Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative: A Literary and Theological Analysis (JSOT Supplement Series)

JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT SUPPLEMENT SERIES 335 Editors David J.A. Clines Philip R. Davies Executive...

Author: James K. Bruckner

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JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT SUPPLEMENT SERIES

335

Editors David J.A. Clines Philip R. Davies Executive Editor Andrew Mein Editorial Board Richard J. Coggins, Alan Cooper, J. Cheryl Exum, John Goldingay, Robert P. Gordon, Norman K. Gottwald, John Jarick, Andrew D.H. Mayes, Carol Meyers, Patrick D. Miller

Sheffield Academic Press

A Continuum imprint

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Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative A Literary and Theological Analysis

James K. Bruckner

Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series 335

Copyright © 2001 Sheffield Academic Press A Continuum imprint Published by Sheffield Academic Press Ltd The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX 71 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10017-653 www.SheffieldAcademicPress.com www.continuumbooks.com

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Typeset by Sheffield Academic Press Printed on acid-free paper in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall

ISBN 1-84127-241-8

CONTENTS

Preface Abbreviations

7 8

Chapter 1

INTERPRETING PRE-SINAI LAW

11

Chapter 2

METHODOLOGY: A PLURALITY OF METHODS FOR READING LEGAL REFERENTS IN PRE-SINAI NARRATIVES

51

Chapter 3

A SURVEY OF JURIDICAL TERMINOLOGY IN THE ABRAHAM NARRATIVE

76

Chapter 4

A CLOSE NARRATIVE READING OF LEGAL REFERENTS IN GENESIS 18.16-19.29: FINDINGS FROM THE INQUEST OF THE CRY AGAINST THE SODOMITES TO THE SENTENCE THAT FOLLOWS GOD'S FINDINGS

124

Chapter 5

A CLOSE NARRATIVE READING OF LEGAL REFERENTS IN GENESIS 20.1-18: THE CONFLICTS AND RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING SARAH IN ABIMELECH' s TENT

171

Chapter 6

REFLECTIONS ON THE CREATIONAL CONTEXT OF IMPLIED LAW

199

Chapter 7

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

212

6

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

Bibliography Index of References Index of Authors

236 250 258

PREFACE

The final stages of doctoral studies are full of debts of gratitude. I am especially grateful to my adviser, Dr Terence Fretheim, whose advice was well timed, whether in giving encouragement or in setting deadlines. For his counsel, expertise, hours of editing and interest I remain in his debt. I am also grateful to my readers, whose commentary, challenges and encouragement motivated and taught me along the way. I am appreciative of the direction Dr Richard Nysse gave in the early stages of my proposal and later, in conversations about God's role in the narrative. Dr Diane Jacobson was particularly helpful in conversations about wisdom, creation and law. Thanks are also due to the rest of the biblical faculty at Luther Seminary, notably Drs James Limburg, Craig Koester, Don Juel, Mark Throntveit, Mark Hilmer and Roy Harrisville, who convened formative seminars and taught at the highest standard. It has been a privilege to listen in the midst of this community of readers. The many contributions of the faculty, staff and administration at North Park Theological Seminary all are deeply appreciated. The faculty have welcomed me as a colleague, understood the labor and offered practical assistance. The staff has encouraged me in countless ways, been patient with my preoccupation, and lent hours of technical support. The administration has provided valuable time and resources, making the writing task possible. I am grateful for my extended family. They have been good companions on the way, endlessly patient and renewing. Above all, there is my wife, Kris. Her sense of humor and joy in living has provided balance for the journey. Her insights into the text and into my reading have made the way light.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABD AOAT BA BASOR BDB

BHT BR BTB CBQ CHR CurTM EvT ExpTim FOTL GKC HBT HTR HUCA ICC IDE Int JAAR JAOS JETS JJS JNES JPSV JQR JR JSOT JSS

David Noel Freedman (ed.), The Anchor Bible Dictionary (New York: Doubleday, 1992) Alter Orient und Altes Testament Biblical Archaeologist Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research Francis Brown, S.R. Driver and Charles A. Briggs, A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907) Beitrage zur historischen Theologie Bible Review Biblical Theology Bulletin Catholic Biblical Quarterly Catholic Historical Review Currents in Theology and Mission Evangelische Theologie Expository Times The Forms of the Old Testament Literature Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar (ed. E. Kautzsch, revised and trans. A.E. Cowley; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910) Horizons in Biblical Theology Harvard Theological Review Hebrew Union College Annual International Critical Commentary George Arthur Buttrick (ed.), The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible (4 vols.; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962) Interpretation Journal of the American Academy of Religion Journal of the American Oriental Society Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society Journal of Jewish Studies Journal of Near Eastern Studies Jewish Publication Society Version Jewish Quarterly Review Journal of Religion Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Journal of Semitic Studies

Abbreviations JTS NASB

NICOT NRSV

OIL RB RSV

SBLDS TDNT

TDOT TLZ TS TTod TWOT

VT VTSup WBC WMANT

WTJ

ww

ZAW ZTK

Journal of Theological Studies New American Standard Bible New International Commentary on the Old Testament New Revised Standard Version Old Testament Library Revue biblique Revised Standard Version SBL Dissertation Series Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich (eds.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley; 10 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964-) G.J. Botterweck and H. Ringgren (eds.), Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament Theologische Literaturzeitung Theological Studies Theology Today R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer, Jr and Bruce K. Waltke (eds.), Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (2 vols.; Chicago: Moody Press, 1980) Vetus Testamentum Vetus Testamentum, Supplements Word Biblical Commentary Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament Westminster Theological Journal Word and World Zeitschrift fiir die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche

9

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Chapter 1 INTERPRETING PRE-SINAI LAW

The thesis of this book is that creation is the first and normative context for biblical law. This assertion is based on the observation that categories of law, more fully represented in Exodus-Deuteronomy, are also present in Genesis. A full range of law, measured by means of formcritical categories, is implied and operative in the Genesis narrative. These occurrences of law should not be dismissed from the narrative, nor from its interpretation by any interpretive method. Indications of law ought to be seen as intrinsic to and interpreted in the context of the narrative. When the Genesis narrative is read in its canonical placement in the over-arching biblical narrative, indications of law and lawkeeping carry significance for interpretation. Specifically, the canonical position of the pre-Sinai legal data is an ipso jure (by operation of law) argument for the operation of law from the beginning of the human community. Its canonical position functions to set law in the context of creation. A study of all the law and law-keeping implied in the Genesis narrative would be an unwieldy task, as the following survey of formcritical categories of law represented in Genesis will illustrate. The argument of this thesis will be developed in detail on the basis of one kind of legal referent, as it occurs in the Abraham narrative. This legal referent will be called the 'ought' and the 'ought not' of the narrative. The study of the Abraham narrative will be further limited to Gen. 18.16-20.18. The rationale for this delimitation will be argued in Chapter 3, which surveys the juridical terminology of oughts and ought nots in the entire Abraham narrative. The exegetical case study of oughts and ought nots delineates their occurrences in Genesis 18-20 and describes the literary and theological warrants by which these oughts are implied. The terms 'ought' and 'ought not' are used in this book to refer to a judgment that is formally or informally disclosed in a narrative as

12


necessarily right (ought) or wrong (ought not). A narrative discloses an ought or an ought not when behaviors or habitual conditions are implied, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be right or wrong. This disclosure is typically made by means of dialogue between characters, plot development (harsh consequence or explicit judgment) or specialized vocabulary. While oughts and ought nots do not exist as categories in form criticism, they are akin to commands and prohibitions. Commands and prohibitions in biblical texts are, outside of Genesis, often a part of covenants made between God and humanity. Oughts and ought nots in Genesis differ from commands and prohibitions in two ways. First, they are not presented in the same syntactical forms, but typically are implied. Second, they are not usually set in the immediate context of covenant, but are presented in the context of the Creator-creation relationship. The full explication of the thesis is divided into six chapters. The first presents initial warrants from the history of research for the study of law in Genesis. A survey of legal referents that occur in Genesis is presented in the form-critical categories by which the referents are classified. A survey of historical-critical approaches to law follows, revealing a curtailed treatment of law before Sinai. Helpful work on the relationship between creation, wisdom, and law is also summarized and engaged in Chapter 1. The second chapter outlines an eclectic narrative methodology. This approach draws on the contributions of many scholars, especially from the areas of narrative and rhetorical criticism. Its purpose is to provide a way of using form-critical taxonomies in service of a close reading of the narrative's legal referents. The third chapter engages the Abraham narrative in a study of the vocabulary and syntactical signs of oughts and ought nots in the text. An argument is made for limiting the study to Gen. 18.16-20.18 on the basis of legal vocabulary and its unique, extensive use in the development of the plot. The fourth and fifth chapters are the heart of the dissertation. A close reading of legal referents in Gen. 18.16-20.18 is developed. This reading results in the dual argument that these narratives are replete with court-like procedures, and that they are best understood by means of the implicit cosmology of the text. Chapter 6 provides a summary of reflections on the argument that

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

13

creation is the narrative context and the theological context of law before Sinai. Implications of the thesis for further research are developed in the excursus on reading law in pre-Sinai narratives, Pentateuchal studies and biblical ethics. What Law in Genesis? A Survey of Form-Critical Categories The pre-Sinai narratives are not usually interpreted as 'legal' texts. The narratives are not ostensibly 'about' law. They do not contain law codes (Noachide laws in Gen. 9.4-5 excepted). No specific statutes or ordinances are presented, as such. The narrative does not treat law as a subject. Nevertheless, the pre-Sinai biblical narrative contains a full range of texts that pertain to the study of law. Commercial law is represented in land purchases and marriage contracts. Treaties are represented in those made between Jacob and Laban and between Abimelech and Abraham. God makes covenants with Abraham and, within that context, makes direct commands: 'Walk before me and be blameless' (Gen. 17.1) and 'Every male among you shall be circumcised' (Gen. 17.10). Oughts and ought nots are also present. Cain ought not to have killed Abel (Gen. 4.1-16). God ought not kill the innocent with the righteous (Gen. 18.16-33). Sarah ought not be in Abimelech's tent (Gen. 20.1-18). Form-critical categories are useful as a diagnostic tool for the study of law in the Genesis narrative. For example, the case of Abimelech, Abraham and Sarah in Genesis 20 certainly pertains to commandments against adultery, but it also is pertinent to categories of 'juridical procedure'. The ought not in that case is not disclosed by means of a direct commandment against adultery in the context of a covenant, but by means of a more lengthy juridical process, which is developed as a narrative. (The importance of this distinction, made possible by the formcritical categories, will be developed further.) For such reasons, formcritical categories and findings about patterns of law in the Hebrew Bible are pertinent in this dissertation. The results of form criticism are valuable, even in a synchronic study. I do not share, however, formcritics' interest in pursuing original historical settings. Three form-critical categories of procedural law are evident in Genesis:1 1. W. Malcolm Clark, 'Law', in J.B. Hayes (ed.), Old Testament Form Criticism (San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press, 1974), pp. 99-139. 'Procedural law' refers to due process or the details of administrating established standards or

14

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative 1.

2.

3.

Commercial law (e.g. contracts of sale and family law) in the purchase of Ephron's field (Gen. 23) and in Jacob's marriage contract (Gen. 24). Treaties between men (Gen. 21, 26, 31) and covenants with God, accompanied by cultic sacrifice (Gen. 8, 12, 13, 15, 26, 33, 35). Juridical procedure (secular and sacral), as in the arraignments of Abimelech (Gen. 20), of Sodom (Gen. 18-19), of Jacob (Gen. 31) and of Tamar (Gen. 38).

What follows is a brief summary of some of the referents of procedural law in Genesis. They are organized by means of the three major categories, with attention to direct commands and sacrifice under the rubric of treaties and covenants. Commercial Law: Contracts, Family Law, Social Customs Commercial law includes contracts for the exchange of rights to property and persons. In Gen. 23.16, Ephron's field and the Machpelah cave are purchased by Abraham with silver, for Sarah's tomb.2 In Gen. 24.53-54, a marriage contract between the families of Isaac and Rebekah is ratified by the exchange of ten camels laden with gifts, and a meal eaten together. In Gen. 25.31-33, a birthright is exchanged by means of swearing and the eating of pottage. Gen. 31.38-39 describes a herding contract between Jacob and Laban.3 Many laws and customs surrounding family events and structures are evident in Genesis. Marriage, birth, death, division of property, firstborn rights and the social customs that govern them all have referents in Genesis. Westermann has provided a concise summary of these kinds of 'legal practices' in Genesis.4 WJ. Harrelson offers these examples of family customs in Genesis: rules, especially in legal hearings, commercial transactions, and treaties. In this dissertation the term 'law' is defined as the binding custom or practice or mode of obligatory conduct in a community. 2. See M. Lehman, 'Abraham's Purchase of Machpelah and Hittite Law', BASOR 129 (1953), pp. 15-18; Gene M. Tucker, 'The Legal Background of Genesis 23', JBL 85 (1966), pp. 77-84. 3. See J.J. Finkelstein, 'An Old Babylonian Herding Contract and Genesis 31.38f, JAOS 88 (1969), pp. 30-36. 4. Claus Westermann, Genesis 12-36: A Commentary (trans. John J. Scullion; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1985), pp. 79-83.


15

A man whose wife had borne him no son might adopt a slave as his heir (Gen. 15.1-4; 24.1-2). Such an adopted son had his rights secured by law in the event that a natural son should later be born. A barren wife was expected to provide another wife to bear children to her husband; she is expressly prohibited from sending such children away (cf. Gen. 19.1-6; 21.8-14; 30.1-13). The possession of the household gods was an indication of the right to the inheritance of the firstborn (Gen. 31.19, 30-35). Deathbed oaths also appear to have had a binding character in law, as indicated by a lawsuit among brothers about the ownership of a slavewife of the dead father. (Gen. 24.1-9).5

The custom of levitate marriage is evident in the narrative of Judah and Tamar. In Genesis 38.8, Judah tells Onan, 'Go into your brother's wife and perform your duty.' This narrative reference to levirate marriage takes the form of codified law in Deuteronomy 25.5-10.6 Finally, etiologies are also recognized as custom. Etiologies provide a historical warrant for 'present' customary practice. For example, in Gen. 32.32, an ancient food custom is explained in the context of the Jacob narrative: Therefore, to this day, the Israelites do not eat the sinew of the hip...' 7 Treaties and Covenants These belong to the second general form-critical category of procedural law represented in Genesis. Three treaties are made in Genesis. The signs by which these treaties are sealed occur again in Exodus-Deuteronomy as various signs of covenant with God (swearing, sacrifice, eating, pillar-raising, etc.). In the Genesis texts, the treaties are sealed with signs shared by the makers of the treaty. In Gen. 21.22-34, a treaty between Abimelech and Abraham is made at Beersheba concerning the use of well water. The treaty is made by means of swearing and the exchange of sheep, oxen and lambs. In Gen. 26.30-31, a treaty is established between Abimelech and Isaac at Beersheba. Again the conflict is over a water well, and is resolved by swearing, eating, and drinking. The third treaty is between Laban and Jacob (Gen. 31.47-55). The stated conflict centers in a fear of being attacked and a concern for Rachel and Leah. The treaty is struck by means of a pillar, a heap of 5. W. Harrelson, 'Law in the Old Testament', in IDB, III, p. 78. 6. Deut. 25.5-10 also provides for the renunciation of this duty. 7. A comprehensive historical analysis of etiologies has been completed by B.O. Long, The Problem of Etiological Narrative in the Old Testament (Berlin: Alfred Topelmann, 1968).

16


stones, God's witness, swearing, eating and a sacrifice. This treaty between Laban and Jacob is sealed by a sacrifice at Galeed/Mizpah (witness-heap/watchtower). The practice of sacrifice in Genesis almost always stands in juxtaposition to covenants with God. There are two exceptions. The sacrifice in Gen. 31.54 is not related to a God-human covenant at all, but seals a human treaty between Jacob and Laban. The sacrifices made by Cain and Abel in Gen. 4.3-5 are not related to a covenant, nor are they described with cultic vocabulary.8 In Gen. 4.3-4 Cain and Abel 'bring' Km an offering ('In the course of time Cain brought...'). The other nine mentioned sacrifices stand in striking juxtaposition to covenants. The sacrifices are not presented as part of the covenantgiving nor a requirement of covenant-keeping. Human initiative and not God's instruction are responsible for the sacrifices in Genesis. In Gen. 8.20, Noah gives thanks for the safe exit from the ark, before God makes the covenant (9.8-17). The sacrifice in Gen. 12.7 is Abram's response to the appearance of the LORD and the promise of land at Shechem. Abram calls on the Name east of Bethel with a sacrifice in Gen. 12.8 and 13.4. In Mamre at Hebron, Abram responds to the promise of land and descendants (Gen. 13.18). The sacrifice of split carcasses in Gen. 15.9 is a result of God's response to Abram's request for a confirmation of the promise.9 In Gen. 26.25 the altar at Beersheba is erected as Isaac's response to the promise of descendants and also to call on the Name. In 33.20 Jacob settles at Shechem and constructs an altar to El Elohe Israel, and in Gen. 35.7 he builds an altar to El-Bethel because 'God had revealed himself to him when he fled from his brother'. The importance of these nine occasions of sacrifice in the pre-Sinai narrative is precisely in their juxtaposition to God's covenant-making. Sacrifice is not commanded by God as a means of sealing covenants. Human initiative in thanksgiving is the motivation for sacrifice. Narratively, this has the effect of setting sacrifice in the context of creation, and not as an act of obedience within a covenant. In Genesis, as in Exodus-Deuteronomy, direct address commands (usually given in the imperative tense) are almost always given in the 8. Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary (trans. John J. Scullion; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), p. 294. 9. See Clark, 'Law', pp. 124-25, for a summary of form critical signs of cultic rituals.


17

context of covenants.10 Some of these commands are stage directions that are necessary to receiving the land of the covenant. Abram is given a series of commands of this nature: 'Go', 'Look', 'Count', 'Walk' (Gen. 12.1; 13.14; 15.5; 17.1). Abram is also given two commands noted above concerning the covenant of circumcision (Gen. 17.1, 10). Isaac is given one command in the context of the covenant: 'Stay and sojourn' (Gen. 26.2-3). Jacob receives several: 'Return', 'Go and live', 'Make an altar' and 'Be fruitful and multiply' (Gen. 31.3; 35.1, 11). The final command to be fruitful and multiply (35.11) adds the promise of land and prosperity to the same command, previously given unconditionally to Adam and Eve (Gen. 1.28) and to Noah (9.1, 7). Commandment as a Form. Albrecht Alt's distinction between apodictic and casuistic law has been widely used since 1934.11 His conclusions concerning the uniqueness of Israelite apodictic law and its origin in the cult have been challenged and modified by S. Herrmann (his last student), J.H. Hayes, Erhard Gerstenberger and Rifat Sonsino.12 Yet Alt's general distinction remains useful. Sonsino has argued for the more accurate designations 'unconditional' and 'conditional'. Sonsino further subdivides these two categories by means of the syntactical structures of the commands.13 Sonsino notes three forms of conditional law: the When/If form 0:>/DN), the relative form ("IC0K) and the participle form, for example, 'he who strikes...' (PDQ). While these forms of law are not present in Genesis, antecedents to the content of some casuistic laws may be present in juridical procedure (contested claims). Unconditional commands (apodictic law) occur in Hebrew texts in the form of direct address commands and in the jussive. In Genesis the jussive form of command is not pertinent, but some direct commands 10. Clark,'Law', pp. 109-11. 11. A. Alt, Die Urspriinge des israelitischen Rechts (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1934). 12. Summaries of the discussion may be found in J.J.M. Roberts, The Ancient Near Eastern Environment', in Douglas A. Knight and Gene M. Tucker (eds.), The Hebrew Bible and its Modern Interpreters (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 92. See also Erhard S. Gerstenberger, 'Covenant and Commandment', JBL 84 (1965), pp. 38-51; J.H. Hayes, Old Testament Form Criticism (San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press, 1974); S. Herrmann, 'Das apodiktische Recht', Mitteilungen des Instituts fiir Orientforschung 15 (1969), pp. 249-61; R. Sonsino, Motive Clauses in Hebrew Law: Biblical Forms and Near Eastern Parallels (ed. D.A. Knight; SBLDS, 45; Ann Arbor: Scholars Press, 1980). 13. R. Sonsino, 'Law', in ABD, pp. 242-65.

18


occur in the Abraham narrative. The majority of these occurrences are not like the commandments of Exodus but are 'stage directions' related to the covenant of land and descendants made with Abram. Two direct address unconditional commands are distinguished from the others by the weightiness of their subjects: 'Every male among you shall be circumcised'14 (Gen. 17.10) and Take your son and offer him' (Gen. 22.2).15 A Problem with 'Commandment' as a Form in the Genesis Narrative. One might expect that a study of oughts and ought nots in Genesis would find, as in Exodus-Deuteronomy, its primary subject in the form of direct address unconditional commandments. In the Genesis narrative, however, not many oughts are represented by direct commands. Rather, oughts and ought nots are simply implied in the narrative. For example: 19.24 Then the LORD rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the LORD out of heaven. 20.18 For the LORD had closed fast all the wombs of the house of Abimelech because of Sarah, Abraham's wife.

The implications are that the men of Sodom ought to have been more hospitable to the strangers and that Abimelech ought not to have had Sarah in his tent. These oughts and ought nots cannot be described formally as 'commands'. I suggest that this situation is typical in the Genesis narrative. Conditional and unconditional commands are usually represented rhetorically by implication as oughts and ought nots. To this observation a second may be added: the context of oughts and ought nots in Genesis is in court-like or 'juridical' proceedings, and not in the context of covenant. Juridical Procedure The first and second form-critical categories of procedural law, commercial law and treaties/covenants, are clearly represented in Genesis. The third category, however, known as 'juridical' procedure, is the most fruitful for a study of oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative. Juridical procedure typically takes place in biblical 'courtroom'

14. 15.

'7IQn, ni. inf. abs. N]~np, qal impv.


19

scenes. Juridical procedure has been studied diachronically, but little attention has been given to the Genesis narrative. Hans J. Boecker has done the fundamental form-critical work in the area of biblical juridical procedure. He observes a basic threefold form in which an accusation is made, evidence is presented and a pleading is given by the accused.16 The presence of procedural language has been noted by Daube in several Genesis texts, especially noting the word "ion, 'he discerned' or 'he acknowledged', from ID], 'he knew', which marks the call to render a verdict: There can be little doubt that this word was technical for the formal finding out of, and making a statement to the other party about, a fact of legal relevance; be it one on which a claim might be based, or one on account of which a claim must be abandoned, or one on account of which the other party's claim must be admitted.17

A cursory survey of Genesis texts results in examples marked by the procedure of deciding officially on the evidence presented. The verb TD!~I (hiphil of the root "D]) is translated in a variety of ways. 27.23a (Isaac and Jacob): He did not recognize [TDH] him. 31.32b (Jacob to Laban): 'Point out [TDH] what I have that is yours'. 37.32b-33a (sons to Jacob): 'See now [TDn] whether it is your son's robe or not'. He recognized [TDn] it. 38.25b-26a (Tamar to Judah): Take note [TDH] please, whose these are...' Then Judah acknowledged [Ton] them.

Juridical procedure in the Abraham narrative tends to use the word CD22J, 'judge':18 16. H.J. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens im Alien Testament (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964); H.J. Boecker, Law and the Administration of Justice in the Old Testament and Ancient East (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1980). 17. D. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), pp. 5-6. See 1 Kgs 3.27. 18. Clark, 'Law', pp. 125-27. Form critics distinguish between secular and sacral juridical procedure. Sacral procedure tends to use the word CDS2): For example, the conflict between Laban and Jacob in Gen. 31 contains both a secular and a sacral form of appeal for a juridical decision: Gen. 31.37b: 'so that they may decide between us two' (irDE? "pD IITD'H); Gen. 31.53a: 'May the God of Abraham...judge between us' (ITm 1CDSB?\..Dn"«D« TT^K). The root HD" is also typical of juridical procedure. See Pietro Bovati, Re-establishing Justice: Legal Terms, Concepts and Procedures in the Hebrew Bible (trans. M.J. Smith; JSOTSup,

20

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative 16.5b

(Sarah concerning Hagar): May the LORD judge [tDQCD] between you and me. 18.25b (Abraham to God): Shall not the Judge [CDD27] of all the earth do what isjust[CDD2JQ]? 19.9b (Sodomites about Lot): He is acting like a judge [CDS2J].

In each of these seven cases, further categories of juridical procedure may also be observed in the narratives. Claims are made, evidence is weighed, and decisions are rendered. Many excellent exegetical studies of judicial procedure in individual texts have been done, especially on the lawsuit speeches of the prophets,19 but little has been done on juridical procedure in Genesis. An important resource for the study of juridical procedure in the Hebrew Bible, including Genesis, has been provided by Pietro Bovati. His comprehensive analysis of legal procedures, to which I am indebted, provides a compilation of the occurrences of legal terms and procedures in the Hebrew Bible.20 Using Form Criticism. Form-critical work on juridical procedure is useful for explicating oughts and ought nots in Genesis. The identification of the sequence of accusation, pleading, presentation of evidence (or argument) and decision (or judgment) provides form to the oughts and ought nots of the text. The framework and vocabulary of legal procedure identified by form critics provide a way of speaking about the moves in the narrative itself. 'A proper articulation of form yields a proper articulation of meaning.'21 On the other hand, the interest in ancient Near East comparative material and in the reconstruction of the setting behind forms and texts is not particularly helpful to this book. Understanding law in the Abraham narrative requires focused attention on the voices of the

105; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994), p. 48. 19. For a substantial list, see Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 24-25. 20. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice. 21. Phyllis Trible's summary of 'Form Criticism and Beyond', James Muilenberg's celebrated address to the Society of Biblical Literature. Phyllis Trible, Rhetorical Criticism: Context, Method, and the Book of Jonah (Minneapolis: Augsburg-Fortress, 1994), pp. 224-25; James Muilenberg, 'Form Criticism and Beyond', in J. Maier and V. Tollers (eds.), The Bible in its Literary Milieu (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), pp. 363-80.


21

characters that accuse, plead, describe evidence, argue and render judgment. The oughts are implied within the discourse of the narrative, not in the forms themselves. Form-critical categories are necessary, but not sufficient for discerning these implications. Critical forms that are identified are applied in the service of narrative and rhetorical criticism.22 The relationships between the speakers of the text, disclosed in an analysis of the discourse in the text, also need to be interpreted. By this rhetorical use of the form-critical categories of juridical procedure, the interpreter has the tools to identify the oughts and ought nots of the text. For example, in Genesis 18-19 an indictment is issued, based on a cry to God (18.20). The process of trial is declared (18.21), the terms of the trial are negotiated (18.23-33), evidence is established by eyewitnesses (19.1-9), and verdicts and a sentence are declared and carried out (19.12-29). In Genesis 20 there are two arraignments. In the first, God indicts Abimelech, a defense is offered and an acquittal is given. In the second, Abimelech indicts Abraham, a defense is made and the conflict is resolved. In these cases, however, the juridical categories in themselves do not provide answers to fundamental questions of meaning and interpretation. Why is the whole valley surrounding Sodom and Gomorrah destroyed? Why does Abimelech pay, if he is acquitted by God? Questions like these require a rhetorical engagement of the narrative. A juridical analysis, however (of the sequence of accusation, pleading, evidence and decision), adds an indispensable depth for understanding the narrative movement of the text. Within this movement, my interest is in the oughts and ought nots by which each case is decided. Oughts in Narratives. Within court-like procedures in narratives, oughts and ought nots are disclosed in a variety of ways. Oughts and ought nots may be disclosed by simple statements in a text, without the use of technical legal vocabulary. The most common expressions are given by means of the voice of the narrator or the voice of a character. In some texts neither technical vocabulary nor a full courtroom sequence is present. Often controversies are resolved before the complaint becomes 'formal'. W. Malcom Clark notes that 'two parallel stages [existed] in the juridical process—interchanges which took place before the court was convened and interchanges which took place after convening...

22.

See Chapter 2.

22


The process could break off at any point, with or without a formal "decision".'23 Even in the absence of a full courtroom sequence or a technical legal vocabulary, the narrative may disclose a legal or moral judgment by means of the discourse among narrator, characters, and God.24 Sometimes the disclosure is by means of human voices. Abram says to Lot, 'Let there be no strife between you and me...for we are kindred' (Gen. 13.8). Sarai says to Abram, 'May the wrong done to me be on you... May the LORD judge between you and me' (Gen. 16.5). Abimelech says to Abraham, 'You have brought such great guilt on me and my kingdom. You have done things to me that ought not to be done' (Gen. 20.9). Jacob says to his household, 'Put away the foreign gods that are among you and purify yourselves...' (Gen. 35.2). Joseph's brothers say to each other, 'Alas, we are paying the penalty for what we did to our brother...' (Gen. 42.21). In some cases the ought or ought not is expressed through the voice of the narrator: 'But the LORD afflicted Pharaoh and his house with great plagues because of Sarai, Abram's wife' (Gen. 12.17); Then the LORD rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the LORD out of heaven' (Gen. 19.24); 'He spilled his semen on the ground... What he did was displeasing in the sight of the LORD and he put him to death also' (Gen. 38.9-10). In other cases the ought or ought not is signified by the voice of God, which adds some explanation to the action described by the narrator: 'Then the LORD said, "How great is the outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah and how very grave their sin" ' (Gen. 18.20) and 'You are about to die because of the woman whom you have taken; for she is a married woman' (Gen. 20.3). Summary This brief survey of three form-critical categories of procedural law (commercial law, treaties and covenants and juridical procedure) serves to demonstrate that Genesis has many texts that pertain to the study of the practice of law before Sinai. A full range of implied and operative law is represented in the narrative.

23. Clark, 'Law', p. 126. Clark follows Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, p. 47. 24. The more fully developed narratives with juridical procedures in Gen. 18.16-20.18 are, of course, more fruitful for the study of ought nots.


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It is not possible to deal with every reference to procedural law in Genesis in detail. The scope of this study will be limited to the third category, juridical procedure, and further limited to the Abraham narrative. Within the Abraham narrative, only the juridical procedures that are significantly developed (Gen. 18.16-20.18) will be considered.25 The focused interest within the juridical procedure will be the oughts and ought nots of the text. In other words: a. b. c.

What necessary actions or restraints (oughts and ought nots) are implied in the Abraham narrative? How are the oughts and ought nots implied? By what grammatical or rhetorical signs are they disclosed to the reader? How does this kind of implied law (command or prohibition) function theologically in its narrative and canonical context?

These questions will guide the survey of juridical terminology in Chapter 3, the close reading of the Genesis text in Chapters 4 and 5, and the reflections of Chapter 6, as well as the implications for further research in the excursus. Historical-Critical Interests and Pre-Sinai Law Most interpreters of the pre-Sinai narrative have made only passing comments about references to law and their function in the narrative. A brief survey of the history of interpretation of biblical law will show that historical interests in law and theological presuppositions have each contributed to this oversight. Historical interests in law have served to reconstruct the history of legal sources, forms and settings that lie behind the biblical text, but little attention has been given to interpreting law in its canonical and narrative context. Theological interests have served to assign references to law to a covenantal context (rr~Q) or to overlook it altogether. Until recently, little attention has been given to the creation-canonical context of law in Genesis. The Interest in Source Criticism and Law The history of the interpretation of law in the last 150 years of biblical study follows the path of the dominant historical methods. Source critics have been interested in distinguishing the main originating documents of Sinai law (Exod. 19-Num. 10). For example, the Elohist 25.

An argument for this limitation will be provided in Chapter 3.

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source is identified with the first decalogue (Exod. 20.2-17), the Yahwist source with the second (Exod. 34.11-26), and the Deuteronomist with the third (Deut. 5.6-21). Older materials within Exodus 19-24 and Exodus 32-34 are identified as independent, smaller and older sources (e.g. The Book of the Covenant, Exod. 20.23-23.19), which were collected into the larger source documents J (for Jahwist) and E (for Elohist). Priestly law (Exod. 25-31; Exod. 35-40; Lev. 1-27; Num. 110), with its interest in the regulation of the priesthood and tabernacle construction, and the Law of Deuteronomy are similarly separated. Within the levitical law, the older and independent Holiness code ('You shall be holy, for I, Yahweh am holy') known as 'H' is distinguished in Leviticus 17-26. The continuing interest of source critics has been to separate the older strands within JE and P and to solve the numerous problems of sequence and coherence. A recent proposal by Erhard Blum represents a shift toward literary concerns, yet his interest remains in reconstructing historical sources and promulgating a new theory concerning their history of development.26 The Interest in Form Criticism and Law The point of departure for the form-critical study of biblical law is Albrecht Alt's The Origins of Israelite Law' (1934). This monograph is an example of form critics' general interest in determining the original historical setting of a law code or a series of lays by means of its style or form. Alt agreed with Sigmund Mowinkel that the setting of apodictic law was to be found in the 'Festival of Yahweh's Enthronement', that is, in the cult and worship of Israel, rather than in a folk setting, as Hermann Gunkel had suggested.27 Casuistic law, on the othe hand, distinguished by protasis and apodosis, had its setting and origin in Canaanite royal law codes (by way of Mesopotamia), used by jurists and judges. Erhard Gerstenberger critiqued Alt's strict categories, arguing that the apodictic form was not unique to Israel, but was present in

26. E. Blum, Die Komposition der Vdtergeschichte (WMANT; NeukirchenVluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1984). A concise summary of Blum's theory is provided by Robert I. Letellier, Day in Matnre, Night in Sodom: Abraham and Lot in Genesis 18-19 (eds. R.A. Culpepper and R. Rendtorff; Biblical Interpretation Series, 10; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 4-5. 27. Sigmund Mowinkel, Le Decalogue (Etudes d'historie et de philosophie religieuses, 16; Paris: Felix Alcan, 1927).


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ancient Near East liturgies.28 Further, he argued that the 'tribal circle' was the setting of the commandments. More recently, Rifat Sonsino argued that uniqueness in Hebrew law is to be found not in the form of the law, but in the content of the motive clauses.29 A second interest of form critics is found in a focus on treaties and covenants by Walther Eichrodt, Gerhard von Rad and George E. Mendenhall.30 Mendenhall's comparison of the form of the Decalogue to the Hittite second person suzerain-vassal treaty style widened scholarly interest in covenant and treaty as the setting for law.31 This focus of interest in law was not new to Old Testament scholarship. In 1938 von Rad's work on the form-critical problem of the Hexateuch had already had made law subservient to covenant.32 He argued that the Sinai covenant and its laws were transmitted by cultic recollection at the Festival of Booths at Shechem. With the covenant-renewing Deuteronomist established as the final redacting theologian, biblical law was generally considered in that context. A third form-critical interest in law may be marked by Gerstenberger's generally accepted argument that wisdom was the original setting of law, particularly given through the advice of clan elders to the young (typified in Prov. 3).33 His study of the command form $h + the second person has helped to establish this focus in the study of law. Wisdom as a final setting for law has been developed most fully by Joseph Blenkinsopp. He argues that there is a 'confluence of wisdom and law' in the history of Israel.34

28. Gerstenberger, 'Covenant and Commandment', p. 38-51. 29. Sonsino, Motive Clauses. 30. Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament (trans. J.A. Baker; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961, 1967). 31. G.E. Mendenhall, 'Ancient Oriental and Biblical Law', in E.F. Campbell and D.N. Freedman (eds.), Biblical Archaeologist Reader, III (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), pp. 26-46. 32. Gerhard von Rad, The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays (trans. E.W.W. Dicken; London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966). 33. Erhard S. Gerstenberger, Wesen und Herkunft des 'Apodikitschen Rechts' (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1965), pp. 38-51. 34. Joseph Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law in the Old Testament: The Ordering of Life in Israel and Early Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 130-32. Recent interest in the relationships between creation, wisdom and law will be pursued fully in the next section.

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The Interest in Tradition Criticism and Law The history of traditions work done by Martin Noth demonstrates not only the interest, but also the results, of this methodology.35 Noth argued categorically for the secondary nature of the law. In evidence he offered that the covenant with Israel preceded the giving of the law in the Old Testament. Moreover, he argued, the exile brought the covenant relationship to an end, and with it the validity of Old Testament law for faith and practice. Further, he noted that Psalms 1, 19 and 119 gave the law a status that was outside of the covenant. That independent status was unfortunate, he stated, for it was the road that led to Judaism's legalism. In each of Noth's observations the focus of tradition criticism is illustrated. First, the priority of the covenant in the historical development of Israel is paramount. Law is understood in the context of covenant. As in source criticism, Genesis is understood as a composition that is historically later than the covenant, and to be understood in its context. Therefore, both law and Genesis are theologically secondary to the historical covenant. History governs theological interpretation. Secondly, in a similar way, the historical exile governs the present value and interpretation of biblical law. With the 'end' of the covenant came the end of its law. Thirdly, when the biblical text demonstrates an independent status for law, as in the psalms mentioned, the texts are regarded as historical inconsistencies. Tradition critics' interest in biblical law is primarily an interest in its functions within the historical covenant during the duration of Israel's history. The dominant interest in the interpretation of Old Testament law has been to discover the history behind the text. For source critics, the interest has been in the originating sources represented in the text. For form critics, the interest has been the social setting as it can be reconstructed from the syntactical, oral and literary forms behind the originating sources. Tradition historians have traced the forms through their changing social uses and cultural adaptations. These interests have shared a common focus on the reconstruction of the history of the legal sources, forms and settings that lie behind the text. As a result, little interest has been shown in interpreting law in its canonical narrative context. Further, the primary object of the historical critic's work has been Sinai

35. M. Noth, The Laws in the Pentateuch and Other Studies (trans. D.R. ApThomas; London: SCM Press, 1984).


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law (particularly its law codes). This focus on Sinai law has led also to an oversight of references to law in the pre-Sinai narrative. The Study of Law in the Pre-Sinai Narrative Specific reference to law in Genesis 1-Exodus 18 is rarely found when reading historical criticism. The primary reason for this oversight is methodological, that is, the predominant interest has been in the history of composition. This means that any reference to law in these texts is treated in its literary-historical context (e.g. as the addition of a late redactor), rather than in its narrative context. When references to law in the Genesis 1-Exodus 18 texts have been addressed, authors have taken one of two paths. They have sought either to place specific legal references in their historical ancient Near Eastern context (that is, pursuing an interest in the historical development of law, or placing these references in a theological schema, such as salvation history).36 For example, in order to make sense of an explicit reference to Abraham's law-keeping (Gen. 26.5), historical and theological proposals have reached behind the text (by means of the history of composition and redaction) and theologically beyond the text (e.g. Abraham kept the law by faith). If no other reference to law or legal procedure were evident in Genesis, one might explain the reference to Abraham's law-keeping only in those ways. But this is not the case. Genesis is full of references that are of interest to procedural law: commercial law, treaties and covenants and juridical procedure. We ought to ask, therefore, what law can be found in the Abraham narrative itself. History and Law. The study of pre-Sinai law in its historical context is sometimes referred to as the study of 'law as law'. The study of law as law engages in comparing and contrasting biblical law with other historical law codes. Biblical references to law have been compared to Roman law and, more commonly, to the seven ancient Near Eastern law codes.37 36. For ancient Near East comparisons to legal referents in Genesis, see Finkelstein, 'Babylonian Herding Contract', p. 15-18; Lehman, 'Abraham's Purchase', pp. 30-36; H. Petschow, 'Die Neubabylonische Zwiegespraechsurkunde und Genesis 23', JCS 19 (1965), pp. 103-20; Tucker, 'The Legal Background of Genesis 23', pp. 15-18. 37. W. Beyerlin (ed.), Near Eastern Religious Texts Relating to the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1978); W. Beyerlin, Origins and History of

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The study of law as law has also allowed specializations, such as in family law (Westbrook, Pressler) and in cultic law (Milgrom, Byrd).38 These kinds of historical studies have been based on sociological reconstructions and the recovery of historical-sociological meanings.39 The study of law as law and its comparative methods are useful at the level of literature. Lexicographical comparisons of words and syntagmas40 add depth to issues of translation by providing lexical parameters of meaning. In the study of law in narrative, however, one ought to be cautious about claims to objectivity or the recovery of historical meaning.41 The lack of consensus in historical reconstruction is nowhere better illustrated than in Brevard Childs's Biblical Theology.42 Repeatedly the the Oldest Sinaitic Traditions (trans. S. Rudman; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); Boecker, Law and the Administration of Justice. David Daube compares biblical law to Roman law in many of his essays. See Daube, Studies in Biblical Law. 38. R. Westbrook, Property and the Family in Biblical Law (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991); Carolyn Pressler, The View of Women Found in the Deuteronomic Family Laws (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1993); Jacob Milgrom, Studies in Cultic Theology and Terminology (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983); Phyllis Bird, The Place of Women in the Israelite Cultus', in P.D. Miller, P. Hanson and S.D. McBride (eds.), Ancient Israelite Religion: Essays in Honor of Frank Moore Cross (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), pp. 397-420. 39. The possibility of recovering historical-sociological meaning has been deeply challenged recently from a variety of disciplines. See A.D.H. Mayes, 'The Period of the Judges and the Rise of the Monarchy', in John H. Hayes and H.M. Miller (eds.), Israelite andJudean History (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), pp. 285-331; William Denver, 'The Patriarchal Traditions', in John H. Hayes and H.M. Miller (eds.), Israelite and Judean History (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), pp. 70-119; Rolf Rendtorff, The Erosion of the Great Picture of Israel's Early History', in Canon and Theology: Overtures to an Old Testament Theology (ed. Walter Brueggemann; Overtures to Biblical Theology; trans. Margaret Kohl; Minnneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), pp. 207-219. 40. A 'syntagma' is a systematic grouping of words. Bovati's translator, M.J. Smith, uses the term 'syntagm'. 41. Cf. Mendenhall's argument for biblical and ANE equivalencies in G.E. Mendenhall, 'Ancient Oriental and Biblical Law', pp. 26-46; G.E. Mendenhall, 'Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition', in E.F. Campbell and D.N. Freedman (eds.), Biblical Archaeologist Reader, III (Garden City: Doubleday, 1970), pp. 5076. Cf. also G.E. Wright's argument for biblical and ANE contrasts. G.E. Wright, The Old Testament against its Environment (London: SCM Press, 1950). 42. Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992).


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reader finds sharp disagreement and a fragmentation of consensus in historical matters. The extremely wide variety of hypothetical historical reconstructions of the history of the Ten Commandments prompts Childs to write, The least one should expect is that the distinction be maintained between a critical hypothesis about the text and the text itself.'43 The methodology of the study of law as law is not sufficient for the interpretation of the pre-Sinai narrative and its legal referents. Abraham is of special interest to the interpreter of the pre-Sinai narrative. While one might concede the difficulty in recovering the history of particular laws, a commitment to a historical 'fix' on the person of Abraham ought to be the minimum expectation. Even here, however, the task is impossible. The typical historical conclusion is that Abraham may have been a historical person, but he is at best a 'shadowy' one, about whom almost nothing can be known.44 Yet biblical traditions have been consigned to the figure Abraham. Since the main character of the text cannot be historically 'recovered', a narrative profile becomes all the more necessary. Such is the case with the 'law' of Abraham. Since the law of the patriarchs cannot be reconstructed as historical law, the least we should expect is a description of the function of the legal referents in the narrative. The Story of Salvation and Law. Von Rad's monumental work on the traditions of salvation history helped to save biblical studies, in his time, for the Church. His unique and erudite combination of historical acumen and commitment to elucidating the 're-telling' of the story, and his confession of faith, guided interpretation for a lifetime. Yet, as with every system, some choices necessarily exclude others. Von Rad's choices led to a short treatment of Abraham and the law. This short Schrift has two explanations, one methodological and the other theological. The methodological explanation is illustrated by the treatment of one reference to law in the pre-Sinai narrative. When God appears to Isaac to make the patriarchal promise, he states that Abraham has kept the law: 43. Brevard S. Childs, The Book of Exodus (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), p. 393. 44. P.K. McCarter, Jr, The Historical Abraham', Interpretation42.4 (1988), pp. 341-52; John Van Seters, Abraham in History and Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

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Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative And all the nations of the earth shall gain blessings for themselves through your offspring, because Abraham obeyed my voice and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes and my laws (Gen. 26.4b-5).

On the basis of the history of traditions, this verse is 'interpreted' by removing it from its narrative. Because of its 'anachronistic' vocabulary, it is recognized as a verse that comes from the hand of a deuteronomist. Von Rad writes: '[It is] expanded stylistically into a mighty programmatic speech of promise by a very much later hand.'45 Gunkel previously wrote: '...von spaterer Hand stark erweitert' ('by a later hand greatly expanded').46 Westermann has: '...that would be the postDeuteronomic period, as the language of v. 5 clearly shows.'47 Even C.F. Keil and F. Delitzsch note the presence of a later vocabulary.48 The use of the historical perspective in this case has the effect of dismissing the pertinence of the reference to law. Its bearing on the interpretation of the Isaac narrative is either ignored by commentators or explained away. This move is peculiar, especially considering the legal scenes that follow in 26.6-11 (Abimelech's arraignment of Isaac) and in 26.26-33 (Isaac's treaty with Abimelech following the waterwell dispute). Is it not plausible that legal terminology and legal categories in the same narrative are related to one another? The second explanation for tradition history's oversight of law in the pre-Sinai narrative is theological. Scholars interested in covenant theology have had no reason to investigate the implications of legal referents in Genesis, since the majority of these referents are not set in the context of the covenant-making texts. Eichrodt's theological commitment to covenant (mil) as the center of Old Testament theology is well known.49 In Genesis, references to law-keeping are made within the context of a covenant only twice.50 The many other referents of law in

45. Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary (ed. John Bright; trans. John Marks; OIL; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, rev. edn, 1972), p. 270. 46. Hermann Gunkel, Genesis (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 6th edn, 1964), p. 300. 47. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 425. 48. See C.F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament, I (trans. James Martin; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), p. 270. 49. Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament. 50. Gen. 22.18: 'And by your offspring shall all the nations of the earth gain


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Genesis are not narratively presented in the context of a covenant, as the study of oughts and ought nots will show. Oughts and ought nots are presented in the narrative and the theological context of creation.51 Another theological factor in the oversight of legal referents in the pre-Sinai narrative was von Rad's commitment to a Pauline-Lutheran reading of Abraham. Jon Levenson has argued that this commitment was so intense that von Rad altogether overlooked the contradiction between his reading and the Torah's Abraham. Levenson has demonstrated (respectfully but convincingly) the fallacy of 'objectivity' in the historical method practiced by von Rad, especially in von Rad's exegesis of Gen. 15.6 ('And he believed the LORD; and he reckoned it to him as righteousness'). Von Rad follows the Pauline-Lutheran way of interpretation [of Gen. 15.6]. His assumption that 'only faith...brings man into a right relationship' implies an exclusion which is not to be found in the Hebrew Bible and certainly not in the J document, the Pentateuchal source responsible for this verse as well as for Gen. 26.5, which notes the reservoir of merit established by Abraham's observance of law...von Rad also ignored completely the possibility that it is Abraham who is doing the reckoning and God who is being reckoned righteous.52

Summary and Conclusions B. Childs addressed the question of pre-Sinai law in a comment on Exod. 16.4 ('...whether they will walk in my law [TnTD] or not'). His comments serve to summarize concisely the landscape of interpretation: The Patriarchs had not received the law. Nor were the sons of Jacob under its imperative throughout the period of slavery and even during the exodus. Of course, this theological principle was not carried through blessing for themselves, because you have obeyed my voice'; Gen. 26.4b-5 supra. 51. See J. Levenson's critique of Wright and Eichrodt' s subordination of law to soteriology. He argues that the law is a sign of the benevolence of God. Jon Levenson, Sinai and Zion: An Entry into the Jewish Bible (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1985), pp. 2-45. Although laws are presented as a part of the historical covenant, their context is prior to the covenant, that is, in creation. Jon Levenson, 'The Sources of the Torah: Psalm 119 and the Modes of Revelation in Second Temple Judaism', in P.D. Miller, P. Hanson and S.D. McBride (eds.), Ancient Israelite Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), pp. 559-74. 52. Jon Levenson, 'Why Jews Are Not Interested in Biblical Theology', in J. Neusner, Baruch Levine, and Ernest Frerichs (eds.), Judaic Perspectives on Ancient Israel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), p. 303.

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Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative with complete consistency as passages such as Exod. 16.4 demonstrate. Nevertheless, the law was given to Moses at Sinai and only then was Israel constituted. Rabbinic Judaism blurred this schema somewhat in assigning to Abraham full knowledge of the law (M. Qid. 4.14, cited by Amir, 'Gesetz' TRE 13, 54).53

Here we see the typical either/or characterization in dealing with preSinai law. Either the law had not been received, in which case the pre-Sinai references to and implications of law must be dismissed as the hand of an inconsistent redactor ('this theological principle was not carried through with complete consistency'), or Abraham had knowledge of the whole law.54 There is a middle ground between these options, and it is the intent of this thesis to begin to demonstrate how broad that ground is. The Exod. 16.4 text is consistent with many implications in the Genesis narrative that the patriarchs, though they did not have the formulations of Sinai, nonetheless had some law akin to it. While the authors surveyed have shown some interest in the literary (narrative) and theological (creational) context of law, a close reading of the Abraham narrative from the perspective of law has not been done. Law as a factor in the study of pre-Sinai narrative is simply overlooked. For example, 'how' does Gen. 26.5 mean ('Abraham obeyed my voice, and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes and my laws')? How does a reference to Abraham's law-keeping function rhetorically in the over-arching narrative? Historical explanations and

53. Childs, Old and New Testaments, p. 535. 54. That is, God must have revealed the whole law to Abraham; it just isn't recorded. Another theological explanation is supplied by Sailhamer, who harmonizes the reference by asserting that here Law = Faith. John H. Sailhamer, 'The Mosaic Law and the Theology of the Pentateuch', WTJ 53 (1991), pp. 241-61. For the rabbinical discussion concerning Abraham's full or partial knowledge of the law, see H. Freedman and M. Simon (eds.), Midrash Kabbah (9 vols.; London: Soncino Press, 1939); The Talmud of Babylonia, III (trans. J. Neusner; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984), p. 75, Yom. 28b; L. Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, I (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1968), p. 292. The problem is that the whole law is not evident in the Abraham narrative. Thus great discussions congeal around such events as Abraham's hospitality to the three visitors at Mamre, where he feeds them both milk and meat (Gen. 18.8). Cf. also Nahum Sarna, Genesis (Jewish Publication Society of America Torah Commentary; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1992), pp. 376-77.


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theological interpretations by historical critics do not address satisfactorily this verse or the many legal referents in Genesis. Historical critics have had the effect of dismissing the interpretive questions, usually by assigning the verse to a late redactor or offering theological explanations extrinsic to the text. Other Genesis commentators simply ignore the legal referents.55 The need for further investigation into the relationship between the patriarchal narrative and the Sinai traditions has been noted by R.W.L. Moberly.56 He quotes Coats, with whom he shares this concern: 'One of the pressing problems, as yet unresolved in the scholarly discussion of the Pentateuch, concerns the relationship between the patriarchs and Moses.'57 A rhetorical and theological reading of the oughts and ought nots of the Abraham narrative will contribute to that discussion through a representation of legal referents that may be compared to the Sinai traditions. Theological Interests: Creation, Wisdom and Law Studies in wisdom literature and creation have led to a renewed interest in the study of biblical law.58 These studies provide a starting point for 55. Ephraim A. Speiser, Genesis (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), p. 203; Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 16-50 (eds. David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker; WBC, 2; Dallas: Word Books, 1994). Wenham says they are only a feature of rhetorical style. 56. R.W.L. Moberly, The Old Testament of the Old Testament: Patriarchal Narratives and Mosaic Yahwism (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), p. 146. 57. George W. Coats, Moses (JSOTSup, 57; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987), p. 38. See also George W. Coats, Genesis: With an Introduction to Narrative Literature (FOTL, 1; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983). 58. Walter Brueggemann, 'The Loss and Recovery of Creation in Old Testament Theology', TTod 53 (July 1996), pp. 177-90. Brueggemann provides a brief summary of three movements in the history of creation theology in the last 70 years: (a) the marginalization of theologies of creation in the context of German national socialism, (b) important paradigm shifts in the 1960s and 1970s that led to the recovery of creation theology, and (c) proposals that have contributed to the recovery of creation theology. See G. von Rad, The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays (trans. E.W. Truman Dicken; London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966); Wright, Environment; Claus Westermann, 'Creation and History in the Old Testament', in Vilmos Vajta (ed.), The Gospel and Human Destiny (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1971), pp. 11-38; Claus Westermann, Creation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971); P.M. Cross, Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic: Essays in the History of Religion of

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the investigation of legal referents in the pre-Sinai narratives. A survey of the studies (which most directly contribute to the study of biblical law) will demonstrate the variety of ways that scholars have described the relationships among creation, wisdom and law. The studies have not dealt fully with Genesis texts, however, nor with the relationship among creation, wisdom and law that is found in Genesis. The thesis that legal referents are best understood in the context of creation presses to the prior descriptions of these relationships. This brief review of scholarship will lead to a helpful perspective for thinking about creation, wisdom and law in Genesis. Creation and Wisdom One's understanding of the relationship between the genre of wisdom and the idea of creation is determined, in part, by the prior question of one's interest. If one studies the development of wisdom literature, then the idea of creation may be understood as a construct or 'creation' of the sages of Israel. For example, Perdue states that 'the wisdom tradition in ancient Israel is the product of sages from the tribal beginning of Israel well into the Hellenistic period'.59 This developmental underIsrael (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973); Hans Heinrich Schmid, Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit: Eine Untersuchung zur altorientalischen und israelitischen Weisheitsliteratur (Berlin: Alfred Tb'pelmann, 1966); Gerhard von Rad, Wisdom in Israel (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972); B.W. Anderson, Creation Versus Chaos (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); B.W. Anderson, From Creation to New Creation: Old Testament Perspectives (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994); W. Harrelson, From Fertility Cult to Worship (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969); Rolf P. Knierim, The Task of Old Testament Theology', HBT6 (1984), pp. 25-57; Jon Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Omnipotence (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988); Terence E. Fretheim, Exodus (ed. James Luther Mays; Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching; Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1991); Terence E. Fretheim, 'The Plagues as Ecological Signs of Historical Disaster', JBL 110 (1991), pp. 38596; J. Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Cf. also Walter Brueggemann, 'The Uninflected Therefore of Hosea 4.1-3', in Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert (eds.), Reading from This Place (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), pp. 231-49. 59. Leo G. Perdue, 'Cosmology and the Social Order in the Wisdom Tradition', in John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue (eds.), The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), p. 457. See also Leo G. Perdue, Wisdom and Creation: The Theology of Wisdom Literature (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), p. 340.


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standing of wisdom may be observed in histories of the growth of wisdom thinking.60 From this reasonable perspective, creation may be seen as a category of wisdom, and creation texts may be viewed as a subcategory of the wider wisdom literature. On the other hand, if one's first interest is not in the historical development of the genre of wisdom, but in the substantive creation and the canonical relationship between wisdom and creation, then creation will be understood as the premise of all sapiential speech.61 To use a common wisdom metaphor, wisdom is a 'word' about creation. Or, to use the metaphor of artistry, creation is the canvas of wisdom's art.62 This is congruent with the presupposition of the canon, in which Genesis has first place.63 Creation provides the context for all that follows it. References to law in the Genesis narrative are best understood within that provision. The problem of understanding the relationship between creation and wisdom stems from the historical-critical approach, which is interested in creation first as an idea. This idea developed late in Israel's history. As a result, creation has been viewed as a late product of Israel's retelling of the story of redemption. 'Israel's knowledge of God as Creator has thereby often assumed theological priority over God's creative activity itself.'64 If creation is first understood, however, as a substantive reality that is the basis of wisdom's appeal, then one may properly speak of it as a context for wisdom and law. The wisdom texts themselves support this perspective, as does the canonical position of Genesis. In the world of the canon, creation is the firmament of wisdom (even though it may be an idea developed later, in the world behind the text). Unless one maintains the notion that there is no actual creation, and that it is only a construct of the sages, then one must grant that

60. See, for example, the historical flow of Perdue's and Crenshaw's tables of contents. 61. 'Substantive' creation means the world and all that is in it. Childs refers to this as the 'ontic' dimension of creation faith, in contrast to the noetic dimension. Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970), p. 110. 62. Perdue, 'Cosmology and the Social Order', pp. 330-31. 63. On the significance of this position, see Terence E. Fretheim, 'The Reclamation of Creation', Int45 (October 1991), pp. 354-64 (55). 64. Fretheim, 'Reclamation', pp. 354-55.

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creation functions as more than a subcategory of wisdom; indeed, it is the ground upon which the house of wisdom is built (Prov. 9.1). Scholarship has long recognized the appeal to creation within wisdom literature, although construing it in different ways. Zimmerli placed Israel's wisdom tradition within a theology of creation. Von Rad argued that wisdom reflection was located with the Yahwistic tradition but approached God through human experience and nature. Wisdom's unique witness is that there is 'a divine order built into the structure of reality'.65 Perdue describes creation as the 'center' of wisdom literature: Each of the wisdom texts finds its theological center in creation. By the activation of memory that draws on the metaphors contained in past traditions, the sages who composed and compiled this literature engaged the past to inform their own views of reality... They believed that in listening to the voice of wisdom in creation they possessed the means to come to at least a limited knowledge of God, the world, and humanity and thus to live an existence that ultimately was good.66

Even if the first chapter of Genesis were absent from the canon, one would have to concede that such texts as Psalms 8, 100 and 104, Job 28, Proverbs 8 and Sirach 24 imply the substantive creation as the foundational premise of wisdom. As Perdue states, 'sapiential cosmology is rooted in a theology of creation'.67 Creation, Wisdom, and the Canon. The role of creational thought in relation to biblical wisdom is, in part, a function of its role in the canon. James Crenshaw argues that creation ought to be moved from the periphery to the center. The issue begins with creation's function in relation to the canon. The function of creation theology within the thought of the sages remains something of a mystery to this day... Any attempt to provide such an analysis of creation theology within the framework of wisdom needs to clarify the role of creation in the total thought of Israel before going on to demonstrate the distinctiveness of the function of creation theology in wisdom literature.68

65. Childs, Old and New Testaments, p. 115. 66. Perdue, Wisdom and Creation, p. 340. 67. Perdue cites the work of R. Albertz, H.-J. Hermisson, P. Doll, D.A. Knight, R. Knierim and H.H. Schmid. Perdue, 'Cosmology and the Social Order', p. 463. 68. James L. Crenshaw, Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom (New York: Ktav, 1976), p. 26.


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Crenshaw observes the consensus that creation is not a primary datum of Israel's faith, but plays a subservient role to redemption. Notwithstanding its canonical place, creation has functioned to support saving history. Crenshaw wants to reassess this peripheral place based on three issues. These three issues point to more than an ancillary place for creation. First, the threat of chaos in cosmic, political and social realms evokes a response in terms of creation theology.69 This threat is complicated by 'a conviction about the bankruptcy of human wisdom'. Wisdom responds by turning to the Creator.70 Secondly, creation functions as defense of divine justice. Attacks on divine justice are countered by praise for a just Creator.71 Thirdly, the centrality of the question of God's integrity in Israelite literature places creation theology at the center of the theological enterprise. Crenshaw notes Sirach's general creation theology:72 [CJreation supplies the principle of order that holds together the cosmic, political, and social fabric of the universe. When this assumed order gives way, appeal to creation surfaces explicitly in wisdom literature for by this means the sage hopes to persuade himself and others that wholeness is available even when chaos reigns. But the difficulty in attaining the wholeness that has been postulated converts creation faith, once a comforting affirmation, into cause for anxiety and dismay. The final breakthrough comes when Sirach moves away from a rational defense of divine justice to a mighty crescendo of praise of the Creator who has made all things in pairs, that is good and evil. By this tour de force even the forces of chaos are enlisted in the divine service, so that both the original creative act and creatio continua bear witness to the justice of God.73

Crenshaw concludes, therefore, that traditions about creation are at the heart of the theological enterprise and not on the outer fringes.

69. Creation cannot be divorced from the concept of chaos. See Crenshaw, Studies, p. 27. 70. Crenshaw, Studies, p. 30. Crenshaw notes especially Qoheleth and Sirach, but also Prov. 30.1-4. 71. Crenshaw, Studies, p. 33. Such a defense is necessitated by the first point, 'the threat of chaos in every dimension of life'. 72. See especially Sir. 24. 73. Crenshaw, Studies, pp. 33-34, his italics.

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Creation does, however, play a secondary role, not to salvation history, but to the concept of justice.74 In a word, the question of divine justice cannot be separated from that of creation, both in the sense of an initial ordering and continual creation in the face of defiant chaos within man and external to him... The function of creation theology in my view is to undergird the belief in divine justice. Consequently I agree with Schmid that creation belongs to the fundamental question of human existence, namely the integrity of God.75

In what sense is creation functionally secondary to the concept of justice, if it undergirds it? Is creation a minor underpinning, or is it the fundamental presupposition? Again, subtly, even in Crenshaw's argument, the focus on Sirach's 'idea' shifts one's thinking to the world behind the text. Within that history behind the text, 'creation' is considered as a construct, ancillary to justice and of secondary importance in the interpretation of texts and the canon. If, however, substantive creation, which is represented in the biblical text and its theology, is a primary concern, creation must be considered the context and ground of the belief in divine justice presented in the wisdom texts. It is of some import that K. Koch and H.H. Schmid have previously argued for the opposite of Crenshaw's rubric, and for placing justice under the rubric of creation. K. Koch argued that the biblical concept of the administration of justice is best understood in the context of creation, and specifically as a relationship between deed and consequence, rather than as a punishment or reward from God.76 It is interesting that the question here concerns which creational context best accommodates the concept of biblical justice. Certain deeds have consequences 'administered' either by the structures of creation or by the Creator. For Koch the question is how directly the consequences of deeds are administered in the creational context. H.H. Schmid, drawing support from K. Koch's philological work, argued that the Old Testament term p"T2£ designates a concept of cosmic world order (much like the Egyptian term ma 'at) and shares a common ancient Near East background. Israel took over the concept of p"T2S from 74. See Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law, p. 73. 75. Crenshaw, Studies, p. 34. 76. K. Koch, 'Is There a Doctrine of Retribution in the Old Testament?', in J.L. Crenshaw (ed.), Theodicy in the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), pp. 1-42.


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the Canaanites to denote a redemptive, harmonious order of the world that Yahweh purposed for his creation. Rather than grounding 'righteousness in the concept of covenant, it ought to be understood as originating in a comprehensive cosmic order which spanned the areas of law, wisdom, nature, war, cult and kingship.'77 While this work steps outside the canonical context, its corroborative import may be seen in the exegesis of specific texts in Genesis. Schmid argued further that the Old Testament concept of justification/righteousness has its proper locus in ontology rather than in story: 'So it happens generally in the Old Testament, as similarly in the ANE, that wherever justice is executed and righteousness occurs, an event of creation is in progress.'78 Childs's criticism of Schmid's history of religions schema notwithstanding, Israel's witness always assumes creation as the locus of the just act.79 Deutero-Isaiah provides the most explicit texts regarding the canonical relationship between creation and redemption history. P.B. Harner has argued convincingly that creation faith has more than a subservient role in relation to salvation. Deutero-Isaiah uses creation to demonstrate God's unique and immanent action in Israel's history.80 R. Rendtorff supports this thesis by demonstrating (with Isaiah's disputation oracles) how a contemporary historical situation is addressed by means of the creation tradition's 'immediacy and existential dimension'.81

77. Hans Heinrich Schmid, Gerechtigkeit als Weltordnung: Hintergrund und Geschichte der alttestamentlichen Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes (ed. Gerhard Ebeling; BHT 40; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1968), p. 23. 78. Hans Heinrich Schmid, 'Rechtfertigung als Schopfungsgeschelen: Notizen zur alttestamentlichen Vorgeschichte eines neutestamentlichen Themas', in J. Friedrich, W. Pohlmann and P. Stuhlmacher (eds.), Rechtfertigung: Festschrift fur Ernst Kdsemann zum 70 Geburtstag (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1976), p. 407. 79. 'Schmid simply substitutes a history of religions schema for von Rad's form critical analysis of Israel's theological witness without ever addressing his problem.' While Childs is correct in this analysis, the 'problem' he mentions was created by their interest in the history of composition and the history of the formation of traditions of witness. Childs says he will address the 'problem' of the ontic dimension of creation faith 'below'. His commentary there (p. 116) is brief and maintains its history of composition stance. Childs, Old and New Testaments, pp. 109-10, 116. 80. P.B. Harner, 'Creating Faith in Deutero-Isaiah', VT 17 (1967), pp. 298-306. 81. Rolf Rendtorff, 'Die Theologische Stellung des Schopfungsglaubens bei Deuterojesaja', ZTK 51 (1954), pp. 3-13.

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Von Rad's changing position on the importance of wisdom and creation theology is sketched by Rendtorff. While von Rad finally allowed for a wider role for wisdom and creation in Israel's faith, he concluded that, from the perspective of the history of traditions, it was 'irreconcilable' with election and redemption faith.82 Rendtorff disagreed, however, arguing from wisdom texts that redemptive history is 'embedded in the world which God has created'.83 He argued, notably from Job and Isaiah, that it is a 'total cohesion which the Hebrew Bible depicts for us. [It is] precisely the framework [of creation] whose restoration is at issue here.'84 Childs considers the move toward creation significant in DeuteroIsaiah, but relies on von Rad, concluding that creation is an 'ancillary' doctrine of the canon, never able to attain to 'independent existence in its own right.85 Childs thinks of creation first as an idea of the prophets, and not as a substantive reality for them. It is Deutero-Isaiah who makes the most extensive use of creation themes from among all the prophets. In a famous passage (51.9ff.) the prophet makes use of the creation tradition as a battle with Rahab, the dragon, and then fuses into one moment of power the creation, the exodus, and the eschatological return to Zion. As we previously saw, von Rad has argued the point convincingly that creation for the prophets did not develop independently of God's historical redemption. The prophetic emphasis upon the creation of the new heavens and new earth (65.17ff.; 66.22f.) forcibly illustrates the one redemptive will of God from the beginning to the end.86

For this conclusion, Childs shares von Rad's interest in the history of composition of the text, that is, the world behind the text. An interest in the canonical text itself, however, leads to quite another result. Creation is more than an 'illustration' of the redemptive will of God. In the over82. Rolf Rendtorff, Canon and Theology: Overtures to an Old Testament Theology (eds. W. Brueggemann et al.\ trans. M. Kohl; Overtures to Biblical Theology; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), p. 103. 83. Rendtorff, Canon and Theology, p. 106. 84. Rendtorff, Canon and Theology, p. 107. 85. Gerhard von Rad, 'The Theological Problem of the Old Testament Doctrine of Creation', in B. Anderson (ed.), Creation in the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), pp. 53-64.1 doubt that the idea of creation is 'late' or underdeveloped in Israel's thought. It must have been so fundamentally assumed early in Israel's history that it was not even a subject for discussion or writing. 86. Childs, Old and New Testaments, pp. 114, 109.


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arching story of redemption, creation is the necessary reality from which redemption emerges, and for the sake of which redemption history is even necessary. That the development of the idea or 'tradition' of creation and the composition of its texts came later as the result of a crisis in Israel's redemption history does not mitigate its role as the context, premise and firmament of the whole biblical text. It is, after all, creation that must be redeemed. That it was not developed fully nor given independence as a written doctrine or genre ought not to preclude the interpreter from discerning the premise and the ground on which redemption in the canon is built. Creation's explicit development in relation to redemption in Isaiah ought not be viewed as an exception, but the manifestation of an implied norm that is so deeply embedded that its articulation only became necessary in the most fundamental theological crisis. When the structured memories and retelling of the extraordinary acts of God that saved and formed Israel are muted and even silenced in the immediate horrors of genocide and exile, the voice of ordinary experiences of creation can be heard. Perhaps only this ordinary voice can convince the disenfranchised of the continuing providence of God. Wisdom and Law The relationship between wisdom and law has been viewed from many perspectives. Gerstenberger's interest was in the origin of the formation of biblical law. He argued that law had its beginning in the wisdom circles of the sages.87 Moshe Weinfeld posited a similar thesis for the monarchical period.88 Wisdom and moral law are connected in the primary sources of Deut. 6.8 and 11.18 and Prov. 7.3. These verses from a book of wisdom and from a book of law share almost identical language: 'Bind them about your neck, write them on the tablets of your heart.' Blenkinsopp's characterization of this relationship is helpful. Wisdom and law are 'two great streams' that 'flow together', finally converging in Hellenistic Judaism.89 Childs says they seem to 'run

87. Gerstenberger, We sen und Herkunft. 88. M. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). 89. Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law, p. 14. Cf. John J. Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1997). Collins argues that wisdom subsumes torah.

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parallel' to each other.90 The nature of the later convergence of wisdom and law has some bearing on the study of law, especially in their mutual relationship to creation. The convergence of these streams John Gammie calls the 'torahization of wisdom'.91 As Childs notes, 'It has been customary to speak of the absorption of wisdom into the all-embracing concept of law.'92 The primary evidence for this move toward torah is found in Sirach, Wisdom of Solomon, and Baruch.93 Childs, agreeing with von Rad, argues that the effect is rather the reverse'. Sirach is an illustration of Israel's ability to sapientalize not only the law, but the whole of her tradition. For example, in Sirach, Wisdom of Solomon and Baruch there is a re-telling of Israel's narrative tradition, but from the perspective now of wisdom (Sir 44.Iff; Wis 10.Iff.; Bar. 3.24ff., 4.5ff.). Thus wisdom becomes the means by which Israel's very different approaches to divine reality...could be brought into divine harmony.94

Blenkinsopp agrees that torah assimilates to wisdom.95 Von Rad and Childs argue that most scholars misinterpret the direction of assimilation because they miss the dynamic behind the identification of wisdom with torah in the pertinent texts.96 It is, again, a primary interest in the history of the development of composition behind the text that drives this interpretation, rather than Childs's canonical-theological approach. J.L. Mays has offered the most helpful argument for the canonical relationship of wisdom and law by means of his work on the torah

90. Childs, Old and New Testaments, p. 138. 91. John G. Gammie on the 'torahization' of wisdom and the 'eschatolization' of wisdom in John G. Gammie, 'From Prudentialism to Apocalypticism: The Houses of the Sages amid the Varying Forms of Wisdom', in John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue (eds.), The Sage in Ancient Israel and the Ancient Near East (WinonaLake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), pp. 479-97. 92. Childs, Old and New Testaments, p. 189. 93. Sir. 24.1 If; Wis. 6.1-2, 9.9-10; Bar. 4.1-2. 94. Childs, Old and New Testaments, p. 189-90. 95. Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law, p. 140. The assimilation of torah by wisdom stands over against Judaism, in which torah is the means of approach to the divine reality. 96. von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, p. 244; Childs, Biblical Theology, p. 189. See Sir. 24.1 If; Wis. 6.1-2, 9.9-10; Baruch 4.1-2.


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psalms.97 Psalms 1, 19, and 119 do not have a significant place in the established critical approaches to the Psalms and are the 'problem children of the Psalter'.98 By pairing them with Psalms 2, 18 and 118, the torah psalms may be read as a torah piety based in the instruction of the LORD.99 Moreover, these torah psalm 'leftovers' are the lens through which the rest of the Psalter's wisdom ought to be read.100 The context for the construal of language in the Psalms shifts. Semantic horizons are more those of intratextual relations and less groups of types and reconstructed cultic occasions. Form-critical and cult-functional questions are subordinated and questions of content and theology become more important. The so-called mixed type of psalm takes on an important role as a clue to the way the Psalms are to be viewed and understood.101

This insight results in a contextual shift for the interpretation of the whole Psalter. The shift to content and theology points to a type of piety that used the entire book as prayer and praise. On the one hand, the torah psalms wrestle with the problems of critical wisdom: the incongruence of conduct and consequence, and the hiddenness of God. On the other hand, torah piety, as reflected in these psalms, becomes the lens through which wisdom is viewed.102 Mays's two critical insights are that torah psalms should be read as wisdom and that the wisdom of the Psalter should be read through the lens of the torah psalms. For the interpreter of wisdom or law, the insight may be applied generally. One ought not assume that wisdom is assimilated by torah, nor that torah is assimilated by wisdom. Each perspective provides a necessary perspective on both.

97. James Luther Mays, 'The Place of the Torah-Psalms in the Psalter', JBL 106 (Spring 1987), pp. 3-12. 98. Mays, Torah-Psalms', p. 12. 99. Mays, Torah-Psalms', pp. 10-11. 100. Mays, Torah-Psalms', pp. 3, 12. Contra Noth, The Laws in the Pentateuch, pp. 85-107. Noth argues that these psalms represent a late and unfortunate [sic] establishment of the status of law outside the covenant, which led to Judaism's legalism. For a summary of critiques of Noth, see John Goldingay, Approaches to Old Testament Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2nd edn, 1990), pp. 45-47. See especially H.J. Kraus, 'Freude an Gottes Gesetz: Bin Beitrag, zur Auslegung der Psalmen 1, 19B und 119', EvT 10 (1950-51), pp. 337-51. 101. Mays, Torah-Psalms', p. 12. 102. Mays, Torah-Psalms', pp. 9, 12.

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Conclusions. The issue at hand concerns the relationships among creation, wisdom, and law. If one asks about the genres of literature, it is preferable to say that wisdom and law are 'two streams'.103 It is helpful to speak of wisdom and law as bodies and genres of literature that provide knowledge and understanding using the theme of creation. It is insufficient, however, to refer to creation only as a theme or a genre. Creation is also a substantive reality. As such, it is implied in and is the premise of all the literature of wisdom and law.104 The canonical and the theological schema used in this book can be diagrammed as follows: Substantive Creation > Wisdom (literature/thought) and Law (literature/thought)

Creation is the continuous presupposition of wisdom and law. Wisdom has creation as its context, studies it and uses it as a theme. Law shares the creational context with wisdom. Wisdom and law are two streams, or, to adjust the metaphor, two channels in a wide river, sometimes joining to flow together and more deeply. Creation and Law The relationship of law to creation is a relatively recent scholarly interest. The laws of Exodus and Leviticus, law in the Psalms and law in the Prophets have all been recently interpreted in relation to creation. In each case, the respective authors argue convincingly that in those texts creation is the proper context for understanding and interpreting law. Gustav Wingren argues that creation is the proper theological context for any discussion about law.105 As warrants, he offers that creation is placed first in the canon, that creation is the first source of order, that creation is the first source of life, that creation is the locus of any conversation about God, and that creation is the biblical worldview. More recently, Terence Fretheim has called for the 'reclamation of creation' 103. Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law, p. 14. 104. Perdue, 'Cosmology and the Social Order', pp. 461-62. Perdue makes this helpful shift when he says, 'Indeed, creation and Torah are the twin poles for authoritative knowledge, for the wisdom used by God in creating and sustaining the world now resides in nature and the text of the Torah (see Psalm 19)... But ben Sira indicates that the increasing prominence given to the Torah as the source of revelation does not displace creation (see Sir 39.1-35).' Note that 'torah' is capitalized here, and refers to the tradition of the five books, not law or instruction in general. 105. G. Wingren, Creation and Law (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1961).


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in Old Testament theology and in the interpretation of law:106 'As B. D. Napier stated long ago: "Hebrew Law, in its present total impression, has its clearest roots in creation faith". Even more, one could say that the law actually belongs to the sphere of creational thought.'107 Terence Fretheim offers canonical, theological, and textual warrants for this needed shift in perspective.108 He has also demonstrated the creational context of the exodus and of the giving of the law at Sinai. The themes of creation presented in Exodus 15 are particularly convincing.109 Jon Levenson has developed a position regarding law in the books of the Torah with a similar premise about its context and theology.110 He has demonstrated an interest in the relationship between creation and law with a specific interest in the creational context of biblical commandments. He suggests that six inter-biblical theologies offer explanations for 'commandment' in the Torah.111 While four of the theologies (commandment, casuistry, commemoration, etiology) are commonly recognized as originating in story ('mythos'} and are subservient thereby to the covenant, two others have an ethos that does not originate in the covenant. The first of these two is the ethos of wisdom, which includes laws that are explained pedagogically and relationally (cf. Ps. 119.66). The second is creational, or 'cosmological', theology. Cosmological theology means that creation is the context by which a commandment is established and understood. In the creational context, a commandment is explained as intrinsic to the natural order (Ps. 119.89, 'Your word is positioned in the heavens'). Levenson notes a strong relationship between creation and law in Psalm 119. He argues that the eight synonyms for 'law' found in Psalm 119, like the word (~n~I) of God, are set up in the heavens. The commandments that the psalmist practices, even those that may be Pentateuchal, constitute a kind of revealed natural law. They enable him to bring his own life into harmony with the rhythm of the cosmos and to 106. Fretheim, The Reclamation of Creation', pp. 354-65. This is the best brief summary of literature on the relationship between creation and law. 107. Fretheim, 'The Reclamation of Creation', p. 362. 108. Fretheim, The Reclamation of Creation', pp. 362-65. 109. Fretheim, Exodus, pp. 161-70. 110. Levenson, The Sources of the Torah', p. 569; Levenson, Sinai and Zion. 111. Jon Levenson, The Theologies of Commandment in Biblical Israel', HTR 73(1980), pp. 17-33.

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have access to the creative and life-giving energy that drives the world.112 That priestly legislation has a creational context has been demonstrated convincingly by Brueggemann.113 He argues that Israel understood Israel's ritual activity in worship as a creating and recreating of the world. This fundamental relationship between creation and worship is also the theme of F. Gorman's work on priestly legislation.114 Obedience in ritual activity was understood as performing actions that affected the created order.115 Priestly writers understood that 'incomplete creation' was 'finished' in the worshiping order of Israel around the tabernacle.116 Previously, the creation themes of so-called Deutero-Isaiah were noted. In the book of the prophet Amos, law also has a creational context.117 Amos's indictment against nations that weren't required to keep the law was based in creation: He was appealing to a kind of conventional or customary law about international conduct which he at least believed to be self-evidently right and which he thought he could count on his audiences familiarity with and acquiescence in... He sees moral conduct as a matter of conformity to a human convention held to be obviously universal, rather than to the overt or explicit demands of God: in other words, ethics in Amos is not simply a question of theonomy, as it is quite widely thought to be.118

The scholarship reviewed thus far shares the interest of my thesis that law ought to be interpreted in the context of creation. Examples given have argued that priestly law (Gorman), the law given at Sinai (Fretheim), commandments and law in the Psalms (Levenson) and appeals to law in the prophets (Barton) are properly interpreted when understood in a creational context. These works have offered an important 112. Levenson, 'The Sources of the Torah', pp. 561, 569. 113. Walter Brueggemann, Israel's Praise: Doxology against Idolatry and Ideology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), pp. 1-28. 114. Frank Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual: Space, Time and Status in the Priestly Theology (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990). 115. See treatment by Fretheim, 'The Reclamation of Creation', p. 364. 116. Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, pp. 230-32. 117. John Barton, Amos' Oracles against the Nations: A Study of Amos 1.3-2.5 (New York: Cambrige University Press, 1980). This monograph is an expanded version of a chapter of his doctoral thesis, The Relation of God to Ethics in the Eighth Century Prophets' (DPhil dissertation, Oxford University, 1974). 118. Barton, 'Relation of God to Ethics', p. 2.


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adjustment to understanding the relationship between biblical law and creation. Little attention has been given, however, to pre-Sinai law. A few brief exceptions pertain. In critiquing the subservience of law to covenant, J. Barr offers one example of law from the pre-Sinai narrative, that is, Jethro's advice to Moses (Exod. 18).119 C. Carmichael has given some attention to the pre-Sinai narrative as a source of Sinaitic law.120 His compositional theory provides many interesting interbiblical links between the pre-Sinai narrative and law.121 Carmichael's work does not, however, develop interpretations of the legal referents in the pre-Sinai narrative itself, but sees them as the occasion for understanding the writing of Sinaitic law.122 T. Fretheim is also concerned with the narrative context of law, as is evident in his salient and unique comment on Gen. 26.5: The language about the law certainly means that the author knows about the law given at Sinai. But this is no simple anachronism; it carries significance for understanding the place of law in the pre-Sinai period.123

Again, he is the first to consider the canonical significance of references to and implications of law in the pre-Sinai narrative: The original creation was not without law (Gen. 1.26-28; 2.14-16; cf. 9.1-6; 18.19, 25; and 26.5, the pre-Exodus, pre-Sinai placement of which must be taken with full seriousness!).124 119. Barr, Biblical Faith, pp. 98-99. 120. Calum M. Carmichael, The Origins of Biblical Law: The Decalogue and the Book of the Covenant (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Calum M. Carmichael, Law and Narrative in the Bible: The Evidence of the Deuteronomic Laws and the Decalogue (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). 121. Carmichael's interest is typified in the following question: 'Why do we find this sequence: a rule about the hire of an animal followed by one about seduction, then a rule about sorcery and then one about bestiality?' He concludes that the first table of the Decalogue was the result of an author's reflection on the golden calf incident (Exod. 32). The second table resulted from reflection on the narratives of Adam, Eve, Cain, and Abel. C. Carmichael, The Origins of Biblical Law, pp. 7, 37. 122. Even though Carmichael is working canonically, his question is still focused on the historical process of composition. His work is helpful for the synchronic interpretation of various texts, but his theory of composition is not convincing. See book reviews by R. Boyce in Int 41 (January 1987), pp. 86-87; A.D.H. Mayes in JTS 37 (1986), pp. 456-57; and Z. Falk in JR 67 (1987), pp. 533-34. 123. Terence E. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', in The New Interpreter's Bible, I (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), pp. 321-674. 124. Fretheim, 'The Reclamation of Creation', p. 363.

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It is the intention of this thesis to take that pre-Sinai placement seriously. Any investigation of biblical law ought to consider the role of creation and creation themes in its analysis. Further, the study of law in the pre-Sinai narrative will show, from a canonical perspective, a full range of law operative before the covenant of Sinai and set in the context of creation themes. This may add to our understanding of the wider canonical relationship between creation and law. Summary and Conclusion The first chapter has provided initial warrants from previous research for the study of law in Genesis. Three general areas of research and their contributions to the questions of the dissertation have been addressed: form-critical categories of law, historical-critical interests in legal referents in Genesis, and theological research in the areas of wisdom, law and creation. These areas of research have established a background and useful framework for the investigation of legal referents in Genesis. The first general area of research addressed has been form-critical categories of law and some preliminary examples of legal referents in Genesis. A survey of three form-critical categories of procedural law (commercial law, treaties and covenants, and juridical procedure) has demonstrated that Genesis has many texts that pertain to the study of pre-Sinai law, and that a full range of law is represented in the narrative. It has been noted that the categories of form criticism are helpful, as a diagnostic tool, for identifying legal referents in the pre-Sinai narrative, but that the interest in the setting behind the text is not shared in this book. Instead, this book is focused on the interpretation of the narrative and on the theological implications of the pre-Sinai canonical placement of the legal referents in that narrative. The second general area of research addressed has been the history of interpretation of law and its focused interest in the world behind the text. A summary of interpretations of the pre-Sinai narrative has revealed only passing comments concerning references to law and their function in the narrative. Historical interests in law have served to reconstruct the history of the legal sources, forms and settings that lie behind the biblical text, but little attention has been given to interpreting law in its canonical and narrative context. The curtailed treatment of the pre-Sinai legal referents has been the result of relegating them to a


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historical past, rather than treating them as rhetorically present. It has been argued that another contribution to this oversight in the history of interpretation of law has been a lack of awareness of how deeply the theological commitments and presuppositions of individual historical critics have influenced their interpretations. Theological interests have served to assign references to law in Genesis primarily to a covenantal context. While the authors surveyed have shown passing interest in the literary (narrative) or the theological (creational) context of law, a close reading of the Abraham narrative from the perspective of law has not been done. Law as a factor in the study of the pre-Sinai narrative has largely been overlooked. The third general area of research addressed has been the relationship between wisdom and creation, wisdom and law, and creation and law. A survey of the studies has demonstrated the variety of ways in which scholars have described these relationships. The thesis that legal referents are best understood in the context of creation presses to the prior question about these relationships. This brief review of scholarship has led to a helpful perspective that the context of creation ought to be considered in the interpretation of law. The studies surveyed have not dealt fully with Genesis texts, nor with the relationship among creation, wisdom and law that is found in Genesis. Although these studies have offered an important adjustment to understanding the relationship between biblical law and creation, little attention has been given to pre-Sinai law. It has been argued that the pre-Sinai placement of legal referents ought to be taken seriously by considering the role of creation and creation themes in their interpretation. It has been argued that there is a lacuna in the study of oughts and ought nots in the pre-Sinai narrative. One must ask, therefore, what methodology is best suited for such an investigation. It is argued in Chapter 2 that a variety of methods of the new literary criticism will serve to identify the signification of oughts in Genesis narrative. The argument will conclude that narratology is the most helpful approach for a close reading of the legal referents of the Genesis 18-20 narrative. It describes the antecedents for my methodology and presents warrants for its usefulness in answering the questions posed earlier and repeated here for the convenience of the reader:

50

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative 1. 2. 3.

What necessary actions or restraints (oughts and ought nots) are implied in the Abraham narrative? How are the oughts and ought nots implied? By what grammatical or rhetorical signs are they disclosed to the reader? How does this kind of implied law (command or prohibition) function theologically in its narrative and canonical context?

Chapter 2 METHODOLOGY: A PLURALITY OF METHODS FOR READING LEGAL REFERENTS IN PRE-SINAINARRATIVES

The thesis of this book is that a full range of law, measured by means of form-critical categories (as demonstrated in Chapter 1), is implied and operative in the Genesis narrative. These occurrences of law should not be dismissed from the narrative or its interpretation by means of the history of composition. Rather, indications of law ought to be seen as intrinsic to the narrative and interpreted in the context of the narrative. A sequential narrative reading leads to a recognition of the canonical significance of law in Genesis. An exegetical case study of implied oughts will delineate their occurrences in Genesis 18-20 and describe the literary and theological warrants by which these laws are implied. In this chapter it will be argued that the new literary criticism provides the most helpful methodologies for establishing this thesis. The general expression 'new literary criticism' refers to a plurality of approaches in biblical interpretation. This plurality includes methods for a close reading of narratives and for interpreting their rhetorical features, discourses and structures. It also shares a common focus on the final form of the text, a focus on the text rather than on the author, and a conviction that meaning is found by the reader within the literary signs of the text rather than in the world behind the text.l The general shift toward these presuppositions and methods in the areas of literary theory, hermeneutics and linguistics has been well documented.2 1. W. Randolf Tate, Biblical Interpretation (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1991), p. xviii; Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 12; Leo G. Perdue, The Collapse of History: Reconstructing Old Testament Theology(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), p. 241. 2. Tate, Biblical Interpretation', John Barton, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1996); Perdue, Collapse of History.

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The first section of this chapter, 'Rhetorical Criticism and Oughts Implied in Narratives', considers the various uses of the term 'rhetorical criticism' and describes its use in this book. This discussion is followed by a description of several methodologies that come under the rubric of rhetorical criticism: Robert Alter's work on the analysis of literary style, H.C. White's description of discourse analysis and Klaus Berger's argument for a 'new' form criticism. The use of the methods described by each of these authors is basic to the exegetical work of this dissertation. The second section, 'Interpreting Legal Referents within the World of the Text', will provide the general arguments of the 'new' literary method for interpreting biblical texts. This leads to a discussion of a positive role for 'history', or historical sources that are extrinsic to the text being interpreted. The basic methodology of this book is then gathered under the term 'narrative criticism'. The third section, 'Law in Narratives', will discuss previous work on Sinai law in narrative, identifying the useful moves in the work of David Damrosch, Terence Fretheim, and Thomas Mann. A discussion of helpful beginnings of various scholars for interpreting law in preSinai narratives follows. Finally, the few brief scholarly contributions made in the area of interpreting pre-Sinai legal referents will be summarized. Mark Powell describes narrative criticism, as it is presently practiced, as a collection of 'eclectic' methodologies. What has thus far been described certainly may be considered an eclectic methodology.3 Robert I. Letellier, following Alonso Schoekel, uses the term 'plurality' in a similar way to describe recent combined approaches to Old Testament research.4 3. Mark Powell, The Bible and Modern Literary Criticism: A Critical Assessment and Annotated Bibliography(New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 15. 4. Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 17. See also Luis Alonso Schoekel, Trends: Plurality of Methods, Priority of Issues', Congress Volume 40 (VTSup; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988). In his description of a plurality of approaches Schoekel includes narrative art, semantic fields, and the sociology of readership. Letellier's recent work on Gen. 18-19 is a fine example of a summary of literary analysis, with many of his own insights from close reading of the text. His argument is that there are thematic and narratological connections between Gen. 18 and 19. Britt rightly calls this 'an eclectic mixture of synchronic methods'. See Brian Britt, Critical Review of Books in Religion 9 (1996), pp. 1-2. Letellier is of limited use in this study because

2. Methodology

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Such a plurality is necessary for interpreting oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative. Not surprisingly, interpreting the narrative, as a narrative, requires the many tools of narrative criticism. In addition, my focus on oughts and ought nots requires the useful tools and resources of form criticism, specifically in the area of biblical law. As stated in Chapter 1, the terms 'ought' and 'ought not' are used to refer to a judgment formally or informally disclosed in a narrative as necessarily right (ought) or necessarily wrong (ought not). A narrative discloses an ought or an ought not when human behaviors or habitual conditions are disclosed beyond a reasonable doubt to be right or wrong. As such, they belong to the realm of law. Form-critical categories of law are necessary, therefore, as a guide for my discussion of oughts and ought nots in the narrative. On the other hand, most of the oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative are not explicit or presented in typical forms, such as direct commands or prohibitions. Instead, they are implied. I use the term 'implied ought' to refer to this kind of 'law', which is embedded in a narrative. By 'implied ought' I mean a legal or moral decision concerning human behavior or a habitual condition that is not explicitly stated as a command or prohibition. This decision is 'implied' in the narrative, usually by means of discourse between characters, by means of a narrator's description of a consequence to some action, or by some other literary convention or style (see Gen. 12.7; 13.8; 16.5; 19.9; 19.24; 20.9; 38.9-10; 35.2,; 42.21). Rhetorical Criticism and Oughts Implied in Narratives A variety of rhetorical critical tools are used in narrative analysis. Several of these rhetorical tools are helpful for interpreting oughts in the Abraham narrative. The most useful are narrative development, rhetorical elements of literary style and rhetoric as the art of persuasion. In his celebrated Society of Biblical Literature address, James Muilenberg called for a new understanding of Hebrew literary composition that he called 'rhetorical criticism'. He was interested in discerning rhetorical devices that indicate the limits of the literary unit and mark the sequences, movements and shifts in the author's thought.5 he gives almost no attention to the juridical procedures and legal referents in the text. 5. James Muilenburg, 'Presidential Address', JBL 88 (1969), pp. 1-18.

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In this book the development of thought in the narrative is treated without reference to the author. Attention is given to the rhetorical moves of the narrative in the development of plot and character and in features of style and the artful use of language. My appropriation of rhetorical criticism follows the common meaning of the term, namely, 'the literary analysis of stylistic features'. W.L. Holladay, Phyllis Trible, Meir Sternberg and Robert Alter all use the term to refer generally to the investigation of key words and motifs in a text. They use it to different ends, but this general sense is accepted.6 R. Alter summarizes which rhetorical devices he includes in his 'literary analysis' (which he uses as a synonym for rhetorical analysis): 'By literary analysis I mean the manifold varieties of minutely discriminating attention to the artful use of language, to the shifting play of ideas, conventions, tone, imagery, syntax, narrative viewpoint, compositional units, and much else.'7 Another use of the term 'rhetorical criticism' that is also assumed in this book refers to the analysis of text using classical rhetorical categories of persuasion. This approach has attended to means through which literary works achieve particular effects on readers. Persuasion as a rhetorical category is best described by G. Kennedy and by M. Sternberg.8 Sternberg argues that the Bible is 'ideological literature', which seeks to persuade its reader through the drama of reading.9 The narrator deals with all the questions a reader or listener would ask, in order to persuade the audience to his point of view. The biblical narrator is an ideological persuader.10 George Kennedy has described 6. William L. Holladay, 'Style, Irony, and Authenticity in Jeremiah', JBL 81 (1962), pp. 44-54; Phyllis Trible, God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978). 7. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, p. 12. 8. G.A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Meir Sternberg, The Bible's Art of Persuasion: Ideology, Rhetoric, and Poetics in Saul's Fall', HUCA 54 (1983), pp. 45-82. 9. Sternberg's subtitle is telling. Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). See also Sternberg, 'The Bible's Art of Persuasion', his Chapter 12, pp. 441-81. See also pp. 50, 179. 10. Sternberg, 'The Bible's Art of Persuasion', p. 46. Cf. the influential book by Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver; Notre Dame: University of

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and illustrated Aristotle's categories of rhetorical persuasion in his interpretations of New Testament texts. The three species of 'argument' (logos) form the basis of his method.11 My argument for the presence of law in the pre-Sinai narrative is based both on Sternberg's understanding of the narrator's point of view and on Kennedy's rendering of the inductive persuasive categories for biblical literature: Logical argument is of two forms, either inductive, which uses a series of examples to point to a general conclusion, or deductive... The examples [paradigms] used in inductive argument are drawn from myth or from nature or other sources. In the New Testament they are most commonly taken from Jewish history or from every day life and nature.12

The inductive power of persuasion in the physical phenomena of sickness and closed wombs in Abimelech's camp (Gen. 20.17-18) is not lost to most readers. Every community values health and fertility and will avoid their loss if possible. The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 19.24) must also seek to persuade the reader in some way. What these extreme examples persuade the reader to think ought not to be hastily concluded. For this I will employ many exegetical tools. Legal contexts are also implied, for example, in the vocabulary used in dialogues and in the juridical-type scenes. That dramatic physical phenomena (e.g. closed wombs and fire from heaven) have a specific persuasive role in the narrative is a claim that will be pursued in relation to the discourse and narration. The Abraham narrative is not presented as a persuasive speech. It is presented as a story that draws the reader into moral discourse and into the ethical paradigms it creates.13 As a story, its argumentation is more Notre Dame Press, 1969). They argue that the primary meaning of a text should be understood in terms of the persuasive effect of its rhetorical strategies. Cf. also Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn, 1982); Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). 11. The three species of argument are judicial (a forensic appraisal of the past), epideictic (present praise and blame) and deliberative (advice for the future). David Clines has also followed the classical rhetorical method: David J.A. Clines, David Gunn, and Alan Hansen (eds.), Art and Meaning: Rhetoric in Biblical Literature (JSOTSup, 19; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1982). 12. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, p. 16. Implied oughts in the Abraham narrative are, by way of classification, Invention-Internal, proof-Logosinduction. 13. See Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives. He argues that all literature (not just

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subtle than a persuasive speech and requires more than the tools of argumentation in classical rhetoric for its interpretation. The primary meaning of a narrative is not to be understood simply in terms of the persuasive effect of its rhetorical strategies.14 Both understandings of rhetorical criticism are necessary for the interpretation of oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative. On the one hand, the narrative is ideological and it does 'persuade'.15 Persuasion, as described by Kennedy and as understood by Sternberg, has helped to shape my eclectic methodology. On the other hand, rhetorical criticism, as it is defined by the tools of literary analysis, is necessary to the interpretation of thoughts of the Abraham narrative. Discernment of the content of oughts in the Abraham narrative is found in the literary analysis of the artful use of language and the play of ideas, and in the narrative viewpoint. Two authors, R. Alter and H.C. White, have demonstrated the rhetorical critical methods used in this interpretation of the oughts and ought nots of the Abraham narrative. Robert Alter's analysis of literary style gives attention to the role of type scenes and the function of indeterminacy. Alter's understanding of the role of the repetition of key word roots as a means to interpretation is helpful, as in the repetition of the roots QSEJ (judge) and U2H (wicked) in Genesis 18 and 19.16 The study of courtroom-type scenes is especially useful for interpreting the progression of the plot in the conversations between Abraham and God (Gen. 18.20-33) and among Abimelech, God and Abraham (20.1-18).17 Alter's understanding of indeterminacy and dissonance in the Abraham narrative is also a useful interpretive tool.18 Dissonance plays an important role in the interpretation of Abraham's questioning of God: 'Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?' (Gen. 18.25). The indeterminacy and ambiguity of Abraham's actions in calling Sarah his sister

sermons, essays and speeches) seeks to motivate and persuade. 14. See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric. 15. Sternberg argues that unless formalism is anchored in the relations between the narrator and the audience, it amounts to simply another mode of atomism. See Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, p. 23-41. 16. See Martin Buber, Schriften zur Bible, in Werker, II (Munich: Kosel, 1964), p. 131. Quoted and translated by Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, p. 93. 17. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, pp. 47-62, 95-96; cf. Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, pp. 408-409. 18. Alter, The Art of 'Biblical Narrative, p. 12.

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(Gen. 20.2) also have a central part in the interpretation of the whole narrative.19 It will be seen with the character of Abraham that in some instances ambiguity gives way, by means of a close reading, to coherence, whereas in some instances it does not. Discourse analysis, another of the many methods of narrative criticism, is also useful for an interpretive reading of oughts in the conversations of the Abraham narrative.20 My focus in discourse analysis is on micro-dialogues, which are a primary matrix of the Genesis narrative.21 H.C. White's employment of discourse analysis is helpful for discerning oughts in the Abraham narrative in two ways. The first is his definition of the narrative text 'as the union of the narrator's discourse and the character's discourse', particularly in 'semantic...implications for the effacement of the narrator's instance of speech behind the thirdperson form of discourse'.22 His development of this idea is useful in establishing the narrator's perspective, in tension with that of the characters, as having priority in the interpretive task. Secondly, his method is useful for establishing the priority of the speech of God. In Genesis 18-20, for example, God expresses opinions that imply that some action ought not be done. 18.20b

And how very grave their sin.

19. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, pp. 114-30. His heading is 'Characterization and the Art of Reticence'. On the art of reticence see also Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, pp. 228, 235-37, 250, 258. H.C. White, Narration and Discourse in the Book of Genesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 185. For the use of dissonance in a legal text, see P. Hanson, 'The Theological Significance of Contradiction within the Book of the Covenant', in G.W. Coats and B.O. Long (eds.), Canon and Authority: Essays in Old Testament Religion and Theology(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), pp. 110-31. 20. William L. Lane, Hebrews (eds. David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker; WBC, 47; Dallas: Word Books, 1991), p. Ixxxii. 21. 'The Micro-dialogue as the Matrix of the Genesis Narrative', Chapter 7 in White, Narration and Discourse. See P. Cotterell and M. Turner, Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1989). See Chapter 4, 'Between Narration and Dialogue', in Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, pp. 63-87. Cf. T. Dennis, review of H.C. White, Narration and Discourse in the Book of Genesis, Theology 95 (January 1992), pp. 51-52; G. Josipovici, review of H.C. White, Narration and Discourse in the Book of Genesis, JR 73 (April 1993), pp. 244-45. 22. White, Narration and Discourse, p. 41.

58 20.3b

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative You are about to die because of the woman whom you have taken, for she is a married woman.

These statements of opinion may be read as one voice among many voices of opinion. White argues convincingly that the text itself discloses the priority of God's spoken 'opinion' for the interpreter. The biblical narrative presents God as a voice from beyond the confines of even the text itself.23 In this way, the voice of God has the highest priority over against the characters of the text, including the narrator.24 Finally, my analysis of the Abraham narratives uses the results of form criticism as rhetorical elements. While I do not share the presuppositions and interests of form critics, they have provided the necessary vocabulary and categories for discussing kinds of law and legal genres encountered in the text.25 The method used here is not in itself form-critical, and the interest is not in the setting in life behind the 23. White, Narration and Discourse, pp. 3-22. White shows the failure of synchronic narrative theories to deal adequately with the divine voice. 24. Michael Goldberg, 'God, Acting and Narrative: Which Narrative? Which Action? Which God?', JR 68 (January 1988), pp. 39-56. H. White argues that this position ignores the semantic categories of discourse and discourse theory. The speech act requires an implicit agreement by the hearer to these conditions. If the hearer does not accede to them in the fourth register of the dialogical process, then the conversation will soon be terminated. This implicit agreement is what Falhault calls the illocutionary effect of the implicit factors in discourse. They represent the unconscious and conscious effects of the interpersonal, social experiences of the speaker which have created in her/him a real or imaginary subjective sense of her/ his place within the social and historical or cosmic system.' White, Narration and Discourse, p. 45. On the illocutionary force of God's speech, see Dale Patrick, Rendering of God in the Old Testament(ed. W. Brueggemann; Overtures to Biblical Theology; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), pp. 90-100. For White, the primary factor in this cosmic system is an observation concerning the creating voice of God in the narrative. The 'primal performative utterance of God' begins the over-arching narrative in Gen. 1.3, 'Let there be light'. White, Narration and Discourse, pp. 3, 40. 'Semantically, the basis...of the symbolic narrative is the micro-dialogue in which the central character encounters that mediating Voice... which opens the possibility of intersubjective existence. It is this fundamental insight into the positive significance of the linguistic forms as mediators of intersubjectivity which sets up the polarities...which then generate other possibilities of narrative development.' White, Narration and Discourse, p. 107. See Gen. 20.4a; 20.5b; 20.7b. 25. Clark, 'Law', pp. 99-139.

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text.26 The definitions provided by form critics, however, have established categories and a critical matrix that are valuable for speaking about law even when priority is given to the narrative itself. Further, the vocabulary of legal form-critical categories is helpful to the interpretation of the Abraham narrative when it is understood as part of the rhetoric of the text. Klaus Berger's arguments for this new use of form criticism are most helpful.27 He suggests that the 'forms' of form-critical scholarship be understood as rhetorical elements of the text. The 'classical' form-critical categories of law have been summarized by W. Malcolm Clark.28 Those that pertain to pre-Sinai law are three subcategories of 'procedural' law: juridical procedure, commercial law and treaties (including covenants).29 For the study of oughts in the Abraham narrative, juridical procedure is the most important. Boecker's work on 'accusation', 'evidence' and 'a pleading' in 'secular' juridical procedure is especially useful to a legal reading of the Genesis 20 narrative. 'Sacred' juridical procedure (with its minor differences from secular procedure) is appropriate to interpreting the arraignment and other court-like proceedings concerning Sodom in Genesis 18-19. Classical form critics compare biblical legal texts with those extrinsic to the biblical text in order to reconstruct life settings of law. A comparison of ancient Near Eastern law with occurrences of law in the biblical narrative, however, is irrelevant to determining what oughts are

26. For a discussion of oral form and literary genre see Barton, Reading the Old Testament, pp. 30-32. 27. Klaus Berger, 'Rhetorical Criticism, New Form Criticism, and New Testament Hermeneutics', in Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht (eds.), Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference (JSOTSup, 90; Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1993), pp. 390-96. He argues that 'everything that leads the reader's psyche towards a goal has to be regarded as a rhetorical element'. While I find Berger's argument concerning the rhetorical function of forms convincing, I modify his narrow definition of rhetoric as a persuasive argument. Berger, 'Rhetorical Criticism', p. 391. The forms of law in pre-Sinai narrative provide a more subtle persuasion, because they are implied. In these texts, legal categories are deeply embedded in the narrative. They are not presented directly as a means of persuasion. This difference, however, does not mitigate his basic argument for the semantic function of formal elements. 28. Clark, 'Law', pp. 99-139. 29. See the survey of Genesis texts by means of these categories in Chapter 1.

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implied in the narrative biblical text itself.30 This study does not attempt to verify the accuracy of the biblical witness through comparison with extrinsic material. Rather it seeks to describe what the text itself implies concerning oughts operative for the Abraham of the text. Comparisons with ancient Near Eastern laws are extrinsic to that purpose. Summary The referents of the term 'rhetorical criticism' are diverse. They include the development and progress of thought in a text, a reading of the art of its literary style and a study of the techniques of persuasion. Each of these is useful to the narrative analysis of oughts in the Abraham narrative. The sense in which Alter uses the term 'rhetoric' is especially helpful. Study of the repetition of key word roots, the comparison of type scenes and attention to indeterminacy and dissonance in the narrative are important tools for reading implied oughts in the narrative. Further, the analysis of the discourse, with a priority given to the voice of God, especially in the work of H.C. White, assists the interpreter in finding the signification of those oughts. Finally, categories of law, established by form-critical scholars, are necessary for speaking about implied law in general. They are helpful to the interpretation of the Abraham narrative when understood as part of the rhetoric of the text and, intertextually, as part of the canon. Interpreting Legal Referents within the World of the Text Interpreting legal referents in the pre-Sinai narrative is best done within 'the world of the text', which is, in general, the locus of the new literary criticism.31 When W.R. Tate speaks about the 'world of the text', he means the world of the final redaction of the text. The distinction between the world of the final form of the biblical text and the sources, written or oral, 'behind' the text is important to the study of pre-Sinai law. Explicit references to law and law-keeping in the narrative before Exodus 18 are typically identified with the hand of a late redactor, and are thereby devalued in the search for early sources or valued only as evidence of a Deuteronomist editor. A commitment to interpreting the text within the world of the text, however, accepts the references to law 30. See a list of comparisons by Harrelson in Chapter 1 at 'Commercial Law', p. 15. Harrelson, 'Law in the Old Testament', p. 78. 31. The phrase is used by Tate, Biblical Interpretation.

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as part of the narrative and seeks to understand them in that context.32 To speak of the 'world of the text' is to all but exclude what may be known about the world of the author(s) 'behind' the text: According to New Criticism, the author's intention and world are not important considerations for interpretation because the literary work itself is sufficient. The text is a literary entity which can stand on its own. Interpretation is limited to the text, meaning that the role of the author is for all practical purposes denied, or at least given no prominent role in interpretation. This, of course, demands an extremely close and careful reading of the text. The reader must give much attention to the various linguistic and literary relationships within the text.33

New literary critics are not interested in the history of composition or in the Bible as 'a scrapbook of corruptions, glosses, reductions, insertions, conflations, misplacings, and misunderstandings'.34 They assume the unity of the text. New literary critics are interested in the text itself, as it is. Robert Polzin summarizes the situation: If...we assume that many gaps, dislocations, and reversals in the biblical text may profitably be viewed as the result of the use of several different viewpoints within the narrative, then, whether the present text is the product either of a single mind or of a long and complicated editorial process, we are still responsible for making sense of the present text by

32. Another benefit of interpreting legal referents within the world of the text is that this commitment establishes the narrative resources of intertextuality for interpretation. For example, references to law and law-keeping in Gen. 26.5 ('because Abraham obeyed my voice and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes, and my laws') and Gen. 18.19 ('that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice') and Exod. 16.4 ('that I may prove them, whether they will walk in my law or not') are, by means of intertextuality, pertinent to the interpretation of pre-Sinai law in Gen. 18-20. Gen. 26.5 is related by its explicit reference to Abraham's law-keeping, and Exod. 16.4 by means of allusion. Allusion is one of the three kinds of intertextuality named by Tate, Biblical Interpretation,pp. 93-94. 33. Tate, Biblical Interpretation, p. xviii. Tate quotes Abrams, 'intention is irrelevant to the literary critic, because meaning and value reside within the text of the finished, freestanding, and public work of literature itself.' M.H. Abrams, A Glossary of Terms (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981), p. 83. For the presuppositions of close reading, see Perdue, Collapse of History, pp. 240-41. 34. Kenneth Gros Louis, Literary Interpretations of Biblical Narratives, II (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1982), pp. 14-15.

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Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative assuming that the present text, in more cases than previously realized, does make sense.35

The general methods of interpretation that operate under this assumption include such diverse disciplines as narrative analysis, rhetorical criticism, discourse analysis, canonical criticism, structuralism and deconstruction. While these approaches are similar in their commitment to a unified text, each locates the meaning of a text differently. For example, canonical criticism seeks meaning in relation to the whole biblical text, structuralism seeks the text's deep structural assumptions, and deconstruction decodes the text against the plot and characters. Narrative criticism, as it is used in this dissertation, seeks to discern the argument of the text and its effect upon the reader through the agencies of plot and character. Narrative criticism has two foci: the story and the reader.36 It intentionally brackets the earlier historical questions of the history of composition and authorial intention as defined in these terms: [N]arrative criticism works with the text as 'world-in-itself. Other approaches tend to fragment, in part because their purpose is to put elements of the text into contexts outside the text; so, for example, biblical scholars may identify the feeding of the five thousand as a historical event in Jesus' time or as an oral story emerging from the early church or as a vehicle for a theological truth...or as a story which reveals the author's intentions, or as instructions to Mark's community. Narrative criticism brackets these historical questions and looks at the closed universe of the story-world.37

The new literary methodologies do not necessarily exclude the supportive role of historical comparison.38 The lexical and semantic resources of extrinsic texts aid the narrative-critical task.39 They set parameters for Hebrew and Greek texts by means of textual criticism. In translation, they provide lexical parameters of word meanings. The 35. Robert M. Polzin, Moses and the Deuteronomist (New York: Seabury, 1980), p. 17. 36. Stephen D. Moore, Literary Criticism and the Gospels: The Theoretical Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. xxi. See the summary of this section for a repetition of my interest as a reader and interpreter. 37. David Rhoads, 'Narrative Criticism and the Gospel of Mark', JAAR 50 (September 1982), pp. 411-34 (413). 38. See Perdue, Collapse of History, p. 259. 39. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, p. 13. His positive example is from Ras Shamra.

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study of ancient syntax, literary conventions and genres is necessary so that grammatical context may shed light on 'dynamic equivalency' in translation.40 In the study of legal genres, the seven ancient Near Eastern codes have provided form critics with some depth perception, by means of comparison with biblical law. While equivalencies (Mendenhall) or sharp contrasts (Wright) between biblical and other ancient Near Eastern texts have both been overrated, the background material has at least helped to establish form-critical categories. Whatever the comparative material is, it offers a critical moment in the interpretation of law within the biblical narrative.41 Its role ought to be limited, in keeping with narrative critical assumptions, to use as secondary data for the study of legal genres, and not considered primary to the interpretation of the text or the world of the text. Narrative Criticism Narrative critics who use theoretical narratology in their work typically cite Chatman's 'narrative communication model'.42 His model makes these distinctions: Real author > [Implied author > (Narrator) > (Narratee) > Implied reader] > Real reader

Moore interprets Chatman's narratological model for his own work in narrative criticism: 'The communication from the real (actual, historical) author to the real reader is conducted instrumentally through the personae within the [brackets].'43 This theoretical basis helps to establish the text and the world of the text as the proper objects of inquiry. Speaking of an implied author (as distinct from the real author), for example, keeps the interpreter's focus on features intrinsic to the world of the text. This is helpful to understanding implied law in the pre-Sinai narrative, for implications and standards of judgment are necessarily intrinsic to the text. The standards of judgment are self-referring. The 40. Tate, Biblical Interpretation, pp. 1-27. For an example, see my argument for the translation of p'TO and iJIZh at Gen. 18.23 in Chapter 3. 41. Cf. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law. 42. Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 151. Rhoads and Michie use Chatman's narratological story and discourse model to organize their study of Mark. David Rhoads and Donald Michie, Mark as Story: An Introduction to the Narrative of a Gospel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982). 43. Moore, Literary Criticism, pp. 46, 51.

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task of exegesis in this 'world', thereby, is to discern the point of view of the narrator.44 Narratology provides an important theoretical basis for understanding narrative, but narrative criticism provides better methodologies for the exegetical task. The definition of narrative criticism used here is quite broad, principally including 'plot, conflict, character, setting, narrator, point of view, standards of judgment, the implied author, ideal reader, style, and rhetorical techniques'.45 Narrative criticism uses a plurality of methods. For the purposes of my work, the term 'narrative criticism' includes the use of rhetorical categories developed by R. Alter and M. Sternberg, classical rhetorical analysis, discourse and critical categorizations of law, as well as the general narrative categories of plot and character development practiced by Stephen Moore and David Rhoads. These tools of biblical narrative criticism are well suited for disclosing and interpreting the implied law that is embedded in the pre-Sinai text. My interest, however, differs from these narrative critics' typical interest in determining the 'meaning' of the text. The interests of those who have developed these tools are somewhat varied, but even their general agreement upon the search for the 'meaning' of the text is secondary to the interest of my eclectic approach. The primary interest of this thesis is to determine what oughts are implied and how oughts are implied in the text. This interest will have implications for determining the meaning of the text, but 'the meaning' is not the primary goal. Further, the interest in law is an interest brought to the text by this reader. It will be argued that the narrative contains clear indications of law and legal referents, but the presence and interest of this reader and interpreter should be noted. The role of the reader is included in Moore's narrative critical methodology:46

44. Moore, Literary Criticism, p. 225. Cf. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, p. x. 45. A narrower definition is used in narrative theology. '[W]e identify a story— a narrative, in the narrow sense...as an account of characters and events in a plot moving over time and space through conflict toward resolution.' Gabriel Fackre, 'Narrative Theology: An Overview', Int 37 (1983), pp. 340-52 (341). See Moore, Literary Criticism, p. 14, and Rhoads, 'Narrative Criticism', p. 412. 46. Any 'meaning' considered in this interpretation would have to be defined as 'a production of the mutual interaction between text and reader'. Edgar V. McKnight, The Bible and the Reader (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 128.

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[T]he more recent preoccupation with readers and reading is largely an extension of (or variation on) narrative criticism. Typically, for example, the successive responses that an unfolding plot sequence anticipates or elicits in a reader become the object of detailed analysis.47

My 'successive responses' in the reading and narrative analysis of Genesis 18-20 will demonstrate beyond doubt my interest in implied oughts and ought nots. The tools of narrative criticism have been employed previously by interpreters of Sinai law. Their continued usefulness will be demonstrated further in the investigation of pre-Sinai law. Law in Narratives The relationship between law and narrative is central to the interest of this thesis. David Damrosch, Terence Fretheim and Thomas Mann have made significant arguments for the necessary role of narrative in the interpretation of Sinai law.48 Concerning Leviticus, Damrosch says the influence between narrative and law is 'mutual': 49 'Far from interrupting the narrative, the laws complete it and the story exists for the sake of the laws it frames... This...leads to a reciprocal influence between law and narrative.'50 Childs asserts that 'the principal effect of the canonical shaping of Exodus' lies in the relation of narrative to law. He offers four ways in 47. Moore, Literary Criticism, p. xxii. 48. Little has been written on law in pre-Sinai narrative. Previous work on Sinai law and narrative provides necessary background and insight for the relationship between law and narrative in general. See especially David Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant: Transformations of Genre in the Growth of Biblical Literature (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987); Thomas Mann, The Book of the Torah: The Narrative Integrity of the Pentateuch (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1988). 49. This is an important change in perspective from historical critical comments, such as this one by Otto Eissfeldt: 'It is one of the tasks of pentateuchal criticism to explain how this interruption of the narrative by large blocks of law took place. It appears inept from a literary and aesthetic point of view, and even the young Goethe took exception to it.' Otto Eissfeldt, The Old Testament; An Introduction, Including the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, and also the Works of Similar Type from Qumran; The History of the Formation of the Old Testament (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 157. Quoted by Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 34. 50. Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 262.

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which it is theologically significant that the events of Sinai are both preceded and followed by stories.51 The most complete work on narrative in law has been done by T. Fretheim.52 T. Mann's work on the narrative integrity of the Pentateuch is also helpful, especially in his discussion of the role of narrative in Leviticus and Deuteronomy.53 Sinai Law in a Narrative Context

One of the most distinctive characteristics of Old Testament law is that it is enclosed by narrative. While law and narrative were no doubt passed down separately for years, the law has now been integrated into the story. The law does not stand in independence from that story. It is not even presented as a single chapter within that story but is woven into the narrative throughout.54 This claim is illustrated in the structure of Exod. 19.1-40.38, where story texts bracket legal texts in an alternating sequence.55 Fretheim has also provided the most complete reflection on the significance of this relationship, offering ten factors that should be considered.56 Four of these are especially helpful for understanding law before Sinai. First, law is given in a creational context, that is, God's creative activity of forming Israel. The law is a means by which the ordering of chaos at the cosmic level is actualized in the social sphere.'57 The themes of creation evident in exegetical commentary on specific Exodus texts manifestly illustrate this context for law.58 A similar context will be illustrated from the pre-Sinai narratives. Secondly, the motivation for keeping the law is provided by the exodus narrative. The ethical argument of the narrative is not abstract, 51. (1) Narrative provides the context of resistence and revelation; (2) narrative serves to set apart the ten commands from other laws; (3) narrative serves to legitimate Moses' role as the interpreter of law; (4) narrative presents law in the context of a covenant-sealing ceremony. Brevard S. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), pp. 173-74. 52. Fretheim, Exodus, pp. 201-207. 53. Mann, The Book of the Torah, pp. 113-24, 143-56. 54. Fretheim, Exodus, p. 201. 55. Story, 19.1-25; Decalogue, 20.1-17; Story, 20.18-21; Covenant Code, 20.22-23.33; Story, 24.1-18; Tabernacle Priesthood, 25.1-31.18; Story, 32.134.35; Tabernacle, 35.1-40.38. Fretheim, Exodus, p. 202. 56. Fretheim, Exodus, pp. 201-207. 57. Fretheim, Exodus, p. 204. 58. See Chapters 4 and 5.

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but is grounded in a specific memory of the exodus experience:59 'For you were strangers in the land of Egypt' (Exod. 22.21; 23.9). Whether one considers law in Exodus or Leviticus, motivational clauses or historical layering of the text,60 the rhetoric of the narrative serves to ground law in Israel's historical experience rather than presenting it as an abstract corpus of rule. The converse is also true of Israel's narrative of its beginnings. Genesis is embedded with law.61 Thirdly, the Exodus narrative serves to present a law that is integrated with life. It 'emerges from the matrix of life itself and is not presented as an abstract or 'special' revelation. Neither is it legalistic, but is 'woven back into the very fabric of life', into the context of a people who have already experienced their own salvation.62 Damrosch notes a verb tense pattern in Leviticus that demonstrates the life-emergent context provided for law by the Sinai narrative.63 Fourthly, the narratives in which the law is embedded are themselves an important part of instruction (torah). Torah is given force and form in stories as well as in law.64 The instructive force of the narrative, then, especially in remembering the story itself, is presented as torah in its own right.65 These four significant relationships between narrative and law are helpful background for the investigation of law in the pre-Sinai narrative. That law is given in the narrative context of God's creative activity will be shown even more fully in Genesis. That law is not abstractly ethical, but has a specific narrative motivation and is integrated with life, both emerging from it and woven back into its context, is the rule rather than the exception in the Genesis narrative. That narrative has the force of torah (as teaching) is part of the thesis being tested in the investigation of oughts in the Abraham narrative.

59. Fretheim, Exodus, p. 205. See Waldemar Janzen, Old Testament Ethics: A Paradigmatic Approach (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1994), pp. 60, 67-68; Mann, The Book of the Torah, p. 116; Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 290. 60. Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, pp. 277-78. 61. See Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, p. 59. 62. Fretheim, Exodus, pp. 59-60, 197-206. See also examples from Leviticus in Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 265. See Exod. 15.22-26; 18.13-27. 63. Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, pp. 277-83; Fretheim, Exodus, p. 206. 64. Fretheim, Exodus, p. 207; Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 284. 65. Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 288; Mann, The Book of the Torah, pp. 146-47.

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While the previous section has focused on Sinai law in a narrative context, little has been done specifically on law in the pre-Sinai narrative. In pre-Sinai law, law is implied by and embedded in the narrative. This is certainly a contrast to law that is bracketed by narrative, as in some of Exodus. Damrosch has shown the rhetorically 'symbiotic' relationship of the Leviticus narrative to law, where the law is 'embedded' in narrative. In that case, however, the law is explicit. In the pre-Sinai narrative, law is embedded, but it is also implied. The rhetorical-critical tools of narrative criticism are necessary for describing this relationship between pre-Sinai narrative and law. Pre-Sinai Law and Narratives Childs's observation on the subject of law in the pre-Sinai narrative is that 'the topic is promising and very little has been done on it... It is the Jewish scholars who have shown most interest in the subject.' He recommends Daube, Falk and Sarna as sources, with a caveat.66 'Read all these works with a critical eye because there are some assumptions... which are not widely held. Still, these scholars are on to something which needs further work.'67 Daube, Falk and Sarna do provide some important clues to the investigation of law in the pre-Sinai narrative. Daube's interest is in biblical law as ancient Hebrew law, sometimes by contrast with Roman law. The presence of procedural language has been noted by Daube in several Genesis texts, especially around the root T3n (to discern, to acknowledge) from "D3 (to know), which marks the call to render a verdict: There can be little doubt that this word was technical of the formal finding out of, and making a statement to the other party about, a fact of legal relevance; be it one on which a claim might be based, or one on account of which a claim must be abandoned, or one on account of which the other party's claim must be admitted.68

Daube's interest in the reconstruction of history limits the usefulness of his work, but his close reading of the narrative in relation to law is 66. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, Z.W. Falk, Hebrew Law in Biblical Times (Jerusalem: Wahrmann Books, 1964); Sarna, Genesis. 67. Correspondence from B. Childs, 25 February, 1994. For Childs's own work on the relation of law and narrative in Exodus, see 'The Relation of Narrative to Law', in Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament, pp. 173-74. 68. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, pp. 5-6.

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helpful. In the case quoted, a discussion of the story of Joseph's brothers presenting his torn and bloodied coat to Jacob as evidence, for an 'acknowledgment' of his death (Gen. 37.31-35) forms the basis of his findings.69 Further, he uses the key root EHCD (torn) to link this text and its legal importance to Exod. 22.13 ('If it [the animal] is torn by beasts, let him bring it as evidence; he shall not make restitution for what has been torn'). Daube also reads it with Jacob's plea of innocence to Laban in Gen. 31.39 (That which was torn by wild beasts I did not bring to you'). Thus Daube stands out as an early (1931) interpreter of pre-Sinai law by means of a close and intertextual reading of the narrative.70 Ze'ev Falk's early interest in pre-Sinai law and narrative was also for the purpose of reconstructing ancient Israelite law.71 He critiqued the form-critical approach to law (Alt, Noth, Jirku, Wellhausen) as lacking evidence for its reconstruction, and called for a concentration on 'trends of development emerging from the Bible as a whole'.72 Falk traced biblical legal terms to cases of the judges, arguing that words tend to be more conservative (slower to change) than anything; therefore, we should look for sources of law in word meanings.73 Further, he suggested that a legal analysis of the narratives could provide information for the study of Hebrew law: For the long development preceding the legal collections of the Pentateuch we have to rely on indirect evidence... Information can...be obtained by legal analysis of biblical narratives, of ceremonies, names, phrases, and terms. Quite often, it is true, this yields little more than a hypothesis, but taken together with the results of interpretation of legal passages and checked by comparative research—this branch of Hebrew legal study may prove fruitful.74

Again, the interest in historical reconstruction is outside the interest of this thesis, but Falk's interest in the 'whole Bible', along with his use of legal terms in biblical narrative, legal analysis of the narrative and 69. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, p. 3. 70. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, D. Daube, 'Concerning Methods of Biblical Criticism: Late Law in Early Narratives', Analecta Orientalia 17 (1949), pp. 88-99. 71. Falk sought the relevance of this reconstruction for modern Hebrew legislation. See his preface in Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 9. 72. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. 17-18. 73. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. 24-26. 74. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. 18-19.

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indirect (implied!) evidence, is congruent with and helpful to the methodology pursued here.75 Nahum Sarna represents a rabbinic approach that is also useful because it takes references to law before Sinai (such as in Gen. 26.5) with seriousness and because it looks to the narrative for signs of its keeping.76 The rabbis' canonical reading of such texts as Gen. 26.5 led to the question, 'How did Abraham know the Mosaic Law?' One rabbinic explanation was that these were the laws given to Noah. Because the vocabulary's sphere of reference is the Mosaic Law (both historically and textually), the Noahic solution is not entirely satisfying. The rabbinic explanation is finally that Abraham received the whole 'Mosaic' Law by revelation.77 Sarna and rabbinical interpretations in general offer a canonical intertextuality that takes the narrative statements about Abraham at face value. An emphatic statement of the Mishnah illustrates this method: 'We find that Abraham our father observed the whole of Torah, all of it, while it was not yet given.' The logic of this statement is based in part on Gen. 26.5.78 The assertion is based also on an intimate knowledge of biblical intertextuality, which interprets one text by means of another. Thus the rabbis cite Ps. 16.7 ('In the night also my heart instructs me') as the speech of Abraham. They also argue that, since Abraham is 'the friend of God' (Isa. 41.8; 2 Chron. 20.7), he must have kept the Torah.79 While it is possible that a different (new literary) methodology will lead to different conclusions, some acknowledgment of debt is in order for this living tradition of interpreting by means of final form intertextuality.

75. He uses the Genesis narrative thoroughly. See Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 171. 76. Sarna, Genesis, pp. 376-77, 'The Noachide Commandments'. 77. 'Now it appears to me from a study of the opinion of our Rabbis that Abraham our father learned the entire Torah by Ruach Hakodesh and occupied himself with its study...', Ramban: Commentary on the Torah I (ed. and trans. R. Charles B. Chavel; 5 vols.; New York: Shilo Publishing House, 1971), p. 331. 78. M. Qid. 4.14. Philo also comments on this text with the conclusion that Abraham obeyed the law before it was given, de Abr. 44.275-76. Jub. 33.16 comes to the conclusion that all the patriarchs kept Torah so far as God made it known to them. 79. Ps. 16.7 in Midr. Teh. on Ps. 1.13 and in Yal. on Ps. 16.7 and in ARN 37; Isa. 41.8 in Jub. 16.21; 22.1-4; 36.2; John Bowker, The Targums and Rabbinic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing House, 1969), p. 235.

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In the context of an intertextual and literary interpretation of Genesis 22 and Exodus 20, R.W.L. Moberly argues that the rabbinic conviction concerning Abraham's law-keeping may have a deeper, implied textual basis. His narrative exegesis is based on the common use of 'test' (HO]) and 'fear' (NT) in Genesis 22 and Exodus 20: 'The general sense of the connection between testing and fearing is that God seeks by his commandments to draw out his people into fuller obedience and righteousness.'80 He suggests that his findings substantiate the rabbinic assertions concerning Abraham: The remarkable verbal and conceptual similarity between Genesis 22 and Exodus 20 suggests that...the passages should be interpreted in the light of each other. The likely significance I propose is that Abraham supremely exemplifies the meaning of living by Torah. He as an individual demonstrates the quality of response to God that should characterize Israel as a whole. This means that the rabbinic tradition that Abraham observed torah before it was revealed to Moses...is developing a point that is more deeply rooted in the biblical text than the traditional appeal simply to Genesis 26.5 would indicate.81

Interpreting Law in Pre-Sinai Narratives While little attention has been given to the narrative-canonical context of pre-Sinaitic law by Christian commentators, a few exceptions pertain. Three authors provide examples of interpretation of texts with explicit reference to pre-Sinai law from narrative-critical methodologies. These are Fretheim, Brueggemann and Hamilton. Terence Fretheim attends to this context of law in his salient comment on Gen. 26.5: The language about the law certainly means that the author knows about the law given at Sinai. But this is no simple anachronism; it carries significance for understanding the place of law in the pre-Sinai period. God introduces law initially at creation (1.26-28; 2.16-17) and other divine commands emerge along the way (e.g., 9.9-17). The law given at Sinai does not emerge as a new reality; it stands in basic continuity with earlier articulations of God's will for the creation. Abraham's conforming to the will of God shows that his life is in tune with God's creational purposes and models, for later Israel, the right response to law, which cannot be 89 collapsed into that given at Sinai. 80. R.W.L. Moberly, 'The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah', VT 38 (July 1988), pp. 302-23 (305). 81. Moberly, 'Akedah'. 82. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 529; see Fretheim, The Reclamation of Creation', pp. 362-65.

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From a theological perspective, critiquing the subservience of law to covenant, James Barr offers one example of law from the pre-Sinaitic narrative, i.e., Jethro's advice to Moses (Exod. 18).83 Fretheim also is one of the few commentators both to note the vocabulary of law and apply literary methods to the interpretation of Gen. 18.19. His method identifies key words, their repetition, their dissonance in this text and their intertextual context: God calls Abraham to charge his family 'to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness [HplK] and justice [CDS2JQ]' (v. 19; cf. Ps. 33.5; Prov. 21.3). These key words—uncommon in Genesis—are picked up in the dialogue, CDSCDQ in v. 25 and the root pl^ seven times in vv. 23-28 (cf. 6.9; 7.1; 15.6; 20.4; 30.33; 38.26). The two words are closely related, characterizing individuals and communities that exemplify and promote life and well-being for all in every relational sphere, human and nonhuman. As such, their lives would correspond to God's creational intentions of the world order including blessing on all nations.84

Walter Brueggemann's commentary on Gen. 18.16-33 demonstrates a similar methodology with the vocabulary of 18.19. He rightly connects the general theme of 'indictment and punishment' with the 'juridical language' of the innocent and the guilty in ch. 19.85 His interpretation is supported by a canonical commitment through which Gen. 18.19 is not viewed as 'an intrusion'. He interprets the text 'as it now stands'.86 Brueggemann makes his argument by means of key word use and with intertextual reference to Genesis 19 and the prophets Isaiah, Amos, Jeremiah and Ezekiel. The result of this narrative-canonical method is the heart of his conclusion: The righteousness and justice of Abraham are not simply moral obedience. They are also a passion for the well-being of the very ones who have violated God... The narrative takes pains to establish Abraham's uncommon qualifications and authority so that he may daringly raise with Yahweh a question that must be raised. Like his counterpart in

83. Barr, Biblical Faith, pp. 98-99. 84. Fretheim, The Book of Genesis', p. 467. 85. Walter Brueggemann, Genesis (ed. James Luther Mays; Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching; Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982), pp. 169-70. He argues that these verses in ch. 18 seek to break open the closed fated world of ch. 19. 86. Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 169.

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the flood story (cf. 6.6), this text offers a remarkable theological innovation.o-y

The narrative repetition of CDE32JQ is also used by Victor Hamilton to mark the development of Abraham's character in the plot, a basic factor in narrative criticism. This development of character is implicitly and intertextually linked (by means of the vocabulary and the promises to Abraham) to Gen. 26.5. Hamilton also uses the repetition of CDDEJQ and npl^ to mark irony in the text.88 [I]t provides an ironic twist in the narrative. We have already compared Yahweh's knowledge of Abraham with his need for a closer look at Sodom. Now here we have God's charge to Abraham to teach his descendants about justice (QD2JQ). But Abraham's concern is whether Yahweh himself will practice CD22JE (v. 25).89

These three authors offer the first examples of interpretation of texts with explicit reference to pre-Sinai law from narrative-critical methodologies. Their use of the final form text and commitment to the integrity of the biblical narrative lead them to treat references to law and legal terminology as necessary to the interpretive task. By attention to intertextuality, key words, repetition, irony, dissonance and character and plot development, the interpretation of the narrative and of law has been enriched. Summary and Conclusions The description of narrative criticism as an 'eclectic method' that uses a variety of concepts and means for interpretation is an appropriate description of my methodology in this book.90 The plurality of approaches available in narrative criticism is necessary for interpreting implied oughts and ought nots in the pre-Sinai narrative. For the purposes of this book, the term 'narrative criticism' includes the use of rhetorical categories developed by R. Alter and M. Sternberg (close reading, repetition, types scenes, the use of ambiguity), classical 87. Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 169-70. 88. Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 18-50 (eds. R.K. Harrison and R.L. Hubbard; NICOT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 18-19. 89. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis. 90. Powell, Modern Literary Criticism, p. 15.1 have also used Alonso Shoekel's term 'plurality' to describe my methodological approach to the biblical text. Alonso Schoekel, 'Trends'. Noted by Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 17.

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rhetorical analysis (as mediated by G.A. Kennedy), the discourse analysis of H.C. White, a 'new' use of form-critical categories (K. Berger), and the general narrative categories of plot and character development (as practiced by S. Moore and K.R.R. Gros Louis). While I stand with these authors of the new literary criticism and rely on their methods for interpreting the Genesis narrative, my primary interest differs from their interest in the 'meaning' of the text.91 My interest is not in the meaning of the narrative, but in the ways oughts and ought nots are implied in it. The purpose of the exegesis and interpretation of Genesis 18-20 in this book is not the determination of the meaning(s) of the narrative as a whole. Rather, my purpose is to identify and to interpret the legal referents in the context of the narrative, and the narrative in light of the legal referents. The best tools for this task are found, not surprisingly, in narrative criticism and its rhetorical-analytical methods. However, because the interest is in the narrative's value for understanding law and not the narrative's 'meaning', the exegesis of Genesis 18-20 has two foci. The work focuses on the narrative 'itself, yet does so by focusing on those features that pertain to legal categories and oughts within the narrative. In this sense, I rely on the reader response element in narrative criticism as described by S. Moore.92 This exegetical commitment presupposes that the text contains no 'meaning' in itself. The interests and questions of the reader, stated or not, influence the production of meaning.93 'Meaning is produced by the mutual interaction between the text and reader.'94 Since my primary interest in the narrative is law, categories established by form-critical scholars will be brought to the text as an additional tool of interpretation. Form-critical categories provide a necessary taxonomy for speaking about law. The method used here is not in itself form criticism, and the interest is not in the forms that lie behind the text. Yet the categories established by form critics provide definitions and a critical matrix that are useful to the study of law, even when priority is given to the narrative of the text itself. They provide a critical moment that adds depth and dimension to the interpretation of 91. Tate, Biblical Interpretation,pp. xvi-xix. 92. Moore, Literary Criticism, pp. 71-107. 93. Tate includes narrative criticism as a reader-centered method. Tate, Biblical Interpretation, pp. 194-97. 94. McKnight, The Bible and the Reader, p. 128.

2. Methodology

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the narrative: '[Although the meaning of a text may not be found in the author's world, at least our understanding of the text improves when we immerse ourselves in its history.'95 This briefly outlined plurality of methods stands on the shoulders of many who have developed tools for understanding biblical texts: interpreters of narrative (Alter, Sternberg and Moore), rhetorical critics (Alter, White and Kennedy) and interpreters of forms and genres (Clark and Berger). This thesis relies on their combined work in order to identify the signification of implied oughts in the Abraham narrative. Finally, the work of T. Fretheim and D. Damrosch on the story context of Sinai law provides an important understanding of the relationship between narrative and law.96

95. Tate, Biblical Interpretation, p. xix. 96. Fretheim, Exodus, pp. 201-207; Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, pp. 261-97; Damrosch, 'Law and Narrative in the Priestly Work'.

Chapter 3 A SURVEY OF JURIDICAL TERMINOLOGY IN THE ABRAHAM NARRATIVE

Introduction to the Survey Chapter 3 will survey the juridical terminology in the Abraham narrative. It will demonstrate that the narrative, specifically Genesis 18-20, is replete with juridical terminology and referents. This survey will present technical juridical language, common words used in technical juridical syntagmas and discursive implications, all of which signify oughts and ought nots in Genesis 18-20. (Distinctions among these three kinds of signs follow.) Genesis 18-20 contains narrative accounts of court-like proceedings. These court-like proceedings are evident first by means of technical juridical terminology. The proceedings also contain technical juridical syntagmas that are constructed from more common vocabulary. Finally, implications of discourse within the court-like proceedings function to form the oughts and ought nots of the text. Each of these kinds of evidence will be presented in this chapter. The narratives of Genesis 18-20 are not 'legal' texts per se. They function nonetheless to teach what ought and what ought not be done. The survey shows the sheer quantity, as well as the variety, of legal lexicographical material in Genesis 18-20. This broad evidence provides the lexicographical background of terms and phrases that will assist in the narrative analysis and interpretation of the text in the fourth chapter of this book. The survey of juridical terminology will also provide the warrants for establishing the parameters of the discussion within Genesis 18-20. Preliminary Issues A brief discussion of five issues will provide a foundation for the interpretive lexicographical work that follows. The issues are (1) the idea of

3. A Survey of Juridical Terminology

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'justice' in the Hebrew Bible; (2) the use of the categories of modern Roman (Italian) law as a framework for talking about biblical law; (3) the relationship between technical juridical terms and ordinary vocabulary in syntagmas that function as technical terms, and their interrelationship with the narrative context; (4) the research of H.-J. Boecker and Pietro Bovati as seminal works in this field; and (5) problems of (diachronic) historical reconstruction of legal procedure in ancient Israel, and the value of synchronic studies of juridical terminology in the Hebrew Bible. The Idea of Justice. An important premise of this chapter and its work on the vocabulary of law and juridical procedure is an understanding of the term npliS. In the context of the Hebrew Bible, np"TC is not an abstraction, but refers to right relationships. While the subject of this book is not specifically 'justice' (nor 'righteousness'), oughts and ought nots are most frequently signified in contexts in which the re-establishment of justice is the subject. G. von Rad emphasized understanding HpliJ in the Old Testament not so much as a reference to an individual's ethical norm as to the relationship between beings expressed through a life of communion. But, oddly enough, no matter how urgently it was sought, no satisfactory answer to this question of an absolute norm could be found in the Old Testament... As we see now...ancient Israel did not in fact measure a line of conduct or an act by an ideal norm, but by the specific relationship in which the partner had at the time to prove himself true.'

Bovati also works from this premise, and adds, 'The just is called upon in fact not only to deal correctly with the other, but to re-establish justice, so as to promote a right relationship between all the members of the society.'2

1. Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I (trans. D.M.G. Stalker; New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 371. Quoting H. Cremer, G. von Rad adds, 'The way in which it is used shows that p~I^ is out and out a term denoting relationship, and that it does this in the sense of referring to a real relationship between two parties...and not to the relationship of an object under consideration to an idea.' H. Cremer, Biblisch-Theologisches Worterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Grdcitdt (Gotha: F.A. Perthes, 7th edn, 1893), pp. 273-75. 2. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 19. For full bibliographic reference for the term pHH and np"T2£, see Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 18.

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Ancient Text and Contemporary Concepts. I rely significantly on the lexicographical survey work of Pietro Bovati, who uses modern categories of law as a framework for analyzing biblical narrative.3 He offers this rationale, which I accept as a necessary premise for my work: Given that we are dealing with an ancient culture of whose juridical activity we have only fragmentary elements, the only way forward is to situate these elements in the more systematic framework provided by another culture. The appropriateness and relevance of such a choice may then be debated. The fact remains that the fundamental concepts of Roman law (the basis of contemporary legislation) seem to be generally accepted as a useful tool for the description and organization of the Old Testament data. I am aware that a heuristic scheme runs the risk of turning into an interpretive thesis or hypothesis; but just as recourse to the terminology of our penal code is inevitable...so it is impossible to avoid a more or less theoretical comparison between ancient legal practice and ours.4

Ordinary Words in Technical Syntagmas. Bovati's work is a study of the Hebrew vocabulary relating to procedures of a penal kind, both its technical terms and those in common usage. Building on H.J. Boecker's work (Redeformen, 1964), his dissertation is the most exhaustive documentation of the re-establishment of justice in the Hebrew Bible. He shows that juridical terminology is not limited to a technical vocabulary, but 'is also filled out by a "generic" terminology, which in certain contexts and particular syntagmas has a meaning quite like the former'.5 He makes the distinction between technical and ordinary terms: The particular aim of my investigation has been not only to make a reasonably complete collection of words and phrases pertaining to legal procedure, but to go on to study the structural relations between them. Looking beyond a series of discrete 'judicial' words (i.e., technical vocabulary) the intention has been to examine the semantic field; rather 3. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 18-19. 4. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice,p. 19 n. 7. Boecker works from a similar premise and caveat. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 14-18. L. Laberge: 'Bovati informs us that his analysis of vocabulary is based on a comparison with the modern Italian penal code. This may have its drawbacks, but all in all I recognize that such an approach, duly admitted, is as good as any of our modern methodological biases.' Leo Laberge, review of Re-establishing Justice: Legal Terms, Concepts and Procedures in the Hebrew Bible, by Pietro Bovati, CBQ 53 (April 1991), pp. 279-80. 5. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 389.


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than studying isolated words it is necessary to study the surrounding phrase and speech, thus engaging in a paradigmatic and syntagmaatic treatment of the material available to us... Following contemporary practice, by 'technical term', as opposed to 'ordinary term', I simply mean the special terminology used by a particular science, discipline or profession.6

Ordinary (or 'generalized') Hebrew words are often used forensically: 'As regards terminology in common usage, I note with I.L. Seeligmann the difficulty of defining the language of judicial procedure with precision.'7 'Ordinary' words used in technical ways are often found in syntagmas, where they are paired with a technical term or another ordinary term. Bovati uses the term 'syntagma' to refer to words and word roots that are used together in various texts consistently to express more than the sum of the two words.8 In this way, common words are used together to form technical expressions that have specific functions in legal contexts. When I speak of 'generalized' terminology I mean that it is not specialized into meaning something in opposition to other terms...but it can be seen how it has a precise and specific function... Although belonging to a wider semantic field [the word] has a place and specific function in the juridical dynamic.9

It is necessary, therefore, for the interpreter to depend on narrative context for the interpretation of vocabulary of juridical procedure. Richard Boyce makes a similar observation in his dissertation on p^, the cry to God in the Old Testament: 'Some context other than their word field must be analyzed in order to discover what the biblical use of pUT and pPS might have to offer in debates such as these.'10 For example, Boyce distinguishes four narrative settings that are legal contexts for the term 'cry': the cry of the legally marginal to the king, the cry of the oppres6. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 20. 7. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice; I.L. Seeligmann, 'Zur Terminologie fur das Gerichtsverfahren im Wortschatz des Biblischen Hebraisch', in Hebraische Wortforschung: Festschrift fur W. Baumgartner (VTSup; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), pp. 253-54. 8. A 'syntagma' is a systematic grouping of words. 9. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 125. 10. Richard N. Boyce, The Cry to God in the Old Testament (SBLDS, 103; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), p. 24.

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sed, the cry of the raped and the cry of the blood.11 These narrativesituational settings provide the context by which the function of an 'ordinary' (or non-technical) word or phrase may be understood as juridical. Boyce notes that there is basic agreement in the secondary material that pltt is sometimes used as a technical term that calls for a legal hearing. 12 His dissertation addresses the question of how narrative contexts help the interpreter to distinguish whether pUT functions as a technical term, and, when it does, to determine its precise function within that context. For example: the cry of the legally marginalized to the king is a technical cry for a legal hearing; the cry of the oppressed is similar, except that in that setting, God is the king who is called upon; the cry of the raped is not an immediate legal appeal, but the outcry in the midst of the rape is later of 'extraordinary significance in court'; the cry of blood is also to God, and, like the rape, is of legal significance after the fact.13 In each of the cases presented, the 'cry' has a legal function, either as a warrant for arraignment or as evidence in a trial. Another general illustration of the need for narrative context in distinguishing juridical vocabulary is the variety of functions of the term CDEJEJQ. Its variety of uses does not mitigate against its specific function in a given text. As a procedural noun it means 'judging'; as a procedural action it means 'judged'; as a sentence or verdict it is 'a judgment'; as a result of a judgment it means 'law' or 'decree'.14 Narrative context is the necessary locus of translation and interpretation. Building on Boecker's work, Bovati has provided an exhaustive analysis of legal terms and procedures and their occurrences in the Hebrew Bible. He has summarized scholarly issues and consensus in the field of biblical law, providing a valuable summary of research, a task that need not be repeated here.15 One of Bovati's major contributions to understanding legal procedure in the Hebrew Bible is his demonstration of the distinction between a 11. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 25-46. 12. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 27-28. 13. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 42-44. 14. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 208. 15. 'He has in fact done Old Testament scholarship a service in presenting the [primary and secondary] material in such a clear and systematic way.' A. Gelston, review of Pietro Bovati, Re-establishing Justice: Legal Terms, Concepts and Procedures in the Hebrew Bible, JTS 40 (April 1989), p. 141.


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controversy (T~!) and a formal court-like procedure (JD2EJQ) or trial: 'It is essential for a correct theological interpretation of the message of scripture to distinguish the procedure of controversy (T"l) from that of the trial (ttQ&Q) and to understand their articulation.'16 A Diachronic Impasse. A primary difference between the work of Boecker and Bovati is Boecker's attempt at historical reconstruction. Boecker notes the difficulty of this interest: It is more difficult than it might appear at first sight to bring together Old Testament data on the administration of law. There are no Old Testament 'rules of court'. We must remember above all that in its basic message the Old Testament is not interested in conveying a picture of legal processes in Ancient Israel. Its concern lies elsewhere. Its purpose is to report God's activity in and with Israel and to demonstrate Israel's answer to this activity. This purpose is pursued in many ways, and in the course of it much is said about law, but unsystematically and in passing. This makes the matter so difficult.17

Since 1964, the difficulties have become more widely evident. Completing his work in 1985, Bovati observed: A diachronic treatment of the Hebrew vocabulary would of course have been desirable and methodologically more rigorous; unfortunately, current knowledge of the subject is so scarce or disputed that a projected history of judicial terminology would risk being based on foundations that were too hypothetical. The various dictionaries and word lists, although occasionally providing useful distinctions, do not comment except in passing on the possible chronological relationship between the various terms and phrases.18

16. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, preface. Bovati engages Boecker on this subject. See Deut. 25.1; 19.17-18; 2 Sam. 15.2 for the clear cases of the movement from informal dispute (3"H) to court (QSCJQ) cases that led to Bovati's dissertation. See Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 171. 17. Boecker, Law, p. 28. 18. See Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch zum Alten Testament, I (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1971), p. xviii; Ludwig Kohler, 'Problems in the Study of the Language of the Old Testament', JSS 1 (January 1956), p. 3; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 21. L. Laberge: 'I agree with Bovati that a diachronic study is not yet possible... Bovati's study is a very accurate analysis which should be consulted by anyone dealing with the juridical vocabulary of texts.' Laberge, review of Re-establishing Justice, pp. 279-80.

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Bovati argues that, particularly in legal terminology, dating and historical reconstruction is, by definition, problematic':19 Moreover, although it is possible to establish, with relative likelihood, the date of a text, the decision regarding a single word or a particular syntagm remains difficult, given that for the most part the degree of harmonization exercised over the final redaction eludes us. As far as legal circles are concerned, they may be considered by nature to tend to conservatism, and it is, therefore, not absurd to imagine the same terminology lasting for centuries, bearing in mind jurisprudence's constant effort to get legally significant words and formulae to agree between themselves.20

Since the reconstruction of ancient Israel's historical practice is not possible, Bovati has dealt with the text as it is. His work is widely recognized as a 'valuable contribution' (Reventlow), 'particularly valuable as a detailed synchronic compilation of the vocabularies of the juridical process' (Garcia-Treto), 'a distinctive contribution' (Gelston), 'a very accurate analysis' (Laberge). For this dissertation, his research is an essential resource.21 Parameters of Syntactic and Lexicographic Study In Chapter 1 it is argued and demonstrated that a full range of law is implied and operative in the Abraham narrative (Gen. 11.27-25.18). A study of that full range of law is beyond the scope of this work. How ever, an exegetical case study of implied oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative will serve to demonstrate the operation of law. The case study will delineate the operation of law and describe the warrants by which this law is implied. I have surveyed the whole Abraham narrative. The results show that legal referents in the narrative are overwhelmingly concentrated in chs. 18-20. The primary text that implies oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narratives is Gen. 18.16-20.18. The narrative within this parameter, therefore, will be the major focus of the exegetical work in 19. See Seeligmann, 'Terminologie', p. 255; cf. also Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 24. 20. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 21. 21. Reventlow, Gelston, Garcia-Treto and others note his valuable contribution in their book reviews: Henning Graf Reventlow, review of Pietro Bovati, Re-establishing Justice: Legal Terms, Concepts and Procedures in the Hebrew Bible, TLZ 113 (May 1988), pp. 339-40; Francisco Garcia-Treto, review of Re-establishing Justice, JBL 107 (June 1988), pp. 302-303; cf. also John C. Meyer, review of ReEstablishing Justice in CHR 74 (October 1988), p. 675.


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this book. The narrative of Lot's daughters and Lot in the cave (following the destruction of the Plain) in Gen. 19.30-38 is omitted, however, from this legal analysis. Legal terminology is entirely absent from these verses, even though they are in the midst of a narrative otherwise replete with juridical language. In addition to the absence of legal terms, the narrator offers no value judgment on the actions of Lot's daughters. Their actions are simply reported as reasonable, given their situation.22 Levitical law condemns incest but this text communicates no negative conclusion.23 If any ought were to be implied, it would be that Lot's daughters did what ought to have been done. The lack of juridical terminology or narrator's discursive expression of judgment leads me to exclude this too subtle text from consideration. Four other texts in the Abraham narrative also require some attention because of their juridical terminology or reference to an ought not. These include Gen. 12.17-20 (Sarah in Pharaoh's tent), Gen. 13.2-13 (the separation of Abraham and Lot at the valley of Sodom), Gen. 16.116 (strife between Hagar and Sarah) and Gen. 21.25-34 (a complaint about Abimelech's use of a water well). In these texts, ought nots seem at first to be indicated by the presence of legal language or forms. For a variety of reasons, however, they stand outside of the parameters of this study. Genesis 12 cannot be treated separately and still effectively, because its juridical context is so brief. It will be examined with its parallel text in Genesis 20. The legal referent in Genesis 13 is also too brief. Genesis 16 provides more material, but concludes ambiguously. It is also a controversy, and not a fully developed trial (a distinction that will be fully developed in Chapter 4). Genesis 21 contains juridical terms, but properly belongs to contract law. Genesis 12.17-18. But the LORD afflicted Pharaoh and his house with great plagues because of Sarai, Abram's wife. So Pharaoh called Abram, and said, 'What is this you have done to me? Why did you not tell me that she was your wife?'

22. See Cheryl J. Exum, 'The Mothers of Israel: The Patriarchal Narratives from a Feminist Perspective', Biblical Review 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 60-67. 23. See Lev. 18.

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This text implies an 'ought not' in the report of the affliction of Pharaoh and his house 'because of Sarai' ("H2? "QT1?!?) and in Pharaoh's question, 'What is this you have done to me?' (^ rPtoi? HNrnQ).24 This text also implies an 'ought' in Pharaoh's second question, 'Why did you not tell me that she was your wife?' These implications are not, however, set in the context of a fully developed court-like proceeding. The signs of these ought nots will be considered with their parallels in a more fully developed juridical text: 20.3, 'Look, you are about to die because of [*?#] the woman whom you have taken, for she is a married woman'; 20.9, 'What have you done to us?' (\±> rTfcirnO); and at 20.18, 'because of Sarah' mT1?!?).25 Genesis 13. la, 8, 13. 13.7a, 8 And there was strife between the herders of Abram's livestock and the herders of Lot's livestock... Then Abram said to Lot, 'Let there be no strife between you and me, and between your herders and my herders; for we are kindred.'

13.13

Now the people of Sodom were wicked, great sinners against the LORD.

The first of these two references in Genesis 13 is considered a sign of an ought not because of Abram's argument, 'Let there be no strife.. .for we are kindred.' This strife, however, is resolved in conversation, without recourse to juridical proceedings. Bovati demonstrates the basic distinction of a controversy (IT"), 'strife') that is resolved without a formal court-like procedure (BS2JQ).26 The controversy is resolved by Abram's proposal, 'Separate yourself from me' (v. 9) and by Lot's decision, 'So Lot chose for himself ' (v. 11). The second reference (13.13) concerning the wickedness of the Sodomites is a comment that foreshadows the actions of Genesis 1819. There the root Din is repeated (19.7: 'Do not act so wickedly', 24. R.J. Williams (ed.), Hebrew Syntax: An Outline (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2nd edn, 1978), p. 291. The warrant given for Pharaoh's affliction is that Sarai is Abram's wife. The causal preposition signifies this ought not. 25. See comments at those references in Chapter 4 on the legal use of HQ and

nto. 26.

Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 171.


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"IKQDfMDn, also has a parallel in 18.20: 'very grave sin', "O DPNBm "1NQ n~QD). The vocabulary will be considered in that fuller narrative context. Genesis 16.5-11. 16.5

Then Sarai said to Abram, 'May the wrong done to me be on you!... May the LORD judge between you and me!'

16.6b

Do to her as you please. Then Sarai dealt harshly with her, and she ran away from her.

16.9

The angel of the LORD said to her, 'Return to your mistress and submit to her.'

16.lib Now you have conceived and shall bear a son; you shall call him Ishmael, for the LORD has given heed to your affliction.

Here again is a controversy rather than a trial. The controversies (n'TI) are between Sarai and Abram and between Sarai and Hagar, although Sarai does threaten to bring it into the LORD'S court to be judged (DE3E>).27 Abram settles out of court. God does intervene, presumably to save Hagar from her fleeing response to the harshness of Abram and Sarai, and certainly to bless her and her offspring. The juridical term 'May the LORD judge' (CDDC? 16.5) used by Sarai leads (by Abram and Sarai's decisions) to a breach of justice rather than a rigorous pursuit of it. Sarai's complaint about Hagar's contempt leads to 'harsh' treatment 0~l& n]J?m) of Hagar that, under normal circumstances, would have led to death.28 It almost does. This text does have some similarities in vocabulary and procedure to Genesis 18-20. God does intervene on behalf of Hagar, but no categorical statement of ought or ought not is offered to the reader. Some juridical language is present, but the full development of the court-like scenes of Genesis 18-20 is absent. This text uses juridical vocabulary (tDD25) in an oath, and common terms are used juridically 27. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 75, 81. 28. BOB, p. 776. n]I>, piel impf. 3 f. s., 3 f. s. suffix. HDU is repeated by the LORD at 16.11.

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(OQn;:mJ; "]srm man). The discourse also uses the root mi> in repetition to designate wrongful behavior (16.6, 9, 11). Nonetheless, no attempt is made in the narrative to demonstrate due process towards justice, as in Genesis 18-20. The use of the term 'judge' (QD2?) is, in fact, ironic in the text, given Sarai's subsequent action. Sarai's action, despite her appeal to the LORD'S judgment, can be seen only as retaliation against Hagar for her contempt (^p).29 God's intervention is not as a judge bringing justice, but as a savior who offers Hagar reasons for hope so that she will return to the relative safety of Abram's care. God offers the hope of a son, a name for him that reminds her that 'God hears', an assurance that God has noted her affliction, and an acceptance of the name she gives to God, 'God sees'. All these are given as motivation for her returning, not to a just situation, but to Sarai's harsh authority (illy). When Ishmael is older and she leaves, not to return, she goes with aid from Abram and from God (21.14-21). The temporary safety of Hagar's and Abram's only son, Ishmael, is the implied reason for God's intervention (16.10-11). This text is a case that points to the necessity of narrative analysis of texts containing juridical language, especially for the interpretation of oughts and ought nots in those texts. Sarai's ironic appeal to Abram that the LORD 'judge' is a rhetorical category that is beyond the scope of a purely lexicographical analysis. Understanding the juridical language in this pericope as ironic (that is, the LORD'S decision is to have Hagar live with Sarai) removes it from my consideration of oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative. This narrative does not demonstrate a due process towards justice, or make a claim that justice has indeed been served. Hagar's return to Sarai's affliction can only be considered a temporary necessity for her survival as a resolution to their controversy.

29. For a discussion of the term 'j'jp, see J. Gerald Janzen, Abraham and All the Families of the Earth: A Commentary on the Book of Genesis 12-50 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), p. 42. Hagar has certainly committed a wrong against Sarah which is a warrant for Sarah's call for justice. The irony is that Sarah calls for the LORD to judge (16.5) but does the judging, harshly, herself.


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Genesis 21.25-27. 21.25

When Abraham complained to Abimelech about a well of water that Abimelech's servants had seized,

21.26

Abimelech said, 'I do not know who has done this; you did not tell me, and I have not heard of it until today.'

21.27

So Abraham took sheep and oxen and gave them to Abimelech and the two men made a covenant.

'I do not know', 'you did not tell', and 'I have not heard' are commonly used together in biblical juridical procedure (£>QE>; 2J33; 1TP), especially in noticing and reporting a crime. In addition, the claim of ignorance as a protestation of innocence is a common form.30 Their occurrence together in this text raises the question of its relevance to my investigation of oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative. It may be excluded from consideration for three reasons. First, the issue is not moral law, nor does it have a theological focus (e.g. God does not participate in the dialogue). Its concern about land use and water rights properly belongs to a discussion of contract law. Secondly, the complaint is resolved without juridical procedure, in conversation between the two principal parties, by the establishment of a covenant. Thirdly, the term PD1*, 'complain', is generally used in sapiential contexts, rather than in contexts of juridical procedure against wrongful action.31 Summary and Conclusions. These four texts differ in two substantive ways from Gen. 18.16-20.18. While they contain some juridical language, the court-like context is not developed. The conflicts are settled without recourse to court-like procedure or judgment (Bovati calls them ZTT1, which are settled out of 'court'). Secondly, God does not play an active role in identifying the oughts and ought nots, except in Genesis 12, which will be discussed in relationship to Genesis 20. Genesis 18.16-20.18 is unique in the Abraham narrative in that God initiates conversations for the purpose of discussing human behavior, 30. 31.

Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 70 n. 16, and 109 n. 32. See Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 44-49.

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first with Abraham (18.17-18) and then with Abimelech (20.3). Furthermore, these verses contain the only uses of the root tftDil, 'sin', in the narrative (11.27-25.18), except for the narrator's notice of Sodom's evil in 13.13. These occurrences of tfttfT (18.20; 20.6, 9a, 9b) are preliminary indications that chs. 18-20 are most useful for the study of oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative. A focus on Genesis 18-20 is useful as a case study because of the clustering of legal terms in these texts and the developed 'court-like procedures' within them. Working with an extended narrative also aids the interpreter by providing the context necessary for the integrity of word study. Three diagnostic questions will shape the study: (1) What are the technical terms of juridical procedure? (2) What are the common words or word combinations (syntagmas) used consistently in the Hebrew Bible in a technical juridical sense? (3) What are the narrative and discursive signs that disclose oughts and ought nots in the text? Evidence of Legal and Juridical Terminology in Genesis 18.16-20.18 The purpose of the presentation of the research that follows in the remainder of this chapter is to note the lexicographical terms of oughts and ought nots and their significance in Gen. 18.16-20.18. This is not a commentary on the whole text. It is limited to evidence from the Hebrew Bible for (a) technical legal vocabulary, (b) common vocabulary or syntagmas that are used in a technical legal manner, and (c) syntactical or discursive indications of legal procedures in the narrative context. A close narrative analysis of the legal referents will be taken up in Chapters 4 and 5. The texts are provided in English by chapter at the head of each section (Genesis 18, 19, and 20). All biblical references are from Genesis unless otherwise designated. Translations are from the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV), except where noted. The underlined phrases will be considered below, each in turn. Legal and Juridical Terminology in Genesis 18.16-33 16

Then the men set out from there, and they looked toward Sodom; and Abraham went with them to set them on their way. 17 The LORD said, 'Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do, 18 seeing that Abraham shall become a great and mighty nation, and all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him? 19 No, for I have chosen him, that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of


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the LORD by doing righteousness and justice; so that the LORD may bring about for Abraham what he has promised him.' 20 Then the LORD said, 'How great is the outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah and how very grave their sin! 21 / must go down and see whether they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me; and if not, I will know.' 22 So the men turned from there, and went toward Sodom, while Abraham remained standing before the LORD. 23 Then Abraham came near and said, 'Will you indeed sweep away the righteous with the wickedl [* Read, 'the innocent with the guilty'.] 24 Suppose there are fifty righteous [innocent] within the city; will you then sweep away the place and not forgive it [* Read, 'not spare it'] for the fifty righteous [innocent] who are in it? 25 Far be it from you to do such a thing [*Read, 'to make a ruling like this'], to slay the righteous [innocent] with the wicked [guilty], so that the righteous [innocent] fare as the wicked [guilty]! Far be that from you! Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is justl [Read, 'make a just decision'].' 26 And the LORD said, 'If 1 find at Sodom fifty righteous [innocent] in the city, I will forgive the whole place for their sake'. 27 Abraham answered, 'Let me take it upon myself to speak to the LORD, I who am but dust and ashes. 28 Suppose five of the fifty righteous [innocent] are lacking? Will you destroy the whole city for lack of five?' And he said, 'I will not destroy it if I find forty-five there'. 29 Again he spoke to him, 'Suppose forty are found there'. He answered, 'For the sake of forty I will not do it'. 30 Then he said, 'Oh do not let the LORD be angry if I speak. Suppose thirty are foundthere'. He answered, 'I will not do it,if I find thirty there'. 31 He said, 'Let me take it upon myself to speak to the LORD. Suppose twenty are foundthere'. He answered, 'For the sake of twenty I will not destroy it'. 32 Then he said, 'Oh do not let the LORD be angry if I speak just once more. Suppose ten are found there.' He answered, 'For the sake of ten I will not destroy it'. 33 And the LORD went his way, when he had finished speaking to Abraham; and Abraham returned to his place.

Genesis 18.19: To Keep the Way of the LORD by Doing Righteousness and Justice. (DSCppI Plp/tS nitDI?'? HYP ^TT riQBn). 'Way' C|"n) is a common term sometimes used with 'justice' (CDSttfQ) in a legal procedural sense. Isaiah 26.8 40.14 59.8

In the path of your judgments, O LORD we wait for you. Whom did he consult for his enlightenment and who taught him the path of justice? The way of peace they do not know and there is no justice in their paths.

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Proverbs 2.7b-8a He is a shield to those who walk blamelessly, guarding the paths of justice. 8.20 I walk in the way of righteousness along the paths of justice. 17.23 The wicked accept a concealed bribe to pervert the ways of justice.

Pietro Bovati notes: When the term 'way' is construed with terms meaning law, justice...it means 'to proceed' in conformity with the law... Just 'proceeding', in certain contexts such as Prov. 17.23, may refer to law court procedure in ^9 conformity with the law.

In Gen. 18.19 -p"! is construed with both UD&Q and ilplS. Wisdom and legal procedure should not be separated in the interpretation of these texts. In several other familiar texts ~pl may be understood to mean 'legal procedures and judgments': Isa. 40.27 My way is hidden from the LORD and my right [tDSCJQ] is disregarded by my God. Jer. 5.4 These are only the poor, they have no sense; for they do not know the way of the LORD, the law [CDSEJQ] of their God. Ps. 1.6 For the LORD watches over the way of the righteous but the way of the wicked will perish. Amos 2.7 They who trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth, and push the afflicted out of the way.

I.L. Seeligmann argues that "p~I means 'judgment' or 'legal trial' in Isa. 40.27 and Jer. 5.4 (where f 11 is in parallel with CD2&D).33 It will be argued that this is the sense of ~[~n in Gen. 18.19. The prefatory context of Abraham's involvement with the trial of Sodom and Gomorrah is the warrant 'to keep the way'. If the term ~[TT has a legal procedural meaning, then Abraham is receiving valuable adjudicatory experience in Genesis 18-19. By Doing Righteousness and Justice (USM npT"$ nifai?1?). The most complete syntagma for 'judging' is npTKl CDDCDQ TOi). This phrase generally refers to uprightness in behavior, but in some texts it is a reference to the administration of a just court procedure.34 32. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 192, n. 52. 33. Seeligmann, 'Terminologie', p. 269. 34. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 188.


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1 Kgs 10.9b

Because the LORD loved Israel forever, he has made you king to execute [H2JU] justice and righteousness. 2 Sam. 8.15b And David administered [HiDD] justice and equity to all his people. (Also 1 Chron. 18.14.) Ps. 99.4b You have executed [n&U] justice and righteousness in Jacob. Ps. 103.6 The LORD works [ITOU] vindication and justice for all who are oppressed. Jer. 22.3 Act [H2JU] with justice and righteousness, and deliver from the hand of the oppressor anyone who has been robbed. And do no wrong or violence to the alien, the orphan, and the widow, or shed innocent blood in this place. Jer. 22.15-16a Are you a king because you compete in cedar? Did not your father eat and drink and do [HE?I?] justice and righteousness? Then it was well with him. He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well. Jer. 23.5b He shall reign as king and deal wisely, and shall execute [H2JU] justice and righteousness in the land. Ezek. 45.9 Enough, O Princes of Israel! Put away violence and oppression, and do [ITOU] what is just and right. Cease your evictions of my people, says the LORD God.

Jeremiah 9.24 and 33.15 also use these common words together in the syntagma npl^l CODCdQ n&D to refer to the administration of just juridical procedure. This is the syntagma used in Gen. 18.19. It does not have the royal procedural context of these other examples, but is given as a charge to Abraham concerning his own children and his household. (The phrase BSBD1 Hpl^, which appears in Gen. 18.19, Ps. 33.5 and Prov. 21.3, is less frequent than Hpl^l QSEJQ, which occurs 22 times mostly in Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel.) n&U and ttSEJQ are also frequently used together without npl^ to mean 'administer justice' or 'execute justice'. (See Exod. 12.12; Num. 33.4; Deut. 10.18; 33.21; 1 Kgs 6.12; 2 Chron. 24.24; Pss. 9.16; 119.8 146.7; 149.9; Isa. 16.3; Jer. 5.1; 7.5; Ezek. 5.8, 10, 15; 11.9, 12; 16.41 18.8, 17; 20.24; 23.10; 25.11; 28.22, 26; 30.14, 19; 39.21; Mic. 7.9.) Genesis 18.20: How Great Is the Outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah (TD-pS rrpip. Dip npinj. The terms for 'outcry' (pJJS and pin) represent 'the loud and agonized crying of someone in acute distress, calling for help and seeking deliverance'.35 They are technical terms of

35.

G. Hasel, 'put', in TDOT, p. 115.

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legal complaint, requesting deliverance.36 In this text both pPXand pltt are used: 'outcry against' (npUT) 37 in 18.20 and 'whether according to the outcry' (nnpIEO)38 in 18.21. The root pyx is repeated in 19.13. The two words are used interchangeably here and throughout the Hebrew Bible.39 Most often, the judge to whom the complaint comes is the LORD. Note these examples: Gen. 4.10b

Listen; your brother's blood is crying out [pPX] to me from the ground! Exod. 3.7b I have heard their cry (pUli) on account of their taskmasters. Exod. 22.23 If you do abuse them, when they cry out [pltti] to me, I will surely heed their cry. 1 Sam. 7.8 Do not cease to cry out [pUT] to the LORD our God for us, and pray that he may save us from the hand of the Philistines. 2 Kgs 8.3b She set out to appeal [pltti] to the king for her house and her land. Isa. 19.20b When they cry [pPX]to the LORD the because of oppressors, he will send them a savior, and will defend and deliver them. Deut. 15.9b Your neighbor might cry [N~lp"1] to the LORD against you, and you would incur guilt.

In each of these verses the verb root is pJJiJ or pDT, except for Deut. 15.9, which has Klpl. This example (among many) is included to demonstrate that other verbs of 'crying out' are also used to denote legal complaint. The commonest terms referring to the complaint are the verbs (and occasionally corresponding nouns) from the roots pPX or pUT, N~lp and VW (Pi.)... The synonymous relationship between these verbs N~ip,pi^/pUT, and I212J (Pi.) is obvious from the fact that they are often found linked to one another.40

Examples of the linking and synonymous use of these roots has been demonstrated by I.L. Seeligmann.41 36. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 62-63; von Rad, Genesis, pp. 106, 211; Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 27; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 314-15. 37. N. f. s. cstr. 38. Interr.+ prep.+ n. f. S+ 3 f. s. sf. 39. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 20. See 1 Sam. 4.13-14; Jer. 25.34-36; Isa. 65.14-19; Jer. 48.3-5; Neh. 5.1-6. See 'ptfJS, Schreien', in Jenni and Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch, II, p. 574. 40. Bovati, Re-Establishing Justice, p. 314. 41. Seeligmann, 'Terminologie', pp. 257-60. For examples, see Jer. 20.8; Ps.


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Richard Boyce notes that the setting of judicial procedure and the use of pW» and p^T in Genesis 18 are 'clear-cut'.42 The function of the single use of pUT is straightforward. While the cry may yet function implicitly as an initiatory appeal for legal hearing, its primary function within this narrative of crime and punishment is evidential serving as the rationale for a trial which is now in progress... pl^...is a cry 'for help', specifically for legal hearing, arising from the maltreated marginals within this community... In this narrative setting, the use of the nominal form underlines this cry's evidential function, serving as the basis for a 'trial'... As a person with a complaint must come (83) before the king, so this negative evidence comes to God (KH plus ^, Gen. 18.20) and thereby, becomes great 'before' him OB1?, Gen. 19.13; cf. 2 Kgs 19.28, Jonah 1.2, Lam. 1.22)43

Genesis 18.21: I Must Go Down and See...and If Not, I Will Know

(njn« #rD«i...ritjn$i Krn-pK). 'Go down and see', ntn + IT, is a syntagma of common words that signals a legal inquiry into the facts of a case. God responds to the cry by coming down (IT) to see (i"tK"l). In some biblical texts, God's 'coming down' is to hear (UQ2J) more closely. In both cases, God comes to investigate the veracity of the testimony so far received, so that he may know (ITP) in order to judge.44 In these examples, Yahweh 'comes down', IT, either to investigate or to judge (see also 2 Sam. 22.10; Isa. 64.1,3; Micah 1.3): Gen. 11.5

The LORD came down [~IT] to see [H^~l] the city and the tower which mortals had built. Exod. 3.7-8a And I have observed [nK"~i] the misery of my people who are in Egypt; I have heard [UQ2J] their cry [pi>^] on account of their taskmasters. Indeed, I know t^T] their sufferings, and I have come down [IT] to deliver them.

18.7; Job 19.7; 35.9; Prov. 21.13. For a long list of synonyms of the verb pittS, see 'pUU, Schreien', in Jenni and Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch, II, p. 574. 42. Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 50. 43. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 50-51. 'In the J framework, once a cry from the marginal has been heard by the king, it functions as a cry against his or her murderer (Gen. 4.8) assailant (Gen. 19.13) or oppressor (Exod. 1.11 and 5.6-14).' Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 53. 44. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 51-52. Boyce notes that the judicial provenance of such words as ilK"), 1?Q2J, in" and ~!T is now apparent to scholars. See Westermann, Genesis 1-11, p. 303.

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The declaration 'I must go down and see' in Genesis 18 is the decision of a magistrate to try a case: God decides to step in as judge; the intervention begins with a verification, a judicial inquiry, whether the situation is in accord with the cries of lamentation.445 This is the manner in which Gen. 18.20-21 has to be interpreted: an accusation against Sodom and Gomorrah has reached the divine judge; as a result he undertakes to clarify the facts.46

'See and know' DT + i~!N~l is another syntagma of common words, which signals a legal inquiry into the facts of a case (See also Job 10.47; Jer. 12.3): 1 Sam. 14.38 Come here, all you leaders of the people; and let us find out [UT + HK"1] how this sin has arisen today. Job 11.11 For he knows those who are worthless; when he sees iniquity, will he not consider it? Job 22.13-14 Therefore, you say, 'What does God know? Can he judge through the deep darkness? Thick clouds enwrap him, so that he does not see, and he walks on the dome of heaven.' Ps. 139.23-24 Search me [~lpn], O God, and know my heart; test me []H3] and know my thoughts. See if there is any wicked way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting.47 Jer. 5.1 Run to and fro through the streets of Jerusalem, look around [ntf~i] and take note [in']! Search its squares and see if you can find one person who acts justly and seeks truth, so that I may pardon Jerusalem.

Bovati notes the following: The pairing W + ilK") describes the nature of the witness...the stage of (logical) certainty... This certainty may be gained from witnesses or acquired directly by the magistrate; but it is only when the judge is in a position of 'seeing' and 'knowing' that it becomes possible to pronounce a sentence in harmony with the law.48

Whether They Have Done Altogether According to the Outcry That Has Come to Me (rb3 W ^K H^H nnpl^?n). The phrase 'whether they have done altogether according to the outcry' describes the process of 45. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 290. 46. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 241 n. 38. 47. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 242-47. Hpn and ]!~!3 are also verbs of judicial inquiry 48. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 244 n. 47, Bovati's emphasis.


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deciding guilt by evidence. It is not known as a technical legal phrase, nor does the expression have parallels in other legal contexts. Nonetheless, the discourse in this narrative context has a legal function. It expresses the warrant for God's going down. Plaintiffs have brought a claim that must be verified by the judge.49 Genesis 18.22: Abraham Remained Standing before the LORD (Dn~O^] miT ^ -mi) vnw). 'Standing before' CDS1? 1Q^) is a common term used in some biblical texts to describe the juridical position of those in the trial. During arraignments, the one pleading stands and the judge is seated. The defendant (or in this case Abraham, the advocate for Sodom) 'stands' during this proceeding, while God 'sits' in judgment.50 In some cases, plaintiffs 'stand before' the judge themselves: 1 Kgs 3.16Later, two women who were prostitutes came to the king and stood before him.

As in Genesis 18.22, an advocate may 'stand before' on behalf of another.51 Jer. 15.la Though Moses and Samuel stood before me, yet my heart would not turn toward this people Jer. 18.20b Remember how I stood before you to speak good for them, to turn away your wrath from them.

There is also a link between the judge's being seated and the act of judging: The judge's being seated in the law court is linked.. .to the movement of those who come forward for judgment; but above all it is the opposite of 'standing up' during the course of the trial.

49. Contra Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 51. Wenham supplies 'deserve destruction' for rto TO. 50. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 231. 'The Juridical 'Position' of Those in the Trial... This is so universally accepted as not to require special comment.' See BDB, p. 763: 'for intercession'. For other interpretations and discussion of Abraham's standing before the LORD, including the Masoretic emendations ('the LORD stood before Abraham'), see Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 468; Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, pp. 23-24. 51. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 237 n. 34. 'It may perhaps be thought that the phrase 'B1? ~IQi), in the sense of 'to intercede', may be regarded as a kind of speech for the defense.' 52. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 233.

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For example: Exod. 18.13 Moses sat as judge for the people, while the people stood around him. Judg. 4.4-5 She used to sit under the palm of Deborah...and the Israelites came up to her for judgment.53

Genesis 18.23: Then Abraham Came Near (Drn?N B?a9X). The verb efa] has special procedural value when it is used in the context of litigation.54 The first procedure preceding the biblical trial is the summons, or an initiative designated by a motion towards a court of law. 273.] is not the only verb of motion used in this way, but it is frequently used:55 Gen. 44.18

Then Judah stepped up [273]] to him and said, 'O my LORD, let your servant please speak a word in my LORD'S ears, and do not be angry with your servant; for you are like Pharaoh himself.' Exod. 24.14 Wait here for us, until we come to you again; for Aaron and Hur are with you; whoever has a dispute may go [2)3]] to them. Deut. 25.1 Suppose two persons have a dispute and enter [273]] into litigation, and the judges decide between them, declaring one to be in the right and the other to be in the wrong. 1 Sam. 14.38 Come [273]] here all you leaders of the people; and let us find out how this sin has arisen today. Isa. 41.Ib Let them approach [2733], then let them speak; let us together draw near [3~lp] for judgment.

One of the two ways in which trial speech is introduced is a combination of 1QI7 with a verb of nearness. In Gen. 18.23, that verb of nearness is 273156 The Innocent with the Guilty? peh'DI? p^X). pH2$ and 17271 are common words that are often used together to denote innocence and guilt in legal contexts. In such texts as Genesis 18, they should be translated 'innocent' and 'guilty' rather than 'righteous' and 'wicked':57

53. See also Isa. 16.5; 28.6; Jer. 26.10; Joel 3.12; Ps. 9.5; Prov. 20.8. 54. Z.W. Falk, 'Hebrew Legal Terms', JSS 5 (1960), pp. 350-54. 55. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 218. For other verbs that function in the same way (especially 3~)p), see 2 Sam. 15.2; 15.6; Exod. 18.16; 1 Kgs 3.16; 2 Chron. 19.18; Job 23.2; Deut. 17.8-9; Judg. 4.5. 56. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 236. The other way is by means of the verb Dip linked to speech of some kind. 57. VonRad, Genesis, p. 212.


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The opposition between pHH and I?2J~1 in a T~l ['controversy'] points to the relationship which necessarily exists between two disputants; the former refers to the disputant which is in the right 'either because his accusations are true or because the accusations of his adversary are false'. ... This also holds good in a two-party controversy, and even in a law court before a judge. I would like to point out.. .how the concept of true and false enters into the definition of 'innocent' and 'guilty'.59

Establishing what is true and what is false in relation to the 'cry against' the inhabitants of Sodom is the context of the case in Gen. 18.23. Abraham's discussion and agreement with God is based on the supposition that the accusation against the Sodomites is possibly false for some of her inhabitants. That Lot may also be a 'righteous' man is not in dispute. Whether he or any others are 'innocent' is Abraham's concern (18.22-33). pHiJ and JXD1 are used together and translated as 'innocent' and 'guilty' in other texts of similar contexts: Exod. 23.7

Deut. 25.Ib

Keep far from a false charge, and do not kill the innocent and those in the right [pH^l ""pTl], for I will not acquit the guilty [UGh pHHtf-tf'? -D]. The judges decide between them, declaring one to be in the right [p'-rîTTlN ipn^m] and the other to be in the wrong

[srchrrnR ijrczhm].60

2 Chron. 6.23 And judge your servants, repaying the guilty [UGH'?] by bringing their conduct on their own head, and vindicating those who are in the right [pH^S pH^rfn] by rewarding them. Isa. 5.23 You...who acquit the guilty [tfEh yTiD] for a bribe, and deprive the innocent pTp'HlS] of their rights!

In Gen. 18.23 and 18.25 p~IH and U2H are used together in opposition three times: 18.23 18.25

Will you indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty? Far be it from you to do such a thing, to slay the innocent with the guilty, so that the innocent fare as the guilty!

pTS is used four more times in the narrative, with U2H only implied. The juxtaposition between the innocent and the guilty is implied, without the use of p~IK and I?2J"l, four more times.61 The opposition and 58. 59. 60. 61. and 32.

J. Vella, La giustizia forense di Dio (Bresia: Paideia, 1964), p. 38. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 103. The RSV has 'acquitting the innocent and condemning the guilty'. pHlS Gen. 18.24 (x2), 26, 28. Both are implied again in vv. 29, 30, 31

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repetition of these terms is itself evidence for the argument that they should be translated 'innocent' and 'guilty': Verbs [including p7£ and D2H] that express the jurisdictional function are all the more relevant at this point to the extent that they refer to the act of separation of the guilty from the innocent... in other words, judging becomes more obviously the final act of a trial the more it makes explicit two opposing series of terms, the former referring to 'acquittal', the latter to 'condemnation'.62

A formal pronouncement of guilt in Genesis 19 is not made by means of this word pair. The narrative description of the behavior of the men of Sodom functions to confirm the truth of the 'cry against' Sodom, resulting in a guilty verdict (19.13). Formal pronouncements in legal biblical contexts are usually declarations of innocence of the kind, 'You are innocent' (nDN pH^). The use of this kind of declaration as a legal formula is well documented by form critics.63 Commentators also recognize the implied legal context of these words.64 For example: Innocence and guilt are always defined in relation to each other. In this narrative the behavior of the Sodomites has been defined as wicked. Hence, the innocent are not intrinsically just or righteous, only in contrast to the Sodomites.65

Finally, the translation of pHlS in Gen. 20.4b as 'innocent' is not disputed. No one translates it 'righteous' in that context. It is the Canaanite's protestation of innocence to God.66 Abimelech asks, 'Will you destroy an innocent people?' (Jinn pHlTD} ""tin).

62. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 349. 63. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 123-32; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 348-49; D.R. Killers, 'Delocutive Verbs in Biblical Hebrew', JBL 86 (1967), pp. 320-24. For Italian and French responses to Boecker, see Bovati, Reestablishing Justice, pp. 103-104. Its characteristic is the use of p^li in a nominal phrase as in Exod. 9.27; 2 Kgs 10.9; Ezra 9.15; Neh. 9.33; Dan. 9.14; Lam. 1.18. See also Ps. 51.6; Neh. 9.8; Dan. 9.7,18; 2 Chron. 12.6. 64. Victor P. Hamilton translates 'the innocent with the guilty'? Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 15. 'The "righteous" are any who had not participated in the behaviors which led to the "outcry".' Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 469. 65. Robert B. Coote and David R. Ord, The Bible's First History (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989), p. 129. 66. See discussion of this verse at 20.4.


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Genesis 18.24: Suppose There Are Fifty Innocent (Dp'HS D^qn 2T ^N). The conclusion of a juridical inquiry, identified by the syntagma 'see' + 'know' (UT + riNH), 'may be signaled in Hebrew by the particle ET'.67 Abraham's question to God (18.24) intercepts God's going down 'to see' n^"i and 'to know' JTP (18.21). When he says 'Suppose there are' (2T ^18) in this context, he begins the use of a legal expression (which will be repeated five more times in 18.26-32) known as such in other biblical law court contexts.68 And Not Spare It for the Fifty Innocent (DTOH ]Dtf? Dips'? N&rr^l Dpn^Hj. The NRSV has 'and not forgive it'. The verb nt0] in this context is better translated 'and not spare it' (RSV), for two reasons. First, the direct object, translated as 'it', is 'the place' (DlpQ^) (repeated from the first half of the verse). The verb 'forgive' assumes the people, not 'the place'. Abraham's request is that the 'place' should be 'spared'. Secondly, the connotation of K2J3 is always juridical; it is not a verb of substitutionary atonement.69 While it can often be properly translated 'forgive' (see Num. 14.19; Isa. 2.9; Hos. 1.6), it refers to a direct juridical pardon from God. In Genesis 18, the translation must consider the use of the verb with the preposition ]^Q^ translated 'for'. Translating N&] as 'forgive' with PQ'? as 'for' can lead to the mistaken impression that 'forgive for the sake of is a reference to an atoning function of the innocent for the guilty. But this is never the use of tf&l Therefore, DlpQ^ N&rrN'?! should be translated 'and not spare the place', and ]Vft>7should be understood as a preposition of 'advantage', and not causally.70 This retains the proper meaning of K&] as 'spare'. The city is to be spared for the innocent people who are there. That the guilty people also would be spared is not a sign of their forgiveness, but of their fortune to be in a 'spared' city.71 The meaning is not a substitutionary forgiveness because of the innocent (DpHKH), but a question of life and justice for any innocent in the 67. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 251. 68. See argument and details at 18.26 below. 69. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 143-44. 70. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 365, 366. Gen. 18.24 is cited as an example. 71. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 292; Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 469.

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city. In either case, however, the implied ought signified by the ]VFb of advantage is that the innocent should not be destroyed with the guilty. pQ^ introduces the warrant (innocence) for God's 'sparing' the city. Thus, in addition to the formal juridical language of pardon, a moral ought not is introduced by means of ]$rh> in the discourse.72 Genesis 18.25a To Make a Ruling Like This (TlTH "DTP HDUn). The NRSV translates, 'to do such a thing'. Whenever "Q"T is used with the language of judging (032JQ), it is translated as 'case', meaning 'legal case', or 'juridical decision', meaning 'ruling', with the exception of Gen. 18.25. This text should be translated in a similar way. In this context, 'to make a ruling like this' would be more precise than 'to do such a thing'.73 There are only nine occurrences of the syntagma QD&ft + "Din in the Hebrew Bible. In seven of them, the reference is to a legal case to be decided (Gen. 18.25; Deut. 1.17; 17.8, 9, 11; 2 Sam. 15.6; 2 Chron. 19.6). The two other occurrences of the syntagma, 2 Chron. 8.14 and Ezra 3.4, also have a legal context, referring to an ordinance (QSEJft) that has a specific duty (~O~J).74 To Slay (TTnrh). The hiphil of the verb TO ('slay' or 'put to death') is used to describe the official action of a court in meting out punishment. Sometimes the actor is the executioner, as in Deut. 17.7, 1 Sam. 11.12, 22.17-18, 2 Sam. 14.7, and Jer. 26.24, 38.16. Sometimes, as in Genesis 18.25, 'the punitive act can be attributed directly to the judge'.75 For example: 1 Sam. 19.1

Saul spoke with his son Jonathan and with all his servants about killing David. 2 Sam. 14.32b Now let me go into the king's presence; if there is guilt in me, let him kill me. 72. The same warrant (innocence) for not destroying the innocent with the guilty is introduced by the compound preposition TniO in 18.26. 73. For the legal procedural use of n&U , see the commentary at 20.9b, 'You have done'. See also 18.21, 'whether they have done', and 20.10, where the verb HE1^ and the noun "Ql are used together in a similar way. Abimelech asks Abraham, 'What were you thinking that you did such a thing?' In this light, it could be translated, 'What were you thinking that you made such a decision?' 74. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. 25-26. Falk argues that ordinances such as this are the product of previous juridical decisions made, 'judge-made' law. 75. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 374.

3. A Survey of Juridical Terminology 1 Kgs 2.26b Jer. 26.21 b

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.. .for you deserve death. But I will not at this time put you to death. .. .the king sought to put him to death.

In both situations, the reference is not simply to killing, but to the judicious action of a court. Genesis 18.25b: Shall Not the Judge...Make a Just Decision? (CDD&n UEtfZJp njpir vb...). The NRSV translates, 'Shall not the Judge...do what is just?' The syntagma QDEJQ + tDDEJn ('the judge' + 'a just judgment') occurs three times in the Hebrew Bible, including Gen. 18.25.76 In the other two cases, the syntagma of the two words together is used technically to refer to the 'judge's just decision'. In Gen. 18.25 this specificity is lost in the more abstract translation 'do what is just' (NRSV) or 'do right' (RSV). It is better rendered 'make a just decision', in consistency with the other two occurrences (Deut. 17.9; 1 Kgs 3.28). These texts reveal a technical use of non-technical vocabulary. For supporting examples in the plural form see Deut. 16.18 and 2 Chron. 19.6.77 The context of Deut. 17.9 is an appellate court, and a contingency for helping to insure the 'justness' of a decision is provided. 'If a judicial decision is too difficult to make...' (Deut. 17.8): Deut. 17.9

You shall consult with the levitical priests and the judge [tDSEJH] who is in office in those days; they shall announce to you the decision [C2S2JQi"I] in the case.

In 1 Kgs 3.28, King Solomon judges between two women who claim the same child, a landmark case for 'just judgments'. 1 Kgs 3.28a All Israel heard of the judgment [CDSCJQiT] which the king had rendered [QD2J ifmn].

In each of these three cases where the syntagma JDDEJQ + QQEJn occurs, the referent is a specific just verdict or decision by a judge which indicates more than a general concept of doing right. The nominal form CDQ^Q has two functions in early texts, both of which include the implication that the judgments are 'just'. First and originally, 12S2JQ 'seems to have been an individual decision or right of

76. Gen. 18.25; Deut. 17.9; 1 Kgs 3.28. 77. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 171. The root CDQ2J has three distinct forms: Q?2JQ, CDDtp, QD2J. 'This triad occurs in one and the same text and shows in a succinct way the scope of the courtroom juridical action.' See Deut. 16.18.

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either party'. Both the plaintiff and the defendant claimed the QDC2Q (just judgment) to be theirs, 'until it was rendered to the party found to be just'. Secondly, these individual legal decisions 'were cited as precedents for similar cases. Thus, CDSEJQ came to mean a collection of casuistic laws such as Exod. 21, which was originally judge-made law, though codified at an early date.'78 Again, it can be assumed that the laws or 'judgments' were considered to be 'just' ones. In Gen. 18.25 the first function of the term is represented. It refers to an individual 'just judgment' that is best understood by the translation 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth make a just decision!'As in the other cases of the syntagma, the abstraction 'do what is right' cannot convey the specificity of the decision represented by the syntagma tOD^Q + CDSCtfn. The translation 'make a just decision' is also supported by a specific use of the syntagma EDEJQ n&U. Usually this phrase means to have 'an ethical attitude of conformity to the law (Jer. 5.1; Mic. 6.8; Prov. 21.7, 15). In certain contexts, however, it refers to a judicial action.'79 (See also Pss. 119.84; 146.7; 2 Chron. 8.18.) For example: 1 Kgs 3.28b And they stood in awe of the king, because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to execute justice [CDD2JQ nfoU]. Ps. 9.17a The LORD has made himself known, he has executed judgment [H2?U CQS3BJQ].

Genesis 18.26: If I Find...29 Suppose Are Found f^K...^*™ l^fT). The syntagma & + K^Q (there is + find), usually with the particle DK (either 'if there is' or, as here, 'if I find'), is the typical biblical expression of the terms of a conclusion to the pre-trial inquiry.80 This is an expression of legal 'findings':81 78. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. 25-26. 79. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 188. 80. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 251. For the expression 'if there is', see 1 Sam. 14.38-39; 20.8; 2 Sam. 14.32; Job 6.30; Pss. 7.3; 14.2-3; Isa. 59.15; Jer. 5.1; 50.20. 81. On 'finding' as legal discovery, see G. Gerleman, 'KKQ Finden', in Jenni and Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch zum Alien Testament, I (2 vols.; Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1971-76), pp. 922-25; S. Wagner, '«:»JQ', in G.J. Botterweck and H. Ringgren (eds.), Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament 8 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), pp. 465-83; D. Daube, To Be Found Doing Wrong', in Studi in Onore di E. Volterra (Milan: A. Giuffre, 1971), pp. 5-6; S. Dempster, The Deuteronomic Formula KKQ'' "D in the Light of Biblical and


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Exod. 22.2a (7, 8) If a thief is found...[K2SQ DR]. Num. 32.2 But if (DK) you do not do this...be sure your sin will find («2iQ) you out. Deut. 24.1 Suppose a man enters into marriage with a woman but [DK] she does not please him because he finds [\K£D] something objectionable... 1 Kgs 1.52b If [DK] wickedness is found [NKQ] in him, he shall die.

The gist of the expression 'if.. .found' is the discovery of wrongdoing and the legal response to that doing, that is, an 'official' finding out. In Gen. 18.24 Abraham says, 'Suppose there are [2T] fifty righteous within the city...will you not spare?' In Gen. 18.26 God replies, 'If I find [N^Q DN] fifty righteous in the city I will spare it.' Several forms of the expression are repeated in the dialogue that follows. 'If I find' (N^Q DK) is in 18.26, 28 and 30, and 'Suppose are found' (KSQ) is in 18.29, 30, 31, and 32.82 With this legal terminology, Abraham argues for the best conclusion he can negotiate with God for the city of Sodom. Legal and Juridical Terminology in Genesis 19.1-29 1

The two angels came to Sodom in the evening, and Lot was sitting in the gateway of Sodom. When Lot saw them, he rose to meet them, and bowed down with his face to the ground. 2 He said, 'Please, my lords, turn aside to your servant's house and spend the night, and wash your feet; then you can rise early and go on your way'. They said, 'No; we will spend the night in the square'. 3 But he urged them strongly; so they turned aside to him and entered his house; and he made them a feast, and baked unleavened bread, and they ate. 4 But before they lay down, the men of the city, the men of Sodom, both young and old, all the people to the last man, surrounded the house; 5 and they called to Lot, 'Where are the men who came to you tonight? Bring them out to us, so that we may know them.' 6 Lot went out of the door to the men, shut the door after him, 7 and said, 7 beg you, my brothers, do not act so wickedly. 8 Look, I have two daughters who have not known a man; let me bring them out to you, and do to them as you please; only do nothing to these men, for they have come under the shelter of my roof.'g But they replied, 'Stand back!' And they said, 'This fellow came here as an alien, and he would play the judge! Now we will Ancient Near Eastern Law: An Evaluation of David Daube's Theory', RB 91 (1984), pp. 188-211. Related to the 'finding' of evidence is D. Daube's work on legal discovery with the term TDil (hiphil of ID]), 'regard' or 'recognize'. These uses refer to the recognition of evidence, and not to first person testimony of persons against persons as in this text. 82. t££Q, qal impf. 1 c. s and NKQ, ni. impf. 3 m. p.

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Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative deal worse with you than with them.' Then they pressed hard against the man Lot, and came near the door to break it down. 10 But the men inside reached out their hands and brought Lot into the house with them, and shut the door. 11 And they struck with blindness the men who were at the door of the house, both small and great, so that they were unable to find the door. 12 Then the men said to Lot, 'Have you anyone else here? Sons-inlaw, sons, daughters, or anyone you have in the city—bring them out of the place. 13 For we are about to destroy this place, because the outcry against its people has become great before the LORD, and the LORD has sent us to destroy it.' 14 So Lot went out and said to his sons-in-law, who were to marry his daughters, 'Up, get out of this place; for the LORD is about to destroy the city.' But he seemed to his sons-in-law to be jesting. 15 When morning dawned, the angels urged Lot, saying, 'Get up, take your wife and your two daughters who are here, or else you will be consumed in the punishment of the city.' 16 But he lingered; so the men seized him and his wife and his two daughters by the hand, the LORD being merciful to him, and they brought him out and left him outside the city. 17 When they had brought them outside, they said [MT, 'he said', "IQK'YJ, 'Flee for your life; do not look back or stop anywhere in the Plain; flee to the hills, or else you will be consumed.' 18 And Lot said to them, 'Oh, no, my lords; 19 your servant has found favor with you, and you have shown me great kindness in saving my life; but I cannot flee to the hills, for fear the disaster will overtake me and I die. 20 Look, that city is near enough to flee to, and it is a little one. Let me escape there— is it not a little one?—and my life will be saved!' 21 He said to him, 'Very well, I grant you this favor too, and will not overthrow the city of which you have spoken. 22 Hurry, escape there, for I can do nothing until you arrive there.' Therefore, the city was called Zoar. 23 The sun had risen on the earth when Lot came to Zoar. 24 Then the LORD rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the LORD out of heaven; 25 and he overthrew those cities, and all the Plain, and all the inhabitants of the cities, and what grew on the ground. 26 But Lot's wife, behind him, looked back, and she became a pillar of salt. 27 Abraham went early in the morning to the place where he had stood before the LORD; 28 and he looked down toward Sodom and Gomorrah and toward all the land of the Plain and saw the smoke of the land going up like the smoke of a furnace. 29 So it was that, when God destroyed the cities of the Plain, God remembered Abraham, and sent Lot out of the midst of the overthrow, when he overthrew the cities in which Lot had settled.83

83.

On the omission of 19.30-38 see p. 82.


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Genesis 19.7:1 Beg You, My Brothers, Do Not Act So Wickedly (Kr^K •7inn TIN). Lot expresses explicitly the notion that the intended action of the men of Sodom is wrong. ##"1 (wickedly)84 is not used in any technical way in legal contexts. The term simply functions in discourse to indicate actions that ought not be done.85 Hiphil stems of JMH in perfect and imperfect forms occur 31 times in the Hebrew Bible and are translated in ways that generally mean 'to do wrong':86 Gen. 44.5b You have done wrong in doing this. 1 Sam. 12.25 But if you still do wickedly you shall be swept away, you and your king. 1 Kgs 14.9a But you have done evil above all those who were before you.

Genesis 19.8b: Only Do Nothing to These Men for They Have Come under the Shelter of My Roof (}^^3 "13"T ^rr^K ^ ZTtiMb pi T"np ^3 183). The expression 'the shelter of my roof is unique to this text. By using it as a warrant for the protection of the two men in discourse, Lot discloses an obligation known to him and, arguably, also to the men of Sodom. Lot's stated warrant, introduced by the causal "D, is that 'they have come under the shelter of my roof'.87 The implication of the discourse is that those who have been welcomed under the 'shelter of the roof ought not be abused. His claim that this 'shelter' ought not be violated is supported by the narrative in the subsequent action of the guests at 19.11 (blinding the men of Sodom) and in God's action at 19.24. As these examples demonstrate, pîr^ (translated 'for' in 19.8) is associated with the obligation of hospitality in Genesis:88 18.5

Let me bring a little bread that you may refresh yourselves...since [p~i?ir''D] you have come to your servant. 33.10 No, please; if I find favor with you, then accept my present from my hand...since [pÎT11!)] you have received me with such favor. 38.26a She is more in the right than I, since [p~biri'D] I did not give her to my son Shelah. 84. linn hiphil impf. 2 m. p. 85. For basic scholarship on the vocabulary of sin, see notes at Gen. 20.9. 86. BDB, p. 949. The word field denotes the infliction of hurt or pain on mother, which is generally implied as wrong in the texts. 87. 1ND p'ÎT'O, 'because they have come', Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. W4, causal "D. 88. BDB, p. 475.

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In these cases the construction pÎT'O introduces the warrant for the preceding request. In Gen. 19.8, 'under the shelter of my roof is the warrant. It refers to the necessity of hospitality, which includes food, lodging and safety.89 Life itself depends on this protection, which in this text is presented as the travelers' right and Lot's prerogative.90 Genesis 19.15: Get Up, Take Your Wife and Your Two Daughters Who Are Here (ntoijn ^7)^ ^0-^1 ÎIKPKTIK np_ Dip). In this verse and those that follow (vv. 15-29), a verb tense, rather than a particular phrase or word, indicates a legal proceeding in the text. Seven imperative forms punctuate the narrative as part of the judgment of Sodom and deliverance of Lot's family.91 In legal texts, the protection of those who have been legally marginalized in a community (as Lot and his family have been) is signaled by what has been called the 'royal imperative'. The royal imperative, and the protection it offers the innocent, is so expected at the conclusion of such narratives that its absence would be surprising.92 In this text, it is far from absent: Genesis 19.12b Bring them out [Kinn] of the place (hi. impv. 2 m.s.). 19.15b Get up, take [np Dip] your wife and your two daughters who are here (qal impv. 2 m.s.). 19.17b When they had brought them outside, He said, 'Flee [CD^Qn] for your life... Flee [tD^QH] to the hills or else you will be consumed' (ni. impv. 2 m.s.). 19.22a Hurry [~1HQ], escape [LD^QH] there (pi. imp. 2 m.s.; ni. impv. 2 m.s.).

With these imperatives the angels of the LORD attempt to deliver Lot's family from the destruction of Sodom. In v. 17, the repeated imperative 'Flee!' is further rhetorically punctuated by the first use of the singular

89. mp is translated as 'roof only here. Sometimes it is translated as 'beam', in reference to the main beam of the roof. ^ generally means 'shadow' but is often used to mean 'protection'. BDB, p. 853. 90. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 27-28: A legal hearing for protection is no casual necessity in the social world of ancient Israel, 'made obvious by the deprivations which threaten if the need for judicial decision goes unmet or leads to an unfavorable verdict: lack of food.. .lack of life.. .lack of house and land'. 91. Two more imperatives occur in hendiadys as Lot repeats the royal imperative of the messengers in 19.14. 92. Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 39.


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'he' in the narrative, referring to the angels/God. These 'royal' imperatives result in the saving of the innocent. That they were not spoken to the others in Sodom is equally a royal verdict.93 The repeated root NKQ 94 is not incidental to the story. The innocent, to whom Abraham referred (18.23-33), are 'found'. The imperatives, which provide the way of deliverance, are for Lot's wife and daughters, who have been 'found' vulnerable by being legally marginalized in the city. They are innocent in the midst of the aggressive inhospitality of Sodom.95 Genesis 19.23: The Sun Had Risen on the Earth ff "INrr1?!? K£ tfl^n,). The morning is the preferred time for an intervention or judgment by God. Verse 23 describes the beginning of the execution of the judgment. The intervention of the messengers to save Lot's family began in a similar manner: 'When morning dawned' (HÛ "in^H 1QD1; 19.15).96 The sun's rising is 'one of the metaphors suggesting the advent of justice promoted by right judgment'.97 For example: Exod. 14.24 At the morning watch, the LORD in the pillar of fire and cloud looked down. Josh. 6.15 On the seventh day they rose early, at dawn, and marched around the city. Isa. 13.10b The sun will be dark at its rising, and the moon will not shed its light.

The metaphor of the rising sun as the advent of justice is usually indicated in texts that combine the root N^*1 and CDD&Q.98 93. Boyce, The Cry to God. Compare royal imperatives that administer justice in 2 Sam. 14.8; 19.30; 1 Kgs 3.24-25; and 2Kgs 8.6. The failure of the king to speak in questions of justice is equally striking. See 1 Kgs 20.35-36 and 2 Kgs 6.24-25. The absence of the royal imperative is the 'final deciding clue that something is here amiss...the absence of the imperative in these two cases is, therefore, not a rejection of this form but a testimony to its fixity'. Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 39. 94. Ni. ptc. f. p. 95. This is another warrant for the translation 'innocent' rather than 'righteous'. Lot's wife and daughters, 'found' here, are not 'righteous' in the text but are innocent of the violent inhospitality of Sodom. 96. See 'early in the morning' at 20.8; 21.14; 22.3. 97. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 366; see Exod. 14.27; Judg. 5.31; Ps. 19.6. 98. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 366-68; Seeligmann, 'Terminologie', p. 278.

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Legal and Juridical Terminology in Genesis 20.1-18 1

From there Abraham journeyed toward the region of the Negeb, and settled between Kadesh and Shur. While residing in Gerar as an alien, 2 Abraham said of his wife Sarah, 'She is my sister'. And King Abimelech of Gerar sent and took Sarah. 3 But God came to Abimelech in a dream by night, and said to him, 'You are about to die because of the woman whom you have taken; for she is a married woman.' 4 Now Abimelech had not approached her; so he said, 'LORD, will you destroy an innocent people! 5 Did he not himself say to me, "She is my sister"? And she herself said, "He is my brother". I did this in the integrity of my heart and the innocence of my hands.' 6 Then God said to him in the dream, 'Yes, I know that you did this in the integrity of your heart; furthermore it was I who kept you from sinning against me. Therefore, I did not let you touch her. 7 Now then, return the man's wife; for he is a prophet, and he will pray for you and you shall live. But if you do not restore her, know that you shall surely die, you and all that are yours.' 8 So Abimelech rose early in the morning, and called all his servants and told them all these things; and the men were very much afraid. 9 Then Abimelech called Abraham, and said to him, ' What have you done to usl How have I sinned against you, that you have brought such great guilt on me and my kingdoml You have done things to me that ought not to be done.' 10 And Abimelech said to Abraham, 'What were you thinking of, that you did this thing?' 1 l Abraham said, 'I did it because I thought, There is no fear of God at all in this place, and they will kill me because of my wife. 12 Besides, she is indeed my sister, the daughter of my father but not the daughter of my mother; and she became my wife. 13 And when God caused me to wander from my father's house, I said to her, "This is the kindness you must do me: at every place to which we come, say of me, He is my brother".' 14 Then Abimelech took sheep and oxen, and male and female slaves, and gave them to Abraham, and restored his wife Sarah to him. 15 Abimelech said, 'My land is before you; settle where it pleasesyou1. 16 To Sarah he said, 'Look, I have given your brother a thousand pieces of silver, it is your exoneration before all who are with you; you are completely vindicated.' l 7 Then Abraham prayed to God; and God healed Abimelech, and also healed his wife and female slaves so that they bore children. 18 For the LORD had closed fast all the wombs of the house of Abimelech because of Sarah, Abraham's wife.

Genesis 20.3b: You Are about to Die (tlQ "^H). In the discourse of the narrative, this statement reads like the verdict of a judge." The threat of 99. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 322; Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 178.


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death is presented in a more recognized formula in 20.7: H1QH mft 100 (you shall surely die). This expression occurs in similar contexts that warn of and declare judgment (Gen. 2.17; 1 Sam. 14.44, 22.16; 1 Kgs 2.37, 42; 2 Kgs 1.4, 6, 16; Jer. 26.8; Ezek. 3.18, 33.8, 14).101 In the context of Genesis 20, however, the threat of death is not simply a forensic judgment. As the qal active participle in 20.3 allows, Abimelech is already 'dying'. The reader will be informed in 20.17 that Abimelech is already sick. The death-threatening illness is a consequence of Sarah's presence in Abimelech's tent, which has already begun to take effect as God speaks the warning.102 Because of the Woman Whom You Have Taken; for She Is a Married Woman f?U2 rbui Kim nnp'?"!^ n^rr^jpj. The warrant given for Abimelech's 'dying' (flQ) is the taking of 'a married woman'. The causal ^1) introduces this ought not in the discourse in the phrase 'because of the woman', and is coordinated with the explicative 1 of Kim, 'for she is'.103 The unusual term în rfrin104 (married woman) designates Sarah's sexuality as Abraham's responsibility (literally, 'ruled by a ruler').105 It is possible that the term is a reference even to Abraham's 'property'.106 Abimelech's violation is a legal violation against what is rightfully Abraham's. The term occurs again only once, in a law with a similar context: Deut. 22.22 If a man is caught lying with the wife of another man (H2JK DI> 'Pin rfrin) both of them shall die, the man who lay with the woman as well as the woman. So you shall purge the evil from Israel.

100. Qal inf. abs. + qal impf. 2 m. s. 101. K.J. Illman, Old Testament Formulas about Death (Abo: Abo Press, 1979), pp. 104-105. A summary of references on this formula can be found in Bovati, Reestablishing Justice, p. 361. 102. See Erhard S. Gerstenberger, '"...He/They Shall Be Put to Death": Life Preserving Divine Threats in Old Testament Law', ExAuditu 11 (1995), pp. 43-62. 103. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 291, causal *?& and explicative 1, para. 291. 104. Qal pass. part. f. s. const. + n. m. s. 105. Pressler, The View of Women. 106. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. I l l , 123, 141; Carmichael, Law and Narrative, p. 216.

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Whether the nuanced meaning of the term is 'property' or 'responsibility', it is a technical reference to a relationship between a husband and wife that ought not be violated, even with the consent of the man and the woman.107 Genesis 20.4b: Will You Destroy an Innocent People? fpn^'DS ^0 :hnn). This phrase is recognized as a legal formula, referred to as one form of 'interrogative protestations of innocence'.108 Examples may be found in Num. 22.28, 1 Sam. 17.29, Isa. 5.4, and Jer. 2.30. Another common form of interrogative protestations is found in Abimelech's subsequent question to Abraham: 'How have I sinned against you?' (•$ TlKBrrnai; 20.9).109 Abimelech's appeal to God ('Will you destroy?') is that God not destroy a 'completely innocent people'. Although 'completely innocent' is redundant in English, it captures the emphasis.110 Genesis 20.5b: In the Integrity of My Heart and Innocence of My Hands fED fp^ ''in'p'DrQ,). This phrase in Abimelech's plea is recognized as a formula.111 [It is] a fixed phrase which, with its parallelism, allows us to recognize a solemn formula: 'In integrity of heart and with innocent hands'...the cultic formula in1? ~D1 D^SD "p] ('he who has clean hands and a pure heart') of Ps. 24.4 is almost the same; it too has a similar function as a rejection of guilt in the Liturgy at the Gate.112

The phrase 'integrity of heart' pD^'DD) is repeated in Gen. 20.6, where God acknowledges Abimelech's 'integrity of heart'. The expression also occurs in 1 Kgs 9.4, in God's promise to Solomon, as well as in Ps. 78.72 and 101.2, as a declaration of integrity. The expression 'innocence of my hands' C'ED'pp]) combines two 107. Further discussion of the use of this term in the plot of the narrative is found in Chapter 4. 108. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 111. 109. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 31-34. 110. See Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 379, for the emphatic use of D3. Because of this emphasis, no one translates p'HIS as 'righteous'. 111. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 482; Walter Brueggemann, 'A Neglected Sapiential Word Pair', ZAW 89 (1977), pp. 234-58. np3 and DQFI are both used in 20.5. 112. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 323.


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words that are each typical in declarations of innocence: np] (free from guilt, clean, innocent; exempt from punishment) and 'hands'.113 Clean hands are often presented as a metaphor for innocence, as may be seen in 1 Sam. 12.5 and 26.18, and Pss. 7.4, 18.21 and26.6.114It is possible to maintain 'integrity of heart' and 'innocent hands' in the world of the text and still suffer the consequences of liability for guilt.115 Genesis 20.7b: But If You Do Not Restore Her, Know that You Shall Surely Die (man HlQ'^ JH zrtpQ ir«'D«1J. God says 'but if you do not' ("p^'DKl) conditionally.116 Because it is God who speaks, the phrase functions as a discursive sign of an ought not in the narrative. It corresponds to the ought just spoken in 20.7a, 'return the man's wife' (ETNn TON D2Jn). The phrase 'but if you do not' introduces the condition (restoration) for accomplishing what ought to be done (ITCDD).117 Sarah's restoration to Abraham is the condition of Abimelech's future wellbeing. The resultative "O (that) and the conditional DK (if not) together introduce the consequence of not restoring Sarah to Abraham, 'you shall surely die' (man miro).118 Genesis 20.9 Then Abimelech Called Abraham C^Wl^ N~p_'l Dn'QN'p). The expression *? N"lp is another example of very common vocabulary that functions in a precise way in juridical contexts. It is the most common Hebrew form used to express the convening of a hearing by a judge. In calling Abraham to account for his actions, Abimelech functions as the judge in his camp.119 'The only thing which seems common to the different acts of convening is that N~lp must take as its

113. BDB, p. 667: 'The accused declares himself innocent' using np]. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 113. 114. Bovati, Re-Establishing Justice, p. 110. 115. Adrian Schenker, 'Once Again, the Expiatory Sacrifices', JBL 116 (1997), pp. 697-719. For another view, Jacob Milgrom, 'Further on the Expiatory Sacrifices', JBL 115 (1996), pp. 511-14. 116. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 453, conditional DK, and para. 407, 'ptf in a bound structure. 117. For comment on the use of the hiphil of D12J in legal procedure, see 325s 1, 'he restored her', at 20.14. 118. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 450, para. 527, resultative "3. For comment on the phrase TOP fllQ, 'you shall surely die', see 20.3. 119. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 223.

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subject someone with a measure of authority.'120 It is often translated 'summoned'. (For other examples, see Exod. 1.18; Deut. 25.8; 1 Sam. 22.11; 1 Kgs 2.42; 2 Kgs 12.7.) What Have You Done to Us? (\"b rPtoirna). One of the characteristic forms of introducing an accusation in court is, 'What have you done?' (rr&£> HQ).121 rr&U HQ is similar to, but not the exact form of, a recognized courtroom formula. The formula *7 PP&U n^mo is similar to a court situation, but distinct from it, while the formula JTtotf fl^mo (without the dative object), in a still stronger degree, has become a spoken expression for which Gen. 3.13 is known, which is in fact the origin of the forensic field.122

In the context of Genesis 20, rrtZJI? TO has the function of initiating an inquest into a crime against the community.123 It is distinct from a protestation of innocence that becomes an accusation that begins with Nttn nn (How have I sinned?). How Have I Sinned against You that You Have Brought Such Great

Guilt on Me and my Kingdom? rrd^r^-^} û ntqrrD ^ TiKarrnqi nî: nijttpn). 'How have I sinned against you?' is a protestation of innocence.124 In 20.4 Abimelech protests his innocence to God with the question, 'Will you destroy an innocent people?' Now he protests to Abraham, as part of an accusation, ~p TlNBrrilQ ('How have I sinned against you?'). The phrase TlKOPrnQ is used to protest innocence as part of a counter-accusation: 1 Kgs 18.9 How have I sinned [TIKOrrriQ] that you would hand your servant over to Ahab, to kill me? Jer. 37.18 What wrong have I done [TIKtarrnQ] to you...that you have put me in prison?

The protest that 'becomes an accusation' is common to biblical legal inquiries. A "O clause is typically used to connect the protest to the 120. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 224. 121. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 76; Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 26-31. 122. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, p. 30 (my translation). 123. See Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 482. 124. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. I l l : 'interrogative protestation of innocence'.


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accusation.125 In Genesis 20.9 the "O presents the accusation 'that you have brought such great guilt on me and my kingdom'. The reversal of perspective, from defense to counter-accusation (cf. Gen. 20.9; Job 7.20; Jer. 16.10) is signaled by certain syntactical indications... Attention should first be directed to a "O which carries forward the declaration of innocence, especially in the interrogative form (cf. e.g. Gen. 20.9; 31.36; 40.15; 1 Sam. 20.1; 1 Kgs 18.9; Jer. 2.5; 37.18); this particle introduces a criticism of whoever is doing the accusing, and lays the accuser under accusation.126

This resultative "O implies that Abimelech thinks there is a necessary connection between his own action ('How have I sinned?') and the 'great guilt' (n^!2 nNCDPI) under which he and his kingdom suffer. He wonders what he has done to Abraham for Abraham to have acted in a way that would bring calamity upon him. The resultative ""D clause (nKnrPD, 'that you have brought') introduces Abimelech's perception of this necessary connection. Abraham corroborates the same idea in his reply, 'I did it because "O I thought.. .they will kill me' (20.11). The accusation introduced by "O is that 'such great guilt' (n^l3 n^CDPf) has been brought upon Abimelech. n^l^ ilK^n is better translated 'a great sin', as in the RSV, which maintains the English repetition of 'sin (KOn) that occurred previously in 20.6 and 20.9a. The 'great sin' is an offense against 'sacral juridical law'. Verse 6 indicates that the 'sin' is against God: "^"IttriQ (against Me).127 The offense of adultery as 'a great sin' is understood in the biblical context in a way similar to idolatry, which is its more typical referent, as in Exod. 32.21-31 and 2 Kgs 17.21. In either case, the offense is cause for action in the heavenly court. The use of the phrase 71*711 if NED PI for adultery is supported by a plethora of ancient literary texts, extrinsic to the biblical texts: Literally, 'a great sin', [is] a phrase that reflects ancient Near Eastern legal terminology found in Akkadian documents from Ugarit and in Egyptian marriage contracts. The 'great sin' is adultery... Ancient

125. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, paras. 450, 527, resultative "D clause introduced. See 20.10 where Abimelech repeats the resultative "D in the question, 'What were you thinking of that SD you did this thing?' 126. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 114. 127. For the form-critical category of sacral-juridical law, see Clark, 'Law', pp. 127-28.

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Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative Mesopotamia seems to have held a similar view of adultery, i.e., as an offense to the deity.128

The 'adultery' referred to by the terms of the text is technically the offense of Abimelech's control over Sarah's sexuality.129 You Have Done to Me fHQI? n^tf). This expression is one example of the juridical importance of the verb H2JU, a common word used in specific ways in legal contexts.130 The verb n&U is used in declarations of accusation, in accusations in the interrogative form, in invitations to admit one's guilt, in the confession of wrongdoing and in proclamations of innocence. (In Gen. 18-20 it occurs ten times: 18.19, 'doing justice'; 18.21, 'whether they have done'; 18.25, 'to do such a thing', 'do right?'; 18.30, 'I will not do it'; 20.5, 'I did this'; 20.6, 'You did this'; 20.9, 'What have you done?' 'You have done'; 20.10, 'You did this thing'.) In juridical procedure, a form of the verb n&D is recognized and translated by means of the misdeed to which it is bound and by its context in the actions of the court: In Hebrew we have a verb (112?^), of itself very generic in meaning, which is specified both by the object to which it is immediately bound (something which is quite common even in modern languages) and by the position it holds in the context of a juridical procedure. Bearing this in mind allows us not only to be aware of the phenomenon when translating or commenting upon Bible texts, but allows us on reflection to 1^1 give importance to the verb 'to do'...

The use of the verb H27D is widely attested in juridical procedures:.132

128. Sarna, Genesis, p. 143. See also E.A. Goodfriend, 'Adultery', ABD, I, pp. 82-86; Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 325; J.J. Rabinowitz, The 'Great Sin' in Ancient Egyptian Marriage Contracts', JNES 18 (1956), p. 73; W.L. Moran, 'The Scandal of the 'Great Sin' at Ugarit', JNES 18 (1959), pp. 280-81; Jacob Milgrom, Cult and Conscience (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), pp. 132-33. 129. I am indebted to a conversation with Carolyn Pressler for the nuance in this 'almost committed' adultery, derived from her analysis of ancient Near Eastern family law. Her dissertation is Pressler, The View of Women. 130. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 117. 131. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 118-19. 132. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice.


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1. n&I} is used in accusations of guilt in both declarative and interrogative forms:133 Neh. 13.18

Did not your ancestors act in this way?... Yet you bring more wrath on Israel by profaning the sabbath. 1 Sam. 26.16 This thing that you have done is not good. As the LORD lives, you deserve to die. Judg. 2.2 For your part, do not make a covenant with the inhabitants of this land; tear down their altars. But you have not obeyed my command. See what you have done!

2. n&i? is used in invitations to admit one's guilt: 1 Sam. 12.17b You shall know and see that the wickedness that you have done in the sight of the LORD is great in demanding a king for yourselves. Jer. 2.23 How can you say, 'I am not defiled, I have not gone after the Baals'? Look at your way in the valley; know what you have done.

3. i~l&£> is used in the confession of wrongdoing: 2 Sam. 24.1 Ob I have sinned greatly in what I have done. But now, O LORD, I pray you, take away the guilt of your servant; for I have done very foolishly [in numbering the people]. Ps. 51.4 Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and done what is evil in your sight, so that you are justified in your sentence and blameless when you pass judgment.

4. n&U is used in the proclamation of one's innocence in both declarative and interrogative forms:134 Gen. 40.15b Ps. 7.4 Mic. 6.3

And here also I have done nothing that they should have put me into the dungeon. O LORD my God, if I have done this, if there is wrong in my hands. O my people, what have I done to you? In what have I wearied you? Answer me!

In the case of Gen. 20.9, the verb rrtoU (qal pf. 2 m.s.) is understood as a legal declaration of accusation because it is bound to the object 'things that ought not to be done'. 133. See also Judg. 6.29; 1 Sam. 27.11; Ps. 50.21; Neh. 5.9; Gen. 12.18; 26.10; 31.26;44.15;Exod. 1.18; 8.1; 1 Sam. 2.23; 2 Sam. 16.10; Isa. 45.9; Job 9.12; Qoh. 8.4; Neh. 13.17. 134. See Gen. 20.5; Num. 22.28; Judg. 8.2; 15.11; 1 Sam. 20.1; 26.18; 29.8; Neh. 5.15.

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Things to Me that Ought Not to Be Done (Trtpi? WSrvb ~1C?$ O-foJJQ HI3i?J. The expression 'ought not to be done' is provided by the obligative use of the niphal imperfect of rttDU.135 The niphal imperfect of n&JJ with the negative particle to1? occurs 15 times in the Hebrew Bible. Nine times the niphal imperfect indicates something that 'ought not be done', ever. These nine occurrences share a unique syntax. Of the remaining six cases, two of the verbs have 'work' (PDN^Q) as their subject, and four mean 'made' rather than 'do'.136 Each of the nine niphal imperfect expressions of n&D + to1? meaning 'ought not to be done' uses the imperfect obligatively. The form is used consistently as an expression of law-breaking (or custom that has the force of law).137 The conclusions of this syntactical survey are supported by the legal or juridical narrative contexts in which the expression occurs. These are the nine niphal imperfect forms of ntU^ +to1?when ntDJJ means 'do':138 Gen. 20.9b

You have done things to me that ought not to be done.139

Gen. 29.26

This is not done in our country—giving the younger before the firstborn.140

135. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 172, obligative use of the imperfect, GKC, para. 107g: 'It is not (wont to be) so done (and hence may not, shall not be)'. GKC, para. 107w: 'In negative sentences to express actions, etc., which cannot or should not happen, e.g. ...(Gen. 20.9) deeds...that ought not to be done'. 136. BDB, p. 795 (qal II). 137. Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 161. In reconstructing law in biblical Israel, Falk distinguishes between the earlier history, in which ought nots were familial or clan 'customs', and later Israel, in which these customs became laws. For the purpose of this thesis, both clan jurisdiction and later forms of judging show a similar commitment to oughts and ought nots by means of this particular vocabulary and syntax. 'An important source of law was custom. Everybody was expected to refrain from doing things 'that ought not to be done' or 'which are not done' (Gen. 20.9; 29.26; 34.7; 2 Sam. 13.12).' Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 29. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 325: 'Abraham has violated an unwritten ordinance which exists among men.' 138. Niphal l.b., passive of qal I. BDB, p. 795. 139. Niphal impf. 3 m. p. 140. Niphal impf. 3 m. s.


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Gen. 34.7b

When they heard of it, the men were indignant and very angry, because he had committed an outrage in Israel by lying with Jacob's daughter, for such a thing ought not to be done.141

Lev. 4.2

Speak to the people of Israel, saying: When anyone sins unintentionally in any of the LORD'S commandments about things not to be done and does any one of them:142

The identical niphal imperfect third feminine plural of ilCT with the negative $b is repeated in the Leviticus 4 context four more times (Lev. 4.13, 22, 27; 5.17). In each case it means the same thing: 'things not to be done': 2 Sam. 13.12 She answered him, 'No, my brother, do not force me; for such a thing is not done in Israel; do not do anything so vile!'143

The remaining six niphal imperfect occurrences ofil&U + $b are included here for the purpose of contrast. Their difference demonstrates the unique expression of the nine examples just given. Two have the subject rDtf^Q and mean 'work accomplished'.144 Exod. 12.16b No work shall be done on those days. Neh. 6.9b Their hands will drop from their work and it will not be done.

Four have the second (BOB, II) meaning of HC1^ and are translated 'made' or 'used':145 Lev. 2.1 la 2 Kgs 12.13 Jer. 3.16 Ezek. 15.5a

141. 142. 143. 144. 145.

No grain offering that you bring to the LORD shall be made with leaven. But for the house of the LORD no basins.. .were made from the money. The ark of the covenant...shall not come to mind...nor shall another one be made. When it was whole it was used for nothing.

Niphal impf. 3 m. s. Niphal impf. 3 f. p. Niphal impf. 3 m. s. Niphal 1 .a, passive of qal I with the subject rDtto BOB, p. 795 Niphal 2, passive of qal II, BDB, p. 795.

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Genesis 20.1 la: There Is No Fear of God at All (tTlf7K nNT-'pK P"U In this context, the phrase 'fear of God' is a discursive element that implies that some basic norm of behavior ought to be kept.146 Abraham's expression implies that where there is fear of God, he need not fear being killed because of Sarah. If there were some 'fear of God', Abraham's life would not be threatened, for Abimelech would fear transgressing the norm of killing a man in order to take his wife from him. 'Fear of God' is not an abstraction in this context, but refers to specific rules of conduct.147 The deep irony is that Abimelech and his people do fear God. The reader has heard already in 20.8 that the men of Abimelech's camp are 'very much afraid' ("INQ D"*2J]8n INT"1"!) simply through hearing about Abimelech's dream. The 'fear of God', which Abraham fears is absent, is 'very' active in Abimelech's camp. They have a high regard and reverence for the 'elementary moral norms' of the divinity.148 The discursive use of the phrase 'fear of God' functions to reinforce the legal language with a theological reference to the source of moral norms, the Creator. Genesis 20.12a: Besides, She Is Indeed My Sister fnh$ rnotjrDJU This may also be translated, 'Besides, I testify that she is my sister'.149 The only other use of the adverb il]QK is another introduction of testimony during an inquiry into wrongdoing: 15° Josh. 7.20a

And Achan answered Joshua, 'It is true [H]QK] I am the one who sinned...'

Both the use in Joshua and that in Gen. 20.12a introduce 'assertions of a legal nature'.151 They are to be distinguished from the simple 146. Sarna, Genesis, p. 143. 147. A parallel concept, extrinsic to the text, is found in Egyptian thought in the concept of ma'at. See J.A. Wilson, 'The Search for Security and Order', in The Culture of Ancient Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 48, 58. 148. Von Rad, Genesis, p. 229. 149. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 65; Shemaryahu Talmon, The New Hebrew Letter from the Seventh Century B.C. in Historical Perspective', BASOR 176 (December 1964), pp. 29-37 (34). 150. Abraham Even-Shoshan (ed.), A New Concordance of the Bible: Thesaurus of the Language of the Bible, Hebrew and Aramaic Roots, Words, Proper Names, Phrases and Synonyms (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 1989), p. 53. 151. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 65.


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asseverative form of the adverb D]QK, which occurs in nine texts but is not used to introduce assertions of a legal nature.152 Genesis 20.14: Then Abimelech Took...and Gave Them to Abraham (DrraN'? inn...^^^ np_s_U This description of Abimelech's restoration of Sarah to Abraham has the form of the payment of damages to a cuckold. Such settlements varied in the ancient Near East, usually at the discretion of the injured party, the husband.153 Compensation and giftgiving were a part of reconciliation. The most recurrent term for the settlement of a suit in biblical texts is the verb ]D] (gave).154 For example: Gen. 20.16 Gen. 21.27

I have given your brother a thousand pieces of silver. So Abraham took sheep and oxen and gave them to Abimelech and the two men made a covenant. Gen. 34.11-12 Shechem also said to her father and to her brothers, 'Let me find favor with you, and whatever you say to me I will give.' 1 Sam. 25.27 And now let this present which your servant has brought to my LORD be given to the young men who follow my LORD.

The terms of the settlement in Gen. 20.14 are sheep, oxen, servants, and silver. The exchange of livestock for a contract or a treaty is typical in Genesis.155 Nahum Sarna notes the Akkadian parallels to the phase 'took and gave': 'Underlying this phrase is a technical, judicial formula known from Akkadian texts (lequ/nasu...nadanu) in connection with royal transfer or conveyance of property... Abraham, the injured party, receives reparation from the king.'156 The biblical syntagma in which the root ]fl] is used to express restoration after wrongdoing is constructed out of three elements: The first consists of a verb, by which the idea of "giving", "handing over" and the like is expressed; the second tells of what is "handed over"; the third is a reference to the subject.'157 Genesis 20.14-16 contains these three elements of the re-establishment of justice. In addition, two of the three verbs that express this re152. 2 Kgs 19.17; Ruth 3.12; Isa. 37.18; Job 9.2; 12.2; 19.4; 19.5; 34.12; 36.4. 153. Goodfriend, 'Adultery', p. 83. 154. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 138-39. 155. Gen. 21.22-34; 26.31; 31.47-55. 156. Nahum Sarna, Understanding Genesis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 144, n. 9. 157. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 378.

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establishment of justice most frequently in biblical texts are used here.158 And Restored His Wife Sarah to Him (in$N rnfo n« ft DCnj. The restoration or 'return' (Did) of Sarah to Abraham is God's condition for reconciliation at 20.7: 'return the man's wife' (eTNiTntfK 32?n) and 'But if you do not restore her' (T27Q ^:TN~DtfY). The restoration of Sarah to Abraham and to the community is the formal resolution of the juridical action. 'Restore' plSJH), the hiphil imperative at 20.7, commonly is used biblically as a reference to legal action. The hiphil of "2W is used to mean 'restore' 36 times in the biblical text.159 For example: Gen. 40.13

Within three days Pharaoh will lift up your head and restore you to your office. Lev. 6.4 When one has sinned and become guilty, he shall restore what he took by robbery, or what he got by oppression, or the deposit which was committed to him, or the lost thing which he found. Num. 35.25 And the congregation shall rescue the manslayer from the hand of the avenger of blood, and the congregation shall restore him to his city of refuge, to which he had fled, and he shall live in it until the death of the high priest who was anointed with the holy oil. Deut. 22.2b You shall bring it home to your house, and it shall be with you until your brother seeks it; then you shall restore it to him. Judg. 11.13b Because Israel, on coming from Egypt, took away my land, from the Arnon to the Jabbok and to the Jordan; now, therefore, restore it peaceably.

When DlEJn means 'restore', it indicates the decision of a court or a regent, or the prescription of a law code. Genesis 20.15: Settle Where It Pleases You p2? ^93 31C33J. In legal texts, Tin HtD is a formula that shows that the accuser has been satisfied or is in agreement. The expression T£Q nCDêr seems, therefore, to be the pointer to an agreement proposed by one party in order to resolve a

158. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice. Both ]D] and H12J are used here. The first element is expressed above all by the verbs ]Pi], DTO and DÔ (piel). 159. See William L. Holladay (ed.), A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), p. 363.


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particular question.'160 In Gen. 19.8, Lot uses this expression to propose that his daughters be taken in place of the two men: 'Look, I have two daughters...as you please' (QDTin mCD3...ni]3 TltD ^ «3~H3n). Literally, r£Q DC2 is 'good in the eyes of. This phrase does not imply good or ill, but simply the power to make judgments which may be judged good or ill by others or by God. It does imply a world of values and of striving in judgment, in that good decisions are not certain or secure. Genesis 20.16: Look, I Have Given Your Brother a Thousand Pieces of Silver pf™1? ^02 =]^ s nn] mn;. The fact that Abimelech calls Abraham Sarah's 'brother' instead of 'husband' is, in the discourse, a sign of Sarah's restoration. It seems to be spoken legally and officially.161 It Is Your Exoneration before All (~£b DT^ H103 "^'Kin nan;. Two expressions are used to describe Sarah's restoration to Abraham: 'exoneration before all' and 'you are completely vindicated'. The first, 'exoneration' (DTtf HIDD), is literally 'covering of eyes'. Nahum Sarna and G. von Rad make similar comments on the expression's use as a legal term: This strange expression is probably a legal term. The gift means that the critical eyes of others will be covered so that they will be unable to discover anything shocking in Sarah.162 The phrase tells us that the payment is a recognition that Sarah's honor was not violated, and so the eyes of others are henceforth closed to what has occurred and she will not be an object of scorn. It is quite likely that some ancient legal formula, not yet discovered, is being used here.163

The second expression used to describe Sarah's restoration to Abraham ('you are vindicated') is a general term of acquittal.

160. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 38-40; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 162. 161. Von Rad, Genesis, p. 229. 162. Von Rad, Genesis; Carmichael, Law and Narrative, pp. 209-10. 163. Sarna, Genesis, p. 144; M. Weinfeld, 'Sarah and Abimelech against the Background of an Assyrian Law and the Genesis Apocryphon', AOAT215 (1985), pp. 431-35.

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You Are Completely Vindicated ffinDil ^3 flNl). 'You are vindicated' (nrD]1; 'completely cleared' in JPS) is from PD"1 (to 'decide', 'judge'). The niphal stem means 'righted' or 'justified'.164 The original use (Sitz im Leben) of the root PD"1 is debated. Some think it has a sapiential origin.165 Others argue for an origin in the field of judicial procedure.166 Whatever its origin, the narrative context in Genesis 20 is juridical. Genesis 20.17: Then Abraham Prayed to God; and God Healed Abimelech (ÊTIlK-nK D'if?K K2T1 DTftNrr^ Dn"n« ^DP'IJ. The discursive sign of the complete resolution of the controversy of Sarah in Abimelech's tent is given in the words of God's instructions in Gen. 20.7a, 'and he will pray for you'. The specialized use of the general verb ^D is not, however, limited to this text. It has a 'specific function in the juridical dynamic':167 'A word which is a confession and a plea halts the continuation of the controversy...this very decisive act is introduced by a generalized terminology... The verb ^D (Hitp.) is the most frequently used.'168 The praying of Abraham is both a discursive sign in the narrative as well as a general term that functions technically as part of a juridical procedure. Summary and Conclusions

What does attention to the presence of legal procedure and vocabulary in this text demonstrate? Genesis 18-20 presents narrative accounts of court-like proceedings. That these are court-like proceedings is evidenced, in part, by the use of technical juridical terminology and formulae. The proceedings give structure to the narrative by means of these juridical terms and formulae, as well as by means of less technical language that is used to designate juridical procedure in this and other courtroom settings in the Hebrew Bible. 164. Ni. part. f. s. BDB, pp. 406-407. 165. Gerhard Liedke, TO"1', in Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch zum Alien Testament, I (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag), pp. 730-32. 166. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 45-47; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 44. 167. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 125. 168. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice. A list of the juridical uses of ^D is found in n. 10.


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Attention to the presence of legal procedure and vocabulary also functions to set limitations on the scope of this study. While Gen. 12.17-20, 13.2-13, 16.1-16 and 21.25-34 contain some juridical language, a court-like context is not developed. The conflicts are settled without recourse to court-like procedure or judgment. These four texts represent 'disputes' (D'Tri) that are settled 'out of court'. Further, God does not play an active role in identifying the oughts and ought nots in three of these narratives.169 In Genesis 18-20, much of the vocabulary and many of the syntagmas have explicit juridical meanings. This discovery establishes the juridical context of the text(s) and aids the interpretation of other vocabulary and syntax in adjudicative terms (e.g. 'innocent' rather than 'righteous' and 'guilty' rather than 'wicked'). These terms and syntagmas serve with syntactical and other discursive signs in the narrative to disclose oughts and ought nots in Genesis 18-20. They do not, however, by their presence in the text provide a meaningful interpretation of the text as a narrative. The reader may reasonably respond, 'So what?' An answer to that question is the subject of the fourth and fifth chapters. The presentation of the lexicographical data has served to demonstrate the sheer quantity of legal referents in Genesis 18-20. The observation of the volume of evidence leads to the question of its function in the narrative and in the canon.

169. Gen. 12 is the exception and is discussed in relationship to Gen. 20.

Chapter 4 A CLOSE NARRATIVEREADING OF LEGAL REFERENTS IN GENESIS

18.16-19.29: FROM THE INQUEST OF THE CRY AGAINST THE SODOMITES TO THE SENTENCE THAT FOLLOWS GOD'S FINDINGS

This close reading of legal referents in Gen. 18.16-19.38 contributes to understanding the text in three primary ways. First, it demonstrates the way in which the text discloses preferred values and 'innocent' behavior (as opposed to 'guilty' behavior, which violates what ought be done). Secondly, the reading of legal referents shows a juridical process of inquiry and decision between competing jurisdictions and rights. Thirdly, the reading of legal referents discloses dynamic relationships among the physical creation, the moral order, humanity and God. Explanation and demonstration of these three contributions form the outline and substance of this chapter. Before a presentation of the warrants for these claims, however, I will provide a brief summary of the narrative from a juridical perspective. This narrative is not a legal text, a set of principles or a law code. Rather, it is a narrative in which preferred values, juridical processes and dynamic relationships are imbedded. This narrative and the overarching narrative to which it belongs are concerned generally with God's promise to Abraham and his descendants.1 Nonetheless, a fully developed court-like process is woven into this narrative. Moreover, the 1. The text immediately prior (18.1-15) concerns a specific reiteration of the promise to a descendant. The text immediately following (21.1-2) records the birth of Isaac. Scholarship has attended especially to Lot's role in relation to this promise. See Brueggemann, Genesis; Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis'; Hamilton, The Book of Genesis; Letellier, Day in Mamre; W.G. Plaut (ed.), The Torah: A Modern Commentary (New York: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1981); von Rad, Genesis; Sarna, Genesis; Speiser, Genesis; Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15 (eds. David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker; WBC, 1; Waco, TX: Word Books, 1975); Westermann, Genesis 12-36.

4. Legal Referents in Genesis 18.16-19.29

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narrative is replete with legal terminology that serves to punctuate the flow of its juridical procedure. This procedure unfolds without interruption from pre-trial notices and conversations (18.20) through the trial proper (19.1), and through the declaration of the sentence (19.13), to a description of its consequences (19.24-26). The court-like procedure begins with a preliminary hearing in which probable cause for an indictment is established on the basis of testimony given as evidence: a complaint has been filed against Sodom and Gomorrah. The reader is also given notice that the alleged offense is punishable as a sin (18.20). On the basis of the allegations, God, taking the role of the judge, initiates an inquest (18.21). While two of the three messengers travel toward Sodom, Abraham stands before the LORD and approaches this judge as an advocate, negotiating an advantage on behalf of the defendants (18.22-33).2 His pre-trial arguments are made on behalf of all of the accused. Abraham negotiates for the innocent (18.23), but also argues for saving the guilty if enough innocent men are found (18.26).3 Abraham succeeds in his pre-trial negotiations. As counsel for the defense, he is satisfied with the condition (18.25) that the whole city will be spared for the sake of ten innocents. The discussion between God and Abraham about the innocent and the guilty (18.16-33) takes place after the need for a formal trial and judgment has already been established (18.17). Abraham's pre-trial negotiation with God is not (as in a 'controversy', T~l) for the purpose of reconciling the Accuser (God) and the Accused (the men of Sodom). It is for the purpose of securing a just judging of the innocent, that they not be condemned with the guilty who may be found, and to seek a stay of sentence for any guilty, for the sake of the innocent. Abraham does not suggest that an inquest is in process that will resolve the matter before a trial. The trial proper begins without announcement. The two men who set out for Sodom (18.22) arrive and meet Lot at the city gate (19.1). The evidence by which the Sodomites are condemned is presented without 2. The conversation between God and Abraham (concerning the innocent of Sodom) is a pre-trial procedure. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, Chapter 6. 3. Bovati discusses the language of 'innocence' and 'guilt' in the context of controversies (!T~I) where the language is typically used in pre-trial inquests to accuse, for example, 'he is guilty', and to respond to the accusation, 'I am innocent'. See Bovati, Chapter 2, 'The Accusation', and Chapter 3, 'The Response of the Accused'. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice.

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comment by the narrator, as if the reader were part of a jury hearing first-hand testimony (19.1-11). As in most trials, argumentation is not included in the presentation of prima facie evidence (by which the primary facts are established). The reader is told about the actions and speech of the two messengers, of Lot, and of the men of Sodom. Lot and the two men serve as three eyewitnesses.4 The discourse of the narrative makes the reader a member of the jury. In this way the reader hears the implicit confession of wrongful harm made by the men of Sodom (19.9). The opinions of Lot and of the men of Sodom on the incident are also presented as evidence, without argumentation by the narrator. They are permitted as evidence, as in a courtroom, because they are first-hand information from personal knowledge. Conviction cannot be based on hearsay. The accused are clearly identified in five sequential phrases: 'the men of the city', 'the men of Sodom', 'both young and old', 'all the people', 'to the last man' (19.4).5 The repetition leaves no doubt that no men in Sodom are innocent, outside of Lot's house.6 A positive identification of the accused has been made. The 'guilty' verdict and the sentence of the city's destruction are announced by the two messengers immediately after the presentation of evidence (19.12-13). The verdict is given by repeating the originally filed complaint (19.13; 18.20). No statute or law has been presented in the trial, so the content of the law-breaking can only be deduced from the presentation of evidence. But the pronouncement of the verdict is explicit. It is then confirmed in the speaking of the sentence of destruction. Acquittal is announced for Lot, who has been shown in the presentation of evidence, to be innocent (though not necessarily 'righteous'), and any who are related to him (19.12-15). However, because the sentence involves a cosmological consequence, securing acquittal involves an evacuation (19.16-23). The pre-trial condition of ten innocent men 4. See Deut. 19.15. 5. Textual critics consider the repetition in v. 4 to be a gloss. Westermann correctly states that this need not be the case. In a juridical reading, the repetition is clearly useful to a definite identification of the guilty parties. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 301; contra Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 35. 6. As in most of the patriarchal narrative, the innocent women are silent and are not mentioned here. Lot's daughters have a voice later, in another circumstance (19.30-38).


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has not been met. The city will be destroyed. The safety of Lot's family is a post-trial decision of the sentencing judge, because of his relationship to Abraham (19.29). The description of the catastrophic consequences that carry out the sentence concludes the court-like narrative. The flow of the juridical procedure in Genesis 18-19 may be summarized briefly as follows:7 Pre-Trial Proceedings (18.20-33): an outcry 'against' Sodom is pretrial evidence > presented as probable cause for a trial (18.20a); > the evidence results in issuing an indictment (18.20b); > and the declaration of due process by public trial (18.21); > Abraham, for the defense approaches the LORD, the pre-trial judge (18.22-23); > he negotiates conditions of the trial (18.23-32); > he confirms the trial judge (18.33). Trial Proper (19.1-23): the evidence of the outcry is verified by means of reporting first-hand information; > the reader is seated as a member of the jury by means of the narrative style (19.1-11); > two messengers and Lot are eyewitnesses (19.1); > the accused are clearly identified in five phrases (19.4); > confession of wrongful harm is made by the men of Sodom (19.9); > a verdict of 'guilty' is announced by repeating the originally filed complaint (19.13, cf. 18.20); > the sentence of destruction is declared (19.13, 14); > the acquittal and safe passage of Lot, and any who are related to him, is announced (19.12, 14, 15 and 19.16, 17, 22); a post-trial decision by the sentencing judge relocates Lot's family and saves Zoar, in the Plain (19.18-23).

Three Kinds of Conflict in Genesis 18-19: A Close Juridical Reading A close juridical reading of Genesis 18-19 brings attention to three kinds of conflict (and resolution). The first kind of conflict in the text is the difference of opinion among the characters about the behavior of the men of Sodom. Ought they or ought they not treat visitors in a certain way? The second kind of conflict concerns the process by which a just sentence may be reached: How does a just judge judge justly? The third kind of conflict concerns the close relationship between the moral and physical orders. What is the relationship between human action and the created order? It is my intention to show how the text both raises and partly resolves these three kinds of conflict by a focus on the following concerns: (a) How does the text disclose certain behavior as valued or not valued? 7. A more complete review of the flow of court proceedings may be found in the summary of the section 'Juridical Procedure: The Process of Decision in Chapters 18-19', pp. 157-58.

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(b) How does the text disclose a process of decision between competing values? (c) How does the text disclose the relationship between the moral and physical orders? An eclectic methodology will be used to describe the art and techniques by which the narrative both raises and responds to these questions. The speaking characters of the narrative (God, Abraham, and the men of Sodom) ask their own questions. The conflicts of the text are represented by the questions that Abraham, the men of Sodom, and God ask. Attending to their questions reveals the vested interests of the characters. Each of their questions may serve generally to introduce the reader to the three juridical conflicts in the narrative. The interest of the men of Sodom is in how they can do what they want. To this end they ask, 'Where are the men who came to you tonight?' The Sodomites present a competing value in which their exercise of power is the arbiter of its own 'justice'. Their question signals at least two decisions for the reader: (1) Are the Sodomites' intentions for Lot's guests innocent or not? (Ought they or ought they not demand to 'know' them?) (2) Is the Sodomites' view of 'might makes right' just, or not? Are they justified in their criticism of Lot? ('This fellow came here as an alien and he would play the judge!') The reader is invited by this question to make a moral choice concerning the Sodomites' intended acts: Are they wicked, or not? She is invited also either to favor a power wielder's right to rule arbitrarily or to oppose it. Do the Sodomites have the right to make their own judgments about right and wrong, or not? The interest signaled by this kind of question focuses the reader's attention on juridical issues related to the morality of this specific situation and more generally to the use of power. What ought and what ought not be done by the characters in this text? For God, the initial question is, Shall I hide my inquiry from Abraham? A related question at work in this inquiry is, Have they done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me? God's stated interest is twofold: (1) Abraham's involvement as a participant in determining justice in this particular case (God allows Abraham's inquiry of God in a series of eight questions); and (2) Abraham's training as an adjudicator who will learn to teach this 'way' of determining justice and living righteously ('For I have chosen him that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice'; 18.17-19). God's interests, signaled by these questions, focus the reader's attention on the juridical process


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of decision in the text, specifically in the case of the outcry against Sodom, and more generally as a precedent for Abraham and his descendants. Abraham asks eight questions in nine verses (18.23-32). Two of the questions signal Abraham's central concern (18.23, 25). Is it just to sweep away a city in which a community of innocent people reside? Will the divine Judge judge justly?8 The assumption at work in these questions may be more than obvious. God intends to execute justice catastrophically. Abraham is aware of this link: God's 'justice' means that there are consequences in the physical sphere when God executes judgment in the moral sphere ('Will you indeed sweep away...?'). Because of this reality and its inequity, Abraham secures God's agreement that a 'community' of ten innocents is enough, in this case, to break that link ('Suppose ten are found there?'). The interest signaled by Abraham's questions focuses the reader's attention on the juridical issue of the relationship between physical (or creational) consequences and moral turpitude. God's previous concern and question about Abraham's training and ability to teach his children raise a subsequent question for the reader: What does Abraham learn, particularly from the eight questions he asks of God? (And what does the reader learn from the text, reading from Abraham's perspective?) Abraham's questions and God's responses result in two diagnostic facts: (1) that his assumption was correct: the moral order and physical order are linked when God judges, particularly in that God's response to the Sodomites' guilt will be catastrophic for the entire Plain (19.17); and (2) that the judging link may be loosened if enough innocent stand in the gap against the guilty. (Whether this suggests that the virtue of the innocent causes the loosening, or that it frees God to loosen the connection, or that God is willing to loosen it when innocent people are present, is not clear in this text.) The three interests raised by these invested questions form the outline for my exegesis of Gen. 18.16-19.29. Other warrants from the text for these assertions will be weighed in the next three sections. They may be summarized as follows: 1.

Conflict of Opinions: Ought or Ought Not. 'Do not act so wickedly' (19.7) versus 'He would play the judge' (19.9).

8. The other six questions focus on a progressively smaller minimum of innocent men.

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2.

3.

How does the text disclose that a certain kind of behavior is valued or not valued in the context of competing opinions? Conflict and Decision: Judging Justly. 'Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do?... No, for I have chosen him that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice.' How does the text disclose the process of decision? Cosmological Consequence: 'He overthrew what grew on the ground'. What is disclosed about the relationship between the moral order and the physical creation by God's execution of the sentence? Ought or Ought Not? Point of View and Juridical Concerns Voiced by the Characters

Several terms and phrases in the narrative disclose that certain standards of behavior are valued above others. The discourse among the characters discloses these preferences and provides evidence of oughts and ought nots for the reader. No statutes or laws have been presented in the trial, so law-breaking and law-keeping are only implied by these terms and phrases. Each of the major characters in the narrative—God, Abraham, the men of Sodom and Lot—presents their opinions concerning the alleged behavior and, later in the narrative, concerning the described behavior of the men of Sodom. The narrative's characters disclose their opinions, delineating the issues in their discourses, but they do not decide the case. The reader finally knows the outcome at 19.13, when the messengers deliver the verdict and the sentence. Until this declaration, the conflicting opinions and values of the characters remain in tension and the controversy within the narrative is unresolved. What are the juridical issues concerning the outcry against Sodom from each character's point of view? What ought, or ought not, be done? God's Voice: God's Point of View in the Preliminary Hearing God's voice and the point of view represented by God's concerns are the starting point of this narrative. God initiates the inquiry. The first disclosure of conflict in Sodom is God's announcement that a complaint has been made and the alleged offense is a 'very grave sin':9 Then the 9.

Gen. 18.20. God's speech is not explicitly adressed to anyone. Abraham,


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LORD said, "How great is the outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah, and how very grave their sin" (18.20)'. The context of God's declaration in a juridical reading is not a 'final judgment'. This is a preliminary hearing. God's declaration initiates these pre-trial procedings, based on the evidence of 'the outcry'. 10 God's expression 'how very grave their sin' refers to the alleged deeds of the outcry, and should be read in the context of the next sentence (18.21). If the allegations are founded, the behavior of the men of Sodom is a punishable offense (sin). The repeated use of 'if found' in the next verse (18.21) and in 18.26-32 confirms the preliminary legal nature of God's speech. God's involvement in speaking to this conflict indicates its gravity. If God's speech is to have integrity, however, establishing the guilt of Sodom and Gomorrah will require a story in which the outcome will truly depend on the participation of other characters and the irrevocable proof of that guilt. God's first juridical concern is to respond to the outcry against Sodom by initiating this public discovery of evidence: 'I must go down and see whether they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me; and if not, I will know' (18.21).11 God's second juridical issue concerning the outcry against Sodom is Abraham's participation. This is voiced in God's soliloquy at the beginning of the text and is based in nothing less than God's choosing of and promise to Abraham (18.17-19). The two resultative clauses state the purposes of Abraham's involvement in the allegations against Sodom (18.19): For I have chosen him, that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice; so that the LORD may bring about for Abraham what he has promised him (18.19)12

however, knows of its content in 18.23. See the discussion in the next section of what God 'knows' in the preliminary hearing with Abraham. "D is used twice in 18.20 and in both cases is asseverative. See Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 449. 10. See discussion below at 'Pre-trial Motions, Arguments, and Decisions', pp. 143-51. 11. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.21, pp. 93-95. 12. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.19, pp. 89-90.

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The voice of God in the text clearly expresses two primary concerns for a close juridical reading. God is concerned, by personal involvement, in a thorough public inquest by which the allegations against the men of Sodom may be established or disestablished. This concern is summarized in the phrase 'whether they have done altogether (rto; "completely") according to the outcry...and if not'. Secondly, God is concerned that Abraham participate in this righteous and just way of the LORD. Abraham's Voice: Abraham's Concern for Due Process Abraham's discourse also discloses that he values a specific standard of behavior. In his pre-trial conversation with God, Abraham's opinion concerning the behavior of the men of Sodom is largely procedural. He is interested in more than proof of the offense and its consequences. He is interested in the way in which it is handled. In his pre-trial conversation with God, Abraham raises four issues related to due process in the trial of the men of Sodom. First, he is concerned with a detailed discovery of the facts. For example, he asks God, 'Suppose five of the fifty righteous are lacking?' (18.28).13 In order to establish the parameters of the trial and sentencing Abraham negotiates for agreement to a thorough procedure, before the trial begins, with a series of five similar questions: 'Suppose five of the fifty are lacking?' (v. 28); 'Suppose forty are found?' (v. 29); 'Suppose thirty are found?' (v. 30); 'Suppose twenty are found?' (v. 31); 'Suppose ten are found?' (v. 32). These questions disclose Abraham's concern for the innocent by way of securing a commitment from the judge to pay close attention to the details of the case.14 Secondly, Abraham is concerned that the innocent do not bear the consequences of the actions of the guilty.15 To this end he asks God, 'Will you indeed sweep away the righteous with the wicked?' (18.23).16 Then he declares, 'Far be it from you to do such a thing, to slay the

13. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.24 and 18.26, pp. 99, 102. 14. For example, what has been done and who is responsible for it. 15. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 103-104. See especially Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 126-29. 16. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.23, pp. 96-98.


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righteous with the wicked, so that the righteous fare as the wicked. Far be that from you' (18.25a).17 A third concern, implicit in Abraham's questioning, is for the community in which the innocent live. He advocates not only for the pardon of the innocent living in Sodom, but for Sodom itself. By his conversation he secures a reprieve for the guilty majority in order to preserve the community in which the innocent may be established.18 Fourthly, Abraham is concerned that the LORD act and hence be known as a just judge. 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?' (18.25b). The expression CDDEJQ nfoir could be translated, 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth make a just decision!'19 The abstraction 'do what is just' does not convey the specificity of decision indicated by this context. Abraham expresses his interest generally in due process. In this question he also implies his concern that the God of 'all the earth' be known as just in this specific judgment. For these four purposes, Abraham participates in pre-trial negotiations with God. He explicitly or implicitly argues (a) for a discovery of the case's details, (b) for a situation in which the innocent will not bear the consequences of the actions of the guilty, (c) for the community in which the innocent live, and (d) for the LORD to act and be known as a just judge. Together, these opinions and values demonstrate

17. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.25a, p. 100. 18. G. von Rad notes the 'astonishing fact that even a very small number of innocent men is more important in God's sight than a majority of sinners and is sufficient to stem the judgment'. Von Rad, Genesis, p. 214. Whether this stemming is a pardon, a stay of sentencing, or some kind of atoning function is not clear in the text. The alleged behavior is, however, still considered wicked. Westermann counters von Rad, saying that Abraham's intercession could in no way alter the situation. God 'punishes the impious and rewards the pious'. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, pp. 292-93. Brueggemann, Hamilton, and Plaut agree with von Rad that the merit of a few is enough to stem judgment on a community. Brueggemann says, 'By the new mathematics of 18.22-23 (and 19.29) one is enough to save'. That is not the case, however, in this text. Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 173; Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 25; Plaut, The Torah, p. 133. 19. The syntagma QS2JQ + Q22JH occurs three times in the Hebrew Bible (Gen. 18.25; Deut. 17.9; 1 Kgs 3.28). In these cases it is used technically as the 'judge's verdict' or 'judge's decision'. These texts reveal a technical use of non-technical vocabulary. See discussion in this chapter at 'Abraham Negotiates the Conditions of the Trial', pp. 148-50 and in Chapter 3 at 18.25b, pp. 101-102.

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that Abraham has begun to 'keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice' (18.19). These concerns constitute the values of judging, in general. They focus on 'the authoritative act of discerning, separating, and deciding between what/whom (sic) is just and what/whom is unjust, between the innocent and the guilty'.20 In court, justice concerns more than the decision-making itself. It concerns the integrity of the judge and the process of coming to the decision. The Voice of the Men of Sodom: Juridical Issues and Political Power The central juridical controversy of the text is found in the difference of opinion among the characters concerning what should be done about the alleged behavior of the men of Sodom. The sharpest conflict is presented in the discourse among the men of Sodom, the messengers and Lot (19.5-9). Their voices disclose another point of view about innocent and guilty behavior and who has the power to judge them. Their self-authenticating claims to justice are based in unanimity and domicile, and are enforced physically: And they called to Lot, 'Where are the men who came to you tonight? Bring them out to us, so that we may know them' (19.5). In the words 'Bring them out' (DRîn) the men of Sodom do not simply suggest a course of action.21 The imperative implies an assumed source of authority. It implies not simply 'you ought to', but 'you must'. This command, which becomes a demand when they attempt to break down the door (19.9), implies a unanimous expression of the shared values of the community. The men of Sodom speak as a community with one voice. The text is so emphatic about the unanimity of the men that textual critics have argued that 'the men of Sodom' (19.4, DID ''C03K) is a gloss.22 Their speech is introduced with the phrases 'the men of the city, the men of Sodom, both young and old, all the people, to the last man, surrounded the house; and they called to Lot' (19.4-5). For purposes of characterization in the narrative, this emphasis presents the 'men of Sodom' as one character, speaking with one voice. From a legal perspective, their voice presents the values and rule of a community that conflict with the values and norms of the other

20. This is seen in the 'very important texts', Deut. 25.1; 1 Kgs 8.32; Qoh. 3.17; Gen. 18.25; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 185. 21. NIT hiphil impf. 2 m. s. + 3 m. p. suffix. 22. Discussion in Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 301.


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characters. This is emphasized in their reply to Lot's appeal to the norm of hospitality:23 But they replied, 'Stand back' (19.9).

n«"pn~Bjg ripK'i

This second command is also unequivocal (qal imperative 2 m.s.), and its own authority is assumed in the speaking. This implied assumption of authority is made more explicit in their challenge of Lot's right to hospitality: And they said, 'This fellow came here as an alien, and he would play the judge' (19.9). CDIDC Qstp'i •nalp-«3 in^n naî

'Play the judge' is a unique phrase in the Hebrew Bible.24 This challenge to Lot is in the manner of Quo Warranto (What warrant?), a legal procedure in which a person is called to show by what authority he claims an office of privilege. Ought Lot or ought Lot not play the judge? Lot has no warrant to judge them, in their opinion, since he is an alien. That he should be excluded from the local juridical and community value process is a perfectly common claim and practice.25 The strength of their opinion on his exclusion is communicated by their reference to Lot in the third person, rather than directly. It is their community. They are unanimous in their values and behavior. Their authority is self-authenticating. The text, however, betrays them to the reader in their final words: 'Now we will deal worse with you than with them' (19.9).

DHQ fj'p ini nn:;

In this phrase, the stated intention of the men of Sodom is to exercise the same authority over Lot as over the messengers.26 For the reader, however, the verb U£H cuts two ways.27 It is given first as a warning 23. For discussion, see the next section. 24. The qal impf. 3 m. s. and qal inf. abs. of this verb do not occur together elsewhere. W. Gesenius, E. Kautzsch and A.E. Cowley, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1915), 'Continuance of an action', para. 113r. 25. That is, every free community exercises a right explicitly or implicitly to form and enforce its own value system. Cf. Exod. 2.14. 26. The comparative Q is the chief indication. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 317. 27. in] hiphil impf. 1 c. p.

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that the local authority will be used forcefully against Lot to bring him into conformity with the community's standard. On the other hand, the second meaning of the hiphil of Uin is 'to cause evil'.28 Lot used the same verb, in its second sense, in his defense of the messengers: 'Do not act so wickedly' (linn TTK Nr^N "IQ^^l, 19.7).29 The Sodomites' repetition of the root Din ('Now we will deal worse with you than with them', 19.9) is spoken as an exercise of their authority, autonomy, and values, but it functions for the reader as an admission of wrongdoing. A close reading of the speech of the men of Sodom raises two major juridical issues for the reader. Because allegations have been made against them earlier in the narrative, their first request to 'know' the guests is under scrutiny. The reader must decide whether the Sodomites' intention for Lot's guests is innocent or guilty. Ought they or ought they not demand to 'know' them? Are there limits to the authority of a community to set its own standards, especially in the treatment of strangers? Their speech makes a claim to unanimous, autonomous rule. This question is partly decided in the text by the double entendre of UIJ~1, but one is left to question whether they are 'wicked' or simply enforcing the community's common values with the authority that is naturally theirs. The question is not fully decided in the text until the verdict and sentence are delivered. A related juridical issue is raised in response to Lot's appeal to be involved in the decision. Should he be allowed to participate, on any grounds? Lot suggests that the rules of hospitality are grounds enough for his involvement. The men of Sodom deny the validity of this warrant. The positive themes of hospitality noted by most commentators in this text (19.1-3) and in its context (18.1-8) serve to support Lot's claim. For the final word, however, the reader must wait for the verdict and sentence. The power wielders' right to rule arbitrarily is not accepted in the end.30 28. BDB, p. 949. 29. See discussion of Lot's speech below, pp. 137-38. 30. Is not the catastrophic sentence by which God demonstrates an opinion on the matter indicated by power as well? Is the exercise of that power arbitrary, like that of the men of Sodom? A theological reference to God's prerogative to act as God is generally assumed. The text, however, offers a juridical response that invites human participation in the process. The text discloses the possibility of a legal process, involving humanity and God, by which questions of justice and injustice


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Lot's Voice: Lot's (Limited) Concern for Hospitality Lot's speech raises the ought of hospitality as a warrant for the protection of strangers. Lot clearly thinks that the 'shelter of his roof (Tllp ^3) is sufficient grounds for the protection of the messengers. He considers the failure to honor this protection 'wicked' (£>m).31 He says, 'I beg you, my brothers, do not act so wickedly' (19.7).32 Lot then declares, 'Do nothing to these men for they have come under the shelter of my roof (19.8b).33 Lot's stated warrant for arguing against 'wicked' actions (introduced by the causal "O) is that 'they have come under the shelter of my roof ,34 The use of the term 'shelter', ^, itself alludes to the theme of protection. ^ generally means 'shadow', but is often used to mean 'protection'.35 'The shelter of my roof is unique to this text, yet the context is clear. By using it as a warrant (p'ÎT'O) for the protection of the two men, Lot discloses an obligation to protect them. This obligation is known to him and, arguably, also to the men of Sodom. Hospitality includes food and safe shelter, no casual necessity in the social world of ancient Israel.36 Westermann's comment summarizes scholarly consensus: 'Lot had offered the men a roof and so protection. The "shadow of his roof became thereby the place of security for the guests, the violation of which was a fearful crime with incalculable consequences.'37 Lot's opinion concerning the protection of the messengers is supported by the narrative in the subsequent blinding of the men of Sodom by the messengers (19.11). The implied ought in Lot's speech is that may be raised and adjudicated. The Gen. 18-19 narrative carries the reader into this participation as well, by means of the juridical process embedded in the story. The final verdict is disclosed by a catastrophe, but it is preceded by full human participation in the adjudication of the case against Sodom. This theme is taken up in the next section. 31. linn hiphil impf. 2 m. p. 32. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 19.7, p. 105. 33. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 19.8, pp. 105-106. 34. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 444, causal "O. BDB notes the hospitality motif of p-ÎTO here (19.8) and in 18.5. See also 33.10; 38.26. 35. BDB, p. 853. 36. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 27-28. 37. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 301.

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those who have been welcomed ought not be abused. The same rule is not applied, however, to his daughters: 'Look, I have two daughters who have not known a man; let me bring them out to you, and do to them as you please' (19.8a). Juridically, the expression 'as you please' (DDTIH 31£33) is a concession to the self-authenticating rule of the men of Sodom. This phrase (and others like it) do not imply good or ill, but simply the power to make judgments which may be judged good or ill by others or by God.38 It implies a world of values and of striving in judgment in which good decisions are not certain or secure. In this case, Lot is willing to concede his daughters to the (abusive) power of the men of Sodom. This blatant patriarchy is disturbing, and was even in the ancient world; Judges 19 is (and was) a necessary co-text.39 Ze'ev Falk comments: Biblical sources reflect the transition from absolute to limited patria potestas which took place in Hebrew society... The exceptional events in Sodom (Gen. 19.8) and Gibeah (Judg. 19.24) and the express prohibition of Lev. 19.29 also illustrate the extent of the patriarchal power. The father's right of punishment was later transferred to the local courts.40

Lot's voice expresses the opinion that a community ought to be hospitable to strangers and that the rule of hospitality ought to transcend the right of self-rule. His commitment to hospitality, however, is limited to the male population. Juridical Procedure: The Process of Decision in Genesis 18-19 Conflict and Decision In Genesis 18-19 a combination of narrative art and juridical phrases function together to disclose a court-like process of decision. The value of attending to the flow of juridical proceedings is the rhetorical effect of the many juridical phrases and terms. The effect of these phrases is to signal that competing values and conflicting standards of behavior are, in the 'way of the LORD', subject to a process of decision or adjudication. The text addresses the question of the process by which a just sentence may be reached. How does a just judge judge justly? The text 38. See comment on 20.15 in Chapter 3 for a similar expression, pp. 120-21. 39. Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 159. 40. Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 161.


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also implies an answer disclosing, in its narrative art and terminology, a process of decision between competing values. God's questions, in conversation with Abraham, also signal this interest in juridical process. They serve to focus the reader's attention on the decision process, specifically in the case of the outcry against Sodom, and more broadly as a precedent for Abraham and his descendants. God first states an interest in Abraham's involvement as a participant in this particular case ('Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do?'). God allows Abraham's emphatic inquiry in a series of eight pressing questions. Secondly, God states an interest in Abraham's training as an adjudicator who will learn to teach. 'For I have chosen him that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice' (18.17-19). Establishing the Court: A Juridical Reading of God's Soliloquy (18.17-19) The LORD said, 'Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do, seeing that Abraham shall become a great and mighty nation, and all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him? No, for I have chosen him, that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice', so that the LORD may bring about for Abraham what he has promised him.'

tnciJ ']$ •)#$ Drn?«n ^ ncpon ~OK nirn :f"wi "ia ^3 ii *L>~ny\ mîn Snar •'ia'p rrrr vn nrrn«!

T-JOK irra-nso VBTIR n^: -iejt$ ]ytf? vru&T -5 Q32JQ1 npTTi nifti?1? rnrr ^71 nocm

:r^ i3T"i$$ n« Drratrî? rnrr ^?n }vti? A new dimension in the relationship between God and Abraham and his descendants is established in these verses.41 In this soliloquy, God decides to involve Abraham in the adjudication of the outcry against Sodom.42 God's decision, however, concerns more than this individual case. The result clause (miT "TON ]^Q^) indicates the broader purpose:43 'In order that he may charge his descendants to keep...' something. The phrase that follows, 'the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and

41. 42. 43.

Notwithstanding Gen. 12.1, 15.1 and 17.1. A soliloquy is spoken alone, but in literary contexts it is often overheard. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 367, purpose clause.

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justice', is unique.44 Narrative context is a necessary source for interpreting this phrase. Each of its parts may refer either to the observance of God's commands (i.e. to proceeding behaviorally in conformity with the law) or to administering a just legal procedure (i.e. to judging justly). Typically, the entire unique phrase has been interpreted in terms of behavior. This is reasonable, given the dramatic focus of the narrative on the actions of the men of Sodom and the messengers. Certainly behavioral oughts are a dominant theme of the text. Nonetheless, more consideration should be given to understanding the referent of this phrase as the administering of proper legal procedure (the words of the text are 'judge justly'). First, the narrative that follows is replete with such procedure. Secondly, the primary question raised by Abraham is centered in proper procedure. Thirdly, the lexicographical range of meaning for the syntagmas in the phrase 'the way of the LORD, doing righteousness and justice' clearly includes an administrative legal procedural sense. This commitment to just judging is an important part of the new relationship between Abraham and God. The commitment forms an inclusio for this narrative: 'The LORD said, "Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do?"' and 'So it was that, when God destroyed the cities of the Plain, God remembered Abraham and sent Lot out of the midst' (18.16-17; 19.27-29). These verses bracket the whole text. They set the lengthy narrative in the context of God's developing relationship with Abraham. Conversely, the proceedings enclosed should provide the context for understanding 'the way of the LORD, doing righteousness and justice'. Their new relationship is given its focus at the beginning of the narrative (18.16-19), treating Abraham's future governance and teaching role with his household. The text also points to the legacy of his governance, which shall be to 'all the nations of the earth' (18.18).45 The narrative concludes with Abraham's silence 'standing in the place where he had stood before the LORD' (19.27). His silence signals an acceptance of the sentence and the procedure that led to it. In contrast to his earlier emphatic appeal

44. In addition to the discussion that follows, see previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.19, pp. 89-91. 45. Gen. 26.5 reports that Abraham was successful in keeping the way of the LORD.


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(18.23-25), Abraham does not even address God. He has accepted the justice of God's judgment.46 'Doing' or 'Administrating'. In 18.19 m&J)1? is translated 'by doing' (righteousness and justice). In juridical contexts, n&U has a technical procedural meaning that may be translated 'to administrate'. The verb is widely attested in the course of juridical procedure.47 Although its meaning is generic in itself, it is used to indicate specific legal procedures in a juridical context when bound syntactically in particular syntagmas.48 In Genesis 18-20 the verb HtoD is used to designate both personal behavioral and juridical procedural oughts and ought nots. Thus, the texts in which it occurs can be divided into these two categories: those that designate 'doing right', in a general sense, and those that refer to 'making just decisions' or 'making just rulings'. The meaning, depending on the context, is either to deeds that ought not be done, or to juridical proceedings that re-establish balance in the created order. Genesis 18.19, 25, 30 and 20.10 belong to the realm of 'making just decisions', and the remainder (18.21; 20.5, 6, 9) to doing what ought not be done. In these uses are two primary sources of evidence for the operation of law in Genesis 18-20. 'Doing Righteousness and Justice'. In 18.19 the objects of the verb 'by administrating' (NRSV, 'by doing') are 'righteousness and justice' (CDD2JQ1 np"l^ rVKDI/T'). The most complete syntagma for 'judging justly' is Hpl^l ttS&Q n&J}.49 Generally this refers to uprightness in behavior, but in texts that have an administrative juridical context it has procedural force. For example, 'Because the LORD loved Israel forever, he has made you king to execute justice and righteousness' (1 Kgs 10.9b); Thus says the LORD: "Act with justice and righteousness, and deliver from the hand of the oppressor anyone who has been robbed"' (Jer. 22.3).50 46. Abraham may also wonder if Lot has been spared. Gen. 14 demonstrates his commitment to Lot's well-being. 47. See Gen. 20.9 in Chapter 3, pp. 111-12. 48. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 117-19. 49. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.25b,pp. 101-102. 50. See also 2 Sam. 8.15; Ps. 99.4b; Jer. 9.24; 23.5; 33.15; Ezek. 45.9. See Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 188.

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This exact syntagma is also in Gen. 18.19. It does not have the obvious royal administrative procedural context of these other examples, but it is given as a charge to Abraham concerning his own children and his household. Abraham's role in the particular 'proceeding' against Sodom does not diminish his role as the (royal) administrator of justice for his family and community. 'To Keep the Way of the LORD by Doing Righteousness and Justice'. The administration of righteousness and justice in 18.19 is set in the context of keeping the 'way of the LORD' (nplK HWVh mrr -pi 11001 CDQEJai).51 "j"n, like the other words in this syntagma, also has a dual use in the literature. It sometimes means 'judgment' or 'trial'.52 Later, ~p~l became a favorite word for a pious observance of the law.53 Part of that later pious observance of the law in general includes the adjudication of conflicts. Approximately 30 per cent of the 613 commandments are laws concerning judicial process. In a general sense, therefore, any reference to the pious observance of the law necessarily refers in a substantial way to judicial process.54 For Gen. 18.19, however, it is enough to observe that ^"11 can mean specifically 'the way of administering justice' for a community when it is used with CDD00.55 When the term 'way' is construed with terms meaning law, justice, etc. (of the kind CDQ2JQ n~lN)...it means 'to proceed' in conformity with the law (cf. Isa. 26.8; 40.14; 59.8; Prov. 2.8, 8.20)... Just 'proceeding', in certain contexts such as Prov. 17.23, may refer to law court procedure in conformity with the law.56

51. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.19, pp. 89-90. 52. Seeligmann, 'Terminologie', p. 269. 53. Friedrich Heiler, Ersheinungsformen und Wesen der Religion (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1961), p. 148. Heiler is quoted by Westermann, who adds: The way of Yahweh consists in observing "righteousness and justice" and Abraham is to teach this to his descendants.' Westermann, Genesis 12-36, pp. 288-89. 54. Harry Gersh, The Sacred Books of the Jews (New York: Stein & Day, 1968), pp. 232-38. 55. For example, see Jer. 5.4 and Ps. 1.6, where 'way' has a legal context. 56. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 192 n. 52.


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The concept of way usually means 'behavior', especially in the sapiential literature and in a religious context.57 When it is construed with nouns meaning the innocent or the just, the syntagma typically refers to righteous behavior.58 In Gen. 18.19 ~[Tf is construed with both CD3EJQ and pl^. Wisdom and legal procedure cannot be separated in the interpretation of this text. Each of the syntagmas of the unique phrase 'to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice' can refer to proper judicial procedure. The context and content of the narrative warrant this understanding. Yet they do not exclude the behavioral interpretation. The lexicographic range, the narrative context, and Abraham's central question ('Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?') provide warrants for understanding the phrase in both a behavioral sense and an administrative sense. Pre-Trial Motions, Arguments, and Decisions (18.20-33) Probable Cause for a Trial (18.20a). A preliminary hearing establishes probable cause for a trial based on the evidence presented (often sworn testimony). In this case, that probable cause is established by the evidence of the outcry against Sodom. God, acting as the magistrate of the pre-trial proceedings, opens the preliminary hearing of the case against Sodom and Gomorrah with a declaration of evidence that has been received against them by saying, 'How great is the outcry [Hpltt] against Sodom and Gomorrah' (18.20a). p^T and pl^ are used in formal legal complaints. This was a cry for 'legal' help.59 These terms are typically used to present the outcry of a maltreated marginalized individual within a community as evidence in legal cases. In this case the juridical usage is obvious from the narrative context. The nominal form emphasizes this cry's function as evidence.60

57. See Jenni and Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch, I, pp. 458-60. 58. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 192 n. 52. 59. See Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 62-63; von Rad, Genesis, p. 27 n. 5; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 314-15; Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 20; Gerhard Hasel, 'pat', TDOT, IV, p. 115. The broad legal background of these terms is presented in chapter 3 at 18.20, pp. 91-93. 60. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 49-53. The people who cried out are not identified in the text. The implication is that they were previous visitors to the Plain and were victims in a pattern of violence illustrated in 19.1-11.

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God's declaration 'How great' establishes probable cause for the indictment against Sodom and Gomorrah.61 Indictment Issued (18.20b). This is the second action of God's soliloquy. The soliloquy is not directed to anyone in particular, yet Abraham does know its content (v. 23). It is given in a declaratory form, as a formal indictment. Once the probable cause for the trial has been declared in the text (the outcry), the formal accusation of an indictment immediately follows: 'How very grave their sin'. This statement of offense declares that the accusation has been formally received and assessed by God. The alleged behavior is a punishable offense (18.20).62 This is not a pronouncement of final judgment, as the conditional language of v. 21 shows ('whether they have done... and if not'). It is an indictment against the alleged sin (implied in the outcry), that is, an acknowledgment that the accused, if guilty, have consequences to face.63 In 19.1-2 the messengers of God enter Sodom to stay the night. Their purpose is not the destruction of the city based on a previous judgment, but the verification or refutation of the indictment (18.21). Declaration of Due Process by Public Trial (18.21).64 When God says, 'I must go down and see' (nNHNl K]~n~nN), the trial is declared. It does not begin until Abraham's pre-trial negotiations are complete (18.2233) and the messengers enter Sodom (19.1), but God's commitment to the due process of a public trial follows immediately on the indictment. When God says 'whether they have done' and 'if not, I will know', the implication is that he does not know enough to convict or acquit. He only knows enough (from the outcry) to indict. Either there is something that God doesn't know, or we must read God's words with a deeply ironic or even sarcastic tone. God repeats the phrase N2$DN~DK, 'If I find', three times, and implies it in three other cases.65

61. 'How great', asseverative SD. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 449. 62. Again note the asseverative "O. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 449. 63. See Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 290. 64. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.21, pp. 93-95. 65. Gen. 18.26, 28, 30 and 18.29, 31, 32. See discussion of the implication of TDin below.


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Commentators have explained the meaning in a variety of ways.66 A close juridical reading of the text helps to interpret the question raised by God's stated lack of knowledge. It means that God must draw close to humanity in the vulnerability of human form in order to justly judge humanity. There are many kinds of 'knowledge'. Court procedure is instructive for interpreting the meaning of 'know' in this context. Pre-trial weighing of evidence may be done behind closed doors, but the trial proper is public. Once God has decided to involve Abraham and all the nations of the world, God is committed to a public kind of knowing. In order for God to be considered 'just' by Abraham (and by humanity?), the trial must be public. This is consistent with God's decision at the beginning of the narrative ('Shall I hide...? No...'). Legal procedure is helpful for understanding this distinction, without attempting to decide what God knows or when God knows it. This is the manner in which Genesis 18.20-21 has to be interpreted: an accusation against Sodom and Gomorrah has reached the divine judge; as a result he undertakes to clarify the facts: 'I want to go down and see if they have in fact committed all the evil of which the cry has reached me; I want to know.'61

Midrash Genesis Kabbah offers a similar interpretation: This teaches that a judge must scrupulously examine a case before pronouncing judgment.'68 66. G. von Rad states that both 'Yahweh and Abraham know what the results of the investigation will be and what the consequences will be for Sodom.' Von Rad, Genesis, p. 212. God's action in going down is perfunctory. Bovati notes, however, that in juridical procedures of the Hebrew Bible, 'when the guilt of an accused is...established the result reached is that of juridical certainty, which allows the passion of a verdict with confidence... "Findings" after an inquiry are expressed in Hebrew by the same verb as means "to catch red-handed", "to catch in the act".' Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 248. Most commentators assert that God 'knows' what will happen. 'God will go through with his decision to punish Sodom.' Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 291; Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 50. A notable exception is Fretheim who argues for the integrity of God's speech, that is, that God's knowledge is provisional. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 469. God 'must go down and see' and then 'know' (18.21). 67. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 241 n. 38. Cf. Luis Alonso Schoekel, Genesis (Madrid: Los Libros Sagrados, 1970), p. 84. 68. Plaut, The Torah, p. 135; Gen. R. 49.6; contra Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 52: 'When God "comes down", he does so not to "see" and "hear" and thereby to

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God says, 'I must go down.' God 'must' come down to see and 'know' and weigh the evidence publicly, in human form.69 This kind of corporeal knowing surely is different from God's knowing in spirit. The context of 'know' in this text is God's knowing in human form, and thus in a public experience of 'going down'. 70 'Whether they have done' and 'if not, I will know' express God's self-limiting commitment to justice. Justice, as Abraham, his descendants and the nations are to know it from God, is public and requires a process. That process, in courts considered 'just', admits only first-hand evidence and testimony based on first-hand, sensory experience.71 The phrase 'whether they have done altogether according to the outcry' describes the process of deciding guilt by personally verified evidence. A judge may 'know', on the basis of pre-trial evidence, that a defendant is guilty. Proper judgment, however, requires a trial of that evidence, of witnesses and of the defendant, that is, a proper trial. God's going down to see is God's commitment to a proper trial of the indictment based on probable cause established by the evidence of the outcry. Such due process and administration of law are not immaterial to justice. They are essential parts of human (and here, divine) justice. In this case it seems necessary to observe that God is committed to a legal procedure and invites Abraham also to follow that procedure for the sake of his household and his legacy ('all the nations of the earth'). God's stated intention is for Abraham to participate in keeping the way of the LORD. How will he learn that way if God does not demonstrate it? In God's commitment to a relationship with Abraham, and in this case to keeping the way of righteousness and justice, God's own self becomes obligated to due process. That process, shown here, involves a proper presentation of evidence. Even the reader of the narrative (19.1-11) becomes a part of weighing and deciding, precisely

"know" more conclusively (see Gen. 11.5) but in order to judge (see Gen. 11.7).' 69. For a discussion of theophanies in human form, see Terence E. Fretheim, The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective (ed. Walter Brueggemann; Overtures to Biblical Theology; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), pp. 49-53. On the issue of God's knowing, see Fretheim, Genesis, p. 476. 70. In Gen. 18.2 three men speak as one. After Abraham remains standing with the LORD (18.22), two angels arrive in Sodom (19.1), sent by the LORD (19.13). They also speak as one (19.17). 71. A common syntagma that signals a legal inquiry into the facts of a case: to see + to know £T + ilK"). Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 244 n. 47.


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because God 'comes down to see'. There is a reciprocal movement toward due process in the text. God 'comes down' (18.21-22) and Abraham 'remains standing before' and 'draws near' to the LORD (18.2223). Abraham, For the Defense, Approaches the LORD, the Pre-trial Judge (18.22b-23a).12 Abraham stands before God, as God sits in judgment. During judicial arraignments in the Hebrew Bible, the one pleading stands and the judge is seated.73 'The legal overtones of the verb 1QU... do appear important, both in the static sense of "to be on trial" and in the dynamic one of "to file an appearance", "to appear in court".'74 The legal referent for 1QU is especially evident when it is combined (as here) with &31 Initiatives preceding the biblical trial are designated by a motion towards a court of law.75 The combination of 1QU with a verb of nearness is a primary way in which biblical trial speech is indicated.76 The judge's being seated in the law court is linked to the movement of those who come forward 'to stand' trial. Abraham is not on trial himself, but stands as an advocate for and in the place of the accused. Presenting oneself before a judge is not a neutral act; it always involves some sort of charge or laying claim to a right. It may perhaps be thought that the phrase "OD^ 1QJJ, in the sense of 'to intercede', may be regarded as a kind of speech for the defense (cf. Gen. 18.22; Jer. 15.1; 18.20).77

In this pre-trial hearing, Abraham is approaching 'the bench' to negotiate for a just trial on behalf of the city of Sodom.

72. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.22 and 18.23, pp. 95-98. 73. For a similar relationship, see 1 Kgs 3.16: 'Later, two women who were prostitutes came to the king and stood before him'. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 233. 74. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 233 n. 29; BDB, p. 763. For other interpretations and discussion of Abraham's standing before the LORD, including the Masoretic emendations, see Fretheim, The Book of Genesis', p. 468; Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, pp. 23-24. Hamilton favors Abraham as a precursor of a mediating prophet. 75. 'The plaintiff is often described as moving toward the judge.' Falk, 'Hebrew Legal Terms', p. 350. 76. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 236. 77. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 237 n. 34.

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Abraham Negotiates the Conditions of the Trial (18.23-32). Abraham, counsel for the defense, negotiates an advantage on behalf of the defendants. He secures the condition that the whole city will be spared judgment on the condition that ten innocent men are found (18.23-33). Abraham begins with a question, which forms the basis of his argument. 'Will you indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty?' (18.23).

ueh'Dj* pis nson *]«n Abraham repeats this foundational question in another form in v. 24:78 'Will you then sweep away the place and not forgive it for the fifty innocent who are in it?' (18.24b).

:n:np3 •$$ apisn nwon ]uti? Dips'? «tern£n n?pn ^n He repeats it again, in v. 25, in the form of an emphatic statement: 'Far be it from you to make a ruling like this, to slay the innocent with the guilty, so that the righteous fare as the guilty. Far be that from you' (18.25a).

sti~o pis? rrrn y&rny pi^ rrpn'p njn TH? n&i:Q ft rft'pn ft nV?n A dynamic equivalent of 'to do such a thing' (NRSV) in 18.25 is 'Far be it from you to make a ruling like this.'19 Abraham develops this foundational question ('Will you indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty?') with the first of his conditional proposals. The proposal and God's reply use a technical legal expression of negotiation and agreement. Abraham asks, 'Suppose there are [CT] fifty innocent within the city?' (18.24a). God answers, 'If I find at Sodom fifty innocent in the city, I will forgive the whole place for their sake' (18.26).

:D~n3U3 Diparr^D1? TIKEHI Tun ^pra DDIS Dôn Dicn NHQK-DN

78. I have translated 'innocent' and 'guilty' instead of 'righteous' and 'wicked' throughout this chapter. For the argument that, in this context, p"H!$ should be translated 'innocent' instead of 'righteous' and 1)27"! translated 'guilty' rather than 'wicked', see Chapter 3 at Gen. 18.23, p. 96. 79. Another preferable dynamic equivalent in this context is 'How can you make such a ruling?' See especially 2 Chron. 19.6 and Deut. 17.8, 11. The RSV has 'verdict' for 131 in Deut. 17.11. When "131 is used with the language of judging, it is translated as 'case', meaning 'legal case', or 'juridical decision'. See Chapter 3, p. 100, for my argument for this translation of Gen. 18.25a.


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The syntagma (2T + NKQ (there is + find), usually with the particle DN (either 'if there is' or, as here, 'if I find'), is the typical biblical expression of the terms of a conclusion to the pre-trial inquiry.80 With this legal terminology Abraham argues for the best conclusion he can negotiate with God for the city of Sodom.81 In Abraham's six proposals and in God's six positive responses, these terms, or the ciphers by which they are implied, occur repeatedly. In God's first, second and fourth responses the answer is 'If I find' (50, 45, or 30). In the first response God also says, 'for their sake', which becomes the cipher for the implied 'If I find' in the third, fifth and sixth responses. There the answer is 'for the sake of 40, 20, and 10. Likewise, Abraham's questions are marked by the legal terminology, 'suppose there are found'. The particle & (there is) is linked to its cipher ""ÎK (suppose) in 18.24, which takes its place in the remainder of the negotiations: 'Suppose there are fifty' (18.24); 'Suppose five of the fifty' (18.28); 'Suppose forty are found' (18.29); 'Suppose thirty are found' (18.30); 'Suppose twenty are found' (18.31); 'Suppose ten are found' (18.32). Even in the use of this biblical legal terminology, the text discloses Abraham's and God's mutual acceptance of a juridical procedure as 'the way of the LORD' for re-establishing righteousness and justice in the earth. After Abraham develops his foundational question ('Will you indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty?') with the first of his conditional proposals ('Suppose there are fifty innocent within the city?'), he emphatically appeals to the character of God, asking the question that introduces the central theological concern: 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?' (18.25b).

:Q50o rroir vb fi^n'^s tDS&n In asking this theological question, Abraham also enters into the 'way of the LORD'. He demonstrates his concern that righteousness and justice be done, even by God. Abraham and God are in agreement that the 'way of the LORD' ought to provide a way of escape for the innocent. Abraham demonstrates this in his questions, and God does so as well by his stated intention to 'go down and see whether they have done altogether according to the outcry'. They are in concert in their stated 80. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 251. 81. Gen. 18.24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32. See previous discussion of 'finding' as legal discovery in Chapter 3 at 18.26, p. 102-103.

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intentions. God provides three ways of escape through a due process of law: (1) by going down to verify the evidence; (2) by agreeing to spare all if ten innocent are found; and (3) by providing a physical escort of the innocent (19.16). Abraham further demonstrates his concern for the 'way of the LORD' in his reference to 'all the earth'. The text states that Abraham's keeping of 'the way of the LORD' is for the sake of 'all the nations of the earth' (p«n ''V ^D; 18.18). The phrase, echoed in 18.25b by Abraham ('the Judge of all the earth'; |*~lîl ^3), shows that he shares God's concern for a universal blessing of righteousness and justice. The syntagma C3SC2Q + QDîl (18.25) occurs only three times in the Hebrew Bible (Gen. 18.25; Deut. 17.9; 1 Kgs 3.28).82 In each of these cases it is used technically as the 'judge's verdict' or 'judge's decision'. Plural forms occur at Deut. 16.18 and 2 Chron. 19.6. These texts reveal a technical use of non-technical vocabulary. Genesis 18.25 could be translated as 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth make a just decision?' In each of these cases, the abstraction 'do right' (RSV) does not convey the specificity of decision indicated by the context. Abraham has succeeded in securing the condition that the whole city will be spared on the condition that ten innocent men are found.83 Abraham's fundamental question, 'Will you indeed sweep away the righteous with the wicked?' (v. 23), has been answered negatively, in Abraham's favor. Trial Judge Confirmed by Abraham (18.33). Abraham ends his questioning after God agrees to spare Sodom for the sake of ten men (18.32). Abraham's silence reveals his satisfaction that the LORD, the judge of all the earth, will judge justly. This silence (in contrast to 82. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.25b, pp. 101-102. 83. On the possible legal significance of the numbers 50 and 10, see a summary of the discussion by Joseph Blenkinsopp, 'Abraham and the Righteous of Sodom', JJS 33 (1982), pp. 119-32 (123). Brueggemann says, 'In its outcome the narrative is thoroughly Jewish because the bottom line is the minimum of ten, a minyan.' Walter Brueggemann, 'A Shape for Old Testament Theology II: Embrace of Pain', CBQ 47 (July 1985), p. 410. Sarna, Fretheim and Plaut follow the rabbinic interpretation, that 10 is a minimum effective social entity. Sarna, Genesis, p. 142; Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 478; Plaut, The Torah, p. 133. Wenham (following B. Jacob) speculates that 50 could be half of the fighting men of a small city (Amos 5.3). See Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 52.


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Abraham's initial emphatic speech in 18.23-25) serves to confirm the LORD as the judge of the public presentation of evidence in the trial that follows in the narrative of ch. 19. This silent confirmation is important later in the narrative when the men of Sodom raise the legal question Quo Warrantol ('by what warrant?', 19.9).84 By that time in the narrative, their question concerning who has the authority to judge in Sodom is futile, for God has already been confirmed by Abraham as the just judge of this case. The Trial Proper (19.1-29) The two angels came to Sodom in the evening, and Lot was sitting in the gateway of Sodom (19.la).

Dip—iifltf? DO'" CDIÎ 3"i;?a rraio D'ON'pan ûi iKiri The trial begins as the evidence of the case is presented by the narrator. The two men who set out for Sodom (18.22) arrive and meet Lot at the city gate (19.1). The evidence by which the Sodomites are condemned is presented without narrative comment, as the testimony of an eyewitness. The primary facts (prima facie}are established by means of reporting first-hand information and the description of personal knowledge, without any added argumentation by the narrator (19.1-11). The reader is presented with the actions and speech of the two messengers, Lot and the men of Sodom. The abrupt beginning of ch. 19 has long been noted by readers.85 This segue ('The two angels came to Sodom...') serves rhetorically to draw the reader, in part by its abrupt transition, to the continuing descriptive narrative in a new locale. It returns to the over-arching narrative thread of 'the men', who now are described as 'angels' or 'messengers' (a reminder that they represent the LORD).86 Now the LORD has come down to see, that is, to gain first-hand evidence, whether the Sodomites have done altogether according to the outcry or not. The evidence of the earlier outcry must be verified and established. The primary effect of this narrative thread is to draw the reader into

84. See discussion of Quo Warranto in this chapter at 'The Voice of the Men of Sodom', p. 134-36. 85. Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 139; Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 300; Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 172. 86. Gen. 18.1,2, 16, 22; 19.1, 15.

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the story by closing the gap between divinity and humanity.87 The theophany begins in 18.1-2 with the notice that three men/the LORD appeared to Abraham by the oaks at Mamre. It is continued at 18.16 before God's soliloquy: 'The men set out from there, and they looked toward Sodom, and Abraham went with them to see them on their way.' The reader is reminded of them again before Abraham's conversation with the LORD at 18.22: 'So the men turned from there and went toward Sodom.' As a narrative device, these men bring God into the realm of human experience. Finally they arrive in Sodom in 19.1, and the reader is with them, more than ready to know what they will actually encounter. The theophany (God's 'coming down' as 'men') and the narrative art of repetition at important transitions are additional ways by which the reader is drawn into the story. Abraham's involvement (e.g. 'Abraham drew near') in the administration of justice also serves to bring the way of the LORD closer to the reader. Now the reader is seated as a member of the jury by means of the narrative style and through hearing the prima facie evidence without any value judgments by the narrator (19.1-11).88 After the segue at 19.1, the direct style and presentation of evidence (19.1-11) engages the reader to judge for herself, as a member of the jury. In this respect, the reader hears 'first-hand' testimony. She also hears the implicit confession of wrongful harm made by the men of Sodom (19.9). The opinions of Lot and of the men of Sodom on the incident are also presented as evidence, without argumentation by the narrator. The opinions are permitted as evidence, as in a courtroom, They are presented as first-hand information. Conviction cannot be based on hearsay, but is based on personal knowledge and experience. Because the narrator withholds value judgments concerning the action, the reader formulates her own value judgments on the characters' behaviors. This artful silence draws the reader into the process of decision, with God and with Abraham. The text also describes several possibilities for reader reaction and response after the verdict and sentence are declared (19.12-13). Will the reader agree with the judgment?

87. For this function of theophanies, see Fretheim, The Suffering of God, pp. 93-106. 88. Contrast the narrative style of Kings, for example, 'And Ahab...did evil in the sight of the LORD' (1 Kgs 16.30).


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Or will she consider the whole matter a jest (v. 14), linger (v. 16), look back (v. 26), flee (v. 17), or find another escape (v. 20)? Eyewitnesses, the Accused and a Confession.The two messengers and Lot are the eyewitnesses in Sodom. The evidence ('the outcry against Sodom') of the pre-trial hearing and the indictment ('their sin') must be confirmed or contradicted by these witnesses.89 The messengers of the LORD have not come to destroy Sodom, but to verify the indictment. Their arrival in Sodom as strangers and their intention to stay the night (19.1-2) are not the actions of those who have come to destroy on the basis of a previous judgment. The narrator's testimony is also given as the testimony of personal experience. The personal knowledge style of this testimony establishes the narrator as the fourth, though shadowy, witness to the events at Sodom. He knows the times of day, the conversations and the details of the actions of all the characters. Also, the accused are clearly identified in five sequential phrases (19.4): The men of the city, the men of Sodom, both young and old, all the people, to the last man, surrounded the house.

:H^P The redundancy in v. 4 is considered by some to be a gloss. 90 In a juridical reading, however, the repetition is useful to a definite identification of the guilty parties. The repetition leaves no doubt about who is being accused. There are none in Sodom who are innocent. A positive identification of the indicted has been made. These witnesses experience a surprising turn in the trial as the men of Sodom make an implicit confession of wrongful harm. Lot begs them, 'Do not act so wickedly' (19.7).91 They respond, 'Now we will deal worse with you than with them' (19.9). The hiphil imperfect of Lot's plea (l^~lfl) and the hiphil imperfect of the men's response (in]) use the same root, Uin. The men of Sodom do not mean this as a confession of wickedness. They are, in fact, in this context, defending their right to

89. See Deut. 19.15. 90. Westermann correctly states that this need not be considered a gloss. See Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 301; contra Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 35. 91. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 19.7, p. 105.

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self-rule.92 This is simply a warning to the 'alien' Lot to conform to the standard local rule or suffer the consequences. But their language betrays them. The response could be translated, 'Now we will deal more wickedly with you than with them'. While this translation would emphasize an implicit confession of wickedness, that is not what the men of Sodom intend. Yet the verb cuts in two directions. Therefore, the NRSV translation should remain, in keeping with the context of intention, but the word-play and the narrative's prejudice for the legitimate judge should also result in the recognition that this phrase functions as an implied admission of wrongdoing. Guilty Verdict and Declaration of the Sentence. During the pre-trial proceedings, the original complaint ('how great is the outcry') was considered enough evidence to establish probable cause for an indictment (18.20a). Now the verdict of 'guilty' is announced by confirming the evidence of that original complaint: 'because the outcry against its people has become great' (nnp!^ H^TPD). This verdict and the first declaration of the sentence are delivered in one direct statement: 'For we are about to destroy this place, because the outcry against its people has become great before the LORD, and the LORD has sent us to destroy it' (19.13).

In this verdict the validity of the accusations implied in the outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah is confirmed for the reader. The outcry' is the warrant given for the pending destruction, and the causal "O signifies that whatever has caused the outcry certainly ought not be done.93 The sentence is repeated three times. In 19.13 the sentence of destruction (nTOJ)94 is spoken twice by the messengers to Lot. Lot repeats the sentence (19.14)95 to his sons-in-law, who are also offered a way of escape because of Lot. They deride the opportunity for acquittal (i.e. 'to be set free from guilt and its consequences').

92. See my discussion in The voice of the men of Sodom: juridical issues and political power'. Their will to self-rule is unanimous, pp. 134-36. 93. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 444. 94. Hiphil participle; piel infinitive construct. 95. Hiphil participle.


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The Acquittal and a Post-Trial Decision. The acquittal and safe passage of Lot and any who are related to him is announced with a series of seven imperatives (19.12, 15, 17, 22). Royal judicial procedures are typically concluded with a 'royal imperative', given for the protection of the legally marginal.96 The acquittal consists of the information and means of escape from Sodom's guilt and its consequences. In this acquittal, the repetition of the imperatives is more urgent because of the catastrophic physical nature of the judgment. The acquittal of Lot and his relatives will be meaningless if they do not also escape the disaster. In order to fully set them free from guilt and its consequences the messengers must also guarantee their safe passage out of the destruction of the guilty: '...or anyone you have in the city, bring them out of the place' (19.12).

This acquittal includes Lot's sons-in-law, to whom he repeats the imperative.97 They refuse, however, the means of escape provided to them. In the morning, the imperative is repeated by the messengers: 'Get up, take your wife and your two daughters who are here' (19.15).98 The phrase 'who are here' (n^^Q]H) is not incidental to the story.99 The repetition of the root ^^Q (used previously in 18.26, 28-32) returns to the theme of 'finding'. The innocent are found. The minimum of ten innocent have not been found, but Lot's wife and daughters, 'found' here, are innocent of the aggressive inhospitality of Sodom. But they linger, and they must be seized and forcibly removed from the city because of the impending comprehensive physical disaster. Even with that removal, the imperative must be repeated: They100 said, 'Flee for your life; do not look back or stop anywhere in the Plain; flee to the hills, or else you will be consumed' (19.17).

96. Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 39. 97. Hiphil imperative 2 m. s. (v. 12); 'Up, get out of this place': qal imperative 2 m. p; qal imperative 2 m. p. (v. 14). 98. Qal imperative 2 m. s.; qal imperative 2 m. s. See previous discussion of the royal imperatives of this verse in Chapter 3 at 19.15, pp. 106-107. 99. Niphal participle, f. p. of KUQ. 100. "IQN'l is niphal imperative 2 m. s. The NRSV translates 'they said', following the LXX, Syriac and Vulgate. This disrupts the narrative less, whic maintains plural references to the men. In v. 21, 'He', as a reference to the LORD, is matched by the first personal T of God's speech.

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Still, Lot will not go. He appeals the conditions of his safe passage. The post-trial decision by the sentencing judge relocates Lot's family. This action also serves to save a small city in the Plain, Zoar (19.21). The versions agree that it is the LORD who speaks this decision. Legally, only the judge, and not simply an agent of the court, can make this kind of exceptional ruling. He said, 'Very well, I will grant you this favor too, and will no overthrow the city of which you have spoken' (19.21).

The royal imperative of acquittal is repeated for the last time, also by this singular voice. 'Hurry, escape there, for I can do nothing until you arrive there' (nnti efton lilO; 19.22).101 This final imperative is rhetorically punctuated by the first use of the singular T. It results in the saving of a small city in the Plain (which would also consequentially have been destroyed) and the full acquittal of three persons. When Lot and his daughters arrive in Zoar, the catastrophic sentence is carried out and recorded (19.23-29). That words of acquittal were not spoken to the others in the Plain is equally a royal verdict, resulting in their destruction.102 Conclusion. The due process of law outlined here is necessary to the interpretation of the 'way of the LORD' in which Abraham is to walk. It stands in contrast to the 'way' of 'judging' among the Sodomites. Their claim to judge is self-authenticating. It is a claim that rules by means of arbitrary power, without any external referent. The 'way of the LORD' in matters of righteousness and justice could be based in a similar claim. That God is the only legitimate self-authenticating judiciary and has the prerogative to act is widely assumed by interpreters. In this text, however, an argument of another kind is offered. The text offers a juridical response that invites human participation in the process. The text discloses the possibility of a legal process, involving humanity and God, by which questions of justice and injustice may be 101. Piel imperative 2 m. s.; niphal imperative 2 m. s. 102. Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 39 ('His failure to speak'). See Chapter 3 at 19.15, pp. 106-107.


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raised and adjudicated. This is the 'way' into which Abraham enters. He freely approaches, questions and influences God's procedure in adjudicating justice. He negotiates a specific agreement concerning the innocent. Abraham keeps, for God, God's intention to provide a due process of adjudication and a way of escape for the innocent ('the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice', 18.19). The narrative carries the reader into this participation as well, by means of the juridical process embedded in the story. The absence of commentary by the narrator and the abrupt segue at 19.1 serve to draw the reader into the decision process. While the reader cannot influence the decision, the rhetorical effect is an experience of the process of resolving conflict. Whether or not the reader concurs with the decisions made and the process followed, the administration of justice by means of due process has been demonstrated as the way of the LORD, and the way for Abraham to keep. Summary The juridical procedure in Gen. 18.16-19.29 may be summarized as follows: a. Establishing the Court (18.17-19). b. Pre-Trial Motions, Arguments, and Decisions (18.20-33). An outcry 'against' is pre-trial evidence that results in an indictment and the initiation of a trial. 1. Probable cause for a trial (18.20a; established on evidence of the outcry). 2. Indictment issued (18.20b; pre-trial judgment on the outcry evidence). 3. Declaration of due process by public trial (18.21). 4. Abraham, for the defense, approaches the LORD, the pre-trial judge (18.22- 23). 5. Counsel negotiates conditions of the trial (18.23-32). 6. Trial j udge confirmed by Abraham (18.33). c. Trial Proper (19.1-29) 1. The primary facts (prima facie) of the outcry are verified (the pattern of the Sodomites' behavior is confirmed) by means of reporting first-hand information and the description of personal knowledge without any added argumentation by the narrator (19.1-11). Hearsay is not sufficient.

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Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative 2. The reader is seated as a member of the jury by means of the narrative style and through hearing the prima facie evidence without any added value-judgments by the narrator (19.1-11). Contrast narrator commentary elsewhere, such as 'and Ahab did evil in the sight of the LORD'. 3. The two messengers and Lot are eyewitnesses (19.1). 4. The accused are clearly identified in five phrases (19.4). 5. Confession of wrongful harm is made by the men of Sodom (19.9). 6. A verdict of 'guilty' is announced by repeating the originally filed complaint (19.13, cf. 18.20). 7. The sentence of destruction is declared (19.13, 14). 8. The acquittal and safe passage of Lot and any who are related to him is announced (19.12, 14, 15; 19.16, 17, 22). 9. A post-trial decision by the sentencing judge relocates Lot's family and saves Zoar, in the Plain (19.18-23). See v. 21, the only occurrence of the singular 'he' in contrast to the plural in v. 18 'my lords'. Only the Judge, the LORD, can make this kind of ruling. 10. The sentence is carried out and recorded (19.23-29).

Cosmological Consequences: The Connection between the Moral Order and the Physical Creation The third kind of conflict raised by a close juridical reading concerns the close relationship between the moral and physical orders. The execution of the court-like sentence discloses that a connection between the moral and physical orders is assumed to be operative. The narrative details of the sentencing (19.13-29) disclose dynamic relationships among the physical order, the moral order, humanity and God. These dynamic relationships form a particular cosmology. The cosmology of Genesis 18-20 is demonstrated in the catastrophic magnification of the assumed link between the moral order and the order of the physical creation. Anticreational and immoral acts result in God's convulsing the creation. The creational convulsion impinges on human and environmental well-being in the realm of the immoral act in a catastrophic way. This convulsing is the cosmological consequence. In this cosmology, typical physical consequences of sin are magnified catastrophically. For example, it is an ordinary fact that Sarah cannot


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conceive Abraham's child while residing in Abimelech's tent (20.2). It is a cosmological consequence that all the women in Abimelech's camp are barren because Sarah is there (20.18). Likewise, it is ordinary that Sodom is a dangerous place to visit, because the men of Sodom are inhospitable and violent (19.5).103 It is a cosmological consequence that the Plain is made violently inhospitable to all human life, because of their lack of hospitality (19.25).104 In the discussion that follows, several disclosures of the potentially catastrophic cosmological relationship between the moral and physical orders of creation are demonstrated. Abraham's initial question about God's just judging assumes the cosmological relationship in its premise. This relationship also may be observed in the announcement of Lot's family's acquittal: their safety required their physical removal from the Plain (19.12-23). The connection between the moral and physical orders under God's judgment is disclosed also by the creational means of the consumption of the Plain and in the environmental consequences of the 'guilt' Cp£>; 19.15). This connection necessitates a special effort by God and cooperation from those rescued in order to escape the cosmological 'disaster' (HITi; 19.19).105 Abraham's Problem and Its Premise Abraham's issue with God is based on the unjust results of the cosmological relationship between the moral and physical orders. His questions reflect both this causal link and its use as a means of justice by God, the Judge of all the earth. He asks, 'Will you indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty?' (18.23b) and 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?' (18.25b). The assumption at work in these 103. On the nature of the sin of the men of Sodom, see Frederick Gaiser, 'Homosexuality and the Old Testament', WW 10 (Spring 1990), pp. 161-65. 104. The inter-biblical tradition interprets brimstone as a symbol of places that are violent and inhospitable to human life. See Deut. 29.23; Job 18.15; Ps. 11.6; Ezek. 38.22; Isa. 34.9. The New Testament carries the metaphor of raining fire from heaven as a punishment for inhospitality to strangers in Lk. 9.51-56. 105. The translation of HIT! as 'disaster' and }1U as 'punishment' belie their consequential implications. J1I3 means (1) 'iniquity' (2) 'guilt of iniquity' or (3) 'consequence of iniquity'. See BDB, p. 731. The third definition is thought rare. 'Or else you will be consumed in the iniquity of the city' (19.15b, n. m. s. construct.) would be the best translation here, since it best expresses the consequential worldview of this narrative. Likewise, nin could be translated 'for fear the wickedness will overtake me, and I die' (19.19b, n. f. s. of JJiTl). See BDB, p. 947.

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questions is that God intends to execute justice catastrophically. Abraham is aware of God's use of this cosmological means of judgment. The execution of the sentence confirms Abraham's problem in the emphatic repetition of 'the LORD' (see also 19.29): Then the LORD rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the LORD out of heaven (19.24).

God Is the Subject of the Sentence. God is the one who acts through the means of nature to impress, by catastrophic consequences, the oughts and ought nots of the text. There is no doubt who is the primary actor in these narratives...the repeated initiatives within these narratives are traced not to human beings but to the divine, royal judge.' 106 For Abraham, God's use of this imprecise means of judgment is the central problem. God does not propose to strike the guilty individuals with lightning, but to destroy an entire valley.107 Sentencing is from God, but it is by means of a cosmological relationship, or 'link', between the moral and physical orders. 'Cosmological link' does not mean that moral violations of this kind always (or ever) result in this same consequence. It is 'cosmological' in the sense that sulfurous fire is a physical phenomenon that 'the LORD rained' catastrophically on the whole valley because of the sin of the men of Sodom. That the cosmological link between the moral and physical order is made by God's action does not diminish the link, or the effect of that relationship. Fretheim has noted this relationship: But does not God cause all the damage? The text links God to this catastrophe (19.24) as an ecological disaster of divine judgment. God sees to

106. Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 53. While God is an 'initiator' of the consequences, the sin of the men of Sodom is the initiating factor. 107. HSO is translated 'sweep away' in 18.23, 24 (both qal impf. 2 m. s.). HDO is translated 'consume' in 19.15, 17 (both niph. impf. 2 m. s.). "JSH is 'overthrow' in 19.21, 25, 29 (x2). ain is 'destroy' (qal impf.) in 20.4. nntf is 'destroy' in 18.28 (x2), 31, 32 (hiphil impf.); 19.13 (x2, hiphil ptc., piel inf. const.), 14 (hiphil ptc.) and 29 (piel inf. const). mo is 'slay' in 18.25 (hiphil inf. const.), nm is 'the disaster' in 19.19 (n. f. s.). EJKT msa is 'fire and brimstone' for the hendiadys 'sulfurous fire' in 19.24. For a summary on 'fire and brimstone' see Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 306. For opinions, see Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, pp. 46-47; von Rad, Genesis, p. 220; Sarna, Genesis, p. 138. A lot of speculation is offered on these terms. The narrator's point is that it is 'from the LORD' and 'out of heaven'.


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a creational form for this disaster; it corresponds to the anticreational form of human wickedness, focused especially in the language of outcry and the deprivation of life and well-being (18.20-21; 19.13). God midwifes or sees to the moral order, through already existing human or nonhuman agents.108

Sweeping Away the Whole Place. The premise of Abraham's pre-trial negotiations is that this cosmological consequence is the means of God's justice.109 This is demonstrated in his choice of words. While God and the messengers use the term JY12J, 'destroy', Abraham uses the term HDD, 'sweep away' (18.23, 24):110 'Will you indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty?' (18.23b). 'Will you then sweep away the place and not forgive it for the fifty righteous who are in it?' (18.24b).

The objects of the verbs ('innocent with the guilty' and 'the place') serve to emphasize Abraham's concern for the comprehensive nature of the intended destruction. This concern is accompanied by a plea for 'forgiving'. H2J] is better translated 'spare' (as in the RSV). The meaning is not a substitutionary forgiveness because of the innocent ('righteous'), but a question of life and justice for any innocent in the city.111 'NC73 is central to the terminology most frequently used to describe

108. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 477; see also Fretheim,Exodus, pp. 105-12. 109. The Abraham of the text witnessed this kind of justice at least once before, when Sarai was in Pharaoh's harem. Then great plagues broke out. He will experience it again in Abimelech's camp. 110. Both are qal impf., 2 m. s. This root is used later by the messengers to stress the urgency of the escape. 111. The verb Kfo] (spare) means to annul the decision to destroy. The righteous do not exercise an atoning function for others, yet the effect is comparable...the wicked may not suffer the consequences of their own sins because of the presence of the righteous.' Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 469. 'But one must ask more precisely, what is to forgive here? [18.26]... It means nothing more than to annul the decision to destroy. This is not a matter of the turning and repenting of a city.' Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 292. See F. Stolz, '82?]', in Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch zum Alien Testament, II (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1976), pp. 109-17.

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the act of pardon, which always has a juridical, not an atoning, connotation.'112 The root Kfa] is repeated by the LORD at 18.26 in an agreement to spare the whole place (DIpQiT^D1? TIKB731) on behalf of 50 innocents. This is a decision not to punish, based on a premise of catastrophe. God, too, is limited by the cosmological means of justice. In order to spare the innocent, God must also spare the guilty. Abraham's premise of the cosmological judgment cuts in two directions. It assumes that the only two possibilities are indiscriminate destruction and indiscriminate sparing. Saving the guilty is not a matter of atonement, but a matter of the cosmology and physical implications of the sentence. Abraham's questions of God and God's responses result in two disclosures. First, Abraham's assumption was correct: the moral order and physical order are connected cosmologically. God's response to the Sodomites' guilt will be catastrophic for the entire Plain (19.17). His series of eight questions and his choice of words serve to focus the reader's attention on the judicial relationship between physical consequences and the moral order. Secondly, that relationship may be loosened if enough innocent people stand in the gap against the guilty. Escape from Destruction The details of the necessary escape from Sodom also serve to emphasize the cosmological relationship between the physical and moral orders. There were not enough innocent men in Sodom to prevent God's convulsing of creation. A physical escape from the physical destruction was necessary. They were declared innocent, yet they were in danger of being consumed in the 'guilt' (]1U) of Sodom. Securing acquittal involved an evacuation because the sentence involved a cosmological consequence (19.16-23). The urgency of the evacuation was repeated emphatically: 'Bring them out of the place' (v. 12); 'Up, get out of this place' (v. 14); 'Get up, hurry' (v. 15). When Lot 'lingered' in the Plain (19.16), he was urged again not to remain in the context of creation's coming convulsion: 'Flee for your life, do not look back or stop anywhere in the Plain; flee to the hills' (v. 17); 'Hurry, escape there' (v. 22). All creation in the Plain was threatened because God's judgment was by means of catastrophic consequences. The mortal danger of Lot and his family was simply a 112. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 143-44 ('Forgiveness of Sins'); see Gen. 18.24, 26; Num. 14.19; Isa. 2.9; Hos. 1.6.


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consequence of their flesh. Being consumed in the punishment was the due course of events for anyone in that valley. These emphatic admonitions to escape serve to disclose to the reader the comprehensive nature of the physical consequence. Rescue by God. The convulsing of the created order necessitates a special action by God in order to save Lot's family from its fatal consequences. The creational means and effect of the destruction are a creational convulsion that began with God's sentence on Sodom (19.13) and subsequently necessitated a special act of rescue by God. God works within the parameters of the consequence. God's limitation in the text discloses the connection between the moral and physical orders under judgment. This limitation is expressed to Lot when God agrees to his escape to Zoar: 'Hurry, escape there, for I can do nothing until you arrive there' (19.22). The royal imperatives of acquittal noted above (e.g. 'Get up, hurry'; 'Flee to the hills') provided the opportunity, warning, and directions for Lot's escape. Their salvation, however, required their safe physical passage. The additional measure of safe passage was necessary only because the consequences of Sodom's sin were physically comprehensive. Salvation from that destruction required a special and persistent effort by God. Rescue from the consequences of the environmental catastrophe required a special physical intervention by God. When Lot 'lingered', he, his wife, and his daughters were physically removed from Sodom by the messengers: But he lingered; so the men seized him and his wife and his two daughters by the hand, the LORD being merciful to him, and they brought him out and left him outside the city (19.16).

rnrr n'pqii^ Trip TIE? T:n incpK~T;n IT? D'tp^n iptrn rmnorn :~rsh firra inna»i in^] r^s God's commitment to righteousness and justice leads to an escort (19.16) for the innocent out of the 'guilt' (flU; 19.15) and 'consumption' (riDO; 19.15, 17) of the Plain. The physical means of this rescue signals God's limitation to work within the parameters of that moral-physical cosmology.113

113. The limits of God's intervention within this cosmology are noted in 19.26, where Lot's wife becomes a pillar of salt.

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Cooperation. The cosmological convulsion also necessitated human cooperation with God for God's success in rescuing Lot's family. God's convulsing of the created order required the cooperation of Lot's family in order to acquit them of its fatal consequences. Even though there were not enough innocent men in Sodom to prevent the convulsing of creation, human participation was essential to the success or failure of the escape of the acquitted. Lot's sons-in-law would have escaped if they had fled. They were consumed in the catastrophe, even though escape was offered to them, simply because they refused the avenue of salvation provided for them (19.12, 14). Even after his lingering, Lot's influence was significant. His conversation with the LORD inadvertently led to the rescue of the people of Zoar, who otherwise would have been destroyed with the other cities in the Plain (19.22). In contrast to Lot's sons-in-law, they would have been consumed, even though not indicted, simply because they were in the Plain. They were saved, however, for no other reason than that Lot desired to dwell there (19.21). Their sparing was indiscriminate with regard to the people of Zoar, even as their destruction would have been. Lot's involvement and conversation with God both delayed and mitigated the catastrophic destruction: 'Your servant has found favor with you, and you have shown me great kindness in saving my life; but I cannot flee to the hills, for fear the disaster will overtake me and I die. Look, that city is near enough to flee to, and it is a little one. Let me escape there—is it not a little one?—and my life will be saved!' He said to him, 'Very well, I grant you this favor too, and will not overthrow the city of which you have spoken. Hurry, escape there, for I can do nothing until you arrive there'. Therefore, the city was called Zoar (19.19-22).

This indiscriminate sparing of Zoar by God also reflects Abraham's premise of the relationship between the moral and physical orders under judgment (18.24b). In order to grant Lot's favor, an entire city will be saved in the Plain. Abraham's premise also aids in interpreting the meaning of the 'pillar of salt'. The death of Lot's wife is the most striking of the consequential deaths. The text does not address the question of whether she 'deserved' to die or not.114 That she, the unnamed, should die as a 114. Contra Wenham: 'By disobeying a God-given instruction, she forfeited her God-offered salvation. In looking back, she identified herself with the damned town.' Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 59. Von Rad, Westermann and Hamilton take a


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punishment for looking back is unconvincing and has no warrant in the text. Rather, her death emphasizes the consequential nature of judgment in this text. She acted foolishly in a dangerous situation. Her death is not a punishment for an act of 'disobedience' to a command of the messengers. It is a consequence of her failure to heed their warning of imminent physical danger. They say: 'Don't look back or stop anywhere in the Plain' (19.17).

The warnings are not imperative commands. They are given in the imperfect form in the context of physical consequence ('lest you be consumed'). This warning of danger is an extension of the concern expressed in v. 15: 'Get up, take...lest you be consumed in the punishment of the city.' Even here, where the imperative is used (np Dip), it is a warning of danger and not a commandment to fulfill some kind of righteousness or faithfulness. Her death is not a discipline administered by God. It is a consequence of a failure to heed a warning. This warning is akin to a parent's warning to a child not to stand too close to a busy street. Failure to heed warnings of this nature may result in death or injury, but no one would call such consequences of heedlessness 'punishment' . This reading is clear if the warning is read in its immediate context: 'Don't look back or stop anywhere in the Plain; flee to the hills, or else you will be consumed.' The concern is for physical haste and physical distance from the consuming destruction. That Lot's wife turns into a pillar of salt, becoming part of the consumed environment for all to observe, is a symbol in the text of the close connection between the moral and physical orders. Human sin has ill effects on the environment, including the people who linger in it, regardless of their level of complicity.115 An environment poisoned by the consequences of human sin has ill effects on human life in general. The cosmological connection between the moral and physical order in this and other texts may be understood as a link, but it is an uncertain link.116 more moderate position: She ignored the directive 'Do not look back' (v. 17). Von Rad, Genesis, pp. 221-22; Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 307; Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 48. 115. For example, consider Chernobyl; see Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 369. 116. See Fretheim, The Book of Genesis', p. 477. Fretheim calls this a 'loose

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This necessity of human cooperation also is disclosed in the narrative by means of consequential language. The language is used to urge human participation in escaping the consequences of Sodom's guilt CpU). Lot and his family do not grasp the dire consequences of their position in the Plain. The consequential language describes and refers to God's formal sentence: 'For we are about to destroy this place, because the outcry against its people has become great before the LORD, and the LORD has sent us to destroy it' (19.13).

The repeated use of consequential language functions to further disclose the relationship between the physical and moral orders to the characters and to the reader. This language is used to convince Lot's family to accept their escort. The language of consequence is necessary for explaining the danger to the acquitted. The city and Plain are to be entirely consumed:117 'For the LORD is about to destroy the city' (19.14b). 'Or else you will be consumed in the iniquity of the city' (19.15b). 'Or else you will be consumed' (19.17b).

Lot, the anti-hero of the narrative, finally understands the premise of consequential judgment. He uses the premise in his negotiations for a domicile in Zoar: 'For fear the disaster will overtake me and I die' (19.19b). 'And my life will be saved!' (19.20b).

causal link'. The connection (or link) is 'uncertain' because it is so loose. Immoral action generally does not result in catastrophic consequence. When it does (as in Gen. 18-20) and the link is observable, it is understood as an act of God. 117. rrn$Q hiphil participle; HSOfl niphal impf., 2 m. s. 'Iniquity' is the best lexicographical and contextual translation of 711?.


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This consequential language serves to develop the premise that there is a physical danger that is consequent to the guilt of Sodom. It began in Abraham's conversation with God, was repeated by the messengers, and is finally understood by Lot. The Overthrow of the Plain The overthrow of the Plain itself is a demonstration of the cosmological relationship between the moral and physical orders. The connection is disclosed in the text through a detailed environmental description of the means and effects of the destruction as a consequence of sin and judgment. The creational means and creational effect of the destruction are a physical convulsion of creation that is initiated by God's sentence: 'We are about to destroy this place because the outcry against its people has become great before the LORD' (19.13). Creation as the Means of the Overthrow. Creation is the means by which Sodom is overthrown. The physical creation is violently convulsed by God as a consequence of the Sodomites' sin. The emphasis on the consequential nature of the consumption of the Plain does not discount or ignore God's active role in the destruction. That the LORD rained sulfurous fire is emphasized in 19.24. Yet the consequences of sin are not simply 'punishment' or death for the guilty individuals. The consequences include the transformation of a fertile green valley, which was 'like the garden of the LORD' (Gen. 13.10), into a wasteland. The detailed description of the physical means of the overthrow serves to emphasize the connection between human sin in the moral order and disturbance in the physical creation.118 Three details of the description of the overthrow illustrate the use of creation as the means of destruction: sun upon the earth, rain out of heaven, and sulfurous fire: The sun had risen on the earth when Lot come to Zoar. Then the LORD rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the LORD out of heaven (19.23-24).

118. See the appeal to creation in Abraham's warrant to God in the pre-trial negotiations: 'I who am but dust and ashes' pDKl "Bi: "DDKI; 18.27).

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The coming of the light often means the coming of judgment.119 The morning is the favored time for an intervention by God.120 When the sun had risen upon the earth, 'the LORD rained' (TCDQn mm).121 "ltDQ is used only two other times in Genesis (2.5; 7.4). The striking contrast between raining water (in the other two texts) and raining sulfurous fire should not be lost.122 The hospitality of the earth depends on rainfall. The lack of that falling rain and its fiery substitution graphically demonstrate the realm of Sodom's failure and violation. The Environmental Effect of the Overthrow. The comprehensive and catastrophic consequences of sin and judgment bring all things to destruction, including the environment. This is a physical and environmental catastrophe. After the reader is reminded that the sun has risen, sulfurous fire descends, destroying even what grew on the ground. When it is over, smoke is rising and a salt pillar remains for the reader's (and traveler's) reminder: And he overthrew those cities, and all the Plain, and all the inhabitants of the cities, and what grew on the ground. But Lot's wife, behind him, looked back, and she became a pillar of salt. Abraham went early in the morning to the place where he had stood before the LORD; and he looked down toward Sodom and Gomorrah and toward all the land of the Plain and saw the smoke of the land going up like the smoke of a furnace (19.25-28).

The consequences of the sin and judgment of the men of Sodom are borne by the women and children of Sodom, who remain silent and are noticed in the text only in the cursory 'and all the inhabitants of the cities' (D'HDn ^sr'^D fittl). The consequences are borne by the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah as well: 'And he overthrew those cities' (~[Sm ^NH D'HtfiTPK). Even with new inhabitants, these cities will not exist. The consequences also destroy all plant life: 'and what grew on the ground' (HQT^n TOÎ). Neither is the destruction limited to the cities. The whole Plain is destroyed: 'and all the Plain' ("DDIT^ rwi). The whole environment, previously 'like the garden of the LORD' (13.10), is 119. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 19.23, p. 107. 120. See Judg. 5.31; Isa. 13.10; Ps. 19.6; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 366-68. 121. ~1QQ hiphil perfect, 3 m. s. 122. The separation of the verb from its direct object emphasizes the contrast.


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ruined. In this environmental disaster, the connection between the moral and the physical creation under God's judgment is most dramatic. Only a pillar of salt (n^Q T^] Tim) and a pillar of smoke ("ItD^pD jCDDn) remain.123 The sentence was carried out by means of nature and has environmental consequences. The text discloses a cosmological relationship between the moral and physical orders through a detailed environmental description of the means and effects of the destruction as a consequence of sin (the verdict in 19.13 says more than simply 'They were destroyed'). The means and effect are a cosmological convulsion, initiated in the moral order and concluded in the physical order. Summary Escape from Sodom is necessary for the deliverance of Lot's family. Both God's rescuing action and human participation prove necessary as part of their acquittal from the guilt of Sodom, because of the catastrophic nature of the convulsing of the physical world. The need for human participation in the escape illustrates that the catastrophe does not distinguish between persons. The need for God's rescuing action demonstrates that God, too, is limited when the catastrophic connection between the moral order and the physical order is joined. Judgment by cosmological consequence is not person-specific. Once the connection is made in the initiation of judgment, creation's convulsing is catastrophic in scope. Conclusions A close reading of the legal referents in Genesis 18.16-19.38 contributes to understanding the text in at least three ways:124 1.

It demonstrates how the text discloses preferred values and 'innocent' behavior, over against 'guilty' behavior that violates an 'ought not'.

123. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 477: 'Both Israelites and moderns know that human behaviors have led and will lead to cosmological disaster (flood story, plagues). The devastation of Sodom and Gomorrah and their environs offers a major instance, the depletion of the ozone layer may be another. See also pp. 476, 478-79, 473, 482, and 484 for discussion of moral order.' 124. On the omission of 19.30-38 see p. 83.

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Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative 2.

3.

The reading of legal referents shows a juridical process of inquiry and decision between competing rights and jurisdiction. The preponderance of juridical terminology is prima facie evidence for the operation of 'ought nots' in the narrative before Sinai. The reading of legal referents discloses dynamic relationships among the human physical order, the moral order, and God.

Having argued these points, a fourth may be added: 4.

The oughts and ought nots of Genesis 18-19 (and 20) are narratively and canonically (theologically) prior to the law given at Sinai. The 'law' in these narratives should be understood as antecedent to Sinaitic law.

Chapter 5 A CLOSE NARRATIVE READING OF LEGAL REFERENTS IN

GENESIS 20.1-18: THE CONFLICTS AND RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING SARAH IN ABIMELECH'S TENT

A close reading of legal referents in the narrative of Genesis 20.1-18 contributes to the interpretation of the text in three ways. First, it clarifies the issues in the conflict among the characters (Abimelech, God, Abraham and Sarah). Who ought not do what to whom? Secondly, a reading of legal referents in this narrative discloses dissonance for the reader concerning the justice of Abimelech's payments to Abraham. It raises the question, Why does only Abimelech pay? Thirdly, the reading of legal referents discloses a dynamic cosmological relationship between the human physical order, the moral order and God. A demonstration of these three contributions and warrants for these claims form the substance of this close reading. A Close Juridical Reading of Genesis 20

From a juridical perspective, a close reading of the Genesis 20 narrative is similar to the Genesis 18-19 narrative in several ways. Both texts are replete with legal proceedings. These proceedings are signified by the logical development of the plot, individual scenes within the plot, and legal terminology.1 In both narratives, conflicts between the characters are resolved by juridical process. Further, both texts demonstrate a connection between God's judgment of an ought not in the moral order and phenomena in the physical order. The legal proceedings weave together character 1. Daube's distinction between 'legal thought' and 'law' in sagas and legends is noted. 'What is relevant is that these [legal] forms existed in popular legal thought, that they would, therefore, be practiced or at least be spoken of in everyday life, and that, above all, they would be introduced, as having legal effect, in saga and legend.' Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, p. 37.

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dialogue about what ought not be done with corresponding physical phenomena. Together the dialogue and the physical phenomena form a cosmology that is necessary to the plot and best explains its logic. 'Law' in Genesis 20 has a 'cosmo-logic'. This cosmo-logic is not separate, however, from a theo-logic. God is the one who acts, by means of creation, impressing, by physical consequence, the oughts and ought nots of the moral order represented in the text. The narratives are dissimilar in that no conversation about legal procedure in Genesis 20 corresponds to that between Abraham and God in 18.23-33. Abimelech does ask, 'Will you destroy an innocent people?' This is not, however, like Abraham's negotiation for better trial terms. It is a part of his plea and defense. Genesis 20 does present another kind of juridical conflict: conflict for the reader concerning whether justice is served. Close reading of the legal referents of Genesis 20 will show how the narrative both raises and partly resolves juridical issues by a focus on the following concerns: (a) How does the narrative disclose oughts and ought nots in the conversations between the characters? (b) How is logical dissonance created for the reader by the juridical actions and judgments of the text? (c) How does the cosmological relationship between the moral and physical orders serve to resolve this dissonance and clarify the ought not? Conflict among the Characters The conflict among the characters of this narrative (Abimelech, God, Abraham, and Sarah) takes place in the context and form of juridical procedures.2 In the two trials, the operative question of conflict is, Who ought not do what to whom? The related arraignments are very compact. In the first trial, Abimelech is arraigned. A formal indictment is made by God against Abimelech, based on the evidence of Sarah's residence in his tent (20.3). Abimelech responds with a formal plea of innocence and a defense for his innocent action (20.4-5). He is tried and acquitted of guilt by God, the judge (20.6). All this occurs in a single 2. 'Juridical procedure' is a form-critical category represented in the Gen. 20 narrative by two court scenes: Abimelech is arraigned by God and Abraham is arraigned by Abimelech. In each scene there is an accusation, evidence presented and a pleading of the accused. In Abimelech's case, a clear verdict and settlement are rendered. H.J. Boecker's fundamental work is summarized by Clark, 'Law', p. 126; Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens.

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173

conversation between Abimelech and God, in Abimelech's dream (20.3-7). The restoration of Sarah by Abimelech (20.14-16) is described after the second trial. The second trial is also brief. Abimelech convenes his court and arraigns Abraham (20.8-10). He issues the indictment in a formal accusation. Abraham admits his guilt and offers a rationale for his actions (20.11-13). His punishment is only implied at the end of the narrative, in the fact that Sarah has been barren and the promise of a son endangered (20.18). Dissonance A reading of legal referents in this narrative discloses dissonance for the reader concerning whether justice is served. Dissonance develops in the narrative in three ways. Firstly, there are two arraignments for the same offense: God arraigns Abimelech and Abimelech arraigns Abraham. Secondly, information concerning the physical consequences (illness and barrenness in the camp) is withheld until the closing verses. This results in ambiguity for the reader early in the narrative. Thirdly, there is a narrative and juridical gap in the payment of reparations by Abimelech (20.14-16), since he has been acquitted by God (20.6). This conflict for the reader is best resolved by understanding the cosmological relationship between the moral and physical orders. Cosmology Reading for legal referents also discloses the dynamic cosmological relationship among the human physical order, the moral order, and God. The cosmological relationship functions in the narrative to imply a prohibition of coveting the wife of another man and of adultery. This ought not is signified primarily in this text by means of physical phenomena: a dream of God that Abimelech believes to be an actual conversation with God, his men's resultant fear, a persistent life-threatening sickness, and the closing of wombs. The first sign of the ought not is given by means of a physical phenomenon, a dream. The second sign of the ought not is given by means of the dialogue between the characters that results from the dream. The third sign of the ought not (and perhaps the most convincing) is the sickness in Abimelech's camp and the closed wombs of the women. I will argue that the connection between the physical and moral orders represented by these physiological phenomena provides the reader with the best explanation of the court proceedings' outcome.

174

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative Conflict among the Characters: Oughts and Ought Nots in the Juridical Proceedings

The First Arraignment: A Dream and the Voice of God But God came to Abimelech in a dream by night, and said to him, 'You are about to die because of the woman whom you have taken; for she is a married woman' (20.3).3

The discussion between Abimelech and God is like a lawsuit.'4 The accusation is that Abimelech has taken a married woman. The evidence is the presence of Sarah in Abimelech's household. The potential penalty is death. Westermann notes that 'God's address to Abimelech is the verdict of a judge.. .in the language of the secular court. The verdict is standard and extremely short: HO "pil "You are about to die".'5 This should be understood as related to Abimelech's sickness (20.17). In this context, the qal active participle is better translated, 'You are dying'. The reader will not hear about the sickness until v. 17. Knowing that, the reader can translate the qal active participle HQ as continuous action, that is, 'You are dying because of... ' 6 The ought not against adultery is given in a court-like setting, and a legal expression is used for the penalty sought. But a special milieu pertains in the world of this text and 'courtroom'. Although the ought not is implied within a dream, Abimelech accepts the dream and its message seriously. He also considers the physical threat of death

3. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 20.3, pp. 108-109. 4. Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 178. 5. See Deut. 18.20. Properly this is a sentence or a sought penalty, though the verdict is contained in it. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 322. 6. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 213. It is translated in the NRSV 'You are about to die'. See Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 214. For the translation 'You are about to die', see W.F. Stinespring, The Participle of the Immediate Future and Other Matters Pertaining to Correct Translation of the Old Testament', in H.T. Frank and W.L. Reed (eds.), Translating and Understanding the Old Testament: Essays in Honor of H. G. May (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), p. 66. The formula occurs in Gen. 2.17; 20.7; 1 Sam. 14.44; 22.16; 1 Kgs 2.37, 42; 2 Kgs 1.4, 6, 16; Jer. 26.8; Ezek. 3.18; 33.8, 14.

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(sickness) to have a serious causal relationship to the presence of Sarah in his house. He does not dispute the ought not which is implied, nor its physical effects. God announces that Abimelech is a dead man because of what he has done (v. 3), even though v. 6 makes clear that God knew he was innocent. Hence the announcement of v. 3 serves not as a forensic judgment, but as a matter-of-fact divine statement regarding the moral order and its effects on Abimelech... The moral order means that certain deeds have an effect just by virtue of their having happened, and people reap the consequences quite apart from their intentions or their knowledge of what they have done (a reality just as true today as then).7

Not only is the voice of God given in the text as a sign of the ought not, but the assent of the Canaanite king is also given. In addition, he believes his whole community to be at risk physically (20.4), a notion that God subsequently confirms (20.7).8 He does not accept guilt for the offense, but he does accept the implied prohibition of adultery.9 Abimelech's Defense: Character Dialogue Now Abimelech had not approached her; so he said, 'LORD, will you destroy an innocent people? Did he not himself say to me, "She is my sister"? And she herself said, "He is my brother". I did this in the integrity of my heart and the innocence of my hands' (20.4-5). rnqn p'^Da ^0 •>]iT« "ID«»1 IT1?** mp vh 'T|'?0"?«] Kin -FIN rna« KirrDrNTn Kin

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