became something of a trauma when Italian soldiers were killed at a checkpoint because of miscommunication with the USA on what line to follow (hard versus soft). Besides, the problems with the civilian population were enormous: warlord Mohammed Aideed used the civilian population against UN soldiers, with the result that Italian soldiers committed cruelties against the civilian population. As a consequence, the Italian government moved out of Mogadishu. Somalia served as a bitter experience, and Italy learned from that. After this operation, the question of the legal status of deployed forces became an issue: first, because the disciplinary mechanisms enshrined in penal war law are considerable and could have been used in Somalia; and, second, in a broader context, the issue of legal status is related to issues like the mandate of the operation, the chain of command and the national ability to influence decisions within the multinational framework. The constitution offers the government an escape or emergency clause to enforce decisions.Article 77 stipulates that: in exceptional cases of necessity and urgency, the Government issues on its own responsibility emergency decrees having force of law, on the same day it shall submit them to the House for conversion into laws. … Decrees lose effect as of the day of issue if they are not converted into laws within sixty days of their publication. This article has become an issue of great contention in the Italian constitutional order, as governments have used it with increasing frequency over the last twenty years. It allows the government to issue emergency executive decrees having the force of law, although they must be converted into regular law by Parliament within sixty days on pain of lapsing. Originally, the Constituent Assembly intended them to be reserved for ‘genuine’ emergencies, but recently their number has grown to well over one a week (Hine 1993: 149).The government uses this emergency clause to pass its decisions to participate in international crisis management operations. The procedure based on article 77 is a simplified one and consists basically of three steps: 1 2

The Council of Ministers deliberates the decision and informs the president of the republic, who authorises the decision. The Council of Ministers puts the decision into a decree, which is signed by the president of the republic. The decree specifies the duration (never more than six months), the resources earmarked for the deployment and the legal status of the soldiers deployed. It also includes a paragraph on the budgetary implications. (It should be noted that the government does not always act in the most expedient manner; a decree may reach

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The case studies: a comparative analysis Parliament while the troops are actually landing in the mission area instead of before they leave Italy.) Parliament debates the decree but must convert the decree into law within sixty days.

The above-described procedure was contested by Parliament, and the Defence Committee passed a resolution committing the government to revise it. Needless to say, the current procedure leaves Parliament emptyhanded and with a bitter taste in the mouth, seeing its powerful position neutralised with one stroke of the pen. It has been a great frustration for representatives to see the government evade the control of the House. On 16 January 2001, the Defence Committee of the Chamber of Representatives approved a resolution setting forth the decision-making process it would like the government to follow.This resolution, the ‘Resolution on deployment of military contingents abroad’ (7-01007), specifies arrangements that will enable Parliament to assume its rightful decision-making role in relation to the deployment of armed forces, especially in the case of international operations. The resolution lays down the procedure for parliamentary oversight listed in Box.7.1. This resolution is an attempt to rationalise the political procedure and codify (elements of) current practice. Although it is a committee resolution, it has the binding power of a resolution adopted by the plenary. Notwithstanding the explicit intention underlying this resolution, it is somewhat less clear and well defined how the procedure will work in actual fact, especially

Box 7.1 Excerpts from Resolution 7-01007 The Committee commits the Government to ensure compliance with the following procedures … : 1. The Government deliberates on any involvement in missions abroad and reports immediately to Parliament (i.e. before a formal decision is taken). 2. Parliament – both Houses or one only, or the relevant parliamentary committees – approves, on the basis of Government communications on the unfolding of the crisis and any initiatives taken … the decisions taken, within a time limit compatible with the international undertakings given. 3. Once Parliament has taken its stance, the Government may either (a) enact by decree the accompanying financial arrangements for the approved measures or (b) submit draft legislation with the same content to Parliament. 4. The Minister for Defence carries out the decisions adopted by Government by giving instructions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Germany and Italy 221 as regards the juncture at which the first communication is delivered to Parliament. It is true that in practice the government automatically consults Parliament. Since any military operation requires funding, the government is obliged to submit to both Houses a decree (a directly applicable law, to be approved retrospectively under the legislative procedures, laying down the limits and the framework of any national involvement) defining the scope and nature of the Italian contribution. This leads to a substantive debate allowing Parliament to scrutinise the choice and scope of the mission, as well as giving it an opportunity to discuss the mission objectives and practical arrangements. The government keeps both Houses informed of developments, very often by reporting to joint meetings of their Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees. Although no formal provision for this system is made in the bicameral system, it is becoming increasingly widespread because it saves time. Naturally it does not enable a document to be put to the vote and is more akin to a lecture followed by a debate. For a motion or resolution to be put to the vote it must be submitted to each of the Chambers separately. For the military mission in the former Yugoslavia, this was the lengthy route that was followed for the political dialogue and scrutiny of the general aim of Italy’s involvement in Operation Essential Harvest. In August 2001, the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of both Houses, in a combined meeting, discussed the broad outlines of the NATO mission without being able to vote. It was not until the end of September that the government laid down the decree authorising Italy’s involvement before Parliament.The Rapporteur, as is often the case, analysed the political content of Italy’s contribution and the part it would play in the Western alliances, expressing regret over the delay to the vote in Parliament, which did not take place until the mission was virtually up and running.The financial implications are spelled out in the decree.As long as no single credit line is allocated exclusively to international crisis management, it is impossible for Parliament to exercise its power of the purse. Crisis management operations are financed out of a credit line ‘unforeseen’. In exceptional cases, e.g. the Kosovo operation, a supplement to the defence budget is made.256 Article 82 of the constitution confers the right on Parliament that ‘Each House may order inquiries into matters of public interest.’This provision is not used in the context of post hoc evaluation of participation in international crisis management operations. Evaluation and post hoc assessment are extraneous to Italian political culture. It is a constitutional precondition for participation in an international crisis management operation that reference is made to an international organisation. The consequence is that the Italian government wants any ‘coalition of the willing’ to act with clear authorisation from the UN (at least with the consent of the UN, if the operation is not a UN mission). Politically, Italy fears that in a coalition of the willing it will be less able to ‘protect’ its national interest in the way it can do via regular institutions. Channels of consultation and information sharing are better established than in a coalition of the willing. Besides these constitutional and political considerations, the concerns voiced in Italian

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Table 7.3 Italian parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation Before the operation

During the operation

After the operation

Government sends notification to Parliament of its intention to participate. Parliament debates this plan. Government submits a decree to Parliament, which debates the decision in principle, the financial implications and the legal status of the troops that are deployed; and converts the decree into law within sixty days.

Government informs Parliament on an ad hoc basis, usually in a joint session of the Defence and/or Foreign Affairs Committees of both Houses.

Neither House engages in a consequent evaluation. Unclear process of accountability.



public opinion are generally negative about such coalitions because they are perceived to be detrimental to the interests of the EU, NATO or the UN.257 The main reasons for reverting to a coalition of the willing were the fundamental differences within the established organisations on how to deal with the Albanian crisis, the risk of entrapment in an ‘inextricable Somalia-type situation’, the scepticism about humanitarian interventions, and doubts about the ability of Italy and Greece to act impartially (Greco 1998: 215). Recent operations Italy’s military participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations began in 1961 in the Congo and reached a peak in 1993–94, when 3,600 troops were deployed under the UN flag. During that year, Italy was the world’s second-largest troop provider, with substantial national contingents deployed in Somalia, Mozambique and Cambodia.258 Participation in the First Gulf War Italy played an active role in the Gulf crisis.259 Its involvement sparked off a debate along two lines: a moral debate on the legitimacy of the use of force and a political debate on the constitutional legitimacy of Italian participation in military operations.The first debate was heavily influenced by the position taken by the Vatican.The second debate revolved around the interpretation of article 11 of the Italian constitution.260 The opposition claimed that article 11 prohibited the country’s participating in military operations of any kind, with the exception of those carried out for national defence. The government, on the other hand, used article 11 to legitimise its action, claiming that the phrase

Germany and Italy 223 repudiating ‘war as an instrument which offends’ supported Italy’s condemnation of Iraqi aggression and its efforts to contain it, while the support for international organisations seeking ‘peace and justice among nations’ mentioned in the same article provided sufficient justification for Italy’s military action within the UN framework. On this basis, the government did not feel it required a declaration of war against Iraq to request Parliament’s approval of the Italian contingent taking part in military operations. This meant that Italy was not going to war but participated in an ‘international policing operation’. This wording was accepted by Parliament and well received by public opinion (most Italians did not perceive it as a collective defence operation but as an operation authorised by the UN). Operation Alba Operation Alba took place at the explicit request of the Albanian government. In addition to this, Italy sought the explicit approval of the UN Security Council. On 28 March 1997, the Security Council, in resolution 1101 (1997), authorised a multinational military and humanitarian mission in Albania, mandating the operation under chapter VII of the UN charter. China considered this to be an excessively broad mandate. It questioned this approach and finally abstained, because it did not consider the threat to be a threat to international peace. The Italian-led coalition of willing member states – code-named ‘Alba’, Italian for ‘dawn’ – deployed in Albania in mid-April. Operation Alba was one of Italy’s shining moments in foreign policy in the 1990s. It gave it credibility while safeguarding its external interests. In the period leading up to the Italian-led operation, Albania nearly collapsed, which caused an exodus of Albanians to Italy. Many ships with illegal immigrants landed on the shore and tried to make their way to Germany, France and elsewhere. This situation caused great social tension and spurred the Italian government into action. Kosovo The Kosovo operation was of vital importance to Italy, so helping stability in the region was a prime national interest. Italy contributed heavily to the various operations and missions. The two most significant contributions were the 2,400 personnel to UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) and the Italian contingent of about 6,000 troops operating within NATO’s Kfor mission under the aegis of the UN. An Italian general, Lieutenant-General Cabigiosu, assumed command of Kfor. Operation Enduring Freedom With regard to the initiatives undertaken following 11 September 2001 to help combat international terrorism, Italy participated within the NATO

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framework. It provided naval forces for Operation Active Endeavour in the eastern Mediterranean, and it participated in the Enduring Freedom operations in Afghanistan. The government recently decided to contribute an additional contingent of about 1,000 Alpini and special troops to Enduring Freedom. Italy also participates in the Euromarfor naval group operation (being carried out by Italy, France, Spain and Portugal) for the surveillance and monitoring of merchant shipping to combat unlawful acts being committed on the high seas, in conjunction with the naval forces of NATO and the United States. SFIR Prime Minister Berlusconi has offered strong political support to President Bush and Prime Minister Blair throughout the Iraq crisis. However, Italy did not participate directly in the hostilities aimed at toppling the Iraqi regime. Instead, it offered the USA and its ally its air space and military Table 7.4 Italian parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions before, during and after the operation Italy

Parliamentary involvement (high, low, none)

Initiator (executive or Parliament)

Predominant influence (executive or Parliament)

Before

During

After

First Gulf War

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

Unprofor (former Yugoslavia)

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

Kfor/Sfor

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

Operation Alba

high

high

low

exec.

exec.

Allied Force (Kosovo)

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

TF Fox (Macedonia)

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

UNMEE

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

Enduring Freedom

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

ISAF

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

Second Gulf War

low

low

none

exec.

exec.

SFIR (2003/04)

low

low

n/k

exec.

exec.

Note: n/k not known.

Germany and Italy 225 bases. Italy has signalled its willingness to become involved in the reconstruction efforts following the hostilities: ‘Italy is ready to send a peacekeeping contingent to Iraq after parliamentary approval’, Berlusconi told reporters during a local election tour in Pescara. Italy participated in SFIR (Stabilisation Force Iraq) with an infantry brigade and took (command) responsibility for one of the governorates in southern Iraq.

7.3

The dominant parliament: concluding remarks

Italy and Germany are what German sociologist Helmuth Plessner called ‘late nation states’.261 The nation came first; it was the nation that created the state, unlike the classic nation-states. This sets them apart from France and Great Britain, where the state dominated the nation. Both Italy and Germany have been vulnerable to the outside world in a geopolitical sense, although in different ways, Germany as a land power with many neighbours, Italy with an extended shoreline exposed to major sea powers. Both countries have been ‘inward-looking’ rather than ‘outward-looking’ in recent decades. And the supremacy of internal, domestic policy over foreign policy is another feature they have in common. Both countries developed after the Second World War into what has been called ‘civil powers’. In this process, a crucial role was occupied by the Italian constitution and the German Basic Law, which are both highly sophisticated as far as democracy and rule of law are concerned. Both countries have been strong advocates of European integration, and during the Cold War both countries relied on NATO for their external security. At the national level, the constitutional issue has a different significance in Germany than in Italy.This is not only a matter of textual differences between the two constitutions; differences in public opinion and in general trends of the two political systems are also driving the diversity. Budget matters seem to be discussed more intensely in Italy. The debate also raised the problem of national interest. Germany defines its interest as the smooth functioning of international institutions, whereas Italy usually upholds a more narrow definition of national interest. After the Cold War, many observers expected a process of normalisation to take place.262 This process was conceived as a gradual development in which Germany especially would shed its multilateral reflexes and pursue its interests in a more direct manner.This has proved to be a highly questionable assumption, not only with regard to the exact meaning of the term (what country is the standard of ‘normality’?) but also with regard to the behaviour patterns to be expected of a normalised Germany. Instead, a process of emancipation of foreign and security policy has started in Germany. This has been driven forward by the debate on engaging the Bundeswehr in out-of-area operations. Italy woke up from a political slumber during the 1990s and started to develop its position in international politics. And the issue of national interest re-entered the political discourse.The Second World War legacy of constraints weighed heavily on German foreign policy behaviour during the 1990s, but

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The case studies: a comparative analysis

Italy’s Second World War history did not impede political developments as much as it did in Germany. With regard to the preconditions for participation, we see the following picture emerge. Both countries are committed to a multilateral approach, Germany primarily to legitimise its actions, Italy primarily to ensure that its resources are embedded in a larger multinational framework. In the 1990s, a clear difference in risk perception came to light. Whereas Germany was highly averse to risk, Italy was not, as became clear, for example, in Operation Alba. But things are changing in Berlin; German participation in international crisis management operations has developed in substance and in style. And the German government has deployed ground troops in Afghanistan and taken the role of lead nation (with the Netherlands). Because of Germany’s and Italy’s heavy reliance on NATO during the Cold War, the two defence establishments have not developed with the speed of the armed forces in the United Kingdom or France. The resource constraints resulting from this deficit are hard parameters in their respective abilities to participate in international crisis management operations. One might be tempted to assume on the basis of the information presented above that the relations between Parliament and government in the two countries have developed along similar, common lines. Parliamentary practice presents an altogether different picture. The Italian prime minister’s voice is decisive, despite the severe fragmentation of the political system and the broad coalition he has to control. The ‘secret of success’ can be partially explained by the use of the emergency clause in the Italian constitution (article 77), which allows the prime minister to decree the freeing of the funds needed for deployment.The German chancellor can hardly have a decisive voice, because he requires the consent of the Bundestag for every deployment of the armed forces and because of the parliamentary culture of ‘cooperative control’, in which he has to work hand in glove with the Foreign Affairs Committee in order to build up enough political support to win the parliamentary vote. Whereas the Bundestag is very forward-looking and imposes a heavy ex ante check on the government, the Italian parliament does not do so. And indeed it cannot do so, because the government coalition majority is usually enough to see the decree through. This is not compensated for by a check ex post. Thus a culture of evaluation does not exist in either German or Italian politics. Recent developments in national parliamentary practice indicate that these omissions may be about to be remedied. In Germany, support is building to increase the powers of the chancellor, while in Italy a growing group of parliamentarians is becoming aware of the changes that are required to involve Parliament in the decision-making process in a more substantive way.

Part III

Comparative analysis and conclusions

8

National preconditions and multinational action

The aim of the next two chapters is to give a factual and comparative overview of the research findings and to explore to what extent these findings can be generalised.This chapter aims to answer the questions of how and why nations precondition their participation in international crisis management operations, as well as to investigate the consequences of that behaviour for the coalition of states and the outcome of the operation.

8.1

Nature and characteristics of the national decision-making process

Political decision making in crisis circumstances is often described as messy, ad hoc and unpredictable. The officials involved often cite a strong preference for informal rather than formalised procedures and channels of communication. The preference for personal, face-to-face contact is a psychological reflex. The first thing that national leaders will do in times of crisis is to seek the opinion of their colleagues, although the position, decisions and expectations of other states and organisations will be taken into consideration when a government must determine what its position will be. In this respect, crisis behaviour does not differ from behaviour in normal times: governments act strategically. Regarding the mechanics or the organisation of national decision making, the differences between the nine states are significant. In the UK, Spain, Italy and France, the government is the dominant actor, while in Germany and Denmark the respective parliaments have a dominant role; the Netherlands occupies an intermediate position. It is very hard to arrive at a ‘best practice’ position, because ‘success’ in foreign policy is a very relative concept.263 When a crisis erupts and the international community is forming an opinion as to whether or not to do something about it, an intricate process of parallel decision making starts in the various countries involved, and all countries that are potential participants will want to exercise their sovereign right to decide whether or not to take part. But as the situation changes, interests may change, which may affect the willingness to participate or shut off certain policy options. Although the mechanics of the national decision-making processes vary greatly between countries, a number of common aspects are present in all of them:

230 •

•

Comparative analysis and conclusions Participation decisions are never all-or-nothing decisions. As opposed to a situation in which a country has to mobilise all its resources in order to defend itself, international crisis management operations are ongoing political processes. The decision to go to war is an all-or-nothing decision. The decision to participate in an international crisis management operation is not. Instead, a country can choose from a wide menu of options. States must decide on the level and intensity of their involvement and balance interests, risks and responsibilities against international demands and expectations. A well-known distinction is that between symbolic and substantive contributions.264 Symbolic contributions are contributions of secondary support, harbour facilities, over-flight rights, financial aid, etc. Substantive contributions are those requiring the deployment of (land) forces. A further differentiation is made here on the basis of the risk that a country takes: the political risk attached to the deployment of a battalion of infantry is far greater than the political risk of the decision to redirect a naval vessel. In both cases, the participating country can put its flag ‘on the line’. Three outcomes of the decisionmaking process can be distinguished: an affirmation leading to a direct military contribution; a qualified affirmation leading to a qualified contribution; and an abstention from participation. Not surprisingly, most decisions belong to the second category. The process of building consensus often follows a growth model. This characteristic is visible in countries with a parliamentary government, although it also operates, albeit to a lesser extent, in presidential systems. The evidence presented here suggests that participation decisions are almost never decisions that can be localised in place and time. Instead, they have all the characteristics of a common ‘growth’ or maturation process, in the course of which the most important stakeholders (government, political parties, Parliament) converge on a shared position.This position will then be formalised by the chief executive. As a result, the road that leads to participation in an international crisis management operation is very often a sequence of partial but significant decisions, changes of opinion or mood swings of the individual actors involved.265 A study by Stern of the decision-making process in France concurs with this view: the [participation] decision is rarely a clearly identifiable decision made at a clearly identifiable moment. It is generally predetermined by a number of earlier decisions which have reduced the range of foreseeable solutions and the framework in which the choice will be made. Once made, the decision applies over a period of time and requires any number of minor decisions to be put into effect. (Stern 1998: 26)

•

Participation decisions are often cascaded. Crisis management operations do not follow a standard script or linear path; on the contrary, ‘every crisis writes

National preconditions and multinational action 231 its own script’. This fluid, changing situation will affect the national contribution, and a government may be forced to take additional decisions as the crisis develops. Every time, a government has to balance and rebalance its interests with the intensity and level of commitment. Participation decisions are taken in a dynamic environment where national and institutional interests may change significantly. A state may simply decide to get involved and then suddenly find itself in a situation in which its credibility or the credibility of the international organisation is challenged. Stakes and interests can change, which can influence the level of national involvement and commitment.An example of a cascaded decision is the following: 1

2

3

The decision to become politically involved (declaratory). This decision can usually be made without any serious political implications or consequences and usually takes the form of a declaration or statement of approval. The decision to commit armed forces. A country can decide to participate in a multilateral force while stipulating that its troops remain under national command.These troops will not then do any shooting; they do not ‘go to war’, and they return home if the situation becomes dangerous or gets out of hand. There is political rhetoric to accompany this decision: show the flag, show international solidarity with the UN, the USA, the cause or the international community, be a reliable ally, etc. The decision to change the conditions of the deployment. The decision to deploy ground troops and whether or not to use military force requires a new political decision. Most often, this is the most difficult decision politically.

As governments act strategically, the national decision-making processes in European states are closely linked (laterally). However, we can distinguish a number of more or less fixed steps or sequences in the process. In the predecision stage, governments will consult each other continuously, always keeping one eye on their domestic audience: Parliament and public opinion. They will face this audience while keeping an eye on ongoing deliberations in the relevant multilateral forums. All the governments involved will address more or less the same issues and go through the same process. When a crisis occurs, a national government is required to formulate a position vis-à-vis the crisis. This often happens under a time constraint and with increased media attention. Because of the dynamic nature of many crises, the national position is subject to change.

8.2

Do participation decisions fit a general pattern?

Evidence from interviews with the officials involved in national decision making in the nine European countries suggests that participation decisions are

232

Comparative analysis and conclusions

made on a case-by-case basis, and usually the uniqueness of each decision is stressed, thus suggesting that any generalisation is impossible. The conclusion seems to be that there is no general pattern for handling participation decisions. Some governments have formally codified this principle, e.g. in a Defence White Paper.The ‘case-by-case’ clause is usually inserted to stress that participation will never be automatic, that the national government retains the sovereign right to decline an invitation to participate. It is evident that in each crisis the facts, circumstances and actors differ and that the specific constellation of the moment is unique. In that sense each crisis is unique. However, the research shows that a national administration will assess or validate a crisis with far less improvisation and contingency than the case-by-case approach seems to suggest. Over the years and even decades of involvement in international crisis management operations, national patterns of assessment and validation have developed. These patterns have ground their way into the bureaucratic system and the national decision-making process. The crisis may be unique, but the model for and pattern of handling the crisis is not. Over the years, national governments and departments have developed a certain ‘crisis template’ that serves as a benchmark for assessing new crises. They have developed – often tacitly and sometimes even unconsciously – a model or image of a ‘perfect’ crisis. Such a perfect crisis is an idealised image (a success model) of a crisis that ‘fits’ the country in question perfectly, i.e. it satisfies all the national preconditions for participation.266 The decision-making process is thus also a matching process; if a crisis is too far removed from the ‘success model’, a bureaucracy will give the advice not to participate. The earthquake that shook Agadir in 1960 is an example of what is considered in EU circles a ‘perfect crisis’, because it would have fitted the preconditions for EU involvement perfectly. Agadir, a coastal town in Morocco, was hit by two consecutive earthquakes, a tsunami and a raging fire in February 1960. The death toll was established at around 15,000. Some EU officials are fond of using this example because it has all the elements that would make an action urgent, important, legitimate and not too risky: the area of operations would be outside the European Union but still very close; a strong sense of urgency would facilitate political decision making; the strong ‘humanitarian’ component would result in immediate and firm political and public support for the operation and the type of units required, and the tasks to be carried out (in general, the policy instrumentation) could be agreed upon without much difficulty. There is one commonality to all crises: they present themselves as a requirement to get engaged. A government must formulate an answer to such a request, and it must decide to what extent and in what form it wants to engage itself. It is true that an established process of governmental evaluation and validation does not point to the establishment of a doctrine or rigid criteria for participation, but it does point to the emergence of a fixed way of organising the political process that allows a government to arrive at a decision that is both thorough and realistic and enjoys enough political support. In some countries, this process is an articulated and explicit political process –

National preconditions and multinational action 233 and is becoming almost a ritual – in other countries it is not; and, as has been shown, the forces to change the process and to make it more explicit and articulate are growing. Participation decisions may revolve around a crisis that is unique, but the political process they generate in a national administration is not unique. Participation in international crisis management operations has become a permanent feature of national security policy. Consequently, national administrations have developed a mental picture or template of a crisis in which the country can ‘make a difference’, i.e. in which the country can make a substantial and successful contribution.The explicit and implicit prerequisites for participation have their place in this tacit frame of reference that is often hidden in the background. The consequence may be that governments will start to react ‘administratively’ instead of ‘politically’ (i.e. that administrators take over from politicians).This is the case when governments – taking their ambition level into consideration – are in fact looking for crises that fit their ‘success model’ instead of judging crises to norms and standards that transcend the national interest.

8.3

How and why do states impose preconditions on their participation?

The actual preconditions for participation formulated by the nine countries differ widely but converge on a number of issues. For the purpose of structure, the findings have been clustered around four recurring issues: national interest and responsibility, legitimacy, risk and popular support. To a large extent these issues overlap. 1

National interest and responsibility. National interest is sometimes considered a vague and difficult concept, hard to articulate. As a result, it has all but disappeared from the security policy discourse in Western European states. Reliability, solidarity and responsibility have become the key words instead.To some extent, the national interest as a concept developed from a rather primitive and transparent material national interest into the abstract, higher-order, opaque, systemic national interest. Obviously, a continuum of direct to indirect interest can be used but, because of the interconnections within the international system, it is often not clear what the long-term effects are and how the national interest will be affected, thus making it quite difficult to articulate the interest other than as the short-term interest.The old adage that small states have small interests is obsolete: small states have a great stake in a well-functioning international system. Globalisation strengthens the stake that governments and people have in the smooth running of the international system. National interest is never merely national in the present context.Thus the burden falling on politicians to state and articulate the national interest in participating in an international crisis management operation is acute and difficult but absolutely necessary.

234 2

Comparative analysis and conclusions Legitimacy.The (perceived) legitimacy of the international crisis management operation in which a country may participate is an overriding concern for all states. This legitimacy has three dimensions that play a significant role in the national decision-making process.267 The first is the external (or international) dimension and refers to the legitimacy of the operation as a whole.This is the (perceived) legitimacy of the operation by the international community at large. The external dimension finds its source in legal norms and international conventions. For the countries in this study, a UN mandate sanctioning the action is necessary and sufficient to fulfil this demand. The UN charter stipulates that ‘armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’. This constraint prohibits nations employing (armed) force unless it reflects the ‘needs, wishes and values of the international community’ (cf. Henrikson 2000: 39). The force of this constraint became clear during the Kosovo crisis. NATO went into action without an explicit UN Security Council authorisation. During the Second Gulf War, France and Germany stayed out of the operation because a Security Council mandate was lacking. During the Iraq crisis, Heisbourg (2002) observed that the willingness of European states to participate in an international crisis management operation is roughly proportionate to the degree of legitimacy conferred by the Security Council, with which my findings concur. The second dimension is the internal or national dimension. This refers to the legitimacy of the operation as it is perceived at home, and the political and public support it generates. Most European states cannot participate without (political) consensus at home. In all European states, the ruling parties and the opposition share the feeling that the (domestic) coalition supporting the decision must be as broad as possible. This dimension finds its source in the adequacy of the reasons and arguments that the political leadership offers to the population to justify its desire to participate.The third dimension is what we will call the process dimension.This refers to the effectiveness or success of the operation and how it is perceived by the people on whose behalf it took place. European states do not participate for ‘fun’ or for ‘good form’.The criterion of a reasonable chance of success has increased in importance over the years. States will make their participation subject to preconditions that enhance the likelihood of success. The cases of Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands illustrate this point: they took part in operations related to the First Gulf War, they contributed significantly to Unprofor and other operations in the Balkans, they contributed to UN peacekeeping missions in various parts of the world, and they deployed military observers. All countries have gone through a process of learning and building up experience at the tactical and operational level. This is reflected in the extensive attention paid to the operational preconditions and requirements in the political debate, including the safety of the personnel involved.268

National preconditions and multinational action 235 3

4

Risk.The understanding of risk as a political concept, the way an ‘acceptable risk’ is operationalised and the way risks are perceived and framed by the respective governments are not yet fully understood.269 Evidently, all governments involved try to reduce the risks attached to the participation as best they can. These risks manifest themselves around two issues: the risk to the lives of the deployed soldiers and that of political or military entrapment. Care for the safety of their soldiers (against mines, hostilities, extraction, etc.) is an overriding political concern of all the governments involved. The political consequences of inadequate force protection are perceived to be direct and profound (the ‘body bag’ syndrome).This type of risk has a technical dimension dealing with good equipment, protective measures, etc., and a political/operational dimension dealing with the mandate, rules of engagement, etc. Most states have learned that the mandate, mission and rules of engagement must be robust but must also have built-in flexibility to deal with a changing situation on the ground, and they therefore favour a robust mandate that allows them to accommodate these changes. The risk of entrapment means that states get involved in an operation and cannot get out, while the situation spirals out of control. Belgium was confronted with such a situation in Rwanda, the Netherlands in Srebrenica. There are roughly two variants of entrapment: physical (or operational) and moral entrapment. Physical entrapment occurs when hostile parties prevent a contingent from leaving its positions; moral entrapment occurs when, for example, no nation can be found to relieve and take over the responsibilities from a particular country; in such a situation, a practical and moral case can be made out for a particular unit to stay longer. In order to prevent entrapment, many states insist on having secured a successor before moving their troops into the operations area. In order to prevent physical entrapment by hostile factions, states may seek additional security guarantees from partner countries, i.e. the USA or big European powers. Risk is in general an extremely important consideration because of the consequences that participation may have for the political leadership at home. If an operation fails, or if many soldiers lose their lives, it may threaten the stability of the governing coalition. Regime survival is thus an issue, not articulated, but very much in the background.The general rule is that any government will try to minimise the risks to its survival.270 One way to manage the risks involved is to retain national control over a contingent, i.e. be able to invoke a sovereign right to unilaterally withdraw troops.271 This often leads to a situation in which a national government imposes restrictions on its ground forces to reduce their exposure to real or perceived threats. Popular support. Obtaining and sustaining popular support for the decision to participate in an international crisis management operation is very important for any government. Based on the evidence presented here, it is clear that public opinion is generally far more sensible than

236

Comparative analysis and conclusions many politicians give it credit for. Theoretically, three popular positions vis-à-vis participation can be distinguished: for, against and indifferent. The traditional view is that public opinion on foreign policy issues is indifferent, but this is changing because nowadays the general public is better informed than ever before, with the media playing an increasingly important role in framing the information as it is presented. Governments differ in their conviction as to whether public opinion can be made. The governments of the United Kingdom and France are of the opinion that leadership will create the necessary popular support. The public relations machinery of the British prime minister is famous, and President Chirac is more concerned about his relations with the public than with the Assemblée Nationale. However, there is a limit; public opinion cannot be made into whatever politicians want it to be. The public needs to be convinced, which requires good argument and excellent communication skills. Most governments are aware that public opinion can become a force that can push them into a conflict ‘from behind’. Not all governments have translated this basic political premise into action by creating an effective information apparatus. There is also a structural explanation for this difference, as the impact of public opinion on the national decision-making process may be related to the type of government. In countries with a coalition-type government, public support is considered less ‘makeable’ than in the United Kingdom, France or Spain. Consequently, public opinion seems to have a greater impact on the national decision-making process in Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway than in the UK. Coalition governments ‘fear’ public opinion more than do presidential systems, because they have less control over it.272 It seems to be the case that coalition parties do not permit the leader of the coalition to appear as a leader or statesman. The most important relations for the government to maintain are the relations with its coalition partners and with Parliament, not with the public. Unlike the British prime minister or the French president, the coalition leader does not have a direct, personal relation with the public.

Why do governments precondition their participation? We have looked at national participation in international crisis management operations from the perspective of the preconditions that a country imposes on the collective effort.The national decision to participate in such an operation is a choice made within constraints, which jointly determine the outcome of the decision.273 Common sense suggests that it is always preferable to have more options than fewer, better to have more knowledge than less, but sometimes it is simply the case that less is more, that states and people actually benefit from being constrained in their options. Using a different lens

National preconditions and multinational action 237 to look at national preconditions, the following distinctions can be made: (1) there are constraints that are imposed on a government from the outside, e.g. by a third party or the international organisation to which it belongs; (2) some constraints are facts of life, e.g. the geographical location of a country; and (3) some constraints are self-imposed, i.e. some preconditions are formulated in such a way that they become constraints deliberately cutting off options from the menu of choice. A self-imposed constraint is one to which a state adheres without being forced to do so by other states or by a fact of life. The strict interpretation by the German government of its Basic Law up to 1994 is a good example of a self-imposed constraint. This constraint precommitted Germany to abstaining from participation in military operations ‘out of area’. A country may, for example, alter its national decision-making procedure by imposing the rule that from now on it will consult Parliament, or even seek its consent, before making a decision. Other self-imposed constraints can affect the type and volume of the policy instruments a country has at its disposal, or the ambition level it aspires to in the international domain. There are also constraints inspired by budgetary considerations, selfimage and a sense of what is desirable and sustainable, but all of these are relative and dynamic phenomena. Their value or weight is relative to the circumstances. A certain precondition that has been imposed as absolutely vital does not play a role in another situation.Actually, very few constraints are fixed in the sense that their value or weight does not change or change only very slowly, for example the size of a population or the fact of being landlocked. For every participation decision, a unique constellation of preconditions and constraints emerges. The uniqueness is caused by the specific value that is given to each of the preconditions in that particular case. In another decision we may find the same preconditions, but their relative value will most probably have changed. Even the list of preconditions does not necessarily remain the same, as some constraints drop off and new constraints may be added in this particular situation.274 This overview provides us with a first-level answer. Governments impose preconditions on their participation because they seek to ensure a clearly defined national interest; that the operation enjoys external and internal legitimacy; that the risks involved are minimal and controllable (and thus acceptable), both with regard to the deployed soldiers and the political ramifications if things go wrong; and that the population is behind the government. The terms ‘precondition’ and ‘constraint’ have been used interchangeably throughout this book. A precondition is a constraint in the sense that a government constrains itself to such options as will sufficiently satisfy the precondition. The precondition of a UN mandate is a constraint in the sense that a government excludes all options in which there is no UN mandate from the set of feasible options. Common sense informs us that constraints are negative (‘more is better’), hence imposing preconditions or constraining yourself entails certain costs. Jon Elster describes at length the effects of constraints and pre-commitment in constitution making and the

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Comparative analysis and conclusions

creation of works of art.275 According to Elster, imposing constraints will entail three main costs, namely loss of flexibility, loss of spontaneity and loss of decisiveness: the first loss is linked to the need for exceptions, and for a way of distinguishing them from merely unconstrained behavior. But the lack of flexibility may also be so severe as to induce a move to abolish the constraints entirely. … Loss of spontaneity is especially important in the arts, where a genuinely powerful imagination may find it intolerable to be shackled by rules. … Finally, the constraints may be so tight as to leave little room for action and innovation. (Elster 2000: 279–80) Applied to foreign and security policy, the cost of reduced flexibility and reduced decisiveness is very recognisable. Being formally bound by Parliament or a political convention to build consensus possibly reduces the number of options that are available to a government. Of the countries researched for this study, only three chief executives are not or only marginally constrained by domestic political arrangements: the president of France, the prime minister of the UK and the prime minister of Spain. The art of politics is often the art of the achievable. Many political solutions require imagination and creativity, especially in international crisis management. Constraints on the types and availability of policy instruments may prove an obstruction to genuinely creative solutions and approaches. In the foreign and security policy domain, the loss of spontaneity is not perceived as a loss, especially by parliamentarians. MPs usually emphasise the ability to prevent the government from embarking on politically adventurous actions. But how does this work out in the case of self-imposed constraints? In other words, why should a government intentionally and deliberately want to reduce its options? From the case studies, it becomes clear that a benefit derived from a self-imposed constraint is enhanced self-protection. It prevents a government from political adventurism, from being drawn into the wrong fight. Elster explains why these self-imposed constraints may also generate certain benefits for an actor. People, and governments, bind themselves because ‘they may want to protect themselves against passion, preference change, and (two varieties of ) time inconsistency’ (ibid.: 1). Some constraints are chosen explicitly because of the expected benefits. Their effect is to ‘remove certain options from the feasible set, by making them more costly or available only with a delay, and by insulating themselves from knowledge about their existence’ (ibid.). This mechanism also operates in politics; consider for example the governments that are constitutionally or politically bound by Parliament. In Germany and Denmark, a constitutional provision is laid down, in the Netherlands and Norway, the government is bound by a political custom (or convention). In Belgium, consensus building takes place in the so-called ‘core

National preconditions and multinational action 239 cabinet’, where the prime minister with the vice prime ministers from the coalition partners have to arrive at a common position.276 Parliaments that have a say in the decision may demand all kinds of guarantees before they will consent to a certain position. This set-up can be seen as a democratic safety device protecting society against an over-ambitious, over-zealous or over-passionate government, but also against unreasonable or unwise international demands. It prevents a democracy from becoming involved in ‘the wrong war for the wrong reasons’. A government may be constrained in its flexibility and decisiveness because the executive is precommitted, in which case the benefit is that an elaborate decision-making process serves as both a democratic check and a tool to create political support for the decision. By pre-committing itself, a government may limit the scope and dangers of political adventures. States may pre-commit themselves against actions out of anger (e.g. the US government after 11 September), but they can also pre-commit themselves in anger in order to get what they want. Article V of the NATO treaty is in that respect the most famous example of such a pre-commitment.Viewed in this light, the benefits of self-imposed constraints can be subsumed under two broad categories: 1

2

There is enhanced legitimacy of participation. An elaborate process of consultation and information exchange enables the government to rally political support and thus to ensure a broader political basis. In the parliamentary process, the levels of risk and uncertainty play a central role. Constraints will be imposed to reduce the risk and uncertainty levels, which in turn will contribute to democratic stability and executive survival.

Overall, self-imposed constraints serve as tools that have a stabilising effect on democracy. Mechanisms of change The research findings allow us to distinguish between at least four different mechanisms by which preconditions are articulated and validated. That is the pattern in which the relative value of a precondition changes: 1 2

3

Adjustment. In this mechanism, the tools determine the (policy) targets, and policy goals are adjusted to the means available for achieving them. Adaptation.277 This is a process of self-adjustment. States adjust their policy to their environment and changing circumstances. Small states are great adapters, because the only possibility for bending the rules is to be conceived of as a ‘special case’ requiring a status apart from others. Conformity.278 This mechanism consists of a process of free but forced adjustment, the perceived need to realign national policies with the expectations, perceptions and ideas of others. This can explain why states

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4

8.4

Comparative analysis and conclusions ‘pay up’ despite the absence of any national interest. Germany conformed to international demands during the Gulf crisis and paid up, against its will and against legitimate concerns and involvement in Central and Eastern Europe. Conformity is a kind of adaptation. Small states are often made to conform. States act out of their dependency on powerful allies. Cast in alliance dependency terms, we speak of ‘entrapment’: states are forced to contribute because they depend on allied states. The contribution is determined by ‘how little’ a state can get away with. In a ‘moral’ alliance, states have to reckon with international public opinion, which can manifest itself in various ways, ranging from the ‘do something general’ syndrome where public opinion demands action, to the very complex situation of neutral states, which have to reconsider their neutrality. States may also be compelled to participate in order to prevent political embarrassment.‘Entrapment’ is often twinned with the notion of ‘abandonment’: you are abandoned by allies. In a moral alliance, states may face political isolation: opting out will lead to political isolation and, ultimately, abandonment. Compensation.This mechanism is based on the assumption that in addition to promoting and safeguarding their national interest, states seek (international) recognition. Status, reputation and a nation’s position in relation to other states are important and do play an important role. The problem is that this aspect is difficult to quantify and difficult to gauge as a motivation. An indicator is the importance that countries attach to statistics giving an overview of for example the number of blue helmets deployed over a given period. Politicians cite these statistics and use them as arguments in political debates, as parliamentary records in many countries show. For the notion of (international) ‘recognition’ we can build on the work done by others. Wendt for example cites ‘collective self-esteem’ as an important element of national interest (Wendt 1999: 236). The point to be made is that if states do not get recognition in one sector (e.g. the security domain), they will try to compensate for this lack of recognition in another (public) policy sector. Since it is difficult for small and medium-sized states to gain recognition in the international security policy field, a number of states have become champions of development aid and international assistance. Denmark and the Netherlands are relatively modest contributors in the security sector, but they are giants in the development aid sector.

National preconditions and the consequences for multinational action

We have shown that some national constraints are self-imposed and can serve as a protection device for democracies.These self-imposed constraints revolve around the notions of a maximum acceptable risk level, a minimum level of legitimacy and a justification of the costs and the risks. Countries will try to

National preconditions and multinational action 241 manage if not control these levels, and they will use the leverage they have to induce the collective of states to generate the required levels for them. Evidence from the nine countries suggests a rough correlation between ‘interest’ and ‘risk’.When an operation is ‘low’ on national interest (e.g. when the interest is indirect), a government can withstand only relatively low risk levels (the instruments it can use and the roles it can perform are limited). When an operation has a ‘high’ national interest, a government can sustain more risk (i.e. it can use all instruments and all types of armed force). The question we seek to answer now is the consequences of nations imposing preconditions on their participation for the effectiveness of the collective, or coalition of states.The imperative of cooperation has been elaborated in Chapter 3: for meaningful and effective action, European states have to cooperate, because unilateral action is impossible. It was also asserted that, in most cases, international crisis management is dictated by the logic and necessity of an intergovernmental approach, conducted by groups of nations that have voluntarily agreed to participate. The preconditions and constraints described above are generally articulated before an operation takes place. It has led us to the conclusion that, taken together, they determine the scope of a national government contemplating participation. However, governments wish to remain in control of the national contingent, and they place constraints on their troops during an operation.279 These preconditions take the form of constraints that are placed on the use of troops in the field. During Unprofor, nine of the sixteen participating countries with troops on the ground imposed constraints on the use of their forces.280 For Unprofor, we identified four types of constraint: (1) constraints in time, e.g. units can only be deployed during the daytime; (2) constraints in space, e.g. units can only be deployed in a predetermined geographical area (e.g. not outside the Ground Safety Zone in Kosovo); (3) constraints concerning the tasks, e.g. units can only execute predetermined (mandated) tasks; and (4) constraints regarding the types and use of weapons, e.g. prohibition of the use of cluster bombs in the Kosovo air campaign. The negative impact of such constraints on the overall effectiveness of the collective effort is profound. Force commanders are obliged to find (more than creative) solutions to deal with them and are seriously hampered in their work of directing a crisis management operation. Although constraints on a participation reduce the uncertainty and risk and compel an organisation to look at the problem from different angles, the resulting restraints on the design and effectiveness of a coalition are considerable.The number of options at the aggregate level is reduced because it is hard to arrive at a common solution or approach when countries, though willing to play their agreed part, are willing to do just that and no more. A negative impact is also felt on the degree of flexibility at the aggregate level. Fierce negotiations will take place to get the mandate agreed, but this exercise is often a two-level game. The demands of the situation have to be balanced with national requirements and domestic concerns.This often leads to a narrow mandate, with little scope

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Comparative analysis and conclusions

for accommodating changes on the ground. And once the mandate is agreed upon and the situation changes, it is not easy to get another mandate that has been adjusted to the changed situation. The situation on the ground often changes more quickly than can be codified in political mandates. Thus if the national mandate is defined too narrowly and the country is not willing to do more, deadlock will quickly develop. A government may, for example, have the approval of Parliament to deploy forces to conduct humanitarian tasks, but it does not have the liberty or the flexibility to quickly change the tasks of the deployed unit in order to respond to changes on the ground.The government must first go back to Parliament and obtain its consent for a change of mission. Risk management is a crucial concern for countries involved in crisis management operations. Small states will therefore seek intra-coalition security guarantees, usually in the form of bilateral agreements. These agreements relate to force protection, guaranteed medical evacuation, back-up in case of escalation, a viable exit strategy, and a guaranteed date of relief.These guarantees can only be given by the big powers. In Europe, only France and the United Kingdom are capable of giving that sort of back-up. This concern is likely to lead to the creation of a ‘strategic reserve’ of some sort that is ready to act as an immediate back-up for forces already involved in an operation.

9

The relation between government and Parliament

The more democratic a system is and the more representative of domestic interests, the more it emphasises roots rather than horizons. There is no deep or widespread constituency for international ties, which nevertheless exist. The risk in these conditions is that the cost of an interdependent world will exceed the benefits. (François Duchêne)

The relation between the national government and Parliament is crucial, because in many cases the preconditions for participation are here articulated and validated. This relation has been compared for three consecutive stages: during the decision-making process; during the operation; and after an operation. This relation can only be adequately assessed if all three segments are taken into consideration. However, scholarly and political attention has concentrated on parliamentary involvement in the decision-making process, but post hoc evaluation by Parliament is as democratic a check as a forwardlooking round of consultations by the government. As to the reasons why parliamentary involvement should or should not increase, the interviews have yielded a fair indication of the current reasons and arguments. The argument against more parliamentary involvement revolves around a – real or perceived – inability of Parliament to handle confidential information and arrive at a common position quickly. Proponents of more parliamentary involvement are of the opinion that participation decisions, although they are being taken more frequently than before, are (have remained) exceptional political decisions that can only be taken with the broadest political and public support possible. Thus an exceptional arrangement structuring the relation between government and Parliament is required. A second reason supporting this claim is the (lack of ) legal protection of the soldiers involved. Parliamentarians from a number of countries, but especially France and Italy, perceive the protection of the soldiers involved in international crisis management to be inadequate, especially when there is no political consensus on the deployment of the troops. National legal systems are adapted to peace (or war) situations, but a legal framework for crises is lacking. Both commanding officers and soldiers are called to testify before the

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Comparative analysis and conclusions

International Criminal Court, which has an increasingly negative impact on the functioning of soldiers on the ground. Budgetary considerations are mentioned as a third reason. The cost of participating in international crisis management operations is often taken straight from the defence budget. The problem faced by many countries is a structural cost overrun, which impinges on normal management and operational processes. A fourth reason for involving Parliament more is that of enhanced policy coordination. Crisis management operations often require military and civilian instruments to be employed in a coherent and coordinated manner. Although this concept is accepted by all Western European states, not all of them have made the necessary arrangements for enhanced policy coordination. Parliament, when overseeing the actions of the government, is confronted with this gap in policy coordination between the various departments. Parliament, and especially parliamentary committees, can play a role in facilitating interdepartmental coordination.

9.1

Binding the government

Parliamentary involvement in the national decision-making process is determined by constitutional arrangements and parliamentary practice. Parliament can bind the government in various ways and at various moments in time. Parliamentary involvement in the decision-making process falls roughly into four categories: Parliament must give its formal consent (Denmark and Germany); Parliament must be consulted (Norway and the Netherlands); Parliament is usually consulted and may take a vote (Italy); or Parliament must be informed only after the government has taken a decision (the UK, France and Spain). Of all the countries reviewed, in the overall score, the Assemblée Nationale has the least influence (‘its absence is quasi-total’) on security policy decisions, and the German Bundestag and the Danish Folketinget have the most. In Spain and the UK, the political pressure to adapt the system is growing most rapidly.281 Parliamentary involvement during the operation is usually limited to information sessions. Indicative is whether these sessions are pre-structured in the sense that the government supplies Parliament with relevant operational information on a given date. Parliamentary involvement in the (post hoc) evaluation process of the decision and action can take the form of an independent inquiry and report. The case studies show that parliamentarians are preoccupied with their involvement and in the decision making and far less on their involvement in the ex post evaluation. The irony, evident in the Belgian and Dutch cases, is that ex ante involvement is not always the most effective way of controlling the government; quite often, a consistent and consequent follow-up of decisions and actions yields more and better results. Moreover, most parliaments are already empowered to conduct (independent) and formal evaluations, but they fail to exercise these powers properly. Instead, parliamentarians complain about the lack of involvement in the decision-making process and seek other

The relation between government and parliament 245 ways to secure influence on the decision itself. One way is to narrow the mandate down as far as possible, allowing only very small margins for flexibility.The consequence is that governments have to go back to Parliament for approval of each and every change of mission. Another option is to allocate the budget in only very small tranches, with the same result. Taken together, parliamentary involvement in the decision-making process and the post hoc evaluation provides a good indication of the level of democratic control that exists in a country over the decision to participate in an international crisis management operation. The debate on parliamentary involvement is in some respects an ordinary battle for power and influence. Evidence from the countries under consideration shows that, with some exceptions, parliamentary involvement is increasing. In some cases, this has led to a change of the rules governing the decision-making process, but in some cases (e.g. France) nothing has changed. But even in France, the UK and Spain, the pressure to change the rules and to involve Parliament more is increasing. In countries with a coalition government, parliaments are binding their governments increasingly tightly. The effects of too loose and too tight parliamentary bounds have been indicated. Too much parliamentary involvement may lead to a fatal loss of executive flexibility and indecisiveness on the side of government, while too little parliamentary involvement may lead to undemocratic practices and political ‘adventurism’. Although it is very difficult to establish an exact ‘optimum’ in the tightness of the parliamentary bounds, a certain balance can be obtained, Table 9.1 Relative levels of parliamentary involvement in the decision-making process and evaluation Country

Parliamentary involvement in decision making

Parliamentary involvement in evaluation (ex post)

Belgium

low

low

Denmark

high

low

France

low

low

Germany

high

low

Italy

medium

low

The Netherlands

high

high

Norway

high

low

Spain

low

low

United Kingdom

low

medium

Note: A low level of parliamentary involvement does not mean an undemocratic decision-making process. In some cases, Parliament chooses not to be involved, e.g. in Germany. 

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Comparative analysis and conclusions

i.e. a certain combination of parliamentary bounds (ex ante and ex post).282 A parliament that concerns itself with too much operational detail may become counterproductive. Consider the following example. During the deliberations for the deployment of army units to Bosnia-Herzegovina under the framework of Unprofor, the Dutch parliament was very vocal in emphasising the peacekeeping nature of the operation and insisted that the government should keep the armaments (weapons) of the unit non-provocative. Hence all heavy weapons (machine guns, mortars, etc.) were removed from the armoured personnel carriers, and the composition of the force was kept ‘light’.283 The consequence was that the unit, when the violence escalated and it had to use force in excess of self-defence, was severely handicapped in defending itself, protecting civilians and achieving its objectives. The unit had to fight with ‘one arm tied behind its back’, as one observer described it (de Wijk 1998).

9.2

Obtaining and sustaining political support

During the 1990s, there was a remarkable consensus among political parties in Western European countries regarding the merits and desirability of international engagement and participation in peacekeeping operations. In most cases, this was the consequence of wholly different motives pointing – often by coincidence – in the same policy direction. Humanitarian motives and realist arguments reinforced the desire to get involved.As the post-Cold War period is nearing its end, this consensus is thinning. The humanitarian content of current operations is less evident, making it difficult for some political parties (usually left-wing) to sign up to a programme of international activism. Increasingly, governments find themselves in a situation in which they have to look for new ways to build political support as it is no longer a political given. The number of actors involved in the decision-making process is increasing, and the research shows a general trend towards attaching increasing importance to obtaining and sustaining broad political support for any participation decision, mainly due to the fact that often a country only has an indirect interest in the operation and needs to justify the risks and costs. How national consensus is reached depends on the political system and tradition. Roughly three ways of achieving consensus can be distinguished: 1

2

3

Consensus by decree. The chief executive or head of state decides and enforces his decision on the political system, and the opposition is left out on a limb.This system operates in its purest form in France and Spain and to a lesser extent in Italy. Consensus by convention. The prime minister decides and has the majority in Parliament, the opposition is informed and because of an existing political convention supports the line of the government (the UK). Consensus by consultation. This means that the government must get the main coalition parties and preferably the most important opposition party(ies) to support its position. This system is followed in Belgium,

The relation between government and parliament 247 Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. All countries have highly developed informal contacts between the government and the political parties. An interesting difference between Belgium and the Netherlands as opposed to the two Nordic countries is that both Belgium and the Netherlands build consensus in a relatively transparent way. The Netherlands has also complemented the informal circuit with a formal and open debate, in full view of the press. The Foreign Affairs Committees of Denmark and Norway meet behind closed doors, and no minutes are made public. As consensus is ‘produced’ in various ways, one can only speculate about the relation between the method of building consensus and its sustainability, or ‘hardness’. Is it so that consensus by decree is softer, less easy to sustain when the situation deteriorates and thus becomes more prone to erosion under duress than consensus obtained after considerable consultation? The relation seems to be that, when the interests at stake are less direct, the executive must have greater support for its participation. And this support must be articulated. A second aspect is the issue of who must be brought into the consensus. The traditional conviction seems to be the government and the main political parties. The committee structure seems adequate to achieve this, as the cases of Norway and Denmark suggest. On the other hand, the effects and impact of the media, the participation of the public and the increasing impact of the trade unions – and concerned families – suggest that the group of stakeholders in the decision process has extended beyond the government and the main political parties. If this is true, then a closed committee meeting is not the right instrument for building a sustainable consensus.

9.3

Does the national decision-making process improve if preconditions are formalised?

Does it matter if preconditions are formalised? That is, does the quality of the decision-making process improve? The countries under consideration in this study have formalised the preconditions for participation to varying degrees, which is why this question became relevant. The criteria to measure the quality of decision making include (executive) decisiveness, thoroughness, transparency and accountability. Based on the evidence from the nine states, this question can be answered in the affirmative (due to both direct and indirect or side effects). In Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, the preconditions for participation have been spelled out, but they have been formalised to varying degrees. Norway has formulated and formalised the elements for such a framework over the last ten years but has never integrated them into one comprehensive framework. In Denmark, the Defence Commission of 1997 identified a number of political and military factors that ‘shape Danish participation’. The Danish parliament adopted this report in 1998 but failed

Table 9.2 Parliamentary involvement before, during and after an operation Country

Involvement in decision making (ex ante)

Level of information 1 during the operation

Involvement in evaluation (ex post facto)

Belgium

Decision is taken by the core cabinet. Parliament is usually informed after the decision has been taken. Parliament may conduct hearings and file oral and written questions.

Oral and written questions. Government informs Parliament on a need-to-know basis (irregular intervals).

Evaluation is conducted by the government (concentrates on operational aspects). Parliament can pose oral and written questions. No 2 political evaluation.

Denmark

Decision is taken by the government, but Parliament has the right of formal consent. The FAC (Nævn) is heavily involved but meets behind closed doors.

The FAC is briefed when necessary.

The government evaluates and produces an internal document. No political evaluation takes place.

France

The decision is taken by the president. Parliament is not involved.

Parliament receives sketchy, incomplete and irregular information.

Government evaluates. Parliament is not involved; no political evaluation.

Germany

The government takes decision, but Bundestag has right of formal consent. The Auswärtige Außchu (FAC) has ‘cooperative control’.

Oral and written questions, debate. Parliament is very well informed.

Government evaluates. No political evaluation.

Italy

The government decides. Parliament must sign a ‘decreto legge’.

Not involved.

Evaluation process is unclear. Parliament is not involved, and no political evaluation takes place.

The Netherlands

The government decides, but Parliament has the material right to consent. Parliament organises independent hearings if necessary. Oral and written questions. Debate and a vote, if required.

Regular briefings by government. Oral and written questions. Debate.

Government evaluates. MFA/MoD send formal evaluation, which is debated in Parliament. Parliament can conduct independent hearings or inquiry if required.

Norway

The government formally decides, but parliamentary consensus is an absolute requirement. The FAC (‘the Extended’) is heavily involved but meets behind closed doors.

Briefed by the government when necessary.

Government evaluates. No political evaluation.

Spain

The president of the government decides. Parliament is usually not involved or consulted but is informed after the decision has been taken.

Parliament is briefed when necessary.

Evaluation unclear. No political evaluation. Parliament not involved.

United Kingdom

The prime minister decides. There is usually a debate in the Commons, and in exceptional cases a vote on a substantive motion takes place. Main parliamentary instrument is the weekly question time.

Debate in the Commons, question time.

Government evaluates. Parliament (HCDC) conducts independent evaluation (‘post mortem’).

1

Notes: The regularity of the briefings is also considered, i.e. whether they follow a fixed timeframe (e.g. every six months). 2



As opposed to the military-technical evaluation, which is carried out by all MoDs.

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Comparative analysis and conclusions

to bind successive governments to the document. The status of this framework is unclear, and it does not play a significant role in the political debate. In Belgium, a review framework of preconditions was drawn up, formalised and adopted by Parliament but fell into disuse. It is only in the Netherlands that such a review framework of preconditions is actively used and constantly revised. The Dutch Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry found that, if these preconditions are formalised and placed in a coherent framework, such a framework is an instrument that helps to build common ground among all stakeholders in the decision-making process, not only among decision makers. Other stakeholders are the members of the armed forces (sometimes represented by their unions), their relatives, and the general public. Providing a structured way of getting information into the public domain gives both the public and the press the opportunity to reflect and to comment on a potential participation. This will feed the necessary public debate. An important side effect of the use of the review framework is that it is used by different categories of people for different purposes at different times. The administrations (civil and military) want to make sure that they are building a strong case and that a thorough decision is being made.‘Thorough’ in this context means based on the best information available and looking at the question from every possible angle. The cabinet ministers who have to defend the government decision in Parliament use the review framework to explain and justify the grounds on which the decision was made. In their case, the framework is used to enhance the transparency of the government’s decision process. Parliamentarians have an interest in safeguarding the integrity of the government and the accountability of ministers. From the parliamentary debates, it has transpired that parliaments use the framework to analyse and scrutinise decisions that have been made and as an instrument for enhancing the process of ministerial accountability. Broad public support is increasingly a crucial ingredient in the whole mix of arguments, reasons and conditions for participation. Having a review framework in place, parliamentarians know where and what to look for and are in general able to obtain better information. Finally, such a framework improves the ability to learn and remember, because the procedure and time for evaluation have been predetermined. People and organisations have a distinct ability to forget, and the lessons of history are kept alive only in institutions (Jean Monnet). An institutionalised evaluation function, making politicians aware in advance that their decisions and actions will be evaluated on the basis of the information they have supplied, ensures that the right lessons are learned from past actions and are remembered. Does more parliamentary involvement lead to risk-averse decisions? More parliamentary involvement in the decision to deploy armed forces in international crisis management operations has in most cases led to more and

The relation between government and parliament 251 better consultations, placing parliaments in a better position to influence their governments and the quality of policy making. But at what price does this improvement come? Has the decisiveness of the government been reduced structurally? It is impossible to answer with a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but a trend can be identified. First, it must be realised that international crisis management was a relatively new phenomenon until the mid-1990s. Many governments were, up to a point, ignorant of the possible risks involved in international crisis management. Second, the role of the media in framing and communicating risks increased enormously during the 1990s. The perception and acceptance of what constitutes an acceptable risk level differ greatly between the nine countries reviewed. And within the countries, the notion of ‘acceptable risk’ evolved greatly in the 1990s. As mentioned above, governments now have a far better understanding than a decade ago of the risks involved and of the possibilities they have to keep these risks within manageable limits. We found that only three countries in Europe are outspoken in their willingness to take risky decisions: France, Spain and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has formalised a ‘first in, first out’ doctrine, expressing a policy preference to deploy its troops in a ‘hot’ crisis situation, which is considerably more risk-seeking than a deployment ‘in stream’, i.e. deployment in a stable situation. It is helpful to differentiate in this context between ‘willingness’ (policy preference) and ‘capability’ (riskabsorption capacity). Willingness may follow from capacity, but not the reverse. Thus France, Spain and the UK have a larger ‘risk-absorption’ capacity to accommodate political risks. Considering the political structure of these countries, one wonders whether the capacity for risk absorption is determined by the structure of the political system. In other words, it may be more difficult for a coalition government to take a highrisk decision than for a government with a president or strong prime minister. Related is the question of whether the organisation of the decision-making process, the distribution of power within the political system and the accountability mechanisms predispose a government to a certain acceptable risk level. For example, the number of agents involved in the decision-making process may be significant. Only in France, Spain and the UK can the executive take decisions single-handedly and enforce them on the political system. In Norway and Belgium, a political convention dictates that this decision is taken by consensus. The Dutch Parliament has to give its material consent, and in Denmark and Germany there is a formal requirement to seek parliamentary approval. If the challenge of a group is to reach a consensual position, the natural tendency then is to move towards the middle. This may imply a weakening of the original positions and the filtering out of extreme positions. In a consensual system, different opinions tend to converge on the middle of the road, usually a position with an average risk level. The centripetal forces result in a tendency to compromise.

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Comparative analysis and conclusions

9.4

Parliamentary scrutiny and evaluation

The mechanisms for safeguarding democratic accountability come into play, roughly speaking, at two moments in time: before a decision is taken formally and after the decision has been implemented. In the former case, they usually take the form of Parliament approving a policy proposal or proposed decision, while in the latter case they consist of an evaluation of the implemented policy decision, i.e. the operation. While many accountability studies emphasise the forward-looking ex ante controls, evidence from the present study shows that the impact that a parliament can have on policies adopted by a government is far stronger in the case of well-developed ex post accountability mechanisms. It is possible to distinguish between two instruments or mechanisms available to parliaments to influence policy decisions ex ante: a constitutional requirement that Parliament give its consent before the government can adopt a policy; and the power of the purse. The case of the Netherlands and the positive political effects of a formal framework specifying a procedure for consultation and exchange of information has been discussed in detail and will be touched upon only briefly here. Such a framework binds the government to a certain procedure. The government not only knows in advance that prior to any decision it has to go to Parliament and defend its position, it also knows in advance that after the operation is terminated it will face another debate with Parliament to evaluate its action and decision. Hence it is inclined to seek very broad support for its position.This is not the appropriate place and time for discussing the democratic merits of seeking consensus, but the mechanism of seeking the broadest possible majority for a government’s position before it is officially adopted makes any government think twice. Of the countries included in this study, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway have either constitutional conventions or a formal requirement to seek a majority. Interviews with both officials and parliamentarians in those countries made it clear that any attempt to avoid doing so would be seriously counterproductive. The power of the purse is an important mechanism, especially in the defence domain, because operations are rarely budgeted. This means that, if a government needs additional funds or needs to redirect funds to other budget lines, it is required not only to inform Parliament but also to actively obtain its approval before doing so.That is the theory.There are several different ways to impair the power of parliaments in this field. The most obvious is the absence of any constitutional controls as a kind of structural omission. In the UK, for example, the mandate of the prime minister derives directly from the prerogatives of the crown. It is a top-down attribution of power. The prime minister, as chief executive, has enormous latitude of action, because the Westminster parliamentary system presupposes a majority in the House of Commons for the prime minister.This makes an additional journey to the Commons in order to seek its approval unnecessary. A second generic category is the establishment of special rules and exceptions, which can increase financial flexibility. A typical example is again found in the United Kingdom,

The relation between government and parliament 253 in the phenomenon of the so-called (contingency) reserve funds (RFs).These can be used at the discretion of the government for policy priorities that the government knows must be addressed but is not sure in what form and at what cost. By designating a substantial amount of the government budget as ‘RF’, the prime minister can finance any military operation he sees fit. It only requires the signature of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The situation in France is different, but the result is the same: the power of the executive is not hampered by any interference of the legislature. Here Parliament can only vote for whole blocks of budget measures and not on single budget lines. If the government is in need of additional funds for the conduct of a military operation, then a de facto change is made in the budget and an ex post amendment is sent to the Assemblée for approval. The Assemblée can subsequently pass a new budget law ex post. Accountability also has a deterrent effect. This specific effect enables a parliament to check politicians who fail to play by the democratic rules and fire those who fail. In some countries, politicians use a number of ways to circumvent, negate, frustrate or plainly sabotage ex post accountability. One mechanism can be described as ‘hiding’. A decision has been taken, but the individual minister who is formally responsible for the policy ‘hides’ behind another minister, who in turn ‘hides’ in the cabinet, making it very difficult for Parliament to point to a single political official who can be held accountable on an individual basis. A different description would be the ‘dilution’ of accountability, which happens when accountability is spread out over a collective.284 The consequence is what I have called ‘all-ornothing’ accountability. Both phenomena are rather well illustrated in the Belgian political system.285 As is usual in small states, the defence minister’s main concern is with technical military issues rather than with policy. Usually the foreign minister is responsible for the overall coherence of the nation’s foreign policy. When contemplating participation in an international crisis management operation, the defence minister will immediately look to the foreign minister and the prime minister. It is not for the defence minister to make this decision; instead, the foreign minister is often the driving force and initiator. Because it is such a delicate matter, the foreign minister will then discuss it in the core cabinet and make sure that the decision is taken collectively. The executive’s method poses a problem for the legislature. From the point of view of legislators, whose prime responsibility is to scrutinise the government and to anchor and answer the question of accountability, the minister of defence ‘hides’ behind the mandate of the minister of foreign affairs, who in turn ‘hides’ in the core cabinet. If something goes seriously wrong with an international crisis management operation, Parliament can put some questions to the minister of defence, but when it comes to accountability, it cannot hold that minister accountable as the individual politician responsible for the department concerned, because the decision to participate is a collective core cabinet decision. Parliament is thus left with only two options: to bring down the entire government or to

254

Comparative analysis and conclusions

accept its explanations, probably accompanied by extensive apologies and a mea culpa. The ability to impose ex post accountability may be diluted when a parliament is coopted by the executive into its position and policies. This happens for example in Germany, where the executive works so closely with the Bundestag in an extensive and important maze of committees as to blur the dividing line between executive and legislature and the legislature is bound hand and foot to the decisions reached in this fashion. This proves to be an insurmountable obstacle to ex post facto scrutiny, with the Bundestag sticking to its ‘cooperative control’. If a parliament is too heavily involved in the decision-making process, this may lead to inaction ex post. A variant of cooptation becomes visible when the executive gives the legislature confidential information on a ‘need-to-know’ basis. The problem is that the legislature cannot use this confidential information in the process of scrutinising the executive. This mechanism exists in many forms and flavours. A government can for example coopt, or indeed incapacitate, Parliament as a body by insisting on discussing the matter in a special committee privileged to hear confidential information, or it can coopt, incapacitate the opposition. This is what happens in the UK. Here the prime minister informs the leader of the opposition on Privy Council terms, meaning that the strictest confidentiality is to be maintained. It is good for the opposition to have knowledge of these facts, but the inability to do anything with it is politically incapacitating. Since people have a natural preference for the short term over the long term, the deterrent effect of ‘direct’ accountability, e.g. a minister facing Parliament on a weekly basis, is far greater than ‘postponed’ accountability, e.g. a prime minister being held accountable by the electorate after his term in office is over and he is up for re-election.The comparison of ex ante practices and ex post controls in the nine countries shows that in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway the emphasis is on the ex ante part. In the UK, ex ante influence is negligible, hence the emphasis is on ex post evaluation of the action. In France, Italy and Spain, parliamentary involvement is minimal both before the decision is formalised and in the process of evaluation after the operation. Parliamentary control begins with the availability of correct information. If more and better information is made available to Parliament, the transparency and thus the quality of the decision-making process can be enhanced. Sharing information can also have a positive effect on the trust and confidence enjoyed by the government. Involving Parliament is the way to build a ‘hard’ consensus – as opposed to a ‘soft’ consensus based on constitutional prerogatives and parliamentary discipline – and ensures broad(er) public and political support. In parliamentary circles, defence issues are often shrouded in mists of secrecy. There is a tendency to keep the doors closed, and opinions differ as to the use or advantages of such confidentiality. There is strong resistance (especially in bureaucratic circles) in Norway and Denmark against opening up the meetings of the Foreign Affairs

Table 9.3 Parliamentary controls and accountability Country

Controls ex ante

Accountability ex post

Belgium

None.

Denmark

Formal consent (a constitutional obligation). None.

Direct, all-or-nothing accountability.* Heavy form of hiding by individual ministers. No culture of evaluation. Direct, individual accountability with a slight form of hiding.

France

Germany

Formal consent (the ‘Parlements vorbehalt’).

Italy

Parliament has to sign the ‘decreto legge’ within sixty days.

The Netherlands

A review framework binds the executive to an agreed procedure. Parliament has the right of material consent. Parliament has the right of informal consent (constitutional convention). None.

Norway

Spain

United Kingdom

In the event of great danger or war the opposition supports the prime minister (parliamentary convention).

Postponed individual accountability. Parliament has no control over the finances. Any evaluation is too politicised to be effective. Parliament does not take up the issue of accountability. The very figure of cooperative control proves to be the greatest obstacle for the Bundestag to scrutinise the government ex post. The government as a whole is responsible. The prime minister has the powers to remove individual ministers. Direct individual accountability. Consequent evaluation by Parliament.

Direct individual accountability with a slight form of hiding.

Indirect accountability. Government as a whole is responsible, and the president has the power to fire individual ministers. Parliament has no grip on finances, because of ‘extended’ credit lines, effectively controlled by the ruling party. Direct, individual accountability. Opposition is informed on Privy Council terms. The HCDC provides an evaluation of the technical implementation of the decision. Parliament has no control over finances, because of (Contingency) Reserve Funds.

Note: * The government falls, or Parliament accepts apology.

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Committee. It is hard to quantify the relation between the transparency of the process and the (perceived) legitimacy of the decision and the public support it gets, but I believe that transparency is an important criterion for establishing the quality of decision making. There is growing demand for more openness and public accountability in all countries, so it is curious that to this day the Nordic countries, for legitimate and historical reasons, stick to a closed and confidential system.The methods used by governments to share confidential information with their parliaments differ. Often parliamentarians are briefed without any official documentation being handed to them, although they can take notes.They have no way of verifying either the truth or the completeness of the information provided. The general argument of why a government must share confidential information with Parliament is that international crisis management is a sensitive affair, both for the soldiers on the ground and for the state. Some governments wish to consult Parliament before taking a formal position.These deliberations involve sensitive, classified or even secret information, which Parliament can only be allowed to address behind closed doors, making the decision process far less transparent, with possibly grave consequences. The single most important consequence that occurs is what has been dubbed here the confidence paradox. By giving classified information to parliaments, by taking them into confidence, the executive infringes upon the primary responsibility of the parliament, which is to check and scrutinise the government. Confidential information is often sold to a parliament under the pretext of helping ‘to avoid useless questions that hold up the decision-making process’. The consequence is that parliaments are de facto (politically) incapacitated. This practice is seen in the UK, where the leader of the opposition in the House of Commons is informed by the prime minister under Privy Council terms. In Germany, a similar mechanism operates. Here the Foreign Affairs Committee receives all relevant information, including the diplomatic cables, but the committee is so close to the executive that parliamentary control takes place during the decision-making process. It is no surprise that the German FAC does not evaluate the decision ex post: ‘that is politically not desirable’, a former chairman admitted. If the relation between the government and Parliament becomes too close, Parliament faces the danger of being coopted by the government. Such an intimate relation can prevent Parliament carring out its work democratically and responsibly.

9.5

Parliament as a democratic learning mechanism

The involvement of national parliaments (and indeed intergovernmental parliaments) as a corrective instrument is a highly important but understudied subject. A most significant observation is that parliaments serve as forums where second-order learning (Argyris and Schön 1987) can take place, thus enabling political systems to learn from past mistakes and traumas.286 This learning ability can be institutionalised by increasing parlia-

The relation between government and parliament 257 mentary involvement in the evaluation of international crisis management operations. Thus a parliament can correct a future policy course by looking backwards. We cited Fukuyama, who stated that the deployment of armed forces is not only an act of sovereignty, it is also an expression of values and norms. The evidence presented here shows that these decisions have been subjected to a certain normalisation and domestication, and as a consequence the administrative ‘content’ of participation decisions has increased.The danger is that the politics may be taken out of the decision, and national participation in international crisis management operations become an administrative affair left to bureaucrats and experts instead of politicians.Van Gunsteren (2003) offers an interesting line of thought when he states that political decisions ultimately express a political vision. That this vision is not something that comes out of the blue is not self-evident: vision it seems to me, can spring from compassion, from telling how things went wrong and who suffered from them. Vision arises out of remembering painful political experiences. The prime example is the extermination camps in the Second World War. Without the continuing remembrance of that political outcome, we would not have had the postwar vision of human rights and the institutions for ensuring them. … The vision of human rights was founded not on nature but on remembered political events. (ibid.: 69) Political remembering takes place, according to van Gunsteren, in forums where politicians have to account for their actions and decisions. It is that process of accounting that can be a source of vision and values, which is subsequently projected onto future decisions. And this is what happened in the Netherlands and in Belgium when both countries changed the rules of the political game after they suffered major political traumas in the 1990s. Both parliamentary committees of inquiry engaged in a process in which historical events were remembered. ‘Never again Srebrenica’ and ‘no more Rwandas’ became slogans and sources from which a new political vision could spring. In both cases, parliamentary involvement in the decisionmaking process increased. The work of van Gunsteren provides an important clue as to why more parliamentary involvement is called for, not necessarily in the decision-making phase but in the evaluation phase. Parliaments need to remember the decisions and actions of their governments, because from that process policy correction (and vision) can spring. According to van Gunsteren, ‘politics can regain its rightful place by accepting backward-looking accounting processes as essential ways of selective steering, and value discovery’ (ibid.: 59). The stance of parliamentarians who give more weight to the political process upstream than downstream is, as has been demonstrated here, not justified. At the same time, frustration is

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building up in some countries due to the lack of parliamentary involvement in the national decision-making process. It can be considered ironic that most parliaments do have the powers to investigate ex post facto but simply fail to do so. This may be because they do not have a culture of evaluation or because the evaluation process will become too politicised to be effective. The research findings show that parliamentary involvement in the national decision-making process regarding the deployment of armed forces in international crisis management operations has increased in most countries. In some countries, this has resulted in a formal change of the rules, whereas in other countries the executive uses existing emergency clauses to guard its primacy. Italy has on paper a strong parliament, but in practice parliamentary power is circumvented by the government, using an emergency clause in the constitution. A discrepancy in political power is manifest, and increasing in strength, in states with a traditionally strong executive, like the UK, France and Spain. However, this issue is not only about the distribution of power, it is also about the transparency and accountability of the decisions and actions.The pressure on the executive to involve the national parliament in the decision-making process in a meaningful way is mounting. The research findings indicate that, in the majority of the countries reviewed, parliamentary practices did not develop in step with the ‘normalisation’ of participation in international crisis management operations. The national decision-making process has changed because of the numbers of actors involved, which requires national executives to spend more and more time and energy building and sustaining sufficient levels of support at home. On the other hand, the same executives are confronted with an increasingly volatile security environment, where certain risks and threats require them to act decisively at a moment’s notice. It is that tension between the domestic need for consensus and an unforgiving security environment that characterises Europe’s current strategic condition.287 Van Gunsteren points out that ‘the striving for political consensus undermines the vitality of politics itself and feeds the illusion that we could do without politics altogether’ (ibid.). The political clashes over instrumentalisation and operating modalities in international crisis management are therefore crucial to the vitality of the European approach. ‘A free society lives on a steady diet of conflicts’, as Albert Hirschman once said. International crisis management requires constant recalibration of the values and norms being expressed, the operational procedures being followed and the instruments being employed – things that can only be achieved through political deliberation before, during and after an operation.

Annex: the review framework of the Netherlands288

Introduction …

Scope and objective of the review framework … This review framework relates to the deployment of military units to which the obligation under article 100 of the constitution to provide information is applicable. It is emphatically meant for the decision-making process of the government and the consultation with Parliament on the deployment of units, which – in view of their mission – may be forced to use violence or risk being subjected to violence. The points for consideration apply exclusively to voluntary deployments, that is, deployments for which no obligation exists under NATO or the WEU treaty.The deployment of forces within the Realm, including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, falls outside the scope of this review framework as well. The deployment of international headquarters or missions in which Dutch military personnel participate on an individual basis also falls outside the scope of this review framework. Likewise outside the scope of this framework is the use of military means for humanitarian aid and assistance in case of natural disasters, in most cases at the request of the minister for development cooperation, in situations in which there is no armed conflict or increased security risk. … The government uses this framework in all cases in which it communicates to Parliament by means of a notification that it [the government] is going to investigate whether a Dutch military contribution is desirable and feasible. Any change in the basic principles of an operation or the Dutch participation in an operation will lead to renewed consideration of the matter based on the points for consideration in the review framework. This applies when the mandate or the tasks of a mission are changed. Depending on the circumstances, this could also apply in the case of a change of location.

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The review framework has the character of a set of points for consideration, which are used to arrive at a balanced, considered political and military decision on Dutch participation in international crisis management operations.289 These operations vary in interest, mandate and level of violence.This means that the relative weight carried by the points for consideration may vary per operation.

Information to Parliament The TCBU report has underscored the importance of a timely and adequate flow of information to Parliament. In order to enable Parliament to prepare a careful and considered reaction, the government expressed its willingness prior to the debate of 11 and 12 October 2000 to inform Parliament when it starts investigating the desirability and feasibility of a Dutch contribution to a peace mission.With such a notification the government aims to avoid a situation in which Parliament is informed exclusively via the media. The letter of notification will generally be short and contain little concrete information, since it announces a preparatory phase which serves to collect as much information as possible. However, the letter may discuss the reason for the action, for example an exploratory question, a request or a report by the secretary-general of the UN that will probably lead to a resolution of the Security Council, or a decision of the NATO council. … In view of the above and without prejudice to article 68 of the constitution, the government will inform Parliament at the various stages of its decision-making process as follows: 1. The government will inform Parliament in writing that it intends to investigate whether a Dutch contribution to an international crisis management operation or a relief operation [hulpverleningsoperatie] in an armed conflict is desirable and possible. The investigation of the government can lead to a positive decision, about which Parliament will be informed pursuant to article 100 of the constitution, or to a negative decision, about which Parliament will be informed as well. 2. Pursuant to article 100 of the constitution, the government will inform Parliament on the basis of the review framework before deciding whether or not to participate in an international crisis management operation or assistance operation in an armed conflict, including information on the conditions, if any, attached to participation, unless it concerns a ‘special operation’. … The government’s obligation to inform Parliament applies likewise in the case of a decision on the extension or early termination of the Dutch participation in an operation, in the case of a new deliberation in connection with a change in mandate or objectives/tasks or a change of area responsibility having consequences for the mandate or the tasks.

The review framework of the Netherlands 261 3. After consulting Parliament pursuant to article 100 of the constitution, the government sends the organisation or the coalition driving the operation written notice requesting acknowledgement of receipt of the military units offered and on what conditions. The reply to the offer is communicated to Parliament. 4. During the preparation of the deployment and the execution of the operation, Parliament will be informed on a regular basis about the progress and developments in accordance with the practice that has developed. 5. Every third Wednesday in May, Parliament will have a ‘mid-term’ evaluation of current operations in which Dutch military units are participating.This evaluation will have been prepared under the responsibility of the ministers of defence and foreign affairs. After termination of a Dutch participation, a final evaluation will be prepared addressing both the political and the military aspects of the operation.

Points for consideration Grounds for participation Military units are deployed to maintain or promote the international rule of law.This includes the prevention or termination of serious and massive violations of fundamental human rights as well as the deployment of military units for humanitarian assistance in case of an armed conflict. Political aspects Based on a conflict analysis and an assessment of the policy instruments available to the international community to end the conflict, implement a political peace agreement or contain the conflict and/or its consequences, the government will explain the reasons why a military operation is, under the given circumstances, the most appropriate option in terms of (political) feasibility and desirability. The following aspects (non-exhaustive) may be included in the analysis: • • • • • • • • •

an assessment of the political context of the conflict; the political attitudes of the parties in the conflict; the issues at stake in the conflict and the motives of the parties; the character of the conflict (intra- or inter-state) and the risks of spillover; (previous) negotiations, international efforts, mediation; whether or not an agreement is in force, and if so, the extent to which it is respected; a political risk analysis of the existing situation considering future developments; the role of the military operation in the political process; the humanitarian, political and economic situation, refugees, reconstruction, rule of law, disarmament, elections.

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Mandate Any deployment of Dutch military units must be in accordance with international law. If the operation does not take place at the request of the country concerned, it must rest on a clear mandate. This mandate usually originates from the United Nations and in principle arises from a resolution of the Security Council. Operations under chapter VI of the charter of the UN can also be based on a mandate from a regional security organisation, for instance the OSCE. The mandate states the political and military aims and objectives of the operation. A distinction must be made between operations with a specific timeframe determined by the international organisation concerned, and operations that are to achieve a certain objective. The mandate will also show whether it is an operation under chapter VI or under chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations. Participating countries In choosing the international organisation that will execute the operation, a balance must be found between the military effectiveness of that organisation on the one hand and the desirability of involving as many countries as possible in the execution of the operation on the other hand.The latter serves to express the fact that the operation is an action taken by the international community and not by individual countries. When deciding to make a specific military contribution to a military operation within an international framework, the government will include in its considerations factors like solidarity and credibility as well as the distribution of responsibilities, risks and burdens. The nature and size of the contributions of relevant countries will also play a role. Influence If the Netherlands is not a member of the international body within which decisions on the operation are taken, it must in its capacity as a troopcontributing nation be able to exert adequate influence on the mandate and its further details, the preferred modes of execution and the duration of the operation. Military aspects a. Feasibility In the assessment of the military/operational feasibility of the operation, a number of connected aspects must be taken into account.The point of departure is the mandate, since this is not only the political but also the military basis of the operation. It contains the military aims and objectives – the military mission – from which the tasks are derived and constitutes the

The review framework of the Netherlands 263 framework within which the operation must be executed. The following aspects will be considered: •

•

•

•

•

the attitudes taken by the conflicting parties (insofar as relevant for the military assessment), the climate and the conditions on the ground: the military capabilities of the conflicting parties and also their intentions … ; the required military capabilities: determining the required military capabilities means determining the volume, the composition, the equipment and the weapons of the military units. Adequate logistic support is likewise a precondition for effective deployment of military units … ; the concept of operations: the concept of operations will address the military aims and objectives, the end-state to be achieved, the tasking and concept of operations of the military unit. Because the Netherlands will always deploy its military units within an international framework, the concept of operations of the international military formation will be directive; the rules of engagement: the rules of engagement are closely related to the character of the mission, the concept of operations and the fielded weapon systems. If it should prove necessary, the unit must be able to act robustly – naturally within the mandate. At all times the unit must be capable of a credible self-defence; the chain of command: a clear chain of command is a precondition for effective military action. Situations of various chains of command with various international organisations (‘dual key’) must be avoided. ‘Full command’, the highest authority, always remains a national responsibility, and the responsibility for deployed units rests with the CDS under the political responsibility of the minister of defence.

b. Risks The security risks for the operation as a whole and for the Dutch personnel in particular must be identified and analysed as accurately as possible prior [to deployment]. They may give reason to adjust the equipment of the units. For example: • • •

risks inherent in the execution of the operation; risks resulting from climatic, sanitary and medical conditions; other risks, for example connected to the presence of landmines and/or hazardous substances.

Contingency plans must be prepared – at national or international level – in case there should be calamities and to extract units and individual soldiers, depending on the nature of the operation. If there is a reason to do so, for example because of changes in the mandate, the assigned tasks or the location, a new risk analysis shall be made.

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c. Fitness and availability The Dutch military contribution must match the composition and character of the multinational formation and must moreover be tailored to the execution of the intended tasks. On the basis of these principles it will be determined which units are in principle suitable for deployment. Subsequently, it is determined which units are available. Considerations in this connection include the required sustainability, the other tasks of the armed forces and the deployment pressure on the personnel. Duration of participation If the Netherlands contributes units for a period shorter than the expected duration of the operation, arrangements must be made for their relief and departure. Any continuation of the Dutch participation requires an express, reasoned decision, while termination at the agreed moment, on the other hand, is automatic. Finances/budget The cabinet decision to participate in an international crisis management operation must include a concrete indication of the costs involved. …

Notes

1 Introduction and plan of the book 1 Gaston Bouthoul (1951) Les Guerres: Éléments de Polémologie, Paris. 2 Another example is Hermann (1972).

2 Elements of change 3 Cf. the address by the secretary-general of NATO, Lord Robertson, Brussels, 10 October 2002. 4 For a historical account of this change, see Hallett (1998). 5 The intimate link between armed forces and their enemy became clear in 1989 when the enemy disappeared. Armed forces define and identify themselves in relation to their enemy, and their mission is a function of the enemy threat.When the enemy in 1989 literally ‘lost his face’, it had a severe impact on the identity and self-image of the armed forces in Western Europe. The crisis that most armed forces went through was in essence an existential crisis. 6 For a thorough sociological account, see Castells (1998). For an elaboration of the domestication thesis along similar lines, see Schmidt (1994: 20–2). 7 The European Union is regarded by many statesmen and scholars as a sui generis construct, reputed to be ‘difficult to understand’. Even people working in its inner sanctum, the European Commission, have expressed doubts about their own ability to understand its core dynamics. According to one commissioner, ‘It is the alchemy between supranational and international that gives the EU its depth and richness’ (speech by the Rt Hon. Chris Patten at the IEA, Dublin, Brian Lenihan Memorial Lecture, 7 March 2001). My aim is to demystify that notion by showing that mechanisms are operating that can be identified, described and improved. 8 A fair number of attempts have been made to deduce recommendations on how to influence conflict dynamics, how to determine the best moment for intervention, and the implications or requirements for the composition of the force dealing with the crisis. Recent examples are O’Hanlon (1997) and Regan (2002). 9 This section draws on Kühne in Kaiser and Krause (1996: 15–31) and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997, 2000). 10 Valuable contributions have been made by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997) and Delmas (1999).

3 Three propositions 11 How different interpretations of the scope and nature of sovereignty as independence can clash is illustrated in the presidential exchange between J.B. Goulart, president of Brazil, and J.F. Kennedy:

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Notes

Goulart: You must understand, mister president, that Brazil will follow a totally independent foreign policy. … Kennedy: Please let me know how that policy works out, mister president, because the United States of America are not capable of following a totally independent foreign policy. (cited in van Ussel 1992: 27) 12 But again, states may have a right of veto, but their behaviour will depend on the behaviour or the choices of other states. The decision by Russia to veto the Kosovo operation gave the international community a problem, but it did not prevent the international community from acting. The ‘interventionists’ got around the problem by insisting that a request from the secretary-general and firm backing by a ‘truly’ international community provided enough legitimacy to go ahead with the action. 13 Krasner (1983: 1) describes a regime as ‘principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area’. 14 I am referring here to Bull (1977). 15 It may be the case that even that possibility is decreasing – one can imagine the rise of a global ‘moral majority’. Cf. the observation by Francis Fukuyama that every crisis is an opportunity to reassert and actualise the values that are important to us and our societies: ‘Armed forces were an expression of sovereignty, now they have become the moral expression of the will and norms of the international community’ (Fukuyama, ‘The West is breaking up’, reprinted in De Standaard, 8 September 2002). 16 Cooper (1999) suggests that interdependence can mean more of a ‘sensitivity of adjustment’ rather than mutuality of dependence. 17 Cf. Riker’s ‘size principle’ (1962). 18 Cf. Elster’s definition: ‘An action is the outcome of a choice within constraints. The choice according to the orthodox view, embodies an element of freedom, the constraints one of necessity. In non-standard cases, however, these equations do not hold … men sometimes are free to choose their own constraints’ (Elster 1985: vii). 19 However, the following qualification must be made: a mechanism can only be recognised in retrospect; one should not attribute any predictive powers to them.

4 Changing the rules: Belgium and the Netherlands 20 Oddly enough, Belgians are rather proud of this absence of grandeur, the absence of big cities and the absence of a culture of grandness. 21 A factor of some political significance is what is known as ‘Flemish pacifism’. Throughout the ages, the Belgian population had to survive alien armies on its soil. This constant exposure instilled some kind of survival instinct, or resistance mentality, in the character of the Belgian people. The trauma of the First World War is still alive, when thousands of young Flemish were killed in their trenches at the front line at the River IJzer in western Flanders. 22 The case has been made for the existence of multiple national identities. The ‘Belgian’ identity of the Walloons differs from that of the Flemish.The absence of a shared national view on the nation in the two communities is paradoxical and considered to be ‘distinctly’ Belgian.There is a widely felt conviction that Belgians would not succeed in building one unambiguous nation, and indeed it would seem today that this is true. However, the absence of a common national view on

Notes 267

23 24 25 26

27

28 29

30

31 32 33 34

35

36

their own nation does not prevent Belgians from being in unison about European politics and European integration. Belgium is a low spender on defence and has to submit – with a heavy conscience according to Ministry of Defence officials – its yearly ‘country chapter’ for evaluation by NATO, knowing and expecting in advance the criticism it will receive. The original slogan read ‘Everything for Flanders. Flanders for Christ.’ Source: Politicograaf 2003. In the summer of 2003, it appeared that the federal government was considering de-federalising the licensing of weapons exports. In that case, the federal government would confer the power to license weapons exports to the Walloon government. The disappointment was considerable when the Belgian government counted on the support of its allies for its colonial policy in the Congo crisis, but the big European allies did not give it any backing. ‘These experiences have made Belgium turn away from ad hoc coalitions’, asserted one former senior official.The issue of ad hoc coalitions will be discussed extensively later on. A very recent example is the speed with which the second Verhofstadt administration amended the so-called ‘genocide law’, which it did at the explicit request of the USA. Source: IISS Military Balance (2001–02). The NATO definition of military expenditure includes all current and capital expenditure on (1) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (2) defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; (3) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (4) military space activities. Such expenditure should include (1) military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; (2) operations and maintenance; (3) procurement; (4) military research and development; and (5) military aid (in the military expenditure of the donor country). For detailed data on the military expenditure of the various countries, see www.sipri.org and www.iiss.org. See also the article by Philip Shishkin, ‘Military budgets show why US can’t rely on major NATO help’ (The Wall Street Journal, 13 February 2003), in which he paints an appalling picture of the Belgian armed forces. ‘Belgium employs hundreds of barbers, musicians and other personnel unlikely to be called into battle, but does not have the money to replace ageing helicopters or conduct regular combat training exercises.’ Defence Minster Flahaut replied with a furious letter to the editor (The Wall Street Journal, 26 February 2003). Private conversation with the author. Based on conversations with senior military representatives. Sometimes the term ‘particracy’ is used to describe this phenomenon. Servicing the national debt is a prime political objective for every Belgian finance minister. Over the years, Belgium has accumulated a public debt that exceeds its annual GNP, and it has an impressive budget deficit. The Maastricht criteria imposed a strict financial discipline, and since the mid-1990s the financial health of the government has improved considerably. Beyers and Kerremans show that, regarding European integration, a federalist consensus exists: ‘the parliamentary debates and party documentation have shown that the consensus among most of the Belgian political parties on the process of European integration is both deeply rooted and stable’ (Beyers and Kerremans 2001: 30). A case in point is the decision to participate in the First Gulf War in 1991. Belgian public opinion was divided.‘Numerous public opinion polls … gave a picture of a country that was wavering … 54% of the Belgians were against any resort to force and 87% preferred negotiations … and only 39% approved government policy’ (van Beveren, in Gnesotto and Roper 1992: 13).

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37 Reprinted in Knack, 19 February 2003, p. 108. 38 This was perceived at the time to have possible negative consequences for the Belgian hostages held by the Hussein regime. For an elaboration, see van Beveren, in Gnesotto and Roper (1992). 39 Willy Claes was nominated in September 1994 for the post of secretary-general of NATO. He took up his appointment on 17 October 1994. 40 Unless otherwise indicated, I follow van Beveren’s account in Gnesotto and Roper (1992: 7–15). 41 Defence Minister Guy Coëme in La Libre Belgique, 14 February 1991. 42 Quotation from the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies, 10 December 1992. 43 Based on Security Council resolution 1037 of 15 January 1996. 44 Private conversation with the author. 45 Annales des Séances Plénières. Annales du 25-03-1999. Communication du Gouvernement et mini-debat.All citations stem from this debate. 46 Debate in the Committee for Foreign Affairs (Chamber of Deputies) 6 March 2002, CRABV 50 COM 680. 47 In a letter to the secretary-general of the UN (1993) explaining the Dutch position. 48 See the comments of Louis Tobback and Derk-Jan Eppink in Jorn De Cock (2003), ‘Verzuipt het Poldermodel”, De Standaard, 8/9 March 2003; Hubert van Humbeeck, ‘De gids loopt op zijn laatste benen’, Knack, 13 March 2002; Jan Blokker,‘Nederland wordt steeds meer een provincie’, Knack, 30 April 2003. 49 Paul Scheffer,‘Het multiculturele drama’, NRC Handelsblad, 29 January 2000. 50 The Netherlands made one battalion available to the UN in 1962 (cf. Klep and van Gils 1999: 31–44). 51 Srebrenica resulted in five official investigations in the Netherlands alone: two parliamentary committees of inquiry, the historical study by the Dutch Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), the so-called ‘debriefing report’, and the report by the Queen’s Commissioner, Jos van Kemenade. 52 For an extensive commentary by article, see Akkermans (1987). 53 For an elaboration of Dutch foreign policy traditions, see Voorhoeve (1979) and Hellema (2001). For an overview of Dutch governance and politics, see Andeweg and Galen Irwin (2002). 54 ‘The war between the departments never stops’, wrote Joustra and van Venetië in 1993, implying the prime minister’s crucial role as an honest broker. 55 However, this directorate was not completely new. It was, effectively, the successor to the directorate for Atlantic cooperation, NATO and the WEU. 56 Unless otherwise indicated, the recommendations by the Advisory Commission ‘Supreme Command’ are followed. Advisory Commission Supreme Command: ‘From weak balance to a strengthened Defence organisation’,The Hague, 19 April 2002. 57 The (first) Balkenende administration proposed to reduce the defence budget by more than €800 million over a period of four years. This proposal has initiated a new round of reorganisation, reform and reduction. 58 Defence White Paper 2000, Parliamentary Record HTK 1999–2000, 26 900, nos 1–2, p. 41. 59 The polder model is traditionally used to describe an economic phenomenon: time for money, or moderate wage claims of the unions in exchange for fewer working hours, have led to stable, even progressive economic growth. For a critique of the ‘cosy consensus’, see ‘Going Dutch’, The Economist, 4 May 2002. 60 Johan Huizinga once described the Netherlands as a ‘complacent nation, selfsatisfied and satisfied with its position in the world’ (Huizinga 1946: 8).

Notes 269 61 This section draws on chapter 2 of TCBU(I) but is complemented with material from the original relevant documents and reports from that period. The review framework is reprinted in the Annex. 62 HTK, 1978–79, 15 441, No. 7. 63 Adviesraad Defensie Aangelegenheden (DAC), Nederland en de Vredestaken van de Verenigde Naties, December 1980. The DAC Report is filed as a parliamentary record under HTK, 1981–82, 17543, No. 2. 64 The criteria formulated by the council are that (1) there must be a request from the secretary-general of the UN to the Dutch government; (2) Dutch participation must have the consent of the conflicting parties; (3) the interest of the intended contribution must be weighed against other security interests of the Netherlands; (4) Dutch participation may not unacceptably damage other security interests of the Netherlands; (5) the peacekeeping operation must promote peace; (6) the risks must be proportional to the aims and objectives of the overall operation; (7) the Dutch government retains the right to withdraw the troop contingent if (a) a change in mandate occurs; (b) factual developments prevent the UN operation from promoting peace in the area, or that the expected risks are not balanced against the aims of the operation; (c) if the continuation of the contribution would endanger the interests of the Netherlands significantly (source:ADA 1980: 57–63). 65 It is important to note that a parallel debate is developing. Establishing a satisfactory relation with Parliament is one thing, but the development of a model for decision making (on the basis of a predetermined set of ‘criteria’) is another.These twin aims will remain present throughout a political debate that will span two decades. 66 HTK 1985–86, 16 521, No. 5. 67 HTK, 1987–88, 16 521, No. 13. 68 HTK 1992–93, Handelingen 28, 5013–5014. 69 HTK 1994–95, 23 591, No. 1. 70 HTK 1994–95, 23 591, No. 2. 71 HTK 1994–95, 23 591, No. 5. 72 A speech by Defence Minister Joris Voorhoeve before the General Assembly of NATO in October 1994 contained the main points for consideration, which would be formalised less than a year later.All citations are from Voorhoeve (1994). 73 HTK 1994–95, 23 591, No. 5. 74 Adviesraad Vrede en Veiligheid (1995a), Commentaar op het toetsingskader voor uitzending van militaire eenheden, 27 October 1995,The Hague. 75 Another debate that picked up steam in 1995 was the debate on military command and control of Dutch units in international crisis management operations. This question was relevant in the overall context of a transformation of working relations, both between government and Parliament, and within the Ministry of Defence. This debate would receive an important impetus in 2001 from the work of the Commission Franssen. 76 HTK 1998–99, 26 454, No. 1. 77 In July 2001, the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defence sent a revised review framework to Parliament, which included the recommendations of the commission. The two broad categories of ‘political desirability’ and ‘military feasibility’ have been replaced by (1) grounds for participation; (2) political requirements; and (3) execution modalities.The integral text of this revised review framework is included in the Annex. 78 All citations that follow come from TCBU (I) 2000: 462–3. Translation by the author. 79 The parliamentary reference of this report is TK 1995–96, 24 464, No. 1.

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80 For an overview of the influence of (Dutch) public opinion on foreign policy, see Everts and Walraven (1989, 1996a). 81 Unless otherwise indicated, this overview is based on the conclusions of the TCBU. 82 Cf.TCBU (I) 2000: 396. 83 See, for example, the evidence given by D.J. Barth before the TCBU (TCBU (I) 2000: 62). 84 Some criticism was voiced from the sidelines by a band of retired generals. Among the most vocal was J. Schaberg – see his article in NRC Handelsbad, ‘Besluitvorming over Eritrea is een farce’, 2 October 2000. 85 Proponents of this view are former Prime Minister Mark Eyskens and Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Michel. 86 The comments on the crisis in NATO over Iraq were reported both in De Standaard and the Financial Times: ‘Lord Robertson had 18 ambassadors waiting and PM Verhofstadt had five coalition partners waiting’ (Financial Times and De Standaard, 18 February 2003).

5 The imperative of consensus: Denmark and Norway 87 Petersen sums up the strategic interests in Danish territory during one of the coldest periods of the Cold War, the early to mid-1970s: ‘Danish territory is seen as strategically important in the following respects: as a transit area for ships and aircraft; as a barrier against the breakout of Warsaw Pact naval units from the Baltic; and against NATO intervention in the Baltic area; as a reconnaissance base area important to NATO for warning as well as control purposes; as a base area for offensive as well as defensive operations’ (Holst 1973: 7–18). 88 These changes have a built-in tension and ambivalence: isolation versus integration and introvert versus extrovert orientation. The vector of the double tension has consistently led to a policy of extreme adaptation to the external environment. 89 Private conversation. For an elaboration of this theme, see Heurlin (2001a). 90 The government’s Foreign Policy Committee can meet in two formats: a foreign and security policy format, and another format to discuss EU matters. 91 An example that backfired was the decision concerning possible sanctions against Austria as a reaction to an ultra-right-wing election victory in 2000.The government did not consult the Nævn; instead, the prime minister called all party leaders and tried to obtain their approval at once. In the post hoc evaluation of that decision, the conclusion was that the decision had not been the right one, but the party leaders were held hostage by the government to their initial agreement. Based on private conversation with parliamentarian involved at the time. 92 This thesis is elaborated by Damrosh (in Ku and Jacobson 2002: 39–61). 93 The issue of whether increased parliamentary involvement and democratic debate produces erratic foreign policy behaviour or fundamental policy change has been touched upon in the chapter on Belgium and the Netherlands. 94 In interviews with parliamentarians from parties not supporting the defence agreement, a number of themes are consistently raised. The decision-making process does not follow a formalised procedure, i.e. not all decisions are presented to the plenary for a vote. Parliamentarians complain about the poor quality of information (and answers) received from the government and the lack of timeliness with which the information is made available. The relation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Parliament is not very warm. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials still regard the formulation and implementation of foreign policy as an executive prerogative and are unwilling (for various reasons) to see their freedom of action diluted by Parliament. ‘The government does not accept any

Notes 271

95 96 97

98

99

100 101

102 103

substantial involvement of Parliament in foreign and security questions.’ Opposition leaders complain about a lack of transparency and the poor ‘climate’ in which these sensitive decisions are generally taken. ‘It is not acceptable to express any doubts, there is no space for dissenting opinions’,‘there is a structural lack of democracy in foreign policy decisions’, and ‘the level of frustration in Parliament is building up’. Private conversations of the author with Danish parliamentarians in Copenhagen, August 2001. The quotations are from interviews in Copenhagen and Brussels. See the chapter on Italy for an elaboration of Operation Alba. For an analysis of the voting patterns in the Folketinget, see Jakobsen (2000: 70–1). The drive to expand the human rights agenda, democracy and good governance to a global scale has a link to trade and economic interests. Denmark is a trading nation and, in order to maintain the social welfare state, new markets have to be found. The policy course adopted by the government led by the liberal prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen seems to contradict this conviction. The Rasmussen government has reduced the budget for development assistance significantly. Instead, it is trying to increase the number of soldiers that Denmark can sustain abroad. In 1979, Denmark took up a principled position in the debate on the deployment of euromissiles. It did not want to accept nuclear weapons on its soil and criticised the INF decision. At the same time, Denmark accepted the NATO strategy based on the use of nuclear weapons as both a deterrent and an instrument of war, yet it wanted a Nordic nuclear-free zone. It refused to pay its share of the infrastructure costs associated with deployment of the INF missiles and voiced criticism of American and NATO negotiating positions on arms control with the Soviet Union. Aggravating the turbulence was the fact that the Danish government had lost its grip on Danish foreign and security policy for most of this decade.The minority government in the period between 1982 and 1988 did not have the support of Parliament on major foreign policy issues and had its policies rejected by a parliamentary centre/left-wing majority on a number of occasions (Holm 1989: 180). See Faurby (1995) and Villaume (1999) for a detailed discussion of this episode in Danish security policy and Holbraad (1991) for a general account of Danish neutrality. Since 1948, Denmark has contributed more than 55,000 soldiers to UN peacekeeping missions. In three key decisions during the 1990s, the personalities involved played an important role. Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was instrumental in shedding the ‘ostrich outlook in foreign policy’ of the previous decades in 1990 and becoming internationally active. Defence Minister Hans Hakkerup was instrumental in the debate around the transition from Unprofor to Ifor because he was able to make the connection between traditional Danish attitudes and the problems and crises of the new world order; with a knack for history, he called it ‘a breakthrough in the history of Denmark’. And during the Kosovo campaign, Prime Minister Poul Rasmussen played the key role because he was able to communicate the deeply felt responsibility to act in the face of a humanitarian tragedy and the need to use military force. However, it would go too far to suggest that the influence of these personalities on the debate was decisive. This account draws on Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2000). A former intelligence officer went public with allegations that the government knew in advance that no weapons of mass destruction were to be found in Iraq. As a consequence, Minister of Defence Svend Aage Jensby resigned from office.

272

Notes

104 I thank Peter Viggo Jacobsen for drawing my attention to this aspect of Danish participation in international crisis management operations. 105 I thank Flagcommander (retd) Jacob Børressen for this colourful and cultural description of these two important elements of the Norwegian identity. For an elaboration of centre–periphery relations, see Rokkan (1999). 106 The year 1994 can count as something of an annus mirabilis in Norwegian history: the outstanding success of the Olympic winter games in Lillehammer; the successful conclusion of the Oslo agreements; and consequently a very high Norwegian visibility on the international scene. 107 Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, cited in Christian Borch (1999), ‘Norway and security: new tasks for a new era’, available at http:// www.odin.dep.no/odinengelsk/norway (accessed 23 April 2003). 108 The core of Nordic cooperation has consisted of two annual meetings of defence ministers and the establishment of various training centres under the auspices of the Joint Nordic Committee for UN Military Matters (NORDSAMFN), which has developed specialised training courses in particular Nordic countries: Norway was to be responsible for logistics, Finland for military observers, Denmark for military police and Sweden for staff officers. 109 There is considerable support for the creation of a Baltic Division. The training arrangements in NORDCAPS (1997) include the Balts. See also Ola Tunander’s entry ‘Nordic cooperation’, available at http://www.odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/ norway/foreign (accessed 24 April 2003). 110 Norway had a majority government in the period from 1983 to 1985, when the Centre Party (Hoyre) formed a coalition with the Christian People’s Party. 111 Personalities had their influence too: when Johan Jørgen Holst switched from defence to foreign affairs, he took the NATO portfolio with him. 112 Parliament agreed to the implementation of a new national command structure. This, it is hoped, will contribute to increased efficiency and strengthened strategic leadership. The HQ Defence Command Norway, located outside Oslo (in Huseby), will be disbanded at the earliest opportunity, and the Defence Staff will be established and co-located with the Ministry of Defence before 31 December 2004. The existing defence commands will be abolished, and two regional commands will be established: Regional Command North (LDKN) in Reitan, Bodø and Regional Command South (LDKS) in Trondheim.The armed forces’ operational headquarters (FOHK) will be located at Jåtta in Stavanger. 113 This report, The Long-Term Proposal for the Armed Forces for the period 2002–2005, was debated in Parliament in June 2001. 114 In the Norwegian debate on security policy, this has been referred to as the danger of ‘political marginalisation’ (MoD 1993–94: 11). 115 For an elaboration, see Joenniemi (1990: 205–17). 116 Stortingsmelding (Parliamentary Report) No. 38 (1998–99), Adaptation of the Armed Forces for Participation in International Operations. 117 E. Colban (1961), Stortinget og utenrikspolitikken, Oslo, pp. 45–6, cited in Riste (1982). 118 Private conversation with Norwegian MP involved in the discussion, 11 June 2001. 119 ‘At these junctions (25 September 1972 and 28 November 1994) referendums have been held; at both occasions, the proposal has been turned down by a relatively narrow popular majority (53.5 percent in 1972, 52.3 percent in 1994). On both occasions, public debate in Norway has been strongly polarised (although nearly a third of the electorate described itself as undecided as late as summer 1994) and, although the actual rhetoric on both sides was very varied, it could be argued that the two sides represented different value orientations at the level of political rhetoric. At a very general statistical level, there was an overrepresenta-

Notes 273

120

121

122 123 124

125

6

tion of women, farmers, fishermen and rural people among the “No” voters. Northern Norway was massively against membership, while the Oslo region was massively favourable’ (Eriksen 1998). Some authors add the OSCE as a mandating organisation, but article 53(1) of chapter VIII of the UN charter states that ‘The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.’ Key government documents in this regard are Prepared for Peace (1993), The Use of Norwegian Armed Forces Abroad (1994), Adaptation of the Armed Forces for Participation in International Operations (1999) and The Long-Term Defence Plan for 2002–2005 (2001). For a comprehensive overview, see the bibliography.All reports were sent to and approved by Parliament in the form of White Papers or reports to Parliament or proposals. In the parliamentary debates following these reports, Parliament also laid down some guidelines delineating the decision process of the government. Norwegian forces are taking part in the operations in Afghanistan. The geography of the country and its climatic conditions make the mountain and Arctic expertise of Norwegian soldiers relevant. Based on an interview with Norwegian officials by Radio Free Europe, 13 March 2002. One day after the 11 September terrorist attacks against the United States, NATO ruled that if it could be determined that the attacks were directed from abroad, they would be regarded as an action covered by article 5 of the Alliance’s founding charter (‘an attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against all NATO members’). Less than three weeks later, on 2 October, the North Atlantic Council invoked article 5 for the first time in its history. There are historical reasons for this situation. In Norway, this procedure was instrumental in keeping confidential information out of the hands of the Communists after the Second World War. A domestic motive was that shortly after the war some information needed to remain secret to prevent a widening rift in the Labour Party. In the debate about NATO membership, ten to fifteen of the eighty Labour Party members in the Storting opposed membership.

The dominant government: the United Kingdom, France and Spain

126 Speech to RUSI, 13 October 1992. 127 Andrew Parker, ‘Troops make Britain a force to reckon with’, Financial Times, 17/18 November 2001. 128 For example, one of Blair’s early speeches was entitled ‘The rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe’. 129 Based on a private conversation with a former senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. 130 The bible for the cross-cutting approach is Wiring It Up (2000), a publication from the Cabinet Office.‘Joined-up’ can be described as ‘looking beyond institutional boundaries; setting cross-cutting objectives; defining and communicating joint working arrangements across departments; ensuring that the implementation is part of the policy process’ (source: Cabinet Office). 131 The reason for the French CEMA’s supremacy lies in his personal and special relation with the president. See the chapter on France for a detailed account. 132 Consider for example the Defence and Research Agency (DERA), which has been reorganised into a Public–Private Partnership (PPP). 133 Private conversation with the author.

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Notes

134 The UK Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) consists of the UK Defence Crisis Management Committee (DCMC) and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood. 135 The attorney-general is present because the UK has a formal procedure to ensure that the laws of war are strictly adhered to. His role is prominent in for example the process of target selection before a bombardment takes place. 136 One participant described it as ‘the PM gives a 10-minute blast of information and that is it’. 137 All information is based on fact sheets (MoD 2003a). 138 Based on a conversation with Professor Michael Clarke, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College. 139 Private conversation with the author. 140 Cf. Alexander Nicoll,‘A theatre where nobody wants a long run’, Financial Times, 13 December 2001. 141 From Labour Party, New Labour because Britain Deserves Better (1997: 38). 142 The royal prerogative makes no reference to Parliament.The decision on NATO enlargement taken in 1997 did not require ratification in either Canada or the UK. The Canadian government went to Parliament for a debate and a vote (‘it basically wanted to be nice’, said a commentator involved at the time), but the UK government refused to do so because this matter was considered to be ‘up to the crown’. 143 I thank Jonathan Eyal for pointing out these mechanisms to me. 144 The Ministry of Defence report, Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis (2000), gives a good overview of the facilities, briefings, etc. To enable the media to get its message across, the MOD arranged for daily press conferences, dedicated web pages, visits to the region, background briefings and 24/7 availability of senior officials for comments. 145 This section is based on a note written by Paul Bowers, ‘Parliament and the use of force’, dated 25 October 2001. I am indebted to Paul Bowers and Mark Oakes of the Foreign Policy Research Unit of the Library of the House of Commons for supplying me with this information. 146 For a passionate and early plea for more democratic control of British foreign policy, see Arthur Ponsonby (1915), Democracy and Diplomacy: A Plea for Popular Control of Foreign Policy, London: Methuen. 147 Under standing order 21, the Speaker may at his discretion grant a private notice question (PNQ) from any non-government member. 148 Parliamentary On-Line Information System, cited in Todd (1998). 149 Cf. the statement by Michael Mates, a former minister responsible for security in Northern Ireland: the Ministry of Defence is ‘a ministry whose culture has always been to keep its information very much to itself, and not to inform either the public or Parliament’ (cited in Todd 1998: 34). 150 For example, the publications forming part of the annual reporting cycle of 1999–2000 were the Ministry of Defence’s Performance Report (November 1998), the government’s Expenditure Plans 1999/2000 to 2001/2002 (March 1999), the MOD’s Investment Strategy (March 1999), the Defence White Paper (December 1999), and the MOD’s Performance Report 1998–1999 (December 1999). Source: House of Commons Defence Select Committee (2000a), Ministry of Defence Annual Reporting Cycle, Second Report of the Defence Committee of the House of Commons, session 1999–2000. 151 In the period between Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the start of the allied action, there were four statements and four debates, all on motions to adjourn. During the Kosovo campaign, there were ten statements and four debates on motions to adjourn. Two statements were made before hostilities commenced.

Notes 275 152 Excellent overviews of the developing political debate can be found in the online archives of The Guardian, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk, and the Ministry of Defence, available at http://www.operations.mod.uk/telic/statements_archive.htm. 153 Available at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/print/page3322.asp (accessed 12 June 2003). 154 In the British parliamentary system, there is a distinction between a standing committee and a select committee. A standing committee works like a miniature debating chamber, with set procedures and an impartial chairman, debating in public the details of a bill, amendment by amendment, clause by clause. Members are chosen in proportion to their party strengths in the House. A select committee works in a completely different way, deliberating in private, hearing evidence (in public or private) and then (again in private) considering and agreeing a report to be made public to the House. Such a committee is normally composed in accordance with party proportions in the House. 155 Illustrative of the independence and thoroughness displayed by the Defence Select Committee in working and gathering information is the following quote: ‘We heard five sessions of formal evidence from the Ministry of Defence from December 1992 to March 1993, preceded by an informal seminar in November 1992 organised by the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College, London.We visited British forces engaged in peacekeeping in Bosnia and Croatia in February 1993, and in Cyprus in May 1993. … We had a private briefing from General Lewis Mackenzie, the former UN Commander in Sarajevo’ (HCDC, Fourth Report, Session 1992–93: vii). 156 Based on the account by Hennessy (2001). 157 An opinion poll published by the Sunday Times on 3 March 1991 showed that 93 percent of British adults were either ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with the way the government had handled the crisis. 158 See Weekly Hansard, 1533, September 1990. 159 Weekly Hansard, 1533, September 1990. 160 ECOMOG was the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group. The British deployment to Sierra Leone was technically ECOMOG II (the first deployment was in Liberia). 161 Weekly Hansard, May 2000. 162 The UK contribution consisted of (major force elements) the headquarters of 3(UK) Division, the headquarters of 16 Air Assault Brigade, the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, including a company of Gurkhas, engineer and signal support, elements from 13 Air Assault Regiment of the Royal Logistics Corps and 16 Medical Regiment of the Royal Army Medical Corps. The Royal Air Force deployed a range of airfield enablers. As these units were deployed, the UK withdrew elements of 40 Commando Royal Marines, who had helped to secure Bagram Airstrip. 163 Statement by Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon to the House of Commons, 20 January 2002. Available at http://news.mod.uk/news/press/ news_press_notice.asp’newsItem_id=1336 (accessed 11 February 2002). 164 Based on the report by the British Ministry of Defence (2003b): Operations in Iraq: First Reflections (July 2003). Available at http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/ publications/iraq2003operations.pdf (accessed 12 December 2003). 165 In the wake of the Second Gulf War, the House of Commons Public Administration Committee started an investigation into the war powers of the prime minister and the royal prerogative.The committee called for radical constitutional reform, which would see a range of powers, including sending troops to war, taken from the government and handed to Parliament. Cf. Matthew Tempest, ‘Curb government war powers, say MPs’, The Guardian, 20 May 2003.

276 166 167 168 169 170 171 172

173 174

175 176 177 178 179 180

181

182 183

Notes Unless otherwise stated, I follow the excellent account given by Cerny (1980). I thank David Chuter for drawing my attention to this typology. In many respects, the French president still is the state:‘l’État c’est moi’. Based on private conversations. See also the accounts by Gildea (1996) and de Villepin (2002). Although there are many such defining historical moments, only those that have a direct bearing on the subject in hand will be briefly discussed. Personal conversation with senior official in the Ministry of Defence in Paris. According to David Yost,‘France’s nuclear force … has imposed disproportionate opportunity costs.The expense of maintaining the nuclear deterrent may hinder France in its pursuit of the conventional military technologies of the future, such as non-nuclear precision-strike systems, intelligence and communication capabilities, and long-range power projection’ (Yost 1996: 117). When the president and the prime minister come from different political parties. The constitutional role and place of the chef d’état major des armées is defined and elaborated in four documents: (1) the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of 1958, which constitutes the president of the republic as commander-in-chief of the French armed forces; (2) the Ordonnance of 1959 (No. 59-147), which lays down the general structure of the defence organisation and the division of responsibilities at the top of the government; the (3) decree of 1982 (No. 82138), which focuses specifically on the ‘attributes’ of the CEMA; and (4) the decree of 1996 (No. 96-520), which determines the responsibilities regarding the nuclear force. Communications with other governments used to take place in these situations at the highest levels.The dedicated channel, i.e. the system of defence attachés, is not used per se; that seems to be used for routine traffic. This article has never been used, although the war in Algeria was only recently declared to have been a war; however, this was for technical legal reasons only, namely to entitle veterans to draw a war pension. The Assemblée has produced a number of studies to substantiate its claim to be more involved. See for example the information reports by Paul Quilès (2000a) and François Lamy (2000b). All quotes that follow are from the Report sur le contrôle parlementaire des opérations extérieures,Assemblée Nationale No. 2237, by François Lamy. This was the procedure followed by Michel Rocard in regard to France’s contribution to the multinational coalition mandated by the United Nations to re-establish Kuwaiti sovereignty following the invasion by Iraq in August 1990. The French speak of ‘external’ operations, but it is not exactly clear when an operation qualifies as an ‘external operation’. Paulmier points to this problem:‘Le critère de la qualification “opération extérieure” retenu par le ministère de la défense correspond à la décision prise par le pouvoir politique d’envoyer des troupes hors de la métropole, dont la durée peut n’être pas prévisible au moment ou elles son déclenchées’ (Paulmier 1997: 136–7). The French concept of defence and its objectives are defined in a few key documents: (1) the Ordinance of 7 January 1959; (2) the Livre Blanc of 1972; and (3) the Livre Blanc of 1994. For a comprehensive account of French security policy in the 1980s and early 1990s, see Menon (2000) and Gregory (2000b). In France, peacekeeping operations are a specific operational category: ‘les missions de la maintien de la paix’ (OMP). The initial ambiguity in the French position is attributed to Mr Chevènement’s presence in the government as the defence minister; the ambiguity disappeared when he stepped down at the end of January 1991. From that point on,‘all traces of ambiguity disappeared from France’s military posture and activity’ (Heisbourg, in Gnesotto and Roper 1992: 25).

Notes 277 184 Unless otherwise stated, the following discussion is based on the accounts given in Cot (1995). 185 Private conversation with a Ministry of Defence official present at the time. 186 Régiment d’Infanterie de Marine, the French equivalent of the Royal Marine Commandos. 187 All information from French Ministry of Defence (2001). 188 For example, an interview with ABC, Paris, 2 March 2003. All official statements can be retrieved through the website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.diplomatie.fr. 189 As this crisis has been unfolding only recently, a full appreciation of its fall-out cannot be given here. 190 Council Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, available at http:// ue.eu.int/pesd/congo/docs/DRC%20Joint%20Action%202003423_CFSP.pdf. 191 Joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of Defence press briefing, 13 June 2003. Available at http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/actu/ articletxt.gb.asp’ART= 35421 (accessed 20 June 2003). 192 Private conversation with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. 193 The poet Antonio Machado called it ‘the two Spains’. In Machado’s own words, ‘now there is a Spaniard who wants to live, and begin to live he does / between one Spain that is dying and another Spain that yawns’. 194 See Heywood (2002) and Gillespie and Youngs (2001). 195 Spain has ample experience of being the first of the smaller countries to be invited to join the big powers at the high table, but also the first to be rejected whenever the group of big powers becomes too large to be manageable. I thank Florentino Portero for drawing my attention to this aspect of Spanish foreign policy. 196 Allegedly, the regionalist parties have a moderating influence on Spanish politics due to their continuous territorial demands. 197 Not unimportant is the fact that France chose the side of Morocco in this dispute because of the special relationship existing between Paris and Rabat. 198 According to the Military Balance 2002–03 (IISS), Spain has deployed around 8,100 soldiers to Ceuta and Melilla, 8,600 to the Canary Islands and 4,550 to the Balearic Islands. 199 Much of the credit for Spain’s smooth transition to a modern democracy goes to King Juan Carlos I. His dialogue with leaders of all political parties during the transition and his reaction against the 23 February coup earned him lasting esteem in the eyes and hearts of the Spanish people. 200 Article 97 of the constitution stipulates that ‘The government shall conduct domestic and foreign policy, civil and military administration and the defence of the State. It exercises executive authority and the power of statutory regulations in accordance with the Constitution and the laws.’ 201 A constitutional problem is that the use of force outside the national borders has not been regulated. For an elaboration, see Antonio Remiro Brotons (1984), La acción exterior del Estado, Madrid:Tecnos. 202 Around €6 million per annum is allocated (2002). The real expenditure is between €30 million and €40 million per annum. 203 The main points of the ‘decalogue’ are: • •

maintenance of the existing situation with respect to the Atlantic Alliance: in other words, membership without incorporation into the integrated military structure; maintenance of the bilateral defence relationship with the United States, but with a progressive diminution of the US military presence on Spanish soil;

278

Notes • • • • •

de-nuclearisation of Spanish territory, with the possibility of signing the Treaty of Nuclear Non-Proliferation; the desire to integrate Spain into the Western European Union; the return (to Spain) of Gibraltar, which would be brought about inter alia by continued Spanish membership of NATO; a Spanish presence in international forums dealing with disarmament; strengthening bilateral relations with other Western European countries in defence matters.

204 Bilateral relations with the USA existed throughout Franco’s reign. US support for Franco during and after the transition was hard to accept for the Socialists; it partly determined their reluctant attitude towards NATO. 205 Regarding Latin America, there is a discrepancy between the political declarations and the (lack of) diplomatic and economic resources to give substance to the policy. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into more detail. 206 See Marquina (1986: 239). 207 The standing goals of Spanish foreign policy are openness to the outside world, the normalisation of international relations, recognition of Spain as a part of the international community of democratic European countries and active participation in international organisations.The ground principles of its foreign policy are respect for international law, the quest for peace, disarmament and progress towards a new world order based on justice, human rights, international cooperation and solidarity. The government also vigorously promotes the use of the Spanish language, which is spoken by 400 million people around the world, a figure that is rising quickly. Great importance is attached to the annual summit of heads of state and government of the twenty-one Latin American countries, plus Spain and Portugal. 208 In 2002, Spain spent about US$7.1 billion or 1.2 percent of its GDP on defence. A very significant additional sum is invested in defence via the Ministry of Research and Technology.This ministry ‘anticipates’ that about half of the investments will be required to develop or buy major weapons/platform programmes, like the Leopard II tank or the A400M transport plane. A contract law obliges the Ministry of Defence to reimburse the Ministry of Research and Technology as soon as it starts receiving equipment and to finalise the payment after ten years. 209 Coates describes this adequately: ‘in view of additional responsibilities and the demands made upon a major western Mediterranean power, Spain needed to develop a capability consistent with its eagerness to play a more active role.Yet, successive government defence ministers have appeared unable to “protect” their budgets in the face of competing demands from other ministries’ (cited in Gillespie and Youngs 2001: 186). 210 SIAF is not a standing amphibious force. It is activated on call by joint (binational) agreement. SIAF will normally be placed under NATO command (CAFMED), EU (Euromarfor) or be deployed to accomplish any requirement from the UN or OSCE or to respond to any national (Italian or Spanish) requirement. Although SIAF is not a standing force, there is a permanent exchange of personnel between both forces. 211 Grupo de Estudio Estrategicos. Available at http://www.gees.org (accessed 2 February 2003). 212 The Spanish contribution to the naval force was a standing naval vessel. 213 From a conversation with a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. 214 As Spain realised that the political cost of being absent would be extremely high, humanitarian considerations perfectly converged with the reluctance of Spain to become engaged.

Notes 279 215 Cf. Steven Adolf, ‘Aznar wil rol spelen in wereldpolitiek’ [Aznar wants to play role in world politics], De Standaard, 2 March 2003. 216 The style of governing of Prime Minister Aznar has been described as increasingly authoritarian, almost anti-democratic. The text of the statement is available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2708877.stm (accessed 21 February 2004). 217 All quotations are from the weekly Sur. Available at http://www.surinenglish.com (accessed 2 February 2003). 218 Diputado Raphael Estrella (PSOE). Private conversation, 12 December 2002.

7

The dominant parliament: Germany and Italy

219 During the Kosovo crisis, Foreign Minister Fischer was accused of ‘hypermoralisation’ and Defence Minister Scharping of drawing dubious historical parallels.This episode is elaborated below. 220 This definition is from historian Heinrich August Winkler (cited in de Waard 2002: 216).Valuable sources of information are Fischer (1994) and Ulrich (1999). A cynical yet humorous portrait of contemporary Germany can be found in Illies (2000). De Waard (2002) provides a perceptive tour d’horizon of recent changes in Germany. 221 Christoph Bertram, director of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, compares the international position of Germany to that of a fat man who claims not to be hungry: no one believes him. Germany, the economic giant, conducts its foreign policy at times as if it did not have enormous interests. Germany was offered a partnership in leadership during the First Gulf War but had to decline because of its commitments in Central and Eastern Europe. Throughout the 1990s, Germany displayed a very clear preference for a multilateral approach, to the surprise and frustration of other countries, which wondered why Germany did not throw its weight around in the world. See the article by Philippe Remarque in De Volkskrant, 18 December 2001. 222 Recently ‘emancipation’ has been used in the German press with the meaning of a German emancipation from the USA as well. 223 For an overview of how the debate has been changing, see Zöckler (1995). 224 For an elaborate account of these developments, see Lohmann (1994). 225 The first was a deployment of naval units in the NATO/WEU operation that monitored the UN embargo against Yugoslavia in the Adriatic (Sharp Guard); the second was the inclusion of German soldiers in AWACS crews to monitor the flight ban over Bosnia-Herzegovina; and finally there was the participation of 1,700 soldiers in the peace mission in Somalia (Unosom II). 226 This ruling is referred to as the Judgement of 12 July 1994 – 2 BvE 3/92, 5/93, 7/93, 8/93-Bundesverfassungsgerichtentscheidungen, Band 90, pp. 286ff. For a legal commentary, see Heintschel von Heinegg and Haltern (1995). 227 Cf. the contribution by von Lersner in de Guttry (1995). 228 For example, along the lines of the US War Powers Act (1974). 229 In the spring of 2002, the Greens left their fundamental pacifist stance. For the first time in its 22-year history, the Green Party did not completely renounce the use of force as a means of last resort. At the same time, the Greens formulated certain limits to military interventions. The report of the party conference is available at http://www.diegruenen.de (accessed 10 October 2002). 230 Some observers conceive the (successful) transformation of the Bundeswehr to be one of the issues crucial to the success of the entire European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 231 Unless otherwise stated, by and large I follow the account presented in Phillipi (1997: 179–203).

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Notes

232 Drawing on the lessons of the Somalia operation, Duffield (1998) presents a similar list of criteria: ‘a legitimate international mandate; … the possibility to fulfil the assigned military tasks within a clearly limited time frame; … the military component of the operation must be based upon a convincing political concept for a lasting solution to the conflict; Germany must be adequately involved in the international decision-making process; Germany would participate in international peace missions only jointly with others and almost exclusively in conjunction with its NATO and WEU allies, which would allow them to draw upon pre-existing common structures; the interests of Germany, Europe, or the international community must be involved; the greater the likelihood of combat and thus the risk to German soldiers, the more compelling the reasons for German participation must be’ (Duffield 1998: 211). 233 For an account of the political motives and strategic calculations at the time, see the contribution by Kaiser et al. in Gnesotto and Roper (1992: 44–5). 234 I thank Elizabeth Pond for drawing my attention to this aspect. 235 For a thorough discussion of this whole episode, including the changes in the position of individual political parties, see Duffield (1998).This section draws on chapter 8 of this book. 236 Unless otherwise stated, I follow the account by Peter Rudolf in Martin and Brawley (2000). 237 The fall-out from this position has been severe. US–German relations have seriously soured, resulting in mistrust on both sides of the Atlantic. For an assessment of how the Iraq war played a role in the German general elections, see Winkler (2003). 238 For an elaboration of this theme, see Ginsborg (1990: 158ff). 239 For an elaboration of this idea, see Chalmers (2000: 27–34) and Maull (1990: 91–106). 240 Tobias Jones, referring to the old Greek idea of kaloskagathos in which beauty and goodness are actually the same thing rather than mutually excluding opposites, states that fare una bella figura is as much a moral as an aesthetic judgement: it implies appropriateness, grace, civility, dignity, stature and so on.A bell’uomo is not only a good-looking man, he is also a ‘good man’, someone who is attractive as a person. Bellissimo is much more than ‘good’ or ‘bad’, the ultimate test by which people, gestures and events are judged.The true measure of una bella figura is that it contains a moral message (Jones 2003: 250–1). 241 An exception is the privileged relation that Italy has sought to maintain with the Arab world, especially with the Middle East. Italy also favoured a strong Mediterranean policy because of its interest in energy resources. 242 Once Italy had entered NATO, it faithfully followed American directives. ‘Italian foreign policy during the Cold War was little more than a perfunctory, periodical restatement of the country’s commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and the process of European integration’ (Croci 2002: 90). 243 An explanation that is often given is that the heads of state in the Mediterranean basin were of a predominantly socialist signature: Dom Mintov in Malta, Andrew Papandreou in Greece, Félipe González in Spain and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. 244 Through the multinational ENI. 245 Although one must bear in mind that the major political parties were the only instruments capable of lifting Italy out of the moral and material misery into which it had fallen. 246 An important difference is that parties now have to declare their alliances (and choose their prime minister) before the elections. This reinforces coalition government, even if the centrifugal force of too many parties remains. 247 For an elaboration of these problems, see de Guttry (1995: 10).

Notes 281 248 The third paragraph of article 133 of the constitution stipulates that ‘An issue is put on the agenda of the first session of the committee fifteen days after it has been presented.’ 249 Germano Dottori pointed out to me a rather peculiar dichotomy between ‘individual brilliance’ and ‘system performance’. Italy is the cradle of a great number of brilliant individuals and home to the most creative people on Earth. It is fair to say that this brilliance and creativity is not altogether absent from the public sector. In the military sphere, one will likewise find flashes of (individual) brilliance. The problem is that Italy lacks the qualities to integrate and coordinate these individual talents, actions and policies. Synergy is a question of luck, not of planning. Italy is able to create highly professional small military units, with a high motivation and excellent equipment, able to compete with the best in the world. But it is not for Italy to create a political-military context in which units from a variety of countries are integrated into a single, workable system. 250 Italians themselves describe this policy as the ‘politica del sedere’ (the politics of grabbing a seat), an expression that is attributed to Ambassador Quaroni. Note that ‘sedere’ means both ‘to sit’ and ‘arse’. Some prefer to quote the expression as ‘politica della sedia’ (‘sedia’ means ‘chair’).The desire to occupy a chair at the table is increasingly complemented by the strings that Italy wants to pull. 251 Sant’Egidio is a non-governmental organisation that takes explicit inspiration from its Catholic faith. 252 The arguments have remained the same: the protection of Iraqi Christians and to counter a clash of civilisations in the relationship with Islam. 253 Private conversation with senior Italian military official. 254 Private conversation with a senior official involved at the time. For more than a week in March 1999, the government continued to deny any active military involvement of the Aeronautica Militare in the bombing of the former Yugoslavia. 255 This political document also contains the objectives and content of the mission. When approving the budgetary implications, the mission objectives to which the Italian government commits itself are also formalised. The government cannot change the objectives of the mission without consulting Parliament, thus limiting the autonomy of the government vis-à-vis other participating states. The six months timeframe is not a rule but a consequence of a governmental choice to request funding for a mission for only a six-month period. 256 Ginsborg describes the opposite, overly bureaucratic route for approving the expenditure of public money: ‘Without passing through five administrative stages: parliamentary vote of credits; legal verification by the Council of State (the supreme administrative court of the republic); control by the auditors of each ministry concerned; agreement of the treasury; notification of the Court of Auditors’ (Ginsborg 1990: 150). 257 Cf. the contribution by Greco (1998), who discusses the reasons for creating a coalition of the willing during the Albanian crisis in 1997. 258 Italy participated with smaller contingents in UNTSO (ninety-three men, eleven observers based in Jerusalem); UNMOGIP (seven observers based in India/Pakistan; UNIKOM (five observers in Iraq/Kuwait); MINURSO (Western Sahara, five observers); UNIFIL (forty-six men, four helicopters); IPTF (Bosnia, twenty-three police officers); MINIGUA (Guatemala, five carabinieri). On 1 September 2000, 8,145 military personnel were deployed in operations abroad (Source: Nota aggiuntiva allo stato di previsione per la difesa per l’anno 2001). 259 Italy deployed Tornado fighters to the Gulf, which were involved in the air campaign. 260 Article 11 stipulates that ‘Italy shall repudiate war as an instrument of offence against the liberty of other peoples and as a means for settling international

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disputes; it shall agree, on conditions of equality with other states, to such limitations of sovereignty as may be necessary to allow for a legal system that will ensure peace and justice between nations; it shall promote and encourage international organisations having such ends in view.’ 261 Helmuth Plessner (1992), Verspätete Nation, Frankfurt-am-Main. 262 This notion differs from the process of normalisation elaborated in Chapter 2.

8

National preconditions and multinational action

263 If ‘success’ is defined as achieving predetermined aims and objectives, international crisis management is in an exceptional position because its objectives are not characterised by clear start–execution–conclusion action sequences. 264 Attributed to Baroness Margaret Thatcher. 265 In contrast to what the rational actor model would assume. 266 Readers may recall the novel by Sebastian Junger, The Perfect Storm (1997), which is a tale of an epic fight by fishermen against a ‘perfect’ storm. The image of a ‘perfect storm’ – the result of a unique combination of factors, causing a storm of biblical proportions – differs fundamentally from that of the ‘perfect crisis’, which is, as explained above, ‘perfect’ because it fits national preconditions exactly. 267 The term ‘political’ legitimacy is used here to distinguish it from ‘legal’ legitimacy. For an extensive discussion of this issue, see Hurd (1999). 268 An indication that the international community is increasingly concerned about the effectiveness of the operation on the ground is found in the work done by the panel of experts chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi. This panel was tasked with evaluating the effectiveness of UN operations and to identify the options to reinforce the chances of success of UN peacekeeping operations. 269 For an important contribution, see Vertzberger (1998). 270 ‘[Party leaders] Bos and Balkenende do not want to risk cabinet formation’ was the assessment of a leading daily in the Netherlands as to why the political leadership in the Netherlands gave its political support, but not its military support, to the coalition forces in Iraq. See Floris van Straaten, ‘Nederland beperkt zich tot verbale steun’, NRC Handelsblad, 18 March 2003. A second example is the Belgian position and manoeuvring in NATO, where it became clear that Prime Minister Verhofstadt did not want to wreck his six-party coalition over Iraq.The Flemish Greens (AGALEV) threatened to leave the coalition if the government participated or even supported the coalition forces. 271 The Spanish example is a case in point. The first decision that Prime Minister Zapatero took, hours after being sworn into office, was to revoke the decision to participate in the operation to stabilise Iraq. 272 I realise that it takes more for a plausible line of reasoning to be considered scientifically proved, but for supporting evidence see the account by Everts (2002). 273 For a conclusion along similar lines, see Russett et al. (2000), who speak of a ‘menu for choice’. 274 The information value of this set of constraints is comparable with the information value of the prices of stocks in the financial pages of a newspaper. All stocks are presented with their current values, which may and in most cases will be different tomorrow and again the day after tomorrow. I thank Herman van Gunsteren for this image. 275 In particular the studies by Elster (1985, 1993, 2000). 276 For an overview of the constitutional/legal provisions, see the ‘Report on national parliamentary scrutiny of intervention abroad by armed forces engaged

Notes 283

277 278 279

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in international missions: the current position in law’, 4 December 2001, Rapporteur Mrs Troncho,Western European Union, Document A/1762. See the work by Petersen (1977) and Mouritzen (1988). See Jones (1984) Consider the issue of whether a military unit should be placed under the operational ‘control’ or operational ‘command’ of a multinational force commander. When a unit is under operational control, the force commander can employ the forces within the given mandate, but for nothing else. If the unit is under his operational command, he can employ the unit as he sees fit, even if the situation changes and he needs to adapt the mission or the objectives accordingly. Based on a private conversation with a senior military officer involved in Unprofor.

The relation between government and Parliament

281 In the early months of 2003, a group of more than 140 British MPs put forward a motion calling for reform of the war-making powers within the UK. The motion, titled ‘parliamentary approval of the commitment of UK armed forces to hostilities abroad’, proposed that: Parliament shall have the opportunity to consider and approve the exercise of duties vested in HM Ministers to commit the United Kingdom’s armed forces to hostilities abroad, or to a situation abroad where hostilities are likely, (a) before such a commitment is made by Her Majesty’s Government, where circumstances permit, or (b) where circumstances do not permit, no later than 20 days after deployment. For this purpose the Prime Minister shall present a report to Parliament setting out the circumstances necessitating the commitment of the armed forces; the extent of the commitment, the mandate to be given to the armed forces personnel, and the chain of command in circumstances where joint participation with other nations is anticipated, and the current or anticipated scope and duration of the hostilities … the Government should bring forward a Bill to establish a statutory footing for parliamentary consideration of this exercise of the Royal Prerogative along the lines set out in this Resolution. The status of the motion is unclear, since this motion was not introduced by the government or the opposition and is not expected to come before the House for debate and decision and is thus expected to lapse. See Crum Ewing (2003) for a current assessment. 282 Considering the possibility of an optimal tightness of bounds, I refer to the work by Elster, who reflected on this mechanism when contemplating sports. ‘In football’ he argues, ‘there is ceaseless adjustment of rules so as to make athletes and players bound neither too tightly nor too loosely. Here, the purpose is to make things just difficult enough to present the participants with a challenge that can be met and the spectators with a sight they can enjoy’ (Elster 2000: 281). A similar mechanism can be observed in politics as the lines demarcating the distribution of power between Parliament and government are not absolute but the subject of continuous debate and ceaseless adjustment in order to provide the spectators not only with a ‘sight they can enjoy’ but also with an effective democratic process. 283 Formally, this was done on the basis of military advice, not because Parliament insisted. See the evidence given by General Reitsma before the TCBU (TCBU (I) 2000: 156) and the transcript of the parliamentary debate (HTK, 1994–94, 22 181, No. 74, p. 6).

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Notes

284 ’t Hart observed a similar mechanism in his study, Groupthink in Government (1994: 185). 285 Parliament accepted a government apology after the Rwanda crisis, but it did not accept an apology in the so-called dioxin crisis in 1999 and sent the entire government home. 286 I am indebted to Professor Herman van Gunsteren for sharing his views on this matter with me. This section builds to a large extent on the ideas that have emerged from those discussions. 287 Almost as an afterthought, one realises the need for consensus engines. A consensus engine is a device that speeds up the political process without sacrificing thoroughness, transparency and accountability. I have begun to elaborate this idea in Houben (2002). For a similar line of thought, see Bauman (2002).

Annex 288 Letter to Parliament by the ministers of foreign affairs and defence, dated 19 July 2001.Translation by the author. 289 The government is obliged in its considerations to review all points for consideration.

Bibliography

This bibliography consists of three separate sections.The first section,‘Official publications’, is organised nationally and contains the relevant publications from official sources: government, Parliament, individual ministries and speeches by serving cabinet ministers or government officials. Excluded are publications issued by political parties. The titles of official publications in Dutch, Danish, Italian, Spanish and Norwegian have been translated into English and appear in brackets directly after the original. French and German publications have been left untranslated. The second section contains monographs, chapters and articles in alphabetical order. The third section contains newspaper articles without reference to an author.

Official publications Belgium Belgian Senate and Chamber of Representatives (1998) Beleidsnota van de Regering over de Belgische Deelname aan vredesoperaties [White Paper from the Government on Belgian Participation in Peace Operations], Kamernummer 1394/1 – 97/98, Brussels. Michel, Louis (2000) address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 13 September 2000. Ministry of Defence (1994) Defence White Paper 1994, Brussels. Ministry of Defence (2001) Plan voor de aanpassing van de Krijgsmacht (2000–2015) [Plan for the Adaptation of the Belgian Armed Forces (2000–2015)], Brussels. Senate (1997) Verslag Parlementaire Commissie van Onderzoek betreffende de gebeurtenissen in Rwanda [Report of the Parliamentary Commission on the Events in Rwanda], Nummer Senaat 1-611/7, Brussels. Verhofstadt, Guy (2002) letter from Guy Verhofstadt to President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Tony Blair, 18 July 2003, in Haine, Jean-Yves, From Laeken to Copenhagen, Paris: EU/ISS. Verhofstadt, Guy (2003) ‘Pleidooi voor een nieuw Atlanticisme’ [‘Plea for a new Atlanticism’], Hofstadlezing,The Hague, 19 February 2003.

Denmark Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament (1993) Danish Security Policy. A Survey by the Board of the Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament, Copenhagen: SNU.

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Bibliography

Danish Defence Commission of 1997, Defence for the Future, Copenhagen: Danish Defence Commission of 1997. Fogh Rasmussen, Anders (2003) ‘Why Denmark participated in the war in Iraq’, Berlingske Tidene, 26 March 2003. Available online at