Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology

EDMUND HUSSERL COLLECTED WORKS VOLUME II

Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Third Book: Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences Volume II Ideas pertaining to a pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology Volume I

T R A N S L A T IO N S P R E P A R E D U N D E R T H E A U S P IC E S O F T H E H U S S E R L A R C H IV E S (L O U V A IN )

E D M U N D HUSSERL

IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY F irst B ook GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY T R A N S L A T E D BY

F. KERSTEN

1983 MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS a member o f ihe KLUWER A C A D E M IC PU BLISH ER S G RO UP

T H E H A G U E / BOSTON / L A N C A S T E R

f

Translation of Edmund Husserl,

Ideen zu einei leinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophies I. Buch: AUgemeine Einfuhrung in die reme Phanomenologie. Halle a. d. S., Max

Nicmeycr Ycrlag, 1913. With corrections and supplementary materials (in footnotes) from Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie, I. Bitch: AUgemeine Einfuhrung in die reme Phanomenologie. Neu herausgegeben von Karl Schuhmann, 1. Hall)band: Text der 1-3 Auflage {Hmserliana Band III, 1); 2. Halbband: Erganzende Texte i 1912-1929) (Husserliana Band III, 2). Den Haag, Martinus NijhofT, 1976. Distributors:

for the United States and Canada K luwcr Boston, Inc. 190 Old Derby Street Hingham , M A 02043 U SA for all other countries Kluwer Academ ic Publishers Group Distribution Center P.O. Box 322 3300 AH Dordrecht T he Netherlands

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Clfc?

H u s s e r l , Edmund, 1 8 5 9 - 1 9 3 8 . I d e a s p e r t a i n in g t o a p u re p h en em en ology and t o a p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l p h ilo s o p h y . T r a n s l a t i o n o f : I d e e n zu e i n e r r e in e n P hano­ m e n o lo g ie und p h a n o m e n o lo g isc h e n P h i l o s o p h i e . C o n t e n ts : 1 s t b k . G e n e r a l i n t r o d u c t i o n t o pure p h en o m en o lo g y . 1 . P h en o m en o lo g y . I . T itle . B32 7 9 .H 9 3 I3 1 3 U 2 f .7 8 2 -2 1 8 0 ISBN 9 0 -2 1 * 7 -2 5 0 3 -8 ( v . l ) AACR2

first published in paperback 1983 ISBN 90-247-2852-5 (paperback) ISBN 90-247-2503-8 (hardback) ISBN 90-247-2342-6 (series) Copyright © 1982 by Martinus Nijhojf Publishers bv, The Hague. All rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recordingy or otherwise, without the prior written permission o f the publisher, Martinus Nijhojf Publishers, P. O. Box 566y 2501 C N The Haguey The Netherlands.

PRIN TED IN TH E NETHERLANDS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

N o t e o f t r a n s l a t o r ..........................................................................................................

xm

I n t r o d u c t i o n ............................................................................................................................

x v ii

F ir s t B o o k

G e n e r a l I n t r o d u c t i o n t o P u r e P h e n o m e n o lo g y P art one

ESSENCE AND EIDETIC COGNITION C hapter O ne

M a t t e r o f F a c t a n d E sse n c e § § § §

1. 2. 3. 4.

§ § § §

5. 6. 7. 8.

§ § § § § § § §

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

§

17.

Natural Cognition and Experience.............................................................................. M atter o f Fact. Inseparability o f M atter of Fact and Essence. . . . Eidetic Seeing and Intuition of Som ething In d iv id u a l......................................... Eidetic Seeing and Phantasy. Eidetic Cognition Independent o f All Cognition o f Matters of F act............................................................................................................... Judgm ents About Essences and Judgm ents H aving Eidetic Universal Validity. Some Fundam ental Concepts. Universality and N ecessity................................... Sciences o f Matters of Fact and Eidetic Sciences..................................................... Relationships of Dependence Between Science o f Matters of Fact and Eidetic Science................................................................................................................................... Region and R egional Eidetics........................................................................................ Region and Category. T he Analytic Region and Its Categories......................... Syntactical O bjectivities and U ltim ate Substrates. Syntactical Categories. . Genus and Species.............................................................................................................. G eneralization and Formalization................................................................................ Substrate-Categories. T he Substrate-Essence and the Todi T i........................... Selfsufficient and Non-selfsufficient Objects. Concretum and Individuum. . Region and Category in the M aterially Filled Sphere. Synthetical Cognitions A Priori......................................................................................... .................. Conclusion o f O ur Logical Considerations..............................................

5 7 8 11 12 14 15 17 18 20 23 24 26 27 28 31 ^

C hapter T wo

N a t u r a l is t ic M is in t e r p r e t a t io n s § § § § § § § § §

18. Introduction to the Critical D iscussions..................................................................... 19. The Empiricistic Identification of Experience and the Originarily Presentive A c t ....................................................... ............................................................ 20. Empiricism as S k e p t ic is m ......................................... 21. Obscurities on the Idealistic S i d e .............................................................................. 22. The Reproach of Platonic Realism. Essence and Concept . . 23. The Spontaneity of Ideation. Essence and F i c t u m .............................................. 24. The Principle of All P r i n c ip l e s .................................................................................. 25. In Praxis: T he Positivist as Scientific Investigator o f Nature. In Reflection: The Scientific Investigator as P o sitiv ist.............................................................................. 26. Sciences of the D ogm atic and Sciences o f the Philosophical Attitude . . . .

33 35 37 39 40 43 44 45 46

P a r t T wo

THE CONSIDERATIONS FUNDAMENTAL TO PHENOMENOLOGY C hapter O ne

T h e P o s it in g W h ic h B e l o n g s t o t h e N a t u r a l A t t it u d e a n d I ts E x c l u s io n § § § § § §

27. The world o f the Natural Attitude: I and My Surrounding World . . . . 28. The Cogito. My Natural Surrounding World and the Ideal Surrounding W o r l d s ................................................................................................................................ 29. The “ O ther” Ego-Subjects and the Intersubjective Natural Surrounding W o r l d ............................................................................................................................ 30. The General Positing W hich Characterizes the Natural A t t i t u d e .................. 31. Radical Alteration of the Natural Positing. “ Excluding,” “ Parenthesizing.” 32. T he Phenom enological f e j io x ^ ..............................................................................

51 53 55 56 57 60

C h a p t e r T wo

C o n sc io u sn e ss a n d N a t u r a l A c t u a l it y § § § § § § §

33. Preliminary Indication o f “Pure” or “ Transcendental” Consciousness As the Phenom enological R e s id u u m ................................ 34. T he Essence o f Consciousness as T h e m e ................................................................ 35. T he Cogito as “ A ct.” N on-actionality M o d if ic a t io n ......................................... 36. Intentive M ental Processes. M ental Process Taken U n iv e r s a lly ....................... 37. The Pure Ego’s “ Directedness-to” W ithin the Cogito and the H eeding Which Seizes U p o n ....................................................................................................................... 38. Reflections on Acts. Perception of Som ething Imm anent and o f Something T r a n s c e n d e n t .................................................................................................................. 39. Consciousness and Natural Actuality. The “ N aive” Hum an Being’s C o n c e p t io n .......................................................................................................................

63 67 69 73 75 78 81

§

§ § § § § §

40. “ Primary” and “ Secondary” Qualities. The Physical T hing Given “ In Person” a “ Mere Appearance” of the “True Physical T h in g” Determined in P h y s i c s ................................................................................................................................ 41. T he Really Inherent Composition o f Perception and Its Transcendent Object 42. Being as Consciousness and Being as Reality. Essentially Necessary Difference Between the M odes o f In tu itio n .................................................................................. 43. T he Clarification o f a Fundamental Error................................................................ 44. Merely Phenom enal Being of Som ething Transcendent, Absolute Being of Something Im m a n e n t..................................................................................................... 45. Unperceived M ental Processes, Unperceived R e a l i t y ......................................... 46. Indubitability of the Perception o f Som ething Im m anent, Dubitability o f the Perception o f Som ething T ran scen d en t.....................................................................

84 86 89 92 94 98 100

C hapter T hree

T h e R e g io n o f P u r e C o n sc io u sn e ss § § § §

47. 48. 49. 50.

§ §

51. 52.

§ §

53. 54.

§

55.

T he Natural World as a Correlate of Consciousness......................................................105 The Logical Possibility and the Material Countersense of a World Outside Ours 108 Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the A nnihilation of the World 109 T he Phenom enological Attitude; Pure Consciousness as the Field of P h e n o m e n o lo g y .............................................................................................................. ........112 The Signification of the Transcendental Preliminary Considerations . . . . 114 Supplem entations. T he Physical T h in g as Determined by Physics and the “ Unknow n Cause o f Appearance.” ......................................................................... ........117 Animalia and Psychological C o n s c io u s n e s s ........................................................... ........124 Continuation. The Transcendent Psychological M ental Process Accidental and Relative; the Transcendental M ental Process Necessary and Absolute . 127 Conclusion. All Reality Existent by Virtue of “Sense-bestowal.” Not a “ Subjective Idealism .” ................................................................ .................. ........128

C h a p te r F our

T h e P h e n o m e n o l o g ic a l R e d u c t io n s § § § § § § §

56. The Question About the Range of the Phenom enological Reduction. Natural and Cultural S c ie n c e s ..................................................................................................... 57. T he Q uestion o f the Exclusion o f the Pure E g o ............................ 58. T he Transcendency, God, E x c lu d e d ......................................................................... 59. T he Transcendency o f the Eidetic. Exclusion of Pure Logic as Mathesis U n i v e r s a l is ....................................................................................................................... 60. The Exclusion o f M aterial-Eidetic D is c ip lin e s ....................................................... 61. The M ethodological Signification of the Systematic Theory of Phenom enolog­ ical R ed u ctio n s................................................................................................................... 62. Epistemological Anticipations. The “ D ogm atic” and the Phenom enological A ttitu d e..................................................................................................... . . . .

131 132 133 135 137 139 141

P art T hree M ETH O D S AND PROBLEM S OF PURE PH ENO M ENO LO G Y

C hapter O ne P r e l im in a r y M § § § § §

63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

§ § §

68. 69. 70.

§ § §

71. 72. 73.

§ §

74. 75.

e t h o d ic

D

e l ib e r a t io n s

The Particular Significance of M ethodic Deliberations for Phenom enology . 147 T h e Phenom enologist’s S e lf-E x c lu s io n .............................................................................149 The Reflexive Reference o f Phenom enology to I t s e l f ......................................... ........149 Faithful Expression o f Clear Data. Unam biguous Term s..................................... ........151 The Method o f Clarification, “Nearness of Givenness” and “ Remoteness of Givenness.” ...............................................................................................................................153 G enuine and Spurious Degrees o f Clarity. T he Essence of Normal Clarification 155 The M ethod o f Perfectly Clear Seizing U pon E s s e n c e s .............................................156 The R ole o f Perception in the M ethod o f Eidetic Clarification. T h e Primacy o f Free P h a n t a s y .................................................................................................................. ........157 The Problem of the Possibility of a Descriptive Eidetics of M ental Processes . 160 Eidetic Sciences: Concrete, Abstract, “ M athem atical.” .............................................161 Application to the Problem o f Phenom enology. Description and Exact D e te r m in a tio n .................................................................................................................. ........164 Descriptive and Exact S c ie n c e s .................................................................................. ........166 Phenom enology as a Descriptive Eidetic Doctrine o f Pure M ental Processes . 167

C hapter T w o U § § § § § § § § § § §

n iv e r s a l

S tructures

of

P u r e C o n s c io u s n e s s

76. T he Them e of the Following In v e stig a tio n s........................................................... ........171 77. Reflection as a Fundam ental Peculiarity of the Sphere o f M ental Processes. Studies in R e f l e c t i o n .................................................................................................... ........174 78. The Phenom enological Study of Reflections on M ental P r o c e ss e s .................. ........177 79. Critical Excursis. Phenom enology and the Difficulties o f “ Self-Observation.” 181 80. The Relationship o f Mental Processes to the Pure Ego ................................ ........190 81. Phenom enological T im e and Consciousness of T i m e ......................................... ........192 82. Continuation. T he Three-fold Horizon of M ental Processes As At The Same Tim e the H orizon o f Reflection O n M ental P r o cesses.................................................195 83. Seizing U p on the Unitary Stream o f M ental Processes as “ Id ea.” .................. ........197 84. lntentionality as Principal Them e of P h en om en ology......................................... ........199 85. Sensuous f5Xr| , Intentive ......................................................................................203 86. T he Functional P r o b le m s ........................................................................................... ........207

C hapter T hree N

o e sis a n d

N

oem a

§ 87. Preliminary R e m a r k s .............................................................................................................211 § 88. R eally Inherent and Intentive Components o f M ental Processes. The Noem a 213 § 89. Noem atic Statem ents and Statem ents About Actuality. The Noem a in the Psychological S p h e r e ............................................................................................................ 216

§ § § § § § §

90. T he “ N oem atic Sense” and the Distinction Between “ Im m anental” and “ Actual O bjects.” ......................................................................................................... ....... 217 91. Extension to the W idest Sphere of ln te n tio n a lity .................................................. ....... 221 92. The Noetic and Noem atic Aspects of Attentional C h a n g e s................................ ....... 222 93. Transition to the Noetic-Noem atic Structures of the Higher Spheres o f C o n sc io u s n e ss......................................................................................................... ................ 226 94. Noesis and N oem a in the Realm o f J u d g m e n t ....................................................... ....... 227 95. The Analogous Distinctions in the Em otional and Volitional Spheres . . . 231 96. Transition to Further Chapters. C oncluding R em arks......................................... ....... 233

C hapter F our T § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § §

h e set o f

P r o b l e m s P e r t a in in g

to

N

o e t ic - N o e m a t ic

Structures

97. The H yletic and N oetic Moments as Really Inherent Moments, the N oem atic M oments as R eally Non-Inherent M om ents, o f M ental P r o c e sse s.................. ....... 236 98. The M ode o f Being o f the Noem a. Theory o f Forms of Noeses. Theory o f Forms o f N o e m a t a ....................................................................................................................... ....... 240 99. T he N oem atic Core and Its Characteristics in the Sphere o f Original Presen­ tations and P r e s e n t a t io n s ................................................................................................... 243 100. Eidetically Lawful Hierarchical Formations o f Objectivations in the Noesis and N o e m a ....................................................................................................................... ....... 245 101. Characteristics o f Levels. Different Sorts of “ Reflections.” ................................ ....... 247 102. Transition to New Dimensions o f Characterizations..................................................... 248 103. Belief-characteristics and B eing-characteristics....................................................... .......249 104. T he D oxic M odalities as M o d ific a tio n s............................................................................251 105. Belief-M odality as Belief, Being-M odality as B e i n g .....................................................252 106. Affirmation and Denial Along With Their Noem atic C orrelations.................. ....... 253 107 Reiterated M odifications................................................................................................ ....... 255 108. Noem atic Characteristics Not Determ inations Produced by “ Reflection.” . 256 109. The Neutrality M o d ific a tio n ....................................................................................... .......257 110. Neutralized Consciousness and Legitim ation of Reason. Assuming . . . . 259 111. The Neutrality M odification and P h a n t a s y ........................................................... .......260 112. Reiterability o f the Phantasy M odification. Non-Reiterability of the N eu ­ trality M o d ific a tio n ......................................................................................................... .......262 113. Actual and Potential P o s i t in g s .................................................................................. .......264 114. Further Concerning the Potentiality o f Positing and Neutrality M odification 268 115. Applications. T h e Broadened Concept of an Act. Effectings of an A ct. Arousals o f an A c t ...................................................................................................................................272 116. Transition to New Analyses. T he Founded Noeses and Their N oem atic C o rrela tes...................................................................................................................................275 117. The Founded Positings and the Conclusion o f the Doctrine o f Neutrality M odifications. T he Universal Concept of P o s i t i n g .....................................................278 118. Syntheses o f Consciousness. Syntactical F o r m s....................................................... .......283 119. The Transm utation of Polythetical and M onothetical A c ts................................ .......285 120. Positionality and Neutrality in the Sphere of S y n t h e s e s ............................................ 287 121. Doxic Syntaxes in the Emotional and Volitional S p h e r e s ................................ ....... 288 122. M odes of Effectuation of the Articulated Syntheses. “ T h em e.” ....................... ....... 291 123. Confusion and Distinctness as M odes o f Effectuation o f Synthetical Acts . . 293 124. The N oetic-N oem atic Stratum of “ Logos.” Signifying and Signification. . . 294 125. T h e M odalities o f Effectuation in the Logical-Expressive Sphere and the M ethod o f C la r ific a tio n ................................................................................................ ....... 297

§ 126. Completeness and Universality of E x p r e s s io n ....................................................... § 127. The Expression o f Judgm ents and the Expression of Em otional Noem as .

299 300

Part F our R E A SO N A N D A C T U A L IT Y

C hapter O ne T § § § § § §

he

N

o e m a t ic

S e n se

and the

R

e l a t io n t o t h e

O

b jec t

128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133.

In tro d u ctio n ............................................................................................................................... 307 “ C ontent” and “ Object;” the Content as “ Sense.” ...................................................... 309 D elim itation o f the Essence, “ Noem atic Sense.” ................................................... ....... 311 The “ O bject,” the “Determ inable X in the N oem atic Sense.” ...............................313 The Core As a Sense in the Mode Belonging to its F u lln ess........................................ 316 T he N oem atic Positum. Posited and Synthetic Posita. Posita in the Realm o f O b je c tiv a tio n s.................................................................................................................. .......317 § 134. The Doctine of Apophantic F orm s......................................................................................319 § 135. O bject and Consciousness. T he Transition to the Phenom enology of Reason 322

C hapter T wo P h enom enology

of

R

e a so n

§ 136. T he First Fundam ental Form of Rational Consciousness: Originarily Presentive “ Seeing.” ......................................................................................................................326 § 137. Evidence and Intellectual Sight. “O rdinary” and “ Pure” Evidence, Assertoric and Apodictic E v id e n c e ................................................................................................ ........329 § 138. Adequate and Inadequate E v id e n c e ......................................................................... ........331 § 139. The Interweaving o f All Kinds of Reason. Theoretical, Axiological and Pract­ ical T r u t h 333 § 140. Confirmation. Justification W ithout Evidence. Equivalence of Positional and Neutral Intellectual S i g h t ........................................................................................... ....... 336 § 141. Im m ediate and M ediate Rational Positing. M ediate E v id e n c e .............................. 338 § 142. Rational Positing and B e i n g ...............................................................................................340 § 143. A dequate Physical Thing-Givenness as Idea in the K antian S en se.................. ....... 342 § 144. A ctuality and Originary Presentive Consciousness: Concluding D eterm inations.................................................................................................................. ....... 343 § 145. Critical Considerations Concerning the Phenom enology o f Evidence . . . 344

C hapter T hree T

he

L evels

of

U

n iv e r s a l it y

T

P e r t a in in g T R easo n

o

T

he

P roblem s

of t h e

h eo r y of

§ 146. T h e Most Universal P r o b l e m s .................................................................................. § 147. Ram ifications o f the Problem. Formal Logic, Axiology and Theory of Practice § 148. Problems of the Theory of Reason Pertaining to Formal O ntology . . . .

349 350 353

§ 149. The Problems of the Theory of Reason Pertaining to Regional Ontologies. The 355 Problem of Phenom enological C o n s titu tio n ........................................................... .......359 § 150. Continuation. T he Region, Physical Thing, As Transcendental Clue . . . § 151. The Strata o f the Transcendental Constitution of the Physical Thing. 363 Supplem entations.....................................................................................................................364 § 152. Extension of the Problem of Transcendental Constitution to Other Regions . § 153. The Full Extension of the Transcendental Problem T he Articulation of the 366 I n v e s t ig a t io n s ................................................................ Index to Proper N a m e s .....................................................................................................................371 Analytic Subject In d e x . . ................... .......................................372

T R A N S L A T O R ’S N O T E

Edm und H usserl’s Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie undph'anomenologischen Philosophic, Erstes Buch: AUgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine PKdnomenologie, was first published in 1913 in the first volume of Jahrbuchfur Philosophie und phanomenologische Forschung, edited by Edm und Husserl, A dolf R einach, M ax Scheler, M oritz Geiger and A lexander Pfander (Halle: M ax Niemeyer), pp. 1-323. In 1922 the book was reprinted with an “ Ausflihrliches Sachregister” prepared by G erda W alther. R eprinted again in 1928, the book contained a “ Sachregis­ ter” prepared by Ludwig L andgrebe replacing th at of G erda W alther. A new edition of the book was published in 1950 by M artinus NijhofT, T he Hague. Edited by W alter Biemel, the title page states th at the edition is a “ Neu, a u f G rund der handschriftlichen Zusatze des Verfassers erw eiterte Auflage.” This edition, p u b ­ lished as V olum e III of Edm und Husserl, Gesammelte Werke (Husserliana) included additions, insertions and m arginal notes of Husserl which were either run into the text itself or printed in a section of “ Textkritische A nm erkungen” (pp. 4 6 3 ^ 8 3 ). M uch of this supple­ m entary m aterial was taken from three copies of Ideen which Husserl annotated between 1913 and 1929. Biemel also included as a p ­ pendices m anuscripts of Husserl in which he either developed further certain ideas in the text or else tried to rewrite existing sections of the book. In 1976 Biemel’s edition was replaced by one edited by Dr. K arl Schuhm ann (Husserliana III , 1 and I II , 2), also published by M ar­ tinus NijhofT. This new edition establishes a corrected text of the three editions printed during Husserl’s lifetime and contains, in a second volume, revised and corrected texts of the supplem entary m aterial found in Biemel’s edition along with m aterial not found in th at edition. In addition to reproducing Husserl’s annotations in still

another copy of Ideen (the copies are identified as Copies A, B, C, D ),1 this edition prints, am ong others, all of the m anuscripts which Husserl had prepared for W. R. Boyce Gibson b ut which the latter did not use in his translation.2 Every effort has been m ade to conform the present translation to the text as published by Dr. Schuhm ann. Included in footnotes is a representative selection of Husserl’s annotations in his four copies of Ideen along with a num ber of very short appendices. T he source of the note is identified according to Dr. Schuhm ann’s edition (e.g., ‘‘A ddition in Copy A ” ), while Husserl’s own footnotes in the printed editions during his lifetime are identified by the locution, “A U T H O R ’S F O O T N O T E .” N um bers of the appendices refer to Dr. Schuhm ann’s arrangem ent of them. Unless otherwise stated, the supplem entary m aterial is to be applied after the word to which the footnote is affixed. All internal page references, including those of the indices, are to the pages of the first printed edition and which appear in the m argins of the pages. A lthough all of the supplem entary m aterials published by Dr. Schuhm ann is valuable to anyone seeking a thorough scholarly and philosophical understanding of H usserl’s great work (Dr. Schuh­ m ann published 38 pages of Husserl’s annotations, and 132 pages of appendices), chiefly for reasons of economy I have translated only a selection of this m aterial. As a consequence, the make up of this volume differs from th at of Dr. Schuhm ann. T aken as a whole, however, the supplem entary m aterials included in the present trans­ lation provide w hat, in my judgm ent, is a good picture of a significant com m entary by Husserl on his own text over a period of about sixteen years and which, I believe, will satisfy the im m ediate needs of the English-speaking reader. 1 For a discussion o f the nature and dating of Husserl’s annotations in these copies, see Schuhm ann’s account in Husscrliana III, 2, pp. 657f., and his “ Einieitungdes Herausgebers” in III, 1, pp. Lff. According to Schuhm ann (III, 2, p. 478), Copy A was annotated from 1913 to 1929; Copy B between 1914 and 1921; Copy C ca. 1921, and Copy D in the Fall o f 1929. * Dated from around 1925 to 1929, these manuscripts are printed in III, 2, pp. 627-651, and discussed by Schuhm ann in III, 1, pp. X L V IIff. T he manuscripts chiefly concern the second chapter o f Part II of Ideen, and reflect Husserl’s attem pt both to reformulate the line of thought in that chapter concerning the psychological and transcendental reductions, and to rewrite the text in such a way that it is brought up to the level o f his thought in the late 1920’s. An important and detailed study o f the various groups of manuscripts involved in the genesis and developm ent o f Ideen also can be found in the second volume of Karl Schuhm ann’s Die Dialektik der Phdnomenologie (Den Haag: Martinus NijhofT, 1973); and a penetrating study of Ideen is given in the same author’s Die Fundamentalbetrachtung der Phanomenologie. £um Weltproblem in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls (Den Haag: Martinus NijhofT, 1971).

A basic concern in m aking this translation has been to preserve H usserl’s distinctions in English and to render his ideas by ex­ pressions which conform to the things themselves which he sought to describe. O f great help in this connection was the Guidefor Translating Husserl by Dorion Cairns3. T he translation also benefited from a com parison with the following published translations: Idles directrices pour unephenomenologie, traduit de l’allem and p ar Paul Ricoeur (Paris: G allim ard, 1950); Ideas relativas a una fenomenologia puray una Jilosofia fenomenoldgica; con las adiciones, notas m arginales y correcciones postumas, traducido por Jose Gaos (Mexico-Buenos Aires: Fondo de C ultura Econom ica, 1962); and Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: George Allen & U nw in Ltd., 1931). A translation is always only th at — a translation. W hile it is possible to m ake Husserl’s philosophy accessible and, hopefully, equally plausible in English, it is also to be hoped th at final judgm ent of the work will be m ade of the expression of this philosophy in the original, and th at the failings of the translator will not be laid to the author. I dedicate this translation to the mem ory of my M other, who thoughtfully gave me my copy of Ideen as a graduation present from college; and to the memory of Dorion Cairns, who patiently helped, me learn to read it. W. R. Boyce G ibson’s translation of Ideen was of great help to me in preparing my translation, and I have tried to preserve the high standard he set for the translation of Husserl. I wish to express here my deep gratitude to Professor Q. B. Gibson of the A ustralian N ational University for his generous cooperation in perm itting the publication of my translation. I also wish to acknowledge the help and encouragem ent in p rep ar­

3 D orion Cairns, Guidefor Translating Husserl (Den Haag: Martinus NijhofT, 1973). Am ong the papers left by Dorion Cairns at his death in 1973 was a very early draft o f about half o f Ideen, some o f which, however, underwent extensive revision in later years. However, with but a few exceptions, this draft did not conform at all to Cairn’s translations o f Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Martinus NijhofT, 1960) and Formal and Transcendental Logic (The Hague: Martinus NijhofT, 1969), nor to the material published in the Guide. W hat Cairns’s translation might have looked like had he been able to com plete it can be found in his essay, “The m any Senses and Denotations of the World Bewufitsein (“Consciousness” ) in Edmund Husserl’s W ritings,” in Life-World and Consciousness. Essaysfor Aron Gurwitsch, edited by Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 20-27. (I wish to thank Richard Zaner, the owner of Cairns’s papers, for allowing me to consult and make use o f Cairns’s manuscripts, especially the commentary Cairns had prepared on Ideen in the years im mediately preceding his death.)

ing my translation from A lexander Schimm elpenninck, Publisher, M artinus Nijhoff; Dr. K arl Schuhm ann, editor of the definitive edition of Ideen\ Dr. Samuel IJsseling, D irector of the HusserlArchives at Louvain; Dr. Lester Em bree, D uquesne University; and Dr. R ichard Zaner, Southern M ethodist University. Andy and Steve K ersten helped prepare the final typescript. F.K .

IDEAS P E R T A IN IN G TO A P U R E P H E N O M E N O L O G Y AN D TO A P H E N O M E N O L O G IC A L P H IL O SO P H Y IN T R O D U C T IO N



Pure phenomenology, the way to which we seek here, the unique position of which relative to all other sciences we shall characterize and show to be the science fundam ental to philosophy, is an es­ sentially new science which, in consequence of its most radical essential peculiarity, is remote from natural thinking and therefore only in our days presses toward developm ent. It is called a science of “ phenom ena” . O th er sciences, long known, also concern pheno­ m ena. Thus we hear that psychology is designated as a science of psychical “ appearances” or phenom ena and th at natural science is designated as a science of physical “ appearances” or phenom ena; likewise on occasion historical phenom ena are spoken of in the science of history, cultural phenom ena in the science of culture; and som ething similar is true of all other sciences of realities. No m atter how varied m ay be the sense of the word “ phenom ena” in such locutions, and no m atter w hat further significations it may have, it is certain that phenomenology also relates to all these “ phenom ena” and does so with respect to all significations of the word “ pheno­ m enon.” But phenomenology relates to them in a wholly different attitu d e whereby any sense of the word “ phenom enon” which we find in the long-known sciences becomes modified in a definite way. To understand these modifications or, to speak more precisely, to bring about the phenomenological attitude and, by reflecting, to elevate its specific peculiarity and that of the natural attitudes into the scientific consciousness — this is the first and by no means easy task whose dem ands we must perfectly satisfy if we are to achieve the realm of phenomenology and scientifically assure ourselves of the essence proper to phenomenology. D uring the last decade m uch has been said in G erm an philosophy and psychology about phenomenology. In supposed agreem ent with

the Logische Untersuchungen} phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of em pirical psychology, as a sphere comprising “ im m an ental” descriptions of psychical m ental processes, a sphere compris­ ing descriptions th at — so the im m anence in question is understood — "are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It would seem th at my protest against this conception2 has been of little avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological m ethod are also quite negative because they miss the straightforw ard sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological m ethod did not at all deny the value of m odern psychology, did not at all disparage the experim ental work done by em inent men. R a th e r it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of m ethod upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification of its field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed “ attacks.” 3 I touch on this dispute here so that, in view of the prevailing m isinterpretations, ever so rich in consequences, I can sharply emphasize from the start that pure phenomenology>access to which we shall prepare in the following essay — the same phenom enology th at m ade a first break-through in the Logische Untersuchungen, and the sense of which has opened itself up to me more deeply and richly in the continuing work of the last decade — is not psychology and th at neither accidental delim itations of its field nor its terminologies, but most radical essential grounds, prevent its inclusion in psychology. No m atter how great the significance which phenom enology must claim to have for the m ethod of psychology, no A u t h o r ’ s f o o t n o t e : E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, two volumes [Halle: Max Niem eyer], 1900 and 1901. [English translation: logical Investigation*;. translated by J. N. Findlay (London: R outledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). | 2 a u t h o r ’s f o o t n o t e : In the article, “Philosophic als strcngc Wissenschaft,” Logos, Vol. I. pp. 316-318 (note especially the statements concerning the concept of experience, p. 316). [English translation: “ Philosophy as Rigorous S cien ce/’ translated by Q uentin Lauer in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 112 -116.] Compare the detailed discussion that had already been devoted to the relationship between phenom enology and psychology in my “ Bericht iiber deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895 99” [“ Review of German W riting on Logic in the Years 1895-99” ], Archiv fiir systematisehe Phitosophie. Band IX . 1904. pp 397 -400. I could not alter a word today. sIn Copy A, the passage beginning in supposed agreement and ending with my supposed “ attacks” is placed in square brackets.

m atter how essential the “ foundations” which it furnishes for it, pure phenomenology (if only because it is a science of ideas) is no m ore psychology than geometry is natural science. Indeed, the difference proves to be an even more radical one than th at in the case com ­ pared. T he fact th a t pure phenom enology is not psychology is in no respect altered by the fact th at phenomenology has to do w ith4 “ consciousness,” with all sorts of m ental processes, acts and actcorrelates. W hat with the prevailing habits of thinking, to achieve an insight into th at indeed requires no little effort. T h a t we set aside all hitherto prevailing habits of thinking, th at we recognize and tear down the intellectual barrier with which they confine the horizon of our thinking and now, with full freedom of thought, seize upon the genuine philosophical problems to be set completely anew m ade accessible to us only by the horizon open on all sides: these are hard dem ands. But nothing less is required. Indeed, w hat makes so extra­ ordinarily hard the acquisition of the proper essence of phenom e­ nology, the understanding of the peculiar sense of its problems, and of its relationship to all other sciences (in particular to psychology), is that, for all this, a new style o f attitude is needed which is entirely altered in contrast to the natural attitude in experiencing and the natural attitu d e in thinking. To move freely in it w ithout relapsing into the old attitudes, to learn to see, distinguish, and describe w hat lies within view, require, moreover, peculiar and laborious studies. It will be the pre-em inent task of this First Book to seek ways by which the excessive difficulties of penetrating into this new world can be overcome, so to speak, piece by piece. We shall start from the natural standpoint, from the world as it confronts us, from5 consci­ ousness as it offers itself in psychological experience; and we shall lay bare the presuppositions essential to psychological experience. W e shall then develop a m ethod of “ phenom enological reductions”