Imitation and Politics: Redesigning Modern Germany

Preface

In January 1997 the Getman DE-i'Jews Service rc·poned that two eastern Gennan brother!> \Veardl .tssistant. The Frerucl families of Cologne ,md Wet nigerode lent profound insight into Ge1 many. West and East. Two people at hows that imitation is not onlv possible but important in political life-too important to remain invisible. It develops its claims through a stud} of institutional transfer, a J...e} mode of imitation. Institutional transfer involves three necessary conditions: first, state elites refer explicitly to a model prominent in another place; second, they tl} to identify the foreign model's legal framework and the actors that help it function; finally, these elites build a replica of all or part of the model (either from scratch or by remolding indigenous institutiom to approximate the foreign model). Policy elites allnnpt transfer when they use foreign models to change institutions in their own counU). But docs transfer worJ...? If so, b) what process? I pursue these questions in one country. Germany, and its extraordinarily rich experience with institutional transfer during rwo watershed periods of reconsu·uction: immediateh after \\'orld \\'ar II. and following reunification. Both periods involved far-n.·aching effort.~ to use existing institutional de signs in new places. Dramatic examples of tramfer attempts itl\'oh ed institu tions of industrial relations and of S('condary education. Each period and policy area had cases both of effective transfer and of failure-a pattern this book seeks to explain. There are few sustained theoretical discussions of imitation. Most accounts ~.

\ tht·m' th.11 lot .Itt'~ unitauun a'

.1

tenu.tl k;uure of hum.1n tognition and ht'h.1\ior

'iu'>.lll Hlad.mo1 e. 11u .\lrtm' Alac/111u (~e~> Yorl..: ( >xt01 d l 111\t'r'i" Pn·"· 199\l). :\. tkhocietal imtitutional transfer is not only possible but ubiquitous. Of course, similarity alone is no proof of diffusion, but studies that relate the copying of

legislation, down to evtoe. < .g.. '>Juatl Dodd , "Dr1Ju,in n h l'rt·dit 1.1hk." ,\ mn tran .,,.,.,/ogrral lln•in•• :.?O ( 1!165): :l'l!!- 102. 12 Th e fi"t of tlww " " ' .l·ll l.. \\all..t·t \ ..eminal .u tick, "Tht' Difhl\ion of lntl

If Montcsquieu's "good Legislator" seeks to change her society, perhaps she will look abroad f'or inspiration: this is the premise of' the policyborrowing approach. 17 Gove1mnents, argues .Jerold \\'altman, an: "like any other human organization .... national governmcnts, beha\ing like business

I ~•. \\rlliam 1.1ndn and Lew" '>olomon, -compubm 1 '>< hooling Lq,rislation, "Jmunal of f:ronomtr lfi11111 \' ~~2 ( 19n): 5'1-!J I. 16. \ncl in manv cases tht·v lit an impl itit ~ociallht'or 1 that onh "!.: Chatham I lnu-.e. 1!193), H3-Yi.

10

Studying Imitatwn

RMAN\

of new agent!> of politics. In order to show this, one often needs to look beyond the state and bt.•yond polic;.

Trn. INSTITt

I'IONAL TRANSH.R APPROACH

Sophisticated rumors too thin to serve as alternative explanations and bodies of theory that acknowledge the phenomenon of imitation but neglect to unravel the workings of the process reveal a clear need for a new approach. This book, unlike the convergence literature, Mudies imitation directly rathet than as an epiphenomenon of modernization processes. Contrary to the dif~ fusion literature, it emphasizes political choices along with structural variables. And unlike the poliq-borrowing approach, it analyzes borrowing by social as well as bun·aucratic actors, without taking the constitution of those actors as fixed and stable; it thus subsumes the phenomenon of policy borrowing by moving beyond the policies themselves to understand imitation among the actors and within the institutions that generate, implement, or codifY the policies. But what can the institutional transfer approach explain? Broadly, two outcomes arc of potential interest. Most obviously, perhaps, one could inveMigate how well the actors attempting imitation accomplished their aims. When has imitation been "successful," with success defined rclati\'e to the objectives of the original advocates? The anS'.\'ers could !>peal.. directly to poliq1nakers, perhaps even helping them avoid costly mistakes. A sustained research agenda using this metric might even improve the quality of governance if policymakers could be engaged in a dialogue. Yet two serious problems disqualify this approach for my project. First, with German reunification only a decade old, final judgments about success and failure are premature, unless one yields to a temptation to compress transfer into the short-term process of setting up institutions. Second, measuring success against policymakers' aims raises tl1e questions of which policyrnakers, which aims, and at which times. In both of the historical periods considered here, such aims changed significant!\ over time. Since the actors prO\ide no clear and stable standards against which to measure outcomes, analysis cannot center on the question of succcss.27 Instead, motivated b" an appreciation of the complexity of social change and the frequency of unintended consequences, I choose to focus on the jJf'rjor mance and persistmrl' of transferred institutions. My judgments about performance do capture benefits to the proponents of transfer (as in a "success" ap ~7. It is tkarh tl'dul to 'JX".tl ol "htilure.- hcl\\nt·J. 'Illign process ground the focus on flcxihili() and civil socit~tv. How do thest· concerns relate to the two periods in question? As will h1 :\ati~>nal Sociali~m have yet to agret: on how to diflt·fl•rrri.ttt• ht·rwt·t·n "oppo.,rtron .rnd r nr'>t.mu· or eved on "diffuse support" for the democratic svstem. recent research distinguishes between the legitimation of democrac} as a form of governance and the legitimation of its constituent institution-;. 111 The legitimacy of a democratic system can remain high even through long periods of poor institutional performance. Constituent institutions, however. appear to acquire and sustain legitimacy only when the system remains unpolarized and the institutional performance is strong. This finding is important because it invites a consideration of whether transferred institutions depend on more than just performance to gain acceptance. One can say with confidence that West German institutions have gained legitimacy f>ince 1945 (though it is too early to gauge its durabilitv in a nonCold War setting). Polls show that both the democratic system and the constituent institutions of West Germany gained acceptance over time: a composite "trust index" more than doubled from 21% in 1950 to 44% in 1984, and a "support for democracy index" increased from 35% in 1950 to 86% in 1987. Although data on performance do not go so far back, the percentage of respondent'> who said German democracy "works well" rose from 60% in 1973 to 75% in 1987. 41 Even Daniel Goldhagen's controversial denunciation of the historical pathologies of German culture suggests that antidemocratic sentiment has been almost entirely overcome in the FRG. 1 ~ Gauging the legitimatjon of new institutions in eastern Germany since 1990 is trickier. There is ample evidence that dissatisfaction is high. especially with the deep economic slump. In 1997 almost 25% of eastern Germans said the GDR system was better than the FRG system, indicating a strikingly high level of general discontent. Possible explanations for such \\idespread disgruntlement include, first, the idea that economic disappointments have been generalited to a range of other questions (though eastern Germans seem eminent!) willing to make precise distinctions and arc not given to blanket appraisals). A second idea is that the cultural values of eastern Germans arc simply different from those of western Germans (the Berlin newspaper TAl recently reported that only 16% of eastern German respondents thought reunification had brought increased freedom of opinion). Third, eastern Germans may simply be deceiving opinion pollsters; still it seems hard to write off the high vote totals- around 25%-ofthc reform Communist Pany of Democratic Socialism (PDS) as merely strategic dissatisfaction. :~9.

St•t• the t•;,;,ay~ in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., 1hr Nl'w f/1\lillllumalllm in 01'f(fl · A IIIII] II\ (Chicago: Uni\'ersity of Chicago Pre,s, 1991). 10. F~t·cklick 'v\'cil, ''The Somce; and Structure of Legitimation in \\btt•tn Dclllot'lilJGNJM.

~Ioot.KX (,ERMANY

in their sample were originally from eastern Germany! H The older generation especial!} ha' been forcibly remO\ed or has voluntarily withdrawn from activity in many institutional domains. In three areas-local politics, clubs and associations, and workplace affairs- there is a huge gap between those aged forty-fow and under, who judge thei1 personal influence since reunification to be up, and those aged forty-five and over, who see their influence as very substantially IRH than before 1990." In consequence, there is a kind of skewed socialization, which, when added to hypercorporatism and artificial value polarilation, leaves the legitimacy of transferred institutions in doubt. All of this point9-60.

21

IMIIAnoN AND PoLITics: REDESIGNI~G MoDERN Gt:RMANY

more broadly and suggest that for imitation to be eiTcctivc, policymakers must focus on more than simply ufit" and "design." 1' 1 Finally, a theory of imitation should not presume a slavish adherence to foreign models, nor should it claim that institutional change emanates exduJwf'l)' from foreign factors. A concept of institutional transfer that admitted onh slavish reproduction driven entirely b~ outside forces would generate a ven small universe of caLitutiolls, ;mel ldt'a~ in liH' Comp.u ;lliH' Politi t .11 Fe onomy of lndu~trialitccl :-lations," in Compamtit•e Politin: Ratumahl). f:11ltt11P, arul 'itnutwr, t·d. \l.ul-. l11ing I iLhiMdl and Ala11 Zuckerman (NPIN(; AND NATIO'IAL INTEGRITY

Elites in :\1cijijapan ust.·d imtitutional transfer to su·engthen their society against the threat of foreign petWll at ion and the rt.·duction of national sov22

23

Embedded Imitation

IMIIAI'ION AND POLITICS: RJ;.DJ;.SIGNING MODJ;.RN GtRMANY

crcignty. 1 If elites attempt to protect their own traditions by becoming more like thol>c they fear, perhaps imitation is highly strategic. Ccnainlv, one key image flowing out of the Meiji case has been the notion of "rational shoppcrs"-polin tudv-abroad program as a windm' into the empire's strategies for institutional emulation. H1s finding"·'" that "in terms both of the fields of study and countries of sojourn, the Monbusho study-abroad program was governed by shrewd considerations for practicalit' and utili1ation vis-a-vis the nation's developmental strategies." Engineering. industry, law, and education were the most important areas of influence, and the most prominent sources of inspiration-in order of descending importance-were Germany, Britain, France, and the United States. Kashioka argued that Meiji judiciously avoided bot.h borrowing haphanrdly from a series of states and relying exclusively on one national model (as he found that former colonies tended to do). H is argument thus endorsed the rational-shopper model proposed by the Meiji elites themselves.~ A stiff challenge to his image of the rational shopper comes from Eleanor Westney's study of Mciji borrowings from Western Europe of models for police organization, the postal system, and daily newspapers. Although she docs not discuss Kashioka's study. she provides evidence that the rational-shopper concept was a tool of the state to promote acceptance of what might otherwise have appeared as "mere imitation.~ National pride led Meiji leaders to give the process a veneer of rationality. In actuality, however, J apanese that in the same pt·liod . ~51-:\5~:

Ht>rmann 1991). U: (.mmlrtjJ tin

1995). (,·"huhtr. 19-15-1990 (Hano,er: FacJ..duagt'l.

25

IMI rA'IION A'

Pou II uncertain.

TrrE FIELD

OF DR~:AMS

IN EASTERN AND

c~:NTRAL

EUROPE

The fall of Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe in 1990 precipitated a rush to determine the pathways to ma1 J...et economies and po~itical democracies. Although social science shared in the general triumphalIsm of that moment. tt was not long before caution,ln voices warned of the likely difficulties of establishing particular Westt•rn institutional forms in these "transi tiona!" societies. 7 Part of the broad('r debate about institutional change in Eastern Europe has focused on the appmpriateness of Westernstyle institutions and has featured charges of institutional fetishism and cultural insensitivity.~< For some critics Western "help" is simply a chimera. For ~xample, Stanley Katz-invoking significant formal and interpretive changes m the U.S. constitution over time and also his impression that Western "legal consultants" in East(•m Europe were offering supe1 flcial answers to serious constitutional questions-argues that outsiders can ofler little help to East Europeans in their constitution writing. In his ,;e\\, true constitutionalism is not an institutional mod(' I at all but a style of poliucs that respects law and codifies local tradition!>. He urges East European states to sift through their

fi. :-\aimark, NU.IIirllll in (,,.lllltl/1_), ·11H. Specialintion 111111111Klht• ( ounrt·"· 1!~IK)

own traditions f(>l solutions." Thomas Carothe•'>'s excellent study of U.S. democracy-as5i'>tance programs in Romania also criticizes efforts to promote particular institutional designs. suggesting "openness~ as a more appropriate goalY' As correctives to the superficial and short-term institutional hucksterism of many visiting experts, these cautionary views have much to recommend them. Yet to put Katz's own point in a different light, emphasizing the value of respect for law presupposes laws worthy of respect. Particular positive values indigenous to the region need institutional homes if they are to prevail in the long run over other indigenous values to which they are opposed. It is ob\'ious that then· i'> no reason such institutional schemes must come from outside the socicl) yet clear enough that tlwy might. But seeing imitation as a struggle blurs th:

Rr.or.siGNIN\.

l\·1ouutN

Gt:R"IANY

ern countries. encourages these governments to engage in act!> of "kgislative appmximation." Such approximation \~ill give them institutional and policy '>tructurcs compatible with those of the EU in policy areas from agri('u)turc to \aim· addt•ct taxt•s (VAT). Phare's task is to "concentrate on building Mate .md non-state institutions and organizations critical for the functioning of ademoet a tic, marl.. t.·t-oriented system." 11 \1ore informally, Pharc offici Ill'\\ laws but also to develop competent implementation.'~ The problem is that Ph are's exhortations to build actors capable of enforcing new laws are buried in laundry lisLs of institutional designs that would be consistent with EU mt.·mbership. Disconcertingly, these EU documents often cast the creation of actors to enforce compliance with the new rules as another in a long series of essentially lfrhniral tasks. 11 This complicated interplay between foreign designs and th involve imitation of institutions that exist elsewhere; others spring from an idcal-t\pical "Washington comensm" on economic policy or simply ask the borrowers to cut back -;orne ongoing practice." Even \\ithin the context of conditionality, institutional imitation is rarely the sole modality for institutional change, since it is so fraught with spnbolic and practical risks. Like many other cases of imitation. conditionality has a political context that mixes coercion and choice. As the financial and debt crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s accekrated, the two major multilateral institutions turned toward a new kind of knding often described as "policy-based." In contrast to the traditional "proj\-ith an environment marked by significant private capital flows, the end of the Cold War, and increased democracy, some scholars saw the era of conditionality as on the decline. JK But recent financial crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil soon led to a new wave of conditions.''' Does conditionalit\ work? It appears that the changes achieved have been modest. relative to the asprrations of the multilaterallenders. 2" Loans to address immediate balancc-of-panncnts problems seem especially ill suited to generate incentives for institutional changes over the long term. 21 Yet according to one large studv, despite many variations in different national

16. On encb aud mc·an,, "''' Joan \ki\Cm .mel '>u•phanie Fglinton, Global Goal1, Ctmtmtw111 .\/mr11 (\\'; 1\hingtun, D.C.: 0\l't>ol'il' Dllitlll'\lt'Wl'd 111\"on.U1on Ill face pressures, typologiting those pres.\ures is, at this early stage of research on imitation, analytically much less useful than pursuing regularities across the great variety of situations where imitation is used. Second, the distinction between voluntarist imitation by a sovereign actor and imitation forced upon a subordinate actor is vulnerable to the objection that overlapping authority often makes the sovereign-subordinate distinction unconvincing. More fruitful are simple judgments about whether motives for imitation come primarily from external pressure or from within a society.'"' As a first step it is important to distinguish between imitation under occupationwhere foreign soldiers influence or indeed make political choices-and that conducted by indigenous state officials (who may still feel enormous pressure from foreign armies, IMF officials, interest groups. or voters). The reason that external-internal pressures deserve analytical priority lies in the hypothesis introduced earlier: state policy elites may well depend upon existing actors in civil society to make transfer effective. If this hypothesis proves fruitful, there arc good theoretical reasons to expect that those linkages to civil society are of a qualitatively di(I'erent (and more problematic) order for occupying armies. But although the formal authority to launch imitation is important, many institution-building processes arc so complex that mere orders can hardly secure the intended results. For example, in both the periods studied in this book, shifts in sovereignty led to shifts in processes ofrmitation. The U.S. and British occupation forces wen· often unable or unwilling to bluntly impose

their own institutional designs on the Germans. As the Allied forces-which beg-an the occupation \\ should be re~ohed through recourse to property rights or to ~ome form of mediation. In all these arenas, processes of imitation arc bound up with issues or contestation and control. \W1id1 Phmomena AfJfJear l\orth Imitating?

Objects of imitation can be located in the realm of the state, society, or commerce and at both formal and informal levels. As the simplest wa} to unpack this t·angc, I limit the ca'>es in this book to focus on institutions having a legal basis. This means that I auempt no systematic analysis of the informal norms present in all "organizational cultures." beyond making ewry effort to note informal practices that directly shape the functioning of transferred in'titutions. 111 Moreover, I include only fonnal institutions of the state (school \tructuies) and sodcty (industrial relations laws), thus excluding the commerciallevcl of firm-to-firm imitation of business practices or technologies.:11 The bencf1t of using the concept of institutional transfer to explme period~ of large-~calc societal transformation carrie' the price of limiting the focus to

30. Rit hard Scott. "l IIJMLking ht,tiwtional.-\q{HIIH'IIh ," in I}., ' ' "' bHiliiii1111WIHm "' Orgam w.•ht·r Powell and P.nol Oi\Ia~:gio (Chicago: t IHH'r.it\ ot ('lritago Pr('"· 1991). 31. Tlw ckliniti1e worJ.. on te('hnolog'l uam.fer lt' no,um E1ereu RogNs, 'fl:D POLJJJCS:

Rt m

'>IGXJ:>:G 1\loot.RJ'

formal institutions. But this limitation is strictly practical and not theoretical; imitation of informal institutions cries out for further anahsis, as docs more theoretically informed investigation of finn-level imitation. ·• I also focus on the constitution of actors by looking at rules for defining the acu.~ptable forms of soda I organiLation and the boundaries for their spheres of action. Put simply. just as institutions help suunure politics, actors help structure the institutions, and this proccs~ in turn shapes actors in profound ways. Perhaps two brief examples (covered in detail later) can suggest what I mean. In post-World War II German\, Allied-German refmm struggles in industrial relations not only turned on issu('S of what unions rould do but also turned into a dispute about what unions were: agcnt..s of economic bargaining, or agents of political democratiLation. And in eastern Germany today, wlwn works councilors make IMndshal..c deals with the managers of their firms to disregard supposedly binding wage contracts, the practice weakens not only formal collective bargaining agrcement~ as such but also the collective actors who pursue them. Actors can change themselves even a-; they structure institutions, and since transfer so compresses processes of institutional change, it is an excellent van tagc point from which to study this interaction. How Does Tmnsfer Pro((w/?

Within the concept of institutional transfer, three final distinctions are needed, corresponding rough!) to breadth, depth, and intensity of imitation. The first distinction is between wholesale and piecemeal transfer; the second, between exact transfer and the functional equivalent approach; the third, between continuous intc1 action and l.ingle-moment u ansfer. Each pair f01 ms a spectrum oflogical possibilities, and an attempt at transfer may lie anywhere along each spectrum, making logicallv possible rnany permutations of the thH·c. Some combinations seem much more likely th of communication. Of interest since German reunification,

:l!i. Ct•t ht-World \\'ar II Ct•rrnanv. Bcrond the hor rihlt- cost in civilian and rnilit.u y deaths, the llnitl'cl States had spt•nt mort• than 45% of its (;!)I> on the war eU"ort. and Hr itain an even gr et Get man go\'ernment) ; in both education cases the formal

40

41

Ero11omic Cot'n 11ance

CHAPTER THREE

Economic Governance: Models of Industrial Relations after 1945 We are the sum of all the pt•oplc \\ ho\·c in\'aded

u~.

-DA\'ID EDGAR,

PeniHo\1

Until 1945 the de\'dopment of German economic institutions wa., dominated not by invading powers but by struggles among German workers, managers, owner~. and states. Could foreign models have an appreciable impact on structure~ as long established as tho~c of German industrial relations in the m_id-twenticth century? They could indccd. 1 Occupation forces staffed by Amcncan and British union officials used their own traditions of economic organization to check the ambitions of German unionist fot "economic democracy" and also to challenge the autocratic structures and practices of German employers. Some allied efforts merely reinforced "lessons of Weimar" ah cady \\idclv held bv German elites (sec the Dnttsdu Arbt'itifront and RichtungsgewPTk~chaftm cases below). Elsewhere, howe\er. crucial, effective Allied interventions did shape the resulting structures and practices (the choice for strong industrial unions and tlH' matter of\odetermination), though in some domains. strenuous Allied inter\cntions either had only modest resulh (antitnt!\! policy) or failed (cham bets of commerce). Yet even where intervention was effective, German industrial relations re-

I. And no1 ouh in iuclu,trial relation,_ Rccenl w01 ks in C1'1111an histoliral ~chola"hip cmpha,ltlllg AI heel dlorL> to lt•,hapc Gt'llll.tnv and Lt·lm..tn emul.ttion ofl 01 eign practin·, ,11 t' Axel '>< lulrlt and \rnold Sn\l>tld.. t•tne centtal in the choice of new an angements. Abstract institutional models blend spatial and temporal variation; they suggest ideal tvpes, and occupation officials used such abstract nwdt+• to 11arrO\\ the initiall\ wide range of organizational forms considered b} the Gnmans and to promote some initially unlikely winners.'· In establishing policies for their respective zones and, after 1947, for the combined C.S.-British zone, the Allies often used functional equivalence models. They did not insist that Germans adopt an entire foreign mdustrial relations ~>ystem or even copy exactly any one piece. But they constantly invoked the broad outlines of their own national practices in ways that bore directh on the choices of German actor\. For example, the Allies' pn·ferences for the fundamental form (decentralit.ed) and function (wllective bargaining) of trade uniom profoundly affected the outcomes of intra-German struggle,. Furtl1er, their experience with corporatist regulation dming wartime led both Allies to try to convince German employers of the benefits of accept in!{ labor as an equal but infonnal partner in broad tasks of economic regulation. This chapter launches the empirical exploration of effecti,•e transfer, which I link to social organization and political flexibility. Jt is clear that the Allies could build on a civil society trying to become more active in the wake of ;'-\;ui p
no

;'Ct'IIHan

rnodd" in cltht'l practicc

nmrt'ptif,n .

4'3

01

IMI rATIO"' AND Pou nc'>: Rt.JH.S IG:-IINed private chambers with voluntan membership seemed both alien and dvsfunctional. Once the Allies had dra\\n certain lines, the~ were often willing to usc their authoritv to veto all German efforts to cross them-even the ellons of dcmocraticall} dected German governments.'• Yet the Allies augmented their functional equivalence techniques with a willingness to listen to the institutional visions of German actors when it came to implementing these functions. Thus, the mmns of pursuing certain institutional ends were regarded by both occupation forces as relatively open. Both Allies were also aware of the possibilitv that institutional functions could be circumvented at the implementation stage. and both monitored implementation carefulh. Yet for the occupation forces, 'igilance in oversight had always to be balanced by concern for supponing the efforts of German democrats, around whom at least part of the new Germany could be built. From the Allied perl>pectivc the dilemma was that the "good Germans" often wanted bad institutiom. And the occupation gove1 nmcnts rarely gave ground on the broad functional ends tl1ey desired. Sometimes (as in industrial unionism) they prevailed; in other cases (such as antitrust policy) they fought mostly in vain until well after the founding of the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, flexibility marked the Allies' attitude toward means if tllev could find German panners with whom they could agree on the pursuit of certain institutional ench. This issue matters more gene• allv because to the extent that polic)Tnal..ers' designs for institutional tramfer arc not self-implementing, they run the risl.. that social actors powerful enough to build upon can also steal the design /c)) their own purpose~. I treat the military governments (MGs) of the United States and Britain as prisms through which to view and understand occupation policie:.." Their 4. The Amt>rir.rm oltt•u mcd poll\ to gauge how much d~o~ngt· clwv could push the {;t·rm;m~ to pt. Sec Rit har rl Men iJC. Ormonal) Imposed: lVi. Omtfmlitm Potu; and the CPn11m1 Pub/u, 19-15 -19-19 (1\'c" 1-l.rwn: Y.rlt- llnrvcr>it~ Press. l\lY5). · 5. For exarnpk. \dwn the sC;IIe of He~sen trit>rl to \mint 1\\ clw rime t ununl nflicer' of thc ot nr·

44

Hronomic Governance

fficer!) were the policy elites who attempted institutional transfer. Of course, :am MG decisions about the organization of industrial relations were tal..en ~n i~structions from their home governmenL'i, and U.S. policy toward German) was the obje and unforeseen German initiati,·es. In this context the functional equivalent approach was more a tool used to respond to the developing facts than a prescriptive \ision. In both :\fanpower Di,isions many key officials were on loan from the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). the U.S. )Jational Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) and their affiliates. This meant that pragmatic judgments about the acceptability of German ambitions were made by those who knew a great deal about their own labor traditions but relatively little about German ones. The Allies struggled to explain how their own industrial relations traditions might be useful in Germany. Both ~1Gs tried to mini mile the public relations problem of ~eeming to impose foreign institutions, aware as they were of Gcrp)ing armie, \H·r t• ·" tll.rllv Ill plat t• in the sumnwr of I q n. ~I L\l F had occn dissoherl. Bv virlllt• of thc rwt>d loa un,minun ;unong the four All it>>. tht• \( \ . though che de jurc gm t'rniiH'IIl of Ct-rmam, wa' eflt·n"d' hlo< keel for long stretchn of tinw; 'lT (.untlwr 1\fai, Drrallwrle Koutwll· rat inl>rullrh/mul (\lunidr: P. Oldcnbourg \'c:rlag, 19\1!"1). 7. A >ummh Polrn toward' C:crmam \ Rolt• in ~ ur opt·. 1945- 4Y.- in Rno11•lt1u1im1 m Po!/· Hllr lJf'TJIW11_), ed. Tuaawr (Oxlorrl: Berg. I'IINl 9. \lrrh.td Fit htt·r , /!. \fll:lltll{\lllfiCht und (~"*"'"'Jtr~~ lutl.llhl'llklrwg 1111d Anu't'lldrmgdn l '\ . l"U'f'rit,drajl•fJUitttk w J>rul\• 1./mu/, 19-1-1--18 ( Opl.ukn. ( ·t·rm.rm: \\'e,tdcubcher \'erllllschlmul. /945- /8: 1lrlwnkanclet Prt·"· I \li6).

51

IMI fAfiON AND

Pou ncs:

R.t:o.t:SIGNI.Ntt·d in ~amuel !.iss memo. n.d. (prohahh '\on·mbt·t l~ll.l), (.t'Ot).tt' Meany \r· t lm n, Um. 12. lolckr 04: I, 2. Papers of the CJO lnternation.ll .VI.Ii" D11 i'lon, Rn••·l."wg i11 tlrr \\nmnr Rrp~tbhlc. /9241111 1930. 2 not de~\ thar ""ne \\orl.ns ll after the war.''' FritJ. Tarnow was probably the strongest supporter of the conversion of the DAF into a trade union organizaLion, having begun the discussion as early as 19:~9 in Sweden. But this and his latet variantfl \EF might ha\1' .u ted a reformed [) U 'll ucuu t' until tlw \loJ~t~uth ,llJ PI;Ul mack "'• h ,, poht' umhinJ...lhlc·. ·,o '>t this "lesson" kat ned bv some Weimar labor leaders about the cost~ of division and therefore unwilling to accept ,\ reformed DAF. In the D.\F case the weight of Allied authority was significant, yet Allied reliance on any sort of "functional equivalent model" remains unclear. In order to sec the real significance of transfer, one must back away from the OAF tree and look at the labor forest. The three most important Allied influences on Germ.u1 union organizations were the limitation of unions to collective bargaining functions, the choice of industrial rather than unitary stmctures, and the proc(•durcs adopted for union organization. Anglo-Arne•;can models and l\fC influence were important in all three decisions. The end of party-affiliated unions did not mean that trade unions wanted to end 1heir political aClivi ty. Yet although the large nHyority of German trade unionists \n·n· committed to some form of economic democracy, the Allies propost•d fit it lv strong divisiom between economic and political activitie~ and rejected 'lwcific attempts to "ckmouati.le" economic relations. Allied policy encouragNiunions to focus all their organi.rational efforts instead on collective bargaining, which, as AFL internationalists such as Irving Brown constantly claimed to European labor leaders, had secured for American workers the higlw!>t living standard in the world.-·:1 Kc(·nan expressed this policy in

;1 i-publi• 1,11ion like: tht· in

·''"'
PouT I< '>: REDESIGN IN b\ economic strength rather than by legislauon, which had been the practice in Germany for many years, the better it will be for the working people. B\ the old method, they were dependent more on the passage oflaws than on their own ability to achieve improved working conditions, higher wages and every day [sic] functions of trade unions."~ In addition to the material benefits of collective bargaining for workers (secured in the United States as a right almost two decades later than in Germany), New Deal and wartime American experience with collective bargaining suggested its value in stabiliting wages and maintaining purchasing power.'•'• The same concern with protrk: Douhkdm, I !150), 2!18. After the end of "ag1or l'mom. eel . .Joan Campbe-ll (\\e;.tpor t, Conn .. ( Ph.D. diss .. l lniversll\ of 1 f1bingen. 1999).

64

ii. !\.l01timer \\olf mc:mo to.J. H. llilldring. febn~designed to have control of union finances and even to pa\ all the full-tinH' employees of the subordinate unions out of its own budgt·t. :--:either principle proved unshakable, however: four unions negotiated successfully for e' cmptions to the polin of central financial contwl. and at lea~t two other small uniom. hired their own oflicials because of concerns that the cen tral organitation was neglecting their sector's needs. A similar confrontation \\ith diflir ulties inherent in unified unions occmred in \\'l'u ttemberg-Baden, when ·. 1)\ the time of the firM Land-w1de conference in Dt>cembcr 1946, the cenu·al organizational authority had been so much rcllhuffied to the advantage of the industrial unions that only one-third of the funds were still flo\,ing to the center.'~• Starting in 1946, with the end of its internal dispute. O~fGCS plus AFL and CIO officiab offered strong and constant support for industrial unionism and material support in the form of newsprint and ~care pIIr·<pom/rll: trinions on union organitation. A long as unit.u' umonism remained the guiding principle. few new unions were allowed, and man) C'XI'>ting ones were disbanded. Bockler. KarL and man} others "ere confrontc·d with the possibilit' that insisting on a particular organitation would mean that the movement simph could not go forward. The other key MG tool turned out to be the Trades Union Congress. In the fall of 19!5 the TUC, to that point a peripheral participant in u ade union 1 policy, wa~ approached about going on a "mission" to the British t.one.~ T he MG ol~jenive was to convince TUC officials that German prcfen·nhing a policy of industrial unionism that looked \'l'l') diflerent fmm the predominantly craft-oriented British svstem. Yet the verv ambiguity of n.nional models of industrial relations wa'> used b' the British to sugge'>t that the\ had faced many of the same issues as the Germam and had found a superior form of organization. One official's criticism of Albin Karl's appeal !or the unitary union acknowledged centralism's temptations even fm the TLC 'et urged Karl to resist them: In the [mi.,-.ion\1 t'll.pc·nt•nn•, a hi.·a,ih centraliLed organization ine,'itably be· cotll~'' btHcaucran. Tht• Bt itish Track~ Union Congress fought bureaucracy in thi~ counu \ during the Wchmidt, [)ip \1,/mulnlr' ,\r~tmdltllll~. II. Hh. Quoll·t· "~\\ orb mun('il,, wdific:d in \(. \ l.:tl\ 22 of April 10. 1946. and bitterly ('ritid7t'd b\ both umon~ and 1\orl.s ('Ouncih '"a IH'.1lenmg of l.lb. The Jaw on works council~

finall' pa2 '''" I.u \\t'}/;tlwjH' c·cl I I.u1' \101 K' calculations to the meath of coexistence with the Smtet~. With the on upation forces thinking much more about promoting German and European economic recovery, employers saw less and less need to sts. At the 'ame time th,lt 0~1GUS disallowed formal codetermination. it continued to pmmote informal contacts along the lines of the social partnership widely thought to have played an important role in wartime America. Indeed, what Charles Maier has termed the "politics of productivity" established a larger policy framework for the issues of institutional redesign pursued by the Allies. w 7 A joint statement of the American and British military governors to both em plover associations and unions emphasi/IIIHI,Hiom ol .\met iGIII Economit l'oli.

!

75

IMITATIOJ\ ,\1\ll

Pou ncs:

REDESIV'1h. F..u lit•t. tlw hau on tw"· in 1 1 1nlllll'lll in Ct•t nMill h1 t\Jllt'tte'> associations-had control over who qualified to open a bus1ne,s. Tlwse German busines) ; Rateen Sallv. Cla.Hicall.rbfcralinn am/ lntl'rllnltonal r.rmwmtc Ol!ln ( I ,UtHlon: Routkclgt•, I ~l of comnw•n· toward stricth· private and voluntarv organitation. British and American \1{~-. both sought to do these things. The Alhes tried to end the business organitations' influence over occupational freedom and to promote competltton among "free organizations~ for member firms, ratht•t than allowing the organitations to di,ide up member firms ( just .ts the member firms divided ap markets). In the most important statement of thest· dlorts, U.S. MG Rt·gulation 13-120. the principles of functional equi,alenn.· were evident. According to the "basic views underlying MGR 13-120," OM GUS personnel, hoped to prevent business organizations from having public law status, t•xercising "governmental powers," or prohibiting new entrants into their occupation. 1:11 Y(·t a gulf remained between the dominant American and German conceptions of the legitimate functions of business organizations. For example, within eighteen months OMGUS had decreed that the German states must liberalit.e their licensing laws, which required that "persons desiring to open new businesses or to enlarge existing businesses l must) t ••uion,, 141. M.~eDon.tld . " \dwllgt•lx·"c.·rhandt·." ''· 11-13.

83

I Mil A !'ION ANI> P01 IIICS: REDESIGN I!\(; ~1001-.RN (;~.RMAN\'

ciations in the U.S. zone were making rapid headwav in organil'ing member fi1ms. Emplovn associations were initially even more restricted. and because of the limits that wage controls put on collective bargaining. tlwi1 policv function~ wc·n· carried out bv the business associations. ~ I n tlw Bnt"h /one a few c·mplm ers had 1ccci\'cd tacit ~1G approval to res tan emplme1 associations in 1945, and mam were multi-industry (as most union organil'.lliom still were at that time). The Briti~h then formally allowed single-st·oor bu-.ineo;s associ:uiom but d1s.1llowed multisector business and all emplmt'l .1"otiations. The employe• association leaders. however. argued that fusing business (lobbving) and employer (collective bargaining) assodations would replicate N~i p1 actice. Additionally. some union leaders sought a partnc1 in industry ";th whom collective bargaining could take place on social issue!> beyond wages, i.'lsue:. for which the unions had to depend on firm-level agroo\'ember 28, 1!1-17. 0-\tGl S Papt•t '· ho' 7. loldt•t ~~. 11-J-3. I IIi. D.l. \It Cut< ht·on .md Waltct ;\lathct 1 t·pmt to 1\ipattit. ~otwiths~ndi.ng the tension arising from U.S. dlortl> to promote stron .muu ust ieg•slauon, America's "cooperative "labOJ-man.tgement relations ll a~ted the at~entio~ ~f many German indusu ialists. Agaimt the backdrop of theu cou_ntq s u·ad1~onal authoritarian practices, mam German managers beca~ne ulle~ested 111 the "socially respomible m.Ul.tge•" associated \\ith ~ord1st U.S. firms. ··'~ Exposed to "Training within Indusuv" course~ offered 111 ~he U.S. wne and a flood of articles in Der Arbritgeber-the oflicial publicauon ol the BdA-advocating the diffusion of U.S. management methods. ~ctA mem_bers came to frame the debate about indmtrial relations institutiOns not 111 the Bdl's terms of "capitalism ver1>U'> socialism" but in terms f " . )' 0 soCia ISm versus community."'W At the same time, German managers were the targets of a larger American cf:ort to export the politics of productivity. As C IO treasurer J ames Care. sa1d: }

a~

The icka_ of ~imul taneously increasing production and the capacity of the moderate manager,. The rclatiYe weight of the American production model in this g• adual e\olution. however. has not been prcciscl) specified. Alongside the emerging hegemony of the American production model were indigenous German traditions of mass production, and a judgment about the relative influence of these two sources awaits further empirical analysis. 11" Nevertheless, Uerghahn's demonstration that a "generational change" inside the German employer associations led to a much less contentious form of industrial relations suggests that the American model was a constant point of reference for the moclcrni.dng faction. There is little rcason to lx·lievc that the resurgent influence of older German traditions would have evoln·cl over time in this fashion; the continued success of the Fordist production model throughout this period seems more likely to have captured German interest. But that this tr~jcctory was dependent upon actively sustaining transnational links m the business community is suggested by the comparison to labm. where the networks built in the 1940s and 1950s declined significant!) dming the 1960s. In sum. nat rowing industn.tl relations issues to economic ones helped change till' calculations of a -.ubst.llltial group of employers as to the possibilil) of accepting unions a-. equal partners in shaping the economy. Even though the concencd .\mnican attempt to gain strong antitrust legislation in Germany was umucn·sslul. the more diffuse effect of the American prolfi2. Quote·cl in ihid .. ~I I he• lull 'to' 1 ol tht• dktt' olthe'e mi\sion' renMin' to bt• "' ittt·n. .\> Luc 1\olt.m,ki h,l, ,,ud ol '"nllont. 199fi). 164. hu tilICl'S in Germany were weak and that authoritarian one.,-whether fascist remnant\in new supporters. 1

I. The Briti,h began with 111.111\ 'iru11.11 oh1c·c 11\C'\ 111 thl·i1 /Oill'. but bv the heginning ol I\H7 thn had la1gel\ IC'tllllletl of Gennan schools 50 co~~ccmed them? ·w hy did they think reading Dewey might help? I he thrce-r:ac ~ Germ~n. schools were and arc unusual in Europe in the ~~ eadth of thc1r d1rr:erenllat10n and in the duration of their u·acking. The outlines of German pnmary and secondary schools have remained remarkabh constant across the twentieth century, a lthough the names of the tracks have changed over time. For the postwar period I usc the then con temporary Ger· man terms Volksschulen, Mittelschulm, and Oymnasirn. The first, the "school of the p~oplc," had comprised since Weimar a four-year elementary phase for all clnldrcn and another four years for the great m~jority. Well over 80% Q( German youth who finished these eight years in the ~blk.Hdmle then left fuU t~me schooling; m~st ent_ered the dual system of vocational training (pan tune classes combmed with firm-based apprenticeship). and others joined t!le labor force as unskilled workers. The "higher schoob" began \\i.th grade inc: the Afllwlschulen generally for pupils oriented tm,md the professwns. and the (;''tflrltlSien for Uni\'erSil} preparation. I The ~v.is had not fundamentall} re~u-uctured this svstem, though someci th_c chang~s they did implement threatened the privikgcs of the traditional ehte.' The1r most important changes were the clof>ing of parochial schoo (Bekmntni~Jdwlen). a reduction in the number of humanistic Gymnasim (although not a reduction in their total number), and a shift of dccision-makiiC from parents to the state and from the localities to the central state. In aD these areas, Nazi rhetoric about equality and Party control of education Car t'xcccded actual alterations. But since the Nat.is had talkfd of changing Gee-

:! .. Rohlk\\tlwil'n. flt~uptlfh hml~rhu/,•, ,tnd (,)TJIIICHtwn \H"re then adoptee!"' lhfocus on ~civilian personnel" hints at the tendency to define the need fm German partners in technocratic tenn!> rathe• than in avowedly pohtKal or coalitional ones. Planners generally had a normative view of edu· c.Ilion a' an apolitical endeavor, and they were looking not f01 groups or par· tic:-. as allies but rather for enlightened indi"iduals who could be entmsted with !.pecilic tasks. Uncertain about the availabilit', of MKh individuals, \1ac· Lcish put detailed planning on the back. burner. and the State Deparunenl developed the Long Range Policy Statement for German Reeducation. or S\\').ICC 269/5. In essence, this statement proposed to delegate maximum educational control to the Germans, foreseeing only a minimal and rapidly n •ceding control function for U.S. occupation forces. By the eve of occupation both the War Department (implicitly) and the State Dept'gan allm•ing pcnio 11 ,J1 h. 111 nc·d tearhc·rs to 1 t'tllt 11 to their job~. By Julv I !l4H, I I ,000 of the 12,000 1\av.n i.cn tc·ac hc· 1 , 01 iginal ly ban nt·d hacl lt'ttunnl; Wt' Herbert Schott. /)ir .\mnilmnn alllltlfii:IIIIK\IIIIIIhl 111 H'tm.l!11rK, J9.J5-! 9-I9 (\\iuthlllf.:: Fcc·undc· ~tainfrru•ki,cher Kumt unci(; .. ,< hi1hu·. lll'i!.">), IIH 1•1. \II SPD ~chool rt·fotm pi.HJ\ Wt'lt' ptedicated on large program' to tr.cin "nt•w lt',lt ht·t, .. (,\1'11/linn). :lO. Wahc·t ~1i1hlhamen,//esseu, /<J-/5 1'150 (Fr.cnf..lnct· lnwl . l'lH">). IIi"> .

104

from the state governments, because "in tl1c process of reviewing and a proving su bel\\t•t·n \met it an ;ucd Cc·c ncan J:chuat l 0, 1947, when Clay st~ nt_ out a. memo requiring ea.ch Lm~d's . .Ministry of Cultme to submit by Apnl 1 a list of general education oqJeCtives and by October 1 a more detailed long-term plan for achieving those aims. 11 The UindPr were to submit plans for a common school in which different kinds of schooling merged in comerutive fashion rather than pursuing separate and exclusive tracks. Taylor and his deputy, Richard Alexander, fleshed out Clay's instructions in a series of strongly worded speeches at the Ministries of' Culture in Bavaria, Hc~scn, and W(irttemberg-Baden. 11 They railed for a six-year elementary t:ducation followed by a common higher school in which a six-year academtC track would exist alongside-wherever possible in the same building. Tavlor stn·'>sIlllt'd 0~1< ;Ls in the rt· conHtH>Il \thoo l' m.tint.tirlt'd \\t'll hnond tht•e nd thl' ''"' ph.l\t' oltht \runitau ocurpatio n, .mel t'\t'ntht•tt'lht· """"'' h.ull.u).(t'h tcllullt·rl lhH·t· tr ;u k. \\\tt'm 1>1 lht: mid · l950s. t:!. Tluon , "'idltllrt>lotm," 95. 1'1. I· xlt·ndt·d hom the original july I dt>adlitH' . 111 \\

II. '1;1\lot had n·n uitnl Alexander. his old rnt•utor horn Columbia. ,\lt·xanclt• r MltH' l'.tvlot '" ht·;td of lht' tR.t\ in April I 947, wht:n ..tlor ts lai lt'el to lind -'Oillt'Oil~). ,-,:1 !i I. Cl.11 \ lllt'IIIO rdlt'tlt'd ,, dt•ti,tc>n to lollol\ tlw \ti"io11 Rq>ort\ implicit rt:conlfllt'lld;uioll 10 fort t' tht· vot.lliollal 'thooJ,, " nllt •t t·d tht· thrlll." 100.

12!1 -:l~.

/08

109

Education after the mzr

IMI rATION AND PoLITICS: Ru>Jn~itivc

to the wishes of the people; and the teaching of civic tt>sponsibility and dcmocra9 through both the curriculum and th01 tam objective. There are manv wavs in \\hith German ecluc,IUon could ht· "improved," in the sense of being made more dlint•nt ot more effective wtth rek• ence to other educational goals. ~1any of the'c way' must seem almmt painfully ob\ious to the American educatot \\'a\S, f(Jt example, of "improving" the teaching of arithmetic, or of home rconomits, 01 present practin·' in vocational education, physical education, school building planning. rhrr 1"{"\{'II

. 1111

Lmbau " \chute md Grgmwnrt I, •

•

1

l:l6. Quoted ttl flrron . ..Schrrlrdorm." r:lh .

115

1M II AIIO"' A:-ID POLl"! ICS: REDEStt:NtN(, Moll~.RN C~. HMANY

r.·duration after the Hfcu·

Wells, declared that the first three years of the occupation had focused far much on institutional change and had been "m01 e or less devoid of an cational and cultural relations effort."''' For Crace, "tlw tnw reform of (,et man pt' ople will come from ''ithin. It will be spiritu.ll and moral. t\pes of sdwol organization or structure. for c·xample. are of less· to the futme of Germany and the world than'' hat is taught. how it is .tnd h\ whom it is taught."'·" Grace immcdiateh threw himself into building up the ntlttu.tl exchange programs between Germany and the Lnited States for whtch Wells had laict tlw foundation.''' Clay. wary of the German reaction to school reform and now co minced of the possibilities of exchange progt am ... soon ended the school reform initiatives.'" Thus, although Grace had a Mrong interest in American influence on German education, his mphasis on the cultural ex change approach marked a dear shift away from the functional equivalent approach to institutional transfer which had characterit.NI the previous two years of dTons. If their effectiveness is difficult to measure, the exchang. i5. l..ange-Qu'""""~i . Xm111dt11111K. 200.

117

IMr I'AI'ION AND PouTrcs: R~oEsrG:-fo•m." 104. 7H. Ibid .. 117. 79 l All\ \(111 , Uf[orm. 9H.

118

Edttcation afta tlu> War

. ·onalists accused these primary school teachers of being "collaborators tra dttl ccupation force~ ancltherdore · · · 1at " h er Ian d ."'"' Th e·Astrallors toth err 0 · of th · I S\'Sthe tra d.ruona . e. or Hirrher School Teachers in Hessen defended S()Clauon n • . . . . . historically proven and brologrcallv natural: far from us excludmg tem. das : dasse-. (clas-.es whose ven exrstence · ·m th c "a · ke o f the . 11 of cenam chi1 1 e · . · th I ·f ·d "-ar's destruction thcv often denwd) . tlw ecl ,, '( hool1