International Assistance and State-University Relations (Studies in Higher Education)

International Assistance and State-University Relations

Studies in Higher Education PHILIP G. ALTBACH, General Editor

I Prefer to Teach An International Comparison of Faculty Preference for Teaching over Research James JF Forest

The Call for Diversity Pressure, Expectation, and Organizational Response in the Postsecondary Setting David J. Siegel

The Virtual Delivery and Virtual Organization of Postsecondary Education Daniel M. Carchidi

Scientific Communication in African Universities External Assistance and National Needs Damtew Teferra

Barely There, Powerfully Present Thirty Years of U.S. Policy on International Higher Education Nancy L. Ruther

Philanthropists in Higher Education Institutional, Biographical, and Religious Motivations for Giving Gregory L. Cascione

A Call to Purpose Mission-Centered Change at Three Liberal Arts Colleges Matthew Hartley

The Rise and Fall of Fu Ren University, Beijing Catholic Higher Education in China John Shujie Chen

A Profile of the Community College Professorate, 1975–2000 Charles Outcalt

University-Industry Partnerships in MIT, Cambridge, and Tokyo Storytelling across Boundaries Sachi Hatakenaka

Power and Politics in University Governance Organization and Change at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Imanol Ordorika University Autonomy in the Russian Federation since Perestroika Olga B. Bain

The Women’s Movement and the Politics of Change at a Women’s College Jill Ker Conway at Smith, 1975-1985 David A. Greene Acting ‘Otherwise’ The Institutionalization of Women’s/ Gender Studies in Taiwan’s Universities Peiying Chen

Teaching and Learning in Diverse Classrooms Faculty Reflections on Their Experiences and Pedagogical Practices of Teaching Diverse Populations Carmelita Rosie Castañeda The Transformation of the Student Career University Study in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden Michael A. Nugent Teacher Education for Critical Consumption of Mass Media and Popular Culture Stephanie A. Flores-Koulish When For-Profit Meets Nonprofit Educating Through the Market Jared L. Bleak Democratizing Higher Education Policy Constraints of Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa Molatlhegi Trevor Chika Sehoole Coming of Age Women’s Colleges in the Philippines during the Post-Marcos Era Francesca B. Purcell Does Quality Pay? Benefits of Attending a High-Cost, Prestigious College Liang Zhang Adaptation of Western Economics by Russian Universities Intercultural Travel of an Academic Field Tatiana Suspitsyna

Dominant Beliefs and Alternative Voices Discourse, Belief, and Gender in American Study Abroad Joan Elias Gore Inhabiting the Borders Foreign Language Faculty in American Colleges and Universities Robin Matross Helms The Changing Landscape of the Academic Profession The Culture of Faculty at For-Profit Colleges and Universities Vicente M. Lechuga The WTO and the University Globalization, GATS, and American Higher Education Roberta Malee Bassett Merit Aid and the Politics of Education Erik C. Ness International Assistance and StateUniversity Relations Jo Bastiaens

International Assistance and State-University Relations

Jo Bastiaens

New York

London

First published 2009 by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2009 Taylor & Francis All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Bastiaens, Jo. International assistance and state-university relations / by Jo Bastiaens. p. cm. — (Studies in higher education) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-415-99074-5 1. Education, Higher—Developing countries. 2. Educational assistance—Developing countries. 3. Higher education and state—Developing countries. I. Title. LC2610.B37 2009 379.1'291724—dc22 2008020282 ISBN 0-203-88816-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-99074-2 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-88816-2 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-99074-5 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-88816-2 (ebk)

To Christel, for partnership and support, in good and bad days . . . . . . And to Eli, Aaron, and Noa, our hopes for a better future

Contents

List of Figures List of Tables Preface Acknowledgments 1

2

3

Introduction

xi xiii xv xix 1

I. Background and Justification II. Problem Statement, Research Questions, and Time Line III. Conceptual Framework IV. Themes and Sub-Themes V. Methods and Data VI. Organization of the Study

1 6 9 16 19 22

International Assistance Goals

25

I. Dutch Assistance in Higher Education II. World Bank Lending to Higher Education in Indonesia III. Summary

26 45 67

International Donor Efforts

69

I.

4

The Context of International Development Assistance in Indonesia II. The Political Economy of Higher Education in Indonesia III. International Assistance Efforts in Higher Education IV. Donor Efforts and Funding Patterns at the Institutional Level V. Conclusion

90 93

Outcomes

95

I.

95

Introduction

71 84 88

x

5

Contents II. Words Matter: Donors and the Language of ‘Reform’ in Indonesia’s Higher Education III. Process Outcomes and Variables IV. Product Outcomes: Integrating Conditions for Institutional Autonomy

120

Assistance and Autonomy: Possibility or Contradiction?

147

I. Relevance to Theoretical Frames and Literature Review II. Relevance to Policy and Practice: (How) Can International Assistance Be Made (More) Autonomy Compatible?

149

Annexes Notes Bibliography Index

98 106

157 161 179 209 231

Figures

3.1

Funding Sources for Higher Education (1985-88)

90

3.2

Distribution of Project Components Old Paradigm

91

3.3

Distribution of Project Components New Paradigm

91

3.4

Institutional Budgets by Level of Assistance Received (1980–95)

92

4.1 5.1

Prismatic Framework for Assessing Dimensions of Congruency

107

Ideal Typical Steering Models in Higher Education

154

ANNEX 1 2

Development of Bilateral and Multilateral ODA in Indonesia (1975–1999)

164

Higher Education Expansion in Indonesia, Enrollments 1971–1998 by Private/Public Sector

169

Tables and Graphs

2.1

Overview of Dutch Policy Documents and Higher Education Programs

29

2.2

Dutch Assistance Goals

31

2.3

PUO-II Program in Indonesia

34

2.4

World Bank Strategies in Indonesian Higher Education and State-University Relations

49

Sectoral Distribution of International Project Aid* (1984–1998, 3 Year Average Percentages)

75

3.2

Third Level Students Studying Abroad (selected years)

79

3.3

Sectoral Distribution of Bank Lending (Fiscal Years)

80

3.4

Dutch Aid Intensity Index for Indonesia

83

3.5

Indonesia’s Share in Dutch (Higher) Education Assistance Expenditures, by Type of Intervention, 1990 (1,000 Fl.)

84

3.1

4.1

Overview and Brief Discussion of Key Documents Regarding the World Bank’s HED ‘Policy Dialogue’ with Indonesia in Years Preceding Formulation of New Paradigm

100

4.2

Institutional Perspectives on Autonomy in Indonesia

104

4.3

Level, Depth and Scope of Change

121

4.4

Autonomy and Change of Legal Status

131

4.5

High Receivers of International Assistance/High Performers of Self-generating Income

140

xiv Tables and Graphs ANNEX 1

List of Interviewees

162

2

Official Development Assistance in Millions of USD

164

3

Multilateral Donor Funded Projects in Higher Education in Indonesia 1975–1997

165

External Funding of Higher Education by Province, and by IBRD share (1980–1995)

166

5(a)

World Bank Lending for Education, 1963–2005

167

5(b)

World Bank Lending for Education. New Commitments by Region (1963–2005)

168

World Bank Loan Projects with the Directorate General of Higher Education, by Objectives, Costs and Bank Share

170

External Funding of HED Institutions, by Institution and by Share of World Bank and Dutch Assistance (1980–1995)

172

Budget Structure of Indonesia Public Institutions of Higher Education (1998/99), by Institution (1,000 Rp.)

175

4

6 7 8

Preface

The initial plans for the research presented in this book took root about fi fteen years ago, at a point when I was contemplating the prospects of a professional career as a university development assistance bureau chief in Brussels. Earlier fi eld work experience in Asia and as development assistance program manager in different kinds of bilateral and multilateral contexts had drawn my attention to the manifest lack of research based knowledge regarding the impact of international assistance in that area, and its relationship to domestic politics and policies regarding higher education in particular. So, instead of becoming a bureau chief, I pursued the more uncertain yet exciting path of graduate studies that would ultimately bring me to write the Ph.D. dissertation that constitutes the basis of this book. In this book I explore goals and efforts of international assistance to Indonesia’s higher education from the late 1970s up to the early beginnings of this century. More specifi cally, the study investigates the ways in which international assistance responded to changing State-University relations in Indonesia throughout this period. My research furthermore focused on the question how international donors affected the institutional autonomy of Indonesia’s State universities. With hindsight, preliminary thoughts for this project originated in the early 1990s, when I worked as a junior professional staff for education at UNESCO’s Jakarta Offi ce. The job gave me a privileged view on the nature and depth of Indonesia’s bureaucratic centralism, which at the time reined the political, educational, and fi nancial organization of the country’s national education system from top to bottom. In addition, I was struck by the irony that international donors, who themselves do not enjoy a particularly good reputation when it comes to decentralizing decision making in own ranks, were moving Indonesia’s government to decentralize funding and educational decision making (notably in curriculum development) to ‘local levels’. My gut feeling was instead that ‘aid’ and ‘autonomy’ would be tough partners to be matched, let alone that foreign assistance could somehow be positively related to institutional autonomy at the university level.

xvi

Preface

The book nonetheless concludes that international aid in Indonesia facilitated and at times actively encouraged changing patterns of State-university relations from direct State control towards policies and steering mechanisms inducing increased institutional autonomy. Case studies reveal empirical evidence of a mutually reinforcing dynamic involving donors and domestic reformers that had a prominent impact on the way public universities are managed in Indonesia. International donor goals and ideologies about institutional capacity building—while often ambitious—responded surprisingly well to domestic and international contextual conditions and were picked up by actors supporting more decentralized decision making, in the process helping develop domestic rationales for a changing government role. In addition, donor efforts were instrumental in changing, expanding and diversifying the resource base for higher education in general and of selected institutions specifically. The analysis of assistance outcomes, finally, does indicate a prominent role of international donors in developing and in some cases implementing institutional strategies to diversify resources, to generate income, and become increasingly autonomous from government. In a sense, my own research has proven my earlier intuitions to be wrong on all accounts. First, I discovered that higher education systems, even sturdy bureaucratic systems, can change in fundamental ways. Within the Indonesian system of public higher education, there is now more institutional differentiation overall, much more fi nancial resource diversification and institutional autonomy than there ever was before. At the political level, notably, the downfall of Soeharto in the late 1990s and the ensuing promises of democracy and pluralism of the still ongoing era of transition and reform (‘reformasi’) provide the current debate on campus autonomy with an entirely new political context to deal with. Secondly, the study indicates that international donor agencies in given contexts and under some conditions can contribute to real change, in spite of their own structural shortcomings. These contexts and conditions in essence relate to the dynamic between the global level, where institutional norms are created and disseminated (in part by some of the major international donors), on the one hand, and the domestic environment, where these norms are absorbed (or not), emulated and readjusted to meet the national structures and conditions on the other hand. Third, international assistance can be an instrumental force, probably among many other vehicles, to further the concept and implementation of institutional autonomy. In spite of the apparently optimistic undertone, the book does not read as an overall blessing of the international aid business per se. The research concerns one case study, in one particular country and one particular subsector of international assistance, and calls for more empirical work in other countries and sectors. Furthermore, the fi nding that donors can be instrumental in realizing effective change does not necessarily imply that this is necessarily always the case. Instead, there is more to be learned from the empirical description and analysis of key conditions that make

Preface xvii international assistance in higher education more autonomy compatible. And fi nally, even though international donor agencies may be found to be effective change agents or at least be promoters of university autonomy, we did not take into consideration the quality of these changes (e.g. what kind of autonomy for whom?) nor did we dwell long too long on the effects of institutional autonomy on the academic quality of Indonesia’s higher education.

Acknowledgments

This study would not have been possible without the support and collaboration of others. I owe a debt of gratitude to many individuals and organizations who generously shared their time, insights, and experiences with me, gave me access to their archives and invited me to witness or participate in seminars, meetings, and other activities. Along the way, I discovered that research is defi nitely not just the ‘solitary business’ for which is often held in standard research mythology. Most of all, I am thankful to Daniel C. Levy, who encouraged me to further explore this line of research, in the process challenging me to continuously look for discomforting evidence and to attempt to reach for the highest quality of scholarly work. Undoubtedly, he was a beacon of support for me to ‘ultimately’ fi nalize the project. I also thank all the people who have contributed during the long path to this point and for their continued interest. A special word of thanks goes to the interviewees around the globe who took time to share their personal views and experiences on this research. Thanks to the globalized setting in which research currently takes place, I was able to communicate with current and former participants, scholars and observers on a worldwide scale, at times from my own living room in Belgium. Nonetheless, I cannot but underline the added value of having been able to meet and talk with so many of my informants on a face-to-face basis. In Indonesia, at the time of my field research in late 1999, many former and current university leaders and high ranking government officers, lecturers and students freely spent loads of time with me to give their perspective on the issue of ‘university autonomy’ and the perceived role of international donors therein. Luckily for me, it was also a special moment in Indonesia’s history (the very fi rst democratic election of the country’s President, with televised Parliamentary debates and voting, and student unrest in Jakarta), but also a moment when university autonomy was high on the agenda of many of Indonesia’s State universities. In particular, I thank Bagyo Moeliodihardjo, the man behind the scenes who during his academic career made the quest for more university autonomy the core of his ‘extracurricular’ service activities. My gratitude extends to the many

xx

Acknowledgments

independent voices in Indonesia who do not take autonomy for granted. A special word of thanks goes to Professor Sediono Tjondronegoro, Paulus Wirutomo, Muljani Nurhadi, and to Ben and Maria Waworuntu. I also wish to thank the World Bank’s Jakarta Office, who allowed me to explore their archives and let me copy a wealth of internal communications and memos. Thanks in particular to Christopher Smith and Jeremy Strudwick, for their reflections, but also for their contributions to the arrangements of meetings, interviews, and for temporary lodging. In the Netherlands, I profited greatly from the insights of Indonesia specialist par excellence Nico Schulte-Nordholt, as well as from the policy ‘insides’ of former associates in the Dutch university linkage program in Indonesia, Harry Brinkman, and Theo Veenkamp. I also thank NUFFIC for granting me full access to their archives and project documents, including all the project evaluations. Closer to home, and not in the least, the continued support and encouragement from my wife Christel made this project feasible and worth all the efforts. Her tough questions helped me—at times forced me—to transform my own goals and efforts into effective outcomes. In their own lovable ways, Eli, Aaron, and Noa Bastiaens, all contributed and happily took care of ‘required interruptions’ on a long term process. I dedicate this book to them. Leuven March 31st 2008

1

Introduction

“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be the master—that’s all” (Lewis Carroll) International assistance to developing countries has received its share of controversy and debate over the recent past, and its motives, goals, resources and effectiveness continue to be the subject of much debate in both academic and policy circles. While already a considerable body of research has examined goals, efforts and results of international aid, much less attention so far has been given to studies of specific types of assistance in particular domestic policy environments. In education specifically, questions regarding the impact of international (f)actors–assistance arguably being only one of those—in relation to educational development have drawn the interest of scholars for some time (Schriewer & Holmes, 1988). Designed as a case-study of international assistance, this book explores how goals and efforts of two selected international donors of Indonesian higher education over the past decades have affected and responded to domestic State-university relations in that country. This introductory chapter fi rst of all provides the contextual background for the study, and states the research problem in relation to conceptual frameworks suggested by the literature. In the next section I will discuss the methods, type of data, and analytical procedures that have been applied. Finally, the chapter sets out the organization of the study, introducing the core theme and sub-themes that will be elaborated in the ensuing chapters.

I.

BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION

1. International Assistance to Education in Indonesia During most of Indonesia’s relatively young history, international assistance has figured prominently in the development of its educational system in general, and of its of higher education specifically (Cummings & Kasenda, 1989).1 Three general features of international assistance in Indonesia merit particular attention here as they provide the general context of this study.

2

International Assistance and State-University Relations

First, the magnitude of the effort as measured in both the absolute and relative volume of resources invested by international donor agencies has been remarkable, and this in at least two respects. Not only has the overall volume of external assistance been noteworthy in relation to the country’s overall public investments, 2 Indonesia overall has also consistently represented an extraordinary large share of the assistance portfolio’s of some of the world’s major multilateral and bilateral donors, and this especially in education.3 International donor agencies and bilateral programs for many years have invested heavily and consistently in supporting Indonesian education and continue to do so (ADB, 1998; USAID, 1988; World Bank, 1990, 1998b). Secondly, international assistance to education in Indonesia stands out because of its specific focus on higher education in particular, an observation which again is reflected in figures and program priorities of donors individually and collectively.4 This emphasis is furthermore reflected in the prominent place that international funding has taken in the country’s overall public resources for higher education, at times accounting for more than half of the total higher education development budget.5 And while these indications of international effort in and by themselves are not necessarily viable indicators of specific outcomes or impact, they do provide overall context and justification for empirical analyses of particular aspects of that assistance. Third, while donors in Indonesia have given for a variety of purposes and in a variety of ways, they have often pursued the development of higher education institutions as a justified goal of their activities in that country. To be sure, and as elsewhere, assistance programs in Indonesian higher education have also served broader sectoral (e.g. training teachers for secondary schools) and even cross-sectoral objectives (e.g. supporting the country’s research capacity for industrial or technological development).6 But in addition to that, activities of many donors included goals that can be more narrowly related to the higher education sub-sector per se. The World Bank in particular draws attention in that regard. Earlier analyses of its lending activities worldwide have cited Indonesia as one of only two of its client countries (with China) illustrating an integrated sub-sector approach of its lending for higher education based on years of sustained policy dialogue and sector analysis (Eisemon, 1992).7 But also other multilateral (especially the Asian Development Bank) and bilateral donors (among them, Japan, Australia, the United States, and the Netherlands most prominently) over the years have supported higher education development with a plethora of initiatives and projects ranging from programs for staff development, overseas training, maintenance and upgrading of laboratory facilities, to the support of broad-based inter-university partnerships or linkages with institutions at home or elsewhere. Clearly, the rationales and priorities, efforts and outcomes of these various programs vary among donors and may have changed considerably over time. This research in particular investigates goals (policies), efforts (resources and processes) and effects (outcomes) of two selected international assistance

Introduction 3 agencies from the perspective of the changing relationship between the State and ‘its’ public universities in Indonesia (see next section). The two cases–i.e. the World Bank and Dutch bilateral assistance—broadly represent two different modes of assistance. One is multilateral, the other bilateral. One is a very big donor internationally as well as in Indonesia, the other has been historically well connected to the Indonesian context for a long time, but even at that time has remained comparatively small in terms of resources. One is in essence a Bank, which raises capital from the international financial market in order to lend money to client-governments for investment projects and programs in sectors deemed productive in terms of development; the other is a government, mostly providing grant money for a range of projects and programs often with substantial components tied to inputs (i.e. personnel, training places . . . ) from the giving country. This study is not set up to compare the two types of assistance on a predetermined set of parameters, but rather will highlight conceptual and empirical differences in light of explicit or implied effects on State-university relations. Specifically, the World Bank’s assistance to Indonesian higher education was selected because of its volume, its longstanding sub-sectoral strategy in higher education, its higher education policy dialogue with the Indonesian government, and its broader political significance in Indonesia in general (USAID, 1988). Excluding this donor’s activities in Indonesian higher education indeed would be particularly hard to justify. On its part, the Dutch bilateral programs in education assistance too have been prominent internationally and as noted used to be heavily concentrated on Indonesia in particular.8 Specifically, Dutch assistance in the area of higher education has been well known internationally for its support of linkages between universities in the Netherlands and institutions in the developing countries (Coombe, 1989; de Gast, 1995). The decentralized nature and mode of implementation of these university-to-university linkages provide a contrasting perspective to the policy-oriented interventions of the other donor. Finally, Dutch assistance to Indonesia has been prominent through the 1980s and up to 1992, when its country representative headed the already mentioned group of donors to Indonesia, but came to a sudden and complete standstill in 1992, when Jakarta rejected all further assistance in response to a Dutch decision to link further aid to progress in human rights (Grant & Nijman, 1998). Even though the rupture per se has not been central to this book’s overall theme, it does underscore the intrinsically political nature of the aidrelationship–even in education—and at least in that sense provides further context to the study.

2.

State-University Relations in Indonesia

The analysis of changing relations between governments and higher education over the past decades has received growing attention from both scholars and practitioners worldwide (Levy, 1986; Neave, 1994). As in other East and

4

International Assistance and State-University Relations

South East Asian countries, a markedly powerful central State traditionally shaped the relationship between the State and the universities in Indonesia. While the dominant pattern of State-control has been attributed by some to the country’s politically turbulent history (Thomas, 1973), its main structural features at the same time reflect rather well main characteristics of the so-called Asian human resource approach (Cummings, 1995; Tilak, 2002). Core components of that pattern include the central coordinating role of the State in planning, funding, and regulating the national education system (Thomas, 1992), an overall preference to invest public funds for education primarily in primary education (Lewin, 1998), relatively more limited and selective public funding for higher education overall, and the presence of a very large private sector of higher education. Specific to Indonesia, albeit again not unique, is furthermore the centralizing tendency resulting from the State’s firm emphasis on higher education’s role in attending to and maintaining the unity of the country (Balderston & Balderston, 1993). Indonesia’s higher education system expanded rapidly from a very small base at the time of independence (about 250 university graduates and three institutions) to a currently massive system which in 1996 served 2,6 million students in 77 public institutions and 1,228 private schools (Ministry of Education and Culture, 1997). While the public institutions represent a minority in number of institutions and enrollments (65% of the students are in private institutions), it is the key sector in public funding and policy, provision in strategic areas, academic, social and political status and prestige. Within Indonesia’s higher education, direct State control—i.e. centralized funding and standardized regulation—has traditionally been found to be the dominant mode at public institutions and specifically so in areas of finance and resource allocation (Thomas, 1992). Notably, and in sharp contrast with private institutions, which receive over 90% of their income from tuition and registration fees (Pardoen, 1998), public institutions until recently have remained almost entirely dependent on the central government allocation.9 The practice of line item budgeting has been most common, although lately alternative funding mechanisms (i.e. block grants, competitive funding schemes) have been introduced in the allocation of research grants and development funds. Extra-governmental sources of income for public institutions include earnings from tuition and other fees from students, contracts (including foreign aid that is directly channeled to the institutions), and private donations. Following the Education Law of 1989, the Ministry in 1990 formally granted institutions more autonomy in determining how to spend the proceeds of this self-generated income. Since public institutions up to that point were at least formally considered as integrated parts of the education ministry itself (universities were formally referred to as ‘service units’ of the State ), this self-generated income in principle could only be recognized and accounted for as ‘non-tax State income’, which not only had to be reported to the Ministry of Finance, but for which the institutions also needed to get the necessary spending approvals from ‘the center’.

Introduction 5 Even after the 1990 regulation, however, and until very recent (legislation in 2000 introduced a new legal status for public universities which so far has been granted only to six leading institutions), the degree of financial autonomy continues to be widely regarded by informants as relatively restricted in practice, in particular regarding these self-generated resources.10 Moreover, and as noted, the self-generated income represents only a small—albeit possibly growing—share of the public institutions’ overall income. One conservative estimate indicates that even the most enterprising of the nation’s state universities typically received 80% or more of their revenue from the central government budget, yet at the same time acknowledges that reliable data are particularly hard to get (Bray & Thomas, 1998). More recent data (1997–1998) indicate that the share of self-generated income at the country’s four leading State universities ranges from 22% up to 45% of their respective total institutional budgets (Team for University Autonomy, 1999). Most recent reforms indicate that income-generating activities are being regularized by changing the legal status of these institutions. Apart from the formal regulatory framework and the financial constraints, Indonesia’s State-university relations have traditionally evidenced a range of informal decision-making processes, which not only run counter to most normative ideas of what autonomy should or should not contain, but also make clear institutional boundary lines between the university and the State particularly hard to draw. For instance, it is common practice for decision-makers at the ministry’s directorate general to consult regularly and at times systematically with rectors and vice-rectors of State universities—specifically those of leading public universities—in special task forces or committees.11 At the same time, top officials in the ministry’s directorate-general for higher education are typically recruited from the former rectors or academics of these universities. Rectors, in turn, are appointed by the (Head of) State. Not surprisingly, decision making at public universities has been characterized by some observers as a “process of negotiation and compromise between top university leaders and government officials, who in most cases have a university affiliation of their own” (Cummings, Malo, & Sunarto, 1997). The characterization fits snugly with the concept of ‘bureaucratic polity’, defined by Riggs as a polity “dominated by appointed officials” (Riggs, 1993), and which provides the broader framework of this period. This context of blurred State-university division lines furthermore leaves little ample room for institutional autonomy as such. Instead, the perspective of the ‘institutional middle’ (Clark, 1983) appears to be lacking altogether. In the past decade, Indonesia has embarked on a comprehensive reform of its higher education system involving a new role of the State and entailing a more decentralized system of management and funding for its public institutions. Significantly, the reform process was initiated by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC), which in late 1994 established a Higher Education Task Force charged to prepare a new concept for a higher education strategy for the coming decade. The concept paper resulted in the

6

International Assistance and State-University Relations

so-called ‘New Paradigm’, the intent of which was to further the quality of Indonesia’s higher education by establishing new mechanisms to enhance decentralized planning and performance-based resource allocation at the institutional level (DGHE, Ministry of Education and Culture, 1996). As noted, earlier government decrees that intended to increase the autonomy of higher education institutions remained relatively restricted in scope and implementation. The language of the New Paradigm, however, suggested a fundamentally altered role of the State, instead involving greater autonomy and accountability of the institutions. Rather than providing detailed regulation and a centrally controlled implementation mechanism, the ministry’s role at the center would become one of setting the rules of the game (and leave oversight of implementation to newly established intermediary bodies), providing incentives so that resources are directed to high-priority areas and that all institutions are encouraged to raise their standards, and provide public funding more selectively and competitively to that end. At the institutional level, increasing responsibilities will imply greater autonomy (from the State), new forms of accountability (towards State and society at large), and quite possibly changing governing structures and power configurations. The focus of these reform efforts was initially on transforming the public institutions—specifically targeted on only 4 of the leading State universities—but has in the meantime been broadened to include not only the other public institutions but also the private institutions. As for the latter, legislation was introduced in 2001 with the explicit purpose to ensure the institutional autonomy of private universities vis-à-vis the private foundations (ie. the so-called ‘Yayasans’). In summary, the autonomy-accountability mix for some time now has become the subject of major reform efforts in Indonesia’s higher education landscape directly touching upon some of its traditional structural features. The boundaries that make up “the zone of negotiation” (Tight, 1992) between the State and academe are in flux. Given the country’s history of centralized State control, and taking into consideration the lack of managerial traditions at the intra-university level centrally, the outcome of this change effort remains highly uncertain to date, even more so in light of the on-going political transformation and change of regime. Of more immediate interest to this study, however, is how international actors have responded to—possibly even contributed to—changing patterns of Stateuniversity relations in Indonesia.

II. PROBLEM STATEMENT, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND TIME LINE The dominant themes of Indonesia’s higher education policy reforms resonate remarkably well with the major tenets of the international reform agenda now actively pursued in various parts of the world and promoted by

Introduction 7 many governments and international agencies (Levy, 1997; Schwartzman, 2001). The relationship between governments and higher education institutions has been under close scrutiny in many parts of the world for some time now, and this not only in developing countries (Neave, 1994). At many places where traditions of centralized control and standardization run deep, policy makers have been experimenting with alternative approaches and mechanisms to provide, fund, manage or otherwise direct higher education opportunities, in the process often increasing or attempting to increase the autonomy and accountability of institutions to extra-university forces. To be sure, reports of international tendencies and reforms are not new to the field and their significance and even validity under otherwise widely different circumstances continues to preoccupy many scholars and practitioners in education. Conceptual similarities with broader international agendas nonetheless provide a useful starting point in a study that sets out to empirically analyze the actions and interactions of selected international actors within the domestic policy environment of one particular country. Specifically, this book investigates goals and efforts of international assistance to Indonesia’s higher education from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, and explores how they have affected and responded to changing State-university relations in Indonesia over that time period. The study focuses in particular on the goals and efforts generated by two selected donor agencies and furthermore zooms in on the ways in which their goals and interventions have affected the relative autonomy of public institutions in matters of fi nance and resource allocation. The analysis will be conducted at three related yet conceptually different levels involving the following specific research questions: (1) What are stated and implicit goals of the two international assistance agencies in relation to their support of higher education in Indonesia—in general as well as pertaining to specific programs and activities—and to what extent do these goals correspond with patterns of State-university relations identified in the literature? (2) In what ways are donor efforts (i.e. resource flows and mechanisms of assistance) related to changing patterns of higher education fi nancing in Indonesia? (3) To what extent have international assistance goals and efforts—either intentionally or inadvertently—affected the fi nancial autonomy of public institutions? The three-part breakdown helps to organize analytically distinct aspects of international assistance while recognizing some degree of overlap. The purpose nonetheless is to achieve relatively inclusive dimensions of assistance that merit separate treatment in their own right. They are analyzed respectively in Chapters 2 through 4. The study’s design does not suggest agreement with a linear policy model, in which social effects or impacts

8

International Assistance and State-University Relations

are studied as direct outcomes of policies, which in turn are assumed to be directly related to efforts and goals. Instead, the analysis will provide relatively equal weight to the three dimensions on their own right, recognizing, for instance the ideological import of donor goals vis-à-vis the implied role of the State, or the relative weight of donor funds in relation to domestic budgets, the impact of the broader international as well as domestic political and economic context etc. Changes over time and differences between the two selected agencies will be included in the analysis. Chapter 5 ties together the results of these case study analyses identifying and elaborating common themes and relationships from the evidence presented. The search for an adequate terminology continues in the main literatures that guide this study. Cross-national variation and translation often aggravate problems of conceptual or definitional disagreements within the field concerned. This study in general pragmatically follows the literature (including government documents) whenever possible, and clarifies choices as they arise. While key concepts will be defi ned in the next sections, two special cases merit consideration here because they appear so prominently in the title. First, the term “international assistance” is a broad denominator to reflect the common ground of two otherwise very different cases. For that reason, it is preferable to potential alternatives such as “international aid” or “development cooperation” which each cover our case only partially. At the same time, “assistance” differentiates the subject of this book from other potentially relevant international—some now argue global— forces, like fi nance, trade, or other types of exchange.12 On the other hand, the term “State-university relations” helps to reflect the peculiarity of the Indonesian case, and more specifically the prominent place of the central State in higher education, and casts the study explicitly in relational terms, thereby underscoring the relative nature of autonomy. Use of the word “universities” in that connection furthermore provides an early indication of the real area of concentration—both thematically and in terms of donor and government attention—; it does not suggest that other sectors of “higher education” have not been included. The use of such broad terms as ‘State’ and ‘international assistance’ of course carries the substantial risk of ‘reification’, which can only be reduced through empirical analysis of specific cases of organizations, projects, and even the role of individual personalities. Thus, different ministries and agencies—and the individuals who represent them—often do have varying commitments to programs and policies and these will be mapped out as much as possible. The time span of this study runs from the late 1970s through the late 1990s yet builds inroads to the current stage of regime transformation. The year 1978 was a particularly turbulent year for Indonesia’s State-society relations in general and its State-university relations specifically. In the aftermath of student protests in Bandung and Jakarta against a second extension of Soeharto’s presidential term in offi ce, the government—and its newly appointed minister of education in particular—

Introduction 9 interfered prominently with campus life, leading one informant to identify that period as a “turning point” in State-university relations.13 While student protests may have sparked off the reaction, increasing government control extended to many other areas of campus life as well, including appointments and removals of university administrators, restrictions on student organizations, curriculum, fi nances, and academic freedom. Importantly, 1978 also was the year in which the two donor agencies selected in this study started major new programs in support of Indonesian higher education.14 At the other end of the time spectrum, the research formally closes with the breakdown of the New Order regime in 1998 but at the same time the book discusses how university autonomy was carried further into the past decade of regime transformation. Again, the period can be characterized by high turbulence in society and at university campuses, as international news reports continue to demonstrate quite forcefully (Cohen, 1998; Aspinall, 2005: 116–144). Increased institutional autonomy not only had become a core feature of stated government policy in higher education, especially in light of the New Paradigm of the DGHE. But the wider idea of autonomy now also gained currency in many other sections of society, including local government, business, and ethnic groups. As time periods are always somewhat artificial constructs, the concluding chapter will also attempt to relate the study’s fi ndings to recent developments and prospects regarding the role of international assistance in relation to university autonomy in New Indonesia.

III.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This section sets out the conceptual framework of the study from the literature, and connects the study’s research question to themes from previous research. A schematic presentation of the conceptual framework is attached at the end of this chapter.

1.

International Education Assistance

For some time now, scholars have shown interest in the structural features of international assistance to education in developing countries, and specifically how these can be related to broader concerns in education and development. Still, in her report to the inter-agency working group of donors to education, one analyst notes that while the attention of donors in areas of social development has grown markedly in the 1990s, this focus has generally not been matched by a particularly large body of knowledge about the purposes, efforts and mechanisms–let alone the results—of educational assistance (Buchert, 1995). Similar albeit more specific complaints about the “inadequacies” of the existing knowledge basis have been formulated with regard to university assistance in particular (Levy, 2005). In her analysis

10

International Assistance and State-University Relations

of educational multilateralism, Mundy calls for a critical re-evaluation of international organizations in education, beyond the historical case studies of particular organizations, and the (neo)Marxist or (neo)institutionalist accounts (Mundy, 1998). Scholars have not only pleaded for more empirical attention, necessarily involving extensive program and project-level analyses of how educational policy making is mediated by donor agencies, but also for more critical and at the same time comparative reflection of the institutional norms and how they are emulated (or not) in domestic contexts. Regarding donor goals and policies, Buchert’s own conceptual classification of education aid policies provides a first starting point for narrowing the discussion further to the relationship between assistance and domestic policy.15 Specifically, the author contrasts four types of education aid policies based on the relative support these provide for an economic growth as opposed to a social welfare development strategy.16 The typology of donor aid policies is significant to our study because the basis for its distinctions feeds directly into the on-going debate on the appropriate role of the State, and the nature of its involvement in education in particular. The typology will therefore be helpful in classifying donor agencies according to the extent to which they may or may not be expected to support certain State roles in higher education. Building on the aid-giving model developed by Pressman in connection to U.S. federal aid programs in Oakland, Kreiner suggests a model of multilateral aid-giving that portrays the intermediary role of international aid agencies (Kreiner, 1984). The author in particular calls attention to the variety of organizational objectives of those participating in the aid-giving environment and how these are mediated in the aid-giving process.17 While not directly concerned with assistance to education in particular, the article is of special interest to this study as it investigates donor-recipient relations on their process dimension. Process variables in the study’s analysis include phasing, mutuality (non-reciprocality), and formal-informal categorizations. The aid-giving process in Kreiner’s model furthermore is sub-divided into two relatively independent environments, i.e. the “resource environment”, where resources and conditions are negotiated and determined, and the “project environment”, where donors and recipients negotiate the distribution of funds and the ‘technicalities’ of project implementation. It might be argued that Kreiner’s portrait of intermediary multilateral aid is not typical but rather specific to the organization on which his case study was built (i.e. UNDP). However, Jones’ analysis of World Bank educational lending comes to similar conclusions where he points in particular to the inevitable tensions between the Bank’s twin functions, i.e. banking and development assistance (Jones, 1992). The implicit tension between ‘technical’ sector policy analysis and the broader mission of the donor agency at times becomes manifest in any donor organization that is not exclusively concerned with one particular sector.18 Distinguishing resource and project environments of both donors at least avoids the false impression that assistance is only about education, let alone higher education.

Introduction 11 Leaving aside donor’s internal project and program evaluations, studies of the long term impact of education assistance are relatively scarce, and tend to come to rather negative assessments of the assistance enterprise (Ellerman, 2005; Dichter, 2003). While theoretically or even ideologically incompatible perspectives may explain part of that criticism, some studies have supported their assessments with empirical evidence (Dichter, 2003). Of direct relevance to this study is the finding from the general literature on foreign assistance arguing that the organizational imperatives of international donors seriously hamper their effectiveness to support institutional development in general, and decentralization in particular. Tendler’s now classical formulation of a “donor-decentralization gap” captures well the meaning of the basic discrepancy between the donor’s goal of furthering decentralized decision-making, and the organizational requirements and constraints that emphasize efficient and effective operations (Tendler, 1975). As a result, tendencies to “insulate” projects from mainstream organizational set-ups, to “move money” rapidly, or to use a “blue print” approach in project design, often loom large (Schmidt, 1989). On a similar vein, the Liberian case study of Nagel and Snyder concludes that international assistance projects contributed to and at times even created organizational problems by de-coupling the domestic education system and making it less coherent (Nagel & Snyder, 1989).19 The study found that donor policies differ and lack continuity, that the structure of their projects (notably the establishment of separate project units in the local ministry of education) inhibited integration or meaningful adaptation, and that the competition for assistance funds locally in general has been harmful. Nonetheless, the assistance literature so far does not provide conclusive empirical evidence to support a general negative relationship between international assistance and decentralization in developing countries. A much more optimistic picture emerges from Schmidt’s analysis of USAID’s support of political decentralization in Peru in the early to mid1980s. This study suggests that donor agencies can play a critical role in securing governmental decentralization reforms and strengthen the viability of decentralized public organizations. It furthermore does not support the often cited criticism that the project mechanism significantly restricts the ability of donors to support capacity-building initiatives in such organizations (Schmidt, 1989). Of even more direct significance to this study are the thematic parallels that can be drawn with the work by Levy on U.S. assistance to Latin American higher education (Levy, 2005). While addressing different contexts— both geographically (i.e. U.S. and U.S.-related assistance to Latin America) and time-wise (i.e. 1950s-1970s, “the golden age of assistance”)—Levy’s study also investigates goals, efforts, and impacts of university assistance at both national and institutional levels. Regarding the relationship to internal university organization, the study supports the thesis that university assistance in fact pushed some degree of intra-university centralization, albeit

12

International Assistance and State-University Relations

more so under certain conditions and at certain types of partner institutions. The study is significant to this book’s theme as it provides a directly applicable framework and sense of direction to the suggested relationship between international assistance in higher education and power configurations at system and institutional levels. At the same time, that framework will be relevant in highlighting similarities and differences that come from different times and places.

2.

Autonomy and Control in Higher Education

The political nature of the relationship between universities and the State has been acknowledged in the comparative literature on higher education policy (Levy, 1979; Tight, 1992). University autonomy has been defi ned in many ways and using different theoretical perspectives, ranging from organizational studies that emphasize processes of internal differentiation (Blau, 1994; Clark, 1978) or external (‘environmental’) influence (Baldridge, 1971), to political approaches that address either its normative or institutional features. In the latter category, many emphasized the structural limitations of autonomy in the context of an international system that puts ‘Third World’ universities in a dependent position (Altbach, 1987), whereas other scholars have taken into consideration its potential dynamic in fostering heterogeneity and pluralism in developing societies. The New Institutionalism in economic theory—while itself not directly concerned with university autonomy—puts forward the idea of ‘institutions’ as “the rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990), offering a new avenue for analysts of “institution building” processes to focus on how specific organizations (e.g. universities) interact with and are affected by institutional constraints, values, and norms in society. The central arguments emerging from that theoretical body of literature, and its relevance to the present study, are that autonomy is best not couched in absolute terms (“you either have it or you don’t”), and that State-university relations generally don’t reflect a zero-sum game. For the purpose of this research, autonomy is therefore conceptualized within an institutional perspective that acknowledges external influences and constraints, and that emphasizes its relational dimension: “an autonomous university is a power within a power” (Levy, 1980). Autonomy might then be defi ned as “the capacity of [university] self-government” (World Conference on Higher Education, 1998) over major components of academic life, ranging from the appointment and management of personnel, the determination of fi nancial decisions, to the professional academic decisions about who to admit, what curriculum to offer, etc. Financial autonomy, specifically, includes the determination of who pays (including, for instance, the freedom to generate and manage income from non-public sources), or where decisions are made as to what the funding level is, what the funding criteria are, how and by whom budgets are prepared and how

Introduction 13 resources are allocated (i.e. the internal management of fi nancial resources), and how institutions are held accountable to funders and stakeholders. The analysis of our main research questions approached questions of power and control in three complementary ways. The fi rst one was by mapping out the institutional framework and regulations in order to determine who has the authority to decide what. This approach was required in order to map out changes in the regulatory environment, but falls short of appreciating the notable discrepancies between (formal) authority (‘pays légal’) and real power (‘pays réel’). A second but complementary approach therefore was to focus on institutions (and personalities) having (had) the prestige, the resources and the connections to make things happen, in the process assuming that they were also the power-holders. This in fact has been the general approach used to identify and select interviewees and institutions for field visits, although specific procedures for data control were included (see section on data and methods). The third approach was to zoom in on one particular issue of State-university relations, i.e. fi nancial autonomy, and identify key players in the decision making process. The topical focus on fi nancial autonomy, however, does not suggest that institutional autonomy can or should be limited to fi nancial autonomy, or even that fi nancial autonomy is the most relevant or otherwise important component of university self-government. Rather, that focus was chosen in part to facilitate operationalization of power gains and losses at different levels throughout the system, 20 but at the same time to reflect an area that is most explicit in its recognition of the relationship between institutional autonomy and accountability.

3.

State-Control vs. State-Supervision

As noted, State-university relations in Indonesia have traditionally been marked by patterns of State control that are strongly rooted in the country’s political tradition. State-control is especially strong in regard to the public universities, as it is there that the State performs its central role as funder, provider and as regulator. In part based on empirical characteristics of higher education systems, and partly building on a conceptual distinction between two types of governmental strategies (i.e. rational planning vs. self-regulation), Neave and van Vucht in this connection have identified two ideal types or models of higher education system governance: State control and State supervision (Neave, 1994). Typical of the State control model is the role of the State as financing agent, provider, and regulator. Furthermore, and following Clark’s classical depiction of the Continental model (Clark, 1983), the authors include strong academic professorial authority (‘bottomheaviness’) and a weak middle-level of institutional administrators among the typical features of the State control model. State supervision, on the other hand, is characterized by a particularly strong institutional center (embodied by a corporate Board of Trustees and institutional administrators with

14 International Assistance and State-University Relations meaningful executive powers), a much less powerful academic professorate, and a seemingly more distant, albeit not necessarily weaker, government that evaluates performance ex-post on the basis of agreed standards and criteria but otherwise leaves implementation to a larger extent to the institutions themselves. To be sure, empirical reality will always prove more complex than these ideal types tend to suggest, and the models themselves do raise further questions that typically cannot be easily answered.21 Notably, the centrality of the State in both models may strike some as (too) far removed from some of the market-like features typical of the American mode (Clark, 1983), whereas others might prefer conceptual typologies that take into account the development of collegial systems (Saeed, 1996). As ideal types however, the models do suggest a framework against which changes in the role of government implied or otherwise supported by international assistance can be assessed.

4.

International Agendas and Domestic Reform

As noted, the international comparative higher education literature has produced several conceptual typologies (van Vucht, 1993) that have allowed scholars to identify, explore, and compare the main structural features that together constitute the “triangle of coordination” (Clark, 1983) of national systems of higher education. Unfortunately, these typologies—and their empirical explorations in particular—so far have not addressed in particular how changing patterns of State-university relations are induced or mediated by international transfers, even though Clark’s own work provides significant thematic clues on the expected importance of such transfers (Clark, 1983). 22 In addition, and compared to other regions and countries, relatively few studies so far have applied these conceptual frameworks to South East Asian countries in general, and to Indonesia specifically. Scholars in comparative and international education remain fundamentally divided over the question as to what extent and in what ways international actors or forces effectively become change agents in the development and reform of education systems in developing countries. Analysts differ significantly in their assessment of the degree to which educational developments can be attributed to internationalizing tendencies and forces–international assistance arguably being just one of the more prominent ones—or in light of the domestic particularities of ‘national’ education systems. Intermediate positions that acknowledge international influence, yet at the same time empirically investigate the process by which such influence is brought to bare in particular domestic contexts remain rare. Two extreme theoretical positions have been articulated in the comparative literature, with probably many intermediate positions (Schriewer & Holmes, 1988). On the one hand, neo-institutionalist scholars argue that education worldwide has become increasingly similar in response to globalizing political and economic forces and tendencies.

Introduction 15 The construction of a world system linked to “modern” ideas of nationhood and citizenship has lead to the establishment of internationally congruent education systems. Notably, these studies have pointed at the worldwide expansion of (Western) formal schooling (Meyer & Hannan, 1979). In that same vein, some contend that education institutions in developing countries have successfully emulated Western–some argue American—forms and reforms (Ginsburg, Cooper, Rajeshwari, & Zegarra, 1990). More recent work focused on the mechanisms of external effects in education reforms, including the study of phenomena such as international educational borrowing, learning, harmonization, convergence, standardization, international interdependence, and even imposition (Ball, 1998; Dale, 1999). Proponents of this view can be found among dependency scholars and world systems perspectives as much as they are represented in literatures under the modernization banner. On the other hand, comparativists reject internationalists claims either on epistemological or substantive grounds, and instead attend to the fundamental differences in domestic structural conditions and culturally endogenous responses (Cummings, 1995). This study by design takes a moderately international perspective: ‘international’ because the object of the research design (i.e. the independent variable) is regarded by many as a prominent vehicle for widespread internationalization; ‘moderately’ international because: • it attends not only to effects or outcomes of international assistance, but also to donor goals and efforts; • it seeks to uncover patterns of relationships between international and domestic actors and variables. Support for this position is found also in fields outside international education assistance. Notably, scholars of international organizations explored why so many developed States established new and seemingly uniform science policy bureaucracies in the 1950s and 1960s (Finnemore, 1993). Finnemore’s study found little empirical support for demand-driven hypotheses, and instead uncovers how an international organization (in this case UNESCO) ‘taught’ new States the value, utility, as well as the form of science policy organization. Her later work confirms the influence of international bureaucracies in the development of new institutional roles (Finnemore, 1997), changing norms and ways of managing and policy making (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This line of research is significant to our research questions in a number of ways. First, it indicates that forces external to States can shape choices about internal State structures. Further, the study reveals that international system actors can be active rather than just reactive to client States or domestic interest groups, a finding which appears particularly relevant to the field of multilateral assistance (Jones, 1997, 1998; Kreiner, 1984). Finally, this research suggests that States are responsive to norms developed in wider international

16

International Assistance and State-University Relations

entities more so than is generally recognized. In other words, States adopt policies in response to socially constructed norms promulgated by the wider international community. Regarding international education assistance in particular, one might argue that this latter point is now also echoed in Jones’ observation that the World Bank has moved from the world of money and banking into the world of ideas or knowledge (Jones, 1992).

IV.

THEMES AND SUB-THEMES

This section is meant to present a brief preview of common themes extracted from the case study analyses. These themes, however, will be further elaborated in the concluding chapter, where they will be placed within a broader conceptual framework for thinking about the relationship between international assistance and domestic reforms in higher education. The general theme of the study is that the goals and efforts generated by international assistance in Indonesia indirectly have facilitated and at times actively encouraged changing patterns of State-university relations towards less-direct State control. First, donor assistance has–often implicitly—promoted and significantly furthered processes of differentiation among and within institutions, notably through selection or competition. These processes of institutional differentiation and competition have not only provided a fruitful platform for increasing university autonomy at the institutional level. The growing diversification of institutional missions and capacities furthermore has steadily complicated centralized system management following the typical State-control mode of more or less standardized operations. Secondly, donor ideas (goals and ideology) about institutional capacity building–while often ambitious and only partially implemented—responded rather well to contextual factors and actors supporting more decentralized decision making, and in the process helped develop domestic rationales for a changing government role. In the case of the World Bank, goals explicitly included support for institutional reforms as well as the introduction of innovative forms and mechanisms through specific projects. Depending on the project mechanism, donors in some cases successfully transcended some of the trade-offs between requirements of efficient implementation and the goal of institution building. Third, international assistance efforts have been instrumental in expanding and diversifying the resource basis for higher education in general and of selected institutions specifically, and in building critical capacities at specific places within the system. In spite of the many significant institutional constraints and weaknesses at both system and institutional level that have persisted throughout the period under study, higher education assistance overall have helped create conditions conducive to increasing autonomy at Indonesia’s public universities. Donor impact on institutional management and decision-making nonetheless has been mixed. On the one hand, the analysis does indicate a

Introduction 17 prominent role of international assistance efforts in developing and in some cases implementing institutional strategies to diversify resources or to generate income, both of which are considered to be significant elements of financial autonomy. On the other hand, and regardless of institutionbuilding goals, efforts have centered predominantly on planning and capacity strengthening activities directed at either the central level (i.e. national) or the level of the academic unit (i.e. faculty, department, study program) and overall have remained much less convincing at the institutional level. Nonetheless, the mismatch between goals and efforts offers only a partial explanation for perceived donor failures in supporting stronger university management. Especially in the case of the World Bank, efforts in that particular area have been significant and early on included specific initiatives to train university administrators, develop institutional management information systems, and enhance institutional planning. At least as important as the extent and quality of donor efforts have been the domestic political conditions, especially the general reluctance on the part of the government to let foreign agencies become involved in local institutional decision making. Frustrated by the plurality of institutional constraints and structural weaknesses (e.g. bureaucratic policy framework, prevailing norms and traditions, lack of incentives to develop management capacity, fi nancial limitations, standardized reward system . . . ) operating at the institutional level, donor support instead (further) encouraged de facto decentralization to individual academic units. Notable exceptions notwithstanding, the central executive powers typical of the U.S. model of university organization remained largely undeveloped during the period of this study. In the immediate post Soeharto period (1998–99), the plans to effectively grant (legal) institutional autonomy to a selected number of State institutions, however, did gain prominent ground and their implementation did involve a good deal of centralization at the institutional level, as will be explored in chapter 4. Finally, regarding the overall policy framework of State-university relations in general, and financial autonomy in particular, international donors have largely operated within the boundaries and institutional constraints imposed by the domestic policy environment–occasionally exploring “windows of opportunity”—rather than taking a proactive stance vis-à-vis institutional change. Significantly, few of the informants regarded international assistance as the vehicle for the “external imposition” of policy agendas for which it is often taken (Dale, 1999), nor was it even considered by many to be a major driving force behind the changes in State-university relations since the mid1980s, when the idea of financial autonomy was first introduced in government planning language. Rather, changes in the domestic policy framework seemed to have developed domestically–albeit quite possibly as a result of broader international forces—then received important external follow-up and backup, rationales and explicit support. Even so, the strong efforts invested by one of the donor agencies selected in this study (i.e. the World Bank) in the development (or continuation) of a (sub)-sector policy dialogue with the

18 International Assistance and State-University Relations Indonesian government have provided this donor with notable, and perhaps atypical influence in that regard. These broad assessments definitely require further qualification and empirical elaboration, to be provided in the ensuing chapters. Not all assistance has had the same–or even similar—goals, efforts, and effects. The scale and scope of activities varied significantly, as did specific instruments and processes. In addition, goals and efforts of both donors have changed considerably over time. In that connection, the case study material suggests that both agencies in their approach have gone through a number of stages ranging from ‘exemplification’ (i.e. providing extensive support to selected number of institutions or selected units within them) to attempted institutionalization (i.e. by encouraging government and institutions to change the institutional framework). The central theme is nonetheless remarkable in the sense that it does seem to offer room for a more positive and possibly also more optimistic assessment of the relationship between assistance and decentralization than is generally awarded in the literature. More positive, because the findings appear to suggest the possibility and even likelihood of decentralizing outcomes of assistance even in the face of significant constraints such as suggested by the ‘donor-decentralization gap’. Only possibly more optimistic, because the overall impact and significance of that outcome still remains uncertain. The study’s findings underscore the impact of the “international transfer mode of change” (Clark, 1983) while at the same time recognizing “the indigenous Indonesian drive for distinctiveness” (Cummings, Malo, & Sunarto, 1997) reflected in policy as well as implementation (or lack thereof). In that sense, the study is thematically related to a wider scholarly debate that addresses the tension between international–some say global— patterns of ‘seeming convergence’ of higher education systems worldwide, and the need for both scholars and policy makers to attend to locally or regionally specific conditions and contexts (Ball, 1998). Formulated at this general level, the material as such do not necessarily imply a direct cause-effect relationship between international assistance and institutional university autonomy, nor do they suggest an entirely unambiguous sense of direction of that relationship. Instead, the analysis allows identifying those conditions and circumstances that have made such relationship more or less direct and explicit, and highlighting where it has remained ambiguous. Further, the study design chose not to deal with international assistance as a monolithic independent variable, instead calling attention to different types of assistance, as well as to different perspectives and views within the organizations that deliver them. Finally, while ‘international assistance’ is regarded as one facilitating factor it is not regarded as the only factor contributing to particular patterns of funding, decision-making structures, norms or practices. Changes with regard to State-university relations overall corresponded well with broader macro-developments in Indonesian society. Notably, the incremental deregulation of the Indonesian economy from 1983 onwards,23 the growing financial constraints

Introduction 19 imposed on government budgets as a result of sharp declines in the oil price in the early and late 1980s, the emergence of an urban socio-economic class, and the increasing role of private capital in the economy at large, these are all important factors that add to the domestic policy context in which the political economy of State-university relations is played out. The existence of these exogenous, intervening and moderating variables therefore needs to be taken into consideration. As suggested in economic analysis of aid over many countries (World Bank, 1998a), domestic socio-economic and political variables (e.g. macro-economic stability, institutional capacity, a legal system, corruption climate) do mediate the impact of international assistance efforts. They can therefore not possibly be captured by studying only part of that picture, even if a significant part.

V. METHODS AND DATA The study combines content analysis of documents, graphical analyses of quantitative trend data on fi nancial resources, and interviews with former participants and privileged observers. Primary data were collected predominantly during field research in Indonesia, at donor archives in the Netherlands, the U.S. and in Indonesia.

Document analysis Donor agency staff kindly gave full access to their archives and even filing cabinets thereby greatly expanding volume of documents analyzed. Formal project documentation was systematically pursued both in the case of Dutch Aid (at NUFFIC’s archives), and at the World Bank office in Jakarta, where access was granted to the full sets of appraisal and completion reports,24 project audit and performance reports, of all the Bank’s higher education projects. In addition, I received permission to browse through and copy from the filing cabinets, resulting in a near to complete documentation data set with regard to the analysis of these donors. The level of detail of the available documentation furthermore allowed me to pursue in-depth case studies of specific projects adding much detail to the analysis. However, project level documents usually do not contain detailed information on the actual interactions between donor-staff and government representatives. Written information hence was supplemented with individual talks, occasionally focus groups, and formally structured interviews with current and/or former stakeholders, including government bureaucrats, university leaders, faculty, students, and donor staff, as well as with external analysts and observers. All studies and documents are listed with the World Bank material in the bibliography. The Dutch NUFFIC archives contained project fi les, internal correspondence, minutes of grant-decision-making meetings, as well as other relevant and less relevant documentation in relation to Indonesia that fi rst needed to

20

International Assistance and State-University Relations

be sorted out. Typically, and with the exception of the evaluation reports pertaining to the early 1980s when the Dutch supported broad institutional university linkages with selected Indonesian universities, project documentation tends to be of a more technical or academic content oriented nature (e.g. ‘evaluation of the earth science project’). While the analysis of these reports provides important indications of the priorities of Dutch assistance in general and of the implementation of its projects more specifically, this project level documentation required to be situated in the broader perspective of Dutch higher education assistance policy. As a result, and while there are some exceptions, most of the basic policy documents related to Dutch higher education assistance do not relate exclusively to Dutch assistance in Indonesia. Dutch documents are also included in the bibliography. A selection of publicly available Indonesian government documents can also be found in the bibliography listed. These include consecutive long term development plans from the Directorate General for Higher Education, statistical data published by the Ministry of Education and Culture, regulations published by the legal bureau of the Secretariat General of the Ministry, and policy notes made available to this researcher during discussions with interviewees. Financial data and statistics pertaining to the early time period of this study (i.e. late 1970s and early 1980s) have generally not been as readily available as for later periods, even though annual reports by the Director General of Higher Education were traced on microfiche. In addition, various secondary sources, including analytical studies conducted in the framework of international assistance programs, were used to fill the gaps and complete the data set.

Interviews and focus groups Content analysis of primary documents was supplemented as much as possible with interviews of (former) stakeholders and participants as well as external observers. Formal interviews gave the researcher opportunities to test interpretations arrived at by analytic induction and content analysis. The interviews were generally not conducted according to a standard script or protocol, as the specific content and nature of the questions differed widely amongst interviewees, depending on nature and time of his or her individual involvement. Nonetheless, general areas for questions were prepared for each audience separately (i.e. donor staff, government staff, project staff, university leaders, faculty, students, and analysts and commentators), which were then further adjusted and/or specified before and during the interviews. In total, 48 formal interviews were conducted with key informants and participants, including current and former government personnel, (former) university leaders, (former) donor agency staff and consultants, and privileged observers (a full list of interviewees, with their current or former affiliation, is provided in annex). Given the historical perspective of the study, a balanced representation of participants and observers over the entire period of

Introduction 21 the study was actively pursued. Detailed write-ups were kept and sent back to the interviewee for feedback and/or factual corrections. Apart from these formal interviews, consultations were held with individuals and groups of faculty, administrators, and students in the margin of field visits to various study programs at 5 different universities (i.e. UI, ITB, UGM, UNSOED, IPB). Furthermore, a seminar on the subject of institution building conducted with a group of Master students in public policy at the UI provided an additional forum for group discussion of institutional university autonomy as a specific case in point. Both the informal consultations and the group discussions have greatly expanded this researcher’s perspective on how autonomy is defi ned and understood by different stakeholders at the operational level of the academic enterprise in Indonesia. The site visits furthermore have provided exposure to project sites supported by some of the international assistance projects included in the study.

Statistical data While the emphasis is mainly on qualitative data–in particular documentary text and interviews—statistical data from existing documents and statistics has been integrated for both descriptive and analytical purposes. From donor documents and available secondary statistical information, a data set was constructed that brings together information on resource flows generated by assistance programs over time with data of public funding patterns over that same period (see graphs and tables in annex). Chapter 3 includes a graphical presentation of the higher education portfolio’s of the two donors over time, and an analysis of how these trends might be related to domestic policies. Apart from providing a tool to describe the aid portfolios of the donor agencies in quantitative terms, the graphical presentation of these quantitative data was used also to supplement the evidence found in documents and interviews. The analysis graphically highlights trends and patterns of relationships between the agencies’ respective portfolios and domestic patterns of higher education funding (Valverde, 1994). By providing indications of the extent to which international assistance programs have either complemented or substituted the regular funding provisions of Indonesian universities, these data show some of the more direct effects international assistance programs have had on universities’ institutional strategies of resources diversification.25

Secondary data Secondary data that have been used in the analysis include scholarly accounts of international assistance in higher education, studies pertaining to Indonesian higher education in general, and public higher education funding and fi nancial autonomy in particular, as well as statistical and fi nancial information from Government, donor agencies, or other institutions. Secondary data can be retraced in the bibliography.

22

International Assistance and State-University Relations

Data sources Institutional data sources for primary data include: • the Ministry of Education and Culture, Directorate General for Higher Education, DGHE or DIKTI (Jakarta) • the National Development Planning Board, BAPPENAS (Jakarta) • the Ministry of Finance, Bureau of the Budget (Jakarta) • the World Bank Resident Staff in Indonesia (Jakarta) • the Ministry of Education and Culture (the Hague) • the NUFFIC (the Hague) • universities visited, i.e. ITB (Bandung), UI (Jakarta-Depok), IPB (Bogor), UGM (Yogjakarta), UNSOED (Purwokerto), Universitas Katolik Atma Jaya (Jakarta), and UNILA (Lampung) Non-institutional data sources include mainly former participants and outside experts who are not (or no longer) affiliated with one or more of the above organizations. Many of the informants have been involved either as consultant, former agency or government staff, or as outside observers of higher education assistance to Indonesia. Current and/or former affi liations have been included in the listing of key informants in Annex (Table 1).

VI.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter 2 analyzes the changing policy objectives of the selected donor agencies in light of evolving State-university relations. Dutch assistance ambitiously aimed for ‘institution development’ and did so by supporting a limited number of broad based institutional links with selected universities and departments and in the course of a decade scaled down to funding a large number of small academic linkages. The Bank started out by supporting the establishment of an entirely new type of institution (i.e. the polytechnics) quickly followed by institutional development projects at selected university institutions and departments, which in turn were followed-up by more focused support of centers of excellence at the country’s leading public institutions. In the late 1980s, this donor explicitly became prominent in supporting higher education development through (sub)-sector policy lending, but more recently shifted back again to more selective efforts to merry the goal of increasing implementation and sustainability of project performance with the more complex objective of institutional change. The goals-analysis will differentiate donors’ policies on the basis of their implicit vs. explicit orientation towards changing State-university relations in general and financial autonomy more specifically. The chapter explores to what extent these goals correspond to patterns of State-control and reviews both supporting and counter evidence of such a relationship.

Introduction 23 Chapter 3 centers on the efforts (i.e. resources and implementation mechanisms) which donor agencies have brought to bear supporting higher education in Indonesia. While the analysis will concentrate on the resource flows (i.e. funding level, awards-disbursements, and counterpart funds) it will also review implementation mechanisms and procedures. Notably, our analysis will highlight significant qualitative differences between the mechanisms used by the two selected agencies in light of the research questions. The World Bank worked almost exclusively through government or governmentassigned project units, whereas the Dutch linkage system chose to channel its assistance predominantly through Indonesian universities often selected by Dutch partner institutions or their intermediary agent. In other words, to the extent that institutional innovation and self-determination was the purpose (chapter 2), the two agencies chose different ways to achieve that goal. Chapter 4 ties together the evidence presented in the previous two chapters with an assessment of outcomes of donor efforts and goals with reference to changing patterns of State-university relations. First, the chapter explores the ways in which international assistance contributed to the changing policy language regarding higher education reforms. We will see how ideas such as decentralization, autonomy and accountability, already suggested in some the early donor project evaluation reports, gradually seeped into DGHE policy documents and ultimately found their way official government strategy. Thematically, the chapter substantiates the ways in which international assistance has been instrumental in the establishment of domestic conditions that are needed in order to ensure increased levels of autonomy at the institutional level. Suggesting Clark’s “Places of inquiry” as a guiding analytical frame of reference, the analysis follows his distinction between the enabling conditions, the formative conditions, and the enacting conditions that on the whole constitute the basis for institutionally integrating basic functions of higher education in Indonesia. At the operational level, the chapter explores how assistance has contributed to institutional differentiation, institutional capacity building, resource diversification, and domestic changes in the institutional policy framework. As a corollary to assessing the results of assistance in these areas, the chapter will also review its limitations, shortcomings, and constraints, as well as possible alternative explanations. The lack of implementation following the formal introduction of financial autonomy in 1990 will reflect some of the structural constraints that impede the kind of institutional change advocated by donors and reformers. Chapter 5 identifies common themes and patterns presented in the preceding chapters, and will feed these back to the literature. Trying to avoid drawbacks associated with analyses based all too exclusively on current events, the chapter essentially intends to summarize in what ways international donors so far have responded to increasing university autonomy (and in what ways not) in order to arrive at a balanced account of constraints and opportunities.

24

International Assistance and State-University Relations

Conceptual Framework International Assistance I. Goals - manifest-latent - types of education aid: 0 human capital development 0 human development 0 human capacity development 0 human resources development II. Efforts 1. Resources - resource environment - project environment * project awards * project disbursements * counterpart funds 2. Instruments - selection mechanism - implementation mechanism - short term/long term - type of activities 3. Processes - negotiation phases - mutual dependencies - formal-informal

Role of the State 1. State-control - regulator (custodian) - funder - provider (demiurge) 2. State-supervision - induce (midwife) - supporter (husbandry) 3. Market - exchange - price setting - competition

Financial Autonomy 1. Determination of who pays 2. Funding level 3. Funding criteria 4. Preparation and allocation of budget 5. Accountability

III. Outcomes - language of reform - resource diversification - institutional differentiation - institutional capacity - policy framework Sources: (1) Financial autonomy: - Levy, D. 1980. University and Government in Mexico. Autonomy in an Authoritarian System, 1980. - Tight, M. 1992. Institutional Autonomy. In International Encyclopedia of Higher Education. Edited by Burton Clark and Guy Neave, 1384–1390. (2) State-university relations: - F. van Vucht, Patterns of Governance in Higher Education. Concepts and Trends. 1993. - P. Evans, Embedded Autonomy. States and Industrial Transformation. 1995. (3) International Assistance: - L. Buchert, Education aid policies and practices. A report from the International Working Group on Education. 1994. - K. Kreiner, Directing Multilateral Aid from the Outside: Donors Caught in a Quicksand Trap. 1984. - D. Levy, To Export Progress. The Golden Age of University Assistance in the Americas. Indiana University Press, 2006.

2

International Assistance Goals

“The long road to education for development passes through the development of educational institutions. No one has yet found a short cut or detour.” (Kenneth Thompson, 1976: 25) Goals are critical analytical tools for the purpose of this study, and this for three different reasons. First, as intentional outcomes goals serve as guideposts or standards by which actions—or ‘projects’ in the assistance jargon—are judged internally as a well as externally. The multitude of evaluation and supervision reports generated by the two selected donor agencies in this study provides some (quantitative) evidence in support of such observation. Secondly, given their international nature, assistance goals require mediation, translation or otherwise negotiation in the domestic environment of the recipient country. The nature and extent of goal receptivity, compatibility (Levine, 1980), or the degree of congruence with the goals, norms of the host, are therefore among the key criteria to estimate the effectiveness of pursued changes (Cerych & Sabatier, 1986). Finally, as self-imposed constraints goals not only provide signposts of what assistance agencies effectively pursue, but at the same time are indicative of what they do not aspire for (any longer). And even if the resulting sense of priority is far from perfect, as often happens when organizations are known to be generously ambitious (Packenham, 1973), these goals will be instrumental in identifying the changing ideology of international assistance, specifically regarding the role of the State in higher education. In spite of all its merits, social scientists nonetheless have pointed to the problematical nature of goal analysis, especially regarding social phenomena that lack empirical defi nition, are conceptually ambiguous, or both. As a generic term ‘international assistance’ seems to fit the two qualifications. But even limiting the focus of attention more narrowly to the study of selected organizations and types of international assistance–as intended in this study—doesn’t settle the problematical nature of goals. To start with, organizational goals are not always explicitly stated–or only poorly so—and often need to be derived from ‘operative goals’ that provide indication of what the organization is actually trying to accomplish, “regardless of what the official goals say are the aims” (Perrow, 1961). Furthermore, organizations generally have multiple, often incompatible and sometimes

26

International Assistance and State-University Relations

even conflicting goals, which all face a multitude of external constraints. Goals can also be ambiguous as they reflect compromises among competing perspectives both within and across organizations and the units within them. Finally, goals change over time in response to changing tasks, circumstances, needs, and constituencies (Hall, 1996). An analysis of past assistance goals that uses concepts that are now in vogue therefore runs the risk of failing to appreciate the particularities of the historical context in which goals are formulated and re-formulated. The general approach taken in this chapter is to study goals of the two selected assistance agencies from a historical-institutional perspective. For each of the two donors, the discussion opens with a brief review of the origins and developments of assistance goals in relation to higher education development (in Indonesia). This review not only offers essential context to understanding the goal-setting behavior of the two donors, but also renders a preview of their respective views on the position of higher education institutions vis-à-vis society in general, and in relation to government more specifically. Before we move into the analysis, however, it will be instructive to point at the differences in scale and scope between these two donors. Apart from apparent differences in the size of the donor investments—to be further quantified in the chapter on donor efforts—these differences also determined the nature and scope of activities in which donors engaged themselves. While primarily based on document analysis, I have further substantiated the discussion with information from interviews with former participants. The following sections—again by donor—discuss how these goals responded to the domestic policy environment of State-university relations in Indonesia–and how not—and goes on to identify in what ways they have suggested or otherwise implied a changing role for government or institutions. Case studies of specific projects are presented throughout in order to illustrate in what ways these have suggested what type of role for government and institutions respectively.

I.

DUTCH ASSISTANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION

From 1969 up to 1992, when all development cooperation with Indonesia was abruptly ended, Dutch assistance to Indonesian higher education was a prominent part of the general policy framework of Dutch development cooperation in higher education. The historical overview of that framework here must be selective although endnotes will provide further references where needed. The section then discusses the major policy goals of Dutch assistance in higher education—focusing on what respective roles they suggest for governments and institutions–, and goes on to review how these goals played out in the Indonesian context of State-university relations. Originating historically from initiatives by Dutch universities–only later followed by official development aid policies—assistance in higher education

International Assistance Goals

27

up to this day provides the overall context for what now would be labeled as a ‘decentralized’ form of international assistance, predominantly involving institution-to-institution links between universities. While these inter-institutional linkage schemes at fi rst sight may not appear to have any direct bearing on the relationship between the overseas institutions and their respective government, their goal (i.e. ‘institution-building’) and vehicle (i.e. ‘decentralized linkages’) at least implicitly suggest broad parallels with the theme of this book. After briefly sketching the origins and resultant structural features of Dutch assistance programs in higher education in general, the ensuing sections will explore these parallels in greater detail on the basis of the Indonesian case.

1.

Modest Beginnings

Dutch assistance to higher education in developing countries originated in the multitude of informal contacts that grew after the second World War between academics in the Netherlands and students from overseas, many of whom from Indonesia. Often these personal contacts would develop into small projects to support specific departments or laboratories at overseas institutions, and initially at least these were typically fi nanced entirely from the university’s own budget. Dutch universities in 1967 jointly committed themselves to spend 5% of their regular budget to such development assistance initiatives. They also established the NUFFIC1 as a forum to promote and coordinate their activities in that area, to exchange information, and to respond to changes in official Dutch aid policy that were being introduced around that time. Notably, the 1966 Dutch policy paper on development aid had recognized the need for a more critical reflection of grants awarded to study programs for overseas students in the Netherlands, 2 and seemed instead to suggest a shift of emphasis involving support to institutions in developing countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992). The official Dutch support to higher education institutions in developing countries initially took the form of grants to fund attendance at courses locally, but as an extension of that policy soon also came to include cooperation schemes between Dutch universities and counterpart institutions overseas. The Minister for Development Cooperation in 1969 established a special Program for University Development Cooperation (PUO-I), which was to provide funds from the development cooperation budget to support university projects in developing countries.3 The goal of the program was to “improve the academic infrastructure for scientific practice in developing countries by putting at their disposal the knowledge and expertise of the Dutch universities” (Ruijter, 1993). The program, which offered a general framework for cooperation between Dutch universities and universities overseas, was operational from 1970 to 1976 and during that time involved aid expenditures close to 30 million guilders ($13.2 million at the current rate), 40% of which was

28

International Assistance and State-University Relations

invested in university linkages with Indonesian institutions (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1977). Staff development was a prominent feature of the program, and generally took the form of Dutch academics being placed at the disposal of the counterpart-university overseas to replace local staff while away for advanced degree training in the Netherlands or elsewhere. Although goal formulation has changed emphasis and wording over the years, as will be elaborated in the next section, the early linkage program reflects rather well some of the structural features of Dutch higher education assistance for years to come. Specifically, these include: • The preference for discreet investments in partnerships and arrangements with no explicit reference to the policy framework of Indonesian higher education; • The prominent emphasis on the university sector, rather than other forms of higher education, has affected not only the selection of institutions–in the Netherlands as well as overseas—but also the type of activities undertaken (i.e. focus on academic subject areas);4 • The strong reliance on the use of direct inter-institutional cooperation between universities in the Netherlands and overseas partnerinstitutions–typically involving a plurality of institutions at the Dutch side—remains the defi ning characteristic of the Dutch strategy to strengthen university institutions in developing countries;5 • . . . and the resulting organizational complexity of the assistance program management and decision-making structure, involving a great number of organizations and committees at different levels of program design and implementation;6 • Strong emphasis on the use of human resources rather than on physical infrastructure;7 • The close involvement of Dutch academic units in the design and implementation of assistance policies and programs;8 • A strong orientation towards academic work (i.e. staff and curriculum development, research projects, fellowships) at the institutions overseas, with little or no direct involvement with management or other internal organizational matters at the partner institution. In sum, these structural features of Dutch university development assistance provide the general context in which assistance to Indonesian higher education took shape. Table 2.1 lists the major policy documents regarding Dutch development cooperation in education since 1969 (left-hand column), and identifies the corresponding programs in higher education development assistance (right-hand column). Its purpose is to provide the general picture and historical time frame of Dutch formal policy and programs in higher education. The discussion that follows, however, will gradually zoom in on goals and their implementation in relation to Indonesia specifically.

International Assistance Goals

29

Table 2.1 Overview of Dutch Policy Documents and Higher Education Programs Dutch Policy Documents Policy paper on aid to less developed countries (1966)

Higher Education Assistance Programs • Program for University Development Cooperation (PUO-II), 1977–1988 • Study in the Region (SIR), 1969– 1986 • Netherlands Fellowship Program (NFP), 1960s-

Policy paper on bilateral development cooperation (1976) • Program for University Development Cooperation (PUO-1), 1969–1976 Policy paper on review of bilateral development cooperation (1984)

• Program for International Education Projects (IOP), 1977–1988

Sector program for training, education and research (1986)

• Inter-institutional Cooperation Program (SV), 1988–1992 • Direct Support to Training Institutions in Developing Countries Program (DSO), 1988–1994

Development cooperation and education in the 1990s (1992) • Joint Financing Program for Cooperation in Higher Education (MHO) • Program of Cooperation with Institutions providing International Education (SIO), in turn consisting of International Education Projects (IOP), and Training in the Netherlands (NFP) • Direct Support to Training Institutions in Developing Countries (DSO)

2. Growing Ambitions: Institution Building and National Development At the level of formally declared policy intentions, the further development of Dutch higher education assistance since the mid-1970s has been marked by the emerging goal of ‘institution-building’, and the various interpretations thereof by successive policy makers and stakeholders. The major phases of that process are represented schematically in table 2.2, which summarizes overall policy goals and rationales for Dutch higher education

30

International Assistance and State-University Relations

assistance programs over the years, and includes basic features pertaining to their implementation in Indonesia. Suggested time periods are indicative only, as they correspond with the introduction of official policy changes more than with actual implementation or funding schedules, which in practice involved some degree of overlap between successive phases.

2.1

The Development University

The goal of ‘institution-building’ was introduced into Dutch policy vocabulary in 1975–76, and at the time seemed a rather loosely defi ned rally point around which otherwise divergent positions within the Netherlands could be accommodated (p.c. Brinkman). While the intricacies of this mostly internal Dutch debate should not here derail us, the sometimes varying rationales would have immediate bearing not only on the way in which the Dutch would shape their higher education assistance, but importantly also on the respective roles of government and institutions implied therein. To the minister of development cooperation Jan Pronk, 9 ‘institution-building’ in higher education was part of a broader aid policy agenda in which the ‘self-reliance’ of the developing world and ‘the combat against poverty’ had been made strategic cornerstones (Cf. policy paper on bilateral development cooperation, 1976). Pronk’s policy framework–well-ingrained in the development paradigm then holding sway internationally—suggested that higher education assistance should be instrumental in making ‘Third World’ societies less dependent on the ‘North’, and in promoting a distinctive and (more) practical role for universities in the task of national development. These themes in turn seemed right in step with the ideal of a ‘development university’; a concept that at the time also had won increasing recognition at several donor headquarters,10 and emphasized the social responsibility and role of the university in developing countries.

2.2

University Development

On the basis of its experience with the management of the then on-going linkage program, the NUFFIC on its part already had suggested a number of policy changes to increase the efficiency and institutional impact of the linkage formula (NUFFIC, 1975). Specifi cally, it was realized that the intense ‘scatterization’ of resources across large numbers of small projects and partner institutions–often based largely on individual contacts—had not been conducive to either overall program effi ciency or significant impact overseas. Instead, the proposals called for a transformation of the program into one consisting of a much more limited number of long-term linkages with overseas universities, and based on broad institutional commitments of all the institutions involved. Apart from the efficiency considerations that inspired some of these proposals,

International Assistance Goals Table 2.2 Time Period

31

Dutch Assistance Goals Goals

Rationales / strategies

Cooperation between 1969– To improve scientific 1976 practice at universities academic institutions is promoted as key in developing counassistance strategy on tries (dc) the basis of: assumed relevance to dc needs, To support academic links with institutions greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness, overseas (operative and responsiveness goal) to mission of Dutch institutions. To train students from dc in country of origin or in the region (cf. local/regional scholarship program, SIR) 1976– Increasing ‘self-reliance’ 1988 of dc, and combating poverty within dc, become the major policy goals of Dutch aid. In higher education, the stated goals are to: - strengthen education and research institutions in dc (‘institution-building’ as the general, unspecified policy orientation); - gradually transfer international training courses from The Netherlands to dc (cf. IOP)

Main features of the program in Indonesia

Heavily concentrated on Indonesia (40% of budget), but consisting of many small projects scattered across the country and across universities; - Focused on academic staff development; - Driven by already existing overseas contacts of Dutch academics

Long term (10 to 15 ‘Broad-based’ (i.e. covering a wide range years) and wide-ranging (i.e. across disciplines of subjects) linkage projects with a limited and fields) linkage agreements with 3 number of overseas selected State universiinstitutions are seen ties. Typically, several as an instrument in a Dutch institutions long term strategy of participate in each. ‘institution-building’; In principle, the ‘new style’ linkage formula suggested both academic and non-academic areas of activity (e.g. institutional management, support services . . . ).

- linkages as umbrella agreement for projects with departments/units within the partner institution - in practice, linkages continue to be focused on academic work (i.e. staff development, curriculum development). In areas of institutional policy and management, partners instead pursue approach of ‘mutual noninterference’ (P.c. Veenkamp). (continued)

32

International Assistance and State-University Relations

Table 2.2 Time Period

Dutch Assistance Goals (continued) Rationales / strategies

Main features of the program in Indonesia

Strategy of supporting targeted interventions (i.e. projects) at unit or department levels, and limited in time (i.e. 4 years) in order to ensure accountability to donor;

The number of SVprojects varies from 27 to 30, spread over 15 institutions and agencies. On average, 25% of linkage budget is spent on links with Indonesia

- to strengthen capac- Concern to make education aid activiity of institutions ties more coherent and in dc (‘institutionconsistent with Dutch building’) aid policy goals at the - manpowercountry level; As to development types of institutions, the program is not - research and restricted to education development institutions, but also Implicit goal: targets public or semiTo build on Dutch com- public service agencies, and professional parative strengths and existing social demands associations;

- projects carried over from earlier programs figure prominently– both on project lists and budget wise- but are administered and financed as separate units

Goals

1988– To expand and to 1992 improve dc’s human resources, and to generate innovative knowledge and technology in and for these countries. Specific goals are:

in The Netherlands for direct cooperation with non- or semi-governmental partner organizations overseas.

- on the Dutch side, participation of nonuniversity institutions increases - on the Indonesian side, stronger involvement of government agencies (typically service unit within line ministry) - all on-going projects are stopped prematurely in April 1992 as a result of Soeharto’s decision to cancel further aid from the Netherlands

the NUFFIC also intended the linkage program to become more responsive to institutional development needs of counterpart universities in the developing countries. The expectation was in fact that the suggested long-term partnerships would facilitate expanding the scope of the earlier linkages beyond ‘mere’ academic collaboration to include assistance in building up the partner-university’s own capacity more broadly speaking, or, put differently, to support “university development” in developing countries (NUFFIC, 1984). Pronk embraced the NUFFIC proposals

International Assistance Goals

33

and in 1976 agreed to support the establishment of the PUO ‘New Style’. The policy changes were motivated in Dutch parliament on the basis of their expected contribution to the strategy of ‘national self-reliance’, specifically noting that they would “support the planning and development of education systems in the developing countries, the improvement of educational methods, and the organization of educational administration” (cited in Ruiter, 1993: 16). The defi nition differed from the earlier link program in its broad reference to ‘education systems’ (rather than narrowly on “scientific practice”), and its explicit inclusion of non-academic aspects of institutional development (i.e. planning, educational administration).

2.3

Conceptual Distinctions

In reality, the new linkage policy–and notably the underlying defi nitions of ‘institution-building’—suggested a delicate balance between essentially different conceptualizations of the respective roles of educational institutions and the State.11 On the one hand, the emphasis on making linkages responsive to institutional needs–now at least potentially also including non-academic needs—of the targeted universities in principle seemed to indicate a commitment to and respect for the institutional autonomy of the partner institutions. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, the inter-institutional linkage agreements indeed often presupposed a certain degree of autonomy on the part of these institutions, if only consisting of the authority to enter into contractual relations with overseas universities and/or funding agencies.12 On the other hand, the donor’s concern with promoting the role of the university in national development suggested ever-greater closeness (e.g. by co-optation of personnel, or through government service schemes), accountability, and even commitment to the State, which under the political circumstances of the time was the main carrier of ‘national development’ in many countries, notably including Indonesia. In other words, as a strategy of institution building in higher education, the developmental concerns emphasized the universities’ responsiveness to the State more than the autonomous development of their basic teaching and research functions. Or, as one informant remarked, “‘Institution-building’ in those days was predominantly seen as ‘State-building’” (p.c. Brinkman). This assessment at fi rst sight appears to run counter to this study’s overall theme suggesting that international donor agencies were promoting institutional autonomy. Nonetheless, the idea of supporting strong State institutions and/or capacity needs not necessarily be incompatible with the goal of strengthening universities. Instead, and congruent with the “continental mode” (Clark, 1983) in which Dutch universities themselves are used to operate, the more likely expectation was that the assisted university would use their fortified expertise to accomplish goals of national

34

International Assistance and State-University Relations

development, for instance by training leaders, providing technical advice etc. And such an expectation not only resonates well with the then dominant ‘State-control model’, which recognizes the power of professional and professorial expertise but leaves little room for autonomy at the central institutional level. It also befits the now widely advocated ‘State supervision’ model that pushes for increased institutional decision making powers.

2.4 Operative Donor Goals in Indonesia: Selecting Institutions and Fields The subtle conceptual nuances between those goals pertaining to ‘university development’ and those furthering ‘development universities’ can only be fully appreciated when considering effective program implementation, where actual choices were made about which countries and institutions to support, at what level, and in what particular fi elds. In that connection, the program’s features in Indonesia suggest a strong impact of criteria of national development relevance in the initial phases of selecting institutions and fields, but much less in the actual planning and implementation of the linkages, where activities continued to be concentrated heavily on more traditional—and indeed much-needed—academic ‘upgrading’ and staff development. Table 2.3 summarizes some of these features, indicating the Indonesian institutions selected in the program, and listing the ‘fields’ (projects) within each. Table 2.3

PUO-II Program in Indonesia UGM

I. Basic Sciences

Unibraw I. Agricultural devt.

- Physics

- Horticulture

- Chemistry

- Soil science

- “Pembina”-physics

- Animal husbandry

II. Integrated Rural Development

- Fisheries - Farm mechanization

- Earth sciences

- Food science

- Health development in rural areas

- Plant protection

- Forestry and nature conservation - Social input (later human geography)

II. Social Sciences III. Basic Sciences - Biometrics - Chemistry - Physics

Unhas I. Community Health - Upgrading of Preand Para-clinical teaching and training (after 1987 including support to central workshop) - Community health development (up to 1986) II. Other - Law (1984/85) - Economics (DGIS)

International Assistance Goals a.

35

Selecting Institutions

The choice of partner-institutions had a powerful impact on the further development of the Dutch assistance program in Indonesia, especially in light of the program’s long-term intent.13 The selection of institutions in the program in general was to be based on their “development concept and potential” (NUFFIC, s.d.). Additional criteria included need for assistance (e.g. presence of other donors), orientation towards the poorest population groups or regions, and the presence of social conditions that allow the university to function as ‘agent of change’ (NUFFIC, s.d.: 2). Before actually selecting institutions, however, political decisions needed to be made about which countries to include (or to exclude), and their relative share in the linkage program. In this connection, the Indonesian program took shape under rather difficult political circumstances. When the fi rst batch of pre-selected partner institutions was submitted to him in June 1977, Pronk had insisted that the number of Indonesian institutions participating in the PUO program should be limited to ‘two or three at most’ (NUFFIC, 1984).14 Politics loomed large and became an even more explicit argument in the aftermath of the military and judicial crackdown that followed student protests at various Indonesian campuses in 1978, in turn fueling criticism within the Netherlands against cooperation with Indonesian universities (VUA, 1980). Indonesia supporters in the Netherlands not only had to emphasize the social relevance and development potential of institution carrying their preference, but also explicitly their ‘relative autonomy’ and distance–politically as well as geographically—from Jakarta (p.c. Brinkman), their independent leadership (VUA, 1980: 9), their non-elitist or at least non-traditional character (van Olden & Serpenti, 1983).15 All three institutions selected to participate in the linkage program to some extent and in varying ways were presented by their respective promoters as ‘special cases’ in the Indonesian higher education landscape, be this in their academic leadership role, their service function or regional development role. Dutch policy makers in other words have been sensitive to arguments underlining that support would go primarily to institutions that could be considered to be functionally different and better equipped. Ironically, by doing so in an increasingly repressive regime, university autonomy at the same became a prominent factor in the political sense too. While ‘serving the State’ in its task of national development targeted institutions preferably were not (considered as) too close to the political apparatus in Jakarta.16 Suggested differences notwithstanding, the selected linkages were also strikingly similar in some respects. Notably, they are all with State universities17 and all emphasize the university’s role in development, be it in teaching (e.g. manpower development), applied or otherwise socially relevant research, or community service. No apparent effort was made by the program developers (i.e. DGIS, NUFFIC) to differentiate the general purpose of the linkage schemes in light of specific institutional missions. Instead,

36

International Assistance and State-University Relations

the program overall seemed to take a rather undifferentiated view on the institutional needs of universities in developing countries, or at least implicitly assumed that broad institutional linkages were the most appropriate way for dealing with these needs. The main objective of the three Indonesian linkages was in fact identical, i.e. “to strengthen the University “X”, and–in conjunction with other Indonesian universities—the higher education system in Indonesia in general, focusing on its contribution to development and self-reliance in society, and with attention for the deprived and poorest segments of the Indonesian population. The aim of self-reliance, as applied to the university itself, means that upgrading staff, in terms of theory, research and education will have high priority”. In summary, the program was selective but not adventurous. The range of eligible institutions was constrained by self-imposed goals and formal policy as much as by the political rationales and feasibility considerations and all the unplanned interactions in between. Fully congruent with Lindblom’s notion of “mutual adjustment” (Lindblom, 1990), the ‘donor selection’ resulted from effective and anticipated interactions between agencies, groups, and personalities inside and outside academia, in Indonesia and in the Netherlands. b.

Selecting Fields and Projects

In principle, each linkage covered a number of fields or areas of collaboration (e.g. integrated rural development), which in turn were to be further specified in projects (e.g. nature conservation project).18 Table 2.3 indicates that the perceived role of the university in areas of national or regional socio-economic development appears as a significant criterion in the identification of fields and projects. That observation further underscores the donor’s commitment to a university that is primarily loyal to its broader development task. In other words, and so far only judging from the menu of fields and projects, development goals and social relevance criteria at this stage seemed to outweigh the “aim of self-reliance, as applied to the university itself”. The argument is illustrated not only by the presence of projects in such applied fields as community health (UNHAS and UGM), integrated rural development (UGM), and agricultural development (UNIBRAW), but furthermore is reflected in the institutional constraints some of these fields experienced within the respective Indonesian partner-universities. The concept of supporting interdisciplinary research involving cooperation across and between different faculties proved particularly hard to implement for both structural and substantive reasons. The institutional environment (i.e. relatively powerful and autonomous faculties, characterized by highly diverse needs and expectations) did not lend itself easily to such cooperation. In addition, as academic subjects, these (inter)disciplinary fields simply were not yet well established academically to garner much interest from the traditional disciplines involved. Soon, these

International Assistance Goals

37

projects were forced either to adjust their ambitions to more modest proportions, as in the IRD component at Universitas Gajah Mada (Veenkamp, 1982), or face deadlock, lack of cooperation, and occasionally even opposition, as happened to the community health program at UNHAS (van Olden, 1983: 24). Nonetheless, these cases not only illustrate the donor’s initial preference for social developmental criteria–even at the risk of failing to come to grips with institutional realities—but also indicate the relative nature of such preference. Rather than an absolute priority of the goal of extra-university development over the goal of intra-institutional development, the linkages usually contained a mixed bag of projects reflecting some balance or compromise between the two perspectives. To begin with, the decentralized mode of developing individual linkage programs–with Dutch and Indonesian academics fi rst negotiating project proposals among themselves, and then with their respective authorities internally (i.e. within their university) and externally (i.e. with NUFFIC or the Ministry of Education . . . )—ensured that academic development was well represented. Significantly, some of the selected institutions, as prominently reflected in the programs at UGM and UNIBRAW, managed to secure significant chunks of funding for the development of basic sciences, and this in spite of donor pressures to center more exclusively on extension or applied research projects (p.c. Brinkman). The needs for academic staff development in basic science disciplines (e.g. chemistry, physics etc.) were great, and Dutch universities (among them the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, VUA most visibly) effectively brought home the message that this was to be a key area of institutional development for Indonesian partner institutions. But even beyond the basic sciences, the strong involvement of academics ensured that staff development and academic upgrading became the paramount features of the Dutch linkage program. Linkage activities were overwhelmingly directed towards improving the academic training, experience, and formal qualifications of the Indonesian staff. The improvement of the academic infrastructure (“scientific practice”)–the hallmark of the earlier linkage program—was instrumental to that end and specifically consisted of activities to extend and improve the existing curriculum at postgraduate levels, to develop and improve course materials, and introduce lecturers to new techniques in research and extension work. Furthermore, both Dutch and Indonesian universities had learned how to accommodate to the development rhetoric of the times. Thus, support for basic sciences and academic upgrading was motivated on the basis of its contribution to Indonesian self-reliance (VUA, 1980: 8). National self-reliance, in other words, conveniently became a vehicle for promoting strategies that would also help increase the institutional ‘self-reliance’ of partner institutions, even though increased institutional autonomy as such never was an explicit goal of the program. Meanwhile, the development rhetoric would soon be loosing its broader appeal even at donor’s headquarter in

38

International Assistance and State-University Relations

The Hague. Evaluation reports in the early 1980s indicated growing university criticism of the practice of judging linkages on the basis of their being in agreement with the Dutch policy criterion of orienting aid towards the poor (Kater, 1984). Such criticism indeed at times became especially sensitive in the context of Dutch-Indonesian relations, where the reproach of “patronizing behavior and attitudes” (Janssen, von Liebenstein, & Adikusumo, 1982) on the part of the Dutch would never be very far away.

2.5

University Administration: the Missing Link?

Conspicuously absent in the overview of the Dutch linkages in Indonesia throughout this period are program components pertaining to non-academic aspects of university development. Dutch and Indonesian academics seemed to be much on the same line in trying to limit the thematic focus of their cooperation as much as possible to academic up-grading of staff. And among them there was little interest or incentive to engage in projects in the delicate and high-risk area of management development, or even in centralized academic or technical support services (e.g. library development). Meanwhile, neither DGIS, as funding agency, or NUFFIC, as intermediary agent, seemed to push hard for interventions in support of centralized institutional planning or management, in spite of the provision made for non-academic types of support. Nowhere was there any mention of intervening in the internal university organization or administration, let alone of stepping into the lions’ den of local university fi nancial management or internal resource allocation. The option of supporting specific initiatives in that area was never really considered by either side, and instead the undeclared policy was to best steer away from it as much as possible (p.c. Brinkman). Significantly, none of the Dutch long-term resident staff in Indonesia formally participated in local management decision-making structures regardless at what level, their tasks being rather strictly confi ned to academic or project matters. Nonetheless, academic and project matters in some cases did have local administrative and even fi nancial implications (e.g. counterpart allowances for Indonesian staff) which occasionally required administrative decision-making and follow-up within the host institution (e.g. selection of grantees, credits for training etc.). In that connection, the person who came closest to systematic and regular informal consultation with Indonesian administrators (i.e. Rector, Vice Rectors, Deans) was the Dutch resident coordinator assigned to UGM during the early years of the linkage program. Rather than to try and influence administrative decision making within the partner institution, however, his main task was to ensure efficient implementation of the Dutch linkage projects. This often required administrative backstopping, and occasionally some crisis management, at various bureaus in Jakarta as well as in Yogyakarta. So when a system of counterpart honoraria was designed (funded jointly by UGM and NUFFIC), its purpose was to provide adequate compensation

International Assistance Goals

39

to active participants in Dutch upgrading activities, rather than to set up a model designed to change the incentive structure within the university (Veenkamp, 1982: III-15). While the coordinator had intimate knowledge and understanding of the situation at Gajah Mada, he was not expected to introduce or improve administrative practices. In relation to management, partners instead chose to continue the existing situation of ‘mutual noninterference’ (p.c. Veenkamp): Dutch institutions would not (have to) get involved in the sensitive area of university management, while the Indonesian side did not (have to) deal directly with the organizational complexity of Dutch aid. Informants suggested several reasons for the Dutch restraint–or lack of ambition—to move into the area of university administration (p.c. Brinkman, Veenkamp, Hagen). Among them were the assumed low interest and receptivity on the Indonesian side, high sensitivity (and particularly so in the context of Dutch-Indonesian postcolonial relations), and a low interest and perceived lack of comparative advantage at Dutch universities. More broadly speaking, and as other studies also suggest, universities in developing countries at the time had become less receptive to external influences, and, as a corollary, increasingly confident about their own capacity to contribute to national development.19 In that sense too, the goal of supporting the ‘Development University’ seemed to provide a better fit with historical circumstances than that of ‘University Development’. As a result, and in spite of the initial prospect to expand the scope of the linkage program beyond the confi nes of the academic subjects and departments, the goals of the Dutch linkage program remained closely associated with the ‘academic infrastructure’ of selected faculties, departments, or study programs. One apparent exception in this regard concerns a project in support of university-wide equipment maintenance and repair at the University of Hasanuddin’s Central Workshop, an initiative that was fi rst introduced in the mid 1980s as a follow up to earlier support in the Medical Faculty. This project stood out in at least two ways. Not only was it located at the central institutional level (the workshop resorted directly under the rector) and functionally oriented to the entire institution, it was also one of the few Dutch linkage projects that was not primarily based on either academic or developmental rationales but instead was grounded in principle on internal organizational needs. Further, the UNHAS central workshop itself at the time was unique to the extent that it was not an officially (i.e. by the Government) recognized part of the standard university structure and as a result was funded largely from the institution’s own resources. Significantly, however, the project’s fi nal evaluation report documents in great detail how the funding decision was in fact based on a ‘misunderstanding’ of the central workshop’s institution-wide task, more than on a particularly well developed appreciation of that role at donor’s end. 20 The project’s exceptional features therefore sum up rather well what the linkages did not seem to target for. In spite of their institution-wide

40

International Assistance and State-University Relations

ambitions, linkages were generally not hooked up in any operational sense with offices or service units of the central administration of the university, but instead were typically located at the level of the Faculty or academic units below. Furthermore, their intentions usually were not so much based on a prior assessment of institutional needs but instead were related to broadly defi ned notions of national development on the one hand, and to specific needs for academic staff development on the other. In other words, and in spite of the officially proclaimed goal of institution building, the institutional “middle-level” (Clark, 1983) does not appear as direct target of Dutch assistance during this period. Only in more recent years–and paralleling similar trends in other donor agencies (Berry, 1995; Coombe, 1989; Olsson, 1992)—has Dutch assistance policy become more assertive in including and indeed actively pursuing institutional management and planning components in its education programs overseas. This broader policy shift was fi rst reflected most explicitly in the policy paper on development cooperation and education, which appeared in 1992 at the time of the aid-rupture with Indonesia. The policy document formally made strengthening the capacity of institutions and systems one of its priority themes, further noting that “A process is under way of decentralization and enhanced local autonomy, intended to produce greater efficiency and flexibility in education. ( . . . ) This trend demands restructuring, tighter cost and quality control, innovation, and a greater focus on educational management and administration and on the reinforcement of local research capacity” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993). However, regarding Dutch cooperation with Indonesia this later emphasis on strengthening institutional management capacity for obvious reasons never really got under way as policy would soon be taken over by events. To the extent that a shift in emphasis could be detected before the aidrupture, it was arguably reflected more visibly in the activities financed from the Dutch Minister of Education’s international budget than in those with traditional support from development assistance (p.c. Zijlstra, Hagen, Maassen). 21 In this connection, mention should be made in particular of one such ‘education initiative’, which was explicitly and this time not mistakenly oriented towards improving the management capacity of Indonesian universities. This small 22 but ambitious project, initiated in 1986, supported the development of university management training courses involving Twente’s Center for Higher Education Policy (CHEPS) and the Institute of Technology in Bandung (ITB). The project ultimately sought to establish a center for higher education management at ITB that would be able to provide training for university managers in such areas as strategic planning, personnel management, and fi nancial planning. This idea was innovative and at the time exceptional in a number of ways. First, the initiative picked up developments within Indonesia from the mid-1980s onwards suggesting less government controls and more fi nancial autonomy for universities (Task Force for Management Reform and Consolidation of Higher

International Assistance Goals

41

Education, 1988). At the level of formal policy, these suggested changes were manifested fi rst in the official planning language and only later–consistent with the decision making pattern in a bureaucratic polity—were to be enshrined in various laws and regulations. 23 Secondly, in anticipation of increased autonomy and at the same time confronted with decreasing government funds, leading public universities such as ITB on their part seemed to be taking a growing interest in how universities in other countries were managed and how modern principles of strategic planning could be introduced. 24 Third, while institutional receptivity regarding external interventions in the area of university management was on the rise, the Dutch Ministry of Education was quick to seize the opportunity and position itself more assertively than before as a knowledge exporter in the area of university management. 25

3.

From Partnerships to Projects

One of the underlying ambiguities that marked the development of the Dutch linkage program over the years concerns the tension between linkages as bilateral aid instruments and as intrinsically valuable goals in their own right. While these differences at times are subtle, often allowing compromise, the analytical distinction nonetheless is relevant to this study as it reflects once more changing donor perspectives on the role of higher education institutions in society. Depending on the emphasis, linkages are regarded either as a vehicle for fostering ties between autonomous institutions for higher learning, or as a technical instrument for assisting countries to carry out specifi c functions. In this connection, the initial goal of fostering long-term partnerships between institutions, based on institution-wide commitments and a recognition of eventual mutual benefit, gradually made room for a more sober look at the purpose of these linkages, and the conditions on which collaborating institutions could participate and be held accountable. The change took place over a number of years, 26 but was reflected most visibly in the 1987 reorganization of roles and programs in Dutch bilateral assistance27. Notably, the former university linkage program was abolished and integrated into a new sector program (‘Training, Education, and Research’) that included institutions outside of higher education. The earlier formula of long-term institution-wide linkages was abandoned and instead the project again became the primary unit at which fi nancial and substantive decisions came to be taken. The erstwhile ambition to strengthen (higher education) institutions as a whole was now given up entirely in order to make room for targeted interventions at specific departments or units, which, depending on the specifi c project objective, could be located either inside or outside of higher education. On the whole, the program was less exclusively concerned with the improvement of higher education programs in developing countries and instead put

42

International Assistance and State-University Relations

greater weight on supporting research for developing countries, building on specific comparative strengths in the Netherlands. The philosophy of linking Dutch and overseas organizations nonetheless was maintained and the new linkage program that started in 1988 essentially merged many of the former linkage projects implemented by Dutch institutes for higher education. Whereas institution building continued to a major goal of the program, its defi nition was now restricted to the confi nes of the operational objective of the particular project. Rather than building “the university as an institution”, the goal was to strengthen specific training, education and research capacities at targeted places and in selected areas. From the perspective of State-university relations, the implication was that the locus of Dutch assistance was situated at the level of specific units and sub-units inside (and outside) the university. In other words, while broadening the range of institutions that received support, the new program seemed to narrow the locus of institution building to specific units within the organization. At the same time, however, the scope of activities would be extended and occasionally also started to include components that aimed at improved management capacity within particular units. To illustrate the shift of emphasis regarding the locus and scope of institution-building, one evaluation report pertaining to a linkage project in remote sensing at UGM fi rst has praise for the project’s institution-building component arguing that the project’s target unit, a training center within the faculty of geography, “ . . . had almost become an institution in itself . . .” and then goes on to suggest ways for the center to enhance its income generating potential through the provision of consulting services in an arrangement with the Faculty and UGM (Lutchman & Patmo, 1991). The reorganization of Dutch linkage programs manifested itself most visibly in an increase of the number of ‘linkages’–totaling 29 in 1991— many of which actually consisted of former PUO projects now continued as separate links. In the case of UGM and UNIBRAW, these projects continued to be regarded as part of a broader cooperation framework, but in spite of the informal ‘coordinating efforts’28 the idea of an institution-wide linkage practically lost much its meaning (van Dongen, 1995). Further, rather than ensuring continuity of activities, the reorganization essentially was meant to bring innovation into the program. Whereas the old linkage idea was criticized as too rigid and ambitious, the new formula was to offer flexibility and room for experimentation with new forms of cooperation, including a greater emphasis on research (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988). New themes (e.g. women in development at UI) and partner-institutions entered the program, including higher education institutions as well as government agencies or branches within specific line ministries. Regarding higher education, institutions that entered the program included the Institute of Technology in Surabaya, the University of Pattimura (Ambon), the University of Indonesia, and even the Ministry’s DGHE directly.

International Assistance Goals

43

With the latter project in particular, the linkage program explicitly also entered the realm of Indonesian higher education policy and implementation. Specifically, this project aimed to improve teaching practices at Indonesia’s public higher education institutions by the gradual dissemination–and ultimately institutionalization—of an instructional upgrading program for teaching staff (i.e. the so-called ‘applied approach’). The project started in 1986 as a direct cooperation program between the Directorate of Academic Affairs of the DGHE and the NUFFIC—in itself a unique construction 29 — but on the Dutch side implementation responsibilities transferred in 1988 to the University of Twente’s Education Center. Of greater significance to this study’s theme is the underlying tension in this project between the need for central government action in a key area of academic concern (i.e. ensuring the quality of teaching) on the one hand, and the recognition of the autonomy of the institutions concerned. The following excerpt from one of NUFFIC’s monitoring reports illustrates the ambiguity rather well: “To realize a more autonomous position of the universities, it was decided by DGHE that a smooth running educational support system, consisting of educational centers at each university, had to be provided . . .” (NUFFIC, 1992). The project, in other words, helped set up and develop (i.e. training) centrally mandated units within each university, which then further operated in a decentralized manner. Additional central support was to be provided by a central unit in Jakarta, but its institutionalization in the Inter University Center of the Open University never got underway before the project, like the rest of Dutch assistance, was terminated in April 1992. 30 As a result of the reorganization, linkages stopped being the exclusive domain of higher education institutions, let alone of universities only. Instead, linkage projects would become more fi rmly embedded in overall Dutch assistance policy regarding Indonesia, and typically also would include cooperation with particular training or research or training units of technical ministries. Examples here include projects such as the training center for poultry husbandry in the Ministry of Agriculture, or cooperation in areas such as water resources development or urban infrastructure in the Ministry of Public Works. But also within the Ministry of Education and Culture, new linkages were being developed with functional units within the bureaucracy. The list includes a program for inter-university legal cooperation with Indonesia, coordinated by a legal consortium within the ministry, as well the continuation of an older and major bilateral project in support of the national center for linguistic development. In a political sense, linkages increasingly came to be regarded as part of a broader instrument in fostering direct cooperation between organizations in the Netherlands and in Indonesia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988: 31–32). One of the essential features of the education and research sector program (TOO) in which linkages were a prominent part was that it was not formally part of the budgetary aid envelope that was part of bilateral negotiations with Indonesian planning authorities. Linkage projects

44

International Assistance and State-University Relations

therefore in principle were “more accessible for initiatives involving mutual collaboration between various groups and organizations in the Netherlands and in Indonesia” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988: 8). To the extent that furthering such cooperation was part of the broader political agenda of Dutch assistance policy at the time, 31 it is ironic to note that so many of the linkage projects in higher education continued to be situated in State universities and government bureaucracies. 32 However, that observation at the same time fits snugly with the noted ambiguity of Dutch assistance goals, which on the one hand aimed to support the institutional capacity of the State in national development while on the other hand increasingly seeking to further at least the professional (academic) autonomy of targeted units in the system.

4.

Conclusion

The implicit nature of the relationship between Dutch assistance goals and State-university relations in Indonesia required relatively extensive handling. While operating within the boundaries and constraints imposed by the bureaucratic system (e.g. regarding the selection of institutions, or government approvals required), goals did not address directly the political economy of Indonesian State-university relations. More than by national or even institutional policy or reform agendas, ‘operative’ assistance goals were guided by pragmatic academic rationales–in the Netherlands as much as in Indonesia—to professionally upgrade selected academic units and selected fields. At one level, Dutch assistance seemed to recognize and at times explicitly support the assertive developmental role of the State in Indonesian higher education, even when occasionally distancing itself politically from Jakarta. At a more implicit level, however, the strategy of building critical capacities at ‘favorite’ spots clearly seems at odds with a system that at least officially favored standardized approaches to distribute resources and opportunities evenly across regions and institutions. Whether intentionally or inadvertently, such a strategy, if successful, would suggest more institutional differentiation, for instance, between those institutions that have the capacity to generate external resources and those that do not, or between those that offer graduate programs and those that do not. And while in practice some degree of differentiation can be accommodated in the State-control model, the principle does challenge the uniformity and homogeneity that are typical of that model (Neave, 1994). Within the targeted universities, meanwhile, Dutch assistance focused prominently on the task of academic capacity building at selected units. Notable exceptions notwithstanding, the linkage program in Indonesia mostly and explicitly steered away from initiatives to strengthen institutional management or university administration. In spite of the ‘institutionbuilding’ rhetoric, the institutional “middle level” remained conspicuously absent in most of the Dutch higher education assistance projects. Instead,

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and especially during the later years of the period studied, the goal of “institution-building” was confi ned to the level of the targeted academic unit. At the institutional level, Dutch assistance goals at the time seemed more compatible with a strategy of intra-institutional decentralization; many of the targeted units indeed explicitly aspired for increased levels of professional autonomy relative to the university as well as to the State. In sum, the pattern of State-university relations implicitly suggested is one that combines strong planning, funding, and regulatory control capacities at the center (i.e. governmental steering) with increased academic and managerial responsibilities at the level of the academic unit.

II. WORLD BANK LENDING TO HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDONESIA This section analyzes and reviews the origins and changing goals of the World Bank’s higher education lending program in Indonesia, focusing on how these correspond to domestic patterns of State-university relations. It suggests an incremental shift in the Bank’s overall strategy, in part responding to domestic conditions, in part following a changing international Bank agenda. Briefly put, whereas the Bank’s program initially sustained government approaches supportive of a central State role in the provision, funding, and coordination of higher education (i.e. State-control), its emphasis gradually shifted towards strategies that either directly or indirectly called for increased autonomy and less direct State control (i.e. State supervision). This movement was accompanied by parallel changes in the Bank’s sector goals in Indonesia, starting from the early emphasis on centrally planned expansion in selective areas, on to significant investments in quality improvement and institutional capacity strengthening, and, more recently, a drive towards decentralization and management reforms. The section reviews these changes with specific emphasis to how they relate to domestic patterns of State-university relations, notably with regard to the provision, funding, and coordination of higher education. The discussion begins with a brief sketch of the antecedents of the World Bank’s higher education lending program in Indonesia. Similar to the section on Dutch assistance goals, the analysis of documents and interviews is conducted at two inter-related levels i.e. the level of broad and formally stated policy goals and the level of operative goals as reflected in project related information (i.e. documents and interviews).

1.

Origins

Whereas Dutch higher education assistance programs originated from international academic contacts, the World Bank’s lending program in Indonesia from the start has been firmly embedded in the close relationship that

46 International Assistance and State-University Relations evolved in the early 1970s between the Bank and the Indonesian government, especially in development planning.33 With the establishment of a strong country presence in Jakarta,34 the Bank had positioned itself strategically to facilitate a broad macroeconomic policy dialogue with the Indonesian government, which would soon be followed-up in various sectors and subsectors of Bank activity. The early development of such a policy dialogue process in education, and later on in higher education specifically, provides the general framework from which the Bank’s wider sector goals as well as its expanding lending portfolio would later emerge (World Bank, 1991). Close relations with clients or recipients are of course common in international aid, as indeed they reflect a shared goal of donors and recipients to ensure a steady flow of funds, “to move money” (Kreiner, 1984). However, the regular format and increased specificity of the Bank’s education policy dialogue in Indonesia suggest that there was more to it than moving money only. First, a broad agreement developed among participants of the dialogue—senior officers in the Bank and in the Indonesian bureaucracy (i.e. BAPPENAS, MOF, and MOEC)—that education was a-key sector in the country’s economic and social development.35 Later upstream activities at the sub-sector level (e.g. in higher education) would essentially build on this basic consensus. Further, the dialogue facilitated an early understanding with the government about the Bank’s self-perceived role and ambition. Notably, even before much education lending was taking place36 the expectation was already fi rmly established that the Bank was not only interested in investments, but also would be seeking to play a leading role in areas such as educational management, technical assistance, and sector analysis in education (p.c. Gilpin). Finally, and not in the least, the policy dialogue process and dynamics37 suggested a broad acceptance and even explicit support by the Bank of at least some of the basic assumptions supporting an active role of the State in educational development. These rationales mostly pertained to public funding (i.e. the argument that education was under-funded), provision (i.e. market failures or inequities) or to a perceived need for more and better planning, management, and coordination (i.e. increased efficiency). In higher education specifically, perceived constraints on the capacity of government and public institutions in general to utilize the Bank’s assistance efficiently, has determined much of the Bank’s lending activity throughout the 1980s (Eisemon, 1992). The Bank conducted its fi rst education sector survey in 1973, at a time when the country was anticipating a significant expansion of government investments in the social sector (World Bank, 1975). The report that followed provides a comprehensive assessment of the education system, and suggests broad outlines of an investment program that would feed into the government’s second five-year development plan (REPELITA II, 1974– 79). Overall, the study calls for a substantial increase in the level of public fi nancial resources devoted to education38 —especially in areas meeting critical manpower needs—yet emphasizes the need for efficiency gains and

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stronger administrative and planning capacities throughout the system.39 In higher education, the Bank’s diagnosis comprised a sharp criticism of existing inefficiencies (e.g. high dropout rates, duplication of courses and facilities, lack of coordination between faculties and institutions), to the point of arguing that “much of the resources spent on higher education are wasted” (World Bank, 1975: 60). Not surprisingly, the Bank at that point called for restraint in expansion of higher education, and instead prudently set out to restrict its investments to critical and manifest manpower needs, especially in the areas of teacher training, agriculture, training of accountants, and technical engineering education. These manpower forecasts in the late 1970s provided the basis for the Bank’s fi rst investments in the higher education sub-sector.40 Although its own interventions in higher education at the time were still very limited, the Bank’s assessment of the sub-sector was comprehensive and includes a foretelling diagnosis of management issues at Indonesian universities. As early as 1975, when the report was fi rst published, the Bank recognized structural weaknesses in university administration and management as a particular cause of concern. Especially the fragmentation of authority within the higher education system, both at national and institutional levels, was reported to represent a major challenge to productive State-university relations in Indonesia, and one which according to the authors required urgent government attention. The Bank’s diagnosis as well as its remedy merit consideration here as they both further illustrate its concern with the capacity of the State to manage higher education at institutional and national levels, a concern which was fully congruent with the requirements of an effective bureaucratic polity. As fragmentation was considered an obstacle, suggested solutions were to include increasing authority, coordination, and management capacity at the center. This concern for central management capacity building—both at State level and central institutional level—later becomes a prominent ingredient of Bank assisted operations in the 1980s. The 1975 sector study at the same time provides an early indication of the relative nature of Indonesian State-control in higher education. Centralized State-control was challenged by fragmented planning and funding arrangements emanating from the central bureaucracy41 as much as by formal and informal decision making mechanisms within the university (World Bank, 1975: 69). At the institutional level, central authority typically was undercut by powerful, ‘semi-autonomous’ faculties enjoying high degrees of autonomy within universities in such areas as student admissions, staff recruitment, and even–albeit mostly unofficially—student fees. Nonetheless, and in marked contrast with the management reforms advocated by the Bank in the 1990s (World Bank, 1994), the Bank’s recommendations in 1975 do not include increasing institutional autonomy, but instead suggest measures to standardize university entrance levels, centralize common administrative functions, and, even, limit fees (World Bank, 1975: 75).

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2.

Evolving Goals in Higher Education

Starting from a modest basis, the World Bank’s higher education program in Indonesia gradually starts to gain momentum in the 1980s. The nature and extent of the program’s quantitative expansion is explored further in chapter 3. This section in particular analyzes the development of the Bank’s strategic goals, derived from country assistance strategies and project documents, in relation to domestic policies and conditions in higher education. Table 2.4 summarizes the key-elements of that relationship over time, and identifies dominant themes in connection to State roles in higher education. While the association between broad strategic goals and successive time periods is of a relative rather than absolute nature, allowing room for overlap across goals and time periods, the following broad patterns emerge: (1) Bank strategies regarding Indonesian higher education (column B in table 2.4) over time have overall remained remarkably congruent with the formal policy goals of the Indonesian bureaucracy, as reflected in official plans and government documents (Column D in table 2.4). The Bank’s major investments in institutional innovations (e.g. the introduction of a polytechnics system, the creation of inter-university research centers) and reforms pursued (e.g. resource diversification, management information systems) correspond well with existing domestic forces of change that typically operated from the center, top-down.42 Bank operations furthermore have been consistent in their emphasis on manpower development and institutional capacity building as key economic rationales for continued involvement in higher education lending. (2) Notwithstanding continuity, the development of the Bank’s program over time also indicates qualitative changes, especially in its approach of the role of the State and its relationship to higher education institutions (Column C in table 2.4). Notably, whereas Bank projects at least initially seemed broadly supportive of a central State role in the provision, funding, and coordination of higher education, its emphasis gradually shifted towards strategies that either directly or indirectly called for different and less direct forms of State control. At the institutional level, meanwhile, the Bank’s more recent emphasis on decentralized planning contrasts rather sharply with earlier calls for standardization and centralized management. The next sections provide more detailed analysis—conceptual and empirical—of the association between the Bank’s goals and evolving patterns of State-university relations in Indonesia. In correspondence with the strategies identified in table 2.4, the discussion is organized around three broad Bank goals (i.e. manpower development, institutional development, and, strategic decentralization) and their relationship to shifting patterns of State control

International Assistance Goals Table 2.4 Timeline

49

World Bank Strategies in Indonesian Higher Education and State University Relations Bank Strategies & ProjectsÆ

1975–84 Manpower Planning - to establish (Polytechnic project) or expand (1st University Development Project) higher education facilities at selected institutions

Themes in Stateuniversity Relations State-control: - expanded provision (new institutions)

Å Government Goals & Plans Expansion (equity considerations)

- increased public funding

- establishment of new institutions (incl. Open University)

- standardized coordination/regulation

- resource availability (oil revenue)

- to improve planning & management both at central (DGHE) and institutional level Attempts to centralize (Master Planning) planning & decision-making at the institutional level (i.e. centralization)

Centralized planning nationally (single system policy) - REPELITA II & III - 1st Higher Education Development Plan (1975–85) Standardization at institutional level - Regulation Nr. 5 (1980)

1985–94 Institutional Capacity Building - investments develop national capacity to train university teachers and researchers in strategic areas (UDP-II) - investments in quality inputs (HEDP)

Less direct State control:

Consolidation (investments in quality inputs)

- increased resource diversification

- stabilization of student population at state institutions vs. rapid growth of private institutions

- decreasing budgets in real terms - institutional differentiation New State roles:

- support for research and technology

- resource diversification (HEDP)

- growing selectivity and competition

- 2nd Higher Education Development Plan (1986–1995)

- planning and management capacity building at central and institutional level (HEDP, UDP, Polytechnic)

- encouraging income generation

Budgetary constraints

- need for scientific and technologically trained personnel (S&T-Project)

- supporting private sector development

- decreasing budget for recurrent expenditures

- management and information system

Legitimizing (financial) autonomy of HED institutions:

At the institutional level:

- REPELITA V, 1988–93 (Financial Autonomy)

- de-concentration

- Basic Education Law 1989 - Regulation Nr. 30 (1990), Financial Autonomy (continued)

50

International Assistance and State-University Relations

Table 2.4 Timeline 1995– 98+

World Bank Strategies in Indonesian Higher Education and State-university Relations (continued) Bank Strategies & ProjectsÆ Strategic Decentralization

Themes in Stateuniversity Relations State-supervision:

Å Government Goals & Plans “The New Paradigm” (management reform)

- creation of semiautonomous interme- Suggests increased autonomy to serve the diary bodies to advise government in accredi- following goals: tation, evaluation, - improve quality (better performance) - increased institutional selection, and policy - selectivity through responsiveness to - make universities (more) competition, block external (accountaccountable grants, and matching ability) and internal - increase efficiency (more funds (participation/ownerresults with same/less ship) demands - autonomy ‘within input) - increased selectivity in hierarchical system’ - strengthen institutional (Long Term Plan) public provision and management funding, through use - enabling regulatory of competitive and better balance local framework alternative funding and global university At institutional level: mechanisms functions - decentralized - to facilitate decenIts development “requires planning tralized planning the willingness to processes within deviate from a more - tension between universities decentralizing and cen- centric management to more widely distributed tralizing tendencies - to facilitate indepencenters” (Soehendro, dent and transparent 1996: 12) quality assurance mechanisms - Third Higher Education Development Plan, Key-projects: URGE/ 1996–2005 DUE/QUE - increased institutional autonomy as a way to enhance quality and relevance

- Introduction of ‘DUElike’ and ‘QUE-like’ projects

over time. It is noted that these overall goals do not necessarily coincide strictly—or even broadly—with successive time-periods and strategic priorities indicated in table 2.4, since that would suggest a degree of incompatibility between goals that is not intended and may not be warranted on the basis of empirical analysis. For instance, manpower development goals continued to represent a, if not the primary rationale for Bank lending in higher education, in Indonesia as elsewhere,43 and its significance to Bank policy consequently goes well beyond the time period narrowly associated with manpower planning strategies and forecasting techniques. Similarly, the overall goal of institutional development is not necessarily in conflict with the

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more recent emphasis on decentralized planning, even though targeted units and approaches have shifted, as will be shown. Rather than incompatibility, the broader image that emerges from the analysis of Bank goals over time is one that suggests incremental progression in directions increasingly exploring opportunities (and capacities) for autonomous action within the boundaries of the existing system. While at times disjointed by varying perspectives and even some intergenerational conflict within the agency, the agenda steadily moved away from State-control. 2.1

Manpower Development

Initial rationales for Bank investments in Indonesia’s higher education were rather strictly confined to the goal of developing skilled manpower to meet the country’s economic needs. Notably, the first Bank sub-sector project in higher education development (i.e. the IDA-funded first polytechnic project (1978–85) drew explicitly upon manpower forecasts to justify its investment in training engineering technicians (World Bank, 1978). But even as manpower planning techniques later were to lose much of their attractiveness on both technical and policy grounds,44 manpower development goals in a broader sense continued to provide guidance to the Bank’s work in higher education throughout the period of this study (World Bank, 1991). The Bank’s broader concern with graduate employability is evident in all of its higher education projects—from the manpower-planning-based investments in polytechnics up to the more recent projects under the Bank’s decentralization paradigm—and has conditioned its preference for specific fields and types of education (e.g. polytechnics, inter-university graduate schools). Nonetheless, significant differences are observed over time as to how the Bank’s changing concept of manpower development suggested varying degrees and different types of State involvement in higher education. The conceptual distinctions are here first briefly summarized, and are then further illustrated with case study material derived from specific Bank projects and documents: Manpower development as ‘manpower planning’ (forecasting) suggests broad acceptance, if not support, for an active State with the capacity to centrally ensure the provision, coordination, planning, and funding of higher education. It is generally sympathetic to a selective expansion or establishment of special types of public higher education, i.e. in fields for which there is a manifest need or shortage. At the institutional level, manpower planning suggests centralized management control in order to ensure effective coordination (e.g. institutions can be told how many students to train, in what fields, at what unit price). Lack of coordination, public under-funding (or, at the least, room for expansion), and market failure, provide the major rationales for manpower planning approaches. Manpower development as ‘institutional capacity building’ aims to improve selected institutions to self-generate and develop their own capacity to provide, plan, and fund activities that contribute to the development of

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manpower in strategic and centrally defined areas (e.g. in research). The strategy seeks to consolidate and to improve resources and facilities within existing institutions rather than to establish new ones. Instead of uniformity and standardization, it suggests increasing differentiation of institutional tasks and capacities within centrally determined parameters of funding, regulation, and provision. Controlled and stratified differentiation being its major thrust, the strategy suggests a less direct and different type of State control, relying less exclusively on public funds and provision, yet at the same time requiring increased capacity in government to develop mechanisms and criteria to select and evaluate programs or institutions. Budgetary or fiscal constraints, lack of institutional management capacity and financial autonomy, and market failure, are the most common rationales supporting institutional capacity building approaches to manpower planning. Manpower development under the ‘decentralized planning’ paradigm moves away from centrally determined manpower objectives, and instead focuses on the extent to which–and the process by which (i.e. bottom-up rather than topdown)—institutions are able to respond to manpower demands in society. At the State level, this approach suggests the capacity to devise public funding mechanisms that ensure maximum flexibility (e.g. block grants), choice (e.g. competition), and accountability (e.g. ex post evaluations). Specifically, public funding becomes an instrument of the State to sanction institutional performance on a range of evolving output criteria (e.g. employability of graduates) and indicators (e.g. salaries of graduates, time to find employment). At the institutional level, the strategy suggests increased competition for resources and status both within and among higher education institutions, public and private. It also suggests less dependence on the State for funding, provision, and planning purposes, and more room for autonomous decision making internally–in matters of finance, personnel, as well as academic matters—the expectation being that such would increase institutional responsiveness to manpower demands. Whereas budget constraints often provide further fuel to the call for increased decentralization, most common rationales include arguments of greater efficiency (i.e. in allocating resources), higher quality and better performance, and a perceived need to correct existing market failures. Apart from economic and educational rationales, however, the decentralization strategy in addition suggests a political rationale that seeks to extend the quality and number of units in society capable of autonomous action within the confines of the existing polity.45 The Bank’s higher education program in Indonesia provides ample documentation of each of these conceptual approaches,46 and does so on a time scale that suggests broad correspondence with the three successive periods identified in table 2.4. The first higher education projects—one involving the creation and later expansion of technical engineering programs (Polytechnic-I and II), the other supporting expansion of specific programs at three universities (UDP-I)—were negotiated at a time when the Indonesian government started to expand its public sector from a relatively modest

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basis.47 Both projects were essentially based on manpower forecasts projecting shortages of skills in specific fields, and both indeed were very explicit and particular in their advise and support for government in establishing, funding, and expanding the public resources for these types of training. The polytechnic project, notably, consisted of the construction and equipment of a previously non-existing system for training engineering technicians in three-year programs, whereas the UDP-I project sought to expand programs in science, agriculture, engineering and economics at 3 State universities. At least implicitly, the Bank in these instances endorsed the government’s position that these types of training should be provided at public institutions, and furthermore went along with the selection of project institutions.48 Apart from providing the typical project rationale found in appraisal documents, persistent under-financing of higher education constituted a problem about which the Bank in those years expressed great concern (World Bank, 1982, 1991). While the Bank never formally endorsed unselective quantitative expansion of higher education facilities, it did advise government to increase public spending levels throughout the 1980s on the basis of a “more systematic assessment of Indonesia’s future professional manpower needs and staff development” (World Bank, 1982: 109). Finally, and still fully consistent with the manpower planning strategy mapped out in table 2.4, the Bank’s early projects in higher education emphasized more effective central coordination and control at both national and institutional levels. Both the UDP-I project and the two polytechnic projects explicitly included major components to strengthen educational planning and management (for instance, introducing master planning procedures, or rationalizing university organization and staffing), thereby reaffirming and addressing systemic weaknesses (i.e. fragmentation of power, lack of effective management controls and planning procedures) identified in the 1975 sector report. One indication of the perceived importance of this project objective can be derived from the UDP-I completion report, which identifies “reinforced centralized control over a sprawling university system” (UDP-I, PCR: 3, World Bank, 1990) as one of the project’s most significant accomplishments.49 In order to ensure that manpower plans could effectively be implemented, the Bank’s assessments early on included provisions highlighting the necessity to invest in central management capacity at different levels in the system (p.c. Gilpin). More effective if not increased State-control not only provided a better fit with the central features of the manpowerplanning models in vogue at the time, but also seemed to respond best to the deficiencies of a system in search of greater policy coherence and in need of increased absorption capacity.50 The latter two considerations (i.e. policy coherence and absorptive capacity) directly fed into the broader goal of institutional development that was to gain greater prominence in Bank operations from the mid-1980s onwards. The second phase of the university development project (UDP-II), which started in 1985, illustrates the change of emphasis. While still broadly based

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on general manpower goals—the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) even contains a projection of required supplies of manpower in a number of fields—its overall purpose was, specifically, “to develop Indonesia’s capacity to train its own university teachers and researchers” (UDP-II, SAR, 12) (World Bank, 1985). The project involved a massive staff development and upgrading plan, organized around 16 so-called Inter-University Centers (IUC) and 10 different fields, and at five different universities.51 Rather than expansion and standardization, this project sought to increase quality, selectivity, and stratified differentiation, notably between institutions having research facilities and significant numbers of teachers with graduate degrees and those that don’t. Increased differentiation of institutional tasks and capacities in turn fit snugly with the Bank’s wider agenda of resource diversification and cost recovery, which at that time (1985/86) was getting increasing attention in sector work, also in Indonesia. UDP-II as well as later Bank projects (Annex) continued to explicitly emphasize manpower goals—notably in the identification of broad fields that deserved special consideration—but their realization was to depend increasingly less on central plans and State-control, and instead increasingly more on the capacity of institutions to pursue them. More recent and on-going Bank projects have moved further away from centrally determined manpower goals, and instead are advocating decentralized approaches to ensure institutions’ responsiveness to society’s manpower needs. The focus has shifted towards new funding mechanisms and more competitive and decentralized incentive structures to help increase the relevance of higher education study programs on the job market. The Bank project, Quality of Undergraduate Education (QUE, 1997)—the third in a series of Bank initiatives closely associated with the implementation of the government’s management reforms in higher education (New Paradigm)—illustrates the change of emphasis in the Bank’s goal of manpower development. As earlier Bank loans, this initiative seeks to address persisting problems of quality and relevance in Indonesia’s higher education, specifically pointing to the perceived mismatch between the output of the universities and the needs of the economy. However, rather than setting central targets or investing heavily in equipment and infrastructure, its goal is “to promote a more cost-effective allocation of public funds by directing resources to high priority fields at both public and private universities” (QUE, SAR: 2) (World Bank, 1997). The project specifically sets out to do so by furthering the use of competitive grant schemes, performance indicators, and block grants (QUE, SAR: 10) (World Bank, 1997: 10). The implications of the decentralization goal to State-university relations go well beyond the promotion of specific approaches to manpower development, but these will be further analyzed later on. 2.2

Institutional Development

Manpower planning providing the initial drive, additional rationales for a more comprehensive involvement in the development of the higher

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education sub-sector began to build momentum when the Bank, through policy studies and related analyses in the mid 1980s, 52 started to engage itself more openly in the process of policy formulation. At that time, Bank staff for a number of reasons anticipated giving higher priority to investments in higher education, 53 while the government on its part seemed to express an increased willingness to borrow for higher education investments.54 In this context, the Bank began to advocate a wider and longerterm policy perspective to the development of higher education, initially seeking mainly to build strong institutional capacity at targeted places (as in UDP-II), but later also ambitiously investing more broadly in government plans spanning the entire sub-sector. The Bank’s upstream sector analyses as well as its lending activities comprised two analytically distinct dimensions of institution building, each of which in a different way suggest a gradual movement away from the dominant pattern of State-control in State-university relations. Institutional development in a narrow sense pertains to the goal of “improving the ability of selected institutions to make effective use of the human and fi nancial resources available” (Israel, 1987).55 In the Bank’s higher education program in Indonesia, the goal typically is reflected in activities seeking to strengthen management information systems, institutional planning, automation of central administrative functions (e.g. student administration), and management training. However, it may also support improvements in the educational process itself, for instance through staff development, research facilities, or library development. In State-university relations, institutional development explicitly advocates selectivity and suggests increased diversity of institutional capacities and missions. At the State level, the strategy presupposes capacity and resources to organize and manage an increasingly complex higher education system, involving different types of institutions (e.g. polytechnics, research centers, universities and ‘less-established universities’ . . . ) with divergent needs in fi nancial (e.g. differential funding mechanism) and human resources (e.g. differential rewards or incentives). The goal of institutional development in principle does not necessarily include any particular preference for centralization or decentralization at the system level. 56 However, at the university level it does suggest at least the ambition to move to centralize management functions in a strong and autonomous institutional middle-level. Institutional development in the broader sense comprises the aspiration to reform or otherwise attempt to change existing policies in directions that enable universities to maximize and utilize the human and fi nancial resource basis available to them. It suggests a revision of the normative framework—the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990)—in which universities operate, be this in funding, accreditation, planning and/or management. Notably, the Bank’s upstream activities and consecutive sector loans in Indonesia sought to introduce or support measures to stimulate the development of private universities, revise accreditation standards for public and

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private institutions, increase cost recovery and resource diversification, and expand managerial and fi nancial autonomy at State universities. Advocated reforms in particular centered on the twin goal of maximizing income generation for higher education while ensuring greater quality and efficiency in the use of these resources.57 In State-university relations, institutional development implies less direct State control in funding (i.e. decreasing share of budgetary sources) and provision (i.e. promotion of private sector development), and a different State role, especially in facilitating or supporting institutions. At the institutional level, the Bank supported government initiatives to increase the fi nancial autonomy of institutions over the allocation and management of resources. While conceptually distinct, the two dimensions of institutional development—at one level suggesting institutional differentiation, at another seeking to increase resource diversification—in actual practice became part of an emerging policy agenda increasingly at odds with the earlier model of uniformity and State-control. As a result of growing ambitions in institutional development, Bank documents were also becoming increasingly explicit in addressing State-university relations, especially where they concerned matters of higher education fi nancing, sector planning, and managerial and fi nancial autonomy (HEDP-I, SAR: 52). The Bank’s broader policy agenda in that area—notably including increased resource diversification and cost recovery, privatization, and decentralized management 58 — fit rather well with the fi nancial and budgetary constraints that were then seriously affecting Indonesia’s resource basis for higher education.59 But Bank goals of institutional development also matched with government plans to stabilize student population at State universities and instead concentrate further growth of enrollments predominantly in the private sector (p.c. Sukadji). Notably, the second Long Term Higher Education Development Plan (1986–95) identified ‘consolidation’ and ‘achievement of critical mass’—not ‘expansion’—as the government’s central policy targets with regard to the future development of State universities (Task Force for Management Reform and Consolidation of Higher Education, 1988: 6–10). The achievement of critical mass in particular was the central institutional goal of Bank projects such as UDP-II, which developed centers of excellence60 at designated institutions and in selected fields (cf. supra), thus explicitly seeking to set these universities apart for specific missions in research and development. The reinforced emphasis on institution building in the mid-1980s also affected Bank goals regarding the then still ongoing Polytechnic project, involving the establishment of a new system of three-year technician training programs. Whereas initially the polytechnics were mostly housed within existing universities and operated under their administrative authority, the Bank at the close of implementation successfully advocated increased autonomy—later separation from host universities—of the polytechnics in budgetary and educational matters (Poly-II, PCR: 4). Both the UPD-II and Polytechnic project reflect goals (and efforts)

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of institutional innovations aimed at strengthened capacity, and ultimately increased differentiation of institutional missions. In the case of the IUC’s the aspiration was to improve the capacity of the leading public universities to provide graduate training and research, whereas in the case of the Polytechnic project the Bank moved to help establish, equip, and further develop an entirely new type of institution. Broad agreement with the Indonesian government on the policy goal of consolidation and quality improvements at State universities boosted the Bank’s aspiration to affect the institutional policy framework of Indonesian higher education. Staff participating in the policy dialogue were encouraged in particular by the government’s “willingness to implement difficult policies” (HEDP-I, SAR: 10), notably by increasing tuition fees at State universities and liberalizing the private sector.61 Not soon later, during the preparation of the government’s fi fth five-year plan (1988–93), DGHE and BAPPENAS agreed to include an entry proposing to grant financial autonomy to the country’s State institutions.62 The Bank’s explicit support for these policy changes and initiatives not only materialized in a sharp increase of Bank investments (cf. chapter 3), but was reflected most visibly in the introduction of a new type of loan, providing direct and sector-wide support to the DGHE development budget. Sector loans—or ‘time-slice loans’ because they fi nanced a time slice of the government’s expenditure program (or part thereof)—were based on a broad agreement between Bank and borrower on a number of specified policy goals. The fi rst Higher Education Development Project (HEDP-I, 1988) identified a program and action plan that covered policy objectives such as increased resource mobilization at public institutions, improved sector-wide planning (i.e. making enrollments contingent on available resources), and better management and Management Information Systems (MIS) at institutions as well as centrally. Both HEDP-I and HEDP-II, the follow-up project that was approved in 1991, included diverse sub-programs (e.g. in library development, university-based research, management training, growth centers to promote the development of private higher education, etc.) providing key inputs perceived (by the center) to be necessary to strengthen institutional capacity. Although institution-building goals in many ways suggested relative movement away from the earlier pattern of State-control—characterized by standardization, and near-to exclusive dependence on public funding—the Bank’s program did not at that time fundamentally challenge the central role of the State in planning, providing, funding, or managing higher education. Instead, it carefully chose to operate within the boundaries of and in close alliance with the State-controlled system, while seeking out and exploring windows of opportunities, presented by the external environment (e.g. budgetary constraints) or by domestic reform agendas.63 Rather than aspiring for ‘deep’ (i.e. implying a fundamental departure from existing norms) and ‘broad’ (i.e. affecting a large number of functional reform areas) institutional reforms at the system level, the Bank’s agenda focused

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on goals that were congruent with prevailing practice, and on areas of comparative advantage (e.g. fi nancing).64 The agency continued to concentrate its resources overwhelmingly in public institutions, in particular the lead universities, while encouraging government to diversify and to facilitate growth of private institutions. At the institutional level, meanwhile, capacity building targets were concentrated at centrally designated places and in centrally determined areas,65 whereas institutional planning and management information systems typically were designed to serve central planning and management purposes.66 The Bank’s implicit goal of institutional differentiation therefore appears as mandated, input-based, and supply-driven, rather than as the desired outcome of a competitive or demand-driven selection process. Similarly, the goal of increased resource diversification was conditioned by the many a-priori’s of a fi nancing system that essentially would remain fi rmly State-controlled for some time to come.67 As long as institutions did not have the discretion to take key-decisions (e.g. in academic planning, personnel management, fi nancial management, etc.), and were not being held accountable for them, fi nancial autonomy to generate extra-budgetary income remained an empty promise. By the early 1990s, at the time when UDP-II was coming to a close and HEPD-II had started operation, Bank staff had become increasingly “frustrated by the endemic structural problems in the organization and administration of higher education in Indonesia” (World Bank, 1991: 75). Discussions with government to identify follow-up interventions— fi rst for UDP, later for HEDP—included reviews of broad sector policy goals as well as specific project approaches. The policy dialogue process now focused even more explicitly on a revision of the role of the State in higher education.68 2.3

Strategic Decentralization

Although manpower building and institutional development remained the overarching goals of the Bank’s higher education portfolio, there was growing recognition from the early 1990s onwards that the effective realization of these goals would require a profound modification of the incentive structure (political economy) of higher education planning in Indonesia.69 Also, and importantly, the Bank had drawn sharp critiques since the late 1980s that it was ‘politically too close to the State’ (p.c. Ralph Harbison). In this context, the Bank explicitly started to advocate a critical revision of the role of the State in funding, providing, and coordinating higher education, at the same time identifying and supporting ways for institutions—and the units within—to take on greater responsibilities in planning and management. I chose the concept of ‘strategic decentralization’ to summarize the overarching theme for a range of structural reforms for which the Bank in the course of only a few years time (1993–96) tried to muster support from reform-minded academic leaders and bureaucrats within government and

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at universities.70 The term underscores the Bank’s growing preoccupation with the process of higher education planning and management—in contrast to the earlier emphasis on inputs and quantitative targets—but also indicates that its preference for decentralized decision-making is based on efficiency considerations more so than on normative a-priori’s. Its general thrust is to enable institutions to become more efficient and more directly responsive, and therefore better, operational units. Or, in keeping with the Bank’s own economic phrasing, its overall goal is to change from a “supply-driven, centrally managed, and sector-wide approach towards a more demand-driven, decentralized and focused approach” (SAR, DUE: 13). Regarding State-university relations, the gradual refocus of Bank goals in general means that: • increased decentralization of decision-making power (i.e. in staffi ng, academic planning, and fi nancial management) from the State to the universities (i.e. autonomy) is explicitly advocated as the most effective way to make institutions—and the units within—more responsive to both external (i.e. accountability) and internal (i.e. ‘ownership’) demands. Specifically, autonomy is regarded as instrumental to enhance the quality and relevance of higher education programs, as well as to broaden participation in internal planning processes at the institutional level;71 • the State is encouraged to become more selective in the provision and funding of higher education, notably through the development and application of performance criteria that center on educational outcomes, and by using alternative funding mechanisms (e.g. block grants, matching funds, competition based awards and incentives).72 It suggests that public funds should be allocated to areas where private fi nancing or information is inadequate (i.e. market failure), where externalities (e.g. in research) are manifest, or social and political goals (e.g. regional equity) suggest specific attention; • the State is advised to put in place an enabling regulatory framework and climate that a) encourages less established institutions to defi ne their own mission, develop their own (strategic) plans, and identify alternative ways to fund them, and b) provides oversight and transparency by way of ensuring independent quality assurance mechanisms and selection processes in which both public and private institutions participate on a more equal footing.73 While in theory, strategic decentralization appears to suggest a rather comprehensive reform agenda, if not a theoretical model,74 in reality its major tenets emerged gradually in the context of an evolving dialogue with DGHE, BAPPENAS, and with academic leaders, that initially centered mostly on project-related concerns. Discussions to follow-up on loans that were coming to an end—and their particular timing75—helped create the momentum and

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International Assistance and State-University Relations

platform from which the Bank was able to gain broad influence in the process of Indonesia’s domestic policy (re)formulation. At the System Level: The Bank nonetheless steered away from imposing or even recommending specific reform packages—let alone from suggesting strategies of conditional lending—and instead would start to seek out targeted investment opportunities for incremental change within the framework a long-term strategy, which it did suggest DGHE to articulate.76 The Bank’s parameters (‘minimum conditions’) of such a long-term policy perspective were well known to DGGE and prominently included the expectation of a stronger commitment from government to increase the autonomy and accountability of public institutions in order to better ensure sustainability of investments.77 In effect, DGHE’s own reform strategy, as reflected in the “Paradigm” concept paper (July 1995) and later on in the Directorate’s third long term development plan (May 1996), was largely prepared in tandem with consultations with the Bank to identify new investment opportunities to follow up on the HEDP.78 Not surprisingly, Bank staff at the time judged the paradigm to be “precisely in line with the Bank’s message” (Internal Memo, 7/2/95), anticipating that it would set the stage for future Bank projects to come. Like before, the Bank fi rst sought to reach broad agreement with the DGHE on sector-wide policies, and their implementation, before committing fi rmly to new lending operations. Like before also, Indonesian reform plans were fi rst conceptualized and promulgated centrally only at a later stage to be ‘socialized’ to and within the institutions.79 However, the paradox of the new paradigm was that its political thrust (i.e. to empower higher education institutions, and the academic units and people within them) seemed at odds with these centrally driven origins. While its message appeared to correspond well with the Bank’s own lessons of experience, in Indonesia as elsewhere, Bank staff was aware that its realization in practice would suggest a major overhaul of the ‘rules of the game’ in planning and operating higher education in Indonesia.80 As one staff report noted, the new paradigm suggested not only a drastic revision of planning procedures or implementation mechanisms but also “a change in the mindset of policy makers and university representatives” (Back to Office, 06/20/95). Broad agreement with DGHE therefore no long was considered sufficient, but would need to be accompanied by broader and more direct participation from the targeted institutions in the design of new Bank-supported investment programs. The Bank began to advocate with DGHE a lending strategy that no longer would focus on centrally determined investment needs but on putting in place an incentive mechanism for institutions and individual academic units to determine, implement, and self-manage their participation in Bank-supported operations. Its strategy shifted away from

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supporting sector-wide loans to clearly targeted programs and operations set up according to centrally agreed policy objectives, criteria and performance indicators, but implemented in a decentralized fashion through the use of block grants.81 At the operational level: The dialogue materialized in a new series of Bank loans, each pursuing the introduction and/or dissemination of decentralized planning and management mechanisms in different types of programs and institutions, including graduate programs (URGE, 1994), ‘less established institutions’ (DUE, 1996), and undergraduate programs (QUE, 1997). The URGE project, which was negotiated and appraised before the new paradigm concept paper was articulated, was the fi rst to reflect the Bank’s new lending strategy for Indonesia. Discussions at an early stage centered on the lack of appropriate incentives both for universities and academic staff to ensure their longterm commitment to research and graduate programs. The Bank expressed concerns not only about the lack of appropriate career incentives to reward individual researchers and ensure their full-time commitment, but especially also about the mechanisms to select and fund programs that would be sustainable in the longer run. The successful experiences with competitive research schemes,82 and the government’s plans to expand these, encouraged the Bank to use these particular initiatives as starting points to develop alternative (i.e. decentralized) models of planning and management. All three projects have been explicitly designed to encourage broader changes in the incentive structure of State-university relations in Indonesia, with the twin goal of optimizing planning and management efficiency (both at State and institutional levels), and improving quality and responsiveness of higher education to society’s needs. While directed at different institutional audiences, they share a common perspective on State-university relations; one that encourages government to move away from central State-control, and instead advocates a type of governmental steering that allows for greater autonomy and accountability of State universities. At the same time, all three projects nonetheless do suggest a continued—albeit much more selective—State involvement in providing, funding, and planning public higher education.83 Specifically, they favor targeted public investments in areas where markets fail (e.g. graduate programs), externalities are perceived to be manifest (e.g. basic research or quality improvements in undergraduate education), or where there is an agreement on social/political goals that require specific attention (e.g. regional equity). Moreover, and contrary to what one might expect, these projects in many ways suggest a strong State. A State that has the capacity to develop and determine selection criteria and performance indicators, the expertise and information basis to select from competing proposals, to design new funding programs, to monitor operations, and, most of all,

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to evaluate outcomes.84 Rather than to further political or bureaucratic models of decision-making, however, the approach reflected in these three projects has been one of promoting and actively supporting the establishment of independent bodies mixing academic (professional), bureaucratic and external loyalties. Agencies like the National Accreditation Board (PTBAN), the University Research Council (URC), later integrated into the Board of Higher Education (DPT), and the DPT itself, are illustrations of this strategy.85 At the system level, in other words, the Bank’s approach in these projects in many ways suggests further movement away from direct or centralized State control—a change, which the agency had started already to advocate in the mid-1980s—but at the same time introduces new and arguably more efficient levers for the State to influence higher education policy’86 more effectively. The model that emerges at the system level is that of State-supervision, or, in the wording of the New Paradigm, ‘autonomy within a hierarchical inter-strata relationship’ (DGHE, Ministry of Education and Culture, 1996; Soehendro, 1996).87 At the Institutional Level: At the institutional level, meanwhile, the Bank’s position, as reflected in these projects, indicates a marked movement away from promoting centralized university management towards more open and explicit support for decentralized models of internal planning and decision-making. The change of policy not only implies a major revision of the nature and extent of the Bank’s involvement in internal university planning, but at the same time may suggests a decreasing reluctance on the part of the government to let foreign agencies become involved with how institutions are run. In spite of its early emphasis on institutional management capacity building, echoed in the objectives of successive projects and activities (starting with the polytechnic project up to HEDP-II), the Bank, like many other donors, consistently steered away from the local political dynamics of institutional planning. Internal evaluations of the earlier Bank projects did seem to recognize the magnitude and political complexity of the tasks involved in university management development, but, as one informant notes, tended to accept them as part of the “political reality” within which donors in Indonesia–even the powerful ones—operated. The already noted reluctance on the part of the government to let foreign agencies become involved in local institutions at least helps explain part of this donor hesitation. At the same time, however, the Bank’s initial optimism about the prospects and possibilities to bring about institutional changes through a top-down and government-led planning process also left its mark on the Bank’s own operations throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, and as an indication of it’s own approach to institutions at the time, the Bank as late as 1990 credited the UDP-I project for having “reinforced centralized control over a sprawling university system”

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(UDP-I, PCR: 3).88 The same report goes on to note that at the time of appraisal “no explicit reference was made to the relative functional importance of academic, administrative, or fi nancial authority within these institutions” (UDP-I, PCR: 4), thereby underscoring the donor’s earlier restraint in becoming involved in institutional politics. Later projects like HEDP-I and II tried to get around the politics of institutional planning by supporting the development of a system-wide management information system that was intended to serve both central and institutional planning needs at the same time.89 By the mid-1990, however, the Bank’s own assessment of this ‘deconcentration’ policy ultimately had become highly critical to the point of suggesting that that these earlier initiatives had been developed “ . . . largely for, not with, the individual public universities” (HEDP-II, PCR: 11). While the Bank in principle continued to aim for improved planning at all levels, staff by then had become convinced that individual departments and study programs, more than central university management, were to be the most effective entry-point to influence content, planning, and ultimately management of higher education in Indonesia. In general, the Bank’s goal at the institutional level is to improve internal ownership, and to increase the commitment and participation of individual units—in particular departments and study programs—in academic planning as well as in management. The area of graduate education and university research was to become the fi rst case for the Bank’s new approach in higher education lending. The URGE project was explicitly designed not only to attract proposals originating from the academic units and individuals to which it was addressed—in this particular case in graduate education—but also to directly provide grants and other incentives (e.g. fellowships) to these units and individuals on a peer-reviewed basis. Joint Bank and government reviews had questioned the structural weaknesses of the Inter- University Centers, their relative insularity within the host universities, the selection of subjects, and the ‘project mentality’ that had become apparent in many of these centers.90 In contrast to the existing system of officially designated IUC’s, the institutional dynamics of the URGE project is driven by competition—for funding as well as prestige—between and within academic units and individuals. Unlike in the earlier Bank projects, investments and awards are provided directly to the implementing academic units in the form of block grants, and these units in turn are held directly accountable to the central URC (within DGHE) based on their performance. Central university management is not directly targeted by the URGE-program, and its role instead is confi ned to one of monitoring and/or evaluating of specific projects.91 The practical and institutional significance of the new policy, however, was not to be restricted to the relatively privileged domain of advanced research and graduate education. The Bank’s project experience had led

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International Assistance and State-University Relations

to the sobering conclusion that university level planning remained generally weak overall, and this in spite of many years of Bank investments in management training and information systems. When the time had come to identify a follow-up project for HEDP-II, staff visits to universities representing a wide range of institutional capacity indicated that university planning was feeble in all, including the prestigious, but that there was variability at faculty and department level (Back to Offi ce Report, 06/20/95). Although the DGHE initially had set its mind on a comprehensive loan that would cover the development budget of many if not all public undergraduate institutions, the Bank this time held a fi rm grip on the number of institutions, and importantly, on the mechanism by which they would be selected. Furthermore, the Bank this time wanted to be able to better target specific objectives and possibly even specific types of institutions. After having conducted a series of workshops involving consultations with a wide range of audiences at a relatively large number of institutions,92 it was agreed to generate two separate projects (Back to Office Report, 10/12/95). The fi rst project directed to a selected group of regional universities outside of Java basis (i.e. the Development of Undergraduate Education, DUE), the other providing direct support to undergraduate study programs selected in an open competition (i.e. Quality of Undergraduate Education, QUE). Both projects closely incorporate the core goals of strategic decentralization—and of the new paradigm—at the institutional level. Like URGE, the two initiatives are explicitly based on a competitive dynamic that seeks to selectively reward proposals that originate from within the universities (and not on institutional needs determined by the center). Specifically, the DUE project provides a framework for screening, selecting, and implementing (and evaluating) institutional investment plans, which initially are generated by teams (‘task forces’) of academics at targeted regional universities. The core goal of the project is that institutions are encouraged to develop plans for institutional improvement based on a transparent and participatory process of institutional self-evaluation and strategic planning.93 The purpose of the procedure is to allow institutions to develop investment plans that can meet specific performance criteria in a sustainable fashion. Furthermore, and as part of their submitted plans, the selected universities are required to commit matching funds from their resources in order to demonstrate an institutional support from their central university management. The QUE project is driven by a similar project dynamic, which emphasizes competition and decentralized initiatives.94 In brief, the Bank’s more recent projects explicitly set out to promote increased participation and involvement of academic staff, in particular the younger generation of academics, in determining institutional choices, broader institutional commitment, and more openness and transparency overall in institutional decision-making. However, rather than attempting to influence institutions directly, the Bank’s intent was to strategically

International Assistance Goals

65

use new investments indirectly as a lever to encourage more effective and more participatory planning procedures (Internal Memo, 07/11/95). As in the case of system decentralization, the Bank’s position with regard to intra-institutional decentralization is not based so much on normative principles but instead seems to drive on the goal of facilitating investment decisions that correspond better to local needs and conditions. In this connection, the perceived failures of central university management at least implicitly are seen by many in the Bank as providing the dominant rationale for a more decentralized approach to planning. But whether at system-wide or institutional levels, the goal of strategic decentralization most of all suggests a further movement away from direct, State-controlled solutions.

3.

Conclusion

The theme that emerges from our analysis of over twenty years of Bank involvement in connection to Indonesian State-university relations is that assistance goals have gradually but consistently and ever more explicitly pushed forward strategies suggesting less direct State control and more academic autonomy and decentralization in general. The shift was part of a broader development in the Bank’s thinking about the appropriate role of the State in education, in social sectors, and in macro-economics, involving a change of public-private roles in society, in introducing alternative, market oriented incentive regimes. While the Bank’s initial approach to manpower planning at least explicitly seemed supportive of a stronger and more central State role in providing, funding, and coordinating higher education opportunities, its evolving goals instead suggest a pattern of ‘creeping decentralization’ broadly progressing in accordance with changing domestic policy configurations. The pattern identified suggests an incremental movement away from State-control, and its derivative goals prominently include growing diversity and institutional differentiation, increasing diversifi cation of institutional resources, and, more recently, increasing decentralization of decision-making power to and within institutions. While responding to shifting domestic conditions, the reforms advocated by the Bank over time also resonate well with successive changes in the Bank’s policy agenda in higher education worldwide, which moved from a near exclusive focus on economic criteria to a gradual, albeit prominent inclusion of the political conditions for more effective decision-making at institutional and national levels. In the longer run, the Bank’s pattern of goals in Indonesian higher education suggests elements of change as well as continuity. Not surprisingly perhaps, the change pursued by the World Bank has been of an evolutionary and not revolutionary nature. The agency never openly challenged the political contours of Indonesia’s higher education

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International Assistance and State-University Relations

system, and instead consistently chose to collaborate directly and extensively with government institutions to expand its resource basis and to manage it more effectively. From the very start, the Bank’s program in higher education has revealed a consistent pattern of close cooperation with government—‘client relations’ in today’s parlor—reflected not only in an expanding lending portfolio but also and perhaps more importantly in an evolving policy dialogue with reformers in government. Both observers and participants have characterized the history of the Bank’s program in higher education in terms of symbiosis and pragmatism, rather than as the imposition or extension of an essentially external policy agenda. And while close government-Bank relations of course need not necessarily be interpreted as an indicator of success in any particular direction, they have overall suggested a relatively strong openness within government at least to some of the Bank’s ideas. The corollary has been that changes have been pursued gradually, oftentimes selectively, building on an emerging strategic alliance with the DGHE leadership and, to a lesser extent, BAPPENAS. Nonetheless, good client relations have generally not prevented the Bank from taking increasingly explicit positions in the relationship between government and State universities. Specifically, whereas initially, the Bank’s position at least implicitly seemed to support direct State-control over “an unwieldy and under-funded sector”, it soon became the major platform from which windows of opportunity were explored at crucial stages of the system’s development, and responding to changing domestic conditions. These explorations notably included the introduction of more significant levels of cost recovery, later fi nancial autonomy more broadly, and the development of the so-called new paradigm in the early- to mid-1990s. Given the nature of Indonesia’s domestic political system at the time, characterized in the literature as a ‘bureaucratic polity’, decentralization continued to represent an opaque theme for donors to tackle explicitly. One prominent witness characterized the Bank’s stance to policy in Indonesia in terms of “a parallel track approach”: whereas open conditionality never was an option, the Bank did not hesitate to use its influence to suggest reforms or at least to fi nd ways not to invest in projects that went against its premises. Parallel track was an operative principle throughout the 1980s but became less viable from the early nineties onwards, when decentralization became an increasingly explicit theme, in Indonesia as elsewhere (p.c. Ralph Harbison). The political paradox that appears from our analysis is that decentralization appears as driven predominantly from a governmental steering perspective. We have highlighted this development with concepts such as ‘State-supervision’, ‘strategic decentralization’, and ‘managed pluralism’. While representing alternative conceptualizations, their common element is that they suggest an increasing number of units capable of autonomous action, thereby implicitly challenging, if not undermining, the centralized nature of the bureaucratic polity.

International Assistance Goals III.

67

SUMMARY

1. Both cases suggest that donor goals have often indirectly facilitated and at times explicitly pursued changing patterns of State-university relations in a gradual movement away from direct State-control. a) Implicitly, donor’s institution-building goals have challenged the norms, mechanisms, and assumptions of standardized Statecontrol, even at times when their explicit purpose was to service the manpower or other development needs of the State. Assistance goals brought along increased selectivity, competition, and resource diversification, all of which were at odds with the dominant model of centralized State control. By increasing the institutional diversification of missions and capacities international donors in turn have complicated uniformity and instead have helped legitimize variation within Indonesian higher education. b) Explicit donor support for institutional policy reforms, with the intent to bring about change in Indonesian State-university relations have been exceptional and has been confined mostly to the specific case of the World Bank. The Bank’s history of involvement and dialogue with the Indonesian government gave this donor a competitive edge to start exploring the constraints of central State-control, first by pushing for greater diversification of resources (i.e. cost recovery) but later also directly calling for structural reforms to accompany increased autonomy. 2. In spite of marked differences between the two agencies, both have been consistent in their emphasis on selectively supporting the development of academically stronger institutions. Whereas initially that goal notably included serving the interest of the State (i.e. in economic development, manpower planning, or ambitiously nation-building), academic capacity building has been the defi ning feature of the donor assistance in this study. It is reflected in goals and ambitions in staff development, academic organization, and institutional development. 3. Donor agencies have gradually adjusted their goals over time, and these in turn have broadly stayed in tune with increased institutional capacity and changing domestic political and economic conditions. By teaming up with domestic reformers, both at center (i.e. DGHE and BAPPENAS) and at targeted universities, international assistance at times has explored the boundaries of Indonesia’s bureaucratic polity albeit often implicitly more than overtly. One implicit political goal of international university assistance has been to increase the strength and the number of units in society that has the capacity for autonomous action. 4. The gradual change of focus in donor goals towards greater decentralization does not in general support the idea that donors were seeking to decrease the influence of the State. Instead, evolving international

68

International Assistance and State-University Relations assistance goals are found to advance a different type of governmental steering in higher education emphasizing increased evaluative capacities and power at the center. Donor goals that either implicitly or explicitly inspire decentralization to and/or within institutions simultaneously promote reorientation and strengthening of the organizational capacity at the center, including the development of linkage mechanisms between various levels. Furthermore, both donors (and government) continued to acknowledge and even to support a central—albeit more selective—role of the State in provision, funding, and coordination. 5. At the institutional level both agencies favored decentralized models of decision making, either because of ‘natural’ preference or restriction (Dutch aid) or out of frustration over attempts to achieve the alternative model of strong corporate university management (World Bank).

3

International Donor Efforts

“We should not forget one important advantage of the “annual IGGI fi x”, namely that the money came directly and exclusively to the center and without any significant State outlays in the form of a tax-gathering apparatus. In other words, not only was the power of the State vis-à-vis society vastly enhanced, but within the State the center came decisively to dominate the periphery” (Anderson, 1982: 113) Having identified the content of the play (policy goals) in chapter two, this chapter will focus instead on issues of stage (context), actors and their performances (efforts). Specifically, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze international donors’ policy instruments in Indonesia’s higher education, and to lay out in what way these have corresponded with changing domestic patterns of higher education fi nancing in Indonesia. While the analysis will concentrate predominantly on resource flows (i.e. funding levels and their distribution within the system), it will also review delivery modes and implementation procedures. The analysis indicates that both the size—certainly not “marginal” in the Indonesian case–and the form(s) of the donor interventions are indicative of a potentially influential role for international assistance in Indonesia’s higher education. As in previous chapters, the terms ‘donor’ and ‘international assistance’ are used here in a broad yet distinctive sense. When referring to international donors, our discussion will include a variety of governmental, semi-governmental and intergovernmental organizations ranging from multilateral development banks to bilateral aid agencies of variable size and shape. Similarly, I use the generalist term ‘international assistance’ to cover a broad range of activities, investments, mechanisms and instruments, recognizing and taking into account the subtle and substantial differences between grants and loans, technical assistance and budget support, investments and policy dialogues. At the same time, by using the term “donor” and “assistance” (rather than ‘aid’ or ‘development cooperation’) the chapter’s topic stands apart from other forces of globalization (e.g. commercial, fi nancial or trade flows). This interpretation furthermore conveniently follows the OECD-Development Assistance Committee’s functional defi nition of Official Development Assistance, which includes grants and concessionary loans “provided by the offi cial

70

International Assistance and State-University Relations

sector with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective” (OECD, 1999). Evidence of donor efforts, it is noted at the outset, does not automatically imply a causal relationship between international assistance and particular outcomes in higher education development. The ‘evidence’ presented in this chapter therefore is of a circumstantial nature rather than conclusive. The theme of the chapter is that in spite of the intrinsically centralist inclinations of international assistance efforts,1 donors have been critical in establishing the enabling conditions for both system-wide decentralization and institutional autonomy in Indonesian higher education. The chapter explores how international assistance efforts over the period of this study in various ways–quantitative and qualitative, implicit and explicit—have become a critical source of higher education funding and system building. The size, shape, and mechanisms of that effort, to be analyzed in this chapter and further documented in the book’s annex, suggest a gradual but notable shift in State-university relations, as these (slowly) moved from uniformity and across-theboard approaches towards greater differentiation of institutional types and functions. Most of all, donor efforts shifted from physical inputs and investments towards newly styled interventions refl ecting and at the same time recommending bottom-up planning procedures, performance based allocation of resources, and decentralized implementation mechanisms. These developments have furthermore paralleled certain qualitative changes in the structure of higher education funding, notably reflected at the institutional level in the changing relationship between development and recurrent budgets, and in the relative growth of extrabudgetary institutional income. Even before moving to outcomes (chapter 4), donor activities could be summed up here provisionally under the respective banners of institutional differentiation—some argue stratifi cation–and resource diversification–some argue marketization or even privatization-. The chapter thereby contributes to the wider argument of the book positing that international assistance has been instrumental in furthering decentralized State-university relations in Indonesia. The chapter is subdivided into 4 separate yet interconnected sections. Section 1 draws the broader picture of international assistance in Indonesia, identifies major donors and resource flows, and highlights their significance to higher education development in particular. Section 2 investigates the domestic policy environment in higher education and shows how it not only provided context to international donor efforts but also suggested, and in many instances determined, many of the donor’s choices as well as boundaries. Section 3 purports to document donor efforts in higher education in greater detail, specifi cally analyzing their overall and relative size, regional and institutional distribution, changing composition and mechanisms. Furthermore, this section will also explore the relationship between international assistance and domestic

International Donor Efforts

71

higher education funding patterns at the system level. Section 4, fi nally, examines the relationship between international assistance and funding patterns at the institutional level. Together, it is argued, these subsections reflect a mutually reinforcing interplay of domestic and external variables that helped push donor efforts forward towards greater decentralization at system and institutional levels.

I. THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN INDONESIA This section outlines the external policy environment of international aid to Indonesia from the late 1970s through the late 1990s. Sources of assistance are identified, as well as their relative positions, gradually and specifically zooming in on the portfolios of the two cases in this study. Tables and graphs concerning the broader external environment of international aid to Indonesia are reported in the annex. Data concerning the specific portfolios of the two cases are included as intrinsic parts of the main text. The data presented in this section indicate that Indonesia over much of the time period of this study became an increasingly prominent recipient of international assistance flows from multilateral banks as well as from bilateral donors. Indonesia furthermore scored particularly high on the Aid Intensity Indices of its major donors, including leaders such as the World Bank, Japan, and the Asian Development Bank, but also the relatively smaller ones such as Australia, the Netherlands, or Germany, just to name these few. Apart from the quantitative increases of international flows, many of these donors have also significantly changed the nature of these inputs and the mechanisms involved. The following broad observations have been especially relevant to the theme of this book, as they not only provide indications of the “resource environment”2 (Kreiner, 1984) of donor efforts in Indonesia, but also determined much of the context for international donor influence on State university relations: First, donors in Indonesia typically did not “leverage” their assistance efforts heavily towards issues of governance or political reforms, but rather—and at times eagerly–stayed neatly within the political boundaries of Indonesia’s bureaucratic authoritarian regime, a strategy that seemed to offer benefits in terms of political stability as well as economic and social progress. 3 For a good deal of the 1980s, and well into the 1990s, Indonesia remained a “darling of donors”, that is, a country whose economic and social success story—not least in (basic) education—invited mostly international praise and seemed to ensure continuous flows of international donor investments (table 3.1 and graph 1 in Annex). Meetings of the Inter- Governmental on Indonesia (IGGI), transformed in 1992 into the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI),

72

International Assistance and State-University Relations

provided the broad institutional framework for donors to pledge their commitments and coordinate their intentions with the national planning board (BAPPENAS). Also at the sector level, and even at the more operational level of project design, this money moving dynamic reflects the mutual interest of donorand government representatives to maintain steady flows of funds. The dynamic also characterized donor efforts in higher education in particular during much of the 1970s and especially the 1980s. From the early years of the Soeharto regime, the Indonesian government was in dire need of donors willing to invest in a comparatively under-funded higher education system. Whereas growing social demand for higher education was to be absorbed by the expanding private sector, the government was anxious to fund and develop an elite public system of higher education with international assistance. International donors, meanwhile, were willing to comply as they hailed the government’s broader development strategy in human resource development. The “resource environment” of international assistance in higher education, in other words, seemed not particularly conducive to processes of decentralization. Instead, it essentially suggests an orientation to the needs of the apparatus of the State bureaucracy. At the same time, however, the broader context created extraordinary space for international assistance to consult with key players (including the Ministry of Finance and BAPPENAS), to construct (i.e. school buildings, campuses), and, even, to experiment (i.e. with ‘new’ types of institutions such as the Polytechnics or, later, graduate education and alternative funding mechanisms) and, in doing so, stretch the boundaries of a centralized bureaucratic system of higher education. Notable, in this regard, was the early willingness and atypical agreement of the Indonesian government to borrow large sums of money from multilateral development banks and, in addition, contribute significantly from its own budget for substantive loan projects (see table 3 in annex). And even though loans from the IBRD or ABD are typically concessionary in that they combine aspects of grants and market loans, they do contribute to the State’s debt and thus constrain or determine the ways in which the State can make use these funds. Second, data indicate the changing sector distribution of donor funds, involving relative and consistent growth of international resources invested in the development of education, or human resource development more broadly, and at least initially (late 70s through mid 80s) in higher education in particular. Table 3.1 provides a quantitative indication of the relative growth of education’s share in international project aid, increasing from a sound 6.5% (1981–84 average) to a stiff 19.8% (1995–98 average) of total international project aid in Indonesia. Further, from the late 1970s onwards, and throughout the 1980s, both donor cases in this study invested their educational assistance predominantly in the development of higher education. Development here often meaning

International Donor Efforts

73

in the physical sense of physical infrastructure development (ie. campus development, equipment and buildings) but gradually also including information management. The relative focus on the tertiary level of education started to change drastically with the “new game plan” of educational assistance that emerged in the early nineties and which, among other elements,4 consisted of a strong bias towards investments in primary education. The changing ‘resource environment’ would not remain without effect on the relative size and nature of donor interventions in the higher education sector. Notably, the World Bank, at that time the lead donor agency’ in Indonesia’s education, if not in size then certainly in policy conceptualization, explicitly moved away from massive and comprehensive sector-wide loans and instead started to put its weight on a series of more selective operations, all implying a new role for the State in its relationship to higher education. The gradual yet remarkable shift from input dominated donor efforts (e.g. infrastructure, equipment, training, TA . . . ) towards process oriented types of support (such as program fi nancing, block grants, tiered competitive schemes . . . ), often involving new procedures typically designed to engage stakeholders in project development, monitoring, and results, was to become thematic in this new State-university relationship. Specifi cally, the introduction of competitive funding procedures, decentralized project management teams, and peer evaluation mechanisms on the one hand suggested selectivity and differentiation, yet on the other hand were explicitly designed to better equip the government’s steering capacities. Third, marked differences between bilateral and multilateral donor efforts in Indonesia’s higher education–both in terms of size and with regard do types of assistance mechanisms—suggest a different position regarding possibilities to influence the State’s role in relation to universities. Specifically, multilateral development banks (i.e. the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank) not only invested massively in higher education development (in absolute terms well over a million USD over the two decades of this study, see table 3 in annex, but also in relative terms to the HED development budget of the DGHE, at times easily surpassing a 50% share) but did so mostly in the form of loans to the Government. Importantly, the lending instrument on the one hand provides ample opportunities for donors to leverage (e.g. through the articles of the loan covenant) on the country’s comprehensive policy regarding higher education, yet at the same time presupposes a willingness from the part of government to negotiate policy (including required legal reforms) and, often, a commitment to implementation and substantive counterpart funds. Bilateral agencies (including, for the US, the official USAID and the Ford Foundation), in contrast, typically put their money in grants, technical assistance or discretionary funding of academic partnerships or fellowships, thereby directing their assistance effort to the institutional or even departmental level rather the more comprehensive policy framework. 5

74

International Assistance and State-University Relations

1. International Donors in Indonesia: Actors, Magnitude, and Shape of International Assistance to Indonesia While overall there are well over 30 bilateral and multilateral donors present in Indonesia, over 80 % of development aid flows derive from only three donors, i.e. Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. Both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have provided the bulk of their loans to Indonesia in the form of concessionary credit. The size and composition of the total donor effort in Indonesia has been significant not only for its dollar value in absolute terms, but also relative to the country’s capital inflows, and to its overall development budget. Indonesia in turn also proved to be a popular target country for many of the donor agencies to which the country became both host and recipient. Measured by the Index of Aid Intensity—a scale that gauges the relative share of one donor’s aid to Indonesia but controlled for the size of that donor worldwide—aid to Indonesia was highly6 valued for the Asian Development Bank (371), Japan (208), Australia (169), and the World Bank (131). Up to the point when President Soeharto severed bilateral aid ties (March 1992), Dutch assistance belonged to the same category of donors. Compared to the much lower values of other donors, notably including the UK (87), Canada (18), and the U.S.A. (8), these index values serve to demonstrate the strong degree of commitment to Indonesia by the country’s most important donors (Dillon, 1997, figures cited for 1993: 5). The sectoral distribution of international aid to Indonesia (cf. table 3.1) indicates a marked shift in the composition of donor efforts, away from infrastructure related departments (agriculture, mining, transportation . . . ) towards ‘soft sectors’ such as education, health, and social welfare. International project expenditures in education in particular jumped from a mere 6.52 % of total donor investments in the early 1980s to a massive 19.83 % in the late 1990s, thereby coming close to or even surpassing some of the traditional heavyweight sectors of donor spending, including mining and energy, and transportation. And these figures do not even take into account donor investments in training or even formal education programs in other sectors of the Indonesian system, including manpower planning, religious affairs, and science and technology.7 The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) was formed in 1966 at the request of the Indonesian Government, and was initially chaired by the Netherlands. Its name and chairmanship were changed in 1992, when it became the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), presided by the World Bank. Throughout the 1980s, and into the 1990s, the donor group’s meetings provided a forum for the Indonesian Government to submit the country’s needs and development plans, and for donors to pledge their commitment to Indonesia’s national development in tangible dollar amounts. As part of the government’s formal system of reviewing foreign aid, BAPPENAS prepares a “Blue Book”, which lists all external development project

International Donor Efforts Table 3.1

75

Sectoral Distribution of International Project Aid* (1984–1998, 3 Year Average Percentages) 1981–84

1995–98

Agriculture and Industry

12.11%

2.94%

Mining and Energy

34.29%

20.39%

Transportation and Tourism

17.39%

13.29%

Manpower and Transmigration

3.46%

1.23%

Regional Development

0.09%

4.89%

Education

6.52%

19.83%

Science and Technology

na

2.26%

Religion

na

1.74%

Health and Social Welfare

1.73%

9.95%

Housing, Human Settlements, & Water Supply

4.54%

12.45%

General Public Service (Civil Service, Justice)

7.36%

4.14%

Government Capital Participation

4.59%

Na

Other (e.g. Media, Environmental Planning, Trade, Finance, Enterprise Development . . . )

7.03%

6.89%

Source: BAPPENAS, 2000 (*): Percentages calculated on the basis of the total project cost, including local costs but not including technical assistance provisions outside of projects (e.g. feasibility studies, sector reviews, program evaluations . . . ).

proposals. Each of the line agencies concerned, including the Ministry of Education and Culture, review their priorities each year in light of modification of or additions to the “Blue Book.” This process in effect facilitated top-down planning of donor efforts— which at times represented well over half of the country’s discretionary development budget—as pledges were translated into donor portfolios (and government counterpart funds), and from there to line agencies’ budgets, project implementation units, and further down to target beneficiaries. While centralized project planning seemed to fit snugly with the Government’s own internal planning process (cf. infra for higher education), reports of lagging project implementation or donors being caught in the quicksand of Indonesia’s complex bureaucracy are not entirely uncommon for this period (IEES, XI-29). Smaller donors indeed very often explicitly sought to avoid the domestic planning process as much as possible (p.c. Veenkamp), instead effectively limiting their contacts with the bureaucracy to lobbying for inclusion of the names and amounts of their small scale projects in the “Blue Book.” Given their typically higher local cost component, the effectiveness of project investments from large bilateral or

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International Assistance and State-University Relations

multilateral donors, however, is typically contingent on effective implementation management capacity within the government bureaucracy, as well as in target institutions. At the same time, staff in these donor agencies often faces internal pressures to meet set targets with new project investments (i.e. commitments), and at the same time ensure a high project implementation (i.e. disbursements) rate. Higher education assistance in particular provides ample examples of the boundaries of this money moving dynamic, as will be shown in sections 4.

2.

Turning Points in Foreign Assistance to Indonesia, 1978–1998

While acknowledging the complexity of the historical process, the purpose of this sub-section is limited to identifying those turning points in two decades of international donor presence in Indonesia that bear particular relevance to international assistance in higher education. Notably, the descriptive aid statistics collected in tables 2 and 3 in annex indicate the following: 2.1 Regardless of the measure used, it appears that the years 1978– 80 mark the start of a period of consistent growth of international aid flows to Indonesia. EDA loan disbursements grew particularly rapid, easily surpassing total ODA. In other words, throughout the 1980s, which have been characterized by many as the “IGGI-heydays” (Hill, 1994), Indonesia to an increasing extent became a borrower of loans instead of a recipient of aid. Whereas in 1979 the ratio of loan disbursements to ODA stood at 1:1, in 1995 the ratio was 4:1. Furthermore, the decreasing grant element in these loans (on average 23 % in 1978; 10.6 % in 1995) suggests that Indonesia was lending at conditions that came increasingly close to commercial practice. The development was paralleled in educational assistance patterns, where the prominence of large American foundations (including Ford and Rockefeller) and bilateral donors (including the Netherlands) was gradually replaced by high profi le lending operations of multilateral banks. In higher education in particular, the Indonesian government in the early 1980s started to support its development most prominently with investments from international development banks. The government, in other words, early on seemed to accept the view expressed by the DGHE leadership that international borrowing for the development of higher education was to be seen as an investment in building the country’s human capital. Following Buchert’s categorization of educational assistance models (cf. chapter 1), ‘human capital development’ conveniently conformed to the economic growth oriented strategy of the World Bank in particular and would become the cornerstone of its efforts in higher education for years to come. 8 Bank efforts in higher education consistently played the card of increasing cost-effectiveness of the sector at large, and early interventions (i.e. Polytechnic I, UDP I) in particular

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77

sought to improve planning capacities at institutional and system levels.9 Project implementation not only required agreement from the State, but also typically depended on a strong and tangible commitment from the government agencies involved (usually expressed in government counterpart funds). Bilateral donors such as the Netherlands, in contrast, continued to concentrate discretionary funds and in-kind contributions into academic programs (e.g. overseas training, academic partnerships) at selected institutions and units. Still according to Buchert’s categorization, Dutch efforts were guided by a ‘human capacity development model’, involving partnerships and experiments highlighting higher education’s role as agent of social change.10 Within this model, universities are considered to expose the critical societal functions addressing issues of regional development and relevance, social and gender equity, community building etc. Much unlike the multilateral efforts, bilateral efforts in higher education consisted predominantly of grants—the majority of which consisted of in-kind contributions (e.g. overseas training, equipment, visiting consultants/professors)—and did not in general require the same level of commitment from Indonesian policy makers. In fact, Dutch project coordinators typically sought to avoid Indonesian politics and policy making as much as possible—both at institutional and system levels11—instead relying on the informality of the partnership arrangement, and the interpersonal relationship skills (or the lack thereof) of the Dutch project managers and their Indonesian counterparts. 2.2 Starting from 1984 multilateral loans start to surpass the bilateral loans, reflecting the increasingly prominent role of international and regional fi nancial institutions. As from 1989 bilateral loans become more prominent again as a result of Japan’s increasing share in the lending department. With the exception of the ODA measure, in which bilateral donors represented the bulk share,12 these three donors continued to dominate the international aid flows to Indonesia throughout the period under review. The donor top three is paralleled in education assistance where the same three donors (i.e. the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Japan) have been responsible for over 80 % of the money flows. Dominance, however, does not necessarily imply uniformity in either policy goals or instruments. In higher education specifically, donors differed in their selection of target audiences within the system, and in the types of intervention they would support. Differences, in turn, affected the position these donors took regarding the role of the government in higher education and the implied the relationship between the State and the different types of institutional providers. Notably, the World Bank, by targeting its efforts almost exclusively13 to State institutions seemed to reflect an explicit recognition the role of the State as a provider (‘demiurge’) of higher education. At the same time, however, it put the bulk of its effort into strengthening the State’s capacity to take on a steering role,

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making institutions more responsive to their audience and more accountable to the country’s needs. Efforts by the Asian Development Bank, in contrast, stayed more closely attuned to the instrumental role of higher education vis-à-vis the labor market. 2.3 Graph 1 and table 2 in annex indicate the relative stability of international project aid as a source of external income for Indonesia, and hence as a way to fi nance the State’s Development Budget. In higher education, fi scal constraints in the early to mid 1980s the oil shocks in 1980, 1983, and 1986 revealed the systemic under-funding of the sector, followed up by heavy donor investments in the development of that sector by multilateral banks. Fiscal constraints in the early to mid 1980s (cf. oil shocks in 1980, 1983, and 1986) reveal a systemic under-funding of the higher education sector in particular, leading to an increasing requests for donor investments in the development of the sector. Indonesia’s public higher education at the time operated in an environment of rising enrolments, constrained budgets, and minimal cost sharing. The national political economy determined much of the margins for efficiency improvement. The Ministry of Finance used the pressure of difficult macroeconomic circumstances to restrain the higher education budget, in particular its recurrent expenditures. The World Bank at one point struggled hard with this incompatibility as it had invested heavily in capital goods and infrastructure (i.e. Polytechnics, fi rst and second UDP project) without any assurance that the Government would be able (or willing) to contribute its share in recurrent expenditures for operations and maintenance. 2.4 From 1993 to 1995 data suggest a gradual end to the aid-boom, at least in quantitative terms. The period coincides with increasing international and domestic confidence of the Soeharto regime,14 refl ected i.e. in the open political confl ict with the Netherlands on aid, Indonesia’s decreasing dependence on income from oil, and the widely reported climate of donor fatigue in donor’s domestic constituencies. In education assistance nonetheless, donor investments continued to flow. Specifi cally to basic education, following the Presidential decision to expand universal primary education from 6 to 9 years, which in the long run would provide yet another boost to higher education enrollments putting further demographic pressures on higher education’s institutional absorption capacity. As a result, and for higher education in particular, donors became increasingly concerned with the lack of sustainability and the risk of further quality reduction and effectiveness on the ground that led them to start experimenting with alternative mechanisms and types of assistance. 2.5 In the wake of the Asian fi nancial crisis that erupted in JulyAugust 1997, many donors increased their commitments to Indonesia’s devastated economy (cf. the re-emergence of program aid), but at the same time started to question and revise their own strategies to include

International Donor Efforts

79

much greater emphasis on governance issues. Notably, the World Bank’s introspection concludes that it had been too soft on Indonesia’s political economy: “Where we failed was in not pushing harder the message that sustainable development requires not only good economic policies, but good institutions as well” (Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report, 1999: 8). The same report further announces a more aggressive program of reform, which, in education specifically, seeks to “create accountable and fi nancially sustainable service delivery arrangements through greater decentralization of education management and increased autonomy of schools” (Ibid.: 13).

3.

Overseas Training

In addition to the fluctuations and changing composition of foreign aid, assistance in higher education has been a prominent, albeit relatively decreasing, provider in the broader market of overseas training. Table 3.2 provides an indication of the massive rise in the numbers of Indonesian students who received their tertiary level training abroad. While the table indicates increasing numbers of students studying overseas, it is noted that the relative share of student numbers supported by international assistance projects (on average 2,500 to 4,000 annually) has in fact been decreasing. Instead, unplanned yet self-paying students have taken up an increasing share of this market, and Australian and UK education policies in particular pursued explicit strategies to attract students from Indonesia in the framework of their own internationalization efforts in higher education (Zijlstra, 1998).

Table 3.2

Third Level Students Studying Abroad (selected years)

Country of Study

1970

1976

1981

1986

1992

1995

1998

662

1,090

4,070

8,115

11,670

12,429

12,142

Germany

1,201

3,543

3,185

2,260

2,200

2,140

1,948

Australia

285

529

880

1,083

2,709

4,835

5,393

Netherlands

382

Na

613

530

140

179

44

Other (*)

976

1,713

2,209

2,128

3,234

4,351

4,233

3,497

6,875

10,057

14,156

20,839

23,450

23,760

USA

Total

(*) Including, most notably, Japan and the U.K., along with various smaller host countries. (Source: UNESCO 1997, 2000)

80

International Assistance and State-University Relations

4.

CASE STUDIES

4.1 The World Bank and the Government of Indonesia: Nourishment of a “Special Relationship”? After having excluded itself from World Bank assistance during the latter years of former President Sukarno’s turbulent reign,15 Indonesia rejoined the World Bank in 1967. The Bank’s Resident Mission in Jakarta was the first of its kind and from the early start fostered a close relationship with Indonesian counterparts at various places in the Indonesian bureaucracy, specifically in economic planning (i.e. BAPPENAS),16 but also in various line Ministries such as Education. Some have labeled the relationship between the Bank and the new order government a symbiotic one, adding that in the final analysis it has not been all that clear where the balance of influence lied (p.c. Dillon). This became especially apparent in the late 1980s, when Indonesia was exempted from the kind of ‘policy conditionality’ that many other countries were often forced to accept (Mosley, 1991: 105). According to a recent assessment by the Bank’s own evaluation department, Indonesia’s exemption status was based on “ . . . an understanding that the Government’s prior actions were part of a medium-term program that would be implemented” (OED, Country Assistance Note, 1999: 15). This was not only relevant to the Bank’s adjustment loans17 but also affected lending in particular sectors, especially those having sector-wide goals and ambitions. The Bank’s appraisal report for the first time-slice HED project not only suggests an unusually high confidence in the Government’s willingness to implement “difficult policies,”18 but also promises that “ . . . the project will be followed by further Bank support of subsequent slices of the GOI higher education program.” (SAR, HEDP-I: 19).

Table 3.3

Sectoral Distribution of Bank Lending (Fiscal Years)

Sector Infrastructure

Million US$ Percent 1969–98 1969–98

1969–79

1980–89

1990–98 46.9

10,196

40.2

36.9

34.3

Agriculture

4,880

19.2

34.8

24.7

9.5

Education/Health/ Population

3,301

13.0

7.3

11.6

16.0

Urban/Water Supply & Sanitation

2,624

10.4

6.1

6.6

15.1

Finance

1,818

7.2

6.6

10.4

4.2

Adjustment

1,200

4.7

0.0

8.7

2.2

Other

1,351

5.3

8.3

3.7

6.1

25,370

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

TOTAL

Source: World Bank, OED-Country Assistance Note, 1999.

International Donor Efforts

81

By the early 1990s, Indonesia’s share of all IBRD debt outstanding and disbursed exceeded 10 %. The sectoral distribution of its lending to Indonesia over three decades underscores the particular growth of the share of social sectors, including education (Table 3.3). Except for its very early efforts in the 1970s,19 Bank lending in education goes through its IBRD window and is not concessional. Soft loans are provided at close to commercial market interest rates (i.e. based on the inter-bank or LIBOR rate, around 7 % on average during that time period). The attraction for Indonesia lies in part in the extended terms available (15 plus years compared to the 5–7 year terms available on the market), the flexibility to select the currency denomination, and the technical assistance in project design, implementation and evaluation which is often offered along with the loans. In addition to its lending facilities, the Indonesian government has made extensive use of Bank provisions for Economic and Sector Work (ESW), often funded with grants from bilateral donors. Well-known for its perceived policy impact both in Bank and government circles is the Basic Education Study (1989), which opened the debate about refocusing attention, and project funds, to quality deficiencies in primary education. 20 Other ESW studies in education include an analysis of human resource shortages in Indonesia’s fast growing economy (1996), and, more recently, the post-crisis education sector report (From Crisis to Recovery, 1998). Bank lending in education has been characterized by its massive size as well as by its diversity (OED, 1991, 1999). Its origin lies in the late 1970s, when broad agreement was reached with the government on the priority of education in the Bank’s future lending strategy (cf. chapter 2). Within education, the Bank’s “comparative advantage” (p.c. Gilpin) at that time was perceived to lie in supporting higher education specifi cally. Already the government was investing heavily in ensuring universal access to primary education, and there was no apparent or expressed need for the government to lend money for foreign exchange components in that sub-sector. The higher education sub-sector, in contrast, was not only reported as being under-funded and subject to fi scal constraints, but also seemed in need of exactly the project inputs that could typically be offered in foreign loans, i.e. training, technical advice, equipment, management capacity building. A review of educational lending to Indonesia by the Bank’s internal evaluation department mentions educational lending as its largest education portfolio in the world (OED, 1999: 18). Between FY69–98, 41 projects, totaling over US$2.6 billion, have been approved. Following a modest start during the 1970s, commitments for education averaged 11 % of the total through FY1998. Tables in annex show explosive growth and stabilization over time of the Bank’s total commitments to “Education and Training” broadly speaking, and as expressed by the dollar value of its loans. From relatively modest beginnings, Bank lending activity in only

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International Assistance and State-University Relations

five years time jumped to the five-year average of 900 million US$ where it still stands. The graph also indicates that with the exception of the period 1986–90, the majority of its lending activity has been directed at the Ministry of Education and Culture. Further, Bank loans with DGHE increased sharply from 1980 to 1985, then decreased before stabilizing at a respectable five-year average of 200 million US$. The trend suggests that the “new game plan” that emerged in the 1990s and called for a reorientation towards primary education–partially reflected in the sharp increase of the share of “projects with MOEC (but not DGHE)”—did not lead to a noticeable reduction of Bank projects with the DGHE. Instead, it would appear that the substantial increase of lending activity in MOEC projects outside DGHE has largely been at the expense of training projects outside the MOEC involving large components of overseas training. Using the same data set, chart 3 shows the development over time of the Bank’s lending activities related to higher education in the very broadest sense (including tertiary level related activities in other departments), separating out projects with DGHE from those in other departments. The chart underscores the sharp rise in Bank lending to higher education from the late 1970s up to the late 1980s, but it also indicates that within the broad category of lending to higher education projects there has been a marked decline of lending for projects in other departments. Projects in that latter category include the Science and Technology Training Project and the Professional Human Resource Development Project (I and II), all two of which set out to provide short term solutions to specifi c supply constraints in the domestic higher education system, notably by offering targeted programs for overseas graduate training. 21 From the mid-1980s through mid-1990s the Bank followed a two-track approach, on the one hand continuing its long-term investments, through DGHE, in Indonesia’s public higher education system, yet at the same time willing to support short-term solutions to manpower shortages in the State’s bureaucracy.

4.2

Dutch Aid in Indonesia: High Intensity / High Context

While much smaller than the World Bank’s operations, Dutch assistance flows for most of the eighties defi nitely were in the top five of major donors to Indonesia. Bilateral assistance from the former colonial power steadily represented 10 to 13 % of ODA to Indonesia from 1981–1987 (OECD-DAC 1994: 21–22). At the same time, Indonesia on average used to represent around 10 % of the Dutch bilateral allocable aid budget in the mid-1980s. Table 3.4 calculates the Dutch Aid Intensity Index for Indonesia at different points in time, underscoring the strong commitment of this donor to assisting its former colony. Even at a time of decreasing aid budgets, and a gradually decreasing Dutch share in total assistance, this commitment seemed to remain consistently and exceptionally high.

International Donor Efforts Table 3.4

83

Dutch Aid Intensity Index for Indonesia

Fiscal year

1982

1987

1991

1992

Aid to Indonesia (in 1991 million $)

143

146

139

7

Dutch Share of Total ODA-Indonesia (%)

11.2

13.4

7.9

0.4

1,595

1,409

1,155

1,304

Dutch Share of Total ODA (%)

6.5

4.9

3.3

4.0

Aid Intensity Index

179

273

239

10

Total Dutch ODA

Source: Calculated from OECD data (OECD, 1994: 21)

This picture of an unusually strong commitment to Indonesia is further underscored by data on Dutch educational assistance in general, and in higher education specifically. Table 3.5 shows Indonesia’s share in Dutch assistance in education, by type of intervention (1990 data), indicating that: • Dutch bilateral assistance with Indonesia represented 25.0 % of all Dutch bilateral assistance; • Education assistance to Indonesia represented 20.4 % of all Dutch educational assistance; • HED education assistance to Indonesia represents 20.9 % of total Dutch assistance in that sector; • HED education assistance represents 37.0 % of Dutch educational assistance in Indonesia. Especially notable have been the programs for university linkages (discussed in chapter 2), 30.3 % of which have been for links with Indonesian universities, fellowships and programs in the Netherlands (13.9 %), and country programs (75.7 %). To these assistance categories should be added part of the 6 million Guilders a year that are channeled into training in the Netherlands from the Dutch Ministry of Education and Training, but attributed to the cash ceiling for development cooperation. One third of this sum is spent on education in developing countries and the remainder on grants to students from developing countries who attend courses in the Netherlands. Indonesia reportedly is the main beneficiary with more than five sixths of the total. Given these figures it should come as no surprise that Indonesia-watchers in the Netherlands have referred to the decision by President Soeharto in March 1992 to stop all projects funded with Dutch aid as traumatic, as a blow to Dutch aid policy, and to its Minister for Development Cooperation in particular. 22 While the reasons for the rupture have been discussed elsewhere, its impact on Dutch assistance in general, and in higher

84 International Assistance and State-University Relations Table 3.5 Indonesia’s Share in Dutch (Higher) Education Assistance Expenditures, by Type of Intervention, 1990 (1,000 Fl.) Indonesia University Linkages (partnerships)

18,945

Bilateral Support to Institutions

% 30.3%

Total 62,490

% 34.3%

77

0.3%

26,256

14.4%

5,216

13.9%

37,519

20.6%

450

4.3%

10,550

5.8%

2

0.2%

890

0.5%

62

5.9%

1,050

0.6%

Country Programs

11,813

75.7%

15,608

8.6%

Sectoral Programs

1,483

10.2%

14,512

8.0%

—

0.0%

124

0.0%

1.7%

5,507

3.0%

0.0%

7,796

4.3%

20.9%

182,302

100%

505,868

100%

25.9% 4,698,878

100%

Fellowships and Programs in The Netherlands Dutch Experts Support and Innovation Special Programs

Emergency Aid NGO-programs Other * Total Higher Education Assistance* As % of Total Education Assistance Total Education Assistance* As % of Total Dutch Bilateral Aid Total Dutch Bilateral Aid*

94 — 38,142

37.0% 36% 103,160

20.4%

8.5% 10.8% 1,215,600

Note*: Excluding Expenditures through International Organizations, and Excluding Aid to Dutch Antilles and Aruba (But including assistance to Surinam)

education in particular, has been devastating. In one month’s notice, all on-going assistance efforts were virtually stopped: equipment was transferred into Indonesian hands; Dutch aid workers had to leave the country; fellows in The Netherlands (except for those sponsored with money from the Dutch Education Department) were sent back to Indonesia.

II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDONESIA The domestic policy environment for international assistance resonates at a number of levels, including nationalist sentiment, fi scal imperatives and limitations, political and economic ideologies. This section sets out to demonstrate the intricate nature of the domestic policy context, i.e. the political-bureaucratic, regulatory, budgetary, and economic conditions

International Donor Efforts

85

that provided the institutional blackboard upon which international assistance efforts were pinned. Domestic variables not only provide context, but also contribute to the mutually reinforcing dynamic between domestic and assistance efforts. Donors invested not just in areas where they wanted to invest, they invested where domestic reformers were already planning new initiatives. Higher education in particular was a sector where reformers were plenty, and conscious of the fact that much needed to be done, and relatively influential in the bureaucratic polity. Both donors and reformers seemed aware from the early beginnings that the road to systemic reform would be long, hard and bumpy.

1.

General Principles and Practices

General principles and practices are fi rst identified and then applied in the context of external higher education funding. The data presented in that section and in the corresponding annex, suggests that: • Quantitative expressions of international assistance efforts need to be further placed within the perspective of Indonesia’s domestic policy context, characterized by a growing and gradually diversifying political economy (slowly becoming less dependent on oil revenue), a tightly centralized and autocratic polity, and yet a fragmented bureaucracy and budget administration. The political economy of the new order regime hampered systemic change and instead seemed to ensure that domestic reforms would be gradual and incremental at best. • In higher education specifically, fiscal constraints as much as political interference and bureaucratic restrictions did leave their mark on a system pressured to expand enrollments and to distribute domestic resources evenly across regions, institutions, social and ethnic groups. Considering priority needs at other levels in the education system, Indonesia’s governments have generally not been inclined to direct much of their scarce domestic public funding to higher education. Instead, they not only showed a high receptivity to foreign models and ideas, but also proved willing to invest in higher education development with external loans and counterpart funding up to the point even of disturbing balances between development and recurrent budgets in the mid-to-late 1980s. Meanwhile, institutions operated formally as ‘service units of the State’ but generally accommodated to the center’s attempts to standardize regulations with a variability of responses—ranging from negation to formal compliance—often depending on power and strength of constituent units. Under these conditions, international assistance provided not only a welcome source of funding and technical advice, but in many cases an academic and fi nancial lifeline for many departments in dire need of opportunities to train staff, and to equip labs and libraries.

86

International Assistance and State-University Relations • While certain parallels can be shown between the country’s macroeconomic policy and political institutional changes throughout the period of study (i.e. deregulation of selected economic sectors, gradual liberalization . . . ) and decentralizing tendencies in education overall, there is little evidence to a priori deny the potential influence of international efforts. Notably, the proposition has been advanced in the literature that State-society relations in Indonesia have been gradually transforming from an essentially patron-client type into a more differentiated and accountable working partnership. Nonetheless, and in spite of successive pushes to deregulate the economy, to decentralize the polity, and to increase pluralism within the bureaucracy, the evolving domestic context provided no guarantees that societal organizations, especially extra-or semi-bureaucratic ones such as State universities, would be accorded or would acquire greater institutional decision room. In other words, there was nothing inevitable in the polity of Indonesia’s “New Order” that could help predict Indonesia’s State universities to gain greater institutional autonomy vis-à-vis the State. Instead, the domestic context provided ample room for external resources and ideas to fully play their part. • The domestic policy context has been particularly favorable for external investments in higher education development and reform. Not only were the needs of the sector high—structural under-funding was a major obstacle for the higher education sector in the late seventies— but the Indonesian counterparts at the same time showed an unusual openness to foreign models and international donors, especially seeking long-term relationships, funding, and technical advice.

2. Limited Bureaucratic Pluralism in Higher Education The 1978–1985 period was characterized by a relatively strong connection between higher education and matters of internal security. Soeharto’s quasimilitary regime at the time exercised tight controls on who was appointed as Minister of Education, Rector or as Director General within the ministry. Surely, the massive student protests against Soeharto’s third term, on (State) university campuses in 1978 were not lightly forgotten. In the Ministry of Education and Culture, 4 out of 9 DG’s in 1984 were known as former military men. In higher education, the President chose to appoint Nugroho Notosusanto, a titular general with long-standing Defense and Security ties, to become Rector of the UI in 1982, and Minister of Education the following year (Emmerson, 1983). Even though the influence from the military has decreased drastically since, leftovers of that period continued to affect the higher education system for decades. Notably, with regard to higher education funding, decisions to increase tuition fees throughout the 1990s needed to be approved by the local Governor, a Presidential appointee and for most of the time period under consideration typically a retired general.

International Donor Efforts

87

In political terms, the New Order’s hallmark of ‘dynamic stability’ suggested a balance between military control of security sensitive parts of the bureaucracy, and a willingness to allow some degree of autonomy to growthrelated departments such as education. A situation which Indonesia scholars have characterized as one of limited bureaucratic pluralism “ . . . which means taking seriously the roles within the bureaucracy of relatively civilian organizations with characteristic policy positions that reflect programmatic mandates” (Emmerson, 1983: 1222). Limited bureaucratic pluralism also reflects in the 1980s, the differentiating forces of economic growth set in motion early in the life of the regime. Greater economic growth underscored the success of technocrats. However, at that time, the level of political differentiation did not provide any guarantees that organizations, especially extra-bureaucratic ones such as universities, would be accorded or acquire more autonomy or decision making room. In fact, according to key informants of the time, the influence of the regime on higher education policy making was felt at crucial stages of the system’s development: the liberalization of private universities, the establishment of the university expansion, and the introduction of financial autonomy in the Repelita 5.23

3.

Economic Development in the Decade of Deregulation

Indonesia’s economic performance was impressive: growth averages 7 % per annum during 1979–1997. A new economic stage began in mid-1980s when expansion of labor-intensive manufactures became the main source of growth, in turn fueling social demand for higher education in specific areas. Indonesia’s improvements in education meanwhile were also pushing demand: universal primary enrollment was achieved in the early 1980s, and secondary school enrollments increased almost threefold between 1970 and 1996. Whereas the new order government at fi rst was firmly based on the basic building blocks of a centralized bureaucratic polity, its economic success and growing entanglement with international players—donors as well as markets (e.g. oil and other natural resources, private investments in emerging industries)—has confronted it at all levels with the critical question of what the appropriate role of government should be. This has been the case in “soft” social service sectors such as education and health as much as in macroeconomic policy, where successive deregulation packages in 1983, 1988 and 1991, marked the 1980s as the decade of deregulation (Soesastro, 1989). Economic growth underscored the success of technocrats and reformers pushing for more deregulation of the economy, implying both reduced roles for government intervention and wider and more creative participation by public. The process has been managed in gradual fashion, with plenty of muddling-through. Deregulation has not been pursued by ideology, but rather as a direct assault on Indonesia’s high-cost and internationally un-competitive economy of the early 1980s. Its driving force

88

International Assistance and State-University Relations

has been a more efficient allocation of resources. A continued uncertain oil market (drop in prices in 1983 and again in 1986) created the strong sense of crisis that was sufficient to keep alive the deregulation process. Deregulation policy was initiated within the government, yet was implemented fi rst in departments where little opposition existed, i.e. those governed by technocrats (civilians).

4.

Domestic Indicators

While overall public expenditure on education as a proportion of public spending has increased (late 1970s-1990s), it is still below average for the region, and especially so in higher education, where government has relied predominantly on private sector and foreign aid. Domestic willingness to invest public funds in higher education has been low traditionally. However, DGHE managed to convince the government early on in the 1980s to lend for higher education for lack of domestic resources. The massive expansion of higher education enrollments, and its distributions between public and private sectors is graphically presented in annex (graph 2 in Annex).

5.

International Assistance in the State Budget

In budgetary terms, the principle of a “balanced and dynamic budget” was the central plank of its fi scal policy: in principle, it implied that the State budget needed to reflect a balance between revenues (including development assistance and loans) and expenditures. In practice, the dynamic budget concept suggested a commitment to expand budget expenditures, if needed with external revenues, in order to “maintain the momentum of development” (BAPPENAS, 1994: 85). For much of the 1980s, when the country faced decreasing domestic revenues from oil, aid became the principal gap-fi lling revenue source in the national accounts. The situation changed only in the early 1990s, when oil-dependency decreased, and foreign private investments came to take on a larger chunk of the country’s capital inflows. Adherence to the balanced and dynamic budget principle required foreign aid to become the balancing item that would fi ll the shortfall between domestic revenues and expenditures. Foreign aid during much of the eighties contributed about one third of budgeted development expenditures. 24

III. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION This section investigates international donor efforts in higher education in greater detail, specifi cally documenting the size, distribution (by

International Donor Efforts

89

institution, by province), and changing composition and mechanisms of international assistance. The data presented in this section demonstrate: (1) The sheer magnitude of the international donor effort overall—on average representing 41.5 % of Indonesia’s higher education development budget (1980–1998)—and the relative position of the two donors selected in this study; (2) The high degree of selectivity of the international assistance effort. Specifically, donors explicitly directed their efforts to a range of institutional innovations and in doing so at least implicitly supported greater institutional differentiation. Indeed, ‘projects’ that attempted otherwise (for instance, by putting funds unselectively in a sectorwide slice of the budget) were abandoned for their perceived lack of sustainability, and were instead followed on with initiatives that specifically put forward new ways and procedures (i.e. competition, peer review) to allocate resources (see ‘mechanisms’). Furthermore, these innovative approaches and funding schemes all seemed to presuppose a radical shift in the nature of the State’s role in managing the system of public higher education, more specifically suggesting a departure from the State as sole provider (demiurge) and/or central funding agent, towards a role of inducing change, ensuring quality and productivity; (3) The HED-portfolio of selected donors, and in particular the changes over time as to the composition of their efforts over different types of assistance. International donor inputs traditionally included provisions for equipment, technical assistance (which in turn includes domestic and international training as well as technical consultations), and infrastructure or civil works, all of which were typically part of a pre-agreed schedule or plan of operation. Particularly notable, however, is the profound shift in project spending patterns towards a situation in which donor inputs are no longer specified a priori but where funds are allocated directly as block grants to selected beneficiaries, be that institutions or specific units within. These newly styled programmatic interventions are significant not only for the multiple challenges they impose on the more classical model of donor’s internal mode of operations (e.g. in project design, implementation, monitoring and supervision), but also for their intent to foster greater participation from target beneficiaries; (4) That during the 1990s the typically centralizing mechanisms in project design and implementation were being replaced with more decentralized procedures, involving increased levels of participation from students, parents, faculty, and the local community. Frustrated with the lack of sustainable results from its earlier massive investments in the higher education sector, the World Bank in the years 1994–1998 launched a new series of projects, which it considered to be better in

90

International Assistance and State-University Relations line with modern management principles. Under this so-called New Paradigm of donor assistance, universities and their units are required to submit plans, rationales, and budget proposals, indicate what their own contribution will be, and compete for the available funds. Target institutions and units are selected on a competitive basis, on the basis of a number of criteria agreed upon with a newly set up Board of Higher Education. All the while, the Bank advised Government to use this mechanism also for allocating regular development funds to institutions. Funding is provided in block grants, but continuation is contingent on continued progress on quantitative sets of project performance indicators. This new generation of projects, which have taken up an increasing share in the Bank’s lending portfolio, comprises hundreds of very small projects supporting a multitude of widely dispersed activities (small contracts, payments . . . ), and have a different disbursement and flow of funds than is characteristic from the more traditional project. On the donor side, the approach has already proven to require strong monitoring capacities at the Resident Mission, especially in the area of procurement.

IV. DONOR EFFORTS AND FUNDING PATTERNS AT THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL Finally, section 3.4 investigates quantitative expressions of international donor efforts in light of structural changes over time in the funding patterns 100%

90%

80%

70%

60% Fees

50%

DIK DIP

40%

External

30%

20%

10%

0% 1985/86

1986/87

1987/88

Graph 3.1 Funding Sources for Higher Education in Mid- to Late 1980s.

International Donor Efforts

91

Distribution of Project Components Old Paradigm 2% 17%

14%

3%

Civil Works Equipment

3% 0%

Technical Assistance Competitive Institutional Grants Competitive Research Grants 25%

Project Management Incremental Staff Salaries Incremental Operation and Maintenance

36%

Graph 3.2 Distribution of Project Components Old Paradigm (World Bank Projects)

Competitive Research Grants 10%

Project Management 1%

Distribution of Project Components New Paradigm Equipment 0%

Technical Assistance; 7%

Civil Works Equipment Competitive Institutional Grants Competitive Research Grants Project Management Incremental Staff Salaries Incremental Operation and Maintenance

Competitive Institutional Grants 82%

Graph 3.3 Projects)

Distribution of Project Components New Paradigm (World Bank

at the institutional level. The purpose is not so much to suggest a statistical correlation between the share of international assistance and the changing composition of the institutional budget as to provide a graphical demonstration of the place of international assistance in the context of institutional

92

International Assistance and State-University Relations

resource diversification. Donor assistance, because of its size and shape, was in a position to leverage on institutional choices and possibilities. In so doing, the section provides the link to a more detailed discussion of assistance outcomes in the next chapter. The evidence presented in this section indicates that: (1) Donor investments in the development of Indonesia’s public higher education coincided with a changing pattern of funding at these institutions, suggesting a decreasing dependence on direct government funds and increased reliance on fees and other extra-governmental income. Data do not indicate that these changes thus far have been substituted with an increased dependence on international assistance. Corresponding tables 4 and 7 in annex illustrate distribution of international assistance by institution and by region, as well as their share in the institutional budget. (2) Increased diversification of resources clearly is more prominent for those institutions that received international assistance than for those institutions that received no or little assistance from 1980–1995. Data support the argument that assistance increases opportunities of institutions to improve their position on the market of extra budgetary resources. Graph 4 indicates distribution of institutional funding patterns for three groups, each consisting of 4 institutions, 25 representing the following categories: high recipients of assistance; medium recipients of assistance; and low to no recipients. The graph demonstrates the decreasing reliance on extra-budgetary resources from the ‘high group’ to the ‘low group’. 100% 90% 80% 70% 60%

QUE/DUE External

50%

DIP DIK DRK

40% 30% 20% 10% 0% High Level Recipients

Medium Level Recipients

Low Level Recipients

Graph 3.4 Institutional Budgets by Level of Assistance Received (1980–95)

International Donor Efforts V.

93

CONCLUSION

From the 1970s, Indonesia’s domestic policy context suggested ongoing constraints to the availability of public resources for higher education, whereas the international political climate at the time was conducive to increased levels of international investments into the Indonesian economy and human resource base. Some donors gradually came to fi nd themselves in positions from which their interventions would start to create an environment (more) conducive to decentralized or less strictly coupled State-university relations. At times, these donors explicitly acted as a catalyst or provider of ideas in trying to get the Indonesian government or its institutions to focus on ‘decentralization’ as a key element of State-university relations and a necessary condition for improving public higher education. Most of the time, however, donor efforts were implicit, indirect or suggestive, occasionally responding more explicitly to scarce opportunities provided by changes of leadership in the Ministry, the Directorate for Higher Education, or at the universities with which they collaborated. Donor inputs, be they in infrastructure, training, management, planning and policy, or, most prominently, in university staff development, were to raise but at the same time to redistribute domestic capacities of the State university system to levels that would have not been achieved without external assistance. Both the relative import (i.e. size of the effort in relation to domestic resources) and the degree of selectivity of donor efforts in general suggest a gradual, at times painstakingly slow, but nonetheless fundamental departure from the more typical State-controlled mode of distributing resources evenly across the system. At the system level, growth and selectivity of donor assistance have gone hand in hand with an increased and intended diversification of institutional types, a process which in turn has put effective pressure on centralizing forces of State control. The introduction and diffusion of new institutional types and educational functions (i.e. engineering education in polytechnics, graduate education and research at selected universities . . . ) undoubtedly complicated centralized management of an expanding and quite elaborate system. The World Bank, in an effort to assist with the implementation of a new paradigm in higher education funding, explicitly introduced competitive mechanisms in the domestic resource allocation process. Following Soeharto’s fall in 1998, this donor even started to collaborate with the DGHE and with selected State universities to explore ways and procedures, quite possibly including legislative measures, designed to increase the autonomy of ‘State’ institutions to an unprecedented (legal, financial and academic) level. Whereas the size and shape of the smaller donors’ efforts were much less dramatic and system-wide than they were for their highly leveraged multilateral counterparts, their position at the institutional level nonetheless is seen to be similar.

94

International Assistance and State-University Relations

At the institutional level, donors explicitly targeted their efforts at increasing academic and managerial capacities, and thereby, often implicitly, acted as a catalyst in creating further opportunities to generate external resources. In this context, the mechanics of the assistance process has gained special prominence over time. Whereas smaller donors such as the Netherlands early on confi ned their efforts to staff development and academic linkages, the World Bank most notably, moved from infrastructure to explicitly seek to introduce and optimize competitive mechanisms in the domestic resource allocation process. While efforts have been predominantly oriented towards the departmental or sub-unit level—more so than the central university administration—data nonetheless suggests that especially those institutions and units receiving the bulk of the assistance efforts have generally become less dependent on central government funding.

4

Outcomes

“Outcomes are the things that are actually achieved, whatever the objectives of policy may have been. Outcomes are real results, whether intended or unintended, and are not restricted to the result of agency” (Lane, 1994: 63) “An innovation fails because it is either incompatible or unprofitable or both, with profitability as the stronger determinant of the two” (Clark in Cerych & Sabatier, 1986: 264–265)

I.

INTRODUCTION

The policy implementation literature provides a productive framework for sorting out conceptual differences between policy implementation and evaluation, inputs and outputs, outputs and outcomes. The intention in this introductory session is not to review that literature (Hill & Hupe, 2002; O’Toole, 2000), but rather to clarify what I mean by outcomes in the context of this study, both in a conceptual and an operational sense. At the conceptual level, the research design was not set up to evaluate Indonesian tertiary education policy reforms. Hence, outcomes of domestic reforms are not the object of this chapter. Our target is not the success or failure of the Indonesian policy reforms, but rather the extent to which selected reforms have been influenced by international assistance. Furthermore, the analysis does not intend to measure the degree of success of international assistance in contributing to an improvement of Indonesia’s higher education. Such an assessment would require a set of educational and/or managerial quality indicators, based on a more or less fixed set of objectively verifiable policy goals, and leading to normative judgments that go well beyond the institutional perspective on university autonomy that we have identified as our dependent variable. Instead, the analysis in this chapter will recognize the continual interaction between policy goals, inputs and outcomes over a specified time period. The purpose is to describe and try to explain what happened in the process of implementation, seek causal connections and relationships on the basis of analytical judgments, more so than

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to assess the output of a particular policy goal and/or effort. In other words, the analysis in this chapter does not conceptually start from the assumption that goals (chapter 2) lead (or do not lead) to inputs or efforts (chapter 3), which in turn lead (or lead not) to specified effects (outputs). Following the substantial “third generation” implementation research literature,1 efforts are not always rewarded with results, ideas can have direct effect without much input intermediation, and various feedback loops to and fro intervening and mediating variables interfere with such linear logic. The outcome analysis in this chapter conceptually leaves the door open for unexpected logics and relationships. Obviously, by explicitly choosing to explore ‘outcomes’ (instead of ‘outputs’ or ‘effects’) as the main object of this chapter, the analysis does not become less complex at the conceptual or the operational level. On the contrary, analyzing the process of implementation implies the inclusion of intervening variables; it suggests an openness towards a broad range of theoretical perspectives, moving beyond agency and instead including more process related themes (such as socialization, language, academic/organizational culture) and relational variables (such as power relationships, organizational culture, inter-organizational networks). At the same time, the chapter needs to empirically defi ne these variables in order to address the central questions of relevancy, efficacy, and efficiency that provide guiding criteria for any assessment of outcome. Relevance, in the context of this study, is regarded in terms of the level of congruence with domestic conditions at the level of national higher education policy, selected institutions and academic units. An assessment of relevance therefore not only suggests the inclusion of material related to the context of Indonesia’s national higher education policy framework–and the changes therein—but also an analysis of stakeholders’ opinions, as well as a sense of the power relationships within institutions. Effi cacy, in turn, concerns the extent to which assistance goals have been achieved (the product sense of the efficacy criterion), or conditions have been established for these goals to be achieved (process sense of the efficacy criterion). Finally, with effi ciency I will refer, fi rst, to the extent to which outcomes are a refl ection of donors’ strategic choices (rather than from other intervening factors), and, second, to an assessment of the profitability of donor goals and efforts in terms of their value as compared to alternative approaches (or what economists call the opportunity cost of the investment). Thematically, the chapter substantiates the ways in which international assistance has been instrumental in the establishment of domestic conditions that are needed in order to promote increased levels of autonomy at the institutional level. Suggesting Clark’s “Places of Inquiry” as a guiding analytical frame of reference, the analysis follows his distinction between the enabling conditions, the formative conditions, and the enacting conditions that on the whole constitute the basis for institutionally integrating basic functions of higher education in Indonesia. 2

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Throughout, the chapter explores the extent to which donor assistance in Indonesia either reflects or else deviates from the internationally dominant higher education reform agenda so prominent in the World Bank’s higher education 1994 policy paper (World Bank, 1994). At the operational level, the burden of proof for this chapter lies in providing evidence for the relationship between selected changes in Indonesia’s higher education system on the one hand, and the goals and efforts of 20 years of international assistance on the other. Specifically, I will try to lay out the various ways in which the politics of the so-called ‘New Paradigm’ has been affected, inspired, influenced or contradicted by donor policies and assistance programs. In effect, in this chapter I will argue how international assistance became one source of influence, providing inspirational, technical and policy support that together helped create an enabling environment for decentralization in the Indonesian higher education system. The communication of ideas, the particular experiences with specific projects and programs–often embedded in a process of “policy dialogue” and sub-sector “upstream work”–came to be reflected into successive “frameworks for long-term higher education”, which in turn set the stage for further institutionalization of reform. Notably, our analysis indicates how international assistance: 1. gradually built up a discourse for State higher education ‘reforms’, involving a different set of government roles, notably implying systems of quality assurance (through peer review, benchmarking and accreditation), procedures for decentralized management (including more institutional autonomy in fi nancial areas, and incentives for bottom-up planning at institutional levels), and alternative funding mechanisms (suggesting increased accountability and effi ciency); 2. for over two decades continued to invest in a long term process of “trials and errors”, allowing for successful ideas and efforts to gradually seep through and ultimately to take root within the domestic environment at both national and institutional levels; 3. helped foster changes in the way the Indonesian government went about in managing its public higher education at the system level, thereby creating ‘the enabling environment’, which in turn is expected to lead to increased levels of institutional autonomy; 4. contributed to particular outcomes fostering institutional differentiation (at system level), resource diversification (at department and institutional level) and cost recovery (at institutional level) that enabled the establishment of ‘the formative conditions’ for institutional autonomy; 5. supported the introduction and systematic implementation of selective and transparent distribution mechanisms (i.e. competition, performance based approaches, benchmarking, peer evaluation and

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International Assistance and State-University Relations accreditation) that are instrumental in sustaining ‘the enacting conditions’ at the level of the academic work floor.

II. WORDS MATTER: DONORS AND THE LANGUAGE OF ‘REFORM’ IN INDONESIA’S HIGHER EDUCATION The term discourse analysis has many different meanings, typically referring to various disciplinary fields, ranging from literary studies to sociolinguistics, and theoretical perspectives and methods. 3 This section is specifically concerned with the use of language (both written and oral) in the particular social context of Indonesian higher education policy, and in its historical interaction with the language of foreign assistance. The policy discourse, in other words, will be traced and analysed as an outcome of donor-recipient relations. Theoretically, this approach starts from the basic assumption that the use of language is tied into social relations, political power and the continuous struggle to obtain more of it. At a more practical level, the method of reviewing and connecting policy analytical papers, project preparation documents, and interviews intends to reveal how and to what extent the language of the donor became the policy language of the recipient. Thematically, the analysis uncovers certain parallels between domestic and international assistance policy discourse highlighting not only the presence of external influence but also, at least to some degree, the internalization of that influence at the level of policy language and reports suggesting (needs for) change and reform in the management of higher education. For sure, convergence of policy language does not allow any fi rm conclusion about donor’s effect on actual decision making or implementation (ie. “real change”). The ensuing sections of this chapter will focus on these more ‘hardware-like’ components of assistance outcomes. Also, it is acknowledged that the international donor discourse was not always easily accepted, let alone taken over by the Indonesian government, at times it was even rejected (for instance the abolishment of the subsidized student loan scheme in the 1980s,4 or, the political decision to discontinue all on-going Dutch assistance in the early 1990s), and often adjusted to local circumstances (cf. infra the prudent crafting of the defi nition of institutional autonomy in the New Paradigm document) or complemented with alternative domestic variations and home-grown concepts or flavours (cf. infra the reference to higher education as a ‘moral force’ in society). The key observation, however, remains that the dominant discourse in Indonesia’s higher education policy today can be traced in great part as an outcome of international assistance goals and efforts, more specifi cally the World Bank’s engagement since the mid 1970s but especially in the course of the 1990s. The genesis of the ‘New Paradigm’ in the mid-1990s illustrates that point very well. The official document appeared in May

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1996 as part of the Framework for Long Term Higher Education Development (1996–2005), but an early draft circulated in August 1995 in the frame of a so-called policy dialogue with the World Bank, which in reality was part of a negotiating process that started in 1992 and was meant to identify a follow-on project to the sector wide time slice loan HEDP-II (cf. discussion in chapter 2). Apart from these project concerns, however, the Bank’s conceptual international work in developing its own higher education policy paper (ie. the preparatory drafts of the Bank’s ‘Lessons of Experience’ paper) also informed the Indonesian policy dialogue. Table 4.1 not only suggests a particular timeline and flavor of this dialoguing process, but at the same time indicates in what particular context and to what extent key concepts, such as ‘new paradigm’, ‘autonomy’, ‘accountability’, ‘accreditation’, and ‘quality’, were introduced into the process and ultimately became part of the official policy discourse of the DGHE, as reflected in the Third Framework for Long-Term Higher Education Development. The discourse of policy change and ‘paradigmatic reform’ in any case contrasts sharply with the preceding ‘Long Term Higher Education Framework’, where ‘consolidation and stabilized growth’ was the name of the game, at least for the State universities. 5 Whether or not this change of discourse was a direct result of explicit or implicit external pressure is not the main argument here. As can be expected, and will be further discussed in the next session, there was a mix of external influences resulting from ‘policy dialogues’ or project evaluation issues on the one hand, and homegrown concerns about the fi nancial continuity of the system on the other.6 Our key point here is that the strategy of the New Paradigm clearly echoes the essential orientations of the Bank’s broader international as well as its Indonesian strategy for higher education, both suggesting a breakaway from the central role of the State in planning, funding, and managing higher education. As can be expected also, the convergence of discourse is not necessarily an indication of agreement on the rationale or the specific meanings of the key concepts (such as, ‘autonomy’, ‘quality’ or ‘decentralization’, to name just these few), nor does it preclude the variety of motives, opinions and interpretations within the Indonesian government as well as within the Bank. Apart from the variety of individual opinions of participants, the interpretation of discourse is coloured by the institutional perspectives of stakeholders at a particular point of time. Table 4.2 summarizes some of these institutional perspectives on the concept of ‘autonomy’ in the mid-1990s. Notwithstanding intra-institutional differences, there are clear indications that the Bank’s policy discourse by the late 1990s had reached a high level of integration within the domestic policy discourse of the DGHE. The government’s own higher education development programs soon started to take over not only the approach (e.g. competitive funding schemes, bottom up planning) but also the terminology of Bank projects. Most prominent

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Table 4.1

Date 2/92

Overview and Brief Discussion of Key Documents Regarding the World Bank’s HED ‘Policy Dialogue’ with Indonesia in Years Preceding Formulation of New Paradigm Type of document

Content

Aide-Memoire Calls for review of government role in HED, with focus on quality improvement at undergraduate level, and new mechanisms for revamping developing domestic graduate education and research capacity.

10/92 Initial Executive Project Summary

Calls for quality improvement as overriding policy focus in sharp contrast to earlier years where quantitative and equitable expansion were at least as important. Government role is to invest in quality assurance, and in key public goods that are important for quality enhancement (i.e. research & graduate education). Makes a case for effective financial autonomy, concentrating resources in selected institutions, competitive funding mechanisms, peer review.

01/93 Letter with Draft for Higher Education Strategy

This document from Bank RSI staff is presented as a ‘think piece’ for developing the long term goals for Indonesia’s HED, and calls for a re-examination of the public role focusing on quality assurance mechanisms (ie. accreditation system for both private and public HED) and concentrating scarce resources in university research and graduate education through competitive funding mechanisms. The document criticizes shortcomings of the 1990 autonomy law and calls for ‘full financial autonomy’ for institutions in setting fees and spending privately raised funds.

03/93 First draft of Calling for comprehensive strategies for improving the quality of World Bank’s HED, supporting reforms involving increased levels of institutional Policy Paper autonomy. Erik Thulstrup’s critical analysis of the results of the (later to be Bank’s investment in Indonesia’s ‘centres of excellence’ (IUC’s) is known as highlighted in the draft paper, but interestingly not in the final ver‘Lessons of sion that appears in 1995. Experience’) 06/93 Back to Office Expresses concerns over sustainability of Bank investments and calls Report for a change of government strategy involving a reform of the financwith Aideing system of HED and for granting more financial and academic Memoire autonomy to institutions. 08/93 Aide-Memoire Establishing the main components of the URGE project and its intended relationship to ‘necessary Government reforms’, including increased private financing of public higher education, granting greater autonomy to public universities in how they raise and utilize resources. 11/93 Aide-Memoire Discussion of Best Practice Paper with government. Recognition of ‘systemic weaknesses that need to be addressed for a long term viability of sectoral investments’, including the lack of financial autonomy at public institutions. ‘Complete financial autonomy of public institutions’ is called for, in order to enable them to crosssubsidize graduate education and research activities. At the same time, the issue of autonomy in higher education is recognized to be part of broader government policies regarding autonomy of public institutions. (continued)

Outcomes Table 4.1

Date

101

Overview and Brief Discussion of Key Documents Regarding the World Bank’s HED ‘Policy Dialogue’ with Indonesia in Years Preceding Formulation of New Paradigm (continued) Type of document

Content

10/94 Back to Office Critical document at critical time in ‘policy dialogue’ towards a new with Letter government HED strategy. Notably, the Bank expressed here a numand Aideber of key concerns with DGHE’s articulation of the Repelita VI Memoire strategy in which the Bank would be ‘filling the gaps left behind by various donor support’. The letter explicitly sums up and elaborates the major critiques: ‘lack of vision/strategy; lack of diversification; lack of efforts to enhance efficiency and sustainability of investments; needed review of role of government in quality assurance (ie. accreditation), financing (ie. incentive framework and autonomy), and lack of provisions for improved planning mechanisms at the institutional level’. 11/94 Letter DGHE

DGHE is concerned with expected delays in continuing critical elements of the time slice project HEDP II. The Bank responds that it will not recommend a time slice format this time, instead suggesting lending instruments allowing for decentralized disbursement of expenditures in relation to proposals coming from HED institutions.

01/95 Aide-Memoire Calls for a much more decentralized approach where institutions HEDPIII themselves are held accountable for their performance. The follow-up project will “assist DGHE to move away from a centralized system of managing university decisions towards one where the DGHE sets and enforces broad policies leaving individual institutions to make decisions how best to implement these policies”. The document calls for granting a separate legal status to public universities so that they can be autonomous in their resource allocation decisions even as some of the funding is channelled from public sources. 03/95 Document DGHE

Document highlighting the State guidelines (GBHN 1993) in relation to HED. Emphasis is on expansion of opportunity, improving relevancy, quality improvement by investments in infrastructure and training. University autonomy is defined as a “mechanism” to increase income of institutions from contracts with industry.

03/95 DGHE

Establishment of Commission for Higher Education Reform, to review options and recommend a strategy for the long run.

04/95 Initial Execu- Summarizes approach of a follow-on project on HEDPII, starttive Project ing from ‘lessons learned’. ‘The most powerful lesson learned is Summary that providing inputs does not necessarily lead to effective use of (HESP, later these inputs. Based on capabilities built from past projects, it now to be split up appears timely and important to focus on ownership and particiin DUE and pation at the institutional level. The key to developing planning QUE projects and management capacity is through tangible delegation of planrespectively) ning and managerial responsibilities’. The strategy is to support with Letter the gradual re-definition of the role of the central government through decentralized planning and management responsibilities to institutions themselves, and in establishing mechanisms such as accreditation to ensure accountability to the public. (continued)

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Table 4.1

Date

Overview and Brief Discussion of Key Documents Regarding the World Bank’s HED ‘Policy Dialogue’ with Indonesia in Years Preceding Formulation of New Paradigm (continued) Type of document

04/95 Letter to DGHE with AideMemoire

Content First time reference to the desirability of a ‘new paradigm of higher education management’ that would use ‘institutional self-evaluation as the entry point for developing university capacity for planning and management’. It was further agreed that the Commission for Higher Education Reform work closely with the project preparation team such that the project design supports the longer-term objective of developing capabilities in universities for autonomy with accountability.

05/95 Back to Office Report’s assessment indicates that university level planning is with Aidegenerally weak with much capacity differences at faculty and Memoire department levels. Self-evaluation and proposal development at the Department/Faculty level is seen as the most effective entry point for new project. 07/95 Letter to Minister

Calls for more ownership and participation in the design of new projects, as well as in the development of a new vision and strategy. Underlines “the need for decentralization and autonomy, not for its own sake, but as a critical step in making universities responsible for educational processes that cannot be effectively governed centrally for the country”. Proposes to assist in the articulation of a strategy and vision for higher education.

08/95 First Draft of DGHE New Paradigm

The New Paradigm for restructuring the system of higher education involves 5 principles that are used as reference both at system and at institutional level. These are quality, evaluation, accreditation, autonomy & accountability. The document makes the point that Quality is central to any future development, that Quality requires Evaluation of the current situation (through institutional self-evaluation), which brings in Accreditation (through an independent board). Autonomy of institutions is the organizing principle that goes hand in hand with Accountability.

09/95 Support of Japanese Grant Facility

The new approach to decentralized planning (bottom-up) is tested in a variety of institutions with support from the JGF. The DGHE terms of reference for carrying out these project preparation activities indicate that the change of approach is so fundamental that an evaluation of interest, readiness and capabilities of institutions is deemed required.

05/96 Framework Although the ‘new paradigm’ constitutes one of the core programs for Longof the framework (next to ‘relevance’ and ‘geographical and social Term Higher equity’), the document’s approach to planning very much fits Education traditional concepts given its starting point from a clear hierarchical Development relationship between the various levels (‘strata’) of the higher educa1996–2005 tion system (centre, institution, academic unit, academic community). Institutional autonomy is instrumental to the higher, national goals formulated at the central level. The discourse is one of ‘social engineering’, containing master plans, regulations, arrangements, hierarchy, and many references to Repelita VI quantitative targets. Concepts such as delegation or decentralization do not appear in the 300 page document7. (continued)

Outcomes Table 4.1

Date

103

Overview and Brief Discussion of Key Documents Regarding the World Bank’s HED ‘Policy Dialogue’ with Indonesia in Years Preceding Formulation of New Paradigm (continued) Type of document

09/96 Letter DGHE Academic Affairs with draft Higher Education Strategy

Content This DGHE document is meant as a response to the Bank’s draft education sector review for Indonesia8. The bulk of the content goes into the development of alternative funding mechanisms for the allocation of public resources to institutions. Specifically, the new paradigm would be reflected in increased shares of competitive and performance based funding.

are the Ministry’s ‘DUE-like’ program or ‘semi-QUE’, where even the title of the project explicitly refers to earlier Bank supported projects, suggesting similarities in approach.9 But apart from this particular example, the data indicates that the Directorate’s development budget increasingly departed from the centralized control mechanism that was typical for line item budgeting instead setting up tiered competition schemes, in which universities were to submit activity plans that were generated in a decentralized fashion. Throughout, the idea was to avoid “the project mentality” typical of the earlier “top-down approach”, instead suggesting a greater sense of “ownership” and a greater concern for “sustainability” of new investments (all quotes from Moeliodihardjo, 1999). In addition, key informant interviews confi rmed that the DGHE was pushing other donors to design their future projects along the same lines, with a greater sense for encouraging bottom-up planning mechanisms within institutions (p.c. Satryo, p.c. Pramutadi). Notably, the government at the time of data collection (late 1999) was in the process negotiating a loan with the ADB, later to become the Technical Professional Skills Development Project, which in effect was guided by the same principles: awarding grants to institutions on a competitive basis, involving institutional self-evaluations and proposals based on decentralized planning from the study programs upward (ADB, TPSDP Guidelines, 2001). Even the typical activities of bilateral donors, including Australia, Germany, and others, fit in well as they often pursued non-monetary, ground level academic links, international scholarships and twinning operations, which all turned out to be helpful in the process of self-evaluation and proposal development. Notably, bilateral agencies had invested heavily in staff development by means of international scholarships, but many who returned were soon drawn from the university as they typically did not get the chances or necessary support in their home institution.10 Merit based competition schemes, and decentralized self-evaluation processes provide a range of new opportunities for young academics to successfully compete for resources and to effectively participate in the institutional planning process (p.c. Pramoetadi).

104 International Assistance and State-University Relations Table 4.2

Institutional Perspectives on Autonomy in Indonesia Discourse and rationale

Government - Minister

Autonomy is a way to save on the HED budget

- MOFinance

Autonomy is an exception to general rules of accounting for ‘service units of the State’ that make all extra budgetary revenues (i.e. tuition and contract revenues) de facto government income and in principle prevents public institutions to decide autonomously or carry over to the next fiscal year.

- DGHE

Autonomy is a management tool to mobilize much needed resources for public HED institutions, based on a “right, granted by a competent party or the government, to execute its functions as long as this does not contradict generally valid regulations in society” (KPTJ: 72) a) Initially, sharp focus on financial autonomy and avoidance of political connotations of the term (p.c. Soekadji) b) Later (post-1996 and especially post-1998), broader perspective (including governance, and attention to required legislative reforms (e.g. directive 60/61 in 1999 or law 20 in 2003) to create separate legal entities

- BAPPENAS (planning)

Autonomy for strong university institutions allows government to spend more resources into less established institutions

Institutions - central

Autonomy stands for consolidation of accounts, intra-institutional rules for encouraging income generation and cross-subsidization

- unit

Autonomy stands for loss of control over income generated

World Bank Autonomy (including the power to set fees, recruit and retrench personnel, and use budgetary allocations flexibly across expenditure categories) is “a sine qua non for successful reform aimed at resource diversification and more efficient use of resources” (World Bank, 1994, 63). The translation of this international strategy in the context of Indonesia took place along the following phases: a) 1990–93: Indonesia’s 1990 autonomy regulation was initially welcomed as an instrument to help ensure sustainability of investments in higher education. Autonomy was associated with cost recovery (as it was during the 1980s). b) 1994–98: The apparent failure to fully implement these regulations was recognised well before the new paradigm, and was questioned in the course of URGE and HESP project discussions, but the Bank undertook little action at the level of domestic policy11. Autonomy was mentioned as a desirable policy objective that would assure project sustainability. Nonetheless, the Bank steered away from domestic legalities and focused on project implementation mechanisms, such as competitive funding, and bottom up planning procedures, self-evaluation, accreditation . . . c) post 1999: After the downfall of Soeharto, the Bank began to provide direct policy support to DGHE plans to grant ‘legal autonomy’ (ie. to make them legally separate from the Ministry of Education) to a selected number of State universities. At this stage, autonomy is seen as part of a broader policy framework involving legal (and political) reforms in funding, governance, and management of higher education. (chapter 5)

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In sum, the World Bank’s international agenda for public higher education by the late 1990s clearly had become the dominant discourse in Indonesia’s higher education policy. The five pillars of the ‘New Paradigm’ (i.e. quality, autonomy, accountability, accreditation, and evaluation) reflect the change of policy discourse very well as they capture a different set of government roles in higher education. Taking into account that discourse implies relationship, the new paradigm definitely suggests a reconfiguration of the State-university relationship. With reference to Peter Evan’s classification of State roles (Evans, 1995: 78–81), the role of the Indonesian State in higher education shifts from the central ‘demiurge’ to a role of ‘custodian’, who protects and ensures quality education by establishing supervising institutions (i.e. Board of Higher Education, Board of Accreditation), procedures (i.e. competition, self-evaluation, peer review), and criteria (i.e. the so-called RAISE framework12) for evaluation and accreditation. It is a selective State, which corresponds with competitive funding schemes and output based funding formulas, away from across the board, line-item funding mechanisms that were common practise. Finally, the State takes on the position of ‘midwife’ in the sense that it sets goals and criteria, but leaves implementation and proposal formulation to the institutions themselves. In principle, the State remains largely dependent on the responsiveness of the universities, even though a sophisticated incentive framework may encourage them to react in ‘desired ways’. Institutions, on the other hand, are expected to get their house on order internally (for instance, in consolidation of budget and financing structure, but also in academic programs, curriculum development, and governance structure). The idea comes close to the notion of “maximizing induced decision making” (Ellerman, 2005), or, perhaps more appropriate to the world of higher education, “governmental steering” as I will further discuss in section 3 of this chapter. With reference to Clark’s triangle, there is little doubt that the now dominant discourse of the New Paradigm suggests a stronger market component of Indonesia’s public higher education. This is reflected in the operational definition of ‘quality education’, which puts a heavy weight on job market related skills and competencies, and values the development of particular subject areas that are in high need for the nation’s economic competitiveness. But it is also expressed in the introduction and expansion of competitive procedures for allocating resource (allowing that some get more than others), the emphasis on merit based criteria, and the discourse on decentralized and demand oriented planning of higher education. The new discourse definitely implies a departure from existing values and practices of higher education at different levels, from resource allocation (across the board) and career paths (following the rules of the civil service) to class room pedagogies, curricula, and quality standards. As the policy discourse of the new paradigm was becoming the dominant policy discourse, alternative discourses did develop. Notably, critics using contesting discourses started to question the withdrawal of the State from public higher education institutions and its replacement by market forces

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on social or regional equity grounds (Moeljani, 1999). Other contesting discourses associate the management paradigm with an erosion of the ideal of the academy as a “moral force” in society,13 and point out that the spirit and ideals of the ‘civitas academica’ have been replaced by the “money making business” that higher education has become. As one critic wrote: “The change to campus autonomy has not really done anything more than institute a change form State tyranny to market domination. The reality is that the civitas academica has not been able to critique the social marginalization that has resulted from this policy.” (Nugroho, 2005: 147). Whether, as critics seem to argue, the discourse corresponds with a ‘neo-liberal agenda’ of ‘privatization’ and ‘commoditization’ of higher education remains largely to be seen. For one, the ‘custodian State’ that is emerging from the new paradigm discourse, typically is a regulating State, with the necessary power and capacity to select, to protect, to set rules and to sanction. The establishment of specialized government agencies, such as the National Accreditation Board (PT-BAN), or the Board of Higher Education (DTP), can be seen as an expression of the different yet powerful role that the State has been taking on since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, whereas at the level of the institutions, the managerial reforms suggested by the New Paradigm may have granted the universities greater latitude in generating income (i.e. fees, non-degree programs, . . . ), it is still uncertain to what extent university governance will continue to be influenced by State rules and regulations in terms of ‘the hire and fi re’ of managers or personnel in general (cf. the civil service status). Again with reference to Clark’s triangle, I will argue in the following sections that the system changed from State control to a different kind of State control.

III.

PROCESS OUTCOMES AND VARIABLES

Both higher education and international assistance are typically sectors of society that are widely known and often criticized for their reflection of a profound and optimistic belief in the possibilities of social engineering. Participants’ belief in rational planning and man-made change (‘human agency’) is prominent. Nonetheless, and following our analysis of assistance goals in chapter 2, the picture that emerges from 20 years of international assistance to Indonesia’s higher education does not provide any proof of a “grand design” or “master plan” with a clearly defi ned strategy implying a move from ‘State control’ to ‘institutional autonomy’. Instead, assistance policy goals and efforts suggest ample room for experimentation with a variety of approaches, much ‘muddling’ with centralized projects as well as decentralized grants and linkages, much standard project work (i.e. infrastructure development, training, scholarships, technical assistance . . . ) but also, and progressively so, recognition of and specific actions directed at the broader policy framework of Indonesia’s higher education.

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In order to be able to assess the outcomes of international assistance in terms of increased levels of autonomy for public institutions, we need to explore the particular types of structural characteristics (the ‘institutional design’14) engendered in the actions of international assistance during these decades, and how these affected the preferences of key actors and the dynamics of political exchange. In this section, therefore, I will focus on those intervening variables that helped to ensure that international assistance–in this particular context- were supportive of institutional autonomy. Specifically, from the interviews and documentation, I was able to construct four process variables that help explain how, and to what extent, international assistance goals and efforts came to be congruent with the Indonesian higher education environment. These variables include: time perspective, levels of legitimacy, consultation, and ‘institutional embeddedness’. Figure 4.1 transposes these variables into a prismatic framework for assessing the level of congruency of international donor interventions with domestic conditions. The idea of prismatic congruence is derived from Riggs classical study of change in developing countries.15 The “prismatic” concept helps us see why models devised to capture change in terms of concrete variables on a continuum are often inadequate to explain underlying and ongoing processes of diffraction and differentiation (Riggs, 1964: 27). In other words, the different dimensions of congruency in our prismatic figure are not to be seen as opposite dimensions

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International Assistance and State-University Relations

on imaginative continua. Rather, they are–often simultaneously—entered into the equation of a process of acceptance and integration in domestic policies.

1.

Consultation—Imposition

At the conceptual level, imposed autonomy is an oxymoron. At the level of policy practice, however, we need to consider the structural complexity of the donor—recipient relationship in order to empirically assess the interplay between imposition (in its varying degrees) and consultation (again in its varying degrees). This relationship was in many ways different for the World Bank than it was for Dutch bilateral assistance. Dutch assistance started from an uneasy postcolonial situation, which left the donor not much latitude for manoeuvring into policy or even management oriented actions in higher education. Throughout the period reported, Dutch assistance balanced a thin line between awareness of Indonesian sensitivities to patronizing tendencies on the one hand, and active involvement in institution building on the other. In higher education, this resulted in discreet investments in academic linkages and scientific collaboration between individual scholars and institutions with little direct attention to the process of institutional management development at the Indonesian university. The development, management and implementation of the Dutch program for university development cooperation (the so-called PUO program, see chapter 2) were decentralized to the Dutch universities and the Netherlands Foundation for International Cooperation (NUFFIC). Choices with regard to the selection of Indonesian institutions in the program, or the specific areas of assistance, more often than not were founded on the interests of individual scholars in the Netherlands consulting with counterparts in Indonesia. Still, and typical for the Dutch model of consensus decision-making (the so-called ‘polder model’), the outcome of the decision making process represented a mixture of influences and consultations with various stakeholders, including the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, experts at NUFFIC, the Ministry of Education in Jakarta, the Ministry of Planning (BAPPENAS), students at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Dutch academics, Indonesian academics, the Rectors of the selected public institutions, and even some Indonesian PhD students pleading with their Dutch supervisors for assistance in pursuing their academic work at home institutions in Indonesia. The process involved an enormous amount of consultations and mutual influences, often implicitly, taking into account the alleged expectations of several stakeholders at the same time. Box 4.1 illustrates how this process worked with regard to the selection of the University of Gajah Mada as partner institution and the setting of priorities in the PUO program. The model suggests a balanced mix of consultation and imposition (‘give and take’) that allowed Dutch assistance to gradually build up credibility on the academic work floor. It started from a shared scholarly interest and gradually built up trust in the selected departments and faculties the projects were

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Box 4.1 The ‘Polder Model’ at Work in Dutch Assistance to Gajah Mada University (Based on Interviews with Theo Veenkam, Harry Brinkman, and PUO Evaluation Reports) The general framework of the PUO program was spelt out in 1976 by the then Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk, who expected the program to contribute to the broader socio-economic development and self-reliance of the country, with first priority to the needs of the poorest population groups. NUFFIC wanted the collaboration to promote interdisciplinary approaches in an effort to integrate and broaden existing individualized links between academics in the Netherlands and Indonesia. Meanwhile, many students in the Netherlands were actively protesting against cooperation with Indonesia because of its authoritarian regime, its corruption and disrespect for human rights. In Indonesia, the ministry of education signaled that assistance would be especially welcomed for its State universities. From consultations with some of these institutions, it was becoming apparent that the official criteria (focus on the poor) somehow would clash with their expectations as they were seeking academic support for the development of basic sciences. The focus on the poor, furthermore, was regarded by many Indonesians as a ‘rather paternalistic condition’ of the PUO Program (Evaluation Report, December 1982: 14). Instead, Indonesian institutions were confronted with tremendous needs for professional staff development and PhD trained lecturers in basic subject areas such as chemistry, physics, and geology. At about the same time, young Indonesian PhD students in the Netherlands convincingly pleaded with their supervisors for Dutch investments in laboratories that would enable them and their colleagues to continue research and improve their teaching in basic sciences. The Free University of Amsterdam (VU) was at the crux of all these different demands and expectations. Its bureau for external relations was well established in those years and the institution had a history of collaboration with Indonesian universities. The VU was appointed to coordinate the PUO program with the Gajah Mada University. The choice for Gaha Madah University was inspired by the expectation that the Indonesian government would certainly appreciate the Dutch decision to restrict its official assistance to State institutions16. The Gajah Mada University, moreover, had symbolic meaning to the Indonesian nation, it was Javanese but at the same time was assigned a supporting role vis-à-vis outer regions (so-called Pembina status). At the same time, the decision not to select an institution in Jakarta was to appease Dutch students complaining about systemic corruption in the Indonesian capital. The content of the program, in turn, clearly reflected a compromise between the expectations of the different stakeholders. The program consisted of two sub-programs, each involving several individual sub-projects. The Dutch Minister’s criteria (focus on the poor) and NUFFIC concern with interdisciplinary approaches translated into a sub-program called ‘integrated rural development’, whereas the other sub-program (basic sciences) responded to the most urgent academic needs of the Indonesian institutions. One informant confided that the Indonesian side at the time was generally not impressed with the IRD approach but still complied since it went along with the other sub-program (basic sciences), which in their eyes was better attuned to their institution’s needs.

implemented. Institutional management development was not a direct focus of the collaboration: the Dutch did not participate in management decisions at the Indonesian university, and explicitly steered away from management development. Asked why this was the case, key informants indicated that

110 International Assistance and State-University Relations their idea of institutional management development was very much context bound. As one source told “we lacked the self confidence to assume that the Dutch system of institutional management, which at the time was already relatively well developed at Dutch institutions, could be transferred to the Javanese cultural context. The cultural barriers and the perceived sensitivities to neocolonial attitudes did the rest”. In sum, the outcome of Dutch assistance in terms of institutional development can best be analyzed in relation to what Clark calls the enacting conditions for university development. Specifically, these include the establishment of the academic infrastructure, the labs and buildings, the research facilities, but also the development of curricula and human resources at selected faculties and institutions. In the next section, I will further explore these product outcomes in relation to the institutional autonomy of Indonesia’s State universities. At this stage, my purpose is to show how the decision-making process of Dutch assistance in higher education in the period 1976 to 1992 overall reflected a careful balance between consultation and imposition, typical of the so-called Dutch polder model. This balance was disturbed fundamentally when the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation in 1992 decided to make further aid to Indonesia dependent on political conditions in respect to human rights and democratic development. As a result, the then Indonesian President, Soeharto, decided to stop all international assistance programs from the Netherlands, including those in higher education. Dutch academic staff in Indonesia was instructed to leave the country, Indonesian Master students in the Netherlands were allowed to fi nish their study program, but some PhD students were sent back to Indonesia without degree. Even the academics that had been hired to work for official assistance programs were reported not to be welcome for a while. The Dutch experience was in many ways different from the World Bank’s. Officially, the Bank also explicitly refrained from imposition in its assistance programs in Indonesian higher education (p.c. Samuel Lieberman). Atypical even for the Bank’s own policies during much of the 1980, it stayed away from conditional lending which in those days was common practice for its loans elsewhere. An internal memo from the early 1990s, specifically reporting on the desirability of higher education reforms, including a call for more financial autonomy for institutions, suggested that “the mission does not recommend an approach of taking these conditions as ‘conditions for this or that’.” The mission also explicitly stayed away from ‘recommending a reform’, partly because Indonesia has its own rhythm and clock in terms of introducing changes, which tend to take place incrementally. With a well articulated long term strategy, incremental changes will be actually advisable.” (BTO, 1994) Unlike the Dutch, the Bank from the early beginnings of its higher education lending operations in the late 1970s explicitly addressed the broader policy framework for higher education development. As reported

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in chapter 3, its consultation process specifically targeted government agencies such as DGHE and BAPPENAS, Ministers of Education, Planning and Finance, Rectors of State universities. Nonetheless, and in spite of its structural significance in the nation’s budget for higher education, the process of consultation left plenty of room for individual agency. The continuity of specialized Bank staff involved in the consultation process and the presence of that staff in Jakarta were crucial elements for the Bank to be able to establish the required rapport with counterparts in government. The physical presence of the Bank’s Jakarta office in Jakarta, in the early years strategically located within the BAPPENAS offices, helped create an atmosphere conducive to regular and close consultations between government and Bank officials. The process of mutual consultations helps explain the Bank’s strong and progressively growing involvement with the development of Indonesia’s State universities. Rectors and former rectors and vice rectors of State institutions, specifically the elite institutions, figured prominently within the government bureaucracy as their institutions were legally considered ‘State agencies’. Moreover, top jobs within the bureaucracy still are typically assigned to people recruited from the leaders of State institutions (including the Director General of DGHE). A least in the early years, the process of regular consultations with the State bureaucracy also helps to explain the massive investments in the physical infrastructure of public higher education (up to the point of fi nancially contributing to the establishment of new types of institutions) and the initial focus on centralized planning mechanisms for higher education. At the time (mid to late 1970s), the Bank was eager to support the development of human resources in Indonesia and basically trusted the bureaucrats/academics to be able to manage the investments. There was no blueprint for the management of institutional development and very little explicit concern for the autonomy of State institutions. The idea of institutional autonomy came to the fore much later and was put on the agenda both by bureaucrats/academics (rectors and former rectors or administrators turned bureaucrats) who very well understood the need for institutions to be able to manage their extra budgetary revenues autonomously, and by Bank staff who increasingly came to realize the shortcomings of a top down strategy for the implementation of its investment projects in higher education. From the mid- to late 1980s, this coalition of stakeholders starts to inform policy makers at both ends.

2.

Embeddedness—Isolation

As indicated in the previous section, the Dutch niche in terms of institutional development was clearly on supporting the academic infrastructure of the State institutions, in particular with regard to staff development (i.e. upgrading the academic level of the teachers) and research collaboration.

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The positive outcome of these investments was that in selected faculties and departments at selected institutions, pockets of well-equipped research and well-trained teachers started to emerge. At the same time, these activities and results risked to be isolated from the broader institutional policy context of the universities that received Dutch support (p.c. Harry Brinkman). Notably, the increased level of differentiation between those individuals or departments who received assistance and those who did not effectively created friction within these institutions which the Dutch were well aware of, but did not explicitly attend to (p.c. Theo Veenkamp). Dutch personnel did not participate in management meetings at department or faculty level. Still, their presence as such introduced management discussions which at the time (late 1970s to early 1980s) were relatively new to the Indonesian way of governing universities. First, regarding the distribution of funds, the tradition was one of across the board funding. Dutch assistance, through its selectivity within institutions, challenged this view and introduced competitive elements to ‘the academic work floor’ (Clark, 1998: 232). However, it was not in a position to ensure that management decisions would effectively support such competitive mechanisms, as pressures to standardize or even to re-equalize the distribution of funds were very common.17 Secondly, with regard to HRM, Dutch assistance, which set out to attract the best and the brightest for further graduate training in the Netherlands (or elsewhere), in effect supported the idea to base incentives and academic career prospects on academic merit, in the process at least implicitly challenging the seniority based system of remuneration and promotion typical of the Indonesian civil service.18 More sensitive still, were decisions related to the appointment of Indonesian staff participating in the project, and the counterpart allowances they were to receive. Again, the question was to what extent the Dean’s decision would be based on seniority or academic merit (p.c. Theo Veenkamp). Finding the right balance between complete isolation and embedded management was one of the more challenging aspects of Dutch assistance to higher education in Indonesia. Apart from the observation that Dutch assistance did not specifically aim for management reform, there simply was no formal mechanism to address issues of fi nancial management or HRM at the institutional level. Dutch influence in these areas usually ran along informal lines (e.g. occasional talks between Rectors, lobbying of Dutch coordinator) and often depended on a solid understanding between the Dutch and Indonesian academic co-coordinators (p.c. Theo Veenkamp). The Bank, on the other hand, had different issues to deal with, resulting in great part from it being traditionally and fi rmly enmeshed in Indonesia’s political economy in general and specifically in its system of planning higher education from the centralized levels of decision making at DGHE and BAPPENAS. During much of the 1980s, the Bank had great confidence in the Indonesian government’s capacity to put money to good use. From

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the late 1970s throughout much of the 1980s, it had invested massively (at times with sector wide loans) in infrastructure, central planning and management, before coming to the sobering discovery in the early 1990s that their investments lacked significant results on the ground. Notably, there was growing concern with the outcome and sustainability of the Inter University Centers (IUC), the efficacy of the Bank supported management information system (MIS) was being questioned, and the position of the IUC’s and Polytechnics had become a topic of debate as to their integration or continued differentiation from the mainstream (p.c. Sachi Hatakenaka). One Bank source confided that “in spite of all the earlier investments, the problem was that we didn’t really know what was going on inside these institutions, whether and to what extent learning was really taking place” (p.c. Sachi Hatakenaka). Incidentally, the increase of concerns went along with key staff changes within the Bank, both at the Jakarta Office and at HQ in Washington DC. The emergence of the new round of project consultations in 1992/93 laid bare the different concerns of the GOI and of the Bank. Whereas the government at the time was mainly worried about a steady flow of funds and insisted on broad institutional coverage in the form of a third sector wide loan, Bank staff was eager to introduce new mechanisms in which ultimate beneficiaries (i.e. students and teachers) would have a larger share. For the Bank, the concern in those days was more with project sustainability than with autonomy per se. Even though preference for increasing autonomy was mentioned in several of the initial project documents and dialogues, the Bank did not want to get explicitly involved in domestic policy too much (there was little expertise within the Bank regarding the domestic legalities) and instead focused on technically manageable approaches (e.g. setting up a competitive funding scheme, quality assurance procedures and indicators . . . ). Implicitly, though, many of these approaches very much so hooked on to the Bank’s then emerging global agenda of institutional diversification, institutional autonomy and a different role for the State in managing and ensuring quality in public higher education (World Bank, 1994). At the same time, the broadened process of project negotiations (often including individual academic units, teachers and students) helped ensure that new mechanisms were grounded in locally embedded realities and actual needs at the academic work floor. The transition from the sector wide HEDP loans to the more targeted series of URGE, DUE and QUE loans (see chapters 2 and 3) in the mid 1990s effectively marked a significant departure in the Bank’s approach in lending for higher education in Indonesia. There are many ways to describe the change (i.e. from supply to demand or from top-down to bottom-up), but they all indicated fundamental alterations in the roles of State and institutions respectively. ‘Evaluation’ and ‘quality assurance’ were becoming core concepts in the design of new projects. Many of the mechanisms (e.g. self-evaluations, peer validation), structures (e.g. accreditation) and

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procedures (e.g. competitive funding) were not entirely new to Indonesia, as they were resolutely built upon local variations and practices. What changed, however, was that they gradually became a systemic part of Indonesia’s public higher education funding. Notably, competitive grant schemes already appeared in other government supported funding programs (e.g. for research funding in the so-called ‘hibah bersaing’), some of which supported with Bank loans (e.g. the accelerated engineering program under HEDPII). However, in the projects new style–or better, the New Paradigm—merit-based19 competition became the dominant principle in selecting proposals, and extended it to other areas (not only graduate education as in URGE, but also undergraduate higher education as in DUE and QUE) and institutions (including the institutions with regional focus far away from Java). Bank staff involved in project negotiations picked up local ideas or practices that resonated well with the Bank’s emerging international agenda, and integrated them into project documents. As one participant admitted “the so-called Bank dialogue with the GOI in higher education usually meant that we dropped an idea or let them know about our criticisms or concerns about things not working, and as soon as this fell on a willing ear, we would jump on it (as with the idea of competitive grants, or the notion of peer reviews and ‘self evaluations’” (p.c. Sachi Hatakenaka). The degree of success varied with the strength of the alliances the Bank was able to forge with the main stakeholders within the government bureaucracy. For instance, when BAPPENAS during URGE talks suggested opening competition for grants in principle to all institutions and study programs, this paved the way for the Bank to press for openness to beneficiaries from private institutions as well. 20 Similarly, the mechanism of requesting institutions to submit ‘institutional self-evaluations’ as a fi rst step in the review process to be selected as beneficiary in the Bank funded projects, or the L-RAISE set of criteria (Leadership, Relevance, Academic atmosphere, Internal management, Sustainability, Efficiency and productivity), did have domestic roots as these instruments had been developed within the Directorate of Academic Affairs in the DGHE. In sum, from the early 1990s onwards, the Bank, while remaining fi rmly embedded in the broader political economy of Indonesia’s higher education, started to seek new ways to redefi ne and at the same time strengthen the role of the State in its capacity to organize merit-based evaluations and funding mechanisms. In doing so, it helped putting institutional autonomy high on the agenda in at least two different ways. First, by promoting and giving meat to the ‘evaluative State’ (i.e. the establishment of central board of accreditation, and a board of higher education to oversee and steer the work at the central level) the Bank was able to continue its close alliance with key stakeholders at the center (i.e. within DHGE and BAPPENAS in particular), many of whom had been keen promoters of the idea of increasing the (fi nancial) autonomy of State institutions. Secondly, and this was

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new for the Bank, the design of the new generation of Bank projects introduced mechanisms and criteria that had a direct impact on the way institutions organized their business. Increasingly, the Bank started to include the institutional level and the level of the departmental unit into its operations and analysis.

3.

Incrementalism—Institutional Reform

In principle, and not taking into account disaster relief, international assistance carries forward an ever optimistic promise as to the possibilities of institutional change in the short to medium term. Kreiner (1984) found a solid explanation for this broad observation in the political / organizational set-up of international assistance, which is such that that donors at regular times, either directly (as for the bilateral donors) or indirectly (for international organisations), are held accountable to their supporting governments and voting public respectively. In practice, however, analysts observed that international assistance in itself has become a long term promise, of which many have argued it has profoundly failed to deliver even in the longer run. Regardless of the position one takes, the question of how the process of international assistance was timed and progressed over a number of years, intentionally or not, will influence the assessment of its contribution to the institutional changes advocated. Regarding the promise of institutional reforms in the relationship between the Indonesian State and its public universities, the outlook on time of the World Bank’s operations in retrospect was surprisingly longterm (well over two decades), while progression and sequencing of operations overall continued the gradual path of ‘muddling through’ or, more positively put, continuously learning from past mistakes and always on a step-by-step basis. Agreed, this is a broad assessment, but one that stands out and, more importantly as we will see later on, one that does not appear to downplay some of the more structural outcomes that have been realized (see next section). Agreed also, it is an assessment that does not, at least not at fi rst sight, recognize the then existing diversity of opinions within the World Bank on the issues of strategy and tactics in either pushing or pulling for desired policy changes. These differences of opinion effectively existed, and especially so at the crucial moments of negotiating new project loans. As one participant in the URGE preparatory talks admitted: “The Bank is not to be seen as a monolith, it allowed a great deal of incrementalism, there was a lot of resistance and confl ict within; with some wanting to push hard for policy reforms as condition for additional lending, others favoring a more gradual approach vis-à-vis the numerous institutional constraints” (p.c. Sachi Hatakenaka). However, in spite of all the internal discussions, the 20 years of Bank lending to Indonesian higher education clearly show that the ‘gradualists’ generally

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won out from the ‘conditionalists’ seeking immediate reforms through the “shock therapy” of conditional lending. 21 Moreover, the World Bank in the late 1970s did not have a “grand strategy” to alter the relationship between the Indonesian State and its public universities in view of increased fi nancial autonomy and accountability of institutions, or, more general, to decentralize decision making within the higher education system. Instead, the Bank in those days seemed more concerned about the lack of management information and monitoring capacities at the central level (cf. discussion of Bank goals in chapter 2). The initial Bank loans invested fi rmly in physical infrastructure of new (Polytechnics) or selected (UDPI and II) institutions, but also in central planning capacities and Management Information Systems at the DGHE. Also the tendency in the 1980s to load all aspects of sub-sector improvement into consecutive time slice loans lacked a grand design or master plan, even though institutional autonomy started to be included as an ever returning buzzword in project preparation documents. As discussed in the previous section, the limitations of this comprehensive sector wide approach came to the surface in the 1990s and led the Bank to revise its lending strategy along the lines of the emerging new paradigm, with its dual focus on evaluation capacity at the State level and attention to management capacities and decentralized planning at the institutional level. With hindsight one might conclude that there was really no discontinuity or rupture between these consecutive phases, as many informants claimed. In the early 1990s it did effectively “make sense” for the Bank to change its involvement with Indonesian higher education towards a policy framework suggesting a changed, more evaluative role for the State, and increased autonomy and accountability at the institutional level. But such an analysis suggests a linear and rational policy model of sequencing operations over a period of two decades, for which I have found no concrete or document based evidence. Rather, therefore, we suggest analyzing the Bank’s history of lending for higher education development in Indonesia in terms of ‘one thing (or, approach) leading to another’: the Bank provided space (and money) to explore and to experiment with a variety of approaches, attempting to learn from past failures and mistakes, and introducing new ideas, approaches and improvements. Over time, the analysis then comes close to the classification as “muddling through” (Lindblom). More than anything else, then, the introduction of market dynamics in higher education, which defi nitely remained a constant element of the Bank’s broader political and economic agenda, took time. International donors, such as the World Bank, contributed by bringing new ideas at the table, gradually assisting in the build up of physical infrastructure and human capacities. As for the Dutch, the initial time perspective of their program for university development was summarized to me as follows: “four years of preparing, four years of investments in academic results, and four years to

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prepare the end of the intervention and ensure sustainability” (p.c. Harry Brinkman). My informant quickly added that such this timing appeared to him as unrealistic and foolishly optimistic in light of the academic, the fi nancial and the cultural context of Indonesia’s State universities at the time. As reported elsewhere, Dutch assistance was effectively cut off from further efforts by the Presidential decree in 1992. Brinkman concludes that Dutch assistance had to offer only a modest contribution to the long term perspective of the “process of emancipation of the Indonesian universities” (p.c. Brinkman).

4.

Socialization—Opposition

International and bilateral donors invested massively in the academic and physical infrastructure of Indonesian State universities. This kind of external assistance was generally welcomed by both the State agencies and the university institutions. At the same time, however, donor goals and investments, by their relative size (in relation to State or institutional budgets, see discussion of donor efforts in chapter 3) and selective nature (some got more than others, many received little or nothing) at least implicitly challenged the ways in which the State and the State universities themselves managed their fi nancial, academic, and human resources. This was particularly the case in Indonesia’s specific institutional context, where government budgets were traditionally used to equalize across and within institutions (rather than to specialize or to differentiate), where funding typically was “across the board” (rather than based on particular needs or qualities), where the politics of a bureaucratic system largely determined the boundaries and often restricted the emergence of competing academic values (cf. ‘civitas academica’), and where the standardized, seniority based rules of the civil service precondition the academic careers of teaching staff. Not surprisingly then, there was opposition, implicit resistance or plain protest against some of these management related by-products of external assistance. Notably, there was resistance against perceived inequalities in the distribution of funds resulting from external assistance, and the Indonesian government at times was very creative in fi nding ways to spread donor investments more equally (cf. the concept of the Bank supported Inter University Centers, which were located at selected institutions but at the same time were assigned to include regional universities in their activities). At the institutional level, university rectors needed to deal with the inequalities between faculties and departments receiving international assistance (so-called ‘wet departments’), and those that did not (‘dry departments’) (p.c. Soekadji, former rector UGM and former Director General). Similarly, there was outright opposition from various sides against the prospect of introducing policy reforms leading to greater institutional

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autonomy and decentralized decision making. To begin with, when the idea of university autonomy was fi rst introduced by DGHE in government circles in the mid 1980s, it was explicitly restricted to ‘fi nancial autonomy’ in order to preventively accommodate expected political sensitivities at the highest level (p.c. Soekadji). Moreover, resistance from within the bureaucracy became apparent at several stages in the process of increasing autonomy. When a crucial regulation in 1991 granted State universities the fi nancial autonomy to manage self-generated income, the implementation of the regulation was overruled by the Ministry of Finance’s State budget rules (p.c. Sukadji). Much later, at a time when the prospect of ‘full’ autonomy was already fi rmly enshrined in policy documents and the language of the New Paradigm, latent resistance within ranks of the DGHE or BAPPENAS seemed to be growing, as bureaucrats saw their power decreasing or their career prospects to be affected by the politics of decentralization (p.c. Sukadji, p.c. Fasli). 22 Within the State institutions, meanwhile, increased fi nancial autonomy began to introduce, albeit hesitantly, centrally institutionalized ways to deal with the tricky issue of cross-subsidization (e.g. from ‘wet’, income generating departments, to ‘dry’ departments where opportunities to attract monies from elsewhere are limited), in the process affecting the power balance between Dean and Rector (p.c. Soekadji). Even sections of Indonesia’s private sector already expressed their doubts and fears, as increased autonomy for State universities (for instance, in setting fees, or starting new non-degree programs) would lead to ‘unfair’ competition in particular market segments (p.c. Willi Toisuta). Further, students, encouraged by the successful overthrow of Soeharto, started protesting the spectacular fee hikes at most top public institutions in the late 1990s, 23 which they associated with new regulations regarding university autonomy (PP60/61). The new regulations for the fi rst time introduced the prospect of granting some State universities legal autonomy as ‘separate legal entity’, further discussed in chapter 5. 24 In the postSoeharto era, the emerging left regarded university autonomy as form of privatization (‘swastinisatie’) promoted by IMF and World Bank’s neo-liberal ideology. In effect, many of the management related outcomes of international assistance typically reflect the need for broadly based processes of socialization for which donors themselves at fi rst sight seem relatively powerless. With regard to the management reforms of the mid-1990s suggesting greater institutional autonomy and accountability (the New Paradigm), several key participants admitted that donor agencies can be strong pushers, but at the same time are typically confi ned to boundaries set by the political and the cultural context of the country. One source put it as follows: “institutions themselves, including the teachers, students, Deans and Rectors, need to make autonomy their own struggle” (p.c. Bagyo Moeliodihardjo).

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International donors dealt differently with opposition and shifting power balances. While many bilateral donors such as the Dutch explicitly often tried to steer away from the ‘internal kitchen’ of management and decision making, the World Bank explicitly sought ways to support the socialization of the twin idea of institutional autonomy and accountability both at the center and within the institutions. One way was to include line items in Bank loans that support the creation of new structures such as the Accreditation Board or the Board of Higher Education. Their role is in great part “to socialize the idea of autonomy within institutions, to start with the rectors, who typically have high prestige function, in some instances associated with quite some power and influence outside the institution and might not be convinced of the need of developing institution wide strategies” (p.c. Sukadji). Another mechanism, which the Bank has been experimenting with under the DUE-project in particular, is the procedure by which institutions need to submit institutional development plans following participative methods and transparent bottom-up processes. Finally, it is noted that also other donor agencies, including the Dutch, introduced and started processes, which, often informally, contributed to introducing and socializing new ways of organizing higher education. Notably, the tacit component in transferring institutional development knowledge is often hidden in low cost exchanges and horizontal learning methods, such as study tours, crosstraining, twinning arrangements, and informal talks between rectors, deans, teachers and students participating in these exchanges. Interim conclusion: congruency In general, both our cases suggest a relatively high score on the various elements of the congruency criterion. Donors avoided imposition of specific reforms related to institutional autonomy, accountability, or the introduction of particular State roles. Instead they either explicitly steered away from interfering with management decisions altogether or explored alliances seeking intrinsic motivations for fundamental reform (such as, notably, budgetary constraints, perceived low quality, lack of international competitiveness, competition with private institutions etc.). Instead of mandated and immediate change, donors, at least in this case, pragmatically chose a more gradual path; with no grand design or master plan to introduce institutional autonomy begin with, but with much muddling through and learning from past experiences, successes and failures. In the end, the Bank in particular discovered that management reforms for increased institutional autonomy required more effective leveraging from below. In other words, one might conclude that the changes introduced in the mid- to late 1990s under the so-called ‘New Paradigm’ reflect the outcome of a learning process that started in the 1970s. To this day opinions differ as to what extent these managerial changes are truly to be qualified

120 International Assistance and State-University Relations as paradigmatic in terms of educational outcomes and performance. The begging question therefore remains what has been the material impact of international assistance over all these years.

IV. PRODUCT OUTCOMES: INTEGRATING CONDITIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY As I have preliminarily concluded from the previous section, the processes of international assistance which have been investigated in this study score relatively high on the criterion of congruence with the Indonesian policy context. In this section, the focus turns to assessing the product variables of outcomes reached. I will discuss ways in which international assistance outcomes might eventually be gauged in terms of its implications for Stateuniversity relations, government’s role and institutional autonomy. At least two possible avenues stand out. The fi rst and most obvious route would be to assess the project outcomes against a set of predetermined indicators. For instance, indicators, such as the number and type of decisions to be made at State or institutional level, the funding system and decision making powers at central and institutional levels respectively, would be assembled and compared over time. Not uncommon to World Bank projects, which generally show a strong preference to assess the ‘value’ of investment projects in measurable parameters (even when rates of return prove hard to calculate), all of its project documents do make a provision to commission a baseline study, summarizing the current status of higher education development (or part of it) in view of establishing the basis for sector based evaluations of rates of return on investments. In addition, international assistance to Indonesia’s higher education development budget typically contributed to increased domestic funding for higher education overall, at least in absolute terms. Notably, the increase of international donor funds for investments in infrastructure and staff development during the early 1980s effectively contributed to an increase of domestic recurrent expenditures for salaries and related routine costs, up to the point that the imbalance between the government’s development and recurrent budgets helped pave the way to consider ‘new’, i.e. more decentralized ways, to channel donor funds into the system. Furthermore, international projects played a catalytic role in directing the government to invest more resources on particular types of higher education (i.e. polytechnics, graduate education and research, upgrading staff qualifications in basic education . . . ), and increase the efficiency in the use of these resources, all of which can be measured and assessed according to predetermined management indicators, typically to be found in project completion reports of the Bank or other donors. Clark’s conceptual distinction between the enabling conditions, the formative conditions, and the enacting conditions for integrating the

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‘institutional fabric’ of higher education suggests an alternative avenue for assessing the outcome of international assistance in relation to Indonesia’s higher education (Clark, 1995). 25 The distinction between three levels of organization (i.e. the level of the national system of higher education, the level of the institution, and the level of the basic unit), and their connected types of conditions (i.e. enabling conditions in the national system, formative conditions in the university, and enacting conditions in the basic unit) foremost suggests a sequential logic for our analysis of assistance outcomes, moving from broad system wide contributions to effects on institutional behavior and, eventually, to impacts at the level of the academic work unit. Besides the level of organization, however, our analysis of assistance outcomes takes into consideration both depth and scope of changes implied in specific reforms (see table 4.3). With Cerych and Sabatier (1986) we defi ne depth of change as “the degree to which these changes imply a departure from existing values and practices of higher education” (Cerych & Sabatier, 1986: 244). Change, in other words, is qualified on a scale from moderate to radical by the extent to which it departs from existing norms or behavior. For instance, an increase of staff in principle does not fundamentally alter the norms and practices of higher education institutions. Instead, the shift from a civil service status based career prospect to an academic merit based recruitment and promotion system will affect both cultural values (i.e. status vs. merit) and institutional management practice. With the scope or functional breadth of change we refer to “the number of functional areas in which a given reform policy is expected to introduce more or less profound modifications” (Cerych & Sabatier, 1986: 244). Functional areas include funding (i.e. level, types, locus of decision making), access and admission, teacher qualifications, internal structures and governance and so forth. Table 4.3 summarizes the potential range of levels, depths and scopes of change. Our further discussion focuses on outcomes (effective changes) in Indonesia’s higher education system implied, inspired or otherwise influenced by international assistance.

Table 4.3 Level, Depth and Scope of Change Depth & Functional Scope of Change Moderate Change Level of Change

Narrow

Radical Change

Wide

Narrow

Wide

Enabling conditions

1

2

3

4

Formative conditions

5

6

7

8

Enacting conditions

9

10

11

12

Source: Based on Clark (1995: 211–39) for levels of change, and Cerych & Sabatier (1986: 247) for definitions of scope of change

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1 International Assistance and the Enabling Conditions in the National System The macro-ecology of Indonesia’s higher education has changed in many ways over the past three decades. Most dramatic was undoubtedly the political shift from a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime to a democracy in progress, with political decentralization and regional autonomy as core features; but also the state of the economy and its fi nancial foundations, the socio-economic fabric (i.e. labor market, industrialization . . . ) and the demographic movements (i.e. growth, urbanization . . . ) co-determine much of that environment. Meanwhile, new laws and regulations have been passed, a paradigm shift was proclaimed, involving changes in management and organization at various levels, staff was upgraded, institutions established, study programs or research units set up or reorganized, and new generations of students entered and left the system. The influence of international assistance on this evolving environment, in particular its contribution to conditions enabling changes in State-university relations supporting more institutional autonomy, can be summed up in four interrelated but analytically distinct concepts: institutional differentiation (and stratification), diversified funding, performance based competition, and normative frames. 1.1

Institutional Differentiation and Stratification

International assistance in many ways contributed to the institutional differentiation of the landscape of Indonesia’s higher education system, which was enriched with more and different functional types of institutions and programs. From the late 1970s and the early 1980s and throughout the next two decades, donors helped the government establish new types of institutions such as polytechnics and interuniversity research centres, and set up staff development programs that provided the required personnel for such specialized institutions. The creation of institutional niches (e.g. catering for technical professions, for institutional capacity development or for scientific research) is not a natural process in an environment where cultural and political norms and pressures abound to spread resources across the board, and where institutions are governed by uniform decree. External assistance did effectively provide the necessary pushes, and did so with massive but selective inputs of technical assistance, infrastructure, scholarships and staff development. Nonetheless, and as expected, specific outcomes are the result of more complex processes of negotiation with domestic forces. Indonesia’s polytechnics parted legally from the initial host universities, ending fears of continued intra-institutional confl icts over limited subsidies. At the system level, however, this outcome provided ammunition for the particular needs and expectations of the evolving sub-sector

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of technical higher education. Both the World Bank and, later, the Asian Development Bank, assisted fi rst with analytical policy work and labour market studies, followed up with loans for continued institutional development of the Polytechnic sub sector (World Bank, 1975, 1982; Asian Development Bank, 1993, 1998). In contrast, the Inter University Research Centres (IUC), which were set up in the 1980s with World Bank loans, remained fi rmly embedded within the selected host universities, even though, as a result of government fears for opposition from non-recipients or regionally focused institutions, the centres served other institutions in the region in developing research capacities in particular academic disciplines. This arrangement illustrates rather well the initial domestic resistance against differentiation of funding levels or institutional roles and subsequent stratification at the system level. Nonetheless, the results were challenged both by internal assessments and donor evaluations (see earlier section) in the early 1990s. Notably, the growing concern within DGHE that some of the more prominent private universities had become better equipped for research and quality education than the traditional ‘elite State universities’ contributed to a greater willingness to concentrate resources for research and graduate education at selected places (p.c. Sukadji). Changes within the domestic context thus helped pave the way for the development of the URGE project, discussed in greater detail in Box 4.2, which explicitly supported differentiation and competitive selection mechanisms for graduate education and research at the level of departments. It resulted in the gradual emergence of a selective group of State universities with growing capacities to sustain top level research and graduate education. Differentiation and stratification, in other words, did take place albeit more slowly than perhaps intended by donors. Institutional differentiation provided the required supportive context for niche formation and increased institutional autonomy, at least in two parallel ways. First, from the perspective of the State, institutional differentiation complicates centralized procedures and standardized regulations. Institutions, on the other hand, are encouraged to become active players on the market for status and funds. Apart from the establishment of new types of higher education institutions, donors—the World Bank in particular—introduced and assisted with the creation of intermediary agencies between government and higher education institutions, typically mixing academic, bureaucratic and political interests and loyalties. National agencies such as the National Accreditation Board (BAN), the University Research Council (URC), later integrated into the Board of Higher Education (BHE), and the Board of Higher Education itself, are outcomes of that policy. The creation of the Board of Higher Education (BHE) was established in the aftermath of DUE project preparation, with the broad mandate to advise DGHE in the task of overseeing the higher education system, and to further the implementation of competitive funding in research, graduate

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International Assistance and State-University Relations

and undergraduate education. As an official advisory agency, the BHE has increased the complexity of decision making in higher education policy, in the process taking away power from government bureaucrats. 26 On the other hand, due to its broad mandate, the Board often lacks the capacity to effectively oversee all areas of higher education policy making (World Bank, PCR, 2003). Notably, in matters of finance, and in particular with regard to the fi nancial autonomy of State institutions in terms of their authority over the use of resources from the State budget (especially the recurrent budget) or even the self generated income, the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance continue to use their veto powers extensively. More so than the Ministry of Education (the DGHE in particular), or the central planning agency (BAPPENAS), opposition and resistance against the growing decentralization in the management of public higher education from the early 1990s came to be located in the Ministry of Finance. 27 To the extent that public universities increased their autonomy vis-à-vis the State, the Ministry of Finance came to reaffi rm its position in the Stateuniversity relationship. 1.2

Performance Based Competition and Quality Assurance

International donors introduced competitive elements into their programs and activities challenging the way resources and status had been traditionally distributed throughout the higher education system. Some donors, such as the World Bank, explicitly designed programs in which funds were to be distributed on the basis of academic merit rather than by unitary (‘fits all size’) and centralized government regulations. The influence of these innovations on the Indonesian funding system of higher education is discussed in the next section. Apart from their impact on the system of funding, however, donor interventions in many ways contributed to a more competitive system for the attribution of academic status and to the introduction of quality assurance mechanisms. In many instances this contribution was implicit. For example, by bringing in international expertise and academic policy experience from all over the world, Indonesia’s higher education system was challenged by and at the same time became increasingly socialized into emerging international norms and standards for reviewing and assessing the quality of higher education. Donor supported study tours in the early 1990s brought key decision makers to different countries in the world (the US, UK, Argentina, Australia, Germany . . . ) where they were exposed to new merit based and peer reviewed systems of quality assessments in higher education. It is hard to measure the exact impact of these horizontal study and learning tours. Nonetheless, participants interviewed all confi rmed the constructive influence of these activities on the eventual formulation of Indonesia’s New Paradigm in higher education (p.c. Bagyo Moeliodihardjo, Soekadji, Willi Toisuta, Pramoetadi, Tadjudin).

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At a more structural level was the international influence on the establishment of the National Accreditation Board (BAN-PT), which was initially announced under the former Education Law (1989), but was formally established only in late 1994, in the wake of the policy dialogues with the World Bank ultimately leading to the formulation of the New Paradigm (cf. supra). The Board was fi rst an operating unit under the DGHE, but since 1998 it has functioned as a relatively autonomous unit directly under the Minister of Education. Proposals to corporatize the BAN-PT have been considered but never approved. BAN-PT now resorts under the R&D department of the Ministry of Education (Sahaenah & Rahardjo, 2006). As a new and ‘foreign concept’ (dixit the then Chairman of the Board), accreditation was at fi rst met with fi rm opposition, not only from academics and universities (especially the ‘elite’ public universities), but also among students, as they perceived the possibility of a negative result as a serious threat to their career opportunities (Tadjudin, 2001). The 20-member Board was mandated to oversee the screening and evaluation of individual study programs of various degree levels (ie. diploma level, bachelor, master and doctoral level) offered by 82 public and 2600 private institutions. As of June 2006 a total of 7319 study programs have gone through the accreditation process (figures all from Sahaena & Rahardjo, 2006), involving self evaluations (portfolios), peer reviews, assessments, and site visits. The study programs are accredited according to four levels: A, B, C, and D (not accredited). Although BAN-PT itself does not have the authority to sanction individual programs or institutions, DGHE takes into account the levels of accreditation in some of its financial incentive schemes (e.g. block grants or competitions restricted to a particular level of accreditation). The arrangement indicates the shift from centralized and uniform system of State control to a powerful steering State role. In other words, accreditation in Indonesian higher education was set up initially with international assistance money and technical assistance, and was directly linked to the new paradigm of managing higher education. Specifically, accreditation helped create an environment conducive to reforms in funding (i.e. competition, block grants restricted to accreditation levels, performance based funding), institutional differentiation (i.e. according to degree level, taking into account difference between general, professional, technical and academic programs) and stratification (i.e. according to accreditation levels), and management reforms at the institutional level, where notions of quality based stratification and competition between study programs provide a new dynamic for institutional decision making. Whereas the initial accreditation effort was focused primarily on the level of the individual study program, the accreditation agency in 2005 was given a new mandate to develop and implement an accreditation system for institutions of higher education. Although outcomes of this change towards accreditation at the institutional level are hard to predict at this

126

International Assistance and State-University Relations

stage, the levels of competition (also between public and private institutions) and stratification are not be likely to decrease. 1.3

Decentralized Funding

In terms of higher education funding, international assistance interfered with Indonesian academic culture, which traditionally valued equality between and within institutions, and ascribed status hierarchies according to centralized rules and regulations rather than academic merit or performance. Implicitly, the selectivity of foreign assistance investment budgets challenged the prominent tradition of centrally funding institutions ‘across the board’, along lines of uniformity and equality. Table 7 in annex not only illustrates the spread and concentration of international donor funds in a limited number of institutions, but at the same time suggests the relative size of these resources in relation to the total development budget of these institutions. Further, and at a more structural level, multilateral donors, notably the World Bank, explicitly incorporated alternative mechanisms of development funding into their operations and policy advice. The long term impact of these efforts are not yet easy to discern in their entirety, as fi nancing innovations have been introduced gradually and continue to evolve. Furthermore, much of higher education funding is entangled with more systemic changes ranging from legal statutes regarding the civil service status of university personnel to the general economical and financial situation in the country. However, what can be affi rmed is that assistance helped effect changes within the Indonesian funding system in its move away from centrally designed line-item budgets, input based objectives, and top-down planning towards more decentralized and output oriented approaches. Some of the more specific outcomes are summarized as follows. First, building on modest domestic beginnings of competitive funding in some of Indonesia’s research programs in the early 1990s, the World Bank began to promote and use the practice in several of its lending operations with the Indonesian government. Competitive funding mechanisms have now become common practice for awarding higher education investment funds in Indonesia, and they have become internalized and mainstreamed up to the point that in fi scal year 1999/2000 about 22% of the government’s investment allocations were effectively awarded on a competitive basis (University Autonomy Team, 2004: 10). This share has even continued to grow further as for FY 2006 not less than 60% of the capital budget was to be allocated through competitive schemes (DHHE, 2006). 28 The move to competitive funding mechanisms for the allocation of investment funds was part of the government’s strategy to decentralize authority, increase autonomy, and further accountability at institutional levels. From the perspective of institutional fi nancial autonomy, it is noted that only part of these competitive funds are administered

Outcomes

127

by the central administration of institutions, as departments and even individual study programs within these institutions still have authority to administer funds. Also, some of the Bank’s own projects (i.e. URGE, QUE) explicitly targeted the sub-unit levels. Secondly, the introduction of decentralized block funding schemes and more transparent mechanisms for assessing budget proposals in projects such as QUE and DUE, are currently fi rmly integrated in the government’s own national follow on programs, often carrying names explicitly referring to former donor programs (cf. the ‘DUE-like’ or the ‘Semi-QUE’ development budget program). In addition, procedures for granting block grants are now being related to the status of accreditation. Even the Ministry of Finance made exception for block grant continuation when the Indonesian government in the aftermath of the fi nancial crisis in 1998 decided to reduce development funds for higher education. Meanwhile, and as mentioned above, procedures for granting block grants are now being tied into the status of accreditation and/or to performance based competitions. Third, international donors successfully equipped and encouraged public higher education institutions to generate more external revenues from outside the government budget while pleading with the Indonesian bureaucracy to eliminate existing barriers for them to do so. The World Bank in particular has insisted on increased cost recovery since the early 1980s, and started to urge government to increase the fi nancial autonomy of institutions to attract and manage their extra-budgetary resources. In Indonesia, self generated income (DRK 29) includes tuition and fees, local government assistance, contract and consulting services and private donations. Figures in table 8 (in Annex) provide information on the size of these resources in relation to the recurrent income of public institutions, ranging from a low 5% to an extremely high 78%, and an overall average of 41% for public institutions (data for FY 1999). While it is not obvious to exactly measure the influence of international assistance on the relative size DRK resources, 30 there are at least some indications that external influence effectively contributed to the growth of self generated income. Figures from our dataset (see graphical analysis of historical data in chapter 3, and more recent fi gures in tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) not only show that the share of government funding has been drastically reduced (from an estimated 88% in the mid-1980s to a real 59% in 1999), but also indicate that high receivers of international assistance have been most successful in attracting funds from the market. Still, and perhaps even more important than the purely quantitative impact of donor investments, are the mechanisms, which some donors introduced to commit both bureaucrats and institutions to diversify resources for higher education by generating income from non-government resources. For instance, incentives for universities to retain 100% of earnings from contracts established on the basis of donor supported research; or the

128 International Assistance and State-University Relations institutional counterpart funds from DRK resources, not only ensuring institutional commitment but also encouraging institutions to generate more income from external resources. Fourth, the diversification of institutional resources and the resulting fi nancial autonomy has encouraged institutions to increase the share of private funding through significantly increasing fees for incoming students. One study speaks of a “doubling of fees of incoming students to 40% of the operational costs” (Berk, 2002). A case study of the four public elite universities, carried out in the late 1990s, indicated that the share of student fees in the recurrent budget at these institutions ranged from 32% at IPB to not less than 60% at UI. 31 A more recent survey compares the total cost to parents at Indonesia’s public universities with those at private universities, and calculates that the private contribution of students and parents to the cover the cost of a fi rst degree academic year at public universities is coming close to that at private institutions.32 Admittedly, it is near to impossible to make a hard assessment of the direct influence of international assistance on the development towards increased private funding of public institutions, as similar developments have occurred in countries and regions where there was little or no international assistance (e.g. in Europe). Nonetheless, it is not because similar developments have taken place at other locations (without international assistance treatment), that no empirical case can be made to suggest influence of international assistance on policies of increased private funding of public institutions. On the contrary, recent case study analyses from scholars of international organizations have indicated the more prominent structural impact of international agency’s institutional norms and discourse on national policies and structures worldwide. 33 In other words, it can be safely argued that the institutional norm of cost recovery for public higher education as it was put forward and disseminated on a global scale since the early 1980s by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and even OECD, did not remain without effect on policy and practice in Indonesia. Still, we acknowledge that international assistance was more successful in terms of visible effects on the allocation of the development budget (i.e. new programs and investments) than on the allocation of the recurrent budget (i.e. personnel and operational expenditures), much of which remains more dependent on legal reforms and is tied into deep structural reforms, for instance with regard to the status of university personnel (i.e. currently under civil service status) or alternative funding formula’s and implementation procedures of the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Whereas the allocation of the investment budget has been drastically changed by the introduction of competitive funding mechanisms, little change has been introduced so far in the MOF’s allocation of the recurrent budget. Only recently, under the higher education long term strategy paper for 2003–2010, the government started to consider introducing performance

Outcomes

129

based funding systems and formulas (DGHE, 2003, 12). The document candidly acknowledges the “legacies of previous strategies, which have resulted in the condition that many institutions are over-invested, particularly in physical and human resources, beyond capacities to effectively utilize and maintain”. It calls for a restructuring of the recurrent budget allocation according to a formula based block grant funding mechanism, which on the one hand recognizes the cost for producing graduates but also includes performance based components. The introduction of a new funding system is currently (December 2006) still under review. 34 And again, the World Bank is participating as a key partner and guide with a multi million dollar investment loan and credit, but also including technical advice and recommendations based on international experience with performance based funding systems (Managing Higher Education for Relevance and Efficiency Project, Project Completion Report, 2005). 1.4

Normative Framework

The basic tenets of the ideology of Indonesia’s higher education system were left untouched by international donors, and instead now have become part and parcel of the rationale for change towards autonomy. The core idea of functional unity of teaching, research and service to society (i.e. the ‘tridharma’) and, more prominently, the concept of the university as a “moral force in society” are key examples of continuity, but at the same time illustrate how ideology is now used to make a convincing argument for change towards more autonomy. The concept of seeing the university as a ‘moral force in society’ originated in the late 1970s as a reaction to the increasing State involvement in campus life. Under the New Paradigm, higher education policy documents (as well as university plans) typically and consistently refer to the need for a “credible moral force” in the current transition process towards a more plural and democratic society. University campuses can only play this role, so the argument goes, if they can act autonomously in relation to the State, but also in relation to market and international environment. And the latter arguments were to become crucial in the response of the higher education leadership to the growing opposition during the political transition period in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when students as well as parts of the academic community began to criticize the “privatization” (‘swastanisasi’ in Indonesian), the “McDonaldization”, and the “hot IMF recipes” for Indonesian universities. 35 At the same time, State universities used the argument against the State in order to urge government not to expect higher education institutions to become fully selffi nancing under the new legislation. When the prestigious Universitas Indonesia in 2001 submitted its formal proposal regarding the offer to become a legally autonomous institution, it mentioned both the positive arguments and the risks associated with “accepting the government’s

130 International Assistance and State-University Relations offer of the new legal autonomy status”, but insisted that it would not accept an arrangement by which it would need to become self-fi nancing: “UI sees autonomy as a multiyear contract with government in which State funding is supplied as a block not linked to salaries and at roughly current levels in exchange for delivering improved performance.” (UI, 2000: 4). Aside from the continuities at the level of ideology, new practices and mechanisms introduced by international assistance projects also helped introduce and promote new values and ideas, such as meritocratic values (as opposed to bureaucratic hierarchy or age status), transparency (e.g. in allocating or reallocating resources), competition, market orientation, decentralization, and, more recently, pluralism and democracy. Although a thorough cultural values study was not part of this research set up, I did fi nd instances and cases of deep cultural change. Most notably, the tendency of international donors to target graduate training efforts to young men and women effectively challenged the bureaucratic or age based road to academic promotion. In some of the Bank projects (i.e. DUE), there was an explicit requirement to staff Local Project Implementation Units with young academics, thereby providing another mechanism to empower a new generation of academics, apart still from the project’s approach to decentralize institutional planning, which involved junior faculty in the overall university strategic planning process. Of more recent date is the influence of international donors on the legal framework of Indonesia’s higher education. As indicated in section 2 (discourse analysis), bilateral agencies often explicitly chose to stay away from the ‘domestic’ politics of higher education management. Even the multilateral donors (including the World Bank) did not want to get involved too far into formal policy during the 1980s and much of the early 1990s, instead preferring to focus on the more technical issues of cost recovery and funding mechanisms. Even the World Bank at the time seemed to recognize its lack of expertise as to the domestic legalities (p.c. Sachi Hatakenaka), and instead followed a strategy of growing pressure and pushing the margins of the system. Its call for fi nancial autonomy during the 1990s in particular led to a situation, which helped expose the structural barriers of the existing state fi nancing laws (the so-called ICW regulation, cf. section 1 of this chapter) and resulted in a new set of regulations and legislation which created the possibility for public higher education institutions to become separate legal entities (as opposed to ‘units of government’). Table 4.4 provides an overview of conditions pre- and post- reform and legal changes, referring to four basic dimensions of autonomy: fi nancial autonomy, academic autonomy, administrative autonomy, and autonomy in relation to human resource management. The legal change process started with the introduction of regulation 61 in 1999, which opened the possibility of becoming a separate legal entity. From the beginning it was

Outcomes Table 4.4

131

Autonomy and Change of Legal Status

CONDITION PRE REFORMS

CONDITION POST REFORMS

Legal Basis: Law UU2/1989 and Regulation PP 30/1990

Legal basis: Law UU20/2003 and Regulation PP 61/1999

Public universities are service units of government. Private universities are service units of private foundations.

- PP61/1999 created the possibility of autonomous public higher education institutions as legal entity (BHMN36), responsible to a Board of Trustees. In 2000, four new government regulations were issued, changing the legal status of four selected universities (UI, UGM, ITB, IPB). Two more institutions (USU in 2003; UPI in 2004) were later added to the list of formally autonomous public institutions. - UU20/2003 (basic education law) promises legislation that would establish independent legal status (BHP) for all education institutions, making them distinct from government agencies, independently holding and controlling assets. Note: BHP institutions do not yet exist as legislation still needs to be passed (situation late 2006).

Financial autonomy:

Financial autonomy:

- Investment funds and recurrent budget from government (based on line item financing).

- Investment funds from government (based on assignment and competition), donations and accumulated margin

- Recurrent budget from government - As service units of government, (based on performance and assigntuition (SPP) and extra-budgetary, ment), tuition, donations and conself-generated resources (DRK) are governed by laws and regulations con- tracts and services cerning the State treasury. In principle, Note: Law 17/2003 on State Finance so far does not formally recognize self-generated income needs to be reported and consolidated centrally. In block grant financing. There is no provision for government financpractice, sub-units (faculties, departing to BHMN institutions either. In ments, research centers . . . ) often practice, block grants remain limited fail to report such income whereas to special projects, and autonomous the institutional center lacks informainstitutions are funded as if still part tion on and control over financial of government. accounts. Academic autonomy:

Academic autonomy:

DGHE is responsible for approval or discontinuation of study programs.

Board of Higher Education and academic senate are responsible of study programs (continued)

132

International Assistance and State-University Relations

Table 4.4

Autonomy and Change of Legal Status (continued)

CONDITION PRE REFORMS

CONDITION POST REFORMS

DGHE determines 60% of the curriculum.

The Academic Senate of the institution determines 80% of the curriculum

Quality assurance by national accreditation board.

Quality assurance by internal audit unit and academic senate (internal), and externally by national accreditation board.

Administrative autonomy:

Administrative autonomy:

Rector heads institution as a unit of the Ministry of Education and Culture.

The Rector heads institution as a distinct legal entity that is held internally responsible for its management to the Board of Trustees, and externally accountable to government and general public.

Autonomy in HR Management:

Autonomy in HR Management:

Centralized management of civil servants does not allow individual institutions to manage their own human resources. (Law 43/1999)

Increasing share of non-civil service staff (e.g. project or special study program staff funded with self generated income) will gradually allow for more autonomy in human resource management. Retention of existing teaching staff subject to civil service rules while at the same time creating a merit based structure on top of the existing structure has become a pragmatic solution at some institutions.

decided by DGHE that the formal granting of the new autonomy status would follow a selection process in which initially only the four top universities (UGM, UI, IPB and ITB) were invited to submit an extensive plan for autonomy. I arrived in Jakarta for interviews exactly at the time the guidelines for proposal submission were being reviewed and was able to witness and observe many of the exchanges (i.e. e-mails and meetings) between staff from DGHE and World Bank staff at fi rst hand. From the perspective of State-university relations it was striking to hear participants’ observations describing the close working relationship between the government agency and the donor representatives. Often it so seemed as if government documents were co-written by DGHE and Bank staff, even though there was no sense of imposition involved. International reviewers were invited to critically comment on the documents and the procedures. Overall the critical point was that the State was submitting a selection procedure to a self appointed group of public institutions and inviting

Outcomes

133

them to demonstrate their readiness to become an autonomous entity. The image of the ‘evaluative State’ (Neave, 1998) as the omniscient gatekeeper, who will only let the “ready ones” through, and asks failing ones to come back better prepared, springs, to mind. It seemed as if the initial driving force had been the DGHE’s autonomy team (with support from the Bank) rather than a groundswell of support from university management and staff. A lot of socialization remained to be done for staff and students. In addition, one might of course also question the criteria and the choice for these particular four institutions to be invited to participate. The institutions concerned are relatively large, are very much decentralized internally (with strong and semi-autonomous departments and Faculties and hence strong opposition to be expected), and typically disposing of historically rooted practices that would not be likely to be easily dismantled. It was not clear either that the big would be best equipped in terms of fi nancial management capacities. To conclude, outcomes at the system level suggest a further movement away from direct or centralized State control but at the same time introduce new and arguably more efficient levers for the State to influence higher education policy more effectively.37 In other words, the model that emerges at the system level is that of State-supervision, or, in the wording of the New Paradigm, ‘autonomy within a hierarchical inter-strata relationship’. Typical in the introduction of autonomy in 1999 was that four top universities were selected by the State and chosen as guides for other universities to be transformed from government service units reporting to the Ministry of Education to State-owned and autonomous legal entities (BHMN) with their own Boards of Trustees. The decisions at the time implied an acknowledgment of the difficulties associated with the transition process, but at the same time suggested that the State knew best how to proceed, or at least considered it competent to evaluate the ideas and proposals from the institutions themselves.

2. International Assistance and the Formative Conditions at the Institutional Level Whereas the coalition of international donors and central government agencies has been instrumental to the process of creating enabling conditions for institutional autonomy, the bigger challenge without any doubt lies in assessing how the institutions responded to these changes. There is plenty of irony in the observation that the internationally inspired and centrally steered move towards autonomy for all intents and purposes was meant to be a move for greater “institutional autonomy”, implying that more decision-making powers and responsibilities are to be located at the institutional level. In a context where public universities and colleges were typically regarded as “service units” of the State bureaucracy, this is not a self-evident process, as it raises questions about the interest (i.e. why should

134

International Assistance and State-University Relations

institutions, their leaders and faculty be interested in the fi rst place?), the existing loyalties and power balances within the organization, the capacity and commitment of the institutional leadership to carry the process to the next level etc. In 2000, the Indonesian government chose to gradually grant legal autonomy to its State universities, in the longer run making each institution a non-profit State enterprise (see table 4.4 above). Since then, 6 of the country’s 52 public institutions were formally made autonomous. Nonetheless, as a result of many years of centralized management and oversight, institutions typically lack the managerial tradition and the broad institutional commitment required to effectively exercise their autonomy. In order to become effectively autonomous, institutions require capabilities of independent decision making in areas of fi nancial management, human resource management, physical plant management, sufficient cost recovery, and at the same time be held accountable to their Board of Trustees and the general public. The influence of international assistance in these particular areas is not easy to assess as the risk for broad generalizations is high, while at the same time the indirect effects of assistance are often not acknowledged. World Bank interventions in higher education, for instance, consistently receive particularly good ratings—”much better than for all education projects”from their own evaluation department in terms of the institutional development impact of their projects.38 However, the assessments are typically based on large-scale cross-sectional statistical analysis (i.e. country wide) and do not reach the level of the impact on particular institutions. At the same time, Bank evaluations tend to be restricted to operational project objectives, and fail to take into account the potential normative implications of the interactive and dynamic nature of the process of international assistance on the organizational behavior of institutions. Instead, my assessment will be based on a relatively small number of site visits at six public institutions where I interviewed university administrators, and spoke with faculty and young undergraduate and graduate students at some of their departments. From these institutions I collected further documentation and program information, and in two cases (UGM and UI respectively) even reviewed their draft institutional strategy paper, which they were going to submit to DGHE as a first proposal to be granted autonomy status. Given the size of the country and its higher education system, my purpose here is not to be representative. The focus was on the universities that were short listed for the procedure to be granted legal autonomy (UI, UGM, ITB and IPB), to which I added two other institutions (UNSOED, UNILA). Without the ambition to be representative for the country, or even comprehensive for the institutions concerned, I was able to detect changes (e.g. cost recovery, diversification), dynamics (e.g. competition and conflict between ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ departments), organizational innovations (e.g. cross subsidizing) and tendencies (e.g. centralization) that typically match the picture of increasing

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institutional autonomy vis-à-vis the State. Some of these changes have furthermore been inspired and encouraged by specific features associated with donor interventions and mechanisms. At the same time, however, the existing organizational set-up at these universities, in terms of governance, fi nancial management, academic policy and human resource management, still seemed far removed from the idea of an institutionally autonomous university. 2.1

Increased Centralization

The institutional level, or in the words of Burton Clark the “middle level” of the higher education system (Clark, 1983), has traditionally been the organizationally weakest link in the Indonesian system. University fi nancial management was typically very much decentralized to powerful Faculties, departments and study programs (or research centres), and even up to the level of the individual faculty staff (especially the full professors or ‘guru besar’) who traditionally enjoyed a remarkable degree of ‘independence’ (if low civil service salaries). At the same time, there was little or no accountability for attendance and teaching, since individual faculty staff as well as the more successful departments and research centers rarely reported the ‘self generated income’ to central accounting or fi nancial management services. It was not uncommon for individual study programs, departments or sub-units to participate in ventures and hold separate accounts from that of the university centrally, and some of these units even had been granted the authority to do so from the DGHE. The UI’s strategic autonomy proposal rather frankly acknowledges that “in order to minimize the effects of prevailing government accounting regulations, 39 much of the income generated by different parts of the university have not been declared. In this regard, it can be said that the University has been breaking the law for quite some period of time.” (UI, 2000, full proposal: 3). Another high ranking official at DGHE admitted that the academic community in general had been “remarkably successful in using their creative resources to bend the rules to its own advantage” (p.c. Pramoetadi). Statements such as these on the one hand provide an indication of the nature of the challenge of ‘granting autonomy’ to higher education institutions centrally (as the existing degrees of freedom enjoyed by staff and entrepreneurial departments and faculties will need to be decreased), yet at the same time question the depth of success of the centralized State control system. At the time of the site visits, the New Paradigm, and the opportunities for increasing autonomy (and accountability) in particular, already started to put strong pressures on institutions and the units and staff within to centralize decision making and integrate management in a number of areas, from academic programs, human resources management, physical infrastructure and maintenance of facilities, but in particular in the field of

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fi nancial management. All of the institutions that I visited struggled with the implementation of a unified or integrated fi nancial management and information system, all encountered great difficulties and reluctance on the part of individual units to share information on revenue generation, let alone to integrate these resources within the central accounts of the university. Nonetheless, hot topics such as cross-subsidization between departments, consolidation of accounts, and demands for greater transparency and external auditing procedures for the fi rst time were being debated in the open. Whereas the majority of rectors and vice-rectors whom I interviewed strongly supported the government policy to increase autonomy at the institutional level, I also encountered hesitations and uncertainty. One informant, and former rector, suggested that “rectors are not used to discuss plans, and may be afraid of being burdened with the responsibilities and duties that go with autonomy. Some prefer the current system in which rectors have a high-prestige function, often with power and influence outside the institutions (e.g. in DGHE), and don’t have to bother with submitting plans but instead can count on a steady flow of government money” (p.c. Soekadji). Uncertainty also came with the ambivalent messages at the time (late 1999) regarding the government’s commitment to continue to fi nance autonomous universities at the same levels as before. In any case, the concern with centralizing fi nancial management capacities at the university level started to preoccupy both the State and international donors more prominently than ever before. One persistent problem common to all institutions visited remains the lack of income reporting by departments and study or research programs within these institutions (p.c. Bagyo). Non-tuition, self-generated income is typically under-reported because many of these individual units maintain their own separate bank account outside the centralized fi nancial management authority of the institution. Even the ownership of the physical infrastructure is not by necessity centralized at the institutional level since in reality traditions of Faculty ownership of particular buildings (as reported by UI, but also present in UGM) continue to persist. Outcomes and influences from international assistance in the area of centralized fi nancial management at university level are mixed. Not many international donors explicitly invested in central university management improvement in the fi rst place. Instead, much of the international donor efforts up to that point were directed to the sub-unit level (i.e. the level of the individual study or research program, or department) within institutions. Bilateral donors such as the Dutch chose to steer away from the sensitive issue of central university decision making. The World Bank, in contrast, in its early interventions in the 1980s did effectively attempt to establish and improve central institutional management information systems, including fi nancial management information, but failed to achieve significant results in that area. Lack of either knowledge

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of or confidence in central management capacities for a long time led the Bank to fi rst concentrate investments on the level of study or research programs. Even the URGE project, which is regarded as the initiator project under the new paradigm fl ag (even though the new paradigm was not yet formally proclaimed at the time of inception, see earlier section), and later the QUE project, tactically chose to directly invest in individual research or study programs rather than on strengthening management or decision making processes at the institutional level (p.c. Sachi Hatakenaka). It is only with the DUE project that the Bank again began to devise mechanisms (for instance, bottom-up planning procedures, increased participation of a young generation of staff, improved management information systems, etc.) explicitly geared towards a better equipped central management. The implication of this strategy is not only that donors remained absent and were generally not well aware of what was going on at the institutional management level, but also that instead they encouraged policies to earmark investment funds to the level of units. In other words, the strategy leads to a situation in which the head of the study program becomes responsible for the use of the bulk of investment funds to either the government (possibly with money lent from donors) or to the donor directly, but in either case with not much control or interference from the institution. As the UI autonomy proposal complained: “Should the government extend such a policy in its new block grant funding system, it would effectively reduce university autonomy to allocate resources and to govern and control its own units.” (UI, 2000, fi nance section: 2). From another perspective, however, international assistance efforts did effectively contribute to institutionally centralizing tendencies, albeit in another, more implicit fashion. Notably, the selectivity of international donor investments in specifi c departments (and not in others), contributed to a particular differentiating dynamic (see next section), which over the years led to a differentiation between so-called “wet” and “dry” departments, that in its turn fuels the need for corrective systems of cross-subsidization. To be sure, ample opposition to autonomy comes from the so-called “dry faculties and departments” (as opposed to the “wet” faculties), i.e. those that do not have the opportunities, capacities or willingness to generate income from extra budgetary sources. These faculties have to rely on a relatively constant stream of “easy money” (no reports or plans required) disbursed centrally in a standardized way. Also some of the “wet” faculties, in particular those that have already established a track record of generating their own income, regard the movement towards increasing autonomy as a threat to their relative independent status within the institution. Some key informants in this regard spoke of the already existing “autonomies within the institutions”. As a result, increasing autonomy at the institutional level at one point implies a consolidation of budgets, or at least an institutional consensus on how

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these budgets are to be distributed and managed. With the introduction of autonomy as legal separation, each of the selected institutions have been in the process of developing its own compromise of cross-subsidization, largely depending on the institution’s own culture and internal power balance between the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’ faculties. The institutional documents and proposals seem to suggest that these institutions (i.e. UGM and UI) are taking into account some degree of decentralization to the department level as a way to keep everybody on board (p.c. Soekadji). 2.2 Winds of Change: Differentiation Within, Decentralized Planning, Resource Diversification (Self-Finance Capacity), Cost Recovery, and Openness to the World International assistance is by defi nition intentionally selective. Donor resources are not spread at random, nor are they distributed equally across or within institutions. Apart from its contribution to the process of institutional differentiation at system level discussed earlier, international assistance over the years also planted seeds for an increased differentiation within. One of the most tangible outcomes of international assistance at the institutional level consists of the brick and mortar infrastructure, the hardware equipment, and research labs that have been literally constructed with loans or credits from donor agencies. The contrast between donor supported departments and other departments was physically visible at all of the institutions that I visited. But apart from the visible differences, and arguably more relevant to the subject of autonomy, Indonesian institutions also diversified programmatically, managerially and academically. International assistance contributed to processes of internal differentiation, which, on the one hand, gave rise to the emergence of well furnished academic research and graduate teaching specializations in some fields and at some departments, but on the other hand, also left other disciplines and departments largely untouched. Overall, exact and/ or applied sciences (i.e. agricultural studies, biotechnology, business, computer sciences . . .) received disproportionably more attention from donors than social or humanistic disciplines (i.e. philology, philosophy, social sciences, arts, and others), leaving a mark on opportunities to excel academically, but also to generate extra-budgetary income. The co-relationship between international assistance and internal differentiation, to be sure, is not necessarily one of linear causality. There are examples of departments that managed to excel and generate extra income without much foundational donor support from elsewhere (e.g. social sciences at UI, or arts at UGM), as there have been examples of heavily funded programs and departments that did not manage to attract durable attention or income. Nonetheless, international donors had a defi nite impact on

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139

the money flows within the institutions where they were present. International assistance not only provided incentives for academic change at the study program, but also gave institutions extra leeway to experiment with alternative ways to reward or restructure study programs and departments internally. In terms of planning and resource allocation mechanisms, international assistance introduced decentralized procedures, which have now been institutionalised and disseminated more broadly in the Indonesian higher education community. Notably, the introduction of block grant programs, associated with transparent, international standards of peer review selection, effectively changed institutional resource allocation procedures to the extent that many institutions distribute their own resources on the basis of review procedures similar to the ones introduced in donor support projects such as DUE or QUE, or in the government’s own clone programs supporting ‘semi-DUE’ and ‘QUElike’ projects. With regard to increased levels of resource diversifi cation (i.e. increased self fi nancing capacities) and cost recovery (i.e. the tuition share in the recurrent budget), the effective influence of international assistance was foremost indirect (for instance, contracts and services with industry, using donor funded equipment or trained staff) rather than direct, and outcomes more often have been the result of implicit rather than explicit donor objectives.40 Adding diffi culty to the assessment of outcomes is that, except for the tuition level, estimating the accurate fi gure of selfgenerated revenue at Indonesia’s public institutions remains a sensitive and diffi cult task at hand, given the fact that institutions and especially their sub-units (and individual faculty) often fail to report income (cf. supra). According to offi cial figures for 1998–1999, the overall average percentage of self-generate income at public institutions stands at around 40% (in relation to total recurrent expenditures), allowing, however, for considerable variability between institutions, ranging from a low 5% to a high 78% (table 8 in annex). As already mentioned, the evidence of a relationship between these figures and the level of assistance by institutions (graph 4, p. 129, and table 7 in annex) is not necessarily directly causal. Even so, the top ten of high performers in terms of attracting extra budgetary resources corresponds surprisingly well with the top ten of receivers of international assistance (table 4.5). Apart from extra budgetary sources of income raised from contracts and services, institutions also receive income from tuition fees and other special fees, which the students are charged with. Student fees at public universities in Indonesia have increased dramatically since the late 1990s and early 2000, when policy discussions about fi nancial autonomy reached their peak (see section 2). In effect, the rapidly growing fees at the time strengthened the negative public image of then on-going reforms towards greater autonomy of State universities. Critics were quick to

140

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Table 4.5

High Receivers of International Assistance/High Performers of SelfGenerating Income

Top 10 receiver of intern. aid 1980–1995

Top 10 performers of self-generating income 1999

Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB)

Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB)

Polytecnics (3)

Universitas Indonesia (UI)

Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB)

Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB)

Universitas Gajah Mada (UGM)

Universitas Padjadjaran (UNPAD)

Universitas Indonesia (UI)

Universitas Gajah Mada (UGM)

Institut Teknologie Sepuluh November (ITS)

Universitas Brawijaya (UNIBRAW)

Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS)

Universitas Sumatera Utara (USU)

Universitas Syiah Kuala (UNSYIAH)

Institut Teknologie Sepuluh November (ITS)

Universitas Sumatera Utara (USU)

Universitas Diponegoro (UNDIP)

Universitas Diponegoro (UNDIP)

Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS)

associate tuition hikes with ‘neo-liberal, IMF-inspired forms of privatization’. As a result of legislation transforming selected institutions to autonomous legal entities, these universities can now collect tuition fees directly from the students and may set their own tuition fee levels (previously set by the central government). Still, the general perspective of university leaders vis-à-vis the new paradigm overall tends to be positive. Undoubtedly one of the more remarkable cultural changes in the post Soeharto era is the increasingly explicit openness to the world in general. Indonesian university rectors are usually not specifi cally inclined towards particular foreign models, even though top US universities are often cited. Instead, informants advocate borrowing from a plurality of foreign models, including also European (UK, German, Dutch . . . ), Latin American (Argentina, Chile . . . ), and Asian (Japan, Australia . . . ) models. This observation is confi rmed by recent research of Indonesian university leader’s attitudes and strategies in a global context, and is often associated with “the novel impact of an open information environment” (Marginson & Sawir, 2006: 355–56). At the same time, there is also a sense of urgency associated with required reforms to transform internal systems and cultures to operate more effectively in the new setting, where universities need to raise increasing part of their funding by themselves. One rector put it this way: “University management has to be changed, away from the

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old departmental bureaucratic model, which has now been transformed in university autonomy that allows us to manage our own systems . . . Now we have to create and develop the budget” (cited in Marginson & Sawir, 2006: 359). 2.3

The Bumpy Road to Financial Autonomy

In the Indonesian situation, increasing the level of institutional autonomy was put forward in the New Paradigm as a necessary way to improve management decision making at the institutional level. The proposition is a risky one in a number of ways, both for government and for the institutions. First of all, Indonesian State institutions have little or no tradition to systematically gather and analyse information for fi nancial management purposes and are organizationally not set up to manage their own resource basis. Key informants from within the institutions confi rm the observation and call for monitoring, evaluation, and adjustments as the implementation of the process of autonomy moves forward. International assistance projects under the New Paradigm typically include mechanisms for monitoring and systemic analysis of fi nancial data for management decision making. In the new generation of Bank projects, institutions were required to contribute part of their self-generated income in the process of bottom-up budgeting and programming. Nonetheless, the latest reports are not very optimistic regarding the fi nancial management status of the universities that have been granted legal autonomy (World Bank, 2005: 62). For government too, the autonomy strategy continues to involve substantial educational, social and even fi nancial risks. Autonomous universities that do not perform better in terms of academic quality arguably do not serve the purposes of the new paradigm. Public institutions that are not well managed fi nancially are expected to put a drain on the State budget. Social risks already became apparent at the time of tuition hikes and threaten to undermine the legitimacy and, thus, the continuity of the reforms. Also the emphasis on merit based competition carries potential risks in terms of inequities, be they socially or regionally inspired. The difference between substantive and procedural autonomy is well established in the scholarly literature: fi nancial autonomy on the one hand relates to the power to decide over the institution’s fi nancial resources per se, as well as to the power to decide at what level and how such decisions are made. The distinction is not merely an academic one as it turned out in the public outcry in media and in parliament following the decisions of 4 autonomous institutions (UI, UGM, ITB, and UNDIP) in 2005 to adopt a special entrance policy (and fee scheme) for students from wealthy families (Jakarta Post, 12/2/05 and Jakarta Post, 1/31/07). In their attempts to generate additional revenue, these institutions decided to accept students on the basis of an alternative selection

142 International Assistance and State-University Relations system, separate from the regular national entrance test held annually, and specifi cally designed for students from families of high income for enrolment in special programs. Institutions differed in the way they select students to enrol in these special programs, in the quota of seats reserved for this students entering through this “special lane”, and, importantly, in the fees they charged. For instance, at the UI, entrance fees for students who enrolled in this special program varied between Rp. 25 million (US$ 2,750) and Rp. 75 million (US$ 8,260), depending on the subject area.41 Tuition fees for the ‘special lane’ at UI were set on Rp. 7,5 million (US$ 820) per semester, whereas the regular students who passed the national exams were being charged Rp. 475,000 (US$ 52) per semester. The case of the ‘special lane’ goes well beyond the distinction between substantive and procedural fi nancial autonomy. Negative reactions ventilated in the media as well as in parliament raised serious concerns about quality, social equity, and the commercialization of higher education. The case therefore also provides ample illustration of the consideration that fi nancial autonomy is not merely an issue of sound management, but also, and necessarily, involves choices for Indonesian institutions and government to come to a sound balance between autonomy and accountability.

3. International Assistance and the Enacting Conditions in the Academic Unit As indicated in the previous chapter, international assistance projects were primarily targeted at the basis academic unit, more so than directly at institutional level. The quantitative impact of international assistance in terms of resources and structures at this level, the so-called “factory floor” (Clark, 1998: 232) of higher education, cannot be denied easily. Assistance outcomes in terms of human resource capacity and staff development stand out prominently, even in subject areas where donor investments typically remained relatively small. The number of academic staff with advanced degrees (Master or Ph.D.) has risen dramatically since the 1970s, in great part a direct outcome of international assistance programs. To illustrate for the social sciences, in 1974 there were nationwide only two Indonesian faculty holding Ph.D.s in anthropology, five in political science, two in communications and seven in sociology. Today, at the Faculty of Social and Political Science at the University of Indonesia only, 25% of its teaching staff holds Ph.D.s, and another 50% have Master degrees (figures cited in Hadiz et al., 2005: 24). In engineering and other applied sciences, areas where much of international assistance efforts tended to be concentrated, the increase of Ph.D. and Master trained staff is even more prominent. For instance, data from the Institute of Technology in Bandung (ITB) indicate that over 50% of

Outcomes

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its teaching staff holds a Ph.D. degree, 75% of which received in other countries and supported with scholarships funded from international assistance projects. To be sure, the proportion of staff holding postgraduate degrees in itself is not necessarily an indicator of success in terms of educational quality nor is it a required condition for greater institutional autonomy. However, improved staff qualifications defi nitely helped institutions— often again with external donor support—to internally establish new institutional structures (e.g. research centers, business contract centers . . . ) and become more competitive to generate extra resources on the market of contracts and services on the basis of its specifi c expertise. To carry the example of ITB further, this institution’s principal income generating units nowadays are the institute for research, the institute for community services (for contracts with governments), and its professional business development off spring (LAPI). Combined, these units generate twice as much income than the regular government funds for recurrent expenditures. Enhanced staff expertise and income-generating capacities also have their drawback as they further complicated organizational challenges at the institutional level, both in terms of personnel management and regarding fi nancial management. Many institutions did not establish special units for income generating activities (under centralized institutional control), but instead left much of these activities to powerful Faculties and departments. In spite of formal obligations and government regulations, incentives to share fi nancial information with the central services are generally absent. In addition, there is traditionally little institutional control over the income generating activities of individual faculty on staff time (Daroesman, 1991; Mayling Oey-Gardiner, 1999). Given the low salaries for teaching staff, the practice to supplement income with external consulting activities on staff time is widespread. The observation that data on institutional income generating activities are generally underreported, however, only further validates the quantitative impact of international assistance on such activities. What it does say is that the primacy of the sub-unit, so prominently present in donor funded projects, does produce challenges at the institutional level. Autonomy, it should be noted at this point, is not only about increasing income generating capacities, especially not so if we consider it from the perspective of the enacting conditions in the academic sub-unit. As Clark reminds us, these enacting conditions relate to the emergence of ‘academic tribes’ (Becher, 1989, cited in Clark, 1998: 236), ‘thought styles’ and ‘thought collectives’ (Fleck, 1979, cited in Clark, 1998: 236), or less metaphorically, in academic disciplines, sub-disciplines, schools of thought, theoretical perspectives, etc. Autonomy, seen from that more qualitative angle, relates to academic norms and ideas that are based on social interactions, which become crystallized (for instance in publications, study programs,

144 International Assistance and State-University Relations etc.) and eventually are integrated and internalized at various levels within the institution. International assistance certainly was a contributing factor to this process of academic socialization even though outcomes are variable and are sometimes difficult to measure (e.g. peer reviewed publications, accreditations). International assistance provided intellectual platforms for academics to escape the bureaucratization of academia under the new order’s regime. In this regard, it is instructive to bear in mind the implications of the ideological backbone of the new order on the intellectual climate in general, and on academic life at Indonesia’s universities in particular. Following citation of Ali Moertopo, one of the regime’s most influential ideologues in the 1970s will clarify the context. He stated that “In order to achieve our country’s goals as efficiently as possible, modernization is nothing more than the process of using all available material, ethical, scientific and technical means to organize structure, and implement development based on one way of thinking.” (cited in Hadiz et al., 2005: 14). Especially the ‘one way of thinking’ is of interest as it was to be taken literally during the ensuing decades. In contrast, international assistance in higher education involved a plurality of voices (for instance, academics and universities from abroad, international experts), establishing project teams supporting increased specialization, in the process fostering a change of culture towards competition, transparency and peer reviewed quality mechanisms. It will come as no surprise that the academic sub-unit is the site par excellence where the contradiction between group cohesion and scientific accuracy is felt most strongly. Even social scientists who are generally critical about international assistance acknowledge that “dissenting inclinations within some of the relatively under resourced social sciences were only possible because of the support of foreign donor organizations. ( . . . ) Over the years, foreign donors— inextricably linked to the social and political issues and concerns in their countries of origin—have left an imprint, for better or worse, on the type of research projects undertaken and supported in Indonesia” (Hadiz, 2005: 4). Perhaps as significant as the fi nancial impact, international donors contributed to the tacit component of transferring institutional development knowledge, often hidden in low cost exchanges and twinning arrangements, or other horizontal learning methods, such as study tours, cross-training, and informal talks between rectors, deans, teachers and students participating in these exchanges. In closing the chapter, and for further illustration purposes, I have included an analysis of one particular project that was extensively being reviewed during my stay in Indonesia. The project was also chosen as a case study because it was often referred to by informants as the fi rst concrete operation under the new paradigm concept.

Outcomes Box 4.2

145

Assessing the Outcomes of the URGE project

The URGE project was set up to assist the Indonesian government to create an enabling environment for graduate education and research. Competitive funding encouraged differentiation between institutions and concentration of funds in a selected number of institutions42. As a result, the increased funding for research and graduate education enabled institutions to develop (or to further) a profile of a ‘research university’. This is not to suggest that all Indonesian institutions started off from a level playing field as institutional stratification was already apparent. Formally, eligibility to compete for funding was open to private and public universities that were accredited to offer degrees beyond the S1 level. In practice, Clark’s assessment of most appropriate (enabling) conditions for graduate education and research suggests that on top of the competition between institutions to make it to the rank of research institutions, competition between those ‘that made it’ (i.e. no longer only for money, but also for reputation) will have a further beneficial effect. Again, assessments take into consideration the extent to which graduate degrees from these institutions are valued (e.g. professionally as well as in the labor market) in society. The ‘ideology of unity’, as Clark calls it (1995: 219), is well represented in the Indonesian higher education system in the ‘tridharma’ principle (i.e. ‘unity of teaching, research and service’), but is not explicitly mentioned in any of the project documents consulted, possibly because the principle applies to all of higher education and thereby ceases to be an ideological rallying point for graduate education specifically. Much more explicit are the project’s objectives in regard to increasing and -in the long run- diversifying the funding basis for research and graduate education. One definite financial marker of success, for instance, is that over time a significantly larger share of institutional resources are obtained by other than the ministry’s core support. It is here that the second level of analysis suggested by Clark, i.e., that of the ‘formative conditions’ at the institutional level, becomes most obvious. Besides the already mentioned policy references to financial autonomy, the URGE project overall was much less explicit in its expected outcomes at the institutional level. Its contracting arrangements suggest an outcome of ‘graduate school differentiation’ that largely bypasses the central institutional level. The question then becomes how institutional decision making responded to this internal differentiation of research groups and graduate schools that managed to attract extra funds on top of the regular government budget. In reality, many have been rewarded with more attention and funding (cf. the so-called Mathew effect), serving as showcases of the university often triggering internal competition and even ‘cross-subsidization’. Others became isolated within their own institution. For understandable reasons perhaps, the project evaluation documents rarely explicitly address these issues, but the call for greater institutional autonomy does seem to suggest at least implicitly that such decision making will become critical to the success of the project as well as to the prospects for institutional autonomy. On the basis of the project documents and the interviews we had with donor staff, I conclude that the project approach (cf. contracting arrangements) suggests that government confidence in the institutions’ internal decision making mechanisms at the time was not yet firmly established. To the extent that university centers and graduate schools, rather than universities, were the dominant actors (and contractors) for the DGHE, then a -probably modified- version of the German model of research institutes might become an as plausible outcome as ‘institutional autonomy’. (continued)

146 International Assistance and State-University Relations Box 4.2

Assessing the Outcomes of the URGE project (continued)

Finally, a long term assessment of the impact of the project should also include the ‘enacting conditions’, which, while hard to measure, ultimately defi ne what Clark calls ‘the factory floor of higher education’ (Clark, 1995: 232–234). How does the project affect the development of individual ‘departments’ and ‘research groups’, how are research and teaching structurally integrated in an environment where ‘graduate schools’ as known in the U.S. are a relatively new phenomenon? In spite of—or because of—the project’s focus and concern with creating the appropriate ‘enabling’ environment for graduate education and research, it is still hard to fi nd evidence of the development of new schools of thought or innovative theoretical perspectives. Indonesian universities still have a long way to go when it comes to the development of schools of thought that fi nd recognition in internationally reviewed publications. Nonetheless, the project instruments and contracting arrangements encouraged and supported decentralized capacity building and decision making at this level, more explicitly even than at the institutional level.

5

Assistance and Autonomy Possibility or Contradiction?

“Autonomy cannot be imposed by international donors. Institutions ultimately need to make autonomy their own struggle.” (p.c. Bagio Moeliodihardjo). “The change to campus autonomy has not really done anything more than institute a change from State tyranny to market domination. The reality is that the ‘civitas academica’ has not been able to critique the social marginalization that has resulted from this policy.” (Heru Nugroho, 2005: 146) In this chapter I will briefly summarize the major conclusions of the analysis, feed these back to the theoretical frames and the literature, and explore their broader relevance for policy and practice in higher education in relation to international assistance. The general theme of the study is that goals, efforts and outcomes generated by international assistance in Indonesia facilitated and at times actively encouraged changing patterns of State-university relations from direct State control towards policies and steering mechanisms inducing increased institutional autonomy. The book indicates that while there has not been so much hard evidence for a causal relationship between international assistance and university autonomy, there was plenty of empirical evidence of a mutually reinforcing dynamic involving donors and domestic reformers that continues to have a profound impact on the way higher education is managed in Indonesia; a process of evolving policies and goals (chapter 2), changing policy instruments (chapter 3) and a picture of varied but substantive outcomes (chapter 4). Without this dynamic, and hence without this relation with international assistance, Indonesia’s state university system would be less developed overall, less differentiated, less equipped and academically manned, less decentralized, and less autonomous from government and the bureaucratic polity. Most of its institutions would have much less capacity to diversify their resource basis, and become fi nancially autonomous. International donor assistance, often implicitly, promoted and significantly furthered differentiation among and within institutions, notably by introducing and inducing procedures of merit based selection and competition. The processes of institutional differentiation and competition not

148

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only provided a fruitful platform for increasing university autonomy at the institutional level. The growing diversification of institutional missions and capacities furthermore has steadily complicated centralized system management following the typical State-control mode of more or less standardized operations. International donor goals and ideologies about institutional capacity building, while often ambitious and only partially implemented, responded surprisingly well to domestic and international contextual conditions and were picked up by actors supporting more decentralized decision making, and in the process helped develop domestic rationales for a changing government role. In the case of the World Bank, goals explicitly included support for the introduction of policy reforms as well as the introduction of innovative forms and mechanisms in projects specifically designed to fuel university management changes concurrent with the so-called new paradigm. International assistance efforts have been instrumental in changing, expanding and diversifying the resource basis for higher education in general and of selected institutions specifically, and in building critical capacities at specific places within the system. In spite of the many significant institutional constraints and weaknesses at both system and institutional level that have persisted throughout the period under study, higher education assistance overall has helped create enabling conditions conducive to increasing autonomy at Indonesia’s public universities. With regard to the influence of international assistance on institutional management and decision-making, the results of international assistance have been mixed. On the one hand, the analysis of outcomes does indicate a prominent role of international assistance efforts in developing and in some cases implementing institutional strategies to diversify resources or to generate income, both of which are considered to be significant elements of fi nancial autonomy. Also, and importantly, the broadly formulated norms, the ideas and the discourse of international donors propagating autonomy as an efficient way to manage higher education, connected well with the forces of careful opposition that emerged from the traditionally close association between top bureaucrats (i.e. at DGHE and BAPPENAS) and some heavy weight university rectors. On the other hand, and regardless of institution-building goals, donor efforts have centered predominantly on planning and capacity strengthening activities directed at either the central level (i.e. national) or the level of the academic unit (i.e. faculty, department, study program) and overall have remained much less convincing at the institutional level. Still, the apparent mismatch between goals and efforts offers only a partial explanation for perceived donor failures in supporting stronger university management. Especially in the case of the World Bank, efforts in that particular area have been significant and early on included specific initiatives to train university administrators, develop institutional management information systems, and enhance institutional planning. At least as important as the extent and quality of donor efforts have been the

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domestic and national political conditions, especially the general reluctance on the part of the government to let foreign agencies become involved in local institutional decision making. Frustrated by the plurality of institutional constraints and structural weaknesses (e.g. bureaucratic policy framework, prevailing norms and traditions, lack of incentives to develop management capacity, fi nancial limitations, standardized reward system . . . ) operating at the institutional level, donor support instead (further) encouraged de facto decentralization to individual academic units. Notable exceptions notwithstanding, the central executive powers typical of the U.S. model of university organization remained largely undeveloped during the period of this study. Only in recent years, in the post Soeharto period, new regulations to effectively ‘grant’ (legal) autonomy status to a selected number of State institutions, the movement to institutional autonomy started to gain political prominence, and their implementation involves a fundamental shift towards more centralization at the institutional level, as was explored in chapter 4. Finally, regarding the overall policy framework of State-university relations in general, and fi nancial autonomy in particular, international donors largely operated within the boundaries and institutional constraints imposed by the domestic policy environment, occasionally exploring “windows of opportunity”, rather than taking a proactive stance vis-à-vis political and institutional change. Instead, the typical pattern was that changes in the domestic policy framework developed domestically—albeit quite possibly as a result of broader international forces—then received important external follow-up and backup, rationales and explicit support. This broad assessment does not correspond very well with the picture of international assistance as the vehicle for the “external imposition” of policy agendas for which it is often taken. At the same time, however, it shows very well the structural weakness of international assistance as an influential force on domestic changes involving increased autonomy, as any “success” (here defined in terms of ‘effective influence’ and not as ‘effective reform’) depends both on the complicity of domestic reformers and on the willingness of institutions to become autonomous. The latter is not self-evident, given the risks associated with it (see chapter 4), and the expected tendencies for ‘prismatic formalism’ and ‘displacement’ further watering down initial achievements. As one informant observed early on during my stay in Indonesia: “Autonomy cannot be imposed by international donors. Institutions need to make autonomy their own struggle.” (p.c. Bagyo Moeliardjono).

I. RELEVANCE TO THEORETICAL FRAMES AND LITERATURE REVIEW The dissertation thematically explored if, how and to what extent domestic changes in the relationship between the State and its public higher education

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system in Indonesia have been influenced by international assistance. Our theoretical framework, based on relevant literatures, builds on conceptualizations of the complex dynamics of influence and patterned relationships between organizations at various levels. With references to both resource dependency theory (i.e. shifting power balances resulting from rational/ cognitive social exchange) and (neo-) institutional perspectives (i.e. emergence of patterned relationships and norms), the case study brought to bare relevant elements of change as well as of change influenced by international assistance in particular. The combination of two theoretically compatible and complementary perspectives provided the dissertation with a valuable framework for analyzing change in organizations as a result of exchanges with other organizations at various levels. As a result, our theoretical framework acknowledged and emphasized both cognitive and institutional elements of the environment in which higher education institutions operate. In other words, in an environment where resources are scarce (as can be argued for Indonesia throughout the period studied and up to this day), organizations are expected to try either to minimize their dependence on others or to maximize the dependence of other organizations on them (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This would be the cognitive part of the environment, which for the purpose of illustration provides an helpful perspective to partially explain the changing State-university relations in Indonesia from a model of State control to a model of State supervision (and not to a private market model). This argument can be summarized as follows: as the Indonesian State required increasing resources to continue the development of its higher education system and at the same time maintain its influence on State institutions (i.e. make them dependent), the State pursued a strategy consisting of strong relationships with international donors in order to obtain much needed resources (in the process becoming increasingly dependent on donor money flows). At the same time, the State sought to minimize its own dependence by actively seeking new levers of power at the national level, for instance in establishing central frameworks and procedures for accreditation or competition and/or performance based funding systems. On the other hand, however, and quite apart from the generation and distribution of resources, systems of higher education are also subject to interactive processes by which structures and organizational rules are made or redefi ned. And again for illustrative purposes, it can be safely stated that the increasingly international environment made Indonesia’s higher education also part of a broader, even worldwide process structuring higher education policies and reforms, including rules, norms, principles and ways of managing higher education. Institutional and neo-institutional theories provide frameworks for inquiring and explaining how these norms are created, diffused, adopted and adapted over space and time (Scott, 2004). In addition, institutionalism helps explain how many of the changes and reforms in Indonesia’s higher education system almost simultaneously take

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place at markedly different locations, even at places where international assistance has not been prominent player, at least not in the sense of a provider of resources and dependencies. Furthermore, the latter observation does not in any way contradict the central theme of this book that international assistance was an influential factor in the Indonesian higher education reforms. On the contrary, set up as a case study of change in Indonesia’s higher education, the analysis confi rms the prominent role of international assistance—and of international organizations such as the World Bank in particular—as central carrier and transmitter of specific institutional norms and ways of managing higher education. As a result, the basis of legitimacy of the New Paradigm rests not so much on (donor or State) sanctions, intrinsic moral values (for instance regarding university autonomy), legalistic, nationalistic or democratic arguments, but instead on the conviction that this new way of managing higher education was to be perceived of as the only conceptually correct one. Looking back at the more specific review of literatures summarized in chapter 1, the study based its research questions on references from a variety of subject areas and fields, ranging from State theories, sociological and organizational perspectives on higher education, literature related to policy implementation, institutional perspectives on international organizations, and policy oriented as well as academic approaches to the combined fields of international assistance and comparative education. The framework of the study was designed to include goals, efforts and outcomes of international assistance in relation to the interactive and on-going processes of domestic State policies and institutional responses, starting from the assumption that explicit donor involvement in domestic policy would be one way in which international assistance can ‘negotiate’ and ‘create’ resource environments. The framework was an effective instrument in guiding data collection and analysis, but with hindsight required completion with additional perspectives and information. For instance, Kreiner’s distinction between two relatively independent environments of the aid-giving process, i.e. the “resource environment”, where resources and conditions are negotiated and determined, and the “project environment”, where donors and recipients negotiate the distribution of funds and the ‘technicalities’ of project implementation, was helpful in sorting out and analyzing a tremendous amount of data. The adage that there is ‘truth to be found in the details’ was often confirmed in analyzing discourse and content of project related ‘aide memoirs’ and consecutive ‘project completion reports’. Nonetheless, the detailed investigation of donor goals and efforts also brings to bare that international assistance is not just about resources only. The mechanics of international assistance and the asymmetric relationship between donor and recipient involve much more complexity than the resource based perspective can handle. Isomorphic tendencies to adopt, emulate, or adjust existing ‘foreign models’ or institutional norms are not easy to explain on the basis of purely resource driven approaches.

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International Assistance and State-University Relations

A valuable additional perspective was discovered in an ongoing scholarly debate on international organization theory, where traditional State-centric explanations for the functional existence of international organizations are increasingly being challenged by scholars exploring the institutionalizing powers of international bureaucracies (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, Finnemore, 1993, 1997). In her early work, Finnemore explored the origins of domestic science policy structures and found that the simultaneous emergence of strikingly similar science policy structures in the 1950s in so many States was to be explained by the institutionalizing influence of international organizations (in this case UNESCO in particular) that “taught new States the value, utility as well as the form of bureaucratic science policy organization” (Finnemore, 1993: 597). In her later research, and even closer to the theme and time period of this book, her initial arguments were further fine-tuned, for instance in a case study indicating the intellectual influence of international donor agencies, and the World Bank in particular, in the process of ‘redefining development’ from a purely economic idea (in the 1950s) into a concept where poverty alleviation moved center stage (in the 1970s) (Finnemore, 1997: 203). Our analysis of especially the World Bank’s role constructing and institutionalizing norms regarding policies and organization of higher education, not only finds support in the proposition that international organizations can shape domestic State policies and choices about internal structures. It also provides further confi rmation of the responsiveness of States to internationally generated and disseminated institutional norms, as well as to the strong institutionalizing power of the World Bank.1 At the same time, however, this does not necessarily imply that ideas and institutional norms about organizing higher education (such as, for instance, the concept of ‘autonomy’), effectively originated within the World Bank, nor does it suggest that the institutionalization of these norms will bring educational improvement. What this line of research does confirm is that international organizations such as the World Bank are bureaucratically very well equipped to institutionalize ideas and norms that are not specifically linked to the needs or expectations of the member States. Of even greater and more direct significance to this book are the thematic parallels that can be drawn with recent work by scholars exploring the relationship between international assistance and change in higher education. Specific mention is made here to the book ‘To Export Progress: the Golden Age of U.S. assistance to Latin American universities’ (Levy, 2005). While addressing different contexts—both geographically (i.e. U.S. and U.S.-related assistance to Latin America) and time-wise—this study also investigates goals, efforts, and results of university assistance at both national and institutional levels, and also comes to a cautiously optimistic assessment of its successes. In spite of the strikingly different era–the 1950s as the golden age of modernization and the optimistic belief in the opportunities for development vs. the end of the century’s age of ‘lost decades’ and decreasing confidence in the effectiveness of the ‘aid industry’—there

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are other, more specific parallels and commonalities to be made with the book’s conclusions. Notably, university assistance’s contributions to diversify resources and to differentiate institutionally by building capacities at selected places while pushing some degree of intra-university centralization resonate well with the major conclusions of this research. Also, the broad observations that donors in general sought to inspire and to facilitate rather than to impose, and that success more often than not depended on the presence of ‘willing receivers’, seem to correspond with the dimensions of congruency that I intended to draw for the Indonesian case in chapter 4. At the same time, however, there are also conceptual and empirical differences to note. First of all, the concept, set-up and ambition of the two studies differed greatly. Our purpose and design was set up to investigate in what ways international assistance influenced the relationship between the State and the public universities in one particular country. Thematically, the major concern was not so much with assessing the effects of changing relationships for the educational or even managerial improvement, let alone the prospect of exporting progress. 2 The domestic conditions and political context of the Indonesian case (i.e. the bureaucratic polity within an authoritarian regime) proved an essential context in that it drew the lines and boundaries for changing State-university relationships. In ‘To Export Progress’, the regional coverage is vast, at least at the receiving end, 3 whereas the political background of the study explicitly carries the signature of the (special) relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Further, the ‘Philanthropic Ideal Type of Change’ that guides Levy’s book (Levy, 2005: 4) was not pursued in this study, even though some of its aspects (i.e. selectivity, problem and reform orientation . . . ) hew rather closely with some of the goals, efforts, and outcomes of assistance in Indonesia. The reason is simply that both donors selected in this dissertation (i.e. Dutch bilateral university assistance and the World Bank) as well the target beneficiaries (the Indonesian State and the State universities) do not seem to correspond well with the concept of voluntarism or with foundation based philanthropy as it is typically found in the U.S.4 In fact, this book explicitly focuses on mainstream and public allocations. In terms of empirical fi ndings, it is further noted that in the Indonesian case and time period, the international donor influence on expanding access was not as substantial as it was during the golden years of university development and higher education expansion. In contrast, donors in Indonesia (with the possible exception of the Asian Development Bank) concentrated almost exclusively on improving (selected) public institutions, leaving massive quantitative expansion largely to the ‘demand absorbing private sector’. As indicated in chapter 4, domestic worries within the government bureaucracy about the private sector not only becoming bigger but in some cases also qualitatively better, inspired higher education leadership at DGHE to pursue policy changes involving a shift in the way higher education institutions were to be managed.

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Apart from the differences, the study also brings to bare new themes that have been effectively used by donors as a lever for change towards greater system decentralization, more institutional autonomy and accountability. For the Indonesian case, we note in particular the World Bank’s contributions to the establishment of internationally inspired quality assurance mechanisms and peer reviewed accreditation procedures, and their connection to the new paradigm. Moving further into the field of comparative higher education, the theoretical framework of the study was also heavily inspired by ‘conceptual typologies’ (van Vucht, 1993) that allowed us to identify, explore and compare the main institutional features of the Indonesian higher education system that together constitute its position within the “triangle of coordination” where the State, the Market, and the Academic Profession are all pulling and pushing for power (Clark, 1983: 143). Clark’s now classical typology defi nitely bridges various theoretical perspectives, as his model acknowledges the impact of power and resources, as well as of strong institutional norms in explaining differences between national systems of higher education. Nonetheless, his ideal type does not explicitly recognize the international environment as a prominent ‘fourth’ player in the higher education triangle. As for the State’s role, Neave and van Vucht distinguished two ideal types or models of higher education system governance: State control and State supervision (Neave, 1994: 9–11). Johan Olson introduced four steering models grasping different approaches to national policy-making, steering

Rationality-bounded Steering model

STATE

ACADEMIA

Corporatist-pluralist steering model

I N T E R N A T I O N A L

MARKET

Institutional Steering model

Figure 5.1

Ideal Typical Steering Models in Higher Education

Supermarket Steering model

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and governance of higher education and the way these affect change in governing universities. Olsen’s ideal types embody different ideals and views of the role of the State, professionals and society at large, but do beg the question of who is ultimately steering. As ideal types, however, these models and ideal types do suggest a framework for analyzing and explaining changes in State-university relations. They are summed up in figure 5.1, where we couch Clark’s triangle of coordination in a quadrangular field of steering models and added an international perspective on top of it. The main features of the ideal typical steering models are fi rst visualized in figure 5.1 and then contextualized in relation to the Indonesian case. The model seeks not only to indicate that change in higher education is influenced by international actors, but also helps to explore the directions of such change.

1.

The Rationality-Bounded Steering Model

This model is closely associated with the model of ‘State control’ (Clark, 1983), in which higher education is seen as an instrument of the State in order to achieve political, economic or social goals. That role is typically upheld by tightly centralized and bureaucratic control over university institutions, with a strong emphasis on accountability to the bureaucratic polity. Change in higher education follows changes in the political leadership. The model corresponds well with the Indonesian situation during much of the 1970s and 1980s, when public universities were generally regarded as “service units” of the State. Yet even in those days, centralized steering from high above captured only part of what was really going on down below within these institutions, where some departments, research units and individual faculty started to mind their own business in research and consulting. The major challenge for international assistance within this steering model is to carefully select its recipients in view of a broader strategy in support of institution building, rather than to restrict itself to the development of individual capacities within the system.

2.

The Institutional Steering Model

In an institutional steering model, the institutions have a special responsibility to protect academic values and traditions against the whims of political regimes and/or bureaucratic planning. This model is best exemplified by the close relationship between the bureaucratic State and the old elitist State universities. The role of higher education is to uphold its traditions and its socio-economic and national cultural role, to protect academic freedom, and to store and transmit knowledge, to secure future independent pursuit and transfer of knowledge, to act as a carrier of the (national) culture, and to uphold and protect its special institutional sphere, its ‘civitas academica’ so to speak. In this model, systemic change of higher education comes with

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historical processes and gradual evolution rather than as a result of intentional reform. In Indonesia, the closely nit relationship between the top leadership of the elite public institutions and the top of State bureaucracies such as DGHE and BAPPENAS, fits rather well with this model even though this domestic bureaucratic coalition in the early 1990s emerged as a coalition for comprehensive reforms, including institutional autonomy. The challenge for international assistance is to support the coalition for reform but at the same time to fi nd ways to broaden the basis of support and the need for major structural and managerial changes within institutions as well as at the center.

3.

The Corporate-Pluralist Steering Model

This model challenges the view that the State is a unitary actor with monopoly over power and control. Rather, this ideal type assumes that there are several competing and legitimate centers of authority and control with respect to higher education. The role of higher education reflects the constellation of interests voiced by different organized interest groups in the sector, such as students, staff, employers, professional associations, industry, and—important in the current Indonesian context of political decentralization—regional provincial authorities. In this model, the Ministry of Education becomes just one of the many stakeholders in higher education. Rather than central steering or even supervising, higher education policy making becomes an arena consisting of a complex network of agencies, public and semi-public boards (e.g. in accreditation), financing committees, parliamentary commissions, regional authorities, student associations, political parties etc. According to this model, change in higher education depends on changes in power constellations, organized interests and coalitions. In the post-Soeharto era of ‘reformasi’, a new set of players started to become involved in the politics of higher education. Notably, the political decentralization and movement towards increasing autonomy of provinces created new opportunities (for instance, extra sources of income for universities located in resource rich provinces) as well as challenges (for instance, more inequality or more regulations from a greater variety of authorities) for higher education. In addition, the change from an authoritarian bureaucratic polity towards a democratic political system, and the resulting liberalization of Indonesian politics opened up a previously unseen public debate between a broadened set of actors, including political parties, Parliament, students, academics and professional associations (for instance, in view of accreditation systems). Not surprisingly in this changed context, criticism about reforms in higher education that had been initiated during the Soeharto era (including the move towards autonomy) are being increasingly articulated in the open, while former domestic and international reformers, ironically, are increasingly under pressure. For international assistance, the challenge becomes to take into account this new political environment (i.e. more attention to the legal framework), not

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to become associated with one actor in particular, and to work within the confines determined by the outcome of the political process.

4.

The Supermarket Steering Model

In this model the role of the State is minimal. In its crude form it assumes that practically all State action and all actions of public providers are less efficient, less effective and/or less just, than the activities of private individuals relating through the market mechanism of supply and demand. The only specific role for public higher education is to deliver services that are not being met by the market (for instance, advanced teaching for basic research, or applied research in areas of national importance). All other services provided by public institutions, such as undergraduate teaching, should in principle be offered only on a full cost recovery basis. Even though Indonesian higher education has traditionally had a thriving private sector of providers, the State has always been keeping a close watch on its development (notably in its regulations concerning accreditation). Furthermore, the bureaucratic State invested heavily and consistently in public provision and funding, even in the current era of campus autonomy. Nonetheless, elements of the market steering model have undeniably been seeping into the Indonesian system as well (e.g. decreasing government funds and ensuing tuition hikes at public institutions, special admission tracks for the rich paying extra high tuition rates at four autonomous institutions in 2004) while critics, both on the left and the right, have blasted reforms towards more campus autonomy as a “ . . . change from State tyranny to market domination” (Heru Nugroho, 2005: 146). The challenge for international assistance in this model is to consider the implications of full or near cost recovery in terms of social inequities and to support coping strategies (e.g. student loan system, scholarships etc.), and to contribute to quality assurance mechanisms in order to safeguard academic work.

II. RELEVANCE TO POLICY AND PRACTICE: (HOW) CAN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE BE MADE (MORE) AUTONOMY COMPATIBLE? In spite of mixed outcomes and results, the study’s major theme seems to contradict those who argue that international assistance can not possibly be an effective instrument for establishing institutional change in higher education. Nonetheless, we should be careful not to generalize glorifying statements about the effectiveness of international assistance too soon, even if we restrict ourselves to the case of higher education. First of all, and most obvious, the case study method is not well suited to formulate generalizations beyond the particular case. Domestic political, economical, financial and even cultural conditions and their historical continuities and discontinuities provided a very

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specific context for international assistance to work with. Broader generalizations are therefore unwarranted and would require similar case studies at different locations or time periods. But quite apart from the methodological caveat, the results of our research simply do not support the conclusion that international assistance as such (or ‘per se’) has been an effective change agent in Indonesia’s higher education. Instead, the study explored the specific conditions that made international assistance more (or less) successful in bringing about particular changes in State university relations. In the process, we described donor failures where success was expected or planned (such as the management information systems of the early 1980s, or the IUCs or the student loan plans in the 1980s), as well as successes achieved where they were initially not suspected, let alone planned (for instance, the increasing resource diversification at Indonesian institutions). In other words, the study’s fi ndings can not easily be couched in terms of seeing international assistance to Indonesia’s higher education as an historical success story of social engineering. Instead, the study sought evidence in the specific qualities of the relationship between donor and recipient, and how this relationship changed over time and under changing conditions. Rather than viewing international assistance as a project of modernization or social engineering, the book calls for a perspective of studying international assistance as a mutual learning process. And a learning perspective does not necessarily imply that learning always takes place, nor that it is necessarily mutual. Even so, whether and how international assistance can be made more autonomy compatible remain valid questions. Work by David Ellerman, former economic adviser at the World Bank and currently highly critical of the international assistance business, puts these core questions to the fore in his recent book ‘Helping People Help Themselves: From the World Bank to an Alternative Philosophy of Development Assistance’ (Ellerman, 2005). Although this is not the place to dwell on the philosophy of international aid, we did fi nd relevant support in his suggestions with respect to autonomy respecting development aid. Specifically, albeit with modesty, we conclude that autonomy compatible assistance (in higher education) is more likely under conditions where . . . • international donors build on local frames of reference (structures, but also norms and values) but at the same time seeks to support innovations in what is already there; • donors construct alliances with domestic change agents; • donors and recipients are involved in a long term and mutual engagement; • donors and recipients acknowledge the adage that autonomy can not be imposed; • donors build as much as possible on local knowledge and experiences;

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• donors and recipients recognize that international assistance is not only about money and technical assistance, but where instead; • donors and recipients learn to appreciate the tacit component in transferring institutional development knowledge by furthering horizontal learning methods, such as study tours, cross-training, twinning arrangements and informal discussion; • donors avoid formal conditionalities; • donors and recipients collaborate in joint activities, such as evaluations, training courses, study seminars and exchange of services; Finally, our study supports the perspective that international assistance can better be no longer couched in terms of “helping” and “receiving” only. In effect, both donors studied in our case study have been confronted with their own limitations as an “helping agency”. The Dutch, to begin with, were relatively successful with their academic twinning arrangements but failed to consolidate in terms of management improvements. The World Bank, in contrast, continues to play different roles that are not necessarily compatible in terms of policy goals, negotiating strategy, and legitimacy on the ground. As a fi nancial institution, the Bank provides loans to countries, its direct clientele being governments willing to borrow. Its leverage often lies with state institutions and bureaucracies that are seeking to reform their education system. Yet the World Bank is also an institution where knowledge is developed (i.e. through research or research networks), technical advice and expertise is provided. It remains to be seen to what extent its core business as a lending agency will either encourage or inhibit its future potential for global knowledge sharing.

Annexes

Table 1

List of Interviewees

Table 2

Official Development Assistance in Indonesia

Graph 1

Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance

Table 3

Multilateral donor funded projects in higher education in Indonesia 1975–1997

Table 4

External Funding of Higher Education by Province, and IBRD share (1980–1995)

Table 5 (a) World Bank Lending for Education, 1963–2005 Table 5 (b) World Bank Lending for Education. New Commitments by Region (1963–2005) Graph 2

Higher Education Expansion in Indonesia, Enrollments 1971–1998 by Private/Public Sector

Table 6

World Bank Loan Projects with the Directorate General of Higher Education, by Objectives, Costs and Bank Share

Table 7

External Funding of Higher Education Institutions, by Institution and by Share of World Bank and Dutch Assistance (1980–1995)1

Table 8

Budget Structure of Indonesia Public Institutions of Higher Education (1998/99), by Institution (1,000 Rp.)

162

Annexes

Table 1

List of Interviewees

Name

Affiliation

Ananto Seta

Bureau chief education, Bappenas

BAPPENAS

Paulus Wirutomo

Academic, UI

UI

Muljani A. Nurhadi

Director Bureau of Planning, MOEC Academic, Universitas Katolik Atma Jaya Director General of Higher Education, MOEC

MOEC

Dean Computer Science, UI and Secretary Autonomy Team, DGHE Former Director-general DGHE, MOEC; Former Chairman BAN; Former Rector UGM

MOEC/UI

MOEC/ITB

Wati Anandy

Former Director Academic Affairs DGHE, MOEC HED-Budget Officer, MOF

Ministry of Finance

Makin Ibnu Hadjar

Project Director, MOEC

MOEC

Waworuntu Bob and Maria

Academics, UI

UI

Joyo Winoto

Head Bureau Multilateral Economic Cooperation, Bappenas

BAPPENAS/IPB

Sutrisno Pardoen Satryo Brodijonegoro Bagyo Moeliodihardjo

Soekadji Ranuwihardjo

Pramutadi

Sediono Tjondronegoro Academic, IPB Rizal Zainuddin Tamin

Institution

Universitas Katolik Atma Jaya MOEC-DGHE

UGM

IPB

Hariadi P. Soepangkat

Vice Rector for Development Plan- ITB ning Administration and Information System, ITB Secretary of Rector for Strategic ITB and International Cooperation, ITB Former Rector ITB ITB

Soewondo

Former Dean Architecture, UI

UI

Prof. Dr. Ir. Aman Wirakartosusumah

Vice Rector I, IPB

IPB

Fasli

Head of Division, Bappenas

BAPPENAS

Prof. Nopirin

Dean Faculty of Economics, UGM UGM

Prof. Sahid Susanto

Secretary of the Autonomy Team, UGM

UGM

Willi Toisuta

Secretary Accreditation Board, BAN

BAN

Prof. Rubiyanto Misman

Rector, UNSOED

UNSOED

Kusmayanto Kadiman

(continued)

Annexes Table 1

163

List of Interviewees (continued)

Name

Affiliation

Institution

Mintarsih A. Sutrisno

Former Rector, UNILA Academic

Ansori R.

Secretary Higher Education Board, IPB MOEC and academic, IPB

Dr. Budi Mulyanto

Project Director at Dept. of Soil Science, IPB

IPB (QUE)

Prof. Dr. H. Kanyo

Vice Rector II, IPB

UNSOED

Sachi Hatakenaka

Former Task Manager, World Bank WB

Maureen Woodhall

Education Consultant

University

Clifford Gilpin

Former Division Chief EA3PH

WB

Chris Smith

Higher Education Task Manager, World Bank

WB

Jerry Strudwick

Education Specialist World Bank Jakarta

WB

Stuart Weston

Consultant

Consultant

Sam Lieberman

Social Sector Coordinator, World Bank Jakarta

WB

Jack Maas

Former World Bank

IFC

Jon Hagen

Director Dutch Education Center (NEC), Jakarta

NEC

Harry Brinkman

Former Chairman Executive Board, VUA Free University of Amsterdam

Theo Veenkamp

Former Project Coordinator in NUFFIC Indonesia, and former Chairman NUFFIC

Nico Schulte-Nordholt

Academic, University of Twente

UTWENTE

Lucien Wolfs

Head of Department

Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands

Bart Zijlstra

Advisor, Ministry of Education and Culture

Ministry of Education (Nthl)

Arnold van der Zanden

NUFFIC

NUFFIC

Corry Klugkist

NUFFIC

NUFFIC

Beer Schroeder

NUFFIC

NUFFIC

Peter Maassen

Academic, University of Twente

CHEPS, Utwente

Rosita van Meel

Former Head of Consultancy Divi- WB sion at NUFFIC

Ralph Harbison

Formerly World Bank

UNILA ITB

UAlbany

164 Annexes Table 2

Official Development Assistance (ODA), in millions of USD (disbursements, 1999 dollar value) Bilateral

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Total

Total ODA as % of GDP

601 537 656 683 675 968 1.238 1.322 1.117 1.634 1.311 2.064 2.702 4.113 3.222 4.317 3.560 3.246 3.405 3.728 3.591 3.274 2.601 1.746 1.686

1.7 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.8 1.4 2.4 3.4 4.6 3.2 3.8 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.2 2.0 1.1

Multilateral

440 278 358 454 402 632 766 625 551 467 625 704 1.713 1.308 1.148 2.538 1.621 1.327 1.663 1.908 1.847 1.644 1.026 668 663

161 259 298 229 273 336 472 697 566 1.167 686 1.360 989 2.805 2.074 1.779 1.939 1.919 1.742 1.820 1.744 1.630 1.575 1.078 1.023

Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, various issues.

3,000 2,500 2,000 Bilateral ODA

1,500

Multilateral ODA

1,000 500

99

97

19

95

19

93

19

91

19

89

19

87

19

85

19

83

19

81

19

79

19

77

19

19

19

75

-

Graph 1 Development of Bilateral and Multilateral ODA in Indonesia (1975–1999)

Annexes

165

Table 3 Multilateral Donor Funded Projects in Higher Education in Indonesia (1975–1997) Actual Donor Amount (disbursed) Year

Project Name

Donor

1975

Surabaya Institute of Technology

ADB

14.500.000

1978

Polytechnic I

IDA

4.900.000

1979

Universitas Hasannuddin

ADB

25.000.000

1981

University Development I

IBRD

43.060.000

1981

Universitas North Sumatra

ADB

26.000.000

1983

Polytechnic II

IBRD

106.000.000

1985

Universitas Sriwijaya

ADB

37.900.000

1985

University Development II

IBRD

147.000.000

1988

HEDP I

IBRD

133.317.000

1988

Marine Science Education

ADB

37.900.000

1990

6 universities development program

ADB

114.000.000

1991

HEDP II

IBRD

150.000.000

1993

Higher Education Project

ADB

102.584.000

1994

University Research Graduate Educ.

IBRD

38.300.000

1996

Development of Undergraduate Education

IBRD

55.750.000

1997

Quality of Undergraduate Education

IBRD

55.730.000 1.091.941.000,00

166 Annexes Table 4

External Funding of Higher Education by Province, and by IBRD share (1980–1995)

Province

Total External

% of TE

IBRD Total

IBRD %

West Java

$ 424.056.000

24,74%

$147.098.000

34,69%

DKI Jakarta

$ 211.012.000

12,31%

$137.529.000

65,18%

East Java

$ 176.607.000

10,30%

$ 67.556.000

38,25%

DI Yogyakarta

$ 128.091.000

7,47%

$103.249.000

80,61%

Central Java

$ 84.303.000

4,92%

$ 22.800.000

27,05%

South Sulawesi

$ 82.059.000

4,79%

$ 27.440.000

33,44%

North Sumatra

$ 68.818.000

4,01%

$ 23.228.000

33,75%

West Sumatra

$ 60.413.000

3,52%

$ 49.068.000

81,22%

North Sulawesi

$ 58.680.000

3,42%

$ 14.137.000

24,09%

DI Aceh

$ 54.776.000

3,20%

$ 8.686.000

15,86%

South Sumatra

$ 51.090.000

2,98%

$ 8.264.000

16,18%

Irian Jaya

$ 37.752.000

2,20%

$ 9.571.000

25,35%

Maluku

$ 30.618.000

1,79%

$ 3.443.000

11,25%

South Kalimantan

$ 28.269.000

1,65%

$ 4.792.000

16,95%

Riau

$ 24.448.000

1,43%

$ 8.673.000

35,48%

Southeast Sulawesi

$ 23.819.000

1,39%

$ 2.600.000

10,92%

West Nusa Tenggara

$ 22.561.000

1,32%

$ 2.875.000

12,74%

Bali

$ 22.239.999

1,30%

$ 11.791.000

53,02%

Central Sulawesi

$ 22.018.000

1,28%

$ 7.184.000

32,63%

West Kalimantan

$ 21.505.000

1,25%

$ 3.493.000

16,24%

East Nusa Tenggara

$ 20.189.000

1,18%

$ 3.039.000

15,05%

East Kalimantan

$ 14.260.000

0,83%

$ 8.163.000

57,24%

Jambi

$ 14.092.000

0,82%

$ 2.934.000

20,82%

Bengkulu

$ 13.647.000

0,80%

$ 3.006.000

22,03%

Lampung

$ 10.106.000

0,59%

$ 4.017.000

39,75%

$ 8.629.000

0,50%

$ 2.509.000

29,08%

$1.714.057.999

100,00%

$687.145.000

40,09%

Central Kalimantan

Notes: (1) USD 196,852,100 for Polytechnics not included as data not available by Province (2) No data available for East Timor, which only has Polytechnic (no university).

Annexes Table 5(a) Fiscal year 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

167

World Bank Lending for Education, 1963–2005 Education New World Bank Total New Education as % of Commitments (millions of Commitments (millions of World Bank Total current US$) current US$) 5 709 0.7% 18 1,086 1.6% 30 1,332 2.2% 34 1,124 3.0% 52 1,131 4.6% 24 954 2.5% 82 1,784 4.6% 80 2,187 3.7% 108 2,505 4.3% 180 2,966 6.1% 273 3,369 8.1% 153 4,314 3.5% 224 5,887 3.8% 321 6,632 4.8% 289 7,050 4.1% 352 8,411 4.2% 496 10,011 5.0% 440 11,514 3.8% 747 12,291 6.1% 526 13,016 4.0% 545 14,477 3.8% 702 15,522 4.5% 937 14,384 6.5% 836 16,399 5.1% 451 17,674 2.6% 867 19,221 4.5% 4.8% 1,023 21,367 1,404 20,702 6.8% 2,036 22,686 9.0% 1,332 21,706 6.1% 1,854 23,696 7.8% 1,746 20,836 8.4% 2,143 22,522 9.5% 1,720 21,352 8.1% 1,037 19,147 5.4% 2,821 28,519 9.9% 1,487 28,996 5.1% 728 15,276 4.8% 1,095 17,251 6.3% 1,385 19,519 7.1% 2,349 18,513 12.7% 1,684 20,080 8.4% 1,951 21,893 8.9%

Note: There is a break in the series because a new coding system for sector analysis was introduced in FY03 and backdated to 1990.

168

Annexes

Table 5(b) World Bank Lending for Education. New Commitments by Region (1963–2005) Region Fiscal year

Africa

East Asia & Pacific

Europe & Central Asia

Latin America Middle East & & Caribbean North Africa

South Asia

TOTAL

Millions of current US$ 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

5 5 20 7 23 15 24 36 31 44 115 5 97 92 52 82 57 84 195 81 135 25 128 125 98 164 108 310 221 324 364 268 175 195 115 400 209 190 210 473 424 363 369

6 6 24 9 5 47 89 39 23 93 83 40 164 138 363 226 237 409 370 476 34 352 156 371 566 391 461 329 277 444 620 185 639 84 15 135 226 119 228

12 27 63 24 25 45

81 40

67 58 54 145 77 198 8 10 65 63 89 126 544 54 23 63 83 395 164 264

3 10 9 34 15 26 21 68 48 35 59 34 53 32 82 113 60 68 196 10 79 112 191 61 534 406 480 919 1,058 474 76 858 462 63 529 560 785 218 680

11 13

13 4 13

8 19 27 13 17 11 89 74 110 167 106 82 93 94 75 46 173 47 91 239 30 240 72 108 30 152 97 100 129 59 197 72 38 154 155 124

12

12 21 6 56 40 25 14 20 57 139 52 139 3 329 555 278 131 431 135 417 420 706 64 171 206 96 365 666 286

5 18 30 34 52 24 82 80 108 180 273 153 224 321 289 352 496 440 747 526 545 702 937 836 451 867 1,023 1,404 2,036 1,332 1,854 1,746 2,143 1,720 1,037 2,821 1,487 728 1,095 1,385 2,349 1,684 1,951

Note: There is a break in the series because a new coding system for sector analysis was introduced in FY03 and backdated to 1990.

Graph 2

0

500,000

,000,000

,500,000

,000,000

,500,000

Private Institutions

Higher Education Expansion in Indonesia, Enrollments 1971–1998 by Private/Public Sector

State Institutions

1971/72 1980/81 1983/84 1986/87 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98

Annexes 169

170 Annexes Table 6 World Bank Loan Projects with the Directorate General of Higher Education, by Objectives, Costs and Bank Share

Project

Project objectives

Actual Cost

Bank Loan

Bank Share

US$ million

US$ million

% of total

Poly I (IDA) / 12/78 -06/85

1. To establish a new system of post-secondary technical education to help meet the country’s needs of technicians for industry 2. To improve accountancy training and practices 3. To help strengthen education planning and management

84,71

49

58%

Poly II / Apr-83– Dec-90

1. Expansion of the polytechnic system by extending existing poly’s, constructing and equiping 11 new poly’s 2. To increase the number of polytechnic teachers, develop new and improved courses, curricula and teaching materials 3. To assist the MOEC in defining mechanisms for management of the polytechnic system within the higher education system

170,4

106

62%

UDP I / Jan-80– Sept-88

1. To increase the output in selected fields at three universities 2. To improve the quality of university inputs 3. To strengthen the management of the university system

49,7

43,06

87%

UDP II / 1. To develop Indonesia’s capacity to train its own May-85– university teachers and researchers Dec-93 a) development of new graduate-level programs in selected fields b) initiation of five specialized undergraduate fields currently not available in Indonesia c) strengthening of overall university planning and management

160

147

92%

HEDP I / 1. To assist the GOI in implementing its higher May-88– education program, specifically including the Dec-93 following policy objectives: a) improvement of sectoral planning, by making growth targets contingent on availability of both public and private resources b) improvement of both sectoral and institutional management c) increasing resource mobilization d) improving educational quality and efficiency e) strengthening selected fields of study reflecting manpower needs f) increasing the contribution of universities to regional development

219,517

133,317

61%

(continued)

Annexes

171

Table 6 World Bank Loan Projects with the Directorate General of Higher Education, by Objectives, Costs and Bank Share (continued)

Project

Project objectives

Actual Cost

Bank Loan

Bank Share

US$ million

US$ million

% of total

HEDP II / 1. In support of the implementation of on of the May-91– GOI’s higher education policy objectives the Jul-96 project would finance a second time-slice of Indonesia’s updated higher education program, aimed at: a) improving quality and efficiency b) alleviating human resource shortages c) improving planning and management d) increasing mobilization of resources e) strengthening regional development

261,4

150

57%

URGE / 1. To improve the quality of graduate education in May-94– Indonesia 2001 a) increase competitive funding for domestic graduate education and research b) strengthen the procedures for selecting grant and fellowship proposals c) strengthen research capacity and dissemination of research findings in universities d) attract highly qualified candidates for domestic graduate education

56,7

38,3

68%

DUE / 1. To improve the quality of undergraduate educaMay-96– tion at 6 target universities 2002 2. To improve the efficiency of the educational process at 6 target universities 3. To improve the relevance of the study programs offered at these institutions

69,51

55,75

80%

QUE / 1. To improve the quality of undergrad. study May-97– programs in national priority fields 2003 2. To promote a more cost-effective allocation of public funds by directing resources to high priority fields at both public and private universities.

67,65

55,73

82%

1139,587

778,178

68%

The specific academic programs to be supported will be determined through a competitive process. The recipient academic programs would utilize block grant funds to implement self-designed development plans.

$ 51.091.000

$ 47.878.000 $ 40.793.000 $ 37.752.000 $ 32.219.000 $ 30.618.000 $ 28.269.000 $ 27.678.000

Universidas Andalas (UNAND)

Universitas Airlangga (UNAIR)

Universitas Cenderawasih (UNCEN)

Universitas Padjadjaran (UNPAD)

Universitas Pattimura (UNPATTI)

Universitas Lambung Mangkurat (UNLAM)

Universitas Brawijaya (UNIBRAW)

$ 53.682.000

Universitas Diponegoro (UNDIP)

$ 50.913.000

$ 54.755.000

Universitas Sumatera Utara (USU)

Universitas Sam Ratulangi (UNSRAT)

$ 54.776.000

Universitas Sriwijaya (UNSRI)

$ 66.418.000

$ 103.898.000

Universitas Indonesia (UI)

Universitas Syiah Kuala (UNSYIAH)

$ 114.062.000

Universitas Gajah Mada (UGM)

Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS)

$ 174.836.000

Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB)

$ 75.177.000

$ 196.852.000

Polytecnics

Institut Teknologie Sepuluh November (ITS)

$ 206.166.000

Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB)

Total External Funding

$ 15.574.000

$ 4.792.000

$ 3.443.000

$ 12.336.000

$ 9.751.000

$ 19.597.000

$ 40.795.000

$ 6.871.000

$ 8.264.000

$ 8.727.000

$ 12.089.000

$ 8.686.000

$ 14.822.000

$ 13.375.000

$ 76.402.000

$ 93.477.000

$ 80.014.000

$ 157.000.000

$ 44.613.000

World Bank

1,51%

1,55%

1,67%

1,76%

2,06%

2,23%

2,62%

2,78%

2,79%

2,93%

2,99%

2,99%

3,63%

4,11%

5,68%

6,23%

9,56%

10,76%

11,27%

Bank by Institution

56,27%

16,95%

11,25%

38,29%

25,83%

48,04%

85,21%

13,50%

16,18%

16,26%

22,08%

15,86%

22,32%

17,79%

73,54%

81,95%

45,77%

79,76%

21,64%

Bank Rel. %

$ 7.422.645

$—

$ 68.711

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$ 1.617.198

$ 2.533.711

$ 821.483

$ 9.487.219

$ 123.296

$—

$—

Dutch Univ. Assistance 2

External Funding of HED Institutions, by Institution and by Share of World Bank and Dutch Assistance (1980–1995)1

Name of Institution

Table 7

0,00%

0,22%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

2,43%

3,37%

0,79%

8,32%

0,07%

0,00%

0,00%

Dutch Rel. %

33,63% 26,82%

0,00%

0,31%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

7,33%

11,48%

3,72%

42,98%

0,56%

0,00%

0,00%

Dutch Asst. by Instit.

172 Annexes

$ 13.647.000 $ 13.237.000 $ 12.383.000 $ 11.948.000 $ 11.856.000 $ 11.557.000 $ 10.160.000 $ 10.106.000 $ 9.536.000 $ 9.456.000 $ 8.629.000

Universitas Jenderal Soedirman (UNSOED)

IKIP YOGYAKARTA

Universitas Jember (UNEJ)

IKIP PADANG

IKIP SURABAYA

IKIP BANDUNG

Universitas Lampung (UNILA)

Universitas Sebelas Maret (UNS)

IKIP MALANG

Universitas Palang Karaya (UNPAR)

$ 14.063.000

Universitas Bengkulu (UNIB)

$ 14.260.000

IKIP JAKARTA

IKIP MEDAN

$ 16.668.000

Universitas Udayana (UNUD)

Universitas Mulawarman (UNMUL)

$ 19.631.000

Universitas Nusa Cendana (UNDANA)

$ 15.641.000

$ 20.189.000

Universitas Tadulako (UNTAD)

$ 14.902.000

$ 22.018.000

Universitas Tanjungpura (UNTAN)

Universitas Jambi (UNJA)

$ 21.505.000

Universitas Mataram (UNRAM)

IKIP UJUNG PANDANG

$ 23.819.000 $ 22.561.000

Universitas Haluoleo (UNHALU)

$ 24.448.000

Universitas Riau (UNRI)

$ 2.509.000

$ 8.956.000

$ 4.566.000

$ 4.017.000

$ 9.460.000

$ 8.534.000

$ 7.631.000

$ 1.521.000

$ 10.606.000

$ 2.159.000

$ 3.006.000

$ 11.139.000

$ 8.163.000

$ 2.934.000

$ 12.618.000

$ 10.898.000

$ 9.183.000

$ 3.039.000

$ 7.148.000

$ 3.493.000

$ 2.875.000

$ 2.600.000

$ 8.673.000

0,47%

0,52%

0,52%

0,55%

0,56%

0,63%

0,65%

0,65%

0,68%

0,72%

0,75%

0,77%

0,78%

0,81%

0,85%

0,91%

1,07%

1,10%

1,20%

1,18%

1,23%

1,30%

1,34%

29,08%

94,71%

47,88%

39,75%

93,11%

73,84%

64,36%

12,73%

85,65%

16,31%

22,03%

79,21%

57,24%

19,69%

80,67%

65,38%

46,78%

15,05%

32,46%

16,24%

12,74%

10,92%

35,48%

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

(continued)

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

Annexes 173

$ 619.000 $ 804.275.000

$ 619.000 $1.829.472.000

100,00%

0,03%

0,04%

0,04%

0,04%

0,09%

0,10%

0,11%

0,32%

0,40%

0,45%

Bank by Institution

43,96%

100,00%

100,00%

100,00%

100,00%

69,99%

100,00%

100,00%

91,44%

93,08%

100,00%

Bank Rel. %

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

Dutch Asst. by Instit.

$ 22.074.263 100,00%

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

$—

Dutch Univ. Assistance 2

1,21%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

Dutch Rel. %

Source: BAPPENAS, World Bank, Ministry of Finance. Figures do not include resources directed at DGHE or to other institutions. Note regarding Polytechnics: there are 26 polytechnics, 17 of which were established with external assistance. Information by institution not available.

$ 675.000

$ 679.000

$ 701.000

$ 1.166.000

STSI SURAKARTA (School of Art)

ISI YOGYAKARTA (Institute of Art)

$ 1.907.000

$ 675.000

$ 1.666.000

STKIP SINGARAJA (School of Teacher Training)

$ 1.925.000

$ 679.000

$ 1.907.000

STKIP GORONTALO (School of Teacher Training)

$ 5.342.000

$ 6.729.000

ASTI BANDUNG (School of Art)

$ 1.925.000

IKIP MANADO

ASKI PADANG PANJANG (Academy of Art)

$ 5.842.000

IKIP SEMARANG

$ 8.176.000

$ 701.000

$ 7.229.000

Universitas Terbuka (Open Univ.)

STSI DENPASAR (School of Art)

$ 8.176.000

Name of Institution

World Bank

External Funding of HED Institutions, by Institution and by Share of World Bank and Dutch Assistance (1980–1995)1 (continued)

Total External Funding

Table 7

174 Annexes

57.434.852

98.906.876

65.164.055

63.831.564

68.311.413

69.617.652

12.414.497

25.322.061

29.952.572

33.723.364

19.881.567

14.989.904

40.015.980

36.053.048

24.049.836

31.567.518

15.841.295

29.292.789

26.410.625

28.998.434

UI

ITB

UGM

UNPAD

Open Univ.

UNILA

ITS

UNS

UNHAS

UNEJ

UNRI

USU

UNIBRAW

UNSYIAH

UNAIR

UNMUL

UNDIP

UNAND

IKIP BANDUNG

Total Recurrent

IPB

Name of Institution

%

73,3%

19.648.894 67,8%

16.519.099 62,5%

17.308.589 59,1%

12.597.295 79,5%

20.963.521 66,4%

15.327.357 63,7%

16.576.048 46,0%

21.140.699 52,8%

11.008.366 73,4%

13.406.308 67,4%

20.661.364 61,3%

18.652.572 62,3%

13.552.812 53,5%

9.097.224

15.015.052 21,6%

27.352.684 40,0%

28.646.564 44,9%

22.355.289 34,3%

38.842.381 39,3%

22.694.852 39,5%

Gov. DIK

9.349.540

9.891.526

11.984.200

3.244.000

10.603.997

8.722.479

19.477.000

18.875.281

3.981.538

6.475.259

13.062.000

11.300.000

11.769.249

3.317.273

54.602.600

40.958.729

35.185.000

42.808.766

60.064.495

34.740.000

Selfgenerated

32,2%

37,5%

40,9%

20,5%

33,6%

36,3%

54,0%

47,2%

26,6%

32,6%

38,7%

37,7%

46,5%

26,7%

78,4%

60,0%

55,1%

65,7%

60,7%

60,5%

%

6.910.600

10.104.630

8.738.900

26.054.072

10.598.106

20.859.830

9.153.800

6.418.500

32.859.434

28.343.857

16.642.800

32.199.286

38.438.118

52.574.134

1.556.000

17.392.234

39.897.231

60.035.984

32.337.290

94.432.818

Total Investment

6.910.600

8.652.600

8.738.900

5.869.799

10.598.106

7.477.100

9.153.800

6.418.500

8.663.400

6.940.900

16.642.800

5.771.132

10.917.200

6.479.000

1.556.000

10.318.200

11.422.900

12.832.400

11.779.500

10.764.300

Gov. DIP

—

5.941.008

31.918.000

—

76.343.673

External

—

26.022.333

1.204.483

5.178.924

25.000

13.382.730

20.184.273

1.452.030 100,0% —

85,6%

100,0% —

22,5%

100,0% —

35,8%

100,0% —

100,0% —

26,4%

24,5%

100,0% —

17,9%

28,4%

12,3%

100,0% —

59,3%

28,6%

21,4%

36,4%

11,4%

%

Table 8 Budget Structure of Indonesia Public Institutions of Higher Education (1998/99), by Institution (1,000 Rp.) QUE/DUE

20.557.790

44.890.651

—

7.074.034

21.377.957

—

26.428.154

—

—

—

—

0,0%

—

14,4% —

0,0%

77,5% —

0,0%

64,2% —

0,0%

0,0%

15,8% 19.017.110

0,1%

0,0%

0,0%

67,7% 1.498.585

2,3%

0,0%

0,0%

14,9% 22.533.323

53,2% 15.285.584

0,0%

80,8% 7.324.845

%

151.867.670

TOTAL I &R

71.173.652

63.760.179

50.366.164

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

(continued)

35.909.034

36.515.255

38.031.689

41.895.367

42.165.624

44.909.666

45.206.848

46.434.480

57,9% 47.849.338

75,4% 48.225.424

0,0%

82,1% 62.151.858

3,9%

85,4% 64.988.631

0,0%

40,7% 85.703.647

56,5% 103.728.795

25,5% 125.200.039

63,6% 131.244.166

7,8%

%

Annexes 175

18.001.552

19.593.506

18.373.830

15.371.066

9.308.464

IKIP MALANG

IKIP MEDAN

IKIP SURABAYA

UNLAM

UNCEN

16.537.610

18.337.560

UNSOED

IKIP SEMARANG

19.760.638

14.646.390

UNPATTI

IKIP YOGYAKARTA

21.252.519

IKIP JAKARTA

6.620.357

24.166.494

UNSRI

21.617.436

22.796.420

UNSRAT

IKIP PADANG

25.479.308

UNUD

UNDANA

9.322.106

Total Recurrent

UNIB

Name of Institution

13.908.235

8.660.914

13.154.651

15.077.531

15.493.506

14.149.051

12.287.624

14.623.963

16.520.623

5.008.964

12.225.555

15.466.224

16.456.415

16.403.420

18.347.608

7.138.480

Gov. DIK

84,1%

93,0%

85,6%

82,1%

79,1%

78,6%

67,0%

74,0%

76,4%

75,7%

83,5%

72,8%

68,1%

72,0%

72,0%

76,6%

%

2.629.375

647.550

2.216.415

3.296.299

4.100.000

3.852.501

6.049.936

5.136.675

5.096.813

1.611.393

2.420.835

5.786.295

7.710.079

6.393.000

7.131.700

2.183.626

Selfgenerated

15,9%

7,0%

14,4%

17,9%

20,9%

21,4%

33,0%

26,0%

23,6%

24,3%

16,5%

27,2%

31,9%

28,0%

28,0%

23,4%

%

5.138.900

13.355.088

7.326.705

5.126.800

4.176.700

6.835.200

7.506.731

7.755.056

6.486.300

21.801.481

13.944.050

8.323.621

5.664.100

9.492.506

7.930.900

24.378.008

Total Investment

99,4%

98,4%

33,5%

%

25,4%

73,6%

70,8%

99,6%

96,1%

5.138.900 100,0%

13.296.200

7.039.300

5.126.800 100,0%

4.176.700 100,0%

6.835.200 100,0%

5.317.330

7.755.056 100,0%

6.486.300 100,0%

5.544.100

10.264.810

8.323.621 100,0%

5.664.100 100,0%

9.434.300

7.800.200

8.166.100

Gov. DIP

0,0%

0,0%

0,6%

1,6%

0,0%

%

—

58.888

287.405

—

—

—

80.000

—

—

124.307

0,0%

0,4%

3,9%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

1,1%

0,0%

0,0%

0,6%

3.679.240 26,4%

—

—

58.206

130.700

—

External

Table 8 Budget Structure of Indonesia Public Institutions of Higher Education (1998/99), by Institution (1,000 Rp.) (continued) %

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

—

—

—

—

—

—

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

2.109.401 28,1%

—

—

16.133.074 74,0%

—

—

—

—

—

16.211.908 66,5%

QUE/DUE

21.676.510

22.663.552

22.697.771

23.500.630

23.770.206

24.836.752

25.844.291

27.515.694

28.103.736

28.421.838

28.590.440

29.576.140

29.830.594

32.288.926

33.410.208

33.700.114

TOTAL I &R

176 Annexes

2.777.285

2.269.352

ASTI BANDUNG

ASKI PADANG PANJANG

AVERAGES

2.124.579

2.419.365

2.860.716

3.613.300

7.459.700

7.477.316

8.815.511

7.677.626

8.021.319

7.642.607

10.045.814

11.334.669

13.293.587

10.221.383

12.691.903

23.790.475

13.960.571

1.213.314.202 711.989.129

3.185.716

STSI DENPASAR

Totals

4.009.900

10.068.904

UNJA

STSI SURAKARTA

10.042.919

UNPAR

7.854.950

11.819.307

UNHALU

STKIP SINGARAJA

13.365.461

UNTAD

8.217.116

14.696.368

UNTAN

STKIP GORONTALO

15.293.587

IKIP MANADO

9.717.623

12.388.620

UNRAM

ISI

14.641.936

IKIP UJUNG PANDANG

70,9%

58,7%

93,6%

87,1%

89,8%

90,1%

95,0%

91,0%

90,7%

76,3%

79,9%

64,7%

75,2%

77,1%

86,9%

82,5%

86,7%

9.829.903

501.325.073

144.773

357.920

325.000

396.600

395.250

739.800

902.112

2.391.278

2.021.600

4.176.700

3.319.647

3.361.699

2.000.000

2.167.237

1.950.033

1.794.039

1.660.300

2.351.611

3.082.300

4.269.700

4.188.339

5.181.300

5.210.800

6.575.800

6.228.150

6.867.627

6.010.500

5.783.450

9.170.336

6.918.700

29,1%

15.217.308

92,2%

96,4%

93,7%

98,9%

7.218.316

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

225.150

432.627

63.800

—

713.436

—

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

3,6%

6,3%

1,1%

0,0%

7,8%

0,0%

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

0,0%

78,2%

3.676.592

8,7%

4.322.400 13,1%

47,4% 187.506.213 24,2% 220.442.416 28,4%

1.794.039 100,0%

1.660.300 100,0%

2.351.611 100,0%

3.082.300 100,0%

4.269.700 100,0%

4.188.339 100,0%

5.181.300 100,0%

5.210.800 100,0%

6.575.800 100,0%

6.003.000

6.435.000

5.946.700

5.783.450 100,0%

8.456.900

6.918.700 100,0%

41,3% 776.082.722 368.134.093

6,4%

12,9%

10,2%

9,9%

5,0%

9,0%

9,3%

23,7%

20,1%

35,3%

24,8%

22,9%

13,1%

17,5%

13,3%

4.063.391

4.437.585

5.537.327

7.092.200

12.124.650

12.405.455

14.898.923

15.279.704

16.618.719

18.047.457

20.233.088

20.706.868

21.077.037

21.558.956

21.560.636

Annexes 177

Notes

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Excluding the period of political turmoil from the mid- to late sixties when much of Western development assistance to Indonesian higher education was sharply reduced—and in some cases (as with the USAID in 1965) abandoned altogether—in response to charges of capitalist propaganda. The episode was quite forcefully reflected in Sukarno’s famous phrase “to hell with your aid”. For an historical account of the story of the “Ousting of Western Professors” see (Thomas, 1973). 2. While further data and analysis of donor resources in education will follow in chapter 3, it is noted here that from 1984 through 1998 international ‘project aid’ on average accounted for over 41% of the government’s total development budget, a figure that has been on the rise even further in the aftermath of the fi nancial crisis of 1997/98 (World Bank, 1999). Indonesia overall has enjoyed a broad base of external support in the donor community, possibly for a variety of political and economic reasons. While the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and Japanese bilateral assistance are now the dominant providers of official external assistance to the country -from 1994/95 to 1996/97, these three donors on average jointly committed a total of $ 4.3 billion annually in loans and grants, accounting for 81% of the total international assistance to Indonesia (ADB 1998: 22). Many other donors have given Indonesia a prominent place in their respective assistance portfolio’s, including Australia, Germany, the United States, France, the Netherlands (the latter until March 1992, when the Dutch-Indonesian aid relationship was abruptly ended), and various UN agencies. Annual meetings between donor agencies in the Consultative Group on Indonesia, a formalized inter-agency consultation body formed in the early years of Soeharto’s New Order, provide a forum for regular discussions with the government and among donors. As from 1992, the Consultative Group was chaired by the World Bank. Before that time, the meetings of the donor group, then called the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, were led by the Netherlands. 3. The World Bank, easily the country’s largest source of official assistance loans from the 1970s onwards, made lending in education and health the second largest sector (following infrastructure) in Indonesia, growing from 7.3% in the 1970s, 11.6% in the 1980s to 16% in the 1990s (World Bank 1999: 13). Altogether, its education lending over the years represented over $2.5 billion worth of loans from 1970 to the present, in turn making Indonesia not only the largest recipient of Bank education assistance in the region—a share currently estimated at 37% of its total East Asia portfolio (and well ahead of China)—but also invariably including this country among its largest education portfolio’s

180

4.

5.

6.

7.

Notes worldwide (World Bank 1999). Not surprisingly perhaps, Dutch educational assistance before the dramatic rupture in the bilateral aid relationship with Indonesia in 1992 was even more heavily concentrated on that country, in 1990 representing slightly over 20% of its total international education assistance portfolio (Van Den Bosch 1992: 70, 74). From 1970 through the 1990s, higher education accounted for over 40% of total international education assistance to that country. To illustrate with data on individual donors, higher education in the early 1980s represented no less than 54% of World Bank educational lending portfolio to Indonesia, and while its share has been on the decrease since, that decrease at least until very recently has been attributed as much to the increasing volume of projects in other education sub-sectors as to a shift in policy or country strategy (World Bank 1991; World Bank 1999: 22). Further, Indonesia is the Bank’s second largest borrower for tertiary education worldwide (Salmi 1998). A similar, albeit less dramatic picture emerges from the data of another major multilateral donor, the Asian Development Bank, which during the 1990s was investing about 30% of its social sector lending in Indonesia (including education, health, and nutrition) to higher education projects (ADB 1998: 21). Corresponding figures for bilateral donors are not easy to make, in part because data are not readily available or comparable over longer periods of time. Nonetheless, and with regard to Dutch educational assistance in particular, data do indicate a remarkable growth of expenditures in higher education in the 1980s (up to 43.9% of total educational assistance), which in 1990 accounted for 37% of educational assistance to Indonesia (Van Den Bosch 1992: 33, 70–74). From the early 1980s through 1995, international aid on average accounted for 40% of the nation’s public higher education development budget. The specific period referred to here goes from 1986/87 to 1989/90, when international assistance accounted for 51.5% of the higher education development budget (World Bank 1991: 2). Funding sources for public higher education in Indonesia basically include the routine budget (DIK), consisting for most part of salary expenditures for its civil service staff paid and by the Ministry of Finance, the development budget (DIP), comprising physical and non-physical investments, international assistance projects, and since the late 1980s also some recurrent expenditures; and the self-generated income (DRK or DIK-S), which includes income from tuition and other revenue generated by institutions (e.g. contracts). Further analysis of the composition of these different funding sources, and specifically of the place of international assistance in it, will be provided in chapter 3. The term ‘sub-sector’ is used here in a generic sense as the subdivision of a larger sector (in this case, education assistance), which in turn can be part of an even broader whole (for instance, social sector assistance). Some of the assistance jargon, however, uses the term ‘sub-sector’ in a more narrow sense, sometimes depending on the particular donor agency. Notably, the World Bank’s lending strategies for higher education have been classified as ‘sub-sectoral’ (i.e. sequential and integrated support for higher education), ‘inter-sectoral’ (i.e. education projects having components or objectives related to other sectors), and ‘sectoral’ (i.e. higher education projects linked to other levels of education, for instance teacher training projects) (Eisemon 1992 : 16). Jones’ analysis of World Bank education lending notes that a sub-sector perspective, often involving long-term investments in consecutive projects, overall has not been typical for World Bank projects in education (Jones 1992: 211). The Bank’s most recent education sector strategy papers in fact advocates a general preference for a holistic approach to educational lending at the level of the sector–rather than the sub-sector (World Bank 1999: 24).

Notes

181

8. In the early nineties, assistance to education comprised 10.5% of total Dutch assistance, of which 43,9% went to higher education (Buchert 1994; Dubbeldam 1991). In 1990, Indonesia represented 20,3% of all expenditures of Dutch educational assistance, while higher education development assistance to Indonesia accounted for 20.9% of all higher education expenditures of Dutch education assistance (Van Den Bosch 1992). 9. Since the early 1990s cost recovery from tuition fees is reported to have risen sharply at most public institutions, now representing well over 20% of their income. In addition, some of the more prestigious institutions either became increasingly successful in attracting self-generated income in the form of contracts (often with government agencies), or have become more open about its existence (see further discussion in relation to international assistance in chapter 4). 10. Notably, proceeds from tuition and other self-generated institutional income continue to be regulated by the formerly colonial State budget law (Indische Comptabiliteitswet, 1927) and the law on ‘non-tax government income’ specifically. As recent as 1998 the Ministers of Education and Finance in a joint letter of agreement granted universities and hospitals the privilege to retain their self-generated income. 11. Ironically, the Team for University Autonomy, headed by a former UI Rector, and formally established by Decree of the Director General of Higher Education in November 1998 provides a most telling example (GOVDOC—426/ DIKTI/Kep/1998). 12. A further argument to be made for ‘assistance’ is that the term happens to correspond well with the general OECD category of “official development assistance” denoting grants or concessional loans “provided by the official sector with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective” (OECD 1999). 13. Student protests have played spectacular roles on Indonesia’s political stage at crucial moments in the country’s history. The student riots in 1978 marked the second serious moment of opposition against Soeharto, and received backing from retired army officers (Bresnan 1993: 197–202). The regime, however, reacted forcibly and successfully crushed the opposition, in the process consolidating its power for almost 20 years. Troops were sent in on the ITB campus (i.e. the leading engineering school in the country and at the time the hotbed of the student protest), the Rector was removed from office, hundreds of students were put in jail (some for several years), and student organizations disbanded (p.c. N. Schulte Nordholt). The ITB Rector’s successor recalls how during those days he spent most of his time trying to get students out of jail, keeping them out, and in the meantime answering phone calls from worrying parents (p.c. Hariadi). The increasingly dogmatic rigidity that characterized the regime during the years following the 1978 events left its mark on campus life with campaigns to “normalize campus life” (NKK, 1978), or to “reeducate civil servants in the Pancacila beliefs” (P4, 1979/80) (Thomas 1981). Little room was left for intellectual debate or criticism inside or outside academia for some time to come (p.c. N. Schulte Nordholt). 14. The World Bank started its fi rst major project in higher education development (excluding earlier efforts in teacher training) in 1978 with the approval of the fi rst Polytechnic project. Meanwhile, Dutch assistance had reoriented its programs in higher education to further concentrate its assistance on a limited number of long-term collaborative inter-university linkages with selected partner universities in Indonesia, all starting in 1978. 15. The author acknowledges the links and overlaps between these concepts, thereby accepting a certain lack of conceptual validity (Buchert 1995: 28).

182 Notes 16. These are: (1) ‘human capital development’ underscores economic growth as the primary purpose of education and emphasized costs, efficiency, and effectiveness as its dominant themes; (2) ‘human development’, by contrast, has a social welfare orientation in which education is related primarily to self-development and societal improvement, with much attention being paid to issues of access, quality, and equity; (3) ‘human capacity development’ implies the abandonment of the ‘relative autonomy’ of education, and instead views support to education exclusively in function of broader social changes and empowerment specific groups in society. Relevance, equity, and gender are emphasized; fi nally (4) ‘human resource development’, fi nally, includes education aid policies that support a comprehensive integration between economic growth and social welfare strategies, covering capacity- and institution-building, donor co-ordination, and program and policy support for the long haul (Buchert 1994: 28–37). It is noted that Buchert’s conceptual typology is echoed in Mundy’s historical analysis of aid ideologies of educational multilateralism over the post-war era documenting a shift away from ‘redistributive multilateralism’ -Unesco and Unicef being the main examples- towards ‘disciplinary’ forms of cooperation that “emphasize the use of market mechanism and a more limited role for the State” (Mundy 1998 : 453). 17. Specifically, and in line with the Pressman model, donors 1) are pressed to move money, 2) need information about recipient and other donors, 3) want to increase their control over the implementation process, 4) seek legitimization, and 5) request stability and continuity. Recipients, on the other hand, 1) are pressed to attract money, 2) want to achieve a steady flow of funds, 3) desire autonomy, and 4) prefer donor stability and support (Kreiner, 1984: 125). 18. In a later article, Jones sees agency policy as a directly dependent on how these organizations secure their funding (Jones 1998). 19. Significantly, and as will be discussed in chapter 3 in relation to the Indonesian case, donors today explicitly advocate policies in which funds are allocated on a competitive basis. 20. Some observers, in search of operational defi nitions, have been tempted to regard “the absence of dependence upon a single or narrow base of support” (Babbidge and Rosenzweig, cited in Clark, 1998) as a proxy of institutional autonomy. However, such a resource dependency perspective does have limitations and will therefore not be pursued in this study. Most importantly, while resource diversification may be part of strategies to increase the fi nancial autonomy of institutions, it is not necessarily indicative of increasing discretionary powers at the institutional level. In effect, our fi nding at some of the more successful university departments (in terms of resource diversifi cation) was that the Faculty level–and the Dean in particular—gained power often at the detriment of the institutional level. 21. One of the architects of the models in a more recent article on the ‘Evaluative State’ notes some of these (e.g. about operationalizing the ‘distance’ implied in notions of ‘remote steering’) and in doing so seems to soften the ideal typical division line that runs between them (Neave 1998). 22. At least one significant exception in that context would be the growing attention which scholars on higher education in Western Europe are now devoting to the implications of European integration on the relationship between Governments and higher education (Darvas 1997; Neave 1994). 23. One analyst notes that “the 1980s will be recorded in Indonesia’s history as the decade of deregulation” (Soesastro 1989: 853) 24. Both types of Bank reports became public information in 1994 and can now be consulted on the World Bank’s website.

Notes

183

25. Although revenue diversification is one of the dominant themes on the higher education policy reform agenda, surprisingly little attention has been given in the literature to the role that international aid plays–or should play- in diversifying the resource basis of universities in developing countries. One of the more prominent works on university funding in developing countries does not even make reference to foreign assistance as a possible element of such a strategy (Ziderman 1995: 101).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 1. While NUFFIC was established as a University Foundation—witness its original name “Netherlands University Foundation for International Cooperation”—its mission and scope have expanded significantly ever since. Today, NUFFIC is known as the Dutch Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education (including non-university higher education) and its relationship with the higher education community as well as with government has gone through significant change. Notably, as semi-public organization, NUFFIC has become more heavily involved in the management of publicly funded international programs on behalf of (various sections of) the Dutch government, thereby nurturing a relationship of contractual accountability to government. At the same time, and in line with its increased professional status, relationships to the higher education support base, which now also includes the so-called HBO-sector (i.e. higher vocational education), have loosened. Meanwhile, NUFFIC’s tasks have expanded well beyond the confi nes of international assistance, and include European exchange programs, study abroad, international credential evaluation, Dutch UNESCO Commission, scholarship programs, and international consulting work. 2. In response to the limited accessibility of mainstream higher education for foreign students (cf. language of instruction, degree structure), the Dutch government in the 1950s and 1960s decided to set up a separate system of institutions known as ‘International Education’ (IO). IO-institutions were designed and set up specifically to accommodate training needs of overseas students from developing countries. The Dutch government takes charge of study grants awarded to course participants (the so-called Netherlands Fellowship Program) and provides direct institutional support through the line ministries organizing such courses (i.e. foreign affairs, education, and agriculture). Under agreement with the OECD Development Assistance Committee, these grants, with the exception of new premises-related investments, are all classified as Dutch Official Development Assistance. In 1991, IO-institutions received 70,613 million guilders ($ 31 million at the current exchange rate) worth of institutional grants (not including fellowships to participants), which were attributed to the cash ceiling for development cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992: 161–163, 195). In addition to the study grants for participants and the institutional grants from government, IO institutions since the mid-1970s have their own program to develop and strengthen training facilities in developing countries, albeit initially with the explicit purpose of transferring a number of their own activities to the developing world. However, these IO-overseas activities mostly have been oriented towards training institutions outside the mainstream higher education system (e.g. technical training facilities of ministries or other government agencies, professional service agencies etc.). Furthermore, they later on were merged for some time with the other education linkages to form the program for Inter-institutional Cooperation Program (SV)

184

Notes

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993: 48; Ruijter, 1993: 9–10). Apart from their significance in budgetary terms, however, the activities of the Dutch institutions for International Education are relevant to Dutch higher education assistance as they provides evidence of the internal complexity of ‘donor’ goals and policies, and of the various domestic constituencies to which bilateral donors need to respond. 3. Funding from the development budget initially was very limited, with a total budget of 1 million guilders (about half a million US $ at the present exchange rate) when the program fi rst got off the ground in 1970, but growing steadily to 26 million guilders between 1970 and 1975. However, besides the funds provided by development assistance, Dutch universities themselves continued to contribute significantly to the ‘linkages’, notably in the form of salaries of professors on short-term missions overseas, and training expenses of fellows from partner institutions. Only much later, in the aftermath of budget cuts imposed by the Minister of Education in the late 1980s, would universities request–and be granted—cost recovery and fi nancial compensations from the Development Cooperation budget. The new fi nancial arrangement, concluded in 1989, made participation in the program financially more attractive to Dutch universities. But at the same time, it also changed the nature of their involvement and commitment to the program, and to the partner institution overseas (Dulfer, 1995: 299–300). Still, and as a matter of principle, the own fi nancial contribution of the Dutch institutions nonetheless remains one of the defi ning characteristics of the linkage programs supported with Dutch aid money. Notably, the now on-going ‘Joint Financing Program for Cooperation in Higher Education’ (MHO-Program) which came to succeed the earlier linkage program in 1993, as its name suggests is based on a joint fi nancing arrangement between official development assistance and Dutch institutions (NUFFIC, 1997). 4. While still prominent, the university focus has become less outspoken over the years, a development that is reflected inter alia in the successive name changes of the Dutch linkage program i.e. from ‘Program for University Development Cooperation’ (PUO) to ‘Inter-institutional Cooperation Program’ (SV), to ‘Joint Financing Program for Cooperation in Higher Education’ (MHO). At the Dutch side, increasing the participation of the so-called ‘hogescholen’ (non-university institutions for higher professional education) became a matter of policy when the MHO Program was launched in 1993. Nonetheless, given the procedure by which counterpart institutions were nominated, the program continues to be biased in favor of universities having longstanding relations and international networks (NUFFIC, 1997: 49–50). The focus on university development becomes even more prominent, and more persistent, when taking into consideration the type of partner-institutions overseas selected to participate in the successive Dutch linkage programs. Institutions outside the university sector have generally not been given much prominence, even at the time of the SV program, when the cooperative linkages of Dutch IO-institutions were included (mostly these involved training divisions within certain ministries). The current MHO program includes one polytechnic out of a total of 12 overseas partner-institutions (NUFFIC, 1997: 21). 5. The Dutch government has also used more typical mechanisms of direct bilateral assistance (i.e. from government to government), including the provision of direct support to training institutions or regional scholarship programs, or the supply of Dutch experts to temporarily ‘supplement’ the staff of Indonesian institutions (with no further project money attached). Overall, however, the bulk of Dutch assistance in higher education (well over 70% in 1990) is channeled through linkages and other programs of

Notes

6.

7. 8.

9.

185

‘international education’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993: 193). This tendency has been even more outspoken in the Asian region, and specifically in Indonesia, where Dutch assistance in the area of higher education has always been overwhelmingly supported through such mechanisms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992: 35). Nonetheless, when the 1992 education aid policy paper was released (in April 1992), the plan was to increase the share of the bilateral programs (in particular DSO) in the Dutch overall higher education portfolio in general, as well as in Indonesia in particular (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993: 92). These policy intentions, however, never materialized in the Indonesian case in light of Soeharto’s formal rejection of further Dutch development assistance around that same time (March 1992). As a result, the budgetary significance of the bilateral programs overall has remained relatively small during the period of this study. Such complexity is generally not a-typical of the consociational model of political decision-making found in the Netherlands, involving close consultations in policy advisory bodies and committees at various levels and with various interest groups inside and outside of government (Lijphart, 1999). In an early evaluation of the fi rst PUO program, Kraak identified at least 8 groups of actors involved in the implementation of the program (Kraak, 1976). At the Dutch side, these include the Minister for Development Cooperation and her policy administration, several policy advisory committees (e.g. to advise on program criteria and design, on selection of institutions, on selection of projects, or on specific issues), the NUFFIC, which has managed and coordinated linkage programs, the universities (and their International Bureaus), contracted to implement parts of the program, and their academic units responsible for project implementation, and coordinating committees to oversee implementation issues at the linkage level. In practice, an inter-institutional linkage arrangement under the PUO-II program typically involved several Dutch universities and one overseas institution, and usually comprised a rather large number of projects (ranging from 4 to 7 in the Indonesian case) implemented in several faculties and/or departments of that institution. The Dutch experience with inter-university linkages is documented in some of the contributions to the NUFFIC conference ‘Linkages revisited’, held in The Hague in March 1995 (van Dongen, 1995; Dulfer, 1995). Most of the specific cooperation projects typically originated from individual contacts of Dutch academics, as many informants and former participants pointed out (p.c. Brinkman, Veenkamp), and these were often continued for many years. In other words, the influence of academia extended well beyond issues of technical implementation, but indirectly also affected such basic choices as the selection of institutions and academic fields. In addition, through their representation in the NUFFIC Board, Dutch institutions at least formally also participated in program policy development, albeit within the margins set by the Minister. Their influence, nonetheless, was not exclusive or all encompassing. Apart from taking critical strategic decisions (e.g. which countries, how much funding . . . ), the Minister for Development Cooperation and the Dutch administration for International Cooperation (DGIS) determined the policy framework and the conditions within which university linkages were to operate. Further, as a result of its changed composition and task structure over the years, the NUFFIC itself has come to play a much more prominent and independent role as broker and mediator, including in the area of program design (Van Audenhove, 1999]. Pronk, a social-democrat, has been a prominent figure in Dutch development aid for many years. His role furthermore was particularly important with

186

Notes

regard to Dutch relations with Indonesia, where he was known as a vocal critic of the New Order regime from the fi rst time he became Minister for Development Cooperation in the seventies (1973–1977). At that time already he had pleaded strongly–albeit unsuccessfully—in favor of discontinuing or at least phasing out Dutch aid to Indonesia. Pronk again became Minister for Development Cooperation in 1989, under very different international and domestic circumstances. Notably, as the protagonist of the strategy to link aid to political reforms he soon became Soeharto’s main antagonist in the events that ultimately led to the ‘rupture’ in March 1992 (Schulte Nordholt, 1994: 8–12). 10. King notes that the early 1970s had produced a “climate of questioning and criticism about the university” (King, 1991: 243), which at least initially was not sharply focused but rather involved a general critique of the perceived lack of relevancy of the university to national development (Eisemon, 1994: 277). Some donors who before had been heavily involved in overall university development during the 1950s and 1960s–”the golden age of university assistance” (Levy, 2005)—around that time decided to disengage from that area altogether (cf. USAID and Ford Foundations). However, many others– including the Netherlands, these would include, inter alia, the Rockefeller Foundation, Swedish SAREC, and Canadian IDRC—began to specifically support the developmental role of universities in the developing countries through projects in such areas as “integrated rural development” (as in the Dutch link with the Universitas Gajah Mada), or “community health care” (supported by NUFFIC at the University Hasanuddin, and successively by Rockefeller Foundation and NUFFIC at Gajah Mada as well). The idea of supporting ‘development universities’–or rather, focusing support on the university’s development and service functions rather than of its traditional role in teaching and research—captured the minds of many as reflected in the donor-commissioned report by Fogel and Thompson for the International Council for Educational Development (ICED, 1976). The upshot of this story is that university linkage programs such as NUFFIC’s did not suffer all too heavily from the then emerging–and later increasingly growing—criticism of the ‘Third World university’ as they had been able to co-opt much of that criticism in their own goals and rationales. For a review of the Rockefeller experience with supporting development universities see Coleman and Court, 1993: 295–310. 11. Not surprisingly, the diverging objectives of Dutch universities and policy makers regarding international assistance were paralleled domestically by diverging views on higher education policy (p.c. Brinkman). 12. None of the decision-making powers required for institutions to enter into such agreements are self-evident. Although regulations and practices vary widely across countries, many have an immediate bearing on the nature of State-university relations. For instance, university rectors don not usually have the authority and/or power to sign agreements without any prior clearing from the ministry or from other government agencies. As linkages involve contractual obligations that often impinge on existing government regulations in a wide range of areas–typical examples here include the duty free importation of goods and equipment usually required by donors, but also the provisions regarding assignment and remuneration of (civil service) university staff, provisions for overseas training etc.—such authorizations are in fact quite common. Within PUO it was in fact standard policy that the inter-institutional agreements were further formalized in intergovernmental accords. As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3, the Dutch linkages in Indonesia similarly involved prior agreements and

Notes

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

187

regular consultation with various agencies in the Ministry (DGHE) and the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS). In spite of these precautions, the political vulnerability of the linkage formula nonetheless remains, as was forcibly demonstrated in April 1992 when all on-going linkage agreements were formally ended as a result of Soeharto’s decision to refuse further aid from the Netherlands. As inter-institutional agreements, the linkages under the PUO program formally ran from 1978/79 to 1988. However, most of the individual projects that had been part of these linkages in fact were continued well beyond that time and often were still ongoing at the time of the bilateral aid-rupture in 1992. Even though starting from 1989 linkage projects with other Indonesian institutions (including two universities) were added, the impact of the initial selection of institutions (and projects) in other words extended over a period of more than 14 years. The Dutch institutions at that point (July 1977) had already suggested a total of nine Indonesian institutions, five of which the PUO-Board, established to advise the Minister on the selection of institutions and project, considered viable candidates (NUFFIC, 1984: 5). The Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VUA), prominently influential in developing and promoting the new Dutch linkage policy, had built a strong case for choosing the symbolically important University of Gajah Mada (“the university of the revolution”), one of the nation’s the top universities. Specific arguments included the institution’s academic status, its reformminded leadership and relative independence from Jakarta, its leadership role in Indonesian higher education in general, and in Central Java in particular (VUA, 1980), but also the presence of other international donor agencies (p.c. Veenkamp). Somewhat in contrast, the second partner institution in the program, the University Brawijaya (UNIBRAW), is a relatively new and less established institution focused on rural development (founded as State university only in 1963). Notably, UNIBRAW’s specific mission and commitment to develop itself as an institution working for the rural communities in East Java (“the university of the ‘village’ or ‘desa’”) resonated well with the policy priorities of Dutch assistance at the time. The University of Hasanuddin (UNHAS), fi nally, was the only non-Javanese institution selected into the program. At the time of its selection into PUOII, UNHAS’s internal organization was “different from the usual one in Indonesia” (van Olden, 1983: 8) as it had been selected by the Ministry of Education for a pilot project seeking a new division of responsibilities between the faculties (i.e. control of resources) and the study programs (i.e. academic programming) following a matrix structure. Probably of more immediate importance to its selection as partner university in the Dutch linkage program, however, was the existing cooperation with the medical faculty of the Erasmus University. Whereas cooperation initially was directed almost exclusively towards upgrading of medical teaching and research, both donor and NUFFIC soon began to express a strong interest to include institutionalized cooperation in the field of primary health care and community health (van Olden, 1983: 22). These political rationales and justifications not only figured prominently at the time the proposals for collaboration were to be submitted and ‘defended’ (VUA, 1980), but also became a regularly reoccurring subject of debate once the linkages were approved (p.c. Veenkamp). One informant notes that it was generally understood that the Indonesian government would not have accepted direct participation of private institutions in the PUO program (p.c. Brinkman). Some Dutch institutions did have

188

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

Notes extensive formal links with Indonesian private universities, but these were usually funded from their own budgets. The linkage program at the time operated on the principle that each linkage should constitute a coherent package, the significance of which would ideally surpass the sum of the constituent parts (i.e. projects). In practice, however, evaluations would soon indicate that such coherence was difficult to accomplish in the absence of mechanisms that could help ensure integration of activities in partner institution plans (Kater, 1984: 8–11). Meanwhile on the Dutch side, apart from an overall ‘indicative budget’ set apart for each linkage, the individual project in fact continued to operate on its own terms and budgets. Occasionally, budgetary pressures would facilitate confl ict rather than cooperation between projects (Hordijk, 1987: 17–18). This shift is reflected, inter alia, in Altbach’s suggestive “From Dependence to Autonomy” (Altbach, 1989), and broadly coincides with the end of the “golden age” of international assistance, when donor efforts usually included activities in such areas as campus development, planning, and management (Levy, 2005). The Rockefeller Foundation’s experience with university development during that period is documented in Coleman and Court (1992). In particular the Foundation’s experience with the Education for Development Program (EDP), which from the 1950s to early 1970s included strengthening the administration of universities in developing countries, illustrates how the international receptivity of many universities for this type of activity had critically decreased by the mid 1970s. Of twelve institutions that received support from the Foundation’s EDP, Indonesia’s Gajah Mada University was the only one where no specific projects were undertaken in that area. Significantly too, it was the last institution to enter the program, collaboration starting only in 1973 (Coleman & Court, 1992: 267, 270). Part of the confusion derived from the fact that the project was fi rst introduced as a direct follow-up to the earlier medical training project in the Medical Faculty, a situation which continued to be reflected in the project’s name (Wiggers, 1991). Dutch higher education itself had experienced major domestic policy changes–notably involving increased autonomy and much less direct and different government control mechanisms—from the mid- to late 1980s (van Vucht, 1993]. The noted policy change in Dutch international educational policy in other words seemed to parallel the reform agenda at home rather well (p.c. Zijlstra, p.c. Maassen, p.c. Hagen). As a result of inter-agency agreements between the Ministry of Education (OCW) and the Ministry for development cooperation (DGIS) in the Netherlands, projects from the education budget were restricted to a budgetary limit of 50,000 guilders a year (slightly over $ 20,000 at the current rate). The phrase ‘fi nancial autonomy’ was fi rst introduced into the fi fth five year development plan (REPELITA V) in 1988, following a process of internal consultations within the DGHE, and with BAPPENAS, the National Development Planning Board (p.c. Sukadji Ranuwihardjo Ranuwihardjo). The education law Nr. 2 dates from 1989 and the government regulation pertaining to fi nancial autonomy was issued in 1990. Study tours of ITB delegations in The Netherlands were a prominent part of this project. Increasingly, from the mid-1980s, similar study tours–with a focus on university management—were to be organized and funded by other donors as well. CHEPS itself had started only in 1984/85, following budget cuts in The Netherlands in the early 1980s and the suggestion of the government that “the universities study themselves” (Clark, 1998: 51). Its increasingly

Notes

26.

27.

28.

29. 30.

31.

32.

189

international appearance received explicit support from the Ministry of Education. The PUO progress report in 1984 notes an increasingly critical attitude on the part of the Minister of Development Cooperation vis-à-vis ‘technical’ project decisions and advice from 1982 onwards (NUFFIC, 1984: 11). Apart from donor criticism, however, growing budgetary pressures at Dutch universities in the mid-1980s forced the institutions in the Netherlands to take a more sober look at their own fi nancial contribution to the linkage program (Dulfer, 1995: 299). The changing roles and contractual responsibilities under the program in the Netherlands need not be further elaborated in this context. Most significant was that the donor agency (DGIS) became increasingly and more directly involved with project management (including the conclusion of contracts with Dutch institutions), whereas NUFFIC took on the role of an independent monitoring agency. The new arrangement further included updated agreements on fi nancial tariffs for Dutch institutions participating in the linkage program [NUFFIC, 1991) These efforts included the drawing of multi-annual plans for each of these two institutions pertaining to ‘the fourth phase of the Dutch-Indonesian cooperation’ (i.e. following three consecutive four-year periods starting from 1978) (NUFFIC, s.d.). The construction was unique at both ends. The DGHE was usually not a direct partner in the Dutch linkage program, whereas the NUFFIC’s in principle did not take on any implementation tasks. Termination of the project, however, does not necessarily suggest failed institutionalization of the ‘applied approach’ within the universities. Institutions still require their lecturers to take the training, as was observed during field visits. The DGIS Indonesia policy plan of 1988 mentions that the goal was to respond to initiatives that support increased involvement of all segments of the population in the development process. The plan acknowledges that opportunities to work outside the realm of government control are restricted and therefore limited in general–the lack of significant institutionalized contacts between Dutch and Indonesian unions is noted as a particular case in point. Institutional contacts between institutions of higher education and NGO’s, on the other hand, are examples of where the linkage-strategy can built on notable precedents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988: 32). In spite of the opportunities created by the sector program, these did not result in any direct (aid-sponsored) linkage projects with Indonesian private institutions, even though several Dutch institutions–as noted—continued to entertain (privately funded) collaborative agreements with some of these. To be sure, private universities may have benefited indirectly from Dutch assistance (e.g. by staff upgrading programs offered at assisted institutions). In light of both absolute and relative size of the private sector in Indonesia, the continued concentration of assistance to public institutions nonetheless was remarkable. It furthermore was not typical of the linkage program only, but also held for other areas of higher education assistance. For instance, a survey of alumni (1984–1988) of the Dutch fellowship program for Indonesian professionals in 1990 identified 93.5% of the respondents as government employees, 15% of which were employed by State universities (other categories included central or regional governments and State enterprises). Only 0.9% of the respondents (4 out of 437) were employed at a private university at the time of the survey (CESO, 1990: 97). A similar picture emerges from the academically oriented Indonesia Academic Fellowship Program (PIAF),

190 Notes

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

which provided scholarships for young Indonesians to undertake university studies in The Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992: 35). The New Order’s macroeconomic policy was essentially designed by a small group of U.S.-trained university economists from the Faculty of Economics at UI who had managed to gain the confidence of the military–and Soeharto—in the aftermath of the political succession of 1966 (Bresnan, 1993: 60–64). The program, which was inspired by theories of macro-economic development holding sway in the 1950s and 1960s, put forward a central role for government as the major institutional source of plans, guidance, and direction for economic growth (James, 1993). Foreign assistance from international institutions such as IMF and World Bank as well as from bilateral donors was welcomed in again to fi nance the technocrats’ development agenda. While their economic agenda and political influence have changed since, many of the leading ‘technocrats’, sometimes referred to as the “Berkeley Mafia”, remained influential throughout most of the 1970’s and 1980s, some even holding key government positions well into the 1990s (Bresnan, 1993; Schwartz, 1994: 52–53). To this day, the University of Indonesia is known by its nickname as “the ministers’ school” (The Jakarta Post, 11 March, 1996). While as a case of the international transfer of ideas broad parallels and similarities can be identified with the Chile project of the later Chicago School of Economics (i.e. the “Chicago Boys”) the substantive differences between these two cases are probably more telling for the purpose of this study. Notably, whereas the Chicago project explicitly sought to oppose the influence of development economics as a particular kind of economics, Indonesia’s technocrats were eager to promote and adjust it in their own country setting. Further, to the extent that there ever was an explicit “Berkeley project” (in fact some of the core members of the group were trained at other places in the U.S.) its core idea of an interventionist State was completely at odds with Chicago’s free market (Valdés, 1995). The Bank’s Resident Mission in Indonesia, the fi rst of its kind, was established in 1968, only two years after the country resumed its membership of the UN, and during the fi rst critical years was headed by known advocates of the economic policies furthered by the economists (Bresnan, 1993: 83). Rather unusual in those days, the Bank’s country chief economist was based in Jakarta rather than in Washington, and the Mission for a long time was even physically housed in the offices of the National Planning Board (p.c. Gilpin). At the government side, the commitment to investments in education was manifested fi rst in the second five-year development plan (REPELITA II 1974–79), and has grown markedly since, in the 1970s greatly helped by increasing oil revenues. Bank lending in education and health grew steadily throughout the period of this study, rising from 7.3% (1969–79), to 11.6% (1980–89), up to 16.0% (1990–98) of its lending portfolio in Indonesia (World Bank, 1999: 13). Early World Bank interventions in education (including all those carried out before the 1973 National Survey, which formally started the dialogue process) were funded with credit lines from the International Development Association. The Polytechnics I project (1978) was the last IDA fi nanced Bank project in education. It is noted in this connection that the calendar of policy dialogue was often organized explicitly around ‘benchmark events’ in the bureaucratic planning cycle (e.g. preparation of annual budgets, five year plans, or even, in higher education specifically, ten year plans). Further, the policy dialogue was essentially seen as a vehicle to “exchange views with a member Government on

Notes

38.

39. 40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

191

the present situation of a sector . . .” (World Bank, 1991: 65). The principle that participation in the dialogue process was restricted to government officials at “a relatively high level of responsibility” was rather consistent with the nature of Indonesia’s bureaucratic polity, and until fairly recent (World Bank, 1999: 18) went largely unquestioned. Government expenditures on education at the time were notoriously low, representing less than 2% (2.5% when adding private expenditures) of GDP in 1971 (Data from UNESCO, cited in: World Bank, 1975: Annex 1). Even so, and apart from political willingness or international support to increase public expenditures, the budgetary muscle to facilitate such increased government spending was greatly enhanced by the massive public revenues resulting from oil price hikes in 1973. To illustrate, in 1974 Indonesia expected to earn over US $ 3 billion in net oil revenues, compared with US $ 0.5 billion in 1972 (World Bank, 1975: 5). The report notes almost prophetically that “ . . . the principal constraint on educational development is not likely to be fi nancial but rather administrative capacity” (World Bank, 1975: 14). Teacher training for secondary education was the Bank’s formal entry point into higher education (cf. 1st teacher training project, 1977). This project was soon followed by interventions having a more specific sub-sector focus on higher education development per se, as with the fi rst Polytechnics project (1978). Key actors within this institutional framework include the Ministry of Education (and DGHE in particular), BAPPENAS (National Development Planning Board), and the Ministry of Finance. Government budget operations are divided into two subsets following parallel tracks: the routine budget and the development budget. Routine budgets are prepared by the Ministry of Finance, whereas the development budget–which includes revenues from international assistance—is coordinated under the responsibility of BAPPENAS. This, however, does not necessarily suggest that reformers from academia had no significant say in matters of policy making. Rather, it implies that academic influence was exerted most effectively at the level of the central bureaucracy (i.e. and by making use of regular bureaucratic procedures, often through a process of ‘co-optation’ (e.g. key-appointments or committees within the Ministry). The process has allowed external donors such as the Bank—which at the time was used to working with and through governments only—to construct policy dialogues and alliances within the bureaucratic polity. The Bank’s consecutive country strategies for Indonesia have included “the enhancement of human resources development” in its list of priority objectives throughout the period of this study (Country Assistance Strategy, 1996). Manpower goals have also continued to provide the basic economic rationale for the Bank to invest in higher education projects in particular, including the more recent ones (QUE, SAR p. 7). From a an outsider’s perspective, Jones in this regard takes the view that “the bank’s rationale has barely changed in 35 years, a celebration of the elegance of human capital theory” (Jones, 118). Both perspectives suggest that the Bank’s investments in higher education at least to some degree—and this is where agreement stops—are grounded in terms of labor market payoffs. A later OED internal evaluation report on the Bank’s education lending experience in Indonesia questions many of the assumptions of the forecasts used in the Polytechnic project (World Bank, 1991: 90). That same report further suggests that the limitations of the use of these manpower forecasting

192 Notes

45.

46. 47.

48.

49. 50.

51.

52.

53.

techniques were well known to the Bank at the time the loans were approved in the 1970s. However, reservations about unselective expansion policies pursued by the Indonesian government at that time reportedly had led the Bank to cater more prudently (and more narrowly) for specifi c technical and vocational skills in high demand (World Bank, 1991: 40, 48–49). In that sense, the decentralization strategy in Indonesian higher education broadly echoes John Bresnan’s conceptualization of the Indonesian political economy in the early 1990s as “managed pluralism” (Bresnan, 1993: 293– 94). The term is an indication of the political constraints and limitations of Indonesian pluralism at the time, but at the same time suggests a increasing managerial capacity and room for autonomous action. An indication in itself of the centrality of manpower development in this donor’s lending rationale. In 1978, less than half a million students had access to tertiary education, representing a relatively meager 4% of the relevant age group (DGHE, 1978). At that time, 200.000 of these were at State institutions, a number that from then onwards rose sharply in only five years time to 390,000 students in 1983 (IEES, 9–15). During that time period, the government established four new public universities outside Java, and created, with the support from bilateral donors, the Open University in 1984 to accommodate increasing social demand for higher education. (Oey-Gardiner, 1991). In the case of the polytechnic project, project designers at an early stage had looked into alternative channels of provision in the private sector but soon decided to support the government’s plan to create a new network of publicly provided polytechnic schools within selected universities (POLY-PPAR: 1). Regarding the identification of project institutions, the Bank’s internal evaluation study on educational lending in Indonesia notes that it was not uncommon for the Bank to give the Indonesian government a powerful say in the choice of target institutions (OED, 92), albeit within certain constraints (e.g. number of institutions). In the case of the UDP-I project, the three institutions that were targeted included two leading universities (i.e. UGM and UI) and one less-established university outside Java (i.e. UNAND), a choice representing the uneasy balance between national prestige and considerations of regional equity. The validity of such a claim will be subject of discussion in chapter 4. Instead, here the statement is used as indication of the importance attached to more effectively centralized control. The latter notably included the capacity to absorb increasing amounts of international aid in the DGHE, as implementation experience during the fi rst series of Bank projects had reportedly been mixed (e.g. slow disbursements, inexperienced management), and as the number and volume of projects would soon start to expand. These included the four traditional top public universities (i.e. ITB, IPB, UGM, and UI) as well as the Open University (Universitas Terbuka), which then had only recently been established to help accommodate growing social demand for higher education in Indonesia (p.c. Sukadji Ranuwihardjo). The sector studies were carried out from 1983–85 with advisory support from the Bank (World Bank, 1986), and fed directly into the drafting of the second ten-year higher education development plan (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan (Ministry of Education and Culture), 1986). A parallel joint review of implementation experience in Bank-funded education projects was conducted in 1985 (World Bank, 1985). Given the government’s emphasis focus on investments in primary and secondary education, and taking into account the particular needs in higher

Notes

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

193

education—i.e. typically biased towards foreign exchange components, such as fellowships, technical assistance or scientific equipment—the rationale was that the Bank had a comparative advantage in higher education (p.c. Gilpin). In addition, and fully compatible with human capital theory, social rates of return to higher education had been estimated at fairly high levels (15–20%). Domestic developments that may help explain this growing willingness to borrow on Bank terms notably include: a changed and reform-oriented leadership in DGHE—the term ‘fi xers’ comes to mind (Cerych, 1986: 250—as well as in government (i.e. growing influence of science and technology-oriented growth strategies), but also the budgetary difficulties resulting from consecutive drops in the oil price in the mid-1980s (p.c. Bagyo Moeliodihardjo). Defi nitional issues have not been settled in the literature on ‘institutional development’, or even ‘institutions’, and theoretical perspectives continue to diverge. This particular defi nition was chosen because it was taken from a study from that time period which analyzed World Bank experience with institutional development in different sectors. In practice, though, projects such as HEDP-I and II combined a fi rm commitment to the development of a centralized management information system with project components supporting planning and decision-making at the institutional level (cf. infra). In contrast, the Bank never aspired for parallel systemic reforms in human resources management, as that would involve a major overhaul of the civil service status of university staff. Instead, the Bank tried to fi nd alternative arrangements (e.g. salary increments) to reward performance in the framework of its projects (p.c. Sukadji Ranuwihardjo). The World Bank 1986 discussion paper on education fi nancing in particular, articulates these priorities very well (World Bank, 1986: 2). Although the paper was highly controversial at the time—reportedly preventing its issue as a formal statement of Bank policy (Jones, 1997)—its recommendations have guided education lending negotiations in various countries. Resource diversification in public higher education later formally became one of the pillars of the Bank’s higher education policy paper ‘Lessons of Experience’ (World Bank, 1994: 40–54). Consecutive drops in oil prices in 1986–87, the increased value of the Yen, and the fall of primary commodity prices were among factors causing an economic slowdown, which in turn resulted in severe budget cuts in a range of sectors, including higher education (World Bank, 1988: 1). The gradual erosion of government funding in relation to enrollments fueled worries about decreasing quality overall. A specific cause of concern was the inadequacy of non-salary recurrent expenditures for operations and maintenance (typically close to 90% of recurrent budgets was taken up by salaries) to match investment projects (some funded with international assistance, cf. chapter 3). Meanwhile, the growing size and complexity (cf. differentiation of missions) of the system had made higher education increasingly difficult to manage centrally (Task Force for Management Reform and Consolidation of Higher Education, 1988: 8). Already in 1983 the government had launched the idea to establish Interuniversity Centers (IUCs) as a way to coordinate the use of scarce physical and human resources while concentrating them at selected institutions. Their main purpose was to support programs of study and research at the graduate level, and to facilitate professional interaction among universities. The idea materialized later in the Bank assisted UDP-II project (UDP-II, SAR: 8).

194

Notes

61. Tuition fees for incoming students at public universities were doubled in September 1986. In 1986–87 the cost of tuition fees was estimated to represent on average 20% of the operational budget per student at the State universities. Student fees varied by region, but basic fee categories were determined jointly by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education and Culture (Mc Meekin, 1986). Restrictions on the establishment and operation of private institutions were gradually being lifted as part of the government’s policy to stabilize the expansion of public education, and instead allow private institutions to accommodate the greater share of social demand for higher education (p.c. Sukadji Ranuwihardjo). 62. The Task Force for Management Reform and Consolidation of Higher Education within DGHE had studied ramifications of various control mechanisms to accompany increased fi nancial and academic autonomy for different groups of institutions. During consultations with BAPPENAS, the proposal later was restricted to include reference to fi nancial autonomy only (p.c. Sukadji Ranuwihardjo). 63. Increasing government support for research and technology, spurred by the technology-minded and increasingly influential Habibie from the late 1980s onwards, represented such an opportunity, as it would later provide the seedbed for the introduction of competitive funding schemes, both inside and outside of Bank assisted projects (cf. infra). Ironically, Habibie’s technology based economic growth strategy (‘habibienomics’) was built on a strongly interventionist government and did not at the time receive much support from the economists at the World Bank (Schwartz, 1994: 90). 64. The distinction between ‘level of change’, ‘depth of change’, and ‘functional breadth of change’ is derived from the study by Cerych & Sabatier on higher education policy reforms in Western Europe (Cerych & Sabatier, 1986: 244). The institutional reforms suggested by the Bank under HEDP I and II at the system level were predominantly fi nance related (not including, for instance, structural reforms of personnel policy in higher education institutions), and furthermore were mostly congruent with either domestic norms or practices (e.g. income generating practices). 65. For instance, the process of selecting ‘strategic disciplines’ to be developed in UDP-II and determining the institutional locations of the IUC’s took place in committees of leading academics brought together at DGHE. Occasionally compromises would result in the establishment of competing IUC’s in the same disciplinary area. The Bank on its part initially was in favor to pilot only a small number of IUC’s but gave in early in project identification (UDP-II, PCR: 12, 15). 66. Rather than supporting the development of locally adjustable management and information systems, consecutive HEDP projects ambitiously—yet unsuccessfully, as it turned out—sought to standardize and extend a prototype MIS-model into an integrated Higher Education Monitoring and Evaluation System (HEDP-I, SAR: 21; HEDP-II, PCR: 5). 67. According to Indonesian State budget laws, tuition fees and other non-budgetary sources of income at public institutions are formally accounted as (non-tax) State income, and therefore continue to be considered by the Ministry of Finance as Government income. State institutions in 1990 in principle were granted more fi nancial autonomy to retain and manage these resources (PP30, 1990), but the implementation of that regulation was made subject to many restrictions, controls, and ‘veto-points’ imposed by the MOF (e.g. spending approvals, reporting requirements, interest earnings, roll-over of unspent funds . . . ). See Interviews Sukadji Ranuwihardjo, Bagyo Moeliodihardjo, Wati.

Notes

195

68. This process has been reconstructed largely on the basis of internal communications, aide memoires, mission reports, official correspondence, and interviews. Further documentation was derived from appraisal and supervision reports pertaining to URGE, DUE and QUE project respectively. 69. Several factors contributed to this growing recognition within the Bank, notably including growing concerns about the sustainability of ongoing and closing projects, changes in operational and technical Bank staff, both in Washington and at RSI, but also the broader intellectual influence of higher education experts who at that time advised the Bank’s on its higher education ‘best practice’ policy paper, which appeared in 1994. Drafts of that paper were presented during Bank missions at the DGHE in late 1993 in order to identify in the Indonesian context “major systemic weaknesses [that needed] to be addressed for a long term viability of sectoral investments” (AM-11/24/93: 5). 70. The Bank never formally identified its evolving strategy in these exact terms, although ‘decentralization’ from that time period onwards is increasingly used in Bank documents and reports. The World Bank at that time also begins to advocate ‘more decentralized and participatory’ development strategies in the context of it’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Indonesia (World Bank, 1995: 9–10) 71. See, for instance, letter to the Minister of Education and Culture, dd. July 11, 1995, one of the more openly critical Bank documents on this topic, expressing deep concern about the quality and responsiveness of the existing higher education system, calling for “‘much more decisive steps to permit individualized institutional development of universities”. The Bank instead underscores the need for decentralization and autonomy, “not for its own sake, but as critical step in making universities responsible for educational processes that cannot be effectively governed centrally for the country.” 72. See Aide Mémoires dd. 11/23/93; 10/07/94. Besides its general recommendations and advice to the government, the Bank itself increasingly will make selectivity and fi ne-tuning of decentralized funding mechanisms a core feature of its own operations. 73. Both elements would figure prominently in the discussions leading up to the identification of new Bank loans following up on HEDP-II (AM, 02/17/95; IEPS, 04/05/95; AM, 06/21/95). 74. The main components of strategic decentralization seem to correspond well with the ‘State-supervision model’ of higher education system integration, in which the political authority of the State sets out broad parameters but decisions about institutional missions and goals—and the ways to achieve these—are left to autonomous institutions guided by academic professionalism and market-principles (van Vucht, 1993: 27). The model, which is based on conceptual and empirical studies of higher education policies in Western Europe in the 1980s (Neave, 1991), represents a theoretical blend of authority-based and exchange-based models of decision making, in turn suggesting an alternative both to State-controlled and market-led coordination mechanisms in higher education. 75. Consultations to follow-up on UDP-II were initiated in October 1992—at a time when investments in higher education were increasingly scrutinized within the Bank—and continued up to May 1994, when the URGE project was approved by the Board. Preparatory missions to identify lending priorities following up on HEDP-II started in late 1994, feeding directly into DGHE’s long-term strategy formulation, a process which was initiated early in 1995 (i.e. Higher Education Strategy Task Force), at least partly at the instigation of the Bank. Loan negotiations were concluded with the board

196 Notes

76.

77. 78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

approval of the DUE project (May 1996) and the QUE project (June 1997) respectively. Like the earlier sector-loans in higher education (i.e. HEDP-I and II) the chosen strategy once more illustrates the Bank’s ‘special relationship’ with the Indonesian government and virtually ruled out ‘policy conditionality’ as a politically feasible alternative (World Bank, 1999: 15). Aide Mémoire and Back to Office Report, Higher Education Lending Development Mission, 10/06/94. The Bank started to encourage DGHE to articulate a more coherent longterm strategy at the time when it was considering the identification of a follow-up loan for HEDP-II (AM, 10/7/94). Soon thereafter, successive Bank missions began to provide input to the DGHE Task Force for Higher Education Reform, which was established early in 1995. Joint workshops and advisory missions were organized throughout much of 1995, in parallel with project preparatory activities (AM 2/17/95; 7/11/95; 10/12/95). The ‘Paradigm’ concept paper (‘Paradigm for Restructuring the System of Higher Education’), referred to in later documents as the ‘New Paradigm’, appeared in July 1995 when it was presented at a meeting with university Rectors. This strategy emerges as the dominant pattern of official higher education policy development in Indonesia, even though in practice the more influential universities in fact contributed heavily to the formulation of official policy at the central level. In the DGHE Long Term Development Plan the strategy is legitimized as follows: “The proposed higher education model’s startingpoint is the hierarchical relationship between four different strata (i.e. the central authority, the universities, the basic academic units, and the civitas academica). Even though the paradigm of reform very much emphasizes autonomy, the link between universities (as organizational units in the implementation of higher education) and economic, political, and social development requires hierarchical relationships that act as adhesive in the pursuit of higher education’s national goal.” (Soehendro, 1996: 45). This awareness becomes increasingly manifest during the preparation of the Higher Education Support Project—the name initially given to the follow-up project of HEDP-II, but later split up into two separate loans (cf. infra)—and appears in particular from the Mission Reports (i.e. Aide Memoires, and Back to Office Reports) and other communications with DGHE from May to October 1995. See: BTO 06/20/95; AM 07/11/95; AM 10/12/95. In spite of the broad agreement on principles, this change of Bank strategy did not always sit very well with DGHE concerns. Notably, the discontinuation of ‘time slice’ loan format, which had ensured the DGHE of a steady flow of development funds, was to be replaced by a mechanism that on the one hand re-affi rmed the Bank’s role in overall project design, and at the same time decentralized implementation to academic units. DGHE reportedly not only feared that such would lead to management inefficiencies, but also doubted the capacity of the universities to prepare and manage more projects on their own (BTO, 06/20/95). In addition, decentralized project implementation put pressure on DGHE to limit the number of institutions to receive support (cf. increased selectivity), and in so doing increasingly seemed to question the ‘equality principle’ that has guided DGHE (Oey-Gardiner, 1991: 84). Earlier Bank projects had included provisions for small research grants that were awarded on a competitive basis. But apart from that, the Indonesian government from the early 1990s onwards started to expand public resources for university research funding on a competitive basis, either through the DGHE or through the Ministry of Science and Technology (Hill, 1995; Koswara, 1999).

Notes

197

83. The Bank’s investments in Indonesian higher education continue to be overwhelmingly oriented towards the public sector policy concerns, even though URGE and QUE for the fi rst time allowed private schools in principle to compete with public institutions for Bank-supported funding opportunities. However, rather than supporting private higher education, the Bank’s approach suggests giving public institutions the responsibility to “behave more as if they were private-sector institutions” (SAR, DUE: 9). 84. The term “Evaluative State”, introduced in connection to broadly similar policy reforms in much of Western Europe in the mid-1980s (Neave, 1988: 11; Neave, 1998), captures the idea of increased evaluative powers and capacities accompanying the State-supervision mode of governmental steering. While operating under vastly different circumstances, the Bank projects in Indonesia seek to further a different kind of government role, emphasizing competitive funding and selection processes, and using evaluation mechanisms that are based on third party reviews of plans or initiatives submitted by targeted beneficiaries. See: Staff Appraisal Reports for URGE, DUE, and QUE respectively. 85. The National Accreditation Board was fi rst provided under the Education Law No. 2 in 1989, but was formally established only in late 1994. The URC was initially created to implement the URGE project’s competitive funding mechanism. The Board of Higher Education, fi nally, was established in the aftermath of the DUE project, with the broad mandate to assist DGHE in the task of overseeing the higher education system, and to further the implementation of competitive funding in research, graduate, and undergraduate education (SAR, DUE: 58–61). 86. Following Clark’s use of the concept of ‘reform’, the term ‘policy’ is used here in the broad sense to include acts and processes of formal policy (e.g. formal rules and regulations) but also the informal procedures and activities originating from both institutional and intra-institutional practices that are tolerated, implicitly encouraged, or simply beyond control of any particular agent (i.e. ‘reform by drift’) (Cerych & Sabatier, 1986: 260). Regarding Indonesian higher education policy specifically, Oey-Gardiner provides specific illustrations of creative institutional responses and loopholes in formal policy (Oey-Gardiner, 1991: 91–92). 87. The strata being ‘central authority’ (i.e. the State, but explicitly including also the intermediary bodies established and used by the State), ‘higher education institutions’, ‘basic academic units, and ‘civitas academica’ (Soehendro, 1996: 46–52). 88. The citation here foremost is meant to strengthen the point of shifting Bank goals in regard to institutional decision-making and therefore needs not be seen as an indication of success (or failure) in bringing about more centralized control throughout the system. 89. While the concept of ‘de-concentration’ was never explicitly put forward in any Bank document to describe or motivate these particular initiatives, it captures rather well the agency’s position regarding institutional planning at the time. Unlike the earlier period (i.e. late 1970s early 1980s), when centralization was explicitly advocated by the Bank, there was a growing recognition from the mid-1980s onwards of the benefits of system-wide decentralization, reflected in a growing attention to institutional needs in planning (cf. MIS), academics (cf. differentiation of missions), and fi nancing (cf. resource generation). However, the Bank up to that point at least implicitly continued to support a policy framework where the specifics of these ‘institutional needs’ were managed and controlled by the center. The resulting figure at the institutional level during that time period therefore seems to

198

90.

91.

92.

93.

94.

Notes be one of ‘de-concentration’, rather than decentralization. The Bank’s ambition to contribute to development of a system-wide management information system reflects that model rather well, as does the centralized procedure to assign target beneficiary institutions for its projects (e.g. IUC’s). Because of their broader inter-university mission (i.e. training and research facilities for other Indonesian universities), IUC’s initially were established as independent units fi nanced directly by the DGHE, with only informal linkages with the host universities. Weak ownership by host universities soon came to be seen as a major bottleneck to institution building, and therefore the decision was taken to integrate IUC’s within the host institutions. While the university senates largely determined their own specific formula for bringing about this integration (e.g. some continued as IUC under the Director of Graduate Programs or as unit under the Deputy Rector for Academic Affairs, others were subsumed into the relevant faculties), DGHE did insist that the host institutions would maintain their inter-university role, and that the ‘centers’ would continue to be assigned a critical mass of trained academic staff (UDP-II, PCR: 12). For discussions and evaluations on IUC developments at time of URGE project preparation see AM, January Feb. 16: 4–7 (1993); June 17: 4 (1993). On ‘project mentality’ see Moeliodihardjo (Moeliodihardjo, 1999: 2). Apart from its support to the central URC, the URGE project consists of seven different competitive grant and fellowship programs. The project component with the strongest link to institutional decision making is the ‘Center Grant Program’, which includes investments to upgrade the physical, managerial, and human resource infrastructure of selected academic units. Significantly, this is also the only program component for which the URC guidelines make provision for universities to organize an internal screening procedure for ‘pre-proposals’ involving university staff (URGE, SAR: 37–38). It is one of only few places in the appraisal document where one fi nds a direct reference to the involvement of the institutional middle-level. The workshops were organized specifically at 17 of the least established institutions. The consultation procedure itself was innovative compared to earlier project preparations, as it involved Bank staff, government staff, rectors and/or vice-rectors, young academics, and—even—sessions with students. The purpose of these workshops was to disseminate the concept of the new paradigm, solicit their responses, and gain better understanding of the ‘institutional realities’ (Moeliodihardjo, 1999: 4). In order to ensure broad participation within the institutions, the majority of the members of the respective task forces were to be “young academics” (i.e. less than 35 years old, and with some overseas training or experience). In order to ensure compatibility with the university management, the task forces were to be chaired (‘ex-officio’) by the vice-rector for academic affairs of these respective institutions. This regulation, which was issued in the process of DUE-project preparation, in fact illustrates rather well the delicate balance, which the Bank and government sought to establish between the need for more ‘bottom-up planning’ in many of these institutions, and the observation that formal authority (and, in many instances, power) continues to move from the top downwards (Moeliodihardjo, 1999). Like the DUE project, QUE aims at quality improvements of undergraduate education. Unlike the DUE project, however, the QUE project is open to all study programs in specific fields (including in principle study programs at private institutions), and is not directed at any type of institution in particular. Its purpose is to reward institutions that can demonstrate excellence in undergraduate education (Moeliodihardjo, 1999: 8).

Notes

199

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 1. Judith Tendler has coined the term ‘donor decentralization gap’ to denote the discrepancies between donor goals that support decentralization in principle and the constraints these donors face as a result of their own money-moving implementation procedures, often leading them to in fact support centralization and top-down planning (Tendler, 1975). In Indonesia, the practice was exemplified not only in the “annual IGGI fi x” but also in some of the more typical features of project implementation design, including, most notably the practice of channeling funds through Ministry based Central Project Implementation Units. 2. Kreiner distinguishes donor’s “resource environment” from their “project environment”. Whereas the former includes issues of donor strategy (e.g. at country level) and legitimacy (e.g. accountability vis-à-vis organization, government, or voters . . . ), the latter refers to the core of donor operations (i.e. the project of program cycle of identifying, awarding, disbursing and channeling funds). 3. In sharp contrast, since the fall of the Soeharto regime in May 1998, the issue of good governance and anti-corruption measures has been put high on the agenda of CGI Meetings and donor policies with respect to Indonesia (Koernya Roesad, 2001, p. 21). 4. Such as the changing domestic situation (strong and growing economy of the early 1990s) and priorities in education (i.e. the move to 9 year basic education) (p.c. Lieberman). 5. Japan is an exception in that its total bilateral aid for over 70% takes the form of loans. With regard to higher education in Indonesia, however, its effort mostly took the form of technical assistance and fi nancial support for multilateral agencies. 6. An index rating greater than 100 indicates that the donor’s aid program to Indonesia represents a greater than proportionate share of the totality of the donor’s programs worldwide. The Index is calculated as 100 [(Adi/Ati)/(Fdt/ Fta)], where: Adi is aid to Indonesia of donor i Ati is total aid to Indonesia by all donors Fdt is total aid flows of donor i Fta is total aid flows by all donors (to Indonesia) to all aid recipients worldwide 7. Donor investments in the manpower sector typically include projects in employment related technical and vocational training. International projects in the Religious sector are exclusively of an educational nature. Recent examples here include projects in support of the development of Islamic Universities (IAIN), in-service teacher training, and basic education. Finally, Science and Technology projects are typically supported by international fellowships and research projects that draw from but at the same time feed into the research capacities of the domestic university system. 8. Human capital development emphasizes economic growth as an overall goal of education. According to Buchert, it is the concept most supportive to the introduction of market reforms with a consequent emphasis on technical, vocational and higher education in areas that support the economic structure of society. Key concerns include issues of cost, efficiency and effectiveness (Buchert, 1995: 28). 9. For instance, the First University Development Project was more concerned with the physical development of the three selected campuses than with the process of establishing a Master Plan (UDP-I, SAR).

200 Notes 10. In contrast with human capital development, this model emphasizes social change and empowerment. Donor efforts in higher education are seen as a way to address social issues—including regional development, poverty, and social problems—and suggest that universities can help support a desired process of societal transformation (Buchert, 1995). 11. One Dutch program manager indicates that monthly visits to DGHE, and more occasionally to BAPPENAS, were all that it took to keep the government informed of their presence and to insure continued formal support from that end (e.g. inclusion in the Blue Book). At the institutional level, the decentralized nature of the Dutch project implementation mechanism ensured that confl icts with the institutional decision making structure (e.g. about allocation of resources within department or faculty) would often be defused or solved in an informal way. (p.c. Theo Veenkamp) 12. And even within the ODA department, OECD data illustrate the overwhelming and increasing dominance of Japanese aid. Its relative share of ODAcommitments rose from 41 % in 1979–1981 to 62 % in 1992–1993 (OECD, 2001). Other major bilateral donors that made it to the top four list at one point or another during this time period include Germany, the U.S., the Netherlands, Austria, and, albeit more recently, Australia. The U.S., remarkably, disappeared from the top four since 1987–1988 (OECD-Data Query, April 2001). 13. Bank support specifically targeted at private institutions was not only limited in size but also indirect and typically passing through the hands of governmental implementing or intermediary agencies. For instance, Bank supported programs would include provisions allowing teachers at private institutions to compete, or allowing private institutions and departments to compete for research grants, or by providing fellowships to teachers at private institutions. And even these minimal provisions for participation of privates needed to be negotiated even though they rarely led to effective private participation in Bank assisted projects. The official reason for not taking a more affi rmative role in the private sector was that the Bank, by its charter, could not directly support private institutions (Jack Maas, cited in Balderston, 1993). However, the Bank did assist private universities to develop engineering in other countries (including South Korea) through setting up mechanisms for on-lending to private institutions at rates more favorable than the market. (Clifford Gilpin, cited in Balderston, 1993). In other words, the early choice to target on the State sector does reveal a political option that characterized the lending programs and operations throughout the period of this study. 14. The President at the time received growing and manifest international recognition reflected by the awards bestowed on him by international organizations in social areas such as basic education (UNESCO), and family planning (WHO), as well as by his political leadership as elected chair and spokesman of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1991. 15. During the mid- to late 1960s much of Western aid to Indonesia was sharply reduced if not abandoned (as was the case with the World Bank and USAID in 1965) as a result of charges of capitalist propaganda (cf. Sukarno’s populist phrase “To hell with your aid”). Interestingly, the State University of New York in those days was very strongly involved in Indonesia with a (Ford sponsored) project at the Institute of Education (teacher college) in Malang (East Java). The story of the “The Ousting of Western Professors” can be read in Thomas, 1974: p. 213–217. 16. The Bank’s country economic team has always been in Jakarta, rather than in Washington. It’s chief economist for a number of years even had his office at BAPPENAS. (p.c. Gilpin)

Notes

201

17. Indonesia’s $300 million Trade Adjustment Loan of March 1987, in the Bank’s phrase, was ‘entirely tied to policy actions previously performed’ (Mosley, 1991, p. 105). 18. Specifically, the document often refers to the doubling of student fees for incoming students in 1986—an area which ironically strictly did not even belong to the authority of the Government (institutions, grouped by region, had to submit their proposal for approval to the Governor, often a military man). World Bank, HEDP-SAR, p. 10–11. 19. In education, four Bank projects have been funded as a grant from the IDA (International Development Association), including Education I (1970, 4.5 million US$ ), First Agricultural Training (1072, 6.3 million US$), Education III (14.5 million US$), and, the fi rst project in higher education, Polytechnic I (1978). Grants from IDA became prominent again after the fi nancial crisis of the late 1990s. 20. Unlike secondary and higher education, primary education up to that point had never been the subject of broad-based lending. The only earlier Bank sector work that dealt specifically with primary education dated back to the 1973 sector survey (World Bank, Basic Education Study, 1989, p. ii). Bank lending in primary education started to pick up only hesitantly in 1992, with the Primary School Teachers project (1992), and Primary Education Quality Improvement Projects (PEQUIP). 21. The Science and Technology Training Project supported more than 1500 overseas graduate fellowships to support six research institutions (LPND) coordinated by the Minister of State for Research and Technology (PCR, p. iii). The Professional Human Resource Development Project included a competitive fellowships program for overseas graduate training of civil servants (Recommendation to the Board, p. 6). 22. Apart from the numbers, there is the political matter of the Netherlands holding the longtime Chair of the International Donor Group. Interestingly, the vacant position would soon, and at the suggestion of the Indonesian Government, be taken over by the World Bank, as if to highlight the lack of international support the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation received for his assertive policy regarding human rights in Indonesia. 23. Former Director General Soekadji Ranuwihardjo recalls how the President in the mid-1980s “ordered his Minister (then Soesanto) to establish an Open University for those students who cannot leave their homes to go study” (p.c. Soekadji Ranuwihardjo). Usually, the influence was less direct than in this instance. Examples would include the carefully worded introduction of the concept of fi nancial autonomy in BAPPENAS and DGHE documents, and even in the late 1990s the Autonomy proposals that were never even submitted for consideration to the President. (p.c. Bagyo Moeliodihardjo) 24. While the distinction between routine (DIK) and development (DIP) expenditures is key to understanding Indonesia’s national development budget, it does at the same time remain a somewhat artificial distinction as all State expenditures do have implications for both national and institutional development. In functional terms, it was understood that DIK covered essential expenditures, whereas the DIP was supposed to be used to support new investments and would vary according to budgetary capacity (or extra-budgetary inputs from either international donors or private investors). In higher education practice, it meant that DIK covered personnel expenditures (80%, an overall percentage that remained stable throughout the period but that did not as such affect the institutional income since paychecks were paid centrally by the Ministry of Finance) and minimal allowances for maintenance and procurement of goods. DIP expenditures then were to cover the residual,

202 Notes which in practice—and often as a result of increasing donor efforts—would increasingly include a mixture of routine (i.e. maintenance, salary supplements . . . ) and investment activity. At the institutional level, DIP income consists of pure government grants, foreign fi nancing, and government counterpart fi nancing of foreign aid projects. Public institutions furthermore have increasingly been able to supplement their income with self-generated revenue (DIK-S, or DRK), comprising tuition fees, contracts and donations. Formally, and given that institutions are “service units of the State”, all institutional income is considered as part of government. 25. High Assistance Group: IPB; ITB; UGM; UI (Average Assistance 1980– 95: 149.7 million US$) Medium Assistance Group: UNAIR; UNCEN; UNPAD; UNPATTI (Average Assistance 1980–95: 35.3 million US$). Low Assistance Group: UNJA; UNSOED; UNEJ; UNPAR (Average Assistance 1980–95: 12.2 million US$). Teacher Training Colleges (IKIP’s), Polytechnics and the Open University were excluded from the sample because of their specifi c mission.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 1. The term “Third Generation implementation theory” was fi rst coined in the jointly published work of Malcolm Goggin, Ann Bowman, Lawrence O’Toole and James Lester. Their book, Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward a Third Generation, published in 1990, calls for a more systemic (and hence, less linear) perspective on the study of policy implementation. To that end, they set out what they call a ‘communications model’ for the analysis of implementation, with a strong emphasis upon what affects the acceptance or rejection of messages between layers of policy networks. Feedback and communication loopholes loom large in their theoretical assumptions (Goggin, M. et al., 1990: 32), which makes their approach more dynamic and less linear than that of earlier generations. 2. Opinions abound as to what the basic functions of higher education are, or should be. Indonesian higher education policy documents from the beginnings have explicitly chosen the principle of ‘tridharma’, including education, research and service to society as the key functions of higher education. Clark’s book (Clark, 1998) is particularly concerned with the conditions that uphold the research-teaching-learning nexus in modern systems. It is noted, however, that the discussion about what constitutes the basic functions of higher education goes well beyond the scope of this book, which, in addition, pointedly intends to avoid such normative approach. Rather, this chapter looks for the particular settings that ensure an integration of multiple functions of high complexity within institutions of higher education, often in spite of centrifugal forces. 3. Slembrouck’s systemic overview of contributing disciplines and theoretical perspectives is a most helpful resource for further exploration in this field (Slembrouck, 2004). 4. In 1982 the government introduced the so-called KMI (Kredit Mahasiswa Indonesia), a subsidized low interest student loan scheme, which was essentially set up in order to improve internal efficiency and specifically targeted ‘needy’ students in their fi nal years in order to encourage them to fi nish their studies (Woodhall, 1992). The scheme was abolished in 1990, as part of a larger banking deregulation package, which intended to eliminate subsidized credits in its entirety. Even so, Woodhall recalls, the political commitment to student loans was extremely limited in government circles (personal

Notes

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

203

communication). Interestingly, or ironically as it happens, the World Bank at the time supported the elimination of subsidized credits from a macroeconomic viewpoint, whereas its education department was supportive of a continuation of the student loan scheme for equity and cost recovery reasons. For the private institutions, public policy was to liberalize the sector in order to absorb surplus social demand for higher education. As a result the private sector expanded dramatically during the 1980’s and well into the 1990s, both in terms of enrollments and (types) of institutions. One might even argue that the suggested management concepts were not all that new for Indonesia, let alone paradigmatic. Following the 5th five year development plan (Repelita V, 1988–1993), which for the fi rst time referred to the idea of ‘fi nancial autonomy’ (as a way to generate more income for higher education institutions), the DGHE established a Task Force for Management Reform and Consolidation of Higher Education. Many of its conclusions (for instance, the need for ‘delegation of authority’ to appropriate levels) are echoed 7 years later in the New Paradigm (Consolidation of Higher Education towards the Second Long Term National Development Stage, 1988, p. 13–14). The discourse of the document differs fundamentally with the current Framework for Long-Term Higher Education Development, which was published in March 2003. The document is much shorter but does go into the practicalities of concepts such as ‘delegation of authority’ and ‘decentralization’ (cf. chapter 5). However, the domestic political context at this time has shifted dramatically, making such concepts much less subversive than they were under the bureaucratic-authoritarian rule of the new order regime. While it is probably not unusual for government agencies to respond to donor reviews, what makes this document unusual is that the DGHE explicitly acknowledges that its higher education strategy builds on one particular donor strategy review. A similar approach is not by necessity an identical approach, and it will therefore be instructive to indicate that the main difference between the DGHE’s own programs and the Bank supported programs relates to the government’s concern that ‘regional’ and less developed institutions also be able to participate and benefit from the respective projects. Hence, unlike the open competition of the Bank supported QUE, the Indonesian semi-QUE (2002) works from a tiered competition where less developed institutions stand a better chance of winning development funds. In fact, entering the program was restricted to institutions that had not yet received any support from other aid supported programs, nor from the DUE-like program. The DUE-like program (1999) similarly expands on the former DUE program in that more or other institutions are invited to participate. Nonetheless, the basic tenets of the international programs (i.e. transparent selection mechanism, competition based grants, decentralized planning based on self-evaluations) remained the same. In other words, the Government’s DUE-like and semi-QUE higher education development programs (as well as the ADB supported TPSDP project) are seen as a strong indication of domestic integration of internationally negotiated principles. Career paths and intra-institutional resource allocation mechanisms were typically not based on objective or transparent criteria (p.c. Pramoetadi). Apart from the politics at the institutional level (e.g. existing systems of patron ship and seniority), several studies also pointed to the structural constraints resulting from the civil service regulations that in effect determined the incentive system for teaching staff at public institutions (D. Clark & Oey-Gardiner, 1991; Insan Hitawasana Sejahtera, 1999)

204

Notes

11. The Bank’s approach at the time is not to be seen as monolithic either. There was plenty of discontinuity resulting from newly arriving project managers (p.c. Samuel Lieberman), but also internal conflicts about strategy; some wanting to push harder for policy reforms as condition for additional lending, others favoring a more gradual approach and taking into account the numerous institutional constraints (p.c. Sachi Hatakenaka). The resulting strategy was one that allowed for incremental change at the policy level, but at the same time pressing hard for pragmatic change that would ensure results at the project level. 12. RAISE stands for Relevance, Academic atmosphere, Internal management and organization, Sustainability and Efficiency-productivity. The criteria are further specified in indicators (for instance, relevance is translated into the indicator “percentage of graduates who fi nd employment within one year after graduation”) that are used as guidelines for self-evaluations and external site visits and evaluations. Entrepreneurship and leadership were later added to the list. 13. The idea of seeing the academy as a moral force in society stems from the social and political protests at universities in 1976 and 1978. These protests were repressed by the Soeharto regime, which issued the so-called policy of “Normalization of Campus Life” (NKK) in response (see also our discussion in chapter 2). 14. ‘Institutional’ here in the sense ‘new institutionalism’ uses the term, i.e. referring to the constraints, rules and norms that condition action and contribute to the emulation of established institutions (Levy, 2004, p. 1). 15. Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries. The Theory of Prismatic Society. Houghton Miffl in Company, Boston, 1964. 16. The prospect of channeling official PUO support to private institutions in Indonesia was never considered as a realistic option within NUFFIC, even though many Dutch institutions, including the VU, had developed close links with private universities and supported these with their own (private) means. Harry Brinkman, at the time Chairman of the Board of the VU, confided that consultations with his colleague Rector of the private (Christian) Satya Wacana University in Salatiga generally allowed for more openness to discuss institutional management issues than at the public institutions or at the ministry (interview). 17. Interviews with professor Sukadji (former Rector of UGM, and former Director General DIKTI), Satryo Brodijonegoro (Director General of DIKTI), Hariadi P. Soepangkat (former Rector ITB), Wati Anandy (Budget Officer, Ministry of Finance). 18. The regular teaching staff at Indonesia’s public universities (PTN) has civil servant status. They are subject to civil service personnel rules of recruitment and promotion. The Civil Service structure for academic staff progresses from IIIA (junior staff with only undergraduate degree) to IIID; thereafter one moves on to levels IVA up to IVE, the highest rank for full professor. Doctorate holders start at IIIB. Higher level positions can be fi lled only through promotion from below. The system inhibits mobility and favors inbreeding. Insan Hitawasana Sejahtera (HIS). Remuneration and incentive system for teaching staff: a policy study. March, 1999, p.3. Oey-Gardiner, 1991. 19. ‘Merit’ in this instance does not need to be restricted to academic merit only, but can, as under the DUE program, also refer to the quality of the institutional consultation process or the self-evaluations that institutions were required to submit. 20. Whether and to what extent private institutions effectively participated in the URGE program is a different matter. From the project’s Implementation

Notes

21.

22.

23.

24. 25.

26.

27.

205

Completion Report we learn that in reality private participation was limited (receiving none of the institutional grants), although in one of the project’s sub-components (i.e. the ‘domestic collaborative research grants’) private universities received 36 of the 168 awards (World Bank, Project Implementation Report for the University Research for Graduate Education Project, 2001, p. 7. The assessment corresponds with a broader macro-economic critique, which the Bank has had to swallow in the post-Soeharto era, when critics, even from within the Bank, with hindsight argued that the “Bank had not pushed hard enough for fundamental reform in Indonesia”. The ‘structuralist’ explanation for the Bank’s apparent preference for a gradualist approach relates to Indonesia’s position in the international political economy. The internal criticism of the Bank’s relation to Indonesia that emerged in the wake of the fi nancial crisis in 1997 precisely made the point that the Bank had been ‘too close for comfort’ with the Indonesian regime, and as a result had been too little concerned with real institutional change (Internal Memo Dennis de Tray, August 5 1997 in response to “Questions Raised During Board Discussion on 10th June, 1997 and also World Bank, Indonesia Country Assistance Note, 1999). The more ‘voluntaristic explanation’, in contrast, focuses on the personalities involved and the dynamics of the process of negotiation between ‘agents’. Our position has been one that starts out from a structural analysis of variables (in inputs, ideas, processes, and efforts) that contributed to institutional reform, but at the same time reveals spaces for agency. To illustrate, at the time of data collection (when regional autonomy had become the ‘talk of the town’ in Jakarta), the mere existence of BAPPENAS as the government’s central planning agency was questioned by many political leaders (p.c. Fasli). For many bureaucrats, the prospect of being sent to a faraway province was becoming all too real . . . Tuition fees at the University of Indonesia tripled in 1999 from 500,000 rupiah per semester (65 $) to 1,500,000 rupiah (195 $) per semester, thereby approaching the student fees at top private institutions, excluding the registration fees, which students at private institutions have to pay (p.c. Bagyo Moeliodihardjo, p.c. Sutrisno Pardoen). Other state institutions also raised their tuition fees that year albeit to more ‘modest’ levels of 50 to 100% increases. Up to that point, State universities were legally regarded as ‘service units’ of the State. Admittedly, Clark’s comparative analysis in ‘Places of Inquiry’ focuses on the integrating conditions of the particular institutional context of graduate education, and, furthermore, empirically investigates classical types of ‘modern’ higher education systems and university institutions. Nonetheless, and although the ways in which these conditions are materialized may vary widely across systems and sub-sectors, the notion of integrating education, research and service to society seems to holds true for any system of higher education or institution seeking or being granted autonomy (International Association of Universities, 1998). The Indonesian Directorate General for Higher Education has been traditionally managed by academics (usually former Rectors), whereas the bulk of its staff of 300 consists of ‘homegrown government bureaucrats’ (p.c. Sukadji). From an international comparative perspective, the conservative role of the Ministry of Finance (and the progressive role of the Ministry of Education) may seem strange in the context of reforms saving on the national budget. However, there are contextual and structural explanations. First, Indonesia’s DGHE stands out for its own relative autonomy within the bureaucracy of

206 Notes

28. 29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34. 35.

36. 37.

the Ministry of Education. Its leadership consists of former rectors and vice rectors who still have strong links and sympathies with the universities they come from, and with the higher education landscape in general. Secondly, and from a resource dependency perspective, the Ministry of Finance looses its own power leverage if institutions gain more autonomy. MOF’s share in funding public higher (the DIK funds for recurrent expenditures, in particular funds for staff salaries) already has been decreasing during the past two decades, and is expected to decrease even further if institutions become autonomous in personnel management. Study on reform on higher education legal infrastructure. Terms of Reference. Jakarta, June 30 2006. Funds for higher education consist of Daftar Isian Proyek (DIP, or development funds), Daftar Isian Kegiatan (DIK, recurrent funds), and Daftar Rencana Kegiatan (DRK, or self generated funds). In public institutions, self generated funds typically appear as recurrent revenue as they are intended to cover working expenditures. Resources from international assistance are used for investments and appear in the investment budget. For one because of lack of reliable data. Information is hard to get, partly because of resistance from institutions to share this information, partly because of unreliability in the institutions’ fi nancial management systems (some sub-units have their own accounts and do not wish to share information with the central management). For ITB the share stood at 35% and for UGM the percentage was 55%. Team for University Autonomy, Directorate General of Higher Education, Ministry of Education and Culture, University Management and Funding Mechanism. Background Paper, Document II, June 1999, p. 11–12. In dollar purchasing power parity terms, the difference was 9,223 $ for one academic year at the high cost end of the public institutions, as compared to 13,747 $ for the high cost private institutions. The suvey was conducted at the University at Buffalo (SUNY), in the frame of the International Comparative higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project, http://www.gse. buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance/. Case studies by Martha Finnemore on the impact of UNESCO on national policy structures for research policy (Finnemore, 1993), on the impact of the World Bank on redefi ning development (Finnemore, 1997), and on the influence of IMF expertise illustrate this point (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). In Fall 2006 the DGHE ordered a study to explore alternative systems and to recommend a new mechanism to allocate the recurrent budget to institutions. For the criticism from the students on the left, see Jean Duval, ‘Swastanisasi’, ‘otonomie’: hot IMF recipes for Indonesian universities, March 2000. For serious academic criticism from within the campus walls, see Heru Nugroho, The Political Economy of Higher Education: The University as an Arena for the Struggle for Power. In: Social Science and Power in Indonesia, Edited by Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, p. 158–163. The public debate focused in particular on concern about rising student fees for students in general, and specific fee schemes for students from wealthy families who had to pass a specially designed entrance test but were required to pay exorbitant entrance fees. See Eny Haryati, Kapitalisme Pendidikan Tinggi, Pasca Tragedi UAN. In: Tempo, 18th June, 2004 (Tempo is a popular but critical Indonesian magazine); or ‘The problems of higher education privatization in Indonesia’, Jakarta Post, January 31st 2007 (Jakarta Post is Indonesia’s English newspaper) BHMN: Autonomous Nonprofit State Higher Education. Following Clark’s use of the concept of ‘reform’, the term ‘policy’ is used here in the broad sense to include acts and processes of formal policy (e.g.

Notes

38.

39. 40. 41.

42.

207

formal rules and regulations) but also the informal procedures and activities originating from both institutional and intra-institutional practices that are tolerated, implicitly encouraged, or simply beyond control of any particular agent (i.e. ‘reform by drift’ (Cerych, 1986: 260). Regarding Indonesian higher education policy specifically, Oey-Gardiner provides specific illustrations of creative institutional responses and loopholes in formal policy (OeyGardiner, 1991: 91–92). Institutional development is defined by Bank evaluators as “the extent to which a project improves a country’s ability to make more efficient, equitable, and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources, through (a) better institutional arrangements—”rules of the game” (laws and regulations), checks/balances and incentives, what governs organizations and their interactions, and culture—and (b) better alignment of organizations’ mission and capacity with their mandates” (Berk report, 2002, p. 15) Explicit reference is made here to the so-called ICW rules dating from the Dutch period, which required all State service units to report and return self generated income to central State accounts. The World Bank to some extent being the notable exception, as it pushed cost recovery and student loans in the early 1980s (and again in 2005), and put fi nancial autonomy on the agenda in the 1990s (see chapter 2). The program at UI was referred to as Program Prestasi dan minat Mandiri (‘self reliant program for achievement and interest’). Entrance fees varied according to discipline, with social sciences at the lowest rate and medicine at the highest rate (Armidas Sasdi, Higher education: balancing fi nancial need and fairness. The Jakarta Post, December 2nd, 2005) Concentration may also occur across disciplines or fields of study. The URGE program summaries do in fact suggest that priority will be given to proposals that strengthen “Indonesia’s capacity for science and technology”. The URC commissions, nonetheless, are broad in scope and include disciplinary fields of Humanities, Education, and Social Sciences, next to Basic Sciences, Agriculture, Health, and Engineering.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 1. The latter theme (i.e. the institutionalizing power of international assistance, and of the World Bank in particular) has also been pursued by other authors, like Joel Samoff (2003) and David Ellerman (2005). 2. The concept of ‘progress’ probably fits better with the time period (Zeitgeist) of modernization (vs. dependency) that provided the background of Levy’s study, than it does with the ambiguity of postmodern times. 3. The book focuses specifically on donors “ . . . with a decisive U.S. presence . . .” (Levy, 2005: p. 1) and explicitly concentrates on the export of the U.S. university model Southward (Levy, 2005: 10–13). 4. Admittedly, Dutch university assistance used to be channeled through NUFFIC, which at the time was a foundation of Dutch universities. Nonetheless, its activities in the area of development are entirely funded and sanctioned (i.e. following government priorities and subject to government evaluations) by the Dutch government and its Minister for Development Aid.

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Index

A academic autonomy, 44, 65, 100, 130, 131, 194n62 academic unit, 17, 28, 40, 44–45, 60, 63, 96, 102, 142, 148–149, 185n6, 196n79, 169n87, 198n91; See also faculty, department, study program academic freedom, 2, 155, 216, 229 academic work, 28, 31, 108, 157, 210; floor, 108, 112–113; unit, 112; culture, 126; graduate education, 17, 28, 40, 44–45, 60, 63, 96, 102, 142, 148–149, 185n6, 196n79, 196n81, 198n91 accountability, 6, 24, 50, 59, 61, 97, 99, 105, 119, 135, 199n2, 225; and autonomy, 6–7, 13, 23, 60, 102, 105, 118, 119, 142, 154, 220; and accreditation, 101,105, 183n1; and competitive funding, 126; to donor, 32, 52; to State; 33, 155 access, 121, 153, 182n16, 182n2, 192n47; to primary education, 82 accreditation, 50, 55, 62, 97–101, 104, 125, 127, 144, 150, 154, 156, 157; and government role, 50, 97; Accreditation Board (PTBAN), 62, 102, 105, 106, 113, 114, 119, 123, 125, 132, 162, 197n85 ADB (Asian Development Bank), 2, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 103, 123, 153, 165, 179n2, 180n4, 203n9 administrative autonomy, 130, 132 admissions, 47, 121, 157

administration, 33, 38, 39, 40, 44, 47, 55, 58, 85, 94, 127, 162, 185n6, 185n8, 188n19, 204n15; donor administration, 185n6, 185n6; government administration, 40, 58, 85; university administration, 33, 38, 39, 40, 44, 47, 55, 58, 94, 127, 162, 188n19 administrators, 9, 13, 17, 21, 38, 111, 148, 222 aid, 1, 3, 4, 10, 19, 21, 24, 46, 69, 79, 151, 152, 158, 182n16, 183n25, 199n4, 200n15; Dutch aid, 3, 19, 26–33, 38–43, 68, 180n3, 184n3, 185n5, 185n9, 186n9, 187n12, 187n13, 189n32, 207n4; and assistance, 8, 69; to Indonesia, 71, 74, 76, 82–88, 110, 140, 179n1, 179n2, 180n3, 180n5, 202n24, 203n9; Aid Intensity Index, 71, 82, 83, 199n6; project aid, 72, 74, 75, 78, 179n2; multilateral aid, 10, 24 agency, 95, 96, 106, 111, 205n21 agriculture, 43, 47, 53, 74, 53, 74, 75, 80, 183n2, 207n42 Asian crisis, 78, 215 audit, 19, 132, 136 Australia, 2, 71, 74, 79, 103, 124, 140, 179n2, 200n12 autonomy and accountability, see accountability

B BHMN (Autonomous Nonprofit State Higher Education), 131, 133, 206n36

232 Index BAPPENAS (Indonesian Government Planning Agency), 22, 46, 57, 59, 66, 67, 72, 74, 75, 80, 88, 104, 108, 111, 112, 114, 118, 124, 148, 156, 162, 174, 187n12, 188n23, 191n41, 194n62, 200n11, 200n16, 201n23, 205n22 basic education, 49, 71, 78, 81, 120, 131, 199n4, 199n7, 200n14 Belgium, xix “Berkeley Mafia”, 190n33 bilateral donors, 2, 71, 76, 77, 81, 103, 115, 117, 119, 136, 180n2, 190n33, 192n47, 200n12 block grants, 4, 50, 52, 54, 59, 61, 63, 73, 89, 90, 125, 127, 129, 131, 137, 139, 171 ‘Blue Book’, 74–75, 200n11 Board of Higher Education, 62, 90, 105, 106, 114, 119, 123,131, 197n85; see also DTP Bresnan, John, 181n13, 190n33, 190n34, 192n45, 210 bureaucratic polity, 5, 17, 41, 47, 66, 67, 71, 85, 87, 147, 149, 153, 155, 156, 191n37, 191n42, 203n7; see also polity

C capacity building, 11, 16, 23, 44, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 58, 62, 67, 81, 146, 148 capacity development, 24, 77, 122, 128n16 centralization, 11, 17, 49, 55, 134, 135, 149, 153, 197n89, 199n1 Cerych, Ladislav, 25, 95, 121, 193n54, 194n64, 197n86, 207n37 change agents, 14, 158 China, 2, 179n3 CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia), 71, 74, 179n2; see also IGGI “Chicago boys”, 190n33 civil service, 105, 106, 112, 117, 121, 126, 128, 132, 135, 180n5, 186n12, 193n57 Clark, Burton R., 5, 12, 13, 14, 18, 23, 24, 33, 40, 95, 96, 105, 106, 110, 112, 120, 121, 135, 142–143, 145–146, 154, 155, 182n20, 188n25, 197n86, 202n2, 203n10

conditionality, 60, 66, 80, 110, 116, 159, 196n76 congruence, 25, 96, 107, 120 consultation, 21, 38, 60, 64, 89, 107–111, 113, 179n2, 185n6, 187n12, 188n23, 194n62, 195n75, 198n92, 204n16, 204n19 cost recovery, 54, 56, 66, 67, 97, 104, 127, 128, 130, 134, 138, 139, 157, 181n9, 184n3, 203n4, 207n40 cross subsidization, 104, 118, 136, 137, 138, 145 cultural change, 130, 140, 144

D DAC (Development Assistance Committee), 82, 200n12 decentralization, 11, 17, 18, 23, 40, 45, 48, 50–52, 54, 55, 58–68, 70, 71, 72, 79, 93, 97, 99, 102, 118, 122, 124, 130, 138, 149, 154, 156, 192n45, 195n70, 195n74, 197n84, 198n89, 199n1, 203n7; see also strategic decentralization democracy, 122, 130 demographics, 78, 122 dependency school, 15, 150, 207n2 depth of change, 121 deregulation, 18, 86–88, 182n23, 202n23 development, human development, 24, 182,16; human resource development, 24, 28, 32, 55, 110, 111, 117, 129, 132, 135, 191n43, 193n57, 193n60 development banks, 69, 72, 73, 74, 76 development university, 30, 39; see also university development differentiation, 12, 16, 23, 24, 44, 49, 52, 54, 56–58, 65, 70, 73, 87, 89, 97, 107, 112–113, 122–125, 137, 138, 145, 147, 193n59, 197n89; internal differentiation, 12, 138, 145; institutional differentiation, 16, 23, 24, 44, 49, 52, 56, 58, 65, 70, 89, 97, 122, 123, 125, 138, 147; stratified differentiation, 52, 54; see also elitism diffraction, 107 displacement, 149

Index DGIS (Dutch Directorate General for International Cooperation), 34, 35, 38, 185n8, 188n22, 189n27, 189n31 DIK (Routine Budget), 90, 92, 175, 176, 180n5, 201n24, 206n27, 206n29; see also recurrent expenditures, DIP (Development Budget), 90, 92, 175, 176, 180n5, 201n24, 202nn24, 206n29; see also investment funds Directorate General for Higher Education (DIKTI/DGHE), 6, 9, 23, 42, 43, 49, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 73, 82, 88, 93, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 111, 112, 114, 116, 118, 123, 124, 125, 129, 131–136, 145, 148, 153, 162, 174, 187n12, 188n23, 188n29, 191n41, 192n47, 192n50, 193n54, 194n62, 194n65, 195n69, 195n75, 196n78, 196n79, 196n80, 196n81, 196n82, 197n85, 198n90, 200n11, 201n23, 203n6, 203n8, 203n9, 205n27, 206n34 diversification, 16, 21, 23, 24, 48, 49, 54, 56, 58, 65, 67, 70, 92, 93, 101, 104, 113, 122, 128, 134, 138, 139, 148, 158, 182n20, 183n25, 193n58; see also resource diversification domestic reform, 14–16, 57, 67, 85, 95, 147, 149 “donor decentralization gap”, 11, 18, 199n1 DRK (also DIK-S; Self Generated Revenue), 92, 127, 128, 131, 180n5, 202n24, 206n29; see also selfgenerated income, self financing capacity DTP (Board of Higher Education), 62, 90, 105, 106; see also Board of Higher Education DSO (Direct Support to Training Institutions), 29, 185n5 DUE (Development of Undergraduate Education), 50, 59, 61, 64, 92, 101, 103, 113, 114, 119, 123, 127, 130, 137, 139, 171, 175, 176, 195n68, 196n75, 197n83,

233

197, 84, 197n85, 198n94, 203n9, 204n19

E EDA (Effective Development Assistance), 76 elitism, 72, 111, 123, 125, 128, 156 Ellerman, David, 11, 105, 158, 207n1 enacting conditions, 23, 96, 98, 110, 120, 121, 137, 142, 146 enrollments, 4, 56, 57, 78, 85, 87, 88, 161, 169, 193n59, 203n5 entrepreneurial, 135 equity, 49, 59, 61, 77, 102, 106, 142, 182n16, 192n48 ESW (Economic Sector Work), 81; see also policy dialogue evaluation, 10, 11, 20, 23, 25, 38, 39, 42, 50, 52, 62, 64, 73, 75, 80, 81, 95, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 109, 113, 114, 116, 120, 123, 125, 134, 141, 145, 159, 183n1, 185n6, 188n18, 191n44, 192n98, 194n66, 197n84, 198n90, 203n9, 204n12, 204n19, 207n4; and screening, 125, 194n66; evaluation capacity, 50, 52, 102, 105, 114, 116, 145, 197n84, 207n4; donor project evaluations, 11, 20, 23, 28, 38, 39, 42, 62, 75, 80, 81, 99, 109, 120, 123, 134, 185n6, 188n18, 192n44, 192n48, 198n90; peer evaluation, 10, 73, 97, 159, 183n1, 204n12; policy evaluation, 95; self-evaluation, 64, 102, 103, 104, 105, 113, 114, 125, 203n9, 204n12 ‘Evaluative State’, 114, 133, 182n21, 197n84; see also Neave, Guy, Evans, Paul, 24, 105 Europe, 128, 140, 168, 182n22, 183n1, 194n64, 195n74, 197n84 expansion, 15, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 87, 88, 100, 101, 105, 153, 161, 169, 170, 192n44, 194n61

F Faculty, 17, 19, 20, 21, 39, 40, 92, 64, 89, 102, 112, 130, 134, 135, 136, 142, 143, 148, 155, 162, 182n20, 187n15, 188n20, 190n33, 200n11

234 Index Finnemore, Martha, 15, 152, 206n33 funding systems, 120, 124, 126, 129, 137, 150 formalism, 149 formative conditions, 23, 96, 97, 120, 121, 133, 145 financial autonomy, 12, 24, 49, 131, 141 Ford Foundation, 73, 186n10

G GBHN (Guidelines for State Policy), 101 geography, 34, 42 Germany, 71, 79, 103, 124, 179n2, 200n12 GOI (Government of Indonesia), 80, 113, 114, 170, 171 government role, 16, 97, 100, 105, 148, 197n84 graduate education, 63, 64, 72, 93, 100, 114, 120, 123, 145–146, 171, 205n20, 205n25 grants, 4, 27, 50, 52, 54, 59, 61, 63, 69, 72, 73, 77, 81, 83, 89, 90, 91, 103, 106, 114, 124, 125, 127, 131, 179, 181, 183, 196n82, 200n13, 201n19, 202n24, 203n9, 205n20; block grants, 4, 50, 52, 54, 59, 61, 63, 73, 89, 90, 125, 127, 131; competitive grants, 114; institutional grants, 91, 183n2, 205n20; research grants, 4, 91, 196n82, 200n13, 205n20 guru besar (full professor), 135

H Harbison, Ralph, 58, 66, 163 HEDP (Higher Education Development Project), 49, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64, 80, 99, 101, 113, 114, 165, 170, 171, 193n56, 194n64, 194n66, 195n73, 195n75, 196n76, 196n78, 196n80, 201n18 HELTS, Framework for Long Term Higher Education Development, 5, 50, 56, 60, 82, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 128, 195n75, 196n79, 203n6, 203n7 higher education institutions, 2, 6, 7, 26, 27, 41, 41, 43, 48, 52, 60, 105, 121, 123, 127, 129, 130,

130, 131, 135, 150, 153, 161, 164, 197n87, 203n6 higher education reform, 23, 97, 101, 102, 110, 151, 196n78 horizontal learning, 119, 124, 144, 159 human capital, 191n43, 193n53, 199n8, 200n10 human resources, 4, 24, 28, 32, 55, 72, 81, 82, 93, 110, 111, 117, 129, 130, 132, 134, 135, 142, 171, 182n16, 191n43, 193n57, 193n60, 198n91, 201n21

I IAI (Index of Aid Intensity), 74, 82, 83, 199n6 IAIN (Indonesian Islamic Universities), 199n7 IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 72, 81, 161, 165, 166 ICW regulations (‘State Accounting Rules’), 130, 207n39 IDA (International Development Association), 165, 170, 190n36, 201n19 ideology, 16, 25, 87, 118, 129, 130, 145 IGGI (Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia), 69, 71, 74, 76, 199n1 IKIP (Teacher Training Institutions), 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 202n25 implementation, see policy implementation income generating capacity, 5, 42, 118, 143, 194n64 incremental change, 60, 67, 110, 115 Indonesian politics, 77, 156 infrastructure, 27, 28, 37, 39, 43, 54, 73, 74, 78, 80, 89, 93, 94, 101, 106, 110, 111, 113, 116, 117, 120, 122, 135, 136, 138, 179n3 institutional autonomy, 5, 6, 9, 13, 17, 24, 37, 47, 50, 70, 86, 97, 98, 100, 106, 107, 110, 111, 113, 114, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 133, 135, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 154, 156, 182n20 institution building, 12, 16, 17, 21, 27, 29–31, 33, 40, 42, 45, 55, 56, 57, 67, 108, 148, 155, 182n16, 198n90

Index

235

institutional change, 17, 22, 23, 62, 86, 115, 134–144, 149, 155, 157, 205n21 institutional reform, 16, 57, 115, 194n64, 205n21 international transfer mode of change, 18 institutionalism (institutional theory), 12, 150, 204n14 institutions as ‘service units’ of the State, 4, 40, 85, 104, 131, 133, 202n24, 205n24, 207n39 institutional differentiation, see differentiation intermediary agencies, 6, 10, 23, 38, 50, 122, 197n87, 200n13 IOP (International Education Program), 29 IPB (Agricultural University Institute, Bogor), 21, 22, 128, 131, 132, 134, 140, 162, 163, 172, 175, 192n51, 202n25 ITB (University Institute for Technology, Bandung), 21, 22, 40, 41, 131, 132, 134, 140, 141, 142, 143, 162, 163, 172, 175, 181n13, 188n24, 192n51, 202n25, 204n17, 206n31 IUC (Inter University Center), 43, 48, 51, 54, 57, 63, 100, 117, 113, 123, 158, 193n60, 194n65, 198n89, 199n90

learning, 15, 41, 113, 115, 119, 124, 145, 158, 159, 202n2 legal autonomy, 104, 118, 130, 134, 141, 149 legal framework, 130, 156 legitimacy, 107, 141, 151, 156, 159, 199n2 level of change, 121 Levy, Daniel C., 3, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 152, 153, 186n10, 188n19, 204n14, 207n2, 207n4 liberalism, 57, 86, 87, 106, 118, 140, 156, 203n5 library, 38, 55, 57, 85 limited bureaucratic pluralism, 86, 87 linkages, 2, 3, 20, 22, 27, 28, 30–43, 83, 84, 94, 106, 108, 181n14, 183n2, 184n3, 184n4, 184n5, 184n7, 186n12, 187n13, 187n6, 198n90 loans, 54, 55, 57, 59, 61, 69, 72–74, 76, 77, 80–82, 85, 88, 110, 113, 114–116, 119, 123, 138, 159, 179n2, 179n3, 181n12, 192n44, 195n73, 196n76, 196n80, 199n5, 202n4, 207n40; see also student loans L-RAISE, Leadership—Relevance, Academic Atmosphere, Internal Management, Sustainability, Efficiency, and Productivity, 105, 114, 204n12

J

M

Japan, 2, 71, 74, 77, 79, 102, 140, 179n2, 199n5, 200n12 Jones, Phillip W., 10, 15, 16, 180n7, 182n18, 191n43, 193n58

‘managed pluralism’, 66, 192n45; see also pluralism management development, 38, 62, 108–110 manpower planning, 49–54, 65, 67, 74 market, 3, 14, 24, 46, 51, 52, 54, 59, 61, 65, 70, 72, 78, 79, 81, 87, 88, 92, 105, 106, 116, 118, 122, 123, 127, 129, 130, 143, 145, 147, 150, 154, 157, 182n16, 190n33, 191n43, 195n74, 199n8, 200n13 MHO (Joint Financing Program for Cooperation in Higher Education), 29, 184n3, 184n4 military, 35, 86, 87, 190n33, 201n18 MIS (Management Information System), 113, 194n66, 197n89 modernization, 5, 144, 152, 158, 207n2

K KMI (Kredit Mahasiswa Indonesia), 202n4, see also student loans knowledge, 9, 16, 27, 32, 39, 41, 119, 136, 144, 155, 158, 159, 181n15, 189n31 KPTJ (Framework for Long Term Higher Education Development), see HELTS Kreiner, K., 10, 15, 24, 46, 71, 115, 151, 182n17, 199n2

L labor market, 78, 122, 145, 191n43

236

Index

MOF (Ministry of Finance), 4, 22, 46, 72, 78, 104, 118, 124, 127, 128, 162, 174, 180n5, 191n41, 194n61, 194n67, 201n24, 204n17, 205n27, 206n27 moral force, 98, 106, 129, 204n13 ‘muddling through’, 87, 106, 115, 116, 119 multilateral assistance, 2, 3, 10, 15, 24, 69, 71–73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 93, 126, 128, 130, 161, 162, 164, 165, 180n4, 182n16, 199n5

N Neave, Guy, 3, 7, 13, 24, 44, 133, 154, 182n21, 195n74, 197n84 New Order, 9, 80, 85, 86, 87, 144, 179n2, 190n33, 203n7 ‘New Paradigm’, 6, 9, 50, 54, 60–62, 64, 66, 90, 91, 93, 97–106, 114, 116, 118, 119, 124, 125, 129, 133, 135, 137, 140, 141, 144, 148, 151, 154, 196n78, 198n92, 203n6 neo-institutionalism, see institutionalism NFP (Netherlands Fellowship Program), 29 NKK (Normalization of Campus Life), 181n13, 204n13 NUFFIC (Netherlands organization for international cooperation in higher education), 19, 22, 27, 30, 32, 35, 37n 38, 43, 108, 109, 163, 183n1, 184n3, 184n4, 185n6, 185n7, 185n8, 186n10, 187n14, 187n15, 189n26, 189n27, 189n28, 189n29, 204n16, 207n4

O ODA (Official Development Assistance), 76, 77, 82, 83, 164, 200n12 OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), 69, 70, 82, 83, 128, 181n12, 183n12, 200n12 Oey-Gardiner, Mayling ,143, 192n47, 196n81, 197n86, 203n10, 207n37 oil, 19, 49, 78, 85, 88, 190n35, 191n38, 193n59; price, 19, 191n38, 193n59; revenue, 49, 85, 190n35, 191n38; shock, 78

opposition, 88, 117, 119, 123–125, 129, 133, 137, 148, 181n13 overseas training, 2, 27, 77, 79, 82, 198n93, 201n21

P partnership, 2, 28, 32, 41, 73, 77, 84, 86 performance based funding, 6, 59, 70, 97, 103, 122, 125, 128, 129, 131, 150 philanthropic change, 153 PHRDP (Professional Human Resource Development Project), 82, 201n21 pluralism, 12, 66, 86, 87, 130, 192n45; see also ‘managed pluralism’ project implementation, 10, 75, 76, 77, 104, 130, 151, 185n6, 196n81, 199n1, 200n4, 205n20 project mechanism, 11, 16 project planning, 75 ‘polder model’, 108–110 policy dialogue, 2, 3, 17, 46, 57, 58, 66, 69, 97, 99, 100, 101–108, 125, 190n37, 191n42; see also ESW (Economic Sector Work) policy implementation, 95, 202n1, see also project implementation polity, 5, 41, 47, 52, 66, 67, 85, 86, 87, 147, 153, 155, 156, 191n37n 191n42 professional associations, 32, 156 professionalism, 195n74 political economy, ix, 19, 44, 59, 78, 79, 84, 85, 112, 114, 192n45, 205,21, 206n35, 210, 214, 215, 221, 224 polytechnics, 22, 48, 49, 51–53, 55, 56, 57, 62, 72, 76, 78, 93, 113, 116, 120, 122, 123, 140, 165–166, 172, 174, 181n14, 184n4, 190n36, 191n40, 191n44, 192n48, 201n19, 202n25 postcolonial, 39, 82, 108, 110 Pressman, Jeffrey L., 10, 182n17 prismatic change, 197, 149 privatization, 56, 70, 106, 118, 129, 140, 206n35 private institutions, 4, 6, 49, 56, 58, 59, 114, 119, 125, 126, 128, 169, 187n17, 189n32, 194n61, 197n83, 198n94, 200n13,

Index 203n5, 204n16, 204n20, 205n23, 206n32 private sector, 4, 49, 56, 57, 72, 88, 118, 153, 157, 189n32, 192n48, 197n83, 200n13, 203n5 procedural and substantive autonomy, 141 professor, 77, 135, 179n1, 184n3, 200n15, 204n17, 204n18; professorate, 14; professorial authority, 13, 34 Pronk, Jan, 30, 32, 35, 109, 185n9, 186n9 PT-BAN (Board of Accreditation), see also accreditation public funding, 4, 6, 21, 46, 49, 52, 57, 85 PUO (program for university development cooperation), 27, 29, 33–35, 42, 108–109, 184n4, 185n6, 186n12, 187n13, 187n14, 187n15, 187n17, 189n26, 204n16

Q quality assurance, 50, 59, 97, 100, 101, 113, 124, 132, 154, 157 QUE (Quality of Undergraduate Education Project), 50, 54, 61, 64, 92, 101, 103, 113, 114, 127, 137, 139, 163, 171, 175, 176, 191n43, 195n68, 196n75, 196n81, 197n83, 197n84, 198n94, 199n8, 203n9

R rector, 5, 20, 38, 39, 86, 108, 111, 112, 117, 118, 119, 132, 136, 140, 144, 148, 162, 163, 181n11, 181n13, 186n12, 196n78, 198n90, 198n92, 198n93, 204n16, 204n17, 205n26, 206n27 ‘reformasi’, 156 regional development, 35, 36, 75, 77, 170, 200n10; regional autonomy, 122, 156, 189n32, 205n22; regional equity, 59, 61, 106, 114, 192n48; regional university, 64, 117, 203n9 REPELITA (Five Year Economic Development Plan), 46, 49, 87, 101, 102, 188n23, 190n35, 203n6

237

resource allocation, 4, 6, 7, 38, 93, 94, 101, 105, 139, 203n10 resource diversification, 21, 23, 24, 48, 49, 54, 56, 58, 67, 70, 92, 97, 104, 127, 138–139, 148, 153, 158, 182n20n, 183n25, 193n58 relative autonomy, 7, 35, 182n16, 205n27 resource dependence theory, 182n20, 206n27, 207n2 Riggs, Frederick W., 5, 107, 204n15

S Sabatier, Paul, 25, 95, 121, 193n54, 194n64, 197n86, 207n37 Schulte Nordholt, Nico, 163, 181n13, 186n9 science and technologies, 74, 75, 82, 193n54, 196n82, 199n7, 201n21, 207n42 scope of change, 121 selectivity, 49, 50, 54, 55, 67, 73, 89, 93, 112, 126, 137, 153, 195n72, 196n81 self evaluation, 64, 102–105, 113, 114, 125, 203n12, 204n19 self generated income, 4, 5, 118, 124, 127, 131, 132, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 175, 176, 180n5, 180n9, 180n10, 180n16, 202n24, 206n29, 206n39; see also resource diversification self government, 12, 13; self reliance, 30, 31, 33, 36, 37, 109 service unit of the State, 4, 32, 40, 85, 104, 131, 133, 155, 202n24, 205n24, 207n39 shock therapy, 116 SIO (Program of Cooperation with Institutions providing International Education), 29 SIR (Study in the Region), 29, 31 socialization, 96, 117–119, 133, 144 Soeharto (also Suharto), 8, 17, 32, 72, 74, 78, 83, 86, 93, 104, 110, 118, 140, 149, 156, 179n2, 185n5, 186n9, 187n12, 190n33, 199n3, 204n13, 205n21 Soehendro, Bambang, 50, 62, 196n79, 197n87 Soekadji, Ranuwihardjo, 104, 117, 118, 124, 136, 138, 162, 201n23

238

Index

staff development, 2, 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 53, 54, 55, 67, 93, 94, 103, 109, 111, 120, 122, 124 State control model, 13, 34, 44 State supervision, 13, 24, 34, 45, 50, 62, 66, 133, 150, 154, 195n74, 197n84 steering, 45, 61, 66, 68, 73, 77, 105, 125, 147, 154–157, 182n21, 197n84 strategic decentralization, 48, 50, 58–59, 64, 65, 66, 195,74; see decentralization strategic planning, 40, 41, 64, 130 strategic decentralization, see also decentralization stratified differentiation, 52, 54 STTP (Science and Technology Training Project), 82, 201n21 student fees, 47, 128, 139, 194n61, 201n18, 205n23, 206n35 student loans, 202n4, 207n40 student protest, 8, 9, 35, 86, 181n13; see also opposition Sukarno, 80, 179n1, 200n15 SV (Inter-Institutional Cooperation Program), 29, 32, 183n2, 184n4

T teacher training, 47, 174, 180n6, 181n14, 191n40, 199n7, 202n25 Team for University Autonomy, 5, 126, 133, 162, 181n11, 206n31 technical assistance, 46, 69, 73, 75, 81, 89, 91, 106, 122, 125, 159, 193n53, 199n5 Tendler, Judith, 11, 199n1 The Netherlands, 2, 3, 19, 26–36, 42–44, 71, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 83, 84, 94, 108, 109, 110, 112, 163, 179n2, 183n1, 183n2, 185n6, 186n10, 187n12, 188n22, 188n24, 188n25, 189n26, 189n27, 190n32, 200n12, 201n22 TPSDP (Technical Professional Skills Development Project), 103, 203n9 ‘tridharma’ (unity of teaching, research and service), 129, 145, 202n2 twinning, 103, 119, 144, 159

U UGM (Gajah Mada University), 21, 22, 34, 36, 37, 38, 92, 117, 131, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140, 141, 162, 172, 175, 192n48, 192n51, 202n25, 204n17, 206n31 UI (University of Indonesia), 21, 22, 42, 86, 128, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 162, 172, 175, 181n11, 190n33, 192n48, 192n51, 202n25, 207n41 UDP (University Development Project), 49, 52–56, 58, 62, 63, 76, 78, 116, 170, 192n48, 193n60, 194n65, 195n75, 198n90, 199n9 UNAIR (Airlangga University), 172, 175, 202n25 undergraduate education, 54, 61, 64, 124, 165, 171, 197n85, 198n94 UNDIP (University Diponegoro), 140, 141, 172, 175 UNHAS (University Hasanuddin), 34, 36, 37, 39, 140, 141, 172, 175, 187n15 UNIBRAW (Brawijaya University), 34, 36, 37, 42, 140, 141, 172, 175, 187n15 UNILA (University of Lampung), 22, 134, 163, 173, 175 university autonomy, 5, 9, 12, 16, 18, 21, 23, 35, 95, 101, 118, 126, 137, 141, 147, 148, 151, 181n11, 206n31, 209, 216, 219, 224 university development, 27–30, 32, 34, 37, 38, 39, 49, 53, 108, 110, 116, 153, 184n4, 186n10, 188n19, 199n9 university management, 17, 39, 40, 41, 62–65, 68, 133, 136, 140, 148, 188n24, 198n93, 206n31 UNPAD (University of Padjadjaran), 140, 172, 175, 202n25 UNSOED (University General Soedirman), 21, 22, 134, 162, 163, 173, 176, 202n25 URGE (University Research Graduate Education Project), 50, 61, 63–64, 100, 104, 113–115, 123, 127, 137, 145, 146, 171, 195n68, 195n75, 197n83,

Index 197n84n, 197n85n, 198n90, 198n91, 204n20, 207n42 USAID, 2, 3, 11, 73, 179n1, 186n10, 200n15, 225 UT (Open University), 43, 49, 192n47, 192n51, 201n23, 202n25

V Veenkamp, Theo, 31, 37, 39, 75, 112, 163, 185n8, 187n15, 187n16, 200n4 VU (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), 35, 37, 109, 163, 187n15, 187n16, 204n16

239

W World Bank loans, 54, 61, 82, 114, 116, 119, 123, 195n73, see also IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development); World Bank and ‘policy dialogue’ (see also ESW; Economic Sector Work), 2, 3, 17, 46, 57, 58, 66, 69, 97, 99–103, 125, 190n37, 191n42 Woodhall, Maureen, 163, 202n4 world system, 15