Identity and Identification in India: Defining the Disadvantaged

Identity and Identification in India This book examines the interplay between state identifications of groups and their...

Author: Laura Dudley Jenkins

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Identity and Identification in India This book examines the interplay between state identifications of groups and their own sense of politicized identity. The quota system for disadvantaged groups in government employment, higher education and legislative bodies fails to reflect the complex interactions of caste, class, religion and gender. This book seeks to address this by contrasting official classifications with social identities as articulated by protest groups. Using empirical data including court decisions, caste certificates, census categories and contemporary interviews, the author challenges theories of identity construction and illuminates the impact of colonial and contemporary policies on identity politics. Jenkins assesses the impact of the dynamic processes of intermarriage, religious conversion and migration on the process of official classification. This in-depth study, combining primary research with theories of identity from a number of different fields in humanities and social sciences, will appeal to scholars interested in identity politics, Indian politics and Asian studies. Laura Dudley Jenkins is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, USA.

Identity and Identification in India Defining the disadvantaged

Laura Dudley Jenkins

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2003 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2003 Laura Dudley Jenkins All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Dudley Jenkins, Laura. Identity and identification in India: defining the disadvantaged/Laura Dudley Jenkins. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Social classes-India. 2. Caste-India. 3. Group identity-India. I. Title. HN690.Z9 S6352 2002 305.5 122 0954-dc21 2002031698 ISBN 0-203-40193-X Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-40837-3 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-29680-3 (Print Edition)

Contents

1 PART I

Acknowledgments

v

Identity and identification

1

State simplifications

21

2

Adjudicating identities

22

3

Official anthropology

40

4

Caste certificates and lists

66

5

Categorizing and counting on the census

87

PART II

Political complications

106

6

"Backward" Muslims and "Scheduled Caste" Christians

107

7

Hindu nationalism and selective inclusion

122

8

Class, classification and creamy layers

136

9

Women's reservations and representation

150

Conclusions

169

10

Appendices Appendix I: Appendix II:

Government documents

182

Interviewees

209

Notes

213

Bibliography

232

Index

252

Acknowledgments

In 1990, I was headed to Delhi when my train screeched to a halt. The explanation gradually circulated through the train: Students were lying on the tracks ahead, protesting against job quotas for lower castes. Accustomed to a culture of student ennui, I decided that any policy that sparked such a reaction was worth looking into. Given ongoing American controversies over affirmative action, I was particularly interested in the insights the rest of the world might glean from India’s longstanding policies for its various disadvantaged citizens. Thanks to the many people I can only mention here, I was able to return to India several years later to carry out the research that resulted in this book. Of course all remaining errors are mine alone, but I have many people to thank for making this project possible. I am most grateful to the administrators, politicians, and activists who shared their time, thoughts and tea with me during my research in India. I thank my academic advisors, here and in India, especially M.Crawford Young, Robert Frykenberg, Ashish Bose, S.K.Thorat, Richard Merelman, Leigh Payne, and Marc Galanter. Others whose comments made me look at my research in new ways include Nandu Ram, A.Gajendran, Bhagvan Das, Barbara Ramusack, Theodore Wright and Sumit Guha. For their enthusiasm and suggestions, I am most appreciative of the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript and the editors of Curzon Press. For their monetary support and belief in my project, I thank the Fulbright-Hays program, the United States Institute of Peace, the MacArthur Foundation, and the University of Cincinnati, particularly the Taft Fund, Political Science Department, and Women’s Studies Program. For logistical and research assistance, I am grateful to the staff of the United States Educational Foundation in India and the many librarians who helped me, especially those at the Parliamentary Library, the Supreme Court Library and the Nehru Memorial Library. Fellow panelists and audience members at academic conferences have helped me to refine my thoughts, especially at the annual meetings of the Association for Asian Studies, the annual conferences on South Asia at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and two smaller workshops at the University of Victoria and Brown University. For their support in so many ways, ranging from warm

vi

meals to dynamic ideas, I owe a huge debt to Kristy Bright, Sushma Sharma, Jeanette Dorner, Brian Axel, Maribeth Kobza, Durba Ghosh, Mona Siegel, Melissa Brown, Elizabeth Frierson, Annulla Linders, Mira Seghal, Anne Caldwell, Brenda Allwardt, Scott Kloek-Jenson, Kate Graney, Manu Bhagavan, Chenyu Sun, Haimanti Roy, Sister Gemma, Chandra Mallampalli, David, Karen, Bill, Vera, Jim and Michelle Dudley, Kim and Erin Jenkins and many others. Above all, I want to thank Chris Jenkins, who helped in innumerable ways through the whole project, and little Isabelle Maya, who showed up part way through.

1 Identity and identification

Where am I to be classified? Or, if you prefer, tucked away? (Frantz Fanon from Black Skin, White Masks 1967:113) I had two surprises in store for me on 27 November 1996, as I stopped in central New Delhi to attend a political rally. The first was the unexpected opportunity to hear hundreds of men, women and children joining in a heartfelt rendition of “We Shall Overcome,” sung in Hindi. The second, even more puzzling, was the protesters’ demand to be classified as a low caste group, despite the fact that none among them was Hindu. Why would a group of people protest for a low caste status? A female student, while jotting the song lyrics into my notebook, told me that the song, familiar to me as an anthem of the United States civil rights movement, was also associated with rights activism in India. This rally over the “right” to be recognized as a low caste can tell us much about state classifications and group identities. Many current battles over rights and recognition are disputes over the state’s identification of groups in society. Reservation policies in India are a system of quotas for disadvantaged groups in government employment, higher education and legislative bodies. Like affirmative action policies in other countries, reservations aim to increase opportunities for under-represented groups. Such policies are targeted at particular groups identified by the government, but the official classifications used often fail to reflect the complex interactions of caste, race, class, religion, gender and other aspects of social identity. The protesters I saw were Christians who wanted the government to recognize that caste discrimination persists in their religious community and to include them in the lower caste category eligible for reservations. Other groups I studied argued for reservations on the basis of religion, gender or class. Can a state empower its citizens by classifying them? Reservations are based on the premise that recognizing group distinctions in society is necessary to subvert those distinctions. At the same time, the official identification of citizens, on the basis of caste, for example, has unintended side effects on

2 IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION IN INDIA

identity politics. It is important to distinguish between categories, as externally defined, and groups, as self-defined entities; yet these outsider and insider definitions do have an impact on each other. In his work on ethnic and racial consciousness, Michael Banton points out that “[g]roups are created by processes of assignment, both self-assignment and the actions of others in categorizing persons as parties to relationships that confer rights and define obligations to fellow members” (Banton 1997:13). Not only do categories influence groups, but groups may also organize to reshape official categories. In India, the most diverse democracy in the world, reservation policies for disadvantaged castes, tribes and classes have created a new arena of conflict over the official categories used to identify beneficiaries. These policies reserve government jobs, university admissions and legislative seats for citizens officially classified as “backward,” that is, members of the “Scheduled Castes” (SCs) and “Scheduled Tribes” (STs); in addition, the “Other Backward Classes” (OBCs), who previously had reservations in some states, have more recently been granted a quota of central government jobs.1 The boundaries of official backwardness remain ambiguous and contested in spite of attempts to neatly list eligible groups in schedules, an effort initiated during the British colonial period and continued after Indian independence in 1947 (Galanter 1984:121–87, Irschick 1969). The public controversy over these policies centers not just on their redistributive effects but also on the difficulty of defining the pertinent groups based on elusive concepts such as caste. The different branches of government add further complexity, resulting in a variety of approaches to defining groups, ranging from legal and administrative definitions to official anthropological classifications. Even if categorization were simple, the desirability of officially demarcating such groupings is an open question. As affirmative action programs worldwide come under fire from people advocating group-blind approaches (Jenkins 1998), I argue that what is at stake in debates over group-based policies in India and comparable policies elsewhere is both equity and identity. Whether people are identified and how they are identified by their governments have an impact on the allocation of opportunities and also on the politicization of identitybased groups. For example, the low caste Christian protesters I saw not only were demanding increased access to jobs, education and political office but also were asserting that they have a caste identity, a controversial claim that divides the Christian community and encroaches on a primarily Hindu category. Based on my study of the implementation of reservation policy categories and the political reactions they inspire, I address the central controversy over groupbased policies: Do reservation policies reinforce the very categories they are meant to undermine? This question has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, I bridge the gap between those who reject state classifications of complex identities, regardless of their political utility, and those who emphasize

IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION 3

the imperatives of group-based mobilizations and policies, regardless of concerns about fragmenting multifaceted identities. In policy terms, I expose some excessive enforcement of official categories by a government, while recognizing the social and political gains facilitated by group-based strategies. To answer my question, I consider both the institutions of the state and the political groups in society which construct and reconstruct reservation policy categories.2 This study does not purport to be a psychological examination of individuals’ identities or a comprehensive or quantitative analysis of the economic and social effects of reservations.3 Rather, it is a case-based analysis of the impact of these policies on governmental practices of identification and identity-based political activism. In Part I of the book, State simplifications, I examine the monitoring and enforcement of the classifications used for reservation policies, focusing on the various state institutions which patrol the official boundaries between categories. These institutions include the courts, official anthropological surveys, caste lists and certificates, and the census. Sometimes people fall between the cracks of these rather staid categories due to dynamic processes such as intermarriage, religious conversion, migration or other forms of social mobility, making it difficult for administrators, judges or ethnographers to classify them. Nevertheless, the state’s role as the arbiter of identity for these policies means that officials must struggle to sort out ambiguous cases. Documents and interviews with officials implementing reservations demonstrate that various government institutions continue to cram people into the ill-fitting boxes of oversimplified and often static classification schemes in ways reminiscent of colonial policies, even for the arguably benevolent purpose of advancing the disadvantaged. These policies sometimes give great weight to boundaries that are becoming increasingly blurred in practice, an unintended and negative side effect. Many policies and practices associated with implementing reservations do seem to officially reinforce the group distinctions they are meant to undermine. Yet, my examination of the protest groups mobilizing over reservations, the focus of Part II, Political complications, shows that these policies also contribute to the blurring of boundaries. In addition to the social, economic, and political advances by members of disadvantaged groups attributed to reservations,4 groupbased policies have complex political repercussions. They do not just mold complex and fluid identities into an official grid, like so much batter in a waffle maker (Guha 2001). Rather, my interviews with political activists and government officials and my review of protest group literature all show that the categories themselves have become political catalysts, sparking challenges and counter challenges to the definitions of the beneficiary groups. Through case studies of identity-based protest groups, I show how caste, religion, class, and gender intersect to create ambiguous or competing claims for reservation benefits. In addition to the social mobility of the individual beneficiaries of


reservations, cross-cutting groups are demanding changes to governmental categories or their boundaries, further undermining the old identity grid. Like the low caste Christian protesters, various Muslim, Hindu and women’s organizations are mobilizing over reservation categories, and the policies themselves are becoming increasingly complicated as individual economic criteria are layered over group-based qualifications. These continuing challenges, particularly the various politicized groups demanding categorical revisions, demonstrate that these policies do not simply reinforce the categories they are meant to undermine. All these controversies over policy categories could lead one to conclude that these policies are hopelessly flawed and futile. Yet, in the context of a policy meant to break down group disparities, the confusion over appropriate groupings is also an indication of success. In her discussion of legal disputes over racial categories in the United States, Adrienne D.Davis writes, “Categorical confusion creates ruptures in the security of our racial taxonomic structure, calling into question the practices by which we identify and label people” (Davis 1996:717). Reservation policies throw many old categories into question, as administrators and judges recognize the difficulties of classifying migrants, adoptees, and intercaste families. The various individuals and groups demanding to be added to the ranks of officially backward citizens raise valid concerns about the opportunities left for the most disadvantaged, but they also rupture the security of traditional categories. In short, I draw on case studies of the state institutions involved in classifying citizens to argue that governments undercut some of the positive effects of reservations or similar policies by using overly simplistic or inert classification schemes, which can reinforce, in an official sense, the boundaries between groups. Nevertheless, I argue that such official identifications alone do not reify or solidify identities, and they can even precipitate new challenges to ossified categories, as my case studies of protest groups demanding changes demonstrate. Bridging a rift in the theoretical literature, I build on theories critical of colonial and post-colonial state simplifications of social identities, while recognizing the utility of identity politics for disadvantaged groups. In short, I keep one foot in the hermeneutics of identity and another in the politics of alliances. This theoretical synthesis emerges from my empirical contribution, namely, documenting interactions between official identifications and identity-based mobilizations. The fact that people are challenging official categories shows that the state oversimplifies society. However, the fact that many groups facing discrimination focus their efforts on adjusting rather than eliminating official categories indicates that such categories, although inevitably imperfect, remain an amendable and valuable tool for undermining longstanding hierarchies based on caste or other aspects of identity.


CATEGORIES AND IDENTITIES I combine multidisciplinary theories about the layered, fluid nature of identity with contrasting theories about the utility of highlighting a single identity for purposes of political mobilization or public policy. My constructivist theoretical approach allows me not only to take into account the complexity of identity, which thwarts attempts to categorize people, but also to recognize the instrumental uses of categories for disadvantaged groups. A focus on the process of social construction means a recognition that identities are not fixed, but rather are constantly being defined and redefined through interactions at all levels of states and societies (Young 1993:21–5, Tilley 1997, Green 2002). Often group identities are constructed through contrasting a notion of “self” with an “other,” as in dichotomous categories of colonizers and colonized, the West and the Orient, whites and blacks, or upper and lower castes. The scholars whom I subsume under a constructivist banner emphasize the multilayered and intersubjective nature of group identities and criticize the notion that such social dichotomies and categories are natural, essential, or fixed. This general approach to identity can be found in a wide variety of literature in the social sciences and humanities.5 Although the idea of social construction has become quite fashionable, appearing in various “new” approaches such as postmodernism, the central premise—that people interactively create meanings and identities which then shape their lives—has long been recognized by anthropologists and other social theorists. As Clifford Geertz wrote, drawing on Max Weber, “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun” (Geertz 1973:5). While there is now fairly wide agreement on the fact that caste and race are constructed (or “spun”) and not natural social divisions, scholars differ in their analyses of these constructions. Some, focused on the multiplicity of identity, reject such oversimplified categories as inherently disempowering. Others retort that dismissing these categories may disable potentially empowering identity-based politics. The former school of thought, emphasizing the danger of categories, can appeal to those who want to reject categories entirely, break down the “words that build walls by labeling race and ethnicity” and allow people “to stand aside, narrate, and debate the terms that others assign them” (Heath 1995:45). According to this approach, the historically oppressive dichotomies of upper caste/lower caste or white/black must be rejected in favor of an emphasis on multiple and overlapping identities: Each individual’s identity is an amalgam including gender, age, class, caste, race, nation, region, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, and countless other facets that cannot be slotted into a particular category. A few examples of this perspective include the work of anthropologists and historians whose research underscores the fluidity and complexity of social identity and problems of imposed categories (Daniel 1984,


Metcalf 1995); other examples are certain feminist and postmodern theorists who focus on “hybridity” and the impossibility of unitary categories (Friedman 1995, Bhabha 1994, Essed 2001) and literary figures whose personal experiences and writings attest to the dangers of classification (Fanon 1967, Rushdie 1995). Some scholars are particularly wary of categories when they are used by governments in public policies. Arjun Appadurai is critical of the “officially enforced labeling activities” associated with the colonial and postcolonial Indian state’s policies. Eschewing the classification and counting of peoples, he argues that “statistics are to bodies and social types what maps are to territories: they flatten and enclose” (Appadurai 1993:326, 334). James C.Scott, examining various ways states have organized societies schematically and treated people according to these categories, discusses the disasters associated with even wellintended “state simplifications” in authoritarian situations, ranging from scientific forestry to compulsory resettlement (Scott 1998).6 Such critical work raises corollary questions: What are the outcomes when similar simplifications are used in colonial situations and, later, under democratic conditions, as in the case of reservations in India? When simplified categories used to demean or segregate become tools to undo the effects of that history, do the negative consequences of using those categories evaporate or linger? To those skeptical of official classifications, state categories seem unlikely vehicles for justice or emancipation. My research challenges blanket assumptions that such categories are dangerous but is attuned to the potential limitations and pitfalls of categorization. A second, and equally varied, group of scholars focuses on the instrumental constructions of identities, illuminating how classifications not only can be a tool of violence or oppression but also can be turned to the advantage of oppressed groups. Since a focus on the multiplicity of identities fragments any given social group, students of social movements have censured theoretical emphasis for disabling transformative politics (Handler 1992). For example, in the United States some African-American scholars criticize what has been called the “postmodern conspiracy to explode racial identity” by constantly drawing attention to the diversity within racial groupings (Fletcher 1994). Social theorists have criticized the tendency of some constructivists to give equal weight to very different axes of identity—all being constructions—and thus underemphasize the particular oppression and lack of choice associated with racism or casteism. The problem arises…when all “identities,” of whatever form, are treated as of equal social validity, so personal lifestyle preferences, such as “musical styles,” physical attributes such as “disability,” and social products such as “race” and “class” are seen as being of the same moment… The result is that fundamental social relations such as racial oppression become reduced to lifestyle choices. (Malik 1996:9)


Such a reduction downplays the unique social or political problems associated with each identity. Moreover, a single-minded emphasis on the fragmented nature of identity ignores the usefulness of reconstructing and using categories such as gender, race and caste. In order to develop grounds for resistance on the basis of gender, some feminist scholars have resurrected categories rejected by other feminists: Although feminists contend strongly among themselves as to whether the concept of woman constitutes a universal category, they must for some purposes and at some levels continue to act as if such a category indeed exists, precisely for the reason that the world continues to behave and treat women as though one does. (O’Hanlon and Washbrook 1992:154) This approach is echoed in former Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh’s defense of a reservation policy based on caste: “[I]f there is discrimination by birth, then in delivering the remedy, identification of victims of such an order can be only done by birth. So the remedy will also have to refer to birth, not because caste has to be sanctified, but…there is a practical need to refer to birth” (Singh interview 20 November 1996). In the United States, Supreme Court Justice Blackmun made a similar argument: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way.” Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 US 265, 407 (1978), Blackmun, J., concurring. Those who advocate this approach contribute to the debate on categories by retaining a practical and progressive concern with social and political outcomes, but at times they fail to fully appreciate the implications of adopting and using certain categories. Blending these theoretical approaches, I accept the potential utility of categories but also take into account the complexity of identity and dangers of oversimplification. For example, I find that even previously degraded and internally diverse caste and racial categories have been embraced as potent tools of empowerment. In India, “[t]oday something quite different is happening: the very sufferers from the system (including the caste system) are invoking caste identity and claims” (Kothari 1994:1589). A poem of lower caste unity, “Hum Dalit” (We the Oppressed), shared with me by a lower caste woman, transforms the categories of oppressor and oppressed into the compensator and the compensated. You will have to compensate


for the cost of every thing… Having opened falsehood’s curtain for the truth We will disrobe your policies.8 Thus any category, even caste, may be turned into a tool of empowerment, but categories often make blunt tools. By emphasizing her caste identity in this poem, the author downplays her gender identity and distinct experience of oppression as a Dalit woman. Adopting a category such as “caste” to fight against castebased discrimination can subsume other significant identities and result in contradictions. In India, where people are, ironically, claiming to be backward (at least in the official sense) in order to benefit from reservations, such contradictions abound. Anthropologist Dorinne Kondo notes that people may “simultaneously resist and reproduce, challenging and reappropriating meanings as they also undermine those challenges” (Kondo 1990:221). Such seeming paradoxes—embracing backwardness or recycling older categories—are inherent parts of reservation policies and politics, which reproduce yet also reconstruct certain categories of identity in the name of ending oppression. POLICIES OF IDENTIFICATION The theoretical and practical conundrum I address through my research is that people have multilayered identities; yet those who have faced discrimination may choose to emphasize precisely those disparaged identities in order to subvert more invidious distinctions through group-based organizations and policies. I find that such organizations often contest boundaries even as they rally around categories of identity. My findings challenge assumptions that groupbased policies are divisive and suggest that it is possible to develop policies that both recognize disadvantaged groups and reflect some of the complexity of identity. These findings about the potential and the perils of state classifications have practical implications for the many countries using social categories for public policies. Policies of affirmative action, promoting educational and employment opportunities for disadvantaged groups, can be found in many countries, ranging from India to Northern Ireland (on the basis of religion) and the United States (on the basis of race and sex) (Jenkins 1998, Wyzan 1990, Nesiah 2000). In addition to affirmative action, several other policies to accommodate cultural diversity depend on the official use of social categories such as ethnicity, race,


religion, gender or caste. Electoral policies drawing on such categories include separate electorates, separate districts, or proportional representation systems. Such categories can also be the basis for various forms of limited political, legal, or cultural autonomy or can be used to monitor antidiscrimination laws. Often group-based policies depend on counting people by categories in a national census for purposes of monitoring and enforcement. Two major criticisms of such official social classifications frequently arise. First, contested categories can become a new terrain for tensions. Second, the use of such categories in policies may give new permanence and political momentum to the group divisions they are meant to ameliorate. Like those who argue that affirmative action in the United States is divisive, critics of reservations in India have generally characterized these policies as an impediment to their vision of a unified Indian nation.9 Some criticized the “Mandalization” or increasing “caste consciousness” in the wake of the extension of central government reservations to more disadvantaged groups in 1990, as recommended by the Mandal Commission (Singh and Sharma 1995, Kumar 1992). Others predicted that quotas would “only aggravate social tension by deepening caste division” (Hindustan Times 9 March 1996). The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party sought to limit certain reservations by extending them only to groups embracing indigenous, “Indian” religions, namely Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism. The tradition of opposition to group-based policies extends back to Mohandas Gandhi, who, in spite of his support for some reforms of the caste system, opposed separate electorates and group-based policies for untouchables, in part due to fears that separating these groups from the Hindu fold would weaken the independence movement and the emerging Indian nation. Today groups such as the “Gandhi Caste Society” perpetuate this philosophy by criticizing both the caste system and caste-based policies (Sajwan interview 17 September 1996).10 The long-standing debate and dilemma continues: India’s group-based preferential policies have been criticized for entrenching group identities such as caste; yet they also empower members of disadvantaged communities, diminishing the limits of caste. Michael Walzer adds a post modern twist to the policy debate in his work on “toleration” and possible models of government for multicultural societies. He describes a “post-modern project” in which people “have begun to experience…a life without clear boundaries and without secure or singular identities” and respond “with resignation, indifference, stoicism, curiosity and enthusiasm to the tics and foibles” of their “post-modern fellows” (Walzer 1997:87). Philomena Essed likewise proposes moving “toward multiple, nonessentialist politics of identity” (Essed 2001:498). These are pretty pictures, yet those facing insecurity and intolerance are wary of the theoretical abandonment of boundaries in a world where certain social boundaries, even if blurry, still cut them off from opportunities. Arguments that group-based policies reinforce categories that are


not “real” tend to confound race or caste with racism or casteism.11 It is racism and casteism that affirmative action or reservation policies are supposed to counteract, and these are all too real. Acknowledging this may necessitate the use of categories for a while longer, yet must we give up on eventually achieving “life without clear boundaries”? Can policies recognize both continuing discrimination and the complexity of identity? I contemplate revisions to group-based policies by considering the variety of categories emerging from different institutions of government and by studying protest groups that both utilize these categories and challenge their boundaries. For example, some groups favor what they consider to be more scientific or objective policies based on class or economic criteria. Policy-makers sometimes combine different categories to better reflect society, as in the combinations of caste and class criteria in India. Such attempts can be difficult, as in the designation of the controversial lists of Other Backward Classes in India. Recent efforts to exclude a so-called “creamy layer,” or well off members, from the Other Backward Classes, have shown some promise, although a lack of reliable economic data complicates enforcement. India also has experience with different combinations of caste and religious categories and is facing competing demands to combine caste, class and gender considerations in legislative reservations. The periodic re-evaluation of policies and categories in India also helps to reflect social changes, but there is a fine line between adjusting policies and descending into a massive proliferation of categories for each and every possible combination of identities. Moreover, the corruption that thwarts the administration of increasingly complex policies and the political momentum that hinders attempts to revise lists are challenges that should not be underestimated. Despite these potential pitfalls, some proposals and innovations in India offer models from which the rest of the world might learn. COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS Through historically grounded analysis of contemporary cases, I consider whether the categories previously used to exploit disadvantaged groups can be used to undermine discrimination. Building on a rich body of research on the tendency of colonial states to reinforce or even reinvent various ethnic identities, I examine the contemporary Indian government’s surprisingly similar proclivities. The literature on colonial states’ involvement in identity politics documents how colonial recruitment, education, missionary work, cartography, legal codification, and ethnographic classification contributed to the hardening of ethnic, caste or racial fault lines (Horowitz 1985:149–66, Young 1994:228–36, Brass 1985, Fredrickson 1981, Marx 1998). These processes recorded identities and also reinforced them by changing the stakes associated with certain


identities. For example, in colonial India, the recording of castes in the census contributed to the formation of interest groups that lobbied census commissioners to try to improve their official caste rankings (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967). Colonial legacies shape contemporary identity politics. Fascinating accounts trace conflicts between communities back to the legacies of colonial states or discuss the wide-ranging after-effects of colonial rule on cultures and identities (Pandey 1992, Prakash 1995). Building on this literature, I demonstrate in the following chapters that some colonial practices persist in the postcolonial era. One example is a court ruling that evidence of tribal affiliation from the colonial era has more value than contemporary proof. Another example is that of administrators and ethnographers who still refer to lists of “castes” made in colonial times to codify two distinct and relatively fluid concepts, jati and varna.12 By documenting the continuing influence of historical assumptions, rules and practices, I build on criticisms of colonial states by demonstrating the continuing relevance of such criticisms in the postcolonial era. Contemporary states continue to shape social identities. Sociologist Ali Rattansi describes the social construction of identities as a three-pronged process, “involving processes of ‘self-identification’ as well as formation by disciplinary agencies such as the state, and including the involvement of the social sciences, given their incorporation in the categorization and distributive activities of the state” (Rattansi 1995:257). Colonial anthropologists and census takers were not the last data collectors to spark political responses. Michael White and Sharon Sassler, in the field of population studies, draw attention to how “issues of ethnic identification and assimilation are intertwined with the data collection mechanisms used by official agencies” (White and Sassler 1995: 470). These contemporary analyses suggest that state identifications, whether legal, administrative or scientific, continue to interact with and influence identity claims. Recognizing that reservation policies, and the group boundaries they depend on, had precedents in India well before independence allows me to consider whether current classifications for more progressive purposes are as divisive in practice as colonial classifications, which have been characterized as “efforts to render fluid and confusing social and political relationships into categories sufficiently static and reified and thereby useful to colonial understanding and control” (Stoler and Cooper 1996:11). Drawing a stark contrast between oppressive colonial polices and benevolent postcolonial policies would ignore the multiple actors and multiple motives at play in both periods. The imperatives of state building in colonial and postcolonial times may be more similar than is commonly assumed, and the Indian state’s colonial and contemporary impulses to categorize and record identities have been remarkably resilient. Crispin Bates, writing on racial theory in India, notes that “its applications were not uniquely


imperial but characteristic, much more generally, of the modus operandi of the modern, centralized, bureaucratic state” (Bates 1995:222). Whether inspired by a desire for control or for equity, or by a complex combination of these motives, official classification often goes hand in hand with centralization; simplification accompanies administration. That said, the shift to an independent, democratic Indian state in 1947 resulted in new dynamics and dilemmas as the government decided not only to use some colonial-era categories but also to create a modified system of reservation policies. When a government identifies certain groups of citizens as the targets of a policy, state identification and social identity become intertwined. Charles Taylor recognizes this “dialogical” nature of identity construction: “[O]ur identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others.” He argues that “the supposedly fair and differenceblind society is not only inhuman (because suppressing identities) but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory” (Taylor 1994:34, 25, 43). According to this line of argument, states that use social categories for policies like reservations risk “misrecognizing” some people, but the alternative, not recognizing any particular groups, may be even more damaging to groups and their identities. My research shows that groups who feel they have been misrecognized (or inaccurately targeted by state policies) often protest against the boundaries of state categories but still prefer the use of the categories to nonrecognition. This finding highlights the continuing importance of state recognition in constructions of group identities. My interest in such state-society interactions through time also inspires my focus on social resistance to state definitions, both historical and contemporary. Even in colonial states, “the novel communal partitioning of society was not simply implanted from above and beyond. An intricate dialectic unfolded” (Young 1994:234). Various societal voices have been overlooked in the rush to describe state, particularly colonial state, constructions of societies. Historian Robert Eric Frykenberg points out that many scholars: give too much credit to Europeans and too little to hosts of Native Indians (mainly Brahmans and others imbued with Brahmanical world views; but also Muslims imbued with Islamic world views) for the cultural constructions (and reconstructions) of India. These Indian elites did as much to inculcate their own views into the administrative machinery and the cultural framework of the Indian Empire. (Frykenberg 1993:534) In addition to the importance of recognizing elite members of colonial and postcolonial societies and their contributions to notions of identity, other scholars have drawn attention to the contributions of social movements and political


activists to identity politics, as in the “new social movements” literature or Benjamin Marquez’s work on the various constructions of racial identities by Mexican-American organizations (Marquez 2001, Larana, Johnston and Gusfield 1994). New attention to the influence or “agency” of disadvantaged groups in society is a notable contribution of the “subaltern school,”13 which recognizes the importance of including in historical accounts the “small voices which are drowned in the noise of statist commands”: For they have many stories to tell—stories which for their complexity are unequaled by statist discourse and indeed opposed to its abstract and oversimplifying modes. (Guha 1996:3) My historical and contemporary focus on individuals and groups who resist the state classification schemes gives me a unique view of the “meeting point of state and society” (Skocpol 1985:27), where simplified state identifications and complex social identities coincide or clash. THE CATEGORIES “Caste” has historically been used as a rough translation of the indigenous term jati, referring to countless “birth groups” that vary depending on context and region, or of another term, varna, which literally means “color” and refers to an idealized hierarchy of brahmins, kshatriyas, vaishyas, shudras, and, below all of these, the avarna (castes outside the varna system), sometimes referred to as “untouchables.”14 These divisions, codified in ancient writings of the subcontinent such as the Vedas (1500–1000 BC) and the Manavadharmasastra (first century AD), are associated with different occupations and accompanied by rules of behavior and ideas of purity. In reality such divisions are more ambiguous and regionally varied than the codifications suggest; nevertheless, caste continues to play a major role in the lives of many Indians, often having a profound effect on opportunities in terms of residence, education, occupation, social interaction and marriage (Bayly 1999:8–10, Searle-Chatterjee and Sharma 1994, Quigley 1993).15 The official Scheduled Caste category encompasses the “untouchables” or Dalits, who are considered to be at the bottom of the caste system. Dalit, which means “oppressed” or “ground down,” is the name currently preferred by many.16 Previously known as the “depressed classes,” the Scheduled Caste category was created by the colonial government in 1936 in order to implement the 1935 Government of India Act. This act gave special electoral representation to certain minority groups, including untouchables. After independence the


Scheduled Caste list was re-enacted with the Scheduled Caste Order of 1950, prepared for the purpose of reservations. The Scheduled Tribes, also known in parts of India as adivasis, are “those groups distinguished by ‘tribal characteristics’ and by their spacial and cultural isolation from the bulk of the population” (Galanter 1984: 147). In many cases, Scheduled Tribes are hardly as isolated as many official and scholarly descriptions make them out to be (Guha 1999). Historically, several groups have crossed the line between tribe and caste, as tribes became absorbed into their local caste hierarchies, generally in the lower ranks (Roy 1994). Although the term “tribe” evokes a “problematic legacy of evolutionary anthropology,” tribes in some cases have “transformed it from a stigmatized label into a political asset and collective identity” (Karlsson 2001:37, n. 4). In spite of such instances of social interaction and mobility, the groups dubbed Scheduled Tribes are among the most socially and economically disadvantaged groups in India (Karlsson 2001:11). Survey data confirms that “Scheduled Castes and Tribes are more likely to be among the most deprived of India as compared to the upper castes” (Mitra and Singh 1999:196).17 The Scheduled Tribe category was also listed and included as a protected minority in the 1935 Government of India Act and later recognized in the Indian constitution for policy purposes including reservations.18 No method is specified in the constitution to define a third category in India, the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), except that the President should appoint a Backward Classes Commission (Article 340). Several states within India have had such commissions from time to time, and some have long histories of special policies for the Other Backward Classes at the state level (Brass 1994:253–64, Bayly 1999).19 Prior to the current National Backward Classes Commission, which was recently institutionalized as a permanent government office to monitor the lists of backward classes and policies for them, there were two other national level commissions which submitted reports in 1955 and 1980. The latter, known as the Mandal Commission Report, served as a basis for extending reservations in central government jobs to the Other Backward Classes in 1990. The term Backward Classes has had a variety of local usages, but notably, in spite of the use of the word “class,” the category has generally not been defined by applying solely economic criteria to individuals. The constitutional debate suggests that Backward Classes were to be a list of castes or communities, rather than lower classes in general (Kumar 1994:1). The Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) ruled that both caste and poverty should be considered when determining the backwardness of groups (Faundez 1994:23– 4).20 Generally speaking, the Other Backward Classes are economically and socially depressed castes or communities, such as lower castes that are not considered untouchables or other similarly disadvantaged non-Hindu communities.


RESERVATION POLICIES IN INDIA The Indian constitution explicitly permits reservations for backward classes (Indian Constitution articles 15 and 16, Galanter 1984:164–5, Nesiah 2000). Reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes include reserved posts in government service and public sector undertakings, university admissions quotas, and reserved legislative seats.21 Based roughly on their percentage of the population,22 the Scheduled Caste quota is 15 per cent and the Scheduled Tribe quota is 7½ per cent in government service, although these quotas are not always met. Reserved legislative seats for Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the national Lok Sabha (House of the People) and in the state legislative assemblies are based on the percentage of their population in each state. Reservations for Other Backward Classes at the national level are not as extensive as the policies for Scheduled Castes or Tribes. Preferences for Other Backward Classes in some state services and educational institutions have been in place in parts of the south for long enough that some groups have become quite powerful (Irschick 1969, Galanter 1984, Parikh 1990); but reservations for Other Backward Classes in the central government services are a newer development, only recently operational in some states. Reservations for Other Backward Classes are legally limited to 27 per cent by a Supreme Court ruling holding that the combined total of quotas (for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) may not exceed 50 per cent. This results in disproportionately low quotas for Other Backward Classes, who constitute far more than 27 per cent in several states.23 These policies have been effective, although inequalities persist. In spite of the ambiguities of these categories, government data on the groups targeted by reservations can give us some idea of the progress and pitfalls associated with reservations. Government figures show that quotas in lower status jobs tend to be filled, while quotas in the higher ranks of the civil service are sometimes left unfilled (Planning Commission 1997–2002: Table 3.9.6, data from a 1995 Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances report). For example, while the percentage of Scheduled Castes in government services increased to almost 17 per cent by 1994 (slightly more than their percentage in the population), their representation in the lowest positions, Group D jobs, was double their representation in Group A posts where important decision-making occurs. Still, even that limited, 10 per cent Scheduled Caste presence in the highest ranking jobs in 1994 was a notable improvement over their 3 per cent representation 20 years earlier. The percentage of Scheduled Tribes in government services also increased from 1974 to 1994 but still did not reach their quota or their percentage in the population. Scheduled Tribe members in government services are also unevenly distributed, with higher percentages in lower ranking positions. Other statistical analyses show that Scheduled Castes


and Tribes have made gains in public employment but not enough to close the gap between them and the general population (Sudarsen 1994). Reservations also assure Scheduled Castes and Tribes representation in legislatures and higher educational institutions. In the 1996 elections, for example, over 19 per cent of seats in the Lok Sabha were held by members of Scheduled Castes or Tribes (Planning Commission 1997–2002:3.9.23). In the educational sphere, the Ministry of Education requested all states to reserve 15 per cent of seats for Scheduled Castes and 5 per cent for Scheduled Tribes in their universities, and such quotas have been widely adopted although, again, not always effectively implemented (Galanter 1984:63, Dushkin 1979). While Scheduled Castes and Tribes have increased in general courses, their proportion in professional courses such as medicine and engineering has lagged and, at times, decreased (Chanana 1993). Other Backward Classes, on the other hand, have substantial reservations in professional schools in a number of states (Galanter 1984). Quantitative generalizations about the effect of reservations on the Other Backward Classes are complicated by the disparate policies in different states, the gradual implementation of new policies in recent years, and the lack of census data on this category, all issues to be addressed in the following chapters. Many evaluations of these policies implicitly or explicitly point to the difficulties of defining which sort of groups are the most appropriate beneficiaries of reservations. For example, some argue that women of the Scheduled Tribes or other targeted groups remain “doubly disadvantaged” (Dunn 1993:53, Chanana 1993). Although female literacy rates have risen, a significant gap remains between the literacy rate of women of all communities (39 per cent) compared to Scheduled Caste women (24 per cent) and Scheduled Tribe women (18 per cent), making reservations of university admissions or of higher level government jobs irrelevant for many (Planning Commission 1997–2002: Table 3.9.2, data from a 1995 Department of Education study). On the basis of a survey of low caste elites, some scholars argue for economically based reservations, pointing to those who benefit under the current system and use their new status “as a spring board for further advances leaving behind not only their recollected history but also their unfortunate community” (Roy and Singh 1987:142, 152). Subgroups may be left behind, but others point to the positive effects of even a section within each category advancing. “[T]here is a sizable section of these groups who can utilize these opportunities and confer advantages on their children; their concerns are firmly placed on the political agenda and cannot readily be dislodged” (Galanter 1986:139). In short, the effectiveness of these policies varies within the categorized groups, a situation which has sparked some of the protests and proposed policy revisions featured in the following chapters.


OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS Part I: State simplifications The chapters of Part I document how states try to fit complex social groups into standardized categories. Drawing on government documents and interviews with state officials, including administrators, judges, and anthropologists, I examine how these authorities execute reservation policies. The oversimplifications of society which have accompanied reservations bear some resemblance to their historical precedents, as they sometimes “freeze” identities. State authority can add longevity or clout to categories, even when officials themselves often recognize that they are oversimplified. The courts are the focus of Chapter 2. I consider three contemporary court cases featuring people making ambiguous claims for reserved opportunities. The cases involve two sisters admitted into a college due to dubious certification as members of a Scheduled Tribe, a woman in an intercaste marriage employed in a reserved job on the basis of her husband’s status as a member of a Backward Class, and a convert to Hinduism who claimed his Christian parents’ former Scheduled Caste status. The circumstances leading to these cases illustrate the malleability of some identities. The decisions demonstrate the legal imperative to fit individuals into the official policy categories. Even while trying to assure a progressive outcome for the most disadvantaged citizens, judges’ decisions over reservation categories have had conservative outcomes, including legal reinforcement of the notion that caste is determined at birth. In Chapter 3, I examine legacies of colonial anthropology for current government classifications. A comparison of Herbert Risley’s turn of the century People of India and the contemporary “People of India” project carried out by the Anthropological Survey of India demonstrates that both projects emphasized caste classification, blurred the line between anthropology and administration and became embroiled in political controversy. Whether colonial or postcolonial, these projects served the needs of the state in similar ways. The reaction to these projects differed, however, since the new study used some of the administrative categories associated with reservations. In response, various groups complained of imposter communities in the Scheduled Caste volume, criticized reservations on the basis of the project’s findings, and even sponsored alternative studies in order to demonstrate their own qualifications for backward status. Chapter 4 turns to bureaucrats and regulations involved in codifying status in the form of caste certificates and lists. Getting an individual caste certificate is a necessary step to qualify for reservations. Interviews with bureaucrats and a review of their rules demonstrate the risks of labeling and stigmatizing individuals in the process of implementing reservation policies and the


challenges of untangling identities in applications involving migration, intercaste families, adoption, and conversion. The process of applying to be included on the national list of Other Backward Classes necessitates group petitions, group data, and group rankings. These processes of certification and listing illustrate the administrative simplification of identities and the risks of reinforcing groups and gradations. Chapter 5 focuses on the census as a tool for implementing reservations. In the wake of the controversial caste classifications associated with the colonial census, the postcolonial Indian census enumerators counted only those communities which were the focus of national-level reservations: the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. With the extension of central government reservations to Other Backward Classes in 1990, a debate ensued over whether to count more castes, all castes, or no castes on the next census. Collecting data on certain disadvantaged minorities can facilitate the implementation of reservation policies; yet this practice involves monitoring some groups more than others, and official census classifications have tended to remain static. Census enumerations, moreover, continue to inspire many groups to prioritize the maintenance of group numbers over the alleviation of group divisions. Nevertheless, census categories are more permeable than other state simplifications, as the infusion of people into the Scheduled Tribe category demonstrates. Part II: Political complications Various protest groups are refusing to be “simplified” by the state. Based on my interviews with political activists, officials, and politicians as well as my review of protest group literature, I compare diverse attempts to reconstruct reservation policy categories by disrupting the previous boundaries of eligible groups. Various groups challenge the existing policies, and each other, by prioritizing caste, religion, class or gender. These overlapping identities splinter both the official categories and the political groups calling them into question. The intersection of religion and caste has resulted in competing demands, which are the topic of Chapter 6. I focus on protest groups from two minority religions. First, some Muslims are asserting that all Indian Muslims should be eligible for reservations, while others argue that class and even caste distinctions within the Muslim community must be the basis for reservation categories. Second, Dalit Christians are demanding recognition as Scheduled Castes in spite of their doctrinally caste-free religion. These “Scheduled Caste Christians” face challenges from other Christians opposed to an official caste distinction within their community and from other Scheduled Castes opposed to an increase in the number of competitors for reserved opportunities. These cases demonstrate how


overlapping identities result in competing perspectives on reservation categories and thus undermine the reification of identities. Chapter 7 turns to an increasingly important force in Indian politics, the Hindu nationalists. Based on their constructions of national identity, Hindu politicians have strategically included Scheduled Castes and certain minority religions within the Hindu fold. They draw a line, however, to exclude Muslims and Christians and oppose their demands for reservations. Current debates between Hindu nationalists and advocates of more reservations parallel the historical tension between nationalist leader Mohandas Gandhi, who felt that inclusive Hinduism was the answer to problems of discrimination, and Dalit leader B.R.Ambedkar, who felt, in contrast, that Hinduism was the root of the problem and reservations were the answer. Hindu constructions of Muslims and Christians as national outsiders have influenced the minority movements for more reservations by impeding cooperation between them. Although Hindu nationalists have strong political organizations and ideologies, the cultural diversity that fragments the Muslims and Christians also fragments the Hindus, inspiring some Hindu nationalist politicians to reconsider their past opposition to certain reservations. Chapter 8 turns to the intersection of class and classification, in particular, how economic considerations complicate definitions of the Other Backward Classes. The extension of national level reservations to Other Backward Classes in the 1990s renewed debates about the role of class in reservation policies. Various critics of this policy, including leaders of student protests and members of the Gandhi Caste Society, prefer economic definitions of backwardness. Further policy adjustments, such as measures to exclude the so-called “creamy layer” (or socio-economically advanced individuals) from the Other Backward Classes and thus from eligibility for reserved jobs, assuaged some groups in the north but also sparked new kinds of resistance in the south. Reservation policy changes that brought new attention to class criteria provoked quite varied reactions from north to south due to distinct policy histories. This analysis of political demands and policy changes on the basis of economic criteria suggests that, at times, it is the government that changes the categories and political activists that prefer static classifications. The contemporary bill to reserve one-third of seats in Parliament for women is featured in Chapter 9. Demands to subdivide the category of “women” to include distinct quotas for Muslim women and women of the Other Backward Classes have repeatedly stalemated this effort. The legitimacy of women as a group for reservations in their own right is a recurring theme in historical discussions of reservation policies. The debates over women’s reservations and rights in the final years of the British Raj demonstrate that religious and caste minorities were a political priority whereas women were a “minor minority.” In their 1974 report, Towards Equality, the Committee on the Status of Women characterized


women as a “category” as opposed to a “community” in their consideration of reservations for women. Women constitute a sizeable part of all other reservation categories, yet they face gender discrimination as well. Historical and contemporary debates over women and representation in India thus address most directly the political dilemmas and policy quandaries posed by multiple, overlapping identities. The final chapter summarizes my conclusions about the relationship between identity and identification. The conclusion offers some practical suggestions for reservations or affirmative action policies and highlights the theoretical insights gleaned from this area of study. By examining both state simplifications and political complications, I synthesize the insights of two theoretical approaches to classifications and identities. Both advocates and critics of reservations are involved in the debates over how to identify various groups and fit them into the state’s schemes. When the categories are contested, it is not necessarily a sign that the policies are flawed and therefore ineffective; in fact, such challenges can be a sign that they are working well enough to throw the old categories into question. Such confusion creates space for individuals and groups to challenge traditional categories. My research shows that disadvantaged groups who embrace the social categories embedded in public policies such as reservations can simultaneously use these categories and contest their official boundaries. Competing political pressures can bring about adjustments to simplified state categories, at times to reflect the interests of powerful groups but, at other times, to better reflect the needs of the truly disadvantaged in a complex and changing society.

Part I State simplifications

2 Adjudicating identities

They used to make pickles, squashes, jams, curry powders and canned pineapples. And banana jam (illegally) after the FPO (Food Products Organization) banned it because according to their specifications it was neither jam nor jelly. Too thin for jelly and too thick for jam. An ambiguous, unclassifiable consistency, they said. As per their books. Looking back now, to Rahel it seemed as though this difficulty that their family had with classification ran much deeper than the jamjelly question. (Arundhati Roy from The God of Small Things 1997:30–1) In the novel The God of Small Things, the protagonist Rahel grows up between communities. Having a Hindu father from north India and a Christian mother from the south makes her unclassifiable; an intercaste relationship that defies classifications underlies the central tragedy of her story. Like Rahel and her jam, some people do not fit into a clearcut schemata provided by the state. Scholars may carry on open-ended debates over the complex and contingent meanings of religious, regional, or caste-based identities, but when such terms are used in public policies, government officials—and, in particular, judges—are often forced to draw boundaries. Reservation policies based on categories defined by caste, tribe or class have resulted in much litigation involving people with identities that are difficult to categorize. Three recent Supreme Court cases illustrate the challenges of legally defining the disadvantaged in India. One case involves a family that cannot “prove” that it is in a certain category; a second features a person who falls between categories due to her intercaste marriage; and a third considers a person who changes categories through religious conversion. These borderline cases challenge a policy framework dependent upon social classifications that, often necessarily, oversimplify society. As Christopher A.Ford discusses, one of the

STATE SIMPLIFICATIONS 23

challenges of adjudicating and administering identity is applying these oversimplified categories in complex social situations: Judges and administrators are less fortunate than social scientists: they must at some point draw lines between rival claimants, rewarding one and sending the other home empty handed. However analytically “soft” a particular classification may be, making it a centerpiece of governmental resource-allocation will require that it be “hardened” dramatically. (Ford 1994:1234) The judges to be discussed here thus participate, perhaps unwittingly, in a process that threatens to legally harden social distinctions, even while enforcing policies designed to offset the inequalities associated with these distinctions. Historically, “hard” state schemata have often resulted from less than benevolent intentions. Much has been written about colonial states, including their legal systems, contributing to the freezing of social identities that were previously more fluid and overlapping (Galanter 1992, Anderson 1991, Jalali 1993, Pant 1987, Young 1993, 1994). Thomas Metcalf notes the political and intellectual objectives behind the British “ordering of difference”: “India was ‘known’ in ways that would sustain a system of colonial authority, and through categories that made it fundamentally different from Europe” (Metcalf 1995: 113). Gyanendra Pandey emphasizes that “the primacy accorded to caste…was related directly to the problems of identifying the centres of productive (hence, revenue-generating) capacity and of maintaining law and order” (Pandey 1992: 68). The colonial legal system in India emphasized not only social order but also orderly social categories. Legal decisions classifying religious converts, for example, suggest that colonial courts gave more weight to a view of modernity as “the authority of institutions to establish criteria for membership” than to a view of modernity as “the capacity for change” (Viswanathan 1998:77). The legal hardening of caste or religious classifications is not surprising given the colonial objectives behind them. In contrast, many contemporary governments are resorting to group-based policies in order to combat severe social and economic stratification. Can such policies avoid the pitfalls of reifying identities? Even in noncolonial situations, James C.Scott warns, “State officials can often make their categories stick and impose their simplifications, because the state, of all institutions, is best equipped to insist on treating people according to its schemata” (Scott 1998:82). In no place is this power of the state clearer than in the courts. When disputes over eligibility for reservations arise, the courts adjudicate various identity claims. Despite their postcolonial context, contemporary Indian Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the continuing legal reinforcement of official identity categories. In cases involving individuals trying to benefit from reservations,


court’s decisions mandate strict state surveillance of identity claims. In addition, the court in these decisions relies on colonialera “proof” of identity and reinforces the notion that caste and even religious identities are determined at birth. Although the situations which led to the litigation in each case are examples of the permeability of some social boundaries, the legal decisions themselves tend to harden group boundaries, in the very process of implementing policies meant to reduce group-based inequalities. In some cases, contemporary judges are even more insistent than their colonial-era predecessors that the government must fit people into official categories. The first case involves a family’s disputed claim to be in the Scheduled Tribes category rather than that of the Other Backward Classes. The central question in the second case is whether a woman in an intercaste marriage should benefit from reservations due to her husband’s backward status. The third case is about reconversion from Christianity back to Hinduism, and whether a family’s previous low caste status can be regained in order to qualify for reservations. The following discussion of these contemporary Supreme Court cases focuses, first, on the ambiguous identity claims people are making in order to benefit from reservations and the forms of social fluidity these claims and their circumstances illustrate. By social fluidity, I mean that various social processes can undermine caste- or tribe-based inequalities within Indian societies. Examples of these processes, which will be further illustrated by the cases, include sanskritization (or the movement of entire caste groups up the social hierarchy), intercaste marriage, and conversions to religions that do not, as a matter of doctrine, recognize caste. By changing the stakes associated with being in certain groups, reservations and the resulting legal definitions of groups affect these processes in some cases, resulting in “desanskritization” and in different incentives for intercaste marriage or religious conversion (Jayaram 1996:79–80, Karanth 1996: 94–5, 101, Webster 1994:171–2). This chapter also includes analysis of the legal responses to these claims, highlighting the court’s rather conservative reinforcement of traditional identities in the process of implementing an arguably progressive policy. Legal restrictions on reservations for individuals with shifting or unclear identities protect the claims of the most unambiguously disadvantaged. On the other hand, such restrictions could also discourage those who would bend the boundaries of longstanding group-based hierarchies. A ªSPURIOUSº TRI BE? The Supreme Court of India’s 1994 decision in Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner Tribal Development centers on two sisters in the state of Maharashtra, Suchita and Madhuri Patil, who were accused of being admitted to a medical college on the basis of a “false Social Status Certificate.”1 The case


arose due to a rule that, to benefit from reservations, people must apply to the government for certificates verifying that they are members of a Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or Other Backward Class. The sisters in question had in fact applied for and received Scheduled Tribe certificates as members of the “Mahadeo Koli” tribe and were admitted into the college, but they still had to apply to the state government’s “verification committee” (also referred to as a “scrutiny committee”) to confirm their status as members of a Scheduled Tribe. The verification committee eventually decided that the sisters were actually “Koli” rather than “Mahadeo Koli.” In their state, Maharashtra, the “Mahadeo Koli” are an officially recognized Scheduled Tribe, but the “Koli” are an Other Backward Class (208). The verification committee “canceled and confiscated” their Scheduled Tribe certificates, throwing their admissions under the Scheduled Tribe reservation into question (208). In this case the sisters appealed to the courts in order to continue their studies. The Supreme Court ruled that the sisters were indeed Kolis and members of the Other Backward Classes, a category which is considered less backward than the Scheduled Tribes and which, in this case, would not have been as beneficial for gaining college admission. Although Other Backward Classes do benefit from reservations in higher education in many states, the Scheduled Tribes reservations more often go unfilled, thus making this a potentially more useful designation for admission purposes. For example, although the number of Scheduled Tribe university students has increased, their numbers in certain subjects, particularly medicine, is “too small and insignificant” (Chanana 1993:136). Only 2101 Scheduled Tribe students were studying medicine in India in 1988–9, and only 526 of these were Scheduled Tribe women, who made up less than 1 per cent of all medical students (Chanana 1993:136). Thus it was easier for the Patil sisters to get into their medical college as members of a Scheduled Tribe. The court agreed with the verification committee that the sisters’ Scheduled Tribe status should be revoked, although they allowed one sister, who had by the time of their decision almost completed her studies, to sit for the final year examination. The court ruled that the second sister could continue her studies if she was eligible for admission as a “general candidate,” that is, without the benefit of the seats reserved for Scheduled Tribes (218). The court concluded that such identity claims “must be judged on [a] legal and ethnological basis. Spurious tribes have become a threat to the genuine tribals and the present case is a typical example of [how] reservation of benefits given to the genuine claimants have been snatched away by spurious tribes” (213). The decision goes on to spell out in great detail the proper procedure for verifying identities for the purpose of social status certificates. The court’s suspicion regarding “spurious” claims to Scheduled Tribe status is a response to a perceived trend associated with reservations, the proliferation of people claiming to be in one of the various backward categories. In contrast to


the process which eminent sociologist M.N. Srinivas called sanskritization (the process of lower caste groups raising their status by emulating the practices of upper castes), some individuals and groups are engaging in “desanskritization” by purposefully making claims to belong to lower status caste or tribal groups (Srinivas 1966:6, 1989:20, 56–7, Karanth 1996:94–5).2 Ironically, there are now benefits to gaining one of the Scheduled or Backward labels, at least in a legal sense. Such a designation carries potential opportunities, such as preferential admission to college or quotas for government jobs, which may motivate some individuals and even entire groups to try to claim a backward status, despite the continuing social stigma of such a label. For example, whereas without the incentive of reservations, the Patil sisters might have aspired to claim the Koli status (still backward but arguably less so), in this case they claimed the more backward Mahadeo Koli status. Policy incentives to claim a previously degraded social category as one’s own could conceivably have some broader, positive social and cultural implications, perhaps by gradually reducing the stigma of such a category or at least blurring the boundaries. On the other hand, at a practical level, such claims could undermine reservations by taking economic and educational opportunities away from what the court calls “genuine” Scheduled Castes or Tribes. Yet the term “genuine” implies a clarity that many identities do not have. Although this is not addressed in the court’s decision, it is notable that the Koli of Maharashtra have organized as the Adivasi Koli Mahasangh (AKM) to demand Scheduled Tribe status on the grounds that “real tribals” should get reservation benefits; moreover, the state home minister told a crowd of 35,000 that “their demands are genuinely legal and correct” (Times of India, 27 July 2001).3 This development not only provides an example of group-level desanskritization but also highlights the ambiguity clouding the very category claimed by the sisters, which precludes definitive conclusions about their “genuine” or “spurious” identities. In the Patil sisters’ case, the court admonished people attempting to stretch the boundaries of the Scheduled Tribe category, characterizing them as “unscrupulous persons who come forward to obtain the benefit of such reservations posing themselves as persons entitled to such status… The case in hand is a clear instance of such pseudo status” (211). In the process of protecting the Scheduled Tribes, however, the court reinforced their boundaries to such an extent that even the so-called “genuine” group members may feel trapped. It did so in two ways. First, the court said that group boundaries are to be policed through a rigorous social status verification process. Second, the court treated identities as static attributes by relying on the idea that caste or tribal membership corresponds with genetic and cultural traits passed on from generation to generation and by giving more weight to colonial-era evidence about identities.


The Kumari Madhuri Patil decision includes a detailed description of how the states should go about policing identity boundaries. Revenue officers originally issue social status certificates to Scheduled Caste and Tribe members after “due verification,” but this is followed by further scrutiny (211). In this case, for example, the social status verification committee called on the medical students’ father to “furnish in the prescribed form the detailed information regarding his family background, ancestry, and anthropology of ‘Mahadeo Koli,’ Scheduled Tribe, to verify the veracity of his claim of status as S.T.” (208). This “scrutiny committee” relied on “a report of an expert committee which had gone into the sociological (sic), anthropology, and ethnology of the Scheduled Tribes including Mahadeo Koli” (209). This report was the basis for a “questionnaire prepared by the government and…given to and answered by the father of the appellants,” as a sort of quiz on his knowledge of his claimed identity (209). The court noted that the father “failed to satisfy the crucial affinity test” (212). M.N.Srinivas’s concept of sanskritization is again illuminating, for he pointed out that caste or tribal practices often change rather than remain static. Thus the father’s practices may not correspond to a test based on older research on his community, due to a prior history of sanskritization or emulation of groups with higher status. This legal ruling, then, not only scrutinizes change in the form of desanskritization but also sanctions sanskritization. After describing the verification procedures followed in this case, the court recommended several general guidelines to best scrutinize social status: In cases of Scheduled Tribes, for example, the scrutiny committee should include a research officer who has “intimate knowledge in the identification of the specified Tribes” (213). An additional “vigilance cell” should include “police Inspectors to investigate social status claims” by going to each person’s place of residence and birthplace to “verify and collect all the facts of the social status claimed” (215). In addition to examining birth registrations and school records, the “vigilance officer” is to “examine the parent, guardian or the candidate in relation to their caste etc. or such other persons who have knowledge of the social status of the candidate” (215). The officer should then submit a report including, in cases of Scheduled Tribe claims, information “relating to their particular anthropological and ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs, mode of marriage, death ceremonies, method of burial of dead bodies etc” (215). If the director reads the report and finds the claim “‘not genuine’ or ‘doubtful’ or spurious or falsely or wrongly claimed,” a notice and the vigilance officer’s report are to be sent to the candidate “or through the head of the concerned educational institution in which the candidate is studying or employed” (215). The candidate may demand a hearing to present more evidence, and a “public notice by beat of drum or any other convenient mode may be published in the village or locality and if any person or association opposes such a claim, an opportunity to adduce evidence may be given to him/it” (215). After additional


inquiry, if “the certificate obtained or social status claimed are found to be false, the parent/guardian/the candidate should be prosecuted for making false claim. If the prosecution ends in a conviction and sentence of the accused, it could be regarded as an offense involving moral turpitude,” which would disqualify that person from elective posts (216). (The Patil sisters’ case was not a criminal prosecution, so this question was not decided; rather the sisters were the appellants, arguing to be allowed to continue their studies.) By laying down these guidelines, the court sought to uphold constitutional objectives for “the genuine Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes or backward classes,” which it perceived as threatened by “unscrupulous persons” (216). These guidelines have served as a model in subsequent litigation.4 Such protective measures for “true” beneficiaries may be well intentioned, but this case and other cases about reservations illuminate the stringent demands placed on anyone trying to benefit from these policies, since the burden of proof of social status rests on them.5 “Mere recitals in documents” that an individual is in a particular caste, if not “supported by independent corroborative material” cannot form a basis for a caste certificate.6 Despite the elaborate verification processes that have developed, committees have overlooked important documents submitted to them and denied caste certificates to members of Scheduled Castes or Tribes, depriving them of their rights under the Constitution and resulting in appeals and lost time, money and opportunities for applicants.7 Moreover, continuing scrutiny and repeated inquiries into the social status of beneficiaries throughout their careers have been oppressive enough to result in claims of harassment.8 This pattern of repeated surveillance and investigation of citizens’ identity claims is one way the state may reinforce caste or tribal distinctions in communities and workplaces, in the very process of implementing policies meant to undermine discrimination. Police inquiries in hometowns, letters sent to universities or employers, and announcements calling for public comment about the identities of people applying for certificates both publicize and tarnish their status. The use of police to investigate at the local level could intimidate applicants for certificates and imply to their neighbors that they are not trustworthy. Moreover, the policing of identities is largely limited to the disadvantaged communities, as only those who hope to benefit from reservations need social status certificates. In addition to police power, the state uses the power of “expert” knowledge, with particular attention to anthropology, to classify Scheduled Tribes. The expert committee on ethnology and the cultural affinity test illustrate this aspect of the government’s power to classify; moreover, the court’s faith in anthropological “proof” reveals an assumption that identities, particularly in the case of the Scheduled Tribes, are unchanging.


In the Patil sisters’ case, the court ultimately portrayed tribes and castes as static social groupings. First, the court held that “[t]he caste of the person…is determined on the basis of the caste of their parents, basically for the reasons [sic] that caste is acquired by birth” (213). This seemingly straightforward rule relies on an assumption about the reproduction of caste or tribe from generation to generation, an assumption that is challenged in all three of the cases discussed in this chapter, as cultural change, intermarriage and religious conversion each, in their own way, thwart identity replication. The court, nevertheless, discussed Scheduled Tribe identity in terms of “genetical traits” passed on from one generation to the next. This term evokes notions of biological inevitability, but, in this decision, the court also used it to refer to cultural continuity, arguing that cultural traits are passed on like genetic traits. For example, responding to the claim that social mobility or modernization could explain the failure of the father to pass the “affinity test,” or government questionnaire about the culture of the tribe in question, the court argued that certain traits and customs will inevitably continue: The “argument of social mobility and modernization often alluringly put forth to obviate the need to pass the affinity test is only a convenient plea to get over the crux of the question. Despite the cultural advancement, the genetical traits pass on from generation to generation and no one could escape or forget” (209). In a later passage decrying the father’s lack of knowledge of the culture of the Mahadeo Koli, this genetic metaphor for cultural continuity resurfaces: “His feigned ignorance of the ancestry is too hard to believe…. The anthropological moorings and ethnological kinship…gets genetically ingrained in the blood and no one would shake off from [the] past, in particular, when one is conscious of the need of preserving its relevance to seek the status of Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled caste” (212). This passage reiterates the idea that identity is determined by birth or blood, while also noting that reservations themselves may further reinforce cultural continuity by the very processes of identity verification laid down in this case. Both points illustrate how the legal implementation of reservations, meant to change the status quo, can simultaneously reinforce the notion that identities are permanent. Using another static approach, the court credited older evidence of tribal membership over newer evidence. The certificates of membership issued by a contemporary “caste association” did not, according to the court, bear any value as evidence, but a school certificate of the students’ father, “being preindependence period, it bears `great probative value' ” (208, 213 emphasis in original). Contemporary evidence is arguably politicized, sometimes coming from the very groups or associations that are seeking Scheduled Tribe status. Thus, in its arguments, the court referred to official government classifications of the tribe from as far back as 1933, and painted a picture of the Scheduled Tribe’s


“traditional moorings and customary beliefs and practices” as its defining features (210). The court relied on historical data and interpreted tribes as essentially static entities, passing on cultural traits, as though they were genetic traits, from generation to generation. In part, this artificial freezing of boundaries is a response to the increasing challenges to these boundaries stemming from desanskritization inspired by reservations. The court concluded: “The ingrained Tribal traits peculiar to each tribe and anthropological features all the more become relevant when the social status is in acute controversy and needs decision” (212). This case is indicative of two ironic processes: First, citizens are applying to be declared backward in order to move forward in society. Second, the court, by monitoring identities and relying on historical ideas and evidence about castes and tribes, is freezing the social categories reservation policy was designed to weaken. INTERCASTE MARRIAGE In the case of Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University (Supreme Court of India 1996), a rejected applicant for a lecturer position in the Cochin University department of law challenged Valsamma Paul, who had claimed her backward husband’s status to successfully apply for that same position, which was reserved for a member of a Backward Class.9 Valsamma Paul, described as “Syrian Catholic (a Forward Class),” was married to a man described as “Latin Catholic (Backward Class Fisherman)” (546). Assuming her husband’s status, she applied for and was appointed as a lecturer in the law department of Cochin University, in a position that was reserved for Latin Catholics. Although Christians are not eligible for Scheduled Caste status (a critical point in the next case on conversion), caste-based stigma persists in some Christian communities. Therefore, some Christian castes, including that of Valsamma Paul’s husband, have been recognized as Other Backward Classes and are eligible for various central or state level reservations. Other Backward Classes, as discussed in Chapter 1, are actually lists of disadvantaged castes or communities. Thus, despite the fact that the couple at the center of this case is Christian, the court quite matter-of-factly discussed them in terms of their “castes.” The court focused on whether the lecturer became a member of her husband’s caste and, if so, whether she should be counted as a Backward Class member eligible for the reserved job. The court concluded that, upon marriage, a wife becomes a member of her husband’s family. She also becomes a member of her husband’s caste. Nevertheless, she is not entitled to claim the benefits of reservations using her new caste identity. While recognizing and even giving a legal nod to patrimonial


notions of identity based on the husband’s status, the court did not permit reservations for women in intercaste marriages on the basis of their new status. This defendant and her husband are part of a small but growing group of Indians willing to ignore strong socio-cultural taboos and marry across caste lines. Caste endogamy (“marriage within the same or allied castes”) means that marriages occur within a limited “marriage circle,” and such social stratification continues to influence marriage practices in contemporary Indian society (Banerjee 1999:650–1). Intercaste marriages are being facilitated by the increasingly diverse universities and workplaces resulting from reservation policies. A study of attitudes toward intercaste marriage, based on interviews with post-graduate students at Calcutta University, suggests that attitudes are changing, as students are becoming more accepting of intercaste marriage than their parents (Kundu and Sherif 1982:324). Yet, one should not exaggerate this trend. A study of under-graduate and post-graduate students at Rajastan University found that one in four women would not oppose their own arranged marriage even if it was contrary to their wishes and indicates that their reasons still include “because of tradition” and “because it would not be liked by caste people” (Upreti and Upreti 1982:249–50). Despite “increased opportunities for young people of both sexes from different castes to socially interact and fall in love, the number of intermarriages…is still very small” (Saroja 1999:186–7).10 Reservations could serve to ameliorate the particularly strong social stigma associated with women in intercaste marriages. The study of Calcutta University students and their parents found that whereas 68 per cent of parents would accept intercaste marriage for their sons, only 45 per cent would accept it for their daughters (Kundu and Sherif 1982:324). Women marrying, “down” is more of a taboo than men marrying lower caste women. Even the Valsamma Paul decision noted that, historically, marriages such as hers, between upper caste females and lower caste males, have been considered “invalid,” even when the opposite combination was recognized as legitimate (560). The court explicitly asserted the importance of social trends toward more intercaste marriage, noting the potential for the institution of marriage to encourage “harmony and integration” as well as “national unity and integrity” (547). Although recognizing the benefits of intercaste marriage, the court ultimately did little to encourage this trend by denying the woman the right to claim her husband’s status. The court justified its position by pointing to the advantages such a woman would have had in her early life; she lacked the extensive experience of indignities and sufferings comparable to the Backward Classes. In addition to these discussions of identity as defined by early childhood socialization and experiences, the court also referred to biologically determined identity, resting its decision on the troubling ground that caste is determined at birth. The court cited a key case regarding reservations for the Backward Classes, in which caste is described as a “socially homogeneous class.” “One is born into it. Its


membership is involuntary… Endogamy is its main characteristic” (554).11 None of these descriptions fit this case of a women who became a member of a backward class by marriage rather than birth. The court rejected the argument of Valsamma Paul’s attorney that “birth by itself is not a determinative factor,” that rather, “due to her marriage, she had subjected herself and suffered all the environmental disabilities to which her husband…was subjected and to which all other members of Backward Class[es] in the region are subjected” (551). The court ultimately agreed with the opposing argument that “persons who by birth belong to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes alone are entitled to the benefit… By marriage, adoption or any other device, viz., by procuring false social status certificates, they are not eligible” (552). Legally lumping together all means of gaining a caste status aside from birth, this decision implies that all voluntary routes to backwardness are equally dubious, whether it is by marriage or by obtaining a false certificate. In this light, any evidence of choice in the matter of identity casts doubt on an identity claim. The court faced a dilemma: Social mobility and voluntary changes of identity through intercommunity marriage are to be welcomed, yet the benefits aimed at those born Backward could be diluted by those who become Backward. Intercaste marriage might, in some cases, be a means of getting oneself or one’s children into a more politically or economically expedient social category; yet by defining intercaste marriage as one such “device,” and equating it with fraud, the court categorically rejected volition, whatever its form, as a legitimate means of social mobility (Jenkins 2001b). The decision concluded, “[a]cquisition of the status of Scheduled Caste etc. by voluntary mobility into these categories would play fraud on the Constitution and would frustrate the benign constitutional policy” (547). A decision to deny reservations to a woman married to a backward man could still have challenged the status quo, namely the patrimonial notion that upon marriage the bride acquires the family, and caste or tribe, of her husband. Yet, this court’s decision explicitly reinforces patrimonial marriage by insisting that the defendant is, socially and legally, still a member of her husband’s family and caste except with regard to her eligibility for reservations. In that instance she is categorized by the higher caste status of her father. For reservations, it seems, caste is determined at birth. An exception to this rule can be found in a different case, that of a lower status woman marrying a higher status man. In this combination, the woman took on her husband’s status and his category for the purposes of reservations. Her new—in this case higher—status disqualified her from previous benefits.12 These decisions embed gender discrimination in policies meant to counteract other forms of social discrimination. In the Valsamma Paul case, the court, on the grounds that reservations should help those who have been disadvantaged from childhood, ended up reinforcing an ideology central to the caste system, the notion of caste as a status determined


by birth. At the same time, it reinforced a contradictory ideology about a woman’s status being determined by her husband’s status for most purposes. Moreover, at a practical level, by denying the benefit of reservations in this case, the court’s ruling potentially discourages intercaste marriage by denying one of the advantages of such marriages for high-caste women, while reinforcing the social and legal disadvantages. Thus the decision has the potential to reduce intercaste marriages, which are one possible solution to caste stratification. Some language in the Valsamma Paul decision hints at a nuanced interpretation of identity, including a comment that people have “several identities which constantly intersect and overlap” (548). The court even included long references to equality for women and sang the praises of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (549, 563). Yet the decision itself embeds a notion of caste based on blood in the legal interpretations of reservations, particularly penalizing women in the most stigmatized of unions, that with a man of a lower status group. Historically, social marriage rules have been applied “selectively so as to maximize the marriage chances of higher castes and men, and very seldom operated in favor of lower caste men and women” (Banerjee 1999:659). The Valsamma Paul decision continues in this tradition. This case shows that the categories associated with reservation policies can be implemented in conservative ways, especially when legal classifications reaffirm primordial or patrimonial notions of identity. Despite the policy goal of overcoming caste-based disadvantages, this ruling on reservation categories could be self-defeating by discouraging intercaste marriages, arguably one of the best ways to overcome caste discrimination. Many young people still rely upon their castes for social and economic opportunities, including but not limited to caste-based reservations, and “they may try to keep their caste affiliation unsullied by strictly following caste endogamy” (Saroja 1999:190). The very reservation policies which are supposed to get beyond a system of status associated with birth groups have resulted in case law holding that birth is the only legitimate basis for an identity claim. CONVERSION In the case of S.Swvigaradoss v. Zonal Manager (Supreme Court of India 1996), the petitioner’s parents had at one time been Hindus of the Adi-Dravida caste, a recognized Scheduled Caste in the state of Tamil Nadu.13 Prior to Swvigaradoss’s birth, his parents had converted to Christianity. According to Swvigaradoss, he converted to Hinduism at age 14 and became a member of his parents’ former caste. Subsequently he was employed by the Food Corporation of India. The next year, however, he married “according to Christian rites in a church,” and “[on] these facts, notice was given to the petitioner to show cause


how the petitioner would be entitled to benefits and privileges extended to the Scheduled Caste candidates in the future” (101). Swvigaradoss filed a suit arguing that he was baptized as a minor and that “[a]fter he became a major, he is continuing as an Adi-Dravida” (101). Thus he wanted to be recognized as a Scheduled Caste member, eligible for Scheduled Caste reservations. Unlike the Other Backward Classes category, which can include some Christians, the Scheduled Caste category does not include any Christians. Thus, the act of conversion is a key element in this case. The court ruled that regardless of the conversion, “the petitioner was born of Christian parents” and thus was not born into Hinduism or the Adi-Dravida caste (103). Since a “Christian is not a Scheduled Caste,” they denied his suit and declared that “the petitioner cannot claim to be a Scheduled Caste” (103). This case is an example of another form of social fluidity, conversions and, occasionally, reconversions among lower castes, sometimes due to religious convictions, sometimes for political or material motivations, and often for a combination of reasons. Lower caste members may seek nominally caste-free religions such as Islam or Christianity, and, historically, entire groups of lower castes have converted from Hinduism. Such conversions, whether individual or mass, are arguably not only spiritual decisions but also a form of political protest. The mass conversion of untouchables to Buddhism in 1956, led by B.R.Ambedkar, continues to inspire mass conversions to that religion (Zelliot 1996, Omvedt 1994: 247–9, BBC News 4–5 November 2001). Mass conversions to other religions, such as Christianity in the late nineteenth century and Islam in 1981–2, were also in part protest strategies (Pickett 1933, Oddie 1997, Mujahid 1989). Conversion involves complex and varied motivations, as a list of reasons given in survey of Indian converts to Christianity illustrates: “To escape from cholera… Because land owners oppressed us… Because our missionary helped us against the Brahmans and the Rajputs… Because the love of Jesus won me… To get a wife for my younger brother… To be saved from forced labor… Because I wanted to know God… Because the wise men of my caste said I should” (Pickett 1933:159–60). Adding to such divergent calculations, contemporary reservation policies provide another material motivation for conversion, the possible advantages of joining one of the religious communities which include legally recognized Scheduled Castes, namely Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists.14 Fearing a spate of conversions inspired by reservations, the government has taken steps. For example, a government circular in Tamil Nadu states that members of Scheduled Castes who convert to Christianity, revert to Hinduism (on the basis of which they obtain jobs in government service), and finally reconvert back to Christianity, can have their employment and scheduled caste status revoked.15 When litigation involves reservations and conversions, judges


find themselves in the difficult position of trying to assess converts’ motivations. This is not only tricky but also troubling. As instrumentally motivated as some of these conversions may be, the act of choosing another religious identity has historically been one possible escape route from an undesirable caste identity. Although these choices could help to undermine a system of caste-based inequalities, judges implementing reservations have at times scrutinized and delegitimized such choices. In the case under consideration, a son of converts reconverted. As in the intercaste marriage case, the court relied on an ideology of caste identity being determined at birth, in this case going even further by assuming that religion is also determined at birth. The decision’s conclusion was that a “Christian is not a Scheduled Caste under the notification issued by the President. In view of the admitted position that the petitioner was born of Christian parents and his parents were also converted prior to his birth... petitioner cannot claim to be a scheduled caste” (103). The court added yet another restriction to the fluidity of identity, namely a rule that caste membership is to be determined by the government rather than by the castes themselves. Building upon the caste certificate procedure laid out in the Kumari Madhuri Patil case, the Valsamma Paul court embarked upon a generalized crackdown on identity fraud, directly relevant to the Swvigaradoss case at hand. The court held that in the process of scrutinizing an identity, “the officer concerned should also verify, as a fact, whether a convert has totally abjured his old faith and adopted, as a fact, the new faith; whether he suffered all the handicaps as a Dalit or Tribe; whether conversion is only a ruse to gain constitutional benefits.”16 Thus, under Valsamma Paul the vigilance officers have the added responsibility of verifying religious beliefs. One of the factors to be considered by these officers is whether a convert’s new community recognizes the convert as a member. However, the Swvigaradoss decision, issued later the same month in 1996 as Valsamma Paul, emphasizes birth and pays little heed to social acceptance as an indicator of a legally recognized identity, a shift from previous cases. In a 1975 case the Supreme Court noted that the law since 1886 had consistently held that people who reconvert to Hinduism can again become members of their former castes, the key criteria being whether the other members of the caste accept the convert back into the fold.17 For example in 1915, noted jurist Ganapathi Iyer wrote that people “are born in their respective castes or sects. It cannot be said, however, that membership by caste is determined only by birth and not by anything else.”18 Another jurist used the analogy of membership in a club to describe caste, rejecting the idea of caste as a birth group in favor of caste as a voluntary, if sometimes exclusive, organization: “It is within the power of a caste to admit into its fold men not born in it as it is within the power of a club to admit anyone it likes as its member. To hold that membership of a caste is determined by birth is to hold that the caste cannot, if it likes, mix with another


caste and form both into one caste. That would be striking at the very root of caste autonomy.”19 In 1976, the Supreme Court of India adopted this rationale in a case which, like Swvigaradoss, involved the offspring of converts by holding that conversion to Hinduism would not automatically give a person membership in his parents’ former caste “but he would become such member, if the other members of the caste accept him as a member.”20 This decision reflected the reasoning of a 1940 ruling that “the caste itself is the supreme judge.”21 Not all court decisions in cases involving reservations and the offspring of converts have been this sensitive to community sentiment (Galanter 1984:120, n. 60), yet in 1996 the Swvigaradoss court did not even address the communities in question. In this case, Swvigaradoss’ community was hardly mentioned, except for his possible ties to the Christian community, implied by the reference to his marriage ceremony. The court did not discuss the opinion of any Adi-Dravidas regarding his claim to be one of them. Rather, the conclusion emphasized birth status and the government’s lists. Not only was the petitioner “born of Christian parents” but also his parents were “converted prior to his birth and no longer remained to be Adi-Dravida, a Scheduled Caste for the purpose of Tirunelveli District in Tamil Nadu as notified by the President;” therefore the “petitioner cannot claim to be a Scheduled Caste” (103). The court repeatedly emphasized that it did not have the power to change the lists of Scheduled Castes, which were constitutionally issued by the President and subsequently amended by Parliament. However, the petitioner did not ask the court to change the lists; rather he changed his identity and asked the court to find that he fit within the current lists. Perhaps the court’s emphasis on the lists was a response to activists trying to expand the definition of the Scheduled Castes to include Christians. However, notably, their demand is quite different from Swvigaradoss’ argument that, by converting from Christianity to Hinduism, he fit into the existing category. This decision applied an “identity as birth group” standard not only to caste identity but also, more surprisingly, to religious identity. Perhaps the difficulties of “proving” in legal terms who is a genuine Hindu contributed to this rather cut and dried demarcation. Characterized by historian Robert Frykenberg as “[t]his soft concept, this jumble of inner contradictions,” Hinduism is particularly susceptible to open interpretations and porous boundaries (Frykenberg 1993: 523). In a reservations case that necessitated categorizing a Hindu-born convert to Buddhism, the Supreme Court of India commented: “Hinduism is so tolerant and Hindu religious practices so varied and eclectic that one would find it difficult to say whether one is practicing or professing Hindu religion or not” (Galanter 1984: 309).22 Perhaps it was this ambiguity that inspired the court in Swvigaradoss to consider religion and caste only at birth, rather than heeding choices made later.


There are other possible explanations for the legal shift from a more open interpretation of caste or religious identity to one in which birth groups and the state’s official lists of castes reign supreme. One is the government’s long held but increasing concern over the influence of foreign missionaries on Indian citizens and its reluctance to back any policies that might facilitate or encourage conversions (Sarkar 1999). Another explanation for the court’s inflexibility in such cases is concern about conversions inspired by the reservation policies themselves. The court is, in other words, increasingly preoccupied with distinguishing between conversions of convenience and conversions of conviction (Viswanathan 1998). The complex relationship between religious and caste identities makes cases involving conversion particularly ambiguous. Whether intergenerational conversions can or should allow a person to re-enter a caste is a challenging question for a court trained to interpret the law. In a psychological sense, the court would have enormous difficulty gauging Swvigaradoss’s motivations for conversion. In a sociological sense, whether his parents ever left their caste upon conversion is unclear; the question of whether he rejoined it is even more complex. Growing more suspicious of conversions and facing increasingly ambiguous claims for reservations, the court shifted from reliance on self-definitions of castes to a top-down, birth-based approach to categorizing citizens, which could undercut any existing flexibility in caste or religious boundaries. CONCLUSION These three recent court cases bring to light the variety of social processes which are helping to undermine identity-based inequalities, and they also illustrate how the courts have responded to a variety of liminal identities. To summarize, the case of the “spurious” tribe shows how the court, with the aim of securing social justice for “genuine” beneficiaries, contributed to the construction of tribes as timeless and unchanging categories and ordered strict policing of identity claims. The decision on intercaste marriage reinforced the notion of caste as a category determined at birth when reservations are at stake, with no recourse to voluntary change through any means, including marriage (with the notable exception of a state court ruling denying a woman reservations after marrying “up”). The third case involving conversion suggests that in the court’s eyes, religion, like caste, is determined by birth, and the state rather than the community in question is the ultimate arbiter of identity. The social circumstances highlighted in these three cases reveal some of the ways reservation policies contribute to the blurring of social boundaries by changing the incentives for desanskritization, intermarriage and conversion. At the same time the legal decisions show the state’s tendency to react to these changes by reinforcing group boundaries, even in the act of trying to reduce


group disparities. In the third case, the court’s decision on caste membership was even more top-down and inflexible than some pre-independence court decisions. These cases demonstrate that in spite of a postcolonial shift in the objectives of state classifications, reservation policies, being dependent on the categorization of social groups, may have unintended side effects, such as a strict state scrutiny of identity claims. These are the dilemmas of a group-based solution applied to individuals. At a practical level, “spurious” claims could hurt the individuals who would otherwise benefit from reservations. At the same time, incentives to claim membership in a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe could reduce the stigma associated with these categories. In the Patil sisters’ case, the court credited precolonial evidence and precluded a dynamic interpretation of caste identities in the process of attempting to protect the rights of the “true” beneficiaries of reservations. By uncritically adopting colonial-era categories, the court emphasized supposedly immutable characteristics of categorizable peoples. The intercaste marriage decision, denying reservation benefits based on claims to be Backward through an intercaste marriage, could keep benefits from women of privileged backgrounds, but did nothing to encourage such marriages. In the third case, the court tried to squelch conversions to more expedient religious identities, but in the process, it shifted from precedents supporting community self-definition toward state definition of identity. Should we judge a policy by how it deals with exceptions? Arguably many other people fit into the state categories more easily. Moreover, imperfect or poorly implemented reservation categories may be better than no categories at all for most of the disadvantaged citizens in India. The legal treatment of anomalous or exceptional cases is important, however, because, given the goals of reservations, such cases are not necessarily “problems” but rather signs of social change. As articulated in the three cases discussed here, such cases have inspired an unfortunate legal distinction between “genuine” and “not genuine” identities. If the courts acknowledged that such cases are ambiguous, rather than assuming fraud, the categories could be implemented in a way that recognizes and fosters changes and choices already occurring in society. A more nuanced adjudication of identities might recognize that even “tribal” cultures can alter over time, that women in intercaste marriages may be stigmatized enough to become Backward, or that religious and caste communities may accept new or returning members. Yet courts are somewhat limited by the categories embedded in the policies themselves. Legislative changes could put into practice at the national level a category of reservations for people who have an intercaste marriage, one alternative model that would not penalize people for stepping across social boundaries (Paswan interview 29 December 1996). Group-based policies, by upping the stakes attached to certain group identities, draw attention to these divisions but also inspire challenges to the


boundaries between them. As seen in the court cases discussed here, the legal response has been, at times, conservative and static rather than flexible, but this state crackdown on categorization is not the whole story. Although judges may try to force an unwieldy social structure into neat legal boxes, these group-based policies inspire further struggles over the gray areas between categories.

3 Official anthropology

In a bookstore in Delhi, a salesperson, apprised of my interest in lower caste politics, handed me a tome about the officially listed untouchable groups, The Scheduled Castes (Singh 1995).1 The first thing to strike me was the cover, a glossy photograph of a presumably Scheduled Caste woman with her back against a tall stone wall, surrounded by her four grubby kids. She is beaming. The second thing to strike me was the title of this new series, of which this was the second volume. The series, by the central government’s Anthropological Survey of India, was called the “People of India,” a name that had been used for several rather notorious colonial ethnographic projects. Intrigued, I began to examine this most recent avatar of the “People of India.” From J.Forbes Watson and J.W.Kaye’s photographic collections to J.D.Anderson and Herbert Risley’s ethnographies, colonial portrayals entitled the “People of India” have classified, categorized and mapped the people under study (Watson 1868–75, Anderson 1982 (orig. 1913), Risley 1915). Historians, anthropologists and political scientists have since critiqued the colonial state’s “ordering of difference” on the basis of caste, ethnicity, region, race or religion in such studies (Metcalf 1995, Pandey 1992, Cohn 1987, 1996, Young 1994). Despite the tainted past of such ethnographies, the Indian government’s anthropological department, the Anthropological Survey of India, is engaged in a project also called the “People of India.” According to the initial circular about it, “[t]his will be a project on the People of India by the people of India,” a phrase ringing with nationalism; yet, the goal of this national project is to generate a profile of each “community” in India, largely defined in terms of caste. Purportedly a work of apolitical anthropology, this endeavor is nevertheless sponsored by the state and uses the administrative categories of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Due to India’s reservation policies for these disadvantaged groups, controversy rages over their boundaries, numbers and social conditions (Galanter 1984, Jenkins 1998, 1999, 2001a). Although castes are a major unit of analysis for the People of India projects, both past and present, the latest project superimposes the new theme of national unity, a


politically useful focus for an ethnography sponsored by the central government of India. I argue that the resumption of this official caste-based anthropology, like earlier colonial projects, reinforces caste. By underplaying continuing disparities in the pursuit of conclusions emphasizing national unity, the contemporary project both reiterates caste-based distinctions and reduces their legitimacy as a tool for reservation policies. While such a study might be used to undermine caste distinctions by providing data to refine reservation policies, the People of India project’s conclusions have often been used to simply undermine the policies. The People of India projects, colonial and postcolonial, and the varied identity claims made about them, in them, and through them demonstrate the intertwined nature of social identities and state identifications. In this chapter I compare the current People of India project led by Kumar Suresh Singh with the most famous colonial ethnography of that name authored by Herbert Risley (1915). First I discuss how this comparison contributes to critiques of colonial forms of knowledge by highlighting contemporary legacies of colonial anthropology, particularly the continuing emphasis on caste and the relationship between official anthropological identifications and politicized identities. I then compare the colonial and postcolonial People of India projects in terms of their tendencies toward classification, administration and politicization. Both are preoccupied with classification, particularly of castes; both blur the line between anthropology and administration; and, consequently, both accounts have become politicized. Responses to the project in the context of reservation policies highlight the political impact of such official identifications. Finally I turn to the major point of contrast between these studies, namely, their different conclusions about Indian nationalism. In spite of its more optimistic conclusions that caste has not impeded national unity, the contemporary study seems at times startlingly familiar; moreover, whether colonial or post-colonial, these official ethnographies serve the needs of the state in similar ways. It is important to preface the following by noting that the contemporary focus of this chapter is by necessity limited in scope to one anthropological project headed by Indian anthropologists in administrative rather than academic positions; the approach discussed here is neither unique to nor generalizable to Indian anthropologists. As Ronald Inden points out, many academics outside India continue to harbor quite essentialist views of caste (Inden 1990:83). Many anthropologists and social scientists in India, some quoted later in this article, are reflective about colonial practices and critical of the People of India project, contributing to ongoing debates about the relationship between the social sciences and governments, both colonial and contemporary.


ANTHROPOLOGY, COLONIALISM AND THE STATE Colonial administrators in India “darted across the subcontinent mapping, tabulating and classifying” (Khilnani 1997:155). Caste categories were reified by colonial administrators concerned about affirming their own superiority and authority, and postcolonial India has been hard pressed to escape their authoritative power. Although the administrators and power relations have changed, the troubling relationship between anthropology and politics has not. In many contexts, “[c]olonial anthropology supplied a library of ethnicity,” writes M.Crawford Young in The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. “The traits of a community closely examined through the classical participant-observation methodology were projected onto a much larger ethnically labeled collectivity, portrayed as a once and future reality through the premise of the ethnographic present” (Young 1994b:233). The portrayal, in some cases, contributed to the reinvigoration or reinforcement of indigenous categories. Young observes that “the standard presumption was of discrete, bounded groups,” and that “[i]n the extreme case, the colonial state veritably breathed life into quite novel categories of identity” (Young 1985:74). Colonial anthropology influenced the societies under study, including their anthropological norms and practices, which, in turn, continue to influence these societies. Categories of identity, once authenticated by “science,” the state, or both, can take on a life of their own, as can be seen in a variety of contexts in Asia and elsewhere (Brown 2001, Gladney 1996, Bremen and Shimizu 1999).2 In the Indian context, Gyan Prakash and Nicholas Dirks have been influential critics of the use of the categories of caste, tribe and race by colonial ethnographers. Dirks points out that: Caste was just one category out of many others, one way of organizing and representing identity. Moreover, caste was not a single category or even logic of categorization… To read and organize social difference and deference—pervasive features of Indian society—solely in terms of caste thus required a striking disregard for ethnographic specificity, as well as systematic denial of the political mechanisms that selected different kinds of social units as most significant at different times. (Dirks 1992a:60) In the process, colonial ethnographers themselves became one such political mechanism, selecting caste as a key unit of analysis and imbuing it with new significance in the political context of colonial rule. Prakash’s work on colonial ethnography and museums illustrates the “link between classification and colonialism” (Prakash 1992:156). One extreme example, from 1866, is a proposal, never fully implemented, for an all-India


ethnological congress. It was to be a sort of living exhibition, in which people, “classified according to races and tribes, should sit each in his own stall, should receive and converse with the Public, and submit to being photographed, printed, and taken off in casts, and otherwise reasonably dealt with, in the interests of science” (from the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society 1866:90, as quoted in Prakash 1992:158). Crispin Bates points out that this idea was actually taken up and implemented on a smaller scale in an 1866–7 exhibition in Jabalpur, at which human “specimens” were displayed and a report produced. “By far the bulk of the report was devoted to measurements: of height, length of upper arm, lower arm, thigh, leg, breadth of chest and body, colour of skin, eyes, pupils, beard and moustache, length or other peculiarity of heel, any other physical peculiarities, and diet” (Bates 1995:239).3 Prakash observes that ambiguity often thwarted such exercises in classification by the British, for whom “[t]o know was to name, identify and compare” (Prakash 1992:155). This is not to say that the colonial rulers invented caste out of the blue.4 Caste, and even caste studies, preceded colonialism, but the Raj’s geographic scope and power in combination with its propensity to categorize were unprecedented. Of the many who have written about the power relations and politics behind colonial anthropology in India, some have considered the implications of such policies for the present. For example, Arjun Appadurai’s critique of “officially enforced labeling activities” (Appadurai 1993:326) suggests that such practices can have a far-reaching impact beyond the colonial period; yet more needs to be written about official anthropology in contemporary India.5 Building on historical work about the role of Indians themselves in the development of colonial ethnographies (Irschick 1994, Bayly 1995:183), I take this line of study into the present day, re-examining the telling critiques of colonial-era anthropology in light of current developments. Both before and after independence, administrators in India have tried to simplify and codify society. Historian Thomas Metcalf precedes his discussion of Risley’s People of India with the observation that “[a]s time went on, Indian ethnography asserted ever more rigorously its scientific claims. Its categories, embedded in censuses, gazetteers, and revenue books, became ever more closely tied to the administrative concerns of the state. At the heart of this ethnography remained always the study of caste” (Metcalf 1995:119). Colonial anthropological studies were driven not only by the desire to contribute to scientific progress but also by the imperative to monitor and control a diverse land. These very motives persist in the contemporary, nationalist desire for scientific achievement and unity in diversity. Thus the postcolonial People of India project retains many of the problems of its colonial precedents, even with a nationalist agenda. Risley wrote that the “peculiar” institution of caste would most likely prove to be a challenge for the development of Indian nationality: “So long as a regime of


caste persists, it is difficult to see how the sentiment of unity and solidarity can penetrate and inspire all classes of the community” (Risley 1915:286, 293). The new People of India project is an attempt to move beyond the colonial emphasis on India as a place distinct from the West and divided internally. Yet, this project embodies the ongoing tension between caste and nation, as it simultaneously categorizes people as did Risley and, whenever possible, emphasizes national unity and linkages. In the following comparison, I find several continuities. Even post-colonial anthropologists espousing national unity can be haunted by the ethnic and racial categories bequeathed by colonialism (Young 1985). The current People of India project breaks from the past in its optimism about Indian nationalism, yet its nationalist conclusions are rooted in some much older ideas and practices. The current project justifies the notion of a unified People of India by drawing on methodologies such as nasal indexes and trait counting, as well as colonial era assumptions, such as the idea that India is essentially communal in nature. The project both classifies the people of India and includes optimistic arguments that, in the end, these various categories are really quite similar. Such conclusions reflect the difficult position of diverse postcolonial states, as the “emergent civil societies of the terminal colonial era were simultaneously becoming one and many” (Young 1994:39). The danger of this official, nationalist anthropology is that categories such as the Scheduled Castes and Tribes get both a scientific and an official stamp of approval, while some persistent disparities between these categories get swept under the carpet. RISLEY'S PEOPLE OF INDIA The rise of caste as the single most important trope for colonial Indian society, and the complicity of Indian anthropology in the project of colonial state formation, is documented in a great many texts, perhaps nowhere more fully, though complexly, than in Risley’s classic work, The People of India. (Dirks 1992a:68) Sir Herbert Risley’s book, The People of India, is based on the extensive report on caste he produced as Census Commissioner for the 1901 census. In the wake of the mutiny by Indian soldiers of the colonial army in 1857, more and more information was collected about the inhabitants of India. Anthropologist G.G.Raheja argues that “the colonial imagination had seized upon caste identities as a means of understanding and controlling the Indian population after the blow to administrative complacency occasioned in 1857” (Raheja 1996: 495).6 The first nation-wide Indian census occurred in 1872, and subsequent


censuses, particularly Risley’s, tried to record additional information about the various groups within India, their practices, and their “character.” This was no easy task. Classification Regarding caste, Risley lamented that “no column on the census schedule displays a more bewildering variety of entries, or gives so much trouble to the enumerating and testing staff and to the central offices which compile the results.” Nevertheless he described a process of “sorting, referencing and cross referencing and corresponding with local authorities, which ultimately result in the compilation of a table” (Risley 1915:109–10). He presented his theory that the caste system originated in the interactions between racial types, offering his contribution to the broader “scientific” study of race, including racial typologies and anthropometry. He felt India’s caste system provided an ideal setting for such physical measurements since “it seemed that the restrictions on intermarriage, which are peculiar to the Indian social system, would favour this method of observation, and would enable it to yield particularly clear and instructive results” (Risley 1915:20). Most notoriously, he commented on the: curiously close correspondence between the gradations of racial type indicated by the nasal index and certain of the social data ascertained by independent inquiry. If we take a series of castes…and arrange them in order of the average nasal index, so that the caste with the finest nose shall be at the top and that with the coarsest at the bottom of the list, it will be found that this order substantially corresponds with the accepted order of social precedence. (Risley 1915:29) Applying racial theories to his study of caste, Risley devoted much of his study to detailed measurements and classifications of “physical types.” In addition to physical types, Risley included many more chapters describing caste in terms of “social types,” “proverbs,” marriage practices, religion, and the origins of caste.8 During the colonial era, the search for order that dominated science became enmeshed with the search for justifications for imperial rule (Metcalf 1995:66–8, Fernandez-Armesto 1995:433–62). Studying racial classifications and phenomena such as India’s caste system helped to distinguish colonies from the West in order to “justify” foreign rule. Whether designing a racial hierarchy or documenting practices seen as “uncivilized,” such studies could undergird claims about the right to colonize. The obsession with classification, however, was not only for academic interest and colonial justification but also for the more practical goal of administration.


Administration Anthropologist/administrators, a rather common hybrid in India, were aware of the administrative uses to which their work could be put. One of Risley’s last public addresses noted the value of teaching Indian anthropology to the men in the Indian services (Risley 1969:xiv). Clearly, British classifications of castes and tribes in India were inspired in part by their administrative uses. Notably, Risley was an administrator before he was an anthropologist. Educated in law and modern history at Oxford, he gained his experience in anthropology after joining the Indian civil service (Risley 1969:xi-xii, Bates 1995:241–2). Nevertheless his work in India allowed him to become president of the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1910. He held a variety of administrative positions throughout his career, serving as a member of a commission studying the working of the Indian police and as the honorary director of the Ethnological Survey of the Indian Empire. These posts are not as far afield as they may seem. The labeling and registering of the so-called “criminal tribes” in colonial India is a particularly striking example of the nexus of anthropology and administration. In the People of India, Risley described one tribe as “habitual thieves and burglars,” another as “the most treacherous and aggressive of all the North-Eastern tribes,” and a third as “hunter, blackmailer, and highway robber” (Risley 1915:Appendix Plates II and XXXV, 139). As part of what Bernard Cohn calls their “surveillance modality,” the British developed criminal ethnography archives and aspired to have systematic anthropometric methods to identify criminals (Cohn 1996:10–11, Major 1999: 657). Criminal categories were not the only ones of administrative interest: “Other categories of caste such as money lending, agricultural or ‘martial’ were used as a basis for legislation controlling land transfers, the grant of proprietary rights, and the regulation of rents, as well as a basis for distinguishing between the loyal and the disloyal, and for recruiting to the armed forces” (Bates 1995:228). In the post-Mutiny context, administrators, based on their beliefs in the power of primordial ties and “martial races,” wanted group studies, including evaluations of which groups were loyal fighters and which were potential threats to order, as part of their efforts to avoid such revolts in the future (Raheja 1996:504, Des Chene 1999:121–36, Metcalf 1995:122–8). In short, the line between administration and ethnography was thin. Politicization Politicization of these studies was an inevitable result of the overriding administrative concerns of those carrying them out. As described above, Risley ushered the census process from a “bewildering variety of entries” on caste to a final table, which could be easily consulted by administrators. Risley threw this


whole process into the political limelight with his decision to try to arrange the castes in order of “social precedence” in the 1901 census, generating, in the words of Ronald Inden, “a mountain of petitions and polemical literature concerning caste standing” (Inden 1990:59). Various caste associations emerged to attempt to increase their official status (Caroll 1978). As Risley himself reflected, “The best evidence of the general success of the experiment, and incidentally of the remarkable vitality of caste at the present day, is to be found in the great number of petitions and memorials to which it gave rise” (Risley 1915:112). Optimistically, Risley went on to argue: “If the principle on which the classification was based had not appealed to the usages and traditions of the great mass of Hindus, it is inconceivable that so many people should have taken so much trouble and incurred substantial expenditure with the object of securing its application in a particular way” (Risley 1915:112). Whether the reaction was due to his perceived accuracy or inaccuracy, clearly Risley’s attempt to arrange castes in a hierarchy inspired many to try to interact with and influence the colonial government. One of the many classifications Risley drew on was the varna system. One possible translation of the term “caste,” varna, as discussed in Chapter 1, refers to an idealized hierarchy of brahmins, kshatriyas, vaishyas, and shudras, corresponding with occupation and status. This type of codification has come under criticism, both by some of Risley’s contemporaries as well as current scholars, since variations in understandings of the varna system have always confounded attempts to come up with such a classification scheme for all of India (Cohn 1987:243, Quigley 1993:16, Pant 1987:155). Although recognition of this system and its meaning varies tremendously, Risley saw it as a potentially neat, if imperfect, typology to aid in the organization of status rankings, which were carried out at the provincial level (Risley 1915:114). In response, petitions for higher status were often attempts to claim a different varna status in the census records, as in the Khatris’ objection to being classified as vaishyas: “A meeting of protest was held…and a great array of authorities was marshaled to prove that the Khatris are lineally descended from the Kshatriyas of Hindu mythology,” considered a more forward caste (Risley 1915:112). Colonial categorizations of caste for anthropological and administrative purposes led to caste associations and caste-based organizing and lobbying to increase official caste standing (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967). The jockeying for position of Risley’s era takes an ironic twist in contemporary Indian politics, when membership in an officially Backward Class can make one eligible for reservations. The ongoing People of India project continues the traditions of classification, administration and politicization, although the current politics of reservations draws more attention to the question of who may become “backward” than who may become “forward.”


THE NEW PEOPLE OF INDIA PROJECT I trust this series on the People of India, which is based on a comprehensive anthropological survey of the country, will be found useful by all sections of our people, including students, researchers, teachers, social activists, administrators and political leaders. (K.S.Singh, India's Communities, People of India Vol. 4 1998:xii) The current People of India project is a national ethnographic survey of “all communities of India,” being undertaken by the Anthropological Survey of India, an organization that emerged from the anthropological section of the Zoological Survey of India (Singh 2000). The Anthropological Survey of India has been called the “brainchild” of Herbert Risley (Bayly 1999:275–6), although it was not founded until 1945. An initial impetus for the new People of India project may also be attributed to Risley. When Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked the Director-General of her Anthropological Survey, K.S.Singh, for an anthropological introduction to India, “Singh could only suggest H.H.Risley’s The People of India…. Thus was born a new People of India” (Pinney 1994:22). The project, headed by K.S.Singh, officially began in 1985, the year after Indira Gandhi’s death, and the data was gradually published throughout the 1990s. The People of India study received funding from the Indian Planning Commission, but the political context of this study is a period in which developmental zeal, especially the idea that caste would simply disappear with modernity, has faded. Previous assessments of the imminent decline of caste, characteristic of immediate post-independence optimism and the ideologies of modernization theory, have been challenged by the persistence of caste as an organizing category in political and social life, despite—or, some would argue, because of—reservation policies for low castes (Randall and Theobald 1998, Jalali 1993). In a context of continuing violence between different castes, growing questions about exactly who should benefit from reservations, and increasing mobilizations and political parties organized along caste lines (Jaffrelot 2000), the government undertook a new, comprehensive study of the “communities” of India. Classification Six hundred investigators participated in the study of 4693 communities in all of the states and union territories. They interviewed 24,951 people, out of whom 4981 were women. They based their findings about each community on an average of five key informants—described as “informed informants”—and spent an average of 5.5 days researching each community (Singh 1998:x).9 Most fieldwork was done between 1985 and 1994, followed by additional fieldwork


between 1994 and 1996, and the expected 43 volumes are gradually being released. These volumes include, in addition to separate volumes on the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, national and state-by-state volumes on “all” communities, as well as volumes on languages, biological variations and an anthropological atlas. Former Director-General of the Anthropological Survey of India from 1984 until 1993, K.S.Singh has “spearheaded, authored and edited” the People of India project (Singh 1995: cover). Like Risley, Singh is both an administrator and anthropologist. Singh’s discussion of this project and his own previous administrative and scholarly work with Scheduled Tribes show a genuine concern for the plight of disadvantaged communities (Singh interview 11 April 1996, Singh 1985:ix-xi). Yet the legacies of colonial anthropology haunt aspects of the new project. Colonial traditions of classifying castes and tribes—and even some of the same classifications—persist in the current project. Lists of castes were drawn from census and ethnographic surveys from as far back as 1806; although attempts were made to update such lists, some characteristics of the previous People of India project continued. For example, informants were asked to try to place themselves in the four-fold hierarchical varna system, reminiscent of Risley’s similar efforts to arrange castes in order of social precedence (Singh 1995:6, 1992a, 1994:7, Risley 1915:114). Singh writes, “There is a widespread awareness of the varna system among Hindu communities (68.5 per cent), about half of whom recognize their place in it (52.6 per cent)” (Singh 1998:xvii). A telling finding is that “Most of the communities (62 per cent) construct their identity from ethnographic accounts” (Singh 1998:xv), leaving readers of the new People of India project to wonder whether repeated anthropological inquiries and accounts about varna have contributed to the public’s “awareness” of such categories. In spite of the inquiries about varna, the national volumes are organized alphabetically rather than by social precedence. Notably, however, two lower status categories, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, almost always considered outside the varna system, have been singled out and scrutinized in their own, more detailed, volumes.10 A form of classification that bears a strong resemblance to Risley’s project is the use of biological data, including cephalic and nasal indexes and “dermatoglyphics.” The organization of this data is also reminiscent of colonial categories: The attributes of physical diversity are discussed in this volume by pooling the samples under seven categories of presumably related groups of people, namely other (caste) communities (general population), Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Muslims, Christians, Parsis and others. (Singh et al. 1994:7)


This list of categories is interesting for several reasons. The authors’ desire to conduct anthropometric measurements on these “presumably related groups” echoes Risley’s enthusiasm for India as an ideal laboratory for such methods due to community endogamy. The labeling of the categories is also notable, signaling which are the dominant groups and adopting administrative categories into an ethnographic study. Upper caste Hindu “others” are also known as the “general population” as opposed to other “others,” presumably sundry minority communities. The lower castes, tribes and related minorities singled out by colonial anthropologists and administrators prior to independence are also singled out here. The organizing assumption seems to remain that religious, caste and even administrative distinctions are the logical categories to use when looking for actual physical differences, although the findings of this study ultimately confound this assumption. The use of the government’s officially listed, or “scheduled,” categories in this anthropological study brings us to the administrative tendencies shaping the People of India project, another continuity with colonial traditions. Administration The government of India continues to focus special research efforts on the “empowerment of the socially disadvantaged groups,” including the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the Ninth Five Year Plan, the government’s “research, evaluation and monitoring” needs included studies of “the problem areas, the problem groups” as well as “special problems related to frontiers/ forest dwelling tribals; malnutrition and alcoholism among SCs and STs; the emerging problems like the drug abuse/drug addiction” (Planning Commission 1997–2002:3.9.93). The focus on “problem” groups and behaviors is a thread running from Risley’s project to the present. Even couched in terms of empowerment, the assumed association of scheduled groups with alcoholism and criminality continues in the present day. For example, alcohol consumption practices are more consistently noted in the People of India volumes on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes than in the volumes on all communities. The most striking parallel to the dark side of colonial administrative anthropology, particularly its focus on “criminals,” is another contemporary Anthropological Survey of India project called the “Portrait Building System.” This was an attempt to aid in apprehending criminals through collecting photos of different population or “ethnic” groups. This initiative took place after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and was a joint endeavor of the Bureau of Police Research and Development and the Anthropological Survey of India. A total of 698 “ethnic groups” from all over India were photographed for this project. Different features were clipped, classified and stored: “Hairline was classified into 7, forehead 6, eye 11, nose 9 and chin into 9 classes” (Basu 1990:114). This


effort epitomizes the imperative to classify and administer, which guided both colonial and postcolonial official anthropology. In order to have diversity of features, 2234 normal adult persons were photographed from Police and Detective Training Schools, post-graduate and under-graduate college hostels, semi-desert and mountainous areas, industrial establishments, market places of tribal areas, villages, tea gardens, slums of big cities, etc. covering great distances on all types of transport wherever necessary and occasionally on foot… For example, number S234L is a segment that indicates that it is from South Indian Material, its serial number is 234 and it is lip. (Basu 1990:114) The People of India project also included a collection of 21,362 photographs; the goal was to take at least five photographs of each community. Although there is no official connection between the two projects, the portrait building system shows that a recent project involving the same organization, the Anthropological Survey of India, was motivated by administrative concerns about criminality. Materials collected for the People of India project could be useful for the portrait building system; even if they are not used, the portrait project illustrates the effect of administrative concerns on official anthropological agendas.11 Another crossover between anthropology and administration is the People of India project’s use of the administrative categories of Scheduled Castes and Tribes and subsequent entanglement with reservation policies. I asked the head of the current project, K.S.Singh, whether the Anthropological Survey of India had any influence on the schedules, or lists, of groups eligible for reservations, given their official capacity as the anthropological advisor to the government of India. Singh responded that “anthropologists of the Anthropological Survey of India are serving on the committee of the government of India which recommends the listing of particular communities as Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste” (Singh interview 11 April 1996). Administrators of the Ministry of Welfare who had dealt with group petitions for Scheduled Caste status had used some Anthropological Survey of India materials, sought advice from the Survey, and included someone from the Survey on a nonpermanent committee that initially went through such petitions (Choudhary and Khan interviews 17 December 1996). A census administrator who, in his previous job in the Census’ Social Studies Division, had responded to queries from the Ministry of Welfare on the makeup of Scheduled Caste lists noted that the Anthropological Survey of India had not generally been associated with this work of submitting recommendations about lists but had more recently been included in meetings on the subject (Chakravorty interview 16 December 1996).


Due to the use of official categories and the benefits at stake, this anthropological project’s commitment to honor the self-identification of groups was compromised. In an early description of the project, Singh wrote, “We decided to go ultimately by how a community identifies itself in practice” (Singh 1987: 241). Yet later Singh wrote, in many cases, “a community, attracted by the facilities extended to the SC or the ST, twists ethnographic accounts in its endeavor to identify itself with either of the constitutional categories” (Singh 1995:25), accounts which, it seems, he felt he must untwist. The Scheduled Castes volume was “guided by government of India notifications,” followed by the “perceptions of the people” (Singh 1995:2). Although initially preferring selfidentification and continuing to recognize the “dynamic” nature of the caste system, Singh faced an administrative reality: “The problem is the scheduled castes and tribes categor[ies] have been listed in India. The list is there” (Singh interview 11 April 1996). In 1990, while the People of India project was in full swing, Prime Minister V.P.Singh announced his intention to expand the reservations program for central government jobs to benefit not just the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, but also the Other Backward Classes. D.L.Sheth, a sociologist and member of the National Commission for Backward Classes, set up to help implement these new policies, said the commission sometimes used People of India data in its work, which dealt with disputes over which groups were really Other Backward Classes (Sheth interview 6 September 1996). A former head of the commission said he had no interaction with the project but that such a study might be useful to them (Prasad interview 18 September 1996). Aside from its utility for the administration of reservations, the project became involved in the public controversy over the extension of central government job reservations to this wider range of disadvantaged groups. As the name “Other Backward Classes” suggests, this is an ambiguous category; moreover, some people were adamantly opposed to increasing the percentage of reserved jobs. The People of India project soon became a weapon in the debate. Politicization K.S.Singh downplayed any direct involvement between his scholarly endeavor and the debate over reservations, yet in his writing on the People of India project, Singh has commented critically on the definitions of the Other Backward Classes used for reservation policies, classifications which at times must rely on census data from 1931, the last time caste was comprehensively recorded (Singh 1987:240, 244). The official ceremony releasing the People of India data, in October 1990, coincided with protests over Prime Minister V.P.Singh’s announcement that he supported the 1980 Mandal Commission’s report on the Other Backward Classes and that he wanted to extend 27 per cent reservations in


central government jobs to these groups. This was one of the most controversial decisions of the V.P.Singh government and contributed to its fall from power shortly thereafter. As upper caste students engaged in demonstrations, including several self-immolations, the People of India data were released. The new study was cited in critiques of the policy, since the People of India project listed a smaller total number of backward classes than the older Mandal report, which was used by the government: As the row over the number of backward communities listed in the Mandal Commission’s report continues a just-concluded study of the Anthropological Survey of India has identified 1051 backward classes in the country… The Mandal Commission has listed more then 3000 communities as socially and educationally backward. (The Statesman, 1 October 1990) This report was followed the next day by a similar report, entitled “Mandal’s many mistakes,” in the Indian Express: The findings of the People of India Project study of all castes and communities in the country, conducted by the Anthropological Survey of India, are a[t] great variance with the Mandal Commission’s report in terms of the number of other backward classes… According to the study, the most exhaustive and definitive work on communities in India so far, there are 1051 backward communities whereas the Mandal Commission has recorded 3743 OBCs… Investigators and scholars who participated in the five-year project found that in all states and Union territories, the number of SC, ST and OBC communities was actually far lower than recorded previously. (Indian Express-New Delhi, 2 October 1990) The numerical disparity between the People of India project and the Mandal report can be partially explained by repetitions of the same community in the latter, due to synonyms and alternate spellings, yet such newspaper headlines and articles implied that Mandal advocated including a large number of illegitimate beneficiary groups on the reserved lists. Entangled in the protests against reservations, the People of India project became overtly politicized. Delhi University sociologist Andre Beteille argues that this study, organized along caste lines, “cannot be passed off as a disinterested piece of research, because it has the stamp of the authority of the Government of India and becomes, therefore, in some sense an officially acknowledged if not an officially affirmed classification” (Beteille interview 9 September 1996). Not only is a government bureaucracy behind the project but


government categories also organize it. B.K.Roy Burman, an anthropologist and head of the Mandal Commission’s “technical committee” (although he stepped down in protest over the commission’s use of data), has been saying since the 1960s that the categories of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe are “policy” categories rather than “scientific” categories (Burman interview 31 October 1996). Thus their place in an anthropological study is dubious. In part due to its official ramifications, this study, like Risley’s before it, has generated petitions from groups anxious to be included or concerned about their own entries or the entries of other groups. Whereas people petitioning Risley hoped for higher status, contemporary reservation policies put scrutiny on the lower status groups. For example, the second edition of the Scheduled Castes volume includes a new appendix, a “restudy” of the Beda Jangam, “following a complaint that the Jangam, the uppercrust of the Lingayat, had passed themselves off as Beda Jangam in order to corner the benefits of the scheduled castes” (Singh 1995:1366). The revised entry describes this group as “infiltrated” and notes that the population rose very quickly between 1961 and 1981. Whereas the initial entry reports, “In Kannada ‘beda’ means begger,” the appendix entry hotly amends this: “These Jangam even claim that the Kannada word Beda… means to beg, and that seeking alms is their age-old practice. This goes against the traditional meaning…hunter” (Singh 1995:205, 1368). The new entry goes so far as to scold the infiltrators: “They treat some communities as untouchables, thus perpetrating caste divisions. Yet the irony is that some of them pass themselves off as Beda Jangam in order to avail the benefits of protective discrimination given to the scheduled castes” (Singh 1995:1368). This restudy illustrates several continuities with the previous People of India project: Informants still try to manipulate official anthropology to their advantage. People still petition the government over the construction of official identities. Official anthropological accounts still unabashedly address administrative concerns. In addition to petitioners, there are numerous examples of groups citing the People of India study to advance various causes. To give an example of the way official categories and community claims interact, a Christian community in Goa was fighting for Other Backward Class status, but eschewed the untouchable Scheduled Caste category. A related concern was that they did not want their street renamed for Dr B.R.Ambedkar, a Dalit leader and India’s first Law Minister, due to concerns about the potential stigma associated with such an address. In their efforts, they cited their entry in the People of India project as scientific proof that they are not untouchable Mahars (Deccan Herald-Bangalore 26 January 1996). In addition to those citing the People of India study for various political purposes, other groups, unsatisfied with such official accounts, have sponsored community studies of their own, which are often used to argue that they too are “backward.” Let my People Go: Scheduled Caste People Group Profiles,


describes disadvantages of untouchable groups, including Christians, countering official ethnography which must follow the government’s current policy that Christians are not eligible for Scheduled Caste status (India Missions Association 1995). The People of India volume on Scheduled Castes, for example, mentions the demand by some Christians and Muslims to be included as Scheduled Castes, but only includes the officially recognized Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist Scheduled Castes, another example of government policies overriding self-identifications (Singh 1995:10). In contrast, Let My People Go attempts to undermine such a classification by making an “anthropological” argument that Scheduled Castes never have been Hindus: Dr Vidhyarti, the famous anthropologist studying the religion of untouchables, says they follow their own native festivals… The recent opening of some Hindu temples for the Scheduled Castes is a purely political gimmick since 1920 to get their votes… To put it more exactly, it was out of the greatest concern to keep the two faiths separate, that untouchability and isolation were stringently maintained. Therefore to call a person as a Hindu Scheduled Caste is as absurd as calling for a hot ice cream. (India Missions Association 1995:40) Another publication likewise argues, on “anthropological” grounds, that the government’s policy of excluding Christians from Scheduled Caste benefits is flawed. The following passage is part of a critique of the Presidential order of 1950 that “No person who professes a religion different than Hinduism shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.” The passage is part of an argument that this order makes no sense because no Scheduled Castes are really Hindus. Reply the Christian Dalit anthropologists “every word of it is wrong. First ‘caste’ is not a Hindu word… To say that Hinduism created us the Dalit peoples is as absurd as to say that Nazism created the Jews… We the Dalits predate the Hindus in India by 1000 years… On what basis [do] you call us converts from Hinduism?” (National Coordination Committee for SC Christians 1995:2) Groups in society are objecting to their categorization by the government and, recognizing the political weight given to anthropological data, are trying to fight fire with fire. An advocate of reservations for Muslims pointed out to me a Muslim organization that sponsored its own study to highlight Muslim disadvantages. Their volume is an attempt to challenge the official “social


science of backwardness,” which, it is claimed, does not do enough to compare the situation of Muslim communities vis-à-vis Hindus, due to the government treating such comparisons as sensitive and thus “classified” (Ahmad 1995:9).12 These counter-studies demonstrate that “anthropological” and other social scientific justifications are seen as potentially valuable tools or weapons in political arguments over the proper classifications for reservations. The fact that the government has relied on anthropology to make and justify administrative decisions in the past and continues to do so inspires groups to make anthropological arguments to legitimize their own claims. Because of its caste classifications and administrative uses, the new People of India has become as politicized as the old, although the arguments over status have become inverted, with various groups today arguing for the “backward” status their ancestors desperately sought to shed. The two studies of the People of India also draw different conclusions about Indian nationalism. NATIONALISM AND THE PEOPLE OF INDIA “India is no more one country than Europe—indeed very much less,” wrote Herbert Risley in his early twentieth-century report, a conclusion that the contemporary People of India project thoroughly rejects (Risely 1915:114). Risley’s final chapter focused on “caste and nationality” and the question of whether they are compatible or not (Risley 1915: 278–301). This chapter contained prescient projections regarding the use of caste by political machines and the prospects for Hindu nationalism in India, yet his conclusions were pessimistic about the future of Indian nationalism. Emphasizing the many social divisions that he spent the rest of the book classifying, such as language, religion and caste, Risley’s conclusions foreshadowed colonial policies based on assumptions of religious incompatibility, which culminated in Partition. Risley argued that “while community of religion strengthens and consolidates national sentiment, religious differences create distinct types within a nation and tend to perpetuate separate and antagonistic interests” (Risley 1915:291). Risley suggested that religious and caste distinctions boded ill for Indian nationalism, although he prudently noted that discounting Indian nationalism completely would be premature. “Caste seems at first sight to be absolutely incompatible with the idea of nationality…but a caste or group of castes might harden into a nation and…the caste organization itself might be employed to bring about such a consummation” (Risley 1915:300). At the same time, in keeping with his “scientific” study of caste, he likened a relaxation of the ties of caste with the “withdrawal of some elemental force like gravitation or molecular attraction” (Risley 1915:278). Risley’s skepticism of nationalism is a striking example of what Nicholas Dirks has called the “relentless anthropologizing of India, which served to misrecognize the social and historical possibilities for the


nationalist awakening, even as it worked to reify categories of social classification” (Dirks 1997:184). Whether caste persisted or not, Risley’s final chapter leaves one expecting disintegration rather than an Indian nation. In contrast, the new People of India project’s director, K.S.Singh, emphasized that his was the first truly “national” People of India project. When asked why he thought a project encompassing all of India was so important, Singh responded, “India has been a cultural area. India has been a civilizational area” (Singh interview 11 April 1996). Alluding to ancient texts of the subcontinent, Singh continued: In Arthashastra and Mahabharata, they mention communities which are spread from Kanyakumari to Kashmir, from Assam to Gujarat. So India has been an ethnographic universe, and to that extent we have done the survey…the first complete survey. (Singh interview 11 April 1996) Evoking ancient references to the most far-flung regions of the modern Indian state, in all four directions, Singh implied that India had an “ethnographic” coherence as a civilization or cultural unit in the past that justifies its status as a political unit in the present. Given the relatively recent development of the Indian nation with its existing boundaries, these allusions to ancient unity are historically dubious, yet imagining India in such a way is useful to the modern Indian state funding the project and trying to keep a diverse country intact. The difficult role of nationalist anthropologists is epitomized in the explanation of K.S.Singh, who uses ancient textual references to justify novel political boundaries largely inherited from colonial rule. Singh noted that although Risley made some comments about “national character” in the Indian context, “colonial ethnography generally ignored linkages of communities” (Singh 1987:244). Singh emphasized his own focus on linkages to counter the argument that a study based on communities might, like previous colonial studies, accentuate community distinctions or competition. In the study’s early stages, Singh noted that there was as yet no anthropological explanation for India’s unity: “It is with this integrational interaction…that this project is largely concerned” (Singh 1987:246, 248). At the official release of quantitative data generated by the project, Arjun Singh, then Minister for Human Resource Development, felt that this “mapping of the human surface of India” might be used to “strike an authentic chord for national integration” (Singh 1990: 100).13 Thus, in spite of its organization along the lines of subnational communities, this project emphasizes national unity wherever possible. The national scope and nationalist sentiment of the project are reasons for the choice of the word “community,” rather than caste or jati, to label the units of analysis. Rather than emphasizing divisions, community implies fellowship;


moreover the term could be applied all over India to countless types of categories. An article from the project’s early years includes a discussion of this decision: The word community or samudaya as it is called in some states like Kerala could be a more appropriate concept for an all India reference than caste with its various local names. Scholars…have expressed their consensus that community (samudaya) is less “offensive” and sounds more meaningful and befitting than jati. The community, is a larger social entity; jati is a closed structure. (Singh 1987:238–9) In contrast, the “old” ethnographers “seemed to take a peculiar delight in describing…the divisions and subdivisions” (Singh 1987:238). An emphasis on community, and unity, is “befitting” a national project, but it is hard to gloss over the key role of caste as a unit of analysis, particularly in the studies of Scheduled Castes. Although the English term community (rarely samudaya) has been used extensively in the various volumes, the volumes on the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, in particular, also refer to these groups as castes and tribes, most obviously in their titles, but also in some textual passages. In the most striking departure from Risley’s chapter on caste and nationality, the current project specifically downplays caste as an impediment to nationality. It does this through several types of arguments, emphasizing cultural and physical similarities, the fluidity of identity and, above all, progress. One method used to analyze national linkages is trait counting, a rather problematic methodology (Moerman 1965). By counting a list of traits, defined as “a cultural value, which is unique” (Singh 1992:98), anthropologists involved in the People of India project could conclude that the communities in India really have a lot in common. Volume seven is devoted in part to “Linkages: a Quantitative Profile” and is one of the volumes Singh described as “the soul of the project” (Singh interview 11 April 1996).14 Again drawing a contrast between colonial ethnography and his project’s emphasis on processes of interaction and linkage, Singh discussed the quantitative analysis of traits: Integration is sharing, and this is, precisely, what this project is about. We have tried to identify those traits which are shared by our people. According to our findings, out of 776 traits that we have identified, as many as 250 traits are shared by all of us. It shows that we are by and large a cohesive society. (Singh 1990:100–1)


Based on this analysis of traits, Singh argued that “there is a very high correlation of traits between the SC and the ST, between ST and Hindus, between the Hindu and Sikh, the Hindu and Muslims (which is very high indeed)” (Singh 1990:100–1). Given ongoing tensions between these groups, including some secessionist movements, this conclusion seems like an attempt to “scientifically” justify Indian unity. “Bio-anthropological parameters,” such as head measurements, are still cited in the current study, not to make an argument about the racial origins of caste as in Risley’s book but, quite the contrary, to make arguments about inter-caste similarities: “The head shape of the dolichocephalic type is predominantly distributed in most of the populations, including scheduled castes…there is less variation at inter-group [caste] level than at inter-regional level” (Singh 1995:4). More modern techniques produced similar arguments: “regional variations in gene frequencies seem to be greater than the variation between castes or religious groups” (Singh 1992:99). The message that physical differences are more geographic than caste-based was, however, less clear in the People of India project’s anthropological atlas (volume 11), which demarcated ten “physiographic” zones, corresponding to both geographic and physiological indicators, yet included the observation that “there is a tendency for relatively broad noses in the scheduled castes in comparison with other communities.” Such “rogue data” on noses bears a striking similarity to Risley’s infamous castenose correlations (Pinney 1994:22). Although the continuity of the tradition of taking head measurements is troubling, most major conclusions, at least, were different. In addition to anthropometric and biological analyses to reinforce the idea that caste is no impediment to national unity, Singh also recognized some fluidity of identity and lower caste progress, even evoking the constructivist notion of the Other. If you look at traditional ethnography, some people are called degraded. Or menials. Or there are derogatory references to people… Now…we are a democratic country. We are normatively politically equal. In fact one of the merits of the project is that we have reflected the growing concern with political equality of all the communities of India. It is not that untouchability has gone…but there is movement towards equality… There is movement towards acceptance of the Other. On equal terms. It is not that all the ugly and vicious and savage characteristics of inequality have disappeared, but…lots of communities have changed their names. They do not want to be called by the names the ethnographic literature has given them…a change in nomenclature is indicative of a change in their perception of themselves. (Singh interview 11 April 1996)


Such change was reflected by noting name changes by communities rejecting a name seen as derogatory to adopt a new one. The project was guided by “sensitivity tests,” an attempt to use the most current names, although former names now considered derogatory were still included in “the larger write up” as a reference, according to Singh.15 Fluidity and lower caste progress were recurring themes in my interview with Singh and in his project. Evidence of such progress is a welcome result, yet the summaries of the Scheduled Caste data tended to emphasize the “glass half-full” and avoid comparisons with higher castes; for example, the study summary mentioned that Scheduled Caste literacy doubled between 1961–81 (to 21.38 per cent) but did not include figures that would show that this literacy rate is still much lower than the upper castes (Singh 1995:12). Similarly, Singh played up increased opportunities while downplaying lingering barriers: In this project on people of India, two things which have come out very sharply in terms of change are, number one, people’s own aspirations, people’s own perceptions of themselves and their relations with others, and secondly, the changing economy, the diversification of occupations which has taken place…. Better opportunities are opening up; migrations are taking place; so these are the factors which make these communities or caste[s] more dynamic than we imagined. (Singh interview 11 April 1996) A book reviewer of the initial People of India volumes rejoiced that the “very popular concept of ‘Indian unity in diversity’ has been perfectly manifested here not through any sentimental view point but by way of the application of scientific methodology” (Sarkar 1992:366). The contemporary People of India project imbued some colonial era methods and classifications with a new spin, the viability and progress of the Indian nation. In spite of these nationalist conclusions, however, the overall structuring of the project along caste lines offers political ammunition to those who choose to emphasize their caste identity. A Dalit publication, for example, rather than challenging the caste distinctions, has taken up the Anthropological Survey of India’s recognition of distinct communities. An article in Dalit Voice, a rather polemic publication for Dalit solidarity, reports that “The ASI verdict is that the Indian society continues to be a collection of castes and communities… scheduled castes have 450 jatis;” whereas “Upper castes want to destroy our caste consciousness by promoting national consciousness. In other words, they want to destroy the national consciousness of each jati and get them assimilated in the Hindu nationalism…‘The People of India Project’ has warned that such a Hinduisation of SC/ST/BCs has not worked and it will not work” (Dalit Voice 16–31 March 1996). One example of the project’s recognition of subnational


cultures is the poem by untouchable saint-poet Cokhamela which opens the Scheduled Castes volume. This was, perhaps, an effort to give Scheduled Castes a creative voice in the volume, although, notably, poetry about inequality from the fourteenth century does not preclude the emphasis on present day progress in later pages. In spite of the project’s focus on national unity, it is still a study which gives subnational communities official, and politically useful, recognition. The official reinforcement of community lines is what worries sociologist Andre Beteille about the new People of India: “Risley’s exercise could have been justified given the time when it was done, given the needs of colonial administrators in a different kind of society; whereas this merely stops a natural process of the dissolution of these categories by reconfirming them once again” (Beteille interview 9 September 1996). For example, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s comments at the release of the introductory volume of the People of India reconfirmed distinct categories and illustrated the conflicting agendas of the People of India. He lauded the “scientific,” “standard” and “systematic” study of all of India. At the same time, his comments on the utility of the project for determining the special medical needs of tribals exposed beliefs in the deep, even biological, differences between communities: “You cannot treat tribals as you treat a person of the plains area” (Rao 1993:2). Not just categorized but also singled out into their own volumes, the Scheduled Castes and Tribes face a predicament in the People of India’s dual emphasis on community and nation. As noted, Dalit Voice has cited the project to support a distinct Dalit identity, but others concerned about the plight of these disadvantaged groups may find any utility associated with this official recognition of their categories undermined by the overall emphasis on progress and linkages. Those Scheduled Castes and Tribes who would use these categories to argue for relief find little support in many of the project’s conclusions, although some of the data could be useful. For example, the introduction to the Scheduled Tribes volume bluntly states that “The tribes do not suffer from any social stigma” (Singh 1994:13); yet, Scheduled Tribes are largely perceived as “low status” according to the project’s own data on community rankings, in the tradition of Risley.16 Public commentaries on the project use its themes of social mobility and progress in attacks on reservations. A media account of the People of India project at the height of the upper caste backlash against reservations in 1990 emphasized that: [A] major finding is the tremendous diversification of traditional occupations that has occurred. According to sociologists, this is a significant indicator that backward classes are being integrated into the mainstream… The study also shows that the largest area of employment among the SC and ST communities is the Government Services. Many SC/


ST members are becoming teachers, engineers, doctors and village-level workers. (Indian Express-New Delhi, 1 October 1990) Actually, 54 per cent of the reserved quota of central government jobs for Scheduled Castes go unfilled, according to the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Human Rights Watch 2001). Moreover, “the predominant occupation of the Untouchables is agricultural work… In agriculture Untouchables are almost always paid labourers or sharecroppers, rather than self-employed landowners” (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1994:79). Although the majority of the scheduled communities are stuck in the lowest levels of employment, the People of India project provided fodder for the antireservation agitation. The project’s positive spin on the data and the media’s idyllic pictures of professional opportunities for Scheduled Castes and Tribes do challenge stereotypes of disadvantaged communities. Yet, the project’s official commemoration of communities, in combination with such exuberant commentary, both reinforces caste and tribal categories and undermines the political utility of the categories for those in them. Perhaps due to fears of the clash between caste and nation, a specter raised by Risley’s earlier work, this reincarnation of the People of India tries to gloss over caste disparities while it continues to record caste for posterity. CONCLUSION The head of the current project, K.S.Singh, feels “we have laid the firm foundation of postcolonial ethnography in our country” (Singh 1990:101). Yet the People of India project fails to fully address the problems of the colonial ethnographic tradition, especially the classification of peoples, the use of these classifications for administrative purposes, and the subsequent politicization of anthropology and the categories themselves. In some ways, the new project does move beyond the work of Risley, particularly when there are attempts to reflect changes, linkages and the development of a nation. Nationalism characterizes this “postcolonial” ethnography, reflecting the changing needs of the state, which shifted from an old concern with maintaining colonial rule by reinforcing social divisions to a new preoccupation with maintaining national unity and integrity in an independent and diverse country. Persistent parallels between colonial and postcolonial anthropology can be traced to some ongoing imperatives of governing. Rajni Kothari’s (1968) description of governmental impulses to collect information in the “‘information and communications explosion’ of our times,” was as applicable in Risley’s time as our own:


Governments are in possession of information and intelligence over their peoples…to an unprecedented degree, with an ability to probe deeply, sometimes regions which were hitherto sanctified as “private and personal.” A variety of impulses and skills join in this enterprise— humanitarian motives, genuinely scientific pursuits, methodological compulsions, the insecurity of those in positions of power. (Kothari 1968:14–19) Despite dramatically changing interpretations of the Indian nation, the Indian state’s colonial and contemporary impulses to categorize and record the people of India have been remarkably resilient. Whether in pursuit of domination or development, administrators need to make societies “legible” and, in the process, may reinforce the categories they only meant to record (Scott 1998). Postcolonial states, with remnants of colonial administrative institutions and traditions, seem particularly prone to these tendencies, as the reinvented People of India project demonstrates. The People of India projects—old and new—take on political significance simply by being anthropology with an official stamp. Indeed, there is a substantial dialogue afoot addressing the academic discipline’s relationship with the government.17 Another debate surrounds the adoption of Western categories, methods or modes of thinking into Indian social sciences. In a forum 30 years ago on “academic colonialism,” Yogendra Singh warned against the dangers of becoming “more imitative than innovative,” and this debate continues (quoted in Uberoi 2000). Against the background of these broader disciplinary debates, the People of India project, with its explicit links to the government as well as to Risley, is controversial in academic circles. Turning from academic politics to national politics, official anthropology in India continues to be guided by administrative considerations, but this does not mean that the People of India project always served the needs of particular governments, as demonstrated by the uproar it inflamed when Prime Minister V.P.Singh instituted new reservations for Other Backward Classes. K.S.Singh argued that the Anthropological Survey of India, while guided by the policies and plans of governments, maintains “considerable autonomy” in matters of research: “It is not correct to assert that it is sarkari [governmental] anthropology all the way” (Singh 2000). A desire for knowledge of a far-flung population and a concern with national integrity and legitimacy are at the forefront of the analysis. A variety of political parties have found these concerns compelling enough to keep the project alive from 1985 until today, spanning a period of quite rapidly changing governments. Although started under the Congress Party, the nationalist bent of some of the project’s analysis seems to complement the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s ideology as well. The project’s accounting of national cultural “linkages” reinforces this party’s emphasis on


“civilizational identity” and “cultural nationalism” (Bharatiya Janata Party 1998). There is tension between the project’s nationalist bent and the community profile data, however, as illustrated by the Dalit Voice article featuring the People of India project in a criticism of Hindu nationalism. In another striking example of this tension, a Christian mission organization felt that these community profiles would be so helpful in their conversion efforts that they actually declared the People of India project a sign from God, much to the consternation of Hindu nationalist Arun Shourie (Shourie 1999).18 The project, although shaped by administrative concerns, is not simply a tool of the government in power. Postcolonial anthropology by official agencies is a fascinating amalgam of old practices and new imperatives. The studies produced and public reactions to them provide unique snapshots of the pressures and priorities of particular political moments. For example, the use of similar forms of data to make opposite arguments about the prospects for Indian nationalism illustrates the power, and limits, of nationalist ideology when older practices and categories linger. Despite the continuity of the central categories, the shift in public attention and governmental scrutiny from the “forward” to the “backward” castes demonstrates the influence of reservations on both official identifications and social identity claims. For example, People of India researchers had to neglect their plan to rely on group “self-identification” when it conflicts with the official boundaries of the Scheduled Caste category, as in the revised entry about the faux Beda Jangams or the exclusion of Christians from the Scheduled Caste volume. Clearly the postcolonial state continues to monitor the boundaries of its official categories. At the same time, various social groups, including Dalits and religious minorities, have utilized or challenged such categorizations, by reinterpreting them to bolster their own political arguments or by putting forth their own studies to portray alternative visions of the “People of India.” Official anthropology and reactions to it provide telling examples of the give and take between analytic or policy simplifications, on the one hand, and politicized identities, on the other. In its more analytical modes, the new People of India project’s recognition of the fluidity of identity provides a welcome addition to colonial classifications, yet legacies of colonial anthropology persist in the bulk of the volumes’ capsule summaries of communities. Even the more nuanced recognition of caste mobility can be taken too far. The current People of India project’s sunny conclusions about caste barriers breaking down—justified with a dizzying combination of colonial era anthropometry, genetic research, trait counting and constructivist notions of identity—could justify state inaction in spite of ongoing discrimination. As I continue to ponder the Scheduled Caste volume I purchased at the Delhi book-store, I must conclude that recognizing the continuing salience of caste may be better than ignoring it, but this recognition could have been cast


in many ways. Concern for national unity has inspired a “rose colored glasses” approach to analyzing the still limited progress of low castes, an approach epitomized in the People of India project by the grubby yet happy cover girl on volume two.

4 Caste certificates and lists

The administration of reservation policies, particularly the definition of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes through caste certificates and lists, contributes to ongoing constructions of these castes, tribes and classes. The administrative enforcement of categories shapes the incentive structure within which individuals and groups claim or mobilize around particular group identities. Building on political science theories about the social construction of populations targeted by public policies, I argue that the substantial benefits of reservations come at a cost to eligible groups. The processes of identity verification associated with caste certificates, in particular, tend to burden and stigmatize disadvantaged groups and to reinforce assumptions that these groups have clear boundaries. In other words, my examination of the administration of reservations shows that, although the policies might be empowering, the process is distinctly not. The administrative processes used to identify groups for inclusion on the lists of Backward Classes necessitate group organization, group petitions and, ultimately, group rankings. In short, although reservations offer opportunities to members of low status groups, the procedures associated with official lists reinforce group-based activism and hierarchies. Several scholars studying policy administration in complex social systems note that states simplify societies and then structure those societies by implementing their simplified schemes: The simplified facts of the administrator are necessarily of a certain type— static… What I want to argue about state simplification is that the modern state, through its official attempts and with varying success, creates a population with those standardized characteristics because it will be easier to monitor, count, assess and manage. (Scott 1995:35) Administrators are forced to view societies as a finite number of standardized groups in order to do what administrators do, implement policies. These policies, in turn, can have an impact on group identities. In the words of political scientist


Theda Skocpol, an important area of study is “the ways in which the structures and activities of states unintentionally influence the formation of groups and the political capacities, ideas, and demands of various sectors of society” (Skocpol 1985:21). In other words, the “constant redefinition of group identities in the political arena is an effect of politics and policy as much as a cause” (Lieberman 1995:441). The following discussion of the administration of caste lists and certificates focuses on how bureaucrats disentangle and reassemble identities for policy purposes. Such administrative practices can reiterate older status distinctions and structure group identity claims. Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram’s research highlights the links between public policies and social constructions of the groups targeted by these policies, which they call “target populations” (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1995). An example would be welfare policies and “welfare mothers” in the United States. Government officials tend to impose burdens on less powerful or negatively constructed policy targets (Schneider and Ingram 1993:337–41). Often policies are based on the assumption that their target populations are readily definable (Schneider and Ingram 1993:335). Depending on their policy experiences, members of the targeted population may either favor collective action or individual interaction with the government (Schneider and Ingram 1993:341). Other scholars have applied some of these ideas in studies of policies and the social constructions of groups as varied as landlords, the elderly, immigrants, and people with AIDS (Hunter and Nixon 1999, Hudson 1999, Coutin 1998, Drass et al. 1997). The various officially backward groups in India constitute striking examples of target populations. Applying ideas inspired by this literature in the quite different setting of India can increase our understanding of the ramifications of group-based policies. The administration of reservation policies in an exceedingly complex society is a feat not well understood, especially since scholars have tended to focus on the development, legalities, and political fallout of India’s reservation policies (Galanter 1984, Mitra 1994, Nesiah 1997, Parikh 1997). Here I address several aspects of the relationship between administration and identity, including identifying and labeling, untangling identities, and individual and group processes. Several conclusions emerge: Bureaucratic procedures associated with reservations tend to burden, label and stigmatize the very groups they are meant to help, particularly the least powerful groups. Reservation policies are based on an assumption that target populations have objective parameters, even as administrators struggle to define those parameters. Reservation policy processes sometimes focus on individuals, as in the case of caste certificates, but the process of officially listing Other Backward Classes necessitates that aspiring groups must be somewhat organized, gather aggregate data, and compare themselves to groups above and below them. Such policies and procedures


increase the efficacy of collective rather than individual interactions with the government and administratively reinforce social groups and gradations. IDENTIFYING AND LABELING BENEFICIARIES: A TANGLE OF ADVANTAGE AND OPPRESSION Every person who claims to belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled [T] ribe has to produce a certificate to the appointing authority as sufficient proof in support of the claim so as to make him eligible for the various relaxations and concessions. (Muthuswamy and Brinda 1996:6) Reservations in India are an extraordinary example of a constitutional commitment to uplift the less powerful; however, the administration of these policies also places substantial burdens on those very beneficiaries. The verification of group identity is one example of the burdens imposed on less powerful policy targets, such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. Not only is the process quite comprehensive and personal, but it also can involve overt labeling and ongoing scrutiny for members of the least powerful groups. The Ministry of Home Affairs has “emphasized the need for a proper verification being made by the certificate issuing authorities before they actually issue a certificate” (Ministry of Personnel 1993:247). Such verification may be based on such data as “revenue records and if need be, through reliable inquiries” (Ministry of Personnel 1993:398). Verifications of Scheduled Caste membership in particular can be personally invasive since, for this category, religious beliefs and practices are scrutinized to exclude Christians and Muslims. According to an organization protesting the denial of Scheduled Caste status to Christians, “The SC applicants for caste certificates are humiliated and insulted by officials, if a symbol related to Christian religion is noticed during the search of the applicants, their houses or their parents” (National Coordination Committee for SC Christians 1995b). The courts have upheld and even encouraged administrative procedures to monitor less powerful groups, as in the Supreme Court decision discussed in Chapter 2 regarding two students alleged to be from a spurious tribe. Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner Tribal Development (Supreme Court of India 1994).1 In that case, the court ruled that the process of getting a caste certificate should include not only an initial application, but also further verification by a “scrutiny committee,” police involvement in local inquiries, and, in some cases, “affinity tests” to verify applicants’ knowledge of the anthropology of the group they claim as their own. Leila Dushkin’s observation


about policies for the Scheduled Castes is apt: In practice, “the so-called beneficiaries have to have a great deal of stamina and political expertise” (Dushkin 1979:665). Other generally more powerful or more positively viewed groups who benefit from special “concessions” in government employment policy, such as exservicemen or sportsmen, also have to furnish certificates and document their eligibility, but they have not inspired the copious memos, rulings and court cases over how best to scrutinize their claims (Muthuswamy and Brinda 1996, Nabhi 2001). Moreover, in the case of the less powerful and negatively constructed backward classes, even after caste certificates have been issued, repeated verifications throughout their careers can haunt beneficiaries. These verifications involve patrolling the parameters of reservation categories and implementing procedures that identify but also label and stigmatize beneficiaries. The sheer number of names used over the course of history to label the Scheduled Castes indicates how difficult it is to give the many so-called untouchable groups a common label and how easily such labels fall from favor as they come to be seen as inaccurate, stigmatizing or simply out of date. As Michael Banton points out, “The doubts about what are the best names for groups, and where the boundaries are to be drawn, show that the groups people recognize in everyday life are often multidimensional” (Banton 1997:13). A list compiled by Simon Charsley and paraphrased here hints at the scope of the countless labels used over the years to refer to Scheduled Castes. Some names emerged from social or political movements and others were coined or at least passed into common usage by administrators: Aprishya Sudras (used by Census Commissioner Herbert Risley); impure castes, avarna, outcastes (outside of varna or caste); Pariah (a jati name that became generalized); Pancham Bandum, the Fifth Caste, Panchama (all meaning a fifth group outside of the “touchable” categories); AdDharm, Adi-Karnataka, Adi-Dravida, Adi-Andhra (all emerging from various regional movements trying to establish untouchables as distinct religious or regional groups seen as “original”); untouchables, ex-untouchables, Depressed Classes, suppressed classes, exterior castes, Scheduled Castes; Harijans (coined by Gandhi), Dalits (coined by Ambedkarites), and Naaga Holeya (in the Mysore area, “a neo-traditional term associated with a Buddhist challenge to converted Christians to reunite with them” (Charsley 1996:17). Of these labels, those which were adopted for administrative uses include “Depressed Classes,” which first appeared around 1880 and which the British used for the 1921 Indian census. J.H.Hutton, the Census Commissioner in 1931, however, saw fit to replace what he called an “unfortunate and depressing label” with another, namely, “exterior castes” (Charsley 1996:14). In the 1935 Government of India Act, this label in turn was replaced by a purely administrative term, Scheduled Castes. In addition to the Scheduled Castes, the Backward Classes label also extends back to the colonial era and was later used


in the 1950 constitution. The term “backward,” in contrast to the more neutral term “scheduled,” evokes inferiority and inevitable comparisons to its opposite, the “forward” citizens of India. The Other Backward Classes category has been sporadically altered in recent years to Socially and Economically Backward Classes (SEBCs), not much of an improvement. Labeling people as backward, in the context of a policy to fight inequalities, simultaneously reinforces hegemonic ideologies about group status and rankings. Categorizing and labeling groups on the basis of untouchability or backwardness in this way seems inevitably stigmatizing. Simon Charsley argues that by subsuming diverse castes, dichotomizing society, and defining certain categories of people as victims, such labels “refer to nothing those labeled do or are, merely what others negatively do to them: they are excluded” (Charsley 1996:13). Moreover, the resilience of caste or jati distinctions within these broader categories inhibits the growth of a wider political unity among those so categorized (Charsley 1996, Omvedt 1993). Surprisingly then, in the political realm, labels such as Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes have in some cases become a political resource rather than a stigmatizing liability. Some scholars trace the gradual growth of a pan-Scheduled Caste or pan-Dalit identity and related political movements (Jalali 1993, Kothari 1994, Zelliot 1996). Others note the increasing political power of the Other Backward Classes (Frankel 1988, Jaffrelot 2000). As I will demonstrate in later chapters, the eagerness of various groups to be endowed with scheduled or backward labels belies the assumption that these are simply stigmatizing terms. Nevertheless, even if many groups are prepared to swallow the stigma to get the useful label, or to accept the burdens to get the benefits, being given these labels is a double-edged sword. The clearest case of labeling and stigmatizing the groups targeted by reservations is the procedure of literally pasting labels on their employee files: The appointing authorities should verify the caste status of a Scheduled Caste/Tribe officer at the time of initial appointment and promotion against a vacancy reserved for Scheduled Caste/Tribe. For this purpose, the caste and the community to which a SC/ST person belongs, his place of residence and the name of the state, should be pasted on the top of the service book, personal file or any other relevant document covering its employee to facilitate such verification. (Ministry of Personnel 1993:248–9, emphasis added) Such labels make it difficult for employees in reserved jobs to choose to hide their caste or tribal affiliation at work. A survey of 55 Scheduled Caste elites, including bureaucrats, suggests that caste anonymity is an important way to avoid being treated as an untouchable.


Thirty-four respondents reported that untouchability was observed at their workplaces, substantially more than the numbers reporting the observance of untouchability in places where it is harder to discover someone’s caste, such as buses, trains, post offices, banks, or restaurants (Roy and Singh 1987:68).2 One of those surveyed, a government official, responded, “When I meet a stranger he starts interacting with me on equal terms but as soon as he discovers my caste his behavior changes drastically and [he] starts maintaining distance” (quoted in Roy and Singh 1987:69). This survey indicates that labeling groups in an attempt to counter discriminatory practices can have negative effects, as such labels can facilitate further caste discrimination. A government official appointing a candidate to a reserved job may engage in further identity verification. For example, “An appointing authority, if it considers it necessary for any reason, [sic] verify the claim of a candidate through the District Magistrate of the place where the candidate and/or his family ordinarily resides” (Ministry of Personnel 1993:248). Hiring authorities are instructed to include the following clause in written offers of employment: The appointment is provisional and is subject to the caste/tribe certificates being verified through the proper channels and if the verification reveals that the claim to belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, as the case may be, is false, the services will be terminated forthwith without assigning any further reasons and without prejudice to such further action as may be taken under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code for production of false certificates. (Muthuswamy and Brinda 1996:6) Even when job candidates have caste certificates, their appointments are to be provisional until their identity is further scrutinized. While clearly onerous, the process includes some protections for the applicant. Once a certificate has been issued, the burden of proof shifts away from the beneficiary; the courts have held that “after a valid certificate is issued, the onus is on the authorities to establish that the certificate was erroneous” (Muthuswamy and Brinda 1996:248). The proper procedure at that point is for the employer to initiate a “discreet inquiry” by a local official to “find out the genuineness of the community claimed by the individual” (Muthuswamy and Brinda 1996:248). Such inquiries occasionally reveal “false” certificates, for reasons ranging from carelessness, to corruption to ambiguity. Contemporary headlines, “Fake Certificate Racket Busted” and “Caste Certificate Racket Lands Official in Soup,” illustrate the value of these certificates and the temptation to falsify identity for material gain (Hindustan Times-New Delhi, 16 July 1996, Indian Express, 23 June 1997). In such cases individuals are to be given a “reasonable opportunity” to justify their claims before their certificates are canceled


(Muthuswamy and Brinda 1996:248). If, instead, the certificate is duly verified by local authorities, and “the report is received that the certificate is genuine, thereafter the certificate holder cannot be further harassed to prove his caste/ community in any other manner” (Muthuswamy and Brinda 1996:247). In spite of such rules, cases of repeated harassment have occurred.3 Moreover, identity verifications, albeit less invasive, continue throughout the careers of persons in reserved jobs, especially at times of promotion. Occasional changes in the schedules or lists of eligible groups are the impetus for this practice of periodically checking to see if employees are still eligible for their reserved jobs. It may be mentioned that a Scheduled Caste Person, whose caste has been descheduled after his initial appointment as a Scheduled Caste, is no longer entitled to enjoy the benefit of reservation in promotions. This verification of caste-status at every important up-turn of employee's career is necessary so that the benefit of reservation and other scheme of concessions etc. meant for SC/ST should go only to the rightful claimants and not those who become disentitled to them. (Ministry of Personnel 1993:249, emphasis added) Even if employees’ group affiliations remain unchanged, the descheduling of groups could disqualify them from their jobs. Points of promotion or “every important up-turn of [the] employee’s career” are usually occasions for kudos, but for the officially backward these are the points at which the employee’s backward status is to be checked. From the time their status is pasted to the cover of their personnel files and throughout repeated examinations of their status, members of the groups targeted by reservation policies face several potentially embarrassing bureaucratic procedures.4 To sum up, administrative procedures to identify those eligible for reservations label and stigmatize the target populations. Calling someone backward is stigmatizing in itself; checking to see if that person is “really” backward can be even more so. One is either considered low (genuinely backward) or a fraud (pretending to be backward). In other less bureaucratic realms, sensitivity to the potential embarrassment of drawing attention to a person’s official category is evident and occasionally leads to efforts to protect target populations from public identification. A case in point is a conversation I had with teachers at a central school, which, since it is set up for the offspring of central government employees, has a sizeable percentage of officially backward students. The teachers told me that according to a directive to teachers, they are not to draw attention publicly to the special status of Scheduled Caste or Tribe students or indicate in any way—during an attendance roll call, for example— who in their classes is a member of an officially backward community (conversation with New Delhi Central School teachers 17 July 1996). Although


commitment to this practice no doubt varies, such rules in the realm of education are an attempt to avoid labeling and stigmatizing the youngest members of groups eligible for reservations. COMPLICATING PARAMETERS: MIGRATION, MARRIAGE, ADOPTION AND RELIGIOUS (RE) CONVERSION Bureaucratic memos, forms, rules and regulations pertaining to reservations rest on the assumption that an empirical categorization of citizens is possible and can be carried out in an objective manner. However, as when the state adjudicates identity claims or designs an ethnographic study, bureaucrats issuing caste certificates are often faced with unclear boundaries. These men and women face particular difficulties classifying those persons who seem to fall between categories, whether due to migration, intercaste marriage, adoption, or conversion. Such cases challenge the notion that the categories themselves can be considered stable and identifiable; yet bureaucrats gamely implement rules to carry out the policies. Those administering reservations, unlike policy-makers, see ambiguous cases in their day-to-day work. Cognizant of such challenges, these bureaucrats occasionally admit that standard responses to some situations are impossible. In order to be eligible for reservations, members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes must be issued certificates by bureaucrats with the authority to do so.5 Those issuing certificates must verify that applicants and their parents belong to the community in which they claim membership; that their particular communities are included in the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes lists in their state; that applicants are really from the state, or area within a state, in which their group is listed; and, finally, that applicants claiming to be Scheduled Castes are either Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist (Ministry of Personnel 1993:397). After all of this verification, the caste certificate officers may still face ambiguity. Additional regulations define the boundaries in cases involving migration, marriage, adoption and conversion. Migration Geographic boundaries are one of several types of boundary issues facing the bureaucrats who issue caste certificates. Membership in the groups eligible for reservations is determined in part by location. The lists, or schedules, of communities vary from state to state, and, in some cases, communities are included in the lists only if they are from certain areas within states. The Ministry of


Home Affairs has issued directives reminding bureaucrats to carefully consider migrants applying for caste certificates: I am directed to say that many instances have come to the notice of this Ministry wherein certificates of belonging to a particular Scheduled Caste/ Tribe have not been issued strictly in accordance with principles governing the issue of such certificates…it is possible that two persons belonging to the same caste but residing in different States/U.T.s [Union Territories] may not both be treated to belong to Scheduled Caste/Tribe or vice versa. Thus the residence of a particular person in a particular locality assumes special significance. (Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum to the State Governments 1977) (A directive consulted by Ministry of Welfare officials as of 1996) In cases of migration, people remain members of a scheduled category even if they move to a region within their state in which their caste or community is not scheduled. In cases of migration between states, a person can only claim Scheduled Caste or Tribe status according to the lists of “the State to which he originally belonged” (Ministry of Personnel 1993:397). The Supreme Court reinforced this bureaucratic principle, ruling that migrants who were considered members of Scheduled Castes or Tribes before they moved can only derive reservation benefits from their original state. Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra and Another v. Union of India (1994).6 Thus the application form for Scheduled Caste Certificates in Delhi, where there are many migrants, asks each applicant for the duration of his or her stay in Delhi, the complete address of his or her father, and even the “State to which ancestors belong” (Application Form for Scheduled Caste Certificate).7 Who should issue a migrant’s certificate? This question is potentially confusing for both bureaucrats and applicants. An administrative rule states that the authority issuing a certificate should be “the one concerned with the locality in which the person applying for the certificate had as his place of permanent abode at the time of the notification of the relevant Presidential Order,” namely, the order which lists his caste or community as a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe (Ministry of Personnel 1993:398). Such a rule can inconvenience migrants seeking certificates, another example of the burdens placed on less powerful target populations, although the identity verification of migrants is sometimes carried out by mail (Mahesh interview 29 November 1996). In short, in order to verify group boundaries, administrators tie applicants’ official identities to their “original” place. This can make it more difficult for migrants to get caste certificates, and, even if they manage to get them, the


certificates cannot be used to obtain jobs in their new states. Resentment of migrants from other states taking over local jobs was the impetus for another form of job reservations in parts of India, namely ethnic reservations for “sons of the soil” (Weiner and Katzenstein 1981). The rule disqualifying inter-state migrants from reservations for Scheduled Castes or Tribes is a similar example of policies favoring people with “ancestral” ties to a place. Marriage and adoption A “guiding principle” issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs states that claims of Scheduled Caste or Tribe status due to intercommunity marriage should be decided based on the caste of a person at birth.8 Non-SC/ST members married to SC/ST members do not become members of their spouses’ categories. Also, SC/ ST members retain their status even after marriage to a non-SC/ST. The Ministry of Home Affairs issued this “guiding principle” to authorities empowered to issue certificates (Ministry of Home Affairs circular letter 1975). Notably, court decisions have not always been consistent with these bureaucratic principles in cases involving the categorization of women. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in a case in which a lower-status woman married a higher-status man, the woman did not get to keep her officially Backward status after marriage. Atul Chandra Adhikari v. State of Orissa, Orissa High Court (1995). However, in Valsamma Paul, a subsequent mixed marriage case discussed in-depth in Chapter 2, the Supreme Court held that caste, for the purpose of reservations, was determined at birth, in keeping with the guiding principle of the executive branch. The offspring of intercaste marriages, not surprisingly, present additional challenges to administrators. The guidelines used by an official of the Ministry of Welfare stipulate that “the crucial test [is] to determine whether a child born out of such a wedlock has been accepted by the Scheduled Caste community as a member of their community and has been brought up in that surrounding” (Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum to States 1977) (a directive consulted by Ministry of Welfare officials as of 1996). According to the same memorandum, community recognition determines Scheduled Tribe status: “[I]t is the recognition and acceptance by the society of the children born out of a marriage between a member of a Scheduled Tribe with an outsider, which is the main determining factor irrespective of whether the tribe is matriarchal or patriarchal.” A letter from the Ministry of Welfare reiterated the need for administrative “verification of the acceptance given by the members” of the community in question before classifying offspring of intercommunity marriages (Ministry of Welfare letter 1994). This overrode a rule, which was more empowering for the target population, that children could be classified “according to the declaration of the parents regarding the way of life in which the children are brought up” (Government of India, Social Welfare Department


1975).9 Now the administrator must determine whether the father or mother’s community is most accepting of the child. This, obviously, may not be a clear call, and one bureaucrat I spoke with told me that in most cases, he would categorize children with their fathers (Mahesh interview 29 November 1996). A “frequently asked questions” page on the website of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment reiterates the unofficial standard that a father’s classification generally determines that of his children.10 Question: What shall be the status of the offspring of a couple one of whom is a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe? Answer:…If the child has been accepted by the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe Community and has been brought up in the surrounding of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe spouse then, the child would be treated as Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, as the case may be. However, each case is to be examined on its merit. However, in general, the following illustrations are made: Example I

Example II

Father—Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe Mother—non-Scheduled Caste/non-Scheduled Tribe Child—shall be Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe Mother—Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe Father—non-Scheduled Caste/non-Scheduled Tribe Child—shall be non-Scheduled Caste/ non-Scheduled Tribe

Note: each case will be decided on case to case basis as per its merit.11

The tension between the general “illustrations” and the case specific “note” in this answer illustrates the quandaries of bureaucrats trying to manufacture standard responses to specific situations. Since only these two examples are given, the father’s status appears to be the default answer to questions about categorizing intercommunity offspring, unless an industrious bureaucrat determines that the mother’s community was more accepting. These cases of intercommunity offspring illustrate bureaucratic standardization and the lack of power of target populations. Intercommunity couples have little say in the classification of their children, and even cases involving matriarchal communities are likely to be standardized in a patriarchal way, as the presumption is that the father’s identity trumps the mother’s. “Illegitimate” children are an exception, according to a rule based on additional assumptions about gender roles. In such cases, the government assumes that “the illegitimate children are generally brought up by the mother in


her own surroundings. Therefore, if the mother belongs to the Scheduled Caste and brings up the child within a Scheduled Caste community, the child can be taken as a member of the Scheduled Caste community” (Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum to States 1977). This memorandum also addresses the status of the offspring when both parents are members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes but each belongs to a “different sub-caste or subtribe.” In such a case, the children can be presumed to be members of the Scheduled Castes or Tribes and usually to be members of the father’s subcaste or tribe, although this rule is not absolute in cases of desertion or divorce. A similar rule applies in cases of offspring when one parent is Scheduled Caste and the other is Scheduled Tribe. Notably, these rules regarding children of mixed marriages leave much up to the administrator, who must determine something as subjective as the “acceptance” of a person by a group. Moreover, each of these specific rules are followed by equivocation, or recognition of the possibility of ambiguous boundaries in spite of the above regulations for so many combinations of identity. As in the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment website, each part of the memo on inter-category marriages closes with a phrase such as: “The above are general observations, however, each case has to be examined in the light of the circumstances prevalent in that case and final decision has to be taken ther[e]of,” or, “[t]he general position of the law has been stated above. However, each individual case will have to be examined in the light of existing facts and circumstances in such cases” (Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum to States 1977). Cases of adoption have also generated bureaucratic rules to clarify and verify the identities of adoptees. When people apply for certificates on the grounds that they were adopted by a Scheduled Caste family, for example, the burden of proof rests on them. They must substantiate the validity of their adoptions. Generally, adoptions after a person has turned 15 years old or has married are suspect. In such cases, a special inquiry by the District Magistrate is necessary in order to determine whether such adoptions are permitted by the customs particular to the relevant community. If so, the Magistrate must make a special note of that on the certificate. Certificates are denied to those who are not living with and supported by their adoptive parents or those who have ties to or are receiving financial help from birth parents who are not in a group eligible for the certificate (Ministry of Personnel 1993:397). To summarize, most people are officially stuck with their “original” caste or tribe in spite of intercommunity marriage or adoption, unless they can meet the stringent burden of proof for legitimate adoptions. This set of rules echoes the rules regarding migrants, who retain their classification in their original home. Bureaucrats and their memoranda mention the need to consider each individual case, particularly in the classification of the offspring of mixed marriages.


However, even in such cases, standard rules of thumb have developed that generally give such children the status of their fathers. Moreover, Ministry of Welfare directives squelched procedures that once empowered parents in intercommunity marriages to declare their children’s community, in favor of bureaucratic verification of community acceptance. Since communities may be quite ambivalent about intercommunity couples and their children, this is another example of administrative burdens on the less powerful, burdens which do little to encourage such marriages. Conversion and reconversion For the Scheduled Caste category, bureaucrats must determine the religion of caste certificate applicants, since only Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists are eligible. Two types of liminal cases arise: first, converts to another religion, such as Islam or Christianity, who reconvert back to one of these eligible religions and, second, converts’ offspring, who reconvert to an eligible religion. The “points of guidance” for both types of cases are to “establish that such a convert has been accepted by the members of the caste claimed as one among themselves” (Ministry of Personnel 1993:397). If so, reconverted applicants can be considered members of their own or their parents’ original Scheduled Caste. Notably, the directive does not recognize those who simply convert (rather than reconvert) to one of the eligible religions. If they or their parents were never Hindus, Sikhs or Buddhists, they cannot get a certificate. Moreover, Buddhists, to be eligible, must be “neo-Buddhists,” formerly members of a Hindu lower caste. A Dalit Buddhist lawyer, Bhagwan Das, describes the government’s decision to include such neo-Buddhists as Scheduled Castes: “They said, yes, we will include them subject to [the] condition that they should embrace Buddhism from such and such caste. So when we applied for a certificate, you have to mention that I am embracing this since this date and I am a Buddhist convert” (Das interview 30 April 1996). In order to monitor the boundaries of the slippery category of religion, government authorities continue to pay attention to the religion of Scheduled Castes even after the caste certificates are issued and the beneficiaries of reservations are employed. According to a directive to government employers, “the appointing authorities should stipulate in the letter of appointment issued to Scheduled Caste candidates that they should inform about the change, if any, in their religion to their appointing/administrative authority immediately after such a change” (Ministry of Personnel 1993:248). It seems that employees who could lose benefits would be unlikely to voluntarily reveal their conversion, but the fact that the demand is made at all signals that the government is keen to continue monitoring the boundaries of their target populations.


In brief, these rules hold that, as long as they do not convert yet again, applicants may receive Scheduled Caste certificates by reconverting to Hinduism, Buddhism or Sikhism if they are accepted by the community in question. A key rule is that they must be reconverting to their own or their parents’ “original” religion. The emphasis on an applicant’s original place, original caste and original religion in the caste certificate process makes the applicants seem “stuck” in their original communities. In the case of religion, however, conversion away from one of the designated religions could immediately expel a certificate holder from Scheduled Caste status. The categorization of converts is a particularly thorny issue in Indian politics, and there are some tensions between judicial decisions and administrative rulings in this area. A Supreme Court decision involving converts, discussed in Chapter 2, disregarded whether members of a Scheduled Caste accepted a convert to Hinduism back into his parents’ former caste, ruling against the convert’s claim to be Scheduled Caste because he was not born in that caste. S.Swvigaradoss v. Zonal Manager, Supreme Court of India (1996).12 These examples involving migration, marriage, adoption and conversion illustrate the rules by which bureaucrats assign people particular identities for the purpose of receiving caste certificates. The examples confirm James Scott’s observation that many people “defy easy categorization; they must be sorted into one bin or the other because the exercise requires that the population be divided into these categories” (Scott 1995:35). In other words, administrative rules tend to render even flexible boundaries static, in spite of changes in location, family or religion. According to the bureaucratic regulations summarized here, official identification and status are tied to a migrant’s original place, to a married man’s original caste, or to a convert’s reconversion to their original religion. The static portrayal of status may be the most feasible rather than the most accurate means of boundary verification. Although reservation policies may be based on the premise that there are clear cut categories, the bureaucrats writing and implementing boundary rules are forced to grapple with the ambiguity of identities, occasionally noting, in the examples above, the need to proceed on a case-by-case basis. Questions facing administrators include whether a person has been accepted by a caste or community after conversion or whether the adoption of older children is permitted by community custom. Bureaucrats at the Ministry of Welfare dealing with Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe issues argued that cases must be seen in context and that bureaucrats must respect community sensibilities in ambiguous cases. On the basis of their own experience, these administrators pointed out that the Scheduled Caste and Tribe categories are internally complex, due to their intersection with other categories such as women and the disabled (A.K.Choudhary and Aziz Khan interviews 17 December 1996). The myriad procedures involved in implementing these policies reinforce the assumption that there are identifiable categories, although, in practice,


bureaucrats seem to recognize that the boundaries could be interpreted in a variety of ways. INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PROCESSES: MAKING THE LIST The administration of reservation policies shapes the incentive structure within which people choose to interact with their government as individuals or as groups. To illustrate, I will contrast the experiences of individuals trying to get Other Backward Class certificates with the experiences of groups trying to get on Other Backward Class lists. Although the certificate process may affect more people directly and is a more individualized process, an increasing number of groups are petitioning for Other Backward Class status, a process which reinforces group-based strategies. Official decisions about issuing caste certificates focus on the question of which individuals qualify as members of a scheduled or backward group. Decisions over the lists of eligible groups, in contrast, focus on the question of which groups qualify to be listed. Thus the process of petition is different. In the first case, an individual goes to a local bureaucrat and fills out a form providing personal and family information. In the latter case, a group submits data about the group as a whole to a state or national Backward Classes commission.13 The bureaucratic procedures associated with reservations vary in their tendencies to reinforce individual or group-level political activity.14 The lists of Other Backward Classes are in flux due to the relatively recent extension in the 1990s of reservations to these groups at the national level. This development led to a new administrative unit, the National Backward Classes Commission, the first permanent commission of this kind, although it has a changing membership. When a person applies for an Other Backward Class certificate, the process is similar to the process already described for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe certificates. K.Mahesh, the Executive Magistrate in charge of issuing caste certificates for part of Delhi, and his associate, Ramesh Kumar, described the process as follows (Mahesh and Kumar interviews 29 November 1996): An individual fills out a form, after which the administrators “send a person for verification,” generally a bailiff or inspector. Mahesh noted that since you find “black, brown and fair” among all castes and cannot make a visual verification, the inspector goes to the individual’s place of residence and makes inquiries, basically by talking to the neighbors. Documents that may be required of the applicant include an ID card from the Election Commission, a ration card or school certificate to prove identity and residence, or, most useful, a caste or tribe certificate of a parent (OBC Certificate Application Form, Annexure I: Supporting Documents Required).15 Since Other Backward Classes in some states are a new category, older relatives’ certificates may not be


available; in such cases local inquiry is especially necessary. Mahesh notes that the OBC category is quite “anthropologically complex,” a composite of caste, class, and profession, further blurred by “mixing” and “migration;” thus he tends to eschew “anthropological” data on the groups in question and to rely instead on an individual’s official documents and the accounts of locals (Mahesh interview 20 November 1996). Unlike the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Class applicants also go through a second process to verify that they are not a member of the “creamy layer” of the Other Backward Classes.16 The official “creamy layer” criteria identify individuals who have risen to the top of their community in socioeconomic terms. The creamy layer of OBCs are not eligible for reservations. This effort to exclude the “forward backwards” population from benefits is the topic of Chapter 8, but the procedure is relevant to the present discussion of individual-level administrative processes. Due to the exclusion of more well-off people from Other Backward Class benefits, the application form from the government of Delhi goes beyond group details such as caste, subcaste, occupational group, and “[s]erial number of the caste in the Central List of OBCs,” to ask for information pertaining to an individual applicant’s “creamy layer” status. This part of the application includes questions about the applicant’s parents or husband—the assumption, evidently, is that a wife could not lift her husband into the creamy layer—including employment, land, and income (“Application Form for a Certificate for Eligibility for Reservation of Jobs for Other Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services Under Government of Delhi” and “Form of Certificate to Be Produced By Other Backwards Classes Applying for Appointment to Posts Under the Government of India”).17 Documentation to be submitted includes such items as a salary slip and tax records, if any. Currently, once an OBC certificate is issued, it is issued for life, regardless of a subsequent change in status, but the next generation might be excluded from the category. Applying for an Other Backward Class certificate is an individual act, although certainly not solitary, as can be seen from the neighborhood inquiries involved.18 Moreover, most of the questions and documentation require personal papers and immediate family data rather than group-level statistics or anthropological data about one’s caste. People in this process are hardly atomized, but the quest for a certificate is significantly more individualized than the collective process needed to get on the list itself. In contrast to the individual certificate process, the process of applying to the National Commission for Backward Classes in order to be listed as an Other Backward Class reinforces group cooperation. One of the mandates of the Commission, formed in 1993, is to standardize the various lists of Other Backward Classes prepared by state government commissions and the central list prepared by the previous, temporary National Backward Classes Commission,


known as the Mandal Commission. The commission was “enacted on the direction of the Supreme Court to set up a permanent body for entertaining, examining and recommending upon requests for inclusion and complaints of over-inclusion and under-inclusion in the central lists of Other Backward Classes” for central government reservations.19 In the words of sociologist D.L.Sheth, a “social science member” of the National Commission for Backward Classes, the commission’s central question is “Who are the OBCs?” (Sheth interview 6 September 1996).20 The five member commission “has to monitor this policy of inclusion and exclusion on the affirmative action list for backward classes” (Sheth interview 6 September 1996). The Commission deals with the Other Backward Classes, and potential Other Backward Classes, as groups only, in contrast to the individualized bureaucracy of caste certificates. The Commission initially compiled a central list made up of those groups that were on both the Mandal list and the state lists. Then, as Sheth described, it turned to the consideration of more ambiguous cases: “What about those who were not in the Mandal list but in the state list?” and vice versa; “And about those who may not be on either but may still be genuinely backward?” The Commission receives both applications from communities trying to get on the lists and complaints against “those who have been wrongfully included.” Another daunting task, “This commission also has to review the entire list after ten years…and take out those communities which may have ceased to be backward” (Sheth interview 6 September 1996). According to M.L.Mathur and Hoshain Singh, of the Research Division of the National Commission for Backward Classes (Mathur and Singh interviews 18 July 1996), the process starts when a group fills out an application in the form of a questionnaire. After the Commission reads the questionnaire and collects additional data from the state in question, they hold a hearing. Sheth described the process: “We would hold public hearings, where all others can appear and contest or support what the claimants have to say. And when we were in doubt, we also institute[d] social inquiry, some kind of research on that community.”21 The “most important data are about their social backwardness” as a group (Sheth interview 6 September 1996). Such data can be difficult to collect. Thus Sheth and the Backward Classes Commission supported counting Other Backward Classes on future censuses, a contentious issue to be discussed in Chapter 5. I think if there is policy of giving reservation then it is logical that they should be counted, like SCs and STs are counted… Our report recommended that that’s the most logical thing to do. Just by counting caste, you don’t support caste… This is part of the policy. We must have data. (Sheth interview 6 September 1996).


Sheth also finds “very useful” anthropological data about groups, such as the government’s recent People of India Project, which he characterizes as an “ethnographic update of caste, communities and tribes in India… We also used… that kind of material in the Commission, in our decision making” (Sheth interview 6 September 1996). In contrast to the caste certificate officers, who eschew anthropological data for more individualized inquiries and documentation, the Commission tries to gather group level statistical and ethnographic data and encourages the government to collect more. Given the paucity of group-level data, compiling the data for the questionnaire and preparing for a hearing require substantial group organization and resources on the part of the petitioners (See Questionnaire for Consideration of Requests for Inclusion and Complaints of Under-Inclusion in the Central List of Other Backward Classes).22 First, the questionnaire demands data on the applicant group as a unit, such as literacy data and percentages of the group involved in various occupations. Second, the form includes inquiries into the history of the group’s previous official classifications, if any, as a caste, community or tribe. Third, the form requests that the group: (A) Furnish the names of two castes/communities…at a level immediately higher than the caste/community under consideration. Give reasons. (B) Furnish the names of two designated backward castes/ communities in the State, along with serial number in the State List, which are more or less at the same level as the caste/community under consideration. Give reasons. (Questionnaire for Consideration of Requests for Inclusion and Complaints of Under-Inclusion in the Central List of Other Backward Classes: 20) Sounding a bit like colonial attempts to rank jatis into hierarchical lists, this step requires that the group see itself as a unit in relation to other groups. It also reinforces the idea that groups are not just categorized but also ranked. This procedure has resulted in groups collecting and submitting data in an attempt to demonstrate that they are more backward than a group already on the list. For example, in the state of Rajastan, the “Rajput Reservation Front” leaders compared Rajputs to Jats, who were already on the list, in terms of their representation in political office and at various universities. They argued that “the Rajputs are more politically and educationally backward than the Jats,” all in an attempt to get Rajputs on the OBC list (The Statesman, “Rajastan’s creamy layer vies for OBC status” 30 October 2001). It may be the less backward rather than the more backward who have the resources to prove their own backwardness and thus wage such a campaign successfully. The listing process, in contrast to the caste certificate process, underscores that applicants are part of a group, reinforcing the perception that engaging in politics


and interacting with the state is best done collectively. Organized and politically powerful groups have more resources to come up with strong applications in spite of the lack of publicly available data, such as census figures on such groups. If a group is unified and numerous, with the potential to vote as a block, they can pressure state or central governments to be included on the lists, making it crucial that the state and national commissions are made up of professional administrators rather than politicized appointees. Sheth noted that in some states “there are some borderline cases of large communities which have acquired political clout, but are peasant communities; and it may be disputable whether they really are backward” (Sheth interview 6 September 1996). He also pointed out that “communities see power in this unification for benefits.” In fact, seeing such reinforcement of group identities has caused him to propose more individualized criteria for Backward status: After my experience on the commission, I think some kind of parental social status index, or socio-occupational status index should serve as criterion… In aggregate terms it will not be individualized; [the] same communities will by and large get this [benefit]… But it will take out the political possibility of OBC votes and unification and solidarities that go with this. (Sheth interview 6 September 1996) In contrast to this more individualized proposal, the existing process of constructing Other Backward Class lists encourages group actions. In pursuit of a policy to undermine group distinctions and disparities, the procedure of listing groups actually generates group petitions and rankings. To summarize, exposure to two very different bureaucratic processes associated with reservations reinforces people’s perceptions of their relationship to the state in divergent ways. Getting an Other Backward Class certificate is a more individualized although far from private procedure. In contrast, petitioning to get on the Other Backward Classes list necessitates collective action to press group claims on the state. CONCLUSION In India, the quite detailed attention to classification necessitated by caste certificates and lists contributes to continuing constructions of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. The overt labeling of beneficiaries, the reliance on “original” identities in ambiguous certificate cases, and the emphasis on group-based claims and data in applications for lists can harden group identities. This examination of administrative practices in India reinforces arguments about preferential policies and target populations in the


United States, where racial and ethnic categories have remained administratively softer: [A] coherent system of group benefit-allocation requires more attention to the process of classification than has hitherto been given, but this attention may solidify the very social divisions beyond which preferential programs were ostensibly designed to move us. (Ford 1994:1285) After serving on the National Backward Classes Commission, D.L. Sheth’s recommendation to move toward an “individualized” process reflects his similar concern about solidifying categories. Reservation policies in India give substantial benefits to members of less powerful groups. It is the administrative procedures associated with these policies that at times constitute a burden. There is a trade-off at play: potential social, economic or political benefits in exchange for regulations and procedures that involve at times invasive identity verifications and labels. Many people and groups are willing to go through these processes for the potential benefits, but the procedures may be unnecessarily burdensome, particularly for the least powerful citizens. The same degree of verification, labeling and social stigma are not associated with policies that target more powerful groups, such as reservations for sportsmen. In some places, the development of village computers and interactive government web sites may be making it less burdensome to get caste certificates; yet the digital divide means that the least powerful citizens will not benefit from these advances any time soon (Dugger 2000, Luce 2001, Paswan 2000).23 The countless historical labels for today’s Scheduled Castes, labels that have been used and discarded over the years, attest to the problems associated with categorizing together several discrete communities on the basis of their poor treatment by others rather than positive qualities of their own. Despite some attempts to limit embarrassment or harassment of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes, procedures continue to haunt beneficiaries of reservations. The necessity of identity verification through local officials and “respectable persons of the locality,” a phrase used on a Scheduled Caste certificate application, implies that the applicants themselves are less than respectable and not to be trusted (Application Form for SC Certificate).24 One striking procedure is literally labeling files of employees in reserved jobs with their Backward status, a status which is to be reviewed at every “career upturn” or promotion, ordinarily occasions of honor and respect. And yet, as we shall see in later chapters, many groups are demanding such labels in spite of the obvious stigma associated with a word like “backward.”


Official identifications tend to be based on standard and rather static determinations of a migrant’s original place, a married person’s original caste, or a convert’s original religion. Policy-makers might assume that such boundaries can be empirically and objectively determined; yet, policy-implementers—the bureaucrats actually trying to work out the details and standards and to issue caste certificates—sometimes find they must consider each case individually. This reinforces James Scott’s argument that “[t]he people who actually make the assignments to these categories know the fictional and arbitrary quality underlying each of these decisions and know that they hide a wealth of problematic variation” (Scott 1995:35). In practice, bureaucrats often recognize continuing ambiguity. Moreover, the public continues to produce a plethora of petitions demanding changes to the official lists. The lists may reinforce group-based strategies, but official categories are often challenged, not simply accepted. Bureaucratic attempts to codify and identify may solidify some identities but do not harden them completely. This study of India highlights an important blindspot in the “target population” literature: The term “policy target” does not capture the agency of those targeted. “The potential beneficiaries of welfare measures are not just passive ‘targets’: they think, choose and respond to policies” (The Hindu, “Caste Count Revisited” 16 September 2000). A comparison of two types of government petitions, an individual applying for an OBC caste certificate and a group applying for OBC status, illustrates the divergent effects of policy administration on people’s interactions with their government. The caste certificate procedures, involving an individual petition followed by collection and verification of personal rather than aggregate data, reinforce a sense that individuals need to press their own claims—and hope that their neighbors back them up. In contrast, the National Backward Classes Commission’s procedures necessitate group level strategy, coordination, and data, and they seem to reinforce, according to one Commission member, “unification and solidarities” among Other Backward Classes and those aspiring to become backward (Sheth interview 6 September 1996). Administrators implement official identity parameters and procedures and can impose bureaucratic burdens on the least powerful citizens. These powers of the Indian bureaucracy, which is still dominated by higher status groups in Indian society, compellingly illustrate the importance of having a representative bureaucracy, one of the goals of job reservations (Planning Commission 1997– 2002: Table 3.6.9).25 Yetthe implementation of these potentially empowering reservation policies has resulted in some significant procedural side effects: burdensome labels, static classifications, and group petitions and rankings. Administrative simplifications do influence group identity constructions, as when individuals and groups in India must claim backwardness in order to get ahead.

5 Categorizing and counting on the census

In 2001, census enumerators asked India’s one billion citizens whether they were members of the disadvantaged communities officially known as the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. To publicize the census, the Census Commissioner, accompanied by television cameras, served as the enumerator for the President of India. President K.R. Narayanan identified himself as a member of a Scheduled Caste, but when he was asked to name his caste as part of the standard verification procedure, his caste did not appear on the official list, much to his consternation. His caste, on the SC lists in the state of his birth, Kerala, did not appear in the lists for the Indian capital (The Hindu, “Blanks on the census form” 25 February 2001, Constable and Laxmi 2001:A12). This is just one prominent example of the numerous challenges and controversies associated with census classifications based on identities such as caste, tribe or religion. Although not all castes are counted on the census, Scheduled Castes and Tribes are. Census enumerators, to verify whether people should really be counted as members of these categories, ask them to name their caste or tribe, so their answers can be checked against official state-by-state schedules.1 In addition, census enumerators record religion, which can also serve to disqualify self-declared Scheduled Caste members from being recorded as SCs, since this designation is not open to Muslims or Christians (Jenkins 2001a, Wright 1997, Wyatt 1998). These census questions juxtapose personal identity and official identification, which do not always neatly overlap, as in the case of the President. In spite of initial intentions to downplay caste in the postcolonial census and ongoing definitional challenges, this limited accounting of castes persists and may even be expanded into a comprehensive caste count in the future. After colonial census administrators’ misguided yet meticulous attempts to rank and record castes, the first post-independence Census Commissioner only collected community data from the so-called “Special Groups,” including the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Anglo-Indians. This decision was motivated by the idea that past census taking had reinforced casteism, dividing Indian society and facilitating colonial rule. Thus the 1951 census


included only those questions that were considered necessary to fulfill the constitutional commitment to public policies such as reservations. Subsequently the census count of Other Backward Classes stopped. However, the controversial extension of reservations in central government jobs to the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in the 1990s caused some people to advocate resuming a comprehensive count of caste so that these groups too could be counted. Although the government ultimately rejected this proposal for the 2001 census, the serious and ongoing consideration of a general caste question on the census is somewhat puzzling. Given post-independence critiques of this colonial practice by both politicians and academics, why is a caste census being seriously considered in India? Recent proposals to resume a comprehensive caste count not only signal a change in perspective from the independence-era optimism that caste would fade away with modernity, but also reflect a continuity in the process, namely, the persistent presence of caste on the census in spite of the goal of removing it. Postcolonial census classifications and enumerations have a mixed legacy for identity politics in India. Census results serve as a policy tool for designing and monitoring reservations to break down group disparities, yet, as I will demonstrate, practices of classifying and enumerating Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and religious communities simultaneously reinforce divisions in several ways. Census classifications tend to maintain static identity categories by failing to recognize some positive social changes. In addition, the state monitors certain already oppressed groups more stringently than the general population. Census enumerations continue to inspire some groups to prioritize the maintenance of group numbers over the alleviation of group divisions. Also, although the census is a potentially valuable source of quantitative data on the social conditions of various groups, official tabulations and dissemination of data sometimes emphasize group numbers more than their conditions. In these ways, census classifications and enumerations reinforce official categories; nevertheless, the boundaries remain somewhat pliable. Dramatic jumps in the populations of certain Scheduled Tribes from one census to the next illustrate changing identity claims in response to official designations and the benefits associated with them. In an ironic reversal of the demands and petitions of colonial subjects to increase their status in the census rankings, some groups are now trying to be counted in the Scheduled categories. Those joining the ranks of the Scheduled Tribes demonstrate that this census category is both influential and permeable. The relationship between the census and reservations rests on two practices: classifying and counting. The official social categories used on the census match those used for reservations for the Scheduled groups, although the methods of determining who is in those categories vary. “Scheduled” identity on the census is supposed to be self-declared to the enumerator, although answers are checked


against a state list and can also be disqualified due to religious affiliation. These official “checks” on largely self-declared identities are somewhat akin to the People of India project’s modified self-identification principle, discussed in Chapter 3. In the context of adjudicating or administering reservations, the topics of Chapters 2 and 4, Scheduled Caste or Tribe identity claims are even more scrutinized. Census data on Scheduled Castes and Tribes factor into the reserved quotas allocated for these groups.2 Continuing to collect social and economic data about the scheduled categories and religious minorities can help the government to monitor their progress and populations and adjust policies accordingly. Thus decisions about whether and how to classify and count people on the census can have an impact on the opportunities of disadvantaged groups. The utility of the census data for achieving further opportunities for the disadvantaged through reservations offsets some of the divisiveness associated with counting caste; nevertheless some counterproductive practices might well be reconsidered, particularly as an expanded caste-wise count is contemplated. Analysis of modern India’s census experience can contribute to ongoing debates worldwide about the use of identity categories on national censuses. The United States, for example, revised the 2000 census to allow multiracial citizens to check multiple races (Nobles 2000, Skerry 2000). South Africans after apartheid made a rather heart wrenching decision to retain racial categories in the census, with the new goal of monitoring progress toward equality.3 Britain recently introduced a rather controversial ethnicity count (Dale and Holdsworth 1995, White 1999), and the new censuses of the former Soviet Republics are sparking controversies about national, ethnic, and religious distinctions (Kertzer and Arel 2002). Given the lengthy history of census taking in India, Indian administrators, academics and politicians have long been aware of the difficulties and downsides of identity classifications. The following discussion of some divisive tendencies of the Indian census is not meant as a criticism of census administrators, who, although coding a plethora of answers into standardized matrices, articulated some of the most nuanced discussions of India’s complex diversity I encountered in interviews on this subject. Indeed the divisive dynamics of census categories occur at multiple stages in the census process, from the design of categories and questions, to data collection, tabulation, dissemination and politicization. Thus while group reinforcement associated with the census is in part due to administrative procedures, it is also due to political pressures, to media coverage, or simply to the imperatives of any large scale accounting of a complex reality. I first show that the arguments of post-independence politicians foreshadowed current academic critiques that colonial census takers emphasized, simplified, and reified social categories such as caste, tribe and religion. Despite these longstanding concerns, such categories never did disappear from the census. Current debates in India about resuming a comprehensive caste count in the


census illustrate not a new but a renewed emphasis on caste and community, in large part due to growing administrative and political concerns about reservations. I analyze some ongoing practices associated with classification and enumeration and argue that these tend to reinforce group divisions despite the goal of breaking them down. Finally, I turn to some recent population jumps due to identity shifts. These shifts into the Scheduled Tribe category became politicized due to the reservations at stake. In comparison with the court cases, caste lists and certificates, and even the People of India project, discussed in earlier chapters, census categories are more porous. They rely upon selfidentification, although the enumerator does a little checking as in the example of the President and the 2001 census. I conclude that divisive administrative practices and political dynamics have haunted group-based census categories from colonial times to the present, with renewed vigor in recent years, yet some people still manage to complicate such categories, if not always overcome them. CRITICS OF THE COLONIAL CENSUS The colonial census administrators were hardly the first to record data about groups on the subcontinent, although their legacy has the most direct influence on today’s census administrators. Historian Sumit Guha compellingly argues that precolonial record-keeping and processes of identity definition are too often ignored in historical work on the Indian census, and he discusses the classifications and enumerations by the Mughals and the Marathas that preceded the British and Indian censuses (Guha 2001). Before the British, Mughal writers and rulers commented on group characteristics and tried to standardize skin color classifications. Mughal surveys, such as the Ain-i-Akbari, were part of the inspiration for the first Indian gazetteers in English, in the late eighteenth century. In addition, the early colonial census administrators drew on revenue collection records of earlier rulers, such as the Nayakas (Bayly 1999:103–5, 108, Barrier 1981). The first colonial census of India was initially planned to coincide with the 1861 census in Britain, but in 1857 Indian soldiers in the colonial army revolted, resulting in a change of plan. The rebellion both delayed the initial colonial census and renewed the motivation of the British to gain more knowledge about the population of the land that officially became their colony in the rebellion’s aftermath.4 After several regional Indian censuses, a census of India with a common schedule was carried out in 1871–72. India has had an unbroken series of decennial censuses thereafter, although not all regions have been covered each time. Attempts to record the variety of communities and castes in the census contributed to caste-based mobilizations and associations, often with the aim of increasing official status, particularly after Herbert Risley attempted a hierarchical ordering in the 1901 census (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967: 116–19,


Charsley 1996). The 1931 census commissioner J.H. Hutton, author of Caste in India, also tried to develop caste indices, but the “hyperpoliticization” of caste, as well as the need for an abbreviated census during Second World War, meant that comprehensive caste counts ceased after 1931 (Dirks 2001:221, 226, Hutton 1946). The social and political side effects of the colonial census inspired much criticism from Indian leaders in the early years of independence as well as from several historians and other scholars in more recent years. Indian leaders at independence, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, wanted to put certain colonial census practices behind them, particularly caste tabulations (Bose interviews 19 July 1996 and 4 November 1996). Some of their comments foreshadowed current academic criticisms; however, like many of their contemporaries, these early postcolonial leaders spoke in what now seem to be idealized terms about the stasis of tradition and the dynamism of the modern era they hoped to enter.5 Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Deputy Prime Minister, spoke in 1950 at a conference about the census to be carried out the following year, contrasting it with the colonial emphasis on India’s divisions: The forthcoming census is the first census of a Free Republican India. Formerly there used to be elaborate caste tables which were required in India partly to satisfy the theory that it was a caste ridden country and partly to meet the needs of administrative measures dependent of [sic] caste divisions. In the forthcoming census this will no longer be a prominent feature and we can devote our energies and attention to the collection and formulation of basic economic data…of the individual and the state. (Quoted in Natarajan 1972:266) The shift in emphasis from groups to individuals and from caste classifications to economic data signaled the optimism at independence about “modernization” and the fading away of caste. At a 1959 census conference, Home Minister Govind Pant echoed these ideologies of modernity: “In the olden days the conditions were static… You were concerned mostly with matters pertaining to caste, religion and so on, but now times have changed. We are on the move and our society has become…dynamic” (quoted in Natarajan 1972:267). These leaders argued that “traditional” identities like caste and religion were static, particularly as portrayed in the colonial census, and they committed themselves to new and progressive agendas for the postcolonial census operations. These critics of the colonial census, anticipating the speedy demise of caste, would be surprised at the current debates over resuming a caste count. Years later, colonial census taking became the subject of much academic scrutiny, which echoed these earlier concerns about the imposed divisiveness of census categories and the opportunities for colonial manipulations. Inspiring


further research, Benedict Anderson’s seminal work, Imagined Communities, notes census takers’ “intolerance of multiple, politically ‘transvestite,’ blurred, or changing identifications. Hence the weird subcategory, under each racial group, of ‘Others’—who, nonetheless, are absolutely not to be confused with other ‘Others’” (Anderson 1991:166). The practices of census taking slot novel or ambiguous answers into standardized categories. India’s multifaceted diversity makes it an extreme case with regard to this problem. Historian Thomas R. Metcalf describes the enumeration of castes for the colonial census as a “project of formidable difficulty… Constant efforts had to be made to reduce the bewildering array of caste names returned by individuals to a consistent order, and to fit all enumerated individuals properly into the assigned categories” (Metcalf 1995:121). Personal identities and official identifications frequently did not mesh neatly. Moreover, the oversimplification of complex identities on the census did not just record social categories but also had political and social effects on them. While acknowledging that disputes over caste rankings preceded the British census, historian Frank Conlon notes: the enduring interest of the British in caste as a system which both divided and ranked their Indian subjects, produced an extensive response among those subjects, and also sometimes created new categories by statistical sleight of hand or administrative fiat. (Conlon 1981:104) Anthropologist Arjun Appadurai argues in even stronger terms about the farreaching effects of the census on social and political life: The Indian census, rather than being a passive instrument of data-gathering, creates, by its practical logic and form, a new sense of category-identity in India, which in turn creates the conditions for new strategies of mobility, status politics, and electoral struggle. (Appadurai 1993:316) Appadurai’s description makes a census seem ill suited to be a mechanism for social justice, which was the justification for continuing the caste count after Independence. The social disputes and political mobilizations associated with caste classifications are no surprise to those who argue that the colonial census “served the cause of both science and imperialism” (Bose 1991:20) and was “an important early apparatus of colonial rule” (Dirks 1997:209). Census taking facilitated colonial goals, ranging from revenue collection to law and order. Understanding and even exacerbating internal divisions could smooth the way for continued rule.


These political leaders and scholars have severely criticized the colonial census for reinforcing or politicizing distinctions on the basis of caste, tribe and religion. Has the postcolonial Indian census avoided such divisive tendencies? Can a census used to design and monitor policies to overcome community-based disadvantages—in contrast to a colonial census used to gather revenue or maintain order and control—avoid the pitfalls of reinforcing divisions? These are the questions raised by recent proposals to resume a comprehensive caste count. A RENEWED EMPHASIS ON CASTE Recognizing the problems associated with the colonial state’s classifications, policy-makers after independence made one attempt to count all of the backward classes but then discontinued counting castes in the census except for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Prime Minister V.P.Singh in 1990 announced his controversial intention to extend central government reservations to the Other Backward Classes. This decision contributed to the fall of his government, sparked violent protests, and faced legal challenges (Dirks 2001, Engineer 1991, Mandal Commission 1980, Parikh 1998). After the Supreme Court’s eventual approval of these OBC reservations, with some limitations, the administrative challenges of implementing this policy came into focus (Justice R.N.Prasad interview 18 September 1996). Indira Sawhney v. Union of India (Supreme Court of India 1993).6 Many argue that census enumerators should count Other Backward Classes or even return to the practice of counting all castes (Singh interview 20 November 1996, Sheth interview 6 September 1996). Otherwise, state and national backward class commissions must continue to rely on their own studies or extrapolations from 1931 census data to estimate populations of the Other Backward Classes.7 A proposal to resume a caste count on the 2001 census received impetus from, among others, the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, which could use the data in its efforts to monitor the empowerment of the disadvantaged; the National Backward Classes Commission, to aid its attempts to identify the OBCs; the Kerala High Court, which issued a direction to the central government to consider a caste-wise count for 2001; and various political organizations (Vijayanunni 1999, Shah 1998).8 For example, the National Backward Classes Commission “recommended that that is the most logical thing to do. Just by counting caste, you don’t support caste,” according to D.L.Sheth, a sociologist who served on the commission. On the dearth of OBC data he lamented, “It becomes very difficult to even judge whether they are adequately represented in services, because we don’t have data, castewise data” (Sheth interview 6 September 1996). After initial support, the government eventually “decided against the idea of a caste-wise Census, 2001” (Registrar General and Census


Commissioner, M.Vijayanunni quoted in Narayan 1999:1). The proposal, still a possibility for a future census, drew mixed responses. Registrar General Vijayanunni initially defended the idea of a caste-wise census. His discussion highlighted the political context of this proposal, as the increasing politicization of caste confounded the hopes of an earlier era that caste would make a graceful exit: After the post-Independence euphoria, when it was vainly thought that caste had been cast off, the course of democratic India has seen the resurgence of caste in the polity through the decades, with caste awareness reaching a high in the post-Mandal 1990s. The first census since then, in 2001 is the right time to reintroduce the caste question in the census questionnaire and fill the glaring sociological data gap. (Vijayanunni 1999) The increasing political and administrative importance of caste, the backward castes in particular, set the context for this proposal (Chandra 2000, Jaffrelot 2000, Kothari 1994). The Registrar General both addressed and downplayed fears that a caste census would result in massive protests, worse than the tragic anti-Mandal demonstrations: “[M]ere collection of caste data can entail no such opposition” (Vijayanunni 1999). More attuned to parallels between this “mere” data collection and the oftcritiqued colonial census, social scientist Ghanshyam Shah argued, “The proposed census of caste and collection of information under the categories created by experts, as done by colonial rulers in the past, would hardly enhance our understanding of caste” (Shah 1998). He was particularly wary of official classifications: “Once such categories are created, they will in course of time emerge as ‘facts’… Do we learn from history or repeat the blunders of the colonial state?” (Shah 1998).9 At a symposium of government officials and policy-makers in Delhi on the issue of caste and the 2001 census, the most widely cited argument for not counting caste was that it would “intensify divisive caste identities,” and many felt that counting caste would revive the “divide and rule” dynamics of British caste enumerations (Deshpande and Sundar 1998). Others reflected on the differences between colonial and postcolonial census operations in their arguments for resuming a caste-wise census. Former Prime Minister V.P.Singh supported the idea of counting Other Backward Classes on the census: “The census should take steps to know the quantitative dimensions of the issue” (Singh interview 20 November 1996). Singh downplayed the dangers of official group distinctions by contrasting contemporary classifications and British policies: “There is a qualitative difference. British never intended sharing power with the depressed classes. Here the aim is to share power” (V.P.Singh interview 20 November 1996). As an enlarged caste count is contemplated, we


must consider whether changed motives are enough to change the outcomes of administrative practices. Has the post colonial Indian state really steered clear of the divisive tendencies of the colonial census, or has contemporary caste-based data collection perpetuated some of the same problems as colonial census classifications? Given the persistence of caste in the postcolonial census, to some the proposed expansion of the caste question seems to be a logical expansion of past practices. Now is a crucial time to take a closer look at those practices. The following discussion illustrates the continuing attention to caste in the postcolonial census and, in particular, the continuing divisiveness associated with classifications and enumerations. CLASSIFYING: A CASTE BY ANY OTHER NAME¼ One objective of group data collection, according to some government accounts, is to help “destroy” group discrimination associated with the caste system. A national Backward Classes commission, set up after independence, concluded in its report: Before the disease of caste is destroyed all facts about it have to be noted and classified in a scientific manner as in a clinical record… The Census officers must have permanent ethnologists and sociologists… As long as social welfare and relief have to be administered through castes, classes or groups, full information about these groups should be obtained and tabulated. (Kalelkar Commission 1953:159) The commission emphasized the importance of data collected and organized along group lines. Although many of the commission’s recommendations were largely discarded, they reflect the faith, at the time, in the possibility of a systematic and scientific destruction of these group distinctions through groupbased policies. The Minister of Home Affairs worried about separatism due to the report’s emphasis on caste yet requested state government surveys of numbers of Backward Classes (Dirks 2001:226). Moreover, Scheduled groups continue to be counted and studied in the national census. Thus, in spite of the desire to downplay caste on the census, expressed above by census officials, substantial inquiries into caste, as well as related census practices, persist. Examination of postcolonial census documents demonstrates that, ironically, in pursuit of the goal of social change through reservation schemes, census classification practices reinforce static identity categories and monitor the “special” groups much more than the general population. A practice going back to the early British colonial census persists as the census enumerators consult


lists of castes to standardize the thousands of different responses they received. Historically, enumerators had consulted lists of terms that should and should not be used. The administrative volume of the census of Bengal in 1901 included a “list of vague and indefinite entries found in the census returns of 1891 that should be carefully excluded from colom [sic] 8 (caste) of the census schedules, except in the special cases where the term is said to indicate a true caste” (quoted in Cohn 1996:224). Up to the present day, enumerators continue to “correct” the responses of those they are counting. (Even a response from the President of India!) Only people who claim to be of castes that are included in the Scheduled Castes lists are counted as true Scheduled Castes. These lists can only be amended by an act of Parliament; thus the lists may be more static than the populations they represent.10 The continuing necessity of these relatively static caste lists results in the government’s failure to fully recognize shifting identities due to a concern with tabulating “true” castes. For example, partly because of the impact of reservation policy “schedules” and partly because of social movements among the lower castes, some people not only identify with their own caste or jati (out of the thousands of geographically scattered and socially distinct jatis) but also sense a larger identification with the lowest, “untouchable,” castes in general (Omvedt 1994). Some claim to be “Harijans” (meaning “children of God,” Mohandas Gandhi’s name for untouchables) or “Dalits” (meaning the “oppressed,” a term associated with Dalit leader and father of the Indian constitution, B.Ambedkar) (Zelliot 1996, Gottschalk 2001). Many are even rallying around the government’s category of Scheduled Castes by forming scheduled caste associations (Jalali 1993). This tendency toward embracing a pan-Dalit identity is a potentially empowering social trend. The census may be encouraging this trend by continuing to focus attention on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as broader categories. Yet enumerators must ascertain someone’s specific group within the larger Scheduled categories to record that person. The enumerator’s instructions for the 1961 census illustrate an attempt to put the increasing number of people claiming broader identity categories back into smaller caste categories: Do not write the names of the Scheduled Castes in general terms as “Harijan,” “Achhut.” You should ascertain the name of the caste when it is returned and write it. If a person is negligent and insists on calling himself merely “Harijan,” tell him that this description will not earn the person any benefits under the Constitution permissible to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This may persuade him to give out the correct name. (Mitra 1961)


This policy discredits unity among lower castes by reinforcing separate caste names as “correct.” The adoption of composite names, in contrast, is portrayed as “negligence.” Thus the postcolonial census procedures continue to ignore some changing identities and reinforce some divisions, particularly among disadvantaged citizens.11 Not everyone’s caste was recorded for the census. In practice, however, everyone had to be asked a caste question. For the first post-colonial census in 1951: [T]he Government of India had already accepted the policy of official discouragement of community distinctions based on caste. They decided therefore, that no general Race, Caste or Tribe enquiries should be made but that an enquiry should be made regarding Race, Caste or Tribe only to the extent necessary for providing information relating to certain special groups of people who are referred to in the constitution of India… The relevant Census questions were re-framed so as to enquire, in relation to every citizen, whether or not he was a member of a “Special Group.” (Gopalaswami 1953b:1) The necessity of looking at a list of caste names to determine whether an individual was “special” or not meant that the census questions had to be much more specific in practice. A 1951 census report addressed some common difficulties with slotting citizens into identity categories. After a notation that for the purposes of question 14 (sex) “Eunuchs and Hermaphrodites should be treated as MALES” (emphasis in original), ambiguities pertaining to “special group” status were discussed. The report noted, “In actual practice, they had to ask every person his caste and it was only at the time of recording the answer that they had to examine the list…to decide on the answer to be written” (Gopalaswami 1951 vol. VII:415).12 In spite of the attempt to minimize the caste question, all respondents had to be asked, reminding all of the continuing official importance of such distinctions. Yet only lower caste members’ specific castes were written and kept in the records of the government. By the next census, in 1961, the government wanted more detailed tabulations on each Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, including industrial classification, age, marital status, education, religion, land, and mother tongue (Mitra 1961).13 Detailed tabulations can be useful tools, but, as discussed below, the data on the disadvantaged are only useful to them if their social conditions get as much attention as their fertility rates. Census-sponsored ethnographic studies also returned with the 1961 census (Padmanabha 1978). That census included 400 village survey monographs, with descriptive reports on caste. These postcolonial reports were reminiscent of the


ethnographic appendices about castes that often accompanied the colonial census, as in the caste report by Herbert Risely for the 1901 census, which became the basis for his People of India, the subject of Chapter 3 (Risley 1915). Colonial ethnographers had an interest in painting populations as “barbaric” to attempt to justify colonial rule, or in identifying “criminal tribes” to monitor or “martial races” to employ (Cohn 1996, Des Chene 1999, Dirks 1997). In light of this history, the 1971 census’ “ethnographic notes” contain some startling descriptions of certain castes as “inveterate criminals” (Bayly 1999: 275). If a caste count is carried out, socio-economic data could make this exercise worthwhile, but analyses of various groups’ so-called criminal proclivities is not the sort of supplementary data likely to help them advance. In India, census classifications raise recurring and troubling issues, particularly the tendency to retain static, subdivided categories and to impose more on the privacy of the disadvantaged through additional state scrutiny and record keeping. COUNTING: THE POWER OF NUMBERS I remember an old village officer in Madras putting the first objective to me as that we must catch every man. Just so. (M.W.M.M.Yeatts, Census Commissioner for the 1941 census, quoted in Natarajan 1972:144) Can “catching” each person in the census be liberating? For disadvantaged groups, the numbers tabulated from the census can aid in monitoring and enforcing reservations; yet because these numbers are so used, the politics of reservations has added new complications and controversies to the census enumeration. For example, although their census answers do not “qualify” them for reservations, many people associate the census with reservations, since they are both government projects and use the same administrative categories. Although the eligibility of individuals is not affected, their answers can cause shifts in the relative percentages of Scheduled Castes or Tribes in the population, which could affect the future allocation of reserved legislative seats, government jobs and university admissions. In spite of their utility for reservations, census numbers can, at the same time, reinforce the divisions between existing social categories in two ways. First, the association between population numbers and power, due to democratic electoral politics as well as the quotas associated with reservations, means that people may become more concerned about counting and maintaining group numbers than about doing away with group distinctions. Second, the release and tabulation of data sometimes emphasize group numbers rather than their conditions,


diminishing the value of the census data as a tool for policy refinement or social empowerment. Concern over population numbers has caused some people to retain categories they might otherwise wish to discard. The demand to count the Other Backward Classes is a case in point. One census scholar, in a striking reversal of independence era statements on the modernity of moving away from a caste count, argues: If the modern census is conceived as a social document of a nation, it would be imperative then to include caste questions (relating, of course, to those which are identified as backward) in the subsequent census questionnaires to throw light on their educational and economic status. (Mohanty and Momin 1996:167) Although the census critics discussed earlier suggest that the colonial counts, in particular, had dramatic effects on the social order, subsequent efforts to downplay caste on the census certainly did not make castes disappear in society. The necessity of using archaic 1931 census data for current policies for Other Backward Classes further complicates any claims about the “modernity” of avoiding a caste-wise count and forces some who might otherwise eschew such a count to advocate it simply to gather the numbers needed to administer existing policies. The power of numbers also sways groups to embrace rather than disavow their backward status. Some even try to come up with their own population figures. Census administrators suggested that the logistics and politics—of coordinating comprehensive, official lists of castes and then counting them may be too much for an already huge census operation. Such concerns may have factored into the decision not to expand the caste count for 2001. One census administrator, while acknowledging the utility of Other Backward Class numbers for government planning, pointed out the challenge: “The demand may be genuine, but it is a very…voluminous exercise” (Chakravorty interview 16 December 1996). Undeterred, some states and, more tellingly, caste associations are trying to fill the gap by sponsoring their own, unofficial Other Backward Class censuses (Hasan 2000:173, n.16). In the words of sociologist A.M.Shah: Democracy, it is said, [is] a game of counting heads… Since the introduction of adult franchise, every caste is counting its heads… Many castes now conduct their own censuses and present their population figures to the government. This has forced the Backward Class commissions in several states to conduct special censuses… The forty year old policy to exclude caste from the census is thus slowly getting reversed. (Shah 1989:13)


The censuses sponsored by the backward classes themselves are of dubious impartiality, but their efforts show the perceived importance of maintaining and recording group numbers and relative percentages in society, rather than eschewing the backward label. A second troubling dynamic associated with the official headcount is a tendency for the media, politicians, and even official tabulations to emphasize “minority” population numbers. Historian Robert E.Frykenberg traces the dangerous development of the idea of a so-called permanent “majority community” in Indian politics (Frykenberg 1987). A corollary development has been the tendency to scrutinize the relative numbers in the various “minority” communities, further shoring up these distinctions. When census statistics are released, numerous newspaper articles appear expressing concern over the rate of growth of the Scheduled Caste and the Muslim populations in particular. These numbers often overshadow data on their social conditions. This reference to numbers and to majority or minority status is exemplified by the most controversial of all census figures—the relative Muslim and Hindu rates of population growth. The religion question on the census could be useful for reevaluating reservation policies by showing whether Muslims (some already receiving benefits as Other Backward Classes and others currently demanding that right) are advancing in the educational or economic spheres (Jenkins 2001a). Yet official census tabulations and media coverage have often stressed the relative numbers over the relative conditions of disadvantaged groups. The population growth rates of different religious groups, as well as the scheduled groups, are published widely, and one of the most common refrains from the politicians of the Hindu right is the rapid growth of religious minority populations.14 English language newspaper reports on census results, accessible by a largely elite audience, are particularly prone to emphasizing population growth rather than other social or economic data about disadvantaged groups. Under the headline, “Census shows massive influx of Muslims in N-E, Delhi,” Shivaji Sarkar notes, “The Home Ministry officials, meanwhile, have taken steps to accelerate the pace of fencing around the Bangladesh border” (Financial Express-New Delhi 17 July 1995). In another account: According to the latest report published by the Census Commissioner of India, the population of Muslims in the country has shown an overall growth of 32.76 per cent during the decade between 1981–91 which is higher than the growth of Hindus…. According to another report published recently, the population of Scheduled Castes in Delhi has been increasing at a faster rate than the general population. (Sahay 1995)


Inadvertently highlighting the failure of the census reports to shed light on possible explanations for these figures, this newspaper article concludes, “Now whatever be the actual causes of these higher growth rates of Muslims and SCs, the phenomenon is sure to cause apprehension and suspicion in the minds of other communities or castes and would certainly harm the country’s family planning program.” The author then argues that Hindus, particularly upper castes, would “shun” family planning in response to the census report (Sahay 1995). This may well be the case if they read the following account by P.S. Sharma, entitled “Danger Signal for Hindus.” But Muslims have always been multiplying at a faster rate than the Hindus, as evidenced by the censuses held from 1891 to 1991. The result is that for the last over 100 years, the communal composition of the country has been changing census after census in favour of Muslims… The rise of Muslim population at a faster pace than the Hindu population strengthened the Muslim demand for Pakistan…even in truncated India after Partition, Muslim population is growing at a faster rate than the Hindu population. If other things remain the same, this will in course of time ensure that Hindus are reduced to a minority and India becomes an Islamic state. (Free Press Journal 13 September 1995) Abdul Malik Mujahid discusses news accounts that actually tried to project when Hindus would become a minority in the state of Tamil Nadu (Mujahid 1989:93). These reports occurred in the wake of mass conversions of untouchables to Islam in that state in the early 1980s. These are extreme examples of the competitive politics of numbers, which can be inspired by census data interpreted without context or cross-tabulation. Clearly, relative populations and growth rates of different groups are widely circulated; yet, the Indian state postpones or simply does not tabulate data for certain other illuminating tables, such as the Muslim literacy rate in comparison with the Hindu literacy rate, on the grounds that these numbers are “sensitive” information. “The census tables do not present such data though the questions on religion and literacy were asked about every individual,” notes census scholar Ashish Bose (quoted in Mohanty and Momin 1996:6, Bose interviews 19 July 1996 and 4 November 1996). Notably, another arguably more sensitive table, on differential fertility by religion, has been included in recent census publications. The possible relationship between fertility rates and illiteracy rates remains hidden, and the misguided assumptions linking high fertility and Muslim “culture,” particularly polygamy, pervade public discussion.15 In a published interview, the Registrar General of India, M.Vijayanunni, was asked about the politicization of census figures and whether it is “warranted to talk about the Hindu rate of growth or the Muslim rate of growth given the fact


that religious communities in India are so amorphous?” He responded, “The point however is that Muslims have always registered a higher growth rate.” A follow up question and answer reveal the Indian census reports’ recent emphasis on population figures to the detriment of social indicators: “Since illiteracy and poverty have always been reflected in high birth rates, could the high growth rates indicate the social status of minority communities in India?” The Registrar General responded, “This is merely a hypothesis. Unfortunately, we have no data to corroborate this” (Indian Express 17 December 1995). Thus, the potential for group-based data to combat intergroup inequities remains partially unfulfilled. Part of the power of numbers lies in their publication and interpretation: Which numbers are publicized? Which are compared? Like the data on Muslims, data on the population growth of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been released, while more detailed data on their social conditions have been delayed. Former Deputy Registrar General of the census, B.K.Roy Burman notes that “[f]or the 1981 Census, no all India Volume, giving data by individual scheduled castes and tribes, was published. I am not sure that all the contemplated tables in respect of individual SC/ST will be available before the advent of the 21st century” (George 1999).16 Even if the government has not declared this data “sensitive” and the root of the problem is the sheer volume of data to be processed, the delayed release of the data weakens the justification for asking about caste. In 2001, enumerators counted Scheduled Castes and Tribes but did not collect income data, making quantitative economic analyses of the Scheduled groups in comparison with the rest of the population difficult.17 In short, census data about the social and economic conditions of groups could be used to combat divisions, whereas their relative numbers can be used to provoke fear and reinforce divisions. SHIFTING IDENTITIES I counted nine I had no right to count (But this was dreamy unofficial counting). (Robert Frost from “The Census Taker” 1995:165) In the previous examples, the practices of official classification or the emphasis on group numbers resulted in the reinforcement of the government’s categories. In the following example, census categories were adopted, yet simultaneously challenged, due to a trend demographer Ashish Bose calls “retribalization” (Bose interview 4 November 1996). Retribalization refers to the dramatic leaps in census figures for certain scheduled communities. In spite of all the dynamics and mechanisms of the census that tend to reinforce existing classifications, the


reliance on self-declared identities means that there are instances in which people still manage to cross state-drawn boundaries. In 1981, census takers recorded a sudden jump in the number of people claiming Scheduled Tribe status in the state of Maharashtra. This population explosion could not be attributed to births alone, but rather was due in part to people deciding to change categories.18 In the case of the Halba/Halbi tribe, the 1971 population of 7205 rose to 242,819 in 1981, in part due to members of a Koshti sub-caste claiming to belong to this tribe. The fact that at one time the Maharashtrian government had recognized this sub-caste as tribal members demonstrates the unclear boundaries between tribals and non-tribals and makes the case more ambiguous than conclusions about “fraudulent responses” imply (Kulkarni 1991). At the same time, reservations are one possible incentive for what historian Sumit Guha has described as the “infiltration” of the Scheduled Tribes in Maharashtra, whose population grew by “an implausible 50 per cent in 1971–81” (Guha 1999:193 citing Gaikwad 1986). This could be seen as “ironically enough, another indicator of progress,” notes Guha (1999:193). The voluntary movement of individuals and groups into stigmatized categories arguably breaks down boundaries, although administering group-based policies aimed at Scheduled Tribes certainly becomes more complex, and their impact may be diluted. The improbable enumerations of Scheduled Tribes in Maharashtra demonstrate that in spite of the seemingly obsessive tendencies of governments to classify, people occasionally throw a wrench into the administrative machinery of the census. “The policing of these increasingly artificial and highly permeable social boundaries by any state, however omniscient, will almost certainly become increasingly difficult in the new millennium” (Guha 1999:198). Enumerators have some authority to “check” census answers to make sure a group is on the schedule but cannot verify whether individuals are “really” in the groups. As discussed in previous chapters, administrative “scrutiny committees” and judicial efforts to expose “spurious” groups or individuals, cast suspicion on voluntary identity shifts (an unfortunate outcome), but even these more stringent processes cannot eliminate such shifts (Jenkins 2001b). The colonial and postcolonial governments’ role in structuring identities certainly can be overstated. Surges in census populations show that the government is not able to stand guard at the boundaries of official categories. Yet the fact that a group is trying to become a Scheduled Tribe shows the government’s indirect influence on identity claims through the construction of a particular menu of categories and a related opportunity structure. The persistence of shifting identities shows that census policies associated with reservations may reinforce certain categories but cannot contain society neatly within them. The reservations-related uses of census data about different social categories tend to inspire suspicion of shifting identity claims rather than


relief over the flow of people in and out of the disadvantaged categories. Nevertheless, these shifts in claimed identities show that people are not imprisoned by the boundaries of official categories, although they are certainly influenced by them. CONCLUSION Dilemmas over categorizing and counting various identity-based groups on the census continue to plague the Indian government as well as many governments worldwide. The census has had a particularly close relationship to identity politics in Indian history. Census data on religion helped draw the boundaries between India and Pakistan at Partition; census data on “mother tongue” aided in the reorganization of states starting in 1956; census data on castes and tribes figured into the percentage of reserved government jobs, university admissions and legislative seats allocated to Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Whether identity-based data collection exacerbates or quells group divisions and tensions is an important question for culturally diverse countries. This analysis of the recent history of the categories most useful for contemporary reservation policies in India—caste, tribe and religion—demonstrates that some aspects of classifying and counting are counterproductive. Intentions changed dramatically at independence, but the postcolonial census has not made a clean break from colonial practices; on the contrary, the growing push for a comprehensive caste tabulation inspires a sense of deja vu. Data on castes and religious minorities could be a political tool for the disadvantaged, but problems persist in the census, including the government’s need for strict classifications despite the goal of more social fluidity, the more intrusive scrutiny of certain minorities, the continuing competition over group numbers, and the limited dissemination of certain “sensitive” data. If caste and religious data could be used more effectively to alleviate inequities and improve reservations and other policies for the disadvantaged, this would help make up for the inherent problems of official identity-based census categories. As it stands the politics of the census and, in particular, the categories relevant to reservations are in danger of doing more to reinforce divisions than to provide tools to fight against them. Regarding the tensions between ambiguous groups and official categories, reservations have raised the stakes attached to certain identity claims, motivating some people to challenge their categorizations. Often, however, people have pushed the boundaries without ultimately under-mining the state classification schemes: Other Backward Classes want to be included in the count; some members of various Scheduled Castes are identifying with the larger SC category; the people who try to switch into the Scheduled Tribe category are embracing the category itself, even while perforating its boundaries. Benedict Anderson says of the colonial census: “It tried carefully to count the objects of


its feverish imagining” (Anderson 1991:169). Now groups are re-imagining their own identities in part based on their identification in the census.

Part II Political complications

6 ªBackwardº Muslims and ªScheduled Casteº Christians

Society does not simply allow itself to be boxed up by the state. Social groups challenge state categories, both reacting to and exploiting the inherent complexity of overlapping identities. Thus we cannot stop at simply vilifying official categories. State classifications do not entirely determine social fault lines, and these classifications may be used to the advantage of subordinate groups. Although critically examining structures imposed by governments remains important, recognizing the agency of members of society, their ability to act and even challenge such structures, is a crucial part of any analysis (Giddens 1977). Political scientists Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, based on their work in India, were among the first to point out the limits of colonial categories in their 1967 classic, the Modernity of Tradition. Although their work foreshadowed some criticisms of imperial or governmental categories by scholars such as Edward Said and Michel Foucault, they later noted that a Saidian or Foucaultian approach can be taken too far: “We would challenge the claim that always and necessarily power dominates knowledge and that knowledge serves domination” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967, 1996:5, 6, 8–9, Said 1978, Foucault 1979). Rejecting oversimplified categories, especially those imposed or re-inforced by Western social science or imperialism—race and caste being two prominent examples—is an appealing idea. Yet such blanket generalizations can be misguided. For example, consider sociologist Pierre Van den Berghe’s sweeping conclusion about race: In practice, social race is always a social stigma for the subordinate group, and all attempts to pretend otherwise have been singularly unsuccessful. Pragmatically, in terms of policy, it means that institutionalization of racial categories, however innocuous or even benevolent it may appear, is frequently noxious in its consequences. I am thinking of such measures as racial questions on the census, race-based affirmative action and similar


measures, which have generally had the effect of reinforcing stigmatized racial distinctions. (Van den Berghe 1995:364–5) In drawing this conclusion, he ignores any agency of the “subordinate group” in the matter. As Adrienne Davis points out, “Racial categories are never solely the possession of the dominant culture; they are internalized and, in part, created by subordinate groups” (Davis 1996:720). In short, race, caste and other social categories have at times been taken up by various subordinated groups as tools of empowerment. Moreover, by denying any legitimate use of such categories, one might be challenging the categories but leaving the power structure intact. As Adrienne Davis further explains, “[N]ot all statements that are counter-categorical are likewise counter-hegemonic. A statement may expose the hierarchy but do nothing to challenge or reform it. Some counter-categorical actions may even reinforce the hierarchy” (Davis 1996:719). A blanket rejection of any consideration of caste or race in public policy, based on the commonly held assumption that consideration of such categories will inevitably reinforce them, is an example of such an action. Disadvantaged groups may want to retain categories—even those that have been used to oppress them—for their own strategic purposes (Spivak 1987).1 In this and the following chapters, I examine protest groups that are using, but also reconstructing, the government classifications discussed in the previous chapters. In other words, although groups adopt or internalize some of the categories used by the state in their efforts, they are also attempting to recreate these categories by disrupting the official boundaries of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. The complexly interwoven identities characteristic of India provide much fuel for such challenges, drawing on all manner of social groupings and various combinations thereof, including caste, religion, class and gender.2 This chapter demonstrates that Muslim and Christian demands to be included in the officially backward categories have sparked dissent within these minority communities in addition to the more publicized criticism from various Hindu organizations. The resulting controversies over who should be allowed to become backward illustrate ongoing political constructions of religious, caste, and national identities. The growing number of citizens in India demanding to be declared officially backward, an ironic outcome of reservation policies, is an example of official categories influencing political activism.3 People’s assertions of unofficial identities, in turn, challenge the official identification of citizens. Based on case studies of two religious minority movements and their aspirations for reservations, I argue that India’s cross cutting identities lead to frequent disagreements over group-based policies but that these competing demands also

POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS 109

prevent the reification of state categories and the dangers of dichotomized conflict. The following case studies of recent Muslim and Christian efforts to join the official categories used for reservation policies demonstrate that contemporary group-based policies, like their colonial precedents, influence identity claims. At the same time, minority activists’ demands push the boundaries of official classifications. Many have criticized India’s past and present caste-based policies for further dividing the nation along caste lines rather than alleviating caste discrimination. Echoing a common conclusion drawn by journalists, politicians and academics in contemporary accounts about reservations, an article in the Hindustan Times included the following argument: “[W]ith more and more clamoring to be categorized as backward…the quota system has come to acquire a self-perpetuating character…widening the scope to cover communities that hardly need such props is nothing but the height of inequity, which will only aggravate social tension by deepening caste division” (Hindustan Times 9 March 1996).4 The following case studies demonstrate that communities demanding reservations may indeed lead to some social tensions, yet they do not necessarily deepen caste divisions. On the contrary, they often complicate the currently recognized divisions. Recent political movements to revise the beneficiary categories demonstrate that state edicts alone cannot reify social identities. Rather, the countless identities that characterize Indian society have resulted in a wide variety of protest groups lobbying for revisions to their classifications. Although such varied and competing demands have arguably contributed to some tensions between and within groups, at the same time, they have complicated and thus diffused potentially more serious conflicts between dichotomized sides. There are some striking examples of this interplay between state and societal categories in India. Some Muslims are demanding Other Backward Classes (OBC) status for their entire religious community, and certain Christians are arguing that they should be recognized as Scheduled Castes (SCs). Since Muslim and Christian religious doctrines do not recognize caste, such claims are quite controversial among current (predominantly Hindu) beneficiaries of reservations as well as among factions within these minority religions. Low caste Hindus fear that their benefits would be diluted by a larger pool of eligible beneficiaries. Some Muslims and Christians are opposed to recognizing caste within their supposedly egalitarian religions or are leery of categorizing themselves with backward groups. Because these debates challenge both the existing distribution of material benefits and widely held assumptions about the link between Hinduism and the caste system, these policy debates are both politically and religiously contentious.5


MUSLIM DEMANDS FOR BACKWARD STATUS In the 1990s, Muslims renewed their demand for backward status for their entire population in India. Muslims benefited from group policies during the colonial period in the form of reserved legislative seats, provided in 1909, as well as separate electorates and a quota of 25 per cent of civil service positions, introduced in 1926. Although the Indian Constituent Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Minorities and Fundamental Rights considered continuing the reservation of legislative seats for Muslims after independence, Muslim reservations ultimately were a casualty of Partition. As Theodore P.Wright describes, “after the communal carnage following independence, neither were Hindu representatives willing to continue this concession nor were the remaining Muslim committee members prepared to press for it” (Wright 1997:852–8). Partition, the ultimate reification of communal politics, also renewed the commitment of Indian politicians such as Jawaharlal Nehru to the construction of a secular state. This vision of secularism was incompatible with reservations on the basis of religion. The end of Muslim reservations coincided, however, with a renewed need to uplift the Muslim minority, now decreased in size and decapitated of its elite, which had, in large numbers, left for Pakistan. There is constitutional support for reservations for Scheduled Castes (a category from which Muslims are legally disqualified), Scheduled Tribes (which are rarely Muslim), and the Other Backward Classes (which can include Muslims). Due, in part, to the vagueness of the category, reservations for the Other Backward Classes were relegated to a back burner to be taken up, or not, on a stateby-state basis. Reservations for the OBCs were put into practice at the national level in the 1990s, after Prime Minister V.P.Singh dusted off the 1980 Mandal Commission Report on Backward Classes and a somewhat modified version of its recommendations was approved by the Supreme Court. The Mandal Commission had declared over 80 Muslim groups to be backward. According to the data they used, backward Muslims made up a little more than half of the total 11.2 per cent of the Indian population that was Muslim; those specified as backward included groups such as weavers, oil crushers, carpenters, and dhobis (clothes washers) (Mandal 1980:60–1, Times of India 18 January 1996, Hamid interview 2 September 1996). Some southern states have gone farther, as when Kerala classified all Muslims as backward for state-level reservations purposes in 1994 (Bayly 1999). The current demand for national level reservations for all Muslims was jump started in the mid-1990s, although rumblings of such a demand had occurred from time to time in previous years (Ahmad 1980). The revived demand has left different Muslim groups at odds with each other, some pressing to be classified purely along religious community lines and others demanding that class or caste categories be retained and strengthened.


“In my view the entire Muslim community in the country forms a backward class,” wrote Syed Shahabuddin, a founder of the Association for Promoting Education and Employment of Muslims, in a letter to the Welfare Minister in 1995 (Muslim India February 1996:78).6 In conferences on the issue in Delhi and Hyderabad, the Association demanded “the recognition of the Muslim community, as a community, as a Backward Class…and for the consequent extension of reservation to the community, in proportion to its population and level of backwardness, both in higher and professional education as well as in public employment” (Association for Promoting Education and Employment of Muslims 1996, emphasis in the original). Based on his research on the leaders of the renewed demand for Muslim reservations, political scientist Theodore Wright argues, “they feared that if Muslims did not get on the backwardness bandwagon, they would be left competing for an ever diminishing proportion of open (unreserved) seats with an ever larger pool of Forward (twice-born Hindu) rivals” (Wright 1997:854). Concerns about both Muslim political unity and proportional opportunities for Muslims underlie this campaign. Syed Hamid, the President of the Association, argued that the entire Muslim community in India is socio-economically depressed and discriminated against, so some positive action must be taken by the government (Hamid interview 2 September 1996). Shahabbudin emphasized the necessity of “cutting the cake” not just horizontally by caste and class, as in current reservation policies, but also vertically, by religion, in order to evenly distribute opportunities (Shahabuddin interview 11 September 1996). The association’s preference is for a separate quota for Muslims, rather than including them in the existing groups eligible for reservations, so that the Muslim community can “enjoy the full benefit of their rightful measure of reservation, free of all apprehensions of any encroachment by other relatively advanced communities if bracketted with them” (Association for Promoting Education and Employment of Muslim 1996:1). Shahabuddin, like his association in their official resolution, argued that those Muslims already declared backward would have “first claim” to benefits, but is this enough to protect the more disadvantaged Muslims? (Shahabuddin interview 11 September 1996). Other Backward Class Muslim and Dalit Muslim groups are skeptical. They have their own ideas on how the cake should be sliced. Those Muslim groups already included in the lists of Other Backward Classes have a vested interest in keeping the competition, including upper class or upper caste Muslims, off the lists. “While Islam may be casteless, our society is divided on the basis of castes,” argued Shabbir Ansari, President of the All India Muslim OBC Organisation, at their first national convention in New Delhi in 1996 (The Hindu 30 August 1996:3). One of their major questions, posed at a 2002 seminar sponsored by this organization and Mumbai University, is “why are Indian Muslims always projected as a single, monolithic group without cultural and social variations?” (Minwalla 2002). A major goal of this organisation is to get


more arguably backward Muslim groups on the official lists of backward classes. According to their estimates, over 90 per cent of Muslims should be considered backward but not all Muslims. The current OBC lists contain several Muslim communities. The head of the National Commission for Backward Classes, R.N.Prasad, pointed out that, theoretically, non-Hindu religions take away the caste basis of social stratification, but in reality there is a “hangover of caste sticking to them” (Prasad interview 18 September 1996). In response to official state and national level lists of backward groups, the All India Muslim OBC Organisation has carried out surveys in order to compile its own lists of Muslim backward classes, including additional Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in addition to Other Backward Classes. For example, in the state of Maharashtra, where the organisation started, it demanded that 42 Muslim groups be added to the lists of the officially backward (Sonavane interview 2 December 1996).7 An activist in this organization, Vilas Sonavane argued that “Religion has been used to suppress the basic contradictions in Indian society, which is [sic] caste” (Sonavane interview 2 December 1996). In contrast to the Association for Promoting Education and Employment for Muslims, which he said had accused him of “dividing Muslims,” Sonavane felt that reservations should be an Other Backward Classes issue, not a Muslim issue. Using caste and class categories to undermine arguments for reservation categories based on religion, he described this movement as “deconstructing the myth of religion in India,” namely the perennial polarization of majority versus minority religions. Because he is focusing on overlapping axes of identity, he characterized his movement as “the first postmodernist movement in India” (Sonavane interview 2 December 1996). Although “the philosophy of caste as a superstructure of social discrimination is quite contradictory to the basic beliefs of Islam which implicitly emphasizes equality and universal Muslim brotherhood,” caste-like stratification persists in Muslim societies in India (Ansari 1960:27). The status distinctions between the descendants of immigrants and descendants of converts, the pre-existing caste distinctions of those who converted, as well as occupational hierarchies have resulted in a complex system of categories internal to the “Muslim community” (Ahmad 1978, Ansari 1960, Jenkins 2000, Mann 1992, Mondal 1996). The Muslim OBC Organisation complicates the notion of a Muslim community and “takes the stand that secular social structures and class/caste hierarchies transcend and come prior to religious identities” (Bidwai 1996). The organization tries to work across religious divides, drawing parallels between the plight of lower status Muslims, Hindus and Christians in its arguments and agenda. For example, in their efforts to get Scheduled Caste status for the Muslims Dalits, the All India Muslim OBC Organisation aligns itself with the Dalit Christian organizations making similar demands. The Scheduled Caste category, originally only open to Hindus, has been expanded to include Sikhs and Buddhists. In a memorandum to the Welfare Minister, the President of the All


India Muslim OBC Organisation, Shabbir Ahmed Ansari, pointedly asked why the Christian and Muslim Dalits had been excluded from Scheduled Caste benefits.8 This argument, to be considered in more depth in the next case study focusing on Scheduled Caste Christians, suggests the potential for a panreligious lower class movement. Their advocacy for the Scheduled Caste Muslim cause means that the All India Muslim OBC Organisation is also pan-backward in approach, meaning they are not just submitting arguments before the government on behalf of Other Backward Classes. They have called for an end to “discrimination” against “Muslim Dalits only on grounds of Scheduled Caste categories of India” (Ansari 1996). Since Scheduled Caste reservations, unlike those for Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes, are closed to Muslims, the “SC Muslim” demands are the most controversial. Other groups have taken up this demand as well. For example, the All India Backward Muslim Morcha (AIBMM) has likewise argued that Muslims should be included in the Scheduled Caste category. Led by Aijaz Ali, they have opposed the demand for a religiously based quota for all Muslims, preferring to press the claims of the Dalits within their religion.9 Another class-based criticism of Muslim reservations comes from the opposite end of the social spectrum. Although they have not formed an organization actively pressing their point of view, some upper class Muslims are opposed to declaring their whole religious community backward. For example, in a newspaper article entitled “Muslims must aim higher than quota,” M.Yusuf Khan argues that “unlike the Harijans, Muslims were never a socially disadvantaged group” (Khan 1996). This opinion was expressed to me most strongly in Hyderabad, at the third convention on the issue of reservations for Muslims, sponsored by the Association for Promoting the Education and Employment of Muslims. Although the official speakers and participants were largely supportive of Muslim reservations, in discussions, some people in the predominantly elite, Muslim audience referred to the princely history of the area and pride in their community, which made them leary of being categorized with India’s lower classes. In the conference’s more informal afternoon discussion, various audience members made several objections and comments regarding Muslim reservations, signaling some ambivalence about this approach: [Hindu] Dalits and Brahmins will definitely put their own person forward, but our approach is altogether different. We don’t want to be treated as backward, like SCs and STs. A Hindu tailor may be treated as backward, but a Muslim tailor is not backward (audience members at Hyderabad conference 18 August 1996, paraphrased). In contrast to the Association for Promoting Education and Employment of Muslims, with its purely Muslim agenda, the All India OBC Organisation complicates simple religious categories with its critiques on the basis of class and caste. Muslim Dalits and even some Muslim elites further garble efforts to promote a reservation for Muslims. Although all of these views are responses to


the government’s classifications, none is entirely satisfied with the boundaries of the official categories. To put debates over the merits of a Muslim reservation in historical perspective, it is useful to recall the comments of anthropologist Arjun Appadurai on the “pathology” of colonial classification and enumeration on the basis of religion: The process by which separate Hindu and Muslim identities were constructed at a macro-level, and transformed not just into imagined communities but also into enumerated communities, is only the most visible pathology of the transfer of the politics of numerical representation to a society in which representation and group-identity had no special numerical relation to the polity. (Appadurai 1993:332). Shahabuddin’s demand for a quota on the basis of the total Muslim population is a contemporary example of this dynamic: “Theoretically, they [Muslims] may be entitled (at the central level) to 4.2 per cent out of the 27 per cent quota for the OBCs, 2 per cent out of the 15 per cent for the SCs and 1 per cent out of the 7.5 per cent for STs. And a fourth subquota in the quota for High Castes” (Shahabuddin 1996:77). Shahabuddin stresses the importance of proportional numerical representation through these figures but ultimately proposes a single Muslim quota on the basis of the total Muslim population, rather than dividing the Muslims into such subquotas. Shahabuddin’s letter to the Welfare Minister is particularly adamant that a policy differentiating Muslims would be detrimental to Muslim unity: “I do not think you would like your Government and Party…accused of dividing the Muslim community” (Shahabuddin 1996:78). Another advocate of Muslim reservations on the basis of religion argues, “by giving reservation to certain classes among Muslims the government will be creating casteism among Muslims to divide their strength” (Khan 1996:226). Ironically, those advocating Muslim reservations through such accusations of government plots to “divide and rule” the Muslim minority are echoing criticisms of the original reservations for Muslims, which have often been portrayed as a colonial effort to divide and rule Indian society as a whole along religious lines (Appadurai 1993, Wright 1997: 852). Does simply demanding to be counted and represented along different lines subvert this dynamic of reified, enumerated communities? If enough groups raise objections to official categories, they are not undermining categorization per se, but they are exposing the fallacy of essentialized communities, the assumption that those who share a religion or caste necessarily have shared interests or form the basis for logical political units. Replacing rigid caste classifications by


returning to the rigid religious classifications of an earlier era may not be the answer; yet the ongoing arguments within the Muslim community over the future of reservations force people to re-examine facile assumptions stemming from historically oversimplified categories. CHRISTIAN DEMANDS FOR SCHEDULED CASTE STATUS Another religious minority in India, the Christians, are smaller in number, yet this minority’s demands for reservation rights has received as much, if not more, attention than the Muslim demands. Christians are about 2.5 per cent of the population, and about “two-thirds of the 20 million Christians in India could be described as dalits” (Wyatt 1998:16). Thus, some Christian organizations are demanding that Dalit Christians be recognized as Scheduled Castes. The notion of “Dalit Christians” gradually gained recognition in the 1980s, and since 1990 activists have pressured the government to amend the constitution to broaden the definition of the Scheduled Castes to include them (Wyatt 1998). A rise in violence against Christians in India, accompanied by increasing ideological attacks by Hindu nationalists, has caused Christians to mute these demands recently. Some Hindu nationalists, the subject of the next chapter, argue that missionaries are “targeting weaker sections” for conversion and suggest that granting reservations would reward this practice (Times of India “Missionaries Targeting Weaker Sections: VHP” 31 July 2000). In spite of such opposition, several Christian org nizations are committed to opening the Scheduled Castes category and associated protections and benefits to Christian Dalits. Although theirs is another purportedly caste-free religion, they argue that caste discrimination persists and should be recognized. The Scheduled Castes category, encompassing the lowest castes, or Dalits, originated with the Simon Commission and was used in the Government of India Act of 1935. In 1936, the Government of India (Scheduled Castes) Order made clear that “no Indian Christian…should be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste” (quoted in Massey 1991:28). This decision faced few objections at the time, for the purpose of the legislation was to assure special electoral representation for certain minority categories, and Christians had these benefits in their own right. This separate representation for religious minorities was eliminated at independence, however, and the purpose of the Scheduled Castes list shifted to include the administration of not only elections but also other social and economic benefits and protections. Nevertheless, an Order of the President (1950) retained the rule that “no person professing a religion different from Hinduism shall be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste” (Galanter 1984: 144).


In 1956 disadvantaged Sikh communities were included as Scheduled Castes, followed by neo-Buddhists in 1990. These decisions reinforce an inclusive legal notion of “Hinduism,” a category broadened to subsume such indigenous religions, while still excluding Christianity and Islam. Legal scholar Marc Galanter feels that the court’s continuing acceptance of a legal theory that caste is coterminous with Hinduism (or, at most, Sikhism and Buddhism) “reflects the continued force of a view of caste groups which sees them as units in an overarching sacral order of Hinduism…From this view of caste derived the longstanding reluctance of the courts to give legal effect to caste standing among nonHindu communities” (Galanter 1984:144). This selective inclusion of Scheduled Castes into the Hindu category indicates a shift in post-independence reservation policy from its more secular framing toward an increasingly Hindu nationalist articulation, in both legal and political arenas. In response to competing identifications of Scheduled Castes, Hindu nationalists have been more eager to subsume Scheduled Castes of certain religions that they consider “Indian.” Thus Sikhism, which developed from an egalitarian reformist response to Hindu traditions, and Buddhism, the religion to which B.R.Ambedkar and his Dalit movement converted in the 1950s, were legally reabsorbed as “Hinduism,” whereas Islam and Christianity, constructed as “foreign,” remain politically useful “Others.”10 This distinction will be further elaborated in Chapter 7. Lobbying for Scheduled Caste Christian benefits extends back to 1950, the date of the Presidential Order that made them ineligible, and a few states have extended state-level benefits to this group similar to the benefits extended to Scheduled Caste Hindus (Kananaikil 1983:15). In the 1990s the movement for revision of the Scheduled Caste category at the national level has been the subject of increasing political activity by Christian organizations, although recently they have kept a somewhat lower profile.11 A controversial Scheduled Caste Christian protest in conjunction with a prayer meeting attended by Mother Theresa drew national attention to the cause in November of 1995 but elicited criticism from Hindu nationalist organizations (Times of India 21 and 24 November 1995). One leader of the movement for Scheduled Caste Christians lamented, “Until today only words are given, promises are given, assurances made by the Prime Minister, Welfare Minister, and the government officials, but in practice they are not doing anything. We don’t believe that they will do it” (Lourduswamy interview 19 December 1995). The Common Minimum Programme agreed on by the 1996 United Front coalition government included Scheduled Caste status for Dalit Christians, but this promise, too, failed to materialize. Subsequently, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s formation of a coalition government at the center took even more wind out of the movement’s sails. In addition to the more publicized Hindu nationalist critiques of Scheduled Caste Christian demands, to be discussed in the following chapter, controversy


has erupted within the church over officially recognizing low caste Christians. Caste inequalities persist within Christian communities in India, where separate seats, communion cups, burial grounds and even churches for lower castes persist (Forrester 1980, Japhet 1998, Koshy 1968, Webster 1994). In addition to caste discrimination among Christians, Dalit converts to Christianity also continue to face the social and economic disadvantages associated with their castes in the wider society, in regard to housing, education, employment and practices of untouchability (Kananaikil 1990). Bishop M.Azariah, in Chennai, pointed out the contrast between Christian doctrine and social practice in India: “The Christian teaching demands that you practice equality,” yet “the caste feeling is so strong,” still playing a role in marriage discrimination, for example (Azariah interview 10 July 1996). Such inequities, then, are part of the life experiences of lower caste Christians, an experience diametrically opposed to the egalitarian ideals of Christian doctrine. Despite continuing inequities in practice, public policies such as reservations were, in part, inspired by Christian egalitarian ideals taken up by indigenous reformers. Historian Robert Frykenberg notes, “The critique of caste begun by Protestant Christians from abroad was increasingly taken up in the twentieth century by Indians, whether national secularist or national Christian in ideology” (Frykenberg 1985). The tension between egalitarian Christian ideology and stratified Christian society is at the root of the controversy over the status of the Scheduled Caste Christians. Some Christians argue that “untouchable Christians” is not a contradiction in terms and that SC Christians should be officially recognized; others respond that such a stance is dangerous and will communalize Christianity. In other words, it could divide the Christian community along caste lines or push it further into the communalist politics pitting Hindus against religious minorities in India by antagonizing Hindus. The Scheduled Caste Christian activists are in the awkward position of having to argue that their own religious community engages in caste discrimination. On this basis they argue that excluding Christians from the Scheduled Caste category is religious discrimination. Their emphasis on division within Christianity leads them to pose an alternative vision, the unity of Scheduled Castes of all religions. In the words of one activist, S.Lourduswamy, “Dalits of all religions are living together. They are also equally undergoing all the disabilities—social, educational and economic disabilities—due to the traditional practices of untouchability” (Lourduswamy interview 19 December 1995). On this basis, several organizations, such as the National Coordination Committee for SC Christians, are trying to expand the Scheduled Caste category to include Christians by lobbying politicians, holding seminars, and orchestrating protests, ranging from Christian school closures and signature campaigns to relay hunger fasts and mass rallies.12 A striking example of such activism was a dharna (protest)


held in New Delhi on 30 November 1995, where protesters staged the symbolic crucifixion of a Christian Dalit (photograph from Network News June 1996). This movement embraces the Scheduled Caste category at the same time as it criticizes its boundaries, desiring the benefits it can confer while lamenting its limited definition. In a pamphlet distributed to Members of Parliament, the National Coordination Committee for SC Christians makes the following argument about Christian Dalits: Except for the (wrong) records in the revenue offices he is a Dalit in every sense of the word viz. Ethnically, lineally, racially, socially, economically, culturally, vocationally, geographically, relationally, contextually, and emotionally. HE CONTINUES A FULL DALIT EVERYWHERE EXCEPT IN THE IGNORANT MIND OF THE EXECUTIVE. (National Coordination Committee for Dalit Christians 1996:8, emphasis in original) As one leader of the Committee described Dalit converts to Christianity, “their conversion has not converted them from the caste system, caste mindedness, caste consciousness” (Lourduswamy interview 19 December 1995). Highlighting the divisions in the church, these activists turn to Scheduled Caste or Dalit identity for unity, although some recognize that the SC category is really a construction of the state rather than a community of people. For example, Father Jose Kananaikil deconstructed the SC category even as he advocated the inclusion of Christians within it: He recognized that Dalits are separate groups “artificially brought together” and noted that “culturally they have separate identities,” although some solidarity is developing (Kananaikil interview 11 January 1996). Nevertheless, in their public demands, activists often emphasize pan-religious SC or Dalit identity and downplay the material benefits associated with official backwardness. A case in point is S.K. Chatterjee’s Presidential Address at the National Convention of the All India Christian People’s Forum in 1996. “The demand for SC status on equal terms with other dalits is not [a] question of jobs or scholarships. It is a question of their identity itself” (quoted in the All India Christian People’s Forum newsletter, Network News, November 1996; Chatterjee interview 22 November 1996). A Dalit Solidarity Programme, launched in 1992, engages leaders from Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Sikhism and Hinduism in meetings and discussions.13 The Dalit Solidarity Programme also brings Christian leaders in northern India in contact with those in the south. Some Christian leaders in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, for example, have taken a particular interest in Dalit Christian issues and are at the forefront of Dalit “liberation theology.” Bishop Azariah of Chennai emphasized “social realities” and “human realities” by listing six types of gaps between Dalits (of all religions) and the rest of society due to caste


discrimination: economic, social, political, cultural, psychological, and physical (Azariah interview 10 July 1996). In Madurai, a Jesuit priest, inspired by learning of a forum of African-American Jesuit priests, started meetings for local Dalit Jesuits (Jayaraj interview 6 July 1996). Dr V.Devasahayan, associated with a Dalit Theology Department in Chennai, stressed the importance of making the Dalit Christian movement inclusive. “When we talk about Dalit liberation, we talk about the liberation of Dalits in all religions and in all parts of India… Our concern is for the total Dalits (Devasahayan interview 10 July 1996). Some Christians, however, are skeptical about demands for Scheduled Caste status, as recognition of caste within Christianity not only goes against Christian doctrine but, they fear, might further divide the church. Unlike the Association for Promoting Education and Employment of Muslims, however, there is no comparable movement advocating reservations for all Christians as a religious minority. In fact, many who are opposing Scheduled Caste Christian reservations also oppose reservations on a religious basis, due to fears that Christians are becoming more “communalist” in this matter (Sharif interview 17 November 1996). Pastor of a Protestant (Church of North India) congregation, Salim Sharif felt that, due to SC Christian demands, “We are becoming another class and caste” (Sharif interview 17 November 1996). This is an interesting comment, perhaps reflecting a fear that Christianity, too, will become absorbed as just one more group within a broadly defined Hinduism. The remark also expresses concern that Christians are becoming involved in the politics of division rather than unification. Instead of demanding Scheduled Caste Christian status, he argues that Christians should ask “unitedly” for help and reservations for all the poor, whether they are Christian or non-Christian (Sharif interview 17 November 1996). Church Counselor Shakuntala David went beyond the multireligious Dalit category advocated by some SC Christian organizers to suggest that the term Dalit transcends both religion and caste: Dalit means downtrodden, she argued, and it could even refer to a downtrodden Brahmin (David interview 17 November 1996). In this way class-based arguments further complicate religious or castebased claims for backward status. These competing demands coming from factions of Christians and Muslims are only the tip of the iceberg. Other demands for new or revised reservation categories are flying fast and furious. In addition to those perspectives already mentioned, some are proposing a separate reservation category for Dalit Christians (DCs) as opposed to incorporating them in with the SCs (Indian Express 26 September 1996, Network News November 1996). The next chapters explore still more demands, based on religion, class and gender. Official attempts to categorize the disadvantaged have spurred many groups into political action. At the same time, claims and counter claims on the basis of religion, caste, class and gender suggest that official and unofficial constructions of


identities may never coincide. What do all these contested categories say about group-based policies for diverse democracies? CONCLUSION Policies to assuage ethnic tensions may spark them anew, but tension over competing identity claims is not necessarily destructive. It is precisely the variety and number of groups protesting their official classifications that may prevent such classifications from “sticking” long after their purpose has been served. It is the cross-cutting competition between and within groups that can prevent a large scale mobilization of “us” versus “them.” These case studies of religious minority arguments about reservations demonstrate that official categories do not necessarily reinforce social cleavages. In fact the categories have sparked heated debate over the very nature of caste discrimination and its relationship to religion. Groups continue to point out when they think they have been misrecognized by the state, and competing claims prevent the solidification of group boundaries. The overlapping nature of identities in India makes it impossible for any religious organization to present a united front on the issue of reservation categories. Those that do demand revisions in the current official categories, such as those wanting reservations for all Muslims or for SC Christians, continuously problematize the official lists and keep them from becoming cemented into the public consciousness. Others counter with criticism or different demands, such as OBC Muslims who are demanding consideration of casteism or Christians who are reluctant to recognize casteism. These arguments, in turn, debunk assumptions about monolithic religious communities. In short, although these movements challenging the current reservation schemes undeniably contribute to some social and political tensions, taken as whole they are not simply reinforcing community fault lines but rather proposing many alternative and often conflicting categorizations of Indian society. Donald Horowitz proposes several formulas to alleviate or avoid ethnic conflict. One way he addresses is the “dispersal of conflict” or the creation of “a new, lower layer of conflict laden issues.” He discusses this in the context of federal systems that geographically disperse national level ethnic bifurcations into the more complicated context of many states, resulting in “a more complex— and therefore less tense—politics at the center.” (Horowitz 1985:604–5). Ashutosh Varshney provides a thoughtful application of Horowitz’s discussion of dispersed ethnic configurations in his assessment of the challenges such dispersion poses for Hindu majoritarianism (Varshney 1998:42–6). The cases examined in this chapter illustrate a variation of this principle. Rather than dispersing the polarized politics of religion or caste in a geographic sense, the above debates over reservation categories shatter dichotomized conflicts in the realm of ideas by constantly drawing into question the boundaries of castes and


religions and their relationship to each other. In this sense, intergroup tensions do not disappear but become certainly more complex and arguably less tense than conflicts between clear cut and unambiguous groups. The ongoing debates over who is in which category, as opposed to nation-wide fighting between clearlydefined sides, is a lower, and generally less explosive, form of conflict over reservations. In some cases new alliances cut across traditional dividing lines of religion. Some groups explicitly downplay religious distinctions, as in the Dalit Solidarity Programme that attempts to bring together an interfaith group of similar castes. A Muslim OBC organization demonstrates “the power that the concept of a subaltern organization cutting across the lines of religion has come to acquire” (Bidwai 1996:12). Some are trying to capitalize on even broader subaltern alliances by emphasizing Dalit-Muslim or OBC-Muslim unity across religions (Nath 1995, Dalit Voice 16–30 June 1996:21). In contrast to these examples of cross-religious ties on the basis of caste or class, other Muslims and Christians downplay class and caste divisions and try to emphasize unity within their religious groups. Contemporary Muslim and Christian protest groups are shaped by the structure of the state reservation categories but also demonstrate agency by challenging static classifications. The resulting melange of competing demands helps to prevent the reification of such classifications. Moreover, these religious minority debates over reservations are only the tip of the iceberg. Muslim and Christian activists face a backlash from Hindu nationalists, who oppose extending benefits if this would reward converts to those religions seen as “foreign,” namely Christianity and Islam. Arguments for economic criteria for reservations have led to new rules to exclude the “creamy layer” from the Other Backward Classes. The demand for reserved seats for women in India’s Parliament has failed repeatedly, largely due to objections that a gender-based category does not recognize disadvantages on the basis of class or religious minority status. Official attempts to categorize the disadvantaged have spurred many groups into political action to press claims and counter claims on the basis of religion, caste, class and gender. These ongoing clashes between various official and unofficial constructions of the disadvantaged are the topics of the chapters to come.

7 Hindu nationalism and selective inclusion

The Sangh Parivar views the demand by the Christian Church for extension of reservation benefits to Dalit Christians as part of a “global strategy by the Vatican to evangelize the world by the Jubilee Year 2000 AD”. (Indian Express-Kochi 3 October 1996:1) Hindu nationalist politicians and activists oppose those demanding reservations for Dalit Christians and those demanding that the entire Muslim community be declared backward. There are Muslim and Christian opponents as well, but the most powerful and organized opponents are Hindu nationalists. Legal scholar Adrienne Davis’s statement that “some counter-categorical actions may even reinforce the hierarchy” is a salient critique of their approach (Davis 1996:719). Hindu nationalists, while disparaging the divisive categories of reservations, draw their own lines and hierarchies between religious groups in the name of national identity and fail to adequately address caste or class stratification. In light of the rise of Hindu nationalism, the fragmented and fluid nature of the minority demands discussed in the previous chapter has a downside. If minorities are beset with intersecting and competing subgroups, what hope have they of standing up to Hindus who make up over 80 per cent of India’s population? Yet, the complexities of India’s “ethnic configuration” may also be Hindu nationalists’ biggest challenge. The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party struggles to appeal to voters beyond their northern, Hindi-speaking, upper caste base and, in order to gain power at the center, has been forced by coalition partners to give up the very planks of their platform that are most threatening to minorities (Varshney 1998, Ali 1998). Although social “hybridity” and “intersecting voices” are gaining much scholarly attention these days, the complexity of identities is neither new nor unique to India (Bhabha 1994, Young 1976, 1993). Georg Simmel’s classic work on the “web of group affiliations” recognizes that many groups “intersect” in an individual and that “the larger the number of groups to which an individual belongs, the more improbable is it that the other persons will exhibit the same


combination of group affiliations, that these particular groups will ‘intersect’ once again” (Simmel 1955:140). The different arguments within the Indian Muslim, Christian, or Hindu “communities” attest to the intersecting identities (such as caste, class or religion) pulling group members in different directions. These various affiliations are an antidote to extremism. Simmel notes that when a single group affiliation influences someone in a “pervasive and one sided manner,” affiliation with another group “quite apart from the nature of the groups involved” is sufficient to instill a “stronger awareness of individuality in general and at least to counteract the tendency of taking his initial group’s affiliation for granted” (Simmel 1955:151). This suggests that although reservation policies highlight certain groups, political activists emphasize various other groups, and the people exposed to these debates are unlikely to take a single identity for granted. Our “web of group-affiliations” means that political complications can confound attempts at state simplifications. This chapter focuses on the Hindu nationalist rejection of Christian and Muslim demands for reservations. Building on a history of selectively including some minority religions and lower castes into Hinduism while at the same time excluding “foreign” religions, Hindu nationalists have their own spin on the debate over reservation categories. Current tensions between Hindu nationalists and advocates of minority reservations parallel an earlier dispute between Mohandas Gandhi and B.R.Ambedkar prior to Independence. Gandhi advocated a more inclusive Hinduism and rejected reservations, whereas Ambedkar rejected Hinduism and advocated more reservations. Yet even inclusive Hindu nationalism became selective. The contemporary Hindu nationalists’ rejection of Muslim and Christian demands for reservations is an offshoot of their nationalist ideology, in which Muslims and Christians are outsiders and political Others. Moreover, the rising political power of Hindu nationalists has driven a wedge between these two minority groups in spite of their complementary demands. The organization and political savvy of the Hindu nationalists bodes ill for Muslim and Christian reservations, although the varied group affiliations that splinter these minority religious groups also cut across Hindus. Their desire to head and maintain a diverse coalition government at the center has inspired some Hindu nationalist politicians to tone down their opposition to various reservations. ABSORBING MINORITIES: EXPANSIVE DEFINITIONS OF HINDUISM By Hindu nationalists, I am referring to a group of three related organizations: the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a political party; the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the wing more involved in social and cultural issues, although not apolitical; and an umbrella organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh


(RSS), again a purportedly cultural but often political organization. Known as Hindu nationalists, the Hindu right, or the Sangh Parivar (blood family), these organizations propagate a Hindu communal ideology known as Hindutva.1 According to the Bharatiya Janata Party’s 1996 election manifesto: The BJP is committed to the concept of one nation, one people, one culture —our nationalist vision is not merely bound by the geographical or political identity of India, but defined by our ancient culture [sic] heritage. From this belief flows our faith in “Cultural nationalism,” which is the core of Hindutva. (BJP Election Manifesto 1996) An important part of this ideology is defining what is and what is not “Hindu” or “national.” This process of definition occurs not only in political rhetoric but also in laws and policies. Hindu nationalists have attempted to construct most Scheduled Castes and certain minority religions as members of the “Hindu” religious category. In contrast, they portray Muslims and Christians as nonHindu and “foreign,” although occasionally they describe these minorities as former Hindus, who were led astray and converted. Even Mohandas Gandhi, known for religious tolerance and staunchly opposed to virulent Hindu nationalism (and, tellingly, opposed by the virulent Hindu nationalist who assassinated him), had set ideas about the proper categorization of Indian society and the relationship between caste and Hinduism. Gandhi dubbed untouchables “Harijans,” or “children of god.” Notably, he chose a Hindu name for god, Hari, implying that these groups were to be included within the Hindu fold. His motivations were complex, but most likely included his sincere desire for better treatment of untouchables, his practical fears of political fragmentation during the nationalist struggle, and his distrust of conversions away from Hinduism by discontented untouchables: Having himself, by personal fiat, ‘converted’ all Untouchables into Harijans and, thus, into co-religionist Hindus, he was resolute in his opposition to what he saw as misguided, perverse, and politically motivated conversion through “alien proselytization”. (Frykenberg 1985:328) Gandhi advocated reforming Hinduism to include rather than revile “Harijans” and discouraged their exodus to different religions through conversion. Gandhi’s grandson and biographer, Rajmohan Gandhi, points out that the context of the freedom movement defined his approach, which was shaped at that time by his overriding concerns about political divisions (Gandhi interview 20 September 1996).


Some so-called Harijans, including B.R.Ambedkar, opposed their involuntary absorption into the very religion that had cast them off as untouchables. As historian Robert E.Frykenberg points out: [It was] this annexation of untouchables into Hinduism, this arbitrary cooptation by definition, without leaving any freedom of choice to the untouchables themselves, which was to be so profoundly offensive to Ambedkar and other leaders of the untouchables. Indeed, all subsequent obfuscation notwithstanding, this action by Gandhi has never been forgotten by Untouchable leaders. (Frykenberg 1985:326) Gandhi’s action contributed to the continuing, close association between the Harijan category—prior to 1935 known officially as the depressed classes, after 1935 as the Scheduled Castes—and Hinduism. A related dispute in the political history of religious and caste categorization in India is the divergent approaches to lower caste justice advocated by Gandhi and Ambedkar. Whereas Gandhi preferred reform from within Hinduism to address Harijan concerns and opposed separate policies for them, Ambedkar demanded group rights. Ambedkar’s followers eventually popularized yet another name for Harijans: Dalits, which means the “oppressed” or “crushed.” In defiant contrast to the rather paternalistic and decidedly Hindu “children of Hari,” the term Dalit evokes political solidarity and protest and is still widely used today. Dr V.Devasahayam, a Dalit liberation theologian in Chennai, articulated the meaning of the term Dalit: They wanted to name themselves. The word Dalit simply means the oppressed. So they wanted to take a name which also reflects their own reality, because they were fooled by the gift of several other names which did not reflect the reality. For example, they were given the name Harijans… In reality they were not allowed to go inside the temple. Even in the villages today the Dalits are not allowed to go inside the temple, but still there are people who would like to call them as children of god. So they say no, enough of this nonsense. (Devasahayan 10 July 1996) Ambedkar’s ultimate rejection of Hinduism occurred in 1956 when he, together with many of his followers, converted to Buddhism.2 This was a powerful protest against both their exclusion from Hindu society and their inclusion within Hindu politics. These ideas about the name and nature of the lowest caste category are reflected in the views of Gandhi and Ambedkar about reservations in the form of


reserved legislative seats. Gandhi, although in his own way an advocate for the rights of Harijans, so vehemently opposed separate electorates for them that he started a hunger fast, fearing that such special provisions would prove divisive to Hinduism and thus the incipient Indian nation (Das 2000, Pyarelal 1984). Ambedkar was a leading advocate for such measures and, eventually, was largely responsible for including references to the special policies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Indian Constitution after Independence. Gandhi’s opposition to reservations was in part a political calculus but also was a reflection of his “guiding principle” and spiritual theme, the “oneness of humanity” (Gandhi interview 20 September 1996). In a 1931 speech against separate electorates and reservations for the Depressed Classes, Gandhi said: I claim myself, in my own person, to represent the vast mass of the “untouchables”… And I would work from one end of India to the other to tell the “untouchables” that separate electorates and separate reservation is not the way to remove this bar sinister… I say it is not a proper claim which is registered by Dr Ambedkar, when he seeks to speak for the whole of the “untouchables” in India. It will create a division in Hinduism which I cannot possibly look forward to with any satisfaction whatsoever. I do not mind the “untouchables” being converted to Islam or Christianity. I should tolerate that, but I cannot possibly tolerate what is in store for Hinduism… I will resist it with my life. (Quoted in Pyarelal 1984:97–8)3 It is impossible to say whether Gandhi would have approved of the contemporary Hindu nationalists’ heated opposition to extending job reservations to more Muslims and Christians. Gandhi’s speech shows more tolerance of conversion than one finds in the contemporary Bharatiya Janata Party, but his concern over dividing Scheduled Castes from the Hindu category is echoed in current Hindu nationalist rhetoric. Gandhi became more critical of Christian conversions and missionary work as the 1930s progressed (Harper 1992:152–3). These later critiques make him more useful to today’s Hindu nationalists, although a congruence of opinion is not necessary for Hindu nationalist politicians to find a popular historical figure politically useful. Not only have Hindu nationalists attempted to appropriate Gandhi, but they have also used the image and appeal of Ambedkar in contemporary political campaigns, a development that would have, no doubt, appalled him (Maclean 1999). As one scholar puts it, “from the late 19th century to the present, Hindu communalism has constantly projected itself as a caring response to the ‘pernicious’ caste divide” (Agrawal 1994:247). This brief history of ideas about the relationship between Hinduism, untouchability and groupbased policies shows that the current debates over reservation categories have


precedents in major pre-independence debates over the nature of national, religious and caste identities. EXCLUSIVE INCLUSION: SETTING BOUNDARIES TO HINDUISM AND CASTE Some Hindu nationalists idealize a broadly defined Hindu identity to counter social splintering, which they blame both on existing reservations and on the minority groups who are proposing categories of their own design. Yet such unifying pleas often contain hidden, or not so hidden, distinctions of their own. The Hindu nationalist parties in India project an image of Indian unity, while at the same time reinforcing caste and communal divisions. This nexus of casteism and Hindu nationalism can be seen in Hindu nationalist responses to reservations, especially the contemporary Christian and Muslim proposals to increase their communities’ access to reservations. Often this response involves contradictions. For example, “In accordance with the overriding concept of Hindu brotherhood, caste is not recognized in RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh] activities,” yet “[a]n occasional qualified defense of the fourfold varna and caste system as a social order that in the past had harmoniously held together Hindu society by organizing the division of labor on the basis of individuals’ differing abilities is still expressed in RSS publications” (Spitz 1993:249). The Hindu nationalist organizations are dominated by upper castes and have, in the past, opposed reservations, calling them a divisive policy. They were at the forefront of the uproar over Prime Minister V.P.Singh’s 1990 decision to extend central government reservations to the Other Backward Classes. Although they have since toned down their opposition as this policy came into effect, they remain the most organized and strongest critics of the Christian and Muslim proposals to further expand the reservations beneficiary pool. They prefer a “gradualist strategy of persuasion which emphasizes the unity of all Hindus” over group-based caste reform policies (Spitz 1993:249). Advocates of a nation defined as “Hindu,” they have been particularly critical of group-based policies that would benefit converts or even long-term members of religions with no connection to Hinduism. Legal precedent helps to explain the extension of the Scheduled Caste category to include lower castes within Sikhism and Buddhism—both religions doctrinally opposed to the caste system. Legal precedent also facilitates the exclusion of Muslims and Christians from this category. Some Indian religions, with the notable exceptions of Islam and Christianity, have been officially subsumed under “Hinduism” for several legal purposes (Jenkins 2001b). Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs have been considered “Hindus” in the arena of “personal law,” or religious civil law, as in the 1955 Hindu Marriage Act. Such an inclusive view of Hinduism is also included in the constitution itself, with


regard to temple entry law, in Article 25 on the freedom of religion. In the constitutional clause allowing states to insist on opening Hindu religious institutions to all Hindus, “the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion” (Bakshi 1996:47). Drawing on this progressive constitutional clause on temple entry, an opponent of including Muslims or Christians in the Scheduled Caste category argued in a Hindustan Times editorial: “The Scheduled Castes have always been regarded as part of the Hindu community,” and “for the purposes of social welfare and reform the Hindus include the Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists” only (Deshpande 1990). Aizaz Rizvi, National President of the BJP Minority Morcha, defined Sikhs as governed by Hindu law and thus not part of his Minority Morcha, which includes only Muslims, Christians and Zoroastrians (Rizvi interview 12 September 1996).4 At many points throughout history, Hinduism has been quite expansive, open to multiple interpretations, and ready to absorb tribes as castes and local deities as members of the Hindu pantheon (Roy 1994). Its doctrinal diversity makes Hinduism seem ideally suited for tolerance. “How,” asks writer Shashi Tharoor, “can such a religion lend itself to fundamentalism?” (Tharoor 1997:56). Despite Hindu philosophy’s potential for open interpretations and Hindu history’s wealth of examples of new groups being absorbed into the fold, a legal and ideological line divides Hinduism, along with religions considered indigenous to India, from Islam and Christianity. This pervasive logic even filters into the arguments of non-Hindu opponents of Scheduled Caste Christian demands: Shakuntala David, a Christian, argued that Buddhists and Sikhs receive reservations because they are part of a larger Hindu community (David interview 17 November 1996). Political calculations in a democracy also figure into the Hindu nationalists’ inclusive yet exclusive definition of Scheduled Castes. Years after the ideological battle between Gandhi, with his notion of Hindu Harijans, and Ambedkar, with his Dalit Buddhist conversion movement, “neo-Buddhists” were welcomed back into the Scheduled Caste fold in 1992. Sikh Scheduled Castes had already been similarly reabsorbed in 1956. Despite these precedents, the Hindu nationalists remain unwilling to absorb the religious Others, Muslims and Christians, which have been so politically useful as groups to mobilize against. Although blurring the line to a certain degree over who is a Hindu, those opposed to reservations for Muslims and Christians are adamant that “caste”— and therefore the Scheduled Caste category—only extends to Hindus.5 For example, a newspaper editorial entitled “What Does SC Mean?” included the argument that the “true meaning of Scheduled Castes is indicated by the word ‘castes.’ Castes are a central feature of only Hinduism and not of Christianity or Islam” (Deshpande 1990). Satyanarayan Jatiya, who later became the Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment, was the National President of the BJP Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Morcha when he made a similar argument


that the Scheduled Castes are only in the Hindu religion: The Muslims and Christians did not have this inequality problem. Although there was economic inequality, there was no social inequality or discrimination (Jatiya interview 12 September 1996, paraphrased). Satyanarayan Jatiya helped organize a Scheduled Caste rally against reservations for “SC Christians,” on the grounds that the SC reservation will be diluted if a new population is added (Jatiya interview 12 September 1996). In short, Hindu nationalists have at times been quite broad when defining Hindus, although whether they were including groups or subsuming them is an important question. They have at times tried to include Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains within the Hindu category. In contrast, their definitions of the caste system are not as loose, especially in their arguments denying the existence of low caste Christians or Muslims. Hindu nationalists not only bar Muslims and Christians from their “big tent” notion of Hinduism but also exclude them from their conception of the Hindu nation. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE NATION: MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS AS OUTSIDERS The Hindu nationalist opposition to Muslim and Christian demands for reservations is rooted in historical associations between these religions and invasion or imperialism. Historian Barbara Metcalf notes that a “striking characteristic of public life in India has been an intensified use of historical narratives to define the nature of India’s people and draw the boundaries of citizenship.” She describes the “version of history” propagated by Hindu nationalists: “There once was a Hindu Golden Age; Muslims came as foreign invaders; Muslims were oppressors who ultimately ushered in a period of decline” (Metcalf 1995:952). Muslims, she argues, have been given a role of a “foil against which the unity of others—Hindus, the nation—can be constituted, and injustices of class and wealth obscured. The history that identifies Indian Muslims as aliens, destroyers, and crypto-Pakistanis, with its profound moral and political implications for citizenship and entitlements, is critical in sustaining that role” (Metcalf 1995:963). Such constructions of history certainly do have implications for membership in the nation and for the definition of official categories with their related entitlements. Hindu nationalist rhetoric commonly links Muslim demands with the idea that they are “foreign,” either foreign invaders of yore or those responsible for Partition and Pakistan. For example, in 1994 when the demand for national level Muslim reservations was renewed in an organized manner, Lal Krishna Advani, BJP President, criticized the demand on the basis that it was divisive and might re-create Partition-like conditions (Syed Hamid interview 2 September 1996). BJP Vice President Madan Lal Khurana likewise suggested that reservations for Muslims


would only occur at the cost of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and would lead to the disintegration of the country (Times of India 21 July 1996:7). In reaction to a government proposal in Andhara Pradesh to include all Muslims as Backward Classes at the state level, the BJP “opposed the inclusion of Muslims en masse as this would give a ‘double benefit’ to the Muslims” (Shatrugna 1994: 2400). How they would benefit doubly is unspecified; perhaps this is a reference to those backward Muslim groups who are already included in the Other Backward Classes. In any event, this is an example of a common refrain of the Hindu right, the idea that Muslims have been appeased and pandered to. Hindu nationalists also oppose extending reservations to all Muslims for fear that it would encourage conversions. The mass conversion of untouchables to Islam in Tamil Nadu during 1981–2 revived Hindu nationalist fears that this minority was growing at their expense (Malik 1989). The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) has started an “anti-conversion and reconversion programme,” including proposals to train Hindu missionaries in a center in Ayodhya. This location is symbolically significant, since, in perhaps the most striking example of Hindu nationalists using “historical” tactics against the Muslims, Hindutva forces in 1992 destroyed a mosque in Ayodhya, claiming that Muslims had built it on the birthplace of the Hindu god Ram. The “anti-conversion” plan is to send 10,000 Hindu missionaries into “backward and tribal areas in the country” to prevent conversions of disadvantaged citizens to non-Hindu religions and to encourage reconversion to Hinduism (The Organizer 21 July 1996). Conversion is an even stronger theme in Hindu nationalists’ arguments that Christian Dalits should not benefit from reservations. The Hindu nationalists emphasize the historical association between Christianity, colonialism and missionaries, arguing that opening the Scheduled Caste category to Christians would increase conversions to this religion as well. These themes have influenced the broader SC Christian debate. For example, the Catholic Bishops Conference of India’s directive to Christians to vote for parties supportive of SC Christian demands inspired the following letter to the editor on the subject: Conversion by Christian missionaries is said to be changing the very demographic profile of the backward and tribal districts of the country. If this religious imperialism continues, a day will come when the churches in India will have control over the ballot boxes, and bishops will dictate state policy. Secularism will then be a hollow slogan in India. (Indian Express 22 March 1996:8) The President of the Vishwa Hidu Parishad, Ashok Singhal, told a VHP gathering that “the motive of Christian missionaries is not the welfare of people. The main purpose is to bring maximum area under their influence” (Times of India “Missionaries Targeting Weaker Sections: VHP” 31 July 2000). Criticisms


of missionary plans to target low castes feed into Hindu nationalist opposition to recognizing Christian SCs. Pointing to potential material motivations rather than spiritual motivations for conversion, such as access to church-based educational or social services, Hindu nationalists do not want to make conversion easier by allowing low caste converts to keep reservations. Ashok Singhal’s rhetoric simultaneously excludes and criticizes Christians and Muslims: “Hindus never believed in converting people of other faith[s] to their own religion” (Times of India 31 July 2000). In response to such charges, the All India Christian People’s Forum (AICPF) and other SC Christian organizations spend much of their time asserting that Christians are part of the Indian nation too. An AICPF resolution reads: “The tendency to treat dalits belonging to Hindu and non-Hindu religions differently, being motivated by revivalist and fundamentalist forces and to brand Christianity as an ‘alien’ religion, is not warranted by history and is aimed at denying the nativity of dalit Christians who are as indigenous as all other dalits” (Network News November 1996:1). When Mother Theresa participated in a prayer meeting in conjunction with an Scheduled Caste Christian rally, Hindu nationalists led a public outcry against a foreign Christian taking a political stand on reservations. BJP General Secretary Sushma Swaraj reiterated the idea that the SC Christian demand is not only emanating from foreign missionaries but is also dividing the nation: “Mother Theresa has always spoken for unity and harmony of people, but the demand for reservation for Christian dalits is by itself divisive in nature” (Times of India 21 November 1995). The Vishwa Hindu Parishad organized a demonstration, and leaders, calling Mother Theresa a “Christian missionary carrying out conversions of the innocent poor and destitute,” again criticized her support for SC Christians. Mother Theresa ultimately issued a statement that she “never demanded reservation for Dalit Christians” (Times of India 24 November 1995). This statement is just one example of the powerful effects the Hindu nationalists are having on the various Muslim and Christian movements discussed in the previous chapter, including the way they categorize themselves. THE IMPACT OF HINDU NATIONALISM ON MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN DEMANDS FOR RESERVATIONS By reinforcing Hindu-Muslim rivalry, the Hindu nationalists, in one sense, add momentum to the activists pushing for backward status for all Indian Muslims. Hindu nationalism reinforces their reluctance to divide Muslims along class or caste lines even for the purpose of reservations. Both the Hindu nationalists and the activists working for Muslim reservations agree on something: They are opposed to the Muslim OBC agenda. “The BJP…is just as hostile to this new trend. It knows that the trans-religious subaltern solidarity could be the nemesis


of the religion-based identity politics it pursues” (Bidwai 1996:12). In addition to entrenching religious competition between Hindus and Muslims, growing fears about Hindu nationalism have hurt prospects for ChristianMuslim cooperation on the issue of reservations. Although a shared trepidation about conservative forces has inspired some coordination among minority religions, such as the interfaith Dalit Solidarity Programme, often fears of Hindu nationalist reactions have stymied such collaborative efforts. Some leaders of the SC Christian movement are reluctant to champion the similar cause of the Muslim Scheduled Castes. A Dalit theologian committed to Dalit solidarity nevertheless discussed the strategic challenges that could face Christian SC activists if they joined forces with Muslims: The government “might consider giving Christians reservations because they are apolitical. When you talk of Muslims then [the] BJP would be up in arms because they are a substantial number and therefore a threat to the Hindu community” (Devasahayan interview 10 July 1996). Some SC Christian activists feel that the Muslim demand is even more unpalatable to those uncomfortable with the Christian demand and would thus undermine their own goals. Scheduled Caste groups too have expressed concern that including Christians within their quota will lead to including Muslims too, a slippery slope that will increase competition for the same number of opportunities. For example, the leader of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Joint Action Council, K.V.Kumaran, worries: “If Christianity is now included, Islam will also have to be added” (The Indian Express-Kochi 3 October 1996:1). Many Christians say that strategically it would be better to get their own demand passed by Parliament and then try to work on Muslim issues. Father Jose Kananaikil noted that since the BJP is especially opposed to reservations for Muslims, Christians are saying “at least include us” and are “not pressing for Muslims” (Kananaikil interview 11 January 1996). Although they “support” the Muslim demand to be treated as OBCs, some SC Christian publications explicitly state that their demand “should not be confused with the demand of various other groups and communities to be included as Scheduled Castes. The demand for equal justice to SC Christians should not also be mingled with that demand to treat the entire Muslim community as OBCs” (Daniel 1996:9). This pragmatic distancing of themselves from other similar movements undermines Christians’ rhetoric about SC unity. So far, there seems to be more emphasis on symbolic unity with those Dalits who already benefit from reservations, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists, than actual cooperation with the Muslims. The leader of the demand for backward status for all Indian Muslims, Syed Shahabuddin, said he had supported but not cooperated with the Christian Dalit movement, although he is against any religious test used to exclude people, whether Muslim or Christian, from the current categories (Shahabuddin interview 11 September 1996). Another leader in this movement, Syed Hamid, when asked


about possible cooperation with the Christian Dalit movement, said that the Muslim movement, in contrast to the Christian one, has been a more “sporadic effort” than the Christian one, which had complicated coordination (Syed Hamid interview 2 September 1996). Although limited by some SC Christians’ pragmatic reluctance to be associated too closely with the backward Muslim cause, Aijaz Ali’s Backward Muslim Morcha has spoken positively about the SC Christian movement, stating that the morcha would “join hands with Christians in mobilizing public opinion” (Indian Express 24 November 1995). Lack of interest and coordination on the part of some other Muslim leaders limits the possibility of joining forces with Christians working on similar challenges to current reservation policies. Yet perhaps the most significant limit on the Scheduled Caste unity advocated by the SC Christian movement is their own fear of greater Hindu opposition if Muslim reservations are also at issue. The Hindu nationalist critique of Muslim and Christian demands is so influential because of the political savvy and organizational strength of the Sangh Parivar, in contrast to the much newer SC Christian organizations, led largely by church leaders rather than politicians, and the even less institutionalized Muslim reservation movement. Two meetings on the single evening of 4 September 1996 in New Delhi illustrate the contrast between the Hindu nationalist and SC Christian organizations. Both meetings were devoted to the issue of the SC Christian demands, but the first was organized by the National Coordination Committee for SC Christians and the second by the BJP legal cell, the Adhivakta Parishad. The NCCSCC meeting, held in order to present their arguments before Members of Parliament, included most of the leaders of the movement in Delhi, who outnumbered the few Members of Parliament who came—MPs who were already supporters of their cause. Speakers cited Bible verses to support their claims, hardly a method to appeal to those not already in agreement. Later that evening at the Adhivakta Parishad’s well-attended meeting against SC Christian demands, a BJP member (who had not attended the previous meeting) cited the very same Bible verse being used by the Christians and had a counter argument ready to deliver in his speech. The contrast between the two movements in terms of their organizational power, awareness of their opponents’ arguments, and political sophistication was striking. THE WEB OF IDENTITIES AND THE MODERATION OF HINDU NATIONALISM Fighting against such a political organization, what chance do the splintered minorities have? Yet the varied identities cutting across India also limit the Hindu nationalists’ appeal, especially at the national level. The multiple, overlapping identities of India mean that Hindu nationalists have been forced to broaden their rhetoric to try to include the lower castes. More recently some have


even made attempts to appeal to Muslims, who were so marginalized in the past. Hindu nationalists’ opposition to expanded Other Backward Class reservations in 1990 became muted as these policies became a reality. When they came to power at the center, the BJP government even expanded the lists of OBCs, which is one way to broaden their appeal to these numerous middle castes and potential regional allies.6 In another attempt to widen their political net, the Bharatiya Janata Party, traditionally an upper caste bastion, named a Dalit, Bangaru Laxman, as party president. He not only tried to appeal to lower castes but also, in his first speech as party President, argued that the party needed to make “sustained efforts to reach out to Indian Muslims” (Rahman 2000). With Muslims at 12 per cent of the population, and Christians at only 2.5 per cent, the latter are not an electoral priority. In a published interview, when asked specifically about reservations for Christians and Muslims, Laxman was more politic in his response than some of his party members, who have harshly criticized the policies. Although he followed his party’s line by not supporting policy changes that would make SC Christians and all Muslims eligible for reservations, he softened his response. He voiced support for literacy programs and pointed out that “[s]ome Muslims— Ansaris, Qureshis—have already been covered under the Mandal Commission recommendations [reserving government jobs for certain backward castes]. If a better case was made with regard to the others, it would be examined” (Rahman 2000). Although silent in this interview on the issue of Christian reservations, Laxman’s party-line stance was overlaid with a more moderate tone regarding the issue of Muslim reservations. This reflects the BJP’s political need to bring more groups into their fold while not alienating their original adherents. CONCLUSION The Muslims, Christians, and Hindus discussed in chapters 6 and 7 shuffle and reshuffle categories based on their diverse conceptions of caste, religion and nation and their distinct ideas about the relationships between these identities. In their inclusive mode, Hindu nationalists have historically made some attempts to incorporate lower castes and certain minority religions, those seen as indigenous, into their conception of Hinduism. Yet a community is, in part, defined by what it is not. In their exclusive mode, the Hindu nationalists have kept Muslims and Christians at arms length, portraying them as foreign conquerors and missionaries whittling away at the Hindu nation. Such ideologies feed into their opposition to any expansion of reservations for Muslims and Christians. The groups discussed in these chapters are motivated by a complex mixture of ideas about identity and concerns about material benefits. The dynamics of reservations as a means of resource distribution complicate the development of pan-religious or cross-class alliances. The material stakes associated with


reservations lead groups to jockey for position. Those who are already officially Other Backward Classes or Scheduled Castes might see backward Muslims and SC Christians as fellow disadvantaged groups, but competition over limited reserved opportunities causes many OBCs and SCs to oppose extending reservations to additional Muslims or Christians. Hindu nationalists have tapped into fears about both identities and interests to rally the largely Hindu Scheduled Castes, for example, against SC Christian demands. Some SC Christian leaders have been a bit reluctant to join forces with Muslims, for fear that their own demands, if so linked, will never be met due to the particularly vehement opposition to Muslim demands by many Hindu nationalists. Concerns about the Hindu nationalists’ reactions have shaped the contours and alliances of the Muslim and Christian reservation movements, at times dividing them from each other. Although very astute at manipulating interests and identities, the Hindu nationalists are not immune from the dilemmas of balancing their ideology of identity with their interest in gaining political power in a democracy. Hindu nationalists, as they have tried to gain and hold on to power at the national level, have had to compromise on some hardline ideas about Hindu identity or Hindutva in order to deal with the practical problem of expanding their potential pool of voters and coalition partners. Balancing the need to expand with the need to retain their more hardline supporters, the Sangh Parivar has used its many related organizations as well as a variety of political figures, ranging from the moderate Bangaru Laxman to the militant Lal Krishna Advani, to put forth many faces of Hindu nationalism. Recognizing the need to reach out to Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Classes and even Muslims, their opposition to some reservations has become more muted, yet opposition to Christian and Muslim demands persists. By recognizing political agency, we can appreciate the ability of groups to put forth their own self-definitions rather than simply absorbing state definitions of their identities. These self-defined identities are at times reigned in by judges and administrators. Yet, official categories are not ossified, in large part due to their political meaning. Categories are combined (and recombined) to make a variety of strategic identity claims. At times these claims, such as the absorption of Scheduled Castes and certain minority religions into Hinduism, perpetuate the power of the majority. Yet, notably, lower castes have not always returned the embrace of Hindu politicians, as demonstrated by Ambedkar’s conversion movement in the 1950s and Kancha Ilaiah’s contemporary manifesto, Why I am not a Hindu (Ilaiah 1996). Disadvantaged groups, such as lower castes and religious minorities, have used both a positive and relatively “convertible” category, religion, and a seemingly negative and more fixed category, low caste status, to challenge the boundaries of the categories themselves and the hierarchies they represent.

8 Class, classification and creamy layers

Economic status has proven a complicating factor when it comes to determining who is eligible for reservations in India. Policy-makers, judges, and disadvantaged groups all face difficult questions regarding how or if class should be taken into consideration when identifying the legitimate recipients of reservations. Should these boundaries be drawn along caste and religious lines, or would economic criteria be a more appropriate basis for allocating benefits? Should more complex or comprehensive definitions of disadvantage be developed? Recent challenges to reservation policies have focused on the issue of class. These challenges, like the religious disputes discussed in preceding chapters, have thrown the very categories of group identity into question. This chapter considers contemporary claims and policy revisions on the basis of class or economic criteria. Two policy changes, in particular, placed economic criteria in the political limelight. First, in 1990 the central government, which formerly reserved jobs only for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, reserved 27 per cent of central government jobs for the Other Backward Classes. Other Backward Class groups are less socially degraded than the scheduled groups, so economic indicators are a key factor in their definition as backward. These controversial national level policies for Other Backward Classes thus renewed debates over economic definitions of backwardness. The second policy change to draw new attention to economic criteria was the “creamy layer” ruling. In a decision on the constitutionality of national reservations for Other Backward Classes, the Supreme Court mandated that the government make further use of economic considerations in the name of helping the “truly backward.”1 The court directed the government to develop criteria and mechanisms to skim off the “creamy layer” of the Other Backward Classes, by which it meant that the government must find a way to disqualify the more advantaged individuals in these classes.2 As a result of the national level OBC reservations and the creamy layer ruling, Indians have further developed multifaceted reservation categories, which take into account not just caste but also economic “backwardness” and individual economic mobility.


Policy changes giving economic considerations an increased role in reservations demonstrate that official categories are not set in stone. Rather, the government has occasionally revised reservation categories in response to social changes and political demands. In this case, in contrast to the preceding chapters, the government has instigated changes to the categories, whereas activists have, at least in many cases, pushed for sustaining the old categories. State simplifications are not inevitable; here a Prime Minister and Supreme Court were willing to press for complex and changeable categories that would recognize the forces of social mobility. Many social organizations and activists, in contrast, protested against such changes. For example, the new national level reservations for Other Backward Classes provoked protests and demonstrations in north India by upper caste students and others concerned about dwindling opportunities for the “forward” communities. Although this protest has faded, an organization called the Gandhi Caste Society continues to offer an alternative vision of a caste-blind society and caste-free policies. The new creamy layer policy sparked resistance as well, particularly in the south. Most strikingly, the southern state of Kerala simply refused to implement it. Reactions to the changes in policy varied regionally, due to different policy histories regarding the Other Backward Classes. The Other Backward Classes category is defined by an elaborate combination of social and economic criteria. Ultimately it is a list of groups, usually castes, rather than individuals. Some states, particularly in the south, had long histories of reservations for Backward Classes prior to the more recent extension of reservations in central government jobs to these groups all over India (Parikh 1997, Galanter 1984, de Zwart 2000, Bhagavan 1994). For example, to counter the domination of the administration by Brahmins, the princely state of Mysore in 1921 started preferential policies for Backward Classes, which “included everyone except the Brahmins and those whose mother tongue was English: some 96 per cent of the population” (Dushkin 1979:661). In 1922 the Madras presidency issued an order to government officials “to give priority in their recruitment policy to non-Brahmans and other so-called ‘backward’ communities” (Irschick 1969: 219). This history meant that reservations for various Backward Classes are much more widely accepted, even expected, in the south. Thus societal reactions to the central government’s 27 per cent reservations for Other Backward Classes and to the Supreme Court’s creamy layer limits on Other Backward Classes varied by region. In the northern capital city of Delhi, for example, the Prime Minister’s announcement of more OBC reservations sparked deadly protests. In the southern state of Kerala, in contrast, the creamy layer limits on Other Backward Classes provoked resistance in the form of denials that a creamy layer existed in that state. Economic or class-based arguments over reservation categories abound. Previous chapters illustrate related concerns about upper class Muslims and


Christians taking over reservation benefits. The next chapter addresses how the demand for a general category of women’s Parliamentary reservations has been effectively squelched due to arguments in Parliament over the necessity of including a subcategory for women of the Other Backward Classes. Some political parties have proposed adding new reservations for lower class, high caste individuals. A few people demand that the government not only add more economic considerations to other types of categories but reject other categories entirely in favor of economic criteria. For example, a symposium on the subject of reservations by leading academics, published in the journal Seminar, included the following call for “a new criterion”: The principle of reservations should be followed, but not on a caste basis as it is resulting in social disintegration. A shift in the criterion for reservations from the orthodox caste principle to a scientific economic class principle may perhaps change the very colour and philosophy of the society. (Tilak 1981:36) Given the legal, bureaucratic and political momentum behind the current categories, a shift to entirely economic criteria is unlikely; yet, in recent years, reservation policies have taken an economic turn. This chapter focuses on policy changes that have added more economic or class considerations to reservation categories and on the political activists who continue to challenge even these revised categories. Several major topics will illustrate this interplay between state and society: The Mandal Commission’s 1980 report on Other Backward Classes; Prime Minister V.P.Singh’s 1990 decision to partially implement the Commission’s findings and reserve 27 per cent of central government jobs for Other Backward Classes; the protests and other forms of resistance sparked by these new reservations; the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision about the legality of these reservations; a government commission’s development of a creamy layer policy; and, finally, political activists’ resistance to the creamy layer rules. Two major conclusions emerge: First, these developments suggest that, at times, it is the government that pushes for changing reservation categories and groups in society that prefer a more static approach. Second, debates over the role of class in reservation policies demonstrate that societal reactions to reservation categories, and the role of class in particular, vary quite dramatically from north to south due to divergent policy histories.


THE MANDAL COMMISSION REPORT ON OTHER BACKWARD CLASSES The debate over the place of class in Indian reservation policies largely revolves around the fate of the Other Backward Classes. Marc Galanter has compiled a list of ten types of historical definitions of “backward classes,” noting that the term extends at least as far back as 1880 (Galanter 1984:154–5). The 1950 constitution named the amorphous category, Other Backward Classes, meaning those disadvantaged groups that are neither Scheduled Castes nor Scheduled Tribes, but did not specify who they were. Several state and national Backward Classes Commissions have since struggled to define these groups.3 These commissions used caste or community as their unit of analysis and classified castes and communities using a combination of social and economic criteria.4 Building on numerous state commissions and one previous national commission on Backward Classes (the 1955 Kalelkar Commission), the Indian government constituted a national Backward Classes Commission, commonly known as the Mandal Commission. In its 1980 report, the Mandal Commission found that “backwardness” persisted among communities outside of the Scheduled Castes or Tribes, concluded that reservations were justified for such Other Backward Classes, came up with criteria to define them, and listed those Other Backward Classes that met the criteria. They concluded that “excluding Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes constitute nearly 52 per cent of the Indian population” (Mandal Commission Report 1980: 61). One difficult question that the commission faced was how to define “classes” (Shah 1996, Mukherjee 1999). The Mandal Commission, like the 1955 Kalelkar Commission before it and the current National Backward Classes Commission after it, continued to use a group-based system. Indeed members of the commission said their task was to “lay down criteria for identifying recognizable and persistent collectivities and not individuals,” noting that “in the Indian context such collectivities can be castes or other hereditary groups” (Mandal Commission Report 1980: 55–7). In this sense the Mandal Commission opted for a definition of class that took into account more than just economic criteria. It drew on a 1969 Supreme Court decision stating that “‘class’ means a homogeneous section of the people grouped together because of certain likenesses or common traits, and who are identifiable by some common attributes such as status, rank, occupation, residence in a locality, race, religion and the like.”5 With this definition of class, the Mandal Commission could include in the Backward “classes” some groups that were not Hindu castes, but it could not include a stratum of individuals who were all poor but otherwise socially unconnected. Debates over the role of class and caste in Indian society and the relationship between them continue to spark much academic as well as


policy debate (Mukherjee 1999, Sheth 1999). Post-Mandal quantitative analyses comparing the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, Other Backward Classes and other communities indicate strong correlations between these categories and class as defined by factors such as occupation, assets, type of house, and income (Mitra and Singh 1999: 188–9).6 The Mandal Commission engaged in class classifications with the knowledge that government classifications are legal and do not violate the Indians’ constitutional right to equality, as long as the classification is not “arbitrary.” As the Supreme Court ruled, government classification “must always rest on some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which the classification is made.”7 Moreover, the official classification of backward classes is specifically protected by a constitutional amendment. Article 15 of the constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, a potential limit on even compensatory discrimination. The year after the constitution was adopted, two Supreme Court decisions barred compensatory discrimination in arenas other than government employment and limited eligible groups.8 In response, the Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to Article 15 to protect broader reservations for Backward Classes, including other areas such as education: “Nothing in this article…shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.”9 The explicit constitutional reference to “special provisions” protects reservation policies for the scheduled or backward groups from legal challenges on the basis of suspect classifications or reverse discrimination. The amendment refers to “socially and educationally backward classes” without mentioning economics, an impetus for the subsequent decisions of the courts and commissions to grant reservations to disadvantaged social groups rather than to the poor in general. After grappling with the meaning and legality of class classifications, the next question the Mandal Commission faced in its delineation of the Backward Classes was the definition of backwardness. The commission examined castes or communities by looking at a wide variety of indicators of backwardness before deciding whether to include them on the list of Other Backward Classes. Through surveys of these groups, the commission evaluated such factors as the type of labor done by group members, average age at marriage, educational levels, the distance of households from drinking water, and the value of assets.10 Both economic and social standing entered into the calculation of backwardness, although social factors ultimately counted more than purely economic factors (Hansen 1999:143, Engineer 1991). In short, the national level designation of backward classes in the Mandal Commission Report emphasized group status while also taking into account economic factors.


The 1980 report, however, had little practical effect until a decade had passed and a government supportive of their findings came to power. In 1990 Prime Minister V.P.Singh announced a plan to extend reservations in central government services to the Other Backward Classes, largely as defined by the Mandal Commission.11 Reservations are legally capped at 50 per cent of total positions or seats. The Scheduled Castes already had 15 per cent reservations and the Scheduled Tribes had 7½ per cent reservations, so Other Backward Classes received 27 per cent reservations in central government jobs. Half of central government jobs were now off limits to the “forward” communities, and protests erupted to try to stop this controversial new policy. ANTI-MANDAL ACTIVISM Urban, upper caste students were particularly active in dramatic demonstrations against the proliferation of quotas, which they saw as a threat to their own opportunities. Most of the protests were in north India, many in Delhi. In the worst moments of a protest in Delhi, a student set himself on fire, and in the weeks to come, several other students also immolated themselves.12 Three former student leaders of the Anti-Mandal Commission Forum at Delhi University spoke to me in 1996 about the opinions that spurred them to protest in 1990. Hare Ram Singh was head of the Forum’s action committee; O.P.Singh headed the legal committee, and Neeraj Kumar was also involved in the Forum and the protests. As we sipped chai on the campus of the Delhi School of Economics and began to discuss the 1990 protests, a young beggar approached us. They seized the opportunity to ask, “How can this girl benefit from reservation?” The policy emphasis, they felt, should be on infrastructure for “genuine development,” such as free, good education for all, rather than on reservations which “sharpen contradictions” and “balkanize on a caste basis.” Insisting that they were not against the concept of reservations entirely, they voiced their opposition to the perceived political motivation behind the Other Backward Class reservations. They felt V.P.Singh and his Janata Dal-led government granted OBC reservations in exchange for the political loyalty of the OBC “vote bank.” These student leaders also expressed dissatisfaction with the way Other Backward Class reservations were initially going to be implemented, namely, that “economic criteria [were] not taken.” Too often, they felt, even Scheduled Caste and Tribe reservations were taken by the upper classes. In addition to wanting more attention to economic factors, they preferred a system with the “individual as unit” as opposed to a group-based system (H.R.Singh, Kumar, and O.P.Singh interviews 22 November 1996). Since the dramatic student protests, other groups have remained more quietly opposed to the increasing lists of officially backward citizens. For example, the Gandhi Caste Society, or Gandhi Sangam, is an organization trying to do away


with caste distinctions in society and public policy alike. At a 1996 meeting in Delhi, several speakers spoke out against “Mandalization” and advocated the use of economic criteria for reservations. The Delhi President of this society, Leela Sajwan, argued that reservations should be based on economics rather than caste (Sajwan’s address at Gandhi Caste Society Meeting, Constitution Club, Delhi, 1 August 1996; Sajwan interview 18 September 1996). The Gandhi Caste Society criticizes the use of caste labels in school admissions, hostel admissions, employment, and politics. Its members encourage individuals to change surnames that indicate caste or jati and to become, instead, a single “Gandhi caste.” They are thus expanding on Gandhi’s approach to caste reform by relying on society, particularly Hindu society, to reform itself. Like the historical disputes discussed in Chapter 7 between Gandhi and Ambedkar, who advocated group-based policies to rectify caste injustices, the Gandhi Caste Society opposes the caste reservations advocated by the Mandal Commission and V.P.Singh. One speaker at a meeting of this organization expressed the organization’s ultimate goal of “a casteless, classless society” (address by a Professor of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1 August 1996). Other speakers argued, “Let us start with the children,” advocating an end to school forms which include caste and religion and encouraging the younger generation to throw out their surnames and stop asking other questions about caste (Gandhi Caste Society Meeting, 1 August 1996). This movement, which holds to the optimistic belief of an earlier generation that caste will fade through assimilation and integration, is another form of anti-Mandal activism and criticism of both official and unofficial caste categories. THE CREAMY LAYER RULING AND THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR BACKWARD CLASSES In addition to resistance by activists, the new reservations for Other Backward Classes also faced a legal challenge. The 1992 Supreme Court case Indra Sawhney v. Union of India tested the constitutionality of such reservations. The court’s decision addressed how economic factors should figure into definitions of backwardness. The court upheld 27 per cent reservations in central government services for Other Backward Classes, as long as the “creamy layer,” or the more socially and economically advanced persons within these groups, was excluded. In the same decision, the court also forbade reservations for economically disadvantaged upper castes. In other words, the court ruling suggested that to be a member of an Other Backward Class, it was not enough to be in a lower caste if one’s father was a government minister. It was also not enough to simply be poor if one was in a high caste. The court directed that the central, state and union territory governments constitute permanent commissions to deal with definitional issues, to make lists


of Other Backward Classes and to assess proposed additions to or subtractions from their lists. In response, the central government instituted the National Commission for Backward Classes, which was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. Unlike the temporary commissions of the past, this is a permanent institution, although its members have limited terms. This commission is responsible for defining a national list of Other Backward Classes based on the Mandal Commission’s list and on the various state level lists. This commission’s task is both an administrative nightmare and a political minefield, since state lists of backward classes vary widely, and many groups aspire to keep, or gain, that designation. In Indra Sawhney the Supreme Court also ruled that individuals are to be excluded from eligible Other Backward Class groups through “creamy layer” rules: “Within four months from today the Government of India shall specify the bases, applying the relevant and requisite socio-economic criteria to exclude socially advanced persons/sections (‘creamy layer’) from ‘Other Backward Classes.’”13 States with OBC reservations at the state level were to do the same within six months. Although the creamy layer ruling applied only to the Other Backward Classes, not to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes, this was a groundbreaking decision. Henceforth, both group and individual criteria were to be taken into account when defining the Other Backward Classes. DEFINING THE CREAMY LAYER: THE PRASAD COMMITTEE Justice R.N.Prasad, the first head of the National Commission for Backward Classes established in 1993, also headed a new Creamy Layer Committee to come up with criteria for national level Other Backward Class reservations. Prasad noted that, following the Indra Sawhney decision, the rules allow for a situation in which a group continues to be an Other Backward Class but individuals within that group are excluded on the basis of advancement or prosperity (Prasad interview 18 September 1996). The creamy layer rules agreed upon by Prasad’s committee necessitate examining applicants, their parents and, in the case of women, their husbands in order to skim off those who hold high-ranking government or military positions (or who have parents or husband in such a position), those who own a certain amount of irrigated land, and those with an annual income level over 100,000 rupees.14 These rules are thus much more complex than a simple economic cutoff. A long list of grounds for exclusion from the Other Backward Classes includes a wide variety of considerations relating to the employment, property and income of the applicant and the applicant’s immediate family.15 Such rules, combining numerous kinds of socio-economic advantages, have created a number of administrative challenges.


The administrative challenges are not limited to the complexity of the rules. Prasad noted that at times non-OBC or creamy layer candidates try to “influence” officials to get caste certificates. In response, he advocated more “transparency” to flush out the cream, in the form of full inquiries and public postings of registries of those applying for and getting certificates, perhaps in panchayat (local council) headquarters. Such transparency, however, raises some of the same issues touched on in Chapter 4 on caste certificates, namely privacy and stigmatization. Yet Prasad defended the idea of making applications more transparent, claiming that doing so will help solve another persistent problem in the doling out of reservations: Officers in the administration, mostly upper castes, sometimes hinder the granting of caste certificates to legitimate applicants by claiming a lack of information. Were the process to be more transparent, members of Other Backward Classes and their associations or advocates could use the public paper trail to organize a protest, a response Prasad felt would be quite appropriate (Prasad interview 18 September 1996). The creamy layer rules have resulted in more classification issues and related activism, as well as manipulation, from both sides of the administrator’s desk. The complexity of the issue is multiplied by the fact that individual states come up with their own creamy layer rules for state level reservations, although several have adopted the Prasad Committee rules (Prasad interview 18 September 1996). Such state-level decisions provide examples of resistance to and manipulation of the creamy layer categories. RESISTANCE TO CREAMY LAYER RULES By the time that the Supreme Court approved Mandal-style Other Backward Class reservations and the government resumed their implementation, the student protesters and political parties which stood against them only a couple years earlier accepted them much more quietly than one might have expected. Not only did V.P.Singh’s Janata Dal Party embrace the Other Backward Class reservations but the Congress Party and Bharatiya Janata Party also eventually included reservations for Other Backward Classes in their manifestos. This gradual acceptance is in part due to the growing recognition, even in the north, of the political power of the backward classes (Jaffrelot 2000). In some cases, groups formerly opposed to OBC reservations have become Other Backward Classes themselves (The Statesman, “Rajastan’s creamy layer vies for OBC status” 30 October 2001). At the same time, increasing economic liberalization is gradually reducing young people’s single-minded focus on access to public sector jobs: “‘People have by and large reconciled,’ says Rohit Sharma, then an antiMandal agitationist and now a marketing executive” (Indian Express, “Mandal Battlefields Barren Now” 23 September 1993). Another reason for the growing acceptance, even among former opponents of Other Backward Class


reservations, is the Supreme Court’s decision: The court’s stamp of approval gave these policies a sense of legitimacy, or at least inevitability, in the eyes of former protesters. At the same time the court’s decision addressed one major concern of protesters by insisting on creamy layer exclusions to attempt to prevent the “forward backward” citizens from taking reserved opportunities from others. In contrast to the northern states, where the anti-Mandal demonstrations were concentrated, much of the south has had a longer tradition of reservations for the backward classes. There the new reservations at the central level were more widely accepted from the outset. In fact in the south it has been the limits on reservations posed by the creamy layer criteria that have become the subject of controversy. Thus the creamy layer regulations that assuaged some of the concerns in the north about Other Backward Class reservations generated some new resistance, particularly although not exclusively in the south. The politics of defining the creamy layer have been particularly contentious in the southern state of Kerala, which claimed to have no such layer (Bose interview 4 November 1996). This area was formerly the princely states of Travancore and Cochin, which like other areas in the south had a history of progressive policies for backward communities during the colonial era. For example, in the mid-1930s the government of Travancore appointed a Public Service Commission, which allocated many posts in government service to a list of 14 communities on a proportional basis (Ouwerkerk 1994:87–8). After independence, Kerala had three state level commissions on Other Backward Classes and reservations for these groups in technical and professional colleges and state government jobs, all prior to the national Mandal Commission (Mandal Commission Report 1980:13–4). Notably, Kerala’s state-level OBC policies have taken into account householdlevel data, such as an income ceiling, when determining eligibility for reservations (Sheth 2000:265, Mandal Commission Report 1980:14). Nevertheless, the government of Kerala, with its long recognition of the Other Backward Classes, resisted the nationally mandated creamy layer rule to trim the ranks of the backward. In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling, the government of Kerala refused to set up a commission to identify a creamy layer, and it passed a resolution in 1995 denying that there was any creamy layer at all in the state, the Kerala State Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointments or Posts in the Services Under the State) Bill. In response, the Supreme Court insisted that the government of Kerala find such a layer and actually appointed a commission to do so. The Joseph Commission’s report raised hackles in Kerala by finding a creamy layer and by including a controversial suggestion that Muslims be categorized as a creamy layer and thus kept off backward classes lists (The Statesman, “Exclude Muslims, says panel: Kerala Government in a fix over Job Quota Proposal” 21 September 1997). The Supreme Court nullified the state’s resolution denying the


existence of a creamy layer in Kerala, and in December 1999 the Joseph committee criteria came into effect (Rediff.com, “Supreme Court strikes down Kerala backward classes act” 13 December 1999). In response, Kerala appointed its own commission, the Narendran Commission, to come up with more lenient rules and thus shrink its creamy layer. The commission was explicitly charged with providing “maximum benefits permissible within the parameters of the December 13 Supreme Court verdict to backward communities” (The Hindu, “Government Appoints Panel on Creamy Layer” 13 January 2000). Options considered to achieve this end included raising the annual income ceiling for the creamy layer category from the one and one-half lakh (150,000) rupees recommended by the Joseph Commission. Some groups in Kerala have suggested that individuals with incomes falling under a ceiling as high as five lakh rupees should still be included within the Other Backward Classes. In addition to challenging the current income ceiling, other political groups have called for a recalibration of the rules for calculating income from property, which have been criticized as unfair to farmers. Others have called for excluding NRI (Non Resident Indian) income, received from family members abroad, from the creamy calculus. Education is yet another factor, which has resulted in a proposal that those without primary education should never be considered creamy, regardless of their income. Yet the predominant suggestion to the Narendran Commission by the various Backward communities was to try to exempt the state from the creamy layer rule. “The commission had invited suggestions from most organizations of backward communities and minorities to help it in its task. But rather than presenting their case with documentary support for the quantum of increase in the income ceiling, almost all organizations have taken the stand that there is no creamy layer among the backward communities in Kerala” (Venugopal 2000). The Izhava community, eligible for reserved government jobs since the mid-1930s, have been particularly opposed to the creamy layer principle (Osella and Osella 2000:211). In a southern state with a large population already declared backward and a regional tradition of Other Backward Class reservations, it has become politically difficult to skim off constituencies, particularly the most powerful members of those constituencies, through new creamy layer regulations. Kerala is not the only state to contest the new boundaries of backwardness, but this case provides a glimpse at the challenges of adding new criteria to existing categories. At times political activists, whether anti-Mandal or anti-creamy layer, have not pressed for changes to the official categories but rather for the status quo. The northern anti-Mandal protesters and southern anti-creamy layer protesters have very different attitudes toward reservations for Other Backward Classes; yet what unites them is their preference for older policies. Student protesters in Delhi did


not want new Other Backward Class quotas and various activists in Kerala did not want new restrictions on Other Backward Class quotas. CONCLUSION Advocates of class or economic criteria often espouse them as a more rational, scientific or objective way to allocate reservations, one that also avoids the problems of state complicity in caste or religious distinctions. It is true that a scheme based largely on caste can be problematic. As administrators from colonial times to the present have discovered, “caste” refers to a variety of types of identity, which are by no means uniform from locality to locality (Pant 1987). Grappling with the notion of caste can make economic factors, which may be more quantifiable, seem like an appealing basis for a policy. In India, however, economic criteria can be as difficult to administer as caste criteria. D.L.Sheth, a sociologist and member of the National Commission for Backward Classes, found, in his work evaluating whether groups are backward or not, that “economic criteria are more difficult because there is a lot of informality, still, in this economy, in [the] agricultural sector, and people’s income…it is common that people may be earning 20,000 rupees but show it as only 2000. So economic criteria are difficult to implement…occupational and caste categories are in fact neater” (Sheth interview 6 September 1996). In addition to complications arising from India’s informal economy, corruption obfuscates economic criteria. People lie to avoid taxes, rendering income statistics unreliable, and the Other Backward Class certificates, which involve creamy layer verification, are sometimes falsified.16 Also, data from an applicant’s extended family may be quite relevant to their economic and social status but difficult for the government to monitor.17 The Indian government, rather than shifting to purely economic criteria, initiated reservation policies with two layers of criteria, which allow the government to consider a more comprehensive combination of factors, both group and individual, both caste and economic class. The creamy layer criteria, developed in the context of new Other Backward Class reservations, constitute a policy shift from purely group-based categories toward a recognition of individual economic factors. Both the new reservations and the new individual level restrictions on them provoked social protest. Like the previous chapters, political activism over the role of economic factors in reservations demonstrates that social groups pose many challenges to state classifications; in this case the competing challenges differed most dramatically along regional lines. In contrast to the previous chapters, the trends toward economically informed classifications discussed here show that state classifications are occasionally flexible and that sometimes it is the political protesters who demand the status quo. Social mobility, in part a result of


reservation policies, has helped create a well off “creamy layer” within disadvantaged groups. Although unable to reach vast numbers of landless laborers, reservations have resulted in an educated subset within the eligible groups, employed in government service and a political force to be reckoned with (Galanter 1984:551, Mandal Commission Report 1980, Roy and Singh 1987). Concern that an advanced subset benefits disproportionately from reservations was one impetus for political protests against reservations in Delhi. Ultimately, advantaged groups were skimmed off; yet the cream did not leave quietly, particularly in Kerala, another example of resistance to official categories. Serious questions remain about the use of economic factors. Is caste-based discrimination waning enough to justify a shift toward economically defined categories? So far, the Indian Supreme Court seems to think not. In the Indra Sawhney case, it ruled that economic backwardness alone is not enough to qualify for reservations, reinforcing the original goal of reservations as a measure to uplift degraded communities rather than to redistribute wealth and opportunities to the poor.18 India’s application of Other Backward Class and creamy layer categories demonstrate that it is possible to consider class in addition to caste, rather than rejecting altogether a category that is still salient in a society in which casteism persists. Observing the policy initiatives along these lines in India will give other countries an indication of whether it is possible to overcome the significant administrative and political challenges associated with drawing affirmative action boundaries around multidimensional categories such as the “backward” or the “disadvantaged.” Are more multifaceted categories, including economic factors, necessarily better tools to fight disadvantage? They may more accurately reflect complex disparities; yet, the increasing use of economic criteria in India also threatens to undermine the ability of reservations to affect change. Depending on how they are applied, these criteria may either expand or restrict the beneficiary pool to such an extent that the status quo is served. In some states, for example, the Other Backward Classes category has been expanded to such an extent that the vast majority of the population is eligible for reservations (Parikh 1997:175, Srinivas 1997). Such generous definitions of disadvantage may water down the effectiveness of reservations for the most disadvantaged. At the same time, skimming off the creamy layer from disadvantaged groups threatens to leave reserved seats at the highest levels unfilled (Pandian 2000). An alternative to disqualifying perhaps the most qualified individuals is subdividing broad categories at the group level. For example, some states, such as Bihar and Tamil Nadu, have tried to take into account different levels of disadvantage by creating a “Most Backward Classes” category. Yet such distinctions add new definitional challenges demanding careful consideration. When the state government of Uttar Pradesh sought to make a controversial distinction between the Backward, More


Backward and Most Backward Classes the year before an election, the Supreme Court stayed the appointments arguing that “the entire exercise seems to have been done in a hurry” (Deccan Herald, “Appointment of ‘most backward’ in UP stayed” 22 January 2002). These continuing dilemmas mean the role of economic criteria will be one of the most contested issues in debates over reservations for years to come.

9 Women's reservations and representation

Introduction of the Women’s Reservation Bill was stalled in Lok Sabha on Monday amid unprecedented scenes of snatching of papers from the Speaker and the law minister and the virtual coming to blows of members… As the shell shocked minister stood rooted to the spot, the member tore the papers with relish and flung them in the air provoking members from the treasury benches to storm the well. By this time, the well of the Lok Sabha looked like a veritable battle field with members from both sides preparing for a scuffle as the Speaker adjourned the House for the day.1 What caused such a commotion in the lower house of India’s Parliament in July of 1998? The Women’s Reservation Bill was an attempt to reserve 33 per cent of seats in Parliament and state assemblies for women. The percentage of women in India’s Lok Sabha reached 8 per cent in 1984 but has since stagnated (Narayan et al. 2002).2 In a society characterized by many forms of stratification, demands for subquotas within the category of “women” for other disadvantaged groups have repeatedly squelched the bill’s progress. The Women’s Reservation Bill that caused such a stir in the Parliament would reserve for women one-third of all seats, including seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, but it did not differentiate between Other Backward Class or Muslim and more privileged women. Defining which social categories should be eligible for such reservations leads to heated disputes because these questions involve both emotional commitments to group identities and material calculations of group interests. Reservations in India apply not only to government jobs and university admissions, but also to legislative seats. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes currently have reserved seats in Parliament. For example, only members of Scheduled Castes can run for the seats reserved for Scheduled Castes, although all voters in the districts designated to fill the reserved seats can vote in the election, whether they are a member of the Scheduled Castes or not. Women, Other Backward Classes, and religious minorities do not currently have reserved


seats in Parliament. Prior to independence, some seats in colonial legislatures were reserved for religious minorities, women and “depressed classes” (the forerunners of contemporary Scheduled Castes), but reservations on the basis of religion and sex ceased at independence. A 1993 constitutional amendment included a reservation of one-third of local council seats for women, and the Women’s Reservation Bill is an effort to extend this model to the level of the Indian Parliament. An unfortunate consequence of these policies to help disadvantaged groups in Indian society is that competition over the allocation of reservations often divides groups that might benefit from working together to fight inequality. A case in point is the repeated downfall of the Parliamentary reservation proposal for women due to demands for subquotas within the category of women for Other Backward Classes and for Muslims. Each category is arguably made up of victims of historical discrimination and inequality; yet claims and counter claims for reservations on the basis of sex, caste, class and religion have resulted in a political stalemate. Previous chapters have illustrated how overlapping identities can prevent the reification of religious and other groups in India. This issue of Parliamentary reservations illustrates a possible downside to this dynamic, namely political gridlock due to competing arguments by various disadvantaged groups. Notably, many of these groups, especially women, are both competing and overlapping. The politics of competing inequalities can divide oppressed groups, which, if consolidated, would have the potential to be numerically and politically dominant. The issue of reserved legislative seats for women in India has reappeared without resolution at different historical moments. The following discussion focuses on three such moments, the debates over constitutional reforms in the last years of the British Raj, the disagreements over a major government report on the status of women in 1974, and the demand for the Women’s Reservation Bill in the 1990s. In each period, the key question concerns the extent to which women constitute a legitimate group for reservations in their own right. In three very different contexts, similar arguments resurfaced. A recurring theme was that women are merely a “minor minority” or “category” within other communities; some are oppressed and some are not. This conception of women shaped the policy debates and the policy outcomes, so that women’s reservations, if instituted at all, have been subdivided along the lines of other reserved categories. Before turning to the three historical cases, I will introduce the groups involved and place them in a theoretical context whereby their respective fates can be understood.


GENDER IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS When official identification becomes the basis for various material perks, identities and interests are intertwined. The relationship between the politics of recognition (of different identities) and the politics of redistribution (of material resources) suggests that solidarities are constantly emerging and shifting on the basis of both the emotional pull of certain identities and rational calculations of interests (Hoskins and Rai: 1998). People have multilayered identities, which can include gender, class, caste, race, religion, ethnicity as well as many others, but material considerations may highlight one facet of identity. As Madhu Kishwar writes, “a group or person may begin to assert a particular identity with greater vigour if it provides greater access to power and opportunities” (Kishwar 1996a: 6).3 For example, Indian women at various times have asserted their identity as women in order to demand reserved legislative seats. The political power associated with these seats has important material dimensions, including the opportunity to have a say in the distribution of state resources. Women in elected office are in a position to try to “improve their access to the resources that count, from education and credit to the ownership of land and housing” (Jaquette 1997). As the lively debate over women’s reservations illustrates, identities and interests do not neatly coincide, although group-based policies sometimes link the two. Political scientist Shane Phelan has observed: Interest talk may make sense if all the members of a group share every “relevant” social characteristic or submerge difference(s) among themselves, but this eventuality is increasingly unlikely. In modern societies, where overlapping social movements and identities are increasingly present, interest becomes as unstable as identity. (Phelan 1995:338–9) Can policies reflect these instabilities rather than reinforce the equation of interests with single identity-based groups? Perhaps to truly advance the interests of women, their multiple identities, including gender, caste, class and religion, must all be taken into account. However, as noted in Chapter 1, even women who would argue that “women” do not constitute a universal category, sometimes choose for political purposes to “act as if such a category indeed exists, precisely for the reason that the world continues to behave and treat women as though one does” (O’Hanlon and Washbrook 1992:154). In other words, gender discrimination persists in all strata of women, which is a major impetus for the demand for an undivided women’s reservation. Yet, in India, as elsewhere, the category of women is riddled by class, religious, and countless other cultural divisions, which can result in different degrees of disadvantage. Economists Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen note the


cumulative effect of layers of oppression, such as when “different sources of disadvantage are combined (e.g. the handicap of being female is added to that of belonging to a scheduled caste and living in a backward region)” (Dreze and Sen 1995:114–15). The current dilemma facing the Indian women demanding reserved seats in Parliament is that their demand is a strong response to continuing gender-based discrimination and disadvantages in politics, yet their proposal may not adequately recognize other categories which are significant to women. In practice, opening the Pandora’s box of subquotas has mired the women’s reservation bill in endless debates over which groups of women should receive their own categories of reservations. A review of the overlapping, yet competing, categories of women, Other Backward Classes, and Muslims and their eligibility for reservations will set the stage for the following discussion. Although women had reserved seats prior to independence and now have reservations in local councils or panchayats, they do not currently have them in Parliament. The Other Backward Classes are eligible for other types of reservations, but not for Parliamentary quotas. Muslims had special rights under the British, including reserved legislative seats, but only those Muslim communities classified as Other Backward Classes currently benefit from national-level reservations, and those do not include Parliamentary seats. The issue of women’s reservations illustrates how India’s intersecting identities result in competing arguments that some groups are more unequal than others. As seen in previous chapters, even in the face of state reinforcement of distinct classifications, a myriad of social groups reassert transecting categories. Yet, examining debates over women’s reservations shows that, historically, a sort of hierarchy of disadvantage emerged. People proposing or making reservation policies repeatedly prioritized “communities” over “categories” and relegated women to “category” status.4 Women, half of virtually all communities, seem particularly well positioned to shatter the discrete classifications embedded in government policies. Women’s current demand for a reservation of their own challenges some long-held ideas about the legitimacy of women as an appropriate group for reserved representation. MINOR MINORITIES: WOMEN'S RESERVATIONS IN COLONIAL LEGISLATURES The demand for women’s reservations in legislative bodies is not new; neither is the controversy over the appropriate categories to use when allocating reservations. Legislative reservations for women were under discussion during debates in the 1920s and 1930s over constitutional reforms for India. At that point, too, the category of women took a back seat to other categories, such as religion and caste. One official went so far as to place “female suffrage and legislative seats in the category of minor minorities (religious communities such


as Muslims and Sikhs and caste groups such as the so-called ‘untouchables’ were considered the major minorities)” (Ramusack 1990:316). Such official recognition of minorities, in part a response to the concerns and demands of various groups in society, cleaved the population into major and minor minorities; notably all of these minorities together are much more than half of the Indian population and would constitute a formidable political force. In the last decades of colonial rule, Britain granted Indians limited rights to serve as representatives in legislative bodies. In part an effort to assuage nationalists and expand the “circle of collaborators,” such policies also contributed to “divide and rule” tactics by giving special electoral rights to certain groups (Nair 1996:122). These policies include the 1909 Indian Councils Act (based on the Minto-Morely Report), the 1919 Government of India Act (based on the Montagu Chelmsford Proposals), and the 1935 Government of India Act. This period also saw the first attempts at forming associations of women across the entire nation, such as the Women’s India Association (WIA) in 1917, followed by the National Council of Women in India (NCWI) in 1925 and the All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) in 1927. These major women’s associations tried to influence the new policies by passing resolutions, sending delegates to conferences, submitting memoranda and letters, and lobbying various decision-makers. The provincial legislatures gradually extended suffrage rights to women between 1920 and 1929, yet the franchise was so limited, by property qualifications, for example, that only 14 per cent of men and 1 per cent of women could actually vote. While the women’s associations’ primary political goal was to have more women enfranchised, they also became involved in the issue of reserved seats for women in legislatures. Although these major Indian women’s organizations ultimately opposed reserved seats, reservations were granted to women in 1935. At that point some “major minorities,” such as Muslims, had already received reserved seats as well as separate electorates. Reservations meant only Muslim candidates could run for seats reserved for Muslims. Separate electorates meant that only Muslim voters could cast ballots for those seats. Muslims received separate electorates under the Government of India Act of 1909. The Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 granted Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians reserved seats and separate electorates. “Depressed Classes” (lower caste groups) were provided a few nominated seats in 1919, more in 1925, and even more elected seats in 1932, but they did not get separate electorates (Galanter 1984, Metcalf 1995). These proliferating categories, some nationalists argued, facilitated continuing British control. Concerned about divisions within the nationalist movement, the leading nationalist organization, the Indian National Congress, objected to special electoral rights for any of these groups. The major women’s organizations, in turn, came to oppose similar proposals for women. Women associated with other


political organizations held a different position. Muslim activist Begum Jahanara Shah Nawaz, for one, agreed with the Muslim League’s support for reserved seats and special constituencies for Muslims and also, initially, supported reservations for women. When the Indian National Congress boycotted the first Round Table Conference on constitutional reform in 1930, the British government nominated Nawaz and another non-Congress delegate, Radhabai Subbarayan, to represent women’s interests at the conference (Visram 1992:35). These two women submitted a memorandum in favor of reserved seats for women, arguing that “we regard the phrase ‘a fair field and no favour’ at the present time as an illusory one” (quoted in Pearson 1989:205). The major women’s associations agreed with these delegates’ demand for adult suffrage, but rejected the reservation of seats. When the Congress decided to participate in the second Round Table Conference in 1931, the president of the All India Women’s Conference (AIWC), Sarojini Naidu and Begum Shah Nawaz introduced a joint memorandum of the three major women’s associations, the AIWC, NCWI, and WIA (Ali 2000:177). This memorandum stated that “to seek any form of preferential treatment would be to violate the integrity of the universal demand of Indian women for absolute equality of political status” (quoted in Pearson 1989:207). Although previously the WIA supported reservations for women as a “transitional necessity,” they signed the joint resolution, thus allowing the nationalist agenda to supersede concerns specific to women (Pearson 1989:206).5 Sarojini Naidu, influenced by Mohandas Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, stressed national unity over group rights, speaking critically of “those purely artificial questions of vulgar fractions, that arithmetic which divided a power into little fractions for this community and that community” (quoted in Ali 2000:177). Although Begum Shah Nawaz, like the Muslim League, no longer supported women’s reservations, Radhabai Subbarayan returned to the second Round Table Conference in 1931 as well, and she continued to support women’s reservations. Skeptical of the major women’s organizations’ emphasis on adult franchise, Radhabai Subbarayan argued that the vast majority of Indian women were still in “a state of civic inertia” having “not yet attained selfconfidence or political consciousness.” She felt that reserved seats would be “one practical step” to ensure women’s presence in politics (quoted in Ali 2000:176). But support for the cause of reservations was dwindling among the national women’s associations, who prioritized equal voting rights. The WIA’s Muthulakshmi Reddi subsequently wrote in opposition to reservations, emphasizing the need for a “common platform”: The “only way to bring the Brahmans, the women and the pariahs together on a common platform is by enfranchising the women and the depressed classes on equal terms with others” (quoted in Pearson 1989:208). In other


words, if women and other politically marginalized groups wanted equal rights to vote, they should not demand special rights to seats. After the second Round Table Conference, the government selected Radhabai Subbarayan as a member of the Franchise Committee, established in 1931, to make recommendations on franchise issues in India. The selection of Subbarayan indicated that the government was not ready to grant India the full adult suffrage advocated by the nationalist women’s organizations but was open to reserved seats (Ali 2000:183–4). Indeed, the 1935 Act included limited suffrage rights with qualifications that still prevented many men and even more women from voting. Women could vote if they were literate, owned property or married men with property. The Act enfranchised one woman for every five men enfranchised (Visram 1992:38–9). Despite the stance of the major Indian women’s organizations, the Government of India Act of 1935 granted women 41 reserved seats in the provincial legislatures, as well as limited reservations in the central legislature.6 Despite their dim view of such a “minor minority,” the colonial government had added women to the list of groups with reserved seats. Yet, their overriding concern with the major minorities affected even the women’s reservations, which were subdivided on a religious basis. Various “communities” had already been granted not only reserved seats but separate electorates. There were several women’s seats in Muslim constituencies and one each in Sikh, Indian Christian, and Anglo-Indian constituencies. This division of the electoral pie brought out tensions along both gender and religious lines. The major women’s organizations, such as the AIWC, including some of its Muslim women members, protested that “the communal award will divide us, Indian women” (quoted in Pearson 1989:210). Some male members of “major” minorities, in turn, were disgruntled at having their quotas diluted by women. Muslim leaders in Punjab, for instance, were “angry that of the few seats for Muslims, one was reserved for a woman” (Forbes 1996:196). Muslim women in particular fell between the cracks of the “major” and “minor” minorities during this period prior to independence and the Partition of India and Pakistan; in addition to facing such resistance from Muslim men, some Muslim women were becoming estranged from the Hindu dominated women’s movement (Forbes 1996:196–203). For example, some Hindu women’s activists eventually gave up on their preference for general rather than separate, communal electorates and argued that if Muslims were to get separate electorates, then the general seats reserved for women should be reserved for Hindu women only (Ali 2000:191). When granted reservations in spite of themselves, women’s associations made the most of the situation. The AIWC initially considered refusing to participate in the new constitutional provisions, but eventually they resolved to take advantage of them. Various women’s groups even lobbied for additional seats in their areas. In the 1937 elections 80 women became legislators, giving India the third


highest number of female legislators in the world after the United States and the Soviet Union (Visram 1992:39). After independence in 1947, the new government retained legislative reservations for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament) and in the Vidhan Sabhas (the lower houses of the state legislatures). Anglo-Indians also got a few nominated seats. The postindependence Constitution did not reserve legislative seats for the Other Backward Classes, religious minorities, or women. The Constitution also outlawed separate electorates for national and state assemblies, so all voters in the appointed districts elected candidates for reserved seats. Although women’s reservations in the waning days of the colonial era were quite short-lived and subdivided along religious lines, they gave women a foothold in Indian legislative life and set a precedent which women could draw on decades later. COMMUNITIES AND CATEGORIES: RENEWED DEBATE OVER WOMEN'S RESERVATIONS Independence brought a “lull” in feminist campaigns (Kumar 1995:60). The Indian National Congress became the ruling Congress Party, and it incorporated a number of feminists into the government. The 1950 Constitution declared women to be equal and granted universal adult suffrage. But optimism about freedom and development in the early years of Independence gradually waned as the status of women seemed to stagnate or even decline. In spite of dramatic exceptions, such as the election of Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister in 1966, Indian women did not achieve the equality constitutionally granted to them and remained grossly under-represented in legislatures. In the early 1970s, the government of India carried out a comprehensive study of the status of Indian women. The resulting 1974 report, Towards Equality, was the most comprehensive government report on women in India. In the process of documenting continuing inequalities and considering possible solutions, the issue that most divided the committee was legislative reservations for women. To place this report in context, the western feminist movement was at its peak and the United Nations was starting to focus more on the status and development of women in the Third World. Partly in response to this new UN agenda, culminating in the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the government of India in 1971 formed the Committee on the Status of Women in India in order to gather new data as well as compile and analyze existing information (Bumiller 1990:26). Towards Equality was released in time for the 1975 observance of the International Women’s Year. In addition to the international push for a reconsideration of women’s status, Indian women began to push for change during the 1970s. Both the report and the renewed activism brought the


debate over the status of women back onto the national stage. The woman in charge of the report, Political Science Professor Veena Mazumdar was previously not a major player in the women’s movement, but she was so appalled by her findings that she became a leading figure in the “new wave” of Indian feminism (Bumiller 1990:125–7). Towards Equality reported on women’s demographic, socio-cultural, legal, economic, and educational status, evaluated current programs and policies, and made several recommendations. Although it was a government report, it was quite critical of the government. The report addressed the economic plight of many women since Independence and the reluctance of legislators to put Constitutional ideals into practice. “Large sections of women have suffered a decline of economic status,” it concluded. “Every legal measure designed to translate the Constitutional norm of equality or special protection into actual practice has had to face tremendous resistance from the legislative and other elites” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:301). Such findings set the stage for the debate in the committee over reserved seats for women in legislative bodies. Those in charge of the report, like Mazumdar, came from backgrounds far more privileged than those of most Indian women, yet they attempted to reflect diverse viewpoints. The issue inspiring the most divergent views, and necessitating the addition of several “notes of dissent” at the end of the report, was legislative reservations for women. Mazumdar and her committee, particularly those from the “pre-independence generation,” initially had no intention of considering the issue of legislative reservations for women. In the tradition of the nationalist women’s organizations, they had “never been supporters of special representation or class representation in any form” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:355). They still associated such reservations with colonial strategies and “in academic discussions we had often criticized the system of reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as a legacy of the historical period which institutionalized the backwardness of certain sections of our population” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:355). The committee’s initial interviews and surveys did not include any questions on the issue of reservations for women. “Only when the problem kept being posed repeatedly before us by various groups of women in the course of our discussions did we become aware that a problem like this was real,” Mazumdar confessed (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:355). By the time the report was released, Mazumdar had embraced the concept of legislative reservations. She personally even espoused reservations in Parliament, going beyond the committee’s recommendation to limit them to the municipal level. Towards Equality signaled a shift towards more open acceptance of reservations among some women, even those previously opposed to such measures.7 At the same time, the committee was very guarded in its limited endorsement and included many familiar arguments against


reservations. Although the report included summaries of arguments for reservations up to the level of Parliament, the committee as a whole concluded that they could not recommend such a step. Major arguments against reservations for women continued to involve concerns about other disadvantaged groups, namely religious minorities and lower classes and castes. Two types of arguments along these lines emerged in the debate over Towards Equality. One argument was that the inequalities faced by these other “communities” outweighed those faced by the “category” of women. This argument parallels the colonial distinction between major and minor minorities and subsequent decisions to grant women’s reservations at a later date than those for other groups and, even then, only with communal subdivisions. A second type of argument in Towards Equality had precedents in the nationalist movement’s anti-reservation stance. This argument raised the specter of national disintegration in the wake of such official distinctions between groups, be they religious, caste or gender based. Clearly, concerns about national unity continued after independence. The report’s conclusions drew on both types of arguments against reservations, prioritizing “communities” over “categories” and expressing concern about national integrity. In terms of communities, it considered fallacious “the entire argument for separate representation for women. Women’s interests as such cannot be isolated from the economic, social and political interests of groups, strata and classes in the society” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:304). This conclusion depended on the idea that women are a “category,” which, in contrast to other groups, does not constitute a “community.” The Committee admitted, “Though they have some real problems of their own, they share with men the problems of their groups, locality and community. Women are not concentrated in certain areas confined to particular fields of activity. Under these circumstances, there can be no rational basis for reservation for women” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:304). Although not using the word “caste,” the Committee contrasted the plight of women with the spacial and occupational segregation characterizing the caste system. The word “community” in the Indian context had become a common euphemism for castes and religious groups, reinforcing the Committee’s distinction between women as a category and these other groups as communities. The Committee also included the national unity argument against reservations: “Such a system of special representation may precipitate similar demands from various other interests and communities and threaten national integration” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:304). In spite of these concerns, it made some limited recommendations for reservations for women at the local level as a “transitional measure” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:303). This careful choice of phrase echoed the WIA’s initial support of reservations


for women in 1931 as a “transitional necessity,” prior to their decision to join with the other two major women’s organizations in opposition to reservations. Even the recommendation of limited and local level reservations sparked notes of dissent, appended to the report. Phulrenu Guha seconded the Committee’s discomfort with prioritizing the category of “women” over class divisions by arguing that “there is a possibility that reservation of seats will only help women of a particular class who are already privileged. It should be our aim to see that the masses of women of all classes become equal partners with men in all senses in our society” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:354). Guha’s note of dissent also embraced the national unity argument that “this type of reservation of seats might lead other communities/classes to argue for reservation of seats. This, to my mind, will encourage separatist tendencies and hamper national integration” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:354). Not all notes of dissent, however, opposed women’s reservations. Some women argued for more reservations. In their note of dissent, Vina Mazumdar and Lotika Sarkar argued that the committee’s reported recommendations did not go far enough. They advocated legislative reservations at higher levels. They claimed that the number of women in Parliament was still less than 5 per cent, only marginally higher than the proportion elected in the Central Legislature after the 1935 Government of India Act. These dissenters discounted the community versus category assumptions of many critics of women’s reservations, arguing that helping women will help the women of various communities as well. “Larger numbers” of women in Parliament, they proposed, “will also help to break the somewhat exclusive class composition of this group” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:357). Mazumdar and Sarkar also rebutted the argument that reservations would fracture the nation, or, as they described it, “the argument that special representation might precipitate fissiparous tendencies” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:357). Here they deployed the argument that because women constitute a widespread category and not a community, they should have special reservations. Contrasting women with other minority communities, they argued that reservations for women could not create the “isolated pockets” feared by critics of reservations (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:357). Although the rhetoric shifted from a distinction between “major” and “minor” minorities to one between “communities” and mere “categories,” the major conclusions of the Committee on the Status of Women continued the tradition of ambivalence towards women as a unitary category for the purposes of public policies. From the beginning, the report noted that “the inequalities inherent in our traditional social structure, based on caste, community and class have a very significant influence on the status of women in different spheres” (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:3).8 One legacy of colonial policies was the continuing primacy of caste and religious communities, even in the eyes of many


members of the Committee on the Status of Women. This view of Indian society undermined demands for a special reservation for “women” as a group. Since independence, fears that the nationalist movement might disintegrate had transformed into fears that the nation itself might disintegrate. This view of the Indian nation and fears of “fissiparous tendencies” further undermined the possibility of a new form of group-based reservation. Both types of arguments, with their roots in the colonial era, limited the prospects for women’s reservations. ELECTED BODIES: WOMEN'S RESERVATIONS IN THE 1990s It’s a step, but it’s not going to deal with all the problems that women face because, then again, politics is not only elected bodies. Politics is what’s happening around you and how you’re treated on the streets. (Feminist leader Brinda Karat, on reservations for women, interview 10 December 1996) Towards Equality's proposal for local level reservations for women eventually became part of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, which revitalized the local government system known as panchayati raj. Introduced by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1989, the amendment passed in 1993. Consequently village panchayats or councils must reserve one-third of their seats for women. They must also reserve seats for Scheduled Castes and Tribes in proportion to their populations in the area; one-third of SC and ST seats are reserved for SC and ST women (Singh 1994, Bakshi 1996). Notably, the “category” receives the quite arbitrary allocation of one-third of seats, while the “communities” receive proportional representation. Former Government Minister Margaret Alva nevertheless sees women’s reservations, even limited to one-third of seats at the local level, as an important step in a gradual process. Alva advocated reservations on all levels, including Parliament, in the 1980s when she was Minister for Women.9 She viewed the 33 per cent reserved seats for women in the panchayats as a stepping stone to reservations in Parliament. “Let us start with the panchayats,” she declared. “Instead of taking on everybody, let’s start with the panchayats and see how it runs, and then move upwards” (Alva interview 19 December 1996). Alva felt such gradualism would quell the doubts of those who believed that “you won’t find women to contest, you know; they are not educated; they are not trained. How do they do it?” (Alva interview 19 December 1996). Alva could then point to the success of the initiative:


In the course of the last three years, between ‘93 and ‘96, one million women have been elected to local bodies. Now one million…is more than the population of some countries. But one million women today are elected representatives in local bodies all over the country. Now just imagine if one million have been elected, at least five million have contested… Five million women have gone through the political process. (Alva interview 19 December 1996) The adoption of this constitutional amendment, with the endorsement of major members of the Congress Party, signaled the increasing acceptability of women’s reservations; yet numerous bills attempting to extend such reservations to the national level failed. The major arguments against these latest proposals repeated those of the past. The 1990s brought several movements pushing for more equal representation into conflict with each other. The competing demands of women, Other Backward Classes and Muslims for legislative reservations have led to political gridlock. In 1990, the Indian government granted reservations in central government jobs, although not in legislatures, to the Other Backward Classes. This national recognition gave the previously more diffuse class-based and castebased critiques of women’s reservations a political grounding. Like the 1998 scene in the Indian Parliament described at the opening of this chapter, other attempts in 1996 and 2000 to introduce a women’s reservation bill succumbed to disputes over recognition of the Other Backward Classes within the category of women.10 Minister of Parliament Madhukar Sarpotdar argued in the Lok Sabha debates over the 1996 bill: “Would the skies have fallen on the nation if it [the women’s reservation bill] had been kept pending or had been referred to a Select or Standing Committee and then, once and for all, a comprehensive Bill in this regard was brought forward?… It should have been brought after involving every section and after proper deliberations…. [W]hat about the people from the Other Backward Classes who have not been included in this bill?” (Lok Sabha debate of 13 September 1996 over the Constitution (Eighty-first Amendment) Bill, 1996). Muslim demands for subquotas have also competed with women’s demands. Competition between groups defined by gender, class, caste and religion have stymied a purely gender-based reservation scheme at the national level. The major critics of Parliamentary reservations for women, again, distinguish between the claims of the “major minorities” or “communities” and those of women. “National unity,” however, is less prominent than in previous debates. Some critics do not necessarily want to thwart the bill but nevertheless point out its limitations for Backward Classes and Muslims. Their concerns are reminiscent of Towards Equality and its recognition of diversity within the category of women. Other critics are incumbent politicians who do have an incentive to thwart the bill because a 33 per cent reservation for women in a legislature that


peaked at 8 per cent women would put their seats at risk. Some incumbents have rather abruptly become concerned about various disadvantaged communities and squelched the bill on the floor, in spite of the decision of every major party to support the bill in their 1996 party platforms. Such tactics resemble group-based policies under the British, which strategically both appeased and divided various groups. By endorsing the bill in party platforms and then failing to pass it out of a sudden concern for backward citizens or Muslims, politicians court the women’s vote, the backwards vote, and the Muslim vote and simultaneously protect their own hopes of re-election. Some women have raised concerns, even while supporting the bill, ranging from prominent leftist activist Brinda Karat to Hindu nationalist Uma Bharati. Karat remains skeptical about women’s reservations and has analyzed the condition of the backward women under the new local level reservations in order to discover the limits of such policies. Karat concluded that even lower caste women have benefited a great deal from reservations in local councils, but she noted that reservations are not always enough to grant them access. She commented on both the progress and the predicaments of a subcategory of women, the Scheduled Castes: What we are finding is Scheduled Caste women who would never have been given an opportunity to come into…politics, are now coming in. Unfortunately, in many, many cases, they are, just as the Scheduled Caste men have been all along, just a rubber stamp… They are not allowed to participate…we had cases, where they hold the meeting deliberately in the house of an upper caste person, so the Scheduled Caste women, because of the social immobility, would censor herself…and so she will be sitting outside and they would send her the register and she would put her thumbprint on it. And so you see reservation on its own cannot be an instrument to remove this. (Karat interview 10 December 1996)11 Local level reservations sparked some concern even among those supportive of such a measure, because these policies for “women” were blunt tools and not a panacea for the problems particular to the women of the lowest castes. Likewise, in spite of policies aimed at the socioeconomic uplift of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, the women within these groups remain “doubly disadvantaged.” “The multiplicity of social categories in India often serves to obscure the status of women in the most disadvantaged segments of the population” (Dunn 1993:66). Vimla Farooqui of the National Forum for Indian Women recognized the mixed success of the local level reservations but argued that even if only a few of the elected women feel that they are an important part of the political process, that is an advance (Farooqui interview 2 December 1996). Due to concerns about


backward women’s access, some local elections, in Goa and Mumbai for example, have included reserved seats for OBC women within the women’s quota (Prabhudesai 2000). Many women’s organizations have failed to build bridges to other disadvantaged groups. For example, many women’s organizations have not been terribly supportive of lower castes or of the extension of central government job reservations to Other Backward Classes. Inspired by minority women’s critiques of the women’s movement in the West, Brinda Karat’s organization has promoted the notion that “sisterhood means you have to come out and openly support Dalit women” (Karat interview 10 December 1996). But when Other Backward Classes were given central government job reservations, only a few national women’s organizations defended this policy: There were “middle class women in the streets of Delhi threatening to kill themselves and coming out with the most obscene signs” as well as “a section who preferred to remain silent” (Karat interview 10 December 1996). This political backdrop increases the tensions between supporters of general women’s reservations and those of an OBC women’s subquota in Parliament. For example, Other Backward Class politician Sharad Yadav memorably said the women’s reservation bill would only benefit “balkati auraten,” or shorthaired women, most likely a reference to upper class, urban feminists.12 Likewise, a newspaper editorial suggesting women’s organizations should consider “reservations within reservations” critiqued “creamy layer feminism” (The Hindu 4 September 1998). The leaders of various “communities” are increasingly questioning feminists’ legitimacy and insinuating that they are not “real” or “true” women (Kumar 1994: 283). The idea that identity can be characterized as true or false is highly dubious; yet this notion is reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s characterization of genuine and spurious identity claims, discussed in Chapter 2, and can be a politically useful argument in the hands of communal politicians (Kumar 1994:238).13 Women’s organizations have been ambivalent towards Muslim demands for reservations as well. Karat claims that Muslims are under-represented in Parliament, but a Muslim reservation would do little for Muslim women without the women’s reservation as well. “This is the only way that Muslim women are going to be able to come out into public life, because even if you have community representation, they will never allow Muslim women to come in and represent. No way” (Karat interview 10 December 1996). Muslims, on the other hand, fear that a women’s reservation would essentially be a Hindu women’s reservation. Such qualms parallel Muslim fears in the 1930s that extending even the right to vote, let alone reserved seats, to women would increase the political power of the Hindu majority, due to the larger number of educated Hindu women. Thus the discomfort of some Muslims with political rights for women is not only due to cultural conservatism but also to electoral calculations. In recent


years some Muslim groups have been demanding the reserved seats that they lost at Independence (Wright 1997). This demand also came up in the context of Parliamentary debates over women’s reservations in the form of proposals for a subquota for Muslim women (Sonalkar 1999). An extreme example of the quotawithin-quota argument was “a demand that the quota for Muslim women be reserved for ‘Backward Class’ Muslims” (The Hindu 12 October 2000). Some women understand the logic behind the demands for reservations on a class or religious basis, but feel that women’s reservations should come first. Margaret Alva, a key proponent of the women’s reservation bill, argued for the legal recognition of women as a legitimate group for reservations. “Whether one is fighting for the Scheduled Castes, the Backward Classes, or the minorities—the largest group that is affected is women,” she contended. “Women are the single largest group of backward citizens in the country” (Nath 1996:11). Feminist and Christian leader Jotsna Chatterjee admits that “we have no objection to the OBCs getting reservations” but first, women should be given 33 per cent reservation, and “automatically this will apply to every category.” That would mean “that women will have to be given space in the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe section, and then if it is extended to the OBCs, it will have to be also given in the OBCs and also in the minorities” (Chatterjee interview 22 November 1996). Chatterjee is a member of a religious minority community, Christians, but since their educational and socio-economic status tends to be higher than that of Muslims, Christians have not been inspired to lodge a similar demand for subreservations within women’s reservations. These activists remain supportive of women’s reservations, although they recognize that this policy alone does not adequately address the doubly disadvantaged backward or Muslim women. Politicians in Parliamentary debates, however, may have raised concerns about Muslim and OBC women in part as a way to defeat the women’s reservation bill. Margaret Alva has charged: “When it was introduced…there was hullabaloo in the House… No man has the courage to stand up in the House and say we don’t want it, so they had to sabotage it. Now the only way they could sabotage it is to appeal to caste, because caste cuts across women” (Alva interview 19 December 1996). Some activists supportive of women’s reservations describe this as a strategy to divide and rule women on the basis of caste, class and creed, “splitting hairs” to continue to hold onto power in Parliament (Ganguli interview 3 December 1996, Chatterjee interview 22 November 1996). Maneka Gandhi predicted that the women’s reservation bill “will be diluted and further diluted till you have a law that says you can have your one third reservation for women provided they have pink hair, are totally backward, completely unheard of in any political arena” (Gandhi 1996:18). A possible example of what these women might call “division” or “dilution,” Member of Parliament Uma Bharati demanded that Other Backward Classes be


included in the women’s reservation bill. She herself is difficult to categorize, a backward class woman in the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is dominated by upper caste men. Although her party’s platform supported the bill, and she claimed to support it as well, she became a spokeswoman for the demand to amend the bill to include the Other Backward Classes, an amendment that led to its downfall. A few years earlier, the Bharatiya Janata Party had vociferously decried the extension of reserved central government jobs to Other Backward Classes, a campaign that led to several self-immolations by upper caste students. At that point the Bharatiya Janata Party was quick to criticize the reservations for Other Backward Classes as divisive and a threat to national integrity. Although this sudden concern for OBCs in the context of the women’s reservation bill seems suspicious, Uma Bharati’s credentials to make such a proposal are hard to fault: “Since I am from the Backward Castes, I know from experience that women from the oppressed classes are the weakest of the weakest section of society” (quoted in Nath 1996:11).14 In short, the discourse of “communities” came up again in the debate over women’s reservations in the 1990s, at times in ways reminiscent of British divide and rule tactics and, at other times, in ways similar to the Committee on the Status of Women’s measured support for reservations. National unity was a minor theme in this latest round. Even the BJP remained unusually silent about the threat such group-based policies might pose for Hindus or national integrity, letting the women’s reservation bill fail largely due to squabbling over proposals to include subquotas. The competing gender, class, caste and religious minority movements for reservations have not yet reached a detente. CONCLUSIONS For women to get rights is not a very simple thing. (Vimla Farooqui, National Forum for Indian Women, interview 2 December 1996) The history of women’s reservations in India illustrates the many ways administrators, politicians and activists have constructed women’s identities and interests. Like the British administrator who categorized women as “minor minorities” in comparison with caste and religious groups, the post-independence Committee on the Status of Women in India contrasted women as a “category” with “communities” based on caste or religion, which were still considered more legitimate political groupings. The extension of reservations to women in local level legislative bodies signaled some acceptance of the category of “women” as a legitimate target of such public policies; yet the uproars in Parliament over the subsequent bill to extend women’s reservations to the Parliament itself


demonstrate that women’s goals are still perceived as competing with other groups rather than complementing them. Muslims fear Hindu women will dominate the reserved seats; lower classes and castes argue that privileged women will prevail. A few politicians see the parallels and linkages between different disadvantaged groups. For example, former Prime Minister V.P.Singh, who spearheaded the expansion of reservations for Other Backward Classes, argued that India “can’t have social justice without justice to women” (Singh interview 20 November 1996). The history of debates over women’s reservations, particularly the competition between various disadvantaged groups, is a rich example of the complexity of overlapping identities and the tendency of political interests to bring different identities into relief at different historical points. Attempting to simultaneously appease and divide the “major minorities,” colonial officials subsumed vast diversity under the categories of a Hindu “majority” and various religious and caste “minorities.” The Government of India Act of 1935 superimposed women’s reservations onto these primary categories. This legacy lingered in the debate over women’s reservations for the 1974 report, Towards Equality. The Committee on the Status of Women agreed to recommend limited, local level women’s reservations, in large part due to overriding concerns about caste and religious communities. One major concern expressed in the report was that such “communities” had more legitimate claims to reservations, as opposed to the claims of women, who constitute a mere “category.” Drawing on similar assumptions, another concern expressed was the fear that any reservations could encourage national disintegration. The more recent arguments against reservations for women at the national level continue to echo these priorities. Throughout the historical and contemporary debates over women’s reservations, other groupings (religious minorities, lower classes or castes, or the nation itself) are given precedence. What makes the persistence of these arguments remarkable is the very different motivations and actors at play in the three time periods under consideration, ranging from a colonial power trying to maintain control of an unruly colony, to a government committee genuinely concerned about the plight of women, to policy-makers hoping to retain their seats in Parliament. Why is gender repeatedly singled out as a problematic category for groupbased policies? Is there a sound basis for past distinctions between the category of gender and communities of religious minorities or lower castes? Do these latter communities in India more neatly coincide with class, further legitimating their claims to special policies for disadvantaged citizens? Every sort of group in India has internal diversity. There are well off Muslims and relatively “forward” backward classes; yet women have the most internal diversity, since they are a substantial part of all class groups. If the only purpose of the policies is to help redistribute power and resources to the poor, gender alone may not be an


appropriate category; yet ignoring gender and using other categories can be equally problematic. Women who are also in other disadvantaged groups are often the worst off, and even advantaged women face gender discrimination. Moreover, legislative reservations in particular are not simply a redistributive policy but also a means for group recognition and representation. For this purpose, women may be as relevant a group as any, even if they are scattered throughout the class hierarchy. As Benedict Anderson pointed out, even people who may never meet can become “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991). On the other hand, the internally diverse category of women is particularly prone to politically motivated re-imagining. Thus politicians could appeal to half of the Indian electorate when promising Parliamentary reservations for women, but in the later debates they could argue, for any other constituency, that those seats would be taken by the women of a rival group. Due, in part, to such political manipulations and to the diffuse nature of the category itself, women’s organizations in India have not achieved unity, let alone a broader solidarity of disadvantaged citizens, encompassing women, Muslims and Backward Classes. Delineating the minority or backward women, like efforts to target the noncreamy Other Backward Classes, could avoid reifying a particular category and reach some of the most disadvantaged members of society. Yet controversies over defining categories and subcategories may prevent any policy innovations at all. Policy-makers and activists must walk the thin line between exploring more complex policies and courting political gridlock.

10 Conclusions

It is a very cruel divide when it comes to daily life. Consider a person of lower caste in a village. From morning to evening the way he is called by name, the way he is addressed, the way he is asked to sit—he goes through 101 humiliations in a day… As a human being he suffers. The only way to really deal with the situation is not to put this reality under a carpet… It is better to put it on the table: Yes it is there. Let us change the results. (Former Prime Minister of India V.P.Singh interview 20 November 1996) Reservation policies designed along group lines pose a dilemma for those who hope to overcome group stratification. By identifying and classifying certain groups in society—by putting these divisions on the table—such policies could further entrench the very boundaries they are meant to diminish. This is a major argument of reservation policy critics. Such critics include several groups discussed in this book, ranging from the anti-Mandal student protesters and some Hindu nationalists to organizations such as the Gandhi Caste Society. Others, however, argue that alternatives to reservations, such as a caste-blind approach, would sweep reality under the carpet. Defenders of group-based policies assert that it is blindness to forms of discrimination like casteism and racism that perpetuates these problems. Such advocates of reservations include the many groups, also described in this book, fighting for their own reservations, including some Muslim and Christian organizations, class or caste organizations, and feminist activists. In the context of racial discrimination, one legal scholar proposed a way out of this dilemma, arguing that an “alternative vision to color blindness is a color-consciousness that seeks to destroy itself” (Wu 1996:185). Can policies both reflect and destroy the categories associated with disadvantage? These arguments over reservation policies parallel some theoretical debates about state identifications and constructions of identities. Critics of essentialist notions of caste or race emphasize the fluidity and complexity of identities and the potential for official classifications to reinforce these identities through static


and unyielding typologies. Other scholars recognize the utility of reconstructing even negative categories of identity for purposes of political action and policyinduced change. At the root of these debates over policy and theory are assumptions about the relationship between identity and the state. People making these varied arguments hold varying assumptions about whether state categories can actually construct social divisions, whether state structures can lead to positive changes in society, and whether societies are inert or active in response to state identifications. It is vital to consider these common political and theoretical arguments for and against state classifications empirically. As Henry Lopez argues in his work on the “legal construction of whiteness,” “[t]here is no indication that in and of itself the legal construction of race is normatively good or bad.” This ultimately depends on “what role such construction plays in the attainment or frustration of social justice” (Lopez 1996:115). My research on reservations addresses these theoretical and political arguments by examining official classifications in practice and by analyzing various political responses to them. Do reservations reinforce the categories they are meant to undermine? On the basis of the first half of this book, on state simplifications, I conclude that the processes of implementing reservations can solidify boundaries, but that these practices could be improved without doing away with the policies. My research on the adjudication of identities, the People of India project, the administration of caste certificates and lists, and the national census demonstrates that government classifications for the purpose of reservations at times solidify the boundaries they are supposed to break down. Sometimes judges and bureaucrats classify liminal people who do not fit neatly into existing categories by privileging old or “original” identities, such as a convert’s original caste, a migrant’s original status, or a tribe’s original culture. The implementation and administration of caste certificates and lists involves labeling, scrutinizing and ranking disadvantaged groups. Government data on disadvantaged groups, whether ethnographic or numeric in nature, are a political tool too often used to divide groups rather than empower them. In all of these arenas of reservation policy implementation, the divisiveness associated with colonial categories persists in contemporary India. Even as reservations weaken group distinctions by opening opportunities to under-represented groups, the process of implementing reservations can indeed give new emphasis and durability to these very distinctions. However, on the basis of the subsequent chapters, focused on political complications, I conclude that, even given these rigid codifications, people are not encapsulated by their classifications but rather defy them in a wide variety of ways. My research on political challenges to reservation categories, on the basis of religion, caste, class, and gender, demonstrates that the boundaries of official categories spark debate rather than stop it. Debates over additional reservations


for religious minorities or women show that competition between identity-based movements may result in political gridlock, impeding the demands of various disadvantaged groups. Yet demands by religious minorities to be included in existing categories and demands by women to have a category of their own throw into question not only the official definitions of disadvantage but also the definitions preferred by more politically powerful groups, such as the Hindu nationalists. Mobilizations on the basis of various intersecting identities help to prevent the reification of categories, so that even Hindu nationalists must juggle the intertwined loyalties of citizens who vary by caste, class, and region. The issue of including class and economic factors in the design of reservation categories suggests that, at times, it is the state that changes the categories and protest groups that resist, preferring the status quo. Based on these political complications, I conclude that even strong systems of official identification do not necessarily reinforce group identities along those lines but can, in fact, be a catalyst for challenges to these boundaries. STATE SIMPLIFICATIONS AND POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS: A THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS I apply two distinct theoretical approaches to the study of identity-based policies and politics in my study of reservations in India. One theoretical approach, introduced and applied in the chapters of Part I, highlights the problems of state simplifications of complex social systems. Such insights, particularly criticisms of colonial era reification of identities, shed light on continuities in the contemporary judicial, anthropological, and administrative practices involved in implementing reservations. As applied in the chapters of Part II, the other theoretical approach focuses on the political utility of identity politics for disadvantaged groups. Although it is often strategically useful to focus on a single identity, identities are never singular. Thus the multiple, intersecting movements organized along lines of religion, caste, class, or gender are the focus of the second part of the book on political complications. State simplifications for the purpose of policies such as reservations raise several dilemmas. Forms of group-based discrimination such as casteism or racism rely on oversimplified categories; therefore groupbased policies to counter such discrimination often result in simplifications too. Liminal individuals or groups are essential to undermine casteism or racism, yet group-based policies necessitate the classification of people who seem to be on the margins of categories or in multiple categories. Striking examples of state simplifications are judges and bureaucrats treating caste, tribe or community as a status determined by birth, with little room for official recognition of the potential malleability of such a category due to modernization, migration, marriage, adoption or religious conversion.


Bureaucrats issuing caste certificates collect information and verify identities in order to ultimately slot each challenging case into an existing category. Applications to be included on the lists of Other Backward Classes require groups to rank themselves against other groups and to supply evidence of their place in the social hierarchy. Census enumerators funnel infinitely varied responses into a finite number of standard entries. Even state employed anthropologists carefully organize their ethnographic accounts into the colonial administrative categories of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. These examples are in keeping with theories emphasizing the state’s tendency to oversimplify complex identities and the dangers of such state simplifications. Those scholars who have drawn attention to the pernicious effects of colonial state classifications can find the lingering effects of this legacy in postcolonial reservation policy implementation. Those scholars who, in contrast, study the strategic use of identity by or for disadvantaged groups would do well to consider the ironic outcomes of implementing group-based reservation policies, especially the judicial, administrative, and even “scientific” reinforcement of traditionally disadvantaged categories. Nevertheless, a group’s sense of identity is not determined by such official identification processes. The second body of theory I draw on highlights the political complications impeding such processes, in particular, the politicized identity-based groups that challenge government classifications. State simplifications do not negate the variety of identities embodied in each individual, although they can influence which identities become salient at different junctures. The editor of the feminist journal Manushi, Madhu Kishwar, writes of “identity layers,” which at various times come into focus with the strategic use of an identity: “For the most part, people take these identity layers for granted and they find expression in their appropriate realms at different points of time,” but group-based reservations can inspire people to assert the identities that could increase their access to opportunities (Kishwar 1996a:6). In the preceding chapters, various examples of political mobilizations to gain reservation benefits demonstrate that people do tend to rally around the currently recognized categories. However, in the process, many groups challenge the boundaries of the existing categories, as in religious minority movements to include new groups in the Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes. In other cases, groups assert that different categories should be used, such as demands to add gender-based reservations in national and state legislatures. Members of subordinate groups reconstruct and utilize categories formerly used to oppress them. Even caste identities that were previously reviled can be reshaped into a tool of empowerment, as the testimony of people of Dalit backgrounds illustrates. A professor of sociology, S.K. Thorat, vividly described grappling with his stigmatized caste identity as a child and eventually embracing the positive reconstruction of that identity as a “Dalit”:


An untouchable child, particularly in a village, is subjected to a stigmatized identity from the time he can begin to walk and to touch things and people… Later, as an adult, he may either accept or reject this identity, or do both partially. (Thorat 1993:67) He discussed both accepting and rejecting his stigmatized identity, then forming a new identity and eventually “outgrowing my caste’s boundaries” over the course of his life (Thorat 1993:66, Thorat interview 29 April 1996). Bishop Azariah argued that regaining a sense of their own identity is at the heart of the Dalit movement. Untouchability, an imposed label, “simply takes away the identity of these people,” and Dalits, a self-defined group, “want to get their identity as human beings and as members of the human society” (Azariah interview 10 July 1996). In addition to individuals such as Thorat and Azariah, lively and diverse movements are challenging the boundaries and meanings of identities, even in the process of using identity-based categories to fight oppression. Current movements, inspired by various forms of identity, complicate the largely caste-based categories used by the state. Christian, Muslim and Hindu groups, themselves divided along class, caste, and gender lines, propound competing visions of the most appropriate reservation categories. Many of these controversies involve differing views about the existence of castes within these three religious communities in India. In addition to disputes within and between these religious communities, some groups are arguing for economic or classbased alternatives to the current parameters, while others resist such considerations by denying the existence of any “creamy layer,” or economically advanced individuals, among the backward classes. Women demanding reserved Parliamentary seats face competing proposals from backward and Muslim groups. Even debates over the future census categories and the sudden population jump in certain Scheduled Tribes are throwing official “boxes” into question. All this churning of categories demonstrates that people are not simply adopting the state’s identifications, however stringent, as their own identities. Although none of these movements could ultimately ignore the hybrid nature of identity, these examples are more in keeping with the theories that recognize the utility of categories, even previously degraded or divided ones such as untouchables or women, for mobilizing and gaining advantages for one’s group. Even groups that challenged the boundaries of existing categories did not reject the use of such categories altogether but, rather, mobilized along different lines to offer alternatives to the state’s definitions of disadvantage. Most of the activists I interviewed felt that the potential of benefitting from reservations outweighed the problems of classification.


Those who note the dangers of official classifications of complex identities might predict an entrenchment of existing reservation categories in society; yet the complexity of identity politics, with movements along not just caste lines but a variety of axes of identity, belies that assumption. At the same time, those who emphasize the utility of simple categories for the political empowerment of the disadvantaged would not have expected the degree of mobilization over the finer, multilayered points of identity differentiation. For example, activists creatively combine religion and caste, as in the Scheduled Caste Christian movement, or gender and class, as in the demands for reserved seats for women of the Other Backward Classes. Moreover, hybrid identities splinter not only political movements of the disadvantaged but also dominant groups. Some of the greatest political challenges facing the Hindu nationalists are from groups that cut across the “Hindu” ranks. Resolving the theoretical debate between those eulogizing the complexity of identities and those asserting the utility of categories necessitates grounding these perspectives in contextual case studies. My study of reservation policies and politics allows me to assess the ways these official categories simultaneously reinforce and undermine group boundaries. POLICY IMPLICATIONS In addition to highlighting the need for a theoretical synthesis, case studies of reservation implementation and political activism demonstrate that major policy debates over reservations are not simply polarized between those who are for or against reservations. Advocates and critics alike are pressing the government to reformulate the reservation categories rather than embracing or rejecting them outright. Therefore, I offer some reflections on this third alternative, revising reservations, particularly focusing on the potential for policies that recognize disadvantaged groups but better reflect the complexity of identity. Beyond reservations, this balance is relevant for the design of other policies that involve group recognition in diverse democracies, whether these policies are political, economic, social or cultural. Reservations or other policies dependant on social classifications could be improved by making the categories more complex and the policies more fluid, as well as by avoiding a group policy versus universal policy dichotomy. Reservations or other forms of affirmative action are largely an attempt to counter the oversimplifications associated with forms of discrimination such as casteism or racism. Therefore, to a certain degree, these policies are bound to involve oversimplified categories. Over time, “caste became rigid and water tight, and it was no more based on ability and functional basis, but on birth. So anybody who had the birth seal, he would be a Brahmin and [was] supposed to be in a superior class, although he may be a bloody ruffian” (Prasad interview 18


September 1996). Justice Prasad’s description of the facile assumptions of casteism has parallels in the following description of racism in the United States: Race discrimination in this country historically has not allowed for racial complexity. Government race classifications have been crude because, by necessity, they reflect the problem they address. Government’s challenge now is to keep fighting discrimination while recognizing some complexity in racial identity. (New York Times, “Multiracial Americans” 8 November 1997:A14) How might governments face this challenge and recognize the complexity of identities? In India, various economic and social criteria feed into the Other Backward Classes category. However, low caste or other similarly disadvantaged communities, the original targets of these policies, are taken as the starting point. This is important because complexity is being recognized without trammeling those originally intended to benefit from reservations. Adopting “creamy layer” rules allowed the government of India to recognize caste or community as an organizing principle of the policy, while excluding individuals who have arguably already managed to overcome caste hurdles. Notably these rules only apply to Other Backward Classes, not to the more disadvantaged Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Given continuing difficulties filling reserved quotas for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, especially in upper level jobs and prestigious academic programs, such restrictions are appropriate only for categories in which it is possible to find “non-creamy” yet qualified applicants for positions at all levels (Chanana 1993, Dushkin 1979, Planning Commission 1997–2002: Table 3. 9.6). Creamy layer rules enable more fluid classifications, reflecting changes in status from generation to generation. Maintaining caste as a unit of analysis, to which other considerations of disadvantage are added or from which a creamy layer is subtracted, retains the still salient categories targeted by the policies but adds other dimensions to better reflect change at both individual and societal levels. With this added complexity, however, comes additional administrative hurdles, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 8. Tracing individual progress is not only a means of fine tuning the categories of beneficiaries but also a way to foster success among those who do benefit. Once reserved positions are filled, particularly in higher education, those in the reserved categories can benefit from a more individualized approach to their continued progress. Veena Das, an anthropologist at Delhi University, argues, “[a]n affirmative action program means that there should be flexibility.” The outcome of rather blunt categories is a pool of beneficiaries who may vary widely in terms of their affluence and education: “Right now Delhi University has quotas for SCs and STs. But there is no homogeneity in the various groups


for whom quotas have been set.” Thus, “[e]very group or student has to be treated differently.” This flexibility could encompass the schedule of the degree program, additional training or preparation, mentoring or fellowships (Das quoted in “Class and Reservations,” Telegraph-Calcutta 25 June 1995). As discussed in Chapter 4, employers are to regularly check on people hired in government jobs in order to make sure their communities are still on the official lists, and a government regulation demands that employees report any religious conversion that might make them ineligible for their reserved position. Yet little is done to track the successes or problems of people in their jobs or universities. Treating people as a category must end when they are enrolled or employed, or they too often fall by the wayside. Additional categories may also better respond to liminal cases. Chapters 2 and 4 illustrate the problem of penalizing those in intercaste marriages in the sense that the lower caste person may lose reservation eligibility. Such marriages, discussed in the context of adjudicating and administering identities, are one of the most positive steps toward breaking down the barriers of caste. Reservations for people who marry outside of their caste, one proposal of a 1961 End Caste Conference, continue to hold promise in the eyes of administrators and politicians (Kumar 1992:298, n.20). To avoid penalizing marriages in which a low caste women would take on the official status of her higher caste husband, the Ministry of Welfare has stated that “Inter-caste marriage should be encouraged. To encourage non-SC male youth marrying unemployed SC girls, incentive of jobs outside the reserved quota may be considered” (Ministry of Welfare 1990:75). Government Minister Ram Vilas Paswan advocated a reservation category for those who have intercaste marriages: In India you can change religion, you can change the party, you can become rich, rich can become poor, but you can’t change your caste. So caste is just like a rock. So the only process where the caste system can be weakened is intercaste marriage… If the reservation is made on that ground, intercaste marriage, then slowly, slowly caste system will be abolished. And if there is no caste then there will be no reservation on the basis of caste. (Ram Vilas Paswan interview 20 December 1996) In this way additional categories cannot only expedite change but may eventually make the old categories obsolete. In addition to recognizing rather than penalizing those who transgress boundaries, another way to incorporate social change in public policies is to reconsider them at regularly scheduled times. The alternative, reconsidering the policies when they are under attack, is less likely to result in incremental changes, as advocates and critics entrench themselves in their positions. Syed Shahabuddin, an activist for reservations for Muslims, proposed a survey every


ten years by a competent authority to determine who should benefit from reservations. This would be a methodological challenge, although a survey is not as daunting as the proposals to collect comprehensive data on all castes in the decennial census, discussed in Chapter 5. A survey might provide data to help adjust, increase, decrease, and eventually phase out reservations (Syed Shahabuddin interview 11 September 1996). In the case of reservations for the Other Backward Classes, a ten-year review of the OBC lists is supposed to be carried out by 2003 to “take out those communities which may have ceased to be backward” (D.L.Sheth interview 6 September 1996). Legislative reservations are also to be reviewed for possible extension every ten years. Such regular reviews can facilitate more fluid policy categories, as long as they are used as an opportunity to comprehensively assess and fine tune the policies rather than simply extend them (Bhatnagar 2001). Review becomes all the more necessary when socio-economic changes affect not only the definition of the targeted groups but also the relevance of the reserved opportunities, now confined to the public sector. With economic liberalization, the administrative service is no longer as dominant a gateway to power and status in India (Heeks 1996). As elites take key positions in the increasingly important private sector, various groups and activists, including several I interviewed, have proposed private sector reservations (Mehta 1997, Times of India, “Liberalization deprives SC/STs of Rights” 9 December 2001). Private professional colleges, especially medical colleges, also can reinforce traditional class and caste advantages (Dushkin 1979:663). This question regarding types of reserved opportunities is beyond the scope of this study of categorizing beneficiaries; yet changes associated with liberalization are likely to throw both the definition of the reservations and the definition of the beneficiaries into question. This changing context reinforces the importance of regularly reconsidering reservations, rather than over-hauling such policies only when they are under fire. Polarized debates can degenerate into endless arguments pitting the merits of group-based policies against the merits of universal policies. These types of policies are not an either/or proposition: Let everybody have the same educations, the same house, the clothing, same food. There is no need of any reservation then. Nobody wants to lock the society into compartments. Let the existing compartments break, these compartments of thousands of years... But the existing reality has to be reorganized. (Prime Minister V.P.Singh, speech to Rajya Sabha, 27 August 1990) Former Prime Minister V.P.Singh, a staunch supporter of reservations in India who was responsible for extending national-level reservations to the Other


Backward Classes, also emphasized the key role of universal policies, going so far as to say “I think a universal policy is the better way because then these distinctions or classes don’t apply” (V.P.Singh interview 20 November 1996). This is not a contradiction. Wider social and economic programs complement reservations by reaching the many disadvantaged citizens that reservations inevitably miss. Policy-makers may be tempted to use reservations as a cheaper, symbolic “fix” for wider social disparities. It is unfair to criticize reservations for not helping each member of disadvantaged groups to gain a good education and job, since reservations cannot solve the problems of inequality and mass poverty on their own. Likewise, it is also a mistake to use the existence of reservations as an excuse to avoid more fundamental, universal policies. In the words of sociologist M.N.Srinivas, “It is unfortunate that reservation is widely regarded as a panacea for ills such as poverty, and lack of access to education, government employment and political power. Reservation has its uses but only up to a point” (Srinivas 1997:4). In Chapter 9, discussion of continuing discrimination against low castes, particularly women, included feminist activist Brinda Karat’s argument that “reservation on its own cannot be an instrument to remove this” (Karat interview 10 December 1996, emphasis added). India, like many other countries, would avoid some of the extreme disparities in life chances that such affirmative action programs can only partly alleviate by providing and enforcing attendance in consistently good primary and secondary educational facilities (V.P.Singh interview 20 November 1996). The sooner such universal policies are effectively implemented, the sooner group-based policies may become unnecessary. Yet “universal” policies to date have had a far from uniform impact on the life chances of citizens. Despite a constitutional commitment to universal primary education, about one half of the population as a whole remains illiterate and almost two-thirds of Dalits remain illiterate (Human Rights Watch 2001). According to reports between 1996 and 1998 by the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Dalit children have a drop-out rate of close to 50 per cent at the primary level, a rate that climbs to 78 per cent for secondary school (Human Rights Watch 2001). Since universal policies seem unlikely to dramatically reshape Indian society any time soon, it is important to recognize the continuing role of group-based policies and to see that these two policy approaches work best in tandem. Although the previous chapters inspired these policy suggestions for more flexible categories, these chapters also highlight some of the political challenges of changing reservation policies as well as the administrative and legal challenges of implementing more malleable categories. Other group-based policies in India and elsewhere have proven to be difficult to change (Jenkins 1998). “Once policy makers have redefined the disadvantaged to encompass the majority, the decision becomes virtually irreversible” (Weiner and Katzenstein


1981). Political momentum behind current definitions of disadvantage may make changes to the policies very difficult but not impossible. This is demonstrated in Chapter 8 by the extension of Other Backward Class reservations and the restrictions on the “creamy layer” in the face of political opposition to such changes to the status quo. Another political challenge to policy adjustment is that one proposed change sparks a plethora of other proposals, as seen in Chapters 6, 7 and 9, in which various movements prioritized categories based on religion, caste, or gender. In spite of the difficulty of implementing changes, both the Indian state and Indian society, at least at times, recognize the complexity of socio-economic disadvantage in India and the need for more flexible policies. In other words, both government officials and political activists argue that policies should reflect social complexity and change. For example, one rather striking government memorandum goes so far as to describe India as a “multiple undulating society” (Ministry of Personnel Office Memorandum No. 36012/31/90-Estt (SCT)). Likewise, a Dalit political organization argues that “Programs for the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes shall not be made like Procrustean beds” (National Action Forum for Social Justice 1996:11, emphasis in the original). Procrustes, according to Greek mythology, was a giant who stretched or squashed his prisoners in order to fit them into standardized beds. Governments sometimes stretch or squash people to fit them into official categories, but people do continue to defy categorization. CONCLUSION Contemporary state practices of identification shape identity politics, yet contemporary protest groups also demonstrate agency by challenging static classifications. The official categorizations of identities used for reservation policies not only are embedded in policies, but also are adjudicated by the courts, given scientific clout by official anthropologists, listed and certified by administrators, and tracked by the national census. Although judges, anthropologists and administrators face the ambiguity and liminality of identities in practice, the judicial, scientific and administrative processes associated with implementing these categories reinforce neat and static definitions of disadvantage. Official categories imposed by the state shape identities but do not determine them. Various protest groups in India are challenging the classifications of citizens used to implement reservations. When abstract state classifications and complex social identities clash, the resulting melange of competing demands helps to prevent the reification of such classifications. Official categories do create boundaries, yet disagreements over reservations in contemporary India are often arguments about the boundaries themselves rather than disputes between


groups neatly divided by those boundaries. Since reservation policies are ultimately supposed to make themselves obsolete, tensions and uncertainty over the most appropriate categories to use can be a sign of progress rather than trouble. Even ambiguous claims to belong in the ranks of the officially disadvantaged challenge the rigid stratification and hierarchies these policies were meant to undermine. State simplifications and political complications together construct identities, as when individuals and groups in India claim to be backward in order to move forward.

Appendices

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APPENDIX I: GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS (a) Application form for Scheduled Caste certificate

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184 APPENDICES

(b) Form of certificate to be produced by a candidate belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in support of his claim (Department of Personnel 1993:396)

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(c) Application for a certificate of eligibility for reservation of jobs for Other Backward Classes in civil posts and services under Government of Delhi

186 APPENDICES

APPENDICES 187

188 APPENDICES

APPENDICES 189

190 APPENDICES

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(d) Form of certificate to be produced by Other Backward Classes applying for appointment to posts under the Government of India (Department of Personnel 1993:487)

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(e) Questionnaire for consideration of requests for inclusion and complaints of under-inclusion in the central list of Other Backward Classes QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I General Descriptive Da ta o f the State 1. Name of the State 2. Population of the State 3. Population of the State as percentage of All India Population 4. Population of OBC in the State 5. Percentage of OBC population to the total State population 6. Percentage of the State OBC population to the All India OBC population 7. Scheduled Caste population in the State 8. Percentage of Scheduled Caste population to the total State population 9. Percentage of Scheduled Caste population to the All India Scheduled Caste population 10. Scheduled Tribe population in the State 11. Percentage of Scheduled Tribe population to the total State population 12. Percentage of Scheduled Tribe population to the All India Scheduled Tribe population 13. Total population of Backward Classes (SCs+STs+OBC) in the State 14. Percentage of Backward Classes population to the total State population 15. Percentage of total Backward Classes population of the State to the All India Backward Classes population 16. (a) When was reservation for OBC in the services of the State started? (b) What was the percentage of such reservation for OBC then? (c) Furnish changes if any, in respect

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of reservation for OBC and its percentage , made from time to time (d) What is the present percentage of reservation for OBC? (e) Furnish statistical data of the quota of reservation for OBC and its fulfilment year-wise for the last ten years indicating shortfalls, if any (f) Reasons for shortfalls and remedial measures taken 17. Has the State government set up any machinery/cell for monitoring the implementation of the reservation scheme for the OBC in the State? If so, furnish particulars 18. What steps has the State government taken and proposes to take for helping and enabling the OBC to successfully compete and secure appointments in the Central Services (services under Govt. of India, Public Sector Undertakings, Financial Institutions etc.) 19. Literacy rate of the state:

20. Number of entries of castes/sub-castes etc. included in: (a) State list:

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(b) Mandal list: (c) Common list: 21. Particulars of Commissions/Committees appointed in the State up-to-date (a) Name of the Commission/Committee (b) Chairperson (c) Number of Members including Chairperson (d) Date of appointment (e) Date of Report (f) Whether the Report has been accepted by the Government or not (g) Any other important information 22. Particulars of Commission/Committee appointed pursuant to the Mandal Judgment of the Supreme Court (a) Whether statutory or not (b) Names of the Chairperson and other Members (c) Whether any report has been presented by such Commission/Committee and if so, what action has been taken on the same by the Government 23. (a) Total number of posts in services under the State Government Year of Reference i) Group A/Class I: ii) Group B/Class H: iii) Group C/Class III: iv) Group D/Class IV: (b) Out of the total number of posts number of posts held by the members of all OBCs: Year of Reference i) Group A/Class I: ii) Group B/Class II: iii) Group C/Class III: iv) Group D/Class IV:

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(c) Out of the total number of posts, number of posts held by each caste/ community included in the list of OBCs of the State, separately in the following format:

(d) Out of the total number of posts, number of posts held by SCs: Year of Reference i) Group A/Class I: ii) Group B/Class II: iii) Group C/Class III: iv) Group D/Class IV: (e) Out of the total number of posts, number of posts held by STs: Year of Reference i) Group A/Class I: ii) Group B/Class II: iii) Group C/Class III: iv) Group D/Class IV: (f) Number of posts held by the single OBC caste/community accounting for the largest number/percentage of the posts held by all OBC castes/ communities Year of Reference i) Group A/Class I: ii) Group B/Class II: iii) Group C/Class III:

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iv) Group D/Class IV: (g) Number of castes/communities among the OBC not holding any post: (specify names of such castes/ communities)

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PART II General Data of the Caste/Community Under Consideration 1. Name of the caste/sub-caste/community/social group/synonym in respect of which the request for inclusion or complaint of under-inclusion has been made 2. Name and address of the individual/organisation/representative making the request or the complaint 3. Is it the main caste/community? If not, give the name of main caste/community 4. Give the names of other sub-castes/sub-communities, synonyms etc. 5. Is the caste/community/sub-caste/known by any other name? 6. Population in the State of the caste/sub-caste/community/ sub-community/ synonym etc. etc. in respect of which the request or complaint has been made 7. a) Percentage of the population of the caste/sub-caste under consideration to the total OBC population of the State b) If the caste/community under consideration is a sub-caste/ subcommunity, then give the percentage of this sub-group to the total population of the main caste/community in the State 8. Percentage of the population of the caste/sub-caste etc. to the total State population 9. Whether the caste/community/sub-caste/social group is spread all over the State or largely concentrated in some districts of the State? In case of the latter position, give the names of the districts where there is large concentration 10. Give district-wise population figures of the caste/sub-caste etc. under consideration. Also furnish the total population of each such district 11. Whether the caste/sub-caste etc is included in: (a) the State List (if included, give its serial number in the State list, with date of its inclusion) (b) the Mandal List for the State (if included, indicate the serial number in the Mandal list) 12. Is the caste/sub-caste etc. listed as a backward class in any other State(s). If yes, give the name(s) of the State(s) and the serial number(s) in the State list(s) 13. Specify the religion/faith/sect if any which members of the caste/community sub-caste etc. (on whose behalf request/complaint has been made) follow 14. Date of request/complaint

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Data Relating to Social and Other Factors A. Social 1. Whether the caste/community under consideration is generally regarded as socially backward or socially not backward 2. (a) What is the occupation on which the members of the caste/ community mainly depend for livelihood? Specify the occupation (b) Indicate whether the occupation is agricultural or non-agricultural (c) If agricultural, what proportion(approximately) of the members of the caste/community are land-holders with holdings of more than 50% of the statutory ceiling limit for agricultural lands in the State (d) (i) If agricultural: Do the activities of their occupation mainly involve manual labour or do not mainly involve manual labour (ii) If agricultural activities involve manual labour, whether it is manual labour rendered for wage or manual labour on own land (e) (i) If not agricultural: state which occupation are the members engaged in (ii) Do the activities of the above mentioned occupation mainly involve manual labour or does not mainly involve manual labour (iii) If the above-mentioned occupation involves manual labour, whether it is manual labour rendered for wage or manual labour rendered on own works (iv) has the caste or community got or acquired significant resource base in the form of a) Infrastructure such as land, buildings, workshops, quarries, etc. b) Machines and equipment necessary for carrying out the occupation. Are the machines and equipment traditional or are they modern? 3. Whether there are any occupations other than the main occupation referred to at 2(a), on which substantial numbers of members of the caste/ community depend for livelihood. If so, specify such occupations 4. a) Whether or not the women of the caste/community, as a general practice, are, for their own or for their family’s livelihood, engaged in agricultural labour for wage

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b) Whether or not the women of the caste/community, as a general practice, are, for their own or for their family’s livelihood engaged in any other manual, (i.e., non-agricultural) labour for wage If so, specify the type/nature of manual labour: 5. a) Whether or not children of the caste/community, as a general practice, are, for their family’s livelihood or for supplementing their family’s income, engaged in agricultural labour b) Whether or not the children of the caste/community, as a general practice, are, for their family’s livelihood or for supplementing their family’s low income, engaged in any other manual, i.e., non-agricultural, labour If so, specify the type/nature of the manual labour 6. What percentage of the population of the caste/community etc. (male, female, children taken together) are landless manual (both agricultural and non-agricultural) labourers? Explanation: The term “landless” includes those who have not more than 1 hectare of unirrigated land and have no irrigated land at all 7. Whether the caste/community is, in terms of the caste system, identified/ linked with any traditional craft If so, (a) Specify which traditional craft are they identified/linked with? (b) The percentage(approximately) of the population of the adult members (males and females taken together) of the caste/community, actually engaged in that craft. (c) Of the adult members of the caste/community who are actually not engaged in that craft, what proportion (approximately) are engaged in: i) agricultural labour for wage ii) other manual labour for wage (specify which) iii) cultivation of own land iv) other occupations [like services (clerical/supervisory/ managerial/ academic) in Government, Public Sector, Universities, Colleges & Schools, organised private sector, trade/commerce/contracts/ entrepreneurial manufacture, professions (lawyer, doctor, consultancy etc.)] Specify the occupation(s): 8. (a) Whether the caste/community is, in terms of the caste system, identified/linked with any other traditional or hereditary occupation, (i.e., other than traditional crafts). If so, specify which occupation(s)

200 APPENDICES

(b) Whether such traditional or hereditary occupation is, in terms of the caste system, regarded to be lowly, undignified, unclean or stigmatised? (c) The proportion (approximately) of the adult members (males and females taken together) of the caste/community actually engaged in that occupation (d) Of the adult members of the caste/community who are actually not engaged in that occupation, what proportion (approximately) are engaged in:i) agricultural labour for wage ii) other manual labour for wage (specify which kind of manual labour) iii) cultivation of own land iv) other occupations [like services (clerical/supervisory/managerial/ academic) in Government, Public Sector, Universities, Colleges & Schools, organised private sector/ trade/commerce/contracts/ entrepreneurial manufacture, professions (lawyer, doctor, consultancy etc:)] Specify the occupation(s) 9. a) Is the caste/community categorised as:i) Nomadic caste/community/tribe? If so, name the Commission(s)/Committee(s)/Report(s) which has so categorised it ii) Semi-nomadic/caste/community/tribe? If so, name the Commission(s)/Committee(s)/Report(s) which has 50 categorised it b) If the answer to (i) or (ii) is yes, What is the present occupation(s) of the members of the caste/community? 10. a) Is the caste/community categorised as De-notified or Vimukta Jati caste/ community/tribe [in terms of Criminal Tribes (Repeal) Act, 1952, Act No. XXIV of 1952] b) If the answer is yes, what is the present occupation(s) of the members of the caste/community? 11. Was the caste/community subject to bonded labour? If so, since when? Is it still being so subjected? 12. a) Number of MLAs belonging to the caste/community on the date of application and their proportion to the total strength of the Legislative Assembly

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b) Furnish separately the number of MLAs belonging to the caste/ community during the twenty-five years preceding the date of application 13. a) State the number of members of the caste/community elected to the elective bodies at the district level, i.e., panchayati raj institutions—Zilla Parishad, Zilla Panchayat, District Council etc. Give the figures for the ten years preceding the date of application b) Give the total number of elected members in the State in such district level elective bodies during the above period

202 APPENDICES

B. Educational 1. a) (i) Number of literates of the caste/community in the State (ii) Literacy rate of the caste/community in the State Specify year of reference b) (i) Total number of literates in the State (ii) Total Literacy rate of the State Specify the year of reference Where the caste/community is not spread over in the entire State but is largely concentrated in one or a few districts, also furnish the following information. c) (i) Number of literates of the caste/community in the district (ii) Literacy rate of the caste/community in the district Specify the year of reference d) (i) Total number of literates in the district (ii) Total literacy rate of the district Specify the year of reference 2. Out of the total number of literates of the caste/community in the State, please furnish the total number of female literates of the caste/community Specify the year of reference 3. a) Number of Matriculates (or equivalent High School Examination) among the members of the caste/community in the State Specify the year of reference b) Proportion of matriculates of the caste/community to the total population of the caste/community in the State c) Total matriculates in the State: Specify the year of reference d) Proportion of total matriculates in the State to the population of the State Where the caste/community is not spread over in the entire State but is largely concentrated in one or a few districts, also furnish the following information e) No. of matriculates among the members of the caste/community in each of the concerned districts

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Specify the year of reference: f) Proportion of matriculates of the caste/community in the district to the total population of the caste/community in the district: g) Total number of matriculates in the district Specify the year of reference: h) Proportion of total matriculates in the district to the total population in the district 4. Out of the total .number of matriculates of the caste/community in the State, please furnish the total number of female matriculates among the members of the caste and community in the State. Specify the year of reference 5. a) Total number of all graduates (in arts, commerce, law, management, science, applied, technological, technical, professional etc. fields) among the members of the caste/community in the State Specify the year of reference b) Proportion of total number of graduate of the caste/community to the total population of the caste/community in the State c) Total number of graduates in the State Specify the year of reference d) Proportion of total number of graduates in the State to the total population of the State Where the caste/community b not spread over the entire State but is largely concentrated in one or a few districts, furnish also the following information e) Number of graduates among the members of the caste/community in the district Specify the year of reference f) Proportion of graduates of the caste/community in the district to the total population of the caste/community in the district g) Total number of graduates in the district Specify the year of reference h) Proportion of total number of graduates in the district to the total population in the district 6. Out of the total number of graduates of the caste/community in the State, specify how many among them are female graduates (arts, science, all other graduates taken together) Specify the year of reference

204 APPENDICES

C. Economic 1. What percentage (approximately) of the families of the caste/community in the State live in the type of houses indicated below: Kachha houses (including huts and sheds) Pucca Houses (including Chawls) Where the caste/community is not spread over the entire State but is largely concentrated in one or a few districts, then the above information may also be separately furnished districtwise in respect of the districts where the population is concentrated 2. a) Total number of cases of surrender of agricultural land in the State under the Land Ceiling Act of the State b) Out of this, the number of cases pertaining to the caste/ community c) The total area (in hectares or acres) involved in the cases at (a) d) Out of this, the area pertaining to the members of the caste/ community Where the caste/community is not spread over the entire State but is largely concentrated in one or a few districts, the following information may be further furnished:e) Number of cases of surrender of agricultural land in each district under the Land Ceiling Act of the State f) Out of this, the no. of cases pertaining to the caste/community g) The total area (in hectares or acres) involved in the cases at (e) h) Out of this the area pertaining to the members of the caste/community 3. Number of posts in the services of the State Government held by the members of the caste/community under consideration

4. Besides State Government Services, state how many persons of the caste/ community under consideration are engaged in the following areas of employment and professions

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a) State level Public Undertakings, autonomous/semi-autonomous establishments b) (i) Teachers in colleges and universities (ii) Administrative Personnel in Colleges and Universities c) Doctors d) Lawyers e) Engineers and Architects f) Chartered Accountants g) Income Tax, financial and managemet consultants h) Media professionals i) Defence services (Major in the Army and above, equivalent ranks of Navy and Airforce) j) Any other important fields of employment or profession (Specify the fields) 5. State what percentage of the members of the caste/community is incometax assessees on account of trade/business

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D. Representation in the Services of Central Government 1. Total number of posts under the Central Government:

2. (a) Number of posts held by all OBC in the present Central List (Common List)

(b) Number of posts held by each caste/community in the Central List (Common List) separately (Serial Number as given in the Central List may be indicated)

3. Explanation: As and when any caste/community is added to the list, the data against Q. 2(a) and 2(b) may be updated Number of posts held by SCs:

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4. Number of posts held by STs:

5. Number of posts held by the caste/community under consideration:

208 APPENDICES

E. Miscellaneous 1. (a) What are the main reasons on account of which the caste/ community consider itself to be backward (b) What are the main reasons on account of which the caste/ community is considered backward or not backward by the State Govt. (c) Has there been any improvement in the condition of the caste/ community during the last twenty years? If so, in what respects? (d) Has there been any deterioration in the condition of the caste/ community during the last twenty years? If so, in what respects? Note: Support your reasoning with authentic evidence as far as possible 2. (a) Furnish the names of two castes/communities (whether from among the backward or forward castes/communities) at a level immediately higher than the caste/community under consideration Give reasons (b) Furnish the names of two designated backward castes/communities in the State, along with serial number in the State List, which are more or less at the same level as the caste/community under consideration. Give reasons. 3. Any other points besides those covered by the questionnaire above which need to be mentioned in respect of the request or complaint

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209

APPENDIX II: INTERVIEWEES Ahmad, Imtiaz. Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, editor of Caste and Social Stratification among the Muslims in India (Delhi: Manohar, 1978) and author of numerous other works on this topic, 14 September 1996, Delhi. Ahmad, M.S. Ministry of Welfare administrator focusing on OBC and Minority issues, 17 December 1996, Delhi. Alva, Margaret. Congress M.P., formerly a Cabinet Minister under Indira Gandhi, 19 December 1996, Delhi. Azariah, M. Bishop. Co-ordinator, All India United Christians Movement for Equal Rights and National coordination Committee for SC Christians, 10 July 1996, Madras. Beteille, Andre. Sociologist, Delhi School of Economics, 9 September 1996, Delhi. Bhansoor, Krishna Devi. Assistant Director, Research Wing, National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 3 September 1996, Lok Nayak Bhavan, Delhi. Bidwai, Praful. Journalist and Fellow at the Nehru Memorial Library, 3 December 1996, Delhi. Bose, Ashish. Demographer and author of numerous works on the Indian census including Population of India (Delhi: B.R.Publishing Corporation, 1991), 17 July 1996 and 4 November 1996, follow up conversation 17 September 2001, Delhi. Burman, B.K. Roy. Anthropologist, Research Officer for first Backward Classes Commission (Kalelkar Commission), Former Head of the Social Studies Division of the Census, former Head of Cultural Research Institute, Tribal Welfare Department, Government of West Bengal and involved in exploratory GOI study of alternatives to caste-based identification of OBCs, Author of Beyond Mandal and After: Backward Classes in Perspective (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1992), 31 October 1996, follow up conversation 15 September 2001, Delhi. Chakravorty, C. Deputy director of the Census, Man Singh Road Office, previously assigned to Social Studies Division of Census, Seva Bhavan, responsible for responding to Ministry of Welfare queries for data to aid in administration of SC lists, 16 December 1996, Delhi. Chatterjee, Jotsna. Women’s movement leader and YWCA activist, 22 November 1996, follow up conversation 15 September 2001, Delhi. Chatterjee, Saral K. President, All India Christian People’s Forum, 22 November 1996. Choudhary, A.K. Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Welfare, 17 December 1996, Delhi. Daniel, Jose. President, All India United Christians Movement for Equal Rights and the National Coordination Committee for SC Christians, 30 January 1996, Delhi. Das, Bhagwan. Dalit Buddhist Lawyer, 30 April 1996, Delhi.

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David, Shakuntala. Counselor, Free Church (Church of North India) Sansad Marg, 17 November 1996, Delhi. Devasahayan, V. Dalit Theology Department, Chennai, 10 July 1996. Farooqui, Vimla. National Forum for Indian Women (NFIW), 2 December 1996, Delhi. Gandhi, Rajmohan. M.K.Gandhi’s grandson and biographer, former Member of Parliament, Research Professor with the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, 21 September 1996, Delhi. Gangurde, R.P. University Grants Commission, 19 June 1996, Delhi. Hamid, Naviad. Secretary of Association for Promoting Education and Employment for Muslims, Former Secretary of Markazi Janait Ulama-e-Hind, 31 January 1996, Delhi. Hamid, Syed. President of Association for Promoting Education and Employment for Muslims, Former Vice-Chancellor Aligarh Muslim University, Former Chair of the Staff Selection Board, (largest civil service recruiting agency for junior posts), career Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer, 2 September 1996, Hamdard Educational Society Office, Delhi. Jatiya, Satyanarayan. All India President of BJP SC and ST Morcha, 12 September 1996, Delhi. Khan, I.A. Office Secretary BJP Minority Morcha, Muslim BJP member, 12 September 1996, BJP Central Office, Delhi. Kananaikal, Father Jose. Former Director of the Programme for Scheduled Castes, Indian Social Institute, Director of Bihar Dalit Vikas Samiti, PhD dissertation on SCs, 11 January 1996, Indian Social Institute, Delhi. Karat, Brinda. Women’s movement leader (AIDWA), CPM (Communist PartyMarxist) political activist, 10 December 1996, Delhi. Khan, Aziz. Ministry of Welfare, 17 December 1996, Delhi. Koppad, K.B. Social Anthropologist, Office of the Registrar General, 30 July 1996, Delhi. Khusro, Ali Mohammad. Former Vice Chancellor Aligarh Muslim University, spoke at Hyderabad Third Conference of the Association for Promoting Education and Employment for Muslims in Hyderabad, 25 September 1996, Delhi. Kumar, Neeraj. Participant in Anti-Mandal Commission Forum during 1990 student demonstrations, 22 November 1996, Delhi. Lourduswamy, Father S. Vice President/Organizing Secretary of the All India United Christians Movement for Equal Rights and National Coordination Committee for SC Christians, Executive Secretary for SC/STs of the Catholic Bishop’s Conference (CBC), 19 December 1995, Delhi. Mahanty, Neeti. Director Jigyansu Tribal Research Center, 27 March 1996, Delhi.

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Mahesh, K. SDO (Sub-Divisional Officer) Executive Magistrate, in charge of issuing caste certificates in part of Delhi, 29 November 1996 and 3 December 1996, Patalia House, Delhi. Massey, James. Author of numerous works on Dalit Christians, and co-editor of Dalit Solidarity, Delhi: ISPCK, 1995, 15 October 1996, Delhi. Mathur, M.L. Research Division of the National Commission for Backward Classes, 18 July 1996, National Commission for Backward Classes, Delhi. Nimesh, R.D. Vice President of All India Federation of Scheduled Castes/ Tribes, Backwards and Minorities Employees Welfare Associations, 26 March 1996, Delhi. Paswan, Ram Vilas. Railway Minister, M.P. and Secretary General of Janata Dal (Party), Head of Dalit Sena, 20 December 1996, Railway Bhavan, Delhi. Prasad, Justice R.N. Former Head of National Commission for Backward Classes, Head of “Creamy Layer” Committee, 18 September 1996, Delhi. Raj, Ebenezer Sundar. 11 July 1996, Madras. Rao, R. Sanghettha. National President of All India Federation of Scheduled Castes/Tribes, Backwards and Minorities Welfare Associations, 26 March 1996, Delhi. Rizvi, Ajaz. All India President of BJP Minority Morcha, 12 September 1996, BJP Central Offices, Delhi. Sajwan, Leela. Delhi State President of the Gandhi Caste Society, 1 August 1996, Delhi. Salmani, Islam Qamar. Secretary General of the All India Muslim OBC Organization, 5 December 1996, Delhi. Santram, Bishop Pritram. Bishop of Church of North India, 10 December 1996, Delhi. Shah, A.M. Professor of Sociology at the Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University. Shahabuddin, Syed. M.P., Janata Dal Party. One of the Founders of the Association for Promoting Education and Employment for Muslims and the Convention on Reservations for Muslims in Delhi in 1994. Editor of Muslim India, 11 September 1996, Delhi. Sharif, Salim. Pastor at Free Church (Church of North India), Sansad Marg, 17 November 1996, Delhi. Sheth, D.L. Professor of Sociology at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies and Member of National Backward Classes Commission, 6 September 1996, follow up conversation 17 September 2001, Delhi. Singh, A.K. Author of the introduction to concepts in the 1991 Census of India. Office of the Registrar General. Numerous conversations in 1996, follow up conversation 13 September 2001, Delhi. Singh, Hare Ram. Headed the Anti-Mandal Commission Forum action committee during 1990 student demonstrations, 22 November 1996, Delhi.

212 APPENDICES

Singh, K.S. Head of POI Project, Former Director of Anthropological Survey of India, 11 April 1996, Delhi. Singh, O.P. Headed the Anti-Mandal Commission Forum legal committee during the 1990 student demonstrations, 22 November 1996, Delhi. Singh, Salig. Office Superintendent, National Federation of Scheduled Castes/ Tribes, Backwards and Minorities Welfare Association, 26 March 1996, Delhi. Singh, V.P. Former Prime Minister of India, 20 November 1996, Delhi. Singh, Hoshian. Research Division of the National Commission for Backward Classes, 18 July 1996, National Commission for Backward Classes, Delhi. Srinivas, M.N. Sociologist, 8 November, St. Louis. Sonavane, Vilas. On Advisory Board of the All India Muslim OBC Organization, Maharashtrian non-party political activist, 2 December 1996, Delhi. Thorat, S.K. Professor of Sociology at Jawaharlal Nehru University, 29 April 1996, Delhi. Vijayanunni, M. Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, 16 December 1996, Delhi.

Notes

1 Identity and identification 1 “Backward” is not my term but rather official jargon associated with reservations. The term is also used by many political activists. The term will appear in the rest of the book without the repeated use of quotation marks, which does not imply that I agree with the negative connotation it suggests. When writing about official categories and the protest groups contesting them, I use either the official language in question or the terms groups choose for themselves. 2 Defining institutions for the purposes of this study as “formal arrangements for aggregating individuals and regulating their behavior through the use of explicit rules and decision processes,” I focus on the bureaucratic and legal institutions most directly involved in implementing reservations (Levi 1990: 404–5). The “new institutionalists” in political science, economics and sociology assert that institutions “constrain and refract politics” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:3), and a few institutionalist scholars have noted the influence of contemporary state institutions on the politics of identity (Gunther and Mughan 1993). 3 Tajfel offers classic social psychological work on the effects of external categorization on individual identities (Tajfel 1981). Such research would be another approach to these issues of categories and groups. When relevant and available, secondary sources which include quantitative data will be cited or summarized. 4 Reservations have been a valuable avenue of social mobility for some members of oppressed groups. Although the procedures involved in implementation are at times problematic due to the need to categorize people, these problems should not overshadow the net positive impact of these policies for the categorized groups. Quantitative data, some of which will be discussed later in this and future chapters, demonstrate the progress facilitated by reservations, notably the increasing number of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes employed in government jobs and their guaranteed representation in legislatures (Planning Commission 1997–2002). 5 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf offers an overview of some “constructivist” approaches in philosophy and social theory and applies them to international relations theory (1989) (see especially pp. 35–65). An excellent collection of works applying constructivism in comparative politics is Daniel Green’s edited volume (2002).

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6 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

Benedict Anderson’s influential work on “imagined communities” introduced the idea of the historical construction of nationalism to a wide audience (1991). Another classic, Edward Said’s Orientalism, examines constructions of the “Orient” by the “West” (1978). Of the literature on race and caste, two notable examples of constructivist approaches are Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s work on “racial formation” (1986) and Ronald Inden’s discussions of colonial codifications of caste in Imagining India (1990). These are just a few representative examples from this varied literature on constructivism and identity. Scott, also known for his work on resistance, is an inspiration for my focus on the agency of liminal groups as well (Scott 1990). Much of the literature on the instrumental uses of ethnic and other identities contrasts this approach with a “newer” constructivist approach; however, many of the classic examples of instrumentalism, such as “ethnic entrepreneurs” mobilizing movements by selectively constructing a sense of shared traditions, could also be seen as a strain of the constructivist approach (Young 1993:21–5, Tilley 1997). An instrumental constructivist approach highlights how identity constructions are often strategic, used to gain a competitive edge or advantage. Many such analyses are attempts to explain ethnic violence and thus focus on the negative effects of manipulating identities for political or economic gain (Horowitz 1985, Basu et al. 1993). The subset of the literature I will consider here underscores instead the potentially positive impact of oppressed groups using- and, in the process, reconstructing—certain identities. This poem, received at a Dalit Women Writer’s Conference held in New Delhi in 1996, was written by Sushila Takbhaure and translated from Hindi by Laura Dudley Jenkins and S.Thapar (personal copy). In the United States the continuing use of race-based affirmative action has been called a form of “liberal racism” that “does not expose racism; it recapitulates and, sometimes, reinvents it” (Sleeper 1997). Another critic wonders “whether it is possible to divorce any system of racial classification from the practice of racial discrimination” (Cose 1997:26). I learned about the approach of the Gandhi Caste Society or Gandhi Margam by attending one of their meetings in Delhi on 1 August 1996, speaking with members, and interviewing Leela Sajwan, Delhi State President of this organization, on 17 September 1996. Race and caste are contingent and ambiguous social constructions, whereas racism and casteism are more persistent phenomena which, by definition, ignore the fluidity of the former. Although “those who resist legal remedies for the history of racism might use the nonexistence of races to argue in the United States, for example, against affirmative action, that strategy is, as a matter of logic, easily opposed…the existence of racism does not require the existence of races” (Appiah 1995:105). The English word “caste” is a variation on the Portuguese casta (meaning species or type). The related words jati and varna will be discussed later in this chapter in the section on categories, but the term caste is also still used in contemporary India, especially in official language and by English speakers. See the numerous volumes entitled Subaltern Studies published by Oxford University Press, the first volumes edited by Ranajit Guha. See also Antonio Gramsci on subalterns (1980).

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14 Declan Quigley characterizes “caste” as “an extremely unhappy translation of two quite different indigenous concepts” (Quigley 1993:4), but the term has since been adopted by many Indians and has taken on important meanings politically, as in the official lists of the Scheduled Castes. Clearly, even if it was an imported concept, we cannot reject the term “caste” today “if we are to know how Indians (especially those educated in English) see their own society” (Galanter 1984:7). The term caste, usually referring to jati, is commonly used, especially in official language. I use the official terms when writing about government categories and the terms protest groups choose when writing about activism. 15 The varied meanings of jati are one example of the messiness of these concepts: “Its meaning in most Indian languages has at least as large a number of connotations as does the term caste in colloquial English. In Kannada, for example, `jati' most simply means ‘kind.’ A man might say, for instance, that he prefers one jati of cigarettes over another jati. If an individual is asked, ‘what is your jati?’ he may respond with the name of the unit within which he confines his marriage relations, with the name of a collection of these units that are similar (caste category or caste complex in anthropological jargon), with his varna affiliation, or even with the name of his religion, as for example, ‘Christian jati’” (Harper 1968: 51). Beth Roy lucidly discusses the idea that castes are both “fixed and mobile” (Roy 1994:18). 16 The term “untouchables” was probably first used in the early 1900s by the Maharaja of Baroda (Rao 2000). Mohandas Gandhi euphemistically, strategically— and, many argue, patronizingly—dubbed them “Harijans,” or children of god, during the Independence movement. Followers of the untouchable leader who contributed greatly to the Indian Constitution, B.R.Ambedkar, preferred and popularized the use of Dalit. 17 Mitra and Singh base this conclusion on the postelection poll data of 1996. Their “deprivation index” includes both objective class differences (occupation, assets, type of house and income) as well as a subjective satisfaction variable (Mitra and Singh 1999:183, 188–9, 193–5). 18 The constitution leaves the contents of the schedules of tribes and castes up to the President, in consultation with the governors; the Parliament can by law include or exclude groups from the list (Indian Constitution, Articles 341 and 342). 19 The term Backward Classes “was used as far back as 1880 to describe a list of groups, also called illiterate or indigent classes, entitled to allowances for study in elementary schools” (Galanter 1984:154, n. 1). 20 1992 Supp (3) S.C.C. 217:1992 S.C.C. (L&S) Supp. 1: (1992) 22 A.T.C. 385. 21 Other policies targeting Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are supposed to redistribute resources such as land, housing, grants, loans and health or legal aid, or offer protection from “social disabilities” or caste-based discrimination and persecution (Galanter 1986:131). See also the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. 22 According to the 1991 census, Scheduled Castes are about 16.5 per cent of the national population, and the Scheduled Tribes are about 8.1 per cent. The 15 per cent and 7.5 per cent quota figures, based on the 1961 census, have been retained since 1970, because the 1971 census figures did not necessitate changes, the 1981 census was not carried out in Assam and the 1991 census was not carried out in Jammu and Kashmir; thus “all India” percentages of the scheduled groups could not

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be calculated. These quotas are used for people appointed to government jobs through direct recruitment on a national basis. For some lower level jobs (classified as group C and D on a scale from A through D), “normally attracting candidates from a locality or region,” the quota is calculated on the basis of the percentage of Scheduled Castes or Tribes in that state or union territory (Nabhi 2001:3–4). 23 The 50 per cent cap on reservations has not always been obeyed. The southern state of Tamil Nadu, for example, has had 69 per cent reservations. The Tamil Nadu Reservations Act is an attempt to protect these state-level reservations.

2 Adjudicating identities 1 (1994) 5 S.L.R. (S.C.) 206: (1994) 6 S.C.C. 241:1994 S.C.C. (L&S) 1349: (1994) 28 A.T.C. 259. The paranthetical page numbers in this section of the text refer to quotations from this decision in the Services Law Reporter (S.L.R.). Citation to Indian legal authority herein is based upon standard Indian legal form. For a discussion of Indian legal citation, see Galanter’s “Note on Citation and References” in Competing Equalities (Galanter 1984:xxix). 2 Srinivas defines sanskritization as “the process by which a ‘low’ Hindu caste, or tribal or other group, changes its customs, ritual, ideology, and way of life in the direction of a high…caste. Generally such changes are followed by a claim to a higher position in the caste hierarchy than that traditionally conceded to the claimant caste by the local community. The claim is usually made over a period of time, in fact, a generation or two, before the ‘arrival’ is conceded. Occasionally a caste claims a position which its neighbors are not willing to concede” (Srinivas 1966:6). 3 See also a government letter dated 19 September 2000, about whether the Kolis of Maharashtra, a Backward Class, would be declared to be Mahadeo Koli, a Scheduled Tribe [www.tn.gov.in/gorders/adtw81-t.htm] downloaded 10 March 2002. A news report addressing this ongoing demand entitled “Grand Birthday Fete of Sharana Planned” appeared in The Hindu 13 January 2002. 4 For example, a court in the state of Kerala, in a case involving several people who were alleged to be members of Other Backward Classes but were asserting a Scheduled Caste identity, held that these questions should be brought before a scrutiny committee, following the procedure outlined in the Kumari Madhuri Patil case. Kerala Pattikajathi Samrakshana Samithy v. State of Kerala, I.L.R. 1995(3) Kerala 1. 5 See Director of Tribunal Welfare, Government of A.P. v. Laveti Giri, Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal No. 4545 of 1995, decided 18 April 1995. 6 C. Sunil Krishnan v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1997 Kerala 63. 7 Gayatrilaxmi Bapurao Nagpure v. State of Maharashtra, Supreme Court of India Civil Appeal No. 4377 of 1996, decided 15 March 1996. 8 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. R.K. Ragala, A.P. High Court (1994). 9 (1996) 3 S.C.C. 545: A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1011. As in the preceding section, page numbers in this section of the text refer to quotations from the Valsamma Paul decision in the Supreme Court Cases (S.C.C.) reporter.

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10 Saroja notes the difficulty of assessing definitively the rates of intermarriages due to the lack of enforcement of marriage registration (Saroja 1999:183). 11 Citing, Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) S.C.C. 217:1992 S.C.C. (L&S) Supp 1: (1992) 22 A.T.C. 385. 12 Atul Chandra Adhikari v. State of Orissa, Orissa (1995). Interestingly, the US Supreme Court refused to disturb a similar tribal rule under which the children of a woman who married outside the tribe could not enjoy the rights of tribal membership (i.e. voting rights, the right to hold office and the right to inherit property), whereas children born to a man who married outside the tribe were considered members of the tribe entitled to such benefits. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 US 49 (1978). 13 (1996) 3 S.C.C. 100. As in the preceding sections, the parenthetical page numbers in this section refer to quotations from the Swvigaradoss decision in the Supreme Court Cases (S.C.C.) reporter. 14 Notably, Buddhism and Sikhism also have been used as escape routes from the caste system. See Chapters 6 and 7 for a discussion of the politics behind this official distinction between Christians and Muslims, who are ineligible for Scheduled Caste status, and Hindus, Sikhs and neo-Buddhists, who may qualify for this category. 15 Discussed in Soosai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 733. 16 Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University (1996) 3 S.C.C. 545, 567. 17 G.M.Arumugam v. S.Rajagopal (1976) 3 S.C.R. 82. 18 Id. at 94. 19 Id. at 94–5, citing Nathu v. Keshwaji, I.LR. 26 Bom. 174. 20 Guntur Medical College v. Mohan Rao, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1904, 1908. 21 Id. citing Dugaprasada Rao v. Sudarsanaswami, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 513. 22 Citing Ganpat v. Presiding Officer, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 420, 424.

3 Official anthropology 1 The Scheduled Caste volume of the People of India project was first published in 1993, and it is the second, revised, hardback edition of 1995 to which I refer. The photograph of the woman and her children is on the protective paper cover of this edition, a point I mention because the earlier edition features a collection of different photographs. 2 Official ethnography elsewhere in Asia likewise has had an impact on constructions of identity. See, for instance, the fascinating work on China by Dru Gladney (1996) and Melissa Brown (2001) and the volume on anthropology and colonialism edited by Bremen and Shimizu (1999). I presented an earlier version of this chapter at the 2000 Association for Asian Studies meeting in a panel on Asian anthropology, including cases from India, Japan and China, which further convinced me of the fruitfulness of future comparative research. 3 Bates is summarizing the Report of the Ethnological Committee on Papers laid before them and upon the examination of specimens of Aboriginal tribes brought to the Jubbulpore Exhibition of 1866±67 (Nagpur 1868). This sort of disrespectful display was not unusual for its era; consider the 1890 Chicago World’s Fair.

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4 Nicholas Dirks, although arguing that caste was “appropriated, and reconstructed, by the British,” holds that “[n]either British administrators nor orientalists were able to go to India and invent caste through sheer acts of will and rhetorical fancy, however useful caste was as a social mechanism to assist in the management of an immensely complex society” (Dirks 1992:61). Likewise, Prakash emphasizes “how the categories of colonial discourse were revised in the process of their historical articulation” and avoids “portraying British India as a place scorched by the power/ knowledge axis, leaving nothing of its history” (Prakash 1992:172). 5 Some valuable studies that have discussed the contemporary implications of past practices include Susan Bayly (1999), especially Chapter 7, and Sumit Guha (1998). Some specifically mention the current People of India Project, albeit briefly (Bayly 1999, Bates 1995:219, Searle-Chatterjee 1996). 6 Raheja elucidates the types of changes which occurred after 1857, clarifying the tight relationship between anthropological studies of caste and the administrative concerns of the state: “Such fissures had certainly begun to appear long before 1857, but the rebellion so impressed itself upon the colonial imagination that dramatic shifts in administrative policy occurred soon thereafter. Colonial administrators began carefully recording caste identities on the decennial census, commissioning the publication of region-by-region caste compendia, relying more heavily on caste identities in formulating land revenue policy, and disciplining certain groups as ‘criminal’ castes and tribes or as castes prone to rebellion” (Raheja 1996:495). 7 This approach was rather standard for the day. See George W.Stocking (1982), particularly Chapter 8 on “The Critique of Racial Formalism.” Not all colonial anthropologists were as guilty of oversimplified typologies. In fact, as Susan Bayly points out, some accounts of caste, such as Denzil Ibbetson’s 1881 introduction to the Census of the Punjab, were quite nuanced (Bayly 1995). Yet Crispin Bates notes that more contextual accounts such as Ibbetson’s were not always well received as proper “science” in their day: “however popular his ideas may have become in certain academic circles in more recent times, they sat awkwardly in the period in which they were first formulated” (Bates 1995:231). Risley himself quotes Ibbetson’s work, which he describes as “[a]n admirable picture of open-air work; it has been drawn on the spot; it is full of local colour; and it breathes throughout with the quaint humour of the peasantry of the Punjab, the manliest and most attractive of all the Indian races. From this wealth of material it is not altogether easy to disentangle the outlines of a cut-and-dried theory” (Risley 1915:263). Risley’s own desire for “scientific” typologies rather than anecdotal nuance come through in this commentary. 8 For more on the use of proverbs in colonial reference works on caste, including Herbert Risley’s work, see Raheja (1996). 9 The criteria for being an “informed” informant are left unspecified, although the relative numbers of men and women interviewed suggest a gender bias among investigators and/or potential informants, perhaps based on a perception that women are less informed or that what they know is not relevant to the study. 10 Keeping more detailed information about certain minority groups is a social science/administrative tradition that is far from unique to India. Consider the degree of scrutiny historically given to nonwhite minorities in the US census (Lee 1993:82).

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11 For more information on the portrait building system and the Anthropological Survey of India’s involvement in it, see the webpage of the NCRB, particularly the section on the Facial Analysis and Criminal Identification System at [http:// www.ncrbindia.org/bound.htm] downloaded 27 September 2000. 12 This work was recommended to me by Syed Hamid, who is a leader in the Hamdard Education Society in Delhi (Ahmad 1995, Hamid interview 2 September 1996). 13 This tendency to emphasize the distinctiveness of groups while simultaneously pointing to a unified or “composite culture” is not unique to the Anthropological Survey. The introduction to an exhibit of tribal art, organized by the Government of India, attempted to “highlight the cohesiveness of our rich and diverse heritage,” noting, about the art forms represented, that “as diverse as they are, there are linkages, a homogeneity which is perhaps the result of the ancient living composite cultural crucible we exist in” (Program from “Usha Abhil Asha: An exhibition of folk, tribal and traditional paintings and sculpture,” 24 March to 7 April 1996, Lalit Kala Academi Gallery, New Delhi. Organized by the Department of Culture, Ministry of Human Resource Development, and the Zonal Cultural Centers). From the Anthropological Survey of India to the Department of Culture, the official study and display of “culture” in India is carefully presented to emphasize national unity. See also Srirupa Roy (1999) on official nationalism in the form of parades and publications. 14 The full title of Volume 7 is Identity, Ecology, Social Organization, Economy, Development Process and Linkages: A Quantitative Profile (1996). The other volumes Singh described as the “soul of the project” are Volume 1, the Introduction (1992), and Volume 8, Communities, Segments, Synonyms, Surnames and Titles (1996). For a critique of “trait distributions” as an anthropological tool, see Moerman (1965). 15 Ironically, in spite of “sensitivity tests” applied to naming practices in the new People of India project, the governmental category of “backward” citizens remains curiously untouched, a remnant of an evolutionary model of countering inequality and social divisions (Searle-Chatterjee 1996). 16 The status ranking of Scheduled Tribes could not rely on “varna” since “only 11.8 per cent of them recognize their place in it” (Singh 1994:7), so the regional hierarchy was measured using the categories of high, medium and low status. Interestingly, both self-perception and perception by others was noted: “When it comes to self-perception of a tribal community in the regional hierarchy we find that 171 tribes, i.e. 26.9 per cent see themselves as being of high status, while 298 tribes (46.9 per cent) perceive themselves as being in the middle position. About 25.3 per cent, i.e. 161 tribes see themselves as being of low status. Others see over 11.2 per cent of the tribes as high, 39.2 per cent as medium and 49.4 per cent as of low status” (Singh 1994:7). It is this last figure which makes the quoted conclusion about the Scheduled Tribes’ lack of social stigma so troubling. 17 Anthropologists and sociologists in India have repeatedly reflected on the dilemmas of postcolonial anthropology and differ in their conclusions about how to move beyond colonial practices. As quoted earlier, Andre Beteille is skeptical about the value of the People of India project, whereas K.S.Singh is confident that the project can supersede the legacies of Risley. Such perspectives reflect in part institutional affiliations, a view from academia on the one hand and a view from

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government on the other; however, many universities were involved in the project, and even eminent sociologist M.N.Srinivas was positive about it as long as it was considered a starting point for more in-depth fieldwork (Srinivas interview 8 November 1997). Sociologists and anthropologists in India from different institutional backgrounds have joined periodically to debate the future of their disciplines, and the issues raised shed light not only on the broader politics of these disciplines in India but also on the tensions ignited by the People of India project; in one recent workshop, both Beteille and Singh were participants (Uberoi 2000; Sundar et al. 2000). One recurring debate is over “relevance” and the proper relationship between anthropology and practical concerns or policy prescriptions, in short, the relationship between the field and the government (Srivastava 1999: 545–52, Debnath 1999). 18 [http://www.ad2000.org/uters2.htm] 18 December 2001.

4 Caste certificates and lists 1 (1994) 5 S.L.R. (S.C.) 206: (1994) 6 S.C.C. 241:1994 S.C.C. (L&S) 1349: (1994) 28 A.T.C. 259. 2 The survey of “Harijan Elites” was carried out in Azamgarh in eastern Uttar Pradesh. The sample included political leaders, caste organization/caste leaders, bureaucrats, doctors, engineers, lawyers, teachers, and businessmen (Roy and Singh 1987:23, 29). 3 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. R.K.Ragala, A.P. High Court (1994). 4 An additional example of the repeated identification and labeling of reservation beneficiaries comes from another bureaucracy devoted to these policies, the National Backward Classes Finance and Development Corporation (NBCFDC). This is a nonprofit corporation, wholly owned by the Government of India, which extends credit to the Backward Classes to assist in skill development, employment schemes and other economic projects. Although this type of affirmative action is not my primary focus, the relatively new procedure of “pre-identification” initiated by the Corporation demonstrates the increasing scrutiny of beneficiaries’ identities by the government. As of 1995, “Pre-identification of beneficiaries has been made compulsory… The factor of unknown beneficiary has also been eliminated” (National Backward Classes Finance and Development Corporation Objective, Organization, Operating Procedure 1996:12). This preidentification is to help in “establishing the authenticity of the loanee,” who is issued a “beneficiary card” (NBCFDC Guidelines for Implementation of NBCFDC Schemes 1996:3). 5 The Caste/Tribe certificate will only be accepted as “sufficient proof in support of a candidate’s claim as belonging to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe” if it is issued by one of the following authorities: District Magistrate, Additional District Magistrate, Collector, Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Deputy Collector, 1st Class Stipendary Magistrate, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Taluka Magistrate, Executive Magistrate, Extra Assistant Commissioner; Chief Presidency Magistrate, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Presidency Magistrate; Revenue Officer not below the rank of Tehsildar; or Sub-Divisional

NOTES 221

Officer of the area where the candidate and/or his family normally resides (Ministry of Personnel 1993:248). 6 (1994) 5 Supreme Court Cases 244. 7 The application form for a Scheduled Caste certificate as well as several other forms are included in the appendix. These are from a caste certificate issuing office in Delhi unless otherwise indicated. These documents include:

a. Application form for Scheduled Caste Certificate. b. Form of Certificate to be Produced by a Candidate Belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in Support of His Claim (Department of Personnel 1993:396). c. Application Form for a Certificate of Eligibility for Reservation of Jobs for Other Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services Under Government of Delhi. d. Form of Certificate to be Produced by Other Backward Classes Applying for Appointment to Posts Under the Government of India (Department of Personnel 1993:487). e. Questionnaire for Consideration of Requests for Inclusion and Complaints of Under-Inclusion in the Central List of Other Backward Classes (from the Office of the National Commission for Backward Classes). 8 Often these memoranda use the term inter-caste in reference to both Scheduled Castes and Tribes. I will use the term intercommunity marriages to more clearly encompass both. By using terms like mixed marriage or even intercommunity marriage I do not mean to imply that I endorse the idea that these castes or tribes are innately distinct. 9 See the government order replacing the older rule with the newer one at [http:// www.tn.gov.in/gorders/adtw17-e.htm] 8 March 2002. 10 The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment was formerly the Ministry of Welfare. 11 [http://socialjustice.nic.in/schedule/faq.htm] 15 March 2002. 12 (1996) 3 S.C.C. 100. 13 In the case of petitions to be included on the lists of Scheduled Castes or Tribes, the group would submit data to the “List Cell” within the SC/ST Division of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (known as the Ministry of Welfare prior to 1998). In contrast to the National Commission for Backward Classes, which is responsible for decisions about which groups are to be added to or removed from the official national lists of OBCs, the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is less involved in determining which groups are on the lists and more involved in acting as a watchdog, monitoring the implementation of SC/ST reservations. Unlike the OBCs, the SCs and STs can only be added to or deleted from lists through an Act of Parliament. According to Mrs Krishna Devi Bhansoor, Assistant Director of the Research Wing of the SC/ST Commission, it is not the SC/ST Commission that supplies data to Parliament to help them make these determinations, but rather the “List Cell” within the (then) Ministry of Welfare’s SC/ST Division (Bhansoor interview 3 September 1996).

222 NOTES

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15 16

17 18

19 20

The Ministry of Welfare’s SC/ST Division deals with questions not only over which groups belong on the lists but also over which individuals belong in which groups. According to the official instructions on caste certificates, “Cases in which a doubt arises whether a person is a Scheduled Caste/Tribe or not may be referred to the Ministry of Welfare (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Division), Shastri Bhavan, A-Wing, New Delhi” (Ministry of Personnel 1993:247). This study’s focus on bureaucratic processes raises interesting questions for future research. What is the impact of the processes on the perceptions of those who experience them? Interviews with people who have gone through these processes might shed light on the impact of the policies on applicants. A related question is how do experiences with petitions for certificates or listings influence applicants’ sense of their own agency in their dealings with the state? A contemporary newspaper editorial paints a dire picture of the government’s treatment of Dalits through procedures such as caste certificates: “At the state level, the attempts are made by the state agencies to dissolve particularly the Dalits into social insignificance where they have to prove their identity not through their authentic self but through certain identity cards or a piece of paper such as a caste certificate as specified by the state” (The Hindu, “Editorial: Hindutva’s Passive Revolution” 21 September 2000). See this document in the appendix. OBC reservations are used not only for central government jobs, but also in several states, as well as the government of the capital, Delhi, and can vary at these different levels. The following discussion draws on regulations and forms from the central government and Delhi government. See these documents in the appendix. The confidentiality of the application seems not to be a major concern. Something that came up in my interview with Mahesh raised questions about the confidentiality, or lack thereof, associated with the caste certificate process. Mahesh noted that another role of his office is to aid the government when a criminal remains unidentified, although, when asked more specifically, he said that the information he gathers in the caste certificate process is not used to help identify criminals (Mahesh interview 29 November 1996). See [http://socialjustice.nic.in/obcs/welcome/htm] 15 March 2002. The following description refers to the process of determining who is an OBC prior the reconstitution of the membership of the National Backward Classes Commission in 1998. Although their task is unchanged, the increase in the number of cases processed under the new commission suggests that the rather in-depth procedures described here may have been subsequently abbreviated. A new member of the commission, Akshaybhai Sahu, has boasted, for example, that “The commission, under the chairmanship of justice P.K.Shyam, cleared 471 cases within months of taking over, while the remaining cases are expected to be cleared by January-end, Sahu said, claiming that the last commission could clear only 320 cases in its tenure—40 cases every year” (as paraphrased in Indian Express, “NCBC Member Raps Government” 7 December 1998). See “126 More Castes on OBC List” (The Hindu 20 November 1999) on the government’s implementation of some of the Commission’s recommendations.

NOTES 223

21 This research may be done by “independent professional bodies, academic bodies, research institutes, university departments, individual scholars who work in that area” (Sheth interview 6 September 1996). 22 See this document in the appendix. 23 Dugger describes a new computer in a village in Madhya Pradesh, where “For 25– 35 cents, villagers buy printouts of documents they might have spent days trying to get from local bureaucrats: land records, caste certificates and proof of income, among others” (Dugger 2000). The Orissa Government launched its official website and announced that “Many more innovative features, including the payment of Government dues, taxes, utility bills, issue of driving licenses, birth, death and caste certificate etc. would be enabled over the Internet in future” (“State Government Launches Website” The Hindu 5 September 2000). See the Delhi government’s Application Form for a Certificate for Eligibility for Reservation of Jobs for Other Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services Under Government of Delhi [http://delhigovt.nic.in/ dept/district/anx8.pdf] 25 January 2002. As Government Minister Ram Vilas Paswan points out, however, “The large majority, especially in remote, rural and semi-urban areas, does not yet have access to even basic telephones, let alone IT services” (Paswan 2000:45). 24 See this document in the appendix. 25 Planning Commission 1997–2002, “Participation of SCs and STs in Administration and Decision Making,” Section 3.9.21–2.

5 Categorizing and counting on the census 1 In the Household Schedule for the 2001 Indian census, question 8 reads: “If Scheduled Caste, write name of the Scheduled Caste from the list supplied” and question nine reads: “If Scheduled Tribe, write name of the Scheduled Tribe from the list supplied” [http://www.censusindia.net/census2001/qpopenu. html] 5 October 2000. 2 See Chapter 1, Note 22 supra. 3 The postapartheid South African census and its utility for affirmative action, in comparison with the US and India, was one subject of discussion at an international conference I attended on “Rethinking Equality in the Global Society” at Washington University in St. Louis, 8–10 November 1997. 4 The trend toward census taking and the date of the first Indian census are discussed in the following passage from the Government of India Home Department (Public) Programs from 26 November 1870: “That a census of the whole people is most desirable, or rather we may say is absolutely necessary, as a sound basis of almost every economical reform, has long since been admitted as a simple truism, but it is only recently that a definite project has been formed to accomplish it. Local attempts had indeed been previously made, but it was only in 1856, that the late Court of Directors urged upon the Indian Government the importance of a measure which is decennially carried out in Great Britain, the United States of America, and many of the countries of Europe, and it was proposed that the general census of ‘our Indian territories’ should be taken in 1861, to correspond with the census of Great Britain and thenceforward to be repeated every ten years. But the mutiny stopped

224 NOTES

5

6 7

8

9 10

11

12

13

14

this project, and a census was only attempted partially in some Provinces and in a very rough and imperfect manner. The Government had more pressing cares to attend to, and it was not until 1865 that the general measure was revived, and the 1st of January 1871 was then fixed for the undertaking” (Natarajan 1972:3). For a discussion of the assumptions associated with modernization theories, as well as the demise of the assumption that caste would fade away with modernity, see Randall and Theobald 1998, particularly their discussion of Rudolph and Rudolph’s classic, The Modernity of Tradition (1967). 1992 Supp (3) S.C.C. 217:1992 S.C.C. (L&S) Supp 1:(1992) 22 A.T.C. 385. The 1941 census was abbreviated due to World War Two; the 1951 count of OBCs was “entirely provisional” (Gopalswami 1953:2); and subsequent censuses recorded caste or tribe only for the scheduled communities. One example of political party involvement can be found in the article “Memorandum seeks caste-wise census” in The Hindu 30 March 2000. Other articles discussed the debates over a castewise census (Indian Express, “Caste in Census” 1 May 1998, Shah 1998). On the initial announcement that caste would be counted see, India Today, “But the die is caste” 11 May 1998. On the decision not to count caste after all, see Narayan 1999. Shah’s suggestion to deal with the paucity of OBC data is a survey (Shah 1998). After the first post-independence lists in 1950, the schedules or lists have been modified or supplemented as in 1956 when the states were reorganized, necessitating reorganization of the lists, which are done on a state-by-state basis. Examples of other changes include a 1976 amendment removing some area restrictions and a 1990 amendment allowing neo-Buddhists to be SCs. Other changes were made to certain state lists, such as the STs in Uttar Pradesh Order of 1967, Meghalaya STs in 1987, and Kashmir STs in 1989 (Nanda 1994). Also note the strategy to extract the “correct” name from the citizen, namely “persuading” them by suggesting that reservation benefits may be at stake. This practice reinforces a longstanding association in the public imagination between census enumeration and reservation eligibility, even though census slips are confidential and cannot be used as evidence in a court of law (The Census Act 1948). This perception helps to explain the rising number of people claiming to be in Scheduled Tribes in recent censuses, to be discussed later in this chapter. Not all states had lists of Other Backward Classes, so each state was to compile either a provisional list of Backward Classes or Non-Backward Classes for the enumerators. The census report on “Special Groups” did not include OBC data; rather it emphasized that this information was to “be treated as entirely provisional” and was “given for use by the Backward Classes Commission” (Gopalaswami 1953:2). This tendency to keep more detailed census data on certain minority groups is widespread. See Lee 1993:82, for similar findings in the US context. For example, the goal of the multiracial categories of 1890 (Mulatto, Quadroon, Octaroon) was not to represent multiculturalism as in the demand for multi-racial recognition on the US census in the 1990s, but rather was an attempt to monitor racial mixing. Anand Patwardhan’s documentary film Father, Son and Holy War (New York: First Run Icarus Films, 1994) includes some striking examples of such rhetoric in political speeches.

NOTES 225

15 Studies have shown that educating women correlates to successful family planning and population control. See Sen (1994), especially Chapter 8 on “Women’s Agency and Social Change.” Demographer Ashish Bose criticized the nonsensical yet popular argument that Muslim polygamy leads to higher population growth (Bose interviews 19 July 1996 and 4 November 1996). 16 The delay in processing the caste data collected in the past is another argument used against the idea of an OBC caste count. P.Radhakrishnan, Professor at Madras Institute of Development Studies, argues: “if the department has not completed processing the data collected on the SCs and STs (accounting for only about onefourth of the total population) even nearly a decade after its collection, how will it be able to process, not to speak of making available to the data-users in the foreseeable future, caste data on 75 per cent of the total population?” (Radhakrishnan 1999). 17 The census did gather information on types of economic activity, land ownership and education, however, which may prove more useful than income data, given the perhaps more extreme challenges of accuracy with the latter type of data. 18 Another factor in the jump in numbers was a switch in the official definition of Scheduled Tribe status. From 1950, when the president promulgated lists of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Areas, the special benefits for Scheduled Tribes were only available if they lived in the specified areas. The removal of intrastate area restrictions in the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976, removed the geographical element from the identification of Scheduled Tribe members within states. See Chaube (1999). Yet, this too cannot account for the entire population jump.

6 ªBackwardº Muslims and ªScheduled Casteº Ch

ristians

1 This use of categories to challenge categories is not unusual. Class consciousness has been used in attempts to destroy class itself; working class solidarity is the basis of most efforts to undermine the class system. Likewise, some groups trying to undermine racism and casteism are themselves based on low caste or racial minority solidarity. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s discussion of strategic essentialisms touches on these ironies. Spivak discusses the use of strategic essentialisms by those contributing to subaltern studies: “I would read it, then, as a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously viable political interest” (Spivak 1987:205, emphasis in the original). Strategic essentialisms are also used by subalterns themselves: “Class-consciousness on the descriptive level is itself a strategic and artificial rallying awareness which, on the transformative level, seeks to destroy the mechanics which come to construct the outlines of the very class of which a collective conscious has been situationally developed” (Spivak 1987:205, emphasis in the original). 2 The many lines along which reservation categories could be drawn has resulted in so many claims that some are beginning to wonder what will be the next category under contention. See for example Swapan Dasgupta’s article entitled, “Madness Unreserved: Caste, Gender, Religion: Where Will it Stop?” (India Today 9 June 1997:27). Although many people challenging the official categories may be

226 NOTES

3 4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

motivated by a sense that these categories do not reflect their unique senses of identity, some are also very cognizant of the material benefits and opportunities that are at stake if a reclassification occurs. Identities and interests are intertwined and impossible to neatly untangle. Such untangling is not attempted here, but their interaction is evident in the following case studies. For a balanced perspective on the ways these group-based policies both overcome group disparities and cause group tensions, see Mitra 1987, 1994. This assumption pervaded many media and academic analyses of the decision to extend central government reservations to the OBCs in 1990. See also Note 12 in Chapter 8 for more sources of similar arguments against reservations. For example, see Singh and Sharma’s argument in their book, tellingly entitled, Reservation Politics in India: Mandalization of the Society (Singh and Sharma 1995). Government officials and citizens are now struggling with the policy ramifications of a debate which has raged among academics, classic examples being Louis Dumont and F.G.Bailey: Is caste a religious institution rooted in Hinduism or a sociological phenomenon characteristic of a variety of societies? (Dumont 1980, Bailey 1957, 1960). I thank an anonymous reviewer of one of my articles (Jenkins 200 1a) for encouraging me to place this political debate in the context of this academic debate. Other groups have made similar demands for Muslim reservations, such as the Islamic Council of India and the All-India Milli Council. See The Hindu 13 April 1996 and Indian Express 22 July 1996. An even larger group of Muslim organizations has included the demand for reservations for Muslims as a religious minority group in their Agenda 1999 for Muslims. See “Backward, Dalit Muslims campaign to secure rights sparks controversy,” Times of India 12 September 1999. Vilas Sonavane is a member of Advisory Board of the All India Muslim OBC Organisation. See also V.Date, “Reservation Demand for ‘Muslim OBCs’ Gains Momentum,” Times of India 10 December 1999. Memorandum from Shabbir Ansari, President of the All India Muslim OBC Organisation, to Welfare Minister B.S.Ramoowalia, 16 September 1996. Other organizations have made similar demands, including the All India Muslim Congress. See “Reservation for Dalit Muslims Sought,” Times of India 16 December 1999. In addition to the broader associations discussed here, the extension of Scheduled Caste reservations to Sikhs and Buddhists has inspired “similarly situated groups among Muslims,” such as Halal Khors, to also seek official SC status (Times of India 18 January 1996:10). Notably, there is no corresponding religious bar to Scheduled Tribe or Other Backward Class membership, perhaps because non-Hindu tribals or lower classes are less of a challenge than non-Hindu untouchables to this ideological association between caste and Hinduism. See an excellent overview of the Dalit Christian movement and its ideology (Wyatt 1998). For a list of some of the rallies, strikes, bills and meetings with public officials over this issue, see the National Coordination Committee for Dalit Christians’ pamphlet (for distribution to Members of Parliament), Demand for Restoration of Reservation for Christian Dalits (1996:17–18). The United Front Government’s 1996 Common Minimum Program included the extension of reservation benefits to Dalit Christians. Deccan Herald-Bangalore 16 July 1996.

NOTES 227

12 The National Coordination Committee for SC Christians is sometimes called the National Coordination Committee for Dalit Christians. Other organizations involved in these issues include the All India Christian People’s Forum and the All India United Christians Movement for Equal Rights. 13 The author attended some meetings of this organization in Delhi in 1995–6. Examples of speeches and information about the Dalit Solidarity Programme can be found in a book written by two of the Programme’s founders, Bhagwan Das, a Buddhist, and James Massey, a Christian (Das and Massey 1995).

7 Hindu nationalism and selective inclusion 1 For an excellent brief introduction to the ideology and politics of the Hindu nationalists, see Tapan Basu et al. (1993). For further analysis see Christoffe Jaffrelot (1996) and Thomas Blom Hansen (1999). 2 Eleanor Zelliot notes that these conversions started in 1956 but also continued afterward. Exact numbers of converts are difficult to estimate but census figures document a large leap in the number of Buddhists in India: 180,823 in 1951, before Ambedkar’s conversion movement began, and 3,250,227 in 1961 (Zelliot 1996:223). 3 This speech was delivered at the last meeting of the Minorities Committee, 13 November 1931. See also Gandhi’s correspondence on this subject (Pyarelal 1984). B.R. Ambedkar’s critique of Gandhi’s approach can be found in Ambedkar’s What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables (1945). 4 Limiting Scheduled Caste status to Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists, argues Dieter Conrad, can “be understood only as a sanction against apostasy from Hinduism,” part of a trend toward what he calls legal Hindutva (Conrad 1995). 5 The strict association of the SC category with Hinduism is not just an assumption and argument of Hindu extremists. As discussed above, Gandhi opposed untouchability but always felt that “Harijans” were a part of Hindu society. Preserving unity in this way was very important to him. Gandhi’s grandson Rajmohan Gandhi has drawn a parallel to Abraham Lincoln, who wanted to end slavery in the United States but also, if possible, preserve the union (Gandhi interview 21 September 1996, Gandhi 1995:242). 6 See the following news coverage of the expanding rolls of OBCs on the national list: “51 castes included in OBC Central List” (Hindustan Times 5 September 2000). “90 Castes Added to OBC List for Jobs” (Indian Express 18 March 2000). “123 More Castes in OBC List” (The Hindu 20 November 1999). “Sheila puts Delhi Jats on OBC List,” a response to the Vajpayee government putting Rajastani Jats on the central OBC list (Indian Express 23 October 1999). “96 More Castes May Be Included in OBC List” (Hindustan Times 15 June 1999).

8 Class, classification and creamy layers 1 The phrase “truly backward,” used by the Supreme Court of India in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) 1992 Supp (3) S.C.C. 217:1992 S.C.C. (L&S)

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4

5 6

7 8 9 10

11

Supp 1:(1992) 22 A.T.C. 385, echoes that of American sociologist William Julius Wilson, who in a different context, argued that a race-based analysis might overlook the “truly disadvantaged” by ignoring class distinctions (Wilson 1987). Advocates of a class approach continue to add to the debate over affirmative action in the United States (Kahlenberg 1996). Indra Sawney v. Union of India, supra note 1. See the Reports of the Backward Classes Commissions of 1955 and 1980. These are known as the Kalelkar Commission and Mandal Commission, respectively, named after their Chairmen. There are also numerous state level commissions and reports. “Communities” in this context can be considered both a euphemism for castes within Hindu society and a term for the caste-like subdivisions within other religions. Notably the OBC category, unlike the SC category, is open to all religions, so communities within each religious community can be declared OBCs by state or national level commissions. Whether disadvantaged subcommunities within these other religions are actually “castes” and not just communities is not only a linguistic and sociological question but also a political question, due to the current demands for Scheduled Caste status for Muslims and Christians, as described in Chapters 6 and 7. Triloki Nath v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1969) I S.C.R. 103 A 1960 S.C.I. Based on the postelection poll survey of 1996, Mitra and Singh charted the correlation between “caste” and “class.” The official SC, ST, OBC and other categories were used a proxies for caste. Data used to define class included occupation, assets, type of house and income. Mitra and Singh found a close correlation between caste and class: The Scheduled Castes and Tribes were most highly represented in the “very poor class” category, while the Other Backward Classes dominated the “poor class” category, and the other (upper) castes were represented at more than twice their percentage in the population in the “upper class” category. According to their data, Scheduled Castes (19 per cent of the population) are 30 per cent of the very poor, and Scheduled Tribes (10 per cent of the population) are 15 per cent of the very poor. The OBCs (38 per cent of the population) are 40 per cent of the very poor, 42 per cent of the poor, 23 per cent of the middle class and 23 per cent of the upper class. The upper castes, in contrast, who are only 34 per cent of the population, make up almost 70 per cent of the upper class category (Mitra and Singh 1999:189 Table 6.1). Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India (1950) S.C.R. 869. State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) 1 S.C.R. 226, and Venkataramana v. State of Madras (1951) 1 S.C.R. 229. This language was added in the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Sec. 2. See Bakshi (1996:23). See the Mandal Commission Report on Backward Classes (1980). The current National Backward Classes Commission uses similar criteria on its questionnaire for those groups claiming backward status. Forty-six questions on a variety of social, educational, economic, and other factors range from the number of community members holding government jobs to the number of members in primitive housing. See National Commission for Backward Classes (1994). More specifically, “[t]he reservation is applicable to all civil posts and services under the Govt. of India, Public Sector Undertakings, Financial Institutions including

NOTES 229

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

Public Sector Banks, autonomous bodies, statutory and semi govt. bodies and voluntary agencies receiving grants from the Govt.” (Nabhi 2001: 374). The Other Backward Classes for purposes of this new policy were defined as the castes and communities on both the Mandal Commission’s list and lists prepared by state governments. These were not the first anti-reservation agitations. See Mitra (1987). On the relationship between the anti-Mandal protests and the dispute between Hindus and Muslims over the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, see Parikh “Religion, Reservations and Riots” (1998). The India Today coverage of the protests in 1990 is notable for its anti-Mandal slant; the Seminar issue of November 1990, entitled “Reserved Futures,” is devoted to reservations, including Ghanshyam Shah’s piece on the “Agitations in Gujarat,” which also discusses the broader anti-Mandal protest. Other coverage of the opposition to Mandal includes: Balagopal, K. (1990) “This Anti-Mandal Mania,” Economic and Political Weekly 25:40, 6 October, pp. 2231– 4; Chopra Pran (1990) “Reservations: the economic criteria,” Hindustan Times 1 October; Karlekar, Hiranmay (1990) “The Wrath of Youth,” Indian Express 4 October; Mammen, Matthew (1990) “Rising Militancy in Bihar: Mandal Protests spark caste war,” Hindustan Times 16 October. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) 1992 Supp (3) S.C.C. 217:1992 S.C.C. (L&S) Supp 1:(1992) 22 A.T.C. 385. Justice R.N.Prasad, Chair of “creamy layer” committee and author of creamy layer ruling, interview, New Delhi, 18 September 1996. Whether one’s wife holds such a position is not accounted for on the “Creamy layer” forms in Delhi. Pressure to raise the one lakh rupee income ceiling has subsequently occurred (The Hindu “India ceiling for OBC creamy layer to be raised” 24 July 1998). From Creamy Layer Schedule, Ministry of Personnel Office Memorandum No. 36012/22/93-Estt. (SCT). Subject: Reservation for Other Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services under the Government of India. See also Chapter 4 in this volume, on caste certificates. A telling example of such problems with identity documents and corruption is the growing number of people losing their official identities entirely when relatives manage to get them declared dead in order to inherit their property. This has sparked an Association of Dead People fighting to be declared alive. Barry Bearak, “Back to Life in India, Without Reincarnation,” New York Times 24 October 2000. Many of these concerns over the use of economic data have also been raised by political scientist Sunita Parikh at a conference on affirmative action in India, the United States and South Africa in a discussion of the “creamy layer” rule in India (8 November 1997). The conference was entitled “Rethinking Equality in the Global Society” and was held at Washington University. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) 1992 Supp (3) S.C.C. 217:1992 S.C.C. (L&S) Supp 1:(1992) 22 A.T.C. 385.

230 NOTES

9 Women's reservations and representation 1 Times of India (1998) “RJD-SP Stall Introduction of Women’s Quota Bill,” 14 July. Similar scenes erupted in 1996 and 2000 as the bill has been repeatedly introduced only to die again. 2 The Women’s Reservation bill would reserve one-third of seats in the lower houses of the national parliament (Lok Sabha) and state assemblies (Vidham Sabhas). The reserved seats would be rotated randomly so the same districts would not be permanently reserved for female candidates only. 3 Kishwar herself is critical of the Women’s Reservation Bill (Kishwar 1996b) and offers an alternative (Narayan et al. 2002). 4 An emphasis on “difference” (such as recognition of distinct class or racial experiences of women) is a trend in western feminist scholarship, offsetting a history of inattention to such differences; yet the study of women’s movements elsewhere reveals that the “politics of difference” itself plays out in different ways (Tripp 2000). In the Indian context, the government pays much attention to religion and caste, so the importance of “difference” is hardly a new revelation and could be viewed instead as a longstanding political challenge for feminist activists. 5 On the relationship between the nationalist and women’s movements in India, see also Nair 1996 and Chatterjee 1989. 6 After elections to the central legislature under this plan, 3.4 per cent of the legislators were women (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:356). 7 Examples in this report of the arguments for legislative reservations include the need for political empowerment of women to precede socio-economic empowerment in the Indian context, the need to compel political parties to shift strategies in candidate selection, and the value of “a body of spokesmen of the women’s cause” in legislatures (Committee on the Status of Women 1974:302–3). 8 Some low caste organizations in the 1970s drew parallels between their oppression and women’s oppression, undeterred by continuing distinctions between communities and categories. Yet the more frequent pattern of activism by women and other disadvantaged groups was continuing division between urban elite organizations and rural, grassroots movements (Kumar 1995:63). 9 Alva was appointed to the upper house of Parliament by Indira Gandhi in 1974. She later was appointed by Rajiv Gandhi as head of the Women’s Department within the Ministry of Human Resource Development. She has also served as Minister of State for Youth Affairs, Sports and Women. 10 The debate in 2000 is described in an article entitled “Sparks Fly Over Delay in Tabling Women’s Bill.” The Hindu (26 August 2000). 11 Such reports about the poor treatment of some female council members help explain survey data suggesting that women tend to trust local government less than men, even after the implementation of women’s reservations at the local level (Mitra and Singh 1999:237) 12 “More Anti-Women than the Common Man?: Demanding Sub-Quotas,” The Statesman, 6 January 2000. 13 Arguments about whether “real” women benefit from reservations have also been raised in cases in which eunuchs have been elected to local offices in seats reserved for women. For example, four eunuchs were elected in the state of Madya Pradesh, including one mayor. Characterized in the media as a sign of voters’ discontent with politics and politicians, this also suggests ambivalent public views of women’s reserved seats (Daily Excelsior (2000) “Eunuch’s Election Shows Voters

NOTES 231

Disgust With Politics,” 2 January). A judge ruled that Mayor Kamla Jaan is male, based on voter registration records, a photo identity card and other official documents, and declared Jaan’s election null and void (Statesman (2002) “Court verdict triggers gender debate on Eunuchs,” 1 September). 14 BJP MP Uma Bharati, quoted in Meenakshi Nath (1996) “Cutting Across Party Lines: Women Members of Parliament Explain Their Stand on Reservation Quotas,” Manushi, no. 96, September-October, p. 11.

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Index

academic colonialism 64 achhut 98 AdDharm 70 Adhivakta Parishad 138; and SC Christian demands 138–9 Adi-Andhra 70 Adi-Dravida 35, 37, 70 Adi-Karnataka 70 adivasi see Scheduled Tribes Adivasi Koli Mahasangh (AKM) 27 administration and identity 10–12, 24, 47, 51–3, 67–9 see also administrators; caste certificates; census; Other Backward Classes: and identifying and labeling 69–74; and reservation policies 86–8; and special concessions 70 administrators (colonial and post colonial): as classifiers of society 43–4, 47, 51–3, 89, 92–4 adoption 33, 78, 80 Advani, Lal Krishna 135, 140 affirmative action policies 1–2, 8–9, 10, 180–5 The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective 43 AIBMM see All India Backward Muslim Morcha AICPF see All India Christian People’s Forum Ain-i-Akbari 92 AIWC see All India Women’s Conference Ali, Aijaz 117, 138

All India Backward Muslim Morcha (AIBMM) 117, 138 All India Christian People’s Forum (AICPF) 122, 136 All India Muslim OBC Organisation 115– 16; And caste/class 116, 118; and Dalits 117; surveys 116 All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) 160, 161, 162 Alva, Margaret 167–8, 171 Ambedkar, B.R. 35, 55, 70, 130, 133, 148; and conversion movement 35, 120, 130, 141; and Indian Constitution 131; and reservations 128, 130–1 see also Mohandas Gandhi Anderson, Benedict 94, 107, 174 Anderson, J.D. 41 Andhara Pradesh 117–18, 135 Ansari, Shabbir Ahmed 115, 117 Anthropological Survey of India 17–18, 41; criminal identification in 52; and People of India survey 49–57; “Portrait Building System” 51 anthropologist/administrators 42, 47, 51–2 see also Risley anthropology: colonial and post compared 43–5, 64, 100 see also People of India; in contemporary India 42, 44, 64–5; in courts 28–30

252

INDEX 253

anthropometric data collected 44, 45, 50, 51 see also bio-anthropological parameters anti-creamy layer see Kerala Anti-Mandal Commission Forum 147 anti-Mandal protests 54, 96, 147 see also Mandal Commission Report Appadurai, Arjun 6, 44, 94, 118 Aprishya Sudras 70 Association for Promoting Education and Employment of Muslims 115, 118, 123; convention on reservations 117 Atul Chandra Adhikari v. State of Orissa 76 avarna 70 Azariah, M. 121, 123, 179 Backward Classes Commission see National Backward Classes Commission Backward Muslim Morcha see All India Backward Muslim Morcha backwardness/backward classes defined/ discussed 2, 14–15, 71, 73, 81–6, 145–6 Banton, Michael 2, 70 Bates, Crispin 12, 44 Beda Jangam 55, 65 Bengal census 98 Beteille, Andre 54–5, 62 Bharati, Uma 169, 172 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) see also Hindu nationalism; Hindu nationalists: and categories 9; and conversion 131; and Dalit Christians 121; and moderation 139; and Muslims 133–5; and OBCs 172; and People of India project 65; platform 127; and political savvy 138; and reservations 150 Bihar 155 bio-anthropological parameters 60 BJP see Bharatiya Janata Party BJP Minority Morcha: Muslims/Christians/ Zoroastrians 133

BJP Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Morcha 134 Blackmun, J. 7 Bose, Ashish 105 British Raj see colonial policy Buddhists: and conversion 35, 79; and Dalit Solidarity Programme 123; and Hinduism 132–3; and Scheduled Castes 120, 133 Bureau of Police Research and Development and Portrait Building System 51 bureaucracy see also administration and identity: and liberalization 183; and representation 88; and reservations 15 Burman, B.K. Roy 55, 104 Calcutta University: and attitudes to intercaste marriage 32 caste see also Scheduled Castes: in Christian society 1–2, 31, 35, 121, 179; defined 13; in Muslim society 116, 179; and nationalism 45, 57–63, 93, 128–30, 134 see also Hindu nationalism caste associations: certificate of membership 30; and Other Backward Class numbers 101; as response to census 48, 93, 101 caste census 89–90, 95–7, 101 see also census; colonial census caste certificates 18, 67–70, 72–3, 81, 87; and conversion 79–81; and creamy layer 82; false certificates 26, 33, 72–3; and intercommunity marriage and adoption 76–9 see also inter-caste marriages; and migrants 74–6

254 INDEX

caste endogamy 32 caste identity: and birth 33, 36, 37; and Christians 2; as club-like 37; and employment files 71, 87; fluidity 13–14, 98; as Hindu 2, 134; paradox of 8; reconstructing 7–8, 130, 179 see also constructivism; repeated verification of 29, 69, 72–3, 79 Caste in India 93 casteism 10 categories see also colonial categories; community; gender; constructivism: boundary keeping 105–6; changing 105; and class 19–20; dangers of 5–6, 9, 85, 177–8; government use of 6, 8–10, 10–13 see also administration and identity; periodic re-evaluation needed 10, 183; political or “scientific” 29–30, 54–5, 97; racial 2, 6–7, 11, 91, 111–12, 175–6 see also race; reconstruction of 105, 107, 111, 112; for reservations 13–15 see also Scheduled Castes; Scheduled Tribes; Other Backward Classes; utility of 5, 6–8, 178–80 Catholic Bishops Conference of India 135– 6 CEDAW see Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women census see also colonial census: administrators and commissioners 89, 91–3, 100, 101, 104; of Bengal 98; classifications 89–92, 97–100;

colonial/postcolonial compared 89–90, 92–5, 96–8; counting caste and religion 95, 100–4; first colonial 92; first post-Independence 93, 95, 99; and identity politics 90, 93; modernization of 93–4; monographs 100 see also Risley; People of India; numbers or social indicators 99, 102–4; of Bengal 98; and Other Backward Classes 89–90, 95– 6, 101–2; and policy uses 106; and religion 89, 93, 102–4, 106; and reservations 18, 90–1, 92, 95–100, 102, 105–6; and Scheduled Castes/Tribes 89, 90, 98–9, 102–6 see also retribalization; and simplifications 94, 97–8, 104–5; and “Special Groups” 89–90, 98, 99 Charsley, Simon 70, 71 Chatterjee, Jotsna 171 Chatterjee, S.K. 122 Christian-Muslim cooperation/discord 116–17, 137–8 Christians: and caste identity 1, 2, 19, 31 see also Dalit Christians; Swigaradoss; and caste recognition 113, 119, 121; and census 89; and Dalit Solidarity Programme 123; demands 119; and Hindu nationalists 19, 119, 120, 121, 127–9, 131, 133–9; Mother Theresa 120; and People of India project 55–6, 65; protesters 1, 4; and reservations 119–20, 123, 124, 134, 137–9; and Scheduled Castes 35–6, 65, 69, 89, 134, 137 Church of North India (Protestant) 123 class see also creamy layer;

INDEX 255

economic conditions; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India: Mandal Commission; Other Backward Classes; Supreme Court decisions; defined 14–15; legality of 146 Cochin see Kerala Cohn, Bernard 47 Cokhamela 62 colonial administrators see administrators (colonial and postcolonial) colonial anthropology see also anthropology; Risley: critics of 43–4 colonial categories/lists (schedules) 11, 30– 1, 50–1 see also categories: and caste association lobbying 48, 93 colonial census see also census: academic scrutiny of 94–5; compared to post colonial 89–90, 92–5, 96–8; critics of 92, 93 colonial ethnography see anthropology; Risley colonial legal system 24, 37 colonial policy see also Government of India Acts: backward class reservations 143, 151; Christian reservations 119; divide and rule 24, 47, 57–8, 160, 173; legislative rights 160; Muslim reservations 114, 160–2; Scheduled Caste/Tribe reservations 14, 70–1, 160, 164; women’s reservations 20, 159–63 colonial states and ethnic identities 10–11 Committee on the Status of Women 20, 163–7 Common Minimum Programme and Dalit Christians 120 community: acceptance by 76, 78, 80; as caste 41;

and competition of the disadvantaged 173; and legislative reservations 164–5; and Other Backward Classes 15, 84, 145; samudaya 59; versus category 165, 166, 172, 173, 174 community studies 55–6 Congress Party: and People of India survey 65; and reservations 150; 73rd constitutional amendment 167–8 Constitution: amendment for special provisions 146; and defining Hindu 133; and discrimination 146; and reservations 15, 145–6, 163; and separate electorates 163; 73rd constitutional amendment 167–8 constructivism 5–8, 111–12, 177–80, 186 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 34, 163 conversion see also Ambedkar; Buddhists; Christians: administrative view of 79–80; and caste status 25, 35–6, 79–80, 121– 2; Gandhi’s view of 129, 131; Hindu nationalist view of 127, 135–6; legal view of 24, 35–40; as political protest 35; reasons for 35–6, 38; and reconversion 35, 79–80 cooperation among minority religions 116– 7 see also Dalit Solidarity Programme: and Hindu nationalism 137–8 courts see colonial legal system; Supreme Court of India creamy layer 19, 125, 179, 181, 185 see also Narendran Commission; for anti-creamy layer see Kerala: administration 82; criteria and economic factors 149, 154; defined 149–50;

256 INDEX

and resistance 150–4; and reservations 148 Creamy Layer Committee 149–50; and transparency 150 “criminal tribes/categories” 47, 51, 100

diversity and categories 8–10, 113, 124–6, 127–8, 157–9, 175–80 see also categories Dreze, Jean 158 Dushkin, Leila 16, 69–70

Dalit Christians 1, 19, 56, 119–24, 134–9 see also Christians; Dalits Dalit conversion movement see Buddhists; conversion Dalit converts to Christianity 121, 122 Dalit Jesuits 123 Dalit liberation theology 123 Dalit Muslims 115, 118, 125 Dalit Solidarity Programme: and fear of Hindu nationalism 137; and interfaith groupings 123, 125 Dalit Theology Department (Chennai) 123 The Dalit Voice 61–2 Dalits 65, 70, 98 see also Ambedkar; Scheduled Castes: defined 13; and identity politics 7–8, 61–2, 70–1, 130, 179, 185; and illiteracy 184; unity of 71, 98, 121–2 “Danger Signal for Hindus” 103 Das, Bhagwan 79 Das, Veena 181–2 David, Shakuntala 123, 133 Davis, Adrienne D. 4, 112 Delhi: and caste certificates 75; and reservations 143 Delhi University and quotas 182 “depressed classes” 70 see also Scheduled Castes desanskritization 25, 27–8 Devasahayan, V. 123, 130; and meaning of Dalit 130 Dirks, Nicholas 43, 45, 58 discrimination see Caste; constitution; gender; race

economic conditions/criteria see also class; creamy layer; Indra Sawhey v. Union of India; Other Backward Classes: and census 104; and creamy layer ruling 142, 148–50; and Mandal Commission 145–8; and policy changes 144, 149–53; and reservation categories 10, 14–15, 16, 82, 84, 142–4, 153–4, 181 education 15–16, 103, 184 see also higher education effectiveness of reservations 15–17, 63, 184 End Caste Conference 182 Essed, Philomena 9–10 ethnic identities/tensions 10–11, 124, 125 see also categories; diversity; identity ethnographic mapping of India and nationalism 58 see also anthropology; People of India Ethnological Survey of India 47 see also anthropology; People of India “experts” and status verification 29–30 exterior castes 70 ex-untouchables 70 false certificates 26, 33, 72–3 see also caste certificates family planning see fertility rates Farooqui, Vimla 170 female legislators 162 feminist legitimacy 170 see also gender; women; women’s associations/organizations

INDEX 257

fertility rates and minority scrutiny 102–4 see also census Fifth Caste 70 Ford, Christopher A. 23–4 Foucault, Michel 111 Franchise Committee 162 Frykenberg, Robert Eric 12–13, 38, 102, 121, 130 Galanter, Marc 120, 145 Gandhi Caste Society/Gandhi Sangam 9, 19, 143, 148 Gandhi, Indira 49, 163 Gandhi, Maneka 171–2 Gandhi, Mohandas 70, 98, 130, 161; and caste discrimination/reform 19, 129; and conversion 131; “Gandhi caste” proposed 148; group-based policies 9, 130–1; and Harijans 129, 130, 131; and inclusive Hinduism 128–31; and reservations 130–1; see also Ambedkar; Dalit; Harijan Gandhi, Rajiv 51, 167 Gandhi, Rajmohan 129–30 gazetteers 92 Geertz, Clifford 5 gender: as category 7, 157–9, 173–4; discrimination 20, 34, 49, 77, 158; and inter-caste marriages 32, 77 see also inter-caste marriages and reserved seats 173–4 Goa: Christian community and status 55; and reserved seats 170 God of Small Things 23 Government of India see also administration; census; courts; People of India: Planning Commission Government of India Act (1909):

and Muslim seats 114, 160 Government of India Act (1935): 14; and Other Backward Classes and Scheduled Castes 14, 70–1, 119; and Scheduled Tribe category 14 Government of India Acts (1919; 1935): nominated seats 160; reserved seats 162; separate electorates 160; suffrage 162 Government of India (Scheduled Castes) Order: and Christians 119–20 group and individual processes 81–7 see also identity group certification see schedules Guha, Phulrenu 166 Guha, Sumit 92, 105 Halba/Halbi tribe: population/category change 105 Hamid, Syed 115, 138 Harijans (untouchables) 117, 70, 98 see also caste; Dalit; Scheduled Castes: and Hindu absorption 130; and Mohandas Gandhi 129 higher education: and reservations 15, 16, 147, 181–2, 183–4; and Supreme Court decision 26 Hindu Marriage Act 133 Hindu nationalism see also Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Hinduism; Hindutva; Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP); Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS): and B.R. Ambedkar 131, 141; and census 102–4; and conversion/reconversion 79, 125, 135–6, 141 see also conversion; and cross-cutting identities 127–8, 139, 180; defined 128–9;

258 INDEX

exclusiveness 9, 132–6, 140; and Mohandas Gandhi 9, 129–31; and Muslim/Christian demands 125, 127–8, 130–6; organizations 128–9, 132; and People of India project 62, 65 see also People of India; political compromise 127, 139–40; version of history 134–6 Hinduisation 62 Hinduism see also Hindu nationalism: and Christianity and Islam 113, 133, 134–6; and Dalit Solidarity Programme 123; and Harijans 130; philosophy/religion 38, 133, 140; and Scheduled Castes 89, 120, 113, 128–32; subsuming Buddhism/Jainisn/Sikhism 120, 132–3 Hindus: defining 38, 129; majoritarianism 125 see also Hindu nationalism; minorities Hindustan Times 113; and scheduled castes 133 Hindutva 129 see also Hindu nationalism Horowitz, Donald 125 “Hum Dalit” 7–8 Hutton, J.H. 70, 93 identification see also administration and identity; census; People of India; Supreme Court of India: identifying beneficiaries 69–70, 72–3 see also caste certificates; outsider/insider 2, 12; by state 1, 2–3, 4, 6, 8–9, 11–12, 17–18, 23, 157, 175–7 identity see also caste identity; gender;

identity politics; self identification: group/unofficial 1–2, 3–4, 18–20, 111– 12; layers 8–10, 19, 112–13, 127–8, 178; reconstructing 178–80 see also constructivism; desanskritization; retribalization; theories of 5–8, 9–10, 11–13, 24–5, 43– 4, 67–8, 94, 111–12, 127–8, 157–9, 177–80 identity construction see identification identity fraud see Supreme Court decisions identity politics/political activism 3, 11, 18–20, 175–80 see also caste, Christians, class, gender, Hindu nationalists, identity, Muslims, race: and colonial/postcolonial practices 10– 13 Ilaiah, Kancha 141 illiteracy see literacy Imagined Communities 94 Inden, Ronald 42, 48 India: diverse democracy 2; an “ethnographic universe” 58; secular state 114 Indian Christians see Christians Indian constitution see constitution Indian Councils Act 160 Indian ethnography and caste see anthropology Indian Express-New Delhi 54 Indian government see Government of India Indian Muslims and reservations see Muslims Indian National Congress 161; and feminists 163; and 1st Round Table Conference 161; and special electoral rights 160 Indian Planning Commission 15–16, 49, 51 Indian Supreme Court see Supreme Court individual and group processes 81–7 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 15; and reservations 148, 149, 154 Ingram, Helen 68

INDEX 259

inter-caste/intercommunity marriages 31– 4; attitudes to 32; and caste status 76–9, 80–1, 34–5, 37; offspring of 76–8; and reservations 32, 182; and social mobility 33; and Supreme Court 31–4; and women 32–3, 77 Islam see also caste; Muslims: and caste 116; and Dalit Solidarity Programme 123 Iyer, Ganapathi 37 Izhava community 152 Janata Dal Party 147; and reservations 150 jati 11 see also caste: and community 59; defined 13 Jatiya, Satyanarayan 134 Jats 85 Jesuits 123 Joseph Commission 152 see also Kerala Kalelkar Commission 97, 145 see also National Commission for Backward Classes; Other Backward Classes Kananaikil, Jose 122, 137 Karat, Brinda 169, 184; and Muslim and Dalit women 170 Kaye, J.W. 41 Kerala 89, 153; and commissions 151; and creamy layer 143–4, 151–2, 154; and economic data 151, 152; and Muslim reservations 114, 152; and OBC reservations 143; and Supreme Court 151–2 Kerala High Court, 95 Khan, M. Yusuf 117 Khurani, Madan Lal 135

Kishwar, Madhu 158, 178 Koli of Maharashtra see Adivasi Koli Mahasangh Koli status 26, 27 Kondo, Dorinne 8 Koshti subtribe 105 Kumar, Neeraj 147 Kumar, Ramesh 81 Kumaran, K.V. 137 Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner Tribal Development 25– 31, 36, 69 Laxman, Bangaru 139, 140 legal system/disputes and identity 23–5 see also colonial legal system; Supreme Court of India legislative assemblies: reservations in 15, 16 legislative change 40 legislative franchise 160 legislative reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes: pre and post independence 15, 162–3 legislative reservations/seats for women and religious minorities see also Lok Sabha: after independence 156–7, 163, 164–72; before independence 159–162; competing demands for 168–9; suffrage 160; 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act and panchayat reservations for women 167; and subquotas for OBC-Muslims 157; suffrage 160 legislators see female legislators Let My People Go: Scheduled Caste People Group Profiles 56 liberalization 183 “Linkages: a Quantitative Profile” 59–60 lists see schedules literacy 103, 184 litigation about categories 23–4, 69–70 see also Supreme Court of India: conversion 35–8 inter-caste marriage 31–4;

260 INDEX

“spurious” tribe 25–31 Lok Sabha (House of the People): reservations in 15, 16; women in 156, 166 Lopez, Henry 176 Lourduswamy, S. 121 Madurai 123 Mahadeo Koli status 26, 27, 28, 30 Maharashtra: and census 105; infiltration of Scheduled Tribes 105; and Muslim surveys 116 Mahars 55 Mahesh, K. 81–2 major and minor minorities 159–60 major minorities (Muslims) and reserved seats 160 majority see Hindus; minorities Manavadharmasastra 13 Mandal Commission 9, 55 Mandal Commission Report 14, 114, 144– 7 see also Anti-Mandal Commission Forum; anti-Mandal protests; National Commission for Backward Classes: backwardness/class defined 145; and Muslims 114; OBCs and economic status 146–7; OBC list 83; OBC reservations 53–54; survey 146 Mandalization 9, 148 Manushi 178 Marathas 92 Marquez, Benjamin 13 marriage and caste status 34, 36, 37 marriage see inter-caste marriage Mathur, M.L. 83 Mazumdar, Veena 164, 166 men and inter-caste marriages 32 see inter-caste marraige Metcalf, Barbara 134 Metcalf, Thomas R. 24, 94;

on Risley 44 migration 74–6, 80–1; and caste/tribe certificates 75–6 Minister of Women 167 Ministry of Home Affairs: and category verification 69, 75, 97; and population growth 102 Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment 95 see also Ministry of Welfare: and category verification 77 Ministry of Welfare see also Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment: and Anthropological Survey of India data 52; and category verification 76–7, 79, 80; and inter-caste marriage 182 minorities: and census 102–5; and Hindu nationalism 128–32, 139–41 see also Hindu nationalism; major vs. minor 159 modernization theory 93 Mother Theresa 120, 136 Mughals 92 Mujahid, Abdul Malik 103 multicultural societies see also diversity and categories; identity: and toleration 9–10 multidisciplinary theories 5; of identity 6–7 see also identity multifaceted reservation categories 142–3, 154, 180–5; caste or economic criteria 147–9 see also class “multiple undulating society” 185 Mumbai reserved seats 170 Muslim League and reserved seats 160–1 Muslim OBC organization 125 Muslims see also Dalit Muslims; OBC Muslims; upper class Muslims: and caste/class recognition 113, 115– 18;

INDEX 261

and Christians 123, 137–9; census/population of 102–3 see also census; demands for reservations 114–19; electoral seats 162; as outsiders/invaders 134–5 see also Hindu nationalism; and Partition 114, 135; and proportional quotas 118; and reservations 19, 56–7, 114, 116, 117; and Scheduled Castes 89; and women’s reservations 170–1 Mysore and OBC reservations 143 Naaga Holeya 70 Naidu, Sarojini 161 Narayanan, K.R. 89 Narendran Commission 152 National Backward Classes list: admittance to 18, 83–8; and People of India data 53 National Commission for Backward Classes 14, 115 see also Kalelkar Commission; Mandal Commission: national list 18, 83–88, 149; permanent commission established 149 National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 81; anthropological data 84; and census 84, 95; certification process by 81–3; data/list compilation 83, 97; Research Division 83; reservations 63; social data 184 National Coordination Committee for SC (Dalit) Christians 138; and Dalit identity 122; protests 122 National Council of Women in India (NCWI) 160, 161 National Forum for India Women 170 nationalism see also Hindu nationalism; Mohandas Gandhi: and caste 57–9;

and ethnographic mapping 58; and Risley 45, 57–8; and Singh (K. S.) 45, 58–9 Nawaz, Begum Jahanara Shah: and women’s reservations 160–1 NCCSCC see National Coordination Committee for SC Christians NCWI see National Council of Women in India Nehru, Jawaharlal 93; and secular state 114 neo-Buddhists see Buddhists Non Resident Indian (NRI) 152 NRI see Non Resident Indian numbers: census and reservations 100; minority counts 102; and OBCs 101; power of 104; reinforcing divisions/categories 100–1, 105 OBC see Other Backward Classes OBC Muslims 115–16, 125 official backwardness see backwardness/ backward classes official classifications see also identifications: debates over 176–7; in practice 177 Order of the President: and Christians 120 Other Backward Classes (OBCs) 2; economic criteria 19–20, 142–4; definitions of 10, 14–15, 143, 145; group and individual criteria 149; and intermarriage 31; lists and group petitions 81–6, 149; numbers 101–2; parliamentary quotas 159; and People of India project 53–4; and political power 71; and reservations 14, 15, 16, 53, 64, 94, 114; and Supreme Court cases 25–31, 31–4; see also creamy layer;

262 INDEX

National Backward Classes list National Commission for Backward Classes; Socially and Economically Backward Classes (SEBCs) overlapping identities see identity Panchama 70 Pancham Bandum 70 pan-Dalit identity see caste identity; Dalit Pandey, Gyanendra 24 pan-religious identity/movement 117, 123 pan-Scheduled Caste identity 71 see also Scheduled Castes Pant, Govind 93 pariah 70 parliamentary reservations for women see legislative reservations for women Paswan, Ram Vilas 182 Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai 93 Patil sisters (Suchita and Madhuri): father 30; status verification of 25–30, 39 Paul, Valsamma 31–4 People of India (Anthropological Survey of India) 17–18, 41; administrative uses of 51–2; and caste 42; caste and nations 45; continuity with colonial survey 48, 50, 51, 55, 65; and nationalism 58–63; petitions resulting 55; political uses 51–7; Portrait Building System 51–2; process 49–50; scientific methodology 61; self-identification 53, 65, 105 People of India projects compared/ contrasted see also anthropology: administrative uses 47, 48, 51–2; agendas 62, 65–6; criminal tribes/portrait building 47, 51– 2; influence of first on second 49, 50–1;

legacies of colonial anthropology 42; nationalism 42, 44, 57–8; political (imperial) uses 41, 44, 46, 51– 7, 85; scientific claims 44 People of India (Risley) 17–18; administrative uses of 47, 48; caste as India 45; caste preeminence 43, 45–6; caste system and race 46; criminal tribes 47; ideology 41–2; and Indian nationalism 57–8; physical and social types 46; and scientific claims 43, 44 Phelan, Shane 158 Planning Commission 15–16, 49, 51 police and category verification 29 political activism see identity politics/ political activism politics of recognition/politics of redistribution 158; and multilayered identities 158 population growth 103; see also census: and family planning interest in 102; projections of 103 Portrait Building System: and criminals 51; “ethnic groups” classified 51–2 Prakash, Gyan 43–4 Prasad Committee 149 see also creamy layer Prasad, R.N. 115, 149–50, 181 privatization/private sector reservations 183 Procrustes 185 professional schools and reservations 16, 25–31, 31–4, 183 quotas 15 15–17 see also reservations: filled and unfilled race/racial categories 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 111– 12, 175–6 see also categories;

INDEX 263

identifications race/racial identities 111–12; see also identities among Mexican Americans 13; postmodern explosion of 6 racial theory in India 12; and caste 46 racism 10 Raheja, G.G. 45–6 Rajastan 85 Rajastan Univedrsity: attitudes toward marriage 32 Rajputs 85 Rao, Narasimha 62 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 128– 9; and caste 132 Rattansi, Ali 11 Reddi, Muthulakshmi 161 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 7 religion see Buddhists; Christians; Hinduism; Hindus; Muslims; Sikhs religious conversion/reconversion, converts see conversion religious identity and birth 38 reservation policies/reservations 85; administration of 67, 153 see also administration and identity; advocates for 7, 175; and categories 2–3, 5–8, 13±15 see also categories; creamy layer; Other Backward Classes; Scheduled Castes; Scheduled Tribes; and census 18 see also census; class/economic criteria see economic conditions/criteria; colonial 10–15, 70–1, 114, 119, 143, 151, 159–64 167 see also colonial policy; conflict 2, 125

see also anti-Mandal protests; and the constitution 15 see also constitution; critics of 9, 16–17 see also Anti-Mandal Commission Forum; anti-Mandal protests; Gandhi Caste Society; Hindu nationalists; and Dalit Christians 119–24 see also Christians; defined 1, 15–17; effectiveness of 15–17, 63, 184; and group-based policies elsewhere 2, 11, 91, 175–6, 180 see also affirmative action; in higher education see higher education; and identity see identity; identification; and legislative seats see legislative reservations; and litigation 23–4 see also litigation about categories; and locale 74–6, 150–1; political repercussions 3–4, 112–13, 124–6, 127–8, 140–1, 143–4, 156–7, 172–4, 177–80; Supreme Court on 15 see also Supreme Court of India; revisions of 143, 180–5 restrictions of social fluidity see Supreme Court decisions retribalization: and self identity 105 rights: and recognition 1, 12; and representation 174 Risley, Herbert 17, 41, 45, 47, 49, 50 see also anthropology; People of India: compared to Kumar Suresh Singh 42, 50; and criminal tribes 50; government uses of work 47; hierarchical caste list 93; and nationalism 57–8; People of India projects 41, 64;

264 INDEX

and politicization 47–8 Rizvi, Aizaz 133 Rudolph, Lloyd 111 Rudolph, Susanne 111 Said, Edward 111 Sajwan, Leela 148 samudaya 59 see also community Sangh Parivar see also Hindu nationalists: blood family 129; and political savvy 138, 140 sanskritization/desanskritization 25, 27–8 Sarkar, Lotika 166 Sarkar, Shivaji 102 Sarpotdar, Madhukar 168 Sassler, Sharon 11 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Joint Action Council: and minority religion inclusion 137 Scheduled Caste Order of 1950 14 The Scheduled Castes (People of India project) 41, 53; revision 55 Scheduled Caste (SC) Christians see Christians; Dalit Christians Scheduled Castes (SCs; Dalits; Harijans) 2 see also Christians; Christian Dalits: defined 14; and Buddhists 120; and caste certificates 71–4 see also caste certificates; and census 89, 90, 98–9; and conversion/reconversion 79–81 see also conversion; and Muslim reservations 117, 124, 137 see also Muslims; number of names/labels 70; and People of India project 41, 50–6, 59–60, 62–3, 65–6; and political power 71; and religions of 56, 120, 132–3; reservations for 15, 16; scheduled caste associations 98;

and varna system 50 Scheduled Tribes (STs; adivasis) 2, 14; and census see census; retribalization; and certificates 71–4; defined/described 14; litigation over membership 25–31; and People of India project 52 see also criminal tribes; reservations for 15, 16; and varna system 50; verification 28–31, 72–3 schedules: application/certification 81, 87; data gathering process 84–5 Schneider, Anne 68 Scott, James C. 6; and official categories 24, 80, 87 2nd Round Table conference 161 self identification see also People of India (Anthropological Survey of India); identity: category change 105; census 91; corrections to 90, 98 Seminar 144 Sen, Amartya 158 separate electorates 131, 160 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act: and panchayat reservations for women 167 Shah, Ghanshyam, 96 Shahabuddin, Syed, 115, 183; and Christian Dalit movement 138; and Muslim quotas 118 Sharif, Salim 123 Sharma, P.S. 103 Sharma, Rohit 151 Sheth, D.L. 53, 83, 84, 85, 95–6; and economic criteria 153 Sikhism: and Dalit Solidarity Programme 123; and definitions of Hinduism 133 Sikhs: and conversion/reconversion 79; and Scheduled Castes 120, 133 Simmel, Georg 127–8

INDEX 265

Simon Commission 119 Singh, Arjun 58 Singh, Hare Ram 147 Singh, Hosain 83 Singh, K.S.: anthropologist/administrator 50; and caste fluidity 60–1; ethnographer 58; and lower caste progress 60–1; and nationalism 58–9; and OBC definitions 53; and People of India survey 49, 52, 53, 63, 64; unity of Indian peoples 59–60 Singh, O.P. 147 Singh, V.P. 7, 96–7; and Hindu nationalist opposition 132; and Mandal report findings 144; and OBC reservations 53–4, 64, 95, 114, 147; and reservation policy 53, 95, 147, 184; and women 173 Singh, Yogendra 64 Singhal, Ashok 136 Skocpol, Theda 68 social fluidity: and the Supreme Court 25 social identities see identity Socially and Economically Backward Classes (SEBCs) 17 see also Other Backward Classes Sonavane, Vilas 116 special concessions 70 spurious tribe 25–6 Srinivas, M.N. 27, 28, 184 state identification 1; see also identification: groups official and theoretical boundaries 4; and social identity 12 state legislative assemblies: reservations in 15, 16 state simplifications 17, 67–8, 177–8 see also identification; and political complications 18–20 see also identity The Statesman 54 Subbarayan, Radhabai 161;

and Franchise Committee 162; and reserved seats 161–2 Supreme Court of India see also litigation about categories: and classifications 146; and conversions 38; and creamy layers/truly backward (OBC) 142, 143, 148, 149; defines class 145; and government distinctions 155; and group boundaries 39; and identity categories 24–5; and migrants 75; and reconversion 37; and reservation policy 95, 154; suppressed classes 70 Supreme Court of India cases/decisions: Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra and Another v. Union of India 75; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 95, 148, 149, 154; Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner Tribal Development 25– 8, 39; S. Swvigaradoss v. Zonal Manager 35– 8, 39, 80; Valsamma Paul v Cochin University 31–4, 39, 76 Swaraj, Sushma 136 S. Swvigaradoss v. Zonal Manager 35–8, 39, 80 Swvigaradoss, S. 35 Tamil Nadu 103, 155 see also Tirunelveli District: Christians of 123; Muslim conversions in 135 target populations 68, 73–4 Taylor, Charles 12 Tharoor, Shashi 133 theories see identity Thorat, S.K. 179 Tirunelveli District in Tamil Nadu 37 Towards Equality 20, 163, 164, 165, 169;

266 INDEX

and debates over reservations 164–6, 173 traits: correlations of 59–60 Travancore see also Kerala: Public Service Commission 151 UN and women 163 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 34, 163 see also Dalits; untouchables 70 Harijans; Scheduled Castes upper class Muslims 117; and backward status 117–18 Uttar Pradesh 155 Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University 31–4, 36 Van den Berghe, Pierre 111–12 varna 11, 48, 50 see also caste: defined 13; and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 50 Varshney, Ashutosh 125 Vedas 13 VHP see Vishwas Hindu Parishad Vijayanunni, M. 96, 104 Vishwas Hindu Parishad (VHP) 135; see also Hindu nationalism: and Hindu missionaries and Mother Theresa 136 Walzer, Michael 9–10 Watson, J. Forbes 41 Weber, Max 5 “What Does SC Mean?” 133–4 White, Michael 11 Why I am not a Hindu 141 Wright, Theodore P. 114, 115 women see also gender; reserved legislative seats; 2nd Round Table conference:

and activism 163–4; and arranged marriages 32; associations, before independence 160; as disadvantaged 169–70, 174; identity 7–8, 172–3; and inter-caste marriages 31–2, 39; medical students 26; and overlapping and competing categories 159; religious minorities and legislative seats, 156–7, 159, 160; reservations 16, 20; reserved seats and equality 160–2, 179; as a rightful group 157; in Third World 163; and UN 163; as wives 31 women’s associations/organizations: and Muslim reservations 170; and politics/lobbying 160–1 Women’s India Association (WIA) 160, 161, 165–6 The Women’s Reservation Bill and legislative seats 156–7 Yadav, Sharad 170 Young, M. Crawford 43

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