India-Pakistan: Coming to Terms (Palgrave Series in Asian Governance)

India-Pakistan

Palgrave Series in Asian Governance Series editors: Michael Wesley, Griffith University, Australia Patrick Weller, Griffith University, Australia Books appearing in the series: Dissident Democrats: The Challenge of Democratic Leadership in Asia Edited by John Kane, Haig Patapan, and Benjamin Wong China’s “New” Diplomacy Edited by Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, and Qin Yaqing Corruption and Money Laundering: A Symbiotic Relationship David Chaikin and J. C. Sharman India-Pakistan: Coming to Terms Ashutosh Misra

India-Pakistan Coming to Terms Ashutosh Misra

INDIA-PAKISTAN

Copyright © Ashutosh Misra, 2010. All rights reserved. First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–61937–1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress. A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: July 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

I dedicate this book to the loving memory of two great personalities: Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan for her relentless pursuit of democracy in Pakistan that I believe will underpin peace with India and Jyotindra Nath Dixit, former Indian Foreign Secretary, Ambassador to Pakistan, and National Security Advisor, for his novel thinking and contribution to India’s strategic thinking and understanding of IndiaPakistan relations. This book is also dedicated to my loving wife Sweta, my two sons Srihan and Ruhan, and beloved mother Pratibha Misra for their unconditional love, motivation, and support in all my successes and failures.

Previous Publications Pakistan: Engagement of the Extremes (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and Shipra Publications, 2008)

CONTENTS

List of Figures

ix

Preface and Acknowledgments

xi

Introduction

1

I

Conceptualizing Enduring Rivalry and Negotiation

9

II

Composite Dialogue Process (CDP): A Structured Mechanism for Addressing Indo-Pak Rivalry

35

III

Bridge over Troubled Waters: The Indus Waters Treaty

57

IV

The Rann of Kutch Dispute and the Resolution Process

81

V

Dispute over Siachen: A Glacier in Need of Thaw

107

VI

The Sir Creek Dispute: A Case of Compromise Driven by Common Interests

139

The Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage and Storage Project Dispute: A Casualty of Linkage Politics?

157

VII

Conclusion: Learning from the Past to Address the Present and Influence the Future

181

Annexure I Text of the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960

201

Annexure II Original Text of the Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan Relating to a Cease-fire and the Restoration of the Status Quo as at January 1, 1965 in the Area of Gujarat/West Pakistan Border and Concerning the Arrangements for the Determination of the Border in That Area. Signed at New Delhi, on June 30, 1965

219

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Contents

Notes

223

Select Bibliography

245

Index

259

FIGURES

0.1 0.2

0.3 0.4

0.5 0.6 0.7 5.1 6.1 7.1

Author en route to remote posts in the Kutch Area Author in the Rann of Kutch with Saurav Ray, cantonment executive officer, Gujarat Circle, and Border Security Force (BSF) officer, Sub-Inspector Tyagi Author in the Rann of Kutch with Saurav Ray, cantonment executive officer, Gujarat Circle, and BSF member Author with Chinta Mani Pandey (right), inspector general of police, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Srinagar, and Gurucharan Singh, deputy inspector general of police, CRPF, Srinagar Author with Jyotindra Nath Dixit, former Indian foreign secretary, ambassador to Pakistan, and national security advisor Author with Benazir Bhutto and Ehsanul Haq Piracha, former finance minister of Pakistan Author with Imran Khan, leader of the Tehrik-e-Insaaf, at Shaukat Khannum Cancer Hospital, Lahore, Pakistan Siachen Glacier Sir Creek Location of the Tulbul Navigation Project/ Wular Barrage and Storage Project

xix

xix xx

xx xxi xxi xxii 113 141 160

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

T

he main thrust of this book is to analyze how India and Pakistan have resolved their disputes in the past, suggesting the factors that facilitated resolution of those conflicts and also examining what major impediments the parties overcame in achieving their desired objectives. The book seeks to examine how, despite being locked in a pattern of enduring conflict, states can still convene, negotiate, and produce agreements. The basic questions today in India and Pakistan concern whether both sides can resolve their pending issues even while their overall relations remain hostile. This book argues that this is possible and moreover, that the answers to those questions shed light on the experiences of other states locked in such conflict dyads in the international system. Research in peace studies and conflict resolution suggests there are ways of negotiating solutions to the overall quarrel underlying specific disputes between pairs of states. In the international system, encouragingly, there are instances of dyads caught in enduring rivalry, yet desirous of peace, being able to find answers to their specific bilateral disputes. Their experiences suggest that if the major bilateral disputes are solved, the larger quarrel may in time be eliminated. In other words, the conflict-resolution approach of addressing and resolving the tractable aspects of disputes helps lubricate the intractable aspects in preparation for negotiating their possible resolution. Unlike countless studies on Indo-Pak relations, this book focuses on the positive aspects of Indo-Pak history and explores how past cooperation can be replicated in the present scenario. In spite of India’s and Pakistan’s history of conflict there have been elements that have tended to bring them closer or at least prevented them from

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coming into conflict. There exists a strong recognition of common bonds: culture, economic interdependence, and the desire, above all, to avoid a conflict in the shadow of nuclear weapons. This study of India-Pakistan negotiations against the backdrop of enduring rivalry illuminates that, even when the shadow of past and future conflicts looms large, negotiated solutions are possible. These case studies have been consciously selected to encompass both territorial and resources issues, including the Indus waters, Rann of Kutch, Siachen, Sir Creek, and Tulbul/Wular disputes. Because they remain central to national security and identity, these are extremely difficult cases to negotiate, and if it can be shown that both sides have actually been successful or nearly successful in resolving them, it will present India-Pakistan relations in a very positive and constructive light. This book studies Indo-Pak relations through the prism of enduring rivalry and, using a framework of negotiation as a template, examines their past negotiations to ascertain what particular characteristics of the framework have been relevant in shaping the final outcome. The book draws important and positive lessons from the pages of history—lessons that surprisingly have not been given enough attention—and analyzes to what extent these positives can help in addressing and resolving pending disputes. I believe that the findings of the book are relevant for not only India and Pakistan, but also for other dyadic rivalries in the international system. This book is a result of my years of research and academic pursuits spanning more than a decade in various capacities: as a post-graduate scholar and doctoral student at Jawaharlal Nehru University ( JNU), New Delhi; as a programme officer at the United Nations Leadership Academy (UNLA) in Jordan; as a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, and Griffith Asia Institute (GAI), Brisbane; and also as an associate investigator at the Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS), Griffith University, Australia. This exercise arises from an intrinsic impulse to contribute to the cause of peacemaking between India and Pakistan in a constructive and policy-relevant manner. This book is about transforming despair into hope, conflict into cooperation, mistrust into lasting understanding, and above all rivalry into partnership. This book is written to impress upon those observers of India and Pakistan who have found it convenient to draw their conclusions from the negative aspects of this enduring rivalry, that in this relationship there are

Preface and Acknowledgments

xiii

positives that have been overlooked and promises of the future that have fallen prey to sustained cynicism. Should this book be able to convince its average reader that India-Pakistan history is not solely the epitome of interstate discord but has a strong positive dimension as well, I would judge the exercise to have been worth the effort. India-Pakistan conflict resolution is about mindset, and I firmly believe constructive thinking will transform sixty years of mutual mistrust, hatred, and antagonism into a positive force multiplier for the entire gamut of Indo-Pak peace initiatives. In the course of research, data collection, and information gathering for this book I faced innumerable problems and constraints which were overcome with the invaluable support of my friends, acquaintances, institutions, and many individuals who without knowing me went out of their way to help me. Completion of this book with no mention of those helping hands would be an unpardonable act. Therefore, at the outset I express my sincere thanks to the academics, leaders, diplomats, and scholars who very patiently and generously subjected themselves to my questions. In this regard, I am particularly indebted to the late Benazir Bhutto, who was very generous and kind in offering me to accompany her in her vehicle from the Marriott hotel to Zardari House, in Islamabad in December 1998, and who answered my unending research queries. I am also thankful to Ehsanul Haq Piracha, former finance minister of Pakistan, who later told me that he was deliberately driving the vehicle slowly so that I had more time to speak to her on our way to Zardari House. I am also thankful to several other important personages and scholars who agreed to talk to me and helped me in accessing resources unavailable in India. In this context I am particularly thankful to: Imran Khan, whom I met at the Shaukat Khannum Cancer Research Hospital in Islamabad; Zafar Iqbal Cheema and Nazir Hussain at Quaid-e-Azam University; Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza and his faculty colleagues at the South Asia Centre at the University of the Punjab; Najam Sethi, at his Friday Times office in Lahore; Ahmar Bilal Soofi, in his chamber in Lahore, and Shafqat Ali Khan of the Pakistan Foreign Office, who helped give this book its desired shape. A further special note of thanks to my friends, Imran Saeed Khan and Ali Mumtaz, for their personal care and support during my stay in Lahore and Islamabad, respectively, and not to forget the hospitality and warmth of their families and of common Pakistanis on the streets of Lahore and Islamabad. The visit was a good learning

xiv

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experience and a wonderful opportunity to meet and interact personally with the Pakistani people. I am equally indebted to Fahmida Ashraf and, particularly to Salma Malik, who in those days was associated with the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Salma Malik, now on the faculty of Quaid-e-Azam University, provided her timely support in the final days of this research by locating, in quick time, some missing pieces of information from press archives dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. I am also obliged to Ahmed Ijaz of the Centre for South Asian Studies at the University of the Punjab for helping me access old newspaper clippings on the Indus Waters and Rann of Kutch disputes. I need to particularly acknowledge the help of Amera Saeed of the Institute of Regional Studies for not only speaking to me on the Indus waters dispute but also sending me loads of newspaper clippings and research materials after I had returned from Pakistan. In India, I owe my deepest gratitude to Kanti P. Bajpai, a teacher, a friend, and a mentor, who played a pivotal role in shaping my research endeavors on Indo-Pak relations, a substantial part of which has found expression in this book. Without his patient and impeccable guidance and counseling during my doctoral-studies days I would have lacked the critical research skills to write this book. I must also thank Happymon Jacob and Suresh Roy of Jawaharlal Nehru University for locating needed pieces of information on the Indus waters and Rann of Kutch disputes in newspaper archives dating back to 1950s and 1960s. I also wish to record my deep appreciation to the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, for awarding me the fellowship for the 1997 and 1998 period, without which it would have been difficult to accomplish the doctoral research that has formed the foundation of my research career. I also thank my brother Paritosh and sister-in-law Patricia for their financial support and encouragement during my years at Jawaharlal Nehru University. A special note of thanks goes to several ambassadors—Jyotindra Nath Dixit, Gopalaswamy Parthasarthy, Jagat S. Mehta, and Shailendra Kumar Singh—for patiently responding to my questions during interviews; in Sri Lanka, I am especially thankful to Ambassador Vernon L.B. Mendis for sharing his diplomatic experiences and insights on negotiations. I must also acknowledge my gratitude to Lieutenant General A.B. Massih, Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, and Brigadier Devinder Singh for having found the time to share their thoughts on the Siachen dispute. Their understanding of the dispute from their professional experience in the Indian armed

Preface and Acknowledgments

xv

forces has been instrumental in imparting knowledge which could not have been gathered from any literature. I am also thankful to Stephen P. Cohen for generally enriching my grasp of Pakistan and Indo-Pak relations over the years. His understanding of Pakistan and Indo-Pak relations finds no parallel, from which I have learned immensely. I must also extend my gratitude to Priyankar Upadhyaya of Malaviya Centre for Peace Research for sharing his thoughts on the India-Pakistan relationship and providing useful tips to sharpen the analytical content of this book. For outstanding assistance and courtesy, and for providing research facilities at various stages, I am very grateful to the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, the United States Information Service Library, and the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library in New Delhi, the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) and Institute of Regional Studies (IRS) in Islamabad, and the Centre for South Asian Studies Library, University of the Punjab, in Lahore. My heartfelt thanks also go to the directorate of Border Security Force (BSF) for providing the necessary permission, assistance, and hospitality during my field visits to the saline areas of the Rann of Kutch. The name of Mr. Saurav Ray, cantonment executive officer, Gujarat Circle, deserves categorical mention for his overwhelming support and for allowing me to accompany him to the most remote and desolate areas in the Rann of Kutch—as far as the Koteshwar-based BSF post that oversees the Sir Creek area in the Gujarat sector. This field visit exposed me to the difficult terrain and enabled me to fathom the geographical complexities of the dispute. I also thank Chinta Mani Pandey, inspector general of police, and Gurucharan Singh, deputy inspector general of police of the Central Reserve Police Force in Srinagar, for facilitating my visit to Jammu and Kashmir, during which I not only visited the disputed site of Tulbul/Wular project but also traveled from Srinagar to Ladakh, via Kargil. The two-day road journey with these officials was a once-in-a-life time experience seeing the treacherous and difficult terrain in the Kargil sector, where in 1999 India and Pakistan fought their fourth war. I am also obliged to Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Centre for giving me permission to use the maps of Siachen, Sir Creek, and Tulbul/Wular disputes, published in his 1995 book Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia. I am also very thankful to Vijay Satokar, news editor, and Subhash Chandra Malhotra, photo editor, at the Press Trust of India for

xvi

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providing the cover photograph for this book. In this regard I must also render my thankfulness to Rishi Raj Singh Dungarpur for facilitating the delivery of this photograph to me. I must also mention Alok Mukhopadhyaya, Ashok Behuria, and Uttam Kumar Sinha of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for helping me acquire key research articles in the critical stages of this study. Institutionally, I am grateful to the United Nations Leadership Academy where as programme officer I was able to learn in-depth about leadership, which I have found very useful in analyzing the role of leadership in conflict resolution. I must also mention my five years of association with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses where my research on Indo-Pak affairs assumed vigor and policyoriented direction. This experience helped me finish this book with a robust policy-oriented approach. I am also thankful to Griffith Asia Institute and the Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, with whom I have been associated since July 2007, for providing the infrastructure and research base to complete this book. By the same token the Griffith University library and the National Library of Australia deserve mention for their resources support. In the end, I owe a special vote of acknowledgment to my wife Sweta who, despite her domestic and professional preoccupations, diligently did the proofreading of the draft manuscript. Her unstinting support during the highs and lows of my professional career and personal life has provided me the motivation and resolve to accomplish my goals, braving all adversities. My two sons, Srihan and Ruhan, have displayed exemplary understanding of my research obligations which have on many occasions kept me away from them for prolonged periods. When they grow up, I expect they will fully comprehend how appreciative I have been of such an understanding from children of that age. In the end, I must mention that whatever I have achieved so far in life has been through the blessings of my mother, Pratibha Misra, and late father, Ramesh Chandra Misra. Their role has been cardinal in making me capable of undertaking such assignments with confidence. Last but not the least, a special acknowledgment goes to Robyn Curtis of Palgrave Macmillan and to the copyeditors Stuart A.P. Murray and Aaron R. Murray for making this book readable and attractive. Their professionalism has no match in the publishing industry and I can say this with complete confidence. I have dedicated this book to my family for their motivational companionship, to the loving memory of Benazir Bhutto for her

Preface and Acknowledgments

xvii

relentless struggle for promoting democracy in Pakistan, which I am convinced will underpin all peace initiatives with India, and also to the late J.N. Dixit, former Indian ambassador to Pakistan and national security advisor, for enriching my knowledge of Pakistan with his valuable insights and for also once fondly committing to write the preface of my book on Indo-Pak relations. All these individuals and institutions deserve my sincerest gratitude and appreciation. ASHUTOSH MISRA Brisbane March 1, 2010

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Figure 0.1

Author en route to remote posts in the Kutch Area

Figure 0.2 Author in the Rann of Kutch with Saurav Ray, cantonment executive officer, Gujarat Circle, and Border Security Force (BSF) officer, Sub-Inspector Tyagi

Figure 0.3 Author in the Rann of Kutch with Saurav Ray, cantonment executive officer, Gujarat Circle, and a BSF member

Figure 0.4

Author with Chinta Mani Pandey (right), inspector general of police, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Srinagar, and Gurucharan Singh, deputy inspector general of police, CRPF, Srinagar

Figure 0.5

Author with Jyotindra Nath Dixit, former Indian foreign secretary, ambassador to Pakistan, and national security advisor

Figure 0.6

Author with Benazir Bhutto and Ehsanul Haq Piracha, former finance minister of Pakistan

Figure 0.7 Author with Imran Khan, leader of the Tehrik-e-Insaaf, at Shaukat Khannum Cancer Hospital, Lahore, Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

I

t took half a century for India and Pakistan to come to terms with the realization that they are neighbors for life—a fact that cannot be undone; that neighbors have problems that cannot be simply wished away or be forcefully settled; and that all problems will have to be settled through bilateral negotiations in tandem with discarding the linkage politics. Fifty years is not a long period for such a pathbreaking realization to set in, but considering that their history is merely sixty years old, it seems like an awfully long time. After Indian independence and the birth of Pakistan in 1947 it took precisely forty-nine years and nine months to establish the composite dialogue process (CDP) achieved in May 1997 in Male, Maldives, under the leadership of Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif. Many would argue that, with bilateralism pledged in the 1972 Simla Agreement as the basis of all subsequent Indo-Pak conflictresolution initiatives, the realization of seeking mutually agreed solutions was established. But their conflicts and confrontations—in the 1970s and 1980s, and over terrorism in the 1990s, Siachen, and Kashmir—resonated with the enduring nature of their rivalry wherein, while constituting a range of military confidence-building measures (CBMs), both sides sought a unilateral resolution of their problems. This book argues that not until 1997 had it become amply clear to both sides that they were neither so strong that they could impose any unilateral solution on the other, nor so weak as to accede to the other’s will without a fight. While India raised concerns over Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir and in cross-border terrorist activities, Pakistan vehemently opposed Indian policy toward Kashmir. Progress on any of these issues became illusory owing to the cardinal question: Which issue drives which issue? India always has maintained that the “Problem in Kashmir,” encompassing Pakistan’s support of jihadi groups and activities, was the key stumbling block in bilateral relations. Pakistan, in turn, has argued that the “Problem of Kashmir” itself implied that it was an unfinished agenda of the partition and that it was India’s

2

India-Pakistan

“forcible occupation” of Kashmir, in breach of United Nations resolutions, that motivated “Kashmiri freedom fighters” to fight against Indian security forces. This fundamental divide in perceptions over the basic cause of India-Pakistan conflict has for several decades continued to cast its shadow over peace initiatives. Between 1984 and 1997 India and Pakistan negotiated over a range of issues, including Siachen, Sir Creek, and Tulbul/Wular disputes, but with only limited success. Negotiators met, discussed, and prepared draft agreements, but the final seal of approval from the leadership was lacking. Due to prolonged mutual mistrust, hatred, and antagonism neither India nor Pakistan was ready to take the plunge by altering stated positions, reaching a compromise, or conceding the other’s point of view. Guns continued to rattle the frontiers, security forces remained engaged in a battle of attrition, terrorism continued to claim thousands of innocent lives, and negotiators met periodically, but no constructive transformation took place in the enduring rivalry of the two countries. Finding a way out became crucial and an end to this madness had to be initiated. In these hopeless atmospherics the realization dawned on India and Pakistan that they needed a complete overhaul of the dialogue process in order to establish a mechanism that treated all disputes and issues at par. India agreed to put Kashmir on the agenda of the CDP and Pakistan accepted the inclusion of terrorism in the bilateral dialogue. The formulated CDP consisted of eight baskets of issues, namely: J&K, Siachen, Sir Creek, Tulbul/Wular, terrorism and drug trafficking, conventional and nuclear CBMs, economic and commercial cooperation, and promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields. It is important to note that the CDP was as much about resolving territorial and resources disputes as about changing mutual perceptions. Just as Anwar Sadat, in his historic 1977 speech in the Israeli Knesset, spoke of the “psychological barrier” formed by years of mutual mistrust, misperception, and hatred—which in his view constituted 60 percent of the problem between Arabs and Israelis—the same holds true for India and Pakistan. The inclusion of economic and commercial cooperation in the agenda for talks, and the promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields, were primarily aimed at stimulating people-to-people contacts in order to create, in both countries, peace constituencies that in turn would help create a positive climate in which political initiatives would have a greater chance of success. By the same token the purpose of the CBMs is also meant to raise the level of trust between the two rivals

Introduction

3

by bringing maximum transparency to the engagement and posturing of the armed forces. With the inclusion in this incendiary mix of the nuclear factor in 1998, the role of CBMs became absolutely critical to preventing military and nuclear accidents. The experience of Brasstacks in 1987 is a perfect case of how acts carried out with benign intentions can be construed as threatening by the adversary; the role of CBMs is to keep such misperceptions at bay. Toward the close of the 1980s, tectonic political shifts in South Asia and in international politics in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall—symbolizing the end of Cold War—and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, brought about a significant change in Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. Pakistan was no longer an active player in the Cold-War politics of South Asia in the same manner it had been for more than forty years since becoming a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the 1950s. On one hand, the resultant plunge in American interest in Pakistan, and on the other the growing warmth in U.S. ties with India, triggered a paradigm shift in America’s foreign policy, which added to Pakistan’s insecurity, but also compelled it to explore ways to overcome this insecurity. It is important to emphasize that Pakistan’s policies on Kashmir and the nation’s nuclear program have been under the firm control of its military and intelligence agencies, primarily the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). These agencies adopted an aggressive strategy in Kashmir following the bungling of the 1987 Jammu and Kashmir elections, and began training extremist groups and alienated youths of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front ( JKLF) to pressure India into a dialogue on Kashmir. Meanwhile, the civilian leadership of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif followed a policy of diplomatic engagement to address other pending disputes. This CDP was an amalgamation of both approaches. The addition of Kashmir to the agenda pleased General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi but, at India’s insistence, Pakistan’s civilian leadership had to add terrorism to their agenda. Furthermore, the ensuing rapprochement between India and China—through bolstering of their trade relations and a growing willingness to resolve their mutual differences by negotiations—pressed Pakistan to rethink its engagement with India. In sum, the stark reality on Pakistan’s part of living with a much larger and more powerful neighbor, and India’s non-reciprocal approach toward its neighbors

4

India-Pakistan

(underpinned by the “Gujral doctrine”) melded into a shared understanding that envisaged a stable and sustainable relationship. It is fair to argue that the Indo-Pak peace process is also driven by India’s strong yearning to break out from its South Asian preoccupations and play a greater role in international affairs. New Delhi’s renewed emphasis on forging stronger ties with Southeast Asia based on the “Look East Policy,” with Central Asia for institutional and energy cooperation, and with the Middle East in order to engage the wider Muslim world—along with growing thaws over the past decade with big powers such as the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia—has contributed enormously to raising India’s stature in world politics. India’s rise in the last ten years as an economic and regional powerhouse, advanced by its military cooperation and civil-nuclear deal with the United States, triggered a soul-searching in Pakistan as to whether to press on with an irredentist attitude or to utilize India’s rise for its own economic and trade interests. Pakistan’s key consideration was whether to continue with the stereotypical policy of making “India bleed through a thousand cuts,” expecting her eventually to succumb to such pressures, or to make peace with India on a give-and-take basis and carve out more space and resources to address Pakistan’s internal challenges, such as economic fragility, political instability, ethno-nationalism, sectarianism, and growing extremism. The withdrawal of thousands of Pakistani troops from the Indo-Pak border in both November 2007 and May 2009 to fight the Taliban in the tribal belt was testimony to the magnitude of the internal threat Pakistan confronts, and any conflict with India at such a critical time would put an enormous strain on economic resources and military capacity. By 2002, the consensus in Pakistani political, academic, and media circles with regard to the “Pakistan first” policy had begun to alter the old notion of “even eating grass” to seek parity with India. The new thinking asserted that it was in Pakistan’s interest to strengthen the peace process and focus national energies on all-round economic growth, development, and internal stability. Following the October 1999 military coup and overthrow of the Nawaz Sharif regime, the peace process suffered a major blow, and India declined to engage with the military regime that assumed leadership. In that same year, under the shadow of nuclear development, the Kargil War had put optimum pressure on the already-fragile ties. After the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, Pakistan was dragged into an alliance with the United States in the

Introduction

5

war on terror (WOT), and its western frontier with Afghanistan became rife with uncertainty. The following months saw a widespread surge in anti-Americanism in Pakistan, which left General Pervez Musharraf waging two battles simultaneously: one in support of the United States in Afghanistan, and the other to control the backlash of this alliance in his backyard. India was no longer the Pakistani military’s preoccupation and, with a boiling western front, the last thing Pakistan could afford was a conflict with India. Indo-Pak relations continued to suffer, however, as terrorism against India reached a zenith when, on December 13, 2001, Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Muhammad ( JeM) attackers barged into the premises of the Indian Parliament. This attack brought Indo-Pak forces to the brink of their fifth war in fifty-four years. India cut all links with Pakistan, including diplomatic, and bilateral ties reached an all-time low. Eventually, pragmatism prevailed in India’s corridors of power, the crisis fizzled out and, after a ten-month high-alert forward deployment, Indian troops withdrew without a single shot being fired. Military conflict was averted but not without reminding the leaderships on both fronts of the perils of nonengagement and of allowing relations to drift uncontrollably. In October 2002 Pakistan held general elections that established “guided democracy” under General Musharraf, and the new government under Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali—acting upon its “Pakistan first” policy—showed willingness to mend ties with India. To complement this policy change in Pakistan, despite the continuing terrorist attacks against India, Atal Behari Vajpayee renewed the offer of peace in 2003, and in 2004 the CDP resumed the resurrection of formerly plummeting relations. Also in 2004, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), led by the Congress party, came to power toppling National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), but the change in government did not affect India’s support of the peace process. Between 2004 and 2008 India and Pakistan held four rounds of talks with various successes but fell short of resolving any of the pending disputes. In 2006, on the heels of the July terrorist-led bomb blasts on a commuter train in Mumbai, the peace process was suspended. It soon resumed after a meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and General Pervez Musharraf in Havana, Cuba, where the two sides agreed to establish a “joint anti-terrorism mechanism.” Between 1988 and November 19, 2008, terrorism caused 42,227 deaths, including 14,504 civilians, 5,835 security personnel, and 21,910 terrorists.1

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India-Pakistan

In 2008, after a two-year run, the peace process was yet again called off by India in reaction to the November 26-29 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, and ever since has remained suspended [until the time of the writing of this book in July 2009]. Currently, while Pakistan engages in a serious battle against the resurgent Taliban and spiraling extremism on its soil since the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Crackdown in July 2007, bilateral relations with India have become a secondary concern. Justifiably, as long as Pakistan remains preoccupied with its own internal challenges and its political stability remains seriously imperiled, peace talks with India will have little chance of a breakthrough. The meetings between the leaders in neutral venues—on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, and the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt—are welcome engagements in the absence of CDP, but expecting any substantial outcomes from them would be naïve. At present, for India to resume an official dialogue there must be a resolution of the deadlock that remains over Pakistan taking meaningful steps toward prosecuting the accused (primarily, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, leader of Lashkar-e-Toiba), in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Again, the linkage factor in the peace process, be it terrorism or Kashmir, hampers progress in peace talks, which ironically defeats the CDP’s purpose of addressing all issues simultaneously. This security and diplomacy quagmire provides the underlying motivation for this book to explore how peace is possible in hostile settings. It is believed that an answer to this question would shed light on the experiences of states in other such conflict dyads in the international system. Research in peace studies and conflict resolution suggests there are ways of negotiating solutions to the overall quarrel between pairs of states, and to specific disputes, if not to all. Encouragingly, there are instances in the international system of dyads (among others, the United States-China, the United StatesSoviet Union/Russia, the Soviet Union/Russia-China, ArgentinaBrazil, Israel-Egypt, and Israel-Syria), caught in a pattern of enduring conflict and rivalry, which have been desirous of peace and have been able to find answers to their specific bilateral disputes. The underlying premise in resolving such dyadic conflict is that if the major bilateral disputes are solved, the larger quarrels may in time be eliminated. The relationship between India and Pakistan has been the focal point of many interesting studies in the field of international

Introduction

7

relations, and while most of these studies have focused on the discord and conflict between the two countries, there have been periods of cooperation that have not been given enough attention. In the general atmosphere of suspicion, rivalry, and distrust after 1947, new and unforeseen problems have arisen and become additional symbols of seemingly unending conflict between India and Pakistan. The failings, frustrations, and faults of one country made important news in the other, and the gulf that emerged in 1947 has further widened. Other factors, however, have tended to bring them closer, or at least prevented them from escalating the conflict. Behind the present-day rivalry is a recognition of common bonds in terms of culture, economic interdependence, and above all the desire to avoid a head-on clash under the shadow of nuclear weapons. Thus, their relationship has been contradictory: The search for solutions to old disputes is matched by the rise of new issues, sometimes pushing them apart and at other times bringing them into proximity. This study of India-Pakistan negotiations under the rubric of enduring rivalry argues that, in spite of the conflictive past and possible future confrontations, negotiated solutions are possible. It is a normative but also theoretical point of importance. This book covers territorial and resources issues, including the Indus Waters, Rann of Kutch, Siachen, Sir Creek, and Tulbul/Wular disputes that form the core of territorial integrity and national identity. These are the most difficult cases to negotiate and if it can be shown that cooperation is nevertheless possible, then the India-Pakistan dyad will appear to be more cordial in nature than generally perceived. The five disputes mentioned above are analyzed with the use of the four major components of negotiation—ripeness of the dispute, prenegotiation, negotiation, and agreement—and by estimating the extent to which these elements or stages of negotiation are present in successful cases and absent in unsuccessful ones. From such a study it is also possible to understand how relevant these characteristics of negotiation are in the management and resolution of enduring rivalries. This book seeks to draw germane lessons and recommendations relevant not only to ongoing and future negotiations between India and Pakistan, but also to other dyadic rivalries in the international system. What constitutes ripeness of a dispute? Is it something natural that occurs in the course of time, or is it induced through bilateral efforts? What are the dangers of launching initiatives in unripe situations? How important was/is the issue of ripeness in the five disputes? What is the significance of the prenegotiation stage in the

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process and what does it entail? What constitutes negotiation and how is it different from prenegotiation, if any distinction exists at all? What are the key ingredients of negotiation and what roles do they play in determining the eventual outcome of the process? What are the compulsions and concerns before signing the final agreement, and what are the salient challenges in the post-agreement phase? What makes a good agreement? This book is woven around these central queries in analyzing the five disputes. The first chapter provides a conceptual understanding of “enduring rivalry” and of the negotiation process, illuminating their key characteristics. The second chapter presents an account of the CDP, or the peace process established in 1997, that has enabled the two sides to discuss their outstanding disputes on an equal footing. The third chapter covers the Indus Waters dispute and traverses the history of the dispute and negotiations in locating the factors (including the role of the third party) that brought about its successful conclusion in 1960. The fourth chapter encapsulates the Indo-Pak dispute concerning the Rann of Kutch and analyzes the ceasefire agreement of 1965 and the Tribunal Award of 1968 that finally settled this territorial dispute. This chapter studies the history of the dispute, the course of negotiation, and the role of external players in bringing this conflict to an end. The fifth chapter focuses on the ongoing dispute over the Siachen glacier, locating the drivers of the conflict, tracing the history of negotiated initiatives thus far, and putting forth the prospects for its resolution. The sixth chapter deals with the Indo-Pak dispute over Sir Creek that has turned out to be a territorial-cum-resources dispute. A comparatively lessvoluminous chapter than the previous ones, it nonetheless presents a succinct analysis of the history of the dispute, the progress in negotiations, and the likelihood of its resolution in the near future. The seventh chapter is on the Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage and Storage Project in Jammu and Kashmir, examining the core elements of the dispute between India and Pakistan, the manner in which both sides have negotiated it so far, and the prospects of its settlement. While the Sir Creek dispute is linked to the Rann of Kutch dispute, the Tulbul/Wular dispute is associated with the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. From the analysis of these five disputes, the final chapter draws relevant lessons that can potentially facilitate ongoing negotiations and positively influence the future course of the India-Pakistan dyad.

CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUALIZING ENDURING RIVALRY AND NEGOTIATION

T

he largely unanticipated end of the Cold War and the consequent difficulties in explaining its demise underline the need for a better understanding of rivalries in world politics. Over the past two centuries, apart from the Soviet-American relationship, a disproportionate number of interstate conflicts have occurred between pairs of states referred to as dyads. After a prolonged period of conflict these dyadic relationships are placed in the category of enduring rivalry.1 As the subsequent analysis will show, the India-Pakistan dyad that is the focus of this book also qualifies as an enduring rivalry. In order to understand the key elements of an enduring rivalry, why India and Pakistan are considered enduring rivals, and how they might conduct negotiations, this chapter expands upon the concept of enduring rivalry and defines the characteristics of the negotiation process. The first section of the chapter describes the concept of enduring rivalry and lays out the criteria for considering the India-Pakistan dyad an enduring rivalry. This section emphasizes that in order to seek solutions to ongoing and future conflicts it is essential to study the past interactions of states. The next section of the chapter examines the negotiation process and formulates an analytical framework based on the literature on negotiation and conflict resolution. This framework of negotiation forms the core tool for my analysis of India-Pakistan relations, with specific reference to five disputes. Two of these disputes were successfully settled through the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty and the 1968 Rann of Kutch Award, while disputes over Siachen, Sir Creek, and the Tulbul/Wular project are ongoing.

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India-Pakistan

The Concept of Enduring Rivalry An abundance of writings is available on the concept of enduring rivalry. This particular aspect of conflict research attracts attention because numerous studies show that militarized conflict is likely to recur between states that have fought in the past and have lingering disputes to settle. Experts refer to repeated conflicts between the same states as enduring rivalries, and they explain the concept of enduring rivalry in various ways and with the help of different parameters. Daniel Geller’s article summarizes definitions of enduring rivalry proposed by several experts. F.W. Wayman considers any dyad engaged in two or more militarized disputes over a ten-year period to be involved in an enduring rivalry. P.F. Diehl and J. Kingston consider a rivalry enduring when the dyad experiences three or more conflicts over a fifteen-year period.2 According to Gary Goertz and Diehl, “Enduring rivalry can be defined as repeated conflict among the same set of states.”3 They argue that 45 percent of militarized disputes since 1816 occured among enduring rivals and that there is a strong possibility conflict will recur in the future even if the dispute is resolved through a formal treaty with a peaceful redrawing of boundaries. It is therefore pertinent to study the pattern of past engagements in order to understand the future trajectory of bilateral relations between enduring rivals.4 The most serious of enduring rivals are believed to be almost eight times more prone to experience a military conflict than states involved in isolated conflicts. Enduring rivalries do not result in a disproportionate number of territorial changes; yet, when such transfers do occur, they are three times more likely to involve military conflict than territorial changes in isolated disputes.5 Drawing on data from the Markov chain analysis of 456 militarized disputes that occurred between 1816 and 1986, Geller suggests that power parity and shifts toward parity are more likely (approximately twice as likely) to result in war than is a condition of power preponderance. He argues that rivals fighting over power parity, shifts toward parity, or other issues could create conditions that might be exploited through the use of force.6 Geller suggests that enduring rivalries can be arranged into three categories: major power versus major power, major power versus minor power, and minor power versus minor power. Based on the conflict data analysis of militarized disputes between 1816 and 1986, Geller places the India-Pakistan dyad as an enduring rivalry in the minor-versus-minor power category.

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In the enduring rivalry literature, studying long-term conflictual dyads is emphasized as an important phenomenon of international relations. This is because these dyads are more likely to witness future wars or conflicts than are other types of rivalries. F.W. Wayman and D.M. Jones contend that enduring rivalries between 1816 and 1986 constitute approximately 8 percent of all dyad years but only 36 percent of the militarized interstate disputes in that period.7 Goertz and Diehl argue that the analysis of conflict patterns in enduring rivalries might provide additional insight into interstate conflicts. Specifically, they suggest that the history of enduring rivalries may shape future conflicts or influence the escalation of conflict between the enduring rivals.8 This underlines the importance of studying past interactions to assess the future trajectory of relations between rival dyads. Wayman and Jones consider long-term rivalries to be the most conflict-prone dyads and also good indicators of how power disparities between rivals and the efforts to reduce or increase this parity may create conditions in which disputes may lead to the deterioration of bilateral relations and ultimately war. Their concept of enduring rivalry has three characteristics: severity (there must be a minimum of five military conflicts lasting over thirty days each between the same dyads), durability (there must be a gap of at least twenty-five years between two disputes), and continuity (following a tranquility period of ten years, it is essential to have a military confrontation in the next twenty-five years on the pending issues).9 Diehl, who considers an enduring rivalry to be a relationship of two nations that have engaged in at least three militarized disputes within a period of fifteen years, argues that there need not be frequent disputes and, unless the relationship experiences a significant peaceful period (ten years) with no military confrontation, it will continue to be an enduring rivalry.10 The types of militarized confrontation that enduring rivals can face is categorized by C. Gochman and Z. Maoz as: first, threat of force, which includes, apart from the threat to use force, also the threat to blockade, to occupy territory, and to officially declare war; second, display of force, which includes putting troops on alert, mobilizing troops along the border, and making a show of force (such as military exercises); and, third, use of force, which includes the use of blockades, occupying territory, firing upon rival troops, and seizure of material or personnel for more than twenty-four hours.11

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In the past sixty years, India and Pakistan have experienced all these manifestations of confrontation. They have fought four overt wars. Until 2003, when a ceasefire was effected, their troops have fired on each other along the Line of Control (LoC) and along the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), beyond NJ 9842. This was not before, in the wake of the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, India snapped all ties, including diplomatic ties, with Pakistan, mobilized troops along the border (Operation Parakram), and blockaded land and air transport connections. In 1987, the two nations were close to war after India conducted Operation Brasstacks, a massive military exercise on the western front. Finally, through the conflict’s history, territories have been seized by both sides. In 1947, Pakistan occupied regions of Kashmir. India seized Siachen in 1984. And, in 1999, Pakistan captured several peaks in the Kargil sector. In the analysis of Gochman and Maoz, and of M. Small and J.D. Singer, a militarized dispute is limited to national political entities.12 It is, however, important to note that, although there have been no overt military confrontations between India and Pakistan since 1999, both sides have constantly faced the threat of a military conflict triggered by cross-border terrorism. On this count the analysis of Gochman and Maoz and others falls short. Such analysis does not consider the use of non-state actors to inflict human and material loss that could lead to war. India has faced cross-border terrorism since the 1980s, a problem that embitters relations between the two rivals and that brought them close to war in 2002. Yet this cross-border terrorism is not recognized as symptomatic of an enduring rivalry conflict. The most recent instance of the use of cross-border terrorism as a covert militant tactic to pressure India was the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008. Despite the preponderance of evidence that non-state entities play a crucial role, the literature on enduring rivalry does not include them in the definition of militarized disputes, ignoring the fact that this factor alone has underpinned the India-Pakistan rivalry more than any militarized threat or action. Tanks do not roll in, guns remain silent, and movement of troops is rare, but attacks on security forces and civilians claim lives on a regular basis, proving that India and Pakistan are enduring rivals without waging an actual war over a long period of time. Pakistan’s tactic of using non-state actors to inflict damage on India, pushes India to threaten force, make a display of force, and in the end employ force. It is important that

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non-state actors begin to be included in the literature and discussion of the concept of enduring rivalry. William R. Thompson makes the argument that enduring rivalries are determined by states’ perceptions of each other—whether they perceive each other as rivals—and not by the number of disputes they engage in over time. He says that there are two varieties of rivalry: positional and spatial. In the positional type of rivalry states compete to be leading powers in the regional or international order. In a spatial rivalry states engage in conflicts over territory.13 The India-Pakistan enduring rivalry is more of a spatial rivalry than a positional one. In the past decade or so, however, India has emerged as a strong power in Asia and has begun to act in a manner befitting its new status. India’s growing economy, rapidly developing information technology sector, highly skilled workforce, strong democratic institutions, nuclear muscle, and powerful military have combined to provide encouragement for the nation to move beyond subcontinental preoccupations and to play a more meaningful role in Asian and global affairs. India’s growing engagement in Afghanistan and Central Asia is indicative of the paradigm shift in New Delhi. India is resolved to play a more proactive role in regional affairs; this is a role that Pakistan has been constantly trying to counter. The history of India-Pakistan relations shows that although India always enjoyed conventional military dominance over Pakistan, the latter has tried to match up with India through alliances with the United States and China, through crossing the nuclear threshold in the wake of India’s nuclear test in May 1999, and through the use of non-state entities to influence developments in India and arrest India’s bid for a larger role in regional and global affairs. There is a sizable constituency in Pakistan’s government, policy, security, and academic circles that is convinced of the need for military and diplomatic power parity with India in order to maintain peace and regional stability. For its part, India desires a more respectable position in the international political, economic, and diplomatic realms. To achieve this, India has relentlessly pursued a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and has had regular interactions with major countries in the Group of 8 (G-8), Group of 20 (G-20), and the European Union (EU). India has been successful in forging a more robust relationship with the United States, with this success including negotiation of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Taking a growing role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, India has also continued a long-drawn push for a comprehensive international convention

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against terrorism. All these policies stoke Pakistan’s fear that India’s steady rise in the global sphere will accentuate the power asymmetry and make it more difficult to extract concessions on pending disputes. Such apprehensions drive Pakistan to employ non-state actors to engage India, keeping India preoccupied with the dyadic rivalry and keeping the pot boiling in Kashmir. Therefore, the Indo-Pak enduring rivalry, though predominantly spatial in nature due to territorial and resources disputes, also has a strong shade of positional rivalry. Some scholars suggest that the deeply rooted India-Pakistan rivalry cannot simply be viewed through the prism of lingering disputes. The rivalry involves the issue of identity and encompasses politics, vision, and each state’s underlying values and interests as interpreted by the political elites, religionists, and their respective constituencies. Pakistan’s quest for a predominantly Islamic identity has had a strong anti-India tenor, with the implication that India’s secular character is the antithesis of this Islamic identity. According to some scholars, this approach forms the nucleus of the rivalry. India is fundamentally different in that it does not consider the issue of identity to be linked to its legitimacy, stability, and survival. Unlike Pakistan, India does not depend on identity, nor is India’s identity based on Pakistan. Pakistan’s identity creation process, however, is attached to an anti-India approach and to justifying Muslim communalism.14 Sumit Ganguly, while characterizing the pattern of Indo-Pak enduring rivalry as one of “unremitting hostility,” also believes that the underlying element of the Indo-Pak friction should be traced back to the fundamentally divergent ideological moorings of the nationalist elites of both countries with regard to their respective anti-colonial movements. Their divergent ideological commitments determined the broad principles of state construction, wherein, as Vali Nasr has argued, a secular state based on civic nationalism was considered antithetical by those who believed in primordial conceptions of identity as a viable basis for state building. Pakistan’s antithetical approach, says Ganguly, is manifested by its irredentist claims to Kashmir to ensure Pakistan’s completeness as a state built on the basis of a Muslim-majority principle.15 Other scholars agree that the Kashmir dispute is in fact a conflict between opposing ideological values—India’s secularism and Pakistan’s Muslim communalism.16 Given the deep-rooted nature of the divide between India and Pakistan, scholars portray a grim future for this enduring rivalry, a rivalry now ingrained in the public, military, and government

Enduring Rivalry and Negotiation

15

psyches of both nations. In this situation, the potential drivers for the termination of rivalry, such as democratic peace theory (the theory that democracies seldom war against each other), a common external threat that might forge cooperation between rivals, political shocks, or major alterations in the international system, are unlikely to do so.17 On the basis of the preceding review of the concept of enduring rivalry, notwithstanding the differences among the theorists, eight core ideas emerge that are fairly widely accepted and appear to have a descriptive utility in the India-Pakistan relations. The first is that past conflicts influence present and future events and choices. The second, and related, idea is that in an enduring rivalry there is a fair to high expectation of future conflict, on old or new issues. Third, enduring rivalry is dyadic. Pairs of states seem to become locked in patterns of rivalry and contestation over some period of time. It is hard to think of enduring rivalries in which there are more than two states. In a triangular situation, there is a tendency for two states to ally against the third, and the alliance patterns tend to be more fluid than in dyadic conflict. Fourth, enduring conflict tends to be of two major types—spatial and positional. Of these, the spatial seems more common and more difficult to resolve or even manage. Spatial conflicts seem also to be more common among smaller and more peripheral powers in the international system. Fifth, there is a tendency for enduring rivalries to occur between powers of some equality. This does not mean that there is strict parity but that there is enough parity so that the conflict can be sustained over a long period of time. Sixth, and importantly, enduring rivalry may become serious enough to lead to actual hostilities that may then in turn become part of the cycle of suspicion and antagonism in the future. Seventh, the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry is more of the spatial type but also embodies some traits of a positional rivalry. Lastly, decision makers and others who are themselves a part of the enduring rivalry recognize the lasting and repetitive nature of the rivalry and the difficulty of exiting the relationship. The hostility-laden history of India-Pakistan relations demonstrates the validity of the theoretical notion that in an enduring rivalry prior interaction and conflict mold, to a large extent, the perceptions, behavior, and choices made by both sides. Immediately following the partition of India, the Indo-Pak dyad had its inauspicious beginning. Communal riots erupted on both sides of the Indian border (West

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Pakistan and East Pakistan). In the rioting, thousands of Hindus and Muslims lost their lives. This was followed by the first war, fought over Kashmir in 1947. The foundation for the bitter rivalry was laid. In the past sixty years, India and Pakistan have fought wars on four occasions—1947–48, 1965, 1971, and 1999 (in Kargil). For most of the period leading up to 2004, they have exchanged heavy artillery fire along the border, engaged in periodic skirmishes, and have had countless instances of land and airspace violations. The two countries were also close to war following Operation Brasstacks, the massive Indian military exercise in 1987, and the subsequent 1990 Pakistani military exercise Zarb-e Momin, which was considered by both Pakistan and India to be a prelude to potential military conflict. To this incendiary mix of past conflicts and deeprooted mistrust was added another equally corrosive element: terrorism. First in Punjab in the early 1980s, and since 1987 in Jammu and Kashmir ( J&K), Pakistan has actively supported terrorist groups as a part of its state policy to make “India bleed through a thousand cuts” and exact concessions on the Kashmir issue. Reports of “electoral fraud” in the 1987 state elections created resentment among the Kashmiri people, especially the youth.18 To stoke public anger toward New Delhi, Pakistan created hundreds of Tanzeems (seminaries popularly known as madrassas) in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) by recruiting and training alienated youths belonging to the India-based Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front ( JKLF).19 Ever since these developments, cross-border terrorism alone can be considered the most formidable roadblock to peace between India and Pakistan, embittering relations and disrupting bilateral talks. In addition to cross-border terrorism, an overt nuclearization policy has added another dimension to the Indo-Pak rivalry. The 1999 Kargil War was a manifestation of Pakistan’s renewed belief that, having acquired nuclear capability, it had little to fear from India’s conventional military. In sum, the Indo-Pakistan enduring rivalry draws its sustenance from a host of factors, including a deep ideological divide, the shadow of the past conflicts, lingering disputes, and cross-border terrorism. And, in the wake of the nuclearization of the subcontinent, which has given Pakistan a sense of power parity with India, the rivalry eludes termination. This notion of an enduring rivalry that seems unlikely to be extinguished leads to the second aspect of this study: Given the enduring nature of their rivalry, how can India and Pakistan engage, even while the overall ties remain hostile, in order to settle their pending problems?

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Theories of Negotiations After having examined the conceptual contours of enduring rivalry and the theoretical validity for characterizing India-Pakistan relations as enduring rivalry, the next step is to determine how India and Pakistan can best engage in order to settle their disputes despite a hostile climate. This book argues that, just as past conflicts have a bearing on future conflicts, so may past cooperation have a bearing on future cooperation. Past instances of fruitful cooperation and successful negotiations to resolve territorial and resource disputes can offer valuable lessons for the present. To benefit from this lessons, there must be close scrutiny of past negotiations. We must analyze the key factors of success and explore the possibility of replicating these factors in future negotiations. To achieve that goal, this book draws upon key literature and various theories of negotiation in order to develop a framework that will help to analyze how India and Pakistan have settled their disputes in the past and how they can resolve pending disputes in the future. Ever since the end of British rule in 1947, India-Pakistan relations have been the subject of continuous and acrimonious debate in both countries. Despite four wars, the description of the relationship as completely hostile is questionable. Although mutual mistrust runs deep, the two governments have shown restraint on several occasions in seeking solutions to their disputes. This study attempts to show that India and Pakistan have sought settlements based on compromise and were careful not to allow public pressure to subvert the working of reasonable accords, described here as “successes” and “near successes.” In order to ascertain the underlying causes of cooperation, despite deep mistrust and a conflictual relationship, the past experience of India-Pakistan negotiations requires attention. As mentioned earlier, the concept of enduring conflict addresses the problem of repeated conflict: the outcomes of crises and wars influence the likelihood of future conflicts. Robert Axelrod notes that the “shadow of the future” makes players more likely to cooperate in their current interactions. Rivals are influenced by the likelihood that they will confront their opponents in future crises or disputes, and so they adjust their behavior accordingly.20 Therefore, as Russel Leng also argues, present interaction becomes the basis for future interaction and future strategies depend on past experience. Coercive strategies, successful in the past, may be reemployed. If the strategy was

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reciprocity, an opponent’s prior response helps to determine a new choice of action.21 This analysis, undertaken with the concept of enduring rivalry as a backdrop, focuses on territorial/resources disputes (spatial) rather than on the positional aspects of the rivalry. The study examines five territorial/resources disputes: the Indus waters dispute, resolved by the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960; the Rann of Kutch disputes, settled by the 1965 Rann of Kutch agreement and by the 1968 Kutch Tribunal Award; the Siachen dispute; the Sir Creek dispute; and the Tulbul/Wular dispute. The negotiations of the Indus waters and Rann of Kutch disputes are considered “successes,” while efforts to negotiate the Siachen, Sir Creek, and Tulbul/Wular disputes are considered “near-successes.” Using a framework of negotiation that has been formulated from the available literature on negotiation and conflict resolution, this study traverses the twists and turns of these conflicts. The framework, encompassing four different stages of negotiation, is as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Ripeness of the dispute Prenegotiation Negotiation Agreement

Ripeness of the Dispute As of July 3, 2003, there are 192 countries officially recognized by the United Nations; countries with different histories, processes of development and emergence, interests, challenges, and disputes. All are part of an intricate web of conflict and cooperation in the international system.22 This makes both conflict and cooperation an inevitability of international affairs, and presents statesmen with the tasks of preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts and disputes, as well as regulating and preventing adversarial relationships from erupting into war, and, finally, managing or resolving the relationships when war does break out. Notwithstanding the academic dispute over the definition of ripeness and how to determine whether a conflict is ripe, the available literature suggests that ripeness is a vital element of conflict resolution and the negotiation process. There is an overwhelming consensus that ripeness should be a key consideration for diplomats before they begin negotiations. In the absence of ripeness, negotiations may

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not only be counterproductive, but they may also lead to disappointment for all sides, which may in turn cause the dispute to further deteriorate. According to Richard Haass, “Ripeness will often determine the success of these diplomatic efforts. Whether negotiation will succeed or fail will hinge on the shared perception by the disputants that an accord is desirable, the existence of leadership on all sides that is either sufficiently strong to sustain a compromise or so weak that a compromise cannot be avoided, a formula involving some benefits for all participants and a commonly accepted diplomatic process.”23 Haass says that the absence of ripeness in many cases, including the Arab-Israeli, Cyprus, India-Pakistan, the Falklands, the Aegean, Lebanon, Central America, Northern Ireland, and South Africa, has shown that key participants were unwilling to compromise due to a variety of factors, suggesting that even if the diplomats had taken a different path not much could have been achieved. Ripeness is therefore not a natural condition. In most conflicts it is a main ingredient for success that is often absent, and it must be searched for, developed, and then exploited constructively. One key element that emerges from Haass’ views on ripeness is the role of leadership. In most cases mentioned above, two types of leaders were absent: strong leaders who preferred resolution over conflict and were able convince people of the merits of making peace, and those leaders who were too weak to resist pressure from their rivals. The absence of either strong or weak leaders tends to make mediators, or others engaged in the peace process, overenthusiastic, leading them to create conditions that can undermine the prospect of resolution. It is therefore important to refrain from too much diplomacy or mediation in an unripe situation, because it can be counterproductive. Such efforts to create ripeness from the outside, while ignoring internal factors that are necessary to create a proper state of ripeness are not a prudent. William Zartman, one of the leading proponents of the concept of ripeness, says that the ripeness of a dispute is based on: the state of military engagement between the rivals; their mutual perceptions of the dispute; the prevailing conditions; the future scenario; and the possible options for resolution. He argues, “When a dispute reaches a mutually hurting stalemate and the rivals perceive that unilateral solutions are no more possible given their power relations and also realize that it is therefore best to seek peaceful solutions, the conflict can be considered ripe for negotiations.”24

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There are others who believe that ripeness can develop as the result of several other factors: changes in the internal political situation of the rivals, the emergence of leaders who are keen to achieve peace, or a fracture in the internal consensus on pursuing unilateral or military solutions.25 Vernon Mendis, a former Sri Lankan diplomat, says: As far as ripeness is concerned, first an issue has to be identified that both parties recognize as a dispute. Then there has to be a desire on the part of the two states to negotiate. Ripeness is subjective. We do not have to wait till the explosive stage comes. What is important is the mentality of the government. Ripeness can also be relative. Some leaders are able to solve problems and some aren’t. Therefore, it is a matter of judgment and also chance. On some moments in history you may have all the necessary ingredients of making the dispute ripe and help resolve the issue. On other occasions leaders or negotiators driven by a sense of national pride would say why should I go, let them come. This is the political psychology of a country.26

The big consideration is whether something should be done if the conflict is not ripe. Can ripeness be induced, or must it develop on its own? Haass believes that diplomatic initiatives launched in unripe circumstances are almost certain to fail, and such failures could undermine the bonafides of proposals that might otherwise be considered in the future. This may put diplomats in disrepute and also drain time and resources. The failure could then be exploited by political elements on both sides, complicating the tasks of diplomats and the prospects of future conflict resolution. But this does not imply that nothing should be done in the interim. A variety of political, economic, and military initiatives can help change the attitudes and perceptions of the rivals, creating conducive atmospherics for overt diplomacy and negotiation.27 In the India-Pakistan case various Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) aim to improve the atmospherics by changing the rivals’ negative perceptions of each other and raising their level of trust. Zartman is also of the opinion that external mediation can help a conflict to become ripe. Support for this view is evident in our analyses of the Indus waters and the Rann of Kutch disputes. Zartman says that ripeness is a perceptual event and is likely to be perceived differently by all parties. Indeed, it may not be perceived at all by some. This makes ripeness a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for

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negotiation that must, at the insistence of the mediators, be seized upon by the parties at the right time.28 The job of the mediator is to convince the disputants of the futility of any unilateral solution and the benefits of reaching a mutually agreed-upon solution. Security assurances, military and economic aid, and visits by high-level leaders can also help to soothe tempers, allay apprehensions on all sides, and induce among the parties a sense of confidence in the conflictresolution process. Mediators can also use public and private education to highlight to governments, leaders, and the public the benefits of a compromise and the costs of continuing the conflict, thus preparing them for any unexpected event that might develop in the course of the negotiations.29

Improving the Atmospherics This definition of the meaning and purpose of ripeness reveals that for negotiations to be launched successfully it is important to have a conducive atmosphere. Such an atmosphere can add to the ripeness for negotiation of the dispute. India-Pakistan relations suffer from a “trust deficit” due to a long history of conflicts over the pending issues, including Kashmir and, in recent decades, cross-border terrorism waged by groups based in the POK. This low level of trust enhances the importance of CBMs, which play a vital role in maintaining regular interaction between the rivals and keeping mistrust to manageable levels. Following Operation Brasstacks, India and Pakistan were on the brink of war due to Pakistan’s perception of the exercise as preparation for war. This emergency instilled a sense on both sides of the importance of having mechanisms to keep the doors of communication open in order to clarify the situation at hand. To this goal, talks were held in July 1990 on a range of CBMs, which were ratified and implemented in 1991 and 1992. These included: an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear installations and facilities, as well as population and economic targets; instruments of ratification relating to agreement on advanced notice of military exercises, maneuvers, and troop movements; upgrading and making permanent the hotline between the Directors General Military Operations (DGMOs) of both countries; an agreement on prevention of airspace violations and on permitting overflights and landings for military aircraft; and a joint declaration on prohibition of chemical weapons. These CBMs

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have ever since played an important role in raising the level of confidence in bilateral relations and have created a positive atmosphere. It was in this positive atmosphere that the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) was initiated in May 1997 by Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral and his Pakistani counterpart Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Male, capital of the Maldives, on the sidelines of a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit. Unfortunately, in the wake of India’s May 1998 nuclear test, the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814 from Kathmandu, and the 1999 Kargil War, relations plummeted. In this tense atmosphere the 2001 Agra Summit, between Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf, was doomed to failure. As the concept of ripeness suggests, diplomatic and peace initiatives launched in hostile and unripe situations are likely to prove counterproductive and the failure of the Agra summit was a foregone conclusion. It ended not only without even a joint declaration or press release, but the Agra summit also added to frustrations on both sides. Relations were further jolted by terrorist attacks on the J&K Assembly, the military cantonment in Kaluchak, and the Indian Parliament in December 2001. These events led to the suspension of the peace process. Eventually, the peace process was resumed in April 2003. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s offer for talks was accepted by his counterpart Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali. At this juncture bilateral relations had entered a lean phase and both sides agreed for the need to first improve the atmospherics through the restoration of suspended rail, road, air, and diplomatic links; the enhancement of people-to-people exchanges; and several CBMs, including new bus and train services, promotion of trade and commerce across the LoC, and opening up of meeting points for civilians along the LoC. Significantly, from November 25, 2003, onward, following the ceasefire, troops disengaged along the LoC, International Border (IB), and the AGPL. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s January 2004 meeting with General Musharraf in Islamabad and the later meetings of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with General Musharraf in Islamabad in April 2005, in New York in September 2005, and in Havana, in September 2006, underlined the importance both sides attached to sustained engagement and to constantly searching for ways to boost trust levels, keeping the political climate conducive for the a continued peace process.

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Prenegotiation According to the literature on negotiation the second phase in the negotiation process is prenegotiation, although where prenegotiation starts and where it ends is vague. Zartman says that prenegotiation is a blurred concept and that it is not clear whether it is a prelude to or a part of negotiation. It is even less clear how different prenegotiation is from negotiation if it is a prelude to it, and if prenegotiation is a part of negotiation what the difference between them is. Also vague is the question of how reversible the flow of negotiation—or whether negotiations can revert back to the prenegotiation stage—is, and whether there is any correlation between prenegotiation and other contextual factors such as crises and regimes.30 Harold Saunders, who served under five U.S. presidents, from Kennedy to Carter, was involved in Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East and in the Camp David Accords. Saunders was instrumental in negotiations during the Iranian hostage crisis. In his widely acclaimed book, The Other Walls, Saunders remarks, based on his own experience, that prenegotiation, which is about getting the politics right before negotiations are underway, has two key purposes: defining the problem and developing a commitment for negotiations. These lead the parties to the third stage: arranging the negotiations. Defining the problem is vital part of conflict resolution because it indicates how convergent and divergent the parties are in their perception of the nature of the problem and what they might offer to do about it.31 A divergent definition of the problem means the parties perceive the problem from different perspectives. They will therefore offer two different solutions. Unless there is some convergence, resulting in a common or complementary definition of the problem, the possibility of finding a shared, or win-win, solution is remote. The second purpose of prenegotiation, developing a commitment by the leaders to negotiations, entails ascertaining that (a) the present situation no longer serves either party’s interest; (b) the substance of a fair settlement is available; (c) the leaders on each side will also be willing and politically able to negotiate; and (d) the balance of forces will permit a fair settlement.32 Saunders argues that, irrespective of the instruments used by policy makers to address the problem, all of the above-mentioned factors must have come to pass in the political arena before the actual negotiations begin. The key, therefore, is to change the political environment. The political environment in

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which negotiations are to be held is created in the mindset of the people and not at the negotiation table.33 Janice Gross Stein argues that prenegotiation not only promotes a search for joint solution and commitment to negotiate but also may create structures for negotiation and help to specify boundaries, participants, and even the agenda of the negotiations.34 Zartman and Maureen Berman consider prenegotiation the diagnostic stage that entails bringing about negotiations long before formal talks are held. They believe that prenegotiation continues until both parties are equally serious about finding a negotiated solution.35 Scholars such as Louis Kriesberg do not use the term prenegotiation and instead classify this phase as conflict transformation that aims to find a cooperative agreement through de-escalation of the conflict, redefinition of relationships, reevaluation of the appropriate means (or the effectiveness of alternative means) to an end, and consideration of potential third-party roles.36 Stein aptly describes the above divergent approaches to prenegotiation as a “stage when one or more parties considers negotiations as a policy option and communicates this intention to the other party and terminates when the parties agree to formal negotiations or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiation as an option.”37 Prenegotiation is the process of assessment by each party of the nature of the dispute, the present situation, and the future possibilities of conflict and cooperation. Depending on their countries’ respective strengths, this assessment compels them to move from seeking unilateral solutions to reaching mutually agreed solutions through negotiations. This is triggered by an attempt to prevent a crisis or to manage a diplomatic relationship in the wake of a recent crisis.38 Zartman, too, acknowledges that the mutual perception of a painful stalemate, informed by a recent or impending crisis, leads policy makers to actively consider the option of negotiation.39 Vernon Mendis encapsulates the prenegotiation stage: In the prenegotiation stage parties meet to agree about what can be done. There is no publicity or statement given regarding this meeting anywhere including the parliament. It’s an explanatory exercise without any commitment. Just one or two knowledgeable people go to explore the possibility. In this stage the framework has to be developed and [the] scope of it assessed. Here genuine willingness is very important. There should

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be a feeling of give and take which is very crucial. Once the framework is established, then only does the formal team go and prepare the agenda. In this way before the actual negotiations, one knows what has to be negotiated. A commonness is thus established. In prenegotiation, a communiqué is prepared for negotiations or pre-prepared drafts are put together. After the communiqué (declarations) is released, meetings with individuals who might create problems are held. This avoids problems during formal negotiations.40

Scholars agree that prenegotiation is useful in presenting leaders with an opportunity to assess how negotiations might unfold without actually entering into them. This is also referred to as the diagnostic stage, because in this stage leaders try to diagnose the risks and benefits of following the path to negotiation. Prenegotiation is not about actually negotiating but building a commitment for negotiations. The leaders can exit without much blame-sharing should they be uninterested in actual negotiation for any reason.41 In sum, Zartman identifies seven utilities of prenegotiation. First, it lowers risk and offers convenient exit routes; second, it allows the opportunity—ahead of formal negotiations—to assess the potential benefits of success and costs of failure; third, it enables the securing from the opposite side of a commitment that reciprocity or recompense will be practiced and not just exploited; fourth, it helps build domestic support or political consensus for treading the path to formal negotiations; fifth, it allows the leaders to identify the problem and define the broad contours within which it can be resolved, discarding various alternatives until the most preferred one is found; sixth, it helps identify possible participants for negotiations; and seventh, it helps build trust between the parties, transforming a mindset of conflict into one prepared for conciliation.42 In Robert Putnam’s view, the issues of political consensus and domestic pressures are of particular significance in this context. He posits that domestic politics often hinder leadership regarding actions and decisions (and affect prenegotiation and negotiation), but in certain situations prenegotiation itself may allow leaders to perform important structuring activity—in both domestic and international politics.43 In the case of India and Pakistan, several issues (such as Kashmir) that are pending a resolution, and issues (such as terrorism) that constantly jolt bilateral ties and the peace process, allow leaders to build support for their government’s or party’s stand on those issues and also to build a favorable public opinion to support that stand.

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Negotiation Once formal talks begin, the prenegotiation stage is considered to have been passed and parties move to the next level, which involves formal face-to-face negotiations across the table. In this stage the parties will negotiate and discuss all aspects of the dispute(s) on the basis of the information and data gathered and exchanged in the previous stage of prenegotiation. Negotiation is a process of defining and reducing alternative positions until a unique combination acceptable to all parties is reached. It is also a collective decision-making process with discrete “sides,” since a decision is a “choice among alternative modes of action.”44 Some scholars consider negotiation as a “process of limiting alternatives until agreement is reached on a single position; the process continues as along as there is hope and convergence at a point acceptable to both sides. Acceptability is a function, not of parties’ initial positions, but of their estimation of cost and gain (applied at any moment to the foreseeable convergence point) as compared to no agreement.”45 Zartman and Berman consider negotiation, particularly international negotiation, as a process in which divergent values are combined into an agreed decision.46 They emphasize three key characteristics of the negotiation stage. First, negotiation is a symmetrical process in which every piece of advice is at the parties’ disposal. The parties can be tactful, tough, or soft on various aspects of the dispute under discussion and in the end determine whether to reach an agreement on the basis of compromise or give-and-take. The parties are also unaware of the threshold beyond which their counterparts may not budge—an uncertainty that makes the process somewhat unpredictable in terms of the result that any particular tactic might produce and which could lead to a deadlock. Second, negotiation is an infinite process, involving moves in all directions, even backward. One party rarely can control the moves of the other, nor the direction of the negotiations, and both sides can change, stop, or derail the movement of the negotiation process. Therefore, the challenge is to juggle, combine, eliminate, and change those unknown elements and minimize their potential for altering the course of the negotiations, even if meeting this challenge entails changing one’s own values or those of the adversary. And third, negotiation is both a preemptive and a reactive process, depending on how both adversaries interacted earlier in the

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negotiation. But it is not necessary that the behavior of the parties remain uniform throughout the process, and in the future a party is likely to react differently than it did in an earlier, similar situation. Different reactions occur primarily because the parties may display varied negotiation behavior at different stages of the negotiation.47 The varied and unpredictable nature of negotiation brings into play the game theory notion of non-zero-sum encounters (one person’s loss is the other person’s gain), and one of the major challenges for any negotiator is to transform any zero-sum situation and attitude into a successful negotiation. The success of the negotiation process depends on whether it can be transformed into a positive-sum situation that, in terms of net gains, benefits all parties and makes them feel better off than they did before entering the negotiation. Since in negotiations the parties look for a mutually agreed solution, it is important for the negotiators to have a clear understanding of how deep are the parties’ differences and on what aspects do the parties have some agreement. In other words, negotiators have to be well aware of the nature of the definitions the parties offer upon entering the negotiations because these definitions reveal the parties’ perspectives on the problem and how they intend to address it. Knowing how the parties define and view problems also gives negotiators an idea as to how differences in the definition of the problem can be abridged.48 Each side’s definition must somehow acknowledge the hopes and pains of the other side. Only when each side sees the other’s problems as a part of the problem will the two definitions of the problem indicate that a joint solution is worth considering.49 Other important factors have a decisive influence on the success of any negotiation. These are: stability of the government; nature and vision of the leadership; composition of the negotiation team and their level of autonomy in decision making; relationship between the negotiating teams away from the table; and venue of negotiations. In negotiations, especially international negotiations over territorial or resources disputes, the political climate in a country plays a pivotal role—a role that includes not only the overall atmospherics and public opinion but also the strength and stability of the ruling governments/regimes. In the case of a weak government in which coalition allies may have more members than the single-largest leading party, it is highly likely that government leadership will be restricted from taking bold decisions for fear of a political backlash. Such weakness may in turn may erode the

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confidence of that country’s negotiators. What matters most is not whether it is a democratic government or a military regime, but whether the government/regime is stable enough to take bold decisions and own the responsibility for the consequences. Analysis in subsequent chapters reveals how negotiations between India and Pakistan have succeeded when those countries were ruled by strong leaders and governments that faced no imminent threat. This explains why Benazir Bhutto was willing to settle the Siachen dispute in 1989 and why Nawaz Sharif supported the establishment of the India-Pakistan CDP in 1997 and signed the Lahore Declaration in 1999. This analysis highlights the significance of the role of leadership in conflict resolution. For a successful conclusion to negotiation it is important that the leadership has a vision of the desired outcome; has the courage to take risks and face the consequences; is sufficiently altruistic and keeps the people in confidence; has the political skills of mediating or negotiating; and has a good understanding of timing (when to enter into negotiations and when to deliver). Several noted political thinkers have underlined key leadership characteristics that can have a positive bearing on the conflict-resolution process. Plato believes leaders are above the people and yet a part of them. Machiavelli argues it is more important for a leader to be respected than loved, which implies the need to sometimes take tough, unpopular decisions that prove to be right in the long run. Thomas Carlyle observes that leaders are born as such and have only to be elevated to the big stage. Leo Tolstoy says leaders are the pawns of history and do not shape history, and that history makes or breaks a leader. Examples of these different types of leaders can be found in India and Pakistan. Plato type: Mahatma Gandhi and Muhammad Ali Jinnah; Machiavelli type: all Pakistani military dictators and Indira Gandhi; Thomas Carlyle type: Benazir Bhutto and Indira Gandhi; and Leo Tolstoy type: General Pervez Musharraf and Rajiv Gandhi. All these leaders had their respective strengths and weaknesses and their unique influences. Irrespective of differences in leadership styles and characteristics, however, what is imperative for successful negotiation is that the leaders have confidence in their negotiators and that the negotiators have the autonomy to make their own judgments and decisions at critical junctures. This imperative illuminates the importance of the negotiating team’s efficiency and worthiness. It is essential that the negotiating

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team consist of knowledgeable technical and professional experts, and not just diplomats or bureaucrats. Territorial and resources disputes encompass enormous technical and legal complexities that technical and professional experts are in a better position to negotiate and comprehend. Experts are fully aware of the dispute’s technical and legal limitations, if any, and make assessments accordingly. In the case of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 and Rann of Kutch of 1968, the negotiating teams consisted of engineers, lawyers, and hydrographers whose presence made a major difference in the end. Also, for negotiations to succeed it helps a great deal if the two negotiating teams can develop some mutual rapport beyond the table. This helps build levels of confidence and trust and facilitates seeing each other’s views in a more positive and constructive framework. Negotiators themselves concede that a good personal working relationship can have a positive impact on negotiations and on the credibility of negotiators. Associations forged away from the bargaining table, in a more relaxed atmosphere, may create good working relations and enhance the chances of successful negotiations.50 This is also applicable at the summit level, where personal relationships between leaders can make a vast difference in the outcome of negotiations. Here, a related aspect is the venue of negotiations. In the Indus waters dispute the neutral venue of Washington, D.C., during the critical phase of the negotiations played a crucial role in the outcome of the talks because it insulated the negotiators from any domestic public pressure and also provided immunity from media scrutiny. This neutral venue enabled negotiators to talk without undue stress from the media, which on occasion imparts the pressure of false public expectations. The Agra Summit of 2001 between Vajpayee and Musharraf is a classic example of how excessive media exposure and the leaders’ exploitation of electronic and print media to vent their rhetoric can create an atmosphere of negativity that erodes the possibility of compromise. The role media plays in the negotiation process itself has become a matter of intense debate in academic and policy circles and perhaps requires a separate book altogether in order to accommodate various dimensions of the debate. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that media has a responsible role to play, especially in the context of rivalries that are enduring, conflict-prone and laden with mutual distrust.

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Agreement Successful negotiations finally reach the fourth stage—that is, the stage of the signing of the agreement. It is also possible that negotiations may end without having an agreement and therefore will resume on a later date or be scuttled for a long time. A successful conclusion is achieved when negotiations end with agreement on the outstanding issues: when the two sides have exchanged agreements on each other’s standpoints or when, through mutual give and take and compromise, both have moved to a point where they are satisfied with the result under the existing circumstances.51 After the agreement has been reached it is subject to implementation by the two sides, which sometimes can also involve a parliamentary resolution or a nod from the legislature. In this phase the role of the leadership becomes critical again because it requires convincing the public and the parliament that the best possible result has been achieved in the interests of the country and of peace. It is also possible that, because of political compulsions, leaders may refuse to implement the agreement, but doing so may invite considerable international criticism that can affect the credibility of the country in the international community. It is therefore more prudent to withdraw from talks without signing the agreement rather than to sign it and then to refuse implementation because of political and strategic considerations.

Case Studies Using the negotiation framework, five case studies will be analyzed in depth, as follows: First: the Indus waters dispute, resolved by an agreement on September 19, 1960, following eight long years of discussions and negotiations involving India and Pakistan and the World Bank. The Indus Waters Treaty ended the long-standing dispute over the use of the waters of the Indus River system, which—apart from the Indus itself—also included five other rivers: the Sutlej, Ravi, Beas, Jhelum, and Chenab, all flowing from India into Pakistan, thus positioning India as the upper riparian. After partition in 1947, Pakistan feared India would exploit its upper-riparian position to turn Pakistan into a dust bowl. This issue led the two countries to negotiate and ascertain their relative consumptive and non-consumptive rights

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over these rivers. Negotiations were held under the auspices of the World Bank, which became a third party to the dispute’s resolution and was instrumental in arranging mammoth financial assistance to help implement one of the twentieth century’s largest water-sharing agreements. Second: Understandably, there are many instances of states coming into conflict over strategic territory, but conflicts over land of no obvious strategic value are perhaps no less common. The Rann of Kutch is an example of a conflict over a huge mass of barren land, approximately 3,500 square miles. The Rann was certainly unimportant in British days and it was not until 1959 that Indian geologists proposed to explore the area for oil and gas. As a result, this area acquired more strategic significance. Eventually, because of high costs and feasibility constraints, the idea of exploration was shelved and the boundary remained disputed and undemarcated. This boundary divided Gujarat (India) and West Pakistan (until 1971 Pakistan had two wings—West Pakistan, present-day Pakistan, and East Pakistan, present-day Bangladesh). The Rann of Kutch agreement of 1965 and the Kutch Tribunal Award of 1968 eventually settled the dispute. Third: Siachen Glacier is the highest battlefield in the world, having witnessed military skirmishes between India and Pakistan for more than twenty-seven years. This glacier is forty-seven miles long and at altitudes between 9,000 and 15,000 feet. Considered uninhabitable, it was left undemarcated in 1949. The Cease Fire Line (CFL) of 1949, which became the LoC in 1972 following the Simla Accord, stops short of the glacier at Point NJ 9842, leaving territorial jurisdiction over the region open to India’s and Pakistan’s respective interpretations of the 1949 CFL agreement. In response to periodic Pakistani mountaineering expeditions in the region, and having learned of Pakistani plans for occupation, Indian forces preemptively occupied the glacier in 1983. Since then India and Pakistan have become involved in military skirmishes, although they were believed close to a resolution in 1989. Political constraints on the Indian government, however, compelled it to pull out of negotiations and the dispute has continued ever since. This conflict puts an enormous drain on the national exchequer on both sides. Indian and Pakistani leaders have acknowledged the human and economic costs of the dispute and have conducted several rounds of negotiations, but with no substantial breakthrough.

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Fourth: Sir Creek is a sixty-mile-long estuary in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch between the Indian state of Gujarat and the Pakistani province of Sind. It forms part of the once-disputed Rann of Kutch area in western India. The international tribunal that settled the Kutch dispute had excluded the Creek, declaring it out of the tribunal’s purview. As a result the present dispute over Sir Creek concerns the demarcation of the boundary from “the mouth of Sir Creek to the top of Sir Creek” and from “the top of the Sir Creek eastward to a point (on land) designated as the Western Terminus.” The boundary was fixed in 1968, but what complicates the issue is that the Creek is a fluctuating tidal channel that from time to time shifts its course. The determination of a boundary in the Creek area will lead to the demarcation of a maritime boundary and also will enlarge the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of both sides by approximately 250 square miles. Any loss of territory in the Creek area would reduce not only the loser’s respective maritime zone but also diminish its EEZ. In recent years both sides have shown a resolve to settle the dispute since the failure to do so will lead to the area being declared international waters in accord with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter known as UNCLOS). Given the mutual possibility of the loss of territory and also the potential economic dividends the area presents, both sides are expected to settle their differences sooner rather than later. And fifth: The nature of the Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage and Storage Project dispute between India and Pakistan is evident from the nomenclature itself. India refers to it as the Tulbul Navigation project whereas Pakistan calls it the Wular Barrage dispute. The basic dispute concerns a barrage to be constructed by India on the Jhelum River just below Wular Lake, about fifteen miles north of Srinagar and 5,180 feet above sea level. Pakistan contends the Wular lake site is unsuitable for dam construction and could be used to flood the POK during hostilities. In contrast, India has argued that the barrage is meant for maintaining the four-and-a-half-foot depth for navigation in the Jhelum River during the lean months. Following a protest from Pakistan in 1986 India suspended construction work until some agreement could be reached. More than ten rounds of talks have already been held to resolve the issue, but with little success. It is important to stress that the term “Storage Project” has been added to the nomenclature at Pakistan’s insistence, making it “Wular Barrage and Storage Project/Tulbul Navigation Project.”

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The dispute is mainly a resources issue, but because of its location in J&K, it has become a politically sensitive issue for both sides. In the next chapter, before discussing the five disputes, it will be useful to have an overview of the India-Pakistan peace process to provide the necessary background of the current state of affairs and progress in talks on various issues. The analysis of the five disputes in subsequent chapters would then be undertaken in order to derive key lessons that can help improve the chances of success in the on-going negotiations.

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CHAPTER II

COMPOSITE DIALOGUE PROCESS (CDP): A STRUCTURED MECHANISM FOR ADDRESSING INDO-PAK RIVALRY

I

ndia and Pakistan have a long history of conflicts and wars since 1947. Although they resolved, through negotiations, both the Indus Waters dispute in 1960 and the Rann of Kutch dispute in 1968, there was no agreed mechanism by which to navigate their enduring conflictual relationship. In the 1980s the two sides began to discuss Siachen, Sir Creek, and the Tulbul/Wular Project disputes, and to constitute a range of military CBMs, including nuclear. These negotiations, with no set timetable and held on a need-to-meet basis, made little progress because of the unresolved Kashmir issue. Before the CDP was constituted, the only negotiated success achieved after the 1972 Simla Agreement was the establishment of conventional (military) and nuclear CBMs. Because of a lack of political will, recurring terrorist incidents, and political instability in Pakistan, neither party was forthcoming in breaking the ice. While India continued with its counter-terrorism measures in J&K elsewhere, Pakistan employed jihad as an instrument of foreign policy in order to force India to come to the negotiating table to discuss J&K. Gradually, the parties realized that a compromise—in the form of a mutually agreed mechanism to discuss all disputes concomitantly—had to be reached. It is noteworthy that the decline of American interest in Pakistan in the decade following the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the growing IndoChina rapprochement, convinced Pakistan of the need to establish mechanisms of dispute settlement independent of the support of its two major allies, the United States and China. In May 1997, on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in Male, Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral and his Pakistani

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counterpart Nawaz Sharif mooted the idea of a CDP: a structured dialogue process to discuss all pending issues simultaneously.1 I.K. Gujral, a visionary and thinker praised for the “Gujral Doctrine” that called for a constructive and proactive relationship with South Asian neighbors on a nonreciprocal basis, and Nawaz Sharif, whose government had an absolute majority in the National Assembly, provided the necessary political will required for the materialization of such an initiative. Based on a compromise approach, the peace process discarded the “Kashmir first” approach and followed a “middle-path,” wherein progress on all issues could be sought in tandem. It was a compromise in the sense that while India agreed to include Kashmir in the agenda for talks, Pakistan agreed to include terrorism. These problems were the two major irritants in bilateral relations. (This chapter does not discuss the disputes of Baghliar, Kishenganga, and Neelam Dam, which were not included in the eight baskets of the CDP.) While disputes over Kishenganga and the Neelam Dam disputes remained unresolved, the 450 MW Baghliar hydropower project on the Chenab River in J&K was, after years in unsuccessful bilateral negotiation, referred to the World Bank, the guarantor in the Indus Waters Treaty. The World Bank appointed neutral expert Raymond Lafitte, whose decision in February 2007 settled the dispute. Both sides claimed victory in the verdict, ruling out the possibility of any backlash from either side.

Disruptions in the Peace Process The first major challenge to the peace process came when both India and Pakistan conducted thermonuclear tests in May 1998. The political climate was suddenly charged with prospects of a nuclear confrontation potentially being triggered by the Kashmir issue or by a terrorist incident. In February 1999, to defuse growing tension and antagonism, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee undertook a historic bus trip to Lahore and, with Nawaz Sharif, signed the Lahore Declaration on the 21st. The ensuing bonhomie eased tensions to some extent but proved short-lived. According to Najam Sethi, “Never in the past has there been any prime minister or leader who has been more keen than Nawaz Sharif to sort out differences. I would go this far to say that if Nawaz had his way he would have put Kashmir on one side and accepted an extraordinary slow progress on that while progress was made on other issues.”2

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Then, in May 1999, Pakistan-trained militants and regular soldiers from the Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) and Tenth Corps, Islamabad, crossed the LoC and occupied several Indian positions in the Kargil sector of J&K.3 The “Kargil War,” a military misadventure by General Pervez Musharraf, derailed the peace initiatives, and Indo-Pak bilateral relations dipped to an all-time low. Soon, peace became ever more distant. In October 1999, Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a military coup by General Musharraf, and after eleven years of civilian rule Pakistan experienced its fourth military takeover. Reversing his previous stand of refusing to talk with a military dictator (who was also the architect of the Kargil War), Prime Minister Vajpayee invited General Musharraf for talks in Agra in July 2001, but to India’s disappointment this effort failed miserably. Even worse was the criticism of India by Pakistanis who asserted the talks had granted political legitimacy to General Musharraf and his military regime. While Indian policy makers were pondering the lessons from the Agra summit, bilateral relations suffered another major jolt when, on December 13, terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament. In response, this time the Vajpayee government upped the ante and mobilized troops along the border (Operation Parakram) with the intention of taking punitive action against terrorist camps in POK. After months of deployment, however, the crisis fizzled out, and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), came under severe criticism from various quarters for losing approximately 800 men in the course of deployment due to accidents on the treacherous terrain and then withdrawing without firing even a single bullet. Although opposition parties in Parliament refrained from criticizing the government over the deployment for fear of public criticism, a fierce debate on the merits and rationale of the operation raged in political, academic, and strategic circles. According to then-Defense Minister George Fernandez, India lost 798 soldiers during Operation Parakram.4 Ironically, this was more than the 474 lives lost in the Kargil War.5 Now, India broke all contacts with Pakistan—political, diplomatic, economic, and commercial—and even made sure that Pakistani commercial flights were denied over-flight permission in Indian airspace. In this tense atmosphere, Prime Minister Vajpayee offered another peace initiative, this time from Srinagar on April 18, 2003. He called for resuming the peace process with the precondition of

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Pakistan’s curbing of cross-border terrorism. A few days later, he also made Pakistan a twelve-point offer6 that was published by journalist Ramananda Sengupta in his column as follows: 1. Resume talks to restore civil aviation links, including overflight rights. 2. Discuss resumption of rail links, following aviation talks. 3. Resume bilateral sporting encounters, including cricket. 4. Issue visas in cities outside the two countries’ national capitals, to shorten travel. 5. Permit individuals aged at least sixty-five to cross into India by foot. Previously only groups could walk across, while individuals had to take a bus. 6. Run more buses on the New Delhi-Lahore route that now operates. 7. Establish links between the two countries’ coast guards, before and after fishing season. 8. Have India and Pakistan stop arresting each other’s fishermen within certain sea areas. 9. Provide free medical treatment to twenty Pakistani children. 10. Have India and Pakistan increase the staff of each nation’s embassy. 11. Consider ferry service between Mumbai and Karachi. 12. Start new bus services, one between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad. The other would be a bus or rail link between Khokhrapar in Sind, Pakistan, and Munabao in Rajasthan, India. The Indian offer was reciprocated by Pakistan, which also added more proposals. It offered 100 scholarships to Kashmiri children to take undergraduate and graduate courses in Pakistan; medical treatment for aged Kashmiris; help for widows and victims of rape; and enlisted the aid of UN agencies to identify perpetrators of atrocities against Kashmiris.7 Following the resumption of the peace process, both sides exchanged parliamentary and business delegations and all links were restored. The Delhi-Lahore bus service Sada-e-Sarhad (Call of the Border) resumed on July 11, 2003, in which Baby Noor was brought to India for heart treatment—a minor event considering the enormity and the complexities of Indo-Pak relations, it nonetheless had a tremendous impact in improving mutual goodwill. Diplomatic

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links were restored on July 16, 2003, and air links would be restored on January 1, 2004. As a quid pro quo Pakistan proscribed Khuddam-e-Islam, formerly Jaish-e-Muhammad ( JeM); Jamaat-ul Dawa ( JuD), formerly Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT); and Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HuM). Further, in a historic departure from Pakistan’s traditional policy on Kashmir, General Musharraf proposed to set aside the UN resolutions in order to explore other options of resolution.8 The two sides announced a ceasefire along the LoC, later extended to the International Border (IB), and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in Siachen on November 23, 2003.9 Prime Minister Vajpayee and General Musharraf also met on the sidelines of the Twelfth SAARC Summit in Islamabad in January 2006 and reaffirmed their commitment to start the dialogue process rolling again.10 The second round of the peace process resumed with the December 2004 meeting in New Delhi of the two foreign secretaries, but in July 2006 the process was suspended by India, this time in the wake of bomb blasts on a train in Mumbai in which more than fifty people were killed. In the fall of this year, new Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met General Musharraf in Havana during the Non-Aligned Summit and conveyed to him that terrorist attacks in India were a major source of concern and tension in their bilateral ties, and that this was something to be jointly tackled. Both sides agreed to establish the “joint anti-terrorism mechanism,” but in the meantime terrorist attacks continued with greater intensity on Indian soil. In Mumbai on November 26, 2008, terrorist attacks on the Chattrapati Shivaji terminus, the Girgaum Chaupati, Hotel Oberoi Trident, Hotel Taj Mahal Palace, Leopold Café, Cama Hospital, and the Nariman House (owned by the Orthodox Jewish community) produced the likelihood of India’s undertaking air strikes on POK-based terrorist camps. The possibility of such strikes appeared so imminent that the Pakistani leadership was alarmed, and Pakistani fighter jets scrambled over major cities in Pakistan. Although hostilities did not break out, it would not be an exaggeration to say that, since the 1980s, cross-border terrorism—more than the Kashmir issue—has damaged bilateral relations and continues to do so.11 In India, between 1994 and May 3, 2010, 58,204 people have been killed, including 22,188 civilians, 8,494 security personnel, and 27,422 terrorists.12

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Structure of the CDP The eight baskets of issues can be broadly compartmentalized for conceptual clarity into four sections: territorial issues ( J&K, Siachen, and Sir Creek), security issues (terrorism, drug trafficking, and conventional and nuclear CBMs, resource/economic issues (Tulbul/ Wular, economic and commercial exchanges) and CBMs (peopleto-people exchanges). This chapter does not discuss the Siachen, Sir Creek, and Tulbul/Wular disputes, since they are analyzed in-depth in subsequent chapters.

I. Territorial Disputes Jammu and Kashmir Peace talks on J&K, held July 27–28, 2004, in New Delhi, were led by Indian Foreign Secretary Shashank and his Pakistani counterpart Riaz Khokhar. No specific progress was made, but the talks were described as “useful,” a “good first step,” and “positive and concrete.” Both sides reaffirmed their commitments to the joint press statements made January 6, 2004, in Islamabad, seeking “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including J&K, to the satisfaction of both sides.”13 Progress in bilateral talks during 2004 and 2005 was reviewed in New Delhi, on January 17–18, 2006, by the Indo-Pak foreign secretaries, Shyam Saran and Riaz Mohammad Khan, respectively, initiating the third round of the peace process. The review talks covered J&K and related CBMs, especially bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, and between Poonch and Rawalakot. The constructive mode of discussion symbolized a discernible shift in mindsets and the desire to refrain from polemics and one-upmanship on Kashmir and to contribute toward the improvement of the situation on the ground. The commencement of new bus services, the enforcement of the ceasefire along the LoC, the IB in the western sector, and AGPL in Siachen all indicated the willingness of the two sides to defuse tensions through people-to-people measures and troop disengagement. The Joint Statements of January 6 and September 24, 2004, and of April 18, September 14, and October 4, 2005, captured the progress India and Pakistan had made on various peace-process issues, including Kashmir.14 General Pervez Musharraf’s Kashmir Proposals. On October 25, 2004, at an Iftaar party, General Musharraf tossed out some ideas for

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resolving the Kashmir dispute, primarily for the purposes of media and domestic debate in Pakistan. He suggested identifying regions of Kashmir on both sides of the LoC, demilitarizing them, and granting them independent status or placing them under either joint IndoPak control or a UN mandate.15 He said: Take Kashmir in its entirety. It has seven regions. Two of the regions are in Pakistan and five are in India. In my view, identify a region, whether it is the whole or part, I do not know. Identify the region, demilitarize the region forever and change its status. . . . [S]tatus can be independence, condominium where there can be a joint control or there can be UN Mandate to be defined by legal people.16

Although he did not specify the seven regions, subsequent reports suggested they are: the plains, including Jammu; foothills up to 7,000 feet; Pir Panjal; the Valley; the great Himalayan Zone; the upper Indus valley; and the Karakoram.17 Of these seven regions, five are within India, namely: Ladakh (Ismaili part), Kargil/Dras (Muslim), Poonch (contiguous to “Azad Kashmir,” referred to here as POK), Jammu (Muslim-majority districts), and the Valley. The remaining two regions are POK and the Northern Areas (minus Baltistan).18 The proposal evoked little interest in New Delhi, primarily because it sought to isolate the “Muslim majority” areas on a religious basis, which in principle was a nonstarter for India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh responded, first in September 2004 in New York and then in November in Srinagar, saying: I have made it quite clear that any redrawing of international border is something which is not going to be acceptable to us. . . . Any proposal which smacks of a further division of our country on the basis of religion is not going to be acceptable to us. . . . Within these two limits we are ready to look into any proposal. . . . [Musharraf’s proposals] are still not clear to us. . . . I do not know what his plan is.19

It has always remained India’s official policy that “boundaries cannot be redrawn.” The prime minister also said the need was to make borders meaningless.20 India has also repeatedly reminded Pakistan that addressing terrorism and improving the situation on the ground were necessary conditions to making possible any progress in Kashmir. While India has raised terrorism-related issues in talks, Pakistan, in response, has raised the issues of “human rights violations” and the reduction of troops in J&K.21

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In September 2005 General Musharraf tossed out another “outof-the-box” proposal regarding J&K. This time he suggested Indian troops withdraw from Kupuwara, Baramula, and Srinagar in order to boost the peace process.22 In fact, back in November 2004, Prime Minister Singh had already affected troop withdrawal from south Kashmir, a step that was criticized by the opposition in New Delhi because of continuing terrorist attacks—not only in J&K, but also in other parts of India. Pakistan, therefore, was told the ground situation in J&K did not allow for any more withdrawals. In a December 2006 interview with an Indian television station, General Musharraf fired another Kashmir salvo. This time his proposal contained four recommendations. First, Kashmir would retain the same borders, but people would be allowed to move freely back and forth in the region; second, the region would have self-governance or autonomy, but not independence; third, troops would be withdrawn from the region in a reciprocal manner; and fourth, a joint supervision mechanism would be set up, comprised of Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri representatives. He stressed that if these proposals could be worked out Pakistan was prepared to give up the independence issue or the UN resolution option.23 The proposal stimulated interest in New Delhi, inside and outside government circles, for an underlying borderless approach, contemplating autonomy, and discounting the independence option. Prime Minister Singh regarded the proposals as positive and a mutual win-win solution. Significantly, the proposals sent a strong message—to the separatists in J&K and in Pakistan—that independence was no more a viable solution. The All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), representing moderate elements in J&K led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, urged New Delhi to discuss the proposals further and asked separatist groups on both sides to support the move.24 Sticking points in the proposals, about which India has remained skeptical, are: troop withdrawal amidst continuing terrorist violence, and joint supervision of J&K.

II. Security Issues Terrorism and Drug Trafficking Terrorism has remained one of the major issues underpinning the Indo-Pak enduring rivalry and keeps the relationship boiling without an actual outbreak of war. Since 1987 Pakistan has supported cross-border terrorism in J&K and created hundreds of jihadi groups, including Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HuM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and

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Harkat-ul Ansar (now known as Jamiat-ul Ansar), mostly based in POK to stoke local sentiments against New Delhi.25 Presently, terrorist groups operating in J&K include Jaish-e-Mohammad (now known as Khuddam-ul Islam JeM), LeT (now known as Dawat-ul Irshad), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Al-umar-Mujahideen (AuM), Jammu Kashmir Islamic Front ( JKIF), Al-Badr, Jamait-ulMujahideen ( JuM), and Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM). These groups have been declared terrorist organizations under the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002.26 The HuM is predominantly a Kashmiri group, whereas LeT, JeM, and others are Pakistani. Several of these terrorist organizations were proscribed by General Musharraf following the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 and also as a result of U.S. pressure, but most have renamed themselves and continued operations against India. The involvement of the Pakistani intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in supporting these groups has long remained a sticking point between New Delhi and Islamabad. It is believed that following the attack on the Indian parliament, a livid Musharraf barged into ISI headquarters, screaming at the agency’s Director General (Internal Security), “Leash in these mad dogs that you have kept.”27 But jihad in J&K has received support from all civilian and military regimes in Pakistan, and this support can be regarded as one of the key means of keeping Pakistan’s jihadi apparatus intact. Perhaps General Musharraf’s much-discussed January 12, 2002, speech sums up the centrality of Kashmir in Pakistan’s jihadi policy. He said, “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. The entire Pakistan and the world knows this. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principal stand on Kashmir.”28 The first round of secretary-level talks between the Indian Home Ministry and Pakistani Interior Ministry was held August 10–11, 2004. These talks showed the willingness of both sides to jointly address terrorism and drug trafficking, and the participants called for the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to institutionalize their cooperation on these counts. The delegations also expressed satisfaction over growing cooperation between Narcotics Control Authorities of the two sides through information-sharing.29 The second round of secretary-level talks was held August 29–30, 2005, discussing progress made since the first round and steps that could be taken to eliminate terrorism. In these talks a proposal for cooperation between the Indian Central Bureau of Investigations

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(CBI) and Pakistani Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) was also considered.30 Technical-level talks were held in New Delhi between the CBI and FIA on March 21–22, 2006.31 Considered significant for being held for the first time after a span of seventeen years, these discussions dealt with key security challenges such as human trafficking, counterfeit currency, and illegal immigration. Despite initial skepticism, owing to mutual mistrust and the sensitive nature of the issues, both sides were forthcoming with regard to holding periodic meetings to discuss these issues, even though the envisaged possibility of conducting professional training in criminal investigations and sharing respective experiences seemed rather remote. The third round of talks, at the level of interior/home secretaries, was held May 30–31, 2006, with participants expressing satisfaction at progress made in talks between the Indian Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and the Pakistani Anti Narcotic Force (ANF).32 The meeting between ANF and NCB to jointly address drug trafficking across the IB and LoC was deemed significant and meaningful, suggesting that while long-standing disputes elude resolution, the two sides meanwhile can resolve common challenges. In another breakthrough, on August 30, 2005, the home secretaries signed an agreement for the release of prisoners and treated this matter as a humanitarian issue. It was agreed to keep each other notified about arrests being made, to provide consular access within three months of an arrest, and to expedite release as soon as the term of imprisonment was complete. As a result, in September, 435 Indian prisoners (including 371 fishermen) and 148 Pakistani prisoners (51 fishermen) were released from the respective prisons. Joint Anti-terrorism Mechanism (Havana Declaration) Cross-border terrorism, which initially had been confined to J&K, has now has spread to other parts of India. The major attacks outside J&K between 2003 and 2008 were: August 25, 2003, in Zhaveri bazaar and the Gateway of India, Mumbai, with 46 dead; July 5, 2005, at the disputed temple site in Ayodhya; October 29, 2005, in Sarojini Nagar, Paharganj, and Govindpuri in New Delhi, with 62 dead; December 28, 2005, at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore; March 7, 2006, at Sankatmochan (a Hindu temple) in Varanasi, with 21 killed; July 11, 2006, in a local commuter train in Mumbai, with 209 dead; September 8, 2006, two blasts in Nasik, with 40 dead; February 19,

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2007, twin blasts in the Samjhauta Express (the train between India and Pakistan) near Panipat, with 66 dead; May 18, 2007, twin blasts in the Mecca Mosque in Hyderabad, with 12 dead; August 25, 2007, twin blasts at a park and snack stall in Hyderabad, with 42 dead; May 13, 2008, nine serial blasts in a crowded Jaipur market, with 63 dead; July 25, 2008, six low-intensity blasts in a Bangalore market, with 1 killed; July 26, 2008, 22 serial blasts in Ahmedabad, with 53 dead; September 13, 2008, blasts in markets in Delhi, with 30 dead; September 27, 2008, blast in a flower market in Delhi, with 3 dead; and last but not the least the November 26, 2008, terrorist attacks and siege in Mumbai, with 78 dead. After suspension of the peace process in July 2006, following the Mumbai train blasts, the first summit-level meeting was held in September in Havana, on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Summit, where Prime Minister Singh and General Musharraf agreed to revive the stalled process. At the same time India specified that it was important for Pakistan to agree to a joint mechanism for addressing terrorism as a condition for moving forward in the peace process. What then emerged was the Havana Declaration comprising the understanding to set up a Joint Anti-terrorism Institutional Mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations.33 The purpose of the Havana Declaration, though questioned by skeptics in India, was to lay down a mechanism for addressing the issue of terrorism in a structured and cooperative manner. The first meeting to develop the Joint Mechanism was held March 6–7, 2007, in Islamabad, wherein India provided Pakistan with evidence assembled after rigorous investigation by Indian security and intelligence agencies into the terrorist attacks that occurred between 2005 and 2007.34 The Pakistani daily, Dawn, wrote that Pakistan was disappointed at India for not presenting any “substantial” evidence in the Samjhauta train blast, apart from a sketch of the suspect drawn on the basis of descriptions by witnesses.35 Pakistan, on its part, offered a comprehensive dossier with “specific information about systematic involvement of Indian security agencies” (ibid.) in Balochistan. This exchange gave a glimpse of the fate of future Joint Mechanism meetings and of the Mechanism itself. Such accusations and counter-accusations in talks continue to defeat the purpose and objective of the Mechanism. As Pakistan continues to question the veracity of the evidence India has from time to time provided, the 2008 Mumbai attacks have again exposed

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the existence of the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and the continued support of the Pakistani establishment, especially the ISI and the jihadi sympathizers in the military. In response to the attacks, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Reza Gilani gave assurances of a joint probe into the incidents and offered to send the ISI chief to India to help with investigations. But his government soon retracted this offer, apparently under pressure from the military and the ISI itself. The Pakistani government did, however, carry out raids against the LeT in the POK area, operations labeled by India as mere empty gestures. India further alleged that top leaders, such as Hafeez Saeed of LeT and Masood Azhar of JeM, were still at large.36 Soon after receiving, on January 5, 2009, a sixty-nine-page dossier prepared by Indian security and intelligence agencies, Pakistan denied any involvement in the attacks and refused to accept allegations that the attackers hailed from Pakistan. It also contended that attacks were possibly the act of Harkat-ul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) of Bangladesh and the planning for these acts was probably done outside, in Dubai or even in Austria.37 The claims of Pakistan were rendered weak due to the capture of one terrorist, Ajmal Amir Kasab, believed to be a resident of Faridkot village in Pakistan. On May 6, 2010, a special court in Mumbai sentenced Kasab to death for his role in the Mumbai attacks. He is expected to appeal in the higher court against the verdict or file a mercy petition before the President of India.38 Under intense Indian and international pressure, Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik eventually admitted that part of the planning was done in Pakistan. In response, Pakistani authorities arrested the alleged mastermind, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, and five others, including Hammad Amin Sadiq, Zarar Shah, Mohammed Ashfaq, Javaid Iqbal, and Abu Al-Qama.39 Both sides continued exchanging further information on the case and India has identified at least sixteen individuals in connection with the attacks and requested Pakistan for their extradition, which appears a remote possibility in the present scenario. In the aftermath the peace process remains suspended by India, and leaders from both countries only occasionally meet at the sidelines of international summits. Prime Minister Singh and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari met during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit on June 16, 2009, in Yekaterinburg, Russia, where they agreed upon dates for a meeting between their foreign secretaries to discuss terrorism. The prime minister also conveyed India’s “unhappiness” over

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Pakistani apathy with regard to curbing cross-border terrorism, and he expressed disappointment over the Lahore High Court’s release of Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the chief of JUD.40 In a press briefing, Prime Minister Singh said, “I explained to [President Zardari] that whereas Pakistan has now taken effective action against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, we have a strong feeling that those elements, who are active in perpetrating terrorist acts in our country are not being brought to justice.”41 The next significant discussion of the possibility of resuming the peace process was between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan, Shiv Shankar Menon and Salman Bashir respectively, who met in Sharm-el Sheikh, Egypt, on July 15, 2009, on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit. In the end, however, they failed even to agree on a joint statement to be issued by the two prime ministers, who were scheduled to meet later on. Prime Ministers Singh and Yousaf Raza Gilani met the next day to discuss the “entire gamut of bilateral relations.” With regard to terrorism, their subsequent joint statement said, “Both Prime Ministers reiterated the need to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice. Prime Minister (Gilani) assured that Pakistan will do everything in its power in this regard. He said that Pakistan has provided an updated dossier on the investigations of the Mumbai attacks and had sought additional information/evidence. Prime Minister Singh said that the dossier is being reviewed . . . ”42 The statement created a furor in the opposition benches of India’s Parliament, an outcry, led by the BJP, accusing the government of a “sell-out” and “capitulation.”43 Responding to opposition charges over the joint statement, Singh said the contention that “. . . action on terrorism should not be linked” implied that Pakistan “cannot await other developments” before delivering on the terrorism front, and added that “. . . [W]hen and in what form we broaden the dialogue with Pakistan will depend on future developments.”44 On July 30, 2009, in one of his longest speeches in Parliament, Singh reiterated that the government had not diluted its position on terrorism, assuring Parliament that Pakistan had been told that Mumbai-type attacks were not to be repeated and that another such attack would put an “intolerable strain our relationship.” He also reminded the body that his predecessor, Atal Behari Vajpayee, had pursued the course of dialogue despite repeated setbacks in the form of terrorist attacks, and therefore his own willingness to continue the talks should not be seen as a concession.45

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In New Delhi on February 26, 2010, the two foreign secretaries, Nirupama Rao of India and Pakistan’s Salman Bashir, resumed talks on terrorism, the Mumbai attacks, Kashmir, and water issues. As expected, no substantial breakthrough was achieved due to on-going political and security turmoil in Pakistan and to the simmering tension between the two sides since the Mumbai attacks. It was, however, noted that to achieve peace, dialogue was the only way forward and that non-engagement had failed to achieve anything in the last year and a half. India’s decision to resume talks may seem to be a step down from its erstwhile demand that Pakistan must curb crossborder terrorism for progress in bilateral talks. Yet it is logical in the sense that these issues cannot be linked indefinitely for continuation of the peace process. The reason is that the rationale underlying the peace process is the neutralization of the very linkage politics (with Kashmir and terrorism) that have hindered progress in talks for a long period of time. Peace and Security (Conventional and Nuclear CBMs) Since 1988 a wide range of CBMs between India and Pakistan has played an important role in keeping communication channels open during crises and maintaining transparency with regard to mutual conduct. After the resumption of the peace process in 2004, India and Pakistan justifiably and appreciably underscored the need for additional CBMs to improve the atmospherics and make the political climate conducive for talks. CBMs have a critical role to play in enduring rivalries such as that between India and Pakistan, and measures such as reduction/cessation of hostilities and promotion of people-to-people exchanges help improve the overall political climate. Such measures are not only an essential component of the prenegotiation stage but are also an important factor in making issues ripe for negotiation. The foreign secretaries of both sides met for the first time in New Delhi, June 19–20, 2004, to discuss various proposals pertaining to conventional and nuclear issues. On September 4 in New Delhi, a follow-up meeting was held at a higher level between the two officials to look at the whole gamut of peace talks, including the CBMs. The talks continued through September 5–6, discussing the draft agreement on advance notice for missile tests and supporting the holding of periodic meetings between the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and Pakistan Rangers. In September 2005 the foreign secretaries met in Islamabad to review conventional and nuclear CBMs. They expressed their resolve

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to continue with the ceasefire and welcomed the finalization of the Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles agreement and the proposal for the MoU on communication links between the Pakistani Maritime Security Agency and the Indian Coast Guard. On October 3, 2005, in Islamabad, the agreement and the MoU were signed between the foreign secretaries and directors-general, respectively.46 On January 17–18, 2006, the foreign secretaries met in New Delhi to discuss progress made in expert-level meetings on CBMs. The two sides reiterated their commitment to finalizing an agreement on “Reducing Risk of Nuclear Accidents or Unauthorized Use of Nuclear Weapons,” for which a draft was presented by India.47 An expert-level dialogue on nuclear CBMs was held in Islamabad on April 25–26, 2006.48 This meeting was productive in shaping perceptions and further strengthening nuclear CBMs, within the framework of the Lahore MoU, that not only reaffirmed promoting peace, security, and trust between India and Pakistan, but also preventing South Asia from becoming a “nuclear flashpoint.” Agreements on the pre-notification of flights testing ballistic missiles and the implementation of a hotline between the two foreign secretaries were key to enhancing trust levels and reducing the potential for an accidental nuclear exchange On the nuclear issue, India and Pakistan have reaffirmed their “unilateral moratorium” on conducting further nuclear tests until “extraordinary events jeopardize their supreme interests.” Interestingly, Pakistan has taken note of India’s approach to diluting the nuclear flashpoint theory, which is popular in the western discourse on South Asia’s nuclearization, by has suggested cooperative measures to boost mutual confidence in nuclear matters. Importantly, both sides called for regular working-level meetings involving all the nuclear powers to discuss nuclear proliferation and disarmament issues, cooperation that reflected a tacit agreement to take the nuclear debate from the regional to the global level. Analysts in Pakistan have increasingly stressed the need for Pakistan to legitimize its nuclear weapons program by making common cause with India and thereby help insulate itself from U.S. pressure. Ayaz Amir in his June 4, 2004, article in Dawn wrote: The Pakistani establishment has yet to realize it but the old paradigms have shifted. The new enemy, the new threat to Pakistani security, comes from the United States and its irresponsible policies in this part of the world, not India. Indian Foreign Minister (former)

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Besides, Indian and Pakistani claims for nuclear power status and China’s instant objection, indicated a significant transformation of the nuclear debate in South Asia. The Islamabad expert-level dialogue on conventional CBMs, held on April 27, discussed various proposals aimed at avoidance of conflict.50 Both sides agreed to the finalization of Border Ground Rules for implementation along the IB; to quarterly flag meetings at the local commanders’ level; to an increase in posts and defense works along the LoC; and a for speedy return of inadvertent line crosser(s). It can be argued that some of the most meaningful breakthroughs in the peace process have been achieved in the “Peace and Security” sphere, and these play an instrumental role in improving the political climate for negotiations.

III. Resource/Economic Issues Tulbul Navigation/Wular Barrage Project Please refer to chapter VII for a detailed analysis of the dispute. Economic and Commercial Issues India and Pakistan agree in principle that economic and commercial cooperation is the key to reviving estranged ties and bringing economic dividends to both sides. On this basis, the commerce secretaries of the two sides met in Islamabad on August 11–12, 2004, to discuss various proposals to expand their economic and commercial relationship. The India-Pakistan Joint Study Group ( JSG) constituted to discuss, in depth, trade and economic issues met on February 22–23, 2005, led by the commerce secretaries. The JSG was composed of two working/sub groups on Customs Cooperation and Trade Facilitation Measures and Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs), and finalized the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the sub groups.51 The first round of working groups talks was held on August 8–10, 2005, covering issues such as air services and trade, shipping protocol and sea trade, a fiber optic link between Amritsar and Lahore, and existing Non-Tariff Barriers, among others.52

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India and Pakistan aimed to raise bilateral trade by 2010 to $10 billion from the current level of $1.6 billion. Considering that trade was quite sluggish and low in volume at merely $835 million in 2004– 2005, its doubling to $1.6 billion in 2006–2007 is very encouraging. Although some sticking points remain, such as trade imbalance in India’s favor and India’s Non-Tariff Barriers and Para-Tariffs, these are being looked into by a task force in New Delhi. While India pushes to raise exports to the $2 billion mark, Pakistan’s exports to India during 2006–2007 totaled a mere $370 million and the trade imbalance is stipulated to be given favorable consideration by New Delhi.53 On March 27, 2006, the commerce secretaries held talks in Islamabad as a part of the JSG to review progress on these issues.54 They emphasized establishing measures to enhance bilateral trade and conducting, as part of the peace process, supplemental deliberations on substantive trade issues. These facilitation measures were deemed helpful in promoting trade at bilateral, multilateral, and regional levels between SAARC countries. The third round of economic and commercial cooperation was held in Islamabad on March 28–29, discussing initiatives and progress the two sides had made since the first round of talks in August 2005. A broad range of issues was discussed, including the scheduled opening of bank branches in both countries, the tea trade, shipping procedures, problems of transportation of goods, the broadening of the list of items that may be exported from India to Pakistan, and the feasibility of trade in information technology-enabled medical services. Both sides expressed satisfaction over the ratification of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) by all SAARC member states, which would potentially boost intraregional trade.55

IV. Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) Promotion of “Friendly Exchanges” Talks under the category “friendly exchanges” pertain to arts and culture, education, Ayurvedic and Unani medicines, archaeology, tourism, youth affairs, sports, and media. Over the years, exchanges such as cricket matches, visits by academicians, professionals, peace activists, and journalists have constructively contributed to greater understanding and friendship. Cricket has a vast following in both countries and has helped in bridging the divide, prompting fans from both sides to travel across the Indo-Pak border to watch

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matches and enjoy mutual hospitality. In 1987 the first instance of cricket being used as a CBM and public diplomacy medium occurred when General Zia-ul Haq flew to Jaipur, India, to witness an IndiaPakistan cricket match. Two decades later, in April 2005, General Musharraf took a cue from his predecessor and came to a match in New Delhi during a state visit. This cricket series of 2005 was extensively covered by the media, and stories of cricket fans being accorded overwhelming hospitality in both countries underscored the existence of vibrant peace constituencies on both sides. The encouraging response of the fans not only facilitated an informed appreciation of each other but also gave a tremendous fillip to the peace process then under way. After the resumption of the peace process, secretary-level talks between the Indian Ministry of Tourism and Culture and the Pakistani Ministry of Culture were held in New Delhi on August 3–4, 2004, on the “Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields.” The two secretaries discussed measures to liberalize visa regulations and expand the scope of the 1974 bilateral Protocol on Visits to religious shrines. Humanitarian issues, such as exchange of prisoners and disaster management, also figured into the discussions.56 The next round of meetings was held in Islamabad on July 26–27, 2005, to explore newer avenues for promoting friendly exchanges. On June 1–2, 2006, the secretary-level meeting again took place in New Delhi to review progress in the field of friendly exchanges. Participants discussed additional issues, such as increasing the number of pilgrims allowed to cross the border and visit religious shrines, and easing visa regulations for delegations as well as for individuals who want to visit relatives on the other side.57 Meeting Points along the LoC In 2005 India and Pakistan agreed to open five points along the LoC to facilitate meetings between long-divided families, trade, pilgrimage, and cultural interaction. These points are: Rawalakot–Poonch (November 7), Chakothi–Uri (November 9), Nauseri–Tithwal (November 10), Tattapani–Mendhar (November 15), and Hajipur– Uri (November 16). Technical-level talks to enhance further interaction and cooperation across the LoC, held in New Delhi on May 2–3, 2006, reviewed the operations of the Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus service (Bus for Peace) since it began in April 2005. The meeting also discussed ways to improve the slow and intricate application process for travel on the bus.58 This complicated application process

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has posed a major obstacle for travelers, who have to brace for long delays in the clearance of their applications. In addition, the Indian proposal to start trucking services to augment trade on the Srinagar–Muzaffarabad route was discussed in depth during those technical-level talks. The truck trade was eventually inaugurated—on the Uri–Muzaffarabad route on October 21, 2008, and on the Poonch–Rawalkot route on October 28. Twentyone types of commodities and goods were permitted, including grains, fresh fruit, vegetables, dried fruit, herbs and spices, carpets and rugs, herbal medicines, embroidered goods, and shawls. Transport Links With a view to facilitating the cross-border movement of people, India and Pakistan agreed to introduce more bus services. These included services that started on April 7, 2005, between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, between Poonch and Rawalakot on June 19, and between Amritsar and Nankana Sahib on January 20, 2006. Unfortunately, Pakistan has to date dragged its feet on starting the Kargil–Skardu and Mendhar–Mirpur services, perhaps because of the presence of terrorist outfits and training camps in those areas. In addition to bus services, the Delhi–Lahore train service resumed on July 11, 2003 (suspended in December 2001 following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament ), as did the Kokhrapar–Munabao train service on February 18, 2006 (defunct since Pakistani fighters bombed it during the 1965 war). The implementation of the Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus service was a watershed in Indo-Pak relations. Initially, the talks were stalled, owing to the modalities pertaining to travel documents, with Pakistan insisting on United Nations documents as the necessary travel papers and India on passports. Pakistan also demanded the bus service be confined only to Kashmiris, as opposed to India’s proposal to open it for all Indians.59 Eventually, in February 2005 in Islamabad, foreign ministers Natwar Singh of India and Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri of Pakistan signed an agreement overcoming the differences over travel documents and the domicile of passengers. The bus service was inaugurated on April 7, 2005, much to the displeasure of Pakistani political parties, such as the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PMLN), and Jamaat-e-Islami ( JI) which suspected it would dilute the “core” issue of Kashmir.60 On June 2, 2005, moderates belonging to the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in J&K, led by party chairman Mirwaiz Umar

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Farooq, boarded the bus to visit leaders in POK and Islamabad. The visit drew flak from United Jihad Council (UJC) leader Syed Salahuddin and hardliners in Srinagar. Mirwaiz reiterated his support for the initiative and criticized the hardliners on both sides saying: For fear of being labeled as treacherous should we sit at home and repeat the song of UN resolutions. One lakh (hundred thousand) people have already lost their lives. Should we wait for the sacrifices of another lakh people before we begin to look at the other possible ways to resolve the issue? There are people in Kashmir who considered talking to New Delhi as treachery. Now we are being told that even visiting Pakistan amounted to treachery. It is high-time the word treachery is redefined . . . [W]hen we return to Kashmir, we need to redefine certain things . . . certain words and phrases.61

Besides reuniting divided families, the Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus service is a testimony that India and Pakistan can compromise even on issues pertaining to J&K. It stands out as a symbol of India– Pakistan pragmatic thinking and of the courage of the people who defied terrorists. Press reports revealed that the names of those passengers who were boarding the inaugural service were leaked, and they were threatened with dire consequences by terrorist groups if they went ahead. The threats were vindicated when a bomb was hurled onto the bus on the eve of its departure, but even this failed to prevent the inaugural service. Disaster Management Jammu and Kashmir were hit by severe tremors on October 8, 2005, killing more than 80,000 people and causing an enormous loss of property,. Following the disaster, which was mostly in POK and Pakistan, the Indian prime minister spoke by phone to General Musharraf, assuring him of all necessary help in disaster relief. India announced assistance of $25 million in addition to providing relief supplies and materials. During his Islamabad visit on November 19, India’s Minister of State for External Affairs, Anand Sharma, announced his country’s resolve to undertake reconstruction projects in health and education sectors in quake-affected areas. India also sent more than 1,300 tons of relief goods from government and private sources, valued at $15.5 million. The five LoC points were utilized for sending relief goods to Pakistan. Overflight permission was granted to foreign aircrafts carrying relief materials

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to Pakistan, and Pakistani helicopters on relief missions were given permission to enter the “no-fly zone” close to the LoC. However, India’s offer to send helicopters into the region for relief operations was turned down by Pakistan, which stated that helicopters could only be flown by Pakistani pilots. New telephone lines were installed by the Indian government to enable people in J&K to speak to their relatives in POK and Pakistan.62 India’s emergency response to the disaster generated considerable goodwill in POK and became a source of confidence building for the future. Learning from this experience, the two sides have begun to discuss the feasibility of creating a joint disaster-management mechanism to deal with future natural calamities. The peace process resumed on February 25, 2010, after a fifteenmonth hiatus following the Mumbai attacks. But progress appeared unlikely due to political uncertainties in Pakistan and to India’s insistence to bring to justice the perpetrators of the attacks, notably JuD chief Hafeez Saeed. It is imperative and timely to explore how relations can be brought back on track and pending disputes be resolved. Subsequent chapters delve into past Indo-Pak negotiations to extract lessons that can possibly be replicated for facilitating conflict resolution between India and Pakistan in pending disputes.

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CHAPTER III

BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS: THE INDUS WATERS TREATY

T

he Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was a path-breaking project and negotiation success that materialized in 1960 after eight years of talks between India, Pakistan, and the World Bank. The treaty ended a simmering Indo-Pak dispute pertaining to the right of use of the rivers of the Indus system. The treaty not only specified the rights and privileges of India and Pakistan in regard to the sharing of river waters but also created a mechanism for conflict resolution in case of future disputes having to do with the rivers. The treaty’s success is due to the farsightedness of the negotiators who, while resolving the prevailing dispute, also anticipated problems that might arise in the future and provided the necessary provisions and mechanisms to address those problems. These mechanisms have since been invoked on several occasions to resolve differences between India and Pakistan on river water usage and sharing. The treaty contains several relevant lessons that deserve attention, since they may aid in resolving many of India and Pakistan’s present-day disputes. This chapter provides the dispute’s history since 1947. It recounts the history of the negotiations and illuminates key factors that have contributed to the success of those negotiations.

The Genesis of the Dispute and Initial Bilateral Negotiations Before independence in 1947 the dispute over the Indus waters was a domestic affair involving the provinces of Punjab and Sind. It only became an interstate dispute after British official Sir Cyril Radcliffe— chairman of the Boundary Commission responsible for drawing up the India and Pakistan borders—demarcated the land border in

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1947, drawing it across an intricate web of rivers. The 1,800-milelong Indus River originates north of the Kailash Mountain in the Himalayas and traverses more than 200 miles of Tibet before entering India from Ladakh. It then flows through Pakistan and into the Arabian Sea. The Indus River system consists of the Indus, which is the main river, and its five tributaries to the east—the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—and three to the west—the Kabul, Swat, and Kurram. The Indus River basin spans the Indian states of J&K, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Haryana and the Pakistani provinces of Punjab, Sind, and the North-West Frontier Provinces (NWFP).1 After the 1947 partition, fears emerged in Pakistan concerning two important irrigation headworks—at Madhopur on the Ravi River and at Ferozpur on the Sutlej River—that lay on the Indian side, and on which two irrigation canals in West Punjab were critically dependent. Pakistan feared that India might choose to cut off water flow to West Punjab (thereby strangulating it) for its own agricultural needs in Punjab and Rajasthan. Given the violent nature of partition, and the subsequent Indo-Pak war over Kashmir, Pakistan’s fears were understandable. As a result of the partition, and the division of Punjab, Pakistan ended up with 18 million acres of irrigated land for 22 million people in the Indus River system. India received 5 million acres for 20 million people. The eastern rivers—the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi—comprised only one-fifth of the water flow; this was insufficient to cater to the irrigational needs of the Indian Punjab. The two states of East and West Punjab signed an agreement on December 20, 1947, to maintain the status quo of the water-sharing arrangements on the Upper Bari Dab Canals (UBDC) at Ferozpur. A decision was also taken to reach an agreement on the Indus River waters before March 31, 1948, when the Standstill Agreement (signed on December 30, 1947) expired. When no agreement could be reached before the stipulated date, India stopped the flow of water from the UBDC to the Central Bari Doab Canals (CBDC) on April 1, asserting its legal rights. This decision dried up the irrigation canals near Lahore.2 Eventually, an agreement between the two Punjabs was reached on April 18, in Simla, to restore the status quo ante in water supplies to the CBDC until September 30, except for some minor channels across East Punjab and West Punjab. Another agreement, which was to last until October 15, pertained to water supplies from the Ferozpur headworks in India to the non-perennial Dipalpur canal

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and to the other West Punjab and Bahawalpur canals on the Sutlej. In May 1948, an interim Dominion conference was held in Delhi to look into the arrangements and an agreement was reached between East and West Punjab on May 4, 1948. The agreement mandated that India would resume water supplies on certain conditions (without specifying those conditions) and Pakistan would develop, in due course, alternative resources for water supplied by the eastern rivers, which belonged to India.3 Strangely, no agreement was reached to make arrangements for when the October 15, 1948, deadline lapsed. Moreover, in contravention of the April 1948 agreement, Pakistan did not take concrete steps to find alternative resources for the water supplied by the eastern rivers. Nonetheless, India agreed to continue the supply till the kharif (growing) season in 1949. This, however, failed to dissuade Pakistan from making another claim based on international law related to the rights of lower riparian, prior appropriation, and equitable distribution.4 For its part, India preferred that Pakistan undertake development programs to meet Pakistani water needs rather than have the two nations become entangled in an international legal battle.5 In June 1949, Pakistan conveyed to India that Pakistan desired an equitable share of all waters common to India and Pakistan, and that both sides must negotiate an apportionment of the common waters. Failing this the issue would be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for settlement. Assuring Pakistan of the water supplies, India agreed to hold discussions at the Inter-Dominion Conference in August 1949. At the conference, a preliminary negotiation committee, consisting of representatives from both countries, was appointed to conduct discussions for the creation of a Joint Technical Commission.6 India also proposed the creation of an additional negotiating team of three members, to be nominated by both governments, to settle the terms of reference of the Joint Technical Commission. Unfortunately, none of these efforts succeeded in resolving the differences. In his letter dated August 23, 1950, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan refused to accept any diminution of Pakistan’s share of supplies from the eastern rivers and said that the agreement of May 4, 1948, had been imposed on Pakistan and was therefore unjustified. This agreement was declared void by the negotiation committee on the grounds that Pakistan had been forced under duress to accept it. As a way out of this impasse, India proposed setting up an ad hoc two-member tribunal, comprising one judge from each side to settle the issue. Pakistan, however, kept insisting on third-party mediation, which

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India rejected. Both sides were prescribing divergent approaches for resolution. Pakistan, owing to its lower-riparian status, continued to criticize India to muster domestic support in Pakistan whereas India insisted on keeping the water issue out of domestic politics and settling it through bilateral negotiations. Pakistan continued to clamor for third-party mediation and pushed to internationalize the issue at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the ICJ. India turned down the request for third-party mediation, stating that there was no precedent for river disputes to be referred to the ICJ and that the bilateral mode was the only plausible way forward. The stalemate continued until David Lilienthal visited the subcontinent in 1951.

The History of Trilateral Negotiations The dispute altered its course when the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), created in 1944 and also known as the World Bank, offered mediation to resolve the dispute. This action was largely inspired by David Acheson Lilienthal, the former head of the United States’ Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Lilienthal believed the dispute could be resolved because it was “a feasible engineering and business problem and not a religious or political problem,” and because the Indus River system had enough water for both India and Pakistan.7 Encouraged by Lilienthal’s views, Eugene Black, the president of the World Bank, wrote to the prime ministers of India and Pakistan urging them to approach the dispute from an engineering and a financial perspective rather than from a political perspective. On March 13, 1952, India and Pakistan decided that “neither side will take any action to diminish the supplies available to the other side for uses” until the World Bank finds a solution. Toward this end, a three-member working party comprising engineers—one each from India, Pakistan, and the World Bank—conducted a technical survey of the canals to collect relevant information. Following the completion of the survey, India and Pakistan submitted their respective plans on October 6, 1953. These plans were loaded with deep differences and demands for their future needs. The working party failed to resolve the differences and so urged the World Bank to submit its own plan. This was subsequently proposed in February 1954.8 The Bank’s proposal, taking into account the history of the dispute and past interactions, offered a practical engineering solution that was based on the concept of “no arbitrary compromise” and

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that respected the existing understanding between the two parties. Unfortunately, although accepted by India, the proposal was rejected by Pakistan.

New Controversies Additional complications emerged in the dispute after the Bhakra Nangal Project on the Sutlej became operational, on July 8, 1954, which, according to Pakistan, posed a “potential threat to peace.”9 However, on August 5, 1954, Pakistan conceded to consider the Bank’s plan as the starting point for negotiations, leading to a provisional agreement to maintain the supply of water. In the meantime, Pakistan went ahead with the construction of the Mangla Dam on the Jhelum canal regulators. India considered this action illegal and opposed it on the basis that the area was in Azad Kashmir—or POK—which was under the illegal occupation of Pakistan. The Indus waters dispute continued to persist and on three counts it further deepened after 1955. First, both sides adopted a more confrontationist attitude, reflected in Pakistan’s rejection of the Bank’s proposal and India’s acceptance of it.10 India approved of the proposal and the investments required, anticipating that the final settlement would give India exclusive rights over the use of the eastern rivers.11 A discontented Pakistan found the allocations unjust and questioned both India’s intentions and capacity to pay for the construction in cash. Second, Pakistan further raised its demands, asking India to pay not only for the construction of the link canals and reservoirs, but also to be assured that any objections it raised in the future to Indian developmental schemes, would be addressed by India.12 And third, India was skeptical of Pakistan’s intentions, fearing Pakistan might derail the proposal at some stage by invoking its lower riparian rights.13 India, in spite of its upper riparian and advantageous position, had begun looking at the dispute as a humanitarian problem, and was disappointed at Pakistani accusations that India was trying to turn Pakistan into a desert or a dust bowl.14

Signs of Hope In such a confrontationist atmosphere two factors kept the hopes of the resolution afloat—the continued involvement of the Bank in the process15 and growing skepticism within Pakistan over the government’s continued opposition to the Bank’s February plan.16 On

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May 21, 1956, the World Bank made a significant step toward accommodating Pakistan’s objections to the Bank’s proposal by publishing the Aide Memoire.17 This document specified that India not only bear the cost of link canals, but also apportion the cost of the “replacement facility” for increased storage on the western rivers (the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab). The cost was to be determined in proportion to the amount of water India would be entitled to withdraw from the western rivers for nondevelopmental purposes. In addition, it stipulated that India continue the water supplies specified by the ad hoc agreements. Although it meant there would be an added financial burden, India nonetheless accepted the terms, conveying its decision on June 18, 1956.18 During this time, new developments and demands emerged that threatened to vitiate the progress being made in the negotiations. India demanded a quick payment of rupees (Rs.), 114 lakhs (approximately $ 2.4 million) for the continuation of water supplies, the nonpayment of which would be a violation of the 1948 agreement, under which India agreed to continue water supplies.19 In response, Pakistan charged India with delaying the supply from the Sutlej for the non-perennial canals in West Pakistan. This statement was challenged by India.20 It was in this contentious atmosphere, in the summer of 1957, that the vice president of the World Bank, W.B. Iliff, visited the subcontinent to expand upon the principles of the “division of the rivers” to resolve the dispute. The efforts of the vice president evoked little interest from either side, and India, becoming frustrated over the continued deadlock, moved to clarify its position: First, it would not wait indefinitely for a settlement.21 Second, it would be free from April 1957 onward (after the transitional agreement with Pakistan terminated in March) to make additional withdrawals from the Bhakra canals.22 Third, Pakistan must construct link canals to replace nearly half the water that it has previously received from the eastern rivers and will not be entitled to in the future. And last, India would exercise the right, conceded by the Bank, to utilize the entire waters of the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej for its own needs after 1962.23 This firm Indian stand made a considerable impact on Pakistan, spurring it to accept the Bank’s proposal on August 2, 1957, although Pakistan’s Prime Minister Husain Suhrawardy was allegedly agitated by India’s tough posture. A press report said, “He (Suhrawardy) wanted that, like the Kashmir issue, the canal waters issue might also come up one day before the Security Council or the General

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Assembly. Therefore, it was absolutely necessary to secure the sympathies of the nations of the world. Otherwise, Pakistan’s continued existence would be in jeopardy. . . . Suhrawardy declared that he would lay down his life but would not let Pakistan be starved for want of sufficient water in the canals.”24 On October 5, 1957, a Pakistani spokesman said that the World Bank had modified its 1954 proposals, which were now accepted by Pakistan, and if these were dismissed by India the prospects of a solution would receive a major setback.25 Pakistan’s conciliatory posture encouraged the World Bank to push for an ad hoc agreement and in November 1957 talks, involving L. Bengston, Sir K. Guinness, and J. Connors from the Bank, were initiated. The trilateral talks between India and Pakistan, under the auspices of the World Bank, began in New Delhi on November 28, 1957. They soon failed when Pakistan insisted that India pay for the operation of the link canals.26 Pakistan was also disseminating political propaganda for arbitration, in order to secure its interests if the negotiations were to fail. Later, on December 30, 1957, India clarified that while minor points of disagreement could be settled by arbitration, once the agreement was reached on the essential features of the Bank’s proposal, arbitration on the canal waters dispute as a whole was not acceptable to India. The continuing controversy over signing the ad hoc agreement underlined the urgency on all sides to carve the best possible terms. Pakistan had begun to sense that it would be worse off in the face of a failure by the Bank to mediate a solution. On April 24 and May 14, 1958, India and Pakistan, represented by Niranjan Das Gulhati and G. Mueenuddin respectively, had held talks in Rome that failed to achieve anything substantial. At the same time, back on the subcontinent, a new controversy was making news: Pakistan charged India with withholding the water of the canals and issuing an ultimatum threatening the unilateral withdrawal of Pakistan’s share of supplies after 1962.27 These charges were dismissed by India as alarmist.28 A series of correspondences between prime ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Feroz Khan Noon followed, in an attempt to allay Pakistan’s fears and iron out differences.29 Nehru, in his letter of June 5, 1958, to Eugene Black, reiterated India’s desire to settle the dispute before 1962 and assured that S.K. Patil’s (Minister for Irrigation and Power) earlier statement in the Parliament was not be taken as an ultimatum but as a statement of policy.30 India also suggested that engineers from Pakistan and India conduct a survey of the flow of water in the Sutlej and Beas rivers to

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establish the facts and build confidence, an idea that Pakistan readily accepted.31 Nonetheless, Pakistan reiterated that the deadline of 1962 was an ultimatum served by India and on September 4, 1958, Prime Minister Noon declared in the National Assembly that Pakistan had informed the United Nations that the agreement of May 4, 1948, had been signed by representatives (“Muslim Leaguers”) under duress, and as such Pakistan was repudiating it.32 Simultaneously, Pakistan sought to garner international legal opinion in order to build a case against India taking a larger share of the Indus waters.33

A Twist in the Political Climate In October 1958, in a major turn of events, martial law was imposed in Pakistan by General Ayub Khan, intensifying the confrontation. Ayub Khan adopted an uncompromising attitude toward India. Soon after coming to power, Ayub Khan pinned his hopes of resolving the dispute on Pakistan’s terms in the Washington talks of December 2, 1958, in which India rejected Pakistan’s suggested plan to build two major storage facilities and three smaller dams on the Indus and Jhelum rivers, and instead proposed the diversion of waters from the Chenab River to meet Pakistan’s needs. Pakistan, however, contended such a diversion of waters would make it more dependent on India. Seeing no headway was possible, the Bank offered to draw up its own proposals and asked India and Pakistan to embrace them. Anticipating a potential breakthrough, India and Pakistan signed an interim agreement in Washington on April 17, 1959, agreeing to share the canal waters for the period beginning April 1, 1959, until March 31, 1960.34 The signatories included Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, and N.D. Gulhati, the additional secretary, Government of India (hereafter referred to as GOI). The agreement provided for additional withdrawals of waters (3.5 million acre-feet) by India from the three eastern rivers during the stipulated period. In a separate but significant development, tensions between India and China were building in 1959 because of Chinese claims to Indian territory. In light of these developments, Pakistan expected India to seek a compromise with Pakistan in order to at least gain some tranquility on India’s western front. Interestingly, the possibility of a military conflict between India and China seemed so likely that Ayub Khan made the offer of a “joint India-Pakistan defence” of the subcontinent.

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It is important to highlight that, apart from the reservations on both sides, the enormous financial obligation involved in the construction of new canals posed a major challenge that neither India not Pakistan were in a position to afford. The Bank now had to find source countries that could fund such a project.35 On the negotiation front, after another round of talks in London, Eugene Black informed India and Pakistan on May 18, 1959, of the Bank’s efforts to get financial aid from friendly governments. “Money alone will not solve the difficulty but without money it cannot be solved,” he said.36 Pakistan expected aid from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the United States for the construction of canals.37 Remarkably, under Ayub Khan, a sense of urgency became evident to settle the lingering diplomatic differences and arrange funds for construction with the Bank’s support. When the World Bank unfurled its compromise plan in this positive climate, it was accepted readily by both India and Pakistan. The plan was an improved version of the Bank’s 1954 proposal and the 1956 Aide Memoire. The plan accommodated most of Pakistan’s demands, including ensuring that the replacement works were located on its territory and that India continued the supply of water until 1972. The estimated cost of construction was £350 million (approximately $125 million) with Pakistan’s share about £125 million (approximately $45 million). The Bank assured India that it would receive the requisite financial help to allow it to undertake construction of the storage areas on the Beas River to fulfill the requirements of Rajasthan. There would also be sufficient funding to allow for the construction of other new Indian canals that would be ready to withdraw water well before the transition period expired.38 To facilitate the Indus basin water supply, Pakistan created the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) on June 1, 1959. The Bank set up the Indus Valley Fund into which all financial contributions from the donor countries were to be deposited. The Indian press attributed the plan’s success to India, saying, “Advance has been made possible to a great extent by the anxiety of India to secure a settlement of this vexed dispute, even if it meant giving away something more and taking much less.”39 A conciliatory Pakistan, too, appeared predisposed to narrow down its differences with India and appreciated India’s willingness to settle the dispute. The Pakistani Finance Minister Amjad Ali said on August 3, 1959, that there seemed to be a desire, which had been lacking in the past, in New Delhi to move toward a settlement.40 Notably, Pakistan had also discarded its stated policy of insisting on the settlement of the

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Kashmir dispute before taking up other issues, and the Pakistani press, while appreciating Pakistan’s role, underlined that success was achieved primarily due to the Bank’s connections in securing financial assistance from the donor countries.

Toward the Agreement India and Pakistan signed an interim treaty covering a five-year period. The interim treaty was designed to last until the final provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty to regulate water supplies to Pakistan were finalized.41 In the run-up to the final agreement, Pakistan raised objections in the Washington talks, held on October 9, 1959, on India’s use of the Chenab waters in J&K, which Pakistan considered disputed territory. Pakistan expressed its concern that any concession to India on this point would prejudice Pakistan’s interest in Kashmir. Eventually, on the Bank’s request, Pakistan dropped the objection, but later, in another demand, asked for more water supplies from India over the next ten-year period. This demand abruptly stalled further negotiations.42 Hectic diplomatic parleys—involving Mohammad Shoib (the finance minister of Pakistan), W.A.B. Iliff, K. Guinness, and Irwin Lorber—ensued, but no breakthrough could be achieved. Finally, Jawaharlal Nehru intervened and gave the final push for settlement. On September 4, 1960, Ayub Khan, in appreciation of Nehru’s timely role, said, “The solution was not ideal but it is the best we could get under the circumstances many of which, irrespective of the merits of the case, are against us.”43 Hinting at a possible backlash against Pakistan’s compromising stand on Kashmir he nonetheless counted the positive aspects and said, “The very fact that we will have to be content with the waters of three Western rivers will underline the importance of having physical control on the upper reaches of these rivers to secure their maximum utilization for the ever growing needs of West Pakistan.”44 A comprehensive treaty was signed by P. Jawaharlal Nehru, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and W.A.B. Iliff, on September 19, 1960, in Karachi. In addition, Pakistan, the World Bank, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Germany signed a separate agreement to create the $900 million Indus Basin Development Fund to which India agreed to contribute £62.06 million (approximately $22 million) and Pakistan £10.29 million.45 Pakistan also signed an agreement with the Bank for a loan

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of an additional $90 million. Indian President Dr. Rajendra Prasad signed the instrument of ratification on December 28, 1960, and Field Marshal Ayub Khan a day before. The two instruments were exchanged between N.D. Gulhati and G. Mueenuddin on January 11, 1961, in New Delhi.

Key Elements of the Indus Waters Treaty The Indus Waters Treaty, spanning 102 pages, consisted of 79 paragraphs, 12 articles, and eight detailed annexures. It allotted the waters of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab to Pakistan for its consumptive use, except for uses essential to India where those rivers flowed through that country, and the waters of the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej to India except for a transition period of ten years between April 1, 1960, and March 31, 1970, with a possible extension of up to a maximum of thirteen years, during which Pakistan would construct the replacement works.46 Article I defined various terms of reference in the treaty; Article II and III specified exclusive provisions regarding the eastern and western rivers respectively; Article IV specified the provisions of the eastern and western rivers combined; Article V laid down the financial provisions in the treaty; Article VI specified the type of data to be exchanged on the flow and usage of waters; Article VII envisaged instruments of future cooperation; Article VIII mandated the creation of the Permanent Indus Commission; Article IX contained provisions for the settlement of differences and disputes; Article X laid down provisions for emergency situations; Article XI mentioned the general provisions pertaining to the rights and obligations of the parties; and Article XII contained the final provisions pertaining to the final ratification and enforcement of the treaty. Under the Indus Waters Treaty, India committed to contribute £62,062,000 (approximately $22 million) for the construction of the replacement works in Pakistan, and the latter in return committed to compensate India for the water supplies during the transition period and for the use of India’s facilities during that period.47 In India, the treaty was regarded as the culmination of a healthy process of realistic reappraisal of India and Pakistan relations. 48 One major irritant had been solved satisfactorily and it was expected that the resolution would play a role in convincing Pakistan of India’s peace with partition. The treaty also enabled both India

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and Pakistan to develop their agricultural plans and hydroelectric projects—within the confines of the treaty provisions—independent of interference and objections. Further, the treaty did not set any precedent for other disputes. This, in the end, proved one of the elements critical to the eventual realization of the agreement. Both sides had agreed to neutralize the Kashmir factor—or the linkage of the Kashmir dispute with the resolution of other pending disputes— and they focused on the resolution of the Indus waters dispute without any prejudice whatsoever. Some in India saw the treaty as a loss since it curtailed India’s rights on the western rivers and also burdened India with the cost of Rs. 83 crores (1 crore = 10 million), equivalent to $174.3 million at the time, for the replacement works in Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan had reasons to be satisfied with the treaty. Pakistan attained complete independence from Indian interference with Pakistan’s vital irrigation needs, and the replacement works facilitated the interlinking of Pakistani rivers for maximum and efficient utilization of the water resources. Now Pakistan could implement flood-control measures through the Mangla and Tarbela dams and develop new hydroelectric projects. The Sutlej River could now expect more water during the transition period and the tube wells and drainage schemes could help the reclamation of waterlogged areas. It became feasible to develop more irrigation systems west of the Indus and, while India continued the water supply, in the Chenab River as well. Pakistan was entitled to approximately 110million acre-feet of water as opposed to the 74.5-million acre-feet previously.49 However, Pakistan was now dependent on the western rivers for its consumptive needs, and the transfer of waters through the newly built link canals to areas receiving waters from the eastern rivers was subject to the problems of sedimentation and flooding. Sedimentation was bound to limit the life of proposed storage facilities and the newly constructed link canals faced the dangers of floods. Also, the treaty meant that Pakistan had to be content with the three western rivers and bear the strain on its economy that was necessary in order to support the construction works. However, on the whole, Pakistan was pleased with the arrangements of the treaty and considered itself in a much better position than before. The treaty—which brought both gains and losses for each side—materialized the mediation of the World Bank. The India-China tension in the late 1950s, the United States’ interest in the successful resolution of the dispute, and the invaluable financial assistance of donor nations also had a significant bearing on the outcome.

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Analysis of the Negotiations The Indus Waters Treaty is considered a fascinating example of an agreement being reached after protracted negotiations between two enduring rivals. This makes it an interesting case study from which to draw lessons for future negotiations. The treaty is also one of the few instances of a successful settlement of a major international river-basin conflict. The following lessons could be relevant to the on-going Indo-Pak negotiations on pending disputes.

Ripeness Of all the major disputes between India and Pakistan, the Indus waters dispute is a rarity because both countries were keen to reach a settlement. During the course of negotiations there were instances of one or the other party seeking to delay the settlement, but these delaying tactics were ploys to secure better terms. The tactics were not aimed at undermining the desire for a settlement. Gulhati observed that the predominant perception in London and Washington was reportedly: “India and Pakistan can go on shouting on Kashmir for all time to come but an early settlement on the Indus waters is essential for the maintenance of peace in the subcontinent.”50 This feeling, which prevailed among the senior officials in the United States and the United Kingdom, was undoubtedly a vital factor in ripening the issue and influencing the World Bank, India, and Pakistan to seek resolution. After the Treaty was signed, Ayub Khan said, “We had no alternative but to make a genuine and determined effort to assist the International Bank to find an engineering solution of this grave problem which imperiled the relations between the two countries, a solution with which we could live and which would provide financial and technical resources to enable us to take waters of the western rivers to feed our canals taking off from the eastern rivers which would become dry ditches after their water had been taken away by India.”51 The statement indicates that there was a perception on both sides of the desirability of an accord. Initially, India and Pakistan negotiated bilaterally to devise mechanisms for the supply of water to Pakistan, but these negotiations did not produce long-term or permanent arrangements. The sharing of the rivers was a complicated issue since it required not only political will but also technical expertise and financial assistance. India’s role, in particular, in making the

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issue ripe for settlement, needs to be illuminated. Despite the political ill will in the 1950s, following the first Kashmir war of 1947–48, India approached Indo-Pak problems from a humanitarian perspective rather than a political one. Prime Minister Nehru emphasized the need for both sides to adopt such an approach after studying the history of the region, particularly the history of the Indus River basin where the population has been dependent on these rivers for centuries. It should be noted that despite India’s own agricultural and electricity needs, it sought to reach an equitable solution, making a display of exemplary understanding of its adversary’s needs and constraints. Such understanding is a crucial prerequisite for conflict resolution. India’s accommodating approach not only helped to ripen the issue, but facilitated progress during the entire negotiation process. The decision to contribute Rs. 83 crores toward the construction of the replacement works in Pakistan is a testimony to India’s constructive approach to the dispute. Another factor that was equally relevant must be taken into account. This was the role of the political leadership and the climate in both countries in ripening the dispute. India was politically stable under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, but during the early to mid 1950s Pakistan was politically divided, governed by a military bureaucratic oligarchy. There was no constitution in place and the Muslim League (the only party that had some political sway across Pakistan) was seen as incapable of settling any dispute to secure Pakistan’s interests. In fact, Pakistani Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon had blamed the “Muslim Leaguers” for signing the agreement of 1948 under duress and against the interests of Pakistan. This division in the political leadership hampered the growth of the strong political will that was required to make the tough decisions necessary to settle the dispute. Immediately following its creation, Pakistan was beset with political turmoil, which lasted through the regimes of Liaquat Ali Khan (1948–51), Khwaja Nazimuddin (1951–53), Mohammad Ali Bogra (1953–55), Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, H.S. Suhrawardy, Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar, and Feroz Khan Noon (1955–58). Gulhati has noted that the candid, reasonable Indian delegation was assured of its government’s backing, which impressed the Bank, but, owing to weak leadership and an unstable government, Pakistan induced little confidence in its negotiators. Sometimes, due either to government instructions or the lack of them, or perhaps because of the outsourcing of negotiations to

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foreign consultants, engineers, and lawyers, the decision making was quite difficult.52 During this period, Pakistan also suggested a settlement through the ICJ; a suggestion that India rejected. Pakistan was thought to be less interested in a negotiated settlement, believing that it might be accorded a better deal by the ICJ. However, when the Bank intervened in 1951 and discussed the plan with both sides, India and Pakistan agreed, after initial reluctance, to follow the Bank’s suggested course. Thus, from 1951 onward, there was a shared understanding of the resolution mechanism and the Bank was accepted as a bonafide mediator. The necessary political will emerged in Pakistan after the 1958 coup. President Ayub Khan took a keen interest in the issue and pushed his negotiating team to seek a settlement. Pakistan was now much more politically stable and the final decision making rested solely with Ayub Khan who, within a short span of time, had developed a good understanding with Jawaharlal Nehru. As a result, negotiations proceeded more rapidly after 1958 and within a year reached their culmination. From May 1959 onward, the treaty took close to fifteen months to complete. In summary, the desire on both sides for a settlement, the mutually agreed upon role of the Bank as mediator, the strength of the political leadership, and India’s willingness to view the dispute as a humanitarian problem induced the requisite ripeness for settlement.

Prenegotiation Since 1948, India and Pakistan had held talks to put in place shortterm arrangements for the flow and usage of river waters in the Indus basin, but they had been unsuccessful in reaching any longterm agreement. Fears in Pakistan that the water supply would be discontinued at the end of the short-term arrangement were not completely unfounded, and it would be unfair to say that India was not concerned with such fears at all. Technical difficulties and the financial demands necessary to reach a settlement were so great that neither of the sides could independently undertake the task. When Lilienthal visited India and Pakistan in 1951 and discussed the possibility of reaching a resolution by employing modern engineering skills to the benefit of both countries, the mood in political circles and the public began to change. Lilienthal observed, “Rivers pay no attention to partitions; the Indus just keeps rolling along through Kashmir and India and Pakistan . . .” He believed that by developing

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the full potential of the Indus River system the Kashmir problem could be muted, if not resolved.53 Although Pakistan did not approve of muting the Kashmir dispute, Lilienthal was nonetheless successful in underlining the larger benefits that a settlement would accrue to Indo-Pak ties. His suggestions that India and Pakistan should jointly administer a comprehensive plan, financed by the World Bank, evoked considerable interest in both New Delhi and Karachi. Encouraged by this positive response, Eugene Black initiated the process. It should be mentioned that although both sides were receptive of Lilienthal’s ideas, they nonetheless had some initial reservations. This necessitated a preliminary round of correspondences and discussions to clarify the facts and their concerns. These discussions involved Eugene Black, David Lilienthal, and representatives of India and Pakistan. Black also visited New Delhi on February 11, 1952, to discuss the matter with Prime Minister Nehru and later visited Karachi to meet with Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin. In his letter of March 13, 1952, Black mentions the outcome of his meetings: . . . I am happy to say that I have found common understanding as to the base on which we can go forward under the Lilienthal proposal. We all agree that the function of the working party is to work out, and the ultimate objective is to carry out specific engineering measures by which the supplies effectively available to each country will be increased substantially beyond what they have ever been. It should be understood that the three main principles set forth in my letter of November 8, 1951, provide the broad basis on which the engineers will meet but are not intended as rigidly fixed terms of reference. Within the broad outline of the basic framework the engineers should be free to put forward or consider proposals in pursuance of the general objective.54

Following this visit, India and Pakistan brought together a team of engineers for talks and consultations and endorsed the role of the World Bank as a “good officer.” Thus, by March 1952, in the formative phase, the World Bank succeeded in bringing India and Pakistan on board for negotiations and the Working Party was formed, comprising A.N. Khosla and J.K. Malhotra, from the Indian side, and Mohammad Abdul Hamid and four senior engineers, from Pakistan. The Working Party conducted its first meeting in May 1952, in Washington.

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The initial meetings of the Working Party were not smooth as both sides understandably adopted a cautious approach, presenting thorough pre-written statements. The meetings faced frequent adjournments during which Raymond Wheeler, the Bank’s representative, carried out the role of the “good officer” with neutrality and enormous good humor, keeping the dialogue going by sharing amusing stories and anecdotes.55 The patient, calm approach of the Indian and Pakistani representatives was notable. Despite the breakdowns in talks, legal hurdles, and technical bottlenecks during this early phase, they continued with the discussions, knowing that the final settlement was not yet anywhere in sight. In this preliminary stage, well before the broad base of formal negotiations began, India and Pakistan entrusted the Working Party to formulate a basic negotiation framework and determine the future course of negotiations as suggested by the World Bank. In technical parlance, the period between February 1951 (when Lilienthal visited India) and March 1952 (when the formal negotiations started) featured India, Pakistan, and the World Bank defining the problem, developing a commitment to negotiation, and arranging the negotiations. These actions are all a part of prenegotiation— which was defined in chapter 1—involving the creation of a political commitment to solve the problem and crystallizing the search for a concrete agreement.56 As discussed in chapter I, Zartman and Berman identify this phase as the diagnostic stage, in which the parties negotiate long before the first formal negotiations begin. Zartman and Berman admit that the limits of this phase are blurred and such prenegotiations continue until each party perceives that the other is serious about finding a negotiated solution.57 Kriesberg and his colleagues suggest that this stage involves conflict transformation, which is a critical element of the prenegotiation phase. During this phase, besides other redefining and exploratory approaches, parties consider a potential third-party role (in this case the World Bank’s role).58 In other words, during this prenegotiation phase, India and Pakistan moved from considering conflicting unilateral solutions toward a mutually agreed solution.

Negotiation The basic element of success in the negotiations was the decision to stick to a pragmatic, rational approach rather than a political one. The March 1952 statement of understanding, based on which the

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negotiations were initiated, proposed: “The water resources of the Indus basin should be cooperatively developed and used in such a manner as most effectively to promote the economic development of the Indus basin viewed as a unit . . . , the problem of development and use of these waters should be solved on a functional and not a political plane . . . independently of political issues.”59 In a departure from the past interstate water disputes in the United States and in India, in the Indus Waters negotiations codified laws, legal principles, and procedures were replaced by the principles of water resources development, irrigational engineering, and economic considerations. The principal negotiators representing India and Pakistan consisted of neither professional diplomats nor political leaders but engineers and administrators of the permanent services. The World Bank, too, assigned a team of its top engineers and senior management officials for the task. The Indus diplomacy did not resemble the old stylized diplomacy or the “gold-fish bowl” kind, and there was no mass audience to address, and no desire for polemics or political rhetoric. The conduct of the negotiators was highly professional; they did not distort or manipulate views or opinions and they backed their measures and claims with facts and figures.60 A second factor that contributed to the success of the negotiations was that despite being pragmatic, both sides observed caution and closely safeguarded their own interests. The Working Party had assured both sides that their legal rights would not be compromised in any manner. The Working Party dealt with the technicalities of the dispute while the discussions were carefully overseen by the respective lawyers, ensuring that neither side’s interests were compromised.61 Both parties were therefore convinced that the negotiations were being carried out by capable and responsible negotiators who would try their best to get an ideal solution. Importantly, during the talks both sides concurred that they would secure an agreement that at least some part of the construction work would be done jointly.62 In conflict-resolution theory, making such an agreement is considered prudent. The parties work together to seek solution on a tractable part of the problem, helping build a cooperative mindset and increasing their chances of success when they proceed to seemingly intractable aspects of the dispute. Third, the negotiators who represented India, Pakistan, and the Bank possessed thorough knowledge of the subject matter and had immense mutual understanding and respect. Their long-drawn experience and conscious effort to avoid undue publicity enabled them to

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overcome occasional frustrations. They were not overwhelmed by public opinion, enjoyed the trust and confidence of their leaders, and had considerable autonomy of action and decision making. In short, while critical decisions were taken at the political level, the protracted and complex negotiations were conducted by experienced, knowledgeable teams of professionals and engineers. Fourth, the third party took a key role, around which the entire negotiation process revolved. Jagat Mehta, the former Indian foreign secretary and the lead negotiator in the Salal Dam project, while critical of the Bank’s initial approach, endorsed its mediation as key to the success of the negotiations. He observed, “The World Bank, in coming forward with its mediating position gave up the optimal solution too readily. It could have canvassed its own proposal based on the Lilienthal approach more strongly with the political leadership.”63 He nonetheless said that the success in hammering out the agreement was due to the skill and ability of the World Bank team and the financial leverage to underwrite the agreement was crucial.64 The Bank was able to commit one billion dollars for the replacement canals, an important consideration for Pakistan. World Bank official W.A.B Iliff has emphasized time and again that the settlement of the Indus problem would not have been possible except with a large block of external financial assistance thrown in.65 Over a period of ten years after the agreement, $1 billion was spent on comprehensive developmental and replacement works comprising the following contributions: Pakistan: India: World Bank: United States: United Kingdom: Canada: New Zealand: Australia: West Germany:

Rs. 70 crores ($147 million) Rs. 83 crores ($174.3 million) $103 million $235 million £20.86 million ($58.48 million) Can$22.1 million ($US22.19 million) NZ$1 million ($US2.78 million) A$6,964,286 ($US15.54 million) DM 126 million ($US30.21 million)

The United States also contributed a further $177 million in grants and $103 million in loans, while Pakistan contributed $870 million in total, and India $200 million.66 It is important to see the role of the Bank as more than that of a mere financial guarantor. It must not be overlooked that the Bank did not carry any political weight or

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interests and was therefore acceptable to both sides as a mediator. Its high standing was instrumental in convincing the donor nations to contribute to the Fund. N.D. Gulhati commented: That the World Bank had no political axe to grind was certainly a major consideration with the parties in accepting its good offices . . . as an international organization forbidden by its statutes from being influenced by political considerations, with India and Pakistan as its members and possessing expertise in technical and engineering problems, the World Bank represented a happy way out of the stalemate into which the two sides had landed themselves after five years of prior bilateral negotiations. The Bank was in no way an unconcerned third party but an agency of both Governments (and of others) constitutionally committed to the welfare and economic development of the contending nations.67

The mediator must be impartial, which the Bank was, but nonetheless it had a complicated task to perform. While a mediator must be an impartial judge, unlike a judge the Bank had to stay close to the parties, taking on the function of a good listener and not becoming upset when its advice was disregarded or rejected. The Bank, in Gulhati’s opinion, was careful not to sit in judgment on the respective attitudes adopted or actions taken by the parties; it avoided apportioning blame to one side or the other. As an unbiased mediator, the Bank, in all its statements and communications treated the parties equally.68 Jagat Mehta referred to it as a “quasi-imperial” third party.69 Apart from being an impartial, patient, and persuasive mediator, the Bank also politely adopted tough postures in the interests of the negotiations and threatened to pull out if its independent proposals were overlooked. This threat worked on Pakistan, which, being the lower riparian, needed the Bank to be involved. India, too, was keen to keep the Bank in the loop for want of a second five-year plan, which required substantial economic aid that the World Bank could arrange. Fifth, the venue of the negotiations was an important factor in achieving the final outcome. The final stages of negotiations were held in Rome, London, and Washington—away from the influences of New Delhi and Karachi. Most of the talks were held at the World Bank headquarters in Washington. Negotiating in these neutral venues, away from distractions at home, enabled the negotiators to pay full attention to the tasks at hand and saved them from the daily reporting to their governments. Therefore, unless the governments

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themselves deliberately resorted to polemics, not much public debate ensued, since the negotiators were inaccessible to the national medias. The minimal influence of the media on the critical phases of the negotiations facilitated the progress of talks. A sixth factor that helped in the prenegotiation and negotiation phases was the political stability in both countries during the period in which decision making by the top leadership was crucial. During the thirteen years (1947−60) of the dispute India had a stable government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Pakistan had achieved a similar stability from 1958 onward under the regime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. Under Ayub Khan, Pakistan had the necessary strength of leadership during the critical periods of the negotiations. Seventh, India’s decision to be accommodative beyond the requirements of international law was vital to the success of the negotiations. At a time when international law pertaining to the use of interstate river water was underdeveloped, India, the upper riparian, took an accommodative approach that set an exemplary precedent and was significant in settling the dispute. There was no international authority that could have intervened—with binding authority—to resolve disputes of such nature or make the “customary” international law mandatory. Hans Kelsen comments, “That there is no rule referring to a case can only mean that there is no rule imposing upon a state . . . the obligation to behave in this case in a certain way. He who assumes that in such a case the existing law cannot be applied, ignores the fundamental principle that what is not legally forbidden to the subject of law, is legally permitted to them . . .”70 In the matter of diversion of international rivers, an upper-riparian state is not obliged under international law to cater to the needs of the lower-riparian states, but the matter can be voluntarily conferred. Despite no legal directives to do so, states enter into legal treaties driven by political compulsions, good neighborliness, humanitarian considerations, or international comity. Although customary international law is not redundant and states are entitled by that law to accept limitations on their freedom of action, still there is no authority to impose this application.71 As per the customary rule of international law, a state has exclusive jurisdiction and control over the waters of international rivers traversing its territory. For political, economic, and humanitarian reasons, states do not strictly follow this rule. While securing their own interests,

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states have also accommodated the interests of the lower-riparian states by signing treaties governing and regulating their respective rights.72 Despite its upper-riparian rights, India did not exploit the Indus waters to compensate for the loss of fertile lands in the partition. Indian leaders did not take refuge in legal subtleties and rigid or juristic thinking, but viewed the problem from a humanitarian perspective. It was reasoned that by employing modern engineering techniques both countries could maximize the use of waters that would otherwise drain into the Arabian Sea.73 India’s decision to forego consumptive use of the western rivers—the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab; to make a contribution of Rs. 83 crores toward replacement works in Pakistan, straining its own developing economy; and to continue the supply of water during the transition period, even after the agreement was signed, stands out as a display of passionate neighborly conduct, conduct that with the passage of time has been forgotten in Islamabad. In the Indian Parliament there were bitter critics of Jawaharlal Nehru who felt that India had conceded too much. They felt that even if the two sides had been on an equitable footing, India would have been entitled to far more than it received in the end.74 Last, and significantly, both parties—Pakistan in particular—had agreed to delink the dispute from the resolution of Kashmir. The treaty itself, however, dealt with the water problem in isolation and a provision was made in Article XI to the effect that the water settlement would not constitute any recognition or waiver of any rights or claims whatsoever other than those expressly recognized or framed in the treaty. It was pertinent that the Indus dispute was divorced from the intricate legalities and politics of the Kashmir question. The elimination of one complicated item from the list of impediments facilitated a realistic appraisal of the other issues. The spirit of compromise displayed in regard to this problem, it was hoped, would eventually permeate the consideration of other issues.75 In the ongoing peace process, negotiations would benefit enormously if both parties acknowledged that all issues must be discussed exclusively on their merits, independent of any linkage with the Kashmir dispute. It would be ironic and self-defeating to find the establishment of eight different baskets of dispute being constituted for parallel talks and yet all being linked to the basket of “Kashmir.” The Indus Waters Treaty certainly has a lot to teach to the present leadership and decision makers in India and Pakistan.

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Agreement Given that the three western rivers—the Indus, the Jhelum, and the Chenab—all flow through J&K, the Kashmir dispute was bound to have some bearing on the negotiations. It is therefore no surprise that it did often figure during the negotiations and on several occasions led to stalemates and political acrimony. But realism and pragmatism ultimately won out over sentimentalism, and the Indus Waters negotiations successfully bypassed the Kashmir dispute. Gulhati writes that because of the deep mistrust and suspicion that mark the IndoPak relationship, the Indus Treaty was written with extreme care and foresight, so that its implementation did not face any major difficulty and the treaty withstood the test of time.76 Although not every negotiation necessarily ends in an agreement, this particular one did. Agreements were reached on almost all the outstanding issues, and provisions were made to deal with problems that might arise from its interpretation and application. The Indus Waters Treaty is a testimony to the farsightedness of the Bank and the two parties in including provisions to deal with disputes that might emerge from interpretation of the treaty or from use of the Indus rivers. The treaty laid down specifications in Article VIII not only for future cooperation but also for dispute resolution. Toward this end, provision for a Permanent Indus Commission was included in Article VIII (i). This commission has played an important role in addressing disputes such as the Baghliar dispute and the Tulbul/ Wular barrage dispute. While the latter dispute is still under negotiation (as is discussed in chapter VII), Baghliar was settled through a neutral expert as prescribed in by the treaty. The Permanent Indus Commission has already met more than a hundred times in the past fifty years to deal with disputes and differences that have surfaced over water sharing. It is laudable that the treaty was insulated from any backlash during the 1965, 1971, and 1999 wars, although there was speculation that India might abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty as a punitive measure following the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. But these fears were found to be baseless. Over the years there has been a substantial surge in criticism of the treaty, largely due to a burgeoning population and growing demands for electricity, irrigation, and water for domestic use. In the POK as well as in J&K, people regard the treaty to be detrimental to their interests and are critical of those who negotiated it in the 1950s. Although many of these criticisms do

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have substance in the light of changes in peoples’ needs, climate pattern, demography, and politics, labeling the treaty as unjust would be grossly disrespectful to those individuals who battled against the odds to put in place such a massive engineering solution. The treaty’s drafters did not discount the possibility of disputes emanating from its interpretation. Rather, they provided, in Article XII (3), the necessary provision for the treaty’s modification. Experts such as B.G. Verghese have argued for years that in the light of changes over the last sixty years in peoples’ lives and necessities, the time is ripe for an Indus Water Treaty II.77 Whether an altogether new treaty is required or the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty are invoked to settle the pending disputes will depend on present-day decision makers and their political masters. Evolution and change are constant and keeping pace with them should be the core of human endeavor.

CHAPTER IV

THE R ANN OF KUTCH DISPUTE AND THE RESOLUTION PROCESS

T

he Rann of Kutch dispute is one example of how states engage in conflict over relatively trivial land masses of little strategic value. The dispute demonstrates that territoriality goes to the heart of states’ sovereignty and integrity, and contested land—even if its strategic and resources values are low or negligible—can long remain a cause of quarrels and hostilities. Originally little attention was paid to this landmass during British rule. It was only in 1959 that Indian geologists proposed to explore the area for oil, and thereafter the Rann acquired more strategic importance. Eventually, due to financial and technical constraints, the potential presence of hydrocarbons reserves could not be explored, but this open question kept alive the problem of demarcating the Gujarat–West Pakistan boundary, which later brought the dispute over the Rann to the fore. This chapter traverses the history and course of the dispute and the sequence of skirmishes and hostilities followed by the mediation of Great Britain. The text examines the major impediments India and Pakistan confronted, during negotiations, in working out the modalities for ceasefire and referral to the International Tribunal. The chapter also illuminates subsidiary factors that influenced the settlement of the dispute.

History of the Dispute The word Kutch comes from kaccha a derivative of the Sanskrit term kaksho, which means marshy ground or land. The Kutch area is situated between the Greater Rann to the north, the Little Rann to the east, the Gulf of Kutch to the south, and the Arabian Sea to the west. The word Rann derives from irana in Sanskrit, meaning desert. The Rann of Kutch is a marshy landmass with saline and barren stretches. It is marred with cracks caused by the scorching sun and a

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climate known for its swirling storms, despite regular annual flooding between May and October. Its uninhabitable nature makes it difficult for humans to survive there, with only wild ass, deer, and birds venturing into it. The Greater Rann occupies more than 50 percent of the Kutch area and is one-eighth of Gujarat. It is approximately sixty miles in length and varies from twenty-five to sixty miles in width. The Little Rann, in the southeast, is approximately 2,000 square miles in area. The Tropic of Cancer passes through both the Greater Rann and the Little Rann.1

Germination of Contention The dispute emerged following the 1947 partition, when Sir Cyril Radcliff—upon drawing the borders—did not take into account regional territorial contentions between the province of Sind and the princely state of Kutch. The partition commission chose to ignore these differences, which led to disputes between India and Pakistan. India claims jurisdiction over the area on the premise that the Kutch state possessed the Rann of Kutch, due to no clear historical evidence supporting the existence of any boundary dispute between Kutch and Sind. India argued that, according to historical records—including Imperial, Bombay, and Sind gazetteers; the official reports of the Bombay and Kutch states; and periodic proclamations by British authorities—the Kutch-Sind boundary was undisputed, except for a small section, the rights to which needed to be settled. India also claimed that since the Rann was part of the state of Kutch, the accession of the latter to India made the Rann also part of India on May 4, 1948. Article I of the Instrument of Accession, executed between the Maharao of Kutch and the Indian Governor General, states: His Highness the Maharao of Kutch hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and power for and in relations to the governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on the first day of June 1948 (referred in the Instrument as “the said day”).2

Pakistan’s contention was that Sind had exercised jurisdiction over the northern half of the Rann since the British annexation in 1843, and historical records suggested that it was indeed a part of Sind,

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which now forms part of Pakistan. It was Pakistan’s claim that since the Rann was a landlocked sea or a lake it should be demarcated according to the Thalweg principle of international law.3 In sum, the claims of India and Pakistan raised two major contentions to be addressed: first, who held jurisdiction over the Rann of Kutch, and second, whether it was a land-locked sea, boundary lake, or a marshy land. Endeavoring to settle these conflicting claims, between July 1948 and April 1955 both sides exchanged notes in which India dismissed Pakistan’s demand for application of the Thalweg principle and Pakistan rejected India’s assertion that the Kutch-Sind boundary was undisputed and only a small stretch required negotiated settlement. These initial correspondences, however, helped both sides evolve their respective arguments more clearly and convincingly. In April 1956 Pakistan again laid a claim on the Rann, which was rejected by India, but in 1958 both governments held discussions to sign a joint communiqué known as the Nehru-Noon Accord (named after Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Pakistani counterpart Feroz Khan Noon) of September 12, 1958. Intriguingly, the communiqué contained no specific reference to the dispute over the Rann. At a ministerial conference in October 1959, Lieutenant General K.M. Sheikh of Pakistan’s interior ministry and Sardar Swaran Singh, Indian minister for steel, mines, and fuel, reiterated the need to resolve outstanding border disputes through negotiations. They called for the India-Pakistan Western Border conference to be held in January 1960 in order for the respective working parties to discuss the issue. 4 Both sides committed to resolve the issue through negotiations within a specific time frame, failing which it was agreed the matter should be “referred to an impartial tribunal” and subsequent demarcation be based on “exchange of territorial jurisdiction, if any.”5 In spite of this mode of dispute-settlement agreed upon by the two government functionaries, no substantial breakthrough was achieved and stalemate persisted from 1960 to 1965. In the interim the Indian government’s request for a joint demarcation by the two surveyor generals was dismissed by Pakistan.

Dispute Intensification: Indo-Pak Military Confrontation in the Rann In the summer of 1964 the Rann became abuzz with activities that set alarm bells ringing in New Delhi. On May 12, an Indian Border

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Security Force (BSF) patrol apprehended some Pakistani nationals on charges of intrusion near Kanjarkot in the Kutch area; they were soon released under the West Pakistan–India Ground Rules of 1960.6 Again in January 1965, a Gujarat police patrol in Kanjarkot detected signs of intrusion into Indian territory and also sighted Pakistani rangers, who withdrew out of sight after seeing the patrol. This matter was ignored at the February joint police meeting, which led the Indian government to protest to the Pakistan Foreign Office and request early discussions to clarify the issue. Pakistan, in response, claimed that Kanjarkot was part of the Rann of Kutch, that the area had been patrolled by Pakistani rangers since 1947, and therefore it was India committing intrusions. Pakistan pointed out that between January 30 and February 27, 1965, Indian patrols and aircraft had intruded into this Pakistan-controlled area and such incursions should not be repeated. India later learned that Pakistan had established permanent posts at Kanjarkot and also at Ding, west of the Kanjarkot post and two kilometers inside Indian territory. In a strong rebuttal, the Indian External Affairs Ministry claimed that between February 6 and 28 Pakistani rangers and troops had intruded into Indian territory more than a dozen times, assuming a “threatening posture,” obstructing the Gujarat police—at times physically—and threatening Indian patrols and officials. India also brought to notice that Pakistan had deployed a company of rangers around Kanjarkot.7 While claims and counterclaims continued, India in the meantime augmented its troop strength, sending four companies of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to join the Rajkot Rangers and establish a post at Sardar. In midst of claims and counterclaims, and with both sides moving to establish a physical presence in the Rann, Indian External Affairs Minister Sardar Swaran Singh raised the issue in Parliament, calling for restoration of the status quo and withdrawal of Pakistani troops, this to be followed by talks. India also summoned the Pakistani deputy high commissioner to notify him of India’s demand for Pakistan’s immediate withdrawal from the area. Matters took a more a serious turn on April 9, 1965, when Pakistani President Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan directed his troops to attack the Indian police at Sardar Post, then summoned the Indian high commissioner to inform him that this was in response to the Indian attack on Pakistani troops in the area. In a contrasting development, within a few hours of the first engagement President Ayub

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Khan delivered a pacifying speech to defuse the tension and later the Pakistani foreign office called for senior-level talks to resolve the border dispute.8 In response India agreed to hold unconditional negotiations and called for a ceasefire. In subsequent talks on April 13 Pakistan put forward the following proposals to (i) maintain a ceasefire; (ii) schedule an intergovernmental meeting to establish the status quo ante, and (iii) arrange a higher-level meeting to settle the matter. India accepted the proposals but differences still persisted over the situation on the ground in Kanjarkot. On April 19 India approved the implementation of Pakistan’s proposals and further unconditional discussions to resolve the matter. This resolution did not materialize owing to Pakistan’s insistence upon both sides withdrawing their forces twenty miles from the disputed border region as a precondition for a ceasefire and the initiation of talks. India rejected the precondition as a Pakistani tactic to maintain a hold over the area, concluding that India’s withdrawal would establish the area as disputed with the result being that Pakistan would then ask for its evacuation and, if necessary, back this strategy with military force.9 The impasse showed no sign of resolution by April 24, when heavy fighting between the two forces erupted at Biar Bet, Chhad Bet, Vigokot, and Sardar Post. The Pakistani Foreign Office, blaming India for the escalation in hostilities and for amassing troops on the border, urged a peaceful solution to the dispute. As a result the Indo-Pak Agreement was reached at the ministerial level conference in Rawalpindi on January 11, 1960, which contained exploratory discussion regarding the boundary dispute in the KutchSind region showed that the boundary between the Governments of India and Pakistan could not be settled. Both Governments have decided to study the relevant materials and hold discussions later with a view to arriving at a settlement of this dispute.10

In the conference Sardar Swaran Singh and Lieutenant General K.M. Sheikh agreed, in light of the persisting historical anomalies over the disputed border, to gather more data to ascertain the historicity of the Kutch-Sind boundary and discuss the matter at a later date. Even as the modalities for tension reduction were being worked out, however, fighting in the Rann flared up again, triggering massive concentrations of forces along the border by both sides.

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External Mediation To arrest the spiraling tensions, Canada as a Commonwealth member, offered to help end the hostilities and Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson expressed willingness to mediate. Simultaneously, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, in a shared understanding with the United States, suggested an immediate ceasefire, a freeze on troop deployments, and restoration of the status quo with effect from January 1, 1965, all to be followed by negotiations. On May 3, in response to the British proposal, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri declared in the Lok Sabha (the Indian parliament’s lower house), “We shall not depart from the position that along with the ceasefire there must be a restoration of status quo ante. . . .”11 On the other side of the border, President Ayub Khan had kept tensions flaring with a threat of a possible “general and total war” should Indian troops stage any offensive.12 India eventually consented to the British offer but only on the condition that Pakistan would withdraw from positions occupied on January 1, 1965, a precondition rejected by Pakistan. Pakistani rejection of the offer prompted a modified British proposal to accommodate its concerns. On April 28 the British high commissioner to Pakistan, Sir Morrice James, carried a letter for President Ayub Khan to allay Pakistani concerns, and this was followed by the April 30 visit to Rawalpindi of the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Walter McConaughty, to push for a ceasefire. James then visited New Delhi on April 30 to confirm whether India required modifications in the ceasefire proposals and also to convey Pakistan’s emphasis on delinking territorial disputes with border disputes. During this period Henry Cabot Lodge, a special emissary of U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, also arrived in New Delhi to discuss the matter with the Indian prime minister and foreign secretary. In response to these envoys India endorsed acceptance of the Pakistani argument to consider the matter as a “border” dispute and not a “territorial” dispute. Thereupon, the British asked both sides to cease all hostilities for one week to allow for planning the next step of resolution. India, though, was not willing to wait a prolonged period for the next set of British proposals. India was aware that once the seasonal tidal floods appeared in the Rann the Indian troops would have to withdraw from their positions, which were in danger of inundation, unlike the Pakistani troop positions. If the stalemate continued for too long, Indian forces would have to

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withdraw. Pakistani forces would not, because their positions were not in the flood zone to the same extent. Thus, India was averse to such a stalemate.13 In the meantime the United States suggested both parties keep the conflict localized while the ceasefire was being put in place and refrain from widening the conflict in other theaters. The Pakistani Foreign Office conveyed to British and American officials that it would withdraw from the area if India conceded, as a precondition for talks, that a dispute existed in the Rann of Kutch, and that India also must withdraw its troops south of the twenty-fourth parallel, which Pakistan regarded as the legitimate border. Further, Pakistan expressed reservations against the Indian proposal of the status quo being designated as of January 1, 1965, which would mean that India could remain at Chhad Bet, while Pakistan would have to vacate Biar Bet and probably Kanjarkot.14 At this point the prime challenge before the mediators was, in the event negotiations failed to make progress, to convince India to agree to arbitration. To achieve this difficult task Britain rested its hopes on Lord Louis Mountbatten, who had strong bonds with Nehru and the Congress party. Mountbatten made the argument to Prime Minister Shastri that India should not be averse to World Court arbitration of the Sind–Kutch border dispute, because it had an “unassailable case.”15 Skeptical of the World Court as an option, India maintained silence for the time being over Mountbatten’s suggestion. Seeing no sign of a consensus on arbitration from the parties, particularly from India, the mediators focused on ensuring that hostilities were suspended and the parties agreed to a ceasefire in the interim. Yet, even on that front, mediators were facing difficulties: Morrice James’ efforts in Pakistan were yielding no results on the ceasefire issue, and in India the British mediators were finding it hard to reason with Indian authorities, who were agitated by Pakistan’s alleged stalling tactics. On May 10 Pakistan floated another set of proposals as preconditions for the ceasefire and subsequent negotiations but did not evoke any interest in New Delhi. Pakistan’s motives later became evident when it suggested that status quo in the Rann could be restored provided India and Pakistan discuss all outstanding border disputes—a subtle reference to the Kashmir case.16 The stalemate continued, and further airspace and ground violations were reported, not only in the Rann of Kutch area but also along the ceasefire line in J&K and on the India–East Pakistan border. Bilateral ties deteriorated further

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amid reports of the torture of Indian prisoners in the Rann of Kutch being shown blatantly on Pakistani news channels.17 Scholars observed that these incidents were part of President Ayub Khan’s well-calibrated strategy, reflected in his anti-India proclamations. His policy was to keep the pot boiling and stalling the negotiations without derailing them completely.18 Tensions increased further when, in his briefing to the Pakistani media, Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto stated: Pakistan would raise the question of the Kutch dispute at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers talks in London if found necessary and useful. . . . It is much better for the Indian leaders to consider a fair and reasonable approach to the settlement of the Rann of Kutch and other disputes rather than to threaten Pakistan by a volume of meaningless threats.19

India and Pakistan continued to show little sign of rapprochement, although India accepted some modifications in the British proposals in order to avoid breakdown of the tripartite engagement. For its part, Pakistan insisted on including on the agenda other border disputes, to be discussed once the ceasefire in the Rann of Kutch was announced. Raids and airspace violations continued on both the eastern and western fronts of India, including areas in the northeast, where the border was demarcated and settled. The situation showed no prospect of improvement, and the tripartite negotiations were on the verge of a complete breakdown. To prevent these ongoing efforts from failing, the British proposed direct negotiation between India and Pakistan, which India rejected unless Pakistan vacated the occupied areas and restored the status quo (as of January 1, 1965) as a precondition of ceasefire.20 India’s reservations became the catalysts for a modified British proposal of June 12, which included the assurance that the withdrawal of troops of both sides from Punjab and East Pakistan would be delinked from the ceasefire agreement in the Rann of Kutch. Consequently, the mood in New Delhi began to change and the possibility of a ceasefire agreement gained vigor. In London on June 17 the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference got under way, and India and Pakistan were expected to meet on the sidelines to discuss the Kutch issue. The Indian prime minister, however, cautioned that only the Kutch issue would be discussed, and that Pakistan must refrain from tossing the dispute into

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the conference.21 This time both sides showed restraint. On June 20 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson held talks with India’s Prime Minister Shastri and Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan to finalize the provisions of the ceasefire agreement. Both Shastri and Ayub Khan approved of the agreement, but Shastri requested more time to discuss the agreement with his cabinet before any final announcement was made. On June 29, 1965, the ceasefire agreement received official approval from both India and Pakistan. The agreement was signed in New Delhi on June 30 by Pakistani High Commissioner Arshad Hussain and the Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Azim Hussain (incidentally, both cousins and brothers-in-law). The British high commissioner and deputy high commissioner, John Freeman and P.A. Scott, respectively, were present at the signing ceremony. The ceasefire became effective on the morning of July 1, expediting troop withdrawals by both sides by July 8. India’s Lok Sabha approved the agreement on August 18, and the prime minister expressed his full commitment to honoring and implementing the agreement, particularly the arbitration clause, if necessary. He remarked, “We do not reject the reference to arbitration. I say it clearly and categorically that we stick to the Agreement. We do not want to deviate from it.”22 The opposition, represented by the Jan Sangh (later known as the Bharatiya Janta Party) and the Samyukta Socialist Party, staged a walkout during voting (269 yea votes to 28 nay, with 23 abstentions). The communists were among the abstentions. The agreement was approved on August 19 in the Rajya Sabha (parliament’s upper house) by 114 votes to 18.23 The Kutch ceasefire agreement, for the first time in Indo-Pak history, worked out a time-bound framework of conflict resolution, starting with a ceasefire agreement and leading to bilateral efforts for settlement and referral, should arbitration in the bilateral negotiations fail. Following the ceasefire agreement, India and Pakistan decided to discuss the dispute at the foreign ministers’ level in August, but it came as a surprise to India to hear that the Pakistani National Assembly had been told that in this meeting both sides would discuss all outstanding matters, since the Kutch dispute was merely a minor facet of a larger dispute over Kashmir. India took serious objection to this misleading description of the agenda for talks and clarified firmly that other issues can only be discussed at the appropriate level at a later date. This firm Indian response did not prevent Pakistan

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from undertaking a large-scale armed infiltration in J&K. Although the opinion of the government in New Delhi still showed a willingness for dialogue with Pakistan, the dramatic turn of events in J&K made the political climate not conducive to any meaningful talks. With this backdrop the foreign ministers’ meeting was cancelled, a decision greeted by a thumping applause in the Indian Parliament. Both sides agreed to refer the matter to the International Tribunal in October.

Ceasefire and the Technicalities of the Dispute The 1965 ceasefire agreement encompassed two aspects, the Gujarat– West Pakistan boundary demarcation and the Kutch-Sind boundary dispute. The agreement stated: Whereas both the Governments of India and Pakistan have agreed to a ceasefire and to restoration of the status quo as on January 1, 1965 in the area of the Gujarat-West Pakistan border, in the confidence that this will also contribute to a reduction of the present tension along the entire Indo-Pak border; [w]hereas it is necessary that after the status quo has been established arrangements should be made for determination and demarcation of the border in that area.24

On the Rann of Kutch issue, Article 3 (c) specified the following: At discussions in January 1960, it was agreed by the Ministers of the two governments that they each collect further data, regarding the Kutch–Sind boundary and that further discussion would be held later with a view to arriving at a settlement of this dispute.

Prior to the 1965 military confrontation over the Rann of Kutch, the dispute manifested the different perceptions of the parties over the nature of the dispute. Pakistan vigorously refuted India’s position that no dispute existed over the Kutch–Sind boundary, except for a small segment that required demarcation; and India persisted in insisting that the focus should be on that segment of the border only and not on the whole of the Kutch–Sind boundary. Pakistan sought to include a much larger part of the Kutch–Sind boundary, a part beyond the boundary pillars put in place in 1924 to demarcate the line. During their engagements with Pakistan between July 1948 and January 1960, Indian leaders and negotiators were cautious in

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making any statement in public or at the official level that might be legally construed as an endorsement or acknowledgment of Pakistani claims that a boundary dispute existed. India was apprehensive of the domino effect that the reopening of boundary-demarcation issues in the Kutch-Sind sector would have on other areas in J&K and in the northeast, where India and China had serious differences over the border. During this period the main objectives of India and Pakistan were to make claims and counterclaims and exchange notes to argue their respective positions on the issue. In the early stages, a proposal had been put forward by Pakistan to set up the Joint Boundary Commission of the Dominion of India and Pakistan to settle the boundary dispute.25 Mukund Untawale has reasoned that India rejected the proposal because, in its view, the 1912 settlement defined the western boundary right from the northern end of the border in the Rann. Pakistan’s view was that the Kutch–Sind boundary be divided into sectors: (a) from the mouth of Sir Creek to a point at approximately 68°48’E and 23°58’N; and (b) from the latter point onward. As regards (a), that is, from the mouth of Sir Creek to the point “WT” on the map, Pakistan argued that the boundary had been demarcated and settled and the boundary beyond this point (northward up to “A” and then eastward) had never been surveyed or demarcated and remained disputed; Pakistan called for the demarcation of the boundary in that sector (b). Both sides were in agreement that in case of any differences, representatives of the two countries could call a conference and discuss the matter.26 Pakistan proposed that, in case a solution still remained elusive, the dispute could be referred to an impartial tribunal, as agreed upon in October 1953 at a conference in Calcutta. In its response India referred to the Sir Creek–Kori Creek settlement through resolution No. 1192, dated February 24, 1914, of the Government of Bombay (GOB), which read: The boundary between Kutch and Sind should be the green line in the accompanying map from the mouth of Sir Creek at the point where it joins the blue dotted line; from there it should follow the blue dotted line due east until it joins the Sind boundary as marked in purple on the map.27

The point New Delhi emphasized was that as long back as 1923–24, the Kutch–Sind authorities had jointly surveyed and demarcated the perpendicular boundary, and what was left was demarcation of the

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boundary with pillars on the ground in accordance with the agreed procedures. Pakistan claimed that a perpendicular line northward of the point “WT” may be the boundary between the Karachi district ( Jati taluka) and the Kutch, but that it was not conclusively established that the northern trijunction (i.e., point “A”) was the northernmost part of this boundary. To resolve this dispute Pakistan proposed to bring point “A” down closer to “WT,” which would establish its claim over the northern half of the Rann along the twenty-fourth parallel.28 India argued that point “A” was a trijunction of the Jati taluka (Karachi district), Badin taluka (Hyderabad district) in Sind, and the state of Kutch. Pakistan contended point “A” was in fact a trijunction between Jati and Badin taluka and the Greater Rann of Kutch. Countering India’s bid to prove Kutch’s administrative jurisdiction over Gainda Bet, Kanjarkot, Chhad Bet, and Nava Bet, Pakistan sought to establish that Sind had enjoyed “actual possession” and “administrative jurisdiction” in the northern half of the Rann.29 Mukund Untawale has pointed out that through the exchange of notes and correspondence it was revealed that there were discretional and procedural cartographic discrepancies in the preparation and authorization of the various British Indian maps, and that India and Pakistan disagreed over these maps and their cartographic symbols, presenting in turn their own maps and claiming them to be more authoritative and authentic than the others. Pakistan questioned the authenticity of the Indian maps, particularly as regards the “alignment of fiscal boundaries and the dash-dot-dash (-.-) symbol found only in the taluka (district) boundaries and unlike the State or Provincial boundaries.”30 In the end the exchange of notes allowed the two sides to assert their respective positions, but in terms of developing a common understanding, this required negotiating the matter across the table, something that rarely happened. The exchange of notes did help highlight the historicity of the dispute and facts, but what was lacking was moving beyond accusation and allegations to devise a common approach, unlike in the case of Indus Waters Treaty. The attendant military confrontation further complicated the task of the negotiators, making negotiation-based resolution difficult, particularly when skirmishes were occurring. Eventually, when Britain and the United States intervened, both India and Pakistan then could be persuaded to work out a mechanism to resolve the dispute, which resulted in the ceasefire.

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The Culmination Point: The Tribunal Award, September 19, 1968 India had first committed to the arbitration course in October 1959, during the meeting between Sardar Swaran Singh and K.M. Sheikh, and this decision was conveyed in the Lok Sabha by Nehru and Lakshmi Menon, the deputy external affairs minister and parliamentary secretary, respectively. In spite of armed conflict in Kanjarkot and the movement of Pakistani troops in J&K, India refrained from using these incidents as a pretext for rescinding its commitment to arbitration. It was always possible that—just as the Indian Parliament had backed the cancellation of the foreign ministers’ meeting scheduled on August 20, 1965, in the wake of developments in J&K—the parliament also could have reversed India’s commitment to arbitration. Scholars have been critical of the Indian leadership for being more concerned with protecting the government’s honor than India’s interests, and have argued that Lal Bahadur Shastri’s approval of the clauses that “the decision of the tribunal shall be final and binding on both parties,” and that it “shall be binding on both Governments, and shall not be questioned on any ground whatsoever,” reflected “utter bankruptcy of intellect.”31 Following the Pakistani military build-up in J&K and the cancellation of the Indo-Pak foreign ministers’ meeting, the dispute was set for referral for arbitration. While committing itself to arbitration, however, India was mindful that no linkage would be established between the Kashmir issue and the Kutch conflict—which linkage seemed to be Pakistan’s underlying motivation.32 Pakistani troop deployment in Kashmir had twin objectives: First, to internationalize the Kashmir issue and possibly make it a part of the arbitration; second, to create conditions which would make bilateral talks unlikely, thereby taking the Kutch issue to the International Tribunal regarding arbitration. Article 3 (iii) of the 1965 ceasefire agreement provided that there will be constituted within four months of the ceasefire, a Tribunal consisting of three persons, none of whom would be a national of either India or Pakistan. One member shall be a nominated by each Government and the third member, who will be the Chairman shall be jointly selected by the two Governments. In the event of the two Governments failing to agree on the selection of the Chairman within three months of the cease-fire they shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to nominate the Chairman.33

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On October 7, 1965, Pakistan nominated for the Tribunal Nasarollah Entezam, a former Iranian foreign minister who also had been president of the U.N. General Assembly (1950–51). On the twenty-sixth India nominated Ales Bebler, an eminent Yugoslavian jurist and a judge of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia. No consensus could be reached on the chairman, whose selection was considered crucial, especially when the two representatives were likely to hold conflicting positions. Consequently, on December 15, 1965, U.N. Secretary General U. Thant nominated Gunnar Karl Andreas Lagergren, President of the Court of Appeal for Western Sweden, as Chairman of the Tribunal.34 On February 15, 1966, Lagergren chaired the Tribunal’s first meeting in Geneva, in camera, and the arguments lasted till July 1967, spanning 600 hours over 170 sittings, with a winter break (December 21, 1966–January 10, 1967). India and Pakistan presented their cases based on some 700 documents and 350 maps, and the proceedings were recorded in 15,000 pages.35 The Tribunal prepared a draft of the dispute and presented it to both sides on October 20, 1967, for their rejoinders to the Tribunal and to each other. Later rejoinders to those rejoinders also were submitted for the perusal of the Tribunal. In accord with the ceasefire terms, India and Pakistan agreed to demarcate the Gujarat–West Pakistan boundary as specified by the Indo-Pak Western Boundary Case Tribunal Award, which was constituted following the ceasefire agreement.36 Subsequently, on February 19, 1968, the International Tribunal put forward a 900page judgment. The award granted Pakistan 320 square miles of disputed territory above the Twenty-fourth Parallel, 10 percent of the 3,500 square miles claimed from the total 9,000 square miles that constituted the Rann of Kutch (comprising both Greater and Little Rann). India’s claim over the remaining 3,180 square miles of disputed territory was upheld, establishing her overall jurisdiction over 8,680 square miles of Rann of Kutch territory.37 It was later revealed that, in the final award, Chairman Lagergren and Judge Entezam approved the settlement, whereas the Indian nominee, Ales Bebler, voted against the allocation of territory to Pakistan.

Analysis of the Negotiations The negotiations over the Rann of Kutch proved complicated because of the territorial nature of the dispute, unlike the Indus waters negotiations. In addition, the Rann of Kutch dispute had a

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military dimension, wherein the skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani forces, and Pakistan’s troop movements in J&K, made the political climate tense and not conducive for successful negotiations. The cornerstone of the negotiations lay in India and Pakistan, for the first time ever, agreeing upon a time-bound mechanism to settle a dispute. Many analysts in India look at the Kutch episode as a negative and unpleasant experience, but from a conflict resolution perspective, the negotiation process and final settlement offer some relevant lessons to ponder.

Ripeness of the Issue The dispute emerged in April 1956; when Pakistan put forth its claim to 3,500 square miles above the Twenty-fourth Parallel, a claim that led to the initial exchange of arguments and counterarguments between India and Pakistan with regard to the location of the boundary in that sector. Surprisingly, three years later, in a brief meeting in New Delhi on September 1, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan announced the broad contours of India-Pakistan engagement, but no specific mention was made of the dispute. Likewise, the Nehru-Noon meeting of September 1958 addressed their mutual desire to settle border controversies, but made no reference to the Kutch dispute. The first specific mention of the dispute was made in Delhi on October 15, 1959, at the Foreign Ministers’ conference led by Sardar Swaran Singh and Lieutenant General K.M. Sheikh, which resumed in Dacca, Bangladesh, October 18–22. Paragraph 6 of the Joint Communiqué released at the end of the conference stated: Both Governments reaffirmed their determination to resolve border disputes by negotiation and agreed that all outstanding boundary disputes on the East Pakistan-India border and West Pakistan-India border, so far by either country, should, if not settled by negotiation, be referred to an impartial tribunal for settlement and implementation of that settlement by demarcation on the ground and by exchange of territorial jurisdiction if any.38

This led to several ministerial-level conferences in Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Delhi, between January 4 and 11, 1960, to discuss West Pakistan–India border questions. The five disputes discussed in these conferences included the Kutch-Sind border problem.

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While the four other disputes—Chak Ladheke, Theh Sarja Marja, Husainiwala, and Suleimanki headworks (a structure on the Sutlej River)—were resolved, the Kutch-Sind dispute appeared rather complex, and an agreement was reached to undertake further data collection and discussions. In these conferences, as the ripeness characteristic suggests, a “shared perception of the desirability” for negotiations toward settling the dispute seemed to be germinating. As a result of this shared will, the West Pakistan–India Border Ground Rules were agreed upon and defined the terms of engagement in that sector. To India’s disadvantage, in 1962 the Indo-China war with the reverses suffered by the Indian army, and in 1964 the unexpected death of Jawaharlal Nehru, shook the country’s confidence completely. The sudden void created in the leadership became a handicap for India as the country braced for a change in leadership (and leadership style) under the Congress party’s Lal Bahadur Shastri, considered less assertive and charismatic than Nehru. Pakistan, on the other hand, owing to its 1954 entry into the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955, had become a beneficiary of military and financial assistance from the United States. Although this assistance was subject to conditions that forbade its employment against India, it was nevertheless used in the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. The now-declassified (May 29, 2003) memorandum, dated July 21, 1965, presented by Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, to W.F. Raborn, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, asserted: “Pakistan almost certainly used the U.S. MAP-supplied equipment against India in violation of the terms under which it was supplied.” The memorandum also mentioned that Pakistan had cited the “possibility of an Indian aggression,” for which there was “no clear cut case,” and that Pakistan only did so in order to “rationalize its own shortcomings as an ally.” The point being made here is that at the beginning of the 1960s there appeared a significant shift in Pakistan’s broad policy approach, underpinned by developments in India. Although Pakistan had committed to peaceful negotiations with India, its activities in the Rann of Kutch suggested other intentions. When the skirmishes erupted in 1965, Indian troops steadfastly defended the territory but India’s government was seen as being less assertive. Shastri’s proclamations

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honoring international agreements and commitments were not taken too positively by the opposition in the Parliament. S.K. Singh, former Indian foreign secretary observed: India was weakened after the defeat at the Chinese front in 1962 and Nehru’s death in 1964, hence it accepted external mediation and arbitration. With a strong India, history would have been different.39

Nonetheless, it would be unfair to say that Shastri’s leadership was devoid of any positive attributes. He always kept the opposition benches informed and updated on developments, giving them a sense of participation in the decision-making, which allowed him to execute policies smoothly, without any outcry from them. While he preferred a peaceful resolution, Shastri qualified his policies with the clear message that this desire for peaceful settlement should not to be construed as a weakness on the part of India, and that the Indian armed forces would respond to any Pakistani aggression with full force and intent. Yet, during the course of negotiations leading up to the approval of the draft of the ceasefire agreement in London, Shastri’s style of leadership, of seeking peaceful resolutions, ripened the dispute for settlement according to terms that Indian analysts, opposition leaders, and political parties believed was not in the best interest of the country. After the Kutch Agreement was signed on June 30, 1965, he welcomed and strongly defended it. The Congress Parliamentary Party (Congress party members holding elected seats in Parliament) approved the agreement on July 2, 1965, but emphasized that the agreement would not set a precedent for other pending India-Pakistan disputes, and that each issue would be dealt with in an appropriate forum, in a specific manner, and on merit. Later, both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha passed the agreement largely because of the Congress party’s majority in both houses of Parliament. From the Pakistani point of view the Kutch negotiations progressed as desired, and due to factors mentioned previously, Pakistan was able to push India toward a ceasefire and to settlement through arbitration. The 1958 military takeover in Pakistan under General Ayub Khan had removed civilian leaders from office, trampling all democratic institutions, thus giving the bureaucratic service de facto authority to run the country. Final decision-making rested with

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President Ayub Khan, both as the head of state and the government. Hasan Askari Rizvi has written: The period of the military rule was not a military dictatorship of the type found in the Middle East and Latin America and, to some extent, in Africa. It was a benevolent authoritarian regime, determined to inculcate discipline that marked the organization of the army. . . . The greatest advantage Ayub Khan enjoyed over the opposition parties was the support of the military, the bureaucracy, and the Basic Democrats as well as lack of unity and understanding among various opposition parties. Ever since 1958, when Ayub took over as the new leader of Pakistan, he had increased his powers steadily and taken command over the affairs of the country, internal as well as external.40

The 1962 constitution concentrated political power further in the president’s hands, and he also commanded the respect and loyalty of the forces, while the entire cabinet and provincial leadership reported to him. After signing the Indus Waters Treaty, Ayub Khan gained considerable confidence in his dealings with India, and this was quite evident in the Kutch dispute. He was very well assisted in his task by his able Foreign Minister, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, an astute statesman who a few years later would play an active role in pushing the military back to the barracks, heralding representative democracy. After the Kutch Award, the Pakistani press reported it was a victory for Pakistan. The Urdu press in particular attributed this triumph to the statesmanship and superior diplomacy of the president. A supportive presidential cabinet and the favorable public opinion created by the press brought about a political climate that was efficiently utilized by Ayub Khan in pursuing his objectives. On the other hand, India under Nehru was able to negotiate with Pakistan on an even keel and exert pressure, when required, to seek the desired outcome in the Indus waters negotiations. But after Nehru’s death, Pakistan under Ayub Khan began to assert its ways in the Kutch dispute. The defiance with which the Pakistani troops entered Indian territory in the Kutch area and J&K was reflective of an aggressive national diplomacy and foreign policy. In sum, the Rann of Kutch dispute became ripe for negotiations in the late 1950s, and the 1960 settlement of the Indus Waters Treaty convinced Nehru he could settle this dispute, too, in a peaceful manner with Ayub Khan. It was with this understanding that the

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ministerial-level conference of January 1960 was convened and the five disputes, including the Kutch issue, were taken up for discussion. The West Pakistan–India Border Ground Rules of 1960, agreed upon to lay down the terms of engagement between the two forces on the border and avoid any possibility of a military conflict, specified mechanisms for dealing with various types of border violations. But after Nehru’s death, despite these mechanisms being in place, Pakistan began to act more aggressively—aggression that combined with Lal Bahadur’s style of leadership and decision-making to ripen the dispute for the ceasefire agreement, in which India committed to resort to arbitration in a time-bound manner if negotiations failed to settle the dispute.

Prenegotiation As highlighted previously, one important aspect of this dispute was its territorial nature, and being a territorial issue, the Rann of Kutch dispute was rigorously investigated by both sides—consulting government documents and records, including Imperial gazetteers, various administrative reports, gazetteers of the Sind province and the Bombay presidency, various encyclopedias, many maps (including those prepared by James Rennel in 1788, John Arrowsmith in 1804, Lieutenant-colonel Sir Alexander Burnes in 1828, and J.G Lumsden in 1844), the Survey of India, contemporary journals, and numerous academic works . The process of gathering data and information had been initiated in July 1948, when the two states exchanged notes regarding the nature of the Rann. Following the 1960 Ministers’ Conference both sides had agreed to collect further information and discuss the issue at a later date. Such a thorough fact-finding and data-collection exercise enabled India and Pakistan to adopt a more informed approach, ascertain the exact nature of the dispute, and accordingly articulate their respective arguments. In fact, it was through one of the early notes exchanged that Pakistan suggested the creation of a Joint Boundary Commission of the Dominions of India and Pakistan to investigate and settle the dispute.41 In these exchanges, both sides adopted a very cautious stance and ensured that they did not reveal too much or too early, and presented the cartographic and legal details in an incremental manner. Tactfully, sometimes one side would provide partial quotations to argue its point, which would be challenged by the other side through another set of evidence and additional excerpts.

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Interestingly, the India-Pakistan investigation also exposed discretional and procedural lacunae in various British documents and maps. The initial exchange of notes helped Pakistan evolve a better understanding, which continued to improve with successive exchanges such as during the India-Pakistan Western Border Conference in January 1960. The 1959 K.M. Shaikh-Swaran Singh conference provided the initial breakthrough in settling border disputes through peaceful means, settling four of the five disputes but leaving the Kutch-Sind border dispute for further study and discussion. Further mechanisms of engagement and conflict management were enshrined in the January 9, 1960, West Pakistan-India Border Ground Rules agreement, Paragraph 1, which stipulated that in areas regarding which disputes of title are already pending with the respective Governments for a decision, the status quo inclusive of defence and security measures will be strictly maintained until such time as the de jure boundary is finalized and the return of territories in adverse possession of the two countries takes place. 42

In February 1965, after both sides made claims of intrusion, India offered to meet at any level to exchange data and other evidence to ascertain future steps for ameliorating the differences over the Kutch-Sind border.43 India’s view was that well before attempting to settle the dispute at the negotiating table both sides required confirmation of the facts in the historical records, a key exercise in the prenegotiation stage. Based on initial consultation of historical records, Lal Bahadur Shastri declared in the Lok Sabha on April 28, 1965: Pakistan must decide to give up its warlike activities. If it does, I see no reason why the simple fact of determining what was the actual boundary between the erstwhile Province of Sind and the State of Kutch and what is the boundary between India and Pakistan cannot be settled across the table. It need not even be on the negotiating table. It is more a question of finding out the facts rather than of negotiating a settlement. It can be done by experts on both sides. All this is possible provided there is an immediate cessation of hostilities and restoration of the status quo ante. . . .44

The only element of prenegotiation that could not be implemented was the lowering of the intensity of the conflict. In May 1964 reports of encounters between the Gujarat police and Pakistani rangers, in

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addition to intrusions by Pakistani nationals, further heightened tensions between the two sides. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs had proclaimed that between February 6–28, 1965, there were more than a dozen instances of “aggressive posturing” by Pakistan, including ground intrusions and airspace violations. With the April 1965 Pakistani assault in Kutch, the situation became extremely dire for India and the Indian Parliament echoed with the opposition’s complaints. In such a tense situation it became extremely difficult for India to hold any meaningful discussion until Pakistani troops withdrew and the status quo was restored. The Indian press was critical of the government and the border police for failing to read Pakistani moves sufficiently in advance, and the political climate became absolutely not conducive for talks. Another distinct element of prenegotiation in this stage was contemplation of the role of a third party in dispute settlement who would have the approval of both conflicting parties. In a tense and volatile atmosphere, with the parties unable to communicate and negotiate a way out, the need for external mediation was imperative. The 1965 skirmishes led to Shastri accepting mediation by Great Britain and the United States in April, much to the annoyance of the opposition parties. It seems, however, that Lord Mountbatten, who had once enjoyed a strong relationship with the Congress party and Jawaharlal Nehru, had conveyed that India had an “unassailable case” and should not be averse to arbitration. So, mediation was accepted, partly for this reason and partly because of India’s weakened standing following the 1962 Indo-China war reverses and Nehru’s death in 1964.

Negotiations The Kutch dispute aptly vindicates negotiation experts’ assertions that the distinction between prenegotiation and negotiation is quite blurred with regard to when prenegotiation ends and negotiation begins. The reason for overlap at this stage was largely because India had argued that the boundary between Kutch and Sind was undisputed and settled according to historical and official records, maps, documents, and literature, and that India-Pakistan only needed to employ existing pillars on the ground in order to physically demarcate the boundary. To achieve this all that was required was to revisit the historical records and documents—a process that was also emphasized by the agreements in 1959 and 1960. The first

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tangible commitment to negotiations, however, was made during the 1958 meeting between Nehru and Ayub Khan in New Delhi, although it did not specifically mention the Kutch dispute. This was followed by the K.M. Shaikh–Swaran Singh meeting in October 1959, in Dacca, which resulted in a Joint Communiqué in which Paragraph 6 stated: Both Governments reaffirmed their determination to resolve border disputes by negotiation and agreed that all outstanding boundary disputes on the East Pakistan-India border and West Pakistan-India border, raised so far by either country, should, if not settled by negotiation, be referred to an impartial tribunal for settlement and implementation of that by demarcation on the ground and by exchange of territorial jurisdiction.45

Paragraph 6, which is self-explanatory, provided a mechanism for dispute settlement through negotiations and also prescribed further steps should negotiations fail to resolve the dispute. To expand the mechanism further, the 1959–60 India-Pakistan Ministers’ Conference addressed West Pakistan–India border questions, resulting in the resolution of four disputes namely, Chak Ladheke, Theh Sarja Marja, Husainiwala, and Suleimanki headworks, andwhile referring the Kutch dispute for further investigation and discussions. Negotiations proceeded smoothly when Nehru was prime minister, but after the 1962 military debacle and, later, Nehru’s death, negotiations between India and Pakistan became less meaningful because of Pakistan’s increased aggressive intentions and diminishing faith in a bilaterally negotiated settlement. With the mediation of Prime Minister Harold Wilson and the United States, negotiations were transformed from bilateral to a tripartite mode. The British government, which from the beginning had been very keen on mediating, intervened in April 1965 to help achieve a ceasefire. Talks were initiated that month, with both parties articulating their cases based on their respective investigations of relevant historical and government records. During these talks, held in London, a consensus was reached with regard to the necessary facts and pieces of information required to take a final decision on the exact nature of the dispute and how it could be settled. Talks lasted till June 1965, during which it was decided to confirm their mutual decision for the terms of a ceasefire,

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which would be followed by talks, and if necessary, arbitration by the International Tribunal. The mediators on their part were watchful to prevent further military confrontations and to ensure that India and Pakistan followed a negotiated route for settlement.

Agreement It is important to clarify that the Ceasefire Agreement did not resolve the dispute, since agreement’s purpose was to end military hostilities, restore the status quo, and recommend the process of resolution, i.e., through negotiations and consequent demarcation of the boundary pillars. The significance of the agreement lay in the fact that it clearly specified procedures for settlement that could be followed, with the provision of arbitration should bilateral talks prove inconclusive. The agreement was duly approved and signed by both sides, with the commitment to adhere to it in letter and spirit. It can be argued that Pakistan managed to get the third-party involved, had the arbitration clause enshrined in the Ceasefire Agreement, and then derailed further negotiations so as to take the dispute to the International Tribunal. It was a diplomatic success for Pakistan, but the lesson from this experience—which must not overlooked with regard to the on-going peace process—is that both sides must consider all the relevant dimensions of dispute settlement before signing any agreement, and once it has been signed, the agreement should not be undermined or challenged by the signatory parties, but should be followed in letter and spirit. This applies to all agreements, including the Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration, which time and again have been challenged by Pakistan, especially by the Pakistani military. After the announcement of the award on February 19, 1968, came the implementation—the most critical part of any negotiated solution. Pakistan, under President Ayub Khan, backed the award completely and without much domestic opposition, largely because in the bargain it had gained 320 square miles of the elevated section of the Rann that escapes flooding during rainy reason. The Pakistani press hailed the award as a victory for Pakistan, asserting that India had grabbed territory in the Kutch that rightfully belonged to Pakistan. The Urdu press, in particular, attributed Pakistan’s gain to the statesmanship and superior diplomacy of President Ayub Khan.46

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On February 21, 1968, the presidential cabinet reaffirmed that the award was morally binding on both sides and would be honored by Pakistan, and the following day requested of India that the award be fully and peacefully implemented. By now, Lal Bahadur Shastri had died (in 1966) of a sudden heart attack suffered during his state visit to Tashkent, with Gulzarilal Nanda assuming the task of the caretaker prime minister. In the next Lok Sabha general election, in 1967, the Indira Gandhi-led Congress party came to power, winning 283 seats and defeating the two main opposition parties: C. Rajgopalachari’s Rashtriya Swantrata Party and the Bhartiya Jan Sangh. Indira Gandhi reassured Pakistan by confirming peaceful implementation of the award. On the Indian front, however, the award faced stiff opposition, and in the Lok Sabha on February 27–28, 1968, a no-confidence motion tabled against the government was defeated by 203 to 72 votes. During the debate Indira Gandhi said India’s decision to implement the award would close an “unhappy chapter” in Indo-Pak relations and would lead to their improvement. She declared that the Indian government would not proceed on the basis of perpetual hostility toward Pakistan and affirmed that, “However tortuous the road, we must make Pakistan realize that its interest lies in cooperation and friendship with India.”47 It is believed that she had closely consulted with her cabinet before the no-confidence vote debate and subsequently—knowing well that extraneous circumstances had led to this award—went on nonetheless to announce that India would “honor her commitment” with respect to the award.48 What was exemplary in the post-award phase was that—despite Indira Gandhi’s expulsion from the Congress on charges of indiscipline, and the consequent Congress split and her newfound status as head of a minority government—implementation faced no hindrance. In a display of unparallel political maturity and accountability, the key opposition leaders also fully backed the implementation of the award. Socialist leader Jai Prakash Narain supported Indira Gandhi, saying, “I cannot imagine a greater dishonour being caused to the country than by refusing to implement the present Award on the ground that it does not fully satisfy us.”49 C. Rajagopalachari stated: When we have agreed solemnly to abide by the decision of an international tribunal, it is good and decent for us to accept the award gracefully instead of creating an atmosphere against it. That we agreed to

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submit the case to a high grade tribunal shows that there was no other way of settling the dispute peacefully. It serves no purpose to attack Mr. Swaran Singh at this stage after finding that the award is to some extent against our wishes. If we rouse public opinion against awards given, we shall not be able to get the services of independent judges to undertake such tasks.50

The award was nevertheless challenged in court and in one such case—in the Delhi High Court—the petition filed by M. Rama Rao, was dismissed, with the Court stating, “We do not propose to interfere at this stage as no ground has been made out on the visit side for the court’s interference.”51 Similarly, petitions filed in the Supreme Court were dismissed by its constitutional bench. The response of the Indian judiciary, too, was praiseworthy for its treatment of the issue on its merits and for rejecting claims made in the petition on emotional and nationalist grounds. In April 1969, following the dismissal of these petitions, India and Pakistan met in New Delhi to review the joint implementation. The final demarcation was executed by June 10, to the satisfaction of both countries.52 Mature and responsible conduct by the Indian leadership saw the implementation of the agreement without any serious problem, and the armed forces were withdrawn within the stipulated period, thus deescalating tensions. The third-party role in the Kutch dispute was decisive. It is commonly understood that India had risked losing territory, and in the end it did, while Pakistan, as its own press reports suggested, had nothing to lose. Yet in 1959 India had committed to arbitration, and the 1962 war, Nehru’s death, and Pakistan’s evolving relationship with the United States only hastened the developments toward this end. American military aid to Pakistan, seventy-five times larger than to India, and its warning to India of serious consequences in the event of Indian aggression in the Kutch, also influenced Lal Bahadur Shastri’s decision to accept the ceasefire.53 Further, Britain had cautioned India that SEATO and CENTO forces might be employed in case of Indian air strikes against Pakistan—an eventuality feared by Pakistan.54 Declassified documents of the U.S State Department have since revealed, however, that Pakistani claims of Indian aggression were unreasonable. The comment of former Indian Foreign Secretary, S.K. Singh that “India was weak in 1965” aptly describes India’s position and Lal Bahadur Shastri’s predicaments in signing the Ceasefire

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Agreement.55 The settlement of the Rann of Kutch dispute illustrated that at times states may have to sign agreements with rivals under duress, owing to their inability to carve out better terms, but once the agreement has been reached, its implementation and legality must not be challenged by future regimes and governments that may be much stronger and self-assured internationally, politically, and militarily.

CHAPTER V

DISPUTE OVER SIACHEN: A GLACIER IN NEED OF THAW

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he highest battlefield in the world, the Siachen Glacier has witnessed conflict between India and Pakistan for more than two decades, so far costing hundreds of casualties caused mostly by adverse climatic conditions and harsh terrain rather than military skirmishes. This is not to mention the continuing conflict’s enormous drain on the national exchequers of both sides. Notwithstanding mutual recognition of the conflict’s enormous costs in terms of men and material, several rounds of negotiations have failed to yield any substantial result—a situation primarily due to the long history of mutual distrust and antagonism. In the past twenty years, the only positive development over Siachen has been the announcement of a ceasefire in 2004, a result of the resumption of the Indo-Pak peace process. In the wake of deteriorating bilateral relations—largely because of the Kargil War of 1999, the military coup in Pakistan, the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Flight IC 814, and the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament—both sides have been keen to arrest the slide before matters deteriorated any further. As a result, India and Pakistan announced the ceasefire along the IB, LoC, and AGPL in the Siachen region with a view to boosting the trust level and improving the atmospherics for bilateral engagements, including talks. The idea was to create a positive political climate to help address pending disputes and their possible resolution. Unfortunately, this positive development in bilateral relations has yet to ease the deadlock over Siachen. Given the vulnerability to terrorism of IndoPak relations, and Pakistan’s irredentist claims over Kashmir, the Siachen dispute has become the natural victim of the deteriorating ties in this enduring rivalry and also is the epitome of mistrust that characterizes the India-Pakistan dyad. In this context, this chapter looks into the basic contentions and claims of the two sides over the

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disputed territory, the progress made, if any, in bilateral negotiations over the years, and the possibilities for its resolution.

History of the Dispute As the world’s highest conflict zone, the Siachen Glacier is recognized for its harsh weather and inhospitable terrain. Situated in the Karakoram Range, the glacier is approximately forty-seven miles long and between two and four miles wide. Winter snowfall averages ten and a half meters, and blizzards can involve winds up to 150-plus knots (more than 170 miles per hour), and the temperature more or less remains in the vicinity of -40° Fahrenheit, and sometimes much lower due to wind; these factors have earned this landmass of contention the title of the “Third Pole.”1 What makes Siachen all the more challenging for both sides is the altitude and topography. The Indian military maintains a base camp at 12,000 feet and some forward bases at Kumar at 16,000 feet, Bila Top at 18,600 feet, Pahalwan at 20,000 feet, and Indira Col at 22,000 feet. Pakistan’s military has been based at a much lower altitude since Indian troops captured Saltoro Ridge by a surprise move in 1984, and therefore occupies positions that are marginally less difficult to maintain. Nonetheless, Pakistani troops are located between 9,000 and 15,000 feet except for one position that is above 17,000 feet at Conway Saddle. Indian and Pakistani troops have been engaged here beginning 1984, but most lives have been lost to harsh terrain and weather (just 3 percent to enemy bullets and shelling).2 A very common illness that has claimed maximum lives is pulmonary edema in which the lungs fill with fluids and blood, causing suffocation. In addition to the climate and topographical difficulties of the glacier, there are political complexities surrounding the Siachen dispute and its linkage with the larger dispute over Kashmir. Within a couple of months following Indian independence and the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, both sides fought their first war over Kashmir after Pakistani troops and tribesmen entered Kashmir to overthrow the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh and wrest control of the region by stoking the passions of the Muslim majority population against him. Facing annihilation at the hands of the raiders, the Maharaja signed the Letter of Accession on October 26, legally acceding to India in conformity with the provisions of the Transfer of Power Act of the British parliament under which India was granted

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freedom. The accession was validated by the British governor general of India on the very day of the Maharaja’s signature. Following the accession, Indian troops moved into Kashmir and pushed back the infiltrators, but did not completely eliminate them. Consequently, on January 1, 1948, India referred the case to the UNSC in the context of Pakistani aggression and violation of India’s territorial integrity. The UNSC president, under UNSC Resolution 38 of January 17, called for direct India-Pakistan talks.3 On January 20 the UNSC passed Resolution 39 to investigate any “dispute or situation” as a matter of “urgency” and appointed the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to proceed to the spot with “dual functions”: First, to “investigate the facts pursuant to Article 34 of the UN Charter,” and second, “to exercise, without interrupting the work of the Security Council, any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties.”4 Subsequently, the Security Council adopted Resolution 47 of April 21, and “strongly” opined that “early restoration of peace and order in J&K is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting,” [and] “noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of J&K to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite.”5 UNSCR 47 recommended measures to end hostility and create “proper conditions” for such a plebiscite “to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan.”6 It called upon Pakistan to “secure the withdrawal from State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for the purpose of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the state of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the state.”7 The resolution recommended that once the withdrawal by Pakistan had been effected, India, in consultation with the UNCIP, was to draw up its own plan for withdrawal of troops from J&K to the “minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order.”8 The resolution also recommended certain directions regarding law-and-order conditions under which the plebiscite had to be conducted.9 A few months later, on August 13, the UNCIP passed a resolution10 which had three parts. Part I called for a ceasefire which India implemented from January 1, 1949. Part II made it incumbent upon Pakistani forces, both regular and irregular to withdraw from the occupied territory and urged India

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to reduce its troop strength in the area. Part III, now the fulcrum of debate, addressed determining the status of J&K in accordance with the “will of the people.”11 Thus, India and Pakistan agreed to a Ceasefire Line (CFL) that divided Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh on the Indian side and Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) and Azad Kashmir on Pakistan’s side. Ever since, India has maintained the integrity of Kashmir with the Indian Union—in the light of UN resolutions that declared Pakistan as aggressor—citing the legal sanctity of the Letter of Accession and the violation of its territoriality by Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan has ignored the troop-withdrawal clause of the UN resolutions and continued to occupy areas under the nomenclature Azad (independent) Kashmir. In 1965 India and Pakistan again fought over Kashmir, although the actual conflict had originated from the Western Sector in the Rann of Kutch. The war ended in 1965 with the Tashkent Accord by which captured territories were returned to both sides, but these were recaptured following the 1971 war, which ended with the unilateral ceasefire announced by India on December 17, 1971. With the Simla Agreement of 1972 the CFL was converted into the LoC that indicated which areas were under the control of India and which of Pakistan. Clause 4(ii) of the Agreement said: In Jammu and Kashmir, the LoC resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. . . .12

The dispute over Siachen originated over the position where the LoC ended: Point NJ 9842. General V.R. Raghavan, who has served as India’s commanding general in the Siachen sector, explained why the region encompassing Siachen is now contested. The general stated that map point NJ 9842 was chosen for convenience, being the corner of a square map, and easily identifiable. This was the closest point to the presence of the troops when fighting ended in 1948, and since there was no combat being waged beyond that point, the LoC had not been extended further. The agreement said that NJ 9842 would extend “thence north to the glaciers,” but did not explicitly mention whether this meant magnetic north, grid north, generally north, or—logically—along the highest northward watershed.13 As a

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result, Siachen has remained fiercely contested and is referred to by Pakistani leaders as a disputed no-man’s land.14 Being an undemarcated territory, the area north of NJ 9842 has been subject to Pakistani encroachments and attacks since 1984, with the motive of gaining territory by force.15 It is important to underline here that there is no occupation of the Siachen Glacier per se, but rather of the Saltoro Ridge that is the highest point in that zone and controls the access to the glaciers. Both India and Pakistan have offered their respective interpretation of the term “thence north” beyond the Point NJ 9842, as shown in Fig. 5.1, and claimed their rights to control the territory. While Pakistan claims the term means that the LoC goes to Karakoram Pass on the Pak-China border, India asserts a more westerly progression of the line along the Saltoro Ridge, south of Karakoram Pass.

Genesis of the Military Conflict The undemarcated status of Siachen Glacier turned it into a no-man’s land, thereby open to incursions and conflicting claims by both sides. It is Pakistan, however, that since 1978 has undertaken various mountaineering expeditions to the area and in the process claimed its de facto jurisdiction. In response, India undertook similar expeditions to counter any Pakistani claims. Although Pakistan ceased these expeditions by 1981, the Pakistani government devised a cartographic incursion, in which it complained that Indian troops must be withdrawn beyond the NJ 9842 line that joined with Karakoram Pass and Pakistan claimed, unilaterally, the direction of the “thence north” advance of the LoC. This move by the Pakistani government set the alarm bells ringing in New Delhi and, in response, India contested these claims and accused Pakistani troops of intruding into Indian territory. The decision was taken to occupy two key passes that gave access to Saltoro Ridge, Sia La and Bilafond La, before Pakistan did so. Knowing well that whoever captured these heights would dominate the area and foil any future intrusions by the adversary, Indian troops under Lieutenant General M.L. Chibber (head of Northern Command), undertook Operation Meghdoot in 1984 and on April 13 occupied Bilafond La, taking Sia La three days later. Ever since, Pakistani troops, beginning with the immediately launched Operation Ababeel, have endeavored to dislodge the Indian troops, but with little success. The ground positions of the two sides have

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remained frozen, with Indian troops occupying and controlling Saltoro Ridge and Pakistani troops stationed to the west of Saltoro, approximately seven miles from Siachen. Commenting on the Indian decision to preempt the Pakistanis, Robert Wirsing wrote: Precisely who shot first is probably impossible to determine. Which of the two armed forces had the “right” to be on the glacier—since the question of the legitimacy of the two sides’ territorial claims have never been submitted to impartial adjudication—is a matter obviously open to disagreement. There is ample evidence, however, that the Indian armed forces were the first to establish permanent posts on the glacier and that they had prepared themselves long and well for the task. [There is] little room for doubt, in fact, that the Pakistanis were caught napping and that their principal strategy for fortifying Pakistan’s claim to the glacier—sponsoring foreign mountaineering expeditions to the area—had failed.16

General Pervez Musharraf himself conceded in his 2006 memoir, In the Line of Fire, that Pakistan was comprehensively outplayed by India’s capturing the heights. From 1983 to mid-1984 he had been deputy director of operations (DDMO) to the Military Operations Directorate and had witnessed the operational planning of the Pakistani army at the highest level, and he was very much part of the planning process when Siachen fell to Indian forces. He confirms India’s anticipation that Pakistan would have occupied Saltoro Ridge to gain control of Siachen Glacier. He has also admitted that Pakistan feared India would try to capture Siachen, just as the Pakistani army planned to. General Musharraf recalled that the army had suggested early March as the time to make the move, a proposal that was turned down by the Superior General Officer commanding the Northern Areas on the grounds of harsh weather conditions. The officer suggested May 1 as the alternative date; a delay that subsequently turned out to be a tactical blunder. When the Pakistani army actually moved it found Indian troops already occupying the heights.17 In his account of Operation Meghdoot, Lieutenant General Chibber mentioned that after the expedition was undertaken by Colonel N. Kumar, in reaction to a Pakistan-sponsored expedition, the decision was taken by the Indian government that Siachen required regular patrolling, although it would be impossible to do so during winter months.18 Between 1974–80 Pakistan had undertaken many expeditions but according to Lieutenant General Chibber, these ceased after 1980.19

Figure 5.1

Siachen Glacier

Source: Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds., Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

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Since India’s preemptive capture of Saltoro Ridge, Pakistan has maintained constant pressure on the Indian troops by periodic military thrusts, shooting, and shelling by heavy artillery. Thus ensued extremely debilitating and expensive warfare. A.G. Noorani believes the conflict could have been averted had Indian and Pakistani leaders acted in 1983 to freeze the status quo as it then existed. Pakistan’s nascent motive to build permanent outposts in the area, as India managed to do first, violated the spirit of the Simla Agreement that said neither side was to take any action that might alter the ground situation. These developments revealed the abject failure of leadership on both sides in resorting to a military approach rather than to diplomacy to resolve the situation.20

Siachen’s Strategic Significance for India Unquestionably, the opinion in the strategic community remains divided over the strategic significance of Siachen for Indian security. The division exists along three broad options: first, continuing the occupation at all costs; second, finding a mutually agreed solution, and; third, withdrawing unilaterally.21 The first option, a dominant one, contends that on Siachen hinges the defense of Ladakh and J&K against any combined Sino-Pak offensive.22 In the Indian perception, Siachen’s geostrategic importance lies in not only providing for the defense of Ladakh and J&K,23 but Siachen is also considered critical for monitoring the Karakoram highway that connects with Aksai Chin; further, evacuation of the Saltoro heights could make Indian defensive positions in Turtuk untenable.24 By occupying the strategic passes along the Saltoro Ridge, India is in complete command of the area, but if these positions were relinquished, giving Pakistan the opportunity to occupy them, it would be impossible to recapture them. Pakistan’s repeated attempts to dislodge Indian troops stationed there confirm these estimates. Ironically, Lieutenant General Chibber, under whose command India had managed to capture Siachen in 1984, has changed in recent years his opinion on the significance of Siachen. Initially he argued that Siachen forms a wedge between Pakistan and China and the present positions, which have been controlled for many years, should not be vacated on the negotiating table.25 Subsequently, he wrote that Siachen had no strategic significance for India, only to retract this statement a few years later, saying that in the light of the troubles Pakistan is causing in J&K, Siachen is critical and should never be

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the starting point of discussion between the two sides.26 In June 1990 he observed: India’s military occupation of Saltoro Pass in Spring 1984 was meant only to deter the Pakistanis from getting there first. The Indian Army had no plans for permanent occupation. At the end of the day, the Siachen conflict was a mistake.27

Notwithstanding Chibber’s inconsistent claims, there are firm backers of India’s continued presence in Siachen, against all costs, who say the financial element should not be key to deciding whether to vacate the positions or not, and since India has controlled the heights for more than twenty-five years, it can continue to do so for many years to come. One such advocate is Gopalaswamy Parthasarthy, former Indian Ambassador to Pakistan who stated: Siachen is both a political and a military problem. . . . Militarily one can talk of demilitarization but if Pakistan captures Siachen, it will be difficult to take back. Defence of the country should never be measured in terms of Rupees. Any country that puts a price tag on its defences will cease to exist. It’s a battle of endurance and Indian territories should not be bartered.28

Others, too, are opposed to the withdrawal and contend: Positions gained and maintained after fierce fighting cannot be given away through talks, since there is no guarantee who will violate the pact and regain more than what was in their possession earlier.29

Former Siachen brigade commander Lieutenant General A.B. Massih, however, puts the onus on New Delhi saying: Siachen is a political problem and not a military one. If guys in Delhi decide to pull out from Saltoro ridge the army would have no problems in that.30

But J.N. Dixit, the late Indian foreign secretary and ambassador to Pakistan, strongly contested Massih’s claims, stating: There’s a great deal of ambiguity on the part of the military. Why does the military not go and say that Siachen does not have any strategic significance? Calling it just a political problem is nonsense. Of course, all problems are political first.31

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On the other hand those who represent the second option put forth a different perspective from the military’s standpoint and say: The dispute is political in nature but has a military manifestation. There is very little significance that Siachen holds for India and prolonged deployment is only giving a diminishing return. Therefore it must be settled on mutually acceptable terms.32

Analysts such as A.G. Noorani, represent the third option and argue that a negotiated or unilateral Indian withdrawal would be wise, as the disputed region is uninhabitable and has no strategic value and the resolution of the Siachen confrontation could possibly induce some thaw in the Kashmir dispute as well.33 This raises the question of the linkage between Siachen and Kashmir disputes, a linkage that has not only hampered progress on the Siachen dispute but also on overall Indo-Pak relations. Sensing this linkage as the key to clearing up the lingering conflict, some believe that the solution lies in delinking Siachen from Kashmir.34 The high costs to India, which must overcome the logistical constraints of maintaining supplies by air (unlike Pakistan’s land-based supply lines), certainly put an enormous drain on India’s economic resources. Meanwhile, the common challenge of weather and terrain for both India and Pakistan could become the catalyst for delinking the two disputes. Despite these constraints, the key question is: In the light of the Kargil intrusion of 1999 that indicated Pakistan’s bid to create a Siachen-type situation for India, can delinking be accomplished? It is hard to negate the predominant understanding that “the issues related to the Siachen Glacier constitutes only a subset of a larger conflict . . . concerning the state of Jammu and Kashmir. . . .”35 The Kargil Review Committee report concluded that the prime motive behind Pakistan’s intrusion in Kargil was to create another Siachen under General Pervez Musharraf, who earlier in 1987, during his posting in the Northern Areas as Commander of the Special Services Group, had made an abortive attempt to capture Bilafond La.36 Since 1987 Pakistan has attempted to create pressure points elsewhere along the LoC in order to squeeze India’s position in Siachen. General Mirza Aslam Beg himself revealed that in 1987 the Pakistan army planned to occupy peaks in the Kargil area to block the Srinagar–Leh highway, disrupt land supply lines to Ladakh, and then launch an assault on Indian troops on the Shyok River. The plan was

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turned down by Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yakub Khan but was implemented in 1999 by General Musharraf.37

Siachen’s Importance for Pakistan Pakistan’s policy on Siachen is based on delinking it with the Kashmir problem and calling it a regional issue, unlike the Kashmir dispute, which it considers as an international dispute. While demanding demilitarization of the Siachen area, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry refuses any direct linkage of the Siachen issue with the Kashmir dispute.38 It is ironic that a region that actually lies in the J&K region and was left undemarcated due to the difficulties of delineating the boundary on the ground (largely due to harsh weather and rough terrain) is delinked from the Kashmir dispute by Pakistan. There is a linkage that cannot be denied by either side. On the other hand several pending disputes, and the overall trajectory of bilateral relations that encompasses economic and resources disputes including the Sir Creek dispute, have been linked to progress on the Kashmir dispute. The vague language of the 1972 Simla Agreement has caused much of the Pakistan’s cartographic aggression, which has also been facilitated by erroneous maps and cartographic aberrations by the National Geographic Society’s Atlas of the World, the University of Chicago’s A Historical Atlas of South Asia, and the Times Atlas of the World.39 India has interpreted the term “thence north” to imply that the LoC beyond NJ 9842 should join Sia Kangri, whereas Pakistan has claimed that it should join the Karakoram Pass. Pakistan interprets the vague language contained in the Simla Agreement to mean the LoC should extend in a straight line in a northeasterly direction from NJ 9842 toward the Karakoram Pass. Ironically, while Pakistan ceded part of the occupied Kashmir territory to China in 1963, it simultaneously described the area south of the border not as Pakistani territory but as being under its “actual control.”40 Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry claims that Siachen lies in Baltistan in the Northern Areas, which is under the direct federal control of Pakistan, while claiming the Northern Areas was never a part of the J&K jurisdiction; this means that Siachen is a part of Pakistan’s territory.41 Pakistan contends that prior to 1984 the administrative control of Siachen had remained under its domain and that India’s occupation of Siachen was a violation of the Simla Agreement. Such contentions overlook the fact that the language of

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the Simla Agreement itself is vague and has been interpreted differently by both sides. As a part of its strategy to project its control over Siachen, Pakistan has been undertaking mountaineering expeditions to the area and at times allowing them free of charge, which revealed its motive to stretch the LoC to the Karakoram Pass. Prior to 1984 Pakistan had accepted the no-man’s land argument over Siachen, and post-1984 it countered India’s occupation by arguing that it lay in the Northern Areas, part of Pakistan. In the post-1984 phase Pakistan has tried to transform its disadvantageous position on the west of Saltoro Ridge into an advantage by maintaining year-round supplies and keeping constant pressure on the Indian positions, making India “bleed” both in economic and human terms. Pakistan continues to question India’s occupation of the Siachen Glacier and has turned down proposals for a unilateral withdrawal on account of the high costs and logistical and geographical difficulties. It is unwilling to concede on Siachen just as India is reluctant to alter its stated stand on Siachen. Pakistani strategy has been a combination of cartographic arguments over the administrative control of Siachen, bilateral talks with India to reach a mutually agreed solution, and periodic military assaults to dislodge Indian troops. The deadlock remains and both sides are unwilling to budge from the position that no piece of sovereign territory can be ceded, whatever the cost.

Indo-Pak Peace Process and the Siachen Dispute The Siachen Glacier dispute was included in the 1984 Indo-Pak negotiation agenda, and in New Delhi in December 1985 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani President Zia-ul Haq agreed to hold talks at the defense secretary level to resolve the dispute. Subsequently, in 1989 Gandhi and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan were believed very close to an agreement, but some refute suggestions that India ever committed to any troop withdrawal. Bhutto lost power shortly afterward, in 1990, and in 1991 Gandhi was assassinated, and ever since peace has had no realistic chance in Siachen. In conjunction, the spurt in cross-border terrorism in J&K following the 1987 election in Kashmir and the initiation of an insurgency abetted by Pakistan’s growing antagonism, ruled out the possibility of any compromise in Indo-Pak disputes, including Siachen.

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On Siachen several suggestions have emerged: from demilitarization and joint monitoring of the area to turning it into a peace park or a center for scientific research.42 During the first round of the defense secretaries’ talks in January 1986 nothing could be achieved due to accusations and counter-accusations by both sides regarding violation of the tenets of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan claimed the Indian protests over the Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement of 1963 implied Indian recognition of Pakistan’s possession of the areas to the west of Karakoram Pass. Pakistan also referred to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s statement in the Parliament that “Pakistan’s Line of actual control . . . reached the Karakoram Pass.”43 India rejected these claims, labeling them as purely Pakistani interpretations. In the second round of talks India indicated the possibility of a ceasefire to be followed up by measures for de-escalation of tensions, but Pakistan rejected any proposal for a ceasefire as this would have eased pressure on the Indian troops. The negotiations ended without any agreement apart from approving the continuation of talks in the future.44 The third round was held in May 1988 in Rawalpindi, where both sides held some focused talks dealing with the specifics of a possible disengagement of troops, but both were wary of any political fallout following a disengagement, fearing it might be seen by domestic constituencies in both countries and by their opposition parties as a sign of weakness or as a sell-out. In Pakistan the situation was more complicated than in India largely due to the confrontation between the military regime of General Zia-ul Haq and the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) led by Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Consequently, the talks ended without achieving any breakthrough; they merely highlighted the impact of domestic politics on international negotiations, particularly on such contentious issues. The fourth round of negotiations in New Delhi in September 1988 was held during a fluid political situation in Pakistan following the sudden death of General Zia-ul Haq in an air crash. The new democratic government was yet to be established, with elections due for November, but the caretaker government reiterated Pakistan’s willingness to carry on with the negotiations in the meantime. In the September talks the Indian side called for a ceasefire followed by demarcation of the border in accordance with the troops’ positions; this was promptly rejected by Pakistan. A second Indian offer for a ceasefire and a partial troop withdrawal, leaving only a

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nominal military presence in the areas under the control of the two sides, was turned down as well. Any proposal effecting military restraint was a nonstarter for Pakistan, which was quite understandable as it would not only have eased pressure on India but also would have amounted to acknowledging de facto Indian control over the area. Interestingly, Pakistan was cognizant of Indian domestic compulsions and was willing to discuss some form of “redeployment” leading to an eventual complete withdrawal, but the talks ended without any concrete progress in the end. In December Bhutto became prime minister of Pakistan and on June 15, 1989, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi sent a delegation to Rawalpindi for talks. Both sides went into these talks with their own perceptions and proposals. India proposed the cessation of “cartographic aggression” by Pakistan; establishment of a demilitarized zone (DMZ); exchange of maps; authentication of the LoC beyond NJ 9842 as per the ground positions; and establishment of ground rules to regulate future military operations and mutually agreed redeployment of troops. Pakistan on the other hand proposed for troop redeployment to the pre-1972 positions and delimitation of the LoC beyond NJ 9842.45 In the talks the Indian delegation discussed all possibilities of demilitarization, redeployment, and identification of each others’ ground positions. The Joint Communiqué of June 17, 1989, after the talks ended, was interpreted by Pakistan as positive, indicating there was some kind of mutual agreement for the redeployment of forces to both reduce future chances of military conflict and reach a comprehensive settlement for enduring peace in Siachen.46 Subsequent speculations aired by Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Humayun Khan, followed by the remarks of Indian Foreign Secretary S.K. Singh on the overall optimism in the talks, were interpreted as an Indian endorsement of withdrawal of troops. The eagerness of Pakistan’s civilian government to enhance its status by showing it was able to secure an Indian withdrawal to pre-1972 positions encouraged false hopes for that withdrawal, which prompted New Delhi soon afterward to overrule the possibility. Pakistan also followed suit allaying any unfounded hopes on the issue. In some sections of the Indian media, however, the decision was attributed to Indian reluctance to withdraw in an election year.47 It is important to bear in mind here that while Bhutto’s civilian government was negotiating with India it was not in the confidence of its military. It is fair to mention that the Bhutto government was not

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really aware of what the military was doing in Siachen, and the abortive Pakistani operations at Saltoro Ridge in May, prior to the talks, was a case in point. In this context the eagerness of Bhutto’s regime to achieve some form of Indian withdrawal and thereby validate her government’s stand with General Headquarters in Rawalpindi was understandable. Another meeting between the Indo-Pak military representatives, held in New York the following July, also failed to make headway due to Pakistan’s reluctance to identify the respective ground positions of the two sides and its insistence on a complete Indian withdrawal before any possible options for a lasting peace could be discussed. In July 1989 Rajiv Gandhi paid a bilateral visit to Pakistan but the subsequent talks of July 16–17 failed to yield any substantial result. Meetings of military representatives on July 11–13 and August 17–18 likewise ended without tangible progress or agreement. After a span of three years, the sixth round of talks was held in New Delhi on November 2–6, 1992.48 During the interim the regional and global climate had altered dramatically in the wake of many unprecedented developments, including: the change in leadership in both New Delhi and Islamabad, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the end of Cold War, and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. In these talks Pakistan again reiterated its demand for the withdrawal of Indian troops to pre-1972 positions before any meaningful proposal could be taken up for resolving the dispute. Although the two sides again discussed a broad range of issues, including disengagement and redeployment of troops, monitoring, maintenance of peace, and implementation schedules for these possibilities, the talks ended with the agreement to hold further talks. It was agreed that the immediate focus should be on restoring peace and tranquility in Siachen. Toward this end, without prejudice to the position taken by either side in earlier rounds of talks, India’s position was that Point NJ 9842 should extend to Sia Kangri while Pakistan’s position was that NJ 9842 should join with the Karakoram Pass. Both sides agreed that the delineation of the LoC beyond NJ 9842 would have to be examined later by a joint commission.49 Both also agreed that to reduce tensions in Siachen, they would disengage from legitimate positions then being occupied and fall back to new positions as follows: This disengagement and redeployment of forces, aimed at securing peace and tranquility in the area, is without prejudice to the known

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positions of either side. Both sides agree that the positions/areas vacated will constitute a zone of complete disengagement (ZOD). Both sides commit: (a) That they shall not seek to reoccupy the positions vacated by them or to occupy the positions vacated by either side, or to establish new positions across the alignment determined by the vacated positions; (b) That they shall not undertake any military, mountaineering, or any other activity whatsoever in the ZOD. (c) That if either side violated the commitment in (a) and (b) above, the other shall be free to respond through any means, including military.50

Both sides also decided to evolve a mechanism for monitoring the disputed area to prevent future violations and to maintain peace and tranquility there. Further, it was also agreed that they would disengage and redeploy according to a time schedule to be worked out to mutual satisfaction.51 In 1997 Indo-Pak relations underwent a pathbreaking restructuring when both sides agreed to tread a middle-path of negotiations on all pending disputes simultaneously and not allow any preference to one dispute over others. Thus, the CDP was created, consisting of eight baskets of disputes (including the Siachen dispute) for parallel discussions, discarding the “Kashmir first” approach. The first round of talks on Siachen as a part of the CDP was held in New Delhi on November 6, 1998, against the backdrop of the IndoPak nuclear tests of May 1998. The talks were led by the Indian and Pakistani defense secretaries, Ajit Kumar and Lieutenant General (Retd.) Iftikhar Ali Khan, respectively. They were conducted while reports of Pakistani military assaults on Indian posts at Siachen were featured in the media. At the conclusion of the talks, as per diplomatic sources, Pakistan called for the redeployment of troops on the basis of the 1989 “agreement.” The subsequent joint statement indicated that while no concrete breakthrough was achieved both sides agreed to continue the talks. On the issue of redeployment, India suggested adopting an “incremental” approach that could eventually lead to complete normalization. Sources said, “India at the talks proposed a package of CBMs that would lead to a ‘comprehensive ceasefire’ in the Saltoro range region.” New Delhi also sought a freeze on the ground positions of troops of both sides to “immediately defuse tension and atmosphere of confrontation in the area.” It was also agreed in principle that specific “modalities” to assure the ceasefire was durable could be discussed in an “agreed framework.”52

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It was anticipated that a bilateral monitoring mechanism could be put in place; this included flag meetings, meetings with formation commanders at “periodic levels,” and the establishment of a hotline between divisional commanders, but the Pakistani proposal that a third party or international monitoring mechanism was essential to supervise the ceasefire in the Siachen area was rejected by India. These steps conformed to the Indian “suggestion” with regard to improving communication between the two sides, which was made in October 1998 at the foreign secretary-level talks in Islamabad.53 Although nothing substantial emerged from the talks, the context nonetheless was extremely vital for both sides because India had undergone a change in regime that was now led by the right-wing Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), which had taken the decision of conducting the nuclear test that had added an incendiary mix to a tumultuous and conflict-prone rivalry. The two sides were genuinely eager to put a lid on all prospective military conflicts to rule out the possibility of a nuclear confrontation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in February 1999 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee undertook a bus trip to Lahore to improve the goodwill between the two countries and to induce confidence in the otherwise estranged ties. The prime minister signed the Lahore Declaration with Prime Minister Nawaz Shari, but the resulting euphoria proved short-lived. It soon became known that while the declaration was being signed the Pakistani military had been putting final touches to an infiltration bid in the Kargil sector of J&K. This resulted in a military confrontation in the J&K sector, causing the deaths of hundreds on both sides. The Pakistani intruders were repulsed from the occupied areas and Pakistan had to withdraw its troops under pressure from United States officials who met with Sharif in Washington. This withdrawal was perceived by the enraged Pakistani military as a humiliation and caused an enormous rift between Sharif and General Pervez Musharraf. In October 1999 Sharif was overthrown in a military coup and the Indo-Pak peace initiatives were relegated to cold storage. India refused to negotiate with the military regime and the CDP was suspended. Bilateral relations dipped further following the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane in 1999 and increased terrorist attacks in India. The bid by Atal Behari Vajpayee to revive the peace process by inviting General Musharraf to hold talks in Agra in April 2002 produced no outcome whatsoever. Relations plummeted to an all-time low following the terrorist attack on the Indian

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Parliament in December 2001. Pakistan became a U.S. ally in the war on terror (WOT) and Pakistan-based terrorist groups operated with impunity against India, forcing India to cut all links with Pakistan. When the peace process and ties with Pakistan were resumed, one immediate positive development was the declaration of a ceasefire along the IB, LoC, and also along the AGPL in Siachen. This ceasefire played a vital part in improving the otherwise tense atmosphere. Subsequently the talks on Siachen resumed on August 6–8, 2004, at the defense secretary level to inclusively discuss the modalities for disengagement and redeployment of troops, and ended with the view to hold further talks on the matter.54 Press reports in India presented a positive picture of the talks, saying that the focus of the two sides had been primarily on redeployment and disengagement but also adding a caveat that, though India faced difficulties in the form of harsh terrain hampering smooth delivery of supplies, it was nonetheless in an advantageous military position, and would have to thoroughly consider all possibilities and ramifications of any redeployment or disengagement agreed upon by the two sides.55 The two foreign secretaries met in New Delhi on September 4, 2004, to focus on the progress made so far more than to discuss the technicalities involved. In this year there was a regime change in New Delhi, and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) lost to the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), but the peace process was not affected by the change. At various times in 2005 several rounds of discussions were held: at the summit level between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf, and at the level of foreign secretaries, foreign ministers, and defense secretaries, but the two sides failed to achieve any breakthrough on Siachen. On May 22–23, 2006, the ninth round of talks on Siachen was held in New Delhi at the defense-secretary level, ending with the two sides agreeing to continue with the ceasefire and with future talks. Indian defense minister Pranab Mukherjee said Pakistan had rejected India’s proposal on the methodology of demilitarization and, although both sides did agree in principle to withdraw from their present positions, the Pakistani refusal to delineate and authenticate the troops’ positions in a document hampered progress, and this perennially remained the core area of disagreement.56 The dispute again featured in the discussion during New Delhi foreign-secretary level meetings on November 14–15, 2006, in which the basic contention over the authentication of troop positions on the glacier again hampered progress.57

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In Islamabad on April 6–7, 2007, defense secretaries Shekhar Dutt of India and Kamran Rasool of Pakistan again met to discuss the matter, but failed to achieve any tangible success. The post-talks joint statement was issued in a template fashion, stating that the “talks were held in a candid and constructive atmosphere,” and that both sides had agreed to resolve their differences in a “peaceful manner.”58 Press reports did underline the disappointment of both sides, calling pre-talk optimism as misplaced. The reports said Pakistan was “disappointed” with India’s “arrogance” and its rigid stance insisting on “authentication of the AGPL before anything else.” According to the reports, Pakistan also said India did not respond to the “detailed plan” given by Pakistan at the November 2006 Foreign Secretaries talks—of which plan India said it was not aware.59 In the meantime Pakistani press reports indicated a notable and interesting shift in the mindset of Pakistan, showing an increased willingness on its part to reach common ground. The reports said Pakistan had proposed a “middle way,” offering to “acknowledge” the current positions of Indian troops rather than to “authenticate” them; this seemed to endorse tacitly India’s present position in Siachen.60 These reports were not confirmed by the Indian side, however, and not much was heard of them in the time period immediately following. Nevertheless, this development did bring about an interesting twist in the dispute-resolution process. Press reports on the April 2007 defense secretary-level talks in Islamabad mentioned that Pakistan was willing to “record” the present troop positions, but added that this would have to be a part of the larger deal, including disengagement and implementation of the 1989 “agreement.”61

Analysis of the Negotiations Between 1984 and 2007, India and Pakistan held eleven rounds of talks but with little progress. The failure to reach a compromise or solution warrants close scrutiny to enable the exploration of an alternative strategy or the addressing of impediments to enhancing the chances of resolution. This necessitates a study of the nature and dynamics of the negotiations and the prevailing circumstances.

Ripeness of the Dispute At the very outset it is important to ascertain whether the dispute is ripe for negotiation and resolution. From our survey, it would appear

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that the Siachen dispute is not yet ripe for resolution for several reasons. First, the Siachen Glacier has over the years witnessed intermittent artillery shelling and skirmishes resulting from each side’s attempts to dislodge the other from occupied posts, and this continued to be the case until the ceasefire was announced in 2004. On many occasions fighting and shelling have continued even while the two sides have been sitting across the table in New Delhi and Islamabad. The Pakistani offensives that began in May 1989 at the Chumik Glacier, continuing throughout the 1990s and culminating in the Kargil War in 1999, indicated that GHQ in Rawalpindi preferred a predominantly military strategy to settle the conflict. In addition, the exchange of heavy artillery in this area remained a permanent feature of Indo-Pak engagement until ceasefire was declared in 2004—even while at the political level the two parties periodically negotiated. In an atmosphere plagued with incidents of armed confrontation, it becomes extremely difficult for the conflicting parties to reach a compromise. Fighting has to cease for a sustained period in order to build an atmosphere conducive to successful negotiations. Second, in the eighth round of talks, held in New Delhi, Lieutenant General (Retd.) Iftikhar Ali Khan stated: A cease-fire agreement would only freeze the current situation not lead to peace or troop disengagement and would thereby provide India the opportunity to consolidate its position. It is a very difficult and complex situation. It will take time.62

The statement shows too many differences have persisted regarding the ground situation and the respective negotiating positions of the two sides. The essence of the talks between 1984 and the April 2007 round reinforces the fact that both sides were sticking to their respective positions and still viewing the dispute as a zero-sum game. India is reluctant to vacate its current military positions because it harbors a deficit of trust for Pakistan, which in turn is unwilling to accept any proposal that does not entail troop withdrawals and disengagement as per the 1989 “agreement.” Both sides do agree in principle that the dispute has to be settled peacefully, but occasional skirmishes and firing on the glacier have discouraged New Delhi from contemplating any troop withdrawals. Third, the resolution of the Siachen dispute will require loads of political will in both capitals, and political will, it seems, is shaped by

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the overall shade and tenor of India-Pakistan relations. The memories of Kargil still plague the Indian psyche, and unrelenting terrorist attacks on Indian soil, originating from POK, have grown over the years in intensity and scale, lowering India’s public and political trust in Pakistan. At the conclusion of the November 6, 1998, talks in New Delhi, Indian Defense Secretary Ajit Kumar responded to a questioner asking why India backed out of the 1989 agreement, and he placed emphasis on his belief that the changing ground situation has compelled India to rethink earlier formulations[, and] a primary factor in this regard has been the spurt in guerrilla activities against Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir after 1989.63

Another senior Indian defense official noted: Ultimately, Siachen is only part of the entire range of Indo-Pakistan disagreements, especially over Jammu and Kashmir. If the Pakistanis gained control of the dominating heights of the Siachen Glacier to the North of Kashmir, infiltration of guerrillas from Azad Kashmir into Ladakh would become much easier. The Indian army has bitter memories of territory splashed with blood, sweat and tears. And to lose them in talks with Pakistanis would be very demoralizing for the forces.64

The May 1999 intrusion, supported by the Pakistan army, in the Batalik, Drass, and Mushkoh sectors of the Kargil region had led to an undeclared war between India and Pakistan. The underlying motive behind this operation was revealed by General Musharraf, who wrote that he had planned to pull a Siachen surprise on India and capture some peaks in the Kargil region, then strike a tradeoff with India.65 The plan failed to yield the desired outcome, however, as Indian troops evicted the intruders and reclaimed the territory. Yet, in one stroke, the war eroded whatever limited spirit of rapprochement had germinated in India and Pakistan since the initiation of the peace process in 1997. As a result, in India there runs a deep aversion to initiating any unilateral withdrawal. Before the Kargil War, the late J.N. Dixit once observed: India should have shown more flexibility. The dispute should be solved in stages. Both sides should move back and sign a standstill agreement not to go up again. Then progress can be made towards a solution.66

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Such was the mood in New Delhi among leading strategists in the pre-Kargil War phase, but it diminished after the war and has waned completely because of terrorist attacks on India. At present the Indian leadership finds it hard to trust the intentions of Pakistan should India decide to order a troop-withdrawal from Siachen. Fourth, although some sections in India’s strategic community consider Siachen of great political significance, Kent L. Biringer argues that India might eventually withdraw from there. He says, “The high cost in financial and human terms of continuing this confrontation makes it an excellent candidate for cooperation while minimizing strategic or military disadvantage.”67 Biringer’s observations are not misplaced and can explain India’s decision to build a road up to the Siachen Glacier to reduce the high expenditure associated with maintaining air-supported positions. Indian troops have been provided with snow-traversing scooters to carry commodities with greater ease and swiftness. The construction of the road is an important indicator of India’s willingness to stay should no compromise be reached between the two sides.68 G. Parthasarthy, former high commissioner to Pakistan and a security expert, argues strongly against the economic logic for withdrawal, saying India has borne the burden for so long and can continue to do so indefinitely, and any country that sees territorial integrity in economic terms will cease to exist.69 In conflict-resolution parlance, a mutually hurting stalemate plays an important role in making disputes ripe for resolution. But in India’s case, though the dispute does hurt in economic and human terms, it does not hurt to an extent that India is forced into a compromise. Fifth, the role of leadership is extremely critical in making a dispute ripe for settlement, but leadership is very much reliant on the nature of the regime it heads and on the existing nature of bilateral ties. For instance, the long interval between the second and third round of talks was to a great extent the result of the tussle for power between Benazir Bhutto and General Zia. In that period Pakistani leadership faced a challenge from the opposition and lacked confidence. Before Zia’s death, when Rajiv Gandhi was in power, both Zia and Rajiv had pushed for the normalization of relations founded on their verbal exchanges and promises, but domestic political turmoil in Pakistan (including Bhutto’s continual pressure on General Zia for losing Siachen) had weakened the central authority to some extent. Bhutto’s popularity was increasing and led the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) against the military regime. She

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headed the MRD protest march in the streets with a plate-full of bangles for the Pakistani generals shouting, “Wear these bangles if you cannot fight on the Siachen.”70 Ironically, after Zia’s death in the August 17, 1988, air crash, Bhutto came to power, but hostilities resumed on the glacier because now the military refused to cooperate with her. This struggle between two power centers in Pakistan—the office of the prime minister and the military—has throughout had a negative impact on the Indo-Pak peace process. This schism can also be discerned from the statement of Benazir Bhutto after her loss in the 1997 elections in which she said that her defeat proves her policy on Kashmir had been an utter failure. Although she had raised the Kashmir issue on every possible platform around the world during her tenure, Bhutto implied in an interview that she did not have the backing of the military top brass for her Kashmir policy.71 Similarly, in the case of Nawaz Sharif when he was signing the Lahore Declaration with his Indian counterpart, the military was not very pleased with the ensuing bonhomie and behind the scenes was planning the Kargil intrusion. Also, Bhutto and Sharif accused each other of a sell-out to India, especially on the issue of Kashmir. Such schisms between leadership and power centers in Pakistan have remained major impediments, not only in the Siachen dispute, but in other disputes as well. Interestingly, on the Indian side short-term and unstable regimes in the mid-1990s did not hamper progress on the peace process because, irrespective of the regime at the center and its level of stability, there existed an underlying willingness in India for peace with Pakistan. In fact it was under I.K. Gujral that the CDP was established in 1997 even though Gujral himself prematurely exited from power. There has been a broader consensus on the Indian side that the peace process with Pakistan is necessary, but differences come to the fore when specific disputes are addressed. Also, no Indian leadership has proved ready to take the unilateral plunge on Kashmir and Siachen and thereby earn the fury and accusations of the opposition. Leadership in India has shown considerable compromise and willingness to push the peace process irrespective of the nature of the regime at the center. As a matter of fact, against Pakistan’s apprehensions the peace process made significant progress under the BJP government. As a leader, Atal Behari Vajpayee deserves accolades for pushing the peace talks and for resuming the peace process whenever any untoward incident derailed it. Rapprochement has continued under the leadership of Manmohan Singh and, though

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India has continued to suffer from terrorist attacks, the Congressled United Progressive Alliance has ensured that the peace process does not become suspended for very long. In the wake of the 2006 terrorist attacks on the Mumbai commuter train the peace process was suspended, but it resumed shortly after. However, after the brazen terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 the peace process was suspended and the talks resumed only in February 2010. In the interim the Indian leadership utilized every opportunity to keep the channel of communication with Pakistan open, such as in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009 and Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2009 after June 2009. All this suggests that, given the volatile nature of Indo-Pak relations, leadership has an important role to play in the resolution of disputes. On the question of Siachen, however, while the leaders of India and Pakistan have managed to continue with the talks, they have not been able to reach any compromise for resolution of the conflict. Therefore, the dispute does appear ripe for negotiations but not for resolution of the realities on the ground. With Pakistan becoming internally unstable as a result of rising extremism, with the political struggle between the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the opposition led by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), and considering the military’s preoccupation fighting the Taliban in the tribal areas, India seems less inclined to push the peace process. It is prudent as well to wait for the situation in Pakistan to stabilize so that its leadership can more easily pick up the threads of the peace process with India. When Pakistan is fighting for its own survival, India cannot expect much from its leadership. Sixth, there also exists a perceptible difference between the two countries over the broad approach to settling the dispute. For long Pakistan has rejected India’s proposal for a ceasefire in Siachen as it did not want to ease pressure off the Indian troops. Pakistan insisted the two sides should first address the question of troop disengagements in the area. India proposed a CBMs package that was expected to lead to a “comprehensive cease fire” in the Saltoro range region. Indian defense secretary Ajit Kumar said a ceasefire in Siachen was necessary in order to address the altered military situation in the area and to “freeze” troop positions of both sides in order to defuse tensions.72 A senior Pakistani diplomat speaking at a press conference after the November 6, 1998, talks said a ceasefire in the region would bring no peace and tranquility unless the troops were disengaged.73 In 2004, after the ceasefire had been agreed on the AGPL, the two parties remained deadlocked over the next step. India has proposed

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to delineate and authenticate in a document the present ground positions of the troops before any disengagement or redeployment can be negotiated. Pakistan has rejected this proposal outright, fearing it would amount to accepting India’s claim over Siachen. Consequently, the parties have continued to face deadlocks and failures in the talks, and unless there is consensus over a mutually agreed approach to demilitarizing the area, any ripeness for talks will not transform into ripeness for settlement. Finally, the linkage of Siachen with the larger Kashmir dispute is also a factor impeding possible compromise between India and Pakistan. Muhammad Mujeeb Afzal wrote in The News: A negotiated settlement between Pakistan and India is possible but the atmosphere is not conducive. The dispute has become linked with the overall Kashmir issue. Both countries cannot retreat from their positions because it will amount to recognition of the other’s stand. India has invested so much human and material resources in it that any retreat means defeat for it. There is a general feeling of mistrust about each other. Moreover, both countries perceive that their high national interests are at stake. Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmed Khan holds the view that the Siachen aggression is not an isolated event. It is a part of the grand strategy of India in the region. India links the issue with the Kashmir issue and with the survival of the Indian Union. In fact, Suneet Chopra (Indian journalist) has also argued against the compromise over Siachen. He is of the opinion that it will affect the Indian claim to the whole state of Kashmir. Furthermore, it will not end the dispute but begin a process of dismemberment of India. It is very difficult to foresee the success of a negotiated settlement in such a highly charged ambience.74

In sum, the Siachen dispute seems ripe for negotiations but not for any settlement. Whatever progress has in principle been made in terms of the ceasefire and an agreement to settle it peacefully, this progress has been largely due to the growing willingness in India and Pakistan for better relations. Since 1997 such willingness for peace has pushed both parties to hold talks, but unforeseen incidents in the form of terrorism have undermined this willingness and spirit of compromise.

Prenegotiation Given the elements of prenegotiation it can be said that India and Pakistan have prenegotiated on the Siachen dispute for a long period

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of time, and the nature of territorial disputes warrants such prolonged prenegotiation. Between 1989–92 the negotiators discussed all possible aspects of the dispute, exchanged data, maps, documents, and other information and managed to underline their basic differences and identify potential areas of compromise and agreement. These talks gave the parties a sense of direction and approach that is the purpose of prenegotiation. What the two sides failed to achieve during this period—and which is a key component of prenegotiation—was reducing the intensity of conflict by ceasing to fight. The guns continued to boom and Pakistan kept pressing the Indian troops through periodic assaults. The tense atmospherics that resulted, including domestic pressure in both countries, made the task of negotiators much more complicated and led to the repudiation by both sides of the existence of definite and tangible terms of agreement. These circumstances also compelled officials to deny any progress that was achieved in previous rounds and to start things afresh. In the 1990s disruption in talks from time to time did not help negotiators either, and every time talks were held negotiators spent valuable time and energy in taking stock of progress previously made. Ironically, one unintended outcome of this situation was that India and Pakistan looked at the same data, maps, and pieces of information countless times and updated their previous negotiated efforts. This allowed both to be fully aware of all the important facts, mutual viewpoints, constraints, and objections. Between 1986 and 2007 negotiations on Siachen and, for that matter Indo-Pak relations, have come a long way. Although the failure of the two sides to lower the intensity of the conflict has kept tension smoldering and prevented talks from moving forward in a sustained and meaningful manner, the 2004 ceasefire along the AGPL can be considered a major breakthrough and an indication of policy-shift on the dispute—more so on the Pakistani side. During these last years the other subsidiary success of the negotiations was acknowledgment of the existence of the dispute— more so by India. In Pakistan historically, due to conflict of interest between civil and the military, the Siachen dispute has eluded any consensus building and the predominant military approach adopted by the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi has had an adverse influence on negotiations. Nonetheless, since 2004 India and Pakistan have tried to transform hostility into peace and cooperation by implementing the

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ceasefire and exploring various mechanisms. Also during this period there emerged a consensus among the parties that the dispute could not be settled unilaterally and could only be resolved through cooperative and joint efforts. Although differences do persist over the mode and mechanism of conflict resolution the desire to de-escalate the fighting and settle the issue in order to minimize the financial and human costs can be regarded as the core success of prenegotiation.

Negotiations It will be fair to submit that between 1986 and 2007 India and Pakistan have negotiated every piece of information, data, and relevant fact and there is hardly any aspect of the dispute that is unknown to both sides. Widely ranging issues, including maintenance of peace on Siachen, monitoring mechanisms, disengagement, redeployment, and a time-bound implementation of various proposals have been discussed. All through this period the parties, although agreeable to the need for peace and tranquility in the area, were unable to implement such on the ground. Pakistan was unwilling to declare a ceasefire and wanted to maintain optimum pressure on the Indian troops, which was a logical decision on its part. It is a different matter that this policy has not succeeded in ejecting Indian troops from Siachen. The two sides also agreed in principle that they would disengage from the area and the vacated positions be declared a Zone of Complete Disengagement (ZOD). To facilitate this India and Pakistan developed an understanding that neither would reoccupy the vacated positions and that both would refrain from undertaking any mountaineering expedition or military exercise in the ZOD. To ensure compliance with this understanding, both sides also discussed the possibility of putting effective monitoring mechanisms in place. Encouraged by this shared understanding, several institutions undertook study of the technicalities of the dispute and proposed mechanisms to reduce hostilities, maintain peace, and move toward eventual resolution. The Cooperative Monitoring Centre at the Sandia National Laboratories has developed mechanisms for the de-escalation of hostilities, disengagement of troops, and demilitarization of the area—all to be followed up by verification techniques, both unilateral and cooperative, to ensure compliance. There exist multiple verification measures varying in degrees of intrusiveness and compliance assurance, such as aerial over-flights in the relevant

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airspace. The appropriate verification technology includes aerial sensing, satellites, ground sensors, video and optical sensors, tags and seals, and periodic inspections.75 Over the years analysts and professional experts have recommended various ways of resolving the imbroglio. One suggests that negotiations for the resolution must end in a clear, well-declared, and well-phrased verdict decreeing that demilitarization would not alter either party’s claims on Siachen, and also ensuring that a time-bound mechanism is mutually envisaged to determine Siachen’s future. This expert also refers to resorting to international arbitration should the need arise.76 Although the suggestion for a well-phrased and declared verdict on the demilitarization modalities is well-taken, the idea of third-party involvement in the form of international arbitration or the UN or international monitoring is something New Delhi rejects in principle. In recent years suggestions pertaining to Siachen becoming a peace park, to the withdrawal of Indian troops from the glaciers after notifying the United Nations of the decision, and to partial withdrawal by India from less-significant positions have all featured in various studies and in the media. All these suggestions do appear logical and rational but fail to identify the vital political dimension of the dispute. The range of suggestions that has figured in various writings and in the media also underlines division within the Indian establishment and its strategic community over Siachen. The military says that if New Delhi orders a pull-back it will have no objections provided they are not asked to recapture it in case Pakistan reoccupies the vacated positions. New Delhi, on its part, is not about to make any such commitment unless it gets a clear written commitment from the military that Siachen has no strategic significance. Retired military officials would say that Siachen has no strategic significance but serving officials are hesitant to say that on record. Many strategic experts say the country’s territorial integrity should not be measured in economic terms and that Siachen should never be vacated for such a reason. It seems there is a lack of consensus on the Siachen dispute even in the Indian strategic community, which makes the task of the political leadership all the more complicated. With so many divergent voices no leadership is prepared to risk its credibility should things turn out badly after a decision has been taken. The negotiations between 1986 and 2007 covered all possible options for reducing the conflict and shaping the final settlement,

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but they hit a dead end when the political decision to implement these options was required. The political nod for the solution of the conflict rests on several factors mentioned in the earlier section, including the nature of the regime, the strength and vision of the leadership, shade and tenor of overall broader Indo-Pak relations, public opinion, and domestic political circumstances. Nonetheless one major success of the negotiations has been the implementation of ceasefire along the AGPL, lowering the intensity of the conflict and improving the atmospherics for talks. From the broad outcomes of the talks in the past twenty or more years it can be discerned that, while the negotiators have played their role in discussing the technical details of the dispute in its entirety, the political leadership at the core of the decision-making process has been unwilling to approve various recommendations requiring implementation. The nature of Indo-Pak relations has been such that blaming leadership alone for the failures would be harsh and unfounded. Inflammatory events, including the Kargil War, incessant terrorist attacks in India, and the linkage of Siachen with the larger Kashmir dispute, have made Siachen ripe for negotiations—as previously stated—but not ripe enough for a settlement. Indo-Pak relations suffer from an acute trust-deficit that prevents either party taking a unilateral step toward resolution. Thus far, the success of negotiations in identifying the possible option of resolution has not been translated on the ground purely because of adverse developments in Indo-Pak relations that have diminished mutual trust to a bare minimum. Despite the heavy human and economic costs of the dispute, no political regime or leadership in India can call for withdrawal of its troops if it is not confident that the vacated positions will not be captured by Pakistan. General Pervez Musharraf once assured that Pakistan will not reoccupy the vacated positions—a promise that in light of his role in the Kargil War has fallen on deaf ears. J.N. Dixit believed that the Siachen dispute has to be solved in stages. Trying to leap forward and move too fast would only prove counterproductive. Every stage has to be dealt with in a meticulous and mature way.77 While India and Pakistan work toward building trust it would be worthwhile to look into past negotiation successes. The case of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and the Rann of Kutch suggest that international arbitration and third-party involvement will not be possible unless both parties agree. Given India’s aversion to such arbitration and foreign involvement, Pakistan must not waste

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its energies in arguing a case for it. There are, however, other relevant elements of these two successful negotiations which the parties can consider as applicable to the case of Siachen. During the final stages of the negotiations in the IWT, Pakistan had kept the dispute away from the media glare and refrained from polemics and inflammatory statements. The parties had also delinked the IWT from the Kashmir dispute, saying it would set no precedent for settlement of the Kashmir controversy. Although Siachen is situated in the Kashmir region there is no reason why the parties cannot agree in principle to delink both. If these disputes can be discussed as two different baskets then there is also a possibility of resolving each without affecting the other. India and Pakistan also had delinked the Kutch dispute from the Kashmir dispute and this had put both sides much at ease while accepting the 1968 Tribunal Award. As has been witnessed in the last quarter of a century of negotiations between India and Pakistan, the linkage with Kashmir has only served to derail progress on other pending disputes, such as the Sir Creek and Tulbul/Wular disputes. It is ironic that both parties have delinked pending disputes from the Kashmir dispute (owing to their uniqueness) and put them in eight different baskets for negotiations, but failed to delink them while negotiating resolutions for each one of them. The IWT and the Rann of Kutch Award also established the importance of comprehensive agreements encompassing clear, thorough, and well-detailed guidelines should any dispute arise in the future. The IWT is a specimen of a detailed framework and guidelines that have been invoked by India and Pakistan with regard to settling all their river waters disputes, including the Baghliar dispute. Similarly, the 1965 Rann of Kutch Ceasefire Agreement laid down a clear, time-bound framework for negotiations and dispute resolution should the parties fail to reach an agreement. As a result, when India and Pakistan failed to settle the dispute in the given timeframe, both resorted to international arbitration, following in letter and spirit the guidelines envisaged by the Ceasefire Agreement. A similar commitment is required to Siachen. After having implemented the ceasefire that has certainly helped in reducing the intensity of the conflict, both sides need to sign a clear, well laid-out process of disengagement and demilitarization, every clause of which should be crystal clear in meaning and mandate. This will allow both sides to have recourse to remedial actions should either party violate any provisions of the agreement. Besides,

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should both parties agree in principle then there is no harm in considering how this agreement can be sanctified through the involvement of a nonpartisan and independent international entity just as it was done in the disputes concerning the Indus Waters and the Rann of Kutch. Such a decision will have to be mutual, and both sides, especially Pakistan, will have to ensure that it show visible changes on the ground in its policy toward the other—changes that will help raise the level of trust, which is vital not only to Siachen but to all pending disputes. The Siachen dispute today is more about trust and less about technicalities. The key impediment is not any technical difficulty in effecting disengagement, redeployment, or demilitarization, but the lack of trust largely resulting from the nature of the parties’ enduring rivalry, which feeds on periodic military conflicts and, today, also on violent acts of terrorism. Improvement on these counts in Indo-Pak relations will have a corollary effect on all pending disputes.

Agreement India and Pakistan are still struggling to reach any concrete agreement on resolution of the Siachen dispute. In the current stage of affairs it important to eliminate hostilities, sustain the ceasefire, improve the atmospherics, and then discuss the feasibility of any plan of disengagement or demilitarization. The approach toward a final solution will have to be incremental, and any haste in the matter will not only be counterproductive but also be perceived as unfavorable by one or the other of the parties. The resolution of the Siachen dispute is not contingent upon resolution of any other dispute, and the mere improvement of the ground realities and in the nature of Indo-Pak ties will encourage the leadership to take bold decisions. In sum, the resolution has two aspects that must be addressed if India and Pakistan are to resolve their dispute over Siachen. As far as the technicalities of the dispute are concerned, it would be correct to say a lot can be learned from past agreements; and as far as any trust-deficit goes, what must be taken into account is that both parties, particularly Pakistan, will have to begin contributing toward improving the ground situation and changing their traditional policy approach.

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CHAPTER VI

THE SIR CREEK DISPUTE: A CASE OF COMPROMISE DRIVEN BY COMMON INTERESTS

T

he India-Pakistan dispute over Sir Creek can be traced back to the pre-independence period, to around 1908, when an argument ensued between the rulers of Kutch and Sind over ownership of a pile of firewood lying on the banks of a creek situated between the two principalities. The dispute was taken up by the Government of Bombay (GOB) state, which in 1914 gave its verdict, supported by Map Number B44 and subsequently B74.1 Nothing significant happened in terms of conflict or negotiations in the next few decades until a quarrel reemerged in the wake of the 1965 war and the subsequent settlement by an international tribunal of the Indo-Pak boundary dispute in the Rann of Kutch. This chapter delves into the origins of the dispute, outlining the basic points of contention between India and Pakistan and analyzing numerous rounds of negotiations that have been held over the years to resolve it.

The Genesis of the Dispute Sir Creek is a fluctuating sixty-mile-long estuary in the swamps of the Rann of Kutch, a region whose boundaries were contested by India and Pakistan in a dispute settled through arbitration in 1968 (discussed in chapter IV). Sir Creek is the last tributary of the Sind River, which originates in India and flows into the Arabian Sea after passing through Pakistan. The Rann is situated between Gujarat (India) and the Sind (Pakistan). Following military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965, Pakistan claimed jurisdiction over half the Rann along the twentyfourth parallel. India rejected this claim, saying the boundary passed along the northern edge of the Rann, which therefore was India’s. The Rann spans an area of 7,500 square miles, 3,500 of which was

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in dispute, a matter referred to an international tribunal for arbitration. The tribunal produced the 900-page “Indo-Pakistani Western Boundary Case Tribunal’s Award,” announced on February 19, 1968, establishing India’s claim over 90 percent of the disputed territory, and ceding approximately 10 percent of the Rann (300 square miles) to Pakistan. The Sir Creek dispute emerged where the dispute settlement over the Rann of Kutch ended. Before resorting to the tribunal both India and Pakistan had agreed to confine their dispute over the boundary in the north of the Rann, as both were in agreement that the boundary in the south began at the head of Sir Creek and proceeded for a short distance eastward along the twenty-fourth parallel. The tribunal excluded the Sir Creek portion from the demarcation, saying it was out of the its purview. The subsequent dispute hinges on the demarcation of the boundary from “the mouth of Sir Creek to the top of Sir Creek” and from “the top of the Sir Creek eastwards to a point (on land) designated as the Western Terminus” (see Fig. 6.1). In 1968 the boundary in the Rann sector was thereafter fixed, as described above. A.G. Noorani explains the tribunal’s position and the contention of the parties: That the short agreed border from the head of Sir Creek eastward was excluded from the tribunal’s consideration was understandable. Unfortunately, the parties agreed also to exclude the boundary from the head of Sir Creek downward to the west, right up to the mouth of the creek on the Arabian Sea; in short, the Indo-Pak boundary along Sir Creek.2

According to a former Pakistani foreign secretary, “The adjudicators in 1968 did not discuss the Sir Creek because in the pre-partition documents the creek was clearly indicated as in Sind that is now in Pakistan.”3 India rejected this claim saying that the tribunal’s decision to keep the Sir Creek area out of its consideration did not imply Pakistan’s control over it. The tribunal had noted, “In view of the aforesaid agreement, the question concerning the Sir Creek part of the boundary is left out of consideration.”4 The determination of the boundary in the creek area now remains disputed because of conflicting claims over whether the creek falls under the “Thalweg” principle of boundary demarcation, which provides for making the mid-channel of a given watercourse a boundary. India has argued that Sir Creek is a navigable channel and therefore falls within the

Figure 6.1

Sir Creek

Source: Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds., Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

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category of “Thalweg” principle, an argument Pakistan has repeatedly rejected. Instead Pakistan has claimed that it is not a navigable channel and that the boundary runs on the eastern side, thereby placing the creek in Pakistani jurisdiction. Both sides have cited past resolutions and provisions by the GOB and the governor of Sind to back their respective claims pertaining to the navigability of the creek and have also claimed that a compromise had been reached between the rulers of Kutch and Sind. In support of its argument Pakistan has claimed that the map attached to the Bombay Government Resolution of February 24, 1914, showed the boundary running on the eastern bank of the creek, but in its note of May 19, 1958, stated that the map was just an annexure to the resolution, implying that it was the resolution that was authoritative, not the map itself.5 The dispute has another interesting dimension that both impedes as well as enhances the prospect of a compromise resolution. The prospect of finding natural gas in the vicinity spurred both parties to attempt to settle the Sir Creek boundary dispute on their own terms so as to enlarge their respective EEZ by 250 square miles, which makes it a territorial-cum-resources dispute. This prospect has acted both as a positive and negative factor. The desire for a larger EEZ has pushed the parties to harden their stance, but at the same time also encouraged them to explore a mutually beneficial settlement. Pakistan has insisted that the boundary in the creek first be delimited in order to establish the point on the land from which a sea boundary can be delimited based on “land toward sea approach.” India argues in favor of delimiting the maritime boundary first and then moving toward the land based on the “sea toward land approach.” Both approaches are technically possible and legal but only one can be followed, for which a compromise has to be reached between the two sides. In recent years both sides have shown the utmost urgency in settling the matter to avert a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS) clause passed in 1982 and entered into force in 1994, that would declare the entire disputed zone as international waters should the two sides failed to determine their claims for respective maritime zones by the May 2009 deadline fixed by the UN. Interestingly, after the deadline passed, no definite indications have come from the UN as to whether or not the area has been declared international waters. If the UN deadline is observed then the disputed region may well be international waters, de facto. At present there is no word from India, Pakistan, or the UN on the

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jurisdictional status of the region, possibly because of the progress made by India and Pakistan in terms of getting the joint survey of the maritime boundary completed in March 2007.

Negotiations on the Dispute India and Pakistan have held negotiations since 1989 to settle their differences, and by the close of talks in May 2007 had achieved considerable breakthrough on some key aspects of the dispute. During the first round of talks, held in Islamabad on June 2, 1989, the Indian and Pakistani delegations were led by their surveyor generals, Major General S.M. Chadha and Major General Anis Ali Syed, respectively. These talks turned out to be generic in nature, sans any substantial breakthrough on any aspect. The second and third rounds of talks, in 1990 and 1991, also ended inconclusively without substantial progress. On October 28–29, 1991, the fourth round of talks was held in Rawalpindi led by Inder Pal Khosla from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and Salim Jilani, Pakistan’s defense secretary, each accompanied by their surveyor generals. Although, during the talks the political desirability of coming to terms on the boundary delineation was apparent, the surveyor general of Pakistan remained adamant about technical considerations and the linking of the delineation of the maritime boundary with the demarcation of the Sir Creek boundary. These difficulties were compounded by a theoretical debate on what factors could govern the determination of the creek’s mid-channel, which shifted quite often depending on the tides. Both delegations also engaged in passionate discussion over the concept of “equidistance” and “equity” in demarcating the maritime boundary from the mouth of the creek toward the open seas.6 The talks eventually failed to achieve any agreement or a compromise. The fifth round of talks was held in New Delhi, on November 5–6, 1992, headed by the additional secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Nareshwar Dayal, and the additional secretary in the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khalid Saleem. Technical experts from the Indian navy were also part of the talks on this occasion. Although the Indian navy, on its part, had done some research on the possible methods of defining a maritime boundary from the sea (the starting point of which was undetermined) toward land, the issue unfortunately did not figure during the talks.7 In 1994, an Indian technical delegation presented a “non-paper” to Pakistan,

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proposing that the delineation of the maritime boundary in the territorial sea be governed by the “median”/“equidistant” principle, using the low water lines and low-tide elevations of both countries. Beyond the territorial sea the maritime boundary could be governed by “equidistant” as well as “equitable” principles.8 No immediate response was received from Pakistan on this suggestion, but two years later on October 29, 1996, Pakistan made a declaration that baselines should be drawn straight, consisting of a series of nine straight lines. India, which at that time was yet to draw its baselines, rejected the declaration on the basis that these lines were not in accordance with Article 7 (2) of UNCLOS III and that its Point K lay off the eastern bank of Sir Creek.9 Both sides were in agreement, however, on the horizontal sector of the land boundary and agreed to delimitation of a boundary line by employing existing boundary pillars along the horizontal line and by placing intermediary pillars in the same line.10 The sixth round of talks was shelved and the next round resumed as a part of the CDP at the foreign-secretary level in June 1997 and then again in September 1998. In these talks India and Pakistan agreed to create separate working groups (baskets) for several pending boundary disputes, including the Sir Creek dispute, and each was to be taken up simultaneously by its particular working group. The talks on Sir Creek were held on November 8, 1998, in New Delhi, led by the surveyor general of India, Lieutenant General A.K. Ahuja, and Rear Admiral M. Jameel Akhtar of Pakistan. Now the talks were driven within the framework of the CDP and gained more seriousness and structured attention to seek not only their resolution but also to build mutual trust and confidence between the two sides. India presented a proposal for the finalization of the boundaries along the following four steps: 1. Allocation: A decision on the basis of which the settlement would be made. 2. Delimitation: This specified the general criteria for the location of the boundary line and for its description. This description would or would not be accompanied by illustrative maps. 3. Demarcation: This procedure involved the precise actual relaying of the criteria of delimitation to demarcation teams on the ground. 4. Administration: This called for regulating the demarcated boundary and exercising administrative control.

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The Indian side asserted that in the Sir Creek area allocation and delimitation were done vide Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the 1914 Resolution illustrated on an accompanying map (B-44). In the map the internal boundary of Sind was depicted by a thin red line proceeding across the western bank of the creek, and the Kutch internal boundary line is shown in yellow along the eastern bank of Kori Creek. The boundary lines agreed upon by the Maharao of Kutch and the Governor of Sind are shown in green and magenta respectively. Demarcation and administration had already been completed in 1925. Since then, the boundary in Sir Creek had been depicted in the mid-channel by a proper boundary symbol and there was no need to erect pillars in the middle of the creek, since it formed a natural, flowing boundary. The administration of this territory remained with Kutch and was therefore inherited by the governments of India and Pakistan.11 In his writings Admiral Ravi Vohra has given a succinct analysis of the communication and exchange of documents and their interpretation and mandate. He wrote that the GOB mediated at the insistence of the GOI in 1905 to resolve this dispute between Kutch and Sind. After eight years, on September 20, 1913, the GOB ruled that the boundary between Kutch and Sind should be the green line in the 1914 map from the mouth to the top of Sir Creek, where it joins the blue dotted line. From there it moves east and joins the Sind boundary, marked in purple, following a line agreed to by the Maharao of Kutch. In response, the Commissioner of Sind agreed to the blue dotted line and said that since the creek changes its course from time to time the western boundary of the area should be described as the center of the navigable channel. In 1998 the Indian delegation pointed out that Pakistan, while emphasizing the 1914 map, was overlooking the basis on which several such maps had been made. There is no ambiguity therefore over that fact that both sides had agreed to the blue dotted line as the boundary between Kutch and Sind, and regarding the boundary from the mouth to the top of Sir Creek (depicted in green), the Commissioner of Sind had urged rectification that was mentioned and agreed upon by the GOI by its inclusion in Paragraph 10.12 The GOB resolution of 1913, which resolved the dispute on Sir Creek between the Maharao of Kutch and the rulers of Sind was the basis for making several sequential maps. This ruling was subsequently endorsed as a resolution by the GOI in 1914.13 In this context India’s suggestion to Pakistan was that the issue should be addressed incorporating the overall perspective so that

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this boundary, which is already settled and in respect of which all four steps relating to boundary demarcation have already been completed, is formalized.14 Pakistan, while agreeing that the boundary along the horizontal line and in Sir Creek was a settled issue, maintained that in its interpretation the green line (denoting the eastern edge of the creek) of the map, as an appendix to the 1914 Resolution, should be transposed onto the ground. Even when it was conveyed by India that the Resolution of 1914 had already been implemented and that the green line was only a symbolic representation with the boundary being mid-channel, Pakistan persisted with its position on the green line boundary. The Indian delegation suggested that, pending formalization of the boundary in Sir Creek, the two sides could consider delimiting the India-Pakistan maritime boundary from the seaward side by commencing at the EEZ limit and proceeding landward up to a mutually acceptable limit in accord with the provisions of the Technical Aspects of the Law of the Sea (TALOS). The seaward approach, India pointed out, is based on internationally accepted principles and would benefit both countries for the exploitation of resources in their respective EEZ. Indian journalist Bharat Bhushan wrote that India proposed the median, or the equidistant, method where the demarcation of the maritime boundary adopts the seaward approach. This method entails determining a point at 200 nautical miles distance from the India-Pakistan coasts and then proceeding toward the coast drawing an equidistant line up to an agreed point. This would help determine the respective EEZs of India and Pakistan.15 The issue had gained some urgency in view of the continental shelf claims that were to be submitted by 2004 to the United Nations by the concerned countries.16 The Pakistani response was that maritime boundary could be demarcated only after the determination of the land boundary in the Sir Creek area and that both these issues should not be delinked and separated and needed to be addressed in one package. India alleged that Pakistan’s attitude reflected its desire to seek an absolute resolution from the map to the exclusion of internationally accepted cartographic procedures while disregarding historical developments.17 In recent years, the demarcation of frontiers in this area has shown prospects of major commercial dividends. The boundary, once defined, can be the basis of determining maritime boundaries that are usually drawn as extensions on the sea from reference points

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on land. Maritime boundaries help in defining the limits of the EEZ and the continental shelves. The EEZ that extends to 200 nautical miles can then be subject to subsequent commercial exploration. The demarcation of maritime boundaries attracted greater attention from India and Pakistan after the discovery of oil and gas in the Sind area in Pakistan just above Sir Creek and in Gujarat basin, south of Sir Creek. It is speculated that the undemarcated maritime zone in between could be rich with hydrocarbon reserves. Given the commercial importance of the area, Pakistan is insisting on defining the extremity of its land frontier in the Sir Creek area in a manner that gives it a control over a larger EEZ. In the case of India accepting the green line showing Sir Creek’s eastern bank as the land boundary for the purpose of drawing maritime frontiers, the Pakistani EEZ would be enlarged by approximately 250 square miles. To this end Pakistan has rejected the mid-channel principle as proposed by India, pointing out that this principle applies only to a “navigable channel” and asserting that Sir Creek is not navigable.18 Responding sharply to Pakistan’s claims, chief Indian hydrographer Rear Admiral K.R. Srinivasan said, “The mid-channel principle on Sir Creek was endorsed by the ‘Para nine and Para ten’ of the 1914 Resolution. This was represented in the final map of 1925 by the ‘proper boundary symbols.’ ”19 Also rejecting Pakistani claims that the creek was non-navigable and not conducive for commercial use, Indian officials asserted that the channel could be used for navigation during the entire year, especially during high tides. It was pointed out by Pakistani officials that Pakistan required more time to complete a hydrographic survey of the area between Gujarat and Sind.20 In these talks India took special exception to Pakistan’s efforts—which amounted to internationalizing the Sir Creek issue—reiterating that all differences between New Delhi and Islamabad, after the Simla Accord, had to be resolved bilaterally. Pakistan was of the view that India should agree to its proposal to take the dispute to an international tribunal if they were unable to resolve it bilaterally. Vivek Katju, joint secretary for Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said in response, “There is no place at all for any third party intervention in the Indo-Pakistani matters following the Simla accord.”21 He reiterated that arbitration was unacceptable under the framework of the composite dialogue between the two sides and that all issues were to be addressed by the two sides directly. In the end, however, the talks concluded without any progress in terms of resolution or

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agreement on any specific aspect of the dispute, although both sides agreed to continue their discussions in the future. Soon after, Indo-Pak talks were put on the back burner because of the Kargil War and the Pakistani military coup of October 1999. Bilateral relations deteriorated and mutual trust was brought crashing to the ground with the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC 814 and terrorist attacks on the J&K assembly and the Indian parliament in 2001. Both sides even came close to war after India mobilized its troops along the border in reaction to the attack on the parliament. Simultaneously, the war on terror was also unfolding and Pakistan had been forced into an alliance with the United States to fight the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan was besieged with domestic instability resulting from the jihadi backlash following the military crackdown against various terrorist groups and their cadres. In such an uncertain and tumultuous state of affairs Indo-Pak talks had become totally unfeasible. The level of alienation and mistrust had run so high that even the July 2001 summit meeting in Agra between Atal Behari Vajpayee and General Pervez Musharraf failed to resuscitate the ties. Following the revival of the peace process in 2003, the first round of talks was held on August 6–7, 2004, led by Indian surveyor general Prithvish Nag and Pakistan’s additional secretary of defense Admiral Ahsan-ul Haq Chaudhry, to apprise each other of the ground situation and share ideas on how to resolve the matter, although the press labeled the talks as meaningless and futile.22 On September 5–6, the two foreign ministers met in New Delhi to take an overview of the peace process, of the progress made thus far, and to determine the next steps on the pending disputes. In pursuance of the foreign ministers’ talks, the Indo-Pak delegation, led by Surveyor General Brigadier Girish Kumar and Major General Jamil-ur-Rehman Afridi, respectively, met in Rawalpindi on December 14–15 to discuss the modalities of a joint survey of the boundary pillars in the horizontal segment (as indicated by the blue line) in Sir Creek. In the talks both parties agreed on January 3, 2005, as the date of commencement of the joint survey.23 The follow-up meeting to take stock of the progress was held on May 28–29 in Rawalpindi, led by Rear Admiral Ahsan-ul-Haq Chaudhry from the Pakistani Ministry of Defense and Major General M. Gopal Rao, additional surveyor general of India. No concrete proposal or agreement emerged from the talks apart from both delegations expressing their satisfaction over the progress in the matter.24

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Pakistan insisted that the boundary in Sir Creek should start with the eastern bank in accordance with the 1914 Resolution Map; this stand was rejected by India, underlining the basic point of contention between the two parties.25 On October 3–4, 2005, the foreign ministers again held talks in Islamabad under the CDP framework, and in accordance with their discussions follow-up talks were held in New Delhi on December 20–21, 2005. These talks were led by Brigadier Girish Kumar, deputy surveyor general of India, and Major General Jamil-ur Rehman Afridi, surveyor general of Pakistan, to formulate terms of reference for carrying out the joint survey.26 Technicallevel talks were held on December 22–23, 2006, in Rawalpindi, led by Rear Admiral B.R. Rao, chief hydrographer, and Major General Jamil-ur Rehman Afridi to determine the coordinates of the joint survey and also to discuss the demarcation of the Indo-Pak maritime boundary.27 Clearly the initial joint survey deadline of January 3, 2005, had long passed and the two sides were pushing hard to conduct the survey as soon as possible to escape the UNCLOS clause. The joint survey was finally complete by mid-March 2007, verifying the outermost points of coastlines using the equidistance method. Following the joint survey, the fourth round of talks within the CDP, led by India’s Major General M. Gopal Rao and Rear Admiral Tanveer Faiz of the Pakistani Ministry of Defense, was held in Rawalpindi on May 17–18, 2007, in which both delegations expressed satisfaction over the successful completion of the joint survey. Maps and charts were exchanged and the experts discussed the delimitation of the maritime boundary as well as the delineation of the boundary in Sir Creek in light of the results of the joint survey. Although the press reported that differences still persisted over whether the boundary lay in the middle of the creek or on the eastern bank, no agreement could be reached on this aspect in the talks. The press notably mentioned that judging by the second set of maps that had emerged following the joint survey, a sense of commonality and convergence characterized the approach of the two sides. The press also highlighted that the Sir Creek matter, unlike the Siachen dispute, had more promise of resolution since both parties had shown positive and conciliatory intentions to devise a mutually agreed solution.28 The Sir Creek dispute, like the Tulbul/Wular dispute, is very much a tractable matter and can be resolved through compromise. The basic problem is that, on both sides, those at the center of the dispute and the decision makers appear unwilling to

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make any compromises, succumbing instead to the overall atmospherics of Indo-Pak relations, which remain not very cordial.

Analysis of the Negotiations The India-Pakistan negotiation over Sir Creek is a case in point that both sides can resolve disputes even while their overall relationship remains hostile. The dispute is also strong testimony, from the conflict-resolution point of view that, when the parties in the dispute conclude that without a resolution both will be worse off, the chances of a compromised solution become high. An analysis of the four stages of the negotiations in the Sir Creek case further explains how the dispute moves from incompatibility toward compatibility, and how the parties (owing to a combination of factors) try to converge their differences for mutual gains.

Ripeness of the Dispute It would be fair to submit that in the initial phase of negotiations the Sir Creek dispute had not been given enough attention largely due to the tense and sensitive nature of Indo-Pak relations in the late 1980s. Relations had been recovering from the fears and apprehensions that spread in Pakistan following India’s massive military exercise Operation Brasstacks. Around this time an insurgency had begun to unfold in J&K following the electoral bungling in the 1987 J&K elections. Promoting jihad and jihadi groups in J&K was the cornerstone of the policy of the Pakistani military and its intelligence. Some ripeness for negotiations on the Sir Creek dispute had developed by 1989 for two reasons. First, Benazir Bhutto had come to power, establishing democracy in Pakistan after twelve years and her government was keen to achieve peace with India. Second, there was considerable momentum in peace talks from the previous regime of General Zia, under whom the talks on Siachen had been initiated in 1986, and both Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi did not want to lose the momentum, which was a strong possibility given the turn of events around that time. It must be acknowledged that, as opposed to other pending disputes such as Kashmir and Siachen, the dispute over Sir Creek evoked little interest and urgency until both sides began to realize that resolution of the problem could accrue some economic dividends as well. The fact that even before the CDP was envisaged India and Pakistan had held several rounds of talks on Sir Creek—exchanging

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maps and documents and giving substantial attention to various modes of demarcation of the boundary—suggested willingness on both sides to negotiate in all earnest. As previously argued, the change in regimes and leadership in India had not in any way reduced its political will for resolving the dispute. Even while hostilities were continuing on various fronts—during the Zia-Rajiv, Rajiv-Benazir, Gujral-Sharif, Musharraf-Vajpayee, and Musharraf-Manmohan periods—resulting in the suspension of the peace process on several occasions, the awareness of the indispensability of the peace process in resolving pending disputes was never lost by either side. In 1991 Pakistani foreign secretary Shaharyar Khan claimed, “Both the disputes (Wular Barrage and Sir Creek) can be resolved if there is a desire to do so.”29 In reply, Indian high commissioner J.N. Dixit, in Islamabad, observed: A process for peace has been continuing for the last two years. The talks are a step in the right direction and in response to the real needs and aspirations of the peoples of India and Pakistan.30

Such a desire unquestionably had always been there in the Sir Creek dispute, which made it ripe for negotiations. Yet, there were and still persist profound technical differences pertaining to the linking of the Sir Creek boundary demarcation with the maritime boundary demarcation, differences that until the latest round of talks in May 2007 hindered progress. The linkage between the maritime boundary and the limits of the EEZ of the respective sides and of the continental shelves was underpinned by speculation concerning the presence, in this zone, of oil and gas fields under the seabed, and this prospect increased the stakes of the dispute. Strategically speaking, Sir Creek is of little significance to either side, but the possibility of energy resources in the region has led to unrelenting attitudes on both sides. India and Pakistan have locked their horns due to differences in their approaches (seaward or landward) to determining both the Sir Creek and maritime boundary demarcations. There was a stage when Pakistan called for a thirdparty role to settle the conflict, which proved to be a nonstarter in New Delhi. When both sides realized that, as per the UNCLOS their maritime area would be declared international waters in the event of failure to fix the dispute by 2009 deadline, a sense of urgency and purpose characterized their subsequent negotiations. One positive and immediate effect of this renewed political will was the 2004 agreement to conduct the joint survey of the boundary

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pillars in the Sir Creek area, completed in mid-March 2007. This goes to show that the dispute that appeared ripe only for negotiations for a long period had begun to exhibit ripeness for resolution, or agreement, as well. This transformation was the result of both sides reaching the conclusion that in the absence of a settlement both would be worse off. The present dispute hinges on India’s insisting that the boundary lies in the middle of Sir Creek and Pakistan’s claiming the boundary runs on the eastern bank of the creek. It is hoped that after the drawing of a second set of maps, following the joint survey of the boundary pillars, both sides would have a better understanding of the ground situation and the cartographic facts. Given the progress in the dispute—largely due to the compromising and accommodating approaches of both India and Pakistan—a possible early resolution is indicated. Both parties seek a mutually agreed solution, which makes their stances on Sir Creek quite distinct from their stances on other pending disputes: Both believe the continuation of the dispute would hurt them equally, and both seem focused in converging their conflicting approaches into a common strategy and devising mechanisms to fix their land and maritime boundaries.

Prenegotiation The conflict-resolution exercise of 1913–14 has played a key role in pinning down differences on many related aspects of boundary disputes (in that area), if not on Sir Creek per se. This 1914 ruling was also instrumental in settling the conflict in the Rann of Kutch by the tribunal that in 1968 upheld India’s claim over 90 percent of the disputed area, largely correlating with what the GOB had long-maintained. The dispute over Sir Creek lay dormant until the 1980s when the prospects of hydrocarbons emerged and UNCLOS III was approved to define the use and exploitation of the sea by various states and claims over their respective territorial waters. In the late 1980s, when India and Pakistan began discussing the Sir Creek dispute, the past rulings, documents, maps, communiqués, notes, and other related pieces of information were exchanged extensively. Throughout the 1990s both sides have extensively exchanged these documents and information at every meeting; this has allowed them to identify the problem, focus on problem areas, and also define the nature of the dispute. In this way, they had made their views and standpoints categorically clear to each other, and as a result were able to develop

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a common understanding and move forward in their discussions. Whatever piece of information existed in the records was available to both sides. The only sticking point turned out to be the approach that was to be adopted in determining the maritime and land boundaries. The purview of the 1968 tribunal award ended at the top of Sir Creek, leaving the area below there in Sir Creek untouched, which led to India and Pakistan conducting the joint survey to determine the boundary pillars on the land according to the tribunal award. The linkage of the land and maritime boundary remains at the heart of the present dispute along with questions regarding the type of approach that should be followed to delimit and demarcate the boundaries. Together, the technical experts from both sides have extensively explored various techniques and have also discussed the authenticity of various maps and documents. Admiral Vohra has revealed that the “Halifax Track Two Group,” consisting of retired naval officers from India and Pakistan, has at length discussed all relevant aspects of the dispute and its feasible settlement, doing so in a free, fair, and amicable spirit, much to the amazement of foreign sponsors and participants, who normally associate tension and heated arguments with India-Pakistan engagements.31 Over the years such exchanges at different levels have helped the two sides develop various proposals, suggestions, approaches, and modalities.

Negotiations India and Pakistan held formal negotiations on Sir Creek between 1989–97, in an unstructured format, and between 1997–2007 as a part of the CDP. These talks have been reflective of willingness on both sides to negotiate in the initial stages and then move on to negotiate with the intention of resolving the dispute. The talks have received full support from the leadership of India and Pakistan, and it must be admitted that both sides have shown considerable maturity and resolve to increase the prospects of resolution. There have been countless instances of unforeseen developments that have impacted bilateral relations, and periodically the negotiations have been suspended, but the underlying desire of both parties to settle the dispute in a spirit of give-and-take was never lost. Their negotiations resonated with purpose and serious intent, although several rounds have ended without making even an inch of progress. Nonetheless, a belief has existed, not only within the formal corridors of government

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but also outside government, that the Sir Creek dispute is likely to be resolved in the near future because both sides stand to gain from it, and to lose should they fail to do so. The composition of the negotiation delegation itself has suggested its importance to India and Pakistan. It has been comprised of hydrographers, surveyor generals, and naval officers well aware of the technicalities involved in understanding, addressing, and resolving this dispute. The political will in India and Pakistan has provided the necessary spark and trigger for negotiations that have been responsibly carried forward by the able members of the negotiation teams. This is how negotiations ideally should be held: supported by the leadership and conducted by technical and professional experts in the field who possess thorough knowledge of the technical aspects of the dispute. The negotiators in Sir Creek have done a commendable job developing various agreements and arrangements, giving shape to longterm policies, roles, and obligations on both sides. Such a continuity in negotiations has been absent in the Siachen case, wherein parties have, for political and strategic reasons, withdrawn time and again from previous stands and commitments. The Sir Creek negotiations reflect an attitude of compromise adopted by India and Pakistan, one that has rewarded them with intermediate breakthroughs. The success of the joint survey indicates a strong possibility that the dispute is approaching closure. The peripheral determinants (of the formal negotiations), such as the media, former bureaucrats and diplomats, armed forces personnel, and analysts, indicate in their proclamations and writings the possibility of an early solution. Academic and scholarly pieces in journals and books, and reportage in electronic and print media, continue to take the pulse of negotiations on Sir Creek, anticipating what can be expected next.

Agreement India’s and Pakistan’s successes in the dispute so far, and the general feeling of optimism prevailing in strategic, academic and media circles outside the government indicate closure of the dispute sometime soon. There remains no ambiguity on either side over the prospect that an agreement will be a win-win outcome for both sides, due primarily to the economic dividends it will yield to both. The clear and present possibility of losing their maritime zones for international use as “international waters” is also a catalyst for a mutually agreed solution.

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All facts and figures have been discussed, and numerous maps have been exchanged and redrawn based on new discoveries of facts. The only impediment remains in the fixing of their maritime and land boundary and, whatever approach is adopted, both sides must recognize that either approach is feasible and that the resulting demarcation would not be much off the mark.

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CHAPTER VII

THE TULBUL NAVIGATION PROJECT/WULAR BARRAGE AND STORAGE PROJECT DISPUTE: A CASUALTY OF LINKAGE POLITICS?

T

hroughout sixty-two years of India-Pakistan relations, disputes have abruptly emerged and flared up, adding to the complexity of the two countries’ engagement with each other. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 has, however, withstood the test of time, allowing the Permanent Indus Waters Commission (PCIW) to meet at regular intervals amid the highs and lows of the bilateral ties. The IWT itself is an illustration of the sagacity and farsightedness of the negotiators who, after years of talks, prepared a document that not only resolved the Indus waters dispute but also laid down clear processes, procedures, and guidelines for the future should any new dispute emerge pertaining to the rivers of the Indus system. Over the past two decades India and Pakistan have envisaged hydropower projects and construction on the rivers of the Indus system to meet the needs of the burgeoning population and respond to increased demands for irrigation, electricity, and trade. Since India possesses the upper riparian position in the Indus river system, several of its projects—such as the Salal, Baghliar, Kishenganga, Nimo Bazgo, and Uri-II dams—have been questioned by Pakistan. Of these the Baghliar dispute was referred for arbitration to the World Bank, which appointed a neutral expert, Swiss engineer Raymond Laffite, to settle the matter. Indo-Pak river-water matters can be treated in different ways, depending on the classification of the specific dispute. If the matter is merely a “question” then it falls under the jurisdiction of the

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Permanent Commission of the Indus Waters (PCIW); if it is deemed as a “difference,” as was Baghliar dispute, it is settled by neutral experts appointed by the World Bank, and if it is regarded as a “dispute” then it is to be settled through international arbitration. In the Baghliar dispute the expert presented a decision on February 12, 2007, covering four aspects of the dispute: maximumdesign flood; spillway ungated or gated; spillway level of gates; artificial raising of the water level, pondage, which refers to water stored for hydroelectric purposes; and the level of power intake.1 Both sides claimed victory in the verdict and endorsed it as a satisfactory outcome of the process, which underlined that, despite ongoing hostility and tense relations, India and Pakistan can resolve their disputes to mutual satisfaction. The Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage and Storage Project dispute is another pending Indus waters system case, one that remains to be settled. This chapter traces the history of the dispute to highlight the existing differences of India and Pakistan on the matter. The second part of the chapter traverses the history of negotiations held so far and offers an analysis of the negotiations from the perspective of conflict resolution.

A History of the Dispute The nature of the dispute is seen at the very the outset in the different nomenclature India and Pakistan have adopted to present their respective interpretations of the case. While India refers to it as the Tulbul Navigation Project, Pakistan calls it the Wular Barrage. At the core of the dispute is a barrage India has proposed to build on the Jhelum River in J&K, just below Wular Lake.2 The lake is about thirteen miles north of Srinagar on Jhelum at about 5,180 feet above sea level, and the river flows into the lake from the south and out to the west. The lake impedes the flow of the river, from which springs its name, Wular, derived from the Sanskrit word woll, meaning obstacle.3 In recent years the term storage project has been added, at Pakistan’s insistence, to the nomenclature of the dispute, making it the Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage and Storage Project. According to India, Wular Lake is in a pathetic state—“a patient on the death bed.” It has “halved in its size over the past five decades and become shallower and flatter.”4 India’s contention is that from late October to mid February the flow in the Jhelum diminishes to 2,000 cubic feet per second (cusecs), perhaps less, with a depth of two-and-a-half feet. During these months a depth of four feet, with

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a flow of 4,000 cusecs, is necessary for navigability. To provide the requisite quantity of water in the Jhelum during these lean months, India proposed that a barrage be constructed to control and regulate the flow from Wular Lake. The lake can store approximately 300,000 acre-feet of water that can be used for maintaining the requisite depth in the river. Therefore, India argues that the Tulbul Navigation Project is intended to maintain navigability for trade and movement in the Jhelum between Sopore and Baramula.5 The 440foot-long Wular Barrage is to be constructed at the mouth of the lake, twenty-four miles north of Srinagar as shown in Fig. 7.1. On the other hand Pakistan’s contention is that the lake cannot support any dam structure and could be potentially used instead for inundating POK. Pakistan’s contention is that Wular Lake is not suitable for a dam of any size, as it would inundate Srinagar and the Valley. Pakistan also argues that going ahead with construction would be a violation of the IWT that had given India restricted, or non-consumptive, use of the Jhelum, much to India’s chagrin, and could potentially jeopardize the Triple Canals Project—the Upper Jhelum Canal, the Upper Chenab Canal, and the Lower Bari Doab Canal.6 According to the Article I (11) of the IWT the term non-consumptive use means any control or use of water for navigation, floating of timber or other property, flood protection or flood control, fishing or fish culture, wild life or other like beneficial purposes, provided that, exclusive of seepage and evaporation of water incidental to the control or use, the water (undiminished in volume within the practical range of measurement) remains in, or is returned to, the same river or its tributaries; but the term does not include agricultural use or use for the generation of hydro-electric power.7

As per Article III the treaty accords India consumptive or nonrestricted use of the eastern rivers, namely the Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas, and restricted and non-consumptive use of the western rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. According to the non-consumptive parameters of Article I (11), India is permitted to undertake “run of the river” type of projects that do not deplete the total volume and flow of water into Pakistan.8 Further, Article IV (2) specifies: Each party agrees that any non-consumptive use made by it shall be so made so as not to materially change, on account of such use, the flow in any channel to the prejudice of the uses on that channel by

Figure 7.1

Location of the Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage and Storage Project

Source: Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds., Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

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the other party under the provisions of this Treaty. In executing any scheme of flood protection or flood control each party shall avoid, as far as practicable, any material damage to the other party, and any such scheme carried out by India on the western rivers shall not involve any use of water or any storage in addition to that provided under Article III.9

Pakistan fears that control of the Jhelum River through a storage work, irrespective of its purposes, could mean ruination of vast tracts of agricultural lands in the Punjab and, additionally, cause a severe shortage of electricity once India decides to withhold water over an extended period, especially during dry months.10 Pakistan has strongly argued that India’s construction of a barrage on Wular Lake is against the provisions of Article I (11) since the lake is connected to the Jhelum, part of the western river system, of which India is only entitled to non-consumptive use.11 Thus, the entire controversy is over whether the Wular Barrage essentially is a project for the “control or use of water for navigation,” or a “storage work,” defined as a work constructed “for the purpose of impounding the waters of a stream.”12 The entire dispute rests on whether the barrage will impound, store, or restrict the water flow or will regulate the flow and depth of the river based on the “run-of-the-river” principle. India, in its defense of the project, has said water will indeed be confined for some time in order to raise the level of the lake, but then only for regulating the supply of water to maintain navigation during lean months.13 Pakistan’s argument is that, from the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty, India is entitled to construct a proper storage work on the Jhelum River as long as it does not exceed 10,000 acre-feet of water. Pakistan pointed out that the estimated capacity of 300,000 acrefeet, thirty times greater than permitted, violates the terms of the treaty.14 Pakistan contends that, although there is no legal restriction against constructing a barrage for navigational purposes, the provisions of the treaty that prohibit the withholding of water and thereby depleting the volume of water in the river, should not be ignored. India is obliged as the upper riparian to ensure the unhindered flow of waters downstream and without any interference. With the barrage in place India would be releasing or withholding water at its discretion, argued Pakistan.15 India is allowed “any natural storage in a connecting lake,” such as Wular, but this must be “storage not resulting from any manmade works.”16 Experts ask whether such a

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control is possible without violating the treaty and without storing the water.17 According to A.G. Noorani, India has provided three assurances to allay Pakistani fears. First, the Tulbul Navigation Project is to control and regulate the level of Wular Lake so as to provide the requisite flow in the Jhelum. Second, the volume of water that flows into the Jhelum will not be diminished as it enters Pakistan, nor will there be any material change in flow in any channel. And third, these precautions envisaged in the project would be in the interest of Pakistan as well.18 Pakistan’s counter-argument to the Indian assurance that the barrage would benefit Pakistan as well—it would withhold water collected during flood season and release that water during dry season—is that this cannot be used as justification for constructing the barrage without the prior consent of the Pakistani government, no matter how noble the intentions may be. Moreover, Pakistan is averse to the notion of India’s controlling the waters during the crucial dry season as it may spell disaster for crops in Pakistan. Pakistan has not forgotten its fears of being turned into a “dust bowl” in April 1948, when India allegedly stopped the flow of water from the Ferozpur headworks to canals in West Pakistan in the middle of sowing period for the kharif crops. Pakistan said India’s stoppage of the flow of water not only ruined the kharif season but also caused water disruption in Lahore. In addition, power distribution to West Pakistan from the Mandi hydroelectric scheme also had been affected.19 This experience became the catalyst for the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty. Therefore, in the context of enduring mistrust, tension, and rivalry, Pakistan is reluctant to allow India to control water supplies that are vital for its agriculture and hydroelectric generation.20 Some scholars believe India’s good faith was challenged, considering that the Wular Barrage project was drawn before 1947 but was always shelved because of fears that a dam of any size would inundate a vast tract of land, possibly including Srinagar.21 This argument appears less convincing when one wonders why Pakistan would be worried about the inundation of Srinagar, which possibility should rather be a cause of concern for India, a fact that forms the core of India’s argument against the engineered-flooding theory. India has repeatedly said that fears of deliberate or intentional flooding of POK are baseless because this theory overlooks the fact that to do so India would have to flood its own territory first, which can never be contemplated by New Delhi. Pakistan has conveyed to Indian authorities that such flooding could stifle the economies

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of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir and might also have serious consequences for Pakistan’s defenses against India. A case in point is the Pakistani claim that during the1965 war, the Indian army failed to cross the BRB Link Canal because it was flooded.22 Pakistan also asserts that India would be in a position to influence the movement and progress of Pakistani troops by inundating the battlefield or canals, or could even facilitate the maneuverability of its own troops by closing the barrage gates and draining the canals dry where required.23 Pakistan has been of the opinion that once India gains the control of water flow in the Jhelum, in addition to its control over the Chenab River through the Salal Dam (constructed by India in the 1970s) and the three eastern rivers under the IWT, Pakistan will be at its complete mercy. Therefore, Indian control of the Jhelum River through this “storage work,” irrespective of its purpose and noble intentions, could mean a serious threat to vast tracts of agricultural land in the Punjab and Sind and also to power generation, defense structures, military bases, and lines of communication.24 According to Mirza M. Nasarullah the Tulbul Navigation Project will have the following consequences for Pakistan’s economy: a. India would be able to stop the water flow of the Jhelum River for 20 to 30 days completely. This could greatly reduce the production of electricity at Mangla and thereby adversely affect Punjab’s agriculture in particular and industrial activity in the country in general. b. The Jhelum is a very important tributary of the Indus. With the reduction in the flow of the Jhelum, water flow in the Indus would be automatically reduced, thereby damaging the economy and agriculture in Sind province.25

Given the deep-rooted fears that bolster Pakistan’s opposition to the project, and considering that the overall nature of Indo-Pak relations has seen more animosity and conflict than cooperation, the question is how such a dispute, which has legal, technical, and also psychological dimensions, can be resolved. As in the case of the Baghliar dispute this dispute has to be sought within the framework of the IWT for a viable resolution. The treaty enshrines three procedures for resolving disputes. First, through the Permanent Indus Commission, which consists of two commissioners appointed from each country for the Indus waters. When the matter is seen only as a “question” pertaining to

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the interpretation of the provisions of the IWT, then “questions” of “interpretation or application” are to be submitted to the commission, which serves as a regular channel of communication on all matters relating to the treaty’s implementation. Second, if the commissioners fail to resolve the matter it becomes a “difference” and, if it concerns any of the twenty-odd questions that fall within the expert’s jurisdiction, then it must be referred to a neutral expert for resolution, if either side requests it. Third, failing resolution by a neutral expert, the matter will be treated as a “dispute” and either side may request its referral to a seven-member court of arbitration. Noorani has opined that the dispute is a “difference” and falls neatly within the scope of the neutral expert’s competence: “whether or not any use of water or storage in addition to that provided in Article III is involved in any of the schemes referred to in Article IV (2) or in Article IV (3) (b) and carried out by India on the Western rivers.”26

Negotiations on the Dispute Pakistan first became aware of the plan for the construction of the barrage in March 1985, when its tender was published in the newspapers by the GOI. Having known of the proposed barrage, the Pakistani high commissioner brought the matter to the notice of President Zia-ul Haq, who directed his government to seek resolution at the secretary level. The diplomatic circle in Islamabad was quite perplexed by Zia’s lukewarm reaction and found it “very strange.” It was believed that Zia did not want to jeopardize the rapprochement that was underway with India at that time.27 Others suggest that Zia treated the matter with utmost seriousness and directed the Pakistan Foreign Office to approach India immediately. The Pakistani high commissioner was directed to lodge a formal protest against the construction work, but India attached little importance to the objection and carried on with construction.28 The dispute was then brought to the notice of PCIW for discussion, in which India conveyed that the Wular Barrage was to be built on Wular Lake for purely navigational purposes and assured Pakistan that the stored water would not be used for power generation. Nonetheless, Pakistan feared that under the cover of a “navigational project” India sought control of the Jhelum and would subsequently use it for the generation of hydroelectricity.29

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In December 1987 the commissioners met again for further discussions. In these discussions India claimed that since Wular Lake was not a part of the Jhelum River, India had every right to construct a dam or barrage on it. In response Pakistan sent a note to New Delhi on January 2, 1988, asserting that the Jhelum Main starts from Verinag and, as clearly stated in the 1960 treaty, all tributaries join each other in Wular Lake and the Jhelum flows from the lake. Therefore, building a dam on the Jhelum Main would constitute a violation of the treaty.30 The talks ended without any agreement and both sides decided to deal with the matter at the political level. Despite the failure to sort out Indo-Pak differences the talks did imply the existence of a dispute that needed resolution. In the meantime Pakistan was advised by British and American experts that Prime Minster Muhammad Khan Junejo approach the International Court of Justice (ICJ), advice that Junejo declined to follow. In a significant move, India suspended construction work until an agreement was reached through direct talks and discussions. India also advised its commissioner against referring the problem to the neutral expert, which left two possible options—signing an accord or approaching the ICJ for arbitration. There is a provision in the treaty for direct consultation between the parties for dispute resolution, bypassing the commissioners and also referring the matter to international arbitration should the PCIW and the neutral experts fail to resolve the dispute.31 In 1988, following General Zia’s death in an air crash, the political scene in Pakistan was rife with uncertainties and coming to a boil. In a significant turn in internal developments, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) came to power under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto, who showed keen interest in settling disputes with India. After studying the present status of the talks on various fronts Bhutto gathered that India was pushing for negotiations. Indian ambassador Jyotindra Nath Dixit informed Bhutto of the possibility of initiating negotiations by February 1989, which proposal Bhutto accepted, leading to talks in March. India emphasized that the barrage was meant only for navigational purposes and not for storage or power generation. Pakistan was far from convinced by Indian assurances and suspected that the barrage would be used for power generation and even alleged the existence of a feasibility report prepared by India for building a power plant near the barrage. Pakistan also claimed that two other plants were

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already working at Mohra and lower Jhelum, a few miles from the proposed barrage.32 Analysts wondered why, given the legally weak Indian case for the barrage, Pakistan chose the path of futile bilateral negotiations rather than referring the case to the ICJ.33 Possible reasons were as follows: First, Pakistan wanted good relations with India, and Prime Minister Bhutto had categorically declared: The government is cognizant of this vital issue that relates to the economy of the country and negotiations with India are being continued in the spirit of the Simla Agreement. The present government is following the policy of coexistence with all its neighbors, especially with India, but not at the cost of compromising Pakistan’s interest. It is wrong to assume that Pakistan has given its consent to India to construct the Wular Barrage, in occupied Kashmir.34

Second, Pakistan expected a better deal through negotiations with India and calculated that even in the worst case scenario of losing out in the negotiations it could go to the ICJ anyway. Besides, since work had been suspended on the barrage, Pakistan’s interests would not be jeopardized if the talks continued over a long period.35 Third, Pakistan was skeptical of receiving the desired decision from the ICJ and feared the court might not necessarily adhere to the treaty’s provisions when reaching its judgment. Plus, although Pakistan considered the construction to be a violation of the treaty, the treaty itself could be challenged under the law of equity.36 Fourth, as settling the dispute might take three to five years in court, it would cost Pakistan as much as Rs. 5 to 10 crores (as per the 1989 exchange rate, approximately US $4.5 million or £2.5 million) in foreign exchange.37 And fifth, even if Pakistan ultimately won the case in the International Court, the latter had no coercive mechanism to implement the decision and, therefore, Pakistan would eventually have to follow the path of negotiations to implement the decision on the ground.38 As a result the two sides chose to settle their differences through bilateral negotiations, which began in March 1989. In fact Pakistan had sent a delegation to New Delhi in November 1989 with a proposal on permitting India to construct the barrage under certain conditions and restrictions, but which India rejected due to some reservations.39 At the conclusion of the talks Sardar Nasurallah Dreshak, Pakistani Punjab’s minister for irrigation and power, advised the

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government to approach the ICJ for arbitration. In response Federal Minister Farooq Leghari said the dispute should not be exploited for any political purpose and reiterated that the option of arbitration would be exercised only as a last resort, in case the talks broke down completely.40 In April 1989 another request was made by the Punjab Ministry for Power and Irrigation, this time to suspend further talks with India, a request that was again turned down by the federal government. On August 16, 1989, Pakistan constituted a new drafting committee, comprised of Abdul Rahim, commissioner, Indus Waters Commission Pakistan; Ghulam Rasool, deputy legal advisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and attorney Zein Sheikh, a legal expert from Karachi. This committee was entrusted with the task of reviewing the draft given to India during the November 1989 New Delhi talks and to submit a revised draft to the Ministry of Water and Power by August 31, 1989, for review by the ministry and the advocate general of the Punjab. On August 18 Punjab’s chief minister, Nawaz Sharif, requested President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to mediate the issue, but the matter was not raised, since the Pakistan People’s Party was set against immediately signing any agreement with India.41 It must be noted that toward the end of 1989 some progress had been made in narrowing down the differences. It was reported that if Pakistan gave the go-ahead for the construction of the Wular dam “India has agreed to surrender 0.3 million acre-feet of the total general storage capacity of the Jhelum tributaries allowed to it under the Indus Waters Treaty. The dam’s total storage capacity was equivalent to the storage capacity India was ready to forego.”42 During the negotiations India also presented a twelve-point draft to Pakistan, which in response presented a six-point draft to India. Pakistan’s draft seemed to approve the construction of the barrage under certain conditions, which later were revised to address the basic disagreement.43 A highly placed Pakistani source disclosed: The Pakistan Government has decided to arrive at a negotiated settlement on the Wular Project with India, allowing it to build the disputed barrage if India agrees to keep 6.2 meters of the structure as ungated with crest level at EL 1,574.90 meters, forego general storage capacity of 0.30 million acre-feet out of the provision of 75 million acre-feet, permitted to it on the Jhelum and not construct the Kishenganga (390 MW) hydro-power generating unit.44

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The News reported: India agreed to surrender on the first two points but consensus on the Kishenganga project is still to be reached. This is the only disputed issue left for the amicable settlement of the Wular Barrage melodrama. Pakistan is of the view that if India constructed the Kishenganga dam it would affect the construction of Pakistan’s Neelam hydropower project on the Jhelum. If we compromise on other points then India would compromise here and construction on Neelam Jhelum held up due to this dispute could begin as it was in Pakistan’s interest. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has given the green signal to the Ministry for Water and Power to go ahead for the negotiated settlement of the issue and a high-powered delegation of the ministry would soon be visiting Delhi to reach an agreement acceptable to both countries.45

The finalized draft agreement that emerged after the October 1991 discussions in Islamabad contained the following commitments and provisions: The Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of Republic of India Desirous of promoting and strengthening friendly relations between the two countries on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual benefit; Re-affirming their continued commitment to the Indus Water Treaty, 1960 (herein referred to as the Treaty and their sincere desire to maintain its sanctity; and Desirous of arriving at a negotiated settlement on the Wular Navigation Project (hereinafter referred to as the Project) on the Jhelum Main, Have in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, agreed as follows: 1. The salient features of the Project shall conform to the features as laid down in the Annexure to this agreement. 2. India agrees to keep 6.2 m of the structure as ungated with a crest level at EL 1574.90 m (5167 ft). 3. India shall not make any alteration in the salient features of the Project specified in Articles 1 and 2 except by mutual agreement between Indian and Pakistan. 4. India shall forego a General Storage Capacity of 0.30 million acre-feet out of the provision permitted to it on the Jhelum (excluding the Jhelum Main) under item (b) Paragraph 7 of the Annexure E to the treaty.

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5. In consideration of India foregoing a General Storage Capacity of 0.30 million acre-feet in terms of Article 4 above, the Project shall be entitled to attain full operational level of 5177.90 ft. each year. The annual filling of the lake up to the full operational level and initial filling below the Dead Storage Level should be carried out at such times and in accordance with such rules as may be agreed upon between the commissioners. In case the commissioners are unable to reach agreement, India may carry out the filling during 21 June and 20 August. 6. Except for the uses specified in Article III (2) of the Treaty and subject to provisions of Article 5 of this Agreement, India shall be under an obligation to let flow all the waters entering Wular Lake. 7. Any question which arises between the parties concerning the interpretation and application of this Agreement or the existence of any fact which, if established, might constitute a breach of this Agreement shall be dealt with under the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty. 8. Matters not expressly provided for in the Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of the Treaty. 9. The terms used in this Agreement shall have the same meanings as in the Treaty.46

Between 1987 and 1992 India and Pakistan held eight rounds of secretary-level talks and after 1992 there was a long break until the ninth round was held in New Delhi on November 5, 1998. This time talks were part of the CDP agreed upon in May 1997, and the Tulbul/ Wular dispute was the first of six agenda items taken up for discussion. The Pakistani delegation was led by Syed Shahid Hussain, Pakistan Ministry of Water and Power secretary, and the Indian side was headed by Water Resources secretary, Z. Hasan. Pakistan suggested the entire project should be looked into afresh, whereas India insisted the threads should be picked up from the 1991 discussion, during which the draft agreement was reportedly endorsed by both sides.47 The Indian delegation pressed Pakistan hard to work on the 1991 draft to achieve mutual satisfaction and not waste the eight rounds of efforts put in by previous negotiators. Pakistan kept insisting, along past lines of argument, that the Wular Barrage would affect its downstream power projects, without categorically naming those affected projects, and at the same time dismissing India’s arguments that any increase in flow during the lean months would be beneficial to all power projects anyway. In the end the talks proved inconclusive and, on their failure, Z. Hasan said,

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“Maybe because of some political reasons” (without clarifying the reasons explicitly).48 According to Hasan the Indian position held that revival of the plans to construct a barrage at Wular Lake in J&K was for navigational and non-consumptive use, for which there was provision in the treaty. He continued: We impressed upon them (Pakistan) that Wular is an existing natural lake and that we were not creating a storage facility. The barrage would help regulate the flows so that there was enough water in the river to make navigation possible along the 20-km stretch between Wular and Baramulla via Sopore. . . . Differences are still there, but we are working toward a solution. It is a very complex issue.49

The joint statement at the end of the talks said discussions would continue at the next round of the dialogues with a view to finding a solution consistent with the provisions of the treaty, describing the talks as “frank” and held in a “constructive atmosphere.”50 Due to the dip in bilateral relations during this period, as highlighted in earlier chapters, talks were shelved until 2004, when they were resumed. The next round, on July 29–30, 2004, was at the secretary level, between the Indian Ministry of Water Resources and the Pakistani Ministry of Water and Power, led by V.K. Duggal and Ashfaq Mahmood, respectively. The two sides explored ways of resolution within the framework of the treaty’s provisions, and, though cordial, the talks failed to yield any breakthrough.51 Pakistan reiterated that the dam should not exceed its height as of 1987 when construction was suspended. Pakistan also obtained some technical clarifications from India and discussed some legal points for a better understanding of the dispute. Pakistani officials also noted that India was genuinely interested in resolution of the dispute, otherwise it would not have suspended construction and carried on with these bilateral negotiations.52 The next round of talks was held in New Delhi on June 28–29, 2005, led by Ashfaq Mahmood, secretary of Pakistan’s Ministry of Water and Power and J. Hari Narayan, secretary of India’s Ministry of Water Resources, to look into the dispute and lay down the future course of action, but as in the previous round no tangible solution emerged.53 While speaking to the press at the conclusion of the talks, Jalil Abbas Jilani, director general, South Asia division, Pakistan

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foreign ministry, and member of the Pakistani delegation said, “The storage of water was not allowed under the Treaty and the barrage envisaged 32 times more storage capacity against 0.1 million acre-feet storage permitted under the Treaty.” Quoting Ashfaq Mahmood, he also said that it has been conveyed to India that no man-made construction was allowed on the main river Jhelum and the project would cause interference in the flow of water which was not permitted under the Treaty. . . . the Indian claim that it was a navigational project had not been substantiated[,] . . . several legal and technical issues were still to be resolved and without their resolution, India could not start work on the project.54

Around this time the term, at Pakistan’s insistence, “Storage Project” was added to the technical nomenclature of the dispute, making it “Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage and Storage Project,” which was an endorsement of Pakistan’s basic contention that it was a storage project. On June 22–23, 2006, a secretary-level delegation headed by Mahmood and Narayan met in Islamabad again to discuss the dispute, but with little success in addressing the basic differences over whether it was a storage or a navigation project. The joint statement in its boilerplate language said talks were cordial and constructive, without giving much detail, and mentioned the commitment of both sides to continue with discussions in the next round.55 In his brief to the press Hari Narayan said there will be a breakthrough when there is perfect understanding and agreement on both sides. According to a Pakistani official the Indian side was told in clear terms to abandon the project, as nothing less would be acceptable to Islamabad as a means to resolve the issue under relevant provisions of the treaty. The Indian delegation reiterated that it was not a violation of the treaty.56 The next round was held on August 30–31, 2007, led by Gauri Chatterji, secretary from India and Muhammad Ismail Qureshi, from Pakistan. Both sides affirmed their resolve to find a solution, within the framework of the treaty, in order to enable socioeconomic development of the peoples of the two countries. They also decided to hold technical-level talks to discuss the intricate technicalities that the resolution of the dispute entailed.57 No substantial details were available on the contents of the talks in press reports from both sides.

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Analysis of the Negotiations India and Pakistan have negotiated the “Tulbul Navigation Project/ Wular Barrage and Storage Project” dispute since 1987 and were close to an agreement in 1991 but have failed to resolve the dispute to mutual satisfaction. The talks have revolved around the discussion of whether the proposed project is permissible under the provisions of the IWT or whether it is a violation of the treaty. Failure to resolve the differences indicates that certain technical factors are proving to be an impediment, specifically those that pertain to the dam’s height and its gated and ungated attributes. Let us look into the elements of the negotiations in order to have a better understanding of major hurdles in the process of resolution.

Ripeness The negotiation history of Wular shows that ever since the issue was added to the agenda for discussions, India and Pakistan were keen to settle it bilaterally. When Pakistan’s high commissioner to India appraised Zia-ul Haq of the construction of the barrage, the latter clearly directed his officials to settle the issue through negotiations, which showed that General Zia took the issue quite seriously, contrary to what his critics alleged, and was keen to push the peace talks with India. In 1988, after a couple of rounds of talks, India and Pakistan had agreed to the fact that a dispute existed, which was a significant breakthrough from the perspective of conflict resolution. In a significant positive gesture, at the request of Pakistan, India suspended the construction work in 1987, which was a sincere indication of India’s desire and commitment to settle the issue across the table. When Benazir Bhutto came to power, she was apprised by Indian ambassador J.N Dixit of India’s willingness to settle the dispute through bilateral talks—a development that underlined the continuity of the process despite regime change. Secretary-level talks resumed in March 1989 and Benazir Bhutto took personal interest in the talks and followed their progress with interest, which emphasizes the kind of constructive role political leadership can play in facilitating the process. On the other hand India wanted to settle the issue because the project was deemed necessary to ensure the requisite navigability in the Jhelum during the lean months and thereby facilitate the movement of goods and people, and toward this end India

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did try to impress Pakistan of the common benefits of the steady flow of water all year round. It must be noted that, concurrently, certain circles in Pakistan wanted negotiations to be suspended and the matter referred to the ICJ for arbitration. Nevertheless, the top leadership decided in favor of talks, a decision based on sound reasoning and rationality, as discussed in the previous section. The interesting point is that Nawaz Sharif then, as the Punjab chief minister, had requested President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to suspend the talks with India and refer the case for arbitration. In reply, the president said firmly that resorting to arbitration would be the last option. He also cautioned that the dispute should not be exploited domestically by opponents of the government. Ironically, when Nawaz Sharif came to power he followed the negotiations mode, contrary to what he had demanded earlier. This illuminates the point that there remains a palpable difference in the policies and proclamations of leaders when they are in positions of authority and when they are not. In power they want to make a difference and make a positive contribution to peace, contrary to what they say when out of power and their statements are more for public consumption than indications of their actual policies. This was confirmed by Benazir Bhutto’s categorical declaration that she would hold discussions in the spirit of the Simla Accord to settle the dispute and reflected in Nawaz Sharif’s policy as well. These were some of the key factors that made the dispute ripe for negotiations. As mentioned previously, India too has shown willingness to settle the dispute through bilateral negotiations. The suspension of construction work and readiness to forego 0.30 million acre-feet of water out of the total general capacity from the Jhelum tributaries (if Pakistan allowed the construction work to go ahead) played an equally important role in making the dispute ripe for negotiations. Thus, there is no negating the fact that since 1987 the political will has persisted on both sides, which has kept the negotiation process rolling. In 1998, when talks resumed after a six-year hiatus, both sides showed they were still desirous of a negotiated solution. Nawaz Sharif and Atal Behari Vajpayee acknowledged the need to address unresolved disputes under the rubric of CDP but, intriguingly, there was a subtle change in Pakistan’s stand in the dispute. The Pakistani delegation’s insistence that the talks must start afresh came as a surprise to India, which said they should build on the agreements reached

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to the satisfaction of both sides in 1991 regarding the technical aspects of the dam. Understandably, due to political considerations the Pakistani delegation was backtracking from past commitments, which was discouraging but anticipated in the context of Indo-Pak enduring rivalry. Encouragingly, Pakistan did not waver from its commitment to a negotiated solution, which kept the process alive. Such a commitment from both sides is reflective of their consensus over a mutually agreed approach—in conflict-resolution parlance: resolution through negotiations that made the dispute ripe for settlement. There also exists a commonly agreed instrumentality in the form of the treaty, which has been invoked to address differences. Both sides have refrained from referring the case to the ICJ for arbitration and have carried on with the discussion and avoided polemics through the media. After the Baghliar case was referred to the neutral expert for settlement Pakistan, it seems, ended up with less than it had expected. Its questioning of dam’s legality in light of the treaty was not fully sustained by the expert. This experience will take Pakistani negotiators back to what Benazir Bhutto had argued: that recourse to arbitration is timeconsuming and expensive, and after all that effort one is not assured of the victory. Therefore, Benazir Bhutto’s observations and the Baghliar experience combined have brought substantial ripeness in the dispute for a negotiated bilateral settlement. To be sure, there are differences that need to be resolved pertaining to the size and structure of the dam, and considering that this is technically a routine task for the engineers, it can be resolved with a little push from the leadership. It is a less contentious issue than Siachen, and its resolution will also help lubricate the negotiation process on other fronts. Realization has already set in on both sides that, since the IWT was signed in 1960, the demography in the area and the requirements of the people has changed astoundingly. Because of a burgeoning population, there has been a sharp increase in demand for electricity, for irrigation water, and for trade. Growing economic hardship, underpinned by the global financial crisis, reinforces the need to exploit whatever resources are available for the betterment of individuals and economies. Any compromise shown by Pakistan on Tulbul/Wular will encourage India to adopt a more cooperative approach on the Neelam Dam issue. Both sides share a common river system and will have to learn to share it in an amicable way, for there is no other way out. If this requires signing Indus Waters Treaty II,

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as many experts suggest, it should be undertaken. If change is constant, minds should be open to that change as well to keeping pace with it, for only such a realization will take the dispute to its logical settlement.

Prenegotiation Some elements of prenegotiation can be discerned in the dispute. For instance, India had begun construction of the barrage in 1984 on the understanding that this did not amount to violation of the treaty since Wular was a natural lake, not a man-made storage facility, and was delinked from Indus river system requirements. When the matter came to the notice of Pakistan through the tender notice that was published in the newspapers, it objected to the construction, calling it a violation of the treaty. Upon Pakistan’s protest India realized there was a problem that needed to be sorted out and defined in clear terms. Toward this end India agreed to discuss the matter with Pakistan and thereby acknowledged that a problem did exist, committing itself to a peacefully negotiated settlement. While India and Pakistan were exchanging views and information on the dispute, tension persisted because of the continuation of construction at the site. Pakistan, objecting, asked India to suspend work and follow the negotiation mode for resolution. In response, India abandoned the construction of the barrage, which to a great extent not only lowered the intensity of the conflict but also sent a clear, positive message to Pakistan of its genuine desire to resolve the dispute through consultation. This goes to show that in conflict situations any negative activity on the ground that brings about tension between the parties has to be arrested to improve atmospherics for talks and also to boost the trust level between the parties. When the parties enter the negotiation process they consider all kinds of options, such as third-party roles. In some political and policy-making circles in Pakistan there prevailed the strong urge to refer the dispute for arbitration, discarding the bilateral mode, but eventually the directive from the highest offices was to follow the route of negotiations. On this count the political leadership of Pakistan deserves commendation. Further, it is important to emphasize here that President Farooq Leghari had also advised Pakistani officials and leaders that the dispute must not be exploited for political gains, and also that Benazir Bhutto, too, had dismissed the idea of going for arbitration rather

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than negotiating. What seems to have reinforced these gestures by Farooq Leghari and Benazir Bhutto was the decision by India to suspend construction work in 1987. This illuminates a vital point that any positive act by one party encourages its counterpart to reciprocate in a similar constructive and confidence-building manner. For long, India and Pakistan have informally exchanged draft proposals and improved upon them in preparation for later discussion in formal talks that form part of the prenegotiation exercise that entails exploring a range of options, ideas, and mechanisms (outside the formal channel of negotiation) and discussing revised versions in formal negotiations. The agreement of October 1991, developed in this manner, is a case in point. In prenegotiation terms India and Pakistan agreed there was a dispute that required negotiations and, as a consequence, India suspended construction, thereby lowering the intensity of the dispute. In this phase political leaderships played a positive and supporting role in advising their respective officials against exploitation of the dispute for political ends or airing it in the media—thus expressing faith in negotiations rather than arbitration.

Negotiations When talks were initiated in 1987 at the Indus waters commissioners’ level serious differences loomed over the dispute. As a result, between October 1987 and August 1992, and again in November 1998 and, subsequently, from 2004 onward the technical and legal aspects of the dispute have been discussed in detail. Until 1991 the main issue being discussed thoroughly was whether what India proposes is permissible under the treaty. For a substantial period of time India kept assuring Pakistan that the project is not a storage facility, since Wular Lake is a natural reservoir and therefore not linked to the Indus waters, so construction of the barrage was permissible. India also said the barrage will function on the “run-of-the-river” basis to help regulate the flow of water in the Jhelum during the lean months, which will be beneficial for Pakistan as well. Pakistan was unimpressed by this argument and said the barrage will hold water in the Wular Lake, making it a storage project, and therefore constitutes a violation of the treaty. India sensed that it would have to get into the technical details of the project to convince Pakistan that the flow of the water in the Jhelum would not be affected and, pursuant to this requirement, the

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barrage would have a design based on strict specifications. When India suggested the construction should be permitted only when it can be ensured that it does not interfere with the flow of water in the Jhelum, Pakistan agreed to discuss the technical aspects of the project. Keeping this understanding in mind, both sides developed the document that resulted in the 1991 agreement. During negotiations Pakistan seemed to have recognized that India was keen for the barrage to be constructed, and on its part India accepted that the barrage could cause interference with the water flow in the Jhelum. By 1991 a compromise had been reached whereby Pakistan would receive 0.30 million acre-feet of the total Jhelum tributaries water originally allotted to India (excluding the Jhelum Main). This was a specific proposal designed to incorporate the needs and reservations of both parties in light of new conditions that had arisen since the IWT was signed in 1960. Pakistan was also persuaded that India would not undertake any unilateral action or project that would violate Pakistan’s rights under the treaty. The draft agreement of 1991 was a major breakthrough in eliminating basic differences between the two, made possible only through the accommodating and compromising attitude of the parties. This indicated that India and Pakistan were to some extent able to transform the dispute from a zero-sum game to a non-zero sum game. India and Pakistan have discussed the issue at both the secretary level and technical level, which included engineers and technical experts from both sides. As discussed in the previous section, the 1991 agreement is reflective of how detailed the discussions have been, taking into account every specification of the barrage design. The agreement shows that both sides have been able to develop proposals within the broader contours of the 1960 treaty and, at the same time, also tried to address their own interests in the issue. Any Indo-Pak negotiation is a very complex affair, given the enduring nature of their rivalry, the political complexities, and linkage politics with the Kashmir dispute. The negotiations on Tulbul/ Wular are no exception, and they become all the more sensitive because of the project’s location in J&K. Naturally, each side is cautious before taking any decision that may have an adverse influence on the people of Kashmir and, thereby, undermine its credibility. Pakistan has repeatedly raised the threat of possible inundation of the Srinagar Valley caused by the barrage, and also has alleged that the barrage could be exploited during war times for drying up and flooding canals or the POK area. Although India has dismissed

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these fears as baseless, saying no country would flood its own population first in order to harm the people on the other side of the divide, this particular issue goes to show the persistence of linkage politics that complicate matters for the negotiators. Such a linkage has to be avoided, and the dispute should be dealt with on its own merits. The stand taken by the Pakistani delegation in 1998, demanding to start talks afresh, was an unconstructive gesture unmindful of the hard work of both sides in preparing the 1991 draft agreement—a stand taken largely because of “political reasons.” The 1991 agreement was a significant breakthrough and needs to be built upon in future talks. Backtracking from it may only prolong the discussion, which may not be a healthy situation for negotiations on other disputes that are more contentious. In fact, the resolution of this dispute may lubricate other sluggish negotiations and bring about a sizable change in the mindset of the people of both sides. As in 1991, the focus should be on looking into the dispute with a positive attitude and discussing the common advantages that are to be accrued to both parties. If Pakistan recognizes the barrage’s advantages for its own population, then a compromise can be easily worked out. Talks should not be held hostage to a treaty negotiated in a different setting and different circumstances, and there is no harm in improving upon that treaty in the light of developments over the past fifty years. Treaties are meant to regulate engagements between states and peoples, not to hamper them, and therefore should be considered in that spirit. India and Pakistan must evoke the relevant clauses and improve upon those clauses that require improvement in order that the treaty can be fruitful to all concerned parties. So far both sides have adopted a compromising attitude on Tulbul/ Wular; the leadership has been very supportive; both countries have refrained from polemics in the media, and on both sides there is enough will prevailing to take negotiations to a logical conclusion.

Agreement The Tulbul/Wular Barrage dispute is not intractable and can be resolved with a compromising approach—which both sides have more or less shown thus far. The 1991 agreement was the result of a thorough and focused discussion involving technical experts from both sides. It went into the detailed specifications of the length of the ungated section and height of the crest level, and India was instructed not to alter the structure without prior consultation. The

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agreement also directed India to forego water permitted to it on the Jhelum and, in return, India would be allowed to maintain an appropriate operational water level at the barrage. India was also to fill the lake during a fixed period based on consultation between the commissioners. The detail in which the agreement was prepared showed that negotiators were drafting provisions in keeping with the concerns and needs of India and Pakistan. The 1991 agreement is a rational and functional document from which the final agreement can possibly emerge. This may also mean signing the Indus Waters Treaty II, as B.G. Verghese has argued for years, and improving upon or replacing those clauses that have become outdated or have worked more as impediments than facilitators in regulating Indo-Pak sharing of river water.58 Ironically, despite the IWT constituting a path-breaking success in a hostile setting thanks to the foresight of the leadership, the skill of the negotiators, and the support of the World Bank, the people of J&K and POK assert that the treaty ignores their interests. There may be abundant reasons for their resentment—demographic pressures, climate change, local and regional politics—but such resentment should not be stoked in order to dismiss the successes and merits of a treaty signed half a century ago in a different political climate and setting. What is required is to look into the 1960 treaty afresh and take stock of the projects that are underway and problems that have arisen in recent decades, then make projections of the future demands and needs of the populations on both sides of the divide. Article XII (3) provides a built-in mechanism to improve upon provisions of the treaty in light of changes on the ground that come about over a period of time.

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CONCLUSION

LEARNING FROM THE PAST TO ADDRESS THE PRESENT AND INFLUENCE THE FUTURE

I

n the preceding chapters an in-depth analysis was undertaken of five major disputes in India-Pakistan relations (here characterized as enduring rivalry). The basic question addressed was: How successful or nearly successful have the two countries been in negotiating solutions to their disputes, even though their overall relations remained hostile? It was believed that an answer to this question would shed light on the experiences of states in other such conflict dyads in the international system. This study focused on the Indus waters dispute and the Rann of Kutch dispute (referred to here as successes), and Siachen, Sir Creek, and Tulbul Navigation/Wular Barrage and Storage project (referred to as near-successes). These five disputes were scrutinized using the framework of negotiation encompassing the factors of ripeness, prenegotiation, negotiation, and agreement. The objective was to analyze the history of Indo-Pak negotiation of these disputes to ascertain the extent to which these four characteristics of negotiations made an impact on the final outcome so as to derive important lessons from successes that can be replicated in pending disputes, and whether such successes can be replicated in future negotiations. The study advances the following conclusions, findings, and lessons for policy makers on both sides engaged in the CDP.

The Indus Waters Treaty The Indus Waters dispute, which was negotiated and discussed for eight years, finally became settled on September 19, 1960. This brought to an end the longstanding dispute on the uses of the Indus system of rivers, comprised of the “western rivers,” namely, the Indus

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main, Jhelum, and Chenab, and the “eastern rivers,” viz., the Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej, which after the 1947 partition were in controversy regarding the upper and lower-riparian rights of India and Pakistan respectively. In conformity with the negotiation framework, the dispute was found ripe for settlement because both India and Pakistan were keen to resolve matters peacefully, and they considered a resolution to be essential for their mutual economic benefit and maintenance of peace in the subcontinent. There was a shared perception on both sides of the desirability of an accord. India was sensitive to Pakistan’s need for water and dedicated to settling the dispute in a good-neighborly fashion, whereas Pakistan was desperate to get the dispute resolved before the December 30, 1947, standstill agreement completed its three months validity. To the mutual advantage of the countries the political leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayub Khan was strong and capable of taking bold decisions during the critical phases of negotiations, the signing of the agreement, and also its implementation. This brought the dispute to a point of maturity (ripeness) whereby serious negotiations to settle it were launched with the aid of the World Bank. From February 1951 (when David E. Lilienthal visited India) till 1952 (when formal negotiations were ushered in), India and Pakistan adopted a systematic approach to formulating a basic framework of dispute resolution with the World Bank’s help, which included “defining the problem,” “developing the commitment to negotiate,” and “arranging the negotiations.”1 In other words, India and Pakistan developed a framework for negotiations that enabled them to move away from contemplating conflicting unilateral solutions and toward a cooperative multilateral or joint solution. The broad basis of discussion was initiated in March 1952, and the principles of water-resources development, irrigation engineering, and economies were the fundamental considerations. Instead of diplomats and ministers, the principal negotiators from the contending nations were engineers and administrators of the permanent services and lawyers, all of whom were well-acquainted with the relevant engineering technicalities and the legality of various provisions and mechanisms. The World Bank, on its part, offered its best engineers and top-management officials for the case. Besides all this, and most importantly (as India’s chief negotiator, N.D. Gulhati, said), there was no mass audience to address, no occasion for rhetoric nor for inflammatory debating tactics, and the two sides adopted a very functional and highly professional approach.

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The negotiators understood and respected one another and always kept their frustrations manageable. They were not unduly bothered by public opinion, and they enjoyed greater autonomy of decision making that speaks of the trust in them held by the respective political leaderships. Although the critical decisions were made at the political level, the negotiations themselves were conducted by professional officials and engineers who, with the full backing of their political masters, took decisions at the negotiating table. In this dispute, the third-party role was vital, especially in arranging the massive financial assistance from the donor countries. Despite the absence of any serious political leverage, the World Bank’s ability to arrange funds proved a crucial inducement to the resolution of the conflict. Both India and Pakistan had expressed their full faith in the good offices of the bank and the bank in turn showed professional maturity and wisdom by not apportioning any blame to either party, adopting a nonpartisan approach, and treating India and Pakistan at par. The bank was neither so close to the parties that it would appear intrusive and overbearing, nor too distant to lose leverage and influence by failing to keep the parties committed to the negotiations. The bank chose Rome, London, and Washington as venues for negotiations—far from New Delhi and Karachi in the critical phases of the negotiations, which helped negotiators concentrate on their work and remain insulated from domestic political pressures and media interference. Most important of all, the bank, aware of the “linkage” diplomacy between India and Pakistan, had urged the two parties to separate the Indus waters dispute from other political issues, especially from the Kashmir question. India and Pakistan, while expressing their will to agree and accept in good spirit the ideas put forward by the bank, made sure the outcome of this negotiation would not set legal precedents for other disputes. The political climate was also a determining element, largely due to the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayub Khan. The period between 1947–60 saw a stable and strong India under the leadership of Nehru, who enjoyed the faith, respect, and support of the people and his cabinet and was in good control, able to manage any possible domestic political fallout from the agreement. Since Pakistan had seven prime ministers between 1947–58, the country did not enjoy political stability like India. Then, after Ayub Khan came to power in 1958, Pakistan achieved a significant degree of political stability that was reflected in Ayub Khan’s committed support to his team of

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negotiators to see the negotiations through. As a result, within two years an agreement was reached. Over the years a fair amount of opposition to the IWT has grown in J&K and POK, articulated by leaders, activists, and others who consider it an unjust settlement. Indeed, due to the burgeoning population and rise in demands for electricity, irrigation, and domestic water use, there is increasing pressure and demand on the existing river waters. These pressures need to be addressed in the same manner they were almost sixty years ago. There is a provision for modification of the treaty, in Article XII (3), which can be invoked to begin work on revisions to address changing demographic conditions and the population’s needs. This built-in capacity for future modifications is a key element of the treaty, one that further indicates the farsightedness of the negotiators and their ability to anticipate future criticism due to the changing situation on the ground. Another, important facet of the treaty has been the built-in mechanism for settling disputes that emerge from its implementation and interpretation. The Baghliar and the Tulbul/Wular disputes are two cases in point. The Baghliar dispute has been settled through a neutral expert, as provided in Article IX, and the Tulbul/Wular dispute, too, is likely to be settled in the future. While India and Pakistan can ponder the possibility of having a second, revised version of the treaty, in light of emerging challenges, the built-in mechanism for settlement of differences and disputes is already playing the requisite role in addressing present demands and disputes. In the Indus waters negotiations realism and pragmatism have gained over sentimentalism, and the final resolution successfully bypassed the Kashmir dispute, making the treaty’s comprehensiveness a template for future agreements.

The Rann of Kutch Dispute The Rann of Kutch agreement of 1965 and the Kutch Tribunal Award of 1968 settled the dispute surrounding the Kutch-Sind boundary, in which Pakistan claimed jurisdiction over the northern half of the Rann, saying the boundary ran through the middle of this area along the twenty-fourth parallel. Disagreeing, India’s contention was that the boundary ran on the northern edge of the Rann and that the entire Rann was India’s territory. This argument put an area of approximately 3,500 square miles (out of a total 9,000 square miles) in dispute. Because of the territorial dimension the

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Rann of Kutch dispute proved difficult and complicated to negotiate (contestation over territory). According to the parameters of the negotiation framework, the dispute did become ripe for negotiations, but not in the same manner as did the Indus waters dispute. The commitment to resolve the issue through negotiations was made by India and Pakistan in 1959, when a joint settlement was considered feasible. A combination of factors compelled India to reach the dispute settlement in the manner it did, which made the dispute’s ripeness element different from that of the Indus Waters Treaty. It is important to note that the Rann of Kutch dispute ripened for two reasons: First, the India-China War of 1962, Jawaharlal Nehru’s death in 1964, and the lack of international support for India increased pressure on Lal Bahadur Shastri to settle the dispute. Second, India and Pakistan were making commitments for settlement through negotiations—although India was more predisposed to reaching a peaceful settlement because of Lal Bahadur Shastri’s passive style of leadership, while Pakistan was aggressively posturing due to India’s diminished international stature. In India, a political vacuum was created after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, whose leadership had been a great source of national strength. Though political stability prevailed between 1959 and 1967, the change in leadership not only transformed India’s approach toward Pakistan but vice versa. In Pakistan, where the media was under the control of Ayub Khan’s military dictatorship, there was little pressure on him on that count, although his aggressive posturing would have been appreciated anyway by a relatively free media. In India there was severe political and public criticism of Lal Bahadur Shastri’s approval of the 1965 Ceasefire Agreement, and the media were up in arms against the government. There was, however, no threat to the government because the Congress party enjoyed a majority in the parliament and could not afford to confront its prime minister on this issue. Besides, Shastri was justified when he said the Ceasefire Agreement was a corollary of the mechanisms agreed upon by Nehru and the agreements of 1959 and 1960, reached under his leadership. So it was a principled stand, taken by Shastri in light of the commitments India had made under Nehru. The territorial dimension of the Rann of Kutch dispute necessitated that India and Pakistan prenegotiate for a substantial period to gather the necessary facts and information to facilitate an effective, meaningful, and informative negotiation. The 1959 Dacca meeting and the following year’s ministers’ conferences in Karachi,

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Rawalpindi, and New Delhi emphasized the need to gather further information to establish the historicity of the dispute. The process of data exchange and information gathering had commenced in 1948, and in 1959 both sides felt a need for more homework. While the 1960 ministers’ conferences also settled four of the five border disputes pertaining to the West Pakistan–India border, the participants also directed India and Pakistan to gather more information on the Kutch dispute. The ongoing exchange of notes since 1948 helped India and Pakistan better elucidate their respective arguments and positions and, following the Indo-Pak Western Border Conference of January 1960, their understanding of the dispute and of each others’ position, had improved significantly. What did, however, pose a serious impediment during this period were the border violations and skirmishes between the two forces in the Rann, incidents that not only vitiated the political atmosphere but also made it difficult for Shastri to convince critics of the logic of a peaceful and negotiated settlement with Pakistan. For any negotiation to succeed it is extremely important to create the proper ambience, and this means hostilities on the ground must cease and all activities that subvert the atmospherics must be arrested. After the 1962 war with China, India was still recovering from its losses and hesitant to wage an all-out war with Pakistan. In addition a word of caution from the United States and Great Britain against contemplating any ground or aerial attack against Pakistan influenced India’s decision to accept the ceasefire. Notwithstanding domestic pressures, Shastri approved of the ceasefire agreement on the condition that status quo would be restored to the January 1, 1965, positions and that both forces would withdraw to their previous positions. Yet even when the ceasefire agreement was announced, in the following four months—during which both sides were asked to find a negotiated settlement—Pakistan moved its troops in Kashmir in a bid to forge a linkage between the Kashmir and Kutch disputes. This move created a furor in the Indian parliament, putting pressure on the government to take a tough stance with Pakistan. The ceasefire agreement did bring about a cessation of hostilities on the ground, but the aggressive posturing of Pakistan, as evident from its move in Kashmir, continued to foment tensions and intensify rivalry. In such a situation any talks were bound to fail and, quite expectedly, the August 20, 1965, foreign ministers’ meeting in Delhi was called off. It was realized that it was pointless to attempt to hold

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any meaningful dialogue while Pakistan was purposefully pushing to enlarge the scope of the negotiations by raising the Kashmir issue and having the Kutch dispute put on the backburner. In this context it was praiseworthy of Lal Bahadur Shastri and his government to have kept focus entirely on the Kutch dispute in the run-up to arbitration and thereby neutralized Pakistan’s bid at forging the KutchKashmir linkage. The ceasefire agreement of June 30, 1965, was a time-bound commitment for conflict resolution, and the provisions and rules envisaged in it laid out specific guidelines for dispute settlement. The third-party role in the Kutch dispute was critical in breaking the impasse and bringing both sides to the negotiating table, compelling them to clamp down on military clashes. The reference to the third-party involvement in the dispute was made in 1959 at the Sheikh-Swaran meeting in Dacca and reaffirmed in the 1960 agreement. The United States and Great Britain engaged with India and Pakistan in separate meetings to end hostilities and held important talks in London that finally resulted in the approval of the ceasefire agreement. The resolution of the Kutch dispute is not seen as a very positive and memorable experience for India, but it would be unjust to find no positive strands emerging from it. First, the dispute established that, for any purposeful negotiations, it is essential to have a conducive atmosphere. With troops engaged on the ground and tensions flaring across the border it becomes extremely difficult for negotiators to achieve any meaningful outcome. Perhaps Pakistan had to realize that an unsuitable ground situation gives the media and the opposition the opportunity to mount pressure on governments that otherwise would be predisposed to finding a joint or cooperative solution. Any agreement made in such a situation would be labeled as a “sell-out” and sometime later could trigger yet another confrontation. There are instances galore in India-Pakistan history wherein an adverse political climate has been the key reason for the failure of talks. Scores of Indo-Pak talks have proved futile because of the absence of peace and tranquility along the border and continuing terrorist attacks and killings in J&K and other parts of India. Following the Kargil War, while the Lahore Declaration was being inked and the 1999 coup was bringing Pakistan under military control, the CDP was suspended by India on the grounds that no breakthrough in talks could be achieved in such a hostile environment. Likewise, the 2001 Indo-Pak Summit Meeting at Agra between Atal Behari

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Vajpayee and General Pervez Musharraf failed miserably (without even producing a joint statement), largely because of continuing terrorist violence in J&K and other parts of India and intense shelling across the LoC and AGPL in Siachen. Following the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, India severed all links with Pakistan, including diplomatic, and bilateral relations reached an all-time low. As a result, when the peace process resumed in 2003 the prime concern was to improve the atmospherics before talks could recommence. Similarly, the meeting between Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani prime minister Yousaf Raza Gilani in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, on July 16, 2009 was subjected to considerable heat from India’s opposition benches over what was perceived as the prime minister’s backtracking from India’s previous stand that unless the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai were prosecuted, talks would not be resumed. The government was accused of a “sellout” for delinking terrorism from the CDP, although in a statement in the parliament Prime Minster Singh said, [A]ction on terrorism should not be linked,” and Pakistan “cannot await other developments” before delivering on the terrorism front. . . . When and in what form we broaden the dialogue with Pakistan will depend on future developments.”2 The shadow of the ground situation over any talks is apparent from the fact that—in spite of the two sides being able to produce a joint statement—the talks that had been suspended in the wake of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai could not be resumed. Second, the Kutch dispute was an expression of the resolution of the Indian leadership, especially of Lal Bahadur Shastri, to respect commitments made by India in the past and to find solutions without backtracking on those commitments. Notwithstanding the severe criticism directed at Shastri, Indian and Pakistani leadership should accept that they must thoroughly discuss the pros and cons of their decisions and of any agreement they reach, and once a commitment has been made it must be respected at all costs. After the Tribunal Award, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi responded to the popular demand for rejecting the award by asserting that India had made an international commitment and should do everything to abide by it. Third, territorial disputes such as the Rann of Kutch are difficult to negotiate, since territory lies at the core of a state’s integrity therefore requires rigorous fact-finding, research, and exchange of information, maps, and documents to acquire ample information that can make subsequent negotiations more productive. Any negotiating

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delegation that does not have all the relevant facts prior to the talks cannot be expected to achieve much. Fourth, a state’s profile—its international stature, military capability, and relationship with the great powers—is an important, even decisive, consideration when estimating how much it can extract from negotiations and what it can achieve in the final outcome. Over the decades since the 1960s the profiles of both South Asia states, especially India, have grown severalfold. Global recognition of India’s rising power status; growing warmth between India and the United States, marked by the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal; robust economic growth underpinning massive military mordenization; and overall self-confidence in dealing with major powers and neighbors on critical matters has reflected in India’s dealings with Pakistan on the pending disputes. At the same time, India should be cognizant that Pakistan’s military capability too has grown significantly in these past decades, and that any sought-after solution to shared problems will have to be in consonance with Pakistan’s current enhanced capabilities and status.

The Siachen Glacier Dispute The Siachen Glacier dispute has witnessed conflict for more than twenty-five years, featuring heavy artillery exchanges, periodic military assaults, and also several rounds of negotiations. The bone of contention is the region that was left untouched by the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in 1949 because of its inhospitable nature. This region falls beyond point NJ 9842, the termination of the CFL, now referred to as the LoC. Both countries have put forward a claim to the area based on their interpretation of the terminology “thence north of the glaciers” to determine the location of the LoC beyond point NJ 9842. The analysis in chapter 5 suggests that the dispute is ripe for negotiations but not yet ripe for resolution. Like the Rann of Kutch it is a territorial dispute and, moreover, is in J&K, which makes it more complicated and difficult to resolve. The analysis of the Siachen dispute revealed that in India there exists conspicuous disagreement between serving and retired military personnel, between the military and strategic experts, which makes it much harder for the leadership to act decisively to resolve the dispute. This means that it is pertinent for India to find consensus over the possible ways for dispute resolution, especially by amalgamating different opinions and perspectives—an amalgamation that is clearly lacking at the moment. For some analysts Siachen is an enormous

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drain on resources, money, and human lives and therefore not worth the occupation, while for others attaching a price to maintaining India’s territorial integrity is completely unjustified. Therefore, the resolution of any dispute that involves Siachen requires a wider understanding that incorporates the views held by most, if not all, segments of the political, military, and strategic community. Siachen is also a casualty of the overall adversarial nature of IndoPak relations, mirrored in the ongoing problems in Kashmir, in terrorism, and in shadows of the past that prevent the leadership in New Delhi from taking bold decisions concerning it. But this circumstance should not become an excuse for doing nothing. Both parties have held discussions since 1984, and it would be incorrect to assume that no progress has been made. There seems to have been a discernible shift in India’s stand over Siachen, which is a consequence of talks held so far. Specifically, as opposed to its previous stand of maintaining control over the glaciers at all cost, India is now contemplating troop withdrawal provided Pakistan authenticates the current positions of its forces, a condition that Pakistan has rejected. At the same time there is a growing recognition on both sides that, owing to their bitter military engagement for almost a quarter of a century, both may be better off resolving it. This recognition is in itself a significant development from which the seeds of resolution will germinate. But a trust-deficit still poses the key impediment to seeking any resolution that brings into focus the overall trajectory and tenor of bilateral relations. This trustdeficit in the India-Pakistan relations is due to their sixty years of enduring rivalry and military conflicts. With regard to Siachen and the dispute over Kashmir, Pakistan’s policy of “making India bleed through a thousand cuts”—reflected in its support for jihad and terrorism to pressure India into a dialogue—has had a negative effect on bilateral dealings. It has not only embittered mutual relations but also has created a confrontational atmosphere, based on mistrust and antagonism, preventing either side from taking the first step toward compromise. This misguided perception is at the core of the IndoPak enduring rivalry. Anwar Sadat’s 1977 speech in the Israeli Knesset, in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, aptly illuminated this symptom of dyadic rivalries. He said: Yet there remains another wall. This wall constitutes a psychological barrier between us, a barrier of suspicion, a barrier of rejection;

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a barrier of fear, of deception, a barrier of hallucination without any action, deed, or decision. A barrier of distorted and eroded interpretation of every event and statement. It is this psychological barrier which I described in official statements as constituting 70 percent of the whole problem . . .3

Likewise, a deficit in the trust levels holds the key to resolving the Siachen dispute and, while Pakistan can continue to push for further talks on Siachen, there needs to be some improvement in the fundamental realities. This does not imply the resolution of any dispute beforehand, but merely delivering on past promises made by General Musharraf that Pakistan will not allow its soil to be used for terrorist attacks against India. The 2009 meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Yousaf Raza Gilani in Sharm-el-Sheikh testifies to the importance of Pakistan’s making some positive gestures on the ground, which will allow the Indian government to muster the domestic support for offering any concessions. The potential resolution of Siachen, as suggested by military and strategic experts, has options ranging from demilitarization to creation of an ecological peace park, or bringing it under the jointmandate of both sides. It has been argued that there is no dearth of technology to monitor the demilitarized zone after all troops have pulled out from current positions, but India’s key concern here is that technology alone might not prevent a possible Pakistani contravention of an agreement. Therefore, any likely resolution of the Siachen dispute, notwithstanding the possible unassailability and feasibility of terms, would not be agreed upon unless India is confident of Pakistan’s intentions and motives. Prime Minister Singh, prior to the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism being signed on the sidelines of the 2006 Non-Aligned Summit in Cuba, has conceded that Pakistan itself is a victim of terror and that terrorism and the peace process must be linked; but he was lambasted by the opposition for giving Pakistan a “clean chit.” Logically, this can be regarded as a prudent policy approach by Manmohan Singh because, just as India does not want Pakistan to hold the entire peace process hostage to progress on the Kashmir issue, Pakistan likewise is averse to India’s holding the talks hostage to the issues of terrorism and progress in the prosecution of the accused in the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. As argued previously, if the peace process were to be held hostage to progress on Kashmir (for Pakistan) and terrorism (for India) then the purpose of creating eight exclusive

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baskets for parallel negotiations becomes superfluous. The main objective of the peace process has been to break this linkage politics and ensure progress on all disputes simultaneously. Nonetheless, this should not minimize the fact that while both sides will continue to search for solutions to the Siachen dispute, it will be most productive for dispute settlement to be preceded by positive gestures from both sides in order to improve the atmospherics and raise trust levels. For instance, the geographical location of Siachen in J&K itself makes each party cautious of making any concession, fearing that doing so may set a precedent for the larger Kashmir dispute. One way of addressing such concerns is by taking a cue from the Rann of Kutch and the Indus Waters disputes, in which both sides agreed that their resolution would not prejudice either side’s positions on Kashmir. A key breakthrough, which has come about after almost twenty years of conflict over Siachen, is that in 2004 both sides agreed to a ceasefire, which substantially lowered the intensity of the conflict. This was more of a concession from Pakistan than from India because Pakistan did not want India to be comfortable in its present positions and attempted to maintain constant pressure on Indian forces. Pakistan agreed to extend the ceasefire in Siachen along the AGPL because it recognized that India had offered a concession by resuming the peace process and reversing its past stand of requiring Pakistan to stop all terrorist activities before talks could be resumed. This was an ideal display of the give-and-take approach and of mutual concessions making for a common objective. Although there are technological means available to implement and monitor the demilitarization of the Siachen Glacier, what is required is political will, not only to negotiate (which is there) but also to settle. This requirement will emerge only by incremental steps being taken to improve goodwill in both capitals. The CBMs agreed upon between India and Pakistan in recent years have certainly played an important role in improving the political climate, but Pakistan is quite justified in arguing that CBMs should not be construed as a solution. Nevertheless, Pakistan must also realize that sixty years of mistrust and rivalry will take time to wane, and impatience on this count can fester, potentially eroding any gains thus far made in the peace process. It is important to bear in mind that, given the tumultuous past of Indo-Pak relations, it will only take a bomb blast, a terrorist attack, a brash statement, or a foiled military bid to wrest control of Siachen

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to deepen the wounds already on the Indian psyche, wounds that as a result would be even longer in healing. In 2009 Prime Minister Singh said to the Indian parliament that Pakistan’s leadership was told to ensure that Mumbai-type attacks were not repeated and that another such attack would put an “intolerable strain on our relationship.”4 In this context, India and Pakistan need to be convinced, through concrete actions on the ground, that each can trust the other. Such an effort will eventually go a long way in puncturing inflated egos on both sides and encouraging them to make compromises.

The Sir Creek Dispute The international tribunal that in 1968 resolved the Rann of Kutch dispute excluded from its purview the border from the mouth of Sir Creek to the top of the creek eastward—a boundary that was in principle agreed upon by both India and Pakistan. With growing speculation regarding large reserves of hydrocarbons in the area, both sides turned their attention to this undemarcated border with the purpose of fixing the boundary on land and sea (maritime boundary) to determine their respective EEZs. A basic technical disagreement has persisted over linking the Sir Creek land boundary demarcation with the maritime boundary demarcation, yet this dispute is an apt example of how shared interests in the resolution of a conflict can encourage disputants to adopt an accommodating approach. Ripeness for negotiations became evident around 1989, following the ascent to power of Benazir Bhutto, who was keen to achieve peace with India. In addition, Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi wished to capitalize on negotiation momentum over Siachen, underway since 1984. Unlike the Kashmir and Siachen disputes, Sir Creek had evoked little interest and urgency until both sides recognized the enormous economic dividends that its resolution promised. Realizing that, as per the UNCLOS, their disputed maritime zone would be declared as international waters should they fail to resolve the disagreement, a sense of urgency and purpose became discernible in their deliberations. One positive outcome of this renewed willingness was the 2004 agreement to conduct the joint survey of the boundary pillars in the Sir Creek area, which was completed in 2007. This indicated that the dispute was fast becoming ripe for resolution. The lone remaining credible challenge hinges on solving whether the boundary lies in the middle of the Sir Creek (the Indian

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position) or that it runs on the eastern bank (the Pakistani position). Encouragingly, after the drawing of the second set of maps following the joint survey, both sides will have a much clearer understanding of the topographical and cartographic facts. In sum, the dispute has shown that India-Pakistan do have the capability to make compromises and bring about changes, even in their hardened official positions, to reach a compromise for a win-win outcome.

The Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage and Storage Dispute The nomenclature itself is indicative of the basic difference between India and Pakistan over this dispute. India’s official position is that the barrage is meant for storing water in the “natural” Wular Lake that will then be released in the lean months to maintain an adequate depth in the Jhelum River to maintain navigability. It has also argued that the barrage will also be useful for flood-control purposes. Pakistan has objected to India’s plans, saying the proposed barrage violates the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, which permits India only a non-consumptive use of the Jhelum water. The dispute is not intractable by any means and can be resolved through compromise, just as both sides are trying to compromise in the Sir Creek issue. At this stage the dispute is deadlocked, but several positives emerge from the negotiations and their approach in general. There is no denying that both sides have been keen to settle this dispute bilaterally, and Zia-ul Haq’s directive to his officials that a peaceful negotiated settlement must be reached with India clearly reinforced this willingness. Benazir Bhutto’s own proclamation to resolve it in the spirit of the Simla Agreement is another indicator of political will that has made the dispute ripe for negotiations. Nawaz Sharif, when serving as chief minister of Punjab, requested Pakistani President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to suspend the talks and refer the dispute for arbitration, but this request was rejected by the president, and the bilateral mode of conflict resolution was preferred. In the initial phases of the dispute Pakistan protested the continuing construction on the barrage. In 1987, responding to Pakistan’s protest, India suspended construction work and thereby defused growing tension. India’s positive gesture reflected what the prenegotiation stage requires: reducing conflict intensity in order to create a political climate conducive to negotiation. Although there have been periods when Pakistan backtracked on its previous commitments,

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on the whole the dispute has featured an accommodative Indo-Pak policy approach. A draft agreement was reached in 1991, reflecting the spirit of accommodation shown by India and Pakistan in negotiating the Sir Creek issue. Yet, when Tulbul/Wular negotiations resumed in 1998, Pakistan demanded fresh negotiations instead of picking up the threads from 1991, when both parties had agreed upon several technical aspects of the dispute. India had agreed to forego a portion of the Jhelum tributaries waters allotted to it under the 1960 treaty if Pakistan agreed to allow construction of the barrage to go ahead. The 1991 agreement also contained an understanding over the design of the barrage and the height of the wall, among other technicalities. Pakistan had agreed to allow India to construct the barrage under certain conditions, indicating that both sides had been flexible in addressing the core elements of the dispute. Although in 1998 Pakistan continued to insist the project would have a negative impact on its downstream projects, India largely succeeded in convincing Pakistan of its merits and of mutual dividends once it was operational. One key bottleneck is the proposed project’s location in J&K, which like the Siachen dispute makes the parties extremely cautious about committing to agreements or decisions for fear of any adverse effect on the perception of people in Kashmir. Pakistan’s objection that the barrage poses a threat of inundation of the Srinagar Valley and could be exploited during any future IndoPak war has been allayed by India, which has argued that flooding its own population first to harm Pakistan is an insane proposition. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s objection goes to show the linkage element in the dispute. As suggested earlier, one way to neutralize the Kashmir linkage is to follow the example of negotiations in the Indus waters and Kutch disputes and agree in principle that the resolution of the dispute will set no precedent, legal or otherwise, for the Kashmir dispute. Also as argued earlier, backtracking or reneging from previous commitments causes enormous damage to peace initiatives and also disregards the efforts of past negotiators (a circumstance arising in the Siachen negotiations). Agreements must be reached only after thorough and rigorous consideration and when both sides are completely convinced of the merits , but once they are reached, backtracking proves counterproductive and undermines mutual trust. As in 1991, efforts should be made in a positive frame of mind to resolve the tractable aspects of the Tulbul/Wular dispute that will

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help lubricate movement on the more intractable facets. Pakistan must genuinely consider the advantages of the project (as in the Sir Creek dispute) and then a compromise can be reached. Talks should not be made hostage to Indus Waters Treaty provisions that were envisaged in a different set of circumstances half a century ago. The Tulbul/Wular dispute can be resolved in a mutually agreed manner. The Baghliar dispute that was settled in 2007 is a case in point that should convince Pakistan of the irrationality of discarding the bilateral mode in favor of arbitration, which could prove expensive, time-consuming, and devoid of any guarantee of complete success, as acknowledged by Benazir Bhutto. The 1991 agreement presents a possible compromise solution containing detailed construction and design specifications and instructs India not to alter the structure without prior consultation. India’s decision to forego allotted water to maintain a specific operational level in the barrage is a constructive response . The 1991 agreement is a prudent document that should be refined further to accommodate mutual reservations. Addressing such reservations may also mean signing the Indus Waters Treaty II, an agreement for which experts such as B.G. Verghese have long argued. Yet, resolution of the Baghliar dispute, and the likely resolution of the Tulbul/Wular dispute, will enable India and Pakistan to resolve their differences in the light of altered circumstances and population demands without necessarily signing Indus Waters Treaty II.

Comparative Analysis The study of the five cases revealed that, of all types of disputes, the territorial disputes—the Rann of Kutch, Siachen, and Sir Creek— were more difficult to negotiate. The resources issues involved in the Indus Waters Treaty and Tulbul/Wular dispute were less intractable cases and less difficult to negotiate. This indicates that a territorial dispute, because of its direct relationship with the sovereignty and integrity of the state, is always difficult to negotiate to mutual satisfaction and on a non-zero-sum basis. The Sir Creek dispute, however, can be regarded as both a territorial and resources dispute because demarcation of the boundary on land and sea would lead to determination of respective maritime zones and EEZs, which would allow both sides to explore the possibility of hydrocarbon reserves under the seabed. Strategically, the land portion of the dispute is less significant than the maritime portion

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because of the resources linkage, but the determination of the land boundary could have an important bearing on the establishment of respective maritime zones and the eventual size of the EEZs. In spite of this complexity this study found that the economic dimension of the dispute has encouraged the parties to resolve their differences in a spirit of compromise that is rather difficult to achieve when there is a purely territorial dispute. If any territorial dispute, such as Siachen, can be transformed into a resources or an economic issue—for instance to promote mountaineering, tourism, or a joint-venture research, the likelihood of resolution will be much greater. The Indus Waters Treaty is an excellent example of how a dispute can be transformed into a mutually advantageous settlement when a resolution is considered desirable by both sides. Dividing rivers flowing across man-made frontiers was no easy affair, but the willingness to focus on the positive aspects of prospective hydroelectric and agricultural projects encouraged negotiating teams to settle the dispute on a give-and-take basis. Similarly, that the resolution of the Sir Creek and Tulbul/Wular disputes would accrue economic gains to both parties is a positive element. Sir Creek, largely due to a greater economic potential, will possibly be settled earlier and could well lubricate the Tulbul/Wular dispute for resolution by bringing about a positive change in the mindset of both sides—not the case with the Siachen dispute. Siachen, like the Rann of Kutch dispute, is directly related to issues of sovereignty and is perceived as a zero-sum game in the sense that vacating the territory would be taken as a loss of sovereignty for one side and a resultant gain of same for the other. Such perceptions become much harder, if not impossible, to change, due to a trust-deficit resulting from events such as the Kargil War and unrelenting terrorist attacks. Another impediment for resolving Siachen is India’s rise as an economic and military power, unlike circumstances in the 1960s when the Kutch dispute was resolved. At the same time, there has also been a significant change in Pakistan’s military and nuclear capabilities, which rules out any unilateral solution being imposed by India. Besides, the 1972 Simla Agreement has established bilateralism as the mode of dispute settlement, which means that neither party can seek a unilateral or externally mediated solution. This study also noted that the role of political leaderships is of immense importance. The Indus waters and the Rann of Kutch disputes showed how leadership can play an instrumental role in reaching the desired outcome. The study also described two types of

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leaders. The first, epitomized by Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayub Khan, is unperturbed by domestic or external factors, and shapes the course of negotiations with decisive and strong leadership. Similarly, Atal Behari Vajpayee, I.K. Gujral, Nawaz Sharif, and Manmohan Singh have, in the context of the peace process, displayed strong leadership attributes and unhesitatingly took decisions even when the political climate was not conducive. The second type of leader is exemplified by Lal Bahadur Shastri, Rajiv Gandhi, and Benazir Bhutto—all of whom did play a vital role in pushing the peace bandwagon, but they buckled under external or domestic pressures. The leadership of Manmohan Singh has shown resolve in character, taking bold decisions against popular criticism. Similarly, his counterpart, Yousaf Raza Gilani, has shown a strong willingness to back the peace process and address Indian concerns, but in the face of internal political turmoil he may be constrained in taking bold decisions. A closely connected issue, therefore, is the political climate in India and Pakistan. History suggests different leaders have acted differently in conformity with both their leadership style and the prevailing circumstances. For instance, in the Kutch dispute Lal Bahadur Shastri went against domestic opposition to sign the ceasefire agreement, and Atal Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif signed the 1999 Lahore Declaration in a tense atmosphere following the nuclear tests. Similarly, when Atal Behari Vajpayee invited Pervez Musharraf for the Agra Summit the Indian political climate was not conducive to such initiatives reaching fruition despite the best of intentions. This goes to show that it depends not only on the characteristics of the individual leadership but also how that leadership perceives the prevailing circumstances. Given the current level of socio-political instability in Pakistan it will require exemplary courage from its leaders to keep the peace process rolling while meaningfully addressing India’s concerns. To conclude, ripeness was a very important factor in resolving any dispute, and this study suggests that negotiations launched in unripe circumstances are bound to fail and will have a negative effect on the peace process and bilateral trust. Political sagacity is required to ascertain the opportune moment for launching a particular initiative, and it is in this context that the true character and quality of leadership is tested. Likewise, prenegotiation, although blurred in terms of when it starts and ends, certainly is a critical exercise, for it not only entails lowering the intensity of the conflict and improving the atmospherics for negotiations, but prenegotiation also allows the

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parties to gather necessary facts and information for a comprehensive understanding of the dispute well before they begin to negotiate formally. In the post-agreement phase the leadership factor becomes critical when it is required to sell the results of a negotiation to the public and the opposition and to implement those results smoothly. The role of Indira Gandhi in implementing the Kutch Tribunal Award in the face of domestic opposition is a case in point. Such examples reaffirm the need for leadership to consider all the possible dimensions prior to signing an agreement, including the likely fallout once it has been reached, and then the leadership must ensure the agreement’s smooth implementation. All this is crucial for trust-building between such enduring rivals as India and Pakistan.

Other Findings Apart from the above conclusions, the study also extrapolated the following findings to be relevant. First, in relation to the negotiation framework, there is a distinct difference between “ripeness for negotiations” and “ripeness for settlement.” In the Siachen dispute, for instance, the two parties and their respective leadership have so far shown the “will to negotiate” but not the “will to settle.” The former has resulted in negotiations, but absence of the latter has caused repeated deadlocks. So, while the “will to negotiate” does help in making the issue ripe, it is limited by the absence of a “will to settle.” In other words, the “will to negotiate” can be considered as the first stage of ripeness in which, unless transformed into the “will to settle,” the likelihood of dispute settlement is remote. Second, much to the discomfort of the Pakistani military, the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration were signed by two civilian regimes and any progress flowing from these agreements has been contingent upon the military’s cooperation in Pakistan, which on most occasions was not too keen to accept the approach adopted by the civilian authorities. This explains why, under nine years of General Musharraf’s rule, the CDP has seen greater progress on the Sir Creek issue and greater vision on the part of Pakistan in devising solutions for the Kashmir dispute. This implies that Pakistani civilian governments need strength of character and decision-making autonomy on the pending disputes while keeping the military in confidence on critical issues such as Siachen and Kashmir to achieve lasting agreements. The likely settlement of the Sir Creek dispute

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will constitute the first major test of Yousaf Raza Gilani’s democratic regime. Third, in the Indus waters and Rann of Kutch disputes, there was third-party involvement in settling the disputes, which made a case for third-party mediation to break deadlocks and push both sides to reach compromises. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that both countries had agreed to third-party involvement for their respective reasons, but since the Simla Agreement of 1972 all disputes have to settled bilaterally. The establishment of the CDP to discuss all pending disputes simultaneously at the bilateral level is testimony to the fact that both India and Pakistan have come to terms with the Simla Agreement’s indispensability as well as with each other in a good neighborly spirit. For future negotiations, the following key lessons are significant: First, approaching dispute resolution in conformity with the criteria of ripeness, prenegotiation, negotiation, and agreement has the greatest chance of success. Second, to enhance chances of success it is important to launch initiatives in ripe circumstances. Third, the linkage of pending disputes with the Kashmir issue will only result in hardened positions and repeated deadlocks, so delinking Kashmir from these issues is therefore essential for resolving them—the basic premise on which the CDP rests. Fourth, just as the political will to negotiate is important, so is the political will to reach an agreement and implement also important. Finally, although domestic political factors do play an important role in the resolution of conflicts, a bold and decisive leadership can be the crucial difference between success and failure, between hope and despair.

A NNEXURE I

TEXT OF THE INDUS WATERS TREATY, 1960

PREAMBLE The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, being equally desirous of attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system of rivers and recognizing the need, therefore, of fixing and delimiting, in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, the rights and obligations of each in relation to the other concerning the use of these waters and of making provisions for the settlement, in a cooperative spirit, of all such questions as may hereafter arise in regard to the interpretation or application of the provisions agreed upon herein, have resolved to conclude a Treaty in furtherance of these objectives, and for this purpose have named as their plenipotentiaries: THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA: Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, and THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN: Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, H.P., H.J., President of Pakistan; who, having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers and having found them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles and Annexures:—

ARTICLE I Definitions As used in this Treaty: (1) The terms “Article” and “Annexure” mean respectively an Article of, and an Annexure to, this Treaty. Except as otherwise indicated,

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references to Paragraphs are to the paragraphs in the Article or in the Annexure in which the reference is made. (2) The term “Tributary” of a river means any surface channel, whether in continuous or intermittent flow and by whatever name called, whose waters in the natural course would fall into that river, e.g. a tributary, a torrent, a natural drainage, an artificial drainage, a nadi, a nallah, a nai, a khad, a cho. The term also includes any subtributary or branch or subsidiary channel, by whatever name called, whose waters, in the natural course, would directly or otherwise flow into that surface channel. (3) The term “The Indus,” “The Jhelum,” “The Chenab,” “The Ravi,” “The Beas” or “ The Sutlej” means the named river (including Connecting Lakes, if any) and all its Tributaries: Provided however that (i) none of the rivers named above shall be deemed to be a Tributary; (ii) The Chenab shall be deemed to include the river Panjnad; and (iii) the river Chandra and the river Bhaga shall be deemed to be Tributaries of the Chenab. (4) The term “Main” added after Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Beas or Ravi means the main stem of the named river excluding its tributaries, but including all channels and creeks of the main stem of that river and such Connecting Lakes as form part of the main stem itself. The Jhelum Main shall be deemed to extend up to Verinag, and the Chenab Main up to the confluence of the river Chandra and the river Bhaga. (5) The term “Eastern Rivers” means The Sutlej, The Beas and The Ravi taken together. (6) The term “Western Rivers” means The Indus, The Jhelum and The Chenab taken together. (7) The term “the Rivers” means all the rivers, The Sutlej, The Beas, The Ravi, The Indus, The Jhelum, and The Chenab. (8) The term “Connecting Lakes” means any lake which receives water from, or yields water to, any of the Rivers; but any lake which occasionally and irregularly receives only the spill of any of the Rivers and returns only the whole or part of that spill is not a Connecting Lake.

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(9) The term “Agricultural Use” means the use of water for irrigation, except for irrigation of household gardens and public recreational gardens. (10) The term “ Domestic Use” means the use of water for: (a) drinking, washing, bathing, recreational, sanitation (including the conveyance and dilution of sewage and of industrial and other wastes), stock and poultry, and other like purpose: (b) household and municipal purposes (including use for household gardens and public recreational gardens); and (c) industrial purposes (including mining, milling and other like purposes); but the term does not include Agriculture Use or use for generation of Hydroelectric power. (11) The term “ Non-Consumptive Use” means any control or use of water for navigation, floating of timber or other property, flood protection or flood control, fishing are fish culture, wildlife or other like beneficial purposes, provided that, exclusive of seepage and evaporation of water incidental to the control or use, the water (undiminished in volume within the practical range of measurement) remains in, or is returned to, the same river or its Tributaries; but the term does not include Agricultural Use or use of the generation of hydroelectric power. (12) The term “Transition Period” means the period beginning and ending as provided in Article II (6). (13) The term “Bank” means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (14) The term “Commissioner” means either of the Commissioners appointed under the provisions of Article VIII (1) and the term “ Commission” means the Permanent Indus Commission constituted in accordance with Article VIII (3). (15) The term “ interference with the waters” means: (a) Any act of withdrawal therefrom; or (b) Any man-made obstruction to their flow which causes a change in the volume (within the practical range of measurement) of the daily flow of the waters: Provided however that an obstruction which involves only an insignificant and incidental change in the volume of the daily flow, for example, fluctuations due to afflux caused by bridge piers or a temporary by-pass, etc., shall not be deemed to be an interference with the waters.

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(16) The term “Effective Date” means the date on which this Treaty takes effect in accordance with the provisions of Article XII, that is, the first of April 1960.

ARTICLE II Provision regarding Eastern Rivers (1) All the waters of the Eastern Rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of India, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Article. (2) Except for Domestic Use and Non-Consumptive Use, Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit any interference with, the waters of the Sutlej Main and the Ravi Main in the reaches where these rivers flow in Pakistan and have not yet finally crossed into Pakistan. The points of final crossing are the following: (a) near the new Hasta Bund upstream of Suleimanke in the case of the Sutlej Main, and (b) about one and a half miles upstream of the syphon for the B-R-B-D Link in the case of the Ravi Main. (3) Except for Domestic Use, Non-Consumptive Use and Agricultural Use (as specified in Annexure B), Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit any interference, the waters (while flowing in Pakistan) of any Tributary which in its natural course joins the Sutlej Main or the Ravi main before these rivers have finally crossed into Pakistan. (4) All the waters, while flowing in Pakistan, of any Tributary which, in its natural course, joins the Sutlej Main or the Ravi Main after these rivers have finally crossed into Pakistan shall be available for the unrestricted use of Pakistan: Provided however that this provision shall not be construed as giving Pakistan any claim or right to any releases by India in any such Tributary. If Pakistan should deliver any of the waters of any such Tributary, which on the Effective Date joins the Ravi Main after this river has finally crossed into Pakistan, into a reach of the Ravi Main upstream of this crossing, India shall not make use of these waters; each Party agrees to establish such discharge observation stations and make such observations as may be necessary for the determination of the component of water available for the use of Pakistan on account of the aforesaid deliveries by Pakistan, and Pakistan agrees to meet the cost of establishing the aforesaid discharge observation stations and making the aforesaid observations.

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(5) There shall be a Transition Period during which, to the extent specified in Annexure H, India shall (i) limit its withdrawals for Agricultural Use, (ii) limit abstractions for storages, and (iii) make deliveries to Pakistan from the Eastern Rivers. (6) The Transition Period shall being on 1st April 1960 and it shall end on 31st March 1970, or, if extended under the provisions of Part 8 of Annexure H, on the date up to which it has been extended. In any event, whether or not the replacement referred to in Article IV(1) has been accomplished, the Transition Period shall end not later than 31st March 1973. (7) If the Transition Period is extended beyond 31st March 1970, the provisions of Article V (5) shall apply. (8) If the Transition Period is extended beyond 31st March 1970, the provisions of Paragraph (5) shall apply during the period of extension beyond 31st March 1970. (9) During the Transition Period, Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use the waters of the Eastern Rivers which are to be released by India in accordance with the provisions of Annexures H. After the end of the Transition Period, Pakistan shall have no claim or right to releases by India of any of the waters of the Eastern Rivers. In case there are any releases, Pakistan shall enjoy the unrestricted use of the waters so released after they have finally crossed into Pakistan: Provided that in the event that Pakistan makes any use of these waters, Pakistan shall not acquire any right whatsoever, by prescription or otherwise, to a continuance of such releases or such use.

ARTICLE III Provisions Regarding Western Rivers (1) Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let flow under the provisions of Paragraph (2). (2) India shall be under an obligation to let flow all the waters of the Western Rivers, and shall not permit any interference with these waters, except for the following uses, restricted (except as provided in item (c) (ii) of Paragraph 5 of Annexure C) in the case of each of

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the rivers, The Indus, The Jhelum and the Chenab, to the drainage basin thereof: (a) Domestic Use; (b) Non-Consumptive use; (c) Agricultural Use, as set out in Annexure C; and (d) Generation of hydro-electric power, as set out in Annexure D. (3) Pakistan shall have the unrestricted use of all waters originating from sources other than the Eastern Rivers which are delivered by Pakistan into The Ravi or The Sutlej, and India shall not make use of these waters. Each Party agrees to establish such discharge observation stations and make such observations as may be considered necessary by the Commission for the determination of the component of water available for the use of Pakistan on account of the aforesaid deliveries by Pakistan. (4) Except as provided in Annexures D and E, India shall not store any water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers.

ARTICLE IV Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers and Western Rivers. (1) Pakistan shall use its best endeavours to construct and bring into operation, with due regard to expedition and economy, that part of a system of works which will accomplish the replacement, from the Western Rivers and other sources, of waters supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which, on 15th August 1947, were dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers. (2) Each Party agrees that any Non-Consumptive Use made by it shall be so made as not to materially change, on account of such use, the flow in any channel to the prejudice of the uses on that channel by the other party under the provisions of this Treaty. In executing any scheme of flood protection or flood control each Party will avoid, as far as practicable, any material damage to the other Party, and any such scheme carried out by India on the Western Rivers shall not involve any use of water or any storage in addition to that provided under Article III. (3) Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as having the effect of preventing either Party from undertaking scheme of drainage, river training, conservation of soil against erosion and dredging, or

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from removal of stones, gravel or sand from the beds of the Rivers: Provided that (a) in executing any of the schemes mentioned above, each Party will avoid, as far as practicable, any material damage to the other Party; (b) any such scheme carried out by India on the Western Rivers shall not involve any use of water or any storage in addition to that provided under Article III. (c) except as provided in Paragraph (5) and Article VII (1) (b), India shall not take any action to increase the catchment area, beyond the area on the Effective Date, of any natural or artificial drainage or drain which crosses into Pakistan, and shall not undertake such constructions or remodelling of any drainage or drain which so crosses or falls into a drainage or drain which so crosses as might cause material damage in Pakistan or entail the construction of a new drain or enlargement of an existing drainage or drain in Pakistan; and (d) should Pakistan desire to increase the catchment area, beyond the area on the Effective Date, of any natural or artificial drainage or drain, which receives drainage waters from India, or, except in an emergency, to pour any waters into it in excess of the quantities received by it as on the Effective Date, Pakistan shall, before undertaking any work for these purposes, increase the capacity of that drainage or drain to the extent necessary so as not to impair its efficacy for dealing with drainage waters received from India as on the Effective Date. (4) Pakistan shall maintain in good order its portions of the drainages mentioned below with capacities not less than the capacities as on the Effective Date:— (i) Hudiara Drain (ii) Kasur Nala (iii) Salimshah Drain (iv) Fazilka Drain. (5) If India finds it necessary that any of the drainages mentioned in Paragraph (4) should be deepened or widened in Pakistan, Pakistan agrees to undertake to do so as a work of public interest, provided India agrees to pay the cost of the deepening or widening. (6) Each Party will use its best endeavours to maintain the natural channels of the rivers, as on the Effective Date, in such condition as will avoid, as far as practicable, any obstruction to the flow in these channels likely to cause material damage to the other Party.

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(7) Neither Party will take any action which would have the effect of diverting the Ravi Main between Madhopur and Lahore, or the Sutlej main between Harike and Suleimanke, from its natural channel between high banks. (8) The use of the natural channels of the Rivers for the discharge of flood or other excess waters shall be free and not subject to limitation by either Party, and neither party shall have any claim against the other in respect of any damage caused by such use. Each Party agrees to communicate to the other Party, as far in advance as practicable, any information it may have in regard to such extraordinary discharges of water from reservoirs and flood flows as may affect the other Party. (9) Each Party declares its intention to operate its storage dams, barrages and irrigation canals in such manner, consistent with the normal operations of its hydraulic systems, as to avoid as far as feasible, material damage to the other party. (10) Each Party declares its intention to prevent, as far as practicable, undue pollution of the waters of the Rivers which might affect adversely uses similar in nature to those to which the waters were put on the Effective Date, and agrees to take all reasonable measures to ensure that, before any sewage or industrial waste is allowed to flow into the Rivers, it will be treated, where necessary, in such manner as not materially to affect those uses: Provided that the criterion of reasonableness shall be the customary practice in similar situation on the Rivers. (11) The Parties agree to adopt, as far as feasible, appropriate measures for the recovery, and restoration to owners, of timber and other property floated or floating down the Rivers, subject to appropriate charges being paid by the owners. (12) The use of water for industrial purposes under Articles II(2), II(3) and III(2) shall not exceed: (a) in the case of an industrial process known on the Effective Date, such quantum of use as was customary in that process on the Effective Date; (b) in the case of an industrial process not known on the Effective Date: (i) such quantum of use as was customary on the Effective Date in similar or in any way comparable industrial processes; or

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(ii) if there was no industrial process on the Effective Date similar or in any way comparable to the new process, such quantum of use as would not have a substantially adverse effect on the other Party. (13) Such part of any water withdrawn for Domestic Use under the provisions of Articles II(3) and III(2) as is subsequently applied to Agricultural Use shall be accounted for as part of the Agricultural Use specified in Annexure B and Annexure C respectively; each Party will use its best endeavours to return to the same river (directly or through one of its Tributaries) all water withdrawn therefrom for industrial purposes and not consumed wither in the industrial processes for which it was withdrawn or in some other Domestic Use. (14) In the event that either Party should develop a use of the waters of the Rivers which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, that Party shall not acquire by reason of such use and right, by prescription or otherwise, to a continuance of such use. (15) Except as otherwise required by the express provisions of this Treaty, nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as effecting existing territorial rights over the waters of any of the Rivers or the beds or banks thereof, or as affecting existing property rights under municipal law over such waters or beds or banks.

ARTICLE V Financial Provisions (1) In consideration of the fact that the purpose of part of the system of works referred to in Article IV(1) is the replacement, from the Western Rivers and other sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which, on 15th August 1947, were dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers, India agrees to make a fixed contribution of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 towards the costs of these works. The amount in Pounds Sterling of this contribution shall remain unchanged irrespective of any alteration in the par value of any currency. (2) The sum of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 specified in Paragraph (1) shall be paid in ten equal annual installments on the 1st of November of each year. The first of such annual installments shall be paid on 1st November 1960, or if the Treaty has not entered into force by the date, then within one month after the Treaty enters into force.

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(3) Each of the installments specified in Paragraph (2) shall be paid to the Bank for the credit of the Indus Basin Development Fund to be established and administered by the Bank, and payment shall be made in Pounds Sterling, or in such other currency or currencies as may from time to time be agreed between India and the Bank. (4) The payments provided for under the provisions of Paragraph (3) shall be made without deductions or set-off on account of any financial claims of India on Pakistan arising otherwise than under the provisions of this Treaty: Provided that this provisions shall in no way absolve Pakistan from the necessity of paying in other ways debts to India which may be outstanding against Pakistan. (5) If, at the request of Pakistan, the Transition Period is extended in accordance with the provisions of Article II (6) and of Part 8 of Annexure H, the Bank shall thereupon pay to India out of the Indus Basin Development Fund the appropriate amount specified in the Table below:— Period of Aggregate Extension of Transition Period One Year Two Years Three Years

Payment to India £ Stg. 3,125,000 £ Stg. 6,406,250 £ Stg. 9,850,000

(6) The provisions of Article IV (1) and Article V (1) shall not be construed as conferring upon India any right to participate in the decisions as to the systems of works which Pakistan constructs pursuant to Article IV (1) or as constituting an assumption of any responsibility by India or as an agreement by India in regard to such works. (7) Except for such payments as are specifically provided for in this Treaty, neither Party shall be entitled to claim any payment for observance of the provisions of this treaty or to make any charge for water received from it by the other Party.

ARTICLE VI Exchange of Data (1) The following data with respect to the flow in, and utilization of the waters of, the Rivers shall be exchanged regularly between the Parties:—

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(a) Daily (or as observed or estimated less frequently) gauge and discharge data relating to flow of the Rivers at all observation sites. (b) Daily extractions for or releases from reservoirs. (c) Daily withdrawals at the heads of all canals operated by government or by a government agency (hereinafter in this Article called canals), including link canals. (d) Daily escapages from all canals, including link canals. (e) Daily deliveries from link canals. These data shall be transmitted monthly by each Party to the other as soon as the data for a calendar month have been collected and tabulated, but not later than three months after the end of the month to which they relate: Provided that such of the data specified above as are considered by either Party to be necessary for operational purposes shall be supplied daily or at less frequent intervals, as may be requested. Should one Party request the supply of any of these data by telegram, telephone, or wireless, it shall reimburse the other Party for the cost of transmission. (2) If, in addition to the data specified in Paragraph (1) of this Article, either Party requests the supply of any data relating to the hydrology of the Rivers, or to canal or reservoir operations connected with the Rivers, or to any provisions of this Treaty, such data shall be supplied by the other Party to the extent that these are available.

ARTICLE VII Future Co-operation (1) The two Parties recognize that they have a common interest in the optimum development of the Rivers, and, to that end, they declare their intention to co-operate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest possible extent. In particular:— (a) Each Party, to the extent it considers practicable and on agreement by the other Party to pay the costs to be incurred, will at the request of the other Party, set up or install such hydrologic observation stations within the drainage basins of the Rivers, and setup or install such meteorological observation stations relating thereto and carry out such observations thereat, as may be requested, and will supply the data so obtained. (b) Each party, to the extent it considers practicable and on agreement by the other Party to pay the costs to be incurred, will, at the request of the other party, carry out such new drainage works as may

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be required in connection with new drainage works of the other Party. (c) At the request of either Party, the two Parties may, by mutual agreement, co-operate in undertaking engineering works on the Rivers. The formal arrangement, in each case, shall be agreed between the Parties. (2) If either Party plans to construct any engineering work which would cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers and which, in its opinion, would affect the other Party materially, it shall notify the other Party of its plans and shall supply such data relating to the work as may be available and as would enable the other Party to inform itself of the nature, magnitude and effect of the work. If a work would cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers but would not, in the opinion of the Party planning it, affect the other Party materially, nevertheless the Party planning the work shall, on request, supply the other Party with such data regarding the nature, magnitude and effect, if any, of the works as may be available.

ARTICLE VIII Permanent Indus Commission (1) India and Pakistan shall each create a permanent post of Commissioner for Indus Waters, and shall appoint to this post, as often as a vacancy occurs, a person who should ordinarily be a highranking engineer competent in the field of hydrology and water-use. Unless either Government should decide to take up any particular question directly with the other Government, each Commissioner will be the representative of his Government for all matters arising out of this Treaty, and will serve as the regular channel of communication on all matters relating to the implementation of the Treaty, and, in particular, with respect to (a) the furnishing or exchange or information or data provided for in the Treaty; and (b) the giving of any notice or response to any notice provided for in the Treaty. (2) The status of each Commissioner and his duties and responsibilities towards his Government will be determined by that Government. (3) The two Commissioners shall together form the Permanent Indus Commission.

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(4) The purpose and functions of the Commission shall be to establish and maintain co-operative arrangements for the implementation of this Treaty, to promote co-operative between the Parties in the development of the waters of the Rivers and, in particular, (a) to study and report to the two Governments on any problem relating to the development of the waters of the Rivers which may be jointly referred to the Commission by the two Governments: in the event that a reference is made by one Government alone, the Commissioner of the other Government shall obtain the authorization of his Government before he proceeds to act on the reference; (b) to make every effort to settle promptly, in accordance with the provisions of Article IX (1), any question arising thereunder; (c) to undertake, once in every five years, a general tour of inspection of the Rivers for ascertaining the facts connected with various developments and works on the Rivers; (d) to undertake promptly, at the request of either Commissioner, a tour of inspection of such works or sites on the Rivers as may be considered necessary by him for ascertaining the facts connected with those works or sites; and (e) to take, during the Transition Period, such steps as may be necessary or sites; and for the implementation of the provisions of Annexure H. (5) The Commission shall meet regularly at least once a year, alternately in India and Pakistan. This regular annual meeting shall be held in November or in such other month as may be agreed upon between the Commissioners. The Commission shall also meet when requested by either Commissioner. (6) To enable the Commissioners to perform their functions in the Commission, each Government agrees to accord to the Commissioner of the other Government the same privileges and immunities as are accorded to representatives of member States to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations under Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (dated 13th February, 1946) during the periods specified in those Sections. It is understood and agreed that these privileges and immunities are accorded to the Commissioners not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Commission; consequently, the Government appointing the Commissioner not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its Commissioner in any case where, in the opinion

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of the appointing Government, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded. (7) For the purposes of the inspections specified in Paragraph (4) (c) and (d), each Commissioner may be accompanied by two advisers or assistants to whom appropriate facilities will be accorded. (8) The Commission shall submit to the Government of India and to the Government of Pakistan, before the first of June of every year, a report on its work for the year ended on the preceding 31st of March, and may submit to the two Governments other reports at such times as it may think desirable. (9) Each Government shall bear the expenses of its Commissioner and his ordinary staff. The cost of any special staff required in connection with the work mentioned in Article VII (1) shall be borne as provided therein. (10) The Commission shall determine its own procedures.

ARTICLE IX Settlements of Differences and Disputes (1) Any question which arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty or the existence of any fact, if established, might constitute a breach of this Treaty shall first be examined by the Commission, which will endeavour to resolve the question by agreement. (2) If the Commission does not reach agreement on any of the questions mentioned in Paragraph (1), then a difference will be deemed to have arisen, which shall be dealt with as follows: (a) Any difference which, in the opinion of either Commissioner, falls within the provisions of Part 1 of Annexure F shall, at the request of either Commissioner, be dealt with by a Neutral Expert in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F; (b) If the difference does not come within the provisions of Paragraph (2) (a), or if a Neutral Expert, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 7 of Annexure F, has informed the Commission that, in his opinion, the difference, or a part thereof, should be treated as a dispute, then a dispute will be deemed to have arisen which shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (3), (4) and (5):

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Provided that, at the discretion of the Commission any difference may either be dealt with by a Neutral Expert in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F or be deemed to be a dispute to be settled in accordance with the provisions of Paragraphs (3), (4) and (5), or may be settled in any other way agreed upon by the Commission. (3) As soon as a dispute to be settled in accordance with this and the succeeding paragraphs of this Article has arisen, the Commission shall, at the request of either Commissioner, report the fact to the two Governments, as early as practicable, stating in its report the points on which the Commission is in agreement and the issues in dispute, the views of each Commissioner on these issues and his reasons therefor. (4) Either Government may, following receipt of the report referred to in Paragraph (3), or if it comes to the conclusion that this report is being unduly delayed in the Commission, invite the other Governments to resolve the dispute by agreement. In doing so it shall state the names of its negotiators and their readiness to meet with the negotiations to be appointed by the other Government at a time and place to be indicated by the other Government. To assist in these negotiations, the two Governments may agree to enlist the services of one or more mediators acceptable to them. (5) A Court of Arbitration shall be established to resolve the dispute in the manner provided by Annexure G (a) upon agreement between the Parties to do so; or (b) at the request of either Party, if, after negotiations have begun pursuant to Paragraph (4), in its opinion the dispute is not likely to be resolved by negotiation or mediation; or (c) at the request of either Party, if, after the expiry of one month following receipt by the other Government of the invitation referred to in Paragraph (4), that Party comes to the conclusion that the other Government is unduly delaying the negotiations. (6) The provisions of Paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) shall not apply to any difference while it is being dealt with by a Neutral Expert.

ARTICLE X Emergency Provision If, at any time prior to 31st March 1965, Pakistan should represent to the Bank that, because of the outbreak of large-scale international

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hostilities arising out of causes beyond the control of Pakistan, it is unable to obtain from abroad the materials and equipment necessary for the completion, by 31st March 1973, of that part of the system of works referred to in Article IV (1) which relates to the replacement referred to therein, (hereinafter referred to as the “replacement element”) and if, after consideration of this representation in consultation with India, the Bank is of the opinion that (a) these hostilities are on a scale of which the consequences is that Pakistan is unable to obtain in time such materials and equipment as must be procured from abroad for the completion, by 31st March 1973, of the replacement element, and (b) since the Effective Date, Pakistan has taken all reasonable steps to obtain the said materials and equipments and, with such resources of materials and equipments as have been available to Pakistan both from within Pakistan and from abroad, has carried forward the construction of the replacement element with due diligence and all reasonable expedition, the Bank shall immediately notify each of the Parties accordingly. The Parties undertake, without prejudice to the provisions of Article XII (3) and (4), that, on being so notified, they will forthwith consult together and enlist the good offices of the Bank in their consultation, with a view to reaching mutual agreement as to whether or not, in the light of all the circumstances then prevailing, any modifications of this Treaty are appropriate and advisable and, if so, the nature and the extent of the modifications.

ARTICLE XI General Provisions (1) It is expressly understood that (a) this Treaty governs the rights and obligations of each Party in relation to the other with respect only to the use of the waters of the Rivers and matters incidental thereto; and (b) nothing contained in this Treaty, and nothing arising out of the execution thereof, shall be construed as constituting a recognition or waiver (whether tacit, by implication or otherwise) of any rights or claims whatsoever of either of the Parties other than those rights or claims which are expressly recognized or waived in this Treaty. Each of the Parties agrees that it will not invoke this Treaty, anything contained therein, or anything arising out of the execution thereof, in support of any of its own rights or claims whatsoever or in

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disputing any of the rights or claims whatsoever of the other Party, other than those rights or claims which are expressly recognized or waived in this Treaty. (2) Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed by the Parties as in any way establishing any general principle of law or any precedent. (3) The rights and obligations of each Party under this Treaty shall remain unaffected by any provisions contained in, or by anything arising out of the execution of, any agreement establishing the Indus Basin Development Fund.

ARTICLE XII Final Provisions (1) This Treaty consists of the Preamble, the Articles hereof and Annexures A to H hereto, and may be cited as “The Indus Waters Treaty 1960.” (2) This Treaty shall be ratified and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged in New Delhi. It shall enter into force upon the exchange of ratifications, and will then take effect retrospectively from the first of April 1960. (3) The provisions of this Treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments. (4) The provisions of this Treaty, or the provisions of the Treaty as modified under the provisions of Paragraph (3), shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purposes between the two Governments. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and have hereunto affixed their seals. Done in triplicate in English at Karachi on this Nineteenth day of September 1960. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (Sd) Jawaharlal Nehru . . . . . .

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN (Sd) Mohammad Ayub Khan . . . . . . Field Marshal, H.P., H.J.

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FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT for the purposes specified in Articles V and X and Annexures F,G and H: (Sd) W.A.B.Iliff . . . . . . . . . Source: The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, The World Bank, at http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/2234971105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf

A NNEXURE II

ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT1 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN RELATING TO A CEASE-FIRE AND THE RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO AS AT JANUARY 1, 1965 IN THE AREA OF GUJARAT/ WEST PAKISTAN BORDER AND CONCERNING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE BORDER IN THAT AREA. SIGNED AT NEW DELHI, ON JUNE 30, 19652

WHEREAS both the Government of India and Pakistan have agreed to a cease-fire and to restoration of the status quo as at 1 January 1965, in the area of Gujarat/West Pakistan border, in the confidence that this will also contribute to a reduction of the present tension along the entire Indo/Pakistan border; WHEREAS it is necessary that after the status quo has been established in the aforesaid Gujarat/West Pakistan border area, arrangements should be made for determination and demarcation of the border in that area;

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NOW therefore, the two Governments agree that the following action shall be taken in regard to the said area:

Article 1: There shall be an immediate cease-fire with effect from 0030 hrs GMT 1 July 1965.

Article 2: On the cease-fire: (i) All troops on both sides will immediately begin to withdraw; (ii) This process will be completed within seven days; (iii) Indian police may then re-occupy the post at Chhad Bet in strength no greater than that employed at the post on 31 December 1964; (iv) Indian and Pakistan police may patrol on the tracks on which they were patrolling prior to 1 January 1965, provided that their patrolling will not exceed in intensity that which they were doing prior to 1 January 1965 and during the monsoon period will not exceed in intensity that done during the monsoon period of 1964; (v) If patrols of Indian and Pakistan police should come into contact they will not interfere with each other, and in particular will act in accordance with West Pakistan/India border ground rules agreed to in January 1960;3 (vi) Officials of the two Governments will meet immediately after the cease-fire and from time to time thereafter as may prove desirable in order to consider whether any problems arise in the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs (iii) to (v) above and to agree on the settlement of any problem.

Article 3: (i) In view of the fact that: (a) India claims that there is no territorial dispute as there is a well established boundary running roughly along the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch as shown in the pre-partition maps, which needs to be demarcated on the ground. (b) Pakistan claims that the border between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch runs roughly along the 24th Parallel as is clear from several pre-partition and post-partition documents and therefore the dispute involves some 3,500 square miles of territory.

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(c) At discussions in January 1960, it was agreed by Ministers of the two Governments that they would each collect further data, regarding the Kutch-Sind boundary and that further discussions would be held later with a view to arriving at a settlement of this dispute; as soon as officials have finished the task referred to in Article 2 (vi), which in any case will not be later than one month after the ceasefire, Ministers of the two Governments will meet in order to agree on the determination of the border in the light of their respective claims, and the arrangements for its demarcation. At this meeting and at any proceeding before the Tribunal referred to in Article 3 (ii) and (iv) below, each Government will be free to present and develop their case in full; (ii) In the event of no agreement between the Ministers of the two Governments on the determination of the border being reached within two months of the cease-fire, the two Governments shall, as contemplated in the Joint Communiqué of 24th October, 1959, 4 have recourse to the Tribunal referred to in (iii) below for determination of the border in the light of their respective claims and evidence produced before it and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding on both parties; (iii) For this purpose there will be constituted, within four months of the cease-fire, a Tribunal consisting of three persons, none of whom would be a national of either India or Pakistan. One member shall be nominated by each Government and the third member, who will be the Chairman, shall be jointly selected by the two Governments. In the event of the two Governments failing to agree on the selection of the Chairman within three months of the cease-fire they shall request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to nominate the Chairman; (iv) The decision of the Tribunal referred to in (iii) above shall be binding on both Governments, and shall not be questioned on any ground whatsoever. Both Governments undertake to implement the findings of the Tribunal in full as quickly as possible and shall refer to the Tribunal for decision any difficulties which may arise between them in the implementation of these findings. For that purpose the Tribunal shall remain in being until its findings have been implemented in full. In WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned have signed the present Agreement.

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DONE in duplicate at New Delhi this thirtieth day of June 1965 in the English language. For the Government of India: M. Azim Husain For the Government of Pakistan: M. A. Husain Source: United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 548-I-7983, 1965, at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Publications.aspx?pathpub=Publication/ UNTS/Page1_en.xml

NOTES

Introduction 1. Compiled from the data available on South Asia Terrorism Portal at http://www.satp.org accessed on November 21, 2008.

I Conceptualizing Enduring Rivalry and Negotiation 1. William R. Thompson, “Principal Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39, 2 ( June 1995), pp. 195–223. 2. Daniel S. Geller, “Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads,” International Studies Quarterly, 37, 2 (1993), pp. 173–193. 3. Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies Quarterly, 37, 2 (1993), pp. 147–171. 4. Ibid. 5. Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries,” Interactions, 18, 1992, pp. 151–163. 6. Geller, 1993. 7. F.W. Wayman and D.M. Jones, “Evolution of Conflict in Enduring Rivalries,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, Canada, March 19–23, 1991, p. 9. Cited in Geller, 1993. 8. Goertz and Diehl, 1992, pp. 1–11. 9. Wayman and Jones, 1991, p. 11. 10. Goertz and Diehl, 1993, p. 147. 11. C. Gochman and Z. Maoz, “Militarized Inter-state Disputes, 1816–1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28, 4 (1984), pp. 585–616. 12. Ibid. Also see M. Small and J.D. Singer, Resort to Arms (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982). 13. Thompson, pp. 195–223. 14. Vali Nasr, “National Identities and the India-Pakistan Conflict,” in T.V. Paul, India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 178–201.

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15. Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), pp. 4–5. 16. Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (Yale: Yale University Press, 2002). 17. P.F. Diehl, Gary Goertz, and Daniel Saeedi, “Theoretical Specifications of the Enduring Rivalry: Application to the IndiaPakistan Case,” in Paul, 2005, pp. 27–53. 18. K. Santhanam, Sudhir Saxena, Sreedhar, and Manish, Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 22. 19. Jammu and Kashmir Backgrounder at http://www.satp.org/ satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/index.html (accessed November 27, 2008). 20. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 16. 21. R. Leng, “Structure and Action in Crisis Bargaining,” in C. Herman, C. Kegley, and J. Rosenau (eds.) New Directions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy (Winchester: Allen and Unwin,1987), pp. 178–199. 22. United Nations Press Release ORG/1507, at http://www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2009/org1507.doc.htm (accessed on March 30, 2008. 23. Richard Haass, Conflicts Unending (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 138. 24. William Zartman (ed.), Preventive Negotiations: Avoiding Conflict Escalation (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 4. Also see William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 236–237. 25. See Stephen J. Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1947–1980 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1991), pp. 26–28. 26. Author’s interview with Vernon L.B. Mendis, former Sri Lankan diplomat, September 14, 1997, Kandy, Sri Lanka. 27. Haass, pp. 139–142. 28. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” in John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 20. 29. Haass, pp. 146–147. 30. William Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 117. 31. Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process in a Global Perspective (New Delhi: Affiliated East-West-Press, 1992), pp. 22–35. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., pp. 158–163.

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34. Ibid., p. 252. 35. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 42. 36. William Zartman, “Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions,” in Janice Gross Stein (ed.) Getting to the Table: The Process of International Negotiations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1989), p. 3. 37. Janice Gross Stein (ed.) Getting to the Table: The Process of International Negotiations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1989), p. 4. 38. For a detailed explanation of crisis and critical stages in negotiation see Daniel Drukman, “Stages, Turning Points, and Crisis: Negotiating Base Rights, Spain and the United States,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30, 2 ( June 1986), pp. 327–360, and William Zartman, “Common Elements in the Analyses of Negotiation Process,” Negotiation Journal, 4, 1 ( January 1988), pp. 31–34. 39. Zartman, and Berman, pp. 52–70. 40. Author’s interview with Vernon B. Mendis. 41. Stein, pp. 9, 245. 42. Zartman in Stein, 1989, pp. 6–13. 43. Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, 42, 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427–453. 44. P. Rossi, “Communicative Decision-Making,” in R. Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanstan: Northwestern University Press, 1958), p. 364, cited in William Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 17. 45. Zartman, 2008, p. 25. 46. Zartman and Berman, 1982, pp. 11–13. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Saunders, p. 24. 50. Zartman and Berman, 1982, p. 29. 51. Ibid., p. 191.

II

Composite Dialogue Process (CDP): A Structured Mechanism for Addressing Indo-Pak Rivalry

1. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summits on numerous occasions provided Indian and Pakistani leaders with the opportunity to meet on the sidelines in the absence of any structured or scheduled process of negotiation. 2. Interview with the author, Lahore, November 27, 1998 published as, “From Lahore, With Love,” Times of India, February 22, 1999. 3. J.N. Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace (New Delhi: Books Today, 2002), pp. 48–51.

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4. Defence Minister George Fernandez’s Statement in the Lok Sabha on July 31, 2001 at www. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ articleshow/104948.cms/. 5. From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publication, December 15, 1999), p. 265. 6. Amit Baruah, “India Proposes a Dozen Steps to Break the Ice with Pak,” The Hindu. October 23, 2003. 7. B. Muralidhar Reddy, “Pakistan Accepts Many CBMS, Attaches Riders to Others,” The Hindu. October 30, 2003. 8. B. Muralidhar Reddy, “We have Left Aside the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: Musharraf,” The Hindu. December 19, 2003. 9. India-Pakistan share a maritime boundary in the Arabian Sea, International Border (IB) along Gujarat, Punjab and Rajasthan Sector, Line of Control (LoC) the de facto boundary in Jammu and Kashmir since 1972, and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in Siachen in J&K, which is up north beyond the point NJ9842 where the LoC terminates. Troops have exchanged fire and shelling along the LoC and AGPL for over two decades. 10. Joint Press Statement, “India-Pakistan Joint Press Statement,” Islamabad, January 6, 2004, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2004/01/06ss01.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). 11. Rasul H. Laskar, “Pakistan Scrambles Fighter Jets Over Major Cities, Hindustan Times, December 23, 2008. 12. Compiled from “India Data Sheets,” South Asia Terrorism Portal at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/index.html (accessed on May 4, 2010). 13. Rajat Pandit, “India, Pak Skirt Kashmir, Build Confidence,” The Times of India, June 28, 2004. Also see Amit Baruah, “India, Pakistan to Find a ‘Final’ Solution to J&K,” The Hindu, June 29, 2004. 14. Joint Statement, “India Pakistan Foreign Secretary Level Talks in New Delhi,” January 18, 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at http://meanindia.nic.in/speech/2006/01/18js01.htm (accessed January 31, 2006). 15. K.J.M. Verma, “Mark and Area, Disarm it, Decide on Freedom or Joint Control,” Indian Express, October 26, 2004. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Khaled Ahmed, “Musharraf’s ‘Seven-Regions’ Options in Kashmir,” at http://www.thefridaytimes.com/page8.shtml. November 30, 2004 (accessed August 3, 2007). 19. Special Correspondent, “No Redrawing of Boundaries: Manmohan,” The Hindu, December 22, 2004. 20. Amit Kotwal, “Let LOC be Line of Peace,” The Times of India, July 16, 2007.

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21. Praveen Swami, “Musharraf’s Offer Nearer to New Delhi’s Bottom Line,” at http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/06/stories/2006120604650100. htm (accessed August 4, 2007). 22. Fahd Hussain, “Kashmir Troops Cut to Boost Peace, Musharraf Tells Bush,” at http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2006-daily/15– 09–2005/main/ main4.htm (accessed August 5, 2007). 23. Jawed Naqvi, “Musharraf’s four-Stage Kashmir Peace Plan: We Can Make Borders Irrelevant: India,” at http://www.dawn.com/2006/ 12/06/top1.htm (accessed August 7, 2007). 24. Jawed Naqvi. “Mirwaiz Asks India to Consider Musharraf’s Proposals,” at http://www.dawn.com/2007/02/02/top3.htm (accessed August 7, 2007). 25. Jammu and Kashmir Backgrounder at http://www.satp.org/ satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/index. html/. 26. Annual Report, 2003–2004, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, p. 16. 27. Syed Shoiab Hasan, “The Whole Truth,” The Herald, October 2005, p. 34. 28. “President Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” January 12, 2002, at http://www.millat.com/president/1020200475758AMword% 20file.pdf (accessed June 7, 2004). 29. Joint Press Statement, “India-Pakistan Talks on Terrorism and Drug Trafficking,” Islamabad, August 11, 2004, Ministry of External Affairs Government of India at http://meaindia.nic.in/ declarestatement/2004/08/ 11js01.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). 30. Joint Press Statement, “End of Home Secretary Level Talks between India and Pakistan on Terrorism and Drug Trafficking,” New Delhi, August 30, 2005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2005/08/30js01.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). 31. Joint Statement, “Second Round of Technical Level Talks between Central Bureau of Investigations (India)-Federal Investigation Agency (Pakistan),” New Delhi, March 22, 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at http://meaindia.nic.in/ jshome.htm (accessed July 24, 2007). 32. Joint Statement, “Third Round of Pakistan-India Interior/Home Secretary Talks on Terrorism and Drugs Trafficking,” Islamabad, May 31, 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at http://meaindia.nic.in/jshome.htm (accessed July 24, 2007). 33. Joint Statement, “India-Pakistan in Havana,” Havana, September 16, 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at http:// meaindia.nic.in/jshome.htm (accessed July 24, 2007). 34. Nirupama Subramanian, “Help Track Down Samjahuta Suspect,” The Hindu, March 7, 2007.

228

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35. Qudssia Akhlaque, “Terror Dossier Given to India,” The Dawn at http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/07/top2.htm (accessed March 14, 2007). 36. Tariq Naqqash and Sayyed Irfan Raza, “Operations against LeT—Dawa Launched in AJK,” The Dawn at http://www.dawn. com/2008/12/08/top3.htm (accessed December 15, 2008). 37. Kamal Siddiqi and Amit Baruah, “Pak Ducks and Weaves,” The Hindustan Times, February 10, 2009. 38. Mohammad Asghar, “Kasab Confessed of his Own Free Will: Document,” Dawn, June 18, 2009. 39. Kamal Siddiqi and Amit Baruah, “Our Citizens Did It, Pak Finally Admits,” The Hindustan Times, February 13, 2009. 40. “Singh Reiterates ‘Tough Stance’: Pak-India Talks at Secretaries’ level planned,” Dawn, June 17, 2009. 41. Siddharth Varadarajan, “We Must Keep the Line Open, Says Manmohan,” The Hindu, June 18, 2009. 42. Joint Statement, “Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 16, 2009 at http:// meaindia.nic.in/declarestatement/2009/07/16js01.htm (accessed July 27, 2009). 43. Siddharth Varadarajan, “No Sell-Out at Sharm-el-Sheikh: Pakistan Forced to Admit Terror Link,” The Hindu, July 18, 2009. 44. Special Correspondent, “No Dilution of Our Stand,” The Hindu, July 18, 2009. 45. Sandeep Dikshit, “We Trust Pakistan but Verify Its Action, Say Manmohan,” The Hindu, July 30, 2009. 46. Muralidhar Reddy, “India, Pakistan Sign Accord on Pre-notification of Missile Tests,” The Hindu, October 4, 2005. 47. Joint Statement, “India Pakistan Foreign Secretary Level Talks,” New Delhi, January 18, 2006, Ministry of External Affairs Government of India at http://meanindia.nic.in/speech/2006/01/18js01.htm (accessed 31 January2006). 48. Joint Statement, “Third Round of Secretary Level Talks between India and Pakistan on Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields,” New Delhi, April 26, 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at http://meaindia.nic.in/jshome.htm (accessed July 24, 2007). 49. Ayaz Amir, “Republic Terrorised by Fools,” The Dawn, at http://www. dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/20040604.htm (accessed on June 6, 2004). 50. Joint Statement, “Third Round of Pakistan-India Expert Level Dialogue on Conventional CBMs,” Islamabad, April 27, 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at http:// meaindia.nic.in/jshome.htm (accessed July 24, 2007).

Notes

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51. Joint Statement, “First meeting of India-Pakistan Joint Study Group ( JSG) on Trade and Economic Cooperation, New Delhi, February 23, 2004, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2005/02/23js01.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). 52. Jawed Naqvi, “New Measures to Boost Pakistan, India Trade,” The Dawn at http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/11/top1.htm (accessed July 23, 2007). 53. Jawed Naqvi, “Pakistan, India Eye $ 10 bn Trade,” The Dawn at http://www.dawn.com/2007/08/02/top3.htm (accessed August 7, 2007). 54. Joint Statement, “Third Round of Pakistan-India Talks on Economic and Commercial Cooperation,” Islamabad, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, March 29, 2006 http://meaindia.nic. in/jshome.htm (accessed July 24, 2007). 55. Joint Statement, “Third Round of Pakistan-India Talks on Economic and Commercial Cooperation,” Islamabad, March 29, 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at http://meaindia.nic.in/ jshome.htm (accessed July 24, 2007). 56. Joint Press Statement, “India-Pakistan Discussion on Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields,” New Delhi, August 4, 2004, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at http:// meaindia.nic.in/declarestatement /2004/08/904js01.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). 57. Joint Statement, “Third Round of Secretary-Level Talks between India and Pakistan on Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields,” New Delhi, June 2, 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at http://www.meaindia.nic.in/ (accessed on August 26, 2006). 58. Joint Statement, “India Pakistan Technical Level Talks on enhancing Interaction and Cooperation across the LOC,” New Delhi, May 3, 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at http:// meaindia.nic.in/ jshome.htm (accessed July 24, 2007). 59. Onkar Singh, 2004. “Muzaffarabad Bus Service Deadlocked,” at http:// www.in.rediff.com/news/2004 /dec/08bus.htm (accessed December 10, 2004). 60. Dawn Staff Reporter, “Opposition Divided over LOC Bus Service: Major Difference between ARD, MMA,” The Dawn at http://www. dawn.com/2005/02/18/top2.htm (accessed August 10, 2007). 61. B. Muralidhar Reddy, “Time to Look for New Options: Mirwaiz,” The Hindu at http://www.hindu.com/2005/06/13/stories/ 2005061312161200.htm (accessed August 4, 2007). 62. Annual Report 2005–2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, p. 16.

230

Notes

III

Bridge over Troubled Waters: The Indus Waters Treaty

1. Niranjan D. Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1973), pp. 24–25. 2. Aloys Arthur Michel, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 196. 3. Gulhati, 1973, p. 65. 4. Javed Tufail, “The World Bank and the Indus Basin Dispute: Background,” Pakistan Horizon, 18 (1965), pp. 231–235. 5. For Indian views see J.S. Bains, India’s International Disputes: A Legal Study (Bombay: Asia Publishing 1962), pp. 29–61. Also see J.B. Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations 1947–55 (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1958), pp. 160–187. 6. India, Parliamentary Debates, 1, 1 (March 1950) Col. 592. 7. D.E. Lilienthal, “Another Korea in the Making?” Collier’s Weekly, New York (August 14, 1951). Cited in Gulhati, 1973, Appendix IV, p. 440. 8. For details see Das Gupta, 1958, pp. 171–183. 9. G.W. Choudhary, Pakistan’s Relations with India (1947–66) (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 161. 10. For the genesis of the dispute refer to Das Gupta, 1958; S.P. Shukla, India and Pakistan: The Origin of Armed Conflict (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1984), pp. 123–124. 11. For explanation on India’s position see Gulhati, 1973, pp. 201–370. 12. For more on India’s case see Das Gupta, 1958. 13. J.S. Bains, “The Diversion of International Rivers,” Indian Journal of International Law, 1, 1 ( July 1960), pp. 38–52. 14. For Pakistan’s position see Mohammad Ahsan Chaudhary, “The Basin Waters Dispute between India and Pakistan,” Institute of Pacific Relations ( June 1958), pp. 1–12. 15. Eugene P. Black, “The Indus Project: Background of the IndianPakistani Agreement,” New York Times, December 11, 1960. 16. Hafeezur Rahman Khan, “Indo-Pakistan Waters Dispute,” Pakistan Horizon, 12 (December 1959), pp. 323–336. 17. Shukla, 1984, p. 124. 18. Ibid. 19. The Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1956, p. 14. Also see The Lok Sabha debates, December 14, 1956, Vol. IX, Cols. 1470–1472. 20. The Annual Report, 1956, p. 14. 21. The Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1957, pp. 15–16. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid.

Notes

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24. Staff Correspondent, “Need to Make Allies Abroad Vital for Kashmir and Water Resources,” Dawn, August 26, 1957. 25. Staff Correspondent, “No Breakup of One Unit, PM’s Pledge at Lahore Meeting,” Dawn, October 7, 1957. 26. “India-Pakistan Hold Talks,” The Hindu, November 30, 1957. 27. The Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1958, pp. 20–21. 28. Gulhati, 1973, p. 234. 29. Ibid. Also see Editorial, “Another Canal Dispute,” The Hindu, June 14, 1958 30. Shukla, 1984, p. 133. 31. The Annual Report, 1958, pp. 21–22. 32. Zamiruddin Ahmed, “Ask Bharat to be Reasonable with Pakistan,” Dawn, September 5, 1958. 33. For an overview of Indian newspapers coverage see K. Balram, “India’s Stand Supported,” The Hindu, July 2, 1958. 34. The Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1959, p. 25. 35. For a detailed analyses of India-China developments and Pakistan’s policy during this period, see “Notes Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China, 1954–1959,” White paper No. 1, New Delhi (1959), pp. 55–57, cited in Ajay Saxena, India and Pakistan: Their foreign Policies (New Delhi: Anmol Publication, 1987), p. 51. 36. “World Bank Plan for Solution,” The Hindu, May 23, 1959. 37. Staff Correspondent, “Pak Accepts WB Plan in Principle: Final Settlement in Sight,” Dawn, May 19, 1959. 38. K. Rangaswamy, “India Confident of Early Settlement of Issue,” The Hindu, June 10, 1959. Also see The Annual Report, 1959, p. 25. 39. Shukla, 1983, pp. 138–139. 40. Ibid. 41. The Annual Report, 1959, p. 25. 42. The Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1960, p. 19. 43. For a critical analysis of the outcome, see Editorial, “Waters of Peace,” Statesman, March 3, 1960 and Editorial, “Healing Waters,” Statesman, September 3, 1960. 44. Khursheed-ul-Hasan, “Kashmir Acquiring New Urgency, Ayub Hopeful of Solution,” Dawn, September 3, 1960. 45. Gulhati, 1973, pp. 307–309. 46. Article II, III, and IV, The Indus Waters Treaty, 1960, The World Bank at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/ Resources/223497–1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf (accessed March 9, 2007), pp. 4–11.

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47. For details see Sisir Gupta, “The Indus Waters Treaty 1960,” Foreign Affairs Reports, 9 (1960), pp. 153–54 and L.F. Rushbrook Williams, “Significance of Indus Treaty,” Asian Review, 51 ( July 1961), pp. 163–173. 48. Sisir Gupta, “Nehru-Meeting,” Foreign Affairs Reports, 9 (October 1960) p.p. 122–133. 49. Hafeezur Rehman Khan, “Indo-Pakistan Water Dispute,” Pakistan Horizon, 12 (December 1959), pp. 323–336. 50. Gulhati, 1973, p. 16. 51. Ibid, p. 339. 52. Ibid., p. 311. 53. D.E. Lilienthal, “Another ‘Korea’ in the Making?” Collier’s Weekly, New York (August 14, 1951) cited in Gulhati, 1973, p. 445. 54. Ibid, p. 99. 55. Ibid, p. 109. 56. Harold Saunders, The Other Walls: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process in a Global Perspective (New Delhi: Affiliated East-West-Press, 1992), pp. 158–163. 57. Please see analysis of what constitutes negotiation in William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982). 58. Also see Louis Kriesberg and S.J. Thorson (eds.), Timing and the Deescalation of International Conflicts (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991) 59. Gulhati, 1973, p. 245. 60. Ibid, p. 3. 61. Ibid, p. 107. 62. Ibid, p. 109. 63. Jagat Mehta, “Rescuing the Future: Coming to Terms with Bequeathed Misperceptions,” unpublished manuscript, chapter eight, November 1996, 1974. 64. Ibid, p. 175. 65. Gulhati, 1973, p. 238. 66. Ibid., p. 277. Indian rupee was equal to US$ 0.30 before September 1949 and then $US 0.21from then until June 1966 and $US 0.13 thereafter. The Pakistani rupee was equal to $US 0.30 until July 31, 1955 and thereafter same as the Indian rupee (Gulhati, 1973, p. 449). 67. Ibid, p. 331. 68. Ibid. 69. Mehta, 1996, p. 175. 70. Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1952), p. 306. 71. Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A/1, p. 25, cited in Bains, 1962, p. 35. 72. J.S. Bains, “Equitable Solution for Water Disputes,” The Hindu, September 16, 1961.

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73. A.N. Khosla, “Development of Indus Rivers System: An Engineering Approach,” India Quarterly, 24 (1958), pp. 239–43; Eugene P. Black, “The Indus Project: Background of the Indian, Pakistan Agreement,” The New York Times, December 11, 1960. 74. See Lok Sabha Debates, November 30, 1960, Cols. 3191, 3214. 75. Gupta, 1960, p. 124. 76. Gulhati, 1973, p. 314. 77. B.G. Verghese, “It’s Time for Indus-II,” The Tribune, May 26, 2005.

IV The Rann of Kutch Dispute and the Resolution Process 1. Hari Ram Gupta, The Kutch Affair (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1969), p. 1. 2. The Kutch-Sind Border Question: A Collection of Documents with Comments (New Delhi: Indian Society of International Law, 1965), p. 1. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid, p. 119. 5. Indo-Pakistan Border Agreement, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi: Government of India Press, October 23, 1959), p. 8. 6. Clauses 11, 12, and 13 of the Ground enshrined provisions for dealing with smugglers, civilians and border security personnel in the area. According to clause 11: “Border security forces of both sides are changed with the responsibility of preventing smuggling in their respective areas. Therefore it is incumbent upon them to arrest smugglers of any nationality, whether armed or unarmed and to deal with them under the law of the land.” Clause 12 provided, “In the case of local population, inadvertent crossings are likely to take place along the border. The border security forces, after satisfying themselves that the crossing was done inadvertently, shall immediately return the persons concerned to the opposite commanders at officers’ level.” And clause 13 said, “Whenever the personnel of the border forces of either country inadvertently stray across the border line information about it should be immediately conveyed to the nearest post of the other side and the personnel must be handed back without delay to the nearest post along with their arms and ammunition, etc., if any, through Gazetted Officers/ Upper Subordinates of both sides.” 7. Gupta, 1969, pp. 160–163. 8. “India to be Tough on Kutch Issue,” Amrit Bazar Patrika, July 22, 1965. 9. Gupta, 1969, p. 261. 10. Indo-Pakistani Border Agreement, p. 8. 11. Selected Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, August 1974), p. 288.

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12. Gupta, 1969, p. 278. 13. Ibid., p. 282. 14. “Border Demarcation by Arbitration,” Statesman, May 6, 1965. 15. Gupta, 1969, p. 283. 16. “New Hitch over Status Quo in Kutch,” Statesman, May 18, 1965. 17. “Pak. Troops Flown via Ceylon,” The Hindu, May 27, 1965. 18. Gupta, 1969, p. 290. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., p. 293. 21. Staff Correspondent, “Shastri’s Pre-condition to Talks on Kutch,” Dawn, June 17, 1965. 22. “Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri on Kutch Agreement,” Asian Recorder, 11, 33 (August 13–19, 1965), p. 6606 and “Conclusion of the Ceasefire Agreement,” Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 15 (1965–1966), p. 20929. 23. “Kutch Ceasefire Agreement wit Pakistan Approved by Parliament,” Asian Recorder, 11, 37 (September 10–16, 1965), p. 6657. 24. See annexure II. 25. Kutch Sind Border Question, pp. 16–17. 26. Mukund G. Untawale, Cooperation within Conflict: International Relations in South Asia, Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1971, p. 573. 27. Kutch-Sind Border Question, p. 24. 28. Untawale, 1971, p. 574. 29. Ibid., p. 576. 30. Ibid. 31. Gupta, 1969, p. 340. 32. “Kutch Talks May be Postponed,” Hindustan Times, August 18, 1965; “Kutch Issue goes to Tribunal,” Hindustan Times, August 19, 1965; K. Rangaswamy, “India Calls off Talks on Kutch,” The Hindu, August 19, 1965. 33. See annexure II. 34. “U. Thant’s Nomination for Gunnar as President of Arbitration,” Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 15 (1965–1966), p. 21123. 35. Gupta, 1969, p. 344. 36. Ibid. 37. For a detailed report see ‘The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) between India and Pakistan (India, Pakistan), Report of International Arbitral Awards, United Nations, February 19, 1968, Volume XVII, pp. 1–576. 38. “Joint Communiqué,” Indian Journal of International Law, 1 (1960), p. 145. 39. Author’s interview with S.K. Singh, former Indian Foreign Secretary, January 25, 1998, New Delhi. 40. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1988), pp. 109–113.

Notes

235

41. The Kutch-Sind Border Question, pp. 16–17. 42. Ibid., p. 150. 43. Ibid. 44. Selected Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri, p.p. 286. 45. Gupta, 1969, p. 89. 46. Gupta, 1969, p. 410. 47. Untawale, 1971, p. 630. 48. “Acceptance of Tribunal Award by Governments of India and Pakistan,” Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 16 (1967–68), p. 22839. 49. Untawale, 1971, p. 627. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid, p. 638. 53. Gupta, 1969, pp. 273–274 gives an account of the U.S. warning; regarding the size of the U.S. military aid see, “India-Pakistan Take Steps to End Confrontation,” Hindustan Times, July 3, 1965. 54. “No Resolution in Kutch,” Statesman, July 24, 1965. 55. Author’s interview with S.K. Singh, New Delhi, January 25, 1998.

V Dispute over Siachen: A Glacier in Need of Thaw 1. Samina Ahmed and Varun Sahni, “Freezing the Fighting: Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier,” Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Papers, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (March 1998), p. 10. 2. Ibid. 3. Resolutions Adopted and Decision Taken by the Security Council in 1948 at http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1948/scres48.htm, p. 1. 4. Ibid, p. 2. 5. Ibid, p. 4. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid, p. 5. 9. Ibid. 10. Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, document S/1100, para. 75. 11. Interestingly, the resolution uses the term “will of the people,” and not “plebiscite.” 12. Ibid, p. 322. 13. V.R. Raghavan, Siachen: Conflict Without an End (New Delhi: Viking, 2002), p. 22. 14. Jasjit Singh, “Siachen Glacier: Fact and Fiction,” Strategic Analyses, 12, 8 (October 1989), p. 696. 15. Ahmed and Sahni, 1998. 16. Robert G. Wirsing, “The Siachen Glacier Dispute—Part 2: The Strategic Dimension,” Strategic Studies, 12, 1 (Autumn 1988), p. 41.

236

Notes

17. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 68–69. 18. Lt. General M.L. Chibber, “Siachen—The Untold Story,” Indian Defence Review ( January 1990), pp. 146–152. 19. A.G. Noorani, “CBMs for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and Wular Barrage,” in Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak (eds.) Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 84. 20. Ibid, p. 85. 21. Ahmed and Sahni, 1998, p. 14. 22. Chibber, 1990, p. 146. 23. Yusuf Jameel, “India Ready Even for Sino-Pak Offensive,” Telegraph, June 23, 1985 and “On the World’s Highest Battleground,” Telegraph, May 12, 1989, cited in Ahmed and Sahni, 1998. 24. Interview with Brigadier Devinder Singh, May 13, 2004, New Delhi. 25. Varun Sahni, “Preventing Another Kargil, Avoiding Another Siachen: Technical Monitoring of the Line of Control in Kashmir,” in Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim, and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy (New Delhi: Har-Anand publishers), p. 156. 26. Lt. Gen. M.L. Chibber, “Solving Siachen,” Times of India, June 14, 1989; “Siachen Solution Will Help India, Pak,” Times of India, June 13, 1989, cited in Raghavan, 2002, p. 160. 27. Sheru Thapaliyal, “Siachen,” Indian Defence Review, 21, 1( January– March 2006), pp. 44–48. 28. Interview with Ambassador (Retd.) Gopalaswamy Parthasarthy, New Delhi, March 10, 2009. 29. Mahendra Ved, “Siachen Talks Aim Is Status Quo,” Hindustan Times, May 30, 1989. 30. Author’s interview with Lieutenant General A.B.Masih, UYSM, General Officer Commanding (GOC), 11 Infantry Division, 33 Core, Ahmedabad, June 18, 1997. 31. Interview with J.N. Dixit, former Indian Foreign Secretary, Gurgaon, December 19, 1997. 32. Interview with Brigadier (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal, Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, March 9, 2009. 33. A.G. Noorani, “Easing the Indo-Pakistani Dialogue on Kashmir: Confidence-building Measures for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and Wular Barrage Disputes,” Occasional Paper 16 (April 1994) Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC. 34. W.P.S. Sidhu, “Siachen: The Forgotten War,” India Today, May 31, 1992, p. 88. 35. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, “Far from a Thaw: What Blocks a Full Settlement,” Frontline, December 4, 1992.

Notes

237

36. Please see Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000) 37. Raghavan, p. 93. 38. Umer Farooq, “Pakistan Ready to Discuss Withdrawal from Siachen,” Nation, March 2, 1995. 39. Raghavan, p. 33. 40. Wirsing, 1988, pp. 45–46. 41. Brig (Retd.) A.R. Siddiqui, “Siachen: The Glacier Won’t Move,” Dawn, June 30, 1986. 42. See Neal A. Kemkar, “Environmental Peacemaking: Ending Conflict between India and Pakistan on the Siachen Glacier Through the Creation of a Transboundary Peace Park,” Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 25, 1 ((2005). 67–121. 43. Noorani, 1995, p. 89. 44. Ibid., p. 46. Also see Robert G. Wirsing, “The Siachen Glacier Dispute: Can Diplomacy Untangle It?” Indian Defence Review ( July 1991), p. 98. 45. Noorani, 1995, p.p. 91. 46. Raghavan, p. 142. 47. M.J. Akbar, “Fresh Bid for End to Siachen War,” The Telegraph, August 20, 1992. 48. This brief description of the talks has been touched upon in J.N. Dixit, Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: Indo-Pak Relations 1970– 1974, Annexure 3 (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1995), p. 312. 49. Ibid, 313. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Staff Reporter, “Pakistan Rejects India’s Siachen Ceasefire Plan,” Hindu, November 7, 1998. 53. Ibid. 54. Joint Press Statement, “India-Pakistan Talks on Siachen,” New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, August 6, 2004, at http://meaindia.nic.in/declarestatement/2004/08/09js01. htm (accessed on March 23, 2007). 55. Sandeep Dikshit, “India. Pakistan Agree to Continue Talks on Siachen,” The Hindu, August 7, 2004 at http://thehindu.com/ 2004/08/07/stories/2004080706190100.htm (accessed on June 22, 2006). 56. Special Correspondent, “Siachen: No Breakthrough,” The Hindu, May 25, 2006 at http://thehindu.com/2006/05/25/stories/ 2006052515280100.htm (accessed on July 17, 2006). 57. Joint Press Release, “Defence Secretary-Level Talks between India and Pakistan on the Siachen Issue,” New Delhi, Ministry of External

238

Notes

Affairs Government of India, May 24, 2006 at http://meaindia.nic. in/prhome.htm (accessed July 24, 2007). 58. Joint Press Statement, “Defence secretary Level Talks on Siachen Between India and Pakistan,” Islamabad, Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, April 7, 2007 at http://meaindia.nic. in/pressrelease/2007/04/07js01.htm (accessed on May 2, 2008). 59. Nirupama Subramanian, “No Tangible Progress in Siachen Talks,” The Hindu, April 8, 2007 at http://www.thehindu.com/2007/04/08/ stories/2007040816820800.htm (accessed on November 14, 2008). 60. Iftikhar Gilani, “India Considering Siachen Proposal,” at http://www. dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page_2007%5CO1%5C18%5Cstory_ 18–1-2007_pg7_1_ (accessed January 28, 2007). 61. Subramanian, April 8, 2007. 62. Rahul Bedi, “Icy Relations,” Himal, 11, 2 (December 1998), p. 19. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Musharraf, 2006, p. 87. 66. Ibid. 67. Kent L. Biringer, “Peace Dividend: Siachen Science Club,” Himal, 11, 2 (December 1998), p. 28. 68. Staff Correspondent, “India Approves Linking to the Siachen Glacier,” Muslim, September 8, 1988. Also see “India to Provide Snow-riding Scooters at Siachen,” Nation, May 3, 1998. 69. Interview with the Author, New Delhi, March 10, 2009. 70. Harish Kapadia, “High Stakes,” Himal, 11, 2 (December 1998), p. 25. 71. Interview with the Author, Islamabad, December 4, 1998. For details of the interview please see “Benazir: Nawaz Not Sharif,” Times of India, December 17, 1998. 72. Staff Reporter, “Pakistan Rejects India’s Siachen Ceasefire Plan,” The Hindu, November 7, 1998. 73. Kamal Matinuddin, “Breaking the Ice on Siachen,” News, November 11, 1998. 74. Muhammed Mujeeb Afzal, “Siachen,” News, April 12, 1995. 75. See Ahmed and Sahni, 1998. 76. Ahmer Bilal Soofi, “Legal Purview: Wullar Barrage, Siachen and Sir Creek,” South Asian Journal, 7 ( January–March 2005), pp. 91–99. 77. Iftikhar Gilani, “Indian Stance on Siachen Stuns Observers,” Nation, November 11, 1998.

VI The Sir Creek Dispute: A Case of Compromise Driven by Common Interests 1. Palash Kumar, “Sir Creek Row Began Over Pile Firewood,” The Asian Age, November 10, 1998.

Notes

239

2. A.G. Noorani, “CBMs for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and Wular Barrage,” in Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak (eds.), Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 100. 3. Anwar Iqbal, “Dialogue on Wular Begins Today as Sir Creek Talks Put Off,” The News, October 11, 1991. 4. Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal, February 19, 1968, cited in Noorani, 1995, p. 100. 5. Ibid, p. 101. 6. J.N. Dixit, Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: Indo Pak Relations 1970– 1994 (New Delhi: Konark Publications, 1995), p. 157. 7. Rear Admiral K.R. Menon (Retd.), “Maritime Conflict Resolution and Confidence Building in South Asia,” Indian Defence Review (October–December 1995), p. 32. Also see Rahul Roy Chaudhury, “Trends in Delimitation of India’s Maritime Boundaries,” Strategic Analysis, 22, 10 ( January 1999), p. 1519. 8. Chaudhury, 1999, p. 1522. 9. See Government of India, “Suggestions and Confidence—Building Measures sent by the Government of India to the Government of Pakistan,” Non-paper ( January 24, 1994). 10. See “Non-Paper,” January 24, 1994. 11. Staff Correspondent, “India-Pakistan Talks: Sir Creek,” The Hindu, November 7, 1998. 12. Rear Admiral Ravi Vohra (Retd.), “The Sir Creek Affair: Can We Accelerate the Resolution?” Maritime Affairs, 2, 1 (2006), pp. 1–15. 13. Staff Correspondent, “India Rejects Pak. Move on Sir Creek,” The Hindu, November 10, 1998. 14. The Hindu, November 7, 1998. 15. Bharat Bhushan, “Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachen: Competitive Methodologies,” South Asia Journal, 7 ( January–March 2000), pp. 100–114. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. The Hindu, November 10, 1998. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Joint Press Statement, “India-Pakistan Talks on Sir Creek, New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, August 7, 2004, at http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2004/08/07ss01.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). Also see Jawed Naqvi, “Sir Creek Talks End Without Progress,” Dawn, at http://www.dawn.com/2004/08/08/ top7.htm/. 23. Joint Statement, “India-Pakistan Meeting on Joint Survey of the Boundary Pillars in the Horizontal Segment in the Sir Creek Area,”

240

Notes

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 15, 2004, at http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2004/12/15js01.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). 24. Joint Press Statement, “Pakistan-India Talks on the Sir Creek Issue,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 29, 2005, at http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2005/05/29js01.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). 25. Qudessia Akhlaque, “No Headway on Sir Creek,” Dawn, at http:// www.dawn.com/2005/05/30/top4.htm (accessed August 6, 2005). 26. Joint Press Statement, “Pakistan-India Talks on the Sir Creek Issue,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 21, 2005, at http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2005/12/21js02.htm (accessed January 31, 2006). 27. Joint Press Statement, “Technical Level Talks between Indian and Pakistan on Sir Creek,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 23, 2006, at http://meaindia.nic.in/ speech/2006/12/23js01.htm (accessed June 19, 2007). 28. Joint Press Statement, “India-Pakistan Talks on Sir Creek Under the Fourth Round of the Composite Dialogue,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 18, 2007, at http://meaindia. nic.in/speech/2007/05/18pr01.htm (accessed June 19, 2007). Also see Iftikhar A. Khan “Sir Creek Differences Remain,” Dawn, at http:// www.dawn.com/2007/05/19/top13.htm (accessed August 3, 2007) and Staff Reporter, “Pakistan, India Exchange Sir Creek Maps,” Dawn, at http://www.dawn.com/2007/05/18/top5.htm (accessed June 3, 2007). 29. See Anwar Iqbal, 1991. 30. Ibid. 31. Vohra, 2006, p. 12.

VII

The Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage and Storage Project Dispute: A Casualty of Linkage Politics?

1. M.A. Salman, “The Baghliar Difference and its Resolution Process: a Triumph for the Indus Waters Treaty?” Water Policy, 10 (2008), p. 10. 2. A.G. Noorani, “CBMs for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and Wular Barrage,” in Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak (eds.) Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 95. 3. Mir Abdul Aziz, “Wullar and the Proposed Barrage,” The Muslim, October 24, 1986. 4. Mirza M Nasaraullah, “Wular Barrage,” Pakistan Horizon, 47, 1 ( January 4, 1994), p. 56.

Notes

241

5. A.G. Noorani, “The Wular Barrage Dispute,” The Muslim, May 20, 1989. 6. Aloys Arthur Michel, The Indus Rivers (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 201, 239. 7. The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article I (11), p. 3 at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497– 1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf (accessed July 9, 2009). 8. The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article III (1), p. 6. 9. The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article IV (2), p. 7. 10. Ijaz Hussain, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), p. 2. 11. Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article III (4), p. 7. 12. The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Annexure E, Paragraph 2(a). 13. Staff Correspondent, “Wular Barrage Not to Be Shelved,” The Hindu, October 29, 1987. 14. Hussain, 1988, p. 5; The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article III (4); See also “Wular Barrage Violation of Indus Waters Treaty,” Pakistan & Gulf Economists Karachi (December 16–22, 1989), p. 17. 15. Hussain, 1988, p. 6. 16. Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article III (4), p. 7. 17. Noorani has raised these questions in his articles, 1995, p. 97. 18. A.G. Noorani, “The Wular Barrage Dispute,” The Muslim, May 20, 1989. 19. Michel, p. 196. 20. Ijaz Hussain has touched upon the psychological aspects of the dispute particularly the popular fears in Pakistan’s thinking pertaining to the dispute, 1998. 21. Michel, pp. 201, 239. 22. Chaudhary Muhammad Anwar Ali Sarya, “Wullar Barrage,” Nation, November 17, 1989. 23. Ibid. 24. Hussain, 1988, p. 47. 25. Mirza M. Nasarullah, “Wular Barrage,” Pakistan Horizon, 47, 1 ( January 4, 1994), p. 59. 26. Noorani, 1995, p. 98. 27. “Wular Barrage-II: Clear Violation of Indus Waters Treaty,” Nation, January 11, 1991. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Nasarullah, 1994, p. 61. 31. The Indus Waters Treaty Article IX (5), p. 19. 32. Nasarullah, 1994, p. 62. 33. Ibid. 34. Cited in Pakistan and Gulf Economist, p. 62. 35. Ibid., p. 63.

242 36. 37. 38. 39.

Notes

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Munir Ahmed, “Wular Barrage: Pakistan’s Case,” Nation, February 26, 1990. 40. Nasarullah, p. 64. 41. Ibid. 42. Ashraf Mumtaz, “Wular Barrage Constructions: Pakistan’s Conditions,” Dawn, September 22, 1989. 43. Noorani, 1995, p. 98. 44. Staff Reporter, “Pakistan Conditionally Allows Indian to Build Wullar Barrage,” The News, February 9, 1992. 45. Ibid. 46. The draft is provided in J.N. Dixit, Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: Indo Pak Relations 1970–1994 (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1995), Annexure 3, p. 314. 47. Staff Correspondent “India, Pak to Continue Talks on Tulbul Project,” The Hindu, November 6, 1998. 48. Ibid. Also see Staff Reporter, “Pak-India-Talks Stumble at 1st Hurdle,” Frontier Post, November 6, 1998; Anees Jilani, “Deadlock over Wular Barrage,” The News, December 1, 1998. 49. The Hindu, November 6, 1998. 50. Ibid. 51. Joint Press Statement, “India-Pakistan Discussion on the Wullar Barrage & Storage Project/ Tulbul Navigation Project,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 30, 2004 at http://www. meaindia.nic.in/speech/2004/07/30js01.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). 52. Khaleeq Kiani, “Wullar Talks End Without Any Accord: Pledge to Continue Progress,” Dawn, July 31, 2004 at http:www.dawn. com/2004/07/31/top8.htm (accessed May 21, 2005). 53. Joint Press Statement, “India-Pakistan talks on the Wullar Barrage / Tulbul Navigation Project,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 29, 2005 at http://www.meaindia.nic.in/ speech/2005/06/29js01.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). 54. Staff Reporter, “Talks on Wullar Barrage to Continue,” Dawn, June 30, 2005 at http://www.dawn.com/2005/06/30/top6.htm (accessed August 4, 2005). 55. Joint Statement, “India-Pakistan Discussion on the Wullar Barrage & Storage Project/ Tulbul Navigation Project,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 23, 2006 at http://www.meaindia.nic.in/secframe.php?sec=jd (accessed August 17, 2007). 56. Staff Reporter, “Wullar Barrage Parleys Inconclusive,” Dawn, June 24, 2006 at http://www.dawn.com/2006/06/24/top4.htm (accessed July 29, 2006).

Notes

243

57. “Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan on the Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, August 31, 2007 at http://www.meaindia. nic.in/declarestatement/2007/08/31js01.htm (accessed November 3, 2007). 58. B.G. Verghese, “It’s Time for Indus-II,” The Tribune, May 26, 2005.

Conclusion Learning from the Past to Address the Present and Influence the Future 1. Harold Saunders, The Other Walls (New Delhi: Affiliated East-West Press, 1992), pp. 158–163. 2. Special Correspondent, “No Dilution of Our Stand,” The Hindu, July 18, 2009. 3. Saunders, 1992, p. vi. 4. Sandeep Dikshit, “We Trust Pakistan But Verify Its Action, Say Manmohan,” The Hindu, July 30, 2009.

Annexure II 1. Came into force on June 30, 1965, by signature. 2. The Agreement was drawn up and signed simultaneously in two originals, one at New Delhi and the other at Karachi. The names of the plenipotentiaries who signed the Agreement at Karachi and some minor drafting discrepancies between the text signed at New Delhi, which is printed herein, and that signed at Karachi are shown on p. 264 of this volume (the UN Treaty Series). 3. United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 375, p. 119. 4. United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 362, p. 24.

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Khan, Ayub, Field Marshal Mohammad, Speeches and Statements, 1–4 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1961–67). Khan, Ayub, Field Marshal Mohammad, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (Oxford University Press, London, 1967). The Kutch Border Question (New Delhi: Indian Society of International Law, 1965). Nehru, Jawaharlal, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946– April 1961 (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1961). ———, Speeches 1953–57 (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1958). ———, Speeches: 1957–62 (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1964).

Interviews Bhutto, Benazir, Former Prime Minister of Pakistan. Cheema, Zafar Iqbal, Professor and Chairman, Department of Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. Dixit, J.N., Former Indian Foreign Secretary, Ambassador to Pakistan, and National Security Advisor. Kanwal, Gurmeet, Brigadier, Director, Centre for Land and Warfare Studies, New Delhi. Khan, Imran, Chief, Tehrik-e-Insaaf and Former Pakistani Test Cricketer. Masih, Lt. General A.B., UYSM, General Officer Commanding, 11 Infantry Division, 33 Core. Mehta, Jagat S., Former Indian Foreign Secretary. Mendis, Vernon L.B., Former Sri Lankan Diplomat and Director General, Bandarnaike International Diplomatic Training Institute, Colombo. Mirza, Sarfaraz Hussain, Director, Center for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. Parthasarthy, Gopalaswamy, Former Indian Ambassador to Pakistan. Saeed, Amera, Senior Researcher, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan. Sethi, Najam, Editor, The Friday Times, Pakistan. Singh, Devinder Brigadier, Indian Army Representative, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Singh, Shailendra Kumar, Former Indian Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to Pakistan. Soofi, Ahmer Bilal, Legal Expert, Attorneys, Solicitors & Advocates, Lahore, Pakistan.

Books and Chapters in Books Abbas, Hasan, Poleaxe or Politics of Eighth Amendment 1985–1997 (Lahore: Watandost, 1997).

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249

Appadorai, A., The Domestic Roots of India’s Foreign Policy 1947–72 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981). Axelord, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Book, 1984). Aziz, K.K., The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1994). Bains, J.S., India’s International Disputes: A Legal Study (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962). Bajpai, Kanti, Afsir Karim, and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publishers, 2001). Bhutto, Benazir, The Way Out (Karachi: Mahmood Publications, 1988). Bindra, S.S., India and Her Neighbours (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1984). Blinkenberg, Lars, India-Pakistan. The History of Unresolved Conflicts (Copenhagen and Arhus: Dansk Udenrigs-Politisk Institute, 1972). Burke, S.M., Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975). Burki, Shahid Javed and Craig Baxter (eds.), Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia-ul Haq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989). Chandra, Prakash, International Politics, Third revised edition (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1994). Chopra, Pran, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Tangle (New Delhi: Indus Publishers, 1994). Choudhary, G.W, Pakistan’s Relations with India, 1947–66 (London: Pall Mal Press, 1968). Darby, John and Roger MacGinty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Diehl, P. and G. Goertz, Territorial Changes and International Conflict (London: Routledge, 1992). Diehl, P.F., Gary Goertz, and Daniel Saeedi, “Theoretical Specifications of the Enduring Rivalry: Application to the India-Pakistan Case,” in T.V. Paul, India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Dixit, J.N. Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: Indo Pak Relations 1970–1994 (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1995). ———, India-Pakistan in War and Peace (New Delhi: Books Today, 2002). Druckman, Daniel, Human Factors in International Negotiations (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1973). Fisher, Roger and William Ury, Getting to Yes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981). Ganguly, Sumit, The Origins of War in South Asia, The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947 (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986). ———, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001). Gulhati, Niranjan D., Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediations (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1973).

250

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Gupta, Hari Ram, The Kutch Affair (Delhi: UC Kapur & Sons, 1969). Gupta, Sisir, India’s Relations with Pakistan 1954–57 (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1957). Haass, Richard N., Conflicts Unending (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990). Heimsath, Charles H. and Surjit Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971). Herman, C., C. Kegley and J. Rosenau (ed.), New Directions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy (Winchester: Allen and Unwin, 1987). Hussain, Ijaz, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Bombay: Progressive Publishers, 1988). Hussain, Mushahid and Akmal Hussain, Pakistan: Problems of Governance (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993). Jones, Owen Bennett, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002). Krepon, Michael and Amit Sevak (eds.), Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995). Krepon, Michael, Dominique M. McCoy and Matthew C. J. Rudolph, eds., A Handbook of Confidence Building Measures For Regional Security (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993). Kriesberg, Louis and S.J., Thorson (eds.), Timing and the Deescalation of International Conflicts (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991). Lamb, Christina, Waiting For Allah: Pakistan’s Struggle for Democracy (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1991). Lax, David A. and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain (New York: Free Press, 1986). McDonald, John W.S. and Diane B. Bendahmane (eds.), Conflicts Resolutions: Track Two Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Centre for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987). Mehta, Jagat S., Rescuing the Future: Coming to Terms with Bequeathed Misperceptions, unpublished manuscript (November 1996). Mishra, K.P. (ed.), Studies in Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1969). Musharraf, Pervez, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006). Nasr, Syyed Vali Reza, “National Identities and the India-Pakistan Conflict,” in T.V. Paul, India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Paul, T.V., India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Raghavan, V.R., Siachen: Conflict Without End (New Delhi: Viking Press, 2002). Raiffa, Howard, The Art and Science of Negotiations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, The Military & Politics in Pakistan 1947–86 (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1988).

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251

Sahni, Varun, “Preventing Another Kargil, Avoiding Another Siachen: Technical Monitoring of the Line of Control in Kashmir,” in Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim, and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publishers, 2001). Salik, Sadiq, State and Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan (Lahore: Zahid Bashir Printers, Lahore, 1997). Santhanam, K., Sudhir Saxena, Sreedhar and Manish, Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003). Saunders, H.H., The Other Walls, Arab-Israel Conflict in Global Perspective (New Delhi: Affiliated East-West Press, 1992). Saxena, Ajay, India & Pakistan: Their Foreign Policies (New Delhi: Annual Publications, 1987). Sebenius, James K. and David A. Lax, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gains (New York: Free Press, 1986). Shukla, S.P., India and Pakistan: The Origin of Armed Conflict (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1984). Stein, Janice Gross (ed.), Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Negotiation (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1989). Tinker, Hugh, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis (London: Praeger, 1962). Untawale, Mukund G., Cooperation Within Conflict: International Relations in South Asia, Ph.D. Dissertation (Berkeley: University of California, 1971). Varshney, Ashutosh, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (Yale: Yale University Press, 2002). Verma, S.N., Trends in India’s Foreign Policy 1954–57 (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1957). Wirsing, Robert G., Pakistan’s Security Under Zia 1977–88: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). Wriggins, W.H., Dynamics of Regional Politics (New Haven: Columbia University Press, 1992). Zartman, William, The 50% Solutions (New York: Anchor Books, 1976). ——— (ed.), The Negotiation Process: Theories and Application (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978). ———, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). ——— (ed.), Preventive Negotiations: Avoiding Conflict Escalation (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). ———, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” in John Darby and Roger MacGinty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). ———, Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2008). Zartman, William and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982).

252

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Ziring, L., The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958–59 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971).

Articles Afzal, Mohammad Mujeeb, “Siachen,” The News, April 12, 1995. Ahmed, Khaled, “Musharraf’s ‘Seven-Regions’ Options in Kashmir,” November 30, 2004, at http://www.thefridaytimes.com/page8.shtml/. Ahmed, Munir, “Construction Allowed with Some Ifs,” Frontier Post, November 5, 1991. Ahmed, Naseem, “Living High and Dry on Siachen,” The News, June 14, 1991. Ahmed, Samina and Varun Sahni, “Freezing the Fighting: Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier,” Cooperative Monitoring Center, Occasional Papers, Albuquerque, March 1998, pp. 8–33. Akhlaque, Qudssia, “No Headway on Sir Creek,” Dawn, at http://www. dawn.com/2005/05/30/top4.htm/. Alam, Aroosa, “Siachen Likely to Be Demilitarized,” The Muslim, December 7, 1993. ———, “Wullar Barrage Talks Make No Headway,” The Muslim, October 13, 1991. Aneja, Atul, “Talks on Sir Creek Today,” The Hindu, November 8, 1998. Asghar, Mohammad, “Kasab Confessed of His Own Free Will: Document,” Dawn, June 18, 2009. Ayaz Amir, “Republic Terrorised by Fools,” Dawn, at http://www.dawn. com/weekly/ayaz/20040604.htm/. Baabar, Mariana, “No Progress in the Sixth Round of Talks on Siachen,” The News, November 12, 1992. Bains, J.S., “The Diversion of International Rivers,” Indian Journal of International Law, 1, 1 ( July 1960). Baruah, Amit, “India Proposes a Dozen Steps to Break the Ice with Pak,” The Hindu. October 23, 2003. ———, “India, Pakistan to Find a ‘Final’ Solution to J&K,” The Hindu, June 29, 2004. Bedi, Rahul, “Icy Relations,” Himal, 11, 12 (November 7, 1998), p. 19. Bennett, D. Scott, “Measuring Rivalry Termination, 1819–1992,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41, 2 (April 1997), pp. 227–254. Biringer, Kent, “Peace Dividend: Siachen Science Club,” Himal, 11, 2 (December 1998), pp. 28–31. Black, Eugene P., “The Indus Project: Background of the Indian, Pakistan Agreement,” The New York Times, December 11, 1960. Chacko, C.J., “Rann of Kutch and International Law,” Indian Journal of International Law, 5 (1965), pp. 147–175. Chaudhury, Rahul Roy, “Trends in Delimitation of India’s Maritime Boundaries,” Strategic Analysis, 22, 10 ( January 1999), pp. 1513–1524.

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Chibber, M.L., “Siachen—The Untold Story,” Indian Defence Review ( January 1990), pp. 89–95. ———, “Solving Siachen,” Editorial, Times of India, June 14, 1989. ———, “Siachen Solution Will Help India, Pak,” Times of India, June 13, 1989. Cloughley, Brian, “India Pakistan and the Siachen Glacier,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (November 14, 1987), p. 1121. Defence Minister George Fernandez’s Statement in the Lok Sabha on July 31, 2001 at www. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/104948. cms/. Diehl, P.F., and G. Goertz, “The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks,” Paper presented at the workshop on Process of Enduring Rivalries, May 1–2, Centre for the Study of International Relations, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1993. Dikshit, Sandeep, “India. Pakistan Agree to Continue Talks on Siachen’, The Hindu, August 7, 2004, at http://thehindu.com/2004/08/07/stories/ 2004080706190100.htm/. ———, “We Trust Pakistan but Verify Its Action, Say Manmohan,” The Hindu, July 30, 2009. Editorial, “Waters of Peace,” Statesman, March 3, 1960 Forbes, Vivian Lewis, “Pakistan’s Claim to Maritime Space,” Indian Ocean Review, 10, 3 (December 1997), pp. 7–10. Geller, Daniel S., “Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads,” International Studies Quarterly, 37 ( June 1993), pp. 173–193. Gilani, Iftikhar, “India Considering Siachen Proposal,” at http://www. dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page_2007%5CO1%5C18%5Cstory_1 8–1-2007_pg7_1_/. Goertz, G., “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies Quarterly, 37 ( June 1993), pp. 147–171. Goertz, G. and P.F., Diehl, “The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries,” International Studies Quarterly, 8 ( June 1993), pp. 151–163. Gupta, Sisir, “The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960,” Foreign Affairs Reports, 9 (December 1960), pp. 153–164. ———, “The Nehru-Ayub Meeting,” Foreign Affairs Reports, 9 (October 1960), pp. 122–132. Hussain, Fahd, “Kashmir Troops Cut to Boost Peace, Musharraf Tells Bush,” at http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2006-daily/15–09–2005/ main/ main4.htm/. Hussain, Ijaz, “Pakistan and the Wullar Barrage Project,” Regional Studies, 6, 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 47–62. “India Data Sheets,” South Asia Terrorism Portal at http://www.satp.org/ satporgtp/countries/india/database/index.html/. Interview with Benazir Bhutto, “Nawaz Not Sharif,” The Times of India, December 17, 1998.

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Interview with Imran Khan, “No More Maiden Over,” The Times of India, December 22, 1998. Interview with Najam Sethi, “From Lahore, With Love,” The Times of India, February 22, 1999. Iqbal, Anwar, “Dialogue on Wullar Begins Today as Sir Creek Talks Put Off,” The News, October 17, 1991. Javed, Tufail, “The World Bank and the Indus Basin Dispute: Mediations by World Bank-II,” Pakistan Horizon, 19 (1966), pp. 34–44. Jilani, Anees, “Deadlock Over Wullar Barrage,” The News, December 1, 1998. Kapadia, Harish, “High Stakes,” Himal, 11, 12 (December1998), pp. 22–27. Katyal, K.K., “U.S. Forced Pak. to the Table,” The Hindu, November 9, 1998. Kemkar, Neal A., “Environmental Peacemaking: Ending Conflict between India and Pakistan on the Siachen Glacier through the Creation of a Transboundary Peace Park,” Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 25, 1 (2005). pp. 1–56 Khan, Ayaz Ahmed, “Siachen: the Gateway to Hell for the Indian Army,” The Muslim, July 3, 1995. Khan, Iftikhar A. “Sir Creek Differences Remain,” Dawn, at http://www. dawn.com/2007/05/19/ top13.htm/. Khosla, A.N., “Development of the Indus River System: An Engineering Approach,” India Quarterly, 14 (1958), pp. 233–252. Kiani, Khaleeq, “Wullar Talks End Without Any Accord: Pledge to Continue Progress,” Dawn, July 31, 2004 at http:www.dawn.com/2004/ 07/31/top8.htm Kotwal, Amit, 2007, “Let LOC be Line of Peace,” The Times of India, July 16, 2007. “Kutch Ceasefire Agreement with Pakistan Approved by Parliament,” Asian Recorder, 11, 37 (September 10–16, 1965). Laskar, Rasul H., “Pakistan Scrambles Fighter Jets Over Major Cities,” Hindustan Times, December 23, 2008. Matinuddin, Kamal, “Breaking the Ice on Siachen,” The News, November 11, 1998. Menon, K.R., Admiral, “Maritime Conflict Resolution and ConfidenceBuilding in South Asia,” Indian Defence Review (October–December 1995). Mirza, Mohammed Nasarollah, “Wullar Barrage: Device to Throttle Pakistan,” The Nation, 4 January 1991. Misra, Ashutosh, “The Problem of Kashmir and the Problem in Kashmir,” Strategic Analysis, 29, 1 ( January–March 2005), pp. 16–43. Naqqash, Tariq and Sayyed Irfan Raza, “Operations against LeT—Dawa Launched in AJK,” Dawn at http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/08/top3. htm/. Naqvi, Jawed, “Musharraf’s Four-Stage Kashmir Peace Plan: We Can Make Borders Irrelevant: India,” at http://www.dawn.com/2006/12/06/ top1.htm.

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———, “Mirwaiz Asks India to Consider Musharraf’s Proposals,” at http:// www.dawn.com/2007/02/02/top3.htm/. ———, “New Measures to Boost Pakistan, India Trade,” Dawn at http:// www.dawn.com/2005/08/11/top1.htm/. ———, “Pakistan, India Eye $ 10 bn Trade,” Dawn at http://www.dawn. com/2007/08/02/top3.htm/. ———, “Sir Creek talks End Without Progress,” Dawn, at http://www.dawn. com/2004/08/08/top7.htm/. Nasarullah, Mirza M., “Wular Barrage,” Pakistan Horizon, 47, 1 ( January 4, 1994), pp. 47–66. Pandit, Rajat, “India, Pak Skirt Kashmir, Build Confidence,” The Times of India, June 28, 2004. Putnam, Robert, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel Games,” International Organization, 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427–460. Qudssia, Akhlaque, “Terror Dossier Given to India,” Dawn at http://www. dawn.com/2007/ 03/07/top2.htm/. Reddy, B. Muralidhar, “Time to Look for New Options: Mirwaiz,” The Hindu at http://www.hindu.com/2005/06/13/stories/2005061312161200. htm/. ———, “Pakistan Accepts Many CBMS, Attaches Riders to Others,” The Hindu. October 30, 2003. ———, “We Have Left Aside the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: Musharraf,” The Hindu. December 19, 2003. ———, “India, Pakistan Sign Accord on Pre-notification of Missile Tests,” The Hindu, October 4, 2005. Rushbrook, Williams, L.F. “Significance of the Indus Waters Treaty,” Asian Review, 57 (1961), pp. 184–189. Sarya, Chaudhary Muhammad Anwar Ali, “Wullar Barrage’,” The Nation, November 17, 1989. Siddiqi, Kamal and Amit Baruah, “Our Citizens Did It, Pak Finally Admits,” The Hindustan Times, February 13, 2009. ———, “Pak Ducks and Weaves,” Hindustan Times, February 10, 2009. Siddiqui, A.R., “Siachen: The Glacier Won’t Move,” Dawn, June 30, 1986. “Singh Reiterates ‘Tough Stance’: Pak-India Talks at Secretaries’ Level Planned,” Dawn, June 17, 2009. Singh, Jasjit, “Siachen Glaciers: Facts and Fiction,” Strategic Analysis, 12, 8 (October 1989), pp. 697–708. Singh, Onkar, 2004. “Muzaffarabad Bus Service Deadlocked,” at http:// www.in.rediff.com/news/2004 /dec/08bus.htm/. Soofi, Ahmer Bilal, “Legal Purview: Wullar Barrage, Siachen and Sir Creek,” South Asian Journal, 7 ( January–March 2005), pp. 91–99. Special Correspondent, “No Dilution of Our Stand,” The Hindu, July 18, 2009. ———, “No Redrawing of Boundaries: Manmohan,” The Hindu, December 22, 2004.

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Special Correspondent, “Siachen: No Breakthrough,” The Hindu, May 25, 2006 at http://thehindu.com/2006/05/25/stories/2006052515280100.htm/. Staff Correspondent, “Negotiations with India over Wullar Barrage Opposed,” Dawn, November 17, 1991. ———, “India Approves Linking to the Siachen Glacier,” Muslim, September 8, 1988. ———, “India, Pak. to Continue Talks on Tulbul Project,” The Hindu, November 6, 1998. ———, “India-Pakistan Talks: Sir Creek,” The Hindu, November 7, 1998. ———, “Need to Make Allies Abroad Vital for Kashmir and Water Resources,” Dawn, August 26, 1957. ———, “Siachen’s Future Depends on Pak-India Talks,” The Nation, December 6, 1993. ———, “Wular Barrage Not to be Shelved,” The Hindu, October 29, 1987. Staff Reporter, “Linking Siachen to Kashmir,” The Nation, November 8, 1998. ———, “Opposition Divided over LOC Bus Service: Major Difference between ARD, MMA,” Dawn at http://www.dawn.com/2005/02/18/ top2.htm/. ———, “Pak.-India Talks Stumble at First Hurdle,” Frontier Post, November 6, 1998. ———, “Pakistan, India Exchange Sir Creek Maps,” Dawn, at http://www. dawn.com/2007/05/18/top5.htm/. ———, “Talks on Wullar Barrage to Continue,” Dawn, June 30, 2005 at http:// www.dawn.com/2005/06/30/top6.htm/. Subramanian , Nirupama, “Help Track Down Samjahuta Suspect,” The Hindu, March 7, 2007. ———, “No Tangible Progress in Siachen Talks,” The Hindu, April 8, 2007 at http://www.thehindu.com/2007/04/08/stories/2007040816820800.htm/. Swami, Praveen, “Musharraf’s Offer Nearer to New Delhi’s Bottom Line,” The Hindu, December 6, 2006, at http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/06/ stories/2006120604650100.htm/. Thapaliyal, Sheru, “Siachen,” Indian Defence Review, 21, 1 ( January–March 2006) pp. 44–48. Thompson, William R., “Principal Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39, 2 ( June 1995), pp. 195–223. Umer, Farooq, “Pakistan Ready to Discuss Withdrawal from Siachen,” The Nation, February 3, 1997. United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 362, p. 24. United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 375, p. 119. Varadarajan, Siddharth, “No Sell-Out at Sharm-el-Sheikh: Pakistan Forced to Admit Terror Link,” The Hindu, July 18, 2009. ———, “We Must Keep the Line Open, Says Manmohan,” The Hindu, June 18, 2009.

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Verghese, B.G., “It’s Time for Indus-II,” The Tribune, May 26, 2005. Verma, K.J.M., “Mark an Area, Disarm it, Decide on Freedom or Joint Control,” Indian Express, October 26, 2004. Vohra, Ravi, “The Sir Creek Affair: Can We Accelerate the Resolution?” Maritime Affairs, 2, 1 (2006), pp. 1–15. Weintraub, Richard M., “Pakistan and India take Steps to Defuse Long Confrontation Over Siachen Glacier,” Washington Post, June 20, 1989. Wirsing, Robert G., “The Siachen Glacier Dispute: Can Diplomacy Untangle It?” Indian Defence Review ( July 1991), pp. 95–107. ———, “The Siachen Glacier-I: The Territorial Dimension,” Strategic Studies, 10, 1 (Autumn 1986), pp. 49–66.

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INDEX

Afghanistan 3–5, 147, India’s engagement 13, Soviet troops 36, 121 Afridi, Jamil-ur Rehman 149 Afzal, Muhammad Mujeeb 131 AGPL 12, 22, 39, 40, 107, 124–5, 130, 132, 135, 188, 192, 226 Agra Summit 22, 29, 37, 66, 123, 148, 187, 198 Ahmed, Aziz 64 Ahsraf, Fahmida xiv Ahuja, Lieutenant General A.K. 144 Akhtar, Rear Admiral M. Jameel 144 Al-Badr 43 Ali, Amjad 65 Ali, Chaudhary Muhammad 70 Ali, Mumtaz xiii All Party Hurriyat Conference, APHC 42, 53 Amir, Ayaz 49 Arrowsmith, John 99 Australia 65, 66, 75 Azhar, Masood 46 Baghliar Dam 36, 157–8, dispute 79, 136, 157, 163, 174, 184, 196, 240 Baramula 42, 159, 169, Baltistan 41, 110, 117 Beas 30, 58, 63, 64, 65, 67, 159, 182, 202 Bebler, Ales 94 Beg, Mirza Aslam 116 Bengston, L. 63 Berlin Wall 3 Berman, Maureen 24, 27, 73, 225 Bhakra Nangal Project 61

Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP 5, 37, 47, 124–5, 129 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 88, 98 Bhutto, Benazir v, ix, xiii, xvi, xxi, 3, 28, 118–20, 128–30, 132, 150, 166, 173–4, 176, 193–4, 196, 198 Biar Bet 85, 87 Biringer, Kent L. 128, 238 Black, Eugene 60, 63, 65, 72 Bogra, Mohammad Ali 70 Border Security Force, BSF xv, 48, 84 boundary disputes border 34, on the East Pakistan-India and West Pakistan-India borders 95, 102 BRB Link Canal 163 Burnes, Alexander 99 Bus service (India-Pakistan) 23, 52, 54, bus trip to Lahore 36, 124, Delhi-Lahore 38, SrinagarMuzaffarabad 40, 52, 53, Kargil-Skardu, Mendhar-Mirpur, Poonch-Sialkot and Amritsar and Nankana Sahib 53 Cama Hospital 39 Camp David Accord 23 Carlyle, Thomas 28 Cease Fire Line (CFL) 31, 110, 189 Cease-fire Agreement 126 Cease-fire Line, CFL 31, 110, 189 CENTO 3, 97, 107 Central Bureau of Investigation, CBI 43 Central Reserve Police Force, CRPF 84

260

Index

Centre for South Asian Studies xiv Chadha, Major General S.M. 143 Chatterji, Gauri 171 Chattrapati Shivaji terminus 39 Chaudhry, Ahsan-ul Haq 148 Cheema, Zafar Iqbal xiii Chenab 30, 36, 58, 64, 65, 66, 68, 78, 159, 163, 182, 202, 206 Chhad Bet 85, 87 Chibber, Gen. M.L. 111, 115–17 China 3, 6, 13, 35, 49, 50, 64, 68, 91, 96, 101, 111, 114, ceding of Kashmir territory 117, 185–6 Chopra, Suneet 131 Chundrigar, Ibrahim Ismail 70 Cohen, Stephen xv Cold War 3, 9, 121 Commissioner of Sind 145, 152 Composite Dialogue Process, CDP 1–3, 5–6, 8, 22, 27, 32, 35–6, 39, 45, 48, 55, 79, 122–3, 129, 144, 147–50, 153, 169, 173, 181, 187–8, 199–200 Confidence Building Measures, CBMs 1–3, 21–3, 49–51, 52, 122, 131, 192, nuclear 35, 41, 48, J&K related 41 Conflict dyad, rival dyad 6, 11, 13, 15, 181, India-Pakistan 6, 11, 29, 107, dyadic conflicts, rivalries 6, 7, 9, 10, 190, 223 Conflict Resolution 1, 6, 9, 18, 20, 23, 35, 36, 55, 57, 74, 90, 128, 133, 150, 152, 172, 187, 194 Connors, J. 63 Cross-LoC trade 53, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Suchetgarh-Sialkot route 53 Dayal, Nareshwar 143 Defence Secretaries 118, 122, 124, 125 Delimitation 120, 144–6 Demilitarized zone 191 Diehl 10–11 Dixit, Jyotindra Nath (also J.N.) xiv, xvii, xxi, 115, 127, 135, 151, 165, 172, 224, 225, 235, 236, 239, 242, 248, 249

Dreshak, Sardar Nasurallah 166 Duggal, V.K. 170 Dukhtaran-e-Millat, DeM 43 Dutt, Shekhar 125 Enduring Rivalry 1, 2, 6–33 Entezam, Nasarollah 94–5 Equidistant 144, 146, 153 Equitable 59, 61, 70, 78, 144, 153 Faiz, Rear Admiral Tanveer 149 Farooq, Mirwaiz Umer 42, 54 Fernandez, George 37, 226, 253 Ferozpur headworks 162 Foreign Secretaries talks 125 Gandhi, Indira 28, 104, 109, 188 Gandhi, Mahatma 28 Gandhi, Rajiv 28, 118–21, 128, 133, 150, 193, 198 Ganguly, Sumit 14 Geller, Daniel S. 10 General Assembly, U.N. 62–3, 94 General Headquarters, GHQ 3, 121, 126 Gilani, Yusaf Raza 188, 198–9, in Sharm-el-Shaikh 47, 191 Girgaum Chaupati 39 Gochman, C 11–12, 223 Goertz, Gary 10–11 Government of India, GOI 64, 152 Government of Bombay (GOB) 91 Great Britain 4, influence on India-Pakistan relations 81, 87, 93, 95, 186–7, and IWT 67, 73, 75, and 1965 war and Kutch dispute 101, 105 Green Line 91, 145–6 Griffith Asia Institute xii, xvi Guinness, Sir K. 63 Gujarat 31, 32, 81, 82, 84, 90, Gujarat West Pakistan Border 94, 219, 226, Rann 139, basin 147 Gujral, Inder Kumar 1, 4, 22, 35, 122, 129, 132, 151, 197, Gujral doctrine 3, 36

Index Gulhati, N.D. (Niranjan Das) 63, 64, 67, 70, 76, 79, 182, 230 Haass, Richard 19–20 Halifax Track Two Group 152–3 Hamid, Abdul Muhammad 72 Haq, Zia-ul 52, 118, 119, 128, 150, 164, 165, 172, 173, 194, with Rajiv Gandhi 128, 150, 193 Harkat-ul Ansar, Jamiat-ul Ansar 43 Harkat-ul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) of Bangladesh 46 Hasan, Z. 170 Havana Declaration 45 Havana, Cuba, NAM Summit 5, 22, 39, 44–5, 191 Henry L. Stimson Centre xv Hizb-ul Mujahideen, HuM 39 Hotel Oberoi Trident 39 Hotel Taj Mahal Palace 39 Hussain, Arshad 89 Hussain, Azim 89 Hussain, Nazir xiii Hussain, Syed Shahid 170 Hydroelectric 68, 69, 162, 164, 203 Hydrographer 29, 147, 149, 154 IC 814, hijack 22, 39, 107, 148, hijacking 123 Ijaz, Ahmed xiv Iliff, W.A.B. 62, 66, 75, 218 Incompatibility 150 India-China war 96 Indian Parliament 78, 90, 93, 101, 186, 192 Indian Parliament attack 5, 12, 22, 37, 39, 43, 53, 107, 124, 148, 188 India-Pakistan Joint Study Group ( JSG) 50, 51 India-Pakistan Nuclear CBM 2, 40, 50 India-Pakistan opening of five meeting points across the LoC 23, 51–2 India-Pakistan Pre-Notification of ballistic missile flights, testing 49

261

India-Pakistan war 1965 86, 87 India-Pakistan Western Border Conference 100 Indo-China War 96, 101, 185 Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal 4, 13 Indus projects, India, Salal, Baghliar, Kishenganga, Nimo Bazgo, and Uri-II 157 Indus Waters Commissioner 176 Indus Water Treaty, IWT 57, 135–6, 157, 159, 163, 172, 174, 176, 177 Institute of Regional Studies (IRS) xiv, xv Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, IDSA vi, xvi Institute of Strategic Studies xiv International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 60 International Border, IB 22, 39, 41, 226 International Court of Justice, ICJ 60, 61, 71, 165, 166, 167–8 Irredentist 4, 14, 107 Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI 3, 43, 46 Jammu and Kashmir, J&K 2, 16–17, 20, 32–3, 35–6, 37, 39–43, 53, 55, 58, 66, 79, 87, 90–1, 93, 95, 99, 101, 109–10, 114, 116–18, 123, 148, 152, 158, 169, 179–80, 184, 187, 189, 192–4 195 Jaish-e-Muhammad, JeM 5, 39, 43 Jamaat-e-Islami, JI 53 Jamait-ul-Mujahideen, JuM 43 Jamali, Zafarullah Khan 5, 22 James, Sir Morrice 86–7 Jamaat-ul Dawa, JuD 39, 47, 55 Jammu Kashmir Islamic Front, JKIF 43 Jawaharlal Nehru University, JNU xii, xiv Jhelum 30, 32, 58, 61, 67, 78, 158, 159, 161–5, 167–8, 171, 173–4, 174, 177, 179, 194–5, 202, 206

262

Index

Jhelum Main 165–6, 168, 177, 202 Jilani, Jalil Abbas 170 Jilani, Salim 143 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 28 Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, JKLF 3, 16 Johnson, Lyndon 86 Joint Anti-terrorism Institutional Mechanism 39, 44, 45, 191 Joint Boundary Commission 91, 99 Joint Communiqué 83, 95, 102, 120, 221, 234 Joint Statements (India-Pakistan) 40, 47, 122, 125, 170, 171, 188–9 Jones, D.M. 11 Junejo, Muhammad Khan 165 Kanjarkot 86, 87 Kanwal, Gurmeet xiv Karachi 39, 66, 72, 76, 92, 167, 182, 183, 185, 217 Karakoram Pass 41, 111, 117–18, 122, Range 98, Highway 114 Kargil Review Committee report 116 Kargil War 4, 12, 16, 22, 32, 37–8, 41, 107, 116, 127, 130, 135, 136, 148, 187, 197, infiltration bid 124, Batalik, Drass, and Mushkoh sectors 128, 1987, plan by Aslam Beg to capture Kargil 116, Chumik Glacier, Pakistani Offensive in 1989 leading to Kargil 127 Kargil-Skardu bus service 53 Kasab, Ajmal Amir 46 Kashmir 1–3, 6, 8, 14, 16, 21, 25, 32, 35, 36, 38, 40–3, 49, 53–5, 58, 61–2, 66–8, 69, 71, 79, 87, 89–100, 115–17, 122, 127–31, 136–7, 150, 163, 166, 177, 183–4, 186–7, 189–91, 193–200 Kashmir proposals (Musharraf’s) 40–1 Kathmandu 22, 38 Katju, Vivek 147 Khan, Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmed 131

Khan, Ayub 64, 67, 69–70, 77, 84, 86–8, 95, 96, 98, 99, 102–4, 182–4, 185, 198, 201, 217 Khan, Ghulam Ishaq 167 Khan, Humayun 120 Khan, Imran 248, 254 Khan, Liaquat Ali 59 Khan, Lt. Col. Ifthikar Ali 122, 126 Khan, Musa 76 Khan, Sahibzada Yakub 117 Khan, Shaharyar 151 Kharif 59, 162 Khosla, A.N. 72 Khosla, Inder Pal 143 Khuddam-ul-Islam 39 Kishenganga 36, 157, 167 Kissinger, Henry 23 Krepon, Michael xv Kriesberg, Louis 24, 73, 225 Kumar, Ajit 122, 127, 130 Kumar, Col. N. 112 Kumar, Girish 148 Kutch (Rann of ) Agreement of 1965 18, 31–2, 97 Kutch-Sind Boundary 82–3, 85, 90, 184, 221 Kutch-Sind Boundary dispute 90–1, 102, 100–1, 184, 221 Ladakh 41, 58, 110, 114, 116, 127 Laffite, Raymond 36, 157 Lagergren, Gunnar Karl Andreas 94 Lahore 28, 36, 38–40, Delhi train service 53, 58, 96, 102, 123, 129, 162, Declaration 28, 187, 198–9 Lahore Declaration 28, 36, 187, 198, 199 Lashkar-e-Toiba, LeT 6, 39, 42–3 Leghari, Farooq 167, 175 Leopold Café 39 Letter of Accession 108, 110 Lilienthal, David E. 60, 71, 72, 75, 182, 230, 232 Line of Control, LoC 12, 22, 31, 37, 39, 40–2, 44, 50, 52, 54, 107, 100–1, 116–17, 121–2, 124, 188–9

Index Lodge, Henry Cabot 86, 111 Lok Sabha 86, 89, 93, 97, 100, 104 Look East Policy, India’s 4 Lorber, Irwin 66 Lumsden, J.G. 99 Maharao of Kutch 82, 145–6, 152 Mahmood, Ashfaq 170 Malaviya Centre for Peace Research xv Male, Maldives, Indo-Pak talks 1, 22, 35, 122 Malhotra, J.K. 72 Malhotra, Subhash Chandra xv Maoz, Z. 11–12, 223 Marriott Hotel, Islamabad xiii Maritime zones 32, 142, 147, 154, 193 Markov chain analysis 10 Massih, A.B. xiv McConaughty, Walter 86 Median 144, 146, 152 Mehta, Jagat S. 75, 76 Mendhar 52 Mendhar-Mirpur bus services 53 Mendis, Vernon L.B. 248 Menon, Shiv Shankar 47 Military coup 4, 37, 107, 123, 148, 181 Ministry of Defence, Pakistan 149 Ministry of External Affairs 46, 89, 101, 143, 147 Ministry of Water and Power, Pakistan 167, 169, 170 Ministry of Water Resources, India 170 Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, MRD 119, 128 Mukherjee, Pranab 124 Mueenuddin, G. 63, 67 Mumbai Attack 2008 6, 12, 48 Musharraf, Gen. Pervez 5, 22, 23, 28, 29, 45, 54, and Kargil War 37, 112, and Agra talks 38–40, Kashmir proposals 41–4 Muzaffarabad 38, 40, 53–4

263

Nag, Prithvish (Surveyor General) 148 Narain, Jai Prakash 104 Narayan, J Hari 170–1 Nariman House 39 Nasarullah, Mirza M. 163 Nasr, Vali 14 National Democratic Alliance, NDA 5, 37, 124 Nazimuddin, Khwaja 70, 72 Neelam dam, hydropower project 36, 168, 174 Nehru Memorial Museum and Library xv Nehru, Jawaharlal 63–4, 66, 70–2, 77–8, 83, 87, 93, 95–7, 99, 100–3, 105, 119, 182–3, 185, 198, 201, 217 New Delhi 63, 65–6, 72, 77, 83, 86–90, 91, 95, 101–2, 105, 111, 116, 118–22, 124, 127–8, 134–5, 143–4, 147–50, 151, 162, 165, 167–8, 169–70, 183, 186, 190 New York 22, 121 non-consumptive use of water 30, 159, 161, 170, 194, mentioned in IWT 203, 204, 206 Non-paper 143, 239 Noon, Feroze Khan 64, 70 Noorani, A.G. 115–16, 140, 162, 164 Northern Areas 37, 41, 110, 112, 117–18 Operation Ababeel 111 Operation Brasstacks 3, 12, 16, 22, 150 Operation Meghdoot (Siachen) 111, 112 Operation Parakram 12, 37 Operation Vijay 37 Pakistani Foreign Office 85–7 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, PML-N 53, 130 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, POK 16, 21, 32, 34, 37, 39, 41–2, 46, 53–5, 61, 63, 79, 89, 126, 159, 162, 177–8, 180, 191

264

Index

Pakistan Peoples Party, PPP 163 Parthasarthy, Gopalaswamy 115, 128 Patil, S.K. 63 peace studies 6 Permanent Commission of the Indus Waters PCIW 157, 164, 165, permanent Indus Commission 67, 79, 163, 203, 208 Piracha, Haq, Ehshanul ix, xiii, xxvi Point NJ 9842 12, 121 Press Trust of India, PTI xv Pulmonary Edema 108 Qaid-e-Azam University xiii Qureshi, Muhammad Ismail 171 Raghavan, Gen. V.R. 110, 250 Rahim, Abdul 167 Rajagopalachari, C. 104 Rajya Sabha 89, 97 Rao, B.R. 148 Rao, Major General. M. Gopal 148 Rao, Narasimha 132 Rasool, Kamran 124 Ravi 30, 39, 58, 62, 145, 159, 182, 202, 204, 206, 208 Rawalpindi 3, 85, 86, 95, 119–20, 126, 143, ministerial level conference 85, 102, 186, discuss Sir Creek 148–9 Rennel, James 98 Resolution of border disputes (West Pakistan-India) Chak Ladheke, Theh Sarja Marja, Husainiwala, and Suleimanki headworks 95, 102 Ripeness, theory of 7, 17–21, 68, 71, 91, 94, 103, 125, 130, 149–51, 172, 174, 181–2, 185, 193, 198–200 Rizvi, Hasan Askari 98, 104 Russia 4, 6, 37, 49 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC 22, 51, Male Summit 35, 122, Islamabad Summit 39, 225 Sadat, Anwar 2, 190

Sada-e-Sarhad 38 Saeed, Amera xiv Saeed, Hafiz Muhammad 6, 43, 46–7, 55 South Asian Free Trade Area, SAFTA 51 Salahuddin, Syed 54 Saleem, Khalid 143 Saltoro Ridge 108, 111, 113, 115, 117, 120, 122, 130 Samyukta Socialist Party 89 Saunders, Harold 23, 223 Scott, P.A. 89 South East Asian Treaty Organization, SEATO 3, 96, 105 September 11 4 Sethi, Najam xii Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO, Summit, Yekaterinburg 6, 46 Sharif, Nawaz 3, 4, 22, 28, 36, 122, 123, 129, 132, 167, 168, 173, 194, 197, 198 Sharm-el Sheikh, Egypt 6, 47, 188, 191 Shastri, Lal Bahadur 86–8, 93, 96–7, 100–1, 104–5, 181–4, 198, 234–5, 243 Shaukat Khannum cancer Hospital ix, xiii, xxii Sheikh-Swaran meeting 102–5, 183 Sheikh, Zein 167 Sheikh, K.M. 83, 85, 92, 95, 103 Shuttle diplomacy 23 Shyock River 116 Sia Kangri (Sia Chen) 117, 121 Siachen 2, 7–9, 12, 18, 28, 30–1, 35, 38–40, 50, 107–137, 149–50, 154, 174, 181, 188–96, 199, Indian military bases—Kumar, Bila Top, Pahalwan, Indira Col 108, Pakistani military base—Conway Saddle 108, passes Bilafond la and Sia La 111, disengagement, redeployment, or demilitarization 119–22, 124, 130, 132, 136, 137 Simla accord, agreement 1, 35, 110, 114, 117, 118, 147, 166, 173, 194, 197, 198

Index Singer, J.D. 12, 223 Singh, Hari, King of Kashmir 108 Singh, Manmohan 5, 22, 41, 124, 129, 132, 188, 193, 197–8, boundaries not to be redrawn 39, 227, on borderless approach in Kashmir 42, in Havana 45, 191, in Yekaterinberg 47, in Sharm-elShaikh 47, 191 Singh, Natwar 50, 53 Singh, S.K. 120 Singh, Shailendra Kumar 248 Singh, Swaran 83–5, 93, 95, 100, 102–4, 187 Sir Creek 2, 7–9, 18, 30, 31, 32, 35, 40–1, 91–2, 117, 136, 139–40, 142–54, 181, 193–6, 199, Point K 143 Skardu 53 Small, M. 12, 223 Sopore 159, 170 South Asia 3–4, 13, 22, 36–7, 49–51, 113, 117, 122, 141, 170 Soviet Union 6 Srinagar 31, 32, 41, 54, 159, 177, peace initiative by Vajpayee 37, Muzaffarabad bus service 38, 40, 52, 53, Manmohan Singh in Srinagar 41, inundation of Srinagar valley 177, 195 Srinagar-Leh highway 116 Srinivasan, Rear Admiral K.R. 147 Stein, Janice Gross 24 Suhrawardy, Husain 62, 63, 70 Surveyor General 83, 143–5, 148, 154 Sutlej 30, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 159, 182, 202, 204, 206, 208 Swatantra Party 105 Syed, Major General Anis Ali 143 Taliban 4, 6, 47, 130, 148, Talibanization 36 TALOS, Technical Aspects of Law of Sea 146 Tashkent Accord 110 Tattapani 52 Tehrik-e-Insaaf ix, xxii

265

Tennessee Valley Authority, TVA 60 Terrorist attacks in India 2003–2008 44–5 Terrorist camps 37, 39 Thant, U 94 Third pole 108 Thompson, William R. 13, 223 Train service (India-Pakistan) 22, Kokhrapar-Munabao 53 Tribunal Award (Kutch) of 1968 8, 31, 93, 88, 136, 153, 181, 184, 188, 199 Tulbul Navigation Project 8, 30, 32–3, Triple Canal Project, Pakistan (Upper Jhelum, the Upper Chenab, and the Lower Bari Doab Canals) 159 Turtuk 114 United Nations, UN 18, 53, 64, 134, 146, 209 UN Charter 109 UN Security Council Resolution, UNSCR 109 UN resolutions on Kashmir 2, 54, 110, Musharraf to set aside 38, 42 UN Commission on India and Pakistan, UNCIP 109 UN Convention on the Laws of Sea, UNCLOS 34, 142–3, 151, 193, United Jihad Council, UJC 54 United Progressive Alliance, UPA 5, 124 United States 3–4, 13, 49, 64, 87, 138, influence on India-Pakistan relations 37, 46, 65, 68, 92, 94, 186, and IWT 66, 74, 75, and 1965 war and Kutch dispute 85, 101, 102, 105, military assistance to Pakistan 96, and Kargil War 123 UN, Treaty Series 222, 243, 247, 256 University of the Punjab xiv Untawale, Mukund 91 Urdu press 98 Uri 52

266

Index

Vajpayee, Atal Behari 5, 47, 151, 173, 197, at Agra Summit 22, 22, 29, 125, 129, 148, 188, bus trip to Lahore 36, 123, 198, April 2003 speech in Srinagar 37, Islamabad SAARC Summit 38 Verghese, B.G. 80, 178, 196, 233, 243, 256 Verinag, Jhelum starts from 163 Vohra, Admiral Ravi 145, 153 War on Terror, WoT 5, 124, 148 Wayman, F.W. enduring rivalry 11, 223 West Pakistan-India Border Ground Rules 96, 99, 100 Wheeler, Raymond 73

Wirsing, Robert G. 112 World Bank 30, 31, 36, 57, 60–3, 65–6, 68, 69, 71–6, 157–8, 179, 182, 183 Wular Barrage 8, 31, 32–3, 51, 151, 157–80 Zarb-e-Momin 16 Zardari House xiii Zardari, Asif Ali 46, 198 Zartman, William 19–20, 23–5, 26, 75 Zero-sum, non-zero-sum 27, 126, 177, 196–7 Zone of Complete Disengagement, ZOD 122, 133