ICTs, Citizens and Governance: After the Hype! Volume 14 Innovation and the Public Sector

ICTs, CITIZENS AND GOVERNANCE: AFTER THE HYPE! Innovation and the Public Sector The functioning of the public sector ...

Author: A.J. Meijer | K. Boersma and P. Wagenaar

12 downloads 666 Views 4MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

ICTs, CITIZENS AND GOVERNANCE: AFTER THE HYPE!

Innovation and the Public Sector The functioning of the public sector gives rise to considerable debate. Not only the efficiency and efficacy of the sector are at stake, but also its legitimacy. At the same time we see that in the public sector all kinds of innovations are taking place. These innovations are not only technological, which enable the redesign of all kinds of processes, like service delivery. The emphasis can also be put on more organizational and conceptual innovations. In this series we will try to understand the nature of a wide variety of innovations taking place in the public sector of the 21st century and try to evaluate their outcomes. How do they take place? What are relevant triggers? And, how are their outcomes being shaped by all kinds of actors and influences? And, do public innovations differ from innovations in the private sector? Moreover we try to assess the actual effects of these innovations, not only from an instrumental point of view, but also from a more institutional point of view. Do these innovations not only contribute to a better functioning of the public sector, but do they also challenge grown practices and vested interests? And what does this imply for the management of public sector innovations? Series Editors:

Prof. Dr. Victor J.J.M. Bekkers Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Prof. Jean Hartley The University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom

Prof. Sharon S. Dawes University at Albany/SUNY, Albany, NY, USA

Volume 14 Recently published in this series Vol. 13. Vol. 12.

Vol. 11. Vol. 10. Vol. 9.

D. Griffin, P. Trevorrow and E. Halpin (Eds.), Developments in e-Government – A Critical Analysis V. Bekkers, H. van Duivenboden and M. Thaens (Eds.), Information and Communication Technology and Public Innovation – Assessing the ICT-Driven Modernization of Public Administration M. Lips, J.A. Taylor and F. Bannister (Eds.), Public Administration in the Information Society – Essays on Risk and Trust M. Veenswijk (Ed.), Organizing Innovation – New Approaches to Cultural Change and Intervention in Public Sector Organizations V.J.J.M. Bekkers and V.M.F. Homburg (Eds.), The Information Ecology of E-Government – E-Government as Institutional and Technological Innovation in Public Administration

This series is a continuation of “Informatization Developments and the Public Sector” (vols. 1–9, ISSN 0928-9038) ISSN 1871-1073

ICTs, Citizens and Governance: After the Hype!

Edited by

Albert Meijer Utrecht School of Governance, the Netherlands

Kees Boersma VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands

and

Pieter Wagenaar VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Amsterdam • Berlin • Tokyo • Washington, DC

© 2009 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-973-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008944035 Publisher IOS Press BV Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

Distributor in the USA and Canada IOS Press, Inc. 4502 Rachael Manor Drive Fairfax, VA 22032 USA fax: +1 703 323 3668 e-mail: [email protected]

Cover Design Joost van Grinsven

LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

ICTs, Citizens and Governance: After the Hype! A. Meijer et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

v

Authors

Frank Bannister is a senior lecturer in information systems and Head of the Department of Statistics in Trinity College. Dublin. Prior to becoming an academic in 1995, he worked in both the Irish civil service and for PricewaterhouseCoopers as a management consultant. His research interests are e-government, e-democracy, IT value and evaluation, particularly in the public sector, and questions of privacy and trust. He is editor of the Electronic Journal of e-Government as well as being on the editorial boards of several other journals. Frank is a member of the Institute of Management Consultants in Ireland, a Fellow of the Irish Computer Society and a Chartered Engineer. [email protected]

Victor J.J.M. Bekkers (1963) is Professor of Public Administration at the Erasmus University Rotterdam (the Netherlands) as well as Director of the Erasmus Center for Public Innovation. He has edited several books on e-government (IOS Press) and his articles have appeared in Public Management Review, Information Polity, Government Information Quarterly, The Information Society and the International Review of Administrative Sciences. [email protected]

vi

Kees Boersma is Associate Professor at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam in the group of Culture, Organization and Management. His research interests are in science and technology studies, business history and in organization, culture and power. [email protected]

G. Brian Burke is a Senior Program Associate with the Center for Technology in Government (CTG). He manages projects at CTG involving academic, government and private sector partners to include a National Science Foundation funded project to model the social and technical processes of intergovernmental information sharing. [email protected]

Regina Connolly is a lecturer in Management Information Systems at Dublin City University Business School, Dublin, Ireland and is programme director of the MSC in Electronic Commerce. In her undergraduate degree she received the Kellogg Award for outstanding dissertation and her M.Sc. degree was awarded with distinction. She was conferred with a PhD in Information Systems from Trinity College Dublin. Her research interests include electronic commerce, online trust and privacy issues, website

vii

service quality, e-government, and strategic information systems. She has served on the expert eCommerce advisory group for Dublin Chamber of Commerce, which has advised national government on eCommerce strategic planning. [email protected]

Jim F. Courtney is Professor of Management Information Systems at the University of Central Florida. His papers have appeared in Management Science, MIS Quarterly, Communications of the ACM, Decision Sciences, Decision Support Systems, and Database, His present research interests are knowledge-based decision support systems, knowledge management, and learning organizations. [email protected]

Jan A.G.M. van Dijk is Professor of Communication Science at the University of Twente, The Netherlands. He is the author of The Network Society (2006, 1999), The Deepening Divide (2005), ICT in Organizations (2005) and Digital Democracy (2000). [email protected]

J. Ramon Gil-Garcia is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration and the Director of the Data Center for Applied Research in Social

viii

Sciences at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico City. Currently, he is also a Research Fellow at the Center for Technology in Government, University at Albany, State University of New York. His research interests include collaborative electronic government, adoption and implementation of emergent technologies, digital divide policies, and multi-method research approaches. [email protected]

Peter Groenewegen is Professor of Organization Science at the Department of Public Administration and Organization Science at the VU University. His research interests are in social networks within and between organizations and the role of scientific expertise in policy making. [email protected]

Marc ter Hedde, MA studied Public Administration at the University of Twente, with a specialization in e-governance. He is working as a researcher for the Faculty of Behavioural Sciences at the same university. He also participates in the research program Governments and ICT (http://www.ictenoverheid.utwente.nl). His interests and research expertise include New Public Management; e-government, virtual communities and electronic democracy (online political debate). [email protected]

ix

Vincent Homburg (1970) is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam. He is the author of Understanding E-Government: Information Systems in Public Administration (Routledge, 2008) and his work has appeared in, among other journals, Knowledge, Technology and Policy; Information Polity and The Information Society. [email protected]

Joost Kuijper (1964) studied public administration at the University of Twente and economics at the College of Europe (1990). He worked as researcher and advisor at the TNO Centre for Policy and Technology Studies during 1990–1997. In that year, he joined the province of Overijssel as a policy advisor for regional innovation policy, followed by some years as ICT policy advisor and controller on internal ICT-affairs. In 2003 he was part-time project manager at ICTU, the e-provinces programme. As of 2007, he is programme manager economic innovation within the department of economic affairs of the province. He participates in the research group ‘ICT and Government’ of prof. Jan van Dijk of the University of Twente. [email protected]

Professor Dr Miriam (A.M.B.) Lips, the first Professor of E-Government at Victoria University of Wellington with positions in the School of Information Management and

x

the School of Government, and a Research Associate at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. Her Chair at Victoria University is sponsored by Datacom systems Limited, the New Zealand State Services Commission , Cisco New Zealand Limited and FX Networks Limited. [email protected]

Timothy J. Lomax is Research Engineer at the Texas Transportation Institute of Texas A&M University. He has been involved in urban mobility research for 29 years. His team of researchers and communications specialists produces the Urban Mobility Report – an examination of congestion trends in major U.S. cities. [email protected]

Luis F. Luna Reyes is an Associate Professor in the Business School at the Universidad de las Américas in Cholula, Puebla. His research focuses on collaborative information systems development across functional and organizational boundaries, dynamic modeling of socio-technical systems, and electronic government. [email protected]

Albert Meijer (1967) works as an associate professor at the Utrecht School of Governance and teaches public administration and organizational sciences. His

xi

research area is the impact of information technologies on the public sector in general and issues of accountability and transparency more specifically. He has published in journals such as Government Information Quarterly, The Information Society, Public Management Review and Information Polity. [email protected]

After studying political science at the University of Leiden Rebecca Moody started her Ph.D. thesis on the influence of Geographical Information Systems on agenda-setting and policy design at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. Relevant topics within this Ph.D. project are, next to agenda-setting, policy design and ICT: urban planning, water management and risk communication and prevention. [email protected]

Paul Niemantsverdriet is working as a senior consultant. He studied Culture, Organization and Management at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. In 2007 he received his Master’s degree; his thesis was on the implementation of GMS and C2000 at Hollands Midden in Leiden. [email protected]

Dr Joe Organ completed his doctoral thesis at the University of Leeds. His thesis explored the UK e-Government landscape, comparing Cabinet Office policy with

xii

departmental projects and programmes. As research fellow at the Oxford Internet Institute, he worked primarily on the ESRC e-Society project 'Personal Identification and Identity Management in New Modes of e-Government', with Miriam Lips and John Taylor. Joe has lectured and tutored at the University of Leeds and Leeds Metropolitan University and worked as a consultant for eGov Monitor. He is now working in admissions administration in St Edmund Hall, University of Oxford. [email protected]

Theresa A. Pardo is Deputy Director of the Center for Technology in Government located at the University at Albany. She is also a faculty member in Public Administration and Policy and Informatics at the University. Theresa has written extensively on a range of topics related to IT innovation in government including cross-boundary information sharing, trust and knowledge sharing, and preservation of government digital records. [email protected]

Willem Pieterson is an assistant professor at the University of Twente in the Netherlands, where he works in the Centre for e-Government studies. His research specializes in Public Sector Multi-Channel Management, the use of service channels by citizens and e-Government. He has published multiple conference papers, journal articles and book chapters on these topics, including articles in Government Information Quarterly and the International Review of Administrative Sciences. [email protected]

xiii

Marshall Scott Poole is Professor of Communication and Senior Research Scientist at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. His research interests include group and organizational communication, information systems, collaboration technologies, and organizational innovation. He is the author of over 125 articles and book chapters. [email protected]

Sabine Rotthier is a Master of Political and Social Sciences (Ghent University, 1996– 2000). She started as a teacher (2000–2001) and worked as a researcher on the topic of e-government for the Policy Research Centre - Governmental organization in Flanders (2002–2006). Since November 2007 she has been a Ph.D. student and currently works as a research assistant at the Faculty of Business Administration and Public Administration at University College Ghent. [email protected]

Filip De Rynck is a Master of Political and Social Sciences (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1975–1979) and holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1995). He started his academic career as a research assistant at the

xiv

Public Management Institute at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (1989–1995). Since 1999 he has been a professor of public administration at the Faculty of Business Administration and Public Administration at University College Ghent. filip.derynckhogent.be

Alexander Schellong is an expert on Citizen Relationship Management (CiRM) and eGovernment. His studies focus on the impacts of ICT on organizational and societal issues. He is a Fellow at Harvard University’s Program on Networked Governance. Schellong also has been a Research Scholar at The University of Tokyo working on networked governance and Web 2.0. He teaches and consults on these and other topics internationally. Among others, he serves as an expert to the European Commission DG INFSO. Alexander received his MA in political science and economics as well as his PhD from the Johann Wolfgang Goethe- University, Frankfurt am Main. [email protected] / [email protected]

Jörgen Svensson is Assistant Professor of Sociology in the School of Management and Governance of the University of Twente. He teaches classes on Organizational Sociology, and his research focuses on institutional innovation, especially where this innovation is related to the adoption of new information and communication technologies. In recent years he has published studies on subjects like electronic voting and online career support and on labor reintegration services for the unemployed. [email protected]

xv

Professor John A. Taylor is Emeritus Professor of Government & Information Management at Caledonian Business School, Glasgow, and Research Associate at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. [email protected]

Dr. Arnold Vedlitz is holder of the Bob Bullock Chair in Government and Public Policy and Director of the Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy in the George Bush School of Government and Public Service. Dr. Vedlitz received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Houston. [email protected]

Pieter Wagenaar is Assistant Professor at VU University Amsterdam in the group of Public Administration and Organization Science. His research interests are in the informatization of public administration and in administrative history. [email protected]

xvi

Anneleen Winters-van Beek is finishing a Ph.D. thesis on management principles for network organizations in government at the University of Twente. She works with the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration. [email protected]

xvii

Contents Authors

v

ICTs, Citizens & Governance: After the Hype! Hypes: Love Them or Hate Them Albert Meijer, Kees Boersma and Pieter Wagenaar

3

Part A. ICTs and Citizens Citizen Government Interaction: The Promise of the E-Channel Alexander Schellong

13

Online Discussion on Government Websites: Fact and Failure? Marc ter Hedde and Jörgen Svensson

21

Does Transparency Lead to Better Education? The Effects in the Netherlands of Publishing School Performance Indicators on the Internet Albert Meijer Governments and Multi-Channeling: Channel Positioning Strategies for the Future Willem Pieterson

38 50

Service Transformation Towards Citizen-Centric Government? The Evolution of a Smart Card Application in UK Local Government Miriam Lips, John A. Taylor and Joe Organ

66

Has Incrementalism Murdered the Hype? An Assessment of the Potential and Actual Use of Geographical Information Systems in Policy Design Rebecca Moody

83

Part B. ICTs and Relations Between Public Organizations Fostering the Information Society Through Collaborative E-Government: Digital Community Centers and the E-Learning Program in Mexico J. Ramon Gil-Garcia and Luis F. Luna-Reyes Coping with ‘Co-Location’: Implementing C2000 and GMS in the Dutch Police Region ‘Hollands Midden’ Pieter Wagenaar, Kees Boersma, Peter Groenewegen and Paul Niemantsverdriet

99

119

Stuck in the Middle? Dutch Provinces in the Information Society Joost Kuijper

135

Designing a Decision Support System for Urban Infrastructure Decision Making Marshall Scott Poole, James Courtney, Tim Lomax and Arnold Vedlitz

150

xviii

E-Government in Flemish Municipalities Sabine Rotthier and Filip De Rynck Information Sharing and Public Health: A Case-Based Look at the ICT Expectations-Reality Gap Theresa A. Pardo, J. Ramón Gil-García and G. Brian Burke Government by Wire: Distance, Discourse and the Impact of Technology Frank Bannister and Regina Connolly

168

180 198

Part C. Conclusions The Myths and Ceremonies of E-Government: Beyond the Hype of a New and Better Government? Victor Bekkers and Vincent Homburg

217

The Perspective of Network Government: The Struggle Between Hierarchies, Markets and Networks as Modes of Governance in Contemporary Government Jan van Dijk and Anneleen Winters-van Beek

235

Unraveling and Understanding the E-Government Hype Kees Boersma, Albert Meijer and Pieter Wagenaar

256

Author Index

267

ICTs, Citizens & Governance: After the Hype!

This page intentionally left blank

ICTs, Citizens and Governance: After the Hype! A. Meijer et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-973-8-3

3

Hypes: Love Them or Hate Them Albert Meijer Utrecht School of Governance, the Netherlands Kees Boersma & Pieter Wagenaar VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands

1. A Serious Analysis of Hypes Discussions about the role of technology in public administration continue to be dominated by hypes. Presentations about the potential offered by technology for making governments more effective, efficient, democratic and legitimate abound. These stories have a natural appeal since everybody likes to believe in a better future. This belief, however, is rather naïve, and time and again the hype ends in disappointment (until the next hype comes around). Serious scientists are not interested in these hypes and focus instead on the actual changes that take place when technologies are used in government. Their main argument is that research should focus on implementation practices and not on images projected by technology enthusiasts [1]. This neglect for the hypes, however, results in a failure to understand the debates about technology and the societal dynamics surrounding them. Practices of e-government are indeed influenced by the hypes about new technologies and their promises for improving government, as we will show in this book. Government organizations feel they need to focus attention and spend resources on new technologies since they do not want to lag behind modernization and societal desires. Generally, new technologies cannot deliver on the promises, but this does not mean that they have no effect. New technologies trigger unforeseen processes of change in government. The relation between hypes and practices is not straightforward, but this book aims to reveal patterns and trends in the relation between e-government hypes and practices. We believe it is time for a serious analysis of these technological hypes and offer that here by means of reconstructing the hypes and analyzing the actual effects. We define a ‘hype’ as something which receives much attention (especially in the media), thereby focusing the attention of actors on a specific object or practice. A hype can be conceptualized as a discourse or “a set of story lines” [2]. These stories consist of various elements but mainly focus on the promises the object or practice brings and the extent to which other actors have already been influenced by it. Everybody talks about the hype, and hypes in turn influence what people think and do. Hypes usually end suddenly when the realization hits that it is not as important as it was thought to be or when the hype has become common practice. In the 1990s and first years of the 21st century, the use of ICTs in government became a hype. Newspapers devoted much attention to the promises of Internet being

4

A. Meijer et al. / Hypes: Love Them or Hate Them

able to innovate government and enable new forms of democracy. The expectations concerning the improvements ICTs could bring to government and its relations with citizens were sky-high. Many expected ICTs to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of government by integrating organizations. Others indicated that ICTs could create client-friendly government organizations open to input from citizens. Now this hype has passed (although the idea of Government 2.0 seems to be creating a new hype). Expectations have diminished, and ICTs are becoming a standard part of technology in government. At this moment we can ask the question: what is the situation of ICTs and government ‘after the hype’? Did ICTs stand up to the expectations? Or, conversely, did nothing change in government? Perhaps the real answer lies somewhere between these two extremes. An empirical evaluation is needed for a realistic assessment of the opportunities ICT offers. To provide a serious analysis of hypes we present a diversity of empirical material relating to technologies and government processes. The technologies vary from network infrastructures to CRM software to web services. Government processes range from service delivery to inspections and policing. The wide variety of technologies observed results in an assessment of realistic effects upon the various government processes. Additionally, we present a diversity of empirical material in terms of countries (USA, UK, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands and Ireland). The empirical material is mostly limited to Europe and North America but shows a variety in government initiatives in countries on both continents. This will prevent an analysis of effects in only one specific country and enables generalization, albeit in a limited form. This book aims to help researchers and practitioners to understand hypes about ICT and government without becoming cynical. Hypes can be functional in triggering processes of change, but one should be able to distinguish a ‘trigger’ from a realistic set of expectations. This book combines an analysis of the discourse (in terms of hypes) with an analysis of practices (in terms of stable routines and relational patterns). The relation between the discourse and resulting changing is complex, situational and interpretable in multiple ways but certainly merits our attention.

2. Institutional Contexts and Research Questions The discussion concerning the hypes and actual use of ICT in the context of citizens and governance challenges both theorists and practitioners to reflect upon the role and use of new technologies in governmental and semi-governmental bodies. The contributions in this volume critically discuss how innovations actually work in local situations. The underlying question in this respect is what the enabling and constraining elements are that come to the fore when actors implement ICTs in their daily practices. Hypes usually consist of narratives without a reference to any context. The institutional context of government needs to be studied in order to understand the actual use of ICTs and the institutional implications of these technologies [3]. Furthermore, the contributors to this volume raise the question of how the implementation and use of ICT influence the relation between citizens and government. The focus here is on governance [4], which implies the constant structuring and restructuring, shaping and reshaping of this relationship. Arguably, it is also the nature of the relationship that is subject for debate: are we becoming a ‘network society’ and if so, what can we say about this in terms of how citizens and government relate to each other?


5

In this book we are mainly interested in two types of institutional contexts and their interrelations by means of the use of ICTs. The first type of institutional context concerns the relation between government and citizens as a new form of governance, as argued above. Do ICTs create new types of client relations between citizens and government? Does ICT change the input of citizens in policy making? Do ICTs influence the way in which government can force or stimulate citizens into certain behavior? These are guiding questions in exploring new relations between citizens and government in the information age. The second institutional context in which we are interested concerns the relations between various government organizations. ICTs stimulate government organizations to cooperate and share their information domains as part of what we can call ‘network monitoring’. However, many government organizations do not want to give up their autonomy and resist new forms of information sharing. In this panel the interplay between ICTs and institutional context is explored and investigated. Does the use of ICTs lead to new forms of joined-up government? Or do organizations resist these forms of cooperation? There are various interesting linkages between these two institutional domains. Changes in government may lead to changes in relations with citizens and, on the other hand, changes in relations with citizens may also demand change in how government is organized. The linkages between ICTs and these two institutional domains are of specific interest to this book. Each chapter in this book deals with three questions: • • •

Hype: What were the expectations concerning the application of ICT in this domain? Backlash: Why was the expected potential of ICT in this domain of government not realized? After the hype: What was the actual impact of the application of ICT on this domain?

On the basis of this discussion of expectations and actual impacts in specific domains, we will assess the changes in ICTs, citizens and governance that are apparent now, ‘after the hype’, so as to create a realistic understanding of the opportunities and limitations of ICT innovations in public administration. In more practical terms, the relevance of the following question is evident: what can we say about the actual implementation and use of ICT in the relationship between citizens and government? Answers to this question can help both citizens and government to understand the often problematic implementation and use of ICTs and to mutually find patterns of interaction enabled by the use of new technologies. Using social scientific theories such as structuration theory [5, 6], the contributors are able to produce new insights in this field of research. Each of the theories that will be used tries in one way or another to connect the structures of ICTs with the intentional and unintentional strategies of the individual actors. Placing the empirical studies in the context of this structure-actor debate, the contributors are able to consider the technical characteristics of ICTs on the one hand and the daily activities of those who work with them on the other hand. It is in contrast to the more promising stories about ICTs in the context of governance that this volume offers a critical reflection on the actual use of new technologies in this domain.

6


3. Hyping the Impact of ICTs on Government-Citizen Interactions The first part of the book presents an overview of various hypes concerning the impact of ICTs on interactions between government and citizens. These hypes promoted the idea that government would open up to all kinds of input from citizens − be it in the form of democratic debates, client relations or complaints about government services. The responsiveness of government, many gurus argued, would be increased by the use of the new technologies. Empirical analyses show that changing the relations between citizens and government takes more than just technological potential: − Alexander Schellong (Chapter 2) describes how many people expected that interactions between citizens and local governments in the US would be carried out through the Internet. In reality, an old technology − the telephone − proved to be much more important in opening up governments and giving citizens the opportunity to signal their worries and complaints. − Mark ter Hedde and Jörgen Svensson (Chapter 3) discuss the expected and real gains of digital debates between local governments and citizens in the Netherlands. They show that only a small group of citizens participate and, more importantly, the willingness of governments to pay attention to these debates is limited. − The hype that Albert Meijer (Chapter 4) discusses is the idea that providing performance information about schools to citizens would convert them into assertive education consumers who use their feet to show schools their dissatisfaction with school quality. In fact, this information is used by only a small group of citizens; the majority relies on traditional sources of information such as talks with their neighbors. − The expected use of the Internet as the preferred medium for interactions between governments and citizens is discussed by Willem Pieterson (Chapter 5). He shows that citizens indeed use the Internet but that many of them prefer other media for various sorts of interactions. Pieterson argues for a multi-channel approach in which the Internet is only one of the channels available for use. − Miriam Lips, Joe Organ and John Taylor discuss service transformation and identity management as hypes in the UK (Chapter 6). They conclude that changes are happening in new forms of digitized public service provision to citizens – changes that are somewhat different, less overt and more evolutionary than transformational government advocates might expect. − The potential and actual use of Geographical Information Systems in interactive policy making is discussed by Rebecca Moody (Chapter 7). The idea that digital maps could have a great impact on citizens’ input in policy making is appealing. However, the use citizens actually make of these maps is very limited, and there seems to be no influence on government policy making. All of these chapters show that changing patterns of interactions is much slower and murkier than the hype suggests. Routines, power relations, norms and perceptual schemes are some of the explanations for the ‘backlash’ which follows the hype. Most chapters, however, do not provide support for the arguments of the skeptics who argue that nothing ever changes. At a deeper level, routines shift. Citizens may use the


7

telephone for interactions with governments, but call centers are organized around information systems. Parents may make little use of information about schools, but this information is widely used by school managements to benchmark their performance.

4. Hyping the Impact of ICTs on the Relations Between Public Organizations

The second part of the book focuses on what happens within government. How does the use of ICTs influence the various relations between government officials and agencies? Hypes suggest that ICTs make governments more effective and efficient. Collaboration between agencies and officials is facilitated, and new technologies, the hype suggests, help them to reach collective goals. Again, empirical analyses show that changing the relations within government takes more than technological potential alone: − Ramon Gil-Garcia and Luis Luna-Reyes (Chapter 8) present an analysis of interorganizational e-government in Mexico. Digital Community Centers were thought to facilitate programs for e-learning. Yet resulting effects were limited, due to failure to pay attention to the context in which these centers were embedded and to the different environments generated by the agencies partnering with the Ministry of Communications and Transportation. − Cooperation in integrated emergency rooms is discussed by Kees Boersma, Pieter Wagenaar, Pieter Groenewegen and Paul Niemantsverdriet (Chapter 9). The basic idea was that ICTs would facilitate cooperation between police, medical and fire brigades. The findings show that ICTs undergo constant change and are used in ways that are quite different from the original plans. − Joost Kuijpers describes the impact of ICTs on the position and functions of Dutch provinces in government (Chapter 10). The hype suggested that ICTs could be used to strengthen the position of provinces and facilitate their tasks, such as urban planning. Actual changes, however, were slow, and the impact of ICTs on the functioning of provinces proved to be limited. An important conclusion is that the lead time for eventual success is underestimated. − Scott Poole, James Courtney, Tim Lomax and Arnold Vedlitz discuss the use of decision support systems in infrastructure decision making for the city of Houston (Chapter 11). They discuss the promise of this technology and nine barriers to the realization of the system. They indicate that the aspirations need to be realistic: a scaled-back prototype was created because the challenges proved too difficult to overcome with current technology and resources. − The question as to why e-government implementation does not proceed as rapidly as one would expect is dealt with by Sabine Rotthier and Filip De Rynck (Chapter 12). Why don’t developments in the back office extend further than the first phase of automation? Their analysis shows that these slow changes can be explained by a number of variables such as a lack of capacity, expensive and incompatible applications, dependence on suppliers and the absence of central control. − Frank Bannister and Regina Connolly discuss the classical idea of making the location of government offices irrelevant and supporting cooperation between agencies over a distance (Chapter 13). Their main finding is that information and

8


communications technology is likely to be of limited value in cases of contentious or complex policy development when actors are spatially separated. These chapters broadly support the findings of the chapters in the first part of the book that deal with the impact of ICTs on the interactions between government and citizens. Change is slow and the lead time for eventual success is underestimated, to say the least. Some chapters present interesting theoretical approaches to help us understand why change does not take place in the intended manner. These explanations are a central focus in the last part of this book.

5. Towards an Interpretation of Hypes

The final part of the book forms an effort to position and understand hypes. Why do hypes come about and, even more puzzling, why do hypes keep coming back even though we know that hyped promises almost never materialize? We will try to delve beyond a demystification of hypes as collective follies in order to understand hypes as playing a crucial role in the social construction of public administration. Three chapters present perspectives for analyzing hypes about ICT in government: − Victor Bekkers and Vincent Homburg discuss hypes as myths (Chapter 14). They argue that hypes can stimulate collective action but can also blur our perspective on reality. Their deconstruction of four myths – the myth of a new and better government which operates as a unity, the myth of technological progress, the myth of rational information planning and the myth of the intelligent and empowered consumer – helps us to understand the character of hypes. − Jan van Dijk and Anneleen Winters (Chapter 15) position the idea of hypes within the wider framework of the struggle between hierarchies, markets and networks as modes of governance in contemporary government. They argue that hypes about changes in government all make the same mistake of overstating the horizontal dimension and autonomy of networks and understating the power and legitimacy of hierarchies in governments and markets. − In the final chapter, we as editors (Albert Meijer, Kees Boersma and Pieter Wagenaar) take a broad view on all chapters and use the arguments presented to answer the research questions (Chapter 16). In our answers we reflect on what we have learned, on the basis of these chapters, about the functions and dysfunctions of hypes and how governments should deal with them. This book provides an overview of hypes, backlashes and realistic assessments. We hope that it will lessen the naïveté of readers who have blind faith in technological potential. At the same time, we hope to make serious scientists who discard hypes as being irrelevant more interested in the role these hypes play in the social construction of public administration in an information age.


9

References [1] [2]

[3]

[4] [5] [6]

W.J. Orlikowski, Using Technology and Constituting Structures: A Practice Lens for Studying Technology in Organizations, Organization Science, 11, 4 (2000), 404-28. M. Hajer, Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalisation of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Great Britain, in: F. Fischer, and J. Forester (eds.), The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, Duke University Press, Durham/London, 1993, 43-67. A. Meijer and S. Zouridis, E-government is an Institutional Innovation, in: V. Bekkers, H. van Duivenboden and M. Thaens (eds.), Information and Communication Technology and Public Innovation: Assessing the ICT-Driven Modernization of Public Administration, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2006, 219-29. A.M. Kjaer, Governance. Polity, London, 2004. A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structure. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1984. W.J. Orlikowski, The Duality of Technology: Rethinking the Concept of Technology in Organizations, Organization Science, 3 (1992), 398-427.


Part A ICTs and Citizens



13

Citizen Government Interaction: The Promise of the E-Channel Alexander Schellong Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main Harvard University

Abstract. E-government was supposed to change the interactions between citizens and government. However, an analysis of e-government practices around the world shows that this transformation has not happened. In particular, governments have not significantly improved opportunities for public participation. Moreover, citizens prefer not to use the Internet in their interactions with government. Government contact centers accessible through a single, easy to remember threedigit number have been successful in the U.S. and around the world. They offer citizens a new form of participation and facilitate performance management, knowledge sharing and cross-boundary collaboration in government. Key words. Contact center, 311, citizen interaction, online services

1. Introduction Governments of any form interact with citizens and businesses. This is central to the business of government. Interactions can be initiated by both sides and can be either mandatory or voluntary. They can be of very short nature or can last a lifetime. Moreover, interactions can happen through various channels: in person (e.g. with a police officer or case worker), at the office, through the mail, a call center or the Internet. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the latter. Before the hype, the Internet offered the promise of being mutually beneficial in citizen–government interactions. Beginning with a review, this chapter will outline the idea and experience of shifting from offline to online government constituent interactions. Today, after the hype, direct human interaction does not appear to be outdated. In particular, there is a revival of government contact centers. As one senior executive in a major U.S. municipality noted, “If we could do this all over again, we would do 311 before egovernment”. In fact, the 311 projects have already inspired governments around the world. Thus this chapter ends with a description of 311 and its impacts.

2. Transforming Government: Online Instead of In-Line Advances in ICT and a rapid adoption of it by society in the late 1990s forced governments to draw their attention to utilizing the possibilities of the Internet and other technologies. The potential of online citizen government interactions was identified in two areas. On the one hand e-government was supposed to offer citizens a convenient and easy way to interact with government at any time. At the same time this

14

A. Schellong / Citizen Government Interaction: The Promise of the E-Channel

was expected to reduce the transaction costs of government services. On the other hand e-government was supposed lead to a transformation of the citizen–government relationship. By allowing for new forms of participation and greater transparency it was hoped that the democratization of the political system would be facilitated. Governments around the globe tend to stress and communicate the citizen-oriented character of their e-government initiatives [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. For example, Singapore, one of today’s good practices in online service provision (www.ecitizen.gov.sg/ my.ecitizen.gov.sg), included in its e-government program’s five strategic goals [10] the aims of delivering integrated electronic services and being proactive and responsive by anticipating citizens’ needs. Another example, Canada, stated that “by the year 2004, our goal is to be known around the world as the government most connected to its citizens, with Canadians able to access all government information and services online at the time and place of their choosing” [11]. The first wave of e-government programs ended in 2005. Of course all were reported to be successful. E-government also plays a legitimizing role as a symbolic act towards citizens and the international system. In some countries ICT is used to strengthen competitiveness and the democratic values of equality and liberty, while in authoritarian states this technology is sometimes used as an instrument of control and surveillance. For example, China follows a two-fold strategy of digitizing all levels of the state in order to both strengthen Beijing’s power in controlling its 31 administrative districts, 22 provinces and 5 autonomous territories and to improve its image in the world with regard to freedom of speech [12].

3. Online but Still In-Line Recent studies on e-government draw a different picture than the one communicated by many governments. Of the government websites around the world, less than 20 percent offer services that are fully executable online [13], among them being the widely successful electronic filing of taxes by citizens. In the European Union, more business (77%) than citizen (57%) services are online, and the evolution of fully available citizen services is slowing down [14]. Similar findings have been presented by the United Nations. In a 2005 study it showed that 179 of the United Nations’ 191 member states were online. However, the study concluded that “not many countries utilize the full potential of e-government to provide information and services to their citizens” [15]. Furthermore, “electronic systems have been large electronic reproductions of existing institutional patterns and relations” [16], which remains an issue. Legislation and regulation often contain what is considered arcane and hard-to-read language, or references to highly specialized concepts which need to be adapted to the online environment. Notwithstanding the overall progress, only a quarter of all countries offer transactional services, and less than 10% have realized applications for online consultation. Accordingly, “most countries are still behind their potential in the provision of avenues for feedback and participation to the citizen, even among the more mature e-ready countries” [17]. E-democracy remains a rhetorical promise [18]. Figure 1 shows how expectations and ideas have changed over time.

15


> Surveys / Benchmarking > Portals

Range of maturity levels

> Low citizen uptake > Online not always good

> Initial eGov programs

> ROI negative / below expectations

> eIdentity Cards / passports

> Security issues

> Streamlining channels

> Channel management troubles > Change Management troubles > Failures and lack of revenue drive divestment

> Single Agency Online service

> 1st eGov programs end > eGov stagnates

Technology Trigger

2001

Peak of inflated Trough of Expectations Disillusionment

2002 2003

> Performance metrics

> Multi-channel strategy

> Interoperability >Enterprise architecture

> Information only sites

1994-2000

> Integrated data management

2004

2005

Slope of Enlightment

2006

2008

> Borderless service > Back-office (reengineering) Plateau of Productivity

2015

Figure 1: Modified Gartner E-government Hype Cycle [9]

Eighty-four percent of American public managers were convinced that the Internet improved addressing citizens, but only 29% of citizens shared their opinion [19, 20]. Of several studies that focused on ICT in the area of “interaction between citizens and the public administration, only half conclude that there have been positive impacts, while about one-third identify negative impacts [21]”. Similarly, Snellen showed that ICT has improved operations but has not affected citizen–public administration interactions [22]. Usage levels of many websites have been disappointing. For instance, with the exception of highly popular services, most of Hong Kong’s e-government offerings had low usage rates [23]. Indeed citizen needs are usually higher in those service areas which are rather complex [24] and tend to give public servants a certain level of discretion, therefore making it difficult to set electronic standards and to provide all services online. Further known issues are either the inability to use digital signatures, the digital divide and a lack of effective governmental marketing of the online services [25, 26, 27]. Governments around the world have introduced programs to address the major disparities in information technology ownership, access and use [28]. However, these programs are currently mostly preoccupied with improving access [26]. Citizens contacting administrators mainly occurs at the municipal level [29]. Therefore, municipal governments have carried a major burden of investing in the

16


means to realize online interactions. Many local government managers quickly realized that preliminary budgeting for e-government projects is difficult. Constant requirement changes and excessive customization from the contractor side are common, increasing the total costs and political risk. Budgeting becomes even more difficult when end users are involved. New forms of service provision can uncover latent í or can even create í demand. Moreover, end user behavior can change over time. Many local public administrations that are constrained by budget deficits (e.g. pensions, public debt) depend on alternative models of financing to cover implementation and operational costs. Inter-institutional funding, bonds, applying for federal/state grants, tapping into special projects budgets (e.g. Homeland Security) or public private partnerships have been approaches taken by administrations to move forward with egovernment. Most governments now maintain at least four channels for service delivery: counter/agency, mail, call center and online portal. Therefore, costs need to be calculated on the basis of the offered service delivery channel mix. Even when most transactions are processed through the online channel, savings are mostly realized by closing down departments or cutting the number of employees, which has proven to be a two-edged sword. If one public servant has to process relatively more cases, efficiency and citizen satisfaction is usually the same as or less than before the staff cuts. It may as well happen, that once most public services can be processed automatically through kiosks or online, the physical interaction with public servants becomes a “premium service”.

4. Why Phone Channel is Important Today’s society is increasingly mobile. Citizens spend many hours at work or on the move. Therefore, individual access to a computer may not be guaranteed when the need for government interaction arises. Consequently, the mobile citizen uses the phone. Mobile phones show a penetration rate that is far higher than that of Internet or fixed lines. This being the case, mobile phones will inevitably evolve as alternative means of access to online public services. Applications already available for smartphones point to the potential opportunities when applied to government. Average U.S. land line and mobile phone penetration is currently around 94%, while average Internet penetration is 68% [30]. In rural or remote areas, Internet penetration is significantly lower, and access to broadband is limited. As many as 16% of U.S. consumers discontinued their use of land lines in favor of mobile phones in 2006. This is an increase of 12% within four years. According to the Telecommunications Industry Associations, Europe’s overall land line penetration was estimated at 56%, and 88% of the population owned mobile phones in 2004. By the year 2007 the number of countries with mobile phone penetration of 100% reached 40. In Japan, for example, there are over 100 million mobile phone subscribers. The Japanese also access the Internet more frequently from their mobile phones than from their home computers. Today, there are roughly 2.2 billion mobile phone subscribers worldwide, and the number will probably reach 3 billion by the end of 2007 [31]. Although Internet users are estimated at 1.1 billon, there are far more users of mobile phones. In conclusion, for many citizens the phone has become an important channel for getting in contact with government. It offers the convenience of mobility as well as the human touch when interacting with government. It underlines the importance of the contact center as an access channel for citizens. The


17

following sections show how government service centers can facilitate service delivery, public management and cross-boundary collaboration.

5. 311 in the U.S. On July 23, 1996, President Bill Clinton called for a national community policing number to help alleviate the abundance of non-emergency calls that were burdening 911 emergency systems. Citizens used 911 as a general number to contact government. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reserved ‘311’ as a telephone number for non-emergency police and other government services in 1996. A 311 pilot in the City of Baltimore resulted in a reduction of non-emergency calls to 911 by 50%. Today there are around 80 municipalities and counties in the U.S. that already rely on 311 as a central channel for citizen interaction or are in the process of implementing it. The take-up by citizens has been remarkable. Many administrators are referring to it as ‘opening the floodgates’. Consequently, call volumes are continuously increasing and 311 services are available 24/7. 5.1. The Characteristics of 311 Contact Centers Government contact centers that follow the idea of 311 are different than the government call centers of the past. The old call centers mostly acted as switch boards, routing calls to the appropriate department. The characteristics of the new government contact centers are summarized in the following paragraphs. The 311 contact centers have two primary functions. The first is to respond to standard inquiries, and the second is to take service requests and information from citizens. The majority (up to 80%)1 of contact center interactions are one-time information inquiries that do not require any follow-up or the gathering of detailed information about the caller. However, the degree to which these two items come into play depends on the number of services available through the contact center and the knowledge of citizens about those services. Most calls are handled by call takers who are commonly referred to as Customer Service Representatives (CSR). CSRs are generally trained to develop a customer-friendly attitude. They act as mediators between citizens and departments, and are able to resolve citizen inquiries for multiple organizational entities using software tools such as a knowledge base. The new government contact centers improve accessibility to information and government services. Multi-departmental and multi-jurisdictional information is centralized and continuously updated. This is two-fold. Information can be adapted to external situational changes or emerging issues raised by the public. Government bodies also get real-time feedback and insights into the public’s needs. A single, easy to remember number also facilitates contact with government and crosses the digital divide. It is common even among people from the lower socio-economic spectrum to own a phone (e.g. a prepaid mobile phone). Finally, the data gathered in the contact centers gives administrative leaders the opportunity to continuously shape their government organization. Many U.S.

1

Based on expert interviews in the U.S., Europe and Japan.

18


municipalities are using the contact center data as a key variable in their performance management programs to create a more accountable and transparent government. Although the city of New York was not the first to take initiative in this area, the city’s 311 project has been widely recognized around the globe as an innovation in government. The UK has started a similar initiative under the name of 101. Germany has the ambition to improve citizen interaction with government through a networked, multi-centric and multi-jurisdictional solution called 115 Bürgertelefon [32]. Citizens in France can already reach their government’s multi-channel contact center by calling 3939, in Korea a similar service is offered through 110.

6. Innovation Beyond Technology The City of Baltimore piloted 311 in the U.S., though it is more commonly known for CitiStat. CitiStat is a leadership strategy that a mayor can employ to mobilize city agencies to produce specific results [33]. Among other sources, the CitiStat process gets its data from the 311 contact center. It serves as a crucial component of citizens’ perspectives on city government’s performance. CititStat was modeled after CompStat. CompStat was developed by NYPD’s Commissioner Willam Bratton and his team as a crime tracking and management tool in 1994 [34]. In bi-weekly meetings precinct and operational unit commanders are required to present crime trends and policing activities. They have to submit their data in advance to the CompStat team, which compiles and analyzes the data. During the meetings different sources of data are put on computer-generated maps. The aim of the CompStat meetings is to hold commanders accountable for responding poorly to problems, as well as to jointly identify effective policing measures and share that knowledge. CompStat helped the NYPD to reduce the crime rate, to motivate its police force and to anticipate various internal and external problems. While CompStat solely sought to improve the performance of the police department, Baltimore’s Mayor O’Malley believed that a similar approach would be able to improve the performance of city departments. CitiStat started small by incorporating one department and gradually adding other city departments and services over a threeyear period. The integration was not standardized but rather customized for every agency, thus taking government heterogeneity into consideration. Even though it was started in times of a budget crisis, CitiStat and 311 had high-level political support. It first focused on areas highly visible to citizens. CitiStat analysts became experts in a department’s business and overlapping responsibilities. They helped to clarify jurisdictions, which improved citizen government interactions. When it came to dead animals on the street, four agencies were potentially responsible, depending on type or location. When this inefficiency was uncovered, responsibility was rerouted to just one agency, whose budget rose accordingly. Technology was a key enabler in 311 and CitiStat. But in essence it was not about technology. It has changed the way politics interacted with public administration. Decisions on both sides are now more grounded in hard, almost real-time data. The impact up to today has been significant.


19

7. Conclusion E-government initiatives have put a large amount of government information and a variety of services at the fingertips of citizens. Citizens have more channels to choose from. However, overall citizen government interactions have not dramatically changed. The citizen-government relationship has not changed, either. Particularly with respect to public participation, the potential of the Internet was overly-hyped. Governments are still in the process of testing for the best ways to utilize the e-channel. This chapter has underlined that the human interaction is important to citizens and will remain to do so. Citizens are increasingly mobile and prefer to get in contact with government over the phone. Allowing citizens to reach government anytime through a single, easy to remember, free of charge number had positive effects in several areas. First, it has improved citizen satisfaction. Second, it has made government more accessible to citizens. Third, users of 311 have become an additional source of information for public administration. They provide real-time information on their genuine demand. Therefore, 311 offers potential as a more pragmatic form of participation [35]. Fourth, transparency about administrative performance has increased. Finally, the ongoing expansion of 311 and its cross-boundary nature has facilitated horizontal and vertical knowledge sharing and collaboration. This also supports e-government activities. The Internet still offers many opportunities to provide government services and facilitate government citizen interactions. The boundaries have to be continuously tested and evaluated. International knowledge sharing of innovative practices such as 311 in U.S. government and beyond offers great opportunities for the improvement of citizen government interactions.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]

Cabinet Office, Modernising Government, London, 1999. Bundesministerium des Innern, Bund Online 2005: Umsetzungsplan für die e-government-Initiative, Bonifatius Druck, Paderborn, 2001. National Office for the Information Economy, Government Online: A Strategy for the Future, Canberra, 2000. OECD, The e-Government Imperative, Paris, 2003. United Nations, Benchmarking E-government: A global Perspective, New York, 2001. Northern Ireland eGovernment Unit, A Digital Inclusion Strategy, Dublin, 2000. Ministro per L’innovazione e le Tecnologie, Linee guida del Governo per lo sviluppo della Società dell´Informazione nella legislature, Roma, 2002. Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, E-Government-Strategie, Stabsstelle IKT-Strategie des Bundes, Wien, 2005. Ministerio de Administraciones Publicas, Plane de Choque para el impulso de la administratción electrónice en España, Madrid, 2003. L. Siew Siew and L.Y. Leng, E-Government in Action: Singapore Case Study, Journal of Political Marketing 2, 3/4 (2003), 19-30. Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, Government on-line, http://www.apeca.gc.ca/e/about/ gol.shtml, 2004, accessed 1 December 2005. X. Zhou, E-Government in China: a content analysis of national and provincial web sites, Journal of Computer Mediated Communication 9, 4 (2004), doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2004.tb00297.x. D.M. West, Global Perspectives on E-Government, in: V. Mayer-Schoenberger and D. Lazer (eds.), Information Government, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2007, 17-32. Cap Gemini, eEurope - Online Availability of Public Services: How is Europe Progressing?, European Commission: Directorate General for Information Society and Media, 2005. United Nations, UN Global E-Government Readiness Report 2004 - Towards Access for Opportunity, UNPAN/2004/11, New York, 2004.

20


[16] United Nations, World Public Sector Report 2003 - e-government at the crossroads, ST/ESA/PAD/ SER.E/49, New York, 2003. [17] United Nations, UN Global E-Government Readiness Report 2005 - From e-Government to e-Inclusion, UNPAN/2005/14, New York, 2005. [18] H. Mahrer and R. Krimmer, Towards the enhancement of e-democracy: Identifying the notion of the ‘middleman paradox’, Info Systems Journal 15 (2005), 27-42. [19] Gartner, Hype Cycle for Government, Stamford, CT, 2005. [20] D. Lance, eGovernment: Creating Tools for Trade, eGov Präsenz 2, 1 (2002), 9-11. [21] J.N. Danziger and K.V. Andersen, The impacts of Information Technology on Public Administration: An Analysis of Empirical research from the ‘Golden Age’ of Transformation, International Journal of Public Administration 25, 5 (2002), 591-627. [22] I. Snellen, Automation of Policy Implementation, Informatization and the Public Sector 3(2) (1994), 135-148. [23] J. Smith, Migrating citizens to e-government channels in Hong Kong, http://www.pstm. net/article/ index.php?articleid=511, 2005, accessed 15 April 2006. [24] K. Schedler and L. Summermatter, Customer orientation in electronic government: Motives and effects, Government Information Quartlerly 24, 2 (2006), 291-311. [25] OECD, Understanding the Digital Divide, OECD Publications, Paris, 2001. [26] J. Van Dijk and K. Hacker, The Digital Divide as a Complex and Dynamic Phenomenon, The Information Society 19 (2003), 315-26. [27] H. Kubicek, Die digitale Spaltung der Gesellschaft. Herausforderungen und Strategien, http://www. ifib.de/publikationsdateien/ddivide_siemens.pdf, 2001, accessed 10 June 2001. [28] P. Norris, Deepening Democracy via E-Governance, Draft Chapter for UN World Public Sector Report, KSG, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2003. [29] M.E. Milakovich, Balancing customer service, empowerment and performance with citizenship, repsonsiveness and political accountability, International Journal of Public Management Review 4, 1 (2003), 61-82. [30] International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication/ICT Development Report 2006, Geneva, 2006. [31] M. Reardon, Emerging markets fuel cell phone growth, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-6159491. html, 2007, accessed 3 March 2007. [32] H. Lemke and H. Westerfeld (eds.), Strategie 115, ibidem, Stuttgart, 2008. [33] R. Behn, What all mayors would like to know about Baltimore’s CitiStat performance strategy, IBM Center for the Business of Government, Washington, DC, 2007. [34] J. Buntin, Assertive Policing, Plummeting Crime: the NYPD Takes on Crime in New York City, C-1699-1530.0, Case Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1999. [35] A. Schellong, Citizen Relationship Management, Peter Lang, New York, 2008.


21

Online Discussion on Government Websites: Fact and Failure? Marc ter Hedde and Jörgen Svensson University of Twente

Abstract. With the advent of the Internet various governments started to experiment with online discussions in which citizens could express their ideas and opinions. The official statistics in the Netherlands on this topic give the impression that the use of this form of Internet participation has been growing ever since, and that more and more governments are attracted to this form of political communication. An empirical investigation of four examples at the local level shows that these online discussions are now functioning with some success. Online discussion forums typically contain numerous contributions by citizens, and they seem to comply with the requirements which have been formulated for open discussions in the public sphere. In the majority of the cases there is evidence of participants who address serious issues, who are sincere and open to others and who discuss on the bases of arguments, while maintaining a reasonable level of respect for other participants. Further analysis, however, shows that these online discussions have little impact on the formal political process and also that the quality of the discussions themselves tends to deteriorate over time. Thus, in the end, the real promises of this democratic innovation seem rather bleak. Keywords. Online discussion, electronic democracy, political participation, Information and Communication Technology, Internet.

1. Introduction As early as the 1970s, political scholars discussed the possibility that innovations in information and communication technology would lead to more direct citizen involvement in the democratic process [1, 2]. With the Internet boom in the 1990s, this prediction seemed to become a virtual reality almost overnight. The new medium made communication with the citizen much easier, at least in a technical sense, and it was expected that it would take only a few years for electronic forms of citizen participation to become common practice. In line with this expectation, many governments developed initiatives to show that they welcomed the exiting new future: e-government programs were developed, pilot studies were conducted and many individual politicians showed their personal enthusiasm by organizing their own electronic debates and online chats. The future was here to stay. Now, some ten years later, after the Internet bubble burst, we may look back at the many ideas and expectations that developed during this period. With the benefit of hindsight, it is often possible to say who was more wrong and who was more right in predicting the impact of the Internet on our democracies. On the one hand, we may compliment those who predicted the explosion in the availability of political and government information. On the other, we now know that some Internet enthusiasts

22

M. ter Hedde and J. Svensson / Online Discussion on Government Websites: Fact and Failure?

overstated the speed with which Internet referenda would transform parliamentary democracies. This contribution concerns a development of which the impact on our democracies is still much less clear, namely that of the use of the Internet by governments to organize online discussions with their citizens. When we look at existing statistical data about the extent of this use in the Netherlands (Table 1) a renewed look at these online discussions seems justified. Table 1: Percentages of local governments and governmental departments offering the possibility of online discussion 2001-2004.

2001

2002

2003

2004

Ministries (13)

26.7

7.7

7.7

30.8

Provinces (12)

16.7

38.5

41.7

50.0

Water authorities (37)

0.0

2.1

4.4

21.6

Municipalities (510)

12.1

11.1

15.9

20.0

Total

11.3

8.8

15.3

21.0

Source: advies.overheid.nl (no data available after 2004)

As the data show, this type of use of the Internet seems to have picked up speed in recent years. At the same time, however, we know very little of these online discussion practices and how they work. What is currently happening on all these discussion lists? To what extent do they generate proper political debate? Are they really valuable extensions to the democratic process? Or, to formulate it as a formal research question: How do online discussion lists on government websites function at present and what is their current meaning in the political process? This chapter tries to give an answer to this research question, based on a multiple-case study of existing online discussions in four Dutch municipalities, namely: Heemskerk, Hoogeveen, Assen and Apeldoorn. The investigation of each of these cases involved an application of two different methods. First, the online discussion platforms and the discussions themselves were investigated thoroughly, applying various criteria to get a reliable overview of what was happening on these sites (e.g. how many participants were involved, which topics were discussed, what could be said about the apparent quality of the interaction). Then, secondly, in each municipality, eleven semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with different stakeholders (participating citizens, local politicians, the responsible alderman or major and two civil servants involved in the organization of the discussion). The aim of these interviews was to get a better understanding of what these different actors thought of these new discussion platforms and their impacts. For example, to what extent did they enjoy participating in them? What was their impression of the influence of online discussions in the local political process, and what reasons could they give for this influence or absence of influence? The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section we begin with the theoretical background of this study: existing assumptions about the meaning of online


23

discussions for democracy. Then, section 3 focuses on the issues studied in this empirical investigation of discussion lists on government websites in the Netherlands: what aspects have we taken into account when investigating this phenomenon and its meanings? Next, section 4 presents the results of the empirical study, followed by a discussion of these results in section 5. Finally, in section 6, some conclusions are drawn.

2. Online Discussions, Enthusiasm and Skepticism During the Internet boom of the 1990s it was obvious that the Internet would change the world. Given the obvious speed of technological developments at the time and given the predictions of the new Internet gurus, there was not only a widespread belief that the Internet would transform international markets and private business models. It was also believed that the Internet revolution would fundamentally change the nature of politics and government. In response to these beliefs, many governments around the world started to develop so-called ‘e-society’ and ‘e-government’ programs [e.g. 3, 4, 5], in which they, among other things, elaborated on the future meaning of the new technology for democracy. The expectations were high. Information and communication technology (ICT) provides a means by which public participation can be increased, and we hope that with an active government policy the potential benefits can be maximized. E-democracy offers new ways of participating and seeks to complement rather than replace existing structures (Robin Cook, Leader of the House of Commons and President of the Council [3]). The age of the Internet also offers new forms of dialogue, communication and cooperation. State and administration must organize their dealings so that they do justice to the significance of the Internet for the democratic process (Otto Schily, German Federal Minister of the Interior [5]).

These kinds of expectations could also be found in the academic debate on this topic at the time. Various prominent scholars expressed rather radical ideas about the fundamental changes that were to be expected in the near future and about the possible blessings the Internet would bring [6, 7, 8, 9]. Central to most of these academic visions on the impact of the Internet on the future of democratic discussions in the information age were a limited set of observations concerning the problematic nature of existing democratic institutions on the one hand and the enabling characteristics of the new media on the other. With regard to the former, many authors argued that in an era of rapid globalization, existing institutions of representative democracy such as parties and parliaments experienced a gradual loss of legitimacy, and that a modern highly educated citizenry had other expectations regarding government and democracy. Some even proclaimed a crisis of representative democracy [8], which was reflected in decreasing memberships of political parties and a decreasing voter turnout during elections [10]. With regard to the enabling characteristics of the Internet, it was pointed out that this new medium had particular characteristics which allowed new forms of communication (especially asynchronous and many-to-many communication) and that it therefore seemed a more ideal vehicle for democratic deliberation than existing mass media. Many

24


scholars thus assumed that the new media would reduce existing barriers to democratic participation and that the Internet would facilitate an era in which democratic debate would be able to flourish. In particular, the following impacts were predicted [11, 12]: x

x

x

A numerical increase in the involvement of citizens in democratic debate and especially an increased involvement in this debate by specific previously underrepresented populations, such as the young who enjoyed being online and people with overflowing agendas who had little opportunity to visit traditional meetings; An increase in the quality of public debates in terms of: o More informed participation, as people participating in online debates would be able to utilize information provided via the Internet; o More reasoned argumentation, as the asynchronous mode of communication allowed participants more time to consider and formulate their arguments; o Participation on equal footing, as in online discussions the influence of personal characteristics and personal appearance was thought to be more limited; and An increased impact of these debates on formal political decision making. When the Internet would result in more people taking part in these debates, with more and better arguments, these debates were expected to become a more serious political factor.

Initially, the Internet boom provided a fertile ground for such predictions of a revival of democratic debate. Although these ideas have lost much of their momentum, they still seem to have some merit. In past years, however, they also have met with more and more skepticism. Essentially this skepticism concerned each of the three aspects formulated above. With respect to idea that Internet debates would lead to an increased involvement of especially underrepresented groups of citizens, many counter arguments have been given [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 8, 19]. First of all, it has been be questioned whether citizens even want to debate online. But, even if some do, it may be argued that the Internet is unlikely to make much of a difference and may even widen participation gaps. As the technology alone is unlikely to make people more interested in politics, it may be the case that the Internet simply provides additional resources for those already participating (e.g. the more highly educated citizens, who are generally interested in politics and who also know their way around computers). Moreover, as some point out, there is the possibility that the Internet debate would displace other forms of participation (such as public hearings), and this could actually lead to the exclusion of citizens who do not have access to these new technologies (e.g. the poor and the elderly). Early evaluations of digital debates strengthened this skepticism about increased participation due to online debates [20, 21, 18]. In these evaluations it was found that online debates especially attract a rather specific cross section of the citizenry, namely white, highly educated men who are already politically active; that people who are not interested in politics in the first place are unlikely to participate in such online debates, and that there are even such things as ‘digital cliques’. These same evaluations also fan skepticism when it comes to the increased quality of such debates. Bekkers and Thaens [20] and Van Dijk [21], for example, showed that


25

existing online discussion platforms were especially used as instruments for opinion polling, aimed at collecting points of view and opinions and that there was little debate. Research by Van Os and Jankowski [12] also suggested that on the Internet, platforms of substantive political discussions were rare. Finally, the idea that such online democratic debates would and indeed even should have an impact on formal politics was also found to be an issue of controversy and skepticism. On the one hand, as with discussions about referenda, this question of impact raises normative questions concerning possible tensions with the institutions of representative democracy. For example, should elected representatives allow their decisions to be informed by popularized single issue debates in which perhaps a large but still limited cross section of the electorate participates? On the other hand, however, there is the question of the extent to which such debates may be ignored, especially when they are initiated by governments or government agencies. Here, several authors take the normative position that especially when a government organizes such discussions, the outcomes have to play some role in subsequent decision making and that in order to make these debates work, it is in fact a conditio sine qua non [22, 23, 6, 12]. With respect to the above controversies about the online debates, this paper decidedly takes an empirical stance. It tries to provide more insight into what is currently happening in and around online debates. The intention is to clarify what is discussed in these debates (the topics), who are participating in these debates in which manner, and how these discussions are appreciated outside and inside the formal political sphere. The specific focus of the research and the concepts used will be presented in the next section.

3. Focus and concepts used in the empirical study The discussion about the possible meaning of the Internet for political debate and democratic participation concerns different forms of political discussion that might be enabled by the Internet, such as discussions organized by political parties or by NGOs. This empirical study, however, focuses on one specific type, namely online discussions on government websites. To be more precise, it studies the practice in which citizens interact with each other by exchanging written messages via a web-based service which is provided and maintained by a government (or a government department) and which is accessible through that government’s website. With this object of study formally defined, it further focuses attention on the three issues about which there is still controversy between enthusiasts and skeptics, namely: a) Contents, participation and prominence; b) Quality of the discussion; and c) Interactions between online discussions and the formal political process. 3.1. Content, Participation and Prominence Although the Dutch e-government monitor reports that many governments offer the possibility of online discussion, this fact alone is not very informative about the extent to which these discussions really catch on. In line with first controversy between enthusiasts and skeptics, the first question is whether these government websites really succeed in attracting a significant number of citizens and in enticing online discussions about meaningful issues, and whether such discussions have any prominence in the

26


community. In other words, does this type of discussion really catch on, and is there any evidence that these discussions are claiming a more or less prominent place among already existing democratic institutions? Or, on the contrary, are these discussions, if any, more comparable to the kind of discussions we may expect in a bar or a café? Are they perhaps just examples of small groups of people coming together in a space that seems more or less private, and are the discussions in fact of limited value to the broader society? 3.2. Quality of the Discussion In line with the second controversy, the second issue investigated focuses on the controversy about the quality of these online discussions themselves. What is the nature of these discussions? How do the participants involved in an online discussion interact? Do these discussions meet the quality criteria that may be formulated for such discussions? Here, following the work of Habermas on debates in the public sphere [24, 25, 26], four quality aspects are distinguished: equality, diversity, reciprocity and argumentation [14, 15, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 12, 32, 33]. The term equality refers to the absence of status differences in a discussion; to what extent are the participants in a discussion on an equal footing, and to what extent do they accept and treat each other as equal? The term diversity refers to both a diversity of participants and a diversity of subjects and opinions [29]. Are there any obstacles that prevent participation or hinder the expression of divergent opinions and insights [33]? The term reciprocity refers to the question of whether there is real interaction and an exchange of arguments between participants or whether a ‘discussion’ is rather a collection of monologues [22]. Do participants take notice of the opinions of other discussants, and do they take these opinions into consideration when formulating their own [14, 29, 33]? Finally, related to the aspect of reciprocity in a discussion, there is the issue of argumentation [22, 29, 34]. Do participants in a discussion provide arguments for their standpoints so that others may understand how they come to them and can scrutinize and possibly refute these arguments? Taken together, these concepts are used to come to an understanding of the quality of the online discussions under investigation. When our study provides evidence of discussions which meet these criteria of equality, diversity, reciprocity and argumentation, this provides strong support in favor of these discussions. On the other hand, when these discussions are dominated by status differences, when they are relatively closed to certain persons and opinions or when they do not generate proper exchanges of arguments with proper argumentation, this is reason to be really skeptical about the meaning of these discussions for our democracies. 3.3. Interactions between Online Discussions and the Formal Political Process Finally, given the controversies around the possible meaning of Internet discussions in a representative democracy, this study focuses on the interaction that takes place between these discussions and the formal institutions of government. Regarding these interactions, three separate issues are distinguished: x In what way and to what extent are these discussions embedded within these formal institutions (e.g. do these online discussions have any formal status)?


x x

27

To what extent is there an involvement of representatives of these institutions in the online discussions? To what extent do the online discussions influence subsequent decision making in these formal institutions?

As already explained in the introduction of this chapter, the empirical research focuses on four examples of online discussions in four Dutch municipalities and applies a combination of more qualitative and more quantitative research methods, with which the different aspects were investigated. Table 2 gives a brief overview of the quantitative indicators. These are explained in detail in the original research report by the first author [35]. Table 2: Overview of the quantitative indicators used in this study Aspects

Indicators (+ positive, - negative)

Participation and prominence

+ number of active participants in the discussions + total number of visitors, active and passive (when reported) + number of postings per subject (thread) + prominence of the discussion platform on the municipal website

Quality aspects Equality Diversity

+ absence of intimidating and/or degrading remarks + the level of entropy [22, 32] - percentage of postings by top 5 most active participants

Reciprocity

+ percentage of contributions which are on topic + percentage of contributions which form a response to another message - percentage of contributions which are totally ignored by other participants [18, 36] - percentage of messages which clearly ignore previous argumentation such asnonsensical contributions and off-topic postings [33]

Argumentation

+ percentage of messages which contain some form of argumentation

Interaction with formal institutions

+ percentages of discussants with formal positions in the municipality

4. Results In this section, we will focus on the results of the investigations in all four municipalities and on the three aspects distinguished. Before this is done, however, we will first provide some additional background information about the four municipalities that had been selected for this investigation and their discussion forums.

28


4.1. The Four Municipalities and Their Discussion Forums The four municipalities in this study were selected from an already available list of 77 municipalities known to be active in the area of online discussions. Their selection was based on a set of additional criteria applied to this list, of which the most important were: x The discussion forum should be open to the public; x The last contribution to the forum should not be older than one week; x The discussion forum should not be purely recreational, in the sense that it should (also) contain discussions about issues such as politics and public administration; x The municipality should be prepared to co-operate in this research; and x The municipality should be within reasonable traveling distance from the University of Twente. The municipalities that were selected using these criteria – Heemskerk, Hoogeveen, Assen en Apeldoorn – varied considerably in size and also varied in their experience with organizing this type of discussion. This experience with online discussion varied from one to four years. With respect to the manner in which the discussions were organized, there were similarities in that all four municipalities provided rules of conduct and employed so-called moderators, who saw to it that the rules were maintained and that older threads were removed. The forums differed in the manner in which they allowed citizens to participate. The two smaller municipalities required participants to register, the larger two allowed anonymous contributions. Table 3 summarizes this basic information about the municipalities and their discussion forums. Table 3: Overview of the cases selected for this study Heemskerk

Hoogeveen

Assen

Apeldoorn

Inhabitants

36,000

54,000

63,000

165,000

Start online discussion forum

March 2005

September 2001

April 2004

February 2004

Form of participation

Registered

Registered

Registered or anonymous

Anonymous

4.2. Contents, Participation and Prominence The first part of the research focused on the aspects of contents, participation and prominence. What was discussed on these discussion lists and by whom, and to what extent did these discussions appear to be important to the municipalities in question? To start with the latter, first visits to the websites of the municipalities involved in this case study showed that the municipalities themselves took their discussion forums seriously and really wanted to make them visible. In each municipality there was a direct link on the homepage leading visitors to the discussion forum. Moreover, in all four cases this link had a prominent place on the homepage (all forums were advertised in a large font and/or by large buttons). This signified that the online discussion had a prominent position in the virtual world of the municipal website.


29

The number of threads and the number of contributions per thread fluctuated, as discussants could introduce new topics at any moment and moderators regularly cleaned up the forums by removing older threads. Typically, however, there were between 20 to 50 open threads about very diverse subjects. The first content analysis revealed that each of the four discussion forums covered a wide range of topics. Although many contributions expressed individual frustrations and personal grievances, many also and most certainly addressed issues of broader political relevance. Examples of topics that were discussed were: public safety (lamp posts, vandalism, calls for more local policing), traffic and transportation (road maintenance, accessibility of the town center, neighborhood buses), the level of local taxes, garbage collection and shopping on Sundays. A simple investigation showed that an average thread contained about 12 contributions sent in by a limited number of contributors, typically three or four persons. These average numbers, however, were found to be only a rough indication, as variance between threads was very large. While some threads might contain no reactions to the original posting, other threads would contain well over a hundred messages and could have received attention of over a thousand visitors (at the time of writing an extreme case was a thread about a local radio station in Apeldoorn, which contained 211 messages and had been visited by 14,449 visitors). Given the content of the discussions, the prominence of the forums on the municipal websites, the number of participants and the number of visitors, a first impression was that in the four municipalities under investigation, online discussion was a relevant phenomenon which deserved serious attention. 4.3. Quality of the Discussion The investigation of the quality of the discussions focused on the following four aspects: equality among participants, diversity, reciprocity and argumentation. With respect to equality it was observed that despite the rules of conduct and the presence of moderators, who could remove offending messages, the online discussions were by no means free of degrading and intimidating remarks (Table 4). In a substantial minority of all messages there were elements which could be qualified as smaller personal attacks, intended to discredit or silence other participants (e.g. in reaction to previous messages, ‘You are welcome to comment, but if you do, first learn to spell and to type’, and, in reaction to someone who seemed to have stopped participating, ‘If she does not react because she can no longer afford her Internet connection, she should take her bike and go to City Hall to apply for financial assistance. Hahaha’). In the interviews several participants indicated that they personally had experienced such examples of lack of respect and had been annoyed by them, but eventually had learned to live with this style of communication. Moreover, on the whole, most interviewees were nonetheless rather positive about the discussions they had been involved in and about the possibility of participating in these discussions as an equal. In general, they reported that they felt that they had had enough information to participate in the discussions about the different topics. With respect to the criterion of diversity, it was noticed that the participants in these discussions were typically middle-aged and male and also that many of them were involved in other forms of (offline) political participation and lobbying activities (during the interviews in Assen, the interviewer found that in fact all five participants he

30


interviewed had such a background of broader political activity). Furthermore, in all cases, a relatively small group of participants was found to be rather dominant in the discussions. This was especially the case in the two smaller municipalities, where the top five participants were responsible for over 60 percent of all contributions. Although this figure was less extreme in the two larger municipalities, here, too, the distribution of inputs was clearly skewed towards the top five. It should be noted, however, that the degree of entropy in Heemskerk and Hoogeveen was quite comparable with what was reported in earlier studies [22, 33] and thus that the discussions in Assen and Apeldoorn could be regarded as relatively heterogeneous. In all four municipalities the majority of the contributions showed some form of reciprocity in the sense that they were on topic and/or formed responses to previous postings. This does not mean, of course, that all contributions received equal attention. While some threads were very popular, there were also many examples of single messages that remained unanswered (on average about three out of five initiatives developed into a thread of more messages). Finally, a content analysis of the messages themselves showed that in the majority of cases the contributor tried to provide some argumentation in the form of references to relevant values, knowledge and/or factual information. This was especially the case in the two smaller municipalities, which required pre-registration of discussants. In Assen and Apeldoorn, where anonymous participation was allowed, there existed a somewhat greater tendency to refrain from further argumentation. The impression was that, in general, rational argument was more effective in the discussions than the status of the contributor. All in all, the analysis of the discussions themselves left the overall impression of discussions which were fairly limited in terms of the number of active participants, but which were certainly not dysfunctional. Although discussants could be rude to each other – just as discussants can be offline – the majority of the discussions was judged to be of reasonable quality. The impression was that this was also helped by the existence of rules of conduct in all four cases and by the presence of moderators who were able to intervene when people ignored these rules. Table 4: Quality of the discussion Heemskerk

Hoogeveen

Assen

Apeldoorn

Degrading remarks

11%

16%

12%

20%

Intimidation

6%

5%

8%

5%

Entropy

76%

76%

83%

92%

% of contributions by top 5

62%

66%

41%

27%

On topic

50%

77%

73%

85%

Response on previous contribution

63%

76%

61%

72%

Threads without response

41%

37%

43%

37%

unintelligible or nonsensical contributions

1%

3%

11%

4%

Equal participation

Diversity

Reciprocity


31

Argumentation Visible argumentation

92%

73%

53%

57%

4.4. Position of the Discussions in the Political Process Analysis of the role of online discussions in the political process focused on the way the online discussion was formally embedded in this process, on the involvement of policy makers themselves in the discussions and on the question of actual usage of the insights generated in the discussions (Table 5). With respect to the way online discussions were formally embedded in the political process, written information was scarce. Civil servants from Assen and Apeldoorn argued that their goal was simply to provide a platform for citizens to contact each other. In Hoogeveen and Heemskerk the function of the forum was more explicitly related to the roles it could play in policy formulation. Hoogeveen formally used its forum for citizen consultation several times per year. In Heemskerk, the forum itself was an initiative by the municipal council, which hoped to involve its citizens in its work and to enhance political participation. Table 5: Formal positioning of the online discussions Heemskerk

Hoogeveen

Assen

Apeldoorn

Function of the platform

discussions and citizen participation

Discussion and consultation

To let citizens discuss among themselves

To let citizens discuss among themselves

Initiator of the forum

Municipal council

Department of communication



Introduction of topics

Participants

Participants and municipality

Participants

Participants

The investigation of actual involvement of aldermen, politicians and civil servants in the online discussions showed important differences between these groups (Table 6). In the four municipalities under investigation neither aldermen nor civil servants played any meaningful role in the discussions. Data with respect to the role of local politicians in these discussions painted a mixed picture, with no involvement in Assen and an involvement of 36 percent in Heemskerk. In the interviews, the aldermen and politicians gave different arguments for not taking part in online discussions. An argument frequently given was that they preferred face-to-face discussions, where they could look their opponents in the eye. Another argument was that they felt that taking part in online discussions came with political risks. As every statement, every remark and every promise was recorded and stored, aldermen and politicians had to be very careful in these discussions and therefore many preferred to talk offline. Finally, some politicians indicated that they had ended their involvement because of negative experiences. In the beginning, I participated frequently. Some people persisted in spoiling the discussion. They went for the man and kicked. At some point I stopped participating.

32


In the beginning, I watched the forum almost on a daily basis, to look for new propositions and also simply to react. Only, I did not like the manner in which citizens reacted to the propositions […] or the manner in which they wanted to address certain issues. Therefore, I became less enthusiastic about participating in the discussions.1

The higher level of involvement of politicians in Heemskerk was explained by the fact that this discussion forum was an initiative by the council itself and that all political parties had agreed to take part in the online discussions and to appoint at least one person as an online representative. Moreover, newness may have been a factor of importance in Heemskerk, as this digital discussion had started only recently. In general, however, participants felt that there was too little involvement of policy makers, and in the discussions themselves there were several examples where citizens expressed some bitterness about this fact: ‘[It is evident that] after the promotion campaign has blown over, the rest of the municipality is returning back to its usual business and is evidently not interested in the opinion of the citizen’. ‘Ladies and gentleman of the council, major and aldermen, let us hear your opinions. A city which promotes progress can not simply ignore the modern means of telecommunication’. In Apeldoorn a complete thread was devoted to this issue and to what one participant described as a ‘deafening silence’ from the side of the politicians. Table 6: Participation in the discussions by politicians, aldermen and civil servants Heemskerk

Hoogeveen

Assen

Apeldoorn

Number of contributions (=100%)

268

305

252

164

Citizens

63 %

84%

99%

89%

Politicians

36 %

14%

0%

10%

Aldermen

1%

0%

0%

0%

Civil servants

0%

2%

1%

1%

Promises to use discussion (politician/alderman)

50

4

0

4

Although there were subtle differences between municipalities, most politicians and aldermen felt that practical relevance of the online discussions was, in general, rather limited. Some indicated that they sometimes used the input of the online discussions in their work, and in two municipalities it had happened that they had invited a participant to continue a discussion offline. Such incidences were rare, however, and many citizens expressed their disappointment. The impression was that the discussions generally had little meaning in the formal political process. This impression was shared by most politicians and aldermen, who gave different reasons for this lack of usage of the results of online discussions. First of all, regardless of the opinions of the participants themselves, local policy makers in all four municipalities expressed the feeling that the quality of many of the discussions was simply too low to have a serious impact. In general, they argued, participants had limited information about the real issues and little insight into the complexities involved in many decisions. Therefore, the online discussions were often of limited relevance. A second important argument, expressed in two of the four municipalities, was that the online discussions were often too late and 1

Translations of Dutch statements, made by the second author.


33

that many discussions were only reactive, starting at the moment that decisions had been made or policy makers had already made up their minds. Finally, many interviewees expressed the feeling that, overall, politicians were not really interested in these online discussions.

5. Discussion This investigation follows a long period of rising expectations, theoretical considerations and pilot studies. What can we learn from the existing practice of online discussions on municipal websites in the Netherlands? In order to answer this question, we distinguish between answers concerning current functioning and answers concerning the future promise of these online discussions. 5.1. Current Functioning At this moment, online discussions on municipal websites are neither a real success nor a complete failure. Discussions that take place on these websites hardly contribute to formal local politics, but they attract some involvement and they are certainly not completely dysfunctional. In each of the four municipalities in this investigation there were citizens who were enthusiastic about this form of participation and who discussed freely about a multitude of subjects. Most were sincere in expressing their opinions and giving their arguments, and only a few participants showed inappropriate behavior. This does not mean, however, that these discussions play any useful role in the local political process, nor that these online discussions help to enhance the quality of formal political decision making. The local aldermen, politicians and civil servants are hardly interested in what goes on their websites. The discussions are simply brushed aside as uninformed or as coming too late in the day. Given their limited numbers, the participants in these discussions are not considered a serious political factor. Moreover, given the fact that the population of participants is not at all representative, there seems to be good reason not to give much attention to these discussions; why would politicians listen to yet another channel of communication in which middle-aged men and political activists are vastly overrepresented? This observation naturally leads to another question, namely that of why these online discussion sites actually exist and why municipalities organize these discussions. On the one hand, it can again be argued that there may be other reasons to maintain these sites, for instance the value of having public discussions between citizens and of giving citizens a platform to vent their opinions more publicly. On the other hand, there is the issue of the expectations these government-organized discussion sites generate. When a local government invites its citizens to take part in a discussion, there is at least some suggestion of an interest in public opinion and an openness to political influence. Thus, the question may be asked as to whether this suggestion should be maintained when in fact this interest and influence does not exist. In the end, the construction of fake channels of participation may be damaging to public trust and the confidence citizens may have in the democratic system as a whole. At this moment, however, it seems too early to give a final judgment regarding this issue about whether or not governments should continue to invest in these discussion lists. Although many participants seem disappointed about the lack of influence and the

34


lack of involvement from City Hall, there are also many citizens who simply enjoy the discussions and judge them as interesting and useful. 5.2. Possible Impacts of Online Discussions in the Future Electronic citizen participation has been a topic of study and speculation for many years now, and there is a remarkable gap between the results of empirical investigations and the conclusions and predictions following these investigations. Reading the literature (see section 2), there are hardly any reports about really successful experiments with online citizen participation, let alone of successful online discussions in a real life setting. Nonetheless, many authors who discuss the issue tend to end on some positive note: practical problems will be resolved, citizens and politicians will lose their cold feet, and online participation will become more common and more useful in the future; it is a development which cannot be stopped. Only a few years ago, there were indeed good arguments to take such positions. Indeed, citizens as well as politicians had to get used to the possibilities of computers and of the Internet. Over time, however, such arguments have lost much of their weight. Nowadays, most citizens know about the Internet and how to use it, and the municipalities we investigated have all had some time to experiment with this new channel of participation. Yet our finding is that there is no evidence that online participation is maturing. On the contrary. In all cases initial momentum seems to get lost. Based on their experiences, local politicians are lowering their expectations and are distancing themselves more and more. They are finding out that they prefer to talk offline rather than online. The same holds true for citizens who come to these forums with the idea that online discussions would give them some influence in the local political process. They are disappointed by the lack of involvement of politicians, and the newness soon wears off. When this leads to citizens leaving the discussions, the risk increases that only diehards such as political lobbyists and citizens with too much time on their hands remain, which in turn further fuels the idea that it may not be wise for politicians to give these forums much attention. Admittedly, such a sober impression seems to ask for a more positive turn. Surely, there must be ways to turn the tide and to make online discussions work? Perhaps. Our observations, however, do not justify such optimism. First of all, it is remarkable that in the four cases in this study, the discussion functions best in the municipality that started only recently and worst in the municipalities that have implemented these forums some years ago. In the latter cases with a longer ‘tradition’, there exists clear evidence of a diminishing spirit. In Apeldoorn, for instance, the forum was introduced with much enthusiasm, but now it seems the municipality merely allows it to exist because it is already there. Moreover, the experiences in Hoogeveen and particularly in Heemskerk give food for thought when it comes to the future of these online discussions. The study of Van Os and Jankowski [12], to which we referred earlier in this article, also concerned the municipality of Hoogeveen and analyzed its online discussions only a few years ago. In this study, these authors concluded that the digital discussion in this municipality did not function optimally, and they provided advice on how to improve the platform. Now, however, despite this advice and despite a few years of additional experience, it seems Hoogeveen is actually doing worse. Finally, concerning Heemskerk, where online discussion seemed to be most promising at the time of writing this article, we are


35

informed that this municipality is pulling the plug. Two years after the start of the experiment, the initial enthusiasm has completely disappeared.

6. Conclusion This empirical case study focused on how online discussions on government websites function at this moment in time, in the Netherlands. A positive finding is that these platforms of online participation are functioning to some degree. The platforms contain numerous contributions by citizens and, in a sense, these discussions comply with many of the requirements which have been formulated for open discussions in the public sphere. In the majority of the cases there is evidence of participants who are sincere and open to others and who discuss on the basis of arguments with a reasonable level of respect for other opinions. Further investigation, however, reveals more problematic issues concerning the real meaning of these discussion sites and their relevance to the democratic process. A first issue is that of limited representativeness. As in other forms of political participation, it is clear that online discussions attract a specific audience in which some groups are overrepresented (in this case middle-aged men who are already active in local politics). Moreover, we find that most discussions are dominated by a small group of persons (a striking example is Hoogeveen, where in a town of 50,000 inhabitants only five persons are responsible for almost two-thirds of all contributions on the municipal discussion platform). A second issue is that these discussions play a very limited to nonexistent role in the formal political process. Aldermen, members of the council and civil servants generally indicate that these discussions are of little value to them and that they tend to ignore them not only because of their limited quality, but also because most discussions come too late in the day, as a reaction to decisions that have already been made. Where many reflections on online participation tend to end in an upbeat conclusion, i.e., that this is a practice that still has to grow and that problems are only there to be solved, this study questions such optimism. The typical experience is that after a short initial period, enthusiasm wanes and negative experiences take the upper hand. This then easily gives way to a negative spiral from which there is little escape. Especially when important participants such as alderman and council members lose interest, these discussions tend to quickly lose all relevance for the political democratic process. This in turn leads to a further decrease in participation, and so on until only a small group of diehards remains.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the municipalities of Heemskerk, Hoogeveen, Assen and Apeldoorn and all of the respondents for their cooperation in this project, without which this study would not have been possible.

References [1]

C.F. Arterton, Teledemocracÿ: Can Technology Project Democracy?, Sage, London, 1987.

36


K. Laudon, Communications Technology and Democratic Participation, Praeger Publishers, New York, NY, USA, 1977. [3] R. Cook, In the Service of Democracy: A Consultation Paper on a Policy for Electronic Democracy, Office of the e-envoy, London, 2002. [4] Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations, Terug naar de Toekomst: Over het Gebruik van Informatie en Informatie- en Communicatietechnologie in de Openbare Sector (Back to the future: on the Use of Information and Information and Communication Technology in the Public Sector), Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Den Haag, 1995. [5] O. Schily, E-Government for a Modern State, German Federal Ministery of the Interior, 2001. [6] P.H.A. Frissen, De Virtuele Staat Politiek, Bestuur, Technologie: Een Postmodern Verhaal, Academic Service, Schoonhoven, 1996. [7] W. Lusoli and S. Ward, Hunting Protestors: Mobilisation, Participation, and Protest Online in the Countryside Alliance, Paper for presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions, University of Edinburgh, 28 March - 2 April 2003. [8] W. Lusoli, S.J. Ward and R.K. Gibson, Political Organisations and Online Mobilisation: Different Media – Same Outcomes?, New Review of Information Networking 8 (2002), 89-108. [9] R. in ’t Veld en A.J. Kruiter, Volksvertegenwoordiging Moet Worden Afgeschaft, NRC-Handelsblad, 22 March 2002. [10] K. van Doorn and E. Schippers, Burgers, Overheid en Digitale Debatten: Handvaten uit de Praktijk, Eburon Publishers, Delft, 2003. [11] E. Ng and B. Detenber, The Impact of Synchronicity and Civility in Online Political Discussions on Perceptions and Intentions to Participate, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 10, 3 2005, 0-0. [12] R. van Os and W. Jankowski, Digitale Democratie binnen de Gemeente Hoogeveen, in Boom Jaarboek ICT, 2004, 159-174. [13] M.A.P. Bovens, De Digitale Republiek: Democratie en Rechtsstaat in de Informatiemaatschappij, University Press, Amsterdam, 2003. [14] L. Dahlberg, The Internet and the Public Sphere: A Critical Analysis of the Possibility of Online Discourse Enhancing Deliberative Democracy, Massey University, Wellington, 2000. [15] L. Dahlberg, Computer-Mediated Communication and the Public Sphere: A Critical Analysis, Journal of Computer Mediated Communication 7, 1 (2001), 0-0. [16] V. Frissen, Kansen voor E-Democracy in de Maatschappelijke Praktijk, in K. van Doorn and E. Schippers (eds.), Burgers, Overheid en Digitale Debatten. Handvaten uit de Praktijk, Eburon Publishers, Delft, 2003, 22-33. [17] R.K. Gibson and S.J. Ward, Political Participation and the Internet in Europe: Who Wants and Wants-Not to Engage in Online Debate, paper presented to the UK Political Studies Association, Nottingham, 23-25 March 1999. [18] H. van Kempen and K. Brants, Een Digitaal Onderonsje: Electronische Democratie en Politieke Participatie, Tijdschrift voor beleid, politiek en maatschappij 29, 2 (2002), 92-100. [19] P. Norris, Who Surfs Café Europa? Virtual Democracy in the US and Europe, Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1-5 September, Atlanta, GA, 1999. [20] V.J.J.M. Bekkers and M. Thaens, Sturingsconceptie en Informatisering Onderzoeksprogramma: Internet en Openbaar Bestuur, Hooiberg, Epe, 1999. [21] J.A.G.M. Van Dijk, Elektronische Discussies bij Interactieve Beleidsvorming, Bestuurskunde 5 (1999), 199-209. [22] C. Hagemann, Digitaal Politiek Café: Een Analyse van On-line-Discussielijsten van D66 en GroenLinks, in Jaarboek 2001 van het Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen (DNPP), 2001, 142-60. [23] M. Hajer, Democratie in Deliberatie of Hoe de Politiek aan een Nieuw Leven Begint, De Groene / De Balie (series: ‘Renaissance van de politiek’), 2000. [24] J. Habermas, Kennis en Belang, in J. Baars (ed.), Een Keuze uit het Werk van Jürgen Habermas, Van Loghum Slaterus, Deventer, 1973, 101-16. [25] J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989. [26] J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996. [27] C. Hagemann, Participation in and Contents of two Dutch Political Party Discussion Lists on the Internet, Javnost/The Public 9 (2002a), 61-76. [28] C. Hagemann, Digitaal Politiek Café D66, Idee 23, 1 (2002b), 27-30 (http://www.d66.nl/-documenten/ ls/idee102-hagemann.html). [29] N.W. Jankowski and R. van Os, Internet-Based Political Discourse: A Case Study of Electronic Democracy in the City of Hoogeveen, Paper presented at Prospects for Electronic Democracy. Community Connections, School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, 2002. [2]


37

[30] N.W. Jankowski and R. van Os, Internet-Based Political Discourse: A Case Study of Electronic Democracy in the City of Hoogeveen, Chapter prepared for Prospects of Electronic Democracy, Routledge, London, 2003. [31] A. Michels, Horizontale Beleidsvorming en Democratie: Normen, Rollen en Verantwoordelijkheden, Paper for the Politicologenetmaal, Antwerpen, 19 and 20 May 2005. [32] S.M. Schneider, Creating a Democratic Public Sphere through Political Discussion, Social Science Computer View 14, 4 (1996), 373-93. [33] S.M. Schneider, Expanding the Public Sphere through Computer-Mediated Communication: Political Discussion about Abortion in a Usenet Newsgroup, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997. [34] S. Sassi, The Transformation of the Public Sphere, in B. Axford and R. Huggins (eds.), New Media and Politics, London, 2001, 89-108. [35] M.J. ter Hedde, Online Discussies op Gemeentelijke Websites: Een Vergelijkende Casestudie met Discussie, Master’s thesis, Universiteit Twente, Enschede, 2006. [36] A.G. Wilhelm, Virtual Sounding Boards: How Deliberative is Online Political Discussion?, in B.N. Hague and B.D. Louder (eds.), Digital Democracy: Discourse and Decision Making in the Information Age, Routledge, London, 1999, 154-77.

38


Does Transparency Lead to Better Education? The Effects in the Netherlands of Publishing School Performance Indicators on the Internet Albert Meijer Associate Professor Utrecht School of Governance

Abstract. Publishing information about school performance on the Internet is currently a ‘hype’ around the world. Many countries publish this information because they believe that this will benefit schools and parents. The assumption is that parents will use this information to assess the performance of schools and consequently choose a school on the basis of this information. Changes in school choice would then form a strong signal to schools to improve performance, with the net result being a better school system. This expectation, however, does not hold true in reality; the information is not used much by parents and, hence, their behavior does not send a strong signal to schools. This does not mean that the publication of school performance data on the Internet has no effect. School administrators do frequently refer to the information in order to know what is happening at other schools. They interpret and analyze this information in the context of competition with other schools, benchmarking themselves and learning from others. Schools do change their behavior in response to the influences of the information being public, albeit not in a deterministic and predictable manner. Key words. Performance indicators, transparency, education

1. The Hype: Publications on the Internet Enhance School Quality ‘Show me, don’t tell me!’ The belief that parents have the right to know how their children’s schools are performing has become widespread. If the performance record of a school is not being published, so it is argued, the school probably has something to hide. Publishing the information is intended to be a strong incentive for schools to keep up their quality, resulting in better education for all students. Publishing performance indicators is a ‘hype’. How can we understand this hype? Broad societal trends in the Netherlands and in many other countries have weakened the link between parents and schools. Traditionally, school choice was based on location and religion: children attended the school nearest to home or the school that fit their parents’ religion. However, increased mobility and secularization have weakened or even eliminated this natural tie between

A. Meijer / Does Transparency Lead to Better Education?

39

parents and schools. This tie once formed the basis for communal steering, and in its absence new forms of steering are now required. Marketization of the public sector is propagated as one such new form of steering [1]. This and other new sorts of public influence fall under the label of ‘New Public Management’, which emphasizes that governments should facilitate markets and refrain from direct steering [2]. In the application of New Public Management (NPM) to education, three broad trends stand out. The first trend is autonomization: within NPM, allowing more autonomy is regarded as a way to enhance the performance of public service providers, e.g. [3]. The second trend is accountability: public service providers must account for their use of this enhanced autonomy and also demonstrate their performance [4]. The third trend is marketization governments all around the world are introducing market mechanisms in public sectors in order to enhance quality, efficiency and effectiveness. Neoclassical micro-economics and market theory present two arguments for school choice [5]: a supply side and a demand side argument. The supply side argument runs as follows: introducing competition in education will force providers to increase quality, meet specific consumer demands, and/or generally decrease cost in a bid to gain or maintain market share. The demand side argument focuses on the parents of students: competition increases the incentives for parents to obtain information about these services, since they will be required to choose one. The result will be that they will assess schools more critically. Put in Hirschman’s terms [6]: parents can exert choice by choosing a school or withdrawing their child from a school and voice by complaining about school quality. A fundamental problem in the ‘education market’ is the lack of information about the performance of schools, and therefore many argue that the transparency of school systems needs to be improved [7, 8]. Worldwide, information about school performance is being published on the Internet in an effort to solve this problem. The basic argument is that this information can be used by parents in choosing the best school for their children and that these choices will send the signal to schools that they need to perform well or risk losing their students. Schools will then supposedly make an effort to improve their performance and, consequently, the overall performance of schools will improve and parents will receive a better education for their children. Therefore, the publication of school performance on the Internet has become a ‘hype’. Proponents of this form of transparency such as Brin [9] argue that the publication of performances will indeed have these intended effects, but opponents such as Power [10] stress that it will lead to all kinds of perverse effects (see [11, 12] for a discussion of intended and perverse effects). The best known of these perverse effects is ‘goal displacement’: schools will try to improve their scores as measured by the School Inspection Service, but the overall quality may actually diminish. Another effect is referred to as ‘meritocracy’, which means that the information strengthens the relative position of higher-educated parents at the expense of those with less education. These effects will be discussed in this chapter. The Dutch government is one of the governments that publish information about school performance on the Internet. The results of school inspections are released so that parents can obtain adequate information about schools. Parents can use this information to choose a school, which could eventually lead to improvements in the quality of Dutch education by activating the environment in which schools function and enabling parents to discuss quality with school management. In discussing the effects of these publications I will first approach the question of whether parents actually use this information for choosing a school. My research has

40


led me to the conclusion that parents hardly use this information at all and that other sources of information, such as contact with other parents and visits to the school, are much more important. The expectations do not prove true. Radical improvements in school performance do not occur as an effect of shifting patterns of school choice based on neutral information. I will then show that this does not mean that the publication of information about school performance has no effect at all. Aside from the hype, the information is in fact used by school administrators in different ways. This has nondeterministic and unpredictable effects on schools.

2. Information about School Performance In the Netherlands school choice is not restricted by school districts as it is in the USA or by catchment areas as in the UK; people are free to choose the school they think is best for their children. During the first half of the 20th century the Netherlands had a pillarized system that included Catholic, Protestant and public schools, and most people chose schools according to these denominations. Nowadays there are still Catholic, Protestant and public schools, but because of the secularized character of the Dutch society, these denominations are not as important in school choice as they used to be. All schools are funded with public money, and the quality of education is inspected by the national School Inspection Service (Onderwijsinspectie). Inspectors from the School Inspection Service visit schools regularly and report on the results of these inspections to the schools and to the Minister of Education. Until 1997 these results were not made public and were not accessible to citizens. In 1997 a Dutch journalist from the newspaper Trouw requested access to databases that contained summaries of these inspection reports [14]. The Minister of Education denied this access, but a judge ruled that the minister did not present sufficient arguments to support his case. The minister was ordered to grant access to the results of school inspections, and the journalist used these results to compare the quality of schools and compare schools in different respects. From then on Trouw has published articles on the quality of schools every year and has opened a website so that citizens can view this information year-round (www.trouw.nl). The increased transparency led to drastic changes in the School Inspection Service, and the agency decided that it would publish the results of school inspections itself. The School Inspection Service even redefined its mission and stated that one of its tasks was to provide citizens with independent and reliable information about the quality of schools. The School Inspection opened a website itself and began publishing quantitative information concerning the quality of schools – the so-called Quality Cards – in 1998 (www.kwaliteitskaart.nl). This website, which presents information about school performance, has become fairly popular in comparison to other government websites in the Netherlands. The School Inspection Service indicated that they received approximately 800 individual visitors daily in July, August and September 2004 and about 200 questions a month through the info-mail facility on their website. In 2004 the School Inspection Service asked the visitors to its website to complete a short questionnaire. Their answers provided insight into who the visitors to the website are (Table 1).


41

Table 1: Results of questionnaire regarding the School Inspection Service

Number of respondents

Percentage

Parents

860

40.5%

Students

189

8.9%

Teachers

311

14.6%

School management

286

13.5%

Others in education-related jobs (e.g. local government officials)

291

13.7%

Other

186

8.8%

Total

2123

100%

This table shows that parents are the largest group of visitors but that they still form only a minority of the total. Together with students they form a group of nearly 50%; the other 50% consists of people who work in the education field as teachers, school administrators or in other positions. These results show that the website is not only used by parents but also by a large group of professionals. When looking at the gender of the respondents, 70% of the parents were women. A majority of the teachers were also women (55%), but most respondents from school management were men (70%). Despite the popularity of this website, the percentage of parents who visit it is still small. A rough estimate would be that, within a period of three months, the maximum number of parents who visit the website is just over 7%. This seems to give some ground to the idea that the ‘hype’ might not be very far off the mark. If this 7% of parents actually uses the information in choosing a school, this could give a strong signal to schools to improve their performance. But does that really happen? To answer this question, we need to go beyond simple numbers and obtain an understanding of the actual use of the information on the website by parents.

3. Use of the Performance Information by Parents The web enquiry was used to gather information about the use of the information about school performance by parents. It measured why parents visit the website. The main reasons given are presented in Table 2. (Note: the percentages add up to more than 100% because respondents could mention more than one reason.) Table 2: Reasons parents mention for visiting the School Inspection Service website

Reason

Percentage

I want to find a school for my child.

41.3%

I want to know what the School Inspection Service thinks of my child’s school.

46.4%

42


I want to compare schools.

31.9%

I worry about the quality of my child’s school or have complaints about the school.

12.2%

This table shows that parents use the website when trying to find a school for their children. Parents also refer to the information simply to know how the school of their child is doing. Some parents have a look at the website when they are concerned about school quality. Both groups, parents who want to choose a school and parents who want to assess the quality of their child’s school, compare their own child’s school with other schools. In another question parents were asked to indicate how important the website is as a source of information about school quality. Seventy-two percent of the parents indicated that it is very important and 27% indicated that it is important. These numbers seem to indicate that the website is indeed used for choice and voice. The respondents to the enquiry were also asked to state their level of education. Of all respondents, 68.7 % had a college or university degree. The education level of parents was specifically analyzed. In this group the level of education was also high: 58.8 % of the parents had a college or university degree. This shows that the website visitors are not a cross-section of Dutch parents. Highly-educated parents are much more likely to use the website that less-educated parents. This finding seems to confirm the idea of a meritocracy: better-educated people can strengthen their relative positions. These numbers seem to indicate that the expectation behind the hype is indeed being fulfilled, but that it takes place specifically among highly-educated parents. To truly understand the effects of the publication of school performance information, we also need to know whether parents actually use the information for school choice and voice. Do schools notice that patterns in school choice are being influenced by the publication of information? Do parents refer to the website when discussing school quality with school management? The results of the qualitative research are mixed and seem to contradict the quantitative findings. Most school managers and professionals indicate that, as far as they have noticed, none of the parents use the website to assess the quality of the schools (although some respondents think this may happen more in the future). Many respondents highlight the fact that options for school choice, especially when it comes to primary education, are limited: “The school is in a small village and one can choose between a Protestant school and a public school. If you go to church on Sundays, you send your kids to the Protestant school, if not, you send them to the public school.” Another respondent emphasized that parents only want to know whether the school offers sufficient quality: “The effect of an average score on school choice is negligible. Only very low scores influence school choice.” Some managers emphasized that they regret the fact that the information is little used because it would give their school a chance to improve its public profile. A minority of the respondents indicated that they do use the information when preparing for school choice. They do not use the information directly, but mainly to prepare for informative meetings with school management. One school manager: “I think that a small percentage of the parents, around 20%, use the website to prepare for an informative meeting with the school management. (…) They pose specific questions that are based on the information on the website.” Another manager confirmed this


43

perception: “Parents who are looking for a school know the information on the Internet, but it does not determine their choice.” The qualitative research indicates that teachers and school management are rarely confronted with parents that refer to the school website when discussing school quality. A school manager: “I recently experienced that parents noticed that we had a bad score for the topic ‘communication with parents’. They came to me and said: ‘That confirms our idea that the communication between school and parents requires improvements.” Other managers mentioned similar instances. They all emphasized, however, that these are very rare instances. Most parents base their assessment of the school quality on their own experiences and not on a website. A school manager: “It has never happened to me that a parent said that he had seen on the Internet that our school did not fulfill the required number of class hours.” How can we understand the discrepancy between the quantitative research that seems to indicate that a substantial group of parents does use the information for choice and voice and the qualitative research which indicates that many schools hardly notice any influence? One explanation could be that the information is only used by parents of certain schools. Another explanation could be that parents look at the information but use it as just one source among many. This would explain both why many parents look at the information and at the same time this goes unnoticed by schools. One manager indicates: “I am never confronted with it, but I would be amazed if parents did not look at the information on the Internet.” That explanation is confirmed by other research [15] which indicates that other sources such as a visit to the school, contacts with other parents and articles in newspapers are much more important. Parents with a child already in school look at the information out of curiosity but base their judgment on their own experiences with the school. The above discussion of the use of information about school performance on the Internet by parents shows that the ‘hype’ is not justified, since use of information is limited and does not send a strong signal to schools to improve performance. Does that mean that publication has no effect at all? That conclusion would be too quick, since one could also argue that although the information is not used by parents, it is used by other stakeholders such as the media, prospective teachers, youth care, etc. If stakeholders use the information to assess school quality, this would still send a strong signal to schools.

4. Use of the Performance Information by Other Stakeholders The School Inspection Service did not mention stakeholders such as journalists, neighbors, church groups, etc. as visitors to the website (see Table 1), which seems to indicate that stakeholders do not make much use of the website. This quantitative finding was confirmed in the qualitative interviews. Interviews with respondents at schools indicated that the information about school performance is hardly used by stakeholders. There are some exceptions. One school manager indicated that local government officials compare the school with other schools and discuss the results of this analysis with school management. Another respondent said that sometimes potential new colleagues study school performance information when applying for a job. Every now and then a student has a look at the website but, as far the respondents know, these are rare occasions. The dominant opinion is briefly summarized in the following remark of one of the school managers: “I never get a question or hear a

44


remark about the information about our school that appears on the website of the School Inspection Service.” More surprisingly, the media rarely pays attention to school performance. School performance was only an issue when this information had just gone public. One respondent said that the local newspaper published a list of underperforming schools in 2002. This article triggered many reactions, but since then the newspaper has not written about school performance anymore. It is not considered something ‘new’ that warrants attention by the media. The media is now interested in other things such as radical opinions among immigrant students. One school manager said that the only reason why a journalist would look at the information about his school is to know how many immigrant students there were in the hope to find a juicy story about radicalization. The lack of media attention in this country for school performance is an interesting difference between the Netherlands and the USA. American newspapers frequently write about school performance and present elaborate analyses when the new numbers about school performance are released [13]. The crucial difference here seems to be the nature of education in society. In the Netherlands, schooling is considered to be an issue between schools and parents and not something that is of interest to society at large. Americans consider public schools to be an issue that is relevant to the local community, and school boards are elected by all citizens. This cultural and institutional difference seems to be at the heart of the difference in the level of attention given to school performance by local media. This empirical assessment of the use of school performance information by stakeholders does not provide any confirmation of the idea that stakeholders would send a strong signal to schools to improve performance. No evidence is found for this alternative ‘hype’ effect discussed in the introduction. Does this mean that the publication of school performance information on the Internet has no effect? That conclusion, too, would be too quick, since publication could also have a direct effect on schools if the publication itself forms an incentive for school management and professionals to improve performance.

5. Use of the Performance Information by Schools The quantitative research showed that the website is used extensively by professionals working in education. Fifty percent of the visitors to the website are people that work in education as teachers, school management or in other jobs (see Table 1). The respondents were asked why they visited the website. The main reasons are presented in Table 3. (Note: the percentages add up to more than 100% because respondents could mention more than one reason.) Table 3 shows that the three reasons for the visits í knowing, comparing and improving í are almost equally important. Knowing is more important to teachers, comparing and improving are more important to school management. The third of these reasons is especially interesting, since it shows that the information is not only used for competing with other schools but also for learning from others’ experiences.


45

Table 3: Reasons school professionals mention for visiting the School Inspection Service website

Reason

Percentage teachers

Percentage school management

I want to know how the School Inspection Service evaluates my school.

53.0%

40.8%

I want to compare schools.

35.0%

40.2%

I am looking for information to improve the quality of my school.

26.0%

37.4%

The explorative research showed that the extent to which the performance information on the website of the School Inspection Service is used varies enormously. Some respondents actively use the website to collect information about other schools, whereas other respondents indicated that they never look at the website. The extent of use is related to the position of the respondents: teachers hardly use the information whereas, on average, managers make much more use of the information (although there are great differences between managers). This shows that the information about school performance is considered to be relevant management information. How do managers use this information? They use the information to prepare themselves for a visit of the School Inspection Service by reading other recent reports to know which aspects are currently important to inspectors. They also use the information to prepare for external communication about school performance. Managers want to know how other, competing schools are doing so as to be prepared for questions by parents or to be able to sketch the unique selling points of their schools. However, the use of the information is not only related to competition; managers are also interested in learning from other schools. Some respondents highlighted that they read the reports of other schools to learn from best practices. One manager indicated that he recently approached the manager of another school. “I had seen that their school had a good score for their quality system. I asked him how we could improve our system.” Benchmarking is a general form of information use that is important to many school managers. Several reasons for benchmarking were mentioned: x x x x

Emotional reasons for benchmarking. Managers indicated that benchmarking can make them feel better about their own performance. Strengthening the external focus. Comparing school performance with other schools strengthens the outward focus of schools. Evaluating the quality of performance. Comparison is needed in order to know how to value one’s own performance. Accountability. One school was held accountable by local government and had to present its own performance in relation to those of other schools.

These results show that public information is important to the majority of managers. The overall effect is that managers focus less exclusively on their own schools; they study other schools to know who they are competing with, to learn from them and to be

46


able to value their own performance relative to other schools. These findings indicate that an understanding of the effects of the publication of school results on the Internet should not primarily focus on the behavior of parents (and other stakeholders) but rather should look at the meanings that school managers attach to this information. These meanings form the basis for the changes in the behavior of school managers. This raises the following question: What meanings do school managers attach to public performance information on the Internet?

6. Effects of Publication on Schools Various respondents admitted that they are ‘not amused’ when bad performance data of their schools are publicized on the website of the School Inspection Service. They feel that the reputation of their schools may be in jeopardy and that this needs to be avoided. The main effect of the publication of school inspection results is that it forms an incentive to improve performance. One manager: “It stimulates us to pay more attention to school quality.” Another respondent: “It focuses our attention on school quality. We are held accountable and therefore need to work more on school quality.” A minority of the respondents highlighted that the publication of school performance has no effect at all. One respondent: “The school inspection report has an effect. It leads to actions to improve the quality of our school. The fact that this report is publicized on a website has no effect. (…) We steer on the content of our program and publication does not put pressure on us.” The respondents who indicated that the publication of school performance information forms an incentive to improve performance stressed that the publication of school performance does not have a direct impact on decisions. The effect is mediated by their own interpretations and analyses of the information. One respondent: “Our own arguments and analysis are more important.” Bad results do not directly lead to efforts to improve the score. School management may analyze the score and conclude that the bad results are only a temporary drop or that the results are not so bad in view of the context and student population of the school. The incentive can certainly not be equated with a deterministic striving towards higher scores. Many respondents emphasized that the publication of school results is just one of the factors that influences decision-making and is certainly not considered the most important one. One could describe the publication of performance information as a ‘weak signal’ that schools need to focus on certain aspects of their performance. Strong signals, such as a decline in test results or a drop in student admissions, directly focus the attention of school management and lead to decisions aimed at improving results and attracting more students. The publication of school performance may, however, lead to attention for new issues. The respondents find the publication of school performance indicators important in view of the long-term support of parents, students and stakeholders for the school. Other respondents indicated that other signals, such as the opinions of parents, may conflict with the signal sent out by the publication of school performance data. In one school the first-year student population is mixed, in the sense that students at different levels are all in the same classroom (which is quite unusual in the Netherlands, where students are usually separated according to ability). The school’s performance could possibly be improved by separating the classes according to the abilities of the students, but parents prefer the mixed system. In this case, the opinion of parents is considered


47

by the school to be more important than improving performance to gain a higher public ranking, and thus the mixed system is retained. Two respondents highlighted that non-traditional schools such as Montessori schools or Jenaplan schools have difficulties with the publication of school performance data. They have a different concept of ‘school quality’ and therefore may not attain the required level of quality as measured by the School Inspection Service. Some of these schools have brought about changes in their programs in order to fulfill the standards of the School Inspection Service. They were pushed into changing their programs by the fact that the media ranked them as underperforming schools on the basis of the data that had been released by the School Inspection Service. These results show that most schools do care about the publication of school performance data, but this publication has a limited and mediated effect on their behavior. No evidence was found of strong and immediate improvements, nor did the publication lead to perverse effects such as ‘goal displacement’. Decisions are not based directly on the data but only on an analysis and interpretation of the data. Publication of school performance data is a signal, but it is relatively weak compared with strong signals such as a drop of students and poor test results. This weak signal does have an impact on schools, but the impact is always mediated by other factors such as the context of the school, the organizational culture, the type of education, other issues facing the school at that moment, etc. Understanding the impact of publication requires a better understanding of how the weak signal of publication is interpreted in various contexts.

7. After the Hype: No Direct Effects but Perceptual Changes Did the hype come through? Has publication of school performance indicators had strong beneficial effects on schools and parents? This explorative research shows that the enhanced transparency of the school system has not had a radical influence on the sector. Citizens – the well-educated ones – visit the website, but use the information to a limited extent in choosing schools or complaining about school quality. Publication of the results has had little influence on the contacts between citizens and schools. Citizens rarely base their school choice on this information, and thus poor performance as measured by the School Inspections Service does not result in the loss of students. Nor does the information form the starting point for a discussion between parents and school management about school performance. Other stakeholders (local governments, potential staff and media) may look at the information, but it does not affect their behavior, either. There is, for instance, little media attention for the performance of schools. This research seems to debunk policy expectations of improved performance through pressure by parents enabled by public information. Does the explorative research show that the transparency has no effect at all? The answer to that question is negative. The release of the website of the School Inspection Service has triggered a number of changes in schools. First, school managers knows that their performances can be scrutinized by outsiders. “It is written on the wall”, as one respondent put it. ‘Public eyes’ [12] can see what schools are doing, and although schools do not get signals from parents or other stakeholders, these public eyes still form an incentive to improve their performance. Second, various schools use the website to learn from the experiences of other schools. A school with a high-quality system may be approached

48


in order to be learned from. Third, school administrations use the information to benchmark their own schools against others. Sometimes they focus on their placement in relation to other local schools, but often school managements prefer to compare themselves with a school that is further away but more similar in student population and curriculum. The fact that publication of school performance data has few direct effects provides no support for the arguments of opponents of transparency. None of the schools showed signs of goal displacement, risk-adverse behavior, creaming, selecting or other perverse effects. The effect of transparency just does not seem to be strong enough to trigger such effects which do often take place when performance indicators are directly coupled to financial rewards. The publication of school performance data in the Netherlands is not coupled to such schemes, and school managers thus have ample room to react in their own manner. Their reactions sometimes focus on improving performance, but they do not do this through perverse ways. The overall effect of the transparency is an enhanced focus on external developments. School management used to have a more inward focus. Developments and trends were discussed within the schools, and other experiences and achievements played a less important role. This external focus changes the behavior of schools, albeit not in a deterministic and predictable manner. The value that schools attach to the publication of performance indicators depends on, among other factors, context of the school, the organizational culture, the type of education and other issues facing the school at that moment. The changes should be conceptualized as a process of social construction. The school environment is not a given but rather something that is constructed through interactions and dialogues [16]. This chapter has provided an idea as to how managers construct their environment under the changing conditions of transparency. The external focus, which is the overall effect, seems to be something that can be valued positively since schools can now more quickly adapt to new circumstances and trends. One can, however, also criticize the external focus, since it could lead to less diversity in schools. The uniform system of measuring performance that is used by the School Inspection Service may stimulate more uniformity in schools. Some even fear a McDonaldization of the Dutch School system [17]. The publication of school performance data on a website does not drastically change school behavior, but it does change the decision-making agenda of schools. They discuss various issues that are triggered by the website. Most importantly, they increasingly discuss school quality in the terms defined by the School Inspection Service. Changes in perceptions are a more subtle effect than changes in behavior, but these changes should not be neglected. Postman [18] shows how new technologies allow us to look at reality in a different manner. The website of the School Inspection Service is an example of a new technology that does not quickly change schools’ behavior but instead slowly changes schools’ perceptions of their environment and school quality.

Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the Dutch School Inspection Service for funding the qualitative research discussed in this chapter and providing quantitative data on the use


49

of their website. He would also like to thank Martijn van der Meulen for his comments on a previous version of this paper.

References [1] J.S. Svensson, Overheidssturing in het onderwijs en informatisering, in P.M. Creemers, J.H.G.I. Giesbers, M.L. Krüger and C.A. van Vilsteren (eds.), Handboek Schoolorganisatie en onderwijsmanagement: Leiding geven in bestel, school en klas, 1998-2003 (loose leaf), Samson, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1999, C2260/1-27. [2] C. Pollitt and G. Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. [3] S. van Thiel, Quangocratization: Trends, causes and consequences, Unpublished Thesis, Utrecht University, 2000. [4] R. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability, Brookings Institution, Washington, 2001. [5] J. Buckley and M. Schneider, Shopping for Schools: How do Marginal Consumers Gather Information About Schools?, The Policy Studies Journal 31, 2 (2003), 121-45. [6] A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1970. [7] R.W. Oliver, What is transparency?, McGraw Hill, New York, 2004. [8] A. Fung, M. Graham and D. Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007. [9] D. Brin, The Transparent Society, Perseus, Reading, 1998. [10] M. Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999. [11] S. Waslander, Koopmanschap en burgerschap: Marktwerking in het onderwijs, Van Gorcum, Assen, 1999. [12] A.J. Meijer, Publishing public performance results on the Internet. Do stakeholders use the Internet to hold Dutch public service organizations to account?, Government Information Quarterly 24, 1 (2007), 165-85. [13] A.J. Meijer, ICTs and Stakeholder Accountability. The use of transparency through the Internet as a policy instrument in education and healthcare in Massachusetts, Unpublished report, Utrecht University, 2006. [14] A.J. Meijer, Vreemde ogen dwingen: De betekenis van Internet voor maatschappelijke controle in de publieke sector, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag, 2004. [15] R. Vogels, Ouders bij de les. Betrokkenheid van ouders bij de school van hun kind, Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, Den Haag, 2002. [16] W.R. Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems, Fifth edn. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 2002. [16] G. Ritzer, The McDonaldization of society: An investigation into the changing character of contemporary social life, Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks, 1993. [17] N. Postman, Technopoly. The Surrender of Culture to Technology, Vintage Books, New York, 1993.

50


Governments and Multi-Channeling: Channel Positioning Strategies for the Future Willem Pieterson University of Twente, Research Program Governments and ICT

Abstract. During the years of the dot-com hype, the Internet was believed to be the ideal service channel. Based on its cost efficiency and some communicative characteristics it was believed that it would render the other service channels, such as the telephone and front desks, obsolete. Yet instead of replacing the traditional channels, Internet simply became an addition to the existing service repertoire. Nowadays many governmental organizations struggle with the management of their multiple service channels. In many cases the Internet did not lead to a decline in the use of the traditional channels, and therefore hardly any cost reductions were realized. Further, citizens appear to prefer different channels for different situations. In this chapter we present an overview of channel usage by citizens as well as various governmental channel management strategies. We pay special attention to the currently popular perspective on multi-channel management. However, multi-channel management is ambiguous, in the sense that a number of different views on multi-channeling exist. We discuss the various perspectives and argue why governmental agencies should focus on integrated multi-channel management strategies. Keywords. Multi-channeling, channel management, service delivery, service channels, service channel positioning

1. Introduction Since its advent and rapid diffusion during the nineties, the Internet has been considered a promising channel for the improvement of both the internal efficiency of government and the relationship between government and citizens. During this period many countries − including most Western countries − have followed a strategy to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of government, among others guided by the perspective of New Public Management. The various national strategies have been directed at the reorganization of public service provision in both front and back offices [1]. Given the attractive characteristics of the Internet (particularly the technical possibilities), and inspired by the commercial success of the private sector during the dot-com hype, it is no surprise that the public sector rapidly embraced the Internet as the means to improve public service delivery [2]. The term for this phenomenon is ‘egovernment’, derived from e-commerce. Nowadays more than 80 percent of all Dutch citizens file their taxes electronically, and the number of hits on the websites of governmental agencies has risen dramatically in the past years. However, the number of contacts via the telephone has also increased.

W. Pieterson / Governments and Multi-Channeling: Channel Positioning Strategies for the Future

51

As has become clear since the hype, citizens have adopted the Internet as a service channel but also continue to use the means of interaction they already had at their disposal. This observation leads to the question of what strategy for service channel positioning best suits governmental organizations. One the one hand, many governmental organizations face the task of working more efficiently in order to reduce the costs of public service delivery. On the other hand, however, public agencies have to satisfy the needs and preferences of their citizens, who apparently use multiple channels alongside each other, rendering public service delivery a costly business. This chapter takes a closer look at how citizens use the various service channels and how this information may be used in creating the ideal multi-channel strategy for both citizens and governments.

2. Internet Hype Before the 1990s the public sector basically deployed three service channels: telephone, face-to-face and written/print. There was not really a specific strategy behind the positioning of these service channels. In most cases, service interactions could be dealt with via all channels. For example, when one had a question, he/she could write a letter, phone the organization or go to a service desk to ask it. In some cases specific services were offered via a specific channel. Forms, for example, were typically sent by mail, but when it came to information and communication services, all channels provided the same functionality. The 1990s were the years in which the relevance of thinking about the positioning of service channels gained importance. The main shift was that channels no longer simply paralleled each other but came to be thought of as able to replace each other [3]. Two important developments produced this shift. First, following the inspiration of New Public Management (NPM), the public sector revised its strategies for dealing with citizens. Secondly, the arrival of ICT − and predominantly the Internet − radically changed the entire scene of service channel use and management. Most NPM advocates argued for a more customer-centered approach to public management [4]. Originated in the United States in the 1980s, NPM spread around the world in the 1990s. In the second half of the 1990s most western countries followed a national strategy for the use of ICT to improve governmental performance [1], based upon NPM [5]. In NPM, public managers are challenged to either find new and innovative ways to achieve results or to privatize functions previously provided by governments [6]. NPM primarily aims at reducing the size of government, reducing its costs and improving its performance [7]. Further, NPM holds that citizens should be treated as customers; and that governments should reach the goal of ‘meeting the needs of the customer, not the bureaucracy’ [4, pp.166-167]. These two main propositions of NPM − better service and cost reduction − were difficult to achieve using only the traditional channels. Both the telephone and face-toface channels heavily rely on human contact between citizens and civil servants, and these contacts are very expensive. Therefore, it is no wonder that government swiftly adopted a new type of service channel that would not only benefit citizens but would also require a fraction of the costs of the traditional channels. This new channel was the World Wide Web and, to a lesser extent, e-mail. The introduction of the World Wide Web in 1991 and the advent of the graphical interface made the Internet accessible to the public. Soon afterwards, the Internet

52


diffused around the world (especially the West) at a tremendous speed. This rapid diffusion led to governmental agencies noticing the possibilities of the Internet as a service channel, leading to the early appearance of governmental websites on the Net in the beginning of the 1990s. The real boost of governmental agencies using the Internet as a service channel emerged during the dot-com hype in the mid-1990s. During this period the Internet made its appearance in governmental plans for public service delivery. The first policy program in the Netherlands dealing exclusively with new technologies was the ‘Electronic Highways’ action program [8]. In this program the opportunities offered by Internet technologies for achieving the goals of New Public Management played a central role; the Internet was believed to be crucial for government, both internally (efficiency) and externally, towards citizens. In the United States, the National Performance Review (NPR) encouraged government agencies to employ the Internet in order to improve service levels, cut red tape and make access to Government easier [9]. Furthermore, internal considerations played a role: Our goal is to make the entire federal government both less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our national bureaucracy away from compliancy and entitlement toward initiative and empowerment. We intend to redesign, to reinvent, to reinvigorate the entire national government [10, p.1].

The basic ideas of the NPR continued to dominate in the succeeding program: the National Partnership for Reinventing Government’s AccessAmerica [11]. An important difference is that the Internet itself received relatively little attention in the NPR but became a major factor in AccessAmerica, in which the Internet is marked as a dominant tool in changing and improving the relationship between government and citizens. The goals set in the NPR and AccessAmerica to reinvent and re-engineer government coalesced in 2000 in the launch of the FirstGov portal. One of the important characteristics of the plans in the United States is the focus on the citizen as customer [12], whereby the Internet is primarily seen as a tool to improve public service delivery. Similar initiatives existed in the United Kingdom, under the label of ‘joined-up government’ [13]. The foundation of Britain’s ‘joined-up government’ project was laid in the 1996 Government Direct prospectus [14], which noted the possibilities of the Internet for a) providing better and more efficient services to businesses and citizens, b) improving the efficiency and openness of government administration and c) realizing cost savings for taxpayers. The two key aims in the joined-up government plans for the use of ICT and the Internet thereby became efficiency (cost-cutting) and better effectiveness in policies, programs and services [15]. Furthermore, the UK government, too, reduced the citizen to solely a customer or consumer of services. In more recent plans (during the Internet hype), such as the 2000 E-Government report, ICT is still seen as a tool for ‘better services for citizens and businesses and more effective use of the Government’s information resources’. In sum, around the globe the electronic channels were believed to achieve the two dominant goals of the NPM: reducing the cost of government and improving public service delivery [16]. But why? Two main reasons determine why the Internet was associated with both cost reduction and improving service delivery. First is the costefficiency of this channel. Studies of the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency have shown that electronic services are, on average, 20 times less expensive than in-person


53

services. The second reason is formed by the positive characteristics of the Internet that are associated with improving service levels. Van Dijk [17] reviews numerous theories that deal with characteristics of media or channels, and presents his model of ‘communication capacities’ based on these theories. The table below shows the model of communication capacities. Table 1: Communication capacities of different media [17] Old media

New media

Communication

Face-

capacity

to-face

Print

Broadcasting

Telephone

Computer networks

Multimedia

Speed

Low

Low/medium

High

High

High

High

Reach

1

1

1

Low

Medium

High

High

High

Low

Reach (social)

Low

Medium

High1

High1

Low

Low

Storage capacity

Low

Medium

Medium

Low

High

High

Accuracy

Low

High

Low/medium

Low

High

High

Selectivity

Low

Low

Low

High

High

High

Interactivity

High

Low

Low

Medium

Medium

Medium

Stimuli Richness

High

Low

Medium

Low

Low

Medium

Complexity

High

High

Medium

Medium

Low

Medium

Privacy Protection

High

Medium

High

Medium

Low

Medium

(geographical)

Note: In developed countries only

Van Dijk distinguishes ten characteristics of types of media, which he divides into ‘old’ and ‘new’ media. Each medium can score high, medium or low on each of the characteristics. As the table makes clear, the new media differ greatly from the old media when it comes to the speed, storage capacity and accuracy [17]. The focus on the positive characteristics of the Internet that dominate the perceptions of governmental organizations towards the web is perfectly expressed in the Dutch governmental program OL2000: Electronic services are efficient for the organizations (fewer citizens coming to counters), effective (citizens’ effort requirements decrease, since they do not have to travel and it is possible to customize services) and citizen-friendly (no more constraints in time and place) [translated] [18].

As the previous paragraphs already make clear; the enthusiasm about the new media and especially the Internet were fed by these positive characteristics. In most cases, the Internet was seen as the channel with unlimited possibilities, rendering all other channels obsolete. This led to the so-called replacement channel positioning strategy [3]. An example of this strategy is the mandatory electronic tax filing system for entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. Traditional channels may no longer be used to file taxes; these have been replaced by the Internet. Another example is television

54


commercials in which no longer the address and telephone number of the sender are displayed, but only the website address.

3. The Backlash: Citizens’ Channel Use During the years of the Internet hype, the Internet was seen by governmental agencies as a replacement of the traditional channels. But what were the views of the citizens? Did citizens adopt the electronic channels, and did they switch to using those channels instead of the traditional channels? In this section we take a closer look at the use of service channels by citizens. We can decompose the use of service channels into a number of related issues. We first discuss the channels used in general by citizens, and secondly the use of channels for specific purposes. What channels do citizens use in general nowadays to contact governmental agencies? Studies in various countries have been conducted that shed light on this issue. On an international level, the European eUSER project has investigated channel use. The eUSER data show that the media channel used when contacting government is still overwhelmingly face-to-face. However, there are very large differences between countries. Denmark is the leading country in the sample, with over 40% of government users using the electronic channels, while in the Czech Republic the figure is less than 9%. In the UK and Ireland the use of postal services and the telephone has overtaken face-to-face contact. Overall, new ICT media provide access for about 20% of all contacts with government, 17% of this via the Internet or e-mail and about 3% via SMS [19]. Accenture [20] takes a global perspective and concludes in its yearly e-government benchmark that the telephone prevails as the dominant service channel. Sixty-three percent of the respondents had used the telephone that year in contrast to 31% having used the Internet. Similarly, citizens in all countries (with the exception of Japan) believe that citizens should be able to access government services by any means they wish, regardless of the cost to government. Also on a national level, a number of studies have been conducted. The table below summarizes some of the findings of national studies about general channel use and/or the use of a particular channel. Table 2: Channel use in various countries Country** Channel*

United States

Switzerland

Canada

Australia

Netherlands

Personal

20%

55%

48%

46%

23%

Telephone

42%

54%

55%

28%

30%

Post (and/or Fax)

17%

24%

25%

13%

21%

The Internet

29%

14%

30%

19%

18%

* Percentages may exceed 100% when added up, due to the fact that people may have more than one service encounter per year. ** Data used originate from different years: United States [23] and Canada [26], 2003; Switzerland [24] and Australia [27], 2005; The Netherlands [32], 2006.


55

The data from Switzerland and Canada displayed in the table above show that citizens do not always use the same channels; many citizens use more than one channel to contact governmental organizations. Some observations about this phenomenon have been presented in different studies: •

•

• •

Pieterson and Ebbers [21] did a survey among Dutch citizens and found that citizens are in practice multi-channelers; on average, they have contact with governmental organizations via three different channels. German research indicates that although nearly 80% of Bavarian citizens wish to have contact with governmental organizations via the Internet, both the inperson and telephone contacts are perceived by a majority of citizens to be important means of citizen-government interaction [22]. Twenty-two percent of all Americans had used multiple channels during their last service encounter with a governmental organization [23]. Finally, the Citizen First study from Canada found that citizens used an average of 1.9 channels to obtain the last used service. Half used a single channel, while half used two or more channels.

The United States’ study also asked citizens their preferred means of interaction. Forty percent of the respondents declared that they preferred the phone, 13% said they preferred in-person contact, and 24% indicated that they favor the web. Furthermore, the study from Switzerland revealed that citizens claim that they will continue to use the traditional channel to a far greater extent than the electronic channels. On an organizational level, too, a number of studies have been conducted; especially internal revenue / tax organizations have been at the forefront of collecting data on channel usage. The tax organizations from countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands all report a tremendous growth in the number of interactions via the electronic channels; however, in all four countries there is hardly any decrease in the number of telephonic and personal interactions. The situation is well illustrated by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA): ‘The telephone remains the most popular service channel for client enquiries’.

4. Channels used for specific purposes Various studies in a number of countries have been conducted in recent years that focus on what services citizens use via which channel. In Switzerland, Canada and the Netherlands [24, 25, 26] studies have been conducted that asked citizens for what purpose they use the Internet. Although each country has different purposes in their top five, the most important factor in all three countries is gathering information from a website. Number 2 in two out of three countries is downloading forms. An Australian study [27] explores in more detail the relationship between the type of channel and the purpose for which it is used. This study distinguishes between information-related services (obtaining information and giving information) and communication services. Table 3 shows which channel respondents use for what kind of service.

56


Table 3: Channels used for different tasks in Australia [20] Channel

Information (obtaining)

Information (giving)

Communication

Personal

30%

41%

52%

Telephone

36%

28%

26%

Post (and/or Fax)

0%

20%

13%

The Internet

33%

16%

15%

As the table shows, the Internet is mostly used to obtain information. To give information and to actually communicate, the more personal channels are deployed more often. In general, a majority of all citizens (61%) sees online information as a replacement of information via the traditional written channels such as newspapers and brochures [28]. On the level of transaction services, the Australian study compares the Internet and the telephone on a variety of services. On relatively standard and simple transactions, such as taxes, respondents prefer the Internet to the telephone. Services involving families and children are dealt with by telephone. Unfortunately, the other channels have not been taken into account in this study. The basic conclusion drawn in the Australian study is that there is a relationship between the characteristics (or perceived characteristics) of the task involved and the channels citizens prefer to use, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: The relation between task characteristics and channels [20] Level of complexity

Low ambiguity

High ambiguity

Low complexity

Prefer Internet (usage already high)

Prefer phone

Moderate complexity

Use Internet if confident (increasing usage over time)

Prefer face-to-face or phone

High complexity

Lower usage of Internet (there is willingness if shown how; levels are expected to increase)

Prefer face-to-face

The Pew Internet and American Life Project [29] also found a relationship between citizens’ preferred means of interaction and the nature of the problem. For those people who classify their reason for contacting the governmental agency as very complex or urgent, the telephone and front desk are the most valued forms of interaction. However, for seeking information, the electronic channels are of increasing importance, as the table below clarifies.


57

Table 5: The relation between different task and preferred channel Preferred means of contacting government – by reason for contact Problem was very complex or urgent

Contacted government to solve problem

Contacted government for transaction

Contacted government to get information

Telephone

46%

47%

40%

41%

Website

14%

17%

30%

33%

In person

16%

15%

15%

10%

E-mail

10%

9%

6%

10%

Letter

11%

9%

7%

4%

Source: Pew Internet & American Life Project Survey, July 2003 (http://www.pewInternet.org/)

Finally, in the Netherlands, Pieterson et al. [30] also explored in more detail the relationship between different tasks and situations on the one hand and the channel used on the other hand. Their research has yielded two findings of importance. First, they found that people in many instances choose the same channel for all situations. This general channel preference can be deduced from the different personal characteristics of the respondents. Men generally use the Internet more often than women; younger people also tend to use the Internet more, as well as the more highly educated. The less educated tend to visit the front desk more often. In line with the results of education is the finding that the lower income classes are less likely to use the Internet. Households consisting of just two people tend to have a higher preference for visiting the front desk than all other household compositions. These findings do not divert from other research findings [e.g. 31, 32], except for the finding concerning gender; other studies reported no difference between men and women [33]. However, although people have general preferences for a certain channel in general, people do use different channels for different tasks and in different situations. From the discussion of various studies about channel usage described above, we can draw a number of conclusions: • A majority of all citizens have adopted the Internet. • However, citizens continue to use the traditional channels to a large degree, but this degree varies alongside such variables as age and education. Citizens perceive the Internet as a supplement to other channels, rather than a substitute. • In general, people tend to prefer the Internet for relatively noncomplex and unambiguous tasks, such as orientation, simple tasks and downloading forms. However, for tasks with high complexity, such as complex questions, and tasks with high ambiguity, such as wanting to be sure and not knowing whether the solution to a problem is right, people tend to choose to visit the organization or to use the phone. How do governmental agencies cope with these findings? In the next section we will take a closer look at current channel management strategies, which are often derived from private sector practices.

58


5. After the Hype: Current Channel Management Strategies If, as described in the previous section, the Internet is not going to replace the other media but will remain a supplement, how should we mix the various channels so as to offer the ultimate blend of service channels to our clients or customers? Currently, many governmental organizations follow different strategies in the management of their service channels. Some public agencies still stick to the model in which the Internet is the preferred channel for public service delivery. For example, the Internet is the primary service channel for the Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA), as stated in the CRA Annual Report to Parliament 2004-2005. The UK’s internal revenue service (HM Revenue & Customs) follows the same strategy; the online channel should be seen as the preferred medium for conducting tax business, such as carrying out transactions, but also communicating and receiving information, as the 2005 annual report depicts. Other governmental agencies follow different strategies. The central government of Canada, for example, plans to further improve its e-government services by an integrated multi-channel service delivery, but it does not mention how. In its plan it merely refers to ‘Canada Service’ (www.servicecanada.gc.ca). This ‘one-stop portal’, however, integrates Internet and phone only by making the same information available via both channels (see http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/en/about/about.html, October 2006). Another is Australia’s guide to ‘the strategic assessment and development of service delivery channels’ [34]. Although this guide mentions that citizens differ in what channel types they prefer when interacting with government, it does not tell why they prefer it or what channel attributes they perceive as useful in what situations. The previously mentioned term ‘multi-channeling’ seems to be of increasing popularity in various policy plans and action programs, but what exactly is multi-channeling? Kotler [35] defines multi-channeling as the use, by one single firm, of two or more marketing channels to reach one or more customer segments. Although the idea of using multiple channels to reach customers or citizens is not new, there has been very little research on this topic. For example, most marketing research focuses on consumer behavior within a single channel. Only recently have a few studies been conducted that explore multi-channel retailing [36]. These studies [e.g. 37, 38], all focus on aspects dealing with customer satisfaction or experience with channels. Verhoef et al. [39] are among the few who have actually compared channels on their characteristics and have drawn some conclusions on how multi-channeling may be used. Their comparison between Internet and “brick and mortar” shops revealed that the Internet in general is seen as having a high information value, making the channel convenient for information retrieval purposes; while regular stores are seen to have a high transaction value, making them the most appropriate channel to actually buy goods. A similar conclusion is drawn by Noble, Griffith and Weinberger [36]. This perspective on multi-channeling stresses the supplemental characteristics of service channels. Channels have different characteristics that make them suitable for different tasks or different phases in the service delivery process. This strategy of multi-channeling is what can be called supplemental service-channel positioning [3]. This is not the only strategy for multi-channeling. As Kotler’s definition suggests, utilizing more than one channel to reach customers is multi-channeling. This would mean that (unless an organization uses only one channel), every organization deploys a multi-channel strategy. This would imply that all channel positioning strategies we have described so far in this chapter are multi-channel strategies. In fact, what Kotler


59

defines as multi-channeling really is what has been labeled by the OECD as ‘multiplechannel service delivery’ [40] (see Figure 1). This is a situation in which various channels exist next to each other and where each individual channel is fed by its own system of front-office applications, mid offices and back offices. This does not imply that the channels operate independently; there may be data sharing between the channels, but functionally, multiple-channel management is characterized by ‘thinking in silos’ and vertical integration. Although the OECD strictly discriminates between multi- and multiple-channeling, Kotler’s definition and the practices in many organizations show that multiplechanneling is often labeled as multi-channeling. We believe multi-channeling should be more than multiple-channeling and we believe that multi-channeling distinguishes itself from other strategies in that it relies on at least some form of relation between the service channels. In the public service context, we define multi-channeling as [3]: The use of multiple service channels within one public service delivery process or the use of different channels for different service delivery processes.

Channels

Front office applications

Mid office

Back office systems

Figure 1: The OECD model of multiple channel service delivery [40]

This definition emphasizes the fact that channels have different characteristics which makes them useful for purposes with different requirements. Multi-channeling is not about using multiple channels alongside each other, but is rather about the planned integration of multiple channels that relate to each other and to the different service requirements. Multi-channeling, as it is being used at present in the private sector (as well as research in marketing) relies mostly on the supplemental value of service channels, as described in the previous section. Basically this strategy implies that services should be offered via the channel that is most suited for the type of service. Information services and transaction services with low levels of complexity and ambiguity should be offered via the Internet, whereas more complex services should be offered via the phone and

60


services with high levels of complexity and ambiguity should be dealt with face-toface. This strategy would have two important benefits. First, it would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness from the supply side. Offering only a selected number of services via a channel instead of all services would result in large cost savings and a less complex − thus more manageable − service system. Second, it would be of interest to many customers. Website visits would no longer result in an information overload, with all kinds of services stuffed into a single website, and they would be more convenient. These important benefits could make this strategy of interest to governmental organizations as well. The first recommendations for how to apply this strategy in the public sector environment have just recently appeared. For example, Accenture has shifted the focus of its periodic e-government benchmark away from a traditional assessment of the breadth and maturity of online services to focus instead on the multiple facets of leadership in customer service: citizen-centeredness, multiple channels, crossgovernment services and proactive communications and education about government services [20]. Further, last year the Dutch government launched the idea to bundle the services of all Dutch governmental agencies in a multi-channel contact center in the hopes of improving citizen satisfaction. Although this idea of supplemental channel positioning seems appealing, some drawbacks must be noted. In contrast to in the private sector, some obstacles to supplemental channel positioning hinder full deployment of this strategy; for example, citizens − as opposed to private sector customers − have the right to obtain services. So citizens without a pc cannot simply be excluded from certain services [41, 42]. Further, governments have the legal duty to deliver those services to all citizens, whereas businesses can choose to focus on the most valuable segments of the market or design a website to exactly fit their target groups. For governmental organizations this means that service channels should be designed to be as broad as possible, appealing to the entire population and to the capacities and/or skills of all citizens. Hence a full-fledged strategy of supplemental channel positioning is not possible.

6. Multi-Channeling for the Future: Channel Integration A different strategy needs to be deployed to deal with the drawbacks of the supplemental strategy; this strategy could be called integrated channel positioning [3]. This strategy relies on the integration of channels; in it all channels offer the same basic set of services, but the channels refer to each other and are designed to optimally use their various strengths. For example, a citizen who makes a reservation for a service counter in city hall is invited to first look for particular information on the city website, download a form and try to fill it in at home. Subsequently, the face-to-face interaction at the counter will resolve all remaining insecurities and help answer the questions on the form not yet completed by the citizen, in addition to allowing the civil servants to ask for the identification of this client, to pose additional questions, to watch for inconsistencies and to inform about other things important to both client and municipality. A second example is when a citizen makes a telephone call to a call center while simultaneously making an electronic transaction on a government website. This completes the interaction in a fast and reliable way; it is more efficient than first trying to use the site all alone and only afterwards calling on the phone to ask questions. A third example is to offer only simple information on the main pages of a


61

Figure 2: Ebbers et al. [31] Model of multi-channel management

government website and use linked pages, ‘deeper’ in the website, for complex information. This should be coupled with advice regarding which additional channel to choose (telephone, service desks) when users need more explanation. The most important thing governments should realize is that channels differ in characteristics. What the Internet offers, the phone cannot, and vice versa. The same is true for the front desk. Over the phone and at the front desk civil servants are able to interpret a citizen’s contextual situation without much help of that particular citizen, a website cannot. Interpreting a contextual situation is often necessary in helping citizens. Citizens often are not exactly sure what problem or what question they have. On a website it can take hours to find out what your tax free income is, while a civil servant would hear or see in an instant that you are a senior citizen that enjoys certain tax benefits. On the other hand, a website can hold much more complex information than phone can handle. Complex information needs many structural elements in order to be understood. Websites have these possibilities, such as wizards, simulations and the like. The telephone cannot provide such a broad range of structural elements. Based on the ideas that channels and tasks have different characteristics and that a good fit between task requirements and the characteristics of service channels renders service delivery more efficient and effective, Ebbers, Pieterson and Noordman [31] suggest an integrated multi-channel management model, as shown in Figure 2. The proposed model contains three channel types and two channel modes. The two main characteristics of tasks they distinguish are complexity and ambiguity. Problem ambiguity refers to the difficulties in interpreting problems and situations. To remove or reduce problem ambiguity government needs to confirm whether or not a citizen’s interpretation is correct. As desk and phone are more suitable than a website for storytelling and for receiving multiple cues, desk and phone are the preferred channels

62


when removing problem ambiguity. Problem complexity is about the number of interrelated actions a citizen has to take in order to solve the problem. The more interrelated actions the more complex a problem becomes. With increasing complexity, individuals have to process more information in order understand a problem. The larger the amount of information becomes, the more structural elements it needs in order to remain understandable. Speech lacks the many structural elements that writing or, for instance, electronic simulation tools, have. For that reason, complex problems should be dealt with via the front desk or websites. The OECD also presents a multi-channel model that has been elaborated in some detail [40] − one that is based on an analysis of service delivery among various tax organizations. This model also relies on an integrated and coordinated approach towards multi-channel service delivery. The basic idea behind this strategy is that the data used by all front office applications are stored centrally and are shared with other applications. This central storage in the first place refers to the idea that data are collected once and than shared by different organizations and, second, it means that users can access the services they want from the location they want. In addition, the OECD approach holds thus that different channels can complement each other, thereby improving the quality of the service delivery. The OECD model is displayed in the figure below. Some interesting differences exist between the two approaches to integrated multichanneling described in this section. Whereas the first approach relies on the integration of different channels with different types of services (the idea of combining the strengths of the channel with the requirements of the task), the second approach relies on integrating back offices whereby the different front offices are fed from the thus integrated back office and mid office system.

Channels

Front office applications

Mid office

Back office systems

Figure 3: The OECD model of multi-channel service delivery [40]

Another difference is that the first approach takes a behavioral perspective towards channel management: adjusting channel management towards the behavior (tasks, needs and wants) of the citizen; whereas the second approach takes a far more technical


63

approach: synchronizing the data, creating centrally stored data, etc. The latter approach is not based on the actual needs of the citizen, but on the assumption that pushing the same data through different channels is the best way of channel management. One could conclude that when it comes to optimizing citizen satisfaction and rendering service delivery more efficient, The model from Ebbers et al. [31], is currently the best defined. However, the ideas from the OECD way are incorporated in the model when it comes to the ideas of data collection, re-use of data and data sharing. Both models do share one important shortcoming, and that is empirical testing. It is uncertain how valid the models are in practice. However, as mentioned before, the theoretical foundations of the first model are better defined.

7. Conclusions The arrival of the Internet and other new media adopted into public services has produced strategic problems in service channel positioning for governments. With the advent and explosive growth of the Internet and other digital media in the 1990s, utopian visions of a complete replacement of traditional channels by electronic channels became increasingly popular. Together with the policy goals at that time, the application of New Public Management and the growth in attention to citizen demands in public services, a replacement strategy reached dominance during the Internet hype. However, recent studies have shown that the usage of the telephone and face-to-face service channels remains high. Furthermore, in some cases Internet use has in fact stimulated a turn (and/or return) to call centers and service desks. This raises serious reservations about the effectiveness and efficiency of public electronic services. Recently multi-channel management strategies have become more popular in public service delivery. Here the attempt is made to implement a multi-channel approach that originated in the business sector and in marketing. However, we have shown that there are fundamental obstacles to adapting such a strategy to public services. For this reason, among others, we have elaborated on strategies of multichanneling that might be suited for public sector purposes: integrated multi-channel positioning. Various models are currently under development that elaborate upon or give their own interpretation of the ideas of integrated multi-channeling. Although the models have important differences and drawbacks, they each help to lay out the future as to how integrated multi-channeling can contribute to the realization of the most important objectives in current public service delivery: cost-efficiency and citizen satisfaction.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration for making this research possible. I specifically would like to thank the people of the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration, Centre for Process and Product Development, and Sector Research and Marketing for their valuable input in this study. Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Jan van Dijk and Dr. Wolfgang Ebbers from the University of Twente for their valuable input.

64


References [1] [2] [3]

[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]

[13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25. [26] [27] [28] [29] [30]

[31]

K. Lenk and R. Traunmüller, Broadening the Concept of Electronic Government, in J.E.J. Prins (ed.), Designing E-Government, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2001. V.J.J.M. Bekkers, E-government: Meer dan e-commerce voor overheden, Management & Informatie 8 (2000), 11-20. W. Pieterson and J. van Dijk, Governmental Service Channel Positioning, in A. Gronlund, H.J. Scholl, K.V. Andersen and M.A. Wimmer (eds.), Fifth International EGOV Conference 2006, Trauner Druck, Krakow, Poland, 2006. D. Osborne and T. Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1992. C. Pollit and G. Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. J.V. Denhardt and R.B. Denhardt, The New Public Service: Serving, not Steering, M.E. Sharpe, Armok, NY, 2003. D.F. Kettl, The Global Public Management Revolution, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2000. Tweede Kamer, Nationaal Actieprogramma Elektronische Snelwegen, 23900, 20 (1994). A. Gore, Businesslike Government: National Performance Review, National Performance Review, Washington, DC, 1997. National Performance Review, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less, Report of the National Performance Review, USGPO, Washington, DC, 1993. National Partnership for Reinventing Government, Access America: Re-engineering through Information Technology, USGPO, Washington, DC, 1997. A. Chadwick and C. May, Interaction Between States and Citizens in the Age of the Internet: ‘EGovernment’ in the United States, Britain and the European Union, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 16 (2003), 271-300. V. Bogdanor, Joined-Up Government, Oxford University Press, London, 2005. Central Information Technology Unit, Government Direct: A Prospectus for the Electronic Delivery of Government Services, HMSO, London, 1996. Cabinet Office, Modernising Government, HSMO, London, 1999. G. Grant and D. Chau, Developing a Generic Framework for E-government, Journal of Global Information Management 13 (2005), 1-30. J.A.G.M. van Dijk, The Network Society: Social Aspects of New Media. Second edn. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London (2005). Programmabureau Overheidsloket 2000, Een Loket op het Internet. Programmabureau Overheidsloket 2000, Den Haag, 2000. J. Millard, E-government for an Inclusive Society: Flexy-channeling and Social Intermediairies, Presented at the Fifth Internantional EGOV Conferenc, 2006. Accenture, Leadership in Customer Service: New Expectations, New Experiences, Accenture, 2005. W. Pieterson and W. Ebbers, The Use of Service Channels by Citizens in the Netherlands; implications for multi-channel management., International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74 (2008), 95-110. Accenture, Was-will-der-Buerger.de, Accenture, München, 2002. J.B. Horrigan, How Americans Get in Touch With Government, Pew Internet & American Life Project, Washington, DC, 2004. Berner Fachhochschule and Unisys, E-Government Trendbarometer, Unisys (Schweiz) AG, Thalwil, 2005. F. Bongers, C. Holland, K. Vermaas and R. Vandeberg, Burgers aan Bod: Elektronische Overheidsdienstverlening in het Perspectief van de Vraagzijde, Dialogic, Utrecht, 2004. Erin Research, Citizens First 3, The Institue for Citizen Centred Service, 2003. Australian Government, Australians’ Use of and Satisfaction With E-government Services, Commonwealth of Australia, Barton, 2005. F. Bongers and K. Vermaas, Een Overheid van Glas? Zoeken en Vinden van Overheidsinformatie op Internet, Dialogic, Utrecht, 2006. Pew Internet & American Life Project, How Americans Get in Touch With Government, Pew Internet & American Life Project, Washington, 2004. W. Pieterson, P. Verboon, W.M. Schoonderbeek and J. van Kruchten, Citizen Initiated Contacts: Fitting Personal Preferences, Task and Situation to Channel Choice, EGOV2007 Communication Proceedings, Regensburg, 2007. W. Ebbers, W. Pieterson and H. Noordman, Rethinking Service and Channel Strategies after the Hype, in J. Makolm and G. Orthofer (eds.), ETaxation State & Perspectives, Trauner Druck, Linz, 2007.


65

[32] J.A.G.M. van Dijk, M. Hanenburg and W. Pieterson, Gebruik van Nederlandse Elektronische Overheidsdiensten in 2006 (Use of Dutch Electronic Government Services in 2006), University of Twente, Enschede, 2006. [33] W. Pieterson and W. Ebbers, The Multi-Channel Citizen: A Study of the Use of Service Channels by Citizens in the Netherlands, EGOV2007 Communication Proceedings, Regensburg, Germany, 2007. [34] Australian Government, Delivering Australian Government Services: Manageing Multiple Channels, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra (2006). [35] P. Kotler, Marketing Management: The Millennium Edition, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 2000. [36] S.M. Noble, D.A. Griffith and M.G. Weinberger, Consumer Derived Utilitarian Value and Channel Utilization in a Multi-channel Context, Journal of Business Research 58 (2005), 1643-51. [37] J. Alba, J. Lynch, B. Weitz, C. Janiszewski, R. Lutz and S. Wood, Interactive Home Shopping: Consumer, Retailer and Manufacturer Incentives to Participate in Electronic Marketplaces, Journal of Marketing 61 (1997), 38-53. [38] C. Mathwick, N. Malotra and E. Rigdon, Experiental Value: Conceptualization, Measurement and Application in the Catalog and Internet Shopping Environment, Journal of Retail 77 (2001), 39-56. [39] P.C. Verhoef, E. de Wilde and A. Doffer, De Verdwenen Klant: Uitdagingen voor Bedrijven in een ‘Multi-channel’ Landschap, Holland Management Review 104 (2005), 38-46. [40] OECD, Improving Taxpayer Service Delivery: Channel Strategy Development, OECD, Paris, 2007. [41] G.T. Allison, Public and Private Management: Are They Fundamentally Alike in All Unimportant Respects?, in J.L. Perry and K.L. Kraemer (eds.), Public Management: Public and Private Perspectives, Mayfield, Palo Alto, CA, 1980. [42] M. Lipsky, Street-level Bureacracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1980.

66


Service Transformation Towards CitizenCentric Government? The Evolution of a Smart Card Application in UK Local Government Miriam Lips Victoria University of Wellington & Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University John A. Taylor Glasgow Caledonian University & Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University Joe Organ Oxford University

Abstract. Governments around the world have far reaching expectations of service transformation to create citizen-centric government. New Identity Management (IDM) systems are acknowledged as the sine qua non for establishing ‘Transformational government’. Whether the introduction of IDM-enabled service transformation will bring us the desired service state, or in fact a surveillance state, as proponents claim, is an important topic of an emerging public debate in the UK. In this chapter we empirically explore what IDM-enabled service transformation means by focusing on the introduction and use of a multi-functional smart card application in UK local government. Although we conclude that service transformation has happened in this particular case, with government-centric, instead of citizen-centric, government as the outcome, it turns out to be a much less revolutionary experience in practice than expected. Instead, we observe an evolutionary development of the smart card: a gradual, difficult and complex process in taking the smart card scheme forward. Keywords. Identity Management; Citizen-centric transformation; Smart card; UK Local Government

government;

Service

1. Introduction The ‘Internet hype’ has been with us for some time though initial beliefs and heady visions about the ‘re-engineering’ capacities of ICTs, including the internet [1] remain very much alive. Just as with early visions of establishing ‘electronic government’ in the 1990s, governments around the globe remain convinced that ICTs will enable fundamental changes of public service provision to citizens in the 21st Century [2, 3]. This service transformation not only implies fundamental reorganisation of the frontoffice and back-office of public service provision to citizens, it also aims to bring about changes in the citizen – government relationship itself. The new ‘E-Government Imperative’ of governments around the world is to achieve citizen-centric, rather than organisation-centric, government.

M. Lips et al. / Service Transformation Towards Citizen-Centric Government?

67

Although governments are continuing to see innovative ways of reforming public service provision, supported by ICTs, the major questions in front of us is ‘to what extent and in what way(s) will these prospective service transformations, such as citizen-centric government, actually lead to fundamental changes in citizen – government relationships?’. Many public administration scholars for instance have alerted us to the potential gaps between policy formation and policy implementation [4, 5, 6]; and between strategic vision and outcomes at the operational level of public service provision [7, 8]. Moreover, and similar to earlier beliefs of governments turning into ‘Panopticons’ or ‘Big Brothers’ as a result of using ICTs [9, 10], the societal introduction of new ICTs bringing along new ‘informating’ capacities [11] reinforces public perceptions of an emerging surveillance society [12] and, with that, perhaps a surveillance state. If this surveillance state has indeed arrived, questions are raised as to whether for instance traditional public service values, such as equality and equity of provision, are being, or can be, realised by governments making use of new ICTs in their relationships with citizens. It may be that service transformation is happening but with different consequences than those expressed as desirable by advocates of transformational government, therefore. Thus far, however, there is little empirical evidence available on what is happening to public services as a result of them being supported by new ICTs. In this chapter we present empirical research findings indicating that changes are happening in new forms of digitised public service provision to citizens – changes that are somewhat different, less overt and more evolutionary than transformational government advocates might expect. In this way we show that changes involving the innovative use of specific ICTs occur subtly, incrementally and to an extent unexpectedly rather than rationally and radically. They occur in ways far removed from the hyperbole of so much academic, professional and press commentary. One of our case studies conducted for an ESRC-sponsored Research Project1 on new forms of identity management in UK e-Government, a smart card project in UK local government, is presented here to illustrate the contours of an emergent and new service state, where citizens are served by their governmental organisations on a different footing than hitherto. The promise of smartcards has been presented strongly. These cards when administered by Government are deemed to allow for ready access to some services, to offer the prospect of a stronger focus on the individual citizen when delivering services and to provide Government with opportunities to incentivise certain preferred consumption behaviours amongst its citizen We also demonstrate in this chapter that this particular E-Government development is quite different from those that doom-laden ‘hyper-proponents’ of the ‘Surveillance Society’ [12] assume. Thus this chapter can be seen as refuting two types of hyperbole simultaneously. It refutes the technologically inspired Utopian commentaries that abound in this sphere and it refutes the dystopian commentaries attaching to the surveillance society.

2. Service Transformation and Identity Management as the New Hypes Where does this current focus on service transformation come from? Internationally, governments are recognising the need to refocus their approach in designing and 1

ESRC RES-341-25-0028. A.M.B. Lips, J.A. Taylor and J. Organ: Personal Identification and Identity Management in New Modes of E-Government.

68


delivering E-Government [13]. With the arrival of what they perceive as the next stage in the evolution of E-Government, e-Transactions, governments increasingly acknowledge the profound impact of deploying E-Government on both their internal organisation and the organisation of their external relationships. ‘Transformation’ is now the watchword for governments in the information age, with the use of newly available means for citizen identification and authentication [Identity Management (IDM)] as the sine qua non for establishing this next e-Transactions stage [14, 15]. At the same time governments are changing their vision of service provision. They are moving beyond the now traditional view of E-Government as ‘simply’ putting services online and starting to adopt a more integrated view of service transformation [15]. For instance, in doing so E-Government or technology-driven change is being replaced by a perception of technology as an enabler of change; an enabler of change with the ultimate goal of achieving ‘whole-of-government’ service transformation, described by some as reaching ‘full E-Government maturity’ [2]. However, this seems to be easier said than done. A 2005 Accenture Report reveals the difficulty governments have to move beyond an ‘E-Government only’ focus in their service delivery visions and strategies. One of the countries in which a technology-enabled vision on E-Government has been adopted is the UK. For instance, the UK Central Government Strategy Transformational Government – Enabled by Technology (2005) presents an agenda of what are perceived to be three key transformations: IT enabled public services must be designed around the citizen (and business); an increased culture of shared services to release efficiencies; and a broadening and deepening of government’s IT professionalism. A later UK Central Government policy document [15] builds on this Transformational Government strategy, looking at how service channels can be made more efficient and responsive to citizens. In presenting the now infamous Whitehall example of how a bereaved citizen needed to address government service counters c44 different times, the Varney report makes a clear case for further examining the scope for coordinating and integrating front-line service delivery to citizens and reducing the duplication of business processes in government. Here, documented in the Varney Report [15], is a case that dramatically reveals government as production- rather than consumption-centric. The silos of the many government agencies that have a stake in bereavement persist with the result that the citizen is left attempting to join them up if he or she is to realize full administrative ‘closure’ in the case of the death of a relative. In each of these major UK Central Government documents the (cross-government) use of new IDM systems is seen as the key to achieving desirable whole-of-government service transformation, a state of affairs increasingly referred to as ‘citizen-centric government’.

3. Service Transformation, IDM and the Surveillance Society In introducing IDM systems and trying to establish whole-of-government service transformation, governments are being confronted with an emerging public debate about the effects of newly available ICTs on society and individuals. In the UK for instance, the UK Information Commissioner Richard Thomas has signalled ‘realistic’ fears about the UK ‘sleep-walking into a surveillance society’ [16]. Most recently he has done so on the basis of a study produced by the UK’s Surveillance Studies Network [12]. In their report the authors indicate that people’s actions are increasingly and more


69

intensively monitored as a result of the increasing availability of new forms and applications of ICT. According to the authors, UK individuals’ daily lives are enveloped by massive surveillance systems. Available ICTs, such as mobile phones, CCTV Cameras, Satellites, RFID tags, Internet cookies, and email traffic, offer unprecedented ways to gather and process personal information of individuals. Smart cards, the particular technology that forms the case study element of this chapter, is one such surveillance system. These new systems are seen as taking over routine practices of governments, achieving the combined aims of efficiency, speed, control and coordination. For instance individual citizens using forms of smart card (eg credit card loyalty card) leave digital traces behind, allowing for increased ‘dataveillance’: the monitoring checking and recording of people’s informational activities in automated ways [12, p.4]. From a Government perspective, many of these ICT-capabilities appear to be helpful in dealing with new and complex identity questions emerging in Transactional E-Government relationships. Governments want to know with a high degree of certainty who is doing business with them on-line? Governments want to reduce the risks of doing business with the citizen in information-intensive, digital environments? [17]. In getting to know the customer to allow online access to public services, these identification capabilities facilitate governments moving towards transformational government. The same systems, and the personal information on the citizen they bring forward, can thus be used to serve citizens better. Think for instance about submitting a tax form online; the electronic health monitoring of patients; or location based emergency services made available through a mobile phone. These are identificationintensive systems that in principle can optimise and transform service provision from a citizen perspective. But how are identification-intensive technologies actually being used? When looking for empirical research findings to answer this question there is little social scientifically-derived empirical data available to guide us. We do not know in what way service transformation enabled by ICTs is happening; whether citizens are living in a surveillance state or a service state. Similarly, we do not know to what extent ICTenabled service transformation is happening: whether a rebalancing of information relationships between citizens and governments is occurring and if so, whether this rebalancing act would be in favour of the citizen or government. In general, the limited scholarly research findings re-confirm the hypothesis that existing institutional contexts are reinforced by the technologies introduced [18, 19, 20]. Others such as Fountain [21] point towards the mutual shaping of institutions and ICTs, which may lead to the reinforcement of the status quo but equally to unpredicted change or even transformation. Internal reports made available to us in the conduct of our e-Society research project reveal how remote transformation remains in UK Central Government, at least. For example, officials at the centre of the EGovernment effort lament their inability to persuade Government departments to engage with the necessary information sharing that can join services at the point of service delivery and consumption [22]. Here in Britain there is prima facie evidence at least that the extant institutional environment is resistant to the shock waves of new ICT capabilities. In this chapter we further explore what service transformation could and does mean in practice by focusing on a case study of citizen-centric government, enabled by a newly available smart card application in UK local government.

70


4. A Smart Card Application in UK Local Government In 2001, a UK Local Authority introduced a multi-functional smart card available free of charge to those who live, work or visit the borough. The smartcard can be used to borrow library books, access leisure facilities, pay for goods and services, provide proof of age and prove entitlement to concessionary bus travel. In 2004, approximately 36,000 people from a population of around 110,000 were holding a smart card. By 2006, an estimated 44,000 people had joined the local smart card scheme. A long-term objective for the council is to see the whole population of the borough holding a card. Another stated aim has always been to first place the card ‘into people’s wallets’ through existing uses, and then increase functions over time. The council first introduced a smart card in 1999. Originally this ‘smart’ card was a ‘dumb’ loyalty flash card. Freely available to residents, the card could be used to achieve discounts in the local shops, with over two hundred local retailers participating in the scheme. Objectives of this first card initiative were to bring extra custom to the local community and to raise the profile of the council. In 2001, in collaboration with an ICT company, the council started to develop further applications for the card including: • • •

Public library membership, including borrowing, loyalty card and e-purse functions; Leisure centre membership, including bookings, loyalty card and e-purse functions; A cashless catering system in several schools: the local council decided to engage in the UK Central Government Department for Education and Skills’ (DfES) Connexions Pilot. This pilot offered sponsored ways of encouraging 16-18 year old students to remain in education. Students would swipe their cards to register for school and individual classes to accrue ‘loyalty’ points, which could be supplemented by good behaviour points at the discretion of the tutor. Periodically, the students would be able to ‘cash’ in these points, using the card at selected retailers.

By this time the smart card was a ‘hybrid’: one side had a contact chip and Connexions logo for school attendance and points accumulation, the other side a contactless chip and a local council logo for council specific functions. In 2003, with DfES funding coming to an end, the Connexions pilot ended but the concept of using the smart card in local schools remained. Once initial internal funding for the development of core applications on the card had been used, the council required further funding for its smart card project and engaged with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), the central government department with responsibility for local e-Government. In 2002 ODPM published a National Strategy for Local Government that included a commitment to offer £80 million for selected councils to define and delivery e-government applications that could then be used nationally [23, p.20]. These ‘National Projects’ were to include Digital TV, CRM (customer relationship management), websites, eprocurement and smart cards, amongst others [23, p.21]. The council was not only successful in becoming a national project, it also led a successful bid of a consortium to develop smart cards at a regional level. In 2004, cards were used or planned in several councils in the region and attempts were being made to define the business rules to


71

achieve levels of interoperability between different cards. Little progress was made and in 2005 it was decided to discontinue efforts at a regional level. In 2003, another ICT company won the smart card contract and introduced a newer generation smartcard including a microprocessor chip and allowing both contact and contactless functionality. The new smart card was a plastic credit card-sized object featuring the cardholders name, a passport sized photograph, date of birth, smart card number (APACS number2), the council brand and a printed ‘resident’ or ‘non-resident’ notification. The contact function required the smart card to be physically inserted into a reader, with the cashless catering application the only service that used the contact portion of the card. The ICT company further developed the library, leisure, and cashless catering applications; added a proof of age service as an additional smart card function; and integrated the separately circulating ‘dumb’ loyalty flash card into the smart card scheme. The new proof of age service offered cardholders under the age of 21 the option to obtain a UK national Proof of Age Standards Scheme (PASS) logo and hologram embossed on their card. This initiative, which responded to widespread problems with fake proof-of-age cards and retailers illegally selling alcohol, tobacco and other restricted goods to those under age, is managed by the British Institute of Innkeepers (BII) and supported by the Home Office, Association of Chief Police Officers and the Trading Standards Institute. Moreover, in that period of time, the council started explicitly to state the following drivers for smart card development: •

The card should act as a powerful awareness tool for the council and the services it provides. It will help create a ‘sense of place’ for the borough; • The card should promote Social Inclusion, for instance by promoting privacy with free school meals entitlement; • The card should allow the council to collect timely and accurate information on service use; • The card should pioneer smart card technology to increase the council’s national profile and attract central government funding; • The card should complement, interoperate and facilitate other IT projects; • The card should provide discounts for residents; • The card should increase security by decreasing the amount of cash carried by cardholders; • The card should provide means of identification, via the photograph; • The card should reduce the number of other cards needed; • The card should allow preferential treatment to residents and other groups. (source: Local Council, 2003) Several targets accompanied these drivers. Firstly, the council hoped that 75% of the adult and student population would carry a card. Secondly, the council wished to attract third party sponsorship. Thirdly, the council wanted 70% of cardholders to be able to recognise the council logo and associated services. 2

The APACS number is a 16 digit smart card scheme wide unique serial number for each card issued. The first eight digits essentially refer to the institution (i.e. council) whilst the last eight identify the actual card.

72


More recently, drivers for smart card development have been unified under a more long term, overarching objective for the council to achieve living, learning and working in a clean, safe and healthy environment. Fifteen medium term objectives were devised to attain this long term objective, including regeneration, community developments, school improvements, transport aims and recreation provisions. Each of these areas has been identified as an important driver for smart card development. In the council’s view its corporate ICT strategy not only supports the delivery of these 15 medium term objectives but also moves the council’s IT operations towards a more holistic, citizen-centric e-government format. The smart card project team is located within the council’s Chief Executives Office, as a result of the need for the smart card to be led from a central and strategic yet neutral position. The Project Board leads corporate smart card policy and development whilst teams within each relevant council organisation (i.e. Libraries, Leisure Centres, Schools’) work on implementation for each sector. In general, the development of the smart card has been strongly driven by the political leader of the council. With a strong majority and several years of experience, the council leader has strongly led the vision of the multifunctional smart card system. He has spent considerable time marketing and promoting the smart card, including potential new functions, and has been able to drive smart card development successfully, despite resistance from council staff and some criticism from political opponents who have argued that the whole scheme is a waste of money and would be better spent on hospital beds for example. One clear objective in the council leader’s vision was that the smart card would promote the council to its own residents and beyond, not least because the council itself was created only seven years ago. Another desire of the council leader was to use smart card data more effectively to target public services provision: for instance by using service use information to obtain more knowledge about the types of citizens consuming specific services, quantifying concessionary bus use and providing discounts to residents and children in care for certain services. Moreover, a wide variety of future services was planned and discussed at the council’s executive level, including: the use of new data stored on the card (e.g. medical data); the use of new forms of identification (e.g. biometrics); the use of the card as an identification device for access to new services or functions (e.g. physical and logical access to the Civic Hub); the use of the card across adjacent councils and transport; the use of the card’s e-purse function as an expanded financial tool (that is, emoney); the switch to a new device to house the smart card microchip and the new capabilities it would bring (that is, mobile phones). In 2006, the smart card had the following functions: • •

Library Card – is used for borrowing books, hiring CDs, DVDs and videos, surfing the internet and renewing or reserving books. 20,000 library users were holding a smart card in 2006; Leisure Centre Booking – users can book online for Badminton, Squash and Golf sessions. To do so customers enter their Edge Card number and surname, and can then choose to pay online or on arrival at the centre. The web site also offers access to currently available time slots and the users own future bookings;


•

•

• •

•

73

E-purse – where users can make payments for small bills in library and leisure centres. This e-purse function is separate to the cashless school catering epurse function. Cash can be uploaded at any library or leisure site for use across participating institutions. In 2006, c1000 cardholders were using this epurse function; Cashless School Meal Payment – four local secondary schools use smart cards for mealtimes and snacks instead of cash transactions. Here, parents can pay for meals in advance through the school office or pupils can load cash onto the cards using terminals in school. Those entitled to free meals receive allowances loaded onto the card automatically; Proof of Age – the card acts as a proof of age for young people aged between 10 and 21 years old; Concessionary Travel - in April 2006 the UK Department of Transport announced that 11 million residents (over 60s and the disabled) would be able to travel in their local areas on buses for free. For this, £350 million was being made available for local authorities to offer the scheme. As the Council had already had a long standing interest in smart card use for concessionary travel, the smart card is now being used to offer this service, albeit seemingly as a ‘dumb’ flash card; Loyalty Card – the card offers discounts and deals in over a hundred shops, restaurants, leisure attractions and businesses.

Moreover, the council has become interested in using the smart card as a means to reward positive citizen behaviour for activities such as recycling, healthy eating, voluntary work, education attendance etc. Individuals can earn ‘smart card points’ for each of these activities. In 2006, the following general terms and conditions applied to the smart card and its holders: • • • • • • •

Any person who lives, works or visits the local Authority could apply for the smart card; Applicants must supply proof of address; Personal details used to produce the card will be held on a council database and are confidential to the council and its contractors; The smart card will have the holders photograph on it, usually taken by a staff member although the applicant can provide a photograph if desired. Only cards with photographs can be used for the e-purse; The smart card is valid only for the person to whom it was issued and is not transferable; The smart card is not valid if defaced or altered in any way; and If the card is lost or stolen then funds on the e-purse are the holder’s responsibility until it is reported to the helpdesk.

Information policies pertaining to the smart card also fall under the UK Data Protection and Freedom of Information legislation. For instance, both Acts require public bodies to respond to requests for information held on citizens and there is a presumption that disclosure will occur in all circumstances except where public safety is at risk. Under the UK Data Protection Act, cardholders are permitted to access personal data held on

74


them in the central supplier’s database by filling in a ‘Your Right to Know’ form. Cardholders will be sent a print-out of the information held on the database about them. If the box that stipulates that information should not be shared is ticked on the application form then a flag is created on the cardholder’s record in the central suppliers’ database to that effect. This might create specific problems if the cardholder updates his/her personal details (e.g. change of address) with the central help-line managed by the commercial supplier, in which case there might be restrictions on whether this information can be shared with library or leisure services for instance. There is also a note on application forms informing applicants that their data will be anonymously aggregated for statistical purposes and shared with other public sector organisations if required by law; there is no option to opt out of this process however. The UK Data Protection Act also restricts the council from sharing data derived from smart card application and usage. A key objective of the multi-functional smart card is that data could be shared between council departments, for instance to facilitate single or easier enrolment procedures, rather than registering for each service separately. However, the council were obliged to seek consent for any potential data sharing between services that could occur in the future. Due to the multi-functional nature of the smart card, several different databases are involved in the range of services offered. There is a central supplier database, which holds a list of cardholders and their application details along with basic card presentation and e-purse data for those cardholders. Moreover, the library service sector and the leisure service sector have their own information systems (Dynix; LeisureFlex and Clarity, respectively). These systems are linked, via the council’s network, across these two service sectors and managed by private companies. In addition, the e-purse function works across library and leisure centre services. The smart card itself is updated with a balance and the same account is used in the two services environments. Although the smart card mostly operates within separate service domains, or ‘silos’, there are data matching procedures that work across these services. When new applicant information is sent from leisure centres and libraries to the central supplier’s database, this information is matched with existing cardholder information in the database to ensure that an existing card for the specific applicant is not in circulation. Despite matching techniques, duplicate cards for a single cardholder do exist, often because slightly different details (for example, variations of name and address) are submitted by applicants who already have a card Moreover, there is a certain amount of management data that can be derived from the supplier’s database, for instance general card usage levels, individual cardholder reports and total e-purse usage reports. However, smart card project team members indicated that there was little that could be done with this data. Also, council staff did not have direct access to the database; only the smart card project team had indirect access to management reports from the supplier’s cardholder database. We will explore three smart card uses more in detail: for library services, leisure services and in schools. 4.1. Smart Card for Library Services The library service field was identified as a potential area to benefit from smart card development. The smart card library application was originally piloted at one of the smaller local libraries which served a population that were likely to be IT literate and


75

therefore more comfortable with the smart card idea. Originally, c300 cards were rolled out with a £5 credit on the e-purse to encourage use. The pilot was a success and in 2003, smart cards were implemented across all libraries. At present, a citizen who wishes to use any of the local public libraries must apply for a smart card. Each applicant is required to go to one of the nine libraries and supply official documentary proof of name, signature and current address. The applicant will be required to fill in a form and have a digital photograph taken by a library staff member. The library staff member will manually input details from the form to add to the borrower database held in the library information system called Dynix; some of these new cardholder details are electronically transferred to the smart card database held by the supplier to constitute a central smartcard holder record, to generate an APACS number and to enable the manufacture of the card itself. After two to three weeks, the applicant will receive a smart card in the post, with a passport photograph embossed on the front. Also, the supplier sends data regarding lost, stolen or revoked smartcards to the library system, which will bar internet access and provide an alert to staff members if these cards are used. When in possession of a smart card it turns out that the card is only used for some library service transactions. For example, the card is not used to access the library physically and it seems likely that anyone can enter the library and read books, paper etc within the building. If the card user wishes to borrow some books or other items he/she will take them to the check out desk and a member of staff will take the card and scan the APACS number from the contact-less chip of the card. This will bring forth the borrower details onto the library staff PC terminal. The staff member will then be able to check out borrowed items, attributing them to the borrower and updating their record. If the smart card for the same borrower is placed on the reader a second time within a short time period, the e-purse application is opened and an e-purse window pops up on to the screen. The e-purse function allows the user to load money on to the card and then use the card to augment cashless debits to pay for borrower fines or DVD/video/CD hire. This appears to have a strong manual function to it: a user would, for instance, give a member of staff £10 to load on to the card and the staff would put the money in the till and manually update the e-purse window by imputing the amount credited. If the user then wishes to pay for fines or DVD/Video/CD hire then the staff member will manually debit the correct amount from the e-purse window. The contactless portion of the smartcard is updated with the new balance and every hour the library e-purse system sends updates of credits and debits to the supplier’s central cardholder database. The Dynix library information system also sends hourly updates on card use other than that associated with the e-purse; however, although the user is likely to be using the card to borrow items or surf the internet, the supplier’s central database only appears to record that the card has been presented and scanned by a reader, rather than what books were borrowed or websites visited for example. Each library has a number of public access terminals which enable card users to log on to the system by placing their smart card on the smart card reader and entering a password. The user is allowed to access the internet for one hour per day and the work station has a timer box which counts down from 60 minutes and warns to cardholder to save any work; each user has some dedicated memory space to put their documents in. The user also has access to the library catalogues and Microsoft office packages via the public access terminals. To reserve an item over the web, library users must enter their

76


smart card number and a PIN number. Users also have the option of personalising their screen, for instance by picking a colour scheme. 4.2. Smart Card for Leisure Services In 2004, the smart card replaced paper card based membership documents in the four leisure centres in the local community. Moreover a new leisure management system was implemented which networked the four centres. Leisure membership applicants now receive automatic membership to all four leisure centres through the use of their smartcard. This includes pool and gym access at reduced rate, booking options, and epurse. Smart card users however can enjoy most of the leisure facilities without the card. Those entitled to concessions (that is, ‘looked after’ children and their foster carers) need a smart card to take advantage of the facilities at the discounted rate. Similar to library card applications, leisure service applicants need to present themselves in person at a leisure centre and provide official documentary proof of name, address and signature. This proof of identity, as well as the completion of a new enrolment form, is required even if the user already holds a smart card originating from another service area (that is, library or cash-less catering). Moreover it is possible to apply for a smartcard at a leisure centre purely for the e-purse function (and by default the retail discount scheme), and not to become a leisure centre member. Once a form has been filled in and proof of age documents are shown, leisure centre staff members will key in the applicants details into the Leisure management system called LeisureFlex and a photograph will be taken. This information is imported to the supplier’s central database daily and an APACS number will be generated by the supplier and electronically transferred to Leisureflex. Although data is not directly shared between the different services organisations (that is, library to leisure sharing), applicant information is sent to the central supplier database, where data matching techniques are employed to ensure that the applicant does not already have a smartcard. If no existing enrolments are found, a new card will be generated; if a card is already held by the leisure centre applicant, the leisure centre function will be automatically added to it. When a leisure centre user arrives to use the facilities he/she presents the card at reception to a leisure centre staff member. The card is scanned by a reader and a LeisureFlex terminal controlled by the staff member will display the member details. The digital photograph will appear to be compared with the physical presence of the user. The staff member is then able to charge the member for use of facilities accordingly, depending on the membership type. The cardholder can also choose to pay for leisure facility use (for example, swim or squash court use) with the e-purse via the LeisureFlex system, in a similar manner to the library e-purse system. However, leisure centre users are also able to use the e-purse to pay for food and drinks via the Clarity information system at the point of payment. Furthermore, it appears that, unlike the Library system, e-purse transactions are recorded in the LeisureFlex and Clarity systems. Whilst credits and debits from both Clarity and Leisureflex are unified in the same e-purse section of the smart card, the two information systems are not merged on the leisure centre side and the Clarity system does not retrieve any membership details. E-purse debit and credit information from both library and leisure centre sources are sent to the supplier’s central database and amalgamated to form a council wide e-purse record. Lost, stolen and revoked card details are sent from the supplier to LeisureFlex electronically, to serve the same purpose as that with the libraries.


77

Smart cardholders are also able to book squash, badminton, sun bed and golf sessions by presenting the card to staff members. This process can also occur online, where users will visit the online booking site and input the last eight digits of their APACS number printed on the card along with their surname, to enable slot bookings. An email will be sent to the user to confirm that the booking has occurred. Although data is stored on the LeisureFlex system pertaining to payments details, membership status, time of booking, time of arrival, facilities used and other data, little of this is sent to the smartcard supplier’s central database. The supplier only receives information on e-purse debits and credits and whether the card has been scanned for any other use. Unlike any other services accessible through the smart card, smart card leisure application forms contain a field in which applicants insert a ‘personal fact’ and ‘personal fact clue’. If users telephones the contact line (operated by the private supplier), for instance to report a lost or stolen card, then the operative will ask for the personal fact (and can inform the caller of the personal fact prompt) so that personal account details can be discussed and acted upon in a secure environment. 4.3. Smart Card Use in Schools The decision to use the smart cards in schools for cash-less catering was made early on in the programme, following on from the Connexions attendance and points scheme pilot. In 2003, a cashless catering pilot involving 840 pupils was fully operational. The pilot was operated by the catering software company using the smart cards; however, a daily spend limit that was put in place to stop pupils spending too much money early in the week was not provided and therefore the supplier was changed to the current system. This system was a success and was rolled out to four secondary schools whilst another two schools opted out. As school pupils arrive for their first term in the first year of one of the four secondary schools, they will be automatically enrolled for a smart card. Photographs are taken of pupils wearing school uniforms and cards are generated and issued to each pupil. Pupils do not have to complete an application form as schools hold all the relevant data already and cards are sent in bulk to the relevant schools rather than home addresses. Identification and authentication for card enrolment is the responsibility of the schools themselves. Forms do have to be filled in for replacement cards however. Pupils can use the smartcards for every transaction carried out in the catering area of each school; some pupils use the cards daily whilst others (who bring packed lunches) might use them infrequently. Staff and teachers also have cards and use them in the same way. It is not possible to use cash at the tills or to use cards in different schools. Pupils will present the card at the till after choosing a meal and catering staff match the photograph to the pupil and scan the card to debit the correct amount from the e-purse balance. The cashless catering system is entirely separate from the library and leisure centre e-purse and no usage data is sent to the supplier’s central database. Basic cardholder data is sent from schools to the central supplier database. Each pupil’s smartcard also has to be credited with cash for the cashless catering system to operate. Parents have the option of sending periodic cheques to the school administration office for the cards to be credited; alternatively pupils may bring in coins to upload onto their smartcards using special machines located in each school. Although encouraged to credit cards using the machines as infrequently as possible (for example, weekly), some pupils still tend to bring in change daily; their parents may not

78


have bank accounts or be able to afford large termly or monthly outlays. Pupils who are entitled to free school meals have e-purse funds automatically loaded on to the smartcard by the schools and will present the card at meal times just as other children do. The system is also said to improve hygiene as coins are not passed around at mealtimes, and reduce bullying as less cash is carried by pupils. Moreover, under a separate pilot project for extended smart card use, pupils swipe smart cards through a smart card reader at the beginning of each class. Smart card points are automatically accrued for every class attended. These points can then be supplemented with extra points for good or positive behaviour, assigned at the discretion of teachers. The points are stored in a central database and pupils are able to exchange them for goods and services with local retailers and organisations participating in this loyalty scheme. Options for pupils include a free swim, cinema ticket or fast food meal. More recently the council have been investigating the possibility of using the smart card to reward healthy eating by awarding points to pupils who buy approved food items for lunch. Healthy eating points could be automatically accrued via the smart card and smart card readers at the check till and stored in a central database. This may fit into a Council-wide ‘motivational scheme’ whereby positive behaviour, such as recycling, voluntary work and healthy lifestyles, is rewarded via smart card point accumulation.

5. Impacts of the Smart Card Application Looking at the case study description there is an argument to suggest that changes have been minimal. The smart card initiative has not led to a joining up of leisure, library and other databases. Functions remain largely separate on the card. Library cards, bus passes and leisure membership cards did exist separately before the implementation of the smart card and thus citizens were already used to carrying an identification token with them for accessing these services. Furthermore, young people were already familiar with providing official identification documentation of their age when accessing restricted goods or services. Moreover, collecting personal information of applicants and storing personal data specific to the smart card can be considered as minimal changes in the informational relationship between citizens and the council. For instance, much of the information was already collected before the emergence of the card. Also, transactional data largely remained in separate service databases. Moreover, users have a clear option on the application form to refuse permission for any sharing of personal data collected in a particular environment. Although a single financial function, the e-purse does not affect this situation particularly as there is no need to submit bank account details or other personal data. Whilst there has been interest from the council in using information lying dormant in databases to, for instance, compare leisure to library use for individual cardholders or identify lapsed users, this is currently not occurring. Customer Relationship Management techniques as envisaged by the council leader for instance have not been employed so far and would require unprecedented data sharing and matching between the supplier’s central database and those found in the service organisations. Moreover, developments in CRM capabilities are likely to be tempered by the need to retain citizen confidentiality and respect privacy, compliant to existing Data Protection legislation.


79

Changes have nonetheless occurred as a result of the introduction and use of the smartcard and related technologies. We will explore changes for citizens and council staff below. 5.1. Changes for Citizens Important changes for citizens are particularly to be found in the use of the card as a cash-less catering identification means, an e-purse and an access channel to Internet in libraries: these functions do not have any precedent. For instance, aimed at reducing the stigma associated with free meals, pupils who are entitled to free school meals have epurse funds automatically loaded on to the smartcard by the schools and present the card at meal times just as other children do. However, as many pupils are seen to be uploading money on the smart cards daily, those that do not and are therefore likely to be entitled to free meals, are still easily identifiable. Moreover, the dependency upon the card for certain benefits and discounts has caused a major shift in the relationship between citizens and governments. For instance, those that cannot or choose not to hold a smart card may lose out on considerable benefits like discounts from retailers, leisure membership discounts, library borrowing facilities, loyalty discounts, free travel and smart card points. This last item especially has caused a fundamental rebalancing of relationships between citizens and government, with the government trying to steer ‘good behaviour’ of citizens through the attribution of smart card or ‘loyalty’ points. Changes for citizens can also be perceived in the resistance of individuals towards the smart card. For instance, there have been several instances where applicants have objected to the photograph on the smart card. In a few persistent cases staff has agreed to replace the required photograph with a barcode image, with the agreement that the user cannot use the e-purse facility. The most fundamental impact perhaps on the informational relationship between citizens and government, and especially the repositioning of the council in that relationship, came from the new ‘motivational’ scheme supported by the smart card. In a clear attempt to influence the behaviour of citizens in areas like educational attendance, rewarding diet, voluntary work and recycling, this council-wide scheme required smart card capabilities to capture, store and retrieve any smart points earned by citizens at the discretion of the council. 5.2. Changes for Council Staff There was significant staff resistance to the smart cards, especially related to the administrative changes and new responsibilities associated with the smart card. Library staff for instance felt that their relationship with users was being jeopardized by the new requirements of the smart card application (e.g. a digital photograph) and its longer enrolment process. Leisure staff resisted the smart card because it changed working practices. Catering firms in schools had to alter their operations considerably to accommodate the card and school administrative staff needed to provide coin change to pupils much more frequently than before the introduction of the smart card. In general, the cards were perceived by staff as an administrative burden which was not offset with improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of the services being offered. Moreover, there was the argument that the previous supplier had provided

80


substandard cards and therefore the information systems behind the cards were not robust or amenable to interoperability. 5.3. Other Changes Also, in many cases any change to the smart card functionality caused a complex and often expensive series of logistical problems further down the service chain. For instance, it was realised much later that the smart card should have a notch cut into the side for use by blind or partially sighted people, so that they can insert or place cards into readers in the correct way. An expensive machine had to be bought to enable this. Similarly, new forms of ‘identity fraud’ emerged which led to several adjustments in the smart card scheme. For example, youngsters had tried to scratch off their date of birth and/or photograph from the smart card, so to circumvent checks of proof of age. This problem was solved by adding date of birth data to the microchip on the smart card and putting card readers in shops to enable proof of age services. Whilst the smart card implementation process had been difficult and expensive, also from a managerial point of view, the smart card project team felt that, as smart card systems were now in place and the card itself had satisfying levels of penetration amongst residents, it was appropriate to reap the rewards by increasing the functionality and benefits of the smart card. Consequently, council managers spent considerable amounts of time discussing future applications. However, as every change in the smart card system created further logistical and financial repercussions at the operational level, a gap emerged between the strategic ‘vision’ of the smart card and the operational realities of separate service organisations.

6. IDM-enabled Service Transformation: Towards Government-Centric Government It becomes clear that the smart card application described above has not met many far reaching ambitions or expectations. Actual impact, even within individual service domains, has been limited. New ICT-enabled identification and IDM processes, although on a different footing, have not caused many changes in data collection, management, and retention practices. Joined-Up Government through linking up databases within separate service domains and sharing information on service use across silos has not happened. Moreover, the application and use of new IDM-systems have not led to increased monitoring of citizen activities and behaviour – contrary to public expectations. A surveillance state does not manifest itself on this local authority stage, where implications for data protection as well as data sharing have been consciously considered within existing regulatory frameworks. Equally, citizen-centric government as a result of whole-of-government service transformation has not been achieved. In general we may conclude that service transformation and IDM hypes turn out to be much less revolutionary experiences in practice than perhaps expected. Instead, in the evolutionary development of the smart card we can observe the ‘muddling through’ in taking the smart card scheme forward: the continuous search for funding and legitimacy through a range of pilots, long-term political support and championship of the card, the building upon existing smart card functions and capabilities, overcoming


81

council staff resistance, and the gradual extensions of existing services through the use of the smart card are all examples of this more gradual and complex process. However, it is undeniable that service transformation has happened in this particular case; and that newer generation smart card capabilities have enabled this transformation. Although the council had used a loyalty card scheme for quite some time it was only when smart card and loyalty card functions got combined and applied to new service domains (education and health) that fundamental changes in information relationships between citizens and government started to appear. The council’s ‘engineering’ of ‘good’ citizen behaviour through smart card points incentives demonstrates the emergence of a new service state, where ‘loyal customers’ or obedient citizens willing to use the new IDM-enabled council ‘loyalty card’ are treated differently, based on alternative public service principles (e.g. inequity), compared to other citizens. The rebalancing act appears to be in favour of government therefore. Government-centric government, instead of citizen-centric government, comes to the fore, where the council has transformed itself similar to an ‘Amazon.com’ or ‘Tesco.gov’ in relating to its willing customers.

References [1] [2]

[3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

[8] [9] [10] [11] [12]

[13] [14]

[15]

US Federal Government, National Performance Review. Reengineering through Information Technology, Washington D.C., 1993. Accenture, Leadership in Customer Service: Building the Trust, 2006, available at: http://www. accenture.com/Global/Research_and_Insights/By_Industry/Government/BuildingtheTrustES.htm, 2006. Booz Allen Hamilton, Beyond E-Government, Booz Allen Hamilton, London, 2005. B. Hjern and D. Porter, Implementation Studies: A New Unit of Administrative Analysis, Organization Studies 2 (1981), 211-27. J. Schofield and C. Sausman, Symposium on implementing public policy: Learning from theory and practice: Introduction, Public Administration 82, 2 (2004), 235-48. S. Barrett, Implementation Studies: Time for a Revival? Personal Reflections on 20 Years of Implementation Studies, Public Administration 82, 2 (2004), 249-62. A. Wildavsky and J. Pressman, Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland: Or, why it’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, this Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973. R.F. Elmore, Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions, in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, No.4 (Winter, 1979-1980), 601-616. A. Westin, Information Technology in a Democracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971. M. Poster, The Mode of Information, Post-structuralism and the Social Context, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990. S. Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power, Basic Books, New York, 1988. D. Murakami-Wood, K. Ball, D. Lyon, C. Norris and C. Raab, A Report on the Surveillance Society, 2006, available at: http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_ application/surveillance_society_full_report_2006.pdf. Accenture, Leadership in Customer Service: New Expectations, New Experiences, Accenture, London, 2005. A.M.B. Lips, J.A. Taylor and J. Organ, Identity Management as Public Innovation: Looking Beyond ID Cards and Authentication Systems, in V.J.J.M. Bekkers, H.P.M. van Duivenboden and M. Thaens (eds.), ICT and Public Innovation: Assessing the Modernisation of Public Administration, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2006, 204-216. D. Varney, Service Transformation: A Better Service for Citizens and Businesses, a Better Deal for the Taxpayer, HMSO, London, 2006.

82


[16] BBC News, Britain is ‘Surveillance Society’, 2 November 2006, published at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/ go/pr/fr//2/hi/uk_news/ 6108496.stm. [17] J.A. Taylor, A.M.B. Lips and J. Organ, Information-Intensive Government and the Layering and Sorting of Citizenship, Public Money and Management 27, 2 (2007), 161-164. [18] J. Danziger and K. Kraemer, People and Computers: The Impacts of Computing on End Users in Organizations, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986. [19] I. Snellen and W. van de Donk, Public Administration in the Information Age, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 1998. [20] C. Bellamy and J. Taylor, Governing in the Information Age, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1998. [21] Fountain, J., Building the Virtual State: Information Technology and Institutional Change, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 2001. [22] Office of the e-Envoy, UK Government Gateway Product Roadmap Review, Office of the e-Envoy, London, 2004. [23] Office of the Deputy Minister, National Strategy for Local Government, Office of the Deputy Minister, London, 2002


83

Has Incrementalism Murdered the Hype? An Assessment of the Potential and Actual Use of Geographical Information Systems in Policy Design Rebecca Moody Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands

Abstract. In this chapter it will be evaluated whether incrementalism can account for Geographical Information Systems not reaching its full potential, and the expectations made in the hype, in the field of policy design. This will be done by first elaborating on Geographical Information Systems, what they are, what the expectations at the beginning of the hype were and what the actual use is. Next the rational actor model, bounded rationality and incrementalism will be elaborated on. Two case studies in which Geographical Information Systems were used to enhance policy making will be demonstrated and used to draw final conclusions on which part of the potential of Geographical Information Systems has not been reached and how the expectations during the hype could not meet practice and how this can be explained. Keywords. Geographical Information Systems; Bounded rationality; Public participation

1. Introduction In the early 1990s ICT became a hype, not only in private sectors, but also the public sector became subjected to the ICT fever. Where ICT’s might have struck one as a technical application that would only be used in technical sectors nowadays ICT’s are very common in all sectors of government. At the beginning of the hype expectations were made on where government in twenty years would be while using ICT. Today we are living the scenario. The different forms ICT’s can come in are countless and therefore here we will only deal with one form of ICT, namely Geographical Information Systems. Furthermore, the use of Geographical Information Systems in the public sector will be limited to policy design. The question that one could ask, almost twenty years after the hype, what is left of the expectations made at the beginning of the hype, are these expectations fulfilled or were we far to positive, to enthusiastic back then? The argument in this paper will be that while we were very enthusiastic in the beginning of the hype we can now see that government have used Geographical Information Systems to a large degree, a part of the expected potential is being reached. However, a large part of the potential has not. The question is why.

84

R. Moody / Has Incrementalism Murdered the Hype?

The answer to this question can be found in various ways, here I aim to use incrementalism and bounds of rationality to explain why Geographical Information Systems have not reached up to their potential in policy design. There are two questions I am aiming to answer here, the first one being: ‘What was expected of Geographical Information Systems during the hype and what can be realistically expected from them now?’ The second question refers to the reason behind this: ‘Why have Geographical Information Systems not reached their full potential?’ In order to answer these questions I will use two case studies, these are two cases in which Geographical Information Systems have been used in policy design aiming to do some redevelopment of the urban center. In both cases the method of research chosen was qualitative in nature, documents were viewed and interviews with policy makers, public administrators, architects, computer experts and the public were conducted. The choice for these two cases is in the first place because of their similarity. Secondly these cases are unique in their kind in the Netherlands. The structure will then be as follows: First it will be explained what Geographical Information Systems actually are and what they entail. Next it will be demonstrated what the expectations for Geographical Information Systems at the beginning of the hype were, what the potential of them entails but also how they are now actually used. In the third paragraph the rational actor model, incrementalism and bounds of rationality will be elaborated on. Fourthly some assumptions will be laid down and the research strategy will be explained. Next the two cases will be elaborated on and the course of the process will be explained. In the sixth paragraph an assessment will be made comparing the potential use of Geographical Information Systems with the actual use in the two case studies. In the conclusion an answer to the main questions will be given.

2. Geographical Information Systems 2.1. The Nature of Geographical Information Systems Geographical Information Systems (GIS) are computerized systems that, like other ICT’s, can order, manage and integrate large quantities of data. What makes GIS different from other forms of ICT is that they are able to present this data in a manner in which complex data is comprehensive for non-experts, mostly in the form of a map [1]. GIS make it possible to visualize spatial distributions of social entities and their characteristics and combine these with geographic spread of other social entities and their characteristics. GIS can make it possible to visualize dynamics of these entities and to establish correlations between them and can follow the accumulation in spatial terms of societal problems or opportunities [2]. In this way GIS can support policy-making and decision-making. Several qualities of GIS can be mentioned. First GIS holds the quality of calculation, this means that GIS can calculate different algorithms and so make a cost-benefit analysis. Through GIS it becomes easier to develop an if … then reasoning that is more sophisticated. For example, in the case of the avian flu in Thailand [3], GIS made it possible to predict how the flu would spread depending of the mobility of the animals. Secondly GIS has the function of control and discipline, they can link different data sets to one another an in this way produce new data in which information is visible that was unknown before. In this way work procedures can be standardized and this also


85

makes these procedures more controllable and more transparent [4]. For example, in California, GIS helped to make sure federal funds are fairly distributed among schools, schools with a large number of children from low-income families were to receive more funding. The information on low-income families, school districts and school attendance zones were all listed in different databases. GIS helped to integrate these databases and calculate which school was to receive extra funding. The procedure for extra funding was set in this way and transparent for different public administrators [5]. Thirdly GIS are said to increase transparency, they can structure work processes and data can be collected on the course of the processes, the process itself becomes more transparent and this opens the possibility to adapt these processes. GIS can also help to approach different angles of a policy problem and in this way increase the accessibility and transparency of the problem. Also, the combination of data produces new information, which enhances the transparency of the policy problem as well as the different policy processes [6]. In the Netherlands, for example, GIS is used to demonstrate the consequences of flooding in an dynamic movie, not only the areas that would be flooded are visible but also the potential material damage, the number of victims, evacuation routes and damage to the environment. In this GIS application it also becomes clear which organization is responsible for all the tasks necessary in case of flooding, additionally the program will hold a logbook stating what each involved organization already has done, the process in this way becomes more transparent and the evaluation of the handling of the flood will become a lot easier. Fourthly GIS have the ability to visualize problems and effects. Advanced visualization, multi media and simulation tools are integrated within GIS capabilities, which improve their capability to visualize complex data. In this way people do not have to look at a plan on paper anymore but can actually see the plan. This virtual world may help choosing between alternatives in policy processes but also this may help to make complex data understandable for a large group of people who would have not understood the data on paper or spreadsheet [4]. Like for example the complex material on flooding as mentioned above. Finally GIS are said to account for an effect of democratization. The GIS application accounting for public participation is referred to as PPGIS, here a GIS application is placed on the internet and makes it possible for people to express their opinion, learn about government plans and maybe even to vote [7]. As will be demonstrated in the cases of Helmond and Tilburg below. 2.2. Expectations and Potential Use At the beginning of the ICT hype around 1990 expectations for the impact of GIS on policy-making were high. In 1990 it was expected that the United States would spend $ 12 billion dollar on GIS software and hardware and another $15 billion dollar on data conversion [8]. Articles convincing government to use GIS in their decision-making procedures came out of every corner. These articles promised a faster, more reliable way of decision-making, more use of existing spatial data and a better oversight of all existing alternatives, possibilities and consequences. These articles argued that governments did not realize themselves what a large amount of their data was spatially based. They also urged governments to share their data so that new information could be generated, standardization would be the norm. At the time GIS were referred to as ‘smart maps’ [9; 8].

86


In the early 1990s the idea of using GIS in public participation, democratization and interactive policy making came into play. At first policy-makers and technicians were skeptical about this, questions like whether a bottom-up GIS actually could be made, or how to involve the community into a complicated application like GIS, other question were aimed at to what extent participation would serve to legitimize top down decisionmaking [10]. But regardless of these questions, governments as well as technicians were extremely enthusiastic about the idea that there would be an understandable ICT application with which participation and democratization could be enhanced. These issues were finally resolved and in the mid-1990s decision-makers as well as technicians proved to be very enthusiastic about the idea of using GIS for means of public participation and interactive policy design. It was believed that using GIS in interactive policy design would be the future, that it would close the gap between citizen and government and that decisions would be perceived as more legitimate [11]. At the beginning of the hype it was expected that within ten years governments would have standardized their data sets and would be sharing all their information in order to come to a transparent and reliable policy. Data from different organizations, different departments and different layers of government would be linked to one another and information that was invisible before would be visible now. This would then reflect on decision-making and policy design, with all this new information policy would not only become more transparent but also more based on rational calculation of cost and benefits and prediction of consequences [8]. It was assumed that there would be a lot of money available for training so that government organizations were able to work with GIS, it was also assumed that citizens would have access to the internet and therefore could be included in processes of public participation, interactive policy-making through the web would become the norm [11]. Information would be more transparent and the rationality of decisions would increase, decision-makers would be limited in their rationality by a lesser degree since GIS would be able to analyze costs and benefits more accurately and consequences of policy alternatives could easily be predicted [9, 8]. Transparency would not only be increased in the way citizens could look at policy-making but also in making standards and work procedures more transparent for government itself. While GIS would be able to link different datasets and generate new information and make existing information clear in a blink of an eye and less dispersed as it was bounds of rationality, as was expected, would seriously be lifted. Where now in policy-design a number of costs and benefits could not be calculated and consequences of a certain policy could not be expected, the new applications of GIS would certainly make sure that these consequences could be predicted more accurately and based more on appropriate cost and benefit analyses. Summarizing this, at the beginning of the hype and during the hype GIS was regarded as the future, not only in policy-design and decision-making but GIS would also be the prime source of enhancing public participation, enlarging democracy and bridging the gap between government and citizens. Hopes were up, expectations where high and an enormous potential was seen in the future of GIS. 2.3. Actual Use When looking to the world around us we see that GIS is used more and more in policymaking, not only in the traditional sectors like water or land use but also in social matters. In matters of public participation GIS are used more often, people are able to


87

give their opinion over the internet and initiatives for interactive policy-making are being made. Even though the usage of GIS in public policy has risen dramatically there are some hurdles that disable GIS to be used to its full potential. First of all we can see the usage of GIS proves to be not that easy. In the first place, while it was expected during the hype that all datasets would be linked and new information would be generated, as of yet this is not the case. There are a lot of datasets, which are not standardized; sharing these datasets becomes thus difficult. A problem relating to this is that government organizations are often not willing to share, this for several reasons. Firstly it is a matter of prioritizing, when an organization wants to share data for the sake of a matter it considers important, the other organization might not consider this matter important and will thus not be willing to invest the time and the resources in sharing. This problem becomes even larger when interest of organizations conflict [12]. Secondly it proves to be difficult to share when there are no suitable contacts between organizations [12]. Finally, government organizations seem to be reluctant to share their information because they fear that they will lose autonomy by giving their information out of hands, either to another existing organization or to a new organization [13]. Another constraint on the usage of GIS is knowledge. Not only do governments often not know what the potential of GIS is, therefore GIS is often not used to its full potential or disregarded as a whole. Often it proves to be difficult for government organizations to predict the consequences of using a GIS application since they are not used to work with them. The money expected during the hype to be invested in training of government officials in using GIS never came through. Secondly this proves to limit public participation using GIS, contrary to the expectations, not everybody owns a personal computer and knows how to work the internet, these people are thus excluded from the process of public participation [10; 14; 11]. Not only the knowledge to work with GIS is needed to use GIS to its full potential but also the means. For public participation this means that citizens need to have a computer. For governments this means that next to an investment in hardware and software, data must be purchased, this purchasing of data proves to be a problem; data is often very expensive [14]. Additionally it must be said that GIS is used in interactive policy-making that this use is very limited. It seems that governments are reluctant to join in public participation applications with GIS, mostly in countries that have little history of public participation. Local authorities often feel threatened and are afraid that these initiatives will undermine their authority position [12]. Further democratization, increased public participation and interactive policy-making did not reach up to expectations because of the reasons mentioned above, lack of knowledge on the side of citizens and fear and risk aversion on the side of the government. Governments seem to be afraid of using GIS for initiatives of public participation and interactive policy-making since they cannot predict the consequences of this, they fear citizens will complain about every plan and will not be a strong partner in interactive policy-making.

88


3. The Rational Actor Model, Bounded Rationality and Incrementalism How can we understand the gap between the expectations and actual use? Theoretical approaches and empirical material will be used to enhance our understanding. Let me first start with possibly useful theoretical perspectives. 3.1. The Rational Model Several theories exist on the nature of the policy-making process. Most of these theories are a reaction to the shortcomings of the rational actor model. The model works in a four step manner. First policy-makers translate their values and preferences into utility functions, which represent the desirability of the alternative sets of consequences, these are ranked in order of preference. Next the policy-maker lists the complete and exhaustive list of alternative actions. The third step deals with attaching the consequences to each alternative laid out in the second step. Finally an alternative must be chosen, it is assumed that all alternatives and all consequences are known to the policy-maker. The choice then simply is for the alternative with its consequences that matches the preferred goal best. It is thus assumed that all possible alternatives to a policy problem can be evaluated in terms of costs and benefits, that all possible consequences can be calculated and predicted, that the policy-makers goal is clear and that finally he will choose that alternative with the lowest costs and the highest benefits [15]. 3.2. Bounded Rationality Herbert Simon was one of the first to react to the rational actor model [16, 17]. He doubts whether actors can be as rational as the rational actor model assumes. Rationality would require a complete knowledge and anticipation of the consequences. Humans, according to Simon, can only predict consequences with imagination, and values will be attached to that, these values can only be imperfectly anticipated. This does definitely not mean that an administrator does not direct his actions towards a defined goal. In other words, actors still act goal-oriented and rational and is thus intendedly rational but within the bounds of rationality. Bounds of rationality may then be defined in a way ‘that individuals are intendedly rational. Although decision-makers try to be rational, they are constrained by limited cognitive capabilities and incomplete information, and thus their actions may be less than completely rational in spite of their best intentions and efforts’ [18]. It must be noted here that Simon also attacks the means-end relationship the rational actor model proposes; Ends are sometimes incompletely or incorrectly stated because of a failure of considering alternative ends. Second a separation of means and ends is often practically impossible since alternative means are not valuationally neutral and finally the mean end terminology is obscure sometimes. Bounded rationality according to Simon thus means that when viewed from the individual policy-makers standpoint that he is limited by firstly his skills, habits and reflexes, secondly by his values and conceptions of purpose and thirdly by his extend on knowledge and information [19]. This then leads us to the assumption that the usage of GIS has brought the process of policy design more toward a rational actor style of policy design, because GIS is able, as


89

demonstrated above, to show and visualize different alternatives in a policy problem, they can help policy-makers look at policy problems from different angles and can help to predict consequences. The bounds in rationality as described by Simon therefore would be limited and policy-makers would act more rational. 3.3. Incrementalism Charles Lindblom also reacted to the rational actor model with his model of successive limited comparisons, better known as incrementalism [20]. Incrementalism is first of all based on the idea that values cannot be selected or clarified in advance. This is so because people in politics will not agree with each other on the clarification of values or the selection of values. This thus means that actors do not first clarify the values but choose between policies and thus the selected values at the same time. Secondly it is claimed that the relation between means and end is different compared to the rational actor model. Within incrementalism means and ends are simultaneously chosen, this because means as well as ends hold values. Thirdly the model deals with the idea that analysis must seriously be limited. It is, according to Lindblom, impossible to collect all possible alternatives and study all their possible consequences to a policy problem, corresponding with Simon’s bounds in rationality. All policy alternatives that are up for consideration should be limited to those alternatives that differ to a relatively small degree from present policies. For these alternatives, they only have to be studied for that part they differ to the status quo. The idea here is that alternatives that differ fundamentally to the policy presently in action are very unpredictable in their consequences. Finally the model deals with a succession of limited changes. The idea here is that policy is never made for once and for all, it is constantly made and re-made. Proceeding towards a far goal with a succession of incremental changes, opposed to one drastic change, will, according to Lindblom, avoid lasting mistakes. This because past sequences gave the actor knowledge on probable consequences of future similar steps. The actor can easily fix a past error since the changes are incremental [20]. This leads us to the assumption that a reason why the expectations on GIS made in the hype were not fulfilled and GIS is still not used to is full potential is that because of incremental decision-making policy-makers would not want to make large steps of which they could not see and predict the consequences, as incrementalism assumes they would not implement GIS to its full extent.

4. Research Strategy In order to answer the two main questions and to test whether the assumptions made are correct the cases of two cities in the Netherlands, Helmond (a medium large city in the Netherlands) and Tilburg (the sixth largest city in the Netherlands), will be used. The cases will be evaluated in terms of how they match the premises of the models described above. The use of GIS in the cases will also be compared with the expectations made at the beginning of the hype and the potential use GIS could have. In both cases the method of research chosen was qualitative in nature, government documents, articles in several media were viewed, meetings were attended and interviews with policy makers, public administrators, architects, computer experts and

90


the public were conducted. The choice for these two cases is in the first place because of their similarity; they both deal with the same GIS application used for visualization and participation in the field of urban redevelopment. Secondly these cases are unique in their kind in the Netherlands. Helmond was the first municipality dealing with urban redevelopment through GIS using citizen participation and visualization, for Tilburg the same is the case with the addition that there was actually the chance to vote, this being completely unique in urban redevelopment in the Netherlands.

5. Tilburg and Helmond In the municipality of Helmond in the Netherlands plans for some urban redevelopment were made. In 2004 it was decided not to do so in a conventional fashion but to invest in e-government. 5.1. Features of Virtuocity in Helmond In 2006 the municipality launched a website in which the new urban center was to be visualized through a three-dimensional technique, developed together with CEBRA. On this website citizens were able to log on from their computer at home. This all without any form of identification, the program had to be downloaded on one’s computer though. In this program, named Virtuocity, with a username and an avatar one could virtually walk through the new urban center of Helmond, just like in a gaming situation. Additionally there was also a possibility for citizens to react to the plans for the redevelopment on a forum. Furthermore there were fixed times on which citizens could chat with the aldermen to give their opinion or to ask questions. 5.2. The Process of Implementing Virtuocity in Helmond At first the city council hesitated to implement Virtuocity, there was fear that citizens would protest against every new building on the site, especially since all became so clear in a detailed virtual environment. The city made it a top priority to make sure the website was accessible for as many people as possible. CEBRA made sure this came about and also installed a helpdesk. Before launching the website CEBRA together with the city of Helmond asked a test panel to test the website so they could still change some of its features. The test panel decided that the technology worked perfect although it seemed a little dull. Therefore CEBRA included sound into the site. Plans to actually have people vote for policy proposals failed even before they reached the city council. The municipality of Helmond did not wish to do so out of fear that citizens would decide on something the city would like to see otherwise. 5.3. The Outcome of Virtuocity in Helmond People felt so much informed and taken seriously that there were almost no complaints on the redevelopment plans. It now is the belief that when citizens are informed and are able to see what is going to happen to their city they are less likely to complain. The chat and the forum proved to grow out to not only a place where citizens could share their opinion but to a social gathering place in which each day thirty to forty people meet up.


91

This became to function as a bridge between the citizen and the government. Opinions of citizens were actually taken into account when a playground was designed, through means of a poll. Based on the outcome of the poll the city council decided upon the plan for the playground. Although while launching the project there were not significant discussions or arguments against it in the city council, genuine e-democracy was not possible. It is claimed that public administration is not ready for these kinds of risks. It is the city’s opinion that Virtuocity made communication with citizens much easier, since plans are more appropriately visualized they can be made clear more easily without any ambiguity, policy becomes more transparent which, in the city’s viewpoint, makes communication easier. Citizens feel more involved, can actually participate en feel taken seriously. 5.4. Features of Virtuocity in Tilburg The municipality of Tilburg used the same program, Virtuocity in 2006, this for the redevelopment of a square named ‘the Heuvel’. As for Helmond this version of Virtuocity, also developed together with CEBRA, had the features of a gaming situation in which one could walk around the square, the chat and the forum were there even though initially this was not the plan. But the city of Tilburg took Virtuocity a little further. It made it a tool with which people could vote for what the square should look like. 5.5. The Process of Implementing Virtuocity in Tilburg On the basis of a competition in which citizens could show what they believed the square should look like eight different architects were invited to make a design of this square. A jury of experts picked out three designs; these together with the current situation were placed in Virtuocity. Citizens could thus walk through four designs and in the end vote for the design they appreciated most. The aldermen committed themselves to take over the advice of the citizens and thus chose the design with the popular vote. The municipality of Tilburg, in the process of launching Virtuocity, was very afraid that opposition in the council would complain about the vote not being representative, while only voting through the internet was possible. Another point was how to prevent fraud, since nobody had to register. The fraud problem was partly solved by filtering out IPaddresses, which held more than one vote. For the problem of representation there was no solution found, initially a plan was made to impose a minimum vote for the vote to be valid but this plan was never executed. In order to enable as many citizens as possible to vote computers were placed in several public places where help was available. 5.6. The Outcome of Virtuocity in Tilburg In the end of the voting period, there were 115.000 visits to the site and over 4000 votes cast. The reactions in Tilburg were slightly less positive than in Helmond. In the first place citizens were upset that not all computers could run this program, secondly citizens were not pleased with the fact that they had to download something on their computer in order to use Virtuocity. Citizens were also skeptical towards the municipality of Tilburg while some did not believe that their vote would actually be listened to.

92


Again there were no significant problems to get this plan through the city council. The city claims that society is not ready for this type of voting yet, conventional means should also be used. Architects were pleased with the idea of a virtual space for their design but were skeptic as well. They claim that Virtuocity makes the idea of a design more clear but the way their design was projected was not the way they wanted it to look. Additionally an architect in this way cannot show the underlying vision of a design. For both cities it can be said that municipalities as well as citizens hold the opinion that Virtuocity accounts for an experience, a virtual journey. Furthermore Virtuocity, while it was initially intended to serve as a tool of visualization, became a means for communication, between citizens but also between citizens and government, a means for transparency and a means for participation. The decision to use Virtuocity in both cities was not based on a rational cost benefit analysis, but on feelings of creativity and need for innovation. Due to the idea that consequences could not be calculated both cities did not choose for an optimal alternative.

6. Assessment When looking at the potential of GIS and policy design we can see that GIS is used in a very useful way in both the redevelopment of the urban center in both cities and in the enhancement of policy design. GIS and Virtuocity have shown that communication could proceed through different channels, not only a virtual meeting place but also a presentation of plans independent of place and time. The visualization function of GIS made it easier to explain and demonstrate what plans entailed. However, in both Helmond as in Tilburg this potential is not reached, first of all because not all citizens were able to participate since not everybody owns a computer and not everybody is able to work a program like Virtuocity. Secondly we see that both local governments have not used GIS to its full potential. In Helmond there were means for communication between government and citizen but there was no possibility to vote. In Tilburg this possibility to vote was present but communication between citizens and government was not satisfactory for citizens. Interactive policy-making was in play here but because of the issues mentioned above it was not taken further to its full potential. When explaining not using the full potential of GIS in Helmond and Tilburg in terms of incrementalism and bounds of rationality we can distinguish between a number of points. First of all being that indeed decisions to use GIS fully in policy design were of an incremental nature. While the decision to implement GIS in Helmond seems very innovative the decisions made afterwards were very careful. At first Virtuocity was solely used to inform citizens and to communicate with them. Later on a poll was included in Virtuocity but results of this poll were by no means binding. Plans to let citizens vote for proposals failed even before they reached the city council. This because of two reasons, first of all the local government feared losing authority to citizens, they were afraid citizens would vote for an alternative the government disapproved of, secondly the local government felt that they were not able to oversee the consequences of such a vote, since Virtuocity was used for the first time they had no idea what reactions and results would be, therefore they decided not to do so. In terms of incrementalism this demonstrates that governments choose for policy that does not differ from past policy significantly for the reason that they cannot predict results. In Tilburg


93

after observing the situation in Helmond, there was a voting moment, but the government of Tilburg in advance decided on three designs for which citizens could vote. A radical vote, choosing between all the designs was thus not possible. Again, in terms of incrementalism, governments limited the scope in which citizens could decide, in this way guaranteeing an outcome that was comprehendible for them. This brings us to the bounds in rationality, while at the beginning of the hype it was expected that decisions would become more rational since GIS would calculate and predict Tilburg and Helmond demonstrate otherwise. In one way the bounds of rationality were lifted, namely it became clear for citizens what their city would look like after the redevelopment and in Tilburg the different alternatives also became more transparent. Where in the past a sketch or a maquette were difficult to understand for citizens now with Virtuocity the plans became a lot more clear, allowing citizens in Tilburg to make a more rational based decision. On the other hand the bounds in rationality for both governments only increased. For them it became more difficult to make a rational decision. This because Virtuocity was new, there was no way to predict outcomes or consequences of using this program, the process of what was going to happen was completely not transparent for governments, hence the incremental decisions. Additionally it must be mentioned here that the government was not familiar with the technology of GIS and Virtuocity, they were in the dark about what the technical possibilities were and prediction of consequences therefore became more difficult. It must be said however that citizens as well as governments for the larger part agreed that the usage of GIS lessened the gap between the two, citizens felt taken seriously and felt like they were being heard. Through the process of interactive policymaking there was more acceptance for the urban redevelopment and relations between citizens and government improved.

7. Conclusions Coming back to both the main questions of what was expected of Geographical Information Systems during the hype and what can be realistically expected from them now and why GIS is not used to its full potential we can see that when looking back at the expectations made at the beginning of the hype we see that people then expected Geographical Information Systems to increase public participation and in that way democracy, we see that it was expected that communication between citizens and government would be enhanced and the perceived gap between the two would be lessened. Policy would become more transparent for citizens as well as for government. Additionally bounds in rationality would be lessened at both sides. Have these matters occurred? Partly, yes. We see in the cases of Helmond and Tilburg that transparency for citizens has increased, citizens were able to understand the plan for their city, through the visualization function of GIS, citizens could understand what they could not before. Additionally citizens felt taken seriously and felt like they were being heard by their government, communication was possible through different channels regardless of time and place. In this way citizens as well as governments felt like the perceived gap between the two has been lessened. Finally public participation becomes possible in a way that had not been possible without the use of ICT’s. The means for public participation increased, where in Helmond people were able to voice

94


their opinion, in Tilburg they could even vote. Bounds in rationality were lifted to some degree especially on the side of citizens, but on the side of the governments these bounds only increased, this because the knowledge on GIS that governments were expected to have obtained according to the expectations made in the hype, has not occurred. What then can reasonably be expected of the potential of GIS? The potential of GIS entails more than what is mentioned above, the expectations were higher. Looking at the cases of Tilburg and Helmond we can see that next to the potential that has been reached there is still a large deal that still has to be done. First of all both local governments have not used GIS to their full potential since they were not able to predict the consequences of using GIS. They took small steps in implementing GIS and were selective in which parts of the system to use. They choose policy regarding GIS not differing radically from past policy, this limiting GIS to be implemented to their full extent. In Tilburg as well as in Helmond governments were so afraid of letting the program go out of control and to face consequences they could not anticipate they fell into risk averting behavior, choosing not to use GIS to its full potential. This corresponds with the premises of incrementalism and in this way it can be stated that incremental policy design has accounted for GIS not being used to its full potential. The potential of GIS cannot be reached as long as governments remain designing policy through incremental steps, it may be expected though that while these sort of applications occur more and more governments will take larger steps since consequences can be predicted on the basis of past experiences with the application. There are however some factors which limit the use of GIS in policy design that cannot be explained by incrementalism. First of all the fear of governments of losing power to citizens. Governments were afraid that citizens would vote for alternatives that would not be appreciated by the two local governments, therefore, in Helmond citizens were not allowed to vote and in Tilburg the alternatives to vote for were limited. The fear of governments to let power float away and therefore not to use GIS to its full potential cannot be explained by incrementalism. Secondly, related to the fear of governments of losing power to citizens is the fear of losing power to technicians [21]. Since governments often do not have the knowledge to understand what the potential of a complex system like GIS entails they fear that when dealing with designers of the program they are in the lesser position, that the designer will decide what is possible and what will be done and that the government themselves lose grip of the process. In Helmond and Tilburg this was also the case. Tilburg at first did not want a chat and a forum, CEBRA convinced them that they had to. Because of this fear governments often simple do not go along with what the designer of a program tell them, they choose to keep it in their own hands, innovation therefore becomes difficult. It now can be expected that GIS will not reach its full potential in policy design as long as governments do not have the technical knowledge they need to implement an application on their own. Related to this is a third factor of why GIS have not reached their potential in policy design. Governments as well as citizens lack the knowledge, not only the knowledge of how to work with these programs but also the knowledge of the potential of GIS. In interactive policy design this proves to be a large problem since citizens who are not able to work a program on the internet are simply excluded from the democratic process, in the process of public participation they cannot participate. In Tilburg, where there were no paper ballots these people were thus excluded. For governments this lack of knowledge limits the use of GIS in general, within policy problems they often do not know it is possible to use a GIS application so they do not. At the beginning of the hype it was expected that there would be a lot of resources available for training within


95

government, this is not sufficient at the moment. It may be expected that in time when these kind of applications become more and more used governments as well as citizens become more aware of what the potential of GIS entails and how to work with this potential, in time then this potential can be reached. Another factor the cases of Helmond and Tilburg that teaches us that GIS is not used to its full potential in interactive policy-making is the lacking of the means. At the time it was assumed that by now everybody would own a personal computer, this is not the case. In both Tilburg and Helmond there are numerous citizens who do not own a personal computer or do not have access to the internet. They are excluded from the process of public participation. In this way GIS cannot be used to its full potential in interactive policy-making since not all citizens can join in. In the future this could be lifted but for now we cannot reasonably expect all citizens to own a computer with internet access. We can also see that the assumption made that GIS would increase rationality and lift the bounds on rationality proves to be false to a large degree. Bounds of rationality did decrease for citizens, for them it was very clear what was going to happen to their city, before they had to rely on maquettes and sketches, which often proved to be difficult to comprehend. Now for citizens it became completely clear how the new city center would look. Difficulties in imagining how the plans would look in real life were lifted and they were able to make a rational assessment on whether they liked or agreed with the new plans. For governments however this did not happen, for them, since the program was fairly new, it was very difficult, if not impossible to predict outcomes of the process of implementing Virtuocity. They were completely unaware of what the consequences would be of using GIS in urban redevelopment, they were not able to list these consequences and were not able to list alternatives. For this reason, as described above, they chose to take small steps in using the full potential of the program. This corresponding with incrementalism, where when policy-makers cannot oversee consequences they choose not to aim for radical change but to use small steps, not differing much from present policy to come to their goal. This demonstrates that expectations of increased rationality have not come true for all parties. This also demonstrates that this decrease in rationality for government results in not being willing to let GIS reach its full potential in policy design, it results in risk averting behavior and consequently in taking incremental decisions which limit the full potential of GIS to be reached. Coming back to the title: Has incrementalism murdered the hype? We must conclude that this is not the case. Incremental decision-making accounts for a number of factors why GIS in policy design has not reached its potential but there are other factors accountable. Additionally it must be noted that part of the potential of GIS in policy design has been reached and it can be expected that more of this potential will be reached as GIS applications are used more frequently. So, no, incrementalism has not murdered the hype, it has only slowed it down.

References [1] [2]

A. Meijer, Geographical Information Systems and Public Accountability, Information Polity 7 (2002), 39-47. I. Snellen, Territorialising Governance and the State: Policy Dimensions of Geographic Information Systems, Information Infrastructure and Policy 6 (2000), 131-8.

96 [3] [4]

[5] [6] [7]

[8] [9] [10]

[11]

[12] [13]

[14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21]

R. Moody / Has Incrementalism Murdered the Hype? S. Moukomia, Rapid Response Spatial Information Systems: Avian Influenza in Thailand, GeoInformatics and Space Technology Development Agency, Bangkok, 2004. V. Bekkers and A. Zuurmond, Achtergronden en Eigenschappen van ICT, in M. Lips, V. Bekkers and A. Zuurmond (eds.), ICT en Openbaar Bestuur. Implicaties en Uitdagingen van Technologische Toepassingen voor de Overheid, Lemma BV, Utrecht, 2005, 47-72. R. Green, GIS in Public Policy. Using Geographic Information for more Effective Government, Esri Press, Redlands, 2000. E. Turban, E. McLean and J Wetherbee, Information Technology of Management, Wiley, New York, 2002. R. Kingston, S. Carver, A. Evans and I. Turton, Web-based Public Participation, Geographical Information Systems: An Aid to Local Environmental Decision-Making, Computers, Environment and Urban Systems 24 (2000), 109-25. L. Lang, Making a GIS Dream Come True, Planning 56, 7 (1990), 14-20. J. Felleman, There’s a GIS in Your Future, Government Information Quarterly 7, 3 (1990), 261-7. S. Carver, Participation and Geographical Information: A Position Paper, Paper prepared for Spoleto Workshop on Access to Geographic Information and Participatory Approaches Using Geographic Information, Italy, 2001. D. Weiner, T. Harris and W. Craig, Community Participation and Geographic Information Systems, Paper prepared for Spoleto Workshop of Access to Geographic Information and Participatory Approaches Using Geographical Information, Italy, 2001. P. Turner and G. Higgs, The Use and Management of Geographic Information in Local e-Government in the UK, Information Polity 8 (2003), 151-65. M. Lips, M. Boogers and R Weterings, Reinventing Territory in Dutch Local Government: Experiences with the Development and Implementation of GIS in the Amsterdam Region, Information Infrastructure and Policy 6 (2000), 171-83. P. Pollard, Geographical Information Services: A UK Perspective on the Development of Interorganizational Information Services, Information Infrastructure and Policy 6 (2000), 185-95. G. Allison, and P. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Longman, New York, 1999. H. Simon, Models of Man. Social and Rational. Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting, Wiley & Sons, New York, 1957. H. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69, 1 (1955), 99-118. J. March, A Primer on Decision Making. How Decisions Happen, The Free Press, New York, 1994. H.A. Simon, Administrative Behavior. A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization, New York, The Free Press, 1976. C. Lindblom, The Science of ‘Muddling Through’, Public Administration Review 19 (1959), 79-88. L. Winner, Autonomous Technology. Technics-out-of-control as a Theme in Political Thought, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997.

Part B ICTs and Relations Between Public Organizations



99

Fostering the Information Society through Collaborative E-Government: Digital Community Centers and the E-Learning Program in Mexico J. Ramon Gil-Garcia1 Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico Luis F. Luna-Reyes Universidad de las Américas – Puebla, Mexico

Abstract. Following a President’s mandate in 2000, several inter-organizational egovernment initiatives were initiated under the umbrella project denominated eMexico. After a public consultation, it was decided that the e-Mexico strategy was going to be organized into four ‘content pillars’: e-economy, e-health, egovernment, and e-learning. The e-learning pillar had the objective of fostering the information society in Mexico through the creation of meaningful content in Spanish for continuing learning and education, and the deployment of thousands of Digital Community Centers (DCC) to make the content of the four pillars available to individuals with no access to Internet. Project leaders and managers originally had great expectations and were envisioning substantial economic and social impacts. However, there were multiple challenges throughout the implementation process and, although the progress in public infrastructure deployment was important, the economic and social impacts are modest in comparison to the initial expectations. This chapter explains the effects of the institutional context on the results of this initiative by highlighting the complex interplay between information technologies, organizational structures, and institutional arrangements in government settings. It also offers insights on cross-boundary collaboration and information sharing among government organizations. Keywords. electronic government, institutional theory, information sharing, crossboundary collaboration, digital divide, technology enactment

1. Introduction Information and communication technologies (ICT) have been a trigger of economic, political, and social change since the invention of the digital computer in the mid 1 Corresponding Author: Dr. J. Ramon Gil-Garcia is an Assistant Professor in the Public Administration Department and Director of the Data Center for Applied Research in Social Sciences at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Carretera México-Toluca No. 3655, Col. Lomas de Santa Fe, C.P. 01210, México, D.F., MEXICO, Tel.: +52 55 5727-9800 Ext. 2311, E-mail: [email protected].

100

J.R. Gil-Garcia and L.F. Luna-Reyes / Fostering the Information Society

1940s. These series of changes were accelerated with the arrival of the Internet in the 1990s. Internet capabilities such as interaction, immediate response, use of multimedia, and 24/7 availability have been some of the promoters of its growth. Moreover, these same capabilities have facilitated the development of high impact applications that allow us to access information of any kind (text, images, voice and multimedia) in ways difficult to imagine some years ago. As soon as the growth of the Internet and the business, educational and government applications became visible, the phenomenon invigorated a discussion among analysts, academics and politicians about the impacts of having information access (or not) on economic, individual, and social development, giving birth to the term ‘digital divide’. In general, the conversations around the digital divide assume that access to ICT and Internet use will radically transform productivity and quality of life, among many other potential benefits [1, 2, 3]. As a result, international organizations, private organizations and governments around the world started to create and fund programs to increase ICT and Internet access to bridge the gap between the information haves and the information have-nots. Although the espoused theory of many of these programs has an important social content, emphasizing the creation of public value, content, and community, the theoryin-use of many of them has focused more on providing hardware and connectivity, falling short in the creation of content, programs or applications to create public value, which is consistent with a perspective called ‘technological determinism’. Technological determinism argues that ICT has the capability to transform organizations and society through its material properties and pay little attention to the context in which these technologies are embedded, as well as to people’s interactions with them [4, 5, 6, 7]. In Mexico the efforts to bridge the digital divide and create a national information society started in 2000 through the e-Mexico program. E-Mexico originated from a presidential mandate and was organized in four strategic themes or ‘pillars’: e-learning, e-economy, e-government, and e-health. Most of the efforts of deploying infrastructure for Internet access, as well as digital literacy programs and other educational programs, have been promoted through the e-learning pillar and started with a fairly comprehensive view of the phenomenon. For instance, the original strategies of the elearning pillar included access to the Internet through digital community centers (DCC), but also training and the creation of meaningful content in Spanish. However, a great emphasis was placed on the infrastructure and less attention was paid to the specific characteristics of the organizational, institutional and environmental contexts, which resulted in modest outcomes in terms of program impact in comparison with the initial expectations. This chapter describes the initial expectations, the impacts of the organizational and institutional factors on the implementation and use of the e-learning program, and the actual results obtained from this governmental effort. The chapter is organized in five sections, including the foregoing introduction. Section two provides a brief literature review on institutional theory and the technology enactment framework as important alternatives for the study of ICT in organizations and societies. Institutional theory offers researchers the opportunity to study ICT as emergent and complex phenomena shaped by organizational and institutional factors [5, 8]. Section three describes the research design and methods used in this study. Section four presents the results of our analysis in terms of the initial expectations, the impact of organizational and institutional factors and the actual results of the e-learning program. Finally, section five provides some concluding comments and suggests future areas for research in this area.


101

2. Information Technologies, Organizational Structures and Institutions In recent years it has become clear that technologies do have an impact on organizations and societies. It would be difficult to argue that the telephone or the personal computer (PC) has not significantly affected the way we live or the way organizations work. This is definitely true at the aggregate level and considering the long run; technologies have affected our lives. However, when we think about specific impacts (productivity, life style, etc.) for specific organizations or individuals, the story is not that clear. Similarly, the short-term results are not always the expected ones, and unexpected consequences are very common [9, 5, 10]. Most of the research done in information systems, management, public administration, and organization theory has looked at individual organizations and specific results; therefore, an alternative to the ‘technological determinism’ lens is needed. We suggest that institutional theory in general and the technology enactment framework in particular represent this alternative and allow us to understand the relationships between information technologies, organizational characteristics, institutional arrangements and environmental conditions. Following, we briefly describe the history and progress of institutional theory and show how the technology enactment framework has integrated technology into an institutional perspective. 2.1. Institutional Theory Throughout the development of institutional theory, institutions have been conceptualized in many different ways. They are thought of as guidelines for human action or appropriate behavior in society [12]. These guidelines are historically produced and reproduced and, therefore, are taken for granted and not questioned [13]. Institutions are also seen as the governance structures and rules that minimize transaction costs and, consequently, improve market mechanisms in certain circumstances [14]. Berger and Luckman [15] define institutions as mechanisms that are perceived as objective and constrain the behavior of individuals. Institutions have also been conceptualized as ways to reduce uncertainty and increase cooperation in the political arena [16]. Therefore, they are seen as rules of behavior based on various important foundations, from culture and mental models to legislation and from social norms to political structures. Scott [17] summarizes these different conceptualizations and foundations in three pillars that according to him represent or support institutions: cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative. Researchers using institutional theory in different disciplines have their own particularities [18, 19, 20], but all of them have in common a skepticism toward the rational-actor model and its strong assumptions. Recently, several disciplinary traditions have started to further develop the institutional perspective. Institutional theory has also been applied to the study of ICT in government settings, and these studies have drawn on previous disciplinary efforts, particularly from sociology, economics and political science. Based on a review of recent literature, Hassan and GilGarcia [21] found that institutional theory has been recently used to understand a great diversity of phenomena such as ICT adoption and innovation, information systems development, institutionalization of information systems, ICT and organizational change, and ICT use in organizations. They also found that these studies present characteristics of the old and new institutionalisms, but with a greater emphasis on the new institutionalism and seven current trends in institutional theory. Following, we

102


describe a recent institutional framework that integrates technology as a critical component of the analysis: the technology enactment framework. 2.2. Technology Enactment Framework Fountain [9, 5] proposes a theoretical framework rooted in institutional theory, Technology Enactment (see Figure 1). She says that the technology enactment focuses on the intersections between institutions, bureaucratic structures and information technologies. The basic logic of this framework is that ‘objective technologies’ are shaped by organizational forms and institutional arrangements to become ‘enacted technologies.’ Similarly, organizational forms and institutional arrangement are affected by the selection, design and use of ICT. Fountain [5] explains that the enacted technology can be understood as the perception, design, and use of objective technologies such as the Internet and different pieces of hardware and software. PuronCid and Gil-Garcia [22] propose that at the organizational level enacted technologies can be characterized as the features of the technology that are actually in place (they are included in the existing information system or systems), in contrast to all the features that could be potentially included (objective technology) but were not selected. The enacted technology produces certain organizational results or outcomes in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and transparency, among others.

Objective Information Technologies

Organizational Forms

Enacted Technology

Outcomes

Institutional Arrangements

Figure 1: Technology enactment framework [5]

Organizational forms include structural characteristics such as centralization, formalization and communication channels [11]. Other bureaucratic characteristics of the organizations are also included in this construct [5]. In contrast, institutional arrangements are laws, regulations and other cognitive, cultural, or socio-structural constraints found in government contexts [5]. The enacted technology and the subsequent organizational results also have an impact on the organizational forms and the institutional arrangements [9, 5]. Therefore, the technology enactment framework


103

acknowledges the recursive nature of the relationships between organizations, institutions and ICT. Recently some modifications have been proposed to the original technology enactment framework [5]. For example, Gil-Garcia [11] expands Fountain’s original framework to include some environmental variables such as potential demand, political orientation and economic conditions. The environment was found to have a direct impact on organizational characteristics and institutional arrangements, but also an indirect impact on the enacted technology and organizational results. This integrative approach allowed for the quantitative testing of the complex relationships between organizational characteristics, institutional arrangement and the enacted technology. Adding the environment to the technology enactment framework had the additional advantage of understanding some of the determinants or antecedents of institutional arrangements and organizational forms [11]. Similarly, Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia and Estrada-Marroquin [23] suggest that the original technology enactment framework could be enriched with two additional causal relationships; one between institutional arrangement and the enacted technology, and the other between organizational forms and results. Finally, based on a multi-method study on inter-organizational collaboration and information sharing, Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia and Cruz [24] propose that the technology enactment process produces not only the enacted technology, but also important social results such as trust and collaboration among the participants. The original technology enactment framework was developed based on empirical evidence of complex but single information systems [5]. Some public policies and governmental programs are implemented in multiple and different contexts and, therefore, the enacted technology and the results are expected to be different, too [11, 10]. In a study of the use of a productivity tool in the private sector, Orlikowski [10] found that the same technological artifact was used in very different ways by different sub-units within a single organization. She explains that ‘the focus is on what structures emerge as people interact recurrently with whatever properties of the technology are at hand, whether these were built in, added on, modified, or invented on the fly’. [10: 407]. Similarly, Gil-Garcia [11] proposes that the technology enactment would be different in different organizational contexts, even when the information technologies seem to be identical in terms of technical aspects. Therefore, since the organizational and institutional contexts greatly affect the enacted technology and subsequent results, it is expected that the same governmental program involving ICT will generate very different results when implemented in multiple contexts (see Figure 2).

3. Research Methods and Design This study is part of a research project that adopts a multi-method approach. It uses semi-structured interviews of project leaders and participants of more than 15 digital government initiatives in Mexico, a survey to project participants, and three in-depth case studies [25, 26]. The objective of this design is to understand the mechanisms and results of collaborative digital government in Latin American contexts. It will also provide some evidence of the similarities and differences regarding collaboration and information sharing in government settings between Latin American and other countries.

104


Organizational Structures and Processes X

Digital Government X Enacted Technology X

Contextual Factors X

Institutional Arrangements X

Organizational Structures and Processes Y

Organizational Outputs X

Digital Government Y Enacted Technology Y

Contextual Factors Y

Institutional Arrangements Y

Technology Enactment X

Technology Enactment Y

Organizational Outputs Y

Figure 2. Multiple technology enactments (adapted from [11])

This paper reports on the findings from interviews and document analysis of the ELearning pillar, which is part of the e-Mexico initiative. Specifically, the results reported here are based on extensive analysis of documentation and 12 semi-structured interviews with public managers involved in the implementation of e-learning programs and digital community centers (DCC). Interviewees include project managers from the ministry of Communications and Transportation (4), the Ministry of Labor (1), the Ministry of Social Development (1), the Latin American Institute for Educational Communication (ILCE) (4), the General Direction of Public Libraries (1), and the National Institute for Adult Education (INEA) (1). The Latin American Institute for Educational Communication, the General Direction of Public Libraries, and the National Institute for Adult Education work under the coordination of the Ministry of Education. Interviewees were asked about the characteristics of the e-learning project, the institutional environment, project’s costs and benefits, their perceptions of project success, collaboration and networking. The research team analyzed the interviews, looking for specific themes and categories, but also for topics that emerged from the data. A prominent finding in the analysis is related to the different enactments and results of the Digital Community Centers (DCC) created in collaboration with different partner agencies. For example, DCC coordinated by INEA are significantly different in the uses and application of computers and Internet than DCC coordinated by ILCE or by the General Direction of Public Libraries. The research team then looked for


105

specific examples of the impact of institutional and organizational factors on the characteristics of the e-learning project and collaboration processes among the Ministry of Education, the Coordination of e-Mexico, schools, libraries and other organizations involved. Document analysis was used to enrich the contextual description and triangulate findings from the interviews. Documents such as the ‘National Plan for Development’, the ‘Good Government Agenda’, the e-Mexico strategy, and other documents describing projects within the e-learning pillar were collected and analyzed.

4. Digital Community Centers and the E-Learning Project in Mexico The E-Mexico program started with a direct mandate of President Fox, who asked the Minister of Communications and Transportation to start the program during his initial address to the nation on December 1st, 2000: I ask the Minister of Communications and Transportation to start the e-Mexico project as soon as possible, so that the information and communications revolution gets a truly national character, reducing the digital divide among governments, private organizations, households and individuals, and reaching the last corner of the Country [27].

In the year 2000, only 2.8 million Mexicans had Internet access, and there was no infrastructure or public policy to support such Presidential initiative. As a result, the eMexico Coordination was created during 2001. This Coordination resided in the Ministry of Communications and Transportation and was charged to develop and implement the Information Society policy in Mexico. After a comprehensive review of current practices, the individuals leading the initiative in Mexico decided to follow a social model initially implemented in Cuba, in which the Digital Community Centers (DCC) were part of a complex network of social relationships and produced great citizen participation and engagement. Moreover, the DCC deployment itself relied on a complex network of government organizations. According to the e-Mexico Coordination, the “Information Society is an economic and social system, where knowledge and information constitute the basic sources of well-being and development” [28]. The information society in Mexico was conceptualized to rest in four main pillars, government (e-government), health (ehealth), economy (e-economy), and education (e-learning). This initial conceptualization has evolved as a result of the work of many individuals and organizations over the past seven years, resulting in other content areas. DCC deployment has been closely related to the e-learning pillar. Several public managers involved in the project thought DCC were going to play a central role in fostering the use of Internet for economic development. In the following paragraphs we briefly describe the evolution of the Mexican e-learning pillar. 4.1. The Hype: Initial Expectations After the presidential mandate in 2000, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation worked in a public consultation involving experts, consultants, policy makers and researchers to get a better understanding of the meaning of the Information Society and the e-Mexico program itself. The public consultation took place on March

106


12, 2001, and involved more than 900 participants who presented about 140 proposals to create the program. As a result, the e-Mexico program objectives were defined, and it was included in the National Plan for Development 2001-2006, giving to the program the level of national public policy. In August 2001 both the e-Mexico Coordination and a Council of the E-Mexico System were created. The e-Mexico Coordination, hosted by the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, published an initial agenda and rationale for the program in October of that same year. The main rationale of the program resides in the opportunities for economic development provided by the access to information and information technologies. In fact, analyzing the experience of countries such as Ireland, India, the US and Brazil, among others, the group developing the e-Mexico strategy concluded that the main problem in Mexico was the inequality in access to computers and to the Internet (only 5% of the population had access to the Internet, and only 9.3% of Mexican households had a computer in those years). Moreover, the initiators of the e-Mexico program noticed differences in access (digital divide) among regions in the northern and southern parts of the country. The rationale for e-Mexico ended up calling for ... a connectivity program that goes beyond a single government agency program, it needs to consider the wide spectrum of technology coverage and penetration issues, as well as the use and benefits of the network through contents and services matching the Mexicans’ needs [29: 7].

In this way, the e-Mexico system was conceptualized as ... an integrative project, articulating interests from different government levels, as well as several entities and public agencies, telecommunication operators, and the information and communication technologies industry associations, with the objective of increasing the coverage of basic services such as education, health, economy, government, science and technology, and other community services [29: 7].

The e-Mexico program was organized in three main strategic lines of work. The first strategic line was associated with building the public infrastructure for connectivity and access. The main components of this strategic area included negotiations with the telecommunications industry to improve infrastructure and service fees, but also the creation of a network of Digital Community Centers (DCC) with computers and Internet access. The second strategic line of work included activities related to the creation of contents in Spanish. Initially, most contents were organized around the four pillars in the e-Mexico Internet Portal (see Figure 3). The last strategic area concentrated on the development of technical platforms and systems to provide government and other services. The e-Mexico portal is the most visible technical platform created by e-Mexico in previous years, but particularly in the e-learning pillar, the e-Mexico program has developed a technical platform to provide distance education called CapaciNET (see Figure 4).


107

Figure 3: The e-learning section of the e-Mexico Internet portal.

In the particular case of the e-learning pillar, the rationales were the impact of education on social development and the use of technology as a tool and resource for learning. The mission of the e-learning program was “to offer new options to access education and training, stimulating learning as a mean for holistic personal development for every Mexican” [29: 17]. Therefore, the e-learning pillar was mainly focused on the creation of alternative ways to access formal education at all levels (K12 and higher education), as well as continuing education and on-the-job training through the Internet. The mission was truly embraced by public managers involved in program development. One of them commented, ... education is a very important part in this process [of constructing the information society], and not only talking about digital literacy, but education in general is one of the big options for the future of the country … The dream of making education available for everyone is possible through e-learning.

In particular, program managers were interested in developing Internet-based elearning options for the poorest communities (usually in rural areas), where education opportunities are not abundant enough and where young men have only two choices: “work very early with their parents on the family land, or migrate to the US”. A significant challenge to making these options available for a rural area is that “education is really concentrated in urban areas, and as such, it is out of context in a rural environment. We need contents that are much closer to the needs of a child or teenager in such an environment”. Closely related to the creation of relevant contents was the deployment of (publicly accessible) Internet infrastructure, so the public could interact with the content and create value for their communities. After reviewing several success cases around the

108


world, the e-Mexico coordination decided to follow the Digital Community Center model from Cuba. The most appealing characteristic of the Cuban model was its social network model. Because of the basis on social networks, ‘Cuban DCC had an important social impact despite their technical limitations,’ as one of the e-learning program managers commented. An opportunity to access the PANAMSAT network, in addition to the Mexican experience with distance education using another satellite network, were also determinants of the selection of a social model similar to the one used in Cuba, providing Internet connectivity via satellite.

Figure 4: CapaciNet learning platform.

The expectations for a public infrastructure based on DCC, however, were high, and the financial resources were quite limited. The initial objective was to create and operate 10,000 DCC geographically located in such a way as to potentially provide Internet access to more than 85% of the Mexican population. In order to do that, managers from the e-Mexico Coordination believed that they needed to create alliances with other Ministries that already had some infrastructure deployed to be able to accomplish the ambitious goal. In this way they looked for support in the K-12 public school system, managed by the Ministry of Education (SEP), the Public Libraries Network, under the management of the Directorate of Libraries at the National Council for the Culture and Arts, the local development centers planned by the Ministry of Social Development, and the Community Plazas managed by the National Institute for Adult Education. Figure 5 shows the full network of organizations involved in the elearning pillar for deploying the public Internet infrastructure through DCC. As shown in the figure, the Ministry of Social Development partnered with the Monterrey Institute of Technology (a Mexican private university) in the creation of distance education programs for their development centers, and the National Institute for Adult Education’s Community Plazas are managed by the National Council of Education for

109


Life and Work. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation funded the DCC program at the Public Libraries. Although initially the Ministry of Health was not considered to be part of the DCC network, due to their experiments with telemedicine and on-site training for physicians in rural communities, they also received resources to deploy some DCC in rural clinics. All these collaborations were formalized by signing an Inter-ministerial Connectivity Agreement in July, 2002. National Council of Education for Life and Work

National Institute for Adult Education

Latin American Institute for Educational Communication

Ministry of Education

Ministry of Communication and Transportation

Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

National Council for the Culture and Arts

Ministry of Health

Ministry of Social Development

Monterrey Institute of Technology

Figure 5: Network of organizations associated with the e-learning pillar

Although the head of the e-learning pillar was the Ministry of Education, the Minister decided to delegate program management (through some sort of outsourcing contract) to the Latin American Institute for Educational Communication (ILCE), assigning one of the Minister Counselors as Chief Executive Officer of the pillar. The e-Mexico Coordination worked directly with many other Ministries for the creation of distance education programs and the deployment of DCC.

+ Digital Community Centers

Social, economic and political conditions

Figure 6: Digital Community Centers affecting social, economic and political conditions

110


The initial conceptualization of the Mexican DCC was monolithically defined by the eMexico Coordination. However, in practice there are many differences among DCC depending on the Ministry providing the basic infrastructure. Moreover, and given the limited financial and human resources for the program, most of the resources were dedicated to the deployment of technical infrastructure, and only a limited amount was used to create the social networks and to develop human capital. Therefore, the theoryin-use for the e-learning pillar followed the philosophy of ‘technological determinism’ represented in Figure 6. As one of the project participants commented, “our main goal is to make the Digital Community Centers key factors for the progress and well-being of the communities in our country”. 4.2. The Implementation Process: Facing Institutional Reality The association with other government agencies to deploy the DCC infrastructure led to implementation differences among the main kinds of DCC. In fact, their names are different depending on the partner agency. They also have different organizational structures and objectives. Before describing those implementation differences we will describe the general DCC deployment strategies and problems. DCC deployment was organized in four different stages. Each stage started with a public auction to choose the Satellite Internet Service Provider (ISP). Once the ISP was chosen, the e-Mexico Coordination looked for sites with their partners to locate the DCC. In general, e-Mexico provided a subsidized satellite Internet connection, but each site needed to provide the computer room, some computers, and local management of the DCC. Figure 7 shows the deployment pattern of DCC and the communities covered by the e-Mexico infrastructure. As commented by project participants, the objective of the first 3,200 DCC was to provide ‘political coverage’. In other words, they were trying to provide an Internet access point to each of the about 2,400 municipalities in the country. After this first stage, the goal was then to provide ‘population coverage’, trying to reach all the communities with more than 1,000 inhabitants.

Figure 7. DCC and community coverage by the e-Mexico program. The graph was constructed based on information in the e-Mexico presentations [28]. Numbers followed by an asterisk (*) were estimated by the authors.


111

The general implementation process was not problem-free. Because of initial learning curves, for example, the technical specifications of the first deployment stage (known as Network 1), had a limited bandwidth, creating connection problems and connection speed problems. Managers in charge of the deployment of the first Network found technical solutions to improve the level of service. Learning from Network 1 promoted a much better procurement process with the auctions of Networks 2, 3, and 4. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the current 9,200 DCC in each of the four deployment stages.

Figure 8. Distribution of the 9,200 DCC in the four satellite networks of the e-Mexico system

After the deployment of the first 3,200 DCC in 2003, financial resources for the following stages were limited. In fact, deployment of networks 2 and 3 started together in 2005. A project participant commented that “the project, which started as a very important project, has become a less important project. The educational sector started with so much energy, but the budget has been reduced year after year … it is a project with lots of potential, but we need the President to embrace it as an important project”. In this way, deploying networks 2, 3 and 4 has been a slow process and the goal of 10,000 DCC has not been yet accomplished. Currently, most of the DCC belong to the school and library systems (see Figure 9), followed by the Community Plazas (CP) in Adult Education Centers, and the Regional Development Centers of the Ministry of Social Development. The Ministry of Health manages 12.6 % of DCC, which are mainly used for telemedicine-related applications. In the following paragraphs, we describe the main characteristics of each of these forms of DCC, highlighting their strengths and limitations.

112


Figure 9. Distribution of DCC by type according to the partnering Ministry

4.2.1. DCC at Public Schools The DCC program at public schools is coordinated by the Latin American Institute for Educational Communication (ILCE). One of the Program Managers at ILCE described it as a program to ‘promote digital culture’. Early in the deployment process they realized that the key element for DCC success was the DCC local manager, who is called a ‘promoter’. The promoter at public schools is usually one of the school teachers, frequently the school director, who is also responsible for the computing resources at the school. He or she receives a 28-hour face-to-face training course with the basic skills needed to run the DCC. After this initial course, they have access to the Virtual Academic Campus, where they can take five more distance learning courses on Education and the Internet, Commerce and the Internet, Government On-line Services, Searching for Information in the Internet, and Web Page Publication. Computing infrastructure was usually the school’s own infrastructure. In many cases this infrastructure was quite old, and a new computer was needed to function as Internet server as well as the creation of a LAN in the school. In general, DCC at schools have had little impact on children’s education because only one of the teachers receives the basic training and the curriculum has not been adapted to the new resource. Impact on the community is even smaller because DCC are used during school hours by the students only, and they are usually closed after school hours. There is no financial compensation for the teacher to open it to the community after school hours, and given that he or she is responsible for the equipment, opening the DCC to the community depends on the teacher/director time availability and willingness. However, as one of the program managers commented, ‘There are many heroes in the educational system and many teachers open the DCC without any compensation.’ In the case of secondary schools, the impact is also limited


113

because of the location of schools, which are usually at a 20-30 minutes walking distance from the community. 4.2.2. DCC at Public Libraries: Digital Service Modules Digital Service Modules (DSM) consist of an area with two to ten computers connected to the Internet through the e-Mexico network in public libraries. Promoters at the DSM are the librarians or other community volunteers (mainly women), who receive a much better training from ILCE, thanks to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation grant. The basic face-to-face training consists of 102 hours followed by the same five distance education courses provided to DCC at schools. In this way, DSM promoters are much better prepared to help users with computer and Internet use than promoters in other DCC. Given that ILCE also coordinates this program, ‘promoting a digital culture’ is also at the heart of the program at DSM. An important limitation of the volunteer model is turnover and the need to continuously train the new promoters. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation grant also served to buy brand new computers for each DSM, avoiding many connectivity problems associated with older computers at schools. Although there are many children and teenagers using the DSM, they have had a more important impact on the community given that they are open to the public, normally Monday through Saturday. In addition, some local libraries have created partnerships with other local government organizations to take advantage of the computing infrastructure in exchange for paper and printer ink. For example, many training courses for local government employees take place at the public library DSM. 4.2.3. DCC at Adult Education Centers: Community Plazas Community Plazas (CP) are local computer stations that provide adult education, including basic literacy, elementary, middle, and high school education. CP follow what has been called an ‘Educational Model for Life and Work,’ which attempts to provide elementary and secondary education in a way that is meaningful and useful for the adult learners. This model is different from the ‘program to promote a digital culture’ promoted by ILCE. In fact, Community Plazas is a program that started working before the DCC establishment by e-Mexico. The promoter at a CP is usually the adult education promoter in the community who does not receive any formal training to include the computers, and the Internet in his or her business practice. In fact, the Educational Model for Life and Work was not designed considering the technology component that many CP have now, and it has not been adapted to the new resource. CP promoters’ incentive system works on the basis of the number of adults that graduate from a program or that make progress in their basic education, but not on computer literacy or community impact [30]. In this way, the impact of DCC in Community Plazas is limited for the regular adult education programs and also on the community. Although a more comprehensive educational and community model has been tested in some CP with promising results, it has not been adopted by the whole system [30]. 4.2.4. DCC at Regional Development Centers: Learning Community Centers The last main group of DCC in Mexico are located in the Regional Development Centers managed by the Ministry of Social Development and are called Learning

114


Community Centers (LCC). Educational programs in these DCC are managed by the Monterrey Institute of Technology, one of the leading private higher education institutions in Mexico with a long tradition in distance learning. Promoters are community volunteers who are trained by the group from the Monterrey Institute of Technology. LCC are established in communities of extreme poverty, where community impacts are mainly constrained by the poverty level. The centers are designed to be open to the community, but the results vary a lot from DCC to DCC. One of the program managers provided two very interesting examples. He described first an Indian community in the state of Oaxaca, “I visited a couple of weeks ago Teotitlán del Valle, where they make carpets, they make art crafts. Although they are Zapotec Indians, they have resources … they export their art crafts to Europe. There, they are taking advantage of the DCC right away”. However, he also described his experience in San Lorenzo Albarrada, a very poor community, I was in a ceremony to give diplomas to a group of women who finished a course on word processing, and I was asking them about how they thought that the computers will help them … one of them told me, ‘to find a job’, and I wondered, ‘how will a Word course help this woman in an isolated community to find a job?’ In many senses, the main challenge in these centers is to imagine applications that create community value and are clearly useful to individuals.

4.2.5. A Note about Contents Although most of the chapter focuses on the description of the implementation and use of DCC, there has also been an effort to create content and, more specifically, distance education content. We already described the Virtual Academic Campus managed by ILCE. In addition to the basic Internet courses, the campus delivers other contents via an Internet newsletter and also creates a community of promoters through Internet forums. The Virtual Academic Campus uses an open source learning management system (LMS) that has proven to be robust for the current level of use. The e-Mexico Coordination, on the other hand, has developed the CapaciNET portal (see Figure 4). CapaciNET uses a proprietary LMS, which is currently used by several Ministries as a platform for distance learning, for example by the Ministry of Labor. The e-Mexico Coordination has also signed important collaboration agreements with firms such as Manpower to increase the distance learning free courses in its platform. All these courses are limited in interactivity and other functionalities because of the variety of computer capabilities and Internet bandwidth in DCC. Currently, the e-Mexico program has developed 21 Internet portals and 17 virtual communities. The e-Mexico portals provide 18,000 web pages with more than 200 million page views per month. The CapaciNET portal holds about 300 courses, and the e-Learning portal has links to 400 more courses. In spite of these impressive statistics, according to the perception of project participants, only 10% of the budget is used for content development, 10% more is used for promoters’ training, and 80% is used for DCC deployment. Thus, additional resources are needed for content and program development. Finally, it is important to note that the assumed relationship between DCC and socio-economic development is not straightforward (see Figure 10). On the contrary, different enactments of DCC have been the result of different influences of


115

organizational and institutional factors as described in the above paragraphs. Moreover, there is also an important interaction between social and economic conditions and DCC implementation. 4.3. After the Hype: Assessing Results and Understanding Future Potential One of the main successes of the e-Learning program in Mexico is the deployment of 9,200 DCC across the country. Moreover, project participants have been able to put together a series of educational resources even with significant budgetary limitations. However, the monolithically conceived vision of a DCC has been proven to be wrong, and many different technology enactments have developed in the last few years. We have only described in this chapter some basic generic types, but there are still lots of variations inside each main category that we do not describe in this chapter. Project managers are now looking for other options because they have realized that solutions that encompass only technology are not enough to face complex social problems. One of the main limitations of the program has been the lack of clear objectives and actions to adapt the current educational programs to the new resources (computers and Internet access), limiting in a very important way the overall impact of the investment. Most of the actors were trying to incorporate the new technologies to the old programs, but very little has been done to obtain the full set of benefits from these technologies. Although project managers realized that technology was not going to solve all the problems, they also understood it is still a very important component of a more integrated and comprehensive solution. However, there are still some issues in relation to technology that need attention. For instance, the strategy to keep the DCC computer technology up-to-date remains an unsolved question. That is to say, who is responsible for replacing computers when they become obsolete? Where will the resources come from? The reinforcement process between ICT, institutions, and organizational characteristics (see Figure 10) works as a virtuous cycle in some communities, but it works as a trap in communities of extreme poverty. A remaining challenge consists of figuring out ways of breaking out of this trap. Other social conditions such as gender roles can have similar constraining conditions [31]. An integrated solution should take into consideration not only the features of the technology, but also the characteristics of the context in which this technology is embedded, including organizational structures, users’ knowledge about technology, institutional arrangements and the political environment, among others. Currently, to take full advantage of the Internet interactivity, the e-Mexico Coordination is exploring a different strategy to provide connectivity to DCC with more bandwidth. They are planning to provide Wi-Max high speed Internet connections through partnerships with public universities in the states, and promote local creation of content from universities and communities. With this, they are attempting to combine innovative technologies with creative organizational models which could support the necessary collaboration and lead to better results.

116


Organizational Structures and Processes Contextual Factors

Institutional Arrangements

DCC Enacted Technology

Organizational Outputs

Figure 10: Relationships between Digital Community Centers, organizational characteristics, institutional arrangements and contextual factors (adapted from [11]).

5. Concluding Remarks The initial conception and objectives of the e-learning program in Mexico had a comprehensive vision of the phenomenon and attempted to integrate access to technology, specialized training (digital literacy), and the creation of meaningful content in Spanish. However, de facto, most of the resources (about 80%) were devoted to the implementation of Digital Community Centers (DCC), which were basically the creation of places for individuals to have access to a computer and Internet. The expectations were that these DCC were going to generate significant social and economic benefits. However, due to an attempt to accomplish the quantitative goal of 10,000 DCC under significant resource limitations, little attention was paid to the context in which the DCC were embedded and to the different environments generated by the agencies partnering with the Ministry of Communications and Transportation. This chapter clearly shows the importance of organizational characteristics, institutional arrangements and environmental conditions for the implementation and use of information technologies in the Mexican DCC. The existing conditions for each type of DCC strongly influenced the characteristics of the enacted technologies and corresponding social structures in each case. The same governmental program using ICT implemented in different contexts (organizational, institutional, social, economic, and political) produced very different results in terms of technological characteristics (enacted technology) and impacts (organizational outputs). In addition, the enactment process generated organizational and social consequences that shaped the results of each DCC and were similar within DCC managed by the same partnering agency. Additional research is needed to explore the effects of different conditions on the resulting enacted technology and social impacts. Similarly, in terms of the whole e-learning program, the social and economic impacts were also affected by the institutional context. The overall results were still


117

positive but modest in comparison to the initial expectations. Information technologies have the potential to radically transform individuals’ life styles and macro social structures, but they are also influenced by existing organizational characteristics, institutional arrangements and environmental conditions. Government programs using ICT should acknowledge these relationships and take more integrative and comprehensive approaches to these phenomena. Future studies should attempt to understand the differentiated impacts of such integrative government programs and policies. In addition, although bandwidth considerations are important to making interactive contents accessible to communities, the main current challenge of the e-learning program is to take advantage of the deployed DCC to create public value and local development. It appears to be a priority to invest in the adjustment of educational programs and incentive structures as part of the strategy. Moreover, specific programs to promote community impact that go beyond computer literacy seem to be needed. Additional research is needed to assess the impact of DCC (and related programs) on social and economic development in urban and rural communities. ICT has a great potential to generate social and economic development, but technology seems to be only one of the components of the complex socio-technical network necessary for these improvements. In conclusion, in the case of the e-learning program in Mexico there was a hype in relation to the potential of information technologies to transform social structures and improve economic conditions. This chapter provides evidence that the technology is only one component of a more complex socio-technical network that includes individuals, organizational structures, institutional arrangements and the context in which they are all embedded.

Acknowledgements This study was partially supported by the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT-Mexico) under grant SEP-2004-C01-46507 and by the National Science Foundation under grant No. 0131923. The views and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CONACYT or NSF.

References [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5]

E. Ferro, J.R. Gil-Garcia and N. Helbig, The Digital Divide Metaphor: Understanding Paths to IT Literacy, Paper presented at the Sixth International Conference on Electronic Government, eGov DEXA, Regensburg, Germany, September 3-7 2007. K. Mossberger, C.J. Tolbert and M. Stansbury, Virtual Inequality: Beyond the Digital Divide, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2003. M. Warschauer, Technology and Social Inclusion: Rethinking the Digital Divide, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003. G. DeSanctis and M.S. Poole, Capturing the Complexity in Advanced Technology Use: Adaptive Structuration Theory, Organization Science 5, 2 (1994), 121-47. J.E. Fountain, Building the Virtual State. Information Technology and Institutional Change, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2001.

118

[6]


J.R. Gil-Garcia and N. Helbig, Exploring E-Government Benefits and Success Factors, in A.-V. Anttiroiko and M. Malkia (eds.), Encyclopedia of Digital Government, Idea Group Inc, Hershey, PA, 2006, [PP. 803-811]. [7] W. Orlikowski, The Duality of Technology: Rethinking the Concept of Technology in Organizations. Organization Science 3, 3 (1992), 398-427. [8] W. Orlikowski and S. Barley, Technology and Institutions. What can research on information technology and research on organizations learn from each other? MIS Quarterly 25, 2 (2001), 145-165. [9] J.E. Fountain, Enacting Technology: An Institutional Perspective, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1995. [10] W. Orlikowski, Using Technology and Constituting Structures: A Practice Lens for Studying Technology in Organizations, Organization Science 11, 4 (2000), 404-28. [11] J.R. Gil-Garcia, Enacting State Websites: A Mixed Method Study Exploring E-Government Success in Multi-Organizational Settings, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, NY, 2005. [12] J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, Free Press, New York, 1989. [13] L.G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence, American Sociological Review 42 (1977), 726-43. [14] D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999. [15] P.L. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Anchor Books, New York, 1966. [16] T. Moe, The New Economics of Organizations, American Journal of Political Science 28 (1984), 73977. [17] W.R. Scott, Institutions and organizations. 2nd edn. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2001. [18] M.C. Brinton and V. Nee, The New Institutionalism in Sociology, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1988. [19] B.G. Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New’ Institutionalism, Continuum, London, 2001. [20] M. Rutherford, Institutions in Economics. The Old and the New Institutionalism, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999. [21] S. Hassan and J.R. Gil-Garcia, Institutional Theory and E-Government Research, in G.D. Garson and M. Khosrow-Pour (eds.), Handbook of Research on Public Information Technology, IGI Global, Hershey, PA, 2007, [PP. 349-360]. [22] G. Puron Cid and J.R. Gil-Garcia, Enacting E-Budgeting in Mexico, Public Finance and Management 4, 2 (2004), 182-217. [23] L.F. Luna-Reyes, J.R. Gil-Garcia and M. Estrada-Marroquin, The Impact of Institutions on Interorganizational IT Projects in the Mexican Federal Government, International Journal of Electronic Government Research 4, 2 (2008), 27-42. [24] L.F. Luna-Reyes, J.R. Gil-Garcia and C.B. Cruz, E-Mexico: Collaborative Structures in Mexican Public Administration, International Journal of Cases on Electronic Commerce 3, 2 (2007), 54-70. [25] J.W. Creswell, Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2003. [26] R.K. Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2003. [27] e-México, Resumen ejecutivo del sistema nacional e-México, http://www.emexico.gob.mx/wb2/eMex/ eMex_Resumen_ejecutivo_del_Sistema_Nacional_eMexic, 2003, Retrieved January, 2006. [28] e-México, E-Mexico Presentations. http://www.emexico.gob. mx/wb2/eMex/eMex_Presentaciones, 2007, Retrieved October, 2007. [29] SCT, Sistema Nacional e-México: Justificación, Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes (Ministry of Communications and Transportation), Mexico City, 2001. [30] B. Salinas Amescua, M.G. Huerta Alva, L.H. Porras Hernández, S.E. Amador Pérez and J.M. Ramos Rodríguez, Uso significativo de la tecnología en la educación de adultos en el medio rural: Resultados de la aplicación piloto de un modelo, Revista Mexicana de Investigación Educativa 11, 28 (2006), 3160. [31] B. Salinas Amescua, L.H. Porras Hernández and M.G. Huerta Alva, Autopercepciones de madres rurales: Implicaciones en el modelaje de sus hijas en edad escolar, in S. Cueto (ed.), Educación y brechas de equidad en América Latina (Vol. II), PREAL, Santiago de Chile, 2006, 399-455.


119

Coping with ‘Co-Location’: Implementing C2000 and GMS in the Dutch Police Region ‘Hollands Midden’ F.P. Wagenaar, F.K. Boersma, P. Groenewegen and P. Niemantsverdriet VU University Amsterdam

Abstract. This chapter is about the introduction and use of the communication tool C2000 and the Integrated Emergency center System (GMS) at the emergency center ‘Hollands Midden’ in the Dutch city of Leiden. ‘Hollands Midden’ is a colocated emergency center that physically houses the police, medical and fire brigades’ emergency center personnel at one site. The introduction of these systems at ‘Hollands Midden’ was part of a nationwide introduction of new technologies in emergency centers in the Netherlands. We studied how C2000 and GMS tie the various information elements together in the back office of the emergency center. In addition, we used Giddens’ structuration theory to understand how, in the reality of the emergency centers, rules, norms and behavior come into being through the use of the new technologies and how the new technologies are (re)shaped by the actors. What we found is that C2000, once introduced as a promising communication tool, is not (always) used as it was designed to be. And GMS, the system that was supposed to integrate the most important routines of the emergency center, has undergone constant change at ‘Hollands Midden’ as a result of local needs and adaptation.Coping with colocation: Implementing C2000 and GMS in the Dutch police region ‘Hollands Midden’

1. Introduction The Dutch security sector is currently trying to realize what the UK criminal justice system has failed to do since 1989, namely to achieve technically supported organizational integration. In 1995 the then Cabinet of the Netherlands decided to implement a single national communications network for the police, the fire brigades and the emergency medical teams. It was to be called C2000 (Communication 2000). Its aim was to make digital voice and data communications between all emergency services (police, medical emergency teams and fire brigades and, in the event of a crisis, public administration) possible – not only in the emergency center but also on the street – and to replace the existing 100 analogous networks, which had hindered such communication. C2000 has therefore been positioned by the government as a system that facilitates the work of emergency center teams. In this context, C2000 is more than just a communication system. As we will see in this chapter, the C2000 technology re-structures the work both for the operators at the emergency centers and for the officers on the street.

120

F.P. Wagenaar et al. / Coping with ‘Co-Location’

The information and communication environment for the dispatch personnel is supported by GMS (the Dutch abbreviation for its integrated emergency room system): an information system that combines a computer-supported work environment with other information systems. Emergency centers conduct the intake of calls for help and relay them to the appropriate services; they also fulfill a dispatch function. In small incidents support for action is usually retained within the emergency center. Initial decisions regarding first response are made in the emergency center; an assessment of the scale of the incident is part of the procedure. When the scale of the incident requires intensive coordination a separate group of responders is formed. At the highest scale coordination may be taken over by crisis response centers of the public services. Even in large-scale crisis situations the emergency center retains an important coordinating role between first responders, emergency workers and decision-makers. The regular tasks in the emergency center also include general dispatching for police street patrols and medical services. An important part of the strategy of the Dutch home office is integrating emergency response into an overall public safety policy. Integrating disciplines for this purpose starts with the restructuring of the safety regions in the Netherlands and with the adjustments and integration of the three core disciplines: police, emergency medical teams and fire brigades. Initial steps have been to physically house the police, medical and fire brigades’ emergency center personnel at one site. Every region (the Netherlands now has 25) could decide for itself how it would implement C2000/GMS, which was an intended part of the implementation trajectory. It was a way of coping with potential resistance, which also implied that variations in equipment, layout of workspaces and, subsequently, working routines, were possible. If we place these events in its historical contexts, we see that the Dutch government has implemented three major initiatives in the same period of time: the re-structuring of the safety regions, the re-organization of emergency centers into co-locations and the implementation of new ICT systems such as C2000 and GMS. At present there are 24 ‘co-located’ emergency centers in operation (the region Amsterdam-Amstelland is an exception; in Amsterdam the police, medical and fire brigades are (still) housed in three different emergency centers). C2000 is part of the comprehensive approach to safety and supports the new emergency center operations. For example, C2000 makes it possible to activate different communication channels, designed for use by multiple field teams during incidents, allowing them to communicate with members of a select group and to stay in touch with the operators at the emergency center at the same time. In other words, C2000 has a structural effect on the work. The initiatives as described above are indicative for the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) hype of the 1990s, which was described by scholars like Davenport [1] and Hammer [2]. The hype consisted of ‘Hammerian’ organizations sharing services on a single information structure that would be standardized and homogenized in all aspects. Such organizations would be process-oriented instead of making use of the old functional division of labor. Their way of working would thus be much more flexible and would include more than just chain-oriented schemes [2]. In our case, implementing ICT such as new emergency center software and C2000 started out as a catch-all solution to the public administration question of whether we can integrate emergency services for citizens with the help of ICT. The optimistic ideas of the early phase did not pan out in practice, however. Various barriers hindered ICT implementation. For several reasons it took ten years before the emergency services


121

could start working with their new equipment, but now it is finally in use. GMS is linked to the public emergency telephone number 112, to C2000, to radio and telephone systems, and to a GIS (Geographic Information System). Although C2000 is meant to be a comprehensive system, stories occasionally appeared in the media that the implementation had failed, or was at least problematic. These stories seem to be confirmed by more systematic investigations into the development of GMS and C2000 [3]. The introduction of C2000 and GMS was done within a single project. This choice made the implementation of GMS at the emergency centers problematic, since these are rather complex technologies. The idea was to introduce GMS in the emergency centers in order to tie the various information elements together in the back offices of emergency centers. The emergency centers adopted GMS on a voluntary basis; GMS was built in such a way that it could support any work procedure that could be found in any emergency center. Once implemented, GMS could be tailored to different needs of different emergency centers. The implementation process was much slower than anticipated because of the complexity of the adaptation of GMS. During this process the various actors involved had to deal with emergency center dynamics at the national, regional as well as local level. Emergency centers can be seen as ‘information clearinghouses’ connecting police, emergency medical teams and fire brigades. New systems have not been implemented from the top down although their design aimed at making interdisciplinary work processes possible but have been implemented in such a way that adjusting the work processes to the information systems (IS)1 was left to the shop floor. Virtual integration [4] is a matter for emergency center operators. In order to understand the adaptation process of the IS, it is necessary to pay attention to the interactions between the groups that manage and work with these systems. An information system does not function on its own but requires action by users. These actions are partly triggered by the system, but every action also changes the system, and thus systems have an emergent nature. For this chapter we have studied the implementation of C2000 and GMS in the Dutch police region ‘Hollands Midden’ in more detail. The region has its headquarters in the town of Leiden and encompasses 35 municipalities. Before C2000, emergency services were coordinated by using two emergency centers: one for the police and one for fire brigade and emergency medical teams. These have now been merged into one co-located emergency center; a term that in itself suggests coexistence rather than integration. Even so, integration from the bottom up is now apparently materializing. We selected Hollands Midden because it is representative in the Netherlands, in the sense that the emergency center serves a medium-size region. Most of the regions in the Netherlands are of similar size, and although there are many local differences they face similar problems. The organization and ICT in use at emergency centers of larger regions, like Amsterdam-Amstelland (Amsterdam), Haaglanden (the Hague) and Rotterdam-Rijnmond (Rotterdam), will be part of a future study. In this case study we will look into the integration issue by a three-phase study of its success in the safety region of Hollands Midden. We begin our investigation with the shop floor. Our focus here is on the mutual influences between work procedures, institutional embeddedness and ICT. We have paid particular attention to the way tensions and ambiguities lead to conscious local actions to try and influence the system 1 We use IS consistently in the plural form because it stands in our case – and more widely in other case studies – for networked systems, communication technology and software.

122


level. Yet at the same time, the degree to which actions at the local level are prescribed by this (or any) system is low enough to allow for adjustments that result in a better fit between the system and the local work processes. Over the course of time it is to be expected that different patchworks of adjustments will be the result. In our conclusion we will assess how much of the hype has become reality in Hollands Midden. Obviously, it is still far removed from being truly Hammerian. Nonetheless, the bottom-up approach to integration led to a much greater success than one would have expected beforehand.

2. Implementing ICT in the organization: A theoretical reflection The ICT hype is far from over. At the moment ‘joined-up government’ is the fashion [5; 6]. In the literature on joined-up government the ICT is an often forgotten factor (see, for example, Pollitt’s survey [7]). This is remarkable, since we can see in practice that this government style aims for better services by linking its organizations through the use of ICT. One way to create links is through information clearinghouses which connect the various information domains. Emergency centers may be considered to be information clearinghouses connecting police, emergency medical teams and fire brigades. Government policy on safety, implemented as an attempt to connect information domains from the top down, has partially failed. It is true that the information systems of police, fire brigades and emergency medical teams have been connected and integrated in GMS. Internally the system is designed to allow working together to a considerable extent. Also, though later than anticipated and at a considerably higher cost than was budgeted, C2000 has replaced inherited communication systems. Almost all the emergency centers are colocated and some are developing new organizational skills for working together. Yet integrating the work in the centers themselves appears to be more difficult than anticipated. Some have called it a failed attempt at integration. The tension between ICT and work processes in the emergency centers is not an isolated case. Since the introduction of ICT in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as Enterprise Resource Systems (ERP) and Intranets, organizations have been confronted with many problems. Problems that have been noted are the failure to deliver promised performance or to reduce manpower, and a lack of up-to-date management information. A significant part of the problems was also related to the social and cultural side of these systems [1]. Whereas managers had implemented ICT to improve organizational processes, often with the help of external consultants, it was in the daily routines of the operators who had to work with the systems that the constraints of ICT became visible. Unsurprisingly, scholars who studied the development and use of these systems found that information systems often failed because of the top-down way they had been developed and implemented [8]. Just to mention three typical examples of such deviation to illustrate this point further: Scott and Wagner described the failed introduction of an organization-wide ERP at a university. Due to the fact that the ERP did not meet the demands of the users, many ‘shadow systems’ emerged in the organization [9]. Hanseth, Ciborra and Braa [10] made a second observation. They argued that because of its complexity ICT easily leads to organizational drift. This is a paradoxical situation since IS, which are adopted by management to control organizational processes and to implement change, become obstacles for reaching those goals because of their complexity and constant need for modifications [10]. Lastly, Van


123

Stijn argues that during the implementation of an ERP there is a need to enact ICT practices in a stable and sustainable way; however, as the organization changes due to internal and external forces, the success of the enactment also depends on the ability to modify these practices over time: the sustainability/flexibility paradox [11, p. 178]. If we reflect on these three examples, the pressing question is whether it is the development and implementation of an ICT that triggers changes in the social structure of the organization or, alternatively, whether the organizational structure is so resilient that it determines the final form of the ICT. It is precisely this question that has been put forward by many authors, for example Markus and Robey [12]. On the one hand, the answer to this question can be that IS are the outcome of a technical rationality. This perspective has been called the technological imperative. On the other hand, the answer could be to look at the organizational structure as the determining factor. This perspective is called the organizational imperative. It is more interesting, however, to look at the interrelation between the technologies and the organizational structures. This third perspective pays attention to the mutual shaping of technology and the organization. A dominant way of interpreting the relationship between the ICT and the organization in this manner is the structuration, or emergent, perspective. In this perspective the outcomes and insights from the other two perspectives can be combined, but in a non-deterministic way. Orlikowski and Robey [13], two scholars who developed this perspective, characterize ICT as an ‘institution’, which both determines and is determined by human action. Their approach is an application of Giddens’ structuration theory to systems development (see also [14]). Giddens states that social reality is determined by human action as well as by the properties of institutions. It is human action that calls institutions into being, but institutions also determine such action. Consequently, institutions are both the product and medium of human action; Giddens speaks of the duality of structuration structures [15]. Crucial to the structuration or emergent perspective is the attention given to the complex interplay between workers and technology on the one hand and to the interaction between the different levels of organization of work and policy related to ICT on the other hand. The emergent perspective assumes that the actual use of information systems will differ from the intended use, because it is in the daily practice that organizational actors integrate work routines and ICT. In the process of ICT implementation the organizational and the technological structures and systems are (re)interpreted, and ICT practices are enacted. Only when an ICT is studied in operation can we grasp the way ICT affects the organization and vice versa. This means that whenever new systems are introduced, subgroups of users decide the manner in which the system fits their purposes and work processes [16]. Frequently, in the course of their actions, ICT is re-interpreted and used in a different manner than was originally intended. The (main) organizational actors base their decisions on past experiences with ICT applications that are still in use within the organization. This can be seen as a mutual shaping of the technology and the organization, which is an ongoing process. Consequently, an actor’s perspective is necessary to understand how, in the reality of the emergency centers, certain rules, norms and behavior come into being. In other words, the insufficient congruence between the dominant norms and ideas at the system level (i.e., the ICT protocols and managerial processes) and those in the emergency center (i.e., the daily routines) needs to be solved at the shop floor level [17, 16, 18). In our case study this requires a focus on the way in which choices on how to use the systems are made by the main actors who use the IS: the operators. Moreover, it

124


requires a search for signals regarding the manner in which systems and organizational design interact and inspire actions by operators as well. Lastly, it requires an awareness of the specific aspects of the work of the operators and of how their interactions are guided by and expressed in local routines, physical reality and the organization of safety. Our approach requires paying attention to the choices made in daily work practice as well as to organizational solutions.

3. Research design and methods In order to understand the daily practice of the actors, in which they give meaning to the organizational rules and the ICT of the Hollands Midden emergency center, we followed a qualitative and interpretative approach. It is known from previous empirical research that at a time of organizational change and ambiguity people try to make sense of what is going on in their organization [19]. Using a sense-making perspective, we have been able to unravel how the actors’ activities interact with the organizational structures (norms and ideas) and how they interpret these structures. This perspective gives us the opportunity to go beyond the front stage rhetoric of the actors and the formal statements made by the management of Hollands Midden. In terms of methods, we reconstructed the case of the Hollands Midden emergency center by analyzing secondary sources, conducting interviews with key actors and by making observations of work behavior [20]. The secondary sources consisted first of policy documents of the local decisionmakers about the implementation trajectory of the information systems in the emergency center. In addition to these documents, we studied the manuals of GMS and C2000 in order to understand the rationale behind the technologies. We further studied how the operators who have to work with the new systems have been trained in using GMS and C2000. Also, we used these documents to reconstruct how these employees were instructed to work within multidisciplinary teams. The documents, however, did not reveal precisely how the operators and other actors of Hollands Midden actually interpret formal rules, protocols, procedures and manuals, and how they translate them into their daily practice. In other words, if we want to understand the process of structuration and investigate how social structures and action are related, we need a reconstruction of the actual work. Therefore, we conducted interviews with the key actors and made observations of their situations. The interviews we conducted were sufficiently open to relate as closely as possible to the everyday reality of the organization being studied. First of all, we held semistructured interviews with those managers of Hollands Midden who have been involved in the decision-making and implementation process of both the co-location and the information systems. Secondly, we interviewed some of the operators the employees who have to work the systems and the most important group for our analyses. We interviewed operators belonging to each of the three disciplines who work together in the emergency center. In this way we were able to analyze the differentiated, and sometimes fragmented, sense-making processes of the key actors, and to understand how they negotiate on a day-to-day basis in order to overcome possible tensions and misinterpretations of each other’s work routines. The third group of actors with whom we held interviews was the coordinators. Due to their role in the organization, the coordinators were able to provide insights into the problems and dilemmas that go beyond the daily activities.


125

In addition to the interviews, we made observations of work practices on the emergency center shop floor. In this way we could get a good idea of the daily routines of the operators and their coordinators. We made site visits to the emergency center and noticed how and under which circumstances the operators carry out their tasks. We took notice of the spatial construction of the emergency center, for example the position of monitors, tables and the information systems tools, and the way this influences the work routines of the operators. The data collection took place in three time periods. The first data was collected by Niemantsverdriet in the period from September 2004 through August 2005, shortly after the introduction of C2000, GMS and the implementation of the co-location of Hollands Midden [20]. Most site visits to the emergency center took place in this period. It was during this period that the operators received their training. Yet at that time the operators of the three different disciplines had hardly ever worked together, and therefore it was difficult for them – and for us to understand how the co-location would actually (re)structure the daily work routines. The second data collection took place about one-and-a-half years later, in the spring of 2007. Interviews with the management and the operators, five in total, were held on location by Boersma, Groenewegen and Wagenaar. At that time, the employees of the emergency center of Hollands Midden had been working together for quite some time. Meanwhile, work routines had gradually changed. Operators worked with the systems and became more knowledgeable about the functionalities and characteristics of GSM. It gave us the opportunity to ask them about their experience with the systems and to collect data about changing working routines. Finally, after the summer of 2007, we returned for a last series of interviews – 6 in total with the coordinators of the three disciplines and with the operators. Since October 1, 2007 the co-location Hollands Midden has been part of the police organization, which has consequences for the employees not only in terms of work routines, but also in terms of identity construction and identification with the work. In a rather mundane manner these three periods coincide with the initial expectations, the realization of ICT in practice, and the gaining of experience. We analyzed the collected data in terms of ICT management, organizational cultural aspects of the co-location and, finally, in terms of working patterns and routines. Although we paid attention to the cultural backgrounds of the various disciplines that have been co-located at Hollands Midden, an analysis in terms of differences in norms and rules asks for an in-depth study into the dominant cultural elements of each discipline separately. In this chapter we will refer only anecdotally to disciplinary rules and norms. The data are presented chronologically, although we used our theoretical framework to reconstruct the organizational developments at Hollands Midden. In the sections below, we will reconstruct the emerging organizational rules and norms of the day-to-day practices at the local level [21]. In earlier work we looked at the national context in which GMS has developed [3], which helped us to connect our interpretations of local adaptation with the institutional context of emerging safety regions.

126


4. An emerging system

4.1. Period 1: Preparing for the new systems The management of the co-located emergency center Hollands Midden, when we studied it during the first period, was still divided into three separate units, each with its own office. Fire brigade and emergency medical teams shared a chief emergency center and had two lieutenant-chiefs; one for the fire brigade and one for the emergency medical teams. The police had a chief and a lieutenant-chief emergency center and four coordinators, who at the same time formed part of the emergency center crew. The coordinators provided the police’s chief emergency center with information on what was going on at the shop floor; information the other chief emergency center lacked. These variations are in part due to the relations with the back office management, which has a more complicated structure in the case of the police, as indicated by the larger number of operators. Local government gave the police part of this management team the liberty to set up the co-located emergency center by itself, and to choose its own equipment. Advice on the implementation trajectory was sought from the national project management, and from colleagues from other police regions. Next, several steps were taken: first the management team developed a vision on how the new emergency center was to function, whereby it stressed multidisciplinary cooperation between members of the emergency center crew. Then the crew’s operating procedures were analyzed. After that the decision was made to leave the operating procedures unaltered until the emergency center had been implemented. After implementation, changes could be made on the basis of suggestions from the shop floor. The police chief emergency center was the first to move to the new emergency center, to prepare the implementation and integration of the three disciplines involved. Management prepared the emergency crew for the changes that would take place by regularly providing information (e-mail, oral briefings, a weekly newsletter) on the implementation process. These means, it has turned out, have not sufficed to inform the crew about all the changes going on, and were terminated too soon. As problems with the information systems emerged, the provision of more information would have been necessary. In addition, informal meetings between the various disciplines were organized, but in practice these soon turned out to be mono-disciplinary, as only members of the same discipline were sent to each meeting. To learn how to use the new equipment a three-day training course was offered to the crew. The course was designed on a national level, in cooperation between police, emergency medical teams, the fire brigades and the military police, and intended for 1.200 instructors, 2.000 members of emergency center crews, and 80.000 end-users. Police, fire brigades and emergency medical teams formed a feedback group, and the emergency centers’ management teams could request specific course material to be included in the training. Emergency center operators followed the course in groups of ten. The training took three days: one for theoretical instruction, two for practice. This turned out to be too short a period to really master the use of the new equipment. As it happens, emergency center operators preferred practicing the equipment to theoretical instruction; this being the reason why the operators found that there was still a lot they had to figure out themselves once they started working in the new emergency centers. As the classes had consisted of people from a single discipline only, operators were


127

also lacking knowledge on how to work multidisciplinary. Moreover, every emergency center has its own operating procedures, which were often unknown to the instructors. Operators felt that during their training attention should have been paid to the specifics of their particular emergency center practices. The introduction processes show that the concerns of implementation were dealt with in an insufficient critical and thought-out way and that investment in learning and accepting new practices was not consistent. Two of the specific aims of the new information technology and reorganization to work together and to develop a uniform system were not well-connected. What is more, attention to work processes specific to this emergency center seems to have lacked. This period seems to have been inspired by the Hammerian ideal of technology as basis for integration, but employed in a rather un-orchestrated way. Therefore it is interesting to look into the manner in which these aims were met in practice in the second period studied. 4.2. Period 2: The organization of the new emergency centers The new emergency centers are divided into four ‘districts’ which cover two geographical ‘regions’. The operators work in disciplinary teams of two, with one team for each of the two regions. In each team one team member mans the telephone, the other the radiotelephone. The telephone operator handles contacts with citizens and enters the information into GMS, whereas the radiotelephone operator coordinates the units in the field. Each discipline has its own cluster of work stations. , reports are given a priority ranking from number 1 (urgent) to 4 (low priority). Reports with priority number 1 or 2 are handled by the operator himself, priority numbers 3 and 4 are passed on to the team coordinator. GMS guides the operator through the necessary tasks. It asks questions, suggests next steps and prioritizes. Of course, the choices GMS makes are not always correct, which is something operators must keep in mind. In 2006, if an operator of a certain discipline received a report which was really intended for one of the other disciplines, (s)he collected as much information as possible and then passed on the report. Yet receiving reports intended for other disciplines is not without difficulties, as each discipline has its own informational needs. In case of a fire, for instance, the fire brigades are interested in the extent of the fire, the emergency medical teams in possible victims, and the police in possible witnesses or arsonists. Every operator involved tried to collect the information according to the needs of his mother discipline; sometimes to the neglect of the information required by the other disciplines. Problems of insufficient information were caused by a lack of understanding of each other’s practices; in a case involving a large traffic accident a police operator simply did not know what information a fire brigade operator needed, and medical emergency operators are not allowed to pass on medical information to the police. As it happens, the disciplines also have different work rhythms. Police emergency center operators are called on all day long, while the fire brigades and the ambulances carry a lesser burden. Yet once the fire brigades do receive a call they experience much more pressure than police operators. The fire brigade operators’ work was heavily standardized, while that of the ambulances was shielded off because of the medical professional confidentiality. The police, in turn, worked under a lot of stress and had a much more directive role toward the field units. Emergency medical team operators and their colleagues from the fire brigades had broad experience in cooperation and understood each other’s practices. For the police, however, cooperation was relatively

128


new. During large-scale emergencies, several disciplines were called upon. In such cases cooperation became even more important, and practices could come into conflict with each other. To be sure, cooperation between disciplines had improved by 2006, but it still left a lot to be desired. Operators were getting to know each other’s operating procedures and were starting to collect the information other disciplines needed. Yet cooperation was still in an initial stage, as emergency services in the field still had trouble using their new equipment. The same held for emergency center operators; there were no multidisciplinary procedures yet, and operators usually did not know how to make multidisciplinary communication possible, so they used the telephone to get into contact with the other disciplines instead of using GMS. This is not surprising, as GMS takes action itself on the basis of the information it is fed. However, the parser terms the three disciplines use differed, which sometimes confused GMS. Part of the problem was caused by the arrangement of work stations in the emergency centers. These were often not close enough to each other to make oral communication possible. Other problems were caused by the lack of multidisciplinary training. The many technical defects of C2000, and especially of GMS, were also a cause of such difficulties. Many of the functions GMS was intended to have were still lacking. The systems were also slow at times and occasionally went down altogether. Our observer witnessed the breakdown of systems at two work stations in the emergency center of police region Hollands Midden. The systems had to be restarted, which meant an ambulance could not be warned as quickly as needed. During this time, reaching emergency helicopters was also problematic. As long as the routines were not standardized and the emergency center operators had not received multidisciplinary training, this continued to pose a problem. 4.3. Period 3: Towards a new practice During the third period the initial glitches in the systems were solved, and it had become clear when improvisation was needed. As the training operators received had been rather rudimentary, an overview of existing emergency center routines was lacking, and operators had never been formally trained in multidisciplinary cooperation, it was up to them to develop new routines. Thus, in March 2007, a few months after the new emergency center had been installed, we returned to see what practices operators had developed and, more importantly, how these practices had been brought about. It soon turned out that in the short run management had not been able to do much to ameliorate the situation. What management had done was initiate the formation of an extra organizational layer, a layer of coordinators just above the operational level, which was intended make interdisciplinary work processes possible. By that time twelve main emergency center procedures for the first half hour of any incident had been identified and analyzed. It had been concluded that 80-95% of emergency center work could be standardized, making it possible to have operators of any of the disciplines man the phone under nearly all circumstances. The coordinators were the key figures. They, in turn, had to answer to three supervisors – one for each discipline – who would respond to (external) management directly. However, as the emergency center had not been completely transferred to the police yet, whereas the other two disciplines were already abandoning it, it was unclear who was in charge. At the same time, on the shop floor, changes were already


129

beginning to materialize. Slowly, interdisciplinary operating procedures were evolving. Operators were acquiring a new understanding, and a new appreciation, of each other’s work. They understood that the different disciplines suffered from stress at different moments, and were volunteering assistance at such times. In the case of a flooding, for instance, the strain on the fire brigade operators increased considerably. At those times the other two disciplines jumped in to take some of the weight off their shoulders. The management of the information systems was now in the hands of the three disciplines together, leading to much more stability. The operators had also managed to jointly decide on the new functionality the systems should have, always keeping in mind possibilities for interdisciplinary work processes. This led to the observation that there were large similarities between the three disciplines’ ICT desires. Three months later, when we returned again, much had changed. The multidisciplinary emergency center Hollands Midden was on the brink of becoming truly interdisciplinary. The work processes had become the basis for the design of the new emergency center organization. The future coordinators had already been selected and had begun their work, albeit in a limited role. The work processes had now been mapped for about 90%, and intake would become mostly interdisciplinary. The three supervisors managed the processes per discipline, and the coordinators each managed specific aspects of emergency center work: ICT, work processes, procedures, training, communication, etc. Proposals for changes from the national and/or shop floor level were now discussed in the meetings they had started to organize every two weeks. Most disciplines supported the changes, with the exception of the medical emergency teams, who had not been used to coordinators in the past and still had to get used to the idea that large parts of the work of their emergency operators could be standardized and executed by operators with a different disciplinary background. Reasons for these changes are clearly related to elements that were not defined at the outset. Because of the co-location the operators are confronted with each other physically, and as a result they are able to understand each other’s discipline in more detail than before. But perhaps more interesting is the fact that because of the colocation the operators were starting to create new work routines. We found that the use of GMS had been improved, not least because in the emergency center a single operator had been held responsible for the maintenance and development of the system. Apparently the adaptation of GMS at the local level of Hollands Midden is only incremental and small, but it can have a big impact on the way GMS enables and constraints the centralists’ work. For example, local actors can put information of the city of Leiden into the system and they can develop and change specific parser terms (information scripts) in the system. These information scripts allow a centralist to share certain information with a centralist of another discipline, but prevent him/her from sharing information that has to stay within one discipline (e.g. classified medical information). Decisions regarding whether and how to change major functionalities of the system are only made at a national level. In a way, those changes are the outcomes of negotiations at nation-wide gatherings in which representatives of the different emergency centers discuss financial (including budgets) and political issues. The improved use of GMS means that emergency calls can be put through the system more efficiently. The information and communication technology works for the operator as a quasi-intelligent system. According to one respondent, ‘GMS thinks for you and with you’. Of course, the operators have to put the information that enters the emergency center into GMS, but the technical architecture of the system forces the operator to make additional decisions. For example, GMS asks via the monitor whether

130


involvement of more than one discipline will be necessary during an incident. If so, GMS asks for additional information, which can be put on the system’s electronic ‘scratchpad’. All the operators of the emergency center can read the information on this scratchpad. This means that the same data are available to all three disciplines. There are some crucial exceptions, for example medical information, which are confidential and can be entered and read only by the emergency medical operators. In cases of emergency help the medical operators have chosen to shield the information by providing their own emergency codes. The police first responders can find that awkward because of risks of, for instance, HIV contact. Moreover, they are usually much quicker to reach the place of the incident than the medical first aid. Similarly, police information, for instance about addresses where known violent persons live, can only be accessed by the police force. It is the organization of the co-location, however, that enables the operators to share their knowledge about an incident in other ways. In the day-to-day practice, the operators of the emergency medical team give indications of their knowledge orally to the operators of the police and the fire brigade. Sharing confidential information via oral communication is not obvious. It became a daily practice only after some months of working together. Whereas the operators used to work in different locations, the co-location gives them the opportunity to literally walk to each other’s desk and ask questions not only about the formal procedures, but also about the logic behind them. For the operators, being in the same room entails the possibility to learn from each other’s practices and to build trust in each other. A negative side-effect of these direct ways of knowledge-sharing is that the information is not (always) put into the system properly. This means that the action undertaken at the time of an incident becomes more efficient, whereas the verifiability afterwards is more difficult because of incomplete or lacking information. This knowledge-sharing does not end with the cooperation in the emergency center. It influences the work processes in the field as well. Yet besides the more practical problems in the learning process, oral communication is still a challenge, because the three disciplines have different work practices. Whereas the fire brigade and the emergency medical operators work with well-structured work procedures and protocols, the police operators have to improvise a lot. In the first place, these differences are caused by divergent practices and work routines. For example, it is part of the habitus of the police to go after perpetrators or evidence after an incident and to close off roads in order to prevent people – the audience from walking onto the scene. Personnel at the fire engines and the ambulances, however, want to approach the scene of the incident without being hindered by the police. Besides, characteristically to their work, the police operator does not know the exact location of the police cars. During an incident each police car has to pass on information about their whereabouts to the operators in the emergency center. That means that there is a need for continuous interaction between the operating room and the police cars. The fire engines and the ambulances, however, are located at fixed locations known to the operator. This makes the interaction between the emergency center and the officers in the field easier. The police officers use C2000 only for the first alarm and to get information about the incident. During the course of an operation, they use GSM (programmed into their mobile phones) to stay in touch with the operators, simply because conversations with C2000 can be followed by all the officers who are online. A final example is the presence of a monitor in the ambulance cars. As opposed to fire engines and police cars, ambulance cars are


131

equipped with GIS, which means that the drivers are able to find out the exact locations and the routes to be taken at any time. Other difficulties arise due to the fact that the three disciplines work in different administrative and normative contexts. As said before, the first aid operators are simply not allowed to put confidential medical information about patients into the part of GMS that can be read by the other disciplines. Other police duties such as searching for information in a computerized vehicle administration or for criminal recognitions descriptions are also handled by the operators. Due to their ‘virtual’ field knowledge and the specific knowledge acquired through knowing the sequence of requests of street officers, they often provide active first line guidance to those in patrol cars. This kind of interaction is missing in the case of the other two disciplines. At the emergency center Hollands Midden, the coordinators have an important role in the negotiation process between representatives of the three disciplines. If, at the time of an incident, the operators fail to reach a compromise, the coordinators of the three disciplines will meet each other in a separate room to negotiate about the conflict. After an agreement, they will explain the outcome to the operators of the different disciplines. The operators on the job can do minor corrections of false information within GMS – for example, the correction of a street name. In practice this proves to be a weak point that requires the attention of two fulltime administrative employees in order to keep the GIS background system and the addresses of key holders for fire alarms upto-date. Yet major modifications, such as re-programming the interface or adding additional functionalities, must be done via protocols. The implementation of major modifications currently takes place at the inter-regional level. The table below presents an overview of the main characteristics of the interrelationship between ICT and the organization of the emergency center Hollands Midden. Table 1: Main characteristics with regard to ICT in-use and organizational change per period

Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Preparing for the new systems

The organization of the new emergency centers

Towards a new practice

introduction of the promising ICT in the emergency center

organizational change and multidisciplinary problems

shop-floor practices

introduction of the new equipment

operating procedures and workarounds

training courses with the personnel

operational problems with C2000 and GMS

interaction (and integration) of the three disciplines, changing work and routines more or less stable work patterns with regard to the IS

first impressions of work at the co-location Lessons learned

Lessons learned

Lessons learned

Implementation meetings and the training of end-users are crucial.

Make use of ICT work-arounds to learn how the end-users make sense of the ICT.

ICT and co-location is a matter of organizational (cultural) change that deserves and needs an integral approach.

132


5. Discussion and conclusion As stated by Pentland [22], ongoing interactions are crucial to understanding the mutual shaping of technology (ICT) and organization. In this chapter we have discussed how, in the context of the emergency center Hollands Midden, organizational actors gave meaning to information systems such as GMS and C2000, and how they embedded these technologies into their daily practice. The introduction of these systems at Hollands Midden was part of a nation-wide introduction of new technologies in the emergency centers in the Netherlands. More broadly speaking, it became part of the ICT hype in the public sector of the mid-1990s and early years of this decade. The introduction of ICT in the emergency centers went hand in hand with an impressive reorganization of the safety regions in the Netherlands. As a result, most of the emergency centers became co-locations in which the three different disciplines of police, medical and fire brigades were housed under one roof. Needless to say, this major operation was not a process without problems. Keeping the mutual shaping perspective in mind, we emphasized that the implementation of ICT at Hollands Midden was a matter of simultaneous technological and organizational change. In this chapter we gathered the following: GMS is strongly dependent on accurate information. However, in the case of Hollands Midden this information was not provided accurately in the first period in which the systems were in use. While it was supposed to really integrate all knowledge, oral communication and the addition of the coordinators show that information clearing systems require additional social action. The main influence is in routines, interactions and co-location leading to physically reduced distance. This is perhaps more important than the system itself. As a result, new social practices emerged. In a study concerning the question of what happens after the ICT hype it is useful, analytically speaking, to have a closer look at the ongoing interactions and ICT in operation at the local level. When we zoom in to the systems in operation, we can conclude that C2000 is intended to be an all-encompassing communication tool. However, particularly police interaction requires a separate line of communication that is now being supplemented by mobile phone use. In other words, C2000, once introduced as a promising IS tool, is not (always) used as it was designed to be. GMS, on the other hand, the system that is supposed to integrate the most important routines of the emergency center, has undergone constant change at Hollands Midden as a result of local needs and adaptation. Because we studied the systems over time [16], we were able to trace down the dynamics behind the ICT in use. For example, we found how the decision to install (or not install) certain GMS parser terms (information scripts, as we called them) enabled and constrained the centralists’ work routines. When we look at the organization of the emergency center, we can see that its design neglected the ongoing nature of police work, in which street patrols are supervised and information is exchanged with these patrols on the basis of their trust in, and the knowledge of, the operators in the emergency center. According to the Hammerian ideal clearinghouse of information, this would lead, from a safety perspective, to further integration. Further integration then follows, which is driven by scaling problems of crisis intervention and the logic of call centers [23]. In practice, after the initial phase described in our case, information technology took a back seat. In actuality this occurred after the hype reality had already set in. In this reality colocation, integration and faltering information technology were dominant. Obviously, merging the emergency centers of three security services into one created a cultural


133

problem of adjusting the work of very different disciplines [24] and a structural problem as well. In line with Bellamy and Taylor [25], it is clear that information domain integration literally requires work-arounds, and a seamless integration of the new technologies into the information domain is not to be expected any time soon. Integrating the input of the mother organizations faces challenges from the legal and labor relations spheres. In some cases this might have led to a ditching of the technology. However, as we learned from the third phase, by collective organization and interventions in the work processes, local systems have stabilized. It is thus quite clear that in this case the completion of the local organization rearrangement was a consequence of information technology as well as a precursor to the stabilization of its use.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[6]

[7] [8] [9]

[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18]

[19] [20]

T.H. Davenport, Putting the Enterprise into the Enterprise System, Harvard Business Review (1998), 121-31. M. Hammer, The agenda: What Every Business Must Do to Dominate the Decade, Crown Business, New York, 2001. P. Groenewegen and P. Wagenaar, Infighting or Emergence? Towards Understanding how Information Systems Come into Being, Information Polity 11 (2006), 1-14. T. Dewett and G.R. Jones, The Role of Information Technology in the Organization: A Review, Model, and Assessment, Journal of Management 27 (2001), 313-46. C. Bellamy, Perri 6 and C. Raab, Joined-up Government and Privacy in the United Kingdom: Managing Tensions Between Data Protection and Social Policy. Part I, Public Administration 83, 1 (2005a), 11133. C. Bellamy, Perri 6 and C. Raab, Joined-up Government and Privacy in the United Kingdom: Managing Tensions between Data Protection and Social Policy. Part II, Public Administration 83, 2 (2005b), 393415. C. Pollitt, Joined-up Government: A Survey, Political Studies Review 1 (2003), 34-49. F.K. Boersma and S. Kingma, From Means to Ends: The Transformation of ERP in a Manufacturing Company, The Journal of Strategic Information Systems 14 (2005), 197-219. S.V. Scott and E.L. Wagner, Networks, Negotiations, and New Times: The Implementation of Enterprise Recourse Planning into an Academic Administration, Information and Organization 13 (2003), 285-313. O. Hanseth, C.U. Ciborra and K. Braa, The Control Devolution: ERP and the Side Effects of Globalization, The DATA BASE for Advances in Information Systems 32, 4 (2001), 34-46. E. Van Stijn, Miracle or Mirage? An Exploration of the Pervasive ERP System Phenomenon Informed by the Notion of Conflicting Memories, Febodruk, Enschede, 2006. M.L. Markus and D. Robey, Informational Technology and Organizational Change: Causal Structure in Theory and Research, Management Science 34, 5 (1988), 583-94. W.J. Orlikowski and D. Robey, Information Technology and the Structuring of Organizations, Information Systems Research 2, 2 (1991), 143-69. G. DeSanctis and M.S. Poole, Capturing the Complexity in Advanced Technology Use: Adaptive Structuration Theory, Organization Science 5, 2 (1994), 121-47. A. Giddens, The consequences of modernity. Polity, Cambridge, 1990. W.J. Orlikowski, Improvising Organizational Transformation over Time: A Situated Change Perspective, Information Systems Research 7, 1 (1996), 63-92. M.C. Boudreau and D. Robey, Enacting Integrated Information Technology: A Human Agency Perspective, Organization Science 16 (2005), 3-18. W.J. Orlikowski and S.R. Barley, Technology and Institutions: What Can Research on Information Technology and Research on Organizations Learn from Each Other?, MIS Quarterly 25, 2 (2001), 14565. K.E. Weick, Sense-Making in Organizations, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 1995. P. Niemantsverdriet, Het C2000 project, de toekomst van de hulpverlening in Nederland?, Unpublished Master’s thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences, VU University Amsterdam, 2006.

134


[21] H. Mintzberg, J. B. Quinn and S. Ghoshal, The Strategy Process, Prentice Hall, London, 1998. [22] B. T. Pentland, Big Brother Goes Portable: End User Computing in the Internal Revenue Service, in J. Yates and J. Van Maanen (eds.), Information Technology and Organizational Transformation. History, Rhetoric, and Practice, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2001, 185-204. [23] M.A. Glucksmann, Call Configurations: Varieties of Call Centre and Divisions of Labour, Work, employment & society 18, 4 (2004), 795-811. [24] J.B. Stinchcomb and F. Ordaz, The Integration of Two ‘Brotherhoods’ into One Organizational Culture: A Psycho-Social Perspective on Merging Police and Fire Services, Public Organization Review 7 (2007), 143-61. [25] C. Bellamy and J. Taylor, Transformation by Stealth: The Case of the UK Criminal Justice System, in J.A. Taylor, I.Th.M. Snellen and A. Zuurmond (eds.), Beyond BPR in Public Administration: Institutional Transformation in an Information Age, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 1997, 37-53.


135

Stuck in the Middle? Dutch Provinces in the Information Society Joost Kuijper Overijssel Province, Dept. of Economic Affairs

Abstract. As the intermediate level of government in the Netherlands, the position of provinces might be threatened by such effects of ICT as deterritorialization. However, this has not been the case in the Netherlands during the past 15 years. Provinces have a niche role because of their relative specialization on information with a spatial component (geo-information). Provinces did not experience either an ICT hype or a severe backlash. They merely followed the national trend. Yet provinces can still make a stronger effort to adequately deploy the possibilities of electronic government. By making a combination between the geo-based information assets and the standard e-government components, provinces might improve their visibility as e-services deliverers. Keywords. Provinces, Netherlands, e-government, ICT, intermediate level.

1. Introduction Over the past few decades digital media have expanded the individual citizen’s view on the world. Traditional boundaries in the living environment, such as the local community, the region and even the country, seem to have become obsolete in the digital world of today. Yet is this a true statement, or is it more accurate to say that we are in a kind of co-evolution between the digital and physical arenas? Within the broader perspective of this book, this article focuses on the impact of ICT upon government at the provincial level in the Netherlands. As the international reader may not be familiar with the phenomenon of provinces, a short introduction is provided here [1]. The Netherlands’ 12 provinces form the intermediate level of government between the municipalities and the State. They deal with issues too substantial for the towns and villages yet not substantial enough for the national State to take on. The provinces often co-operate with other governmental authorities (State, municipalities, water boards), with companies and social organizations. The most important provincial responsibilities are environmental and spatial planning. Provinces determine if cities and villages are allowed to expand and where industrial estates and business parks are allowed to be built. They are also responsible for the accessibility of cities, villages and the countryside. Examples of this are the concessions for regional bus and taxi services. For the common good and general well-being, the provinces develop natural parks and subsidize various economic and cultural activities. In Figure 1 the composition of the Netherlands in provinces is visualized.

136

J. Kuijper / Stuck in the Middle? Dutch Provinces in the Information Society

The institutional division of responsibilities between the various levels of government in the Netherlands is subject to continuous change. It also forms a recurring topic in discussions about the quality of Dutch public administration. Inspired by the impact and potential of ICT as well as the considerable use of ICT within administrations from the 1980s onwards, authors like Abrahamson, Arterton, Orren and Frissen emphasized that ICT would lead to horizontalization, deterritorialization and disintermediation [2]. These potential effects were mentioned in a number of advisory reports on Dutch e-government during the ICT hype years around 2000, suggesting that internal processes and even the three-level government structure itself would require major redesigning [3]. It has been a recurring theme since, even though expectations of ICT’s pervasiveness have been downsized considerably. Thanks to improvements in information management and ICT usability, government is able to perform its tasks more efficiently and more effectively. ICT has become indispensable, with the rapidly increased use of the Internet − the leading communication channel − being the most visible expression of its dominant position. Key questions discussed in this article are: What significance have the provinces in the Netherlands given to the use of ICT, and in particular the Internet, over the past ten years? Did they experience a hype period, a backlash and an ‘after-party’ period? What was ICT intended to do for provinces? Were expectations fulfilled during the past decade? In what way has ICT changed the provinces’ external activities and output? Are the developments that have taken place up to this point a reason for provinces to reconsider their way of working? What are likely scenarios for the near future? For some ten years now, public organizations in the Netherlands have been heavily involved in implementing ICT and improving its functioning. This involvement takes place at all levels of government: in municipalities, water boards, provinces, nondepartmental public bodies and the central government. The Dutch administrative system comprises some 1,600 organizations in total, incorporating a large diversity of actors and developments. Inside this larger whole, provinces form a limited group both in size and number: a personnel count of 12,000 FTE spread over just 12 organizations varying in size from 450 (Flevoland) to 1,400 FTE (Zuid Holland). Regional government is rarely the subject of studies on ICT and administration, hence a focus on this intermediate level of government might enrich the empirical material available.

2. Reconstructing the Hype: Setting the Agenda of ICT Policy 2.1. Introduction In the evolution of provinces’ awareness and coping behavior with ICT, three periods can be differentiated. These periods, outlined in the next paragraph, were punctuated by the Provincial Council elections, which took place in the springs of 1996, 1999, 2003 and 2007. The strategic results of elections are documented in agreements between the political parties that together constitute the day-to-day provincial government: the Provincial Executive. The general implementation of these political intentions is subsequently given concrete shape in a four-year policy program with a corresponding program budget. As for ICT, the provinces in the Netherlands virtually ignored the rise of Internet in the first period. This was followed by a period of increased political awareness and


Figure 1.

137

Geography of the provinces in the Netherlands

attempts by individual provinces to address ICT and society, which evolved in 20042007 into a common ‘e-provinces’ program. We are now in a phase of consolidation and structural investment in governmental service delivery and interoperability at both the national and local levels. Looking back, the learning curve has been quite steep. 2.2. Provinces Surrounded by the Hype: 1996-1999 In the 1990s, Dutch provinces were coping with a dusty image. They have been locked between municipal and state governments in a three-level structure dating back from the 1850s. Their main formal tasks lie within the fields of: • Spatial and country planning; • Environmental planning, permit licensing and enforcement;

138


• • • •

Maintaining social facilities (youth care, culture and social welfare); Supervision of municipality finances; Maintaining traffic and public transport facilities (granting of concessions, management); and Stimulating regional economic development (awarding subsidies).

At first ICT was seen merely as a tool for office work. An exception was the in-house geo-information system for the support of spatial and environmental planning. In late 1996 and early 1997 most provinces were only cautiously starting the first version of their organization’s website. Most of these sites had addresses that began with a variant of <prv> or <provincie>, followed by the name of the province. Marketing of any form was absent. Starting in 1998, preparations for the millennium transition captured the lion’s share of attention for ICT. The provinces’ slow adoption of the new possibilities of the Internet contrasts sharply with the multiple activities developed by the various central government institutions and particularly by the larger municipalities. The OverheidsLoket 2000 (‘e-government’) initiative, the fast expansion of government websites and the incorporation of ICT initiatives in urban policy [4] did not affect provincial policies. Managerial attention within the provinces during that period was instead caught up by larger reorganizations, including changes in governance and organizational layout [5]. This took place without significant changes in the support and facility services. Despite the reluctant attitudes of their own provincial organizations, some provincial politicians supported ICT infrastructure and backed innovative projects in their regions. Provinces showing the most initiative in this area were those that had European structural funds for regional economic development at their disposal (e.g. Overijssel, Noord Brabant and Limburg). 2.3. Creating Awareness and an ICT Policy Agenda for Provinces: 2000 When it was apparent that the Dutch government administration had survived the Millennium test relatively unscathed, provinces woke up into the new era. A provincial answer to the many promotional programs initiated by central government and the competition from the larger cities was considered indispensable by a number of provincial politicians. Deputies from the provinces of Noord Brabant, Overijssel, Drenthe and Noord Holland, chaired by Flevoland’s Queen’s Commissioner Mr. Jager, formed an ad hoc committee entitled ‘Provinces and ICT’. Based on a research report, this committee issued political recommendations in the autumn of 2000 [6]. Because this committee managed to define an agenda for ICT policy, its recommendations will be discussed in more detail below. To enhance the added value of provinces in the information society the committee proposed five policy impulses: • To stimulate social organizations, companies and co-governments to utilize the possibilities ICT has to offer; • To improve the provincial delivery of services to citizens, companies and cogovernments (it is acknowledged that this is usually not an isolated task but one that should be given shape together with other organizations, particularly municipalities); • To enhance the provinces’ profile on the Internet with the help of better websites and more interaction with citizens and companies;


• •

139

To enhance the public nature and accessibility of relevant politicaladministrative information; and To counteract the threatening dichotomy in the information society – the so called ‘digital divide’ - and to prevent groups in society and specific segments of the industries from lagging behind in the information society.

It was also concluded in the research report that the alignment between the internal ICT department – deployed in particular for the provinces’ own management – and the policy departments was weak. This did not help to properly anchor these impulses in external policy. The ad hoc committee stressed the need for additional investments in the use of ICT to be made by each province. Finally, a temporary knowledge organization was proposed, dedicated to realizing these opportunities and ambitions. The ad hoc committee continued, like a kind of Gideon’s gang, to advocate the urgency of the ICT policy impulse to their politician colleagues in the Provincial Executive Councils. It fulfilled its role as a booster at least through the following period of government (2003-2007).

3. The Backlash: Individual and Collective Responses 3.1. The Bubble Bursts Up to and including 2000, expectations of the new economy still remained high, but the Internet bubble burst shortly after. A worldwide economic recession followed. Many of the semi- or entirely public Internet initiatives that were supported by provinces in the preceding period were stopped for lack of future perspectives. Draft implementation programs never moved beyond the paper they were written on. Most provinces failed to connect the desired ICT policy impulse to other managerial fields of attention. The political climate in the Netherlands became unstable. Provinces did get their own share of political unrest, but it was the national level which attracted all attention. New parties arose, the electorate’s trust in government was diminished. Two disasters – the explosion of an illegal storage facility for fireworks and a bar fire, in the towns of Enschede and Volendam in May 2000 and early 2001, respectively – gave an unexpected boost to the desire for openness and government transparency. The State, provinces and municipalities enforced environmental and safety rules more strictly thereafter, but it was also understood that citizens needed to be better informed about risks in their direct living environment. The vulnerability of western societies to terrorism was additionally emphasized by the events of ‘9-11’. The Queen’s Commissioners claimed a formal role in collecting and presenting risks related to the general public. Between 2002 and 2007 all provinces built sophisticated geo-data warehouses and web portals in order to deliver risk related data over the Internet [7]. What happened with the ICT policy impulse? Despite the changed circumstances a few provinces managed to a modest extent to implement the aforementioned ICT policy impulses in the remaining part of the government period through 2003. Their strategic intentions, however, diverged in this period. Two contradictory examples are the provinces of Overijssel and Brabant, which selected different sets of policy impulses. Other provinces more or less limited their external ICT ambitions to close cooperation with policy initiatives from the national government.

140


3.2. Overijssel versus Noord-Brabant In 2001, based on the recommendations of the previously mentioned ‘Provinces and ICT’ committee and due to the changed economic situation, the Executive Council of Overijssel approved a 2.5 million euro ICT investment program [8]. Overijssel selected the targets of better delivery of services, web access to public information about Overijssel, and web-based citizen consultation. The policy impulse ‘to counteract the digital divide’ was given shape through better digital facilities for public libraries, cofunded by the national government. Overijssel published one of the first regional Dutch portal websites with selected partners. Although the actions were directed towards the provincial organization itself, the effect of the impulse was limited. The ICT program competed with projects put forward by the line organization, and basic network facilities proved to be insufficient. In that same period the province of Noord Brabant took a different path. There the initiative for an ICT impulse was taken by the Provincial Council and injected into the executive political program. The @Brabant program was started in 2001, with the main objective being to turn Brabant into an excellent ICT province. The program was assigned a budget of € 4.1 million and focused on awareness and participation, electronic government (e-government) and stimulation of the use of ICT in society. Almost 50 small-scale initiatives of local volunteer organizations were supported. Efforts were made to enhance the educational ICT support structure for primary and secondary schools. As in Overijssel, exchange of knowledge and experiences took place with municipalities. Neither Overijssel nor Noord Brabant continued their external ICT impulse in a separate program after an evaluation. In late 2005, the impact of the @Brabant program was assessed by the policy evaluation committee of the Provincial Council [9]. The main conclusion was that the ambitions of the program were set too high, given the relatively short lead time and the limited budget. Also, there was critique of the nonalignment with the strategic program of the Executive Council. 3.3. Mid-Term Conclusions Dutch provinces were neither victims nor winners in the early days of the ICT hype and backlash period. An attempt to implement a common ICT strategy for all provinces failed in that period. ICT was on the political agenda of a limited number of provinces, but was not strong enough to make any substantial impact. Moreover, such policy impulse programs need a longer period of incubation before changes in output or even outcome can be seen.

4. After the Hype: Back on the Cooperation Track 4.1. More Cooperation Since 2002/2003, national government has been redirecting its ICT impulses towards its internal processes. In the fields of spatial planning and homeland security municipal, provincial and national government bodies have begun structural cooperation on the implementation of common standards and the exchange of data. Here, the classical role


141

of the provinces as a territorial authority is paying off with respect to the use of ICT. Provinces are key players in the domain of geo-information storage and data delivery. Any exchange of spatial data in the chain of government will pass through the provincial level. After the hype and up through today provinces have been developing their ICT implementation policy along three lines: • Strengthening capacity and skills in geo-information systems both for internal use and service delivery on a government-to-government basis; • Restructuring internal ICT infrastructure and service management as well as redesigning ICT governance and business processes; and • Implementing national e-government principles and components within the service delivery of provincial information.

4.2. Cooperation in the Geo-Information Value Chain Provinces are now actively involved in two major programs developing geoinformation systems. Since 2000 the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment has been taking the initiative with digitally exchangeable spatial plans (Dutch abbreviation is ‘DURP’) [10]. The program has aimed to stimulate governments to produce, make accessible and exchange their spatial plans digitally. Provinces have a substantial legal task in spatial planning and have been engaged in digitalizing data with a spatial (geo-related) component since 1995. Shared action began in 2002, when an inter-provincial coordinator was appointed to develop joint activities and projects, among others in the area of standardization. Various provinces and municipalities are running tests for the digital submission of zoning plan information. The nationally drawn-up information model for spatial planning (Informatie Model Ruimtelijke Ordening, or IMRO), which incorporates both the coherence and the definition of data in the spatial domain, is being extended in such a way that also provincial spatial plans can be adequately described and exchanged with this. In 2004 there was an evaluation of the program. The original target of 50% digital availability of spatial plans had not yet been met. The emphasis in the follow-up program thus shifted from stimulating initiatives to the implementation and anchoring of the digital availability of spatial plans in the new Spatial Planning Act, which was introduced in 2008. It has become clear that digitalization of and standardization in the spatial domain will continue beyond 2010. A second important development for the ICT profile of provinces has been the requested and awarded responsibility for risk-related policy information. Since the disasters in Enschede and Volendam and the terrorist attack in New York, the call for a better provision of information to citizens about risks and dangerous situations in municipalities has grown. As of 2004, provinces have had a legal obligation to publish risk information on the Internet. Late in 2003 the Ministry of Internal Affairs passed the functional Risk Card Model on to the provinces, after which a multi-year implementation trajectory was set in. In the period from 2004 through 2006, all provinces published web risk maps of their own, based on a risk register shared with the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. Due to the contraterrorist legislation, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations somewhat restricted the availability of these risk data. Most provinces now have a public risk map on the Internet and one for professional use only.

142


Because of these geo-related services on spatial plans and risk mapping, provinces are now investing in their own ‘niche’ of e-government service delivery, namely publishing warehoused geo-related maps. 4.3. Improvement of Internal ICT Facilities and Governance Political and managerial attention for the implementation of ICT in provinces has increased considerably since 2003. Provinces have copied the national urgency program on e-government, yet have customized it for their own tasks. The Balkenende II Cabinet (the current national government) recently presented the Alternative Government (Andere Overheid) program and a corresponding electronic government action plan. In the 2003-2007 administrative period, all provinces ran special investment programs for their ICT operations. At the strategic level the perceived backlog in comparison to the larger municipalities, water boards or the national government was tackled. The budget for the internal ICT facilities was enlarged. Laws that are significant for the jurisdictions of provinces, such as the Youth Care Act, the spatial planning policy document, the new Spatial Planning Act and the Rural Areas Investment Act, were established and as such widened the authority and tasks of provinces as ‘middle management’. In 2005, some external policy domains got their own ‘ICT impulse program’ [11]. There was also better administrative coordination between the national, regional and local government authorities. In April 2006 a statement was signed by the Minister for the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Association of Netherlands Municipalities, the Association of Provincial Authorities and the Association of Water Boards, in which the parties involved described the desired results and priorities of e-government through 2010. At the tactical level, a clear disciplining of the ICT function was taking place in the provinces during 2003-2007. The emphasis on internal ICT delivery was common to all provinces. The dependency of primary and secondary processes on the supply of basic information and the large quantity of projects and policy preferences necessitated sharper infrastructural planning, project definition, purchasing- and contracting management, capacity assignment and budget control. The main line of reasoning was to put things in order internally first, before tackling the e-service delivery to external clients. As we will see further on, this situation severely impeded the development of a joint full-scale e-provinces implementation program. All provinces introduced new forms of ICT governance. The ‘CIO’ function (Chief Information Officer) within companies was used as an example to introduce an ‘information management board’ at the highest management level. At the operations level, the focus was on network infrastructure, expansion of storage and e-security and large-scale replacement of financial, documentary and personnel information systems. The size of these programs varied considerably, depending the set of ICT-related problems individual provinces faced. The spectrum ran from backlogs in maintenance and replacement of hardware and information systems (Zuid Holland), to reorganization and out-sourcing (Noord-Holland), reassessment of information architecture (Gelderland, Utrecht) and office renovations (Overijssel, Friesland and Noord-Brabant). Without exception, these were large projects which ran for several years.


143

4.4. The e-Provinces Program Apart from the ICT investment programs of individual provinces, 9 out of 12 provinces started a trial joint implementation program on e-government in 2002. This program was the elaboration of the temporary knowledge organization advocated by the committee ‘Provinces and ICT’ in 2000. It was not placed under the Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO), because not all 12 provinces participated. Like its equivalent in municipal e-government (EGEM), it was incorporated in the national egovernment implementing organization ICTU. After the provincial council elections in 2003, the program found sufficient response in all provinces for a four-year extension. It was presented as a separate line of action of an ‘Alternative Provinces’ initiative, the inter-provincial pendant of the national ‘Alternative Government’ initiative. In the first years of the e-provinces program, the emphasis was still on awareness building, identifying the gains of ICT cooperation and translating the Cabinet’s e-government objectives [12]. Unfortunately for this program, the provincial organizations were not all in the same phase of implementation, as shown in section 4.2. As of 2004, the eprovinces program mainly concentrated on two issues: e-government services and their components, and cooperation within the administrative chain. Its results up to the end of 2007 are summarized in table 1. The e-provinces program has been a clearly supply-oriented program, i.e., one that is very much focused on the implementation of and alignment with the basic components made available by the national government. The urgency and enthusiasm felt in the initial years of the program was somewhat flawed. The program dealt with complex ICT issues. Its relevance for provincial business domains was sometimes contested. Cooperation among the 12 provinces at the operational level proved to be met with obstinacy. Furthermore, the e-services development at the national level was (and is) very much geared towards the citizen as the end user; whereas provinces, as intermediate actors in government, are more in the government-to-government chain of information delivery. So far the national e-components has provided few gains to provincial operations. In one way the joint e-provinces program sped up the need for shared ICT services. In 2008 a new small shared service unit will be opened within the Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO). It will be responsible for the further development of the e-provinces’ legacy and the geo-related information services.

5. Analysis and Conclusions 5.1. Observations and Question Marks In 15 years’ time the digital evolution has significantly changed the scenery for government. The supply of government information on the Internet has been expanded; search, storage and publishing techniques have created the information society, and companies and citizens have gained many more possibilities for accessing information and getting help from government. Such is also the case for provinces in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether the impact of ICT on task execution and intermediate position has in fact been a boost to change at provincial authorities.

144


Table 1: E-provinces program content Item

Adopted by

Not realized by end of 2007 by # of provinces

Explanation

# of provinces Adoption of provincial service catalog (psc)

12

-

Psc is part of Dutch national e-service catalog

Electronic forms

18 generic forms implemented in 4 provinces

8 other provinces chose own forms or implemented fewer than 18

National e-form platform is malfunctioning. Customizing is still needed.

Adoption of Digital identity (DigID)

2

10

DigID is not the same as digital signature; pre-fill in forms do not work.

citizens

(5 test)

companies

(3 test)

Transparency in government’s output: permits

No standard facilities, and insufficient alignment of business units (communication, permit licensing)

proclamation

5

7

decrees

5

7

web guidelines

4

8

mixed

mixed

(4 test)

8

Provinces no priority for PIP

Roadmap and ICT architecture for application domains

8

4

ICT architecture is top priority, including permit licensing and granting of subsidies

Shared e-service facilities

In-sourced at

Personal Internet (web) Page PIP (mygovernment.nl)

Association

Joint service unit per 1/1/2008

Source: Final report of the e-provinces program, ICTU, Den Haag, december 2007

A first observation is that not until after the Internet hype did provinces take serious action to utilize ICT for external policy objectives. While in 2000 the ICT strategy impulses were still diverging, the quest for a more efficient and effective government at the intermediate level rather quickly closed ranks and provided a shared vision for the provincial executive politicians and top level managers. Summing up, provinces stepped into the market after the hype and the backlash, making their introduction into the ICT world less harsh than in a lot of commercial industries. The second finding relates to the indirect effect ICT has on external tasks through the internal operations. The lead time for eventual success is underestimated. The establishment of a properly functioning customer channel management (using


145

telephony, the Internet, mail and desk contacts in primary processes) takes years. Moreover, it is based on a parallel investment in ICT infrastructure, database management and process alignment. These days, provinces are still in the middle of this long-term development. The scope of operations is still at the level of the individual province, not a large-scale turn towards a single shared service center. The e-service components, developed by the national government, are not yet well integrated into primary processes such as permit licensing and granting of subsidies. Only geo-information systems have contributed to a significant expansion of the task execution of provinces. Provincial data find their way into longer government-togovernment value chains. Thirdly, provinces have directed the ICT impulses more towards their own organizational performance than to broader societal issues such as the digital divide or ICT as a vital asset in regional economies. This shift is part of a longer process in which government is strengthening its ICT capacities but subsequently neglecting capacity building in societal organizations. Looking back, the main conclusion drawn is that provinces have acknowledged the strategic implications of ICT and are paying more attention to ICT and automation in their day-to-day processes and management. The Internet channel is widely used, though more for public information services and communication than for transactions. Provinces have made commitments in agreements regarding standardization and implementation of e-government that concern all bodies of government. In this respect, ICT’s sting as the boost of structural change has been drawn out of the public government’s flesh. The way in which provinces have helped shape the concept of information society thus far gives rise to some comments about the way in which ICT has influenced public management in the Netherlands. The first comment is about the speed of modernization of public management as a result of the implementation of ICT. This is quite a bit slower than was predicted in literature of the 1990s. The developments in provinces highlight a number of delayinducing variables that require more attention in their elaboration. The first is the institutional dependency between deregulation and the desired, differently functioning – commercial, more client-oriented – government. The redesign of processes and information management in decentralized administrative authorities follows the decision for deregulation at the national government level. As the Court of Audit in the Netherlands has concluded already, when new policies and legislation are proposed, too little consideration is given to their implementation aspects [13]. By now, other government levels demand a lot more certainty in advance, before embarking on largescale processes of change. A second comment concerns the development from an ‘infocratic’ government to a ‘networked’ government. Van Dijk lists three structural variables that determine the internal composition of public management [14]. At the moment, the change in the scale of acting, in the form of deterritorialization, does not much affect the institutional composition of the Netherlands in terms of the twelve provinces. Yet it places ever greater demands on structural cooperation in the field of data delivery and information traffic. So far, ICT has strengthened the intermediate level of Dutch government. The network government is a logical extension of the infocracy. One of the reasons why the position of provinces remains more or less the same, despite political discussions about their role [15], is their installed base of geographically organized information. Provinces prove to be a suitable scale level for integration and aggregation of social

146


changes with a spatial effect. This evidence-based experience is confirmed and acknowledged by the recent changes in Dutch legislation that have been transferring formal responsibilities to the provinces. This enhances the position of provinces as source holders of unique data and as nodal points for knowledge sharing. Provinces took this step using the risk web map as a first application. A third comment relates to the practical translation of the concept of service delivery to citizens and to companies. It is one of the key concepts of e-government. The elaboration of this concept is essentially different for provinces than for national agencies or for municipalities. Central to the elaboration of the delivery of services are the way in which the ‘client’ is approached and one’s own organization’s added value, but also the way in which delivery is supported. Zuurmond argued in favor of making the client and his/her questions central to the work of government organizations and advocates a ‘Copernican turn’ in public management [16]. This is not a self-evident revolution for provinces, since they have never been organized as ‘front offices’ for citizens or companies. The main target groups in the provinces’ information traffic are the national and local government levels plus a wide range of institutions that implement provincial policy objectives. In pursuance of the recent Agreement on egovernment, provinces will work together with municipalities and, among others, Chambers of Commerce to deliver information to citizens and companies [17]. Fourthly, regarding the Internet as communication channel, it is still very much in question as to whether provinces should deploy it as their dominant medium. Provincial policy usually does not target the trend setters in Internet use and usually relates to fairly specific niche information about the use of space, nature, rural areas and traffic. Physical points of contact may well be equally effective for the recognizability of provincial services in the region. Recent research about the use of government websites, carried out by Van Dijk, Hanenburg en Pieterson, unfortunately fails to illustrate with numbers the difference in Internet use between urban and rural areas [18]. Provinces’ experiences with the Internet channel, expressed in numbers of visitors and use of information services, as yet fail to convince in this matter. 5.2. Future Developments What are likely scenarios for the near future of provinces and e-government? If we continue along the line of the national e-government initiatives, which involves all levels of government, the implementation of basic facilities is likely to continue into 2015 and beyond. The costs of information management are expected to increase further. The benefits will take an even longer period to accrue.

5.2.1. Scenario 1: Aggregation above the Provincial Level The intermediate level of government in the Netherlands will remain necessary for a number of years. Nevertheless, a number of realistic scenarios can be foreseen in the light of the developments up to this point. The driver for change will be how long provincial administrators will continue to accept the ever-increasing cost and complexity of ICT facilities. This fact may result in a greater will to cooperate between provincial governments. Thanks to broadband connections, distance is no longer an insurmountable problem for collaboration on ICT infrastructure and applications.


147

Complexity and cost reduction are considerations in support of the formation of a limited number of mutually linked shared ICT service centers. A similar scenario for concentrating and collaborating is imaginable with respect to geo-information. A gradual evolution of sectoral information infrastructure towards a national information infrastructure is one of the possibilities. In that case provinces would lose their strategic position in the delivery of geo-information. In the water chain, for example, with the support of provinces, water boards and the Directorate General for Public Works and Water Management, a single Water Information Desk is already active in the area of information models on water systems [19]. More likely is a kind of dual-evolution, integrating geo-administrative information management along the line of the sectoral model and along the line of territory. See for example the incorporation of the Geonovum Foundation as a national center for the standardization and development of spatial information models and the formation of a Geo-Information Council among the levels of government [20]. As bulk consumers and suppliers of geo-administrative-information, provinces are closely involved with this center. 5.2.2. Scenario 2: Merger of Municipal and Provincial e-Government The development to upscale the information infrastructure might also crystallize further in a much more regional sense through closer cooperation between municipalities and provinces. In various regions, municipalities are already joining together in ICT- and data service centers. They are also developing common standard citizen-oriented front offices. As pure ‘back office’ organizations, provinces can link in to this with primary key processes such as the granting of subsidies and licensing of permits, road and traffic management and control. Municipalities could in turn specialize in customer contact centers. By bundling expensive and complex means, this scenario might improve the mutual service delivery levels of local and regional authorities. In an embryonic sense, this cooperation is already visible in provincial websites turning into regional information portals. 5.3. Summary In this article the evolution in the use of ICT within the intermediate level of provincial government in the Netherlands has been highlighted. It is concluded that provinces distinguish themselves from other Dutch government authorities by their relative specialization in information with a spatial component (geo-administrative information). Unlike other levels of government, provinces did not experience an ICT hype or severe backlash. Provinces can still make more of an effort to deploy the possibilities of electronic government adequately. In this area we still have a long way to go. ICT did not cause the expected structural changes in the allocation or execution of tasks at the intermediate level of government that supposedly would lead to a weaker position of provinces. The effect of deterritorialization has not materialized. On the contrary, over the past 10 years, governance in certain domains has been decentralized by law and designated to the provinces. It seems that provinces in the Netherlands remain firmly ‘stuck in the middle’ and that ICT has supported this positioning. This expression by the business strategist Michael Porter [21] refers to the phenomenon that companies are unable to choose

148


between two strategic alternatives. This has not been the case with provinces. Up to now provinces have been able to use ICT effectively to shape their intermediate position between the national and local government levels.

Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank John Kuipéri, ICTU and Jan van Dijk, University of Twente, for fruitful discussions on provinces and ICT. The opinions expressed are those of the author, not representing Province of Overijssel’s point of view.

References [1] See www3.provincies.nl/english/ [2 ] Abrahamson, J., F. Arterton & G. Orren, The electronic commonwealth, New York, 1988; Frissen, P., De virtuele staat, Schoonhoven, 1996; Frissen, P.H.A. (1997). 'The Virtual State: Postmodernisation, Information and Public Administration' in: B.D. Loader (Ed.), The Governance of Cyberspace Politics, Technology and Global Structuring (pp. 111-125). New York/London. [3] See, for example, WRR (Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy), Staat zonder land: Een verkenning van de bestuurlijke gevolgen van ICT, Den Haag, 1998; and Commissie ICT en Overheid (Advisory Committee on ICT and Government), Burgers en overheid in de informatiesamenleving: De noodzaak tot institutionele innovatie, Den Haag, 2001. [4] See, for example, the establishment of ‘digital playgrounds’, in which citizens can train their computer skills and discover the Internet. [5] In regard to this, see the dissertation of R. van Lier, De provinciale organisatie in continue staat van verandering, (The provincial organisation in constant flux), The Hague, 2007. [6] Jong, H. de (et al.), Provincies in de informatiemaatschappij: Beleidsimpulsen voor een urgente opgave, (Provinces in the information society: Momentum for an urgent problem), Berenschot, Utrecht, October 2000. [7] See www.risicokaart.nl [in Dutch] for more details. This web-based map is the result of the 2003 Risk Information Quality Improvement Act (Wet Kwaliteitsverbetering Risico-informatie). [8] Province of Overijssel, Sterk en leefbaar Overijssel. Bestuursakkoord 1999-2003, (Executive Council Strategy Statement), Zwolle, 1999. [9] Provincial Council of Noord Brabant, Evaluatie @Brabant, statenvoorstel 13/06 A, (Evaluation “@ Brabant programme”), Den Bosch, April 2006. [10] Participants were the Ministry, the provinces (through the IPO, the Association of Provincial Authorities), the municipalities (through the VNG, the Association of Netherlands municipalities), professional planning, construction and architectural bodies and the RAVI (the Netherlands Council for Geographic Information, a network organisation for standardization in the property and geo-sectors). [11] See, for example, the application of ICT (domotics) for the benefit of living independently for a longer time, improving coordination in the care chain, improving the broadband infrastructure in regional economy. [12] Examples of this are the feasability study Winst met ICT bij provincies (Gains in provinces through ICT), Zenc, 2003 and the publication Morgen begint vandaag: Handreiking Voorbereiden op Andere Overheid (Tomorrow starts today: How to get to an alternative government?), Programme e-provinces, ICTU, Den Haag, 2005. [13] Algemene Rekenkamer (Court of Audit), Tussen beleid en uitvoering (Between policy making and implementation), Den Haag, 2004. [14] Dijk, J.A.G.M. van, Nieuwe media en politiek: ICT voor burgers, politici en ambtenaren (New media and politics: ICT for citizens, politicians and civil servants), Houten/Diegem, 1997. [15] Provinces and the larger municipalities in esp. the Holland region (Randstad) often conflict. There are a number of publications both for and against the change of scale of the intermediate level of government in the Netherlands. Surprisingly, ICT is not one of the variables mentioned that do suggest this change of scale. See: Geelhoed, committee, Op schaal gewogen, regionaal bestuur in Nederland in de 21ste eeuw, IPO, Den Haag, 2002; Frieling, D.A, De Hollandwet, Den Haag, 2005; Toonen, Th.A.J., Theorie van de provincie, Den Haag: IPO, 2005.


149

[16] Zuurmond, A., De verwaarloosde staat (The neglected state), Leiden, 2005. [17] Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Association of Provincial Authorities, Association of Netherlands Municipalities and Association of Water Boards, Verklaring betere dienstverlening en minder administratieve lasten door inzet van ICT, (Declaration for better service delivery and less red tape), The Hague, April 2006. [18] Dijk, J.A.G.M. van, Hanenburg, M., Pieterson, W.J., Gebruik van Nederlandse elektronische overheidsdiensten in 2006. Een enquête naar motieven en gedrag van burgers, (The use of egovernment services in the Netherlands, a survey of citizens’ motives en attitudes), University of Twente, Enschede, 2006. [19] See www.idsw.nl . [20] See www.geonovum.nl . GI Council is in Dutch: GI Beraad. [21] Porter, M.E., Competitive strategy, New York/London, 1980.

150


Designing a Decision Support System For Urban Infrastructure Decision Making Marshall Scott Poole Department of Communication, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign James Courtney Management Information Systems Department, University of Central Florida Tim Lomax Texas Transportation Institute, Texas A&M University Arnold Vedlitz Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy, Texas A&M University

Abstract. The vision of utilizing information technology to make government more effective, efficient and responsive to its citizens has long captivated government officials and the public alike. This chapter describes a project to design a decision support system (DSS) for planning and budgeting infrastructure in a major U.S. city. The system was projected to help with decision making related to numerous aspects of the city’s infrastructure (water, sewage, roads, and waste water) and to include input from multiple stakeholders to infrastructure decisions, including relevant government agencies, the public, builders, community leaders, and the city government. The design of the DSS had to address nine challenges which formed significant barriers to realization of the system. In the end a scaled back prototype was created because the challenges proved too difficult to overcome with current technology and resources. We discuss the nine challenges and some avenues for future DSSs that might help to address them. Keywords. Decision Making, Decision Support System, Planning, Infrastructure, Deliberation

1. Designing a Decision Support System For Urban Infrastructure Decision Making Cities struggle with keeping infrastructure on the ‘front-burner’ in order to facilitate on-going, effective management of urban services1. In countless cities across the U.S., infrastructure – streets, bridges, sewers and other public utilities – is aging and falling into an increasingly critical state of disrepair. Recent serious accidents such as the explosion of a steam pipe in New York City and the collapse of the I-35 bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, with accompanying loss of life, underscore the critical state of U.S. infrastructure and the importance of maintaining it. Just as these elements of our

M.S. Poole et al. / Designing a Decision Support System for Urban Infrastructure Decision Making 151

infrastructure have passed their prime, so too have the computer information systems we use to manage and maintain them. A related challenge is how to create and maintain informed communication among policy-makers, engineers, and the public about a city’s infrastructure management decisions and costs. Funds to maintain, manage and build infrastructure are limited. In urban areas, where approximately 80% of Americans live, ecological, political and technical needs vie for prominence. Adding pressure to this competition for resources is a pattern of growth and subsequent decline, observed in older core city areas in the Northeast and Midwest, now occurring in Sunbelt cities as well. This growing problem is about much more than simply fixing what is broken; it is about fixing the way that we fix what is broken. This was the focus of a research effort by a team of scholars from civil engineering, agriculture, political science, communication, and management information systems at Texas A&M University. With funding from the U. S. National Science Foundation, this team worked to develop modern decision models to help cities maintain their infrastructure in a way that is more efficient and less expensive. It was hoped that the project’s findings could result in advancements that could assist in producing nationwide savings worth tens of billions of dollars, promote economic growth, and help to maintain a safe and healthy society.

2. The Hype A decision support system is an ‘interactive, flexible and adaptable computer-based information system, especially developed for supported the solution of a non-structured management problem for improved decision-making’ [1]. First articulated in the early 1970s [2, 3], the vision of the decision support system (DSS) promises more rational management based on the advice of scientifically based models. The DSS draws together all of the data relevant to the decision and offers the decision maker scenarios and a range of options, enabling him or her to make a judgment on the best course to take. DSSs have been developed for a wide variety of tasks, including investment decisions, capacity planning for information systems, and medical decisions. Originally based primarily on numerical models, DSSs have expanded to incorporate simulation techniques, visualization, and many other techniques. DSSs have long been used in government. King [4, 5], for example, details the implementation and use of a large scale DSS in the U.S. government budgetary process. DSSs are part of the larger move toward e-Government that has spread around the world in the past decade. As Holmes [6] argues, ‘The e-government movement is being driven by the need for government to: • cut costs and improve efficiency • meet citizen expectations and improve citizen relationships • facilitate economic development’ (p. 2). These goals can be met, the vision continues, by employing information technology widely and by getting government online. This will reap the efficiencies of information technology, cut costs, and enable the government to be more transparent and responsive to its citizens.

152 M.S. Poole et al. / Designing a Decision Support System for Urban Infrastructure Decision Making

In the realm of infrastructure, a DSS would enable planners and decision makers to act more rationally and responsively to the needs of citizens. It would also offer ‘hard data and conclusions’ that would enable planners and politicians to show citizens the need for infrastructure investment. The DSS models ideally would integrate stores of data related to the condition of infrastructure elements (roads, sewers, etc.), costs for repair, replacement, and new builds, schedules of existing projects, surveys of citizens and businesspeople, and many other sources to produce an authoritative, objective analysis that could guide the difficult process of infrastructure decision making.

3. The Strategy Our basic assumption was that to attain truly sustainable development in urban areas depends on a balance among the built system—the province of civil engineering—the urban ecosystem—the province of ecologists—and the human system—the province of social scientists and of politics. Sustainable ecosystem development can occur only if there is high technical quality, political will supporting it, and effective implementation. Political will crumbles without quality solutions, which depend on technical knowledge and implementation, and without a livable urban environment. Technical quality cannot be sustained without political support and high quality management, and it is mere technical rationality without a concept of quality of life and environment to build toward. A key issue, then, is how the built, ecological, and human systems can link together to promote an integrative approach to the urban environment. Because theory and research in each domain has most often been conducted independently of considerations of the other domains, bringing them into congruence requires transformations of each perspective. Rather than positing a ‘grand synthesis’ as an abstract level, this project explored transformation at critical decision-making and operations levels. This lower level work was strongly informed by theories from each domain which were cast in a fashion that they should be compatible. These theoretical and operational linkages among the three domains would be integrated through development of decision models and a decision support system for urban infrastructure decision making. We engaged Houston, Texas, the fourth largest city in the U.S., as a partner and testbed for this effort. Houston provided a concrete case for developing the theoretical models and decision support system. A model for Houston could serve as a prototype for development of models specific to other cities in other environments. We focused on four types of infrastructure: water, sewerage, storm drainage, and roads. Our research goals were: • Development of a conceptual model for integrated sustainable development in the natural, human, and built domains. • Evaluation of this model through application. • Development of theory relating decision-making in the three domains. • Design of a decision support system that embodied the conceptual model and decision making theories from the three domains. In order to achieve these goals it was necessary to identify models for each domain that were compatible in that they are conceptualized at the same level and could be linked in a common logical system. We found that theories in each domain operated on the


basis of very different assumptions and explanations, so we believed that the most likely starting point was to integrate through modeling the intersection of the areas. Developing an information-technology-based community model which incorporated key stakeholders, key decision premises, and key values from each domain offered a reliable and well-understood means of achieving an integrative formula. We designed a DSS to support Capital Improvement Project selection for the core actors in infrastructure decision-making in the Houston City Government. Users included three units, the Department of Public Works and Engineering, the Mayor’s Office, and the City Council. The DSS was designed around the following set of requirements: • It should bring all technical information into one system that enables easy access to support the decision • It should allow comparison of projects subject to several different sets of criteria representing different stakeholder perspectives. • It should include information, data, and models relevant to the following domains: engineering, ecological, city decision process, and general citizenry. • It should connect decision making on roads, water, sewers, and drainage into one system so that systemic implications for both budget and performance can be identified. • It should incorporate the deliberations of human actors as part of the data. • It should have an interface tailored to the user so that actors with different levels of sophistication and comfort with data analysis can utilize different displays. The ultimate goal of this exercise was to design a DSS that would: (1) Integrate status and process data concerning the condition of infrastructure in Houston; (2) Enable better decision making and planning for infrastructure that draws on the integrated database and considers human, environmental, and economic issues; and (3) Provide a sounder scientific and engineering foundation for the necessarily political process of infrastructure decision making.

4. The Process The first step was to gain an in-depth understanding of how infrastructure and infrastructure decision making worked in Houston. We gathered extensive documentation on infrastructure, environment, and political situation in Houston and visited the Houston Department of Public Works numerous times to study their process and the types of information available. We also gathered data from other government agencies that played a role in infrastructure decision making, including Harris County, the Harris County Flood Control District, the Houston–Galveston Council of Governments, Houston Metro, and the Texas Department of Transportation. We conducted in-depth interviews with forty key actors, including officials from each of aforementioned agencies, politicians, principles in the engineering companies that the city contracts with, environmentalists, special interest groups like the Houston Chamber of Commerce, and private citizens who were active in the infrastructure decision process. We decided to center our analysis on four neighborhoods of the city,


and this guided our selection of interviewees from the interest groups and private citizen groups. Requirements for the DSS as well as central design parameters were drawn from this data. To design the DSS in support of the decision flow for Capital Improvement Project (CIP) decision-making in the Houston City government, we mapped the decision flow based on interviews and documents obtained from the city. The result was a set of Use Case and Interaction diagrams that depict the sequence of steps involved in the capital and maintenance decision process, the actors involved in each step, and the information or data utilized in the step [7]. The model design was coded in the object oriented design system UML. The Use Case diagrams depicted the sequence of steps involved in the capital and maintenance decision process, the actors involved in each step, and the information or data utilized in the step. The Interaction diagrams, which are a useful supplement to the Use Case diagrams, depict how information and data move through a succession of actors in the process; they give a step-by-step view of which actors are involved and what information is input at each step. (The Use Case and Interaction diagrams are shown in Mangal, Courtney and Poole [7]). Analysis of these diagrams indicated that some steps of the process are well-suited for decision support, other steps generate information or decisions that need to input into the DSS and still other steps are not well-suited for support. So the DSS was designed to be used intermittently during the decision process, at times when it could provide useful advice or support for the actors. The DSS was designed to provide both modeling and information management. In some cases, it simply supplied information to the parties, integrating data from separate databases, and in others it generated indices and modeled key variables such as cost, schedules, and project impacts. Figure 1 shows a Use Case Diagram of the first steps in the Capital Improvement Process for Water Projects. The process goes through four steps which run from top to bottom of the square box titled CIP-W Initiation. The steps in Exhibit 1 represent the first four significant activities that initiate capital improvement plans for the city, requesting a project through a council member, make project requests directly to the Water and Sewer Department, requesting a project through a public meeting held by the Planning Department, and the compilation and distribution of requests for the planning process. In some cases steps will be sequential and in others they may occur simultaneously. In addition to indicating steps in a process, Use Case diagrams indicate the actors involved in each step. In this case the relevant actor types are citizen (who has input in the first three steps), Council Member (who is involved in steps 1, 2, and 4), community groups (involved in steps 2 and 4), Water and Sewer Division personnel (who are involved in steps 1, 2 and 4) and Planning Department personnel (who are involved in steps 3 and 4). In some cases, data used or added by a step is also indicated in the Use Case diagram. A typical process will be broken up into several logically unified stages such as Capital Improvement Initiation, Capital Improvement Plan Preparation, Capital Improvement Plan Review and Approval, etc., and each will have its own Use Case diagram. The Use Case diagram is the logical structure for the DSS, which is shown in Figure 2. This general schematic of the DSS is composed of the steps (which flow horizontally at the top of the diagram), a database (data warehouse), a processor which carries out the modeling required by the DSS, and a constructor that compiles information and results from the modeling done by the processor into a tailored interface which is designed for a particular type of user.


Figure 1: Use Case Report for Initiation of Water Projects Use Case Report – Water CIP CIP-W Initiation citizen request through council member

water and sewer division

Council member make direct project requests

planning department community groups

public meetings

Distribution of requests

Actor: water and sewer division Actor: Council member Actor: planning department Actor: community groups Actor: citizen Use Case: request through council member Communicates With Actor: water and sewer division Communicates With Actor: Council member Communicates With Actor: citizen Description: The citizen may also request a project through the council member instead of contacting the city department directly.

The constructor draws on the database and processor for its inputs and rearranges them according to the type of interface required, either for the technical user (interface 1) or the general lay user (interface 2). Prototype designs for water and storm drainage systems were developed and presented in the final report to the National Science Foundation. The system was never implemented, in part due to a change in the city government and in part due to challenges to be detailed in the next section.

5. Pushback for the Hype: Challenges for Decision Support in Complex Urban Environments The final set of requirements for the design of the urban infrastructure DSS listed above was distilled from a much longer list derived from our interviews and other data. Like most preliminary lists of requirements, this one was long and included some requirements that were vague, potentially contradictory, and difficult to satisfy.


Figure 2: Basic DDS Design

uc11

uc12

uc13

uc14

Tailored Interface 1

uc21

uc22

Tailored Interface 2

Constructor Database

Processor Models Curves Statistical Models Functions

From Use Case steps and other sources data enters into the database. Some is taken directly into the DSS, while other data is passed to the processor, where results of impact and other analyses are generated and passed to the constructor. The constructor assembles the data and results appropriate for particular stakeholders. This is passed back to the Use Case. The first four use case steps in the diagram correspond to the four steps in Figure 1. The display in tailored interface 1 is designed for city employees.

However, the list was also much messier than usual in that it included a very large set of stakeholders and problem elements in complex relation to one another that changed dynamically during the decision process. It would literally be impossible for a traditionally-structured DSS to satisfy the all the requirements that we derived. Yet we were convinced that they had to be satisfied for the DSS to have the desired impacts. To understand the challenges facing those developing urban infrastructure DSSs, we can reframe them into sets that represent ‘tangles’ of problems that comprise the decision environment for complex urban decisions. We present them here as challenges for developers, because we believe they can be addressed to the satisfaction of the parties involved, even if they cannot be ‘solved’ in the traditional sense. Each challenge asks researchers and developers of DSSs to expand traditional concepts of DSS in order to address the realities of complex decisions. Throughout this discussion, it is important to keep in mind an overarching master requirement for any government DSS in a democratic society: It must honor the democratic process embodied in urban governance. Central to the democratic process are the need to (a) acknowledge and include the stakeholders in the decision, (b)


promote fair choices that serve the public good of the larger urban community, and (c) keep the process open to public scrutiny, which is the best corrective for the inevitable biases introduced into governance by human limitations and frailties. Within this general frame, we can identify nine challenges for DSSs in urban infrastructure decision making. 5.1. Challenge 1: A complex set of nested decisions A key issue in the design of a DSS is the particular decisions that will be supported. The focal decisions provide a design center for the DSS, indicating the types of data needed, decision rules, and the form of the output. In our initial planning we thought that decisions to be made were straightforward—which infrastructure projects should be built and in what sequence. However, this seemingly simple decision turned out to be quite complex for several reasons. First, due to the fact that decision making in urban environments involves marshaling: resources, either through acquisition of new funds or redirection of existing funds that may already be committed to other priorities; political support of voters and other stakeholders; and the support of the bureaucracy. Closer inspection reveals a nested set of interrelated decisions. In the case of Houston these included decision making on several different levels: • Level 1: Overall budgetary priorities for the area, including issues such as (a) the proportion of the budget that should be devoted to new construction versus maintenance, (b) priorities that should be assigned to the four areas (roads, water, sewer, flood control), (c) degree of emphasis given to different core values such as growth, preservation, environmental issues; (d) overall importance assigned to infrastructure versus police, fire protection, health and other concerns • Level 2: Selection and scheduling of particular projects, including issues such as (a) selection of a portfolio of projects; (b) the division of work between new development and existing development; (c) maintenance versus replacement of existing infrastructure items; (d) location of work in terms of neighborhood and political district it occurs in. • Level 3: Project details, including issues such as (a) whether a project should be listed as a separate budget item or handled piecemeal from maintenance funds, (b) the particular governmental unit or subunit that will handle the work (e.g. maintenance versus external contractors). These layers of decisions are interdependent. For example, decisions made at level 1 about the relative priority assigned to maintenance versus new construction constrain the particular projects selected at level 2 and what parts of the city government will undertake them at level 3. So decisions made at one level serve as parameters for decisions at other levels. This is certainly true for decisions at the top level, but also lower level decisions can influence higher level priorities. Projects too are interdependent. If one is tearing up a road in one area and other aspects of the infrastructure need repair, such as water mains, then it makes sense to coordinate work so that just completed work will not be torn up by new work. There also tends to be a shift in priorities for different decisions over time. For example, the previous Mayor placed great emphasis on maintenance and upgrading, while his successor took maintenance funds and shifted them to support police and fire


departments. Excessive work on one aspect of infrastructure, such as sewers, tends to highlight shortcomings in other aspects, such as the water system and so there is a tendency to swing from one concern to others. There are also different arenas for these decisions. Level 1 decisions tend to be made ‘in the background’, by a small set of parties. They represent the exercise of ‘hidden power’ in that they are decisions that set the frame for other decisions, determining what can actually be decided at other levels of the process. 5.2. Challenge 2: Fundamentally Different Perspectives on These Decisions Typical decision support systems are designed to manage differences within relatively limited frameworks. For example, a decision support system to evaluate potential acquisitions by an investment firm is set up to allow bankers with different preferences to explore a range of scenarios. In this case all users have fairly similar backgrounds and training and also similar goals for the organization. A much more diverse set of perspectives must be accommodated in urban decision making, perspectives that differ radically in terms of: (a) the information they consider relevant to infrastructure decision making, (b) how they would prefer this information to be represented, (c) how they process the information, (d) how they desire to participate in the decision process, (e) how they are able to participate in the decision process, and (f) the meaning the decision process has for them. In the City of Houston there is a large and diverse set of stakeholders that have potential claims to participate in the decision making process. While a complete listing of stakeholders found in our study is not practicable, the following is a representative list of stakeholders: • The Mayor of Houston; • City Council members, some of whom represent a constituency in a particular part of the city with particular demographics and interests and some of whom serve at large; • The City Manager of Houston; • The Department of Public Works, which manages new construction and maintenance of infrastructure elements; • The Planning Department, which is charged with coordinating planning of infrastructure and its relationship to other elements of the city; in the City of Houston the Planning Department does not have formal coordination authority; • Area-wide coalitions of businesses, such as the Greater Houston Partnership and the West Houston Association, which take an interest in promoting growth in the area • Contractors and contractor associations in both design and construction industries for infrastructure; • Housing developers and construction firms that build subdivisions and buildings in Houston; their projects are dependent on appropriate and sufficient infrastructure being developed; • Area-wide agencies, such as the Harris County Flood Control District, the Harris County Subsidence District and the Port Authority; they are charged with dealing with problems that extend beyond the city of Houston and seek to coordinating area governmental agencies in taking action on their charge;


•

• • • • • • •

Neighborhood associations, which take an interest in infrastructure and quality of life in neighborhoods; Houston has officially designated neighborhoods and so these associations have a degree of official standing as representatives of their neighborhoods; Principals of local schools and teacher associations; they are concerned by virtue of the fact that infrastructure affects the schools and the safety of children; Citizen associations that represent particular groups, such as the AfricanAmerican Ministerial Association; these groups work for the general good of their defined constituencies; Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club; Federal and State agencies concerned with infrastructure, such as the Texas Department of Transportation and the Texas State Highway Commission; Federal and State regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Environmental Protection Agency, the General Accounting Standards Board, and the Texas Fisheries and Wildlife Commission; State and federal congressional representatives; they have an interest in constituent service and also in bringing in support for large scale projects; Unions representing city employees.

The constituents of this list differ in terms of the elements of infrastructure they are interested in and the types of interests they have. For instance, the Department of Public Works is interested (among other things) in building and maintaining high quality infrastructure services, while the contractors are interested in obtaining approval for design and construction work, while the neighborhood associations are interested in workable and affordable infrastructure to serve their citizens. So these groups are likely to focus on different aspects of infrastructure decision-making, and different sets of stakeholders are likely to converge around different infrastructure decisions. The changing nature of the parties and interests involved is a challenge for structuring a DSS that seeks to represent relevant perspectives and interests. Stakeholders also differ in how they can participate in the decision process. Regulatory agencies, for example, may set goals and parameters on the process, but have little direct influence on decisions, while contractors conduct feasibility and design studies for potential projects. Neighborhood associations focus mostly on level 2 decisions about specific projects and, to some extent, on level 3 decisions about how projects will be carried out, whereas City Council members have numerous opportunities to influence decisions at all levels. For this reason, the points at which stakeholder interests and information are represented in the DSS will vary. The range of stakeholders involved and their variability on the two dimensions poses a challenge for DSS design. This challenge is even greater when we consider the dynamic nature of the decision process, in which relevant stakeholders and interests may change over time and the fact that infrastructure decisions involve multiple interlocking projects (see below). 5.3. Challenge 3: Multiple and Potentially Contradictory Decision Criteria The interviews revealed a number of decision criteria that might be considered. These include:


• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

All stakeholders should believe they have been equitably treated and accommodated; ‘Equal opportunity, with no favoritism for poor, middle, or wealthy neighborhoods’; Those parts of infrastructure in worst condition should have highest priority— ’the worst first’; ‘Give preference to key elements of each type of infrastructure; they must work or other parts of the system begin to break down’; Infrastructure elements that pose a danger to public safety or public health have highest priority; Project budgets must fit available funds; Projects near schools and facilities that are for the public good (e.g. parks, factories) have higher priority than those that serve private citizens only; ‘Destruction of property involved in project versus saving of property that project will bring’; Projects must meet legal and regulatory mandates; Projects must conform to and serve the lifestyle of the communities they are in; Projects must improve urban metrics, such as the urban mobility congestion index; Projects must meet political needs of council districts by distributing work equitably across districts; Projects should improve the quality of life; Projects should contribute to the economy of Houston; Projects should enhance Houston’s standing relative to other similar cities; Consider the state of economy: When the economy is growing new building has preference; when it is not maintenance/replacement has preference; Projects should increase the tax burden as little as possible; Projects for which federal or state funds are available should be undertaken.

As this list indicates, criteria vary in the degree to which they are stated in absolute or contingent terms. They also vary in the particular public values that they relate to. Several of the criteria have the potential to come into conflict as well: Meeting legal and regulatory mandates and improving the quality of life, for example, may in some cases be contradictory. Finally, some of the criteria are multifaceted. There are three types of growth: growth through annexation, growth through new development, and growth through redevelopment. These relate to different types of values and issues and often require different decision processes. The ‘quality of life’ movement, which develops multiple indices of the quality of life in urban communities, offers a systematic method for balancing a range of values in urban decision-making [8, 9]. However, there is no generally agreed on list of measures of quality of life and indices must be tailored to specific contexts. 5.4. Challenge 4: Coordination Infrastructure is not the sole responsibility of the City of Houston. Other agencies initiate and manage infrastructure projects as well. Across the four types of infrastructure, over twenty different governmental agencies and private organizations


had projects running. These included Houston Department of Public Works, Harris County, Harris County Flood Control District, Texas Department of Transportation, Northwinds Houston L.P., school districts, the City of Baytown, the City of Hedwig Village, the City of Houston Aviation Department, the City of Humble, the City of Jersey Village, Harris County Engineering, Houston Lighting and Power, and various fiberoptic cable installers. The different projects have the potential to interfere with one another and need coordination for the most cost-effective and efficient use of resources. For example fiberoptic installers may cut a channel in a newly-repaved road; if the road repair project and the fiberoptic project had been coordinated the two operations could have been done together, minimizing cost and inconvenience for those using the roadway, as well as the aesthetics of the project. The coordination load is considerable in the case of infrastructure. For example, the Department of Public Works was coordinating 20 projects with the Texas Department of Transportation as of June, 2001. Coordination of this many projects on an on-going basis is a big job. Until the early 1990s there was partial and sporadic coordination, and the problems that arose sparked the creation of an Interagency Coordination Committee (IACC) associated with the Greater Houston Wastewater Program, a large scale Federally-mandated initiative to rebuild waste and storm sewers so that overflow from waste sewers would not be routed into the storm sewers. The IACC developed maps that indicated where projects were located so that they could coordinate using a standard key map. A database was created that had the information units needed to coordinate, including dates and schedules for projects, status reports, and contact information. However, once the wastewater program was completed and no longer funded, it has been a struggle to keep the database up to date, since there is no longer regular funding to do so. An important function of a DSS would be to facilitate coordination of the projects undertaken by different agencies. This would require a method for gathering information on projects and models for utilizing this information to coordinate projects. At the low end, merely cataloguing the information would help agencies discover potential conflicts and who to contact to address them; at the high end, scheduling applications could help devise the best schedules for projects. It may be difficult, however, to get agencies to give up control of their own projects, in view of the multitude of parties and tasks that must be managed. 5.5. Challenge 5: Stakeholders with Different Capacities to Utilize DSSs The stakeholders listed above vary considerably in their level of sophistication with regard to information technology and decision models. Engineers, for example, are quite comfortable with numerical data and reports, while some City Council members and private citizens are not. So different stakeholders will require different types and levels of DSS support if they are to use the DSS effectively. A DSS that works on numerical data may need to provide one type of output for engineers and another for City Council members; the engineers might be interested in statistical data about the condition of water lines and details on their history of repair, while a color coded map showing the overall condition of water lines in various neighborhoods would be preferred by Council Members concerned with constituent service and equitable distribution of funds across the city. These considerations raise the challenge of determining who should and can use the DSS. Should the DSS be designed for limited use by a relatively small number of parties? There are several special-purpose DSSs in use in the Department of Public


Works. For example, a DSS is used to determine the load on water lines, supporting decision making on which lines will need to be replaced in a given project. However, when we begin to consider a broader DSS that can be used to integrate decision making across departments and constituencies, challenges multiply. Such a DSS will likely require outputs with multiple levels of complexity and different modes. Use of the DSS by nontechnical personnel will require the creation of indices that summarize complex data in simpler formats. Incorporation of data from multiple stakeholder groups will require the system to work with data that vary in terms of format and reliability. 5.6. Challenge 6: Different Motives for Developing the DSS Utilizing a DSS in public deliberation and political decision making invariably introduces questions of motive. What do we want the DSS to do? What questions should the DSS raise? Where should it direct public attention? The interviews and other data gathered during the project indicate a range of possible motivations behind developing the DSS. One set of motives revolves around a concern for enhancing infrastructure decision making through data-driven decision analysis. On this view, the DSS is a means for consolidating existing data and providing a holistic analysis of technical factors related to infrastructure decision making. It is also a means to stimulate the city to collect the right kinds of data and update its measurement of infrastructure condition. One finding of this project was that the city often does not collect the right kinds of data to enable it to make the best decisions in terms of current engineering knowledge. Designing a DSS based on the best available science is one way to motivate the city to reengineer its condition assessments, update its databases, and install new equipment for sensing and monitoring conditions. This set of motives tends to drive the DSS in a technical direction and encourages designers to think in terms of the ‘best possible science and engineering’ when designing the DSS. A second set of motives pertains to economic benefits from infrastructure decision making. It is often argued that infrastructure decision making should be driven by a concern with building the local economy and enabling economic growth. On these grounds the DSS should incorporate measures of possible benefits of the projects for the city. A related economic motive is the direct benefits some stakeholders— contractors, design firms, and their supporting companies—derive from design and construction of infrastructure elements. It is to their benefit that the DSS incorporate data that they can influence, such as contractor-generated need assessments. This set of motives encourages the designers of the DSS to build in theories of economic benefit and to design the DSS around existing data that have evolved in response to the needs of the parties who currently drive the system, notably the personnel in the Department of Public Works, the contractors and related businesses, and the Mayor and City Council. A third set of motives concerns the benefits of public participation in infrastructure decision making. A common argument is that the public is generally apathetic about infrastructure and that some means of energizing public awareness and interest is needed. On this view, the DSS should be designed to educate the public about infrastructure and current and future needs with respect to infrastructure. A second motive in this set is the desire to include all legitimate voices in the decision process. The DSS is seen as a way to break out of the current, relatively closed decision making system and include stakeholders whose voices do not usually figure strongly in the


process. According to this position, the DSS should incorporate diverse viewpoints and information from different perspectives. The DSS would also need to provide ways for stakeholders with quite different views on infrastructure and with different perspectives on the types of information and decision criteria that are relevant for decision making. The three sets of motives imply quite different requirements and capabilities for the DSS. Depending on which are emphasized a different DSS will result. 5.7. Challenge 7: Political and Legal Constraints The DSS must support a political process. To do this, it must take into account the fact that there is no one best model for political decision-making. Hence, the system must be designed around the goal of supporting a fair process of deliberation whereby interests and solutions are considered in an open forum. There is no way to automate or calculate political decision making. Confronted with a complex decision involving multiple interests, parties who have histories of prior negotiation, and fundamental conflict, the best a system can do is to help to manage a fair and mutually accepted decision-making process. Much of the interaction and decision making will have to occur outside the DSS, with the DSS supporting the process at appropriate junctures. The DSS must also operate within several types of constraints imposed by the political system. First, certain stakeholders—the Mayor and City Council—are constitutionally charged with making the final decision on infrastructure projects. Hence, the DSS may in some cases be supporting the work of advisors to the decision makers and in other cases the work of the actual decision makers. Second, infrastructure decisions are often made under mandates by external regulatory or funding bodies. Several years ago the City of Houston was required to rebuild much of its main sewer systems to eliminate problems with sewage overflow during times of heavy rain. Currently the city is under a mandate from the Harris County Subsidence District to raise the proportion of its water supply taken from surface stocks to 30%. These mandates may ‘overrule’ even the best advice given by the DSS. Third, funding sources for infrastructure projects are constrained. Capital projects must come from one type of fund and maintenance from another. Some types of infrastructure—water and sewer—are funded by user fees and other types—roads and drainage—do not have such regular sources of funding. Where the funds come from and the amounts available in the various funding categories influence the likelihood of project approval. Fourth, decisions must be made on a schedule in city government and this schedule will influence (and in some cases govern) the pacing of activities in the DSS. Other political factors also have the potential to influence the decision process. The Houston city government has term limits for elected officials. Term limits have the potential to make a DSS more important, since Council members and mayor will not be in office long enough to become knowledgeable about infrastructure. The DSS can substitute for the learning curve city officials would follow if they were able to run for multiple terms. However, term limits also trigger certain pressures that influence decision making and complicate how the DSS will be utilized. Some infrastructure elements are subject to cross-cutting political jurisdictions that apply differing decision criteria and may hold differing interests. For example, storm sewers for flood control are managed by the city of Houston, but also subject to the Harris County Flood Control District. The various constraints complicate the design and use of DSSs because they often compel decision makers to make situated, contingent judgments that cannot be easily


incorporated into a DSS. In making a judgment as to whether a project can be placed into capital expenditure rather than maintenance budgets, for example, decision makers may engage in a fine ‘balancing act’ in which they try various combinations of funding possibilities and formulae, also judging the plausibility of funding projects from certain categories in light of possible audits and administrative oversight. 5.8. Challenge 8: Incomplete and Unreliable Information A DSS should incorporate the best possible models based on the best possible scientific and engineering knowledge. However, in view of the sheer size and complexity of urban areas and the costs associated with gathering and maintaining databases, available information is often incomplete and much information that would be desirable is not available at all. The case of road data provides a good example. For years Houston had an incomplete inventory of roads and conditions. By 1994 the city had created a database in which all roads were catalogued and their condition registered using a systematic rating system. Eight years later, this database is again incomplete because it has not been maintained. And the information in the database does not contain all the information that would be ideal for condition assessment according to the latest engineering knowledge. As a result, while a DSS could be designed around the best current research and knowledge, in practice it must be designed to make do with the information that is available. Since this information is often suboptimal, the DSS is likely to underperform what might be possible with better data. 5.9. Challenge 9: Information Technology Cities require huge governmental structures. In view of the fact that government information technology (IT) is often underfunded and is replaced more slowly than would be the case in the private sector, the IT infrastructure is often inadequate to meet the needs of a comprehensive GSS. In Houston there were multiple incompatible IT systems in different departments, which would render integration of data and information challenging. The city had just recently agreed on a standard GIS, and much of the data had not been mapped onto this GIS, which had also not been rolled out through all departments. In addition, there were a number of special purpose DSSs designed to help with specific tasks in the Department of Public Works. For example, there was a program that calculated water pressure for systems of water lines; it enabled planners to determine which lines needed to be replaced to ensure that new water lines did not underpressurize the system. Design of a global DSS to support infrastructure decision making would have to determine to what extent these local DSSs should be incorporated into the system versus left on their own, perhaps to provide data or other input to the global GSS.

6. Reprise Together these nine challenges are daunting, even more so because they interact so that the whole situation faced by DSS developers is a tangle of issues. This represents a truly ‘wicked’ problem [10]. For instance, differing motivations for the DSS exacerbate


coordination difficulties, and the many different stakeholders are likely to advocate different decision criteria. In order to move forward with the project, we constrained the DSS design by limiting the scope of decisions it supported and the key parties involved to the Department of Public Works, the Mayor’s Office, and the City Council. This reduced the number and extent of challenges we addressed. This limited DSS could incorporate information and opinions from stakeholders other than the users; it was designed to take data representing these other positions and made it available in a format comfortable for the focal users. For instance, neighborhood perspectives might be captured by taking survey data on their preferences and by consulting the list of citizen complaints on infrastructure in the city database. It is by no means certain that this core DSS could be expanded to serve other stakeholders, because it is based on numerical data and its interface is designed for educated professionals.

7. After the Hype: Options for Urban DSS Development Does this mean that we should not attempt to develop a DSS for broad participation in urban infrastructure decision making? To the contrary, we believe that a properly designed DSS could be a springboard for greater involvement of stakeholders who do not currently have a voice, or whose input is limited to speaking at open hearings and voting in elections. These stakeholders are an untapped resource for new ideas and could spark innovation in how infrastructures are planned, developed, and maintained. Including them will enable policy makers and government officials to understand the arguments pro and con for infrastructure and to engage in deliberations that sharpen the planning process. And, since true participation tends to foster a sense of ownership, a broader DSS could enhance public support for infrastructure development and maintenance and the public’s willingness to pay for it. The challenges detailed in the previous section imply that fundamentally different approaches to decision support systems are needed to deal with complex systems such as this. Three options have been explored. One option is to reduce our aspirations and construct local DSSs for particular decisions and types of infrastructures, for instance for roadways only. The DSS designed in our project is much more extensive than typical DSSs, and this scale-up may have made it impracticable. A second option is to develop a specific normative model that supports decision making from multiple perspectives. This system would then be populated with perspectives, information, decision criteria, and values from the specific case. Elgarah and Courtney [11] describe a framework for one such system, which is designed on the basis of Churchman’s Singerian inquiring system. This DSS incorporates multiple perspectives and utilizes a dialectical process to promote dialogue among stakeholders as to the design of the system. This approach would deal with several of the challenges outlined above. In particular, it would help to deal with challenge 1, different perspectives, because it is explicitly designed to bring perspectives into dialogue. It also helps to meet challenge 3, multiple and potentially contradictory decision criteria, because the dialectical inquiry process enables discussion and consideration of different criteria and offers means to cope with contradictions. In the same vein it deals with challenge 6, different motives for the DSS. The system proposed by Elgarah and Courtney is specifically designed to enhance participation and if the inquiring process is conducted properly, then decision


making will be based on data that is thoroughly interrogated. If properly designed the normative DSS could also cope with challenge 5, stakeholders with different capacities to utilize the DSS. Finally, the dialectical inquiry process could enable participants to at least become aware of incomplete knowledge (challenge 8). The major problems that would confront this second option are political and legal constraints and problems with information technology. A third option is to develop a system that brings relevant stakeholders together to deliberate about infrastructure development. These deliberations can then be the foundation for technical and political decision making on infrastructure. The Deliberation Support System (DeSS) incorporates several DSSs in a general deliberative framework that enables the stakeholders to explore the viewpoints of others and discuss their viewpoints [12]. The DeSS constitutes a community DSS and would require an elaborate IT infrastructure implemented over the internet. It would enable different stakeholders to develop understanding of commonalities and differences. The DeSS would recognize that a single DSS could not encompass the complexities of infrastructure decision making. This third option would also deal with most of the challenges. It would recognize that the decision set was complex by allowing all stakeholders to articulate their viewpoints. It is designed to allow for multiple perspectives represented by the various stakeholders (challenge 2). Multiple decision criteria could be discussed, though dealing with contradictory criteria may spark conflicts among stakeholders that would need to be addressed. The coordination challenge (#4) is specifically met by including all stakeholders in the process and a properly designed DeSS would take challenge 5, stakeholder capacities to use the system, into account. Like the normative DSS, the DeSS would primarily address the goal of citizen participation; a well-run deliberative process could also take advantage of data and consider economic development, thus covering challenge 6. In the same vein, vigorous deliberation is the best means possible of coping with the negative effects of incomplete and unreliable information (challenge 8). Finally, political and legal constraints, challenge 7, can be represented if the proper stakeholders are included. The major drawback of this approach is the extremely large number of stakeholders who would need to be included. The process would be in danger of collapsing under its own weight, if proper measures for managing participation are not used. Straus [13] discusses some ways of managing stakeholder involvement and participation. And, as with the normative DSS, the DeSS is subject to problems or shortcomings in current information technology. The second and third options stretch the bounds of DSSs as they are traditionally defined. Venturing beyond ‘safe’ narrow DSSs and extending the valuable support provided by DSSs to wicked problems such as infrastructure development necessitates such boundary-breaking. Whether such systems can be brought to fruition and whether they can help deal with the large numbers of stakeholders to infrastructure decisions is still an open question.

Acknowledgements This research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation Urban Research Initiative. The views reported here are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the National Science Foundation. We would like to express our gratitude to


our colleagues who participated in this project: Letitia Alston, Robert Harriss, Eric Lindquist, Robert Lytton, Marty Matlock, Richard Murray, Meg Rogers, and Roger Smith, and to our research assistants, Michael Acosta, Byron Allen, James Franklin, Mangal Kunal, Celeste Simons, Sheri Smith, and Huy Van Vo.

References [1]

E. Turban, Decision Support and Expert Systems: Management Support Systems, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1995. [2] G.A. Gorry and M.S. Scott-Morton, A Framework for Management Information Systems, Sloan Management Review 13 (1971), 55-70. [3] J.D. Little, Models and Managers: The Concept of a Decision Calculus, Management Science 16 (1970), 466-85. [4] J.L. King, Successful Implementation of Large-Scale Decision Support Systems: Computerized Models in U.S. Economic Policy Making, Systems, Objectives, Solutions 3 (1983), 183-205. [5] J.L. King, Ideology and Use of Large-Scale Decision Support Systems in national policymaking, Systems, Objectives, Solutions 4 (1984), 81-104. [6] D. Holmes, E.Gov: E-business Strategies for Government, Nicholas Brealey, London, 2001. [7] K. Mangal, J. Courtney and M.S. Poole, UML Diagrams for the Water, Sewer, Drainage, and Roads Capital Improvement and Maintenance Processes, Department of Information and Operations Management, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX., 2002. [8] A.T. Moore, J. Nolan and G.A. Segal, Competitive Cities: A Report Card on Efficiency in Service Delivery in America’s Largest Cities, Reason Public Policy Institute, Los Angeles, CA, 2000. [9] B. Ulengin, F. Ulengin and U. Guvnec, A Multidimensional Approach to Urban Quality of Life: The Case of Istanbul, European Journal of Operational Research 130 (2001), 361-74. [10] H.W.J. Rittel and M.M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, Policy Sciences 4 (1973), 155-69. [11] W. Elgarah and J. Courtney, A Dialectical Approach to Information Systems Design, Management Information Systems Department, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, 2001. [12] M.S. Poole, D. Whittaker, M. Neumann, D. Olson, A. Stricker and J. Yen, Planning for the Future: Designing a Deliberation Support System for Urban Decision-Making, Department of Communication, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 2002. [13] D. Straus, How to Make Collaboration Work, Barrett-Koehler, San Francisco, 2002.

168


E-government in Flemish Municipalities Sabine Rotthier and Filip De Rynck Faculty of Business Administration and Public Administration, University College Ghent

Abstract. Theoretical models that represent the growth process of e-government are derived by iterating different phases. The ideal final phase as proposed in these models is a transformed government that offers the provision of services to its citizens in an integrated way. All of the Flemish municipalities have been online for several years now. Developments in the back office appear in practice not to extend further than the first phase of automation. This chapter focuses on the internal and external variables that explain this, such as a lack of capacity, expensive and incompatible applications, dependence on suppliers and the absence of central control. This chapter even goes a step further by stating that a strong automation phase militates against the completion of an integrated provision of services. Key words. E-government, Flemish municipalities, Strategic Alignment Model, Iscan, integrated service delivery, organizational and social determinism.

1. Introduction E-government should, or so the mantra used to run, stimulate governing bodies and ultimately compel them to proceed towards a more integrated and efficient provision of services. In this chapter we investigate how it comes to be that, so many years after the hype of e-government, we must conclude that these promises have not been realized in Flemish local authorities. After all, we see that departments have largely been automated but that the step to a more integrated provision of services, viewed from the citizen’s perspective, has scarcely started. In this contribution we defend the position that it is precisely the investments in automation that have made the step towards a more integrated provision of services more difficult. Since the advent of the concept of e-government many normative growth models have been developed. Lee [1] has analyzed this (see table 1). This overview shows the expectations that were awakened with the introduction of e-government: the ultimate goal is supposedly a transformed authority that is able to offer a completely horizontally and vertically integrated provision of services. So why is it that Flemish municipalities remain stuck in the first phase? Why is it taking so long to achieve the transition to integrated service provision? Why, too, does the rethinking of work processes, supported by ICT, continue to move with so much difficulty? What internal and external variables explain this stagnation and help us to see the difficulties that are experienced with ICT itself? Rather than a growth model we see a model of crumbling, of stagnation and even deterioration, of hope and new doubt.

169

S. Rotthier and F. De Rynck / E-Government in Flemish Municipalities

Table 1: Overview of the different phases in the development of e-government [1]

Layne & Lee

Hiller & Belanger

Cataloguing

Information

UN/ ASPA Emerging web presence

World Bank

Publish

Gartner

Presence

Enhanced web presence

Transaction

Vertical Integration Horizontal Integration

Two-way communication

Interactive web presence

Transaction

Transactional web presence

Integration

Fully Integrated Seamless web presence

Interact

Interaction Transaction

Transact Transformation

The model brings forward new difficulties that were not foreseen, making the acquisition of ICT and organizational change lead to new complexity but not necessarily to better organizations. In each case it is clear that the deterministic vision of technology [2], from which it followed that the technology in itself would give enough impetus to carry through changes, does not appear to work in practice with Flemish municipalities. We recognize numerous variables associated with organizational and social determinism, which states that the organization only takes in those technologies that are associated with the existing processes and that suit the behavior of the people. Stronger still, the consequences of the automation phase can be so compelling for the organization that they instead sabotage the step towards a more integrated provision of services from the citizen’s perspective.

2. The I-scan as a measuring instrument In 2006 and 2007 we conducted an in-depth study with a number of Flemish municipalities into the use of ICT and the associated embedment into the organization. The investigatory instrument that we employed for this was the QuickScan. The QuickScan was originally developed in the Netherlands [3] and has been carried out in 100 Dutch municipalities. The underlying theoretical model of this scan is the Strategic Alignment model of Henderson and Venkatraman [4]. The Strategic Alignment Model builds on two important assumptions: strategic fit and functional integration. Strategic fit stresses the need for any strategy to address the internal infrastructure and processes. Functional integration refers to the integration of business and ICT domains. This dimension considers how choices made in the ICT domain impact the choices made in the business domain − whether they enhance or threaten − and vice versa. It deals with the capability of ICT functionality to both shape and support the business strategy. It also deals with the link between the organizational infrastructure & processes and the information system infrastructure & processes.

170


EXTERNAL

BUSINESS STRATEGY

I/T STRATEGY

TECHNOLOGY SCOPE

BUSINESS SCOPE

DISTINCTIVE COMPETENCIES

BUSINESS GOVERNANCE

AUTOMATION

INTERNAL

STRATEGIC FIT

SYSTEMIC COMPETENCIES

LINKAGE

ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE

PROCESSES

I/T GOVERNANCE

ARCHITECTURES

SKILLS

PROCESSES

SKILLS

ORGANIZATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROCESSES

I/S INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROCESSES

BUSINESS

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION

Figure 1: The Strategic Alignment Model [4]

The QuickScan gives a picture of the level of development of the organization (O-scan) and of the ICT side (I-scan), and enables us to see whether the two are following a similar evolutionary path and thus whether they are attuned to one another. For both aspects the areas of leadership, employees, policy and strategy, processes and resources were measured. These were obtained from quality models such as the CAF and INK [8]. A combination of the strategic alignment model with the five areas of interest leads to the following figure.

Leadership Strategy and policy

Leadership and ICT ICT-strategy and policy

Processes Employees Means

ICT-Processes Employees/ I-professional Means: software, data, infrastructure

O-scan

I-scan

Figure 2: The areas from the QuickScan within the SAM model.

171


The scan starts with an intake conversation with a small group of employees of the organization and, if there are any, with an analysis of the ICT policy documents. This allows the researchers to become informed about the organization. The actual scan is an eight-hour workshop. During this workshop, employees from each division of the organization (ICT and non-ICT divisions, management and executives, politicians and public officials) first fill in a questionnaire that assesses the level of development of the organization in the areas of leadership, employees, policy and strategy, processes and resources. Then a discussion starts about the same issues, but then in relation to ICT. The participants score several propositions related to these ICT related issues on a scale from 1 tot 10. Based on these scores and the discussion that follows afterwards, a curve (called the I-chart) can be drawn which places the ICT side of the organization in a five-phase model. A brief description of the main characteristics from the five different phases is presented in the table below. Table 2: The different phases of the I-scan

Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

Phase 4

Phase 5

Quality on the floor

Primary processes

Organization as a whole

Cooperation in chain

Capability of transformation

Leadership

Technical issue

Automation primary processes

Total management

Chain

Progressive

Employees

ICT as a tool

ICT in function of optimization

ICT in function of connecting

ICT in function of “bridge builder”

ICT as standard

I-professional

Technological focus

Understands the organization

Partner from the organization

Chain organization

Pro-active

Strategy and Ipolicy

Missing

Primary processes

Total policy

Chain focus

Improvement of service delivery

Processes

Technical

Tactical

Strategic

Chain

Permanent evaluation and improvement

Software

Spaghetti

Primary processes

Total management

Chain

Developing standards

Data

Work place/ department

Primary process

1 time input

Authentic registration chain

Digital safes

X-time use

Focus on work place

Primary process

Total organization

Infrastructural organization

Pace-setting

Infrastructure

The higher the scores, the greater the extent to which the organization has evolved into an organization that offers integrated service delivery. The main development in phase 1 is the automation of the departments, with as yet no cooperation from other departments or the overarching organization. In this phase the organization does not

172


experience any of the promised changes of integrated service delivery. A result of phase 5, on the other hand, implies that the organization functions ideally. The client is the key figure in this phase. In phase 5 the organization has reached total integration, both horizontally and vertically, and it continually evaluates and improves its different working processes. This ‘ideal’ phase has not yet been reached by any government body.

3. The Backlash: Why Were the Expectations not Fulfilled? This section draws upon the results of the scans already performed and previous research into e-government in Flemish municipalities. The explorative study by Rotthier & De Rynck [5] discussed a case study of two Flemish municipalities. In a later study, Rotthier, Boudry & De Rynck [6] focused on the take-up of ICT in municipalities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. Meanwhile the I -scan has been performed in another 7 municipalities. All of these experiences underpin our observations: not a single municipality has completely reached phase 2, let alone considered phases three to five. Thus in all municipalities an attempt has been made to introduce ICT to support automation on a service basis, but none of the municipalities is yet considering the inter-service integrated provision of services. ICT was supposed to have stimulated this integration or at least be capable of supporting it. So reform of the back office has not been achieved anywhere, and there are few indications that this has actually been incorporated into the priorities of organizations. Evidently the introduction of ICT stalls and stops in the transition from phase 1 to phase 2. What internal and external variables determined in the I-scans performed might explain this? 3.1. Internal Elements For the arrangement of the internal variables we apply the five areas used in the QuickScan. 3.1.1. Leadership In most municipalities the leadership runs ahead of the rest of the organization. This is one of the few aspects that are found in all municipalities in the second phase, both on the organizational level (O-scan) and on the ICT level (I-scan). From the organizational point of view, this means that the leadership has abandoned their previous executive role and are running the organization much more as key players. Since 1 January 2007 Flemish municipalities have been obliged to have a management team. This partly explains the score in phase 2. Nevertheless, we notice that many municipalities still have problems with staffing and operating the management teams. The management team must be more than purely a preparation for the Council, as was often the case in the past. Strategic matters rarely entered the picture. A score in phase 2 on the I-scan signifies that the leaders no longer regard ICT as a purely technological affair. They no longer regard the organization as the sum of different departments and see ICT as a means for the automation of the primary processes in the organization. Primary processes are the basic processes of the


173

organization, such as issuing driving licenses, renting out rooms/halls, managing cemeteries, etc. The observation that the leadership runs ahead of the organization is not astonishing; it forms part of the expected leadership role. However, it does not mean that these leaders are in practice also the dynamic triggers of change processes or that they use ICT as a strategic instrument. There can be significant differences between perceiving the role and actually getting the job done. The civil servants running municipalities have in any case learned the lesson that a similar vision of change processes must form part of their role perception. Our earlier observation that the role of the town manager (in Dutch ‘gemeentesecretaris’) in the automation process is important is also confirmed by the scans. Knowledge of the organization and its operation takes precedence over knowledge of technology. It is important that the town manager has a good view of the processes and the functioning of the organization and of possible common points between departments. A town manager who does not view the organization as a whole makes less of a link between the role that ICT can play and the former process-based way of working. The way the trigger’s role works in practice differs from municipality to municipality. Some of the town managers do much more than simply comply with the role which is expected of them; they go a step further by advocating the importance of ICT in their organization. In one of the scanned municipalities we were able to establish that the burden of automation had been almost completely carried by the town manager. This was also the only municipality that had made progress in process-based thinking. A pitfall this municipality must watch out for is losing the broad support of the employees. Illustrative of this is that some of the employees sometimes spoke of “his e-government”. There are also examples of the opposite, where the town manager makes a point of saying he/she considers it important to bring in ICT but only allows heads of departments to take the further role of triggers upon themselves. In these cases the real triggers receive rather passive support from the town managerO. We observe that only rarely does the I-professional form part of a management team. In not a single municipality is ICT a fixture on the management team’s agenda. This explains to a large extent the absence of an ICT strategy and policy. 3.1.2. Strategy and Policy The lack of an ICT strategy and policy in the majority of the municipalities scanned is a fact and forms a very important barrier to the development of e-government. The absence of an organization-wide ICT strategy means that decisions with regard to ICT are taken ad hoc on the initiative of employees in the departments. Departments come up with proposals themselves. They often allow themselves to be guided by the experiences of other municipalities or by what is offered to them by ICT suppliers (cf. below). The ICT department is responsible for the technical resources with which to respond to these specific questions. In other words it is rarely the ICT department that makes suggestions that fit within an organization-wide strategy. Instead, they provide what the departments ask for. This way of working militates piecemeal automation of the different departments and limits the impact of ICT. To jump start the automation process into phase 2 an organization-wide strategy is necessary, against which the demands of individual departments can be tested in advance. The development of such an ICT strategy and policy is an enormous bottleneck and is apparently an almost insurmountable barrier. Several of the scanned municipalities do have an ICT policy

174


and strategy on paper. In these municipalities there was also already an organizationwide consultation body or a specific department that took this task upon itself. There was even an ICT specialist who was in a position to think strategically about ICT and organization. The problem then was that this strategy often remained limited to that top level; it had rarely been passed down to the rest of the organization and was often even unknown to the employees. We will return to this point further on in this chapter. 3.1.3. I-professional Municipalities are wrestling with the crucial problem of finding and retaining good Iprofessionals who can get to grips on the strategic level with the introduction of ICT. There is a real shortage of ICT specialists on the labor market. The public sector in general and the local public sector in particular are not attractive employers for ICT specialists, particularly because the wages and conditions (company car, etc.) are more favorable to ICT specialists in the private sector. Another variable here is the scale of the municipalities examined: they are too small to be able to attract high-quality people and offer sufficient organizational scope with which to perform the task in a high-level manner. The organizations are too small to make the job really challenging. We consequently notice that small municipalities cannot attract high-quality I-employees. As a result of the factors on the leadership level as well as on the I-employees level, the main task of the I-professional is often helpdesk support for municipal employees. This is extremely time consuming. It appears to be quite difficult to find a balance between the role of helpdesk worker and the role of strategic I-professional. The emphasis clearly lies on the first, although the I-employees think that they should have more time for the second. Whether this is more an issue of feeding role expectations and whether they are really up to this task is another question. In recent years larger municipalities have been trying to divide these two different tasks between two different employees, one for the helpdesk and one who plans the deployment of ICT at a more strategic level. If they succeed in engaging someone for the strategic level (cf. above) it appears in practice to be very difficult to make this difference clear to the employees. Employees expect to be able to fall back on both people when they have ICT problems. They even find it annoying that an organization-wide strategy is being developed if this implies that their immediate questions will no longer be answered (as quickly). One of the difficulties with performing the strategic role well is that municipalities deal with many matters, each one requiring automation. There is no “one size fits all” solution that can be implemented in one go. It is particularly difficult to be aware of the specific requirements of each different task. Often the ICT departments, which usually depend on a single person, are totally incapable of acquiring this overview and therefore cannot sufficiently anticipate the possible proactive contribution of ICT. 3.1.4. Employees The employee item varies in the different municipalities between phases 1 and 2. We confirm that ICT is an accepted tool in performing duties as long as attention is first paid to the duties of the department itself. Each employee possesses a PC, often with an Internet connection. ICT allows them to organize their current working processes in a better way. Employees are rarely uncooperative about the technology itself. However, they do have difficulty with relinquishing a department and task-focused mindset and beginning to think in terms of processes. They are unfamiliar with thinking in


175

processes, let alone with revising the existing processes, and the organization clearly does not encourage or force them to think in this way and therefore to react differently. It is striking that employees cannot form concrete ideas of how things could be done differently. This leads to resistance to change among the employees. Terms such as ‘integrated services’ and ‘rethinking primary processes’ are very abstract to the employees and therefore gain little support. The fact that these terms have been circulating for some time, but that in practice after all these years there are still no working systems to point to, makes it all the more unclear for many employees, therefore creating an increase in resistance. The absence of internal communication about what employees may expect of the introduction of ICT within the organization worsens this confusion. In a number of municipalities the employees mention that it is unclear to them what is to be decided and who is to decide. More than once we heard from employees expressions such as, ‘Now we have to learn such-and-such, but within a couple of months it’s something else again. Just when you think something can be finalized, something else changes’. The employees’ need for periods during which the changes are stabilized is often overlooked. That need for stability within the decisions made regarding service-oriented automation leads to resistance to changes within the organization, even if they can be justified from a broad organizational perspective. Based on the municipalities we examined, we can conclude from all these elements that employee support for the reorganization of processes and the spontaneous desire for them is very limited. 3.1.5. Processes ICT is supposed to be the vector for reforming the existing processes. BPR is a necessary precondition if we are to achieve an integrated provision of services and a transformation of the organization. Without BPR an organization is limited to digitizing the existing processes; in other words, simple automation. The item ‘processes’ is a point that scores very badly at both the organizational level and the ICT level in the I-scans. During the discussion it was made very clear that employees have insufficient feeling for thinking and working in processes. Pure and simple automation is perceived as less threatening than the revision of the existing manner of working. The latter invokes much more resistance. We have established that employees are quite open to the use of ICT when they immediately appreciate that it will help them get their own work done more efficiently, within the known boundaries. As soon as it is unclear how the new situation will look as a result of the introduction of ICT, the resistance increases. Some municipalities are currently working on a description of these primary processes, but that remains limited to an exercise on paper. We learn from the scans that it will be of fundamental importance right from the start as to how the organization is involved in this exercise. That often creates an immediate problem: management is rethinking the processes. We have already indicated above that we doubt whether sufficient capacity is present in Flemish municipalities at the managerial level and at the level of the ICT departments to be able to prepare similar thorough processes well and to be able to tackle them organization-wide. 3.1.6. Resources The O-scan enables us to see that municipalities often use their resources in a very ad hoc manner. Decisions are not considered in the light of a comprehensive policy plan.

176


Purchases are dealt with in a case-by-case approach. Questions are the results of requests (of employees) from the department. We see great similarities here with the introduction of ICT resources. The I-scan divides the aspect of ICT resources into three subgroups: data, applications and infrastructure. The lack of a global ICT strategy and policy affects the purchase of the computer applications and the use of data. We have already mentioned earlier that the purchase of applications results in separate responses to individual demands from the departments. Departments generally request very taskspecific applications. When these applications are purchased for each individual department, regardless of the broader organizational context, these applications are not necessarily compatible with each other. This is now a major source of complaints within most municipalities and is the result of policies in recent years that typify the dominant thinking of phase 1 organizations. ICT suppliers have now been asked to solve these incompatibility problems caused by several years of this type of purchasing policy. This issue will be discussed further below. The different departments do not share data, either. This is partly the result of incompatible systems. However, municipalities cannot completely hide behind this. For example, different departments store data about companies and associations in electronic (Excel) files. Each department must consequently keep these files up to date and maintain them itself. This increases the chance of errors. In order to keep this information cleaner the municipality should be able to decide on a common file to install in all departments. In practice we notice great resistance to this. Everyone trusts his/her own database the most. If people really prefer to continue working with their own files, on the organizational level people should be able to make agreements about the way in which name and address data is stored. This reduces the passing on of information to a simple ‘copy-paste’ action instead of having to re-enter the data. In only one municipality was there talk of similar agreements. It is a remarkable finding that although software and data are still in phase one, hardware has already evolved to phase two. The main reason is the presence of a network that connects all PCs and provides employees with (sometimes limited) Internet access and e-mail facilities. The infrastructure could theoretically be used as a tool for integrated services, but the practical use of the infrastructure has been limited to individual service-based practices at the software and data level and, instead of more integration, the hardware has been used to institute more separation. 3.1.7. The chasm between phases 1 and 2 The combination of internal variables shows that the transition from phase 1 to phase 2 is by no means an evolutionary and spontaneous transition. It is not the case that phase 1 inevitably and inescapably forms the basis upon which progress automatically extends until phase two is attained. We actually observe the opposite: the consequences of the well-established practice of ICT use within phase 1 lead strongly to the automation of the existing provision of services and result in a stronger compartmentalization between the departments. They thereby form a hindrance rather than a stimulant for the transition to phase 2. This means that we are fundamentally calling into question the growth models on which the introduction of e-government was based, according to their own normative assumptions. Characteristic of the way in which phase 1 is put into practice in Flemish municipalities is that the departments themselves are requesting applications that functionally support their own package of tasks. However, these packages make it


177

difficult − not to say impossible − to make the transition to phase 2, because they are not compatible with each other. Bringing about an integrated provision of services is only possible when departments are included in an organizational framework that thinks and works in a cross-departmental way. Service-oriented automation increases the differences regarding ICT between the departments. As we also indicated above, the management and I-professionals are too limited with regard to the capacity to make the organizational framework and the coupling with ICT a sufficiently convincing project involving the entire organization. All of these elements lead to the conclusion that the extension of phase 1 in the Flemish municipalities, given their capacity, acts more like a brake than a stimulus for the transition to phase 2. It makes the step to more integrated provision of services even more burdensome because meanwhile each department has been separately automated according to its own requirements and opinions. This causes increased resistance to ICT having to be used in another way for a more integrated vision of the provision of services. The habits and cultures that have been established in the meantime with the automation of individual departments generate resistance and are obstacles to the creation of an organizational culture that is supported by the entire organization and the provision of services as a whole. 3.2. External elements In addition to a number of organization-led factors, there are external variables that tend to keep municipalities in the first phase and so hinder further growth in the phase model. We will discuss them here individually. 3.2.1. Incompatibility of ICT applications Characteristic of phase 1 is the ad hoc introduction of ICT applications at the request of the employees, which leads to a collection of different applications distributed over the organization. This in itself would not be a problem for the reorganization of processes if the various applications were mutually compatible. But in practice this is not the case. Packages from different suppliers are not compatible for connection with one another. Municipalities can partly solve this problem by purchasing everything from the same supplier, but even this does not appear to be a guarantee. The incompatibility hinders not only the creation of horizontal integration between the departments (phase 2), but also vertical integration with other authorities (phase 4). In the spring of 2007 the Flemish government ordered a study [7] to be conducted into the needs of local authorities for the development of e-government. This study revealed a strong demand from municipalities to have this problem solved. Municipalities are pushing the Flemish government to develop standards and to impose them on ICT suppliers. The Flemish government is currently looking into how this can be achieved. The fact that all this has only now been discovered and that it is not yet certain if it will lead to results, means that for many years the preconditions for integration of the provision of services have not been present. 3.2.2. ICT Available on the Market In all municipalities the purchase of ICT applications was undertaken by the ICT department. ICT departments theoretically have a number of options. Either they

178


develop the application themselves, they get the application made to order or they buy an existing package from an ICT supplier. The absence of time and internal capacity, together with the conscious decision not to do the same work 308 times, mean the first option is rarely taken up. Developing an application to order is a very expensive solution and consequently does not lie within the reach of the average municipality. From this it follows that the municipality must look at what is available on the market. It is indeed striking that this market does not function according to the normal principles of supply and demand, in which the requester (municipality) and provider (ICT supplier) are equal partners. We have heard the criticism many times that ICT suppliers develop packages that they think will be useful to municipalities. In other words they force upon the municipality a picture of how, according to them, egovernment should appear within the municipality. Many of the packages supplied include the automation of service-oriented duties. In this way what is available on the ICT market strengthens the positioning of municipalities in phase 1. We have often heard employees complaining about the fact that ICT suppliers are, in their opinion, insufficiently acquainted with the functioning of the municipality and that consequently the applications do not completely meet the needs the municipality. This in turn leads to a lack of ownership on the part of the users of the packages, which does not encourage their confidence and faith in ICT. 3.3. Municipalities Are on Their Own The municipalities lack a general framework and guidelines within which to proceed. From neither Flanders [8] nor the Federal Government is there a policy with respect to the local e-government. The recent study consigned by the Flemish government, referred to in section 3.2.1, resulted in the formulation of 7 strategic projects to support local e-government. These projects satisfy three municipal needs. One project is a practical project that allows citizens and firms to search for information about products and services using a single (digital) desk. Four projects form the technological backbone of e-government. These projects might solve the current incompatibility problems. Two projects encourage inter-municipal cooperation and allow for improved knowledge sharing. In other words, after a good ten years have passed on the road to egovernment, the Flemish government is still in the phase of setting up strategic projects and has clearly stalled on structural problems. This absence of any context has two consequences for local e-government. First, municipalities have long adopted a wait-and-see attitude for fear of later edicts from the Flemish or federal government that they should not undertake such (expensive) investments. Meanwhile most municipalities have indeed invested in the automation of tasks. They look suspiciously at the future plans of other authorities. This uncertainty contributes to not daring to take decisions that would have more effect on the organization. Second, this implies that 308 Flemish municipalities are each autonomously trying to give form to e-government. To do this they look to one another and follow each other’s example in order to ensure they do not fall behind other municipalities. Investment in phase 1-related automation applications remains locked into its current state by the imitation of each other’s applications.


179

4. After the Hype? Based on our study of local e-government, we have established that municipalities still find themselves in the first phase of the five-phase model as employed in the QuickScan. We have come to the conclusion that the automation of the departments lays a separate burden on organization-wide automation of the (primary) processes (phase 2 and 3 in the scan) and the vertical connection in the chain between levels of government (phase 4). The automation process has been going on for years and has been making itself felt for years. It has resulted in improved efficiency. Receivers can no longer manage without accountancy systems. E-mail is a handy instrument for internal communication. Addresses are no longer kept in paper files. Decisions of the town council are available online. GIS makes working with geographical data much more convenient to organize. The introduction of ICT, even though it is task-oriented, has an added value. At the same time, in this first phase employees have gotten used to the technology itself (PC and network). According to the normative growth model, which derives from a technological deterministic vision, after this first phase municipalities should continue to grow towards further phases. Our study, however, leads to skepticism and calls the normative assumptions of this growth model into question. In practice, technological determinism appears unable to stand up to the organizational and social determinism that states that only those technologies are brought into the organization for which it is clear in advance that they have a place in the existing processes and structures and will fit with people’s behavior. Automation is developing within the context of a lack of capacity, expensive and incompatible automation, dependence on suppliers and absence of central control. The way in which the first (automation) phase has taken shape in Flemish municipalities has led to organizational patterns in behavior that inhibit the transition to a more integrated provision of services.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

J. Lee, Search for Stage Theory in eGovernment Development, in D. Griffin, P. Trevorrow and E. Halpin (eds.), Developments in e-Government, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2007, 33-48. H. Bouwman, J. Van Dijk, B. Van Den Hooff and L. Van De Wijngaert, ICT in organisaties: Adoptie, implementatie, gebruik en effecten, Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, 2002. T. Dicks, K. Lammers, R. Te Velde and A. Zuurmond, Verslag van de ontwikkeling van de I-scan gebaseerd op het INK-managementmodel, Rapport in opdracht van Alliantie Vitaal Bestuur, 2003. J. Henderson and N. Venkatraman, Strategic Alignment: Leveraging Information Technology for Transforming Organisations, IBM Systems Journal [2&3] (1999), 472-484. S. Rotthier and F. De Rynck, eGovernment bij lokale overheden, Research Report Policy Research Centre - Governmental organization in Flanders, 2005. S. Rotthier, E. Boudry and F. De Rynck, Diffusie van ICT in kleine Vlaamse gemeenten, Research Report Policy Research Centre - Governmental organization in Flanders, 2006. IBM, Strategische studie geïntegreerd e-government: Hefboom voor een e-government aanpak voor, door en met de lokale besturen, Studie in opdracht van CORVE, 2007. L. Raes, E-governmentstrategie van de Vlaamse overheid, Vlaams Tijdschrift voor Overheidsmanagement 10, 4 (2005), 11-20.

180


Information Sharing and Public Health: A Case-based Look at the ICT ExpectationsReality Gap Theresa A. Pardo Center for Technology in Government, University at Albany, SUNY, USA J. Ramón Gil-García Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico G. Brian Burke Center for Technology in Government, University at Albany, SUNY, USA

Abstract. Sharing information across organizational boundaries is central to efforts to improve government operations and services. However, creating the capability necessary to enable information sharing across the boundaries of organizations is among the most difficult types of information technology projects. New knowledge about information sharing is required; in particular, new understanding about how government, non-governmental and private sector organizations come together to share information is necessary. This chapter draws on the experiences of key actors in three states in the United States as they organized to create new capability to share information as part of their responses to the West Nile virus outbreaks. The cases highlight the gap between expectations and reality, providing opportunity to more fully understand the gaps between expectations (the hype) about ICTs and the reality facing government practitioners who seek to use ICTs to share information. Examining the cases in terms of four contexts of information integration and sharing provides a more specific understanding about the gaps between these expectations and the reality (after the hype). The lessons learned in the context of public health include the central role of information sharing and the implications of resource constraints on data capture and use capability in the context of an outbreak management and surveillance effort. Insight into the interdependence of system design and process support and improvement in the context of public health surveillance was also found to be critical to future planning of public health surveillance systems. This chapter serves to reemphasize to both researchers and practitioners the need to close the gap between expectations and reality; the point is made again through the cases that closing the gap depends on strategies that draw on technology, process, interorganizational, and political perspectives and resources. Keywords. information sharing, electronic government, information technologies, information integration, cross-boundary collaboration, social aspects, technical aspects.

T.A. Pardo et al. / Information Sharing and Public Health

181

1. Introduction Sharing information across organizational boundaries is central to efforts to improve government operations and services. The enabling role of information integration and sharing in government programs and services is broadly recognized by researchers and practitioners alike, in particular in the public health and safety policy areas [1]. The central role of information and information sharing is becoming more and more evident over time, particularly as the world faces new and complex issues such as public health, where borders are generally irrelevant. However, creating the capability necessary to enable information sharing across the boundaries of organizations is among the most difficult types of information technology projects. As a consequence new knowledge about information sharing is required; in particular, new understanding about how government, non-governmental, and private sector organizations come together to share information is necessary. Information and communication technologies are expected to play a major role in creating this new information sharing capability. And in many cases, it has been found to do so. However, recent experiences such as Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the Tsunami in Southeast Asia tell us we do not know enough about the gap between what we expect ICTs to do for government and citizens and what they are actually doing. In a sense, we need a reality check: Are the expectations about the role of ICTs in information sharing being met through the solutions provided? If not, what is the gap and what can we do to close it? This chapter contributes to these questions by drawing on the experiences of three states in the United States as they responded to the outbreaks of the West Nile virus (WNV) beginning in 1999. The cases highlight in specific detail the nature of the gap between expectations about ICTs in terms of sharing information as part of three WNV response efforts and the actual impact of the systems put in place. In doing so, the study demonstrates the recursive causality and interactions between important social and technical processes in cross-boundary collaboration and information sharing. It also provides some lessons and implications for public managers facing similar situations. The chapter opens with a brief review of the literature on information integration and sharing, followed by the introduction to the four contexts of information integration used to frame the case discussions. Following an overview of the research method and the cases, the three cases are discussed within the four contexts of information integration and in terms of expectations, real experiences, and lessons learned. Practical lessons and insights from the cases are presented in the conclusion as guidance for both practice and future research.

2. Information Sharing and Integration as a Social Process Digital government, e-government, e-governance: all are terms that have become synonymous with the use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) in government agencies. Regardless of the label, ICTs have become a central component of government administrative reform, as well as non-routine response strategies [2, 3, 4]. E-government projects can potentially increase the quality of government services, generate financial savings, and improve the effectiveness of government policies and programs [5, 6, 7, 8]. In an effort to understand this generalization more fully, many scholars focus on specific aspects of digital government. Along the way, they are

182


realizing some of the most promising benefits from the use of ICTs in government rely upon the integration of information across organizational boundaries [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Outcomes

Effective Interpretation and Use of Integrated Information

Integration Processess

Resources Technical Artifacts

Organizational Artifacts

Figure 1: Relationships of integration components

Cross-boundary information integration can be conceptualized as a complex social process in which technological and organizational artifacts are developed and assembled for the purpose of information use (see Figure 1). These social and technical processes are embedded in four contexts: technology, business process, interorganizational, and political (see Figure 2). Advancing understanding of information integration in terms of these four contexts requires a multi-disciplinary perspective. Such a multi-disciplinary perspective can enhance the ability of government leaders and IT professionals to look beyond traditional organizational and information systems technology boundaries. 2.1. The Technology Context Issues of meaning and semantic translation are central to integrating and sharing information from diverse, distributed sources such as data bases, text files, images, or Web sites. Solving the technical problems of access and use of information from these diverse sources typically involves development of standards, platform and application interoperability, metadata, and use of algorithms and other software devices. These tools address the problems resulting from unstructured textual information and natural language names for objects and data by developing automated matching methods (for example [15, 16]). Other techniques involve constructing systems of ontologies that provide the underlying structure for alignment of meaning across heterogeneous data


183

Figure 2: Contexts of information integration

bases [17-19]. These methods have the potential to greatly reduce the cost of manual search and translation processes, making automated searching and matching of heterogeneous data feasible in large database environments. However, these methods will not in themselves resolve issues of agreement about the significance or use of integrated data or problems of policy in the public sector [20]. The changing and expanding use of data in governmental and private organizations demands increased attention to all of the components of data quality—accuracy, timeliness, consistency, and completeness [21]. Until recently, this attention was confined to improving the quality of data generated and used within single organizations. Today, the effectiveness of both public and private organizations often depends on data exchanges with others. As more organizations deploy and use communication networks in their day-to-day processes, sharing and integrating data across institutions becomes more attractive and more feasible [22]. However, integrating large amounts of data that often differ in form, as well as in organizational and geographical origin, poses myriad challenges in ensuring the quality of the integrated data. These problems arise because the integrated data reveals broad inconsistencies in definition, content, and overall quality, even when the individual data sources appear to be valid [23]. Moreover, data quality cannot be evaluated, and hence improved, independently of the context in which data are produced, stored, and used. Whether data are of high quality depends on the characteristics of the resulting integrated information infrastructure and on the demands of the tasks that use these data [24]. 2.2. The Business Process Context The tasks and production processes of complex organizations have been the subject of research since the early 20th century when Taylor [25] offered his principles of scientific management that strongly influenced the structure and functional

184


specialization of business and government organizations. Work processes, including decision processes, have interested contemporary scholars, especially as they relate to productivity and information technology. Hammer and Champy [26] contend that, over time, processes lose their connection to productive purposes and become rigid and selfperpetuating. Productivity breakthroughs demand radical re-engineering of entire organizations. Taking a less dramatic view, Davenport [27] recognizes the intractability of complex organizations and advocates more selective process innovation, coupled with applications of advanced IT to achieve performance improvements. Zuboff [28] studied the infusion of information technology into work processes and the effects that the technology has on the discretion of workers, the means of process control, and the meaning of work. Information systems are commonly understood to embed processes and information flows in complex software, which becomes difficult to change and has strong influences on the work of the organization and its employees, managers, and leaders. Information integration demands that the work processes of multiple organizations be both understood and mutually adjusted. However, the development of separate operating procedures, control mechanisms, information flows, and work flows makes such integration exceedingly difficult, leading to serious problems, quick disintegration, or outright failures of information system initiatives that depend on not only information integration, but process integration [2, 29]. 2.3. The Interorganizational Context Sharing and integrating information among organizations depends on the creation and maintenance of interorganizational relationships. The formation of these relationships, involving differing goals and interests, requires negotiations and the development of commitment among participants [30-33]. The strength and richness of resource commitments and their distribution can be influential [34, 35]. The development and maintenance of the relationships may also be critically dependent on trust [36-42]. Knowledge and information sharing among organizations is also characterized by substantial risk, resource constraints, and conflict [43, 44]. Some risk and conflict comes from the differences in expectations and goals the various parties bring to the sharing process [12, 45, 46]. These differing expectations may reflect each party’s individual and organizational history [47, 48], or simply variations in the characteristics of the individuals or organizations [49]. Interorganizational relationships are also influenced by the characteristics of the problem or goal motivating the activity. Interorganizational relationships may result from mandates, common interests [31], interdependence [50, 51], or from the need to resolve a variety of different problematic situations [52]. In addition, there may be substantial disagreement among potential participants about the level or exact nature of the problem to be addressed [49]. Interorganizational networks in the public sector have traditionally been studied as political structures [53-57] and more recently as dynamic operational partnerships (for example, [58, 59]). The bureaucratic and institutional issues surrounding interorganizational networks in the public sector have also gained interest from the research community [2, 60]. 2.4. The Political Context The political environment of government agencies exerts strong institutional and situational influences on information integration. A focus on government organizations


185

requires attention to bureaucratic and political theories. Most government activity is defined and funded through legislation that creates specific programs and assigns responsibility for those programs to specific agencies. This web of vertical relationships leads agencies to focus on their own programs rather than on crossboundary issues or linkages with outside organizations. These program boundaries are powerful barriers to collaboration [60, 61]. Agency staff develop deep knowledge and expertise in their respective programs and protect their ability to act with discretion and autonomy [62]. Since information integration may subject agencies to external evaluation and criticism, agencies seldom regard program information as an asset of the whole agency, the entire government, or the public [52]. Since cooperation across organizations implies joint responsibility and shared control, it often involves coordination, monitoring, and feedback that can potentially damage legitimacy and integrity if cooperation fails [63]. Dawes [52] contends some of these barriers can be lessened by policies that encourage information use and stewardship (rather than ownership) and by the creation of practical tools, such as metadata inventories and standardized data sharing agreements. Landsbergen & Wolken [64] propose similar tools, including an economic model, to help agencies identify costs and benefits of information integration. Citing the experiences of information technology initiatives sponsored by the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, Fountain [2] maintains that strong institutional pressures and existing incentives and resource allocation patterns mitigate against even the most highly visible and politically popular integration efforts.

3. Research Methods and Description of the Cases This research is based on a study conducted by the Center for Technology in Government at the University at Albany and supported by a grant from the United States National Science Foundation. The research included eight in-depth case studies of state-level efforts to share information across agencies and across government levels in two policy domains: public health and criminal justice. The public health domain, the focus of this paper, was studied through a retrospective analysis of state and county public-health responses to WNV. The cases discussed in this paper focus on the response to or preparation for WNV outbreaks in Colorado, Connecticut, and New York. Facilitations and interviews were transcribed and analyzed following an inductive logic approach and using grounded theory techniques [65, 66]. 3.1. The Response to West Nile Virus in New York In late summer and early fall of 1999, New York was the site for the first outbreak of WNV in the Western hemisphere. In preparation for a possible re-emergence of the disease in 2000, the New York State Department of Health led an effort to improve the state’s capacity to respond to another outbreak. A critical component of this response capability was the development of a Web-based integrated information network. This network, the Health Information Network (HIN), was originally created to provide secure Web-based electronic health information exchange for a multi-sector group of organizations, including state and local health departments, healthcare facilities, and healthcare providers [67]. Based on the existing infrastructure, the state health department worked with other state agencies and local health departments to develop

186


and implement an integrated electronic system to collect and provide access to WNV related case data. The collecting and sharing of this information was critical to the ability of the state to effectively respond to the initial outbreak and subsequent reemergence over the following years. The HIN became the platform for sharing data on mosquitoes, birds, mammals, and humans throughout a network of county health departments, state animal and human public health agencies, and healthcare facilities. 3.2. The Response to West Nile Virus in Colorado The first case of WNV in the state of Colorado occurred in Larimer County in 2002. At that time the virus was reported in only birds and horses. The first human cases were reported the following year in 2003. At the local government level, the county health department was responsible for coordinating the response to the initial outbreak and the subsequent annual re-emergence of the virus. In Colorado, similar to New York, local government is responsible for providing public health services to its citizens. With over 2,800 local governments, each having different statutorily defined authority and responsibility, coordinating WNV response efforts between the state and local governments and even regional efforts among neighboring local governments was a complex task. The cross-boundary information sharing initiative among Larimer County, the state, and neighboring local governments reflected this complexity and was characterized by an interorganizational process of collecting, disseminating, and analyzing information from a disparate group of information providers and users. 3.3. The Response to West Nile Virus in Connecticut The State of Connecticut identified its first WNV case in the fall of 1999. It was identified in birds only and confirmed in eighteen towns; the first human case occurred in 2000. The Connecticut Department of Environmental Conservation was the lead for WNV but the Connecticut Department of Public Health was responsible for coordinating the daily surveillance of the virus with local health departments and other state agencies. Key partner agencies for WNV outbreaks also include Connecticut Agriculture Experiment Station, responsible for the trapping of mosquitoes; the Department of Agriculture, responsible for the testing of horses for the virus; and the University of Connecticut, responsible for the identification of birds for testing and coordinating samples with the state lab. In contrast to New York and Colorado, Connecticut has no county government. It is the responsibility of each town, by statute, to provide public health services. The 169 towns work with 100 local health departments to provide these services.

4. Expectations and Reality: The Hype Experience tells us that the impact of ICTs on organizational programs and processes, in general, does not meet our expectations. To understand the gap between our expectations and reality this study examines three cases where information sharing and integration was a core activity. The four contexts of information integration provide a framework for the case analyses. The technology context focuses attention on issues such as the technical problems of access, the use of information from diverse sources, and data quality problems, as well as organizational and geographical origins. The


187

business process context draws attention to questions about the infusion of information technology into work processes and the ability of organizations to mutually adjust their work processes. Through this lens we can examine the extent to which information systems commonly understood to embed processes and information flows in complex software are in fact doing so in these cases. The interorganizational context supports a focus on the creation and maintenance of interorganizational relationships, in particular the ability of organizations to work through differing goals and interests to forge the necessary agreements and to establish commitment among participants. Examining the cases through this lens will provide understanding of the effect of differing expectations and organizational history. Focusing on the cases from the political context allows an examination of the Web of vertical relationships that lead agencies to focus on their own programs rather than on cross-boundary issues or linkages with outside organizations. Further, this lens supports an analysis of the institutional pressures and incentives and resource allocation patterns that mitigate collaboration even in highly visible events such as disease outbreaks. The four contexts frame of reference allows examination of the social and technical interactions taking place in such initiatives and provides new insight into how social processes influence and are influenced by interorganizational information integration. The discussion of the cases is presented in three sections: 1) expectations about how ICTs will enable information sharing in the response efforts, 2) experiences with ICTs and information sharing in the response effort, and 3) lessons learned during actual use in the response and reform efforts. A brief discussion of the ‘vision’ practitioners communicated is presented first to set the stage for the analysis. 4.1. A Common Vision The vision of a highly integrated information system to support response efforts was common to many, if not most, of the participants, regardless of their home state or profession. This ideal system would contain data about all aspects of the outbreak and provide users with the capability to access and use that data to understand the virus and to support decision making and planning about the response. According to a state level public health manager in Connecticut, Because West Nile is an arthropod-borne virus with a wild vertebrate host, this complex lifestyle meant we needed complex surveillance systems. And so we tried to establish surveillance systems that would capture information from each of those different stages of its life cycle.

Participants talked about how such a system might make is possible to provide citizens with accurate and timely information about the disease; telling citizens what they want to know, when they want to know it. One local public health manger in Colorado characterized his vision of the value the right system could deliver to citizens. …we knew we had a death from West Nile, confirmed at the hospital, but it took several days or longer to have it confirmed with the state. So we were showing a death in Larimer County from West Nile before the state actually confirmed it. And it was kind of verbal confirmation at the state but not in their statistical pool. And so we again have to deal with some of that lag. The public wants to know right now what’s going on...

188


This vision of an ideal system and the value it should deliver sets the stage for a discussion of expectations held by participants in the response, the reality they faced, and the lessons they learned along the way. 4.2. Expectations about ICTs, Information Sharing, and the WNV Response Participants in all three states were guardedly optimistic about the role of ICTs in supporting the response to the WNV outbreak. The cases consistently illustrate a set of expectations centered around data and the use of technology to capture and share it. These expectations were presented primarily in terms of the technology and business process contexts and the interactions between the two. Some observations were also made about the political and interorganizational contexts and their respective interactions. Many local governments could not handle all the testing themselves and needed to work with laboratories run by the state and other local governments, as well as universities and the private sector. As a consequence, getting efficient and timely access to the results of tests was difficult. In New York, public health professionals expected the new technology to provide users with access to a data repository containing testing information from the laboratories engaged in the testing process. One local government public health manager in New York stated his expectations for the new health information network and how it would alleviate the difficulty of drawing together data from all the testing facilities. What happened in 2000 was that even though we acquired the ability to do the testing locally, we still were going to rely on the state for some of our laboratory testing. So we had hopes that somehow the system would make it easier to reconcile testing that was being done in other laboratories with our own testing...

Expectations about the role technology could play in addressing problems of access and bringing together data from diverse sources were expressed. Specifically, participants spoke of the central role an integrated data repository could play in creating improved business processes in laboratory testing. The HIN in New York can be considered an example of where the infusion of information technology into work processes was considered central to improving the process of reconciling test results and following up on questionable results. It wasn’t even the positives that we were so concerned about. It was really just making sure that everybody got tested that needed to get tested and that we actually had negative results on those… So we had hopes that the HIN would help us do that and that was the reason that (name) spent more time working with ... their data folks than the actual, you know, administrators.

Participants also shared expectations that the technology would allow them to bring data from different programs together into one place. These expectations were stated most consistently in terms of a system that would support new ways to look at data, both in terms of data completeness and analysis tools, and generate new understanding of the virus and its behavior. A local government public health professional characterized his expectations about the potential value of an integrated data repository, both in terms of efficiency and knowledge generation, in this way: ‘Also to just have


189

more of a pool of data for them to use, to hopefully figure something out. And that’ll come back to help us hopefully in the future’. Expectations about the role of ICTs were stated consistently in terms of how technology could be used to change the way data was captured, made available, and used in the processes of responding to and tracking the virus. In particular, participants hoped for more rapid and fact-based responses to the public and a more holistic understanding of the disease in context.

5. Mapping the Gaps: The Backlash Participants identified gaps between their expectations for technology as a core component of the response and planning efforts and the reality they were experiencing. They reported gaps in terms of data access and manipulation capability, impact on work processes, and coordination across programs. As noted above, one expectation commonly held in two of the states was that a centralized data repository would reduce the overhead of working with a number of decentralized and disparate data sources. Participants from these states also expected an increase in the quality of data available for use in decision making and planning. Localities expected to benefit from the new repositories; i.e., they expected they would have access to the data and be able to use it in a variety of ways for local purposes. They expected a streamlining of data entry and problem resolution. These expectations, according to two local public health managers, one in New York and one in Colorado, were found to be misaligned with reality. I think mostly it was going to be … a sort of a centralized database so that we wouldn’t have to keep things separately here. And that we would all be able to access, meaning both ourselves here locally as well as (capital city) and all be working off of the same database to be looking for any types of information. And one of the things, as I said, that I guess is a bit frustrating about it right now is that even though the HINs there, it seems to me that even at the state they’re still using a separate database a lot of times to do certain things. And so things are having to be data-entered twice. And so it’s not unique to the HIN but it seems to me if we could get it all in one place, all of us would rather just data-enter it once because then it’s only once as opposed to having to do this repeated times… So I’d like to see it just one place, one time, everybody working off of that same database.

In addition to the technology context, the interorganizational context provides additional perspective on the challenges a centralized data repository raised in terms of delivering on expectations about data access. Expectations were also misaligned in terms of ease with which systems could be developed to capture and use data more effectively to generate new understanding of the virus and its behavior. ‘Putting it all together’ was not as easy as it sounded. The time involved in establishing new relationships across the boundaries of programs, even in a visible situation like a public health crisis, was also an issue. Participants noted gaps between what they expected in terms of new understanding about the virus and what the systems in place were designed and used for. Regardless they continued to be hopeful and committed resources to doing things that did not provide value immediately, but which they believed would provide value in the long run. According to one public health manager,

190


We’re entering a lot of it because the state is asking us to. We don’t feel that it’s a requirement but we’re hoping that some good will come out of giving them all this data. I haven’t seen a lot of benefits of that at this point. I was hoping to have some more answers by now about what’s happening with the virus and the mosquitoes and thought that maybe by now they’d figure out from all that data they’re collecting, be able to predict some things and just know more about what’s going on … But I’m hoping it’s not all just a bunch of busy work and hoping to get some, hoping that somebody’s doing research with all this and statistical analysis or something and is going to be able to tell us something pretty soon from entering all of this stuff.

As this indicates, participants were hopeful, but they were also frustrated. Frustrations were created by gaps between expectations and reality in capturing surveillance data, data integration, and supporting local processes and practices. These frustrations are best understood in the context of technology and process.

5.1. Capturing Surveillance Data When asked about the experience of using the computer to capture data, one local government public health worker in Connecticut responded in this way, It was slow… You’d have to wait until it would accept that record... And you didn’t always have the choices of, you know, if it was a strange kind of bird, you’d just have to check off ‘miscellaneous’ if you didn’t know what kind of bird it was. You were to report it anyway.

Another respondent from New York noted a gap in the capability of the system as designed to accommodate the situation; the result being that things had to be ‘juggled’ to get them into the system. The most frustrating part about using it is the error messages. And it doesn’t seem to accept every possibility that can possibly happen for an individual entering data. And when you put in your circumstances, it doesn’t like them a lot of times and it won’t take it. So you’ve got to juggle things around until it’s happy with it.

And another spoke to the choices that localities are making about what they enter and why, because entering all the data they capture isn’t realistic. We actually got a call last year from the state saying that they see that we’re not, they noticed that we’re not doing any larval surveillance or something to that effect. But we are doing larval surveillance; we’re responding to complaints that homeowners have about mosquito breeding grounds and we’re taking samples and we’re identifying mosquitoes and we’re keeping track of it. But every time we find larvae we’re not entering it and it’s not that easy to enter that part of it anyway. It takes a lot of time to enter; it’s not just forms to fill out.

5.2. Data, Sharing, and Integration A local government public health IT manager in Colorado expressed frustration about how data quality issues prevented the integration necessary to make certain kinds of


191

data usable. Geocoding laboratory results, in particular, were affected by data quality issues. For human cases, CEDRS was utilized--that’s the Colorado Electronic Disease Reporting System. And the human case would be reported in there with the type. That information was then manually plotted into the same system with a different layer so that we could view them separate from horses and birds and all that stuff. Frequently the information or sometimes--I won’t say frequently--about, say, ten to fifteen percent of the data in CEDRS was not able to be plotted with just as it is. Either the address wasn’t really right or it didn’t have the correct locations...

In New York there was hope the centralized repository would provide operational support for case management. So there was a level of granularity that we needed just for operational purposes that wasn’t necessarily, that didn’t need to be--I don’t know how, whether or not it was an issue for the other counties. But for us it was an issue to have a database that we could use for operational and not just, you know, data counting purposes.

5.3. Balancing Priorities Gaps between expectations and reality were also found in areas related to the interorganizational and political contexts of the response efforts. Balancing local government priorities with the state’s desire to have the fullest data available on the virus, for example, was a challenge in all three states. The states wanted as much data as possible, but the localities were not fully motivated to do so. This was due to the lack of access localities were then given to the data; both theirs and others, as well as the lack of resources available to support the new workload. We’re still hopeful that it’s a good system to use and we want to continue to enter data on there. But as we get busy, we didn’t have any of our work taken away from us--we got West Nile added onto our work load. So we’re at the point where we’re going to do enough, we don’t want to be criticized by the state for not doing enough. And we actually feel like we’re doing more than some other counties as far as sending birds year round ... So we’re trying to do our part to give them the data that they need. But we’re certainly not motivated to enter every bit of data.

5.4. Communication and Coordination An inability to communicate and share data with even contiguous counties was a frustration for one local public health IT manager in Colorado. Our closest health department, as far as the physical locality, Weld County has a health department location thirty miles away from us... I can’t directly communicate with them [using the state surveillance system] and we share a population.

The lack of ability to see each other’s cases, as this participant points out, also limits the ability of the counties to work together on process improvements; to deal with response efforts, for example, on a regional versus a jurisdictional level.

192


Their West Nile system and our West Nile system, as far as reporting, don’t talk to each other ‘cause it’s specifically excluded in the CEDRS piece [the state’s disease reporting system]--we only get our cases; we don’t get Weld County’s cases. How can we work on rules or enhancements to those kinds of processes to allow these local agencies that are physically close to each other, declared as a region of communicable disease reporting and control potentially and allow us to purge that data for basically a region-wide response?

A local public health professional from New York captured the sense of frustration created by the lack of coordination across programs and agencies, in particular the cost to the response effort in terms of dollars and time. And I think one of the things we got a sense of is, for whatever reasons, is that even though it was all the HIN, it was very fragmented in New York--I shouldn’t say and I don’t know that I necessarily mean that in a bad way. But for example, there was one set of either data or IT people who were working specifically on the bird database. There was a second group of people who would work on the mosquito database. There was yet a third group of people who might have been working on the human database. So it was just not one central place to have this discussion even though at a local health department level, it was the same group of people; we were working on everything. And so it seemed that it was a lot of communication issues trying to get that coordinated. ... it was an issue of having to have similar conversations with at least three separate groups of people, even though it was the same disease, the same outbreak.

The response to WNV required a new kind of coordination across programs not used to working together. The delay associated with building new capability, in terms of interorganizational relationships and alignment, was real. Efforts to improve response processes and to leverage technologies in support of that response effort were impacted by these coordination challenges. The technical, process, interorganizational, and political contexts of information integration all shed light on the challenges to the response efforts. Overall, the gaps which emerged between expectations for ICT and the reality were tangible and the impact of those gaps on the ability of the states and localities to work together effectively to respond to WNV as a public health crisis are clearly expressed by those directly involved.

6. Lessons Learned: After the Hype The challenges faced in responding to the WNV were significant, but in facing them participants noted the lessons learned for use in future efforts. Insights about leadership; the critical role of an integrated database for public health surveillance and the difficulty of creating such a resource; the need to fully appreciate the size of the job of getting data, all the data, into that database; and about the need to be incremental in creating capability for data capture, access, and use in support of a public health crisis were consistently noted by the participants. 6.1. Health Information Sharing is Critical to Public Health Response Efforts Many participants considered an integrated database a necessary resource to support the complex and broad-based job of communicable disease surveillance. The Health


193

Information Network in New York, for example, became a core resource in the response effort. According to one NY public health professional, …I know for our particular function in terms of communicable disease surveillance and again, just being used to track … disease, trying to identify populations that are at highest risk or geographically locating where something might be clustered. It’s really the only way to collect or look at this data. So we absolutely--I think it’s fair to say, if we didn’t have such a database, we couldn’t do our jobs.

6.2. Understanding Resource Implications One local government public health professional spoke to new understanding about the resource implications of getting data collected and entered. That was a major, major challenge. And one of the things that I’ve learned, whether it be West Nile, whether it be SARS, whether it be whatever it is, is that just supporting that kind of data collection and data entry in itself is a not insignificant thing. And something that we did not and still do not quite honestly have the resources for.

He spoke about the need to pull people from the hallways, or worse from other important public health areas to do the data entry. The first year that we were doing this, which really was in 2000 when we had any kind of systematic place to do this, we were pulling in just about everybody that you can imagine to help do the data entry. We had our nurses, who normally have to do, out doing bird data entry, helping to do with mosquito entry. Actually, the director of my HIV programs here... had a strong data background and was overseeing all the data entry ... We had a couple of summer students that we hired that year that we were having help do this. We were having clerical staff and I believe that we, even with the help--and this was again the Planning and Evaluation Division upstairs also just hired some temporary clerical help to help with the data. So that was a major, major challenge, was to do that.

Creative strategies were used to ‘press’ people into service for dealing with the resource constraints on data entry, but the same strategy was recognized as not feasible for data analysis. We’re able to do the investigations, interview the people and collect the information and even fill out maybe a hand-written questionnaire. But where we don’t have the capability is then to get all that into a database so you can do something with it. And that is like the big bottleneck, so to speak, I have found over and over again. We can’t manage all the information that we’re collecting and we can’t analyze it to figure out how to use it in a constructive way in terms of what to do next.

The challenge of public health surveillance, according to a number of the participants, and aptly characterized by one, is the ‘huge, huge’ job, of getting the data available so the right people, in the midst of resource constraints, ‘can look at it in any way.’ 6.3. Incrementalism and Flexibility Participants had high hopes for the integrated repositories. Through the response efforts they learned that an incremental approach might have, in the long run, provided more

194


functionality. One Colorado public health professional spoke to the value of an incremental approach. I’ve certainly and we’ve taken this approach with CEDRS [the state disease reporting system], is you start out with a base model. And then you add on the bells and whistles as you go on, once you make sure that the base model, once you make sure the car starts and backs out of driveway, then you start adding the horns and the lights and the other features that might be useful down the road. Because I’ve seen when programs have gone the other way to let’s build a Cadillac ‘cause it does everything for everybody that everybody could possibly want--they don’t work too well; they can bomb badly. And so that’s been part of the way we’ve approached this is, you know, let’s get the base thing, which is moving information on case reports from hospital to the local health to the state, getting that piece in place. And then adding on, let’s have--how about a mapping feature ... statistical calculation or statistical feature or search feature that might be useful.

The base capability in this case is the capture and sharing of information, not analytical tools. Another participant spoke to the strategy used in New York to leverage the base capability of the integrated repository and the local analytical capability. I think what we were able to work out with them and I believe what we do now is that whenever we want anything from the HIN, we basically do a download. And then once it’s into sort of an Excel or Access type of format, you can then basically do with it whatever it is that you want or look for whichever field that you want.

In this case, local government practitioners convinced the state to focus on a quality interface for data collection and sophisticated downloading capability rather than canned queries, generally considered inflexible and restrictive. 6.4. A New Style of State-level Leadership Participants overall seemed to recognize the unique leadership role state government has in intergovernmental coordination. Beyond a certain level of complexity, they noted, the state needs to take the leadership role. In these cases, the state agencies often were taking the lead, but the traditional approach was not effective. Participants spoke to need for a collaborative strategy rather than the traditional command and control strategy. A local public health professional in Colorado characterized the lesson learned in this way, The locals can only initiate that to a point. It needs to flip a little bit, this thing, we need an initiative statewide to do data collaboration and sharing. What we’re getting right now is, here’s my system, here’s [the state system] tracking system ... here’s what you will use if you want to do collaboration. Well, that’s not collaboration; that’s you dictating a system to me and that’s different.

7. Conclusion The premise of this chapter is that information sharing across organizational boundaries is a powerful strategy to improve government operations and services. The cases presented support this premise in the context of public health response. Additionally, they provide opportunity to more fully understand the gaps between expectations (the


195

hype) about ICTs and the reality faced by government practitioners who seek to use ICTs to share information as part of performance and service improvement strategies. Examining the cases in terms of the four contexts of information integration and sharing provided a more specific understanding about the gaps between these expectations and the reality (after the hype). The cases map these gaps and in doing so highlight the need for new answers to the question, ‘What are the challenges?’ Policy makers and practitioners alike can benefit from a consideration of these well known challenges in the context of information sharing in public health. The specific lessons learned after the hype in the context of public health include the central role of information sharing and the implications of resource constraints on data capture and use capability in the context of an outbreak management and surveillance effort. Insight into the interdependence of system design and process support and improvement in the context of public health surveillance was also found to be critical to future planning of public health surveillance systems. This chapter serves to reemphasize the need to close the gap between expectations and reality, and once again the point can be made that closing the gap depends on integration strategies that draw on technology, process, interorganizational, and political perspectives and resources.

Acknowledgements The authors want to thank Sharon S. Dawes, Anthony M. Cresswell, and Fiona Thompson for their valuable suggestions to early versions of this paper. Any mistakes or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors. This work was partially supported by the United States National Science Foundation under Grant No. ITR0205152. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

References 1.

T.A. Pardo and G.K. Tayi, Interorganizational Information Integration: A Key Enabler for Digital Government, Government Information Quarterly 24 (2007), 691-715. 2. J.E. Fountain, Building the Virtual State: Information Technology and Institutional Change, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 2001. 3. R. Heeks, Reinventing Government in the Information Age: International Practice in IT-Enabled Public Sector Reform, Routledge, New York, 1999. 4. K.L. Kraemer and J.L. King, Information Technology and Administrative Reform: Will the Time after E-Government Be Different?, in Heinrich Reinermann Schrift Fest, Post Graduate School of Administration. Speyer, Germany, 2003. 5. D.B. Gant, J.P. Gant and C.L. Johnson, State Web Portals: Delivering and Financing E-Service, The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, Arlington, VA, 2002. 6. G.D. Garso, The Promise of Digital Government, in A. Pavlichev and G.D. Garson (eds.), Digital Government: Principles and Best Practices, Idea Group Publishing, Hershey, PA., 2004, 2-15. 7. D. Holmes, E-Business Strategies for Government, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London, 2001. 8. D.J. Landsbergen and G.J. Wolken, Realizing the Promise: Government Information Systems and the Fourth Generation of Information Technology, Public Administration Review 61, 2 (2001), 206-20. 9. L. Caffrey, Information Sharing Between & Within Governments, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1998. 10. A.M. Cresswell et al., Interorganizational Information Integration: Lessons from the Field, 65th ASPA National Conference, Portland, OR, 2004.

196


11. A.M. Cresswell et al., Modeling Intergovernmental Collaboration: A System Dynamics Approach, in Proceedings of the 35th Hawaiian International Conference on System Sciences, IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA., 2002. 12. S.S. Dawes, Interagency Information Sharing: Expected Benefits, Manageable Risks, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 15, 3 (1996), 377-94. 13. S.S. Dawes and T. Pardo, Building Collaborative Digital Government Systems: Systemic Constraints and Effective Practices, in W.J. McIver and A.K. Elmagarmid (eds.), Advances in Digital Government Technology, Human Factors, and Policy, Kluwer, Norwell, MA., 2002, 259-73. 14. J.R. Gil-García et al., Interorganizational Information Integration in the Criminal Justice Enterprise: Preliminary Lessons from State and County Initiatives, in Proceedings of the 38th Hawaiian International Conference on System Sciences, IEEE Computer Society Press: Los Alamitos, CA, 2005. 15. W.W. Cohen, Data Integration Using Similarity Joins and a Word-Based Information Representation Language, ACM Transactions on Information Systems 18, 3 (2000), 288-321. 16. S.P. Reiss, Simplifying Data Integration: The Design of the Desert Software Development Environment, in ICSE-18, 1996. 17. J.L. Ambite and C.A. Knoblock, Agents for Information Gathering, IEEE Expert Intelligence Systems & Their Applications 12, 5 (1997), 2-5. 18. C.N. Hsu and C.A. Knoblock, Semantic Query Optimization for Query Plans of Heterogeneous Multidatabase Systems, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 12, 6 (2000), 959-79. 19. R. Krishnan et al., On Heterogeneous Database Retrieval: A Cognitively Guided Approach, Information Systems Research 12, 3 (2001), 286-301. 20. M. Safai-Amini, Information Technologies: Challenges and Opportunities for Local Governments, Journal of Government Information 27 (2000), 471-9. 21. G.K. Tayi and D.P. Ballou, Examining Data Quality, Communications of the ACM 41, 2 (1998). 22. F. Naumann, U. Leser, and J.C. Freytag, Quality-driven Integration of Heterogeneous Information Systems, in International Conference on Very Large Systems (VLDB), Edinburgh, UK, 1999. 23. D.P. Ballou and H.L. Pazer, Designing Information Systems to Optimize the Accuracy-Timeliness Trade-off, Information Systems Research 6, 1 (1995), 51-72. 24. D.M. Strong, Y.W. Lee and R.Y. Wang, Data Quality in Context, Communications of the ACM 40, 5 (1997). 25. F.W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc, New York, 1967, ed. 1911. 26. M. Hammer and J. Champy, Re-engineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution, Harper Collins, New York, 1993. 27. T.A. Davenport, Process Innovation: Reengineering Work Through Information Technology, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 1993. 28. S. Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power, Basic Books, New York, 1984. 29. S.S. Dawes and T.A. Pardo, Maximizing Knowledge for Program Evaluation: Critical Issues and Practical Challenges of ICT Strategies, 5th International EGOV Conference, Krakow, Poland, 2006. 30. T.A. Pardo et al., Interorganizational Knowledge Sharing in Public Sector Innovations, in Best Paper Proceedings, Annual Conference of the Academy of Management, Washington DC., 2001. 31. P.S. Ring and A.H. van de Ven, Developmental Processes of Cooperative Interorganizational Relationships, Academy of Management Review 19, 1 (1994), 90-118. 32. A. Larson, Network Dyads on Entrepreneurial Settings: A Study of the Governance of Relationships, Administrative Science Quarterly 36 (1992), 76-104. 33. M.L. Nathan and I.I. Mitroff, The Use of Negotiated Order Theory as a Toll for the Analysis and Development of an Interorganizational Field, Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 27, 2 (1991), 16380. 34. P. Hart and C. Saunders, Power and Trust: Critical Factors in the Adoption and Use of Electronic Data Interchange, Organization Science 8, 1 (1997), 23-42. 35. R.S. Burt, The Contingent Value of Social Capital, Administrative Science Quarterly 42, June (1997), 339-65. 36. K.T. Dirks and D.L. Ferrin, The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings, Organization Science 12, 4 (2001), 450-67. 37. K. Kumar, H.G. van Dissel and P. Bielli, The Merchant of Prato-Revisited: Toward a Third Rationality of Information Systems, MIS Quarterly 22, n (1998), 199-227. 38. A. Zaheer, B. McEvily and V. Perrone, Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance, Organization Science 9, 2 (1998), 141-58.


197

39. W.K. Powell, K.W. Koput and L. Smith-Doerr, Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, Administrative Science Quarterly 41 (1996), 11645. 40. R. Gulati, Social Structure and Alliance Formation Patterns: A Longitudinal Analysis, Administrative Science Quarterly 40, 4 (1995), 619-53. 41. R.C. Mayer, J.H. Davis and F.D. Schoorman, An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust, Academy of Management Review 20, 3 (1995), 709-34. 42. M. Dodgson, Learning, Trust, and Technological Collaboration, Human Relations 46, 1 (1993), 77-95. 43. P. Bloomfield, D. Westerling and R. Carey, Innovation and Risk in a Public-Private Partnership, Public Productivity and Management Review 21, 4 (1998), 460-71. 44. C. Hardy and N. Phillips, Strategies of Engagement: Lessons from the Critical Examination of Collaboration and Conflict in an Interorganizational Domain, Organization Science 9, 2 (1998), 217-30. 45. C.C. Han, Exploring a Path to the Formation of Network Collaboration, in Public Administration and Policy. University at Albany-SUNY, Albany, NY., 1998, 181. 46. D.E. Andersen, S. Belardo and S.S. Dawes, Strategic Information Management: Conceptual Frameworks for the Public Sector, Public Productivity and Management Review 17, 4 (1994), 335-53. 47. L.T. Hosme, Trust: The Connecting Link between Organization Theory and Philosophical Ethics, Academy of Management Review 20, 2 (1995), 379-403. 48. D.P. McCaffrey, S.R. Faerman and D.W. Hart, The Appeal and Difficulties of Participative Systems, Organization Science 6, 6 (1995), 603-27. 49. S.S. Dawes et al., Partners in State-Local Information Systems: Lessons from the Field, Center for Technology in Government, Albany, NY, 1997. 50. J.M. Logsdon, Interests and Interdependence in the Formation of Social Problem-Solving Collaborations. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 27, 1 (1999), 23-37. 51. R.C. Hill and D. Hellriegel, Critical Contingencies in Joint Venture Management: Some Lessons from Managers, Organization Science 5, 4 (1994), 594-607. 52. S.S. Dawes, Interagency Information Sharing: Expected Benefits, Manageable Risks, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 15, 3 (1995), 377-94. 53. D.P. Warwick, A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1975. 54. P. Navarro, The Policy Game: How Special Interests and Ideologies Are Stealing America, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1984. 55. M.J. Green, The Other Government: The Unseen Power of Washington Lawyers, W.W. Norton, New York 1978. 56. D. Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, Doxbury Press, North Scituate, MA., 1978. 57. D.B. Walker, Toward a Functioning Federalism, Wintrop Publishers, Cambridge, MA, 1981. 58. K.G. Provan and H.B. Milward, A Preliminary Theory of Interorganizational Network Effectiveness: A Comparative Study of Four Community Mental Health Systems, Administrative Science Quarterly 40, 1 (1995), 1-33. 59. H.B. Milward and K.G. Provan, Principles for Controlling Agents: The Political Economy of Network Structure, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8, 2 (1998), 203-21. 60. E. Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1998. 61. D. Osborne and T. Gabler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, Penguin Books, New York, 1992. 62. F.E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy. 2nd ed. Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1978. 63. J.A. Weiss, Pathways to Cooperation among Public Agencies, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 7, 1 (1994), 94-117. 64. D. Landsbergen and G. Wolken, Eliminating Legal and Policy Barriers to Interoperable Government Systems, Annual Research Conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, New York, 1998. 65. A. Strauss and J. Corbin, Grounded Theory in Practice, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1998. 66. A. Strauss and J. Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1998. 67. M. Eidson et al., Dead Bird Surveillance as an Early Warning System for West Nile Virus, Emerging Infectious Diseases 7, 4 (2001), 631-5.

198


Government by Wire: Distance, Discourse and the Impact of Technology Frank Bannister and Regina Connolly Trinity College, Dublin and Dublin City University, Ireland

Abstract. When most people talk about e-government, in practice, they are referring to e-public administration. Discussion of how information and communications technology (ICT) might be used in the processes of governing as such has been limited to a few areas such as document flow management and executive support type technologies. A decision by the Irish government in 2003 to disperse government departments throughout the state raised many questions, not least political and administrative, but amongst these was the potential of technology to alleviate the problems the practical problems likely to arise when senior civil servants are geographically dispersed and, by implication, on the ability of technology to facilitate the process of government itself. This paper is a theoretical exploration of the likely contribution, if any, of ICT to supporting the process of policy formulation where those involved in the process are dispersed and asks whether this is yet another technology where the hype fails to take account of practicalities. Keywords. e-government, decentralization, communications, groupware

1. Introduction In December 2003, during an otherwise unexceptional budget speech, the then Irish Minister for Finance unexpectedly announced an extensive programme of decentralization of the Irish civil service. The plan envisaged that five departments of state, several state agencies and approximately 10,500 of the approximately 33,000 civil servants currently based in the capital Dublin would move to 57 locations scattered around the country [1]. Decentralization had been on the Irish political agenda for decades, but heretofore it had only proceeded fitfully. A number of government operations and some state agencies had been successfully moved out of Dublin, but the scale was small and the moves voluntary. Furthermore, heretofore, the functions that had, in the past, been moved out of Dublin shared two important characteristics. First they were executive operations. In practice, this meant that most of the staff involved were junior with a only a small cadre of senior staff required to manage them. Second they were nearly all operations that did not routinely require civil servants to deal with the public face-toface. While still stated to be voluntary, the decentralization now proposed was different, again in two respects, from previous initiatives. First it involved moving whole departments out of Dublin, i.e. far away from the Dáil (parliament) and the

F. Bannister and R. Connolly / Government by Wire

199

centre of government. Second, it was both on a large scale and was to be implemented over a short period of time. This chapter focuses on one of the assumptions underlying the rationale for dispersed government, namely that developments in information and in particular in communications technology make such a form of governance feasible. This was explicitly stated by the chief champion of decentralization, the then Minister for State at the Department of Finance, Tom Parlon [2], when he wrote: ‘In addition, the advent of broadband, the internet and e-mail, instant messaging and other advanced communication technologies now means that for many business functions, location is irrelevant’. The key word in the above quote is ‘many’. This chapter considers a function which is at the core concept of government and seeks to answer the following question: to what extent do current and foreseeable developments in ICT facilitate the development of policy electronically where politicians and senior civil servants are geographically dispersed? This chapter is organized as follows: x x x x x

First the concept of e-government in its literal, as opposed to its common, meaning will be examined; Secondly, the process of policy formulation will be examined conceptually using a practical example to illustrate the points made; Thirdly, the current state of the art in telecommunications and potential developments in that technology to support or enable policy development as a decentralized process will be examined; Fourthly research into the effectiveness and impact of electronically mediated group work, decision making and organisational cohesion will be reviewed; Finally all of the above will be brought together and the possible contribution of ICT to decentralization assessed.

2. e-Government and e-Administration According to Kayaa [3], the term ‘e-government’ was first coined in the United States. This is almost impossible to prove, but it is probably valid on etymological grounds. When Americans talk of ‘government’ they mean what Europeans understand by public administration. So while the term e-government is now ubiquitous, a much more accurate term, in Europe at least, would be e-public administration and services. In this chapter, the term e-government is used in its literal, rather than its colloquial sense, i.e. carrying out the practice of governance using, or with the assistance of, electronic tools. This chapter is about government per se, not service delivery. To make this distinction clear, a currently out-of-fashion model will be used namely the policy/execution divide. Prior to the Second World War, discussion of public administration was mostly in the context of this divide. After the war, this model was perceived to have serious shortcomings and many other models were proposed [4]. Perhaps the most influential of these, certainly from the 1980s onwards, has been new public management (NPM) [5]. While the policy/execution model has its limitations, it is not without its merits. In Ireland, this model reached its apotheosis in 1972 with the implementation of the

200


Devlin Report [6] which recommended that all government departments be divided into a policy making unit called an Aireacht (a Gaelic word which can be loosely translated as ‘policy group’) and an executive arm responsible for implementation of the policies determined by the Aireacht. The Aireacht would comprise the minister, his senior advisors and relevant specialists. The execution unit would be run by professional civil servants who would in effect be operations managers. While the enthusiasm for this model has waned over the years, and notwithstanding the launch in 1995 by the Irish government of its own Strategic Management Initiative [7], the concept of policy and execution divide in Irish public governance remains intact – de facto if not always de jure. As noted above, it has already been shown that executive agencies can be successfully decentralized. A question posed by the proposed 2003 decentralization plan was whether this could be done equally effectively for those arms of government responsible for policy development?

3. An Illustrative Case Study: Irish Medical Education In examining the process of policy formulation, it is helpful to relate it to a real case. The example that will be used is a current policy development in Ireland, namely the introduction of graduate entry to medical education. Traditionally, the only way to study medicine in Ireland has been via direct undergraduate entry into a medical school. For various reasons, there has been a longstanding shortage of places in these schools available to Irish students. As student entry is strictly based on performance in the final second level education examinations, for many years only the most academically gifted Irish students have been able to become doctors. As girls tends to out-perform boys academically in the 17-19 year old age group, it has meant the steady feminization of the medical profession. This is creating other problems, inter alia the unwillingness of an increasing number of female doctors to work the long and frequently unsociable hours traditionally associated with general practice and hospitals. There are other, more subtle, negative effects of this situation. Given that the incoming students tend to be academically orientated, many wish to pursue careers at the cutting edge of medicine. Consequently, as soon as they qualify, many go abroad to work or study further and many of these do not return. Another effect is that they tend to be less interested in the more mundane areas of medicine such as general practice. All of these factors have led to a shortage of Irish doctors in Ireland and an increasing reliance on doctors from other, often less economically advantaged, countries to keep the Irish health system working. In particular, there is potential crisis in looming in general practice as many family doctors are due to retire in the next decade. One health authority is actively looking to recruit from abroad to deal with a shortage of such doctors [8]. Faced with this situation, the government set up a Medical Education and Training Working Group to look at the problem. This group reported in 2005 [9], recommending that the government should introduce a system of graduate entry to medical schools, along the lines of the American model. While there is much more to this as a policy issue than is in the above sketch, it is sufficient to illustrate the points that follow.


201

4. The Process of Policy Formulation Policies rarely, if ever, spring, like the goddess Athena, fully formed from the head of some minister or civil servant. There are numerous other sources. Political parties and their election manifestos are one. Cabinets are another. A need for a policy or a revision to an existing policy may arise from public demand or plebiscite (as in Switzerland and California for example), political unrest, a decision of the judiciary, economic circumstances, the European Union, global events and so on. Policies may also come from pressure groups or members of the public. Where the requirement for a policy is identified, the first stage is usually to put together an outline of the problem(s) or need(s) to be addressed. Stakeholders must be identified, the scale of the problem quantified, data gathered, analyses undertaken and memos written. Various types of modelling may be needed to analyze the extent of the problem and the scale of the remedies required. Having defined the scope and scale of the problem and determined that it justifies action there normally follows a period in which different policy options are proposed and explored. Position papers are prepared, circulated and discussed, initially within the department responsible for the policy (in this example the Department of Education and Science). This circle soon expands to encompass other relevant ministries, departments, civil servants, agencies and external stakeholders. In this case, the Department of Health would have to be brought into the process almost from the start and the medical schools fairly soon afterwards. Research may be commissioned, further analyses undertaken and models built. Numerous internal, bilateral and multilateral meetings will be held. In theory this should all happen in a formal and structured manner. In practice, policy evolves in both formal and informal ways, the latter via informal meetings, networking, ad hoc groups etc. Such informal methods of developing policy are widely recognized as important not only in the literature [10, 11, 12, 13], but come across in conversations with senior civil servants. Important elements in these informal structures are trust, networks and individual knowledge. The degree of publicness of this process varies. The government may set up a working party of public servants or an expert group (the latter is what happened in this case [14]). For policies with major public implications, a public commission or inquiry may be established and public submissions invited. White and green papers may be prepared and published to widen the debate. One way of looking at the development of policy is that it is a process built around conversations between and feedback loops involving stakeholder groups. Conversations can be formal and informal and can take place between individuals and groups. Informal and off-the-record discussions can play a key part in arriving at the compromises that are necessary in coming up with a workable public policy. It is not unknown, for example, for ministers to agree political trade-offs or for senior civil servants to have private meetings at which sensitive issues can be aired away from public or political eyes. The unrecorded nature of such discussions can be important and has become more so with the implementation of Freedom of Information (FoI) acts in many countries. The latter have opened up the possibility of all documented interpersonal exchanges including e-mails between public servants being later exposed to public scrutiny (as one senior civil servant observed, one impact of FoI has been to drive discussion away from paper with consequent implications for both the quality of decision-making and for the public record). This process is summarized in figure 1.

202


Figure 1: The process of policy development

The development of policy has other dimensions. One already mentioned is stakeholders. Few policies concern only one department or state agency. Most involve at least two, one of which is the finance ministry, and some involve several different public bodies not to mention citizens and special interest groups. In the case of Irish medical education, the two central state bodies most involved are the departments of Education and Health. Because there will be financial implications in any such policy change, the Department of Finance must be part of this conversation as must a number of other state agencies and public bodies, including the Health Services Executive (responsible for the health services) and the universities. Other groups affected include the Irish Medical Association, the Irish Hospital Consultants Association and the Irish Association of General Practitioners. Each of these may try to influence the shape of the policy by a variety of means including written submissions, public statements, public relations activities and behind-the-scenes lobbying. The civil servants responsible for developing the policy documents will also consider political, financial, economic and legal risks. There are questions of logistics and practicality which will have to be assessed. A regulatory impact assessment may also be undertaken [15]. It is clear from the above that the way that government and public administration operates is simultaneously complex and subtle and while there are many formal mechanisms within the process of government, a great deal of business is done in ways that are neither formal nor always documented. And all of this is before one even starts to consider the role of politicians. All experienced civil servants are well aware that ministerial wishes are frequently conveyed without anything being put in writing and sometimes without anything being said. Politicians like deniability. Thus, whilst the theory may talk of formality and transparency, in practice the place where decisions sometimes are made and business done is in private meetings, away from the public gaze. Given all of this, how might these processes work when ministers are in Dublin attending to cabinet and parliamentary business and their top officials are in the west of Ireland, over 150 kilometers away? Assuming that ministers and civil servants will not be travelling around together like a circus troupe, there will be a need for extensive electronic communications between them. The question here is whether the complexity and subtlety of the process described above is likely to be supported, enhanced or


203

undermined by having to rely on electronic intermediation? To answer this, it is first necessary to review what technology has to offer.

5. Collaboration Technologies There are four basic technologies, some with several variations, which are currently available to aid meetings and discussion where participants are separated by long distances: x x x x

Voice based systems including telephone, teleconferencing and fax; Voice and picture systems including video conferencing and videophones1; Document transmission services including e-mail and file transfer protocols; Groupware which may integrate some or all of the above and provide an additional range of utilities (see below).

All of these fall under a general heading of collaborative systems, but it is useful to distinguish them. 5.1. Voice Telephony comes in many formats. Conference calling has been available for many years, enabling numerous participants to join in such a call from any location in the world. Speaker telephones further facilitate this type of communication. Fax is ubiquitous. There are plenty of voice-based options including, increasingly, Internet Protocol (IP) telephony. The problem is that telephones are limited as communication tools. Documents can at best be exchanged only slowly and facial expressions or gestures cannot be seen. Asides are not possible on a conference call, unless participants open another private connection (see below). In general, while the telephone provides an excellent medium for certain types of communication, it is difficult to see it as more than continuing its role an adjunct technology in something as complex as formulating policy. 5.2. Video The two main technologies currently available are video telephony and videoconferencing. Both 3G and IP telephony promise the widespread use of video phones. While there are still bandwidth and reliability problems, it is only a matter of time before these technologies become commonplace, at least for important applications such as governmental discussions. Videoconferencing has been around for quite a long time (AT&T demonstrated the first videophone at the 1960 World Fair). Early videoconferencing used conventional television technologies and was only possible within organisations that had set up special (and often expensive) facilities for the purpose. With inexpensive portable devices and the Internet, the concept of anywhere to anywhere videoconferencing is becoming a reality. Bandwidth permitting, it is only a matter of time before this form of 1 Virtual reality is also starting to emerge as an option, but is as yet in an embryonic form so it will not be considered here.

204


communication becomes routine. There are two basic models: one where all participants go to a special room, equipped with cameras, electronic whiteboards and other useful devices and a quite different approach based on split screen technology, local cameras and PCs. Many variations and combinations of these are possible. A third model, explored by Kraut et al. [16], is to have cameras in public areas where people can ‘catch’ each other as they pass by. 5.3. e-Mail and Document Exchange In terms of how civil servants work, e-mail has had a profound impact, not least on speeding up the slow migration of files from outbox to inbox. For public servants email has some downsides. High up on the list of these is that every e-mail becomes part of the permanent record. Not only do e-mails leak (see, for example, [17]), but, under FoI, they can be accessed by journalists and the public. This is, of course, also true of paper files, but the nature of e-mail correspondence tends to be more reactive and less formal. Public servants are aware that anything they type today may appear on the front page of a national newspaper tomorrow. Consequently comments may become guarded and sensitive discussions will tend to become verbal. The implications of this for record keeping are worrying [18]. Where e-mail is simply replacing the formerly hand written or typed record, this is no different from what went before. There may be a higher risk of leakage or ill-judged comment and searches are easier, but structurally the situation is unchanged. This is not true where e-mail is used as a substitute for verbal discussion. No civil servant in her right mind would engage in a free and frank discussion with a colleague by e-mail. If a topic is that sensitive, a smart civil servant will go to her colleague’s office and talk it through there. If, however, that office is on the other side of the country, this is not an option. There is always the telephone, but some matters are best discussed face-to-face and away from potential eavesdroppers. Moreover, as e-mail messages have the potential to be misconstrued leading to misunderstandings [19, 20], civil servants may simply prefer face-to-face communications to technology-mediated communications. 5.4. Groupware In addition to e-mail, groupware covers a range of different technologies such as: x x x x x x x x

Bulletin boards; Electronic whiteboards; Chat rooms; Messaging systems; Hypertext databases; Document sharing; Intra- and extranets; The Internet.

Sometimes these are clustered as in electronic meeting systems. These too have the disadvantage that they leave an audit trail and paradoxically this can, on the one hand inhibit discussion, and on the other, lead to problems when discussion occasionally


205

become too uninhibited. It is not surprising that use of this type of technology is the subject of much research, some of which is now considered.

6. The Impact of Technology on Collaboration There is a large body of research into how people communicate and interact in organisations. Unsurprisingly, the view that one gets depends on which literature one reads. For example one can approach the subject from the perspectives of organisation theory, psychology, communications theory, media richness theory, group dynamics, social information processing theory and collaborative technology to name but some. In the context of this chapter, there is a rapidly growing literature on the impact of ICT on human communications, team working, cohesion, collaborative work and so on. Space constraints preclude an extensive discussion of this subject, but some key considerations and important lessons that emerge from the literature and from recent research are outlined below. A useful place to start is with the champions of technology. ‘The death of distance’ has become one of the catchphrases of the dot.com era [21, 22]. A not uncommon layman’s view, as articulated by Minister Parlon (see above), is that modern communications has eliminated or can eliminate the need for members of teams or groups to work in close proximity to each other. In the academic literature, the support for this viewpoint is decidedly mixed; the view one gets depending to some extent on the literature one reads. While there are certain common or shared themes and conclusions, beneath the surface, many subtle points arise. Unsurprisingly, much of the technology-oriented literature focuses on technical types of teamwork and investigates the impact of technology related factors such as bandwidth and security (for example, [23]). Even within the confines of this literature interesting questions surface. For example, in an article on Conway’s Law, which states any IT architecture mirrors the structure of the organisation that designed it [24], Herbsleb and Grinter [25] note that one impact of distance in teams of programmers working on the same project is that issues take longer to resolve. However, in general, the tone in the literature tends to be positive. Nunamaker et al. [26] undertook an extensive experiment with electronic meeting systems at the University of Arizona and analysed what they describe as the process gains and losses concluding that, within the confines of the application they were examining, the advantages outweighed the drawbacks. Burke et al. [27] assert that the effect of electronic media on cohesion and what they call process satisfaction is initially dependent on the richness of the media (for example its ability to convey cues such as body language or tone of voice), but that with extended used, cohesion and process satisfaction improve with all types of media, irregardless of richness. From other perspectives, things are not seen in quite so positive a light. For example, an important aspect of individual and group interaction is informal communication. This has been mentioned several times as an important aspect of the policy development process; it also plays a central role in much negotiation, in building networks and in social bonding. Research by Mintzberg [28, 29] and others has shown that 50% or more of managers’ time can be spent in informal conversations. An excellent summary of this is given by Kraut et al. [16] who classify such conversations into four types:

206


x x x x

Scheduled where A and B plan to meet; Intended where A sets out to find B; Opportunistic where A needs to talk with B and happens to meet him; Spontaneous where A and B meet by chance and a discussion develops.

They show that probability of the latter two increases greatly the nearer A and B’s offices are to each other, particularly if they share an office or their offices are on the same floor. The effect diminishes with different floors and much more so with different buildings. Clearly if the distances between offices are measured in kilometres, there will be no meetings of the second type and meetings of the third type and fourth types will be rare. Kraut et al. [16] also showed that, while the scheduled meetings were much more productive than chance encounters, much important work is done in unscheduled meetings (i.e. types 2 to 4). Other research cited by Kraut et al. [16] has shown that personal relationships including liking and trust are positively correlated with physical proximity. Their conclusion is that physical proximity has a significant effect not only on communications, but also on working relationships, trust and social and psychological processes in organisations. Their research was aimed at addressing this problem with different uses of technology. Wilson et al. [30] approach the concept of proximity from a quite different perspective, asserting that a key factor in team interaction and cohesiveness is what they call subjective distance; i.e. it is not the spatial, but the psychological perception of distance that may be of more importance. Subjective distance is an individual’s cognitive and affective representation of his or her distance from other actors. Notwithstanding Allen’s [31] work on the impact of distance on communications, Wilson et al point out that there are many examples of dysfunctional teams where members work in close proximity to each other. Conversely, there are examples of geographically dispersed teams working effectively; they cite the case of open software developments such as Linux. The reasons why development projects like Linux or the Apache server work may be due to the narrow scope of the objectives and the shared culture and values of the team. Team members may be on opposite sides of the globe and may have never met, but they have common goals and values; they feel an affinity with each other and with the group. In their wide-ranging review of research to date, Wilson et al conclude that the impact of technology and the absence of face-to-face contact on subjective distance is not clear, in part because research done to date has not taken sufficient account of contextual factors. A third strand in the literature is the degree of significance, not just of proximity, but of face–to-face meetings. A widely cited definition of a meeting comes from Goffman [32] who defined a meeting as an interaction with a central situational focus. Wasson [33], using an ethnological study, shows that this definition breaks down when meetings become virtual and there no visual presence at the meeting (as there would be in a videoconference for example). Even when there is videoconferencing, visual presence is usually limited. From a communications perspective, there are three important differences between electronic and face-to-face meetings namely: x x x

Tone of voice; Visual cues; Positioning.


207

In a face-to-face meeting, the position of people at a table matters. Looking at a cabinet meeting, it will be observed that the table is typically oval rather than round. The most important ministers will either be located beside the Prime Minister, President or whoever or directly opposite him or her. Less important ministers are further away and find it more difficult to enter the discussion. Tone of voice can convey much. Body language can speak volumes. How much of this is lost in an electronic meeting depends on the richness and the quality of the media. For example, where there is limited vision two things often occur. First meetings often take place at more than one level. In a face-to-face meeting, one person can speak at a time. There may be a dialogue going on or one person may be delivering a long speech. Protocol, the chairperson and implicit meeting rules or norms will determine who gets to speak when. While that person is speaking, everybody else pays attention. Those who visibly do not, for example by reading, will normally face peer pressure to desist. This is not the case in a virtual meeting. Here meetings can be played out at several different levels via different technologies. Any member may separately telephone or e-mail another member (or speak to them if they are nearby) without other members of the group necessarily being aware of this. This changes the dynamic of the meeting. Secondly (though less important for this discussion), members multitask, engaging in other non-relevant activities during the meeting. This may improve the productivity of the person concerned, but it is also likely to lead to a deterioration in the quality of discourse if many people are not giving the discussion their full attention. Even where there is visual communication, it is limited and dependent on camera angles, split screens and so on. Looking at this problem, Anson and Munkvold [34] report that, whilst many of the features of face-to-face meetings extend into distributed meetings, it is more difficult to maintain engagement and participation in such meetings. In another study, Kelly et al. [35] studied the impact of media richness on the development of cohesion from the perspective of media richness theor(ies) which seek to compare the effectiveness of electronically mediated with face-to-face meetings. Cohesion is defined by McGrath [36] as the interpersonal transactions of individuals within a group both to other individuals in the group and to the group as a whole. Cohesion occurs when all individuals in a group perceive that both personal and group goals can be attained through group action. Some of these theories relate to ‘bandwidth’ suggesting that the more of this there is, the more cohesive the group. Burke et al suggest a hierarchy of bandwidth along the following lines: x x x x x x

Face-to-face; Video conference; Combined audio/video; Audio conference; Synchronous computer mediated communications (messaging, chat rooms); Asynchronous computer mediate communications (e-mail, bulletin boards).

They suggest that while richer media lead to faster development of cohesion, over time, all electronically mediated communications facilitates cohesion. It must be said that their evidence for this is not strong being based on use of a survey instrument and a small number of studies.

208


Campbell [37] notes that research into the use of videoconferencing technology shows both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, it leads to shorter, more task oriented and structured meetings. There is more order, more equality of participation and exchanges of opinion. Persuasion seems to be more effective. Respondents to his survey also reported large decreases in informal exchanges and non-task related communications during meetings. On the other hand, no matter how sophisticated the medium, some non-verbal forms of communication are lost. A participant is restricted to what the camera(s) show(s). She cannot look around and read signals from those not currently on screen. There is a loss of what Hiemstra [38] calls ‘social presence’ and the psychological and physical stimulation that this can generate. The psychological consequences of reduced social presence should not be underestimated as, although technological changes such as email and voice mail have made face-to-face communication unnecessary, an over-reliance on technology can create its own problems. For example, Hallowell [39, 20] has found that the replacement of face-to-face contact by technology-mediated communication can have psychologically destructive consequences. He cites examples of where his clients’ over-reliance on technology has resulted in misunderstandings, where e-mail messages were misconstrued, voice mails forwarded to the wrong person, and offense taken when a person is not included on a circulation list. While, when viewed singly, the consequences of these misunderstandings may appear minor, Hallowell argues that over a period of time, they exact a toll both on the individuals who are reliant on the technology and on the organizations for which they work. He emphasizes the need for face-to-face contact as it provides both a psychological benefit to the individual and a strategic benefit to the organisation. Another consequence of the depersonalization effect of computer-mediated communications, as noted in the literature [40, 41, 19, 42], is its effect on trust building. Research has shown that when groups of people working on common projects are separated by distance (as can be the case with government departments), the success or failure of such virtual teams is determined by the level of trust between individuals, with high performing teams demonstrating high levels of trust [40, 43]. Trust has been shown to result in more open communication, cooperation, and improved decisionmaking [44] in distributed work arrangements. However, the development of trust becomes more difficult when communication is predominantly mediated by e-mail or groupware technology. In their study of the influence of four different communication situations on the emergence of trust in teams communicating at a distance, Bos et al. [45] found that video and audio-conferencing groups were second to face-to-face communication in terms of their ability to generate trust between those communicating. Both forms of technology-mediated communication showed evidence of delayed trust (i.e. slower progress towards full cooperation) and fragile trust (the participants were very conscious of their vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour). Similarly, a study by Jensen et al. [46] found that in an online environment the choice of communication modality significantly influences levels of cooperation and trust, with voice communication providing the most positive results. The clear implication of these studies is that while technology can provide significant benefits in facilitating distributed work arrangements, it can never replace or lessen the importance of face-toface communication. What emerges from this brief review is that problems in cohesiveness and coordination of the type required for policy formulation can occur for reasons other than spatial separation. There are many other forms of distance besides the geographical.


209

Examples are technological distance, cultural distance, institutional distance, status distance and so on. Objective distance itself can be more than simply spatial; it can include temporal distance and what O’Leary and Cummings [47] call configurational difference. Temporal difference, where people work in different time zones, is not a problem in most government. Configurational differences are. These relate to the ways in which people are separated. In Dublin, the head offices of the departments of Education, Finance and Health are within 20 minutes walking time of each other. If one of these departments was, say, over a hour or more by car or train apart from the other two adjacent departments the nature of the discourse and the relationships between parties cannot but be affected. Other theorists argue that proximity is essential to some types of business. Cities are particularly efficient for precisely this reason. Kim, cited by the Economist [48], states that over 40% of employment in the USA is located in 1.5% of its land area. Storper and Venables [49] argue that, while certain types of business can be done remotely, anything that involves serious/major deals requires face-to-fact contact.

7. Summary of potential impacts In summary, and somewhat cautiously, the following are some of the relevant points suggested by the literature: x There are many dimensions of the concept of distance when applied to group work of which spatial separation is only one; x The nature of the physical separation matters; x There are some situations where not being in close proximity may actually make teams more effective; but x Where there is high task interdependence or time pressure, then proximity may be essential for effectiveness; x Studies indicate that an absence of face-to-face contact can impact negatively on both individual and organisational effectiveness. Moreover, face-to-face communication is more effective at building trust and cooperation between team members than any form of technology-mediated communication; x There are examples of groups which can and do work closely together although separated by great distances; x Groups which work effectively over distance tend to be specialized communities with shared goals, skills and values; x With increasing distance (from as little as 30 metres) the number of all faceto-face meetings falls rapidly. The incidence of opportunistic or spontaneous meetings quickly falls to zero; x The research tends to focus on existing technology-mediated groups. There is limited research on the impact where the situation is fluid and groups come into and go out of existence frequently and/or the membership changes as the situation evolves; x With time, people may adapt to electronic media and the absence of technical richness in those media may become less important; x Use of technology for virtual meetings tends to change the nature of the meeting, enhancing efficiency, increasing formality, but leading to less engagement in the process;

210


x x

Electronic meetings can work well, but no matter how good the technology, much is lost; Finally, while there may be a gain in time usage, the elapsed time required to develop policy may increase due to the substitution of formal process for informal communication.

This is summarized in figure 2

Cohesiveness

Speed

Flexibility

Quality of Debate

Efficiency

-

+ + Process Effectiveness + +

Structure

Standardisation

Nature of process

Contextual Factors

Nature of Separation

Transparency

Task Dependence/Complexity Figure 2: Summary of the impacts of ICT on policy formulation process

There are significant implications of this for the process and the effectiveness of the process of policy formulation in a decentralized administration.

8. Reflections and Conclusions A number of conclusions can be tentatively drawn from the preceding discussion. The most important of these is that information and communications technology is likely to be of limited value in the specific case of contentious or complex policy development when actors are spatially separated. There will be some benefits to the process. In particular, use of electronic media is likely to make the process more structured and efficient. In as much as an objective is to formalize and standardize the way of doing things, increased dependence on or use of electronic media is likely to be helpful. Furthermore, the literature suggests that with use some of the shortcomings of electronic media decrease (though they do not vanish) over time. With extensive use of this technology, the ability to use it will increase and the value obtained will improve.


211

On the other hand, the absence of proximity may lead to a loss of cohesion. The potential impact here is unclear. The evidence suggests that strongly motivated teams, sharing goals, cultures and methods do work well, if not always quite as efficiently, when spatially separated provided the technology is reliable and secure. The difficulty is that policy is not developed by groups of this type. While there may be a level of shared cultural values (provided that process are put in place to retain this), there will be differences in sectional cultural values and there will frequently be conflicting goals (for example, the Department of Health wants more doctors, the universities want more money, science departments may be concerned about their ability to cope with a flood of applicants, the medical professions in Ireland may be worried about lower standards and so on). In such a complex situation, as Storper and Venables [49] point out, faceto-face meetings become essential and off-the-record informal negotiations critical. The absence of spontaneous meetings may not matter, but the absence of ad hoc intended meetings may well matter. That technology enabled distance meetings are as effective as face-to-face meetings for certain types of need is all very well, but for broader context these conclusions may not apply. Bekkers [50] uses the development of Linux to make this point. Speaking of how to make distance working more effective, Bekkers [50: 201] points out that: ‘The first lesson is that it is necessary to have a clear, rather narrow … focus ...’ (emphasis added). But only a small fraction of policy developments have a narrow focus. Furthermore, those that do tend to be internal to departments or agencies and are less likely to need electronic media to facilitate their development. Much policy development is often far from narrow and focused at any stage of its evolution. While there has been much research into this topic, none of it maps closely onto the processes of policy formulation in government. Studies have tended to be either intra-organisational or within communities of practice and/or of specialized groups. While there have been notable successes in remote collaboration in each of these, it would not be safe to infer that this will be true in the much more complex processes of government. The concept of subjective distance might seem to offer some degree of comfort. These are all civil servants, brought up in the same system. They share an ethos and a value system. Many will have worked in several departments during their careers. Perhaps physical distance will matter less than intuition suggests it might? On the other hand, the evidence of the importance of face-to-face meetings in deal making and multi-party negotiations suggests that, whatever the technology, people are still going to want to be physically in the same room for critical discussions. The impact on different types of meeting will depend on the configuration of the decentralization. If an entire department is relocated, then the impact on scheduled, intended, opportunistic and spontaneous meetings within the department will only differ from the current situation inasmuch as the design or layout of building differ. If, as was proposed for some departments, the department were to be split over several locations, then only scheduled meetings will remain. For inter departmental meetings, the situation will remain as before, i.e. meetings will all be scheduled, but the frequency will drop and the formality will rise. It may be that the answer to the questions posed by this chapter cannot be answered with conviction until such time as a government actually puts decentralization along the lines proposed in Ireland, into effect. At the time of writing it looks as if the Irish government’s decentralization plan will become a victim to the current economic crisis in the government’s finances. From a research perspective, if from no other, that will be a pity. Were decentralization to proceed as planned in

212


Ireland, it would provide a unique laboratory for assessing how well some of the theory about the ICT on communication in the public administration, plays out in practice.

References [1] [2] [3]

[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]

[15] [16]

[17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26]

Department of Finance, Financial Statement (Budget Speech by Minister McCreevy), 2004, available at: http://www.budget.gov.ie/2004/speech04.asp (accessed 10 July 2006). T. Parlon, Good for the Regions and Good for Dublin, The Irish Times, 10 June 2005. J. Kayaa, Implementing e-Government Services in East Africa: Assessing Status through Content Analysis of Government Websites, Electronic Journal of e-Government 2, 1 (2004), available at: www.ejeg.com/volume-2/volume2-issue-1/v2-i1-art5.htm (accessed 10 July 2006). L. Mainzer, Public Administration in Search of a Theory: The Interdisciplinary Delusion, Administration & Society 26, 3 (1994), 359-94. A. Gray and B. Jenkins, From Public Administration to Public Management: Reassessing a Revolution, Public Administration 73, Spring (1995), 75-99. L. Devlin, Report of Public Services Organisation Review Group, 1966-1969, Stationery Office, Dublin, 1969. D. Byrne et al., Strategic Management in the Irish Civil Service: A Review Drawing on Experience in New Zealand and Australia, Administration, The Institute of Public Administration 43, 1 (1995). The Irish Times, 31 May 2005. The Irish Times, 14 July 2005. M. Sinetar, The Informal Discussion Group – A Powerful Agent for Change, Sloan Management Review 29, 3 (1994), 61-5. D. Johnson, W. Donohue, K. Charles and S. Johnson, Differences between Formal and Informal Communication Channels, The Journal of Business Communication 31, 2 (1994), 111-22. S. Crampton, J. Hodge and J. Mishra, The Information Communications Network: Factors Influencing Grapevine Activity, Public Personnel Management 27, 4 (1998), 569-84. G. Michelson and V. Suchitra Mouly, ‘You didn’t hear it from us but…’: Towards an Understanding of Rumour and Gossip in Organizations, Australian Journal of Management 27 (2002), 57-65. Department of Education and Science, Martin and Dempsey Announce Details of Working Group on Undergraduate, 2003, available at: www.education.ie/robots/view.jsp?pcategory=10861&language =EN&ecategory=11465&link=link001&doc=19133 (accessed 10 July 2006). Department of Finance, Guidelines for the Appraisal and Management of Capital Expenditure Proposals in the Public Sector, Department of Finance, Dublin, 2005. R. Kraut, S. Fish, R. Root and B. Chalfonte, Informal Communications in Organizations: Form, Function and Technology, in I. Oskamp and S. Spacapan (eds.), People’s Reactions to Technology (The Claremont Symposium on Applied Social Psychology), Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, 1990, 145-99. The Guardian, Ministers bid to plug email leak, 7 June 2002, available at: www.guardian. co.uk/traincrash/Story/0,2763,728918,00.html (accessed 10 July 2006). M. Du Rea and D. Pemberton, Electronic Mail and Electronic Data Interchange: Challenges to Record Management, Records Management Quarterly 28, 4 (1994), 3-12. L. Sproull and S. Kiesler, Reducing Social Context Cues: Electronic Mail in Organizational Communication, Management Science 32, 11 (1986), 1492-1512. E.M. Hallowell, The Human Moment at Work, Harvard Business Review 77, 1 (1999), 58-64. F. Cairncross, The Death of Distance: How the Communication Revolution Will Change Our Lives, HBS Press, Boston, 1996. G.M. Olson and J.S. Olson, The (Currently) Unique Advantages of Collocated Work, in P. Hinds and S. Kiesler (eds.), Distributed Work, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 113-36. M. Maybury, Collaborative Virtual Environments for Analysis and Decision Support, Communications of the ACM 44, 12 (2002), 51-3. M.E. Conway, How Do Committees Invent?, Datamation, 14(4) (1968), 28-31. J. Herbsleb and R. Grinter, Architectures, Coordination and Distance: Conway’s Law and Beyond, IEEE Software, September/October (1999), 63-70. J. Nunamaker, A. Dennis, J. Valacich, D. Vogel and J. George, Electronic Meeting Systems to Support Group Work, Communications of the ACM 34, 7 (1991), 41-61.


213

[27] K. Burke, A. Kregg and L. Chidanbaram, Media Effects on the Development of Cohesion and Process Satisfaction in Computer Supported Workgroups, Information Technology and People 14, 2 (2001), 122-41. [28] H. Mintzberg, Managerial Work: Analysis From Observation, Management Science 18, 2 (1971), B97B110. [29] H. Mintzberg, The Manager’s Job: Folklore and Fact, Harvard Business Review, March-April (1990), 163-7. [30] J. Wilson, M. Boyer O’Leary, A. Metiu and Q. Jett, Subjective Distance in Teams, INSEAD Working Paper Series 2005/38/OB, 2005. [31] T. Allen, Managing the Flow of Technology, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1977. [32] E. Goffman, Behaviour in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings, Free Press, New York, 1993. [33] C. Wasson, Multitasking During Virtual Meetings, Human Resources Planning 26, 4 (2004), 47-60. [34] R. Anson and B. Munkvold, Beyond Face-to-Face: A Field Study of Electronic Meetings in Different Time and Place Modes, Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce, Mahwah 14, 2 (2004), 127-52. [35] Kelly et al. 2001? [36] J. McGrath, Groups: Interaction and Performance, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1984. [37] J. Campbell, The Impact of Videoconference Meeting on the Patterns and Structure of Organisational Communication, Singapore Management Review 19, 1 (1997), 77-93. [38] G. Hiemstra, Teleconferencing: Concern for Face and Organisational Culture, in M. Burgeon (ed.), Communications Yearbook 6, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, 1982, [PP.]. [39] E.M. Hallowell, Overloaded Circuits: Why Smart People Underperform, Harvard Business Review, January (2005), Article number R0501E. [40] P. Kanawattanachai and Y. Yoo, Dynamic Nature of Trust in Virtual Teams, Sprouts: Working Paper on Information Environments, Systems and Organizations 2, 2 (2005), 41-58. [41] M. O’ Hara-Devereaux and F. Johanson, Global Work: Bridging Distance, Culture, and Time, JosseyBass, San Francisco, CA, 1994. [42] S. Kiesler, J. Siegel and T.W. McGuire, Social Psychological Aspects of Computer Mediated Communication, American Psychologist 39, 10 (1984), 1123-34. [43] D. Meyerson, K.E. Weick and R.M. Kramer, Swift Trust and Temporary Groups, in R.M. Kramer and T.R. Tyler (eds.), Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1986, 166-95. [44] J. Lipnack and J. Stamps, Virtual Teams: People Working Across Boundaries with Technology, Wiley, New York, 2000. [45] N. Bos, J. Olsen, D. Gergel, G. Olsen and S. Wright, Confidence and Trust: Effects of Four Computer Mediated Communications Channels on Trust Development, Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems: Changing Our World, Changing Ourselves, Minnesota, USA, 20-25 April 2002. [46] C. Jensen, S. Farnham, S. Drucker and P. Kollock, The Effect of Communication Modality on Cooperation in Online Environments, Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2000, 470-7. [47] M. O’Leary and J. Cummings, The Spatial, Temporal and Configurational Characteristics of Geographic Dispersion in Work Teams, Working Paper Number 148, MIT E-Business Centre, Cambridge, MA, 2002. [48] The Economist, Business: Press the Flesh, not the Keyboard; Face-to-face Communications, 364(8287) (2002), 56. [49] M. Storper and A. Venables, Buzz; Face-to-Face Contact and the Urban Economy, Journal of Economic Geography 4, 4 (2004), 351-70. [50] V. Bekkers, Virtual Policy Communities and Responsive Governance: Redesigning On-line Debates, Information Polity 9, 3/4 (2004), 193-205.


Part C Conclusions



217

The Myths and Ceremonies of EGovernment: Beyond the Hype of a New and Better Government? Victor Bekkers and Vincent Homburg Erasmus University Rotterdam, Department of Public Administration, the Netherlands

Abstract. The hype around e-government can also be understood in terms of myths. Myths play an important role in policy formulation because they can inspire and convince and thus can stimulate collective action. However, they can also blur our perspective on reality. In such cases people talk about ‘hypes’. In this chapter we look at policy documents regarding the first waves in the establishment of electronic government in Australia, Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands. We discuss these documents in terms of myths in order to understand the cleft between the ambitions of these documents and daily reality. Four myths are constructed and discussed: the myth of a new and better government which operates as a single unit, the myth of technological progress, the myth of rational information planning and the myth of the intelligent and empowered consumer. Key words. E-government, myths, institutional innovation

1. Introduction At the end of the millennium a new frontier in public administration was promised. A perspective of radical change was sketched: a more efficient, more client-friendly government accessible 24 hours per day, seven days per week. In this sketch the Internet was embraced as a liberalizing technology. A ‘hype’ was born. Typical for hypes is the over-enthusiasm with which new ideas or new technologies are approached and the disappointment that sets in after some time when the practical impact of these new ideas of technologies is assessed. We describe e-government as the use of modern information and communication technologies – currently especially Internet and web technology – by a public organization to support or redefine the existing and/or future information, communication and transaction relations with ‘stakeholders’ in the internal and external environment in order to create added value [1, 2, 3]. Relevant stakeholders are citizens, companies, societal organizations, other government organizations and civil servants [5, 6]. Added value can be found in the following goals: increasing government accessibility, increasing the quality of service delivery, stimulating internal efficiency, supporting public and political accountability, and increasing the political participation of citizens. In various national e-government policy documents, the image of a new and better government has taken shape. Notwithstanding this intuitive appeal, the implementation pace of many e-government initiatives has been criticized [4, 6, 7, 8]. There seems to

218

V. Bekkers and V. Homburg / The Myths and Ceremonies of E-Government

be a serious mismatch between the political objectives and challenges of e-government and the ability to meet them [6]. This may explain why some people talk about an egovernment ‘hype’. It is possible to analyze this gap in terms of instrumental factors which obstruct the implementation of e-government goals and programs. Relevant factors are the availability of an overall information and ICT infrastructure to ensure interoperability, threats in relation to privacy and security, the lack of financial resources and technical staff, the lack of expertise, resistance to changing existing working routines, the absence of top management and political commitment and the lack of effective cooperation between government agencies in sharing information [2, 4, 6, 7]. In this chapter we use a different perspective in order to understand the ‘hype’ concerning e-government. We analyze the assumptions behind several policy documents and try to understand them from a cultural perspective on policy processes. In such an approach policy programs can be understood in terms of the myths and ceremonies that policy makers use to inspire and convince in order to organize collective action [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. We therefore analyze the policy documents which were published during the first waves of e-government policy making in Australia, Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in order to reconstruct these myths. Our next step, discussed in the following section, is to examine and reflect upon these myths by comparing their contents with the empirical and theoretical body of knowledge regarding the use of ICT in public administration.

2. Myths and Rhetoric in Policy Processes What is the ‘story’ that the e-government hype, which started at the end of the 1990s, tells us? Policy-makers, politicians and citizens tell stories about the nature of policy problems and how they can be dealt with. Claims and demands are formulated [9, 10, 11]. Symbols, language and numbers í both real and artificial í play an important role in the (re)construction of any story about what has caused a problem and what actions should be undertaken to address it [14]. Edelman points to the importance of ‘language’ and ‘rhetoric’ that bureaucrats and politicians use to tell a story about the necessity of government intervention – for instance, to use ICT in order to reinvent government in terms of e-government. The real power in policy-making, he believes, resides in the process whereby problems, solutions and actions are constructed and articulated, since it is through language that we experience politics [9, 10]. In Edelman’s work, the emphasis is on the symbolic content of policy and politics and how policy-makers are involved in exploiting symbols and language [9, 10]. In the creation of myths rhetoric and symbolism come together. There are symbols that may refer to more or less real or ‘tangible’ rewards and resources, but there may also be condensational and emotional symbols that reassure and give an illusion of involvement or seem to offer a certain kind of solution [15]. Symbols and language are capacities which can be used to structure complex problems in ways and words that suit policy-makers and distort the perceptions of citizens; or, as Edelman has expressed it: “Words that succeed and policies that fail” [10]. The deconstruction of policy discourses and the demystification of the myths and symbols that are deployed by policy-makers is one of the core tasks of policy analysis [15]. A more positive approach of the role of myths in public administration can be found in the work of March and Olsen [12]. They promote an institutional approach to public


219

administration that focuses on the ‘rules’ that guide the behavior and interactions of individuals, groups and organizations in and around public administration. By rules they mean “the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms and technologies around which political activity is constructed”. They also view the beliefs, myths, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge that surround, support, elaborate or contradict these roles and routines as expressions of the rules [12]. These ‘rules’ and their embodiment into myths function as a frame of reference within and between organizations; a frame of reference that is shared among the members inside and outside the organization. This frame can be defined as a shared language or ‘a common grammar’ that enables people with different backgrounds to share and express common values, norms and experiences in order to coordinate and integrate behavior in a sensible way, thereby reducing ambiguity [16]. Myths are a part of this grammar. They facilitate the development of a shared understanding about the meaning of electronic government. March and Olsen conclude that myths do not only function as a scheme of interpretation for reducing the complexity and ambiguity of social reality [12], but also function as a source of inspiration to create or to enact social reality [16]. Myths define and (re)construct social reality and thus define the image of e-government and the revolutionary powers of ICT which can be used to express the desire and willingness to create a new and better government. Meyer and Rowan have shown us the importance of ‘myths’ and ‘ceremonies’ that legitimize the transformation of organizations to meet changing environmental conditions in order secure success, survival and resources. New public sector management techniques and reforms such as e-government can be seen as myths and ceremonies which, if adopted and performed, add to the legitimacy of an organization towards its environment. Implementing e-government can be viewed as a ceremony that an organization has to go through in order to meet the myths of ‘efficiency’ or the myth of ‘client-friendliness’. Conformity implies success; non-conformity implies failure [13]. From this point of view the introduction of e-government can be seen as ceremony, a ritual in which organizations in the public sector have to participate in order to show that they are able and willing to modernize themselves [17]. In general, we can conclude that myths play an important role in the policy process because (a) they play an important role in defining the construction of policy problems and solutions, (b) they add to the creation of shared understanding among different actors through the use of a ‘common grammar’, and (c) they play an important role in the legitimating of organizational transformations and policy changes. At the same time they can create an ‘implementation gap’, which is when the distance between the ambitions of e-government and the reality of implementation is too big. In order to construct these myths it is important to have a closer look at the assumptions that lie behind the several strategic policy documents that have been formulated in different countries.

3. Research Approach The reconstruction and interpretation of myths was done by confronting the policy assumptions of national e-government initiatives in various countries with the results of ICT studies undertaken in the field of public administration [e.g. 1, 18, 19, 20]. The countries we selected for the analysis are the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Australia and Canada. While small selections tend to be dubious, we support

220


this selection based on a number of criteria. First, there is the dispersion of continents. We have selected European and North American countries as well as Australia. Second, we have looked at countries that have deployed, in an earlier stage, a number of e-government initiatives. Australia and Canada are at the frontier of e-government, while the Netherlands and the United Kingdom can be characterized as relative ‘laggards’. Denmark is interesting because – like the other Scandinavian countries í it has a long-standing tradition of using ICT in public administration. It is interesting to see how Denmark has reacted to the challenges of using Internet technology in public administration. While this research approach seems to indicate a comparative design, this is not entirely accurate. It was not our research goal to compare the e-government policies of the countries involved and to link these policies to, for example, the typical institutional policy structures of the countries involved in the analysis. Moreover, we do not present an assessment of organizational, managerial and technical factors that could explain the success and failure of the e-government initiatives in the selected countries. Rather, our study aims at developing a preliminary inventory of national e-government policies, their contents, instrumentation and basic beliefs in order to illustrate that there is a rather common belief that the promises of e-government will be fulfilled. Furthermore, the policy documents that we selected stem from the first waves of the use of Internet and web technology in public administration (1994-2002), because in these documents we expect that the myths regarding the promise of e-government are most visible. This enables us to gain a better understanding about the gap between the rhetoric and reality of e-government. If we want to analyze this gap by comparing e-government policies of the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Australia and the United Kingdom, we must have a framework that allows the comparison of the assumptions that lay behind these policies. In our view, the following sets of assumptions are important. First, there are assumptions with respect to the goals and ambitions of e-government. What claims are put forth to justify the actions and investments to be made? Second, we refer to assumptions with respect to the assessment of the use and effects of ICT because within e-government ICT is seen as the most important tool that can be used to achieve these goals. Assumptions with respect to the barriers and problems that should be overcome are another set that will be studied. When drafting the e-government programs, did policy-makers have a realistic view of the organizational setting in which ICT was introduced and a realistic view of the potentials of ICT? Very often these barriers reflect the dominant problems of government organizations, such as the coordination and integration problems between agencies. In relation to this last set of assumptions, it is worth looking at the actions that should be undertaken when implementing egovernment. Given these barriers, how do governments act to put e-government into practice? Another set of assumptions refers to the role of citizens. Most e-government initiatives are directed toward improving the delivery of service to citizens. How do citizens assess the possibilities of Internet technology in relationship to government? Are citizens portrayed as consumers or are they more than that?


221

4. The Myth of a New and Better Government Looking at the goals of e-government, the myth of a new and better government is fostered: one of a government that is responsive as a whole. But how realistic are these ambitions? 4.1. A Comparison of Goals and Ambitions In the British documents Modernizing Government [21] and E-Government: A Strategic Framework for Public Services in the Information Age [22] the creation of egovernment (defined as information-age government) is seen as an aspect of modernizing government with only one purpose: to make life better for citizens and business. The emphasis lies in the improvement of electronic service delivery in such a way that it reflects real lives and delivers what people really want, with more effective use of the government’s information resources. In order to accomplish these goals, all parts of government have to work better together. In other words, coordinated government action is needed. The aim of the Australian document Government Online: The Commonwealth Government’s Strategy [23] is to improve the quality of all public services and increase the responsiveness of citizens. Government Online is the natural extension of the emphasis on service quality and meeting the needs of clients, already the focus of previous reports such as Investing in Growth [24]. In this specific document, the goal of putting all appropriate government services on line by 2001 has been established. On-line technology is believed to have the potential of breaking down traditional barriers faced by clients; it seems that it is no longer necessary for citizens to understand the structure of government in order to access information, because it is possible to establish transparent, one-stop access points. Moreover, in the short term, Government Online will require new investments by agencies while setting up new service delivery channels and retaining existing channels, but in the long run greater use of the Internet will reduce overall costs. The mission of the Canadian e-government policies, as formulated in Government Online [25] is to collaboratively advance the federal government’s citizen-centered service delivery vision across departments and other levels of government. Characterized as citizen-centered government, it is a vision that recognizes the different ways in which people interact with their government: tax payers who expect value and results, clients who expect accessible, quality services and good citizens who participate in the democratic process. By placing citizens and business at the centre of activity, the federal government organizes processes and services around their needs and expectations. Canada has embraced a vision of electronic service delivery that would offer Canadians services at the right time and place, a vision that enables individuals and businesses to interact securely with government in a convenient, accessible way. In the Danish vision on e-government, as seen in From Vision to Action: The Information Society 2000, e-government is embedded in the idea of the revolution of the information society: a worldwide short circuit of time, space, people and processes [26]. Several values should be supported by ICT: it should support the free access to information and exchange of information, support democracy and give the individual the opportunity to exercise his influence, support personal development in his working situation and in his leisure time, support openness in the public sector by making it

222


more transparent, contribute to the promotion of efficiency and rationalization in public institutions and enable them to provide better services, and ICT should be used to sustain the disadvantaged of society. In the subsequent document Towards E-Government: Vision and Strategy for the Public Sector in Denmark [27] the intent behind egovernment is that it should systematically use digital technologies to introduce new ways of thinking and transforming organizations and work processes for the improvement of the quality and efficiency of service. In the Netherlands the aims of e-government as formulated in Action Program for Electronic Government [28] and The Digital Delta [29] are to increase the accessibility of government, improve the quality of public services and enhance the internal efficiency of government. E-government requires the Dutch government to actively focus on its role as producer of public services. In a subsequent document, Contract with the Future [30], the scope of e-government is broadened: the political participation of citizens is also mentioned as a domain that deserves stimulation. High expectations prevail about the added value e-government will realize in shaping a new, better, more efficient and more responsive government. Do these countries also pay attention to a number of major barriers that should be taken into account? 4.2. A Comparison of Major Problems and Barriers It is interesting to look at the major barriers mentioned (and to notice those that are not mentioned) in the various documents that could obstruct the implementation of egovernment. In the Canadian document, an explicit definition of problems that should be attacked cannot be found [25]. It can, however, be derived from the priorities established in the document. One of the major problems is the lack of a governmentwide infrastructure and the lack of inter-operability among government ICT programs, both of which obstruct the sharing of information internally and externally (‘external’ meaning with external clients and partners in other jurisdictions). The Canadian government also identifies a lack of a common set of standards, techniques and tools. In Modernizing Government the UK government gives a number of reasons as to why the UK government and governments in other countries are lagging in their quality of service delivery [21]. One reason is that organizations consider only their own interests and that public services are organized around the needs of risk-avoiding providers instead of the needs of users, who have no serious means to express their desires and interests regarding the quality of service delivery. Also, an assessment was made of the barriers that obstruct information-age government. The most important barrier is that government has followed a largely decentralized approach to ICT development. The result in the UK is that government is unable to maximize the benefits of ICT for government as a whole. As a result, the country has incompatible systems and services that are not integrated. In the Danish report [26], three major risks are identified. First, the public sector and Danish companies are unable to adequately redefine working routines and develop new ICT-based products; second, they see an increased social polarization into a twotier society with ICT winners and losers; and third, the info-society takes on the features of a centralist, surveillance society which threatens privacy. In the Australian document Government Online [23] and the Dutch reports Action Program for Electronic Government and The Digital Delta [28, 29] no attention is paid to possible barriers that could obstruct the implementation of e-government.

223


When we confront this overview of problems with the ambitions presented in the previous section, we see that only in the UK and Canada documents is attention paid to internal barriers, while only in the Danish document is attention paid to external, societal barriers. In the Australian and Dutch documents an analysis of possible barriers has not been made. In the next table (Table 1) we will summarize the goals and actions which have been sketched in the documents we have studied. Table 1: A comparison of goals and barriers Assumptions/

Australia

Canada

Denmark

Netherlands

United Kingdom

Improving online service quality; increasing responsiveness to needs of citizens

Accessible, high quality and citizen-centered service delivery across boundaries of organizations which deliver value for money

Aspect of government in the information society, thereby focusing on improving service delivery and efficiency

Making government accessible; improving the quality of public services; and enhancing the internal efficiency of government

Modernizing government in terms of better quality of services that reflect daily lives of people and business and which require a coordinated government

No attention to barriers

Lack of a governmentwide infrastructure and the lack of interoperability (standards, techniques and tools) among government ICT programs, both of which obstruct the sharing of information internally and externally

Resistance to changing the working routines and to the need to develop new ICTbased products; increased social polarization (ICT winners and losers); threat of a centralist, surveillance society which threatens privacy

No attention to barriers

Dominance of own interests and risk-avoiding behavior; decentralized approach to ICT development

country Goals ambitions

Barriers

and

224


4.3. Revealing the Myth of a New and Better Government: Government as a Whole? The emphasis in the goals and ambitions of the e-government initiatives which have been described is on the possibility of developing new service delivery methods which are more responsive towards the needs of citizens and which present government as a whole. Each of the countries that were studied tries to establish one-entry service delivery points for both citizens and enterprises. Sometimes these entry points are related to a central theme. However, the goal of integrated electronic service delivery í especially in relation to contact and transaction services – leads to serious integration and coordination problems. Integrated service delivery implies that several back offices should be working together in handling questions, requests etc. They need to exchange and share information and knowledge across internal and external organizational boundaries. For instance, in the case of Dutch single entry points í like living and building, care and enterprises í a necessary condition for success is the cooperation between several offices within local public administration and between public, semipublic and private organizations such as housing societies. In essence, the exchange and sharing of information and knowledge between these back offices implies the integration of several information domains, each with their own legal framework, their own information systems in which is heavily invested, their own data definitions, their own routines and procedures, their expertise and experience and their own frames of reference [18, 31, 32]. Moreover, the cooperation of the back offices and the integration of different information systems and policies imply that positions and interests are going to change. Which back office will win, which will lose? Thus, ICT is not only a source of innovation but also a source of resistance. It may even generate a battle of the back offices. This battle is the Achillesheel of e-government. An examination of recent assessments of the e-government initiatives in general [4, 7] and the assessments of egovernment practices in the Canada, the UK, Australia and the Netherlands show that the lack of cooperation between these back offices is still a major problem. The call for government-wide or sector-wide information architectures and for infrastructures that cross the boundaries of separate organizations has recently become louder in Canada and the Netherlands. For instance, Teicher and Dow, looking at the Australian situation, conclude that coordinated government will not be a reality for the near future, neither horizontally nor vertically [8]. Nor did they find plans that would enhance the reshaping of existing bureaucratic structures as a result of the potential of e-government to organize electronic connections between and across levels of governments, facilitating the exchange of information. In Australia the idea of government as a whole is still far away. It is flawed by the highly fragmentized nature of government at the federal level and the absence of coordination mechanisms with the two other levels of government in Australia. In a Dutch study on inter-organizational electronic service delivery, Van Venrooij has shown that the most important impediments are coordination problems due to an ambiguous distribution of tasks and legally defined competences among the back offices which should be working together, the plurality of the actors and interests which are at stake, the lack of a common vision and the lack of a ‘sense of urgency’ about the necessity to work together, a focus on service delivery structures instead of a focus on the processes of service delivery, and incompatible data systems and data definitions [33]. If these integration problems are addressed, they are primarily defined as technical problems for which technical solutions exists, like the introduction of middleware, data warehousing solutions or business intelligence


225

techniques [e.g. 7]. It is not seen as a problem of organizational politics in terms of actors, their interests, their power bases and resources and their strategies, conflicts and compromises [31, 32].

5. The Myth of Technological Progress and Instrumentality E-government relies on the power of ICT to realize effects that can lead to a revolution in government. What assumptions lie behind the idea that ICT can be a powerful instrument to reinvent government? Have these assumptions contributed to the egovernment hype? 5.1. A Comparison of the Views on Technology What are the proposed effects of the use of ICT for accomplishing the goals of a new, better, seamless and responsive government? How can ICT be controlled or managed in an effective way to accomplish these goals? In the UK vision on technology the various promises of ICT are written in the imperative: ICT will make our life easier [21]. Moreover, ICT is a revolutionizing force. It changes our lives in the way we work, they way we do business, the way we communicate with each other, the way we spend our time. The British government intends to be at the head of these developments, using them to give effect to the goals established in the policy document. A small reservation is made here: the pace of technological change is fast and exhilarating, and this requires a flexible government strategy. ICT as an exogenous driving force is also noticed in the Danish vision on ICT. Introducing the Internet, the authors of the Danish policy document From Vision to Action Info Society 2000 speak of a network-like environment with interconnected global networks, including debates, databases and the dissemination of information, that do not lend themselves to government control [26]. These defining elements invite both anarchy and refreshing debate. ICT is seen as a tool that provides us with yet unrecognized potentials of public information. With the help of technology, information and communication may reach remote areas that would other wise be very difficult to reach. The Danish see the information society as a revolution in progress that cannot be missed. The only question is how to respond to it. It has unrecognized potentials, also for the public sector. The Info-Society is developing itself into a much more open and decentralized society with the prospect of an openness yet unseen and of controlled access to information, communication and debate. In Dutch programs like Digitale Delta [29] and Action Program for Electronic Government [28] there is a strong belief and trust in the possibilities of modern ICT. Optimism prevails about the progress ICT will bring. Things that were previously unthinkable will now happen, especially in the field of electronic service delivery and, according to the Dutch government, this is just the beginning. The blessings that ICT will bring cannot be denied. Public administration has a moral duty to use ICT and to adjust to these promised blessings by using the most advanced ‘tools’. In the Australian picture of e-government, Government Online, the information economy revolution cannot be missed [23]. There is hardly any sphere of activity that could not be improved by online government – to achieve more and to do it more quickly and efficiently. The potential of ICT í seen as a set of tools í and its availability is ubiquitous. Government Online will aim to make the best use of

226


available and emerging technology. Online technology has the potential to break down the traditional barriers faced by clients. Online access to information can have a significant impact on regional communities, older Australians and the disabled. It can break down the barriers of distance or mobility that some clients face. Online service delivery can complement and replace existing traditional service channels and provide around-the-clock access to government from almost anywhere. The Canadians also foster an imperative picture of the potential of ICT [25]. They see a changing landscape in which distance has perished and a picture of ubiquitous computing is dawning. ICT has infiltrated almost every aspect of modern life, resulting in the rise of a new set of expectations and demands. People will have nomadic access to their information and computing systems from publicly shared access points. ICT will allow us to imagine new ways of connecting citizens, of eliminating the barriers of distance, and of giving a fuller, richer meaning to democracy and citizenship. 5.2. Revealing the Myth of Technological Progress and Instrumentality: Can Technology Be Controlled? In the various national policy documents there is a strong belief and trust in the promises of modern ICT. Optimism prevails about the progress the information society and Internet technology will bring. Things that were previously unthinkable will now happen, especially if we look at the goals of e-government. And this is just the beginning. The blessings that ICT will bring cannot be denied and are in essence ‘good’. ICT is penetrating every aspect of public life and public administration. Public administration has a moral duty to use ICT and to adjust to these new possibilities by using the most advanced ‘tools’ to reinvent government. Especially in the Dutch, British and Danish documents, there is a realm of evangelism about the good life ICT will bring. Sometimes, as in the Danish documents, the blessings of ICT are not only limited to technology itself, but are related to a broader concept like the information society. The dominant view on technology that lies behind the several policy documents is a combination of a determinism and voluntarism. These two positions reflect two ‘old positions’ in the so-called ‘technology debate’. These deterministic positions reflect the idea that ICT is an autonomous, exogenous power. The effects that will occur are a given with the characteristics of the technology. ICT is a defining technology [34]. References to the emergence of the information society, which is present in almost every document but most explicit in the Danish case, should underline this position. Technological voluntarism presupposes that ICT is a neutral set of tools that enables individuals to realize their goals. Technology is viewed as an enabling technology; a set of instruments that are willing in the hands of their masters and the goals they want to accomplish. The effects that ICT will realize are primarily goal-driven and depend on the effective and efficient use of ICT. ICT is seen as a set of instruments that can be controlled by the people who use them. The challenge is to apply the right tools in the right way. Both positions can be combined by the following assumption, which is dominant in all the documents. The emergence of the information society produces new technologies which cannot be denied, and because they are available they should be applied in the most proper way so that they can produce effects that support the reinvention of government. However, research into the effects of ICT in public, but also private, organizations [18, 19, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39] show that the effects generated by the use of ICT in public


227

administration are not general, but specific and context-driven. In the policy documents studied, the existing political, socio-organizational and institutional setting in which ICT and e-government is introduced, is neglected. There are hardly any general effects. Effects are limited to the specific setting in which ICT is introduced. The reason why these effects are limited and context-driven is that the introduction of ICT into public administration is a social intervention in a policy and organizational network, which influences the position, interests, values and (information) domains of the actors involved [39, 40]. Thus, the introduction and use of ICT (and thus e-government) is not a neutral, but a political intervention. Local choices with respect to ICT influence the access, use and distribution of information and communication as well as the information relations and patterns between the actors in the policy network, and thus also the effects that will occur [38]. Therefore, the effects that occur can be understood more sensibly by using an ‘information ecology’ approach. Information ecology can be described as the evolving interactions and relations between a diversity of actors, their practices, values and technology within a specific and local (thus unique) environment. It is important to stress that the social and technological aspects of an environment coevolve [39, 40]. This is an important conclusion because e-government (especially that related to transaction services) is, to a large extent, a matter of business process redesign of working, information and communication processes between local front and back offices and between back offices which lie behind many sophisticated websites [41]. The general effects that are being claimed in many e-government documents cannot be found in the research about the use of ICT in public and private organizations. This is one of the possible explanations as to why there is a cleft between the rhetoric of egovernment, the lagging implementation of e-government and the local effects that occur when a number of measures and actions have been undertaken. The next question is: who benefits from these limited effects? Research has shown that ICT in the public sector very often strengthens the existing frames of reference, power relations and positions within a policy sector [36, 37]. ICT tends to extend and reinforce the prevailing biases of governmental structures and processes, although this so-called reinforcement hypothesis stems from the period before the massive introduction of network technologies like the Internet. Does this hypothesis survive the age of the Internet? Up until now research findings have been scarce, and when present they are ambiguous and based on a single or a few case studies, but they tend to confirm this hypothesis [e.g. 8, 42].

6. The Myth of E-Government as Rational Information Planning In the documents studied, we have seen that is important to select the right ICT tools and apply them in the right way, thereby looking at experiences in the private sector. How realistic is this promise? 6.1. Measures and Actions to Be Taken: Technology and Management as Dominant Solutions In the Canadian document four priorities are set that could stimulate a smooth implementation of e-government [25]. The first priority is aligning the various ICT infrastructures that can support electronic service delivery. This implies the develop-

228


ment of a federated information- and ICT-architecture that enables secure transactions and information sharing. The second priority is to develop a world-class ICT workforce within government that is attractive for people to join. Another point of attention is the improvement of the management and success rate of ICT investments and the minimizing of risks, for instance by reforming the government procurement regime. In the eyes of the UK government it is important to develop a corporate ICT strategy for government which encourages the convergence and interconnection of ICT systems of individual public service agencies [21, 22]. In such a strategy, key objectives are formulated, frameworks for technologies that require stronger coordination are identified, a Government Secure Intranet is developed and attention is given to the protection of privacy and other human rights while, at the same time, a clear basis for sharing data between departments is provided. Effective implementation requires a focus on delivering defined business objectives with measurable benefits, strong leadership, clear accountability, improved project management and attention for risk management. In the Danish strategy, collaboration between the private and public sectors is seen as a necessary condition for Denmark’s transition toward the Info-society [26, 27]. The public sector should carry out its share of the work by realizing the ICT applications. The focus is on implementing a relatively small number of projects with realistic goals and clear deadlines. The emphasis here is on the realization of a comprehensive and interconnected electronic service network for the public sector. In the Australian document Government Online a national approach to egovernment is promoted, based on a number of priorities [23]. The first priority is that each agency should adapt a thorough and systematic approach to placing its information and services online. Action plans and reporting arrangements play an important role in this approach. The second priority is to ensure that relevant enablers are in place. The enablers are prerequisites such as user confidence (i.e., authentication, privacy and security) and the development of principles and standards (i.e., electronic publishing and record keeping principles, meta-data standards, accessibility). Another relevant priority is the development of transaction and payment services, like eprocurement. In addition, it is necessary to pay attention to cross-agency facilitation services and cross-agency collaboration. In the Dutch view on electronic government the emphasis lies primarily on the establishment of virtual services counters, which are theme-oriented, such as ‘living and building’, ‘care and welfare’, ‘companies’, and on the reduction of ‘ administrative costs for companies’ [28, 29, 30]. In all of these counters, several (semi-)government organizations will have to work together. An important project, focused on the improvement of the internal efficiency of government, is the realization of authentic registers in which basic public data that will be shared by several parties are stored. If we compare the measures to be taken in the several countries we see that the focus is, in the first place, on the use of rational planning and management methods which should be used to guarantee a proper implementation of ICT. Only the Danish opt for a rather incremental approach, while in the Dutch document no attention is paid to an implementation strategy. In the second place, the focus is on the development of all kinds of technological applications which should be developed and installed.


229

6.2. Revealing the Myth of Rational Information Management: Bricolage? In the British, Australian and Canadian documents, the realization of e-government can be achieved by using corporate information planning and project management methods and techniques. Information planning and ICT project management is seen as a question of setting goals, formulating action plans, and allocating budgets as well as clear roles and responsibilities, all of which can imply a plea for more centralization. Also, in a number of managerial assessments of the practice of e-government [7, 43], there are pitfalls in the effective implementation of e-government, such as bad planning and bad project management. There is a lack of central information planning. In the literature about effective business information planning, serious question marks are placed on such an approach. Mason and Mittroff, Gazendam and Ciborra have shown that the practice of ICT strategic decision making and planning does not reflect the realm of method, procedure and systematic reasoning that many methods of information management, information systems management and information planning suggest [44, 45, 46]. According to Ciborra the practice of ICT strategic decision making and planning is that of ‘bricolage’. Bricolage means tinkering with the combination of resources at hand, in which improvisation, learning-by -doing and serendipity play an important role. ICT-driven innovations in private and public organizations are mostly the result of the bubbling up of new ideas from the bottom of the organization, whereby the existing organizational reality, the environment and ICT applications are seen anew by relevant stakeholders [46; see also 31]. Formulating and implementing e-government can be viewed as a governance problem that takes place in the context of a network of organizations, where on the one hand, standardization and integration in the back office is needed in order to allow for inter-organizational information exchange but where, on the other hand, standardization and integration may intensify existing dependencies and enshrine these dependencies in the technology [31, 32]. Consequently, an abundance of integration fuels interorganizational tensions and conflicts. In the literature on complex decision making, there seems to be an increased appreciation for specific techniques that are expected to be able to better fit the dynamics and nature of networks and inter-organizational relationships, namely process management techniques [32, 47, 48]. Process management is aimed at selectively ‘closing’ and ‘opening’ decision making in various arenas and decision-making rounds, thereby allowing for the variety in interests among various organizations to be taken into account. It aims at the development of a mutual implementation practice, based on a shared understanding of the major policy or organizational challenges and possible solutions. The techniques involved are sometimes cumbersome and may give rise to complex interactions for which more traditional project management and system development methodologies do not allow.

7. The Myth of the Citizen as Empowered Consumer In many policy documents about e-government the citizens is portrayed as an intelligent and ‘empowered’ consumer, while government is seen as a service organization. Is this a realistic promise?

230


7.1. A Comparison of the View of the Citizen In the Canadian view, e-government is citizen-centered government, which recognizes the fact that citizens act in different ways with government [25]. The Canadian government views the citizen as a taxpayer who expects value and results. As clients, citizens expect accessible, quality services, and as citizens they want to participate in the democratic process. E-government should address all of these elements of citizenship. Moreover, ‘empowered’ citizens, using ICT in almost every aspect of modern life, are supposed to have developed a new set of expectations and demands: since technology can create instant communication, instant answers are expected. Because technology has the ability to warehouse and organize information, comprehensive, one-stop service has become the acceptable standard. In the Australian report, it is stated that an online environment will allow individuals to tailor and select their approach to government, complementing í not replacing í existing written, telephone, fax and counter services [23]. ICT offers citizens new and alternative communication channels. People are supposed to have the ability to customize their online channel with government, to make it more useful, familiar, and convenient and in many instances, transparent. This will, according to the Australian government, lead the Australian community toward having a greater familiarity with government policy and programs. Bringing government closer to the people encourages them to interact with government. In the Danish vision of the position of the citizen, attention is paid to the increased social polarization into a two-tiered society with ICT winners and losers [26]. The winners are those with a higher education who are able to master the new technology, who know the possibilities of the info-society and who are able to learn and to develop the necessary qualifications. Attention is also paid to the risk of ‘Big Brother’. Because ICT is a natural element of every day life, it possibly places individual citizens under central surveillance. The Danish report proposes the use of ICT to support the personal development of the citizen and to give individuals the opportunity to exercise their influence to harness this threat. The UK vision of the citizens expresses the idea that people are exercising choice and demanding higher quality, not only in the private sector but also the public sector [21]. This implies a genuine partnership between those providing services and those using them. Moreover, it implies that government must consult with and listen to citizens instead of simply imposing solutions. Also, it states that government should not only serve those who embrace the new technology. The information age should increase the choices of how citizens and businesses receive services, not restrict it. The Internet is just one of the service delivery channels citizens can choose. In the document E-Government: A Strategic Framework for Public Services in the Information Age e-government is primarily seen as the development of a new set of service delivery channels for citizens and businesses [22]. In the Netherlands the emphasis is on the citizen as a consumer of government services. In Contract with the Future a relationship between the rise of the empowered and intelligent citizens and the process of individualization is identified. These new citizens demand a government which is responsive to their needs, able to organize an open and horizontal dialogue and able to organize its internal processes in a transparent way [30]. This comparison shows that the dominant image of the citizen is that of a citizen who acts as and should be approached as a consumer, who wants the efficient and


231

convenient delivery of public services. Only in the Canadian and Dutch documents has attention been drawn to the democratic and participatory role of citizens, but the emphasis lies in the consumer role of citizens. The Danish document focuses on the digital divide and privacy threats of ICT. 7.2. Revealing the Myth of the Citizen as Consumer: Legitimacy Problems? The citizen is generally seen as an intelligent being who uses the possibilities of the Internet in optima forma to improve his/her position as a consumer of government services. Citizens will demand a public administration that in turn also uses the possibilities of the Internet in optima forma; a public administration which enables them to act as empowered and intelligent citizens. These assumptions about the role of the citizen and government are not without risk. Fountain points to the so-called legitimacy paradox of public service delivery [49]. The improvement of the quality of public service delivery does not increase the legitimacy of government; in the end, it will even lead to a serious legitimacy problem. A dominant focus on service delivery (and a focus on the consumer rather than on the citizen) narrows the multi-dimensionality of citizenship and public administration. Citizenship is more than consumerism, and government is more than the production of public services [50]. A citizen is also a voter and a ‘citoyen’, who is also concerned with issues that relate to the quality of the public domain in which he/she functions: issues like public safety and public health problems, the quality of life in the neighborhood or the quality of the public school system. For a number of government agencies that are machine bureaucracies, such as the tax administrations or social security agencies, this legitimacy paradox is not so important. They merely execute legal tasks on a massive scale. For municipalities, which take the largest burden of e-government projects in many countries, this paradox is more important. On a local level, public service delivery and political decision making – balancing between public values and the allocation of scarcity [51] – are related to each other. Public service delivery is not always an administrative and technical issue, as is the production of a passport. Very often political decisions and normative deliberations lie behind the services that are delivered. For instance, what are the societal effects of neighborhood policing as a form public service delivery? What is the contribution to the quality of life in such a neighborhood? Addressing citizens as consumers and defining government as a production company ignores the public and political characters of service delivery. The challenge for e-government is to develop participative forms of electronic service delivery and to address citizens as concurrently consumers, voters and ‘citoyens’. Customer-orientation, focusing on the demands of citizens and companies, is one of the leading principles in all policy documents about e-government that we have studied. For instance, in the Netherlands one talks about the reconstruction of demand patterns of target groups, for whom corresponding products and services should be developed. The development of these demand patterns is seen as a way of improving the quality and pro-activeness of electronic service delivery. However, if we look at the practice of a large number of e-government initiatives and approaches in the Netherlands – at both the local and central levels í we see that questions arise about the demand-orientation of e-government [52, 53]. First, it is difficult to (re)construct these demand patterns. Citizens find it difficult to formulate their demands and needs. Second, these patterns are dynamic and flexible. They change all the time. Third, a large number of these public products and services are not market-driven but are based on legal obligations

232


and rights. A municipality has a legal obligation to deliver a large number of services, which conflicts with the demand orientation of many e-government initiatives. However, there is a lot of progress to be made in redesigning (electronic) public service in a more customer-friendly way. This myth of the empowered citizen is also challenged by the so-called digital divide, which refers to the socio-economic divide between those citizens who have access to the Internet and those who are not, i.e., info haves and have nots. However, the ability to use the Internet effectively in order to deal with government depends not only on technological access (having a computer or an Internet account and have the practical knowledge to operate them) but also to the intellectual and informationhandling capacities of citizens. This also influences the actual usage of e-government services [54]. For instance, are citizens able to find their way among the ‘information overload’ represented by the Internet? Are they able to select the right information?

8. Conclusion One of the reasons for the cleft between the ambitious goals and aspirations of egovernment and the slowing implementation pace of many programs is the rhetoric tone of many government programs – a tone that can also be framed in terms of a ‘hype’. In this chapter we have studied the rhetoric of the e-government programs of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands. Rhetoric, using and appealing to myths, plays an important role in politics. We have distinguished and described a number of e-government myths by looking at the assumptions of relevant egovernment programs: the myth of technological progress and inevitability, the myth of a new and better government, the myth of rational information planning and the myth of the empowerment of the intelligent consumer. Rhetoric enables policy makers and politicians to mobilize people and organizations to pursue their ideas. Myths can be seen as beacons which show us the way to a desirable future, to a new and better public administration. When we look at the rhetoric of a number e-government policies it is important to understand the mobilizing capacities of rhetoric. However, when we confronted these rhetorical claims with the body of knowledge concerning the practice of the use of ICT in public administration, we have demonstrated that this rhetoric has dysfunctional effects. In evaluating e-government programs and developing new (and adjusted) programs it is important to take the exposure of these myths into account to enhance the critical discussion about and the responsiveness of e-government programs. Does the exposure of e-government imply that no change will take place in public administration? Does it mean that the intuitively appealing promises of a better, new and more responsive government will remain an idle dream? Will there be no institutional renewal? Internet technology is changing public administration. Numerous examples can be given despite all the critical remarks made. However, it is important to look at the time horizon in relation to the pace of change we are talking about. The promise of e-government is a promise that consists of a large number of small, incremental and local steps that can ultimately lead to a larger step forward. But we must be skeptical about the ‘canvas cleaning’ effects of e-government (to paraphrase Karl Popper) and the promise of a short-term and radical change. E-government will be more a matter of ‘piecemeal engineering’ than of implementing a blueprint for a better and more responsive government. What is needed are myths which reveal the


233

‘muddiness’ of computerization in public administration and which inspire us to overcome the problems of implementing e-government.

References J. Fountain, Building the Virtual State: Information Technology and Institutional Change, The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 2001b. [2] R. Heeks (ed.), Reinventing Government in the Information Age, Routledge, London/New York, 1999. [3] V. Bekkers and V. Homburg, The Information Ecology of E-Government: Backgrounds and Concepts, in V. Bekkers and V. Homburg (eds.), The Information Ecology of E-Government, IOS Press, Amsterdam/Berlin/Oxford/Tokyo/Washington, D.C., 2005, 1-20. [4] Gartner, New Rules and Realities in E-Government, www.gartner.com, 2000 (accessed May 2003). [5] A. Chadwick and C. May, Interaction Between States And Citizens in the Age of the Internet: ‘EGovernment’ in the United States, Britain and the European Union, Governance 16, 2 (2003), 271-300. [6] M.J. Moon, The Evolution of E-Government Among Municipalities: Rhetoric or Reality?, Public Administration Review 62, 4 (2002), 424-33. [7] OECD, The E-Government Imperative, Paris, 2003. [8] J. Teicher and N. Dow, E-government in Australia, Promise and Progress, Information Polity 7 (2002), 231-46. [9] M. Edelman, The Symbolic Use of Politics, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1967. [10] M. Edelman, Political Language: Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail, The Free Press, New York, 1977. [11] F. Fisher and J. Forester (eds.), The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, [PUBLISHER], Durham, 1993. [12] J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, Harper, New York, 1989. [13] J.W. Meyer and B. Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977), 340-63. [14] D. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, Political Science Quarterly 104, 2 (1989), 281-300. [15] W. Parsons, Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1996. [16] K. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, McGraw-Hill, Reading, Mass, 1969. [17] V. Bekkers and E. Korteland, Governance, ICT and the Innovation Agenda of Public Administration: A Comparison of Some European Policy Initiatives, in V.J.J.M., Bekkers, M. Thaens and H. van Duivenboden (eds.), Information and Communication Technology and Public Innovation, IOS Press, Amsterdam/ Berlin/Oxford/Tokyo/Washington, 2006, 22-52. [18] Ch. Bellamy and J.A. Taylor, Transformation By Stealth: The Case of the UK Criminal Justice System, in J.A. Taylor, I.Th.M. Snellen and A. Zuurmond (eds.), Beyond BPR in Public Administration, [PUBLISHER], Amsterdam, 1997, 37-54. [19] I.Th.M. Snellen and W.B.J.H. van de Donk (eds.), Public Administration in an Information Age, IOS Press, Amsterdam/Berlin/Oxford/Tokyo/Washington, 1998. [20] K.V. Andersen and J.N. Danziger, Impacts of IT on Politics and the Public Sector: Methodological, Epistemological, and Substantive Evidence from the ‘Golden Age’ of Transformation, International Journal of Public Administration 25, 5 (2001). [21] Ministry of the Cabinet Office, Modernising Government, London, 1999. [22] Ministry of the Cabinet Office, E-Government: A Strategic Framework for Public Services in the Information Age, London, 2000. [23] Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, Investing in Growth, Canberra, 1997. [24] Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, Government Online, the Commonwealth Government’s Strategy, Canberra, 2000. [25] Treasury Board, Strategic Directions for Information Management and Information Technology: Enabling 21st Century Service to Canadians, www.gol-ged.gc.ca, 1997 (Accessed May 2003). [26] Ministry of Research and Information Technology, From Vision to Action: Info-Society 2000, Copenhagen, 1995. [27] Digital Taskforce, Towards E-Government: Vision and Strategy for the Public Sector in Denmark, Copenhagen, 2002. [1]

234


[28] Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relationships, Action Program for Electronic Government, The Hague, 1999. [29] Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Digital Delta, The Hague, 1999. [30] Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relationships, Contract with the Future, The Hague, 2000. [31] V.M.F. Homburg, The Political Economy of Information Management: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Decision Making Regarding Interorganizational Information Systems, [PUBLISHER], Capelle a/d IJssel, 1999. [32] V. Bekkers, The Governance of Back Office integration, Public Management Review 9, 3, 2007, 377400. [33] A. van Venrooij, Nieuwe Vormen van Interorganisationele Publieke Dienstverlening, Ph.D. thesis, TU Delft, Delft, 2002. [34] S. Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power, Basic Books, New York, 1988. [35] W.E. Bijker, Th.P. Hughes and T.J. Pinch (eds.), The Social Construction Of Technological Systems, [PUBLISHER], Cambridge Mass, 1981. [36] J.N. Danziger, W.H. Dutton, R. Kling and K.L. Kraemer, Computers and Politics, [PUBLISHER], New York, 1986. [37] K. Kraemer and R. King, Computing and Public Organizations, Public Administration Review, November (1986), 488-96. [38] Kling, R., Computerization as an Ongoing Social and Political Process, in G. Bjerkness, P. Ehn and M. Kyng (eds.), Computers and Democracy, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1987, 117-36. [39] Th. Davenport, Information Ecology, Oxford University Press, 1997. [40] B.A. Nardi and V.L. O’Day, Information Ecologies, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1999. [41] V. Bekkers and V. Homburg (eds.), The Information Ecology of E-Government, IOS Press, Amsterdam/ Berlin/Oxford/Tokyo/Washington DC, 2005. [42] S. Coleman, J. Taylor and W. van de Donk (eds.), Parliament in the Age of the Internet, Oxford Univerity Press, 1999. [43] Accenture, E-Government Leadership: Realizing the Vision, www.accenture.com, 2002, accessed May 2003. [44] R.O. Mason and I.I. Mitroff, Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions, Wiley, New York, 1981. [45] H.W.M. Gazendam, Variety Controls Variety: On the Use of Organization Theories in Information Management, Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen, 1993. [46] C. Ciborra, The Labyrinths of Information, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. [47] H. de Bruijn, E. ten Heuvelhof and R.J. in ‘t Veld, Process Management (Why Project Management Fails in Complex Decision Making Processes), Kluwer, Boston, 2002. [48] V.M.F. Homburg and V.J.J.M. Bekkers, The Back Offices of E-Government (Managing Information Domains as Political Economies), Proceedings of the 35th HICSS. January 7-10, Hawaii, United States, 2002. [49] J.E. Fountain, The Paradoxes of Public Sector Customer Service, Governance 1 (2001), 55-73. [50] V.J.J.M. Bekkers and S. Zouridis, Electronic Service Delivery In Public Administration: Some Trends And Issues, International Journal of Administrative Sciences 65, March (1999), 183-95. [51] D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Wiley, New York/London, 1965. [52] OL2000, Van Vraagpatroon naar Loket-Idee, Den Haag 2000. [53] OL2000, Referentiemodel Elektronisch Loket, Den Haag, 2000. [54] J. van Dijk, W. Pieterson, A. van Deursen and W. Ebbers, E-Services for Citizens: The Dutch Usage Case, in M. Wimmer, J. Scholl and A. Gronlund (eds.), Electronic Government: Proceedings of the DEXA EGOV Conference 2006, Springer, Heidelberg, 2007, 155-66.


235

The Perspective of Network Government: The Struggle Between Hierarchies, Markets and Networks as Modes of Governance in Contemporary Government Jan van Dijk and Anneleen Winters-van Beek University of Twente, Department of Media, Communication and Organization

Abstract. The rise of networks of ICT, the Internet in particular has spurred all kinds of utopian and dystopian views of the revolutionary potential of networks, among others in the context of (E-)government. Presently, a similar hype appears in the perspective of Web 2.0 and e-participation of citizens. The authors advocate a more sober view of network government after the hype and after about twenty years of experience with ICT in government. They describe the current epoch of turning government with a growing importance of network configurations in government. This practice stimulates the projection of a future stage of network government that might have matured after a generation to come. The authors emphasize that three modes of governance are competing and will continue to do so in all epochs of government: hierarchies, markets and networks. Finally, they elaborate ten principles of network management in the context of contemporary hierarchies and markets. Keywords. Network configurations, network government

1. Introduction In the last decade the terms ‘network’ and ‘networking’ have appeared evermore often in discussions about the current and future management and policies of modern government. This is due to both societal/organizational and technological developments. Increasingly, contemporary society is indicated by the concept of ‘network society’ in addition to that of ‘information society’ [1, 2, 3]. It is assumed that in the network society the structures of social and organizational networks emerge and start to characterize all spheres of society, from a network economy to a digital culture. This is strongly supported by the rise of media networks such as the Internet and other networks of telecommunication and mass communication. When this classification of contemporary modern society is justified it should also be valid for the sphere of government. Indeed, in many proposals to restructure government both central government and public administration that have come forward since the 1980s, all kinds of suggestions have been made to decentralize government and to gain independence for its components or to privatize them. Subsequently, all kinds of organizational and policy networks are

236

J. van Dijk and A. Winters-van Beek / The Perspective of Network Government

now expected to take care of the remaining necessity of coordination and control in the execution of government tasks. With the rise of computer networks, and the Internet in particular, the prospect of e-government is added to this preoccupation with networks. The prospect of e-government is the technological drive behind the rise of networks as a steering or governance principle for the government as a whole. All developed countries have started to create an infrastructure of information and communication technology that in the future should be able to link all government departments. Recently, a growing number of electronic shared services and registrations have been designed and introduced. The rise of information and communication technology and e-government spurred all kinds of utopian and dystopian views of the revolutionary potential of networks in the days of the Internet hype during the 1990s. Democracy was thought to become ‘teledemocracy’ in a direct Athenean Agora way, and the State was expected to then evolve into a virtual State, becoming either ‘hollow’ and marginalized or a dominant surveillance State. The perspective of teledemocracy [4] was built on the technical opportunities of the existence of direct links between the terminals of computer networks and their central registration, in this case the political and electoral center. The idea of a virtual State becoming marginal or hollow was based on either the libertarian view of a traditional core of institutional politics that could be bypassed by autonomous citizens, corporations and societal or political organizations to create their own politics in networks [5, 6, 7]; or on the privatization and outsourcing of government tasks that would continue to be linked to a coordinating but ever less powerful State in a network structure [8]. In the Surveillance State the opposite movement was projected: a flow of information and control to the omnipotent center of the network in the State and the public administration [7, 9]. All these utopian and dystopian views in the time of the Internet hype were in fact guided by a combination of technological determinism and particular political strategies, hopes and wishes. The network perspective of government and politics would inevitably prevail. In fact, particular views of democracy were clearly projected in this perspective [2]. Now, five to seven years after the hype, we are able to observe how network structures both network organization and network technology actually are implemented in politics and public administrations and can draw a much more sober, balanced and realistic picture of the perspective of network government. This is the main objective of this chapter. We will show that the rise of networks in government structures and infrastructures meets with many problems, drawbacks and bottlenecks, both in organizational or policy networks and in computer networks charged with e-government tasks [10, 11, 12]. Organizational and political resistance appears to be high, and not all problems of network technology are solved. With these problems in mind we ask ourselves what the perspective is for network government in the coming thirty years. In this article we will describe this perspective and explain the problems we observe as a collision of three ideal-type modes of governance, while simultaneously characterizing contemporary government as hierarchies, markets and networks. We assume that in a long evolutionary process the network mode of governance will become stronger in the context of the nascent network society. To describe this evolution we construct three typical historical stages of government in succession: traditional government, contemporary turning government and potential future network government. In traditional government hierarchy is


237

dominant as mode of governance. In the transitional stage of government the modes of market and network government come forward to compete with traditional hierarchies and to produce a practice of government full of tensions. In the third stage the network mode of government might dominate. However, this is not a matter of historical necessity. It is by no means sure that the network mode will prevail. Neither do we know how long this evolution will last. Our conjecture is that in all stages there will be a conflict of three modes of governance and that none of them will disappear. Even when the network mode ultimately prevails, the networks concerned could be either more centralized, appearing as some kind of new hierarchy, or more decentralized with many links to markets. The network mode of governance is not superior in a normative sense. The network mode has many disadvantages and characteristics that must be compensated by efficient and democratic government and by appropriate network management. For example, network forms of governance based on privatization and widespread outsourcing were partly discredited after the Hurricane Katrina disaster in the region of New Orleans. The multitude of networked help agencies of the American federal and local governments previously split government units that were privatized or made independent appeared to work in completely separate and uncoordinated ways, lacking any central direction (see summary of criticism in Wikipedia 2007: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Criticism_of_government_response_to_Hurricane_Katrina). The response to this emergency shows “what happens when the management of a network fails” [13]. Finally, Kamarck [13] has emphasized that government by network, as she calls it, only serves particular government problems: “government by network works best on policy problems that require flexibility, personalization and innovation” (p. 22). According to her, other problems could better be solved by different ways to innovate government, such as so-called ‘Reinvented Government’ (which works with performance goals and measures) and ‘government by market’ (which uses prices and other market signals). In the next section we will first define networks and describe in what forms they occur in government. Subsequently, the three ideal-type modes of governance, by means of hierarchy, market or network, will be elaborated. This will be followed by a characterization of three historical stages with different combinations of these modes of governance. Finally, we will illustrate this rather abstract argument with a case study. This is the Dutch government project PDirekt for a shared electronic services center for the employee and salary registrations of ministries, which turned out to be a giant management and financial failure. This project clearly exemplifies the collision of hierarchy, market and network forms of governance in contemporary public administration.

2. Networks and network configurations in government A network can be defined as a collection of links between elements of a unit [3]. The unit as a whole is often called a system. Emphasizing the links between the elements of this system means referring to the network inside a particular system. It is important to add that there have to be at least three connected elements to create a network. These elements are also called nodes.

238


In this case the larger unit or system is the government as a whole, but units can also be observed at lower levels of government, such as government organizations comprising departments and individual civil servants connected by relations. A basic assumption of network theory is that the internal and external relations of units become evermore important in the actions of contemporary social units and their elements [14]. With respect to governments the reason for this trend are discussed below. First, we want to draw a picture of network government at the most general societal level. In Figure 1 it is assumed that the government still has a central location in the political system of (post- or late-) modern society. However, the figure also shows that actors other than (central) government are able to bypass this center and to build political and other relations among each other.

Networked Government

Global Networking

Outsourced Government Joint-up Government

Online Democracy

Figure 1: Kinds of Network Government in the Political System as a Network (Adapted from [3], p. 100)

This figure also identifies five kinds of contemporary network government. The first kind is the cooperation of organizations of central government using computer networks. This is usually called joined-up government, referring to a system in which ministries, provinces, municipalities and administrative or executive government organizations at every level are linked by computer networks and the services they share. Increasingly, these government units face common tasks in the field of electronic government. For these tasks all kinds of project teams, task forces and other groupings with temporary


239

coordination and control functions are formed. Most often they are organized as networks and acquire the shape of a particular network configuration. A network configuration can be defined as a particular organizational form of a network. This means that it has at least three elements or nodes that cut through or bridge fixed organizational divisions, that is, both within and across organizations. Cutting and bridging these divisions means distancing the fixed hierarchical departments of government. This kind of network government joined-up government is our prime focus of attention in this chapter. Toward the edges of Figure 1, other kinds of network government are portrayed. First of all, there is a place for so-called networked government [10] or government by network [13]. These terms indicate the growing number of pubic-private partnerships in government at large that often also have acquired the character of a network. In the 1990s many governments of OECD countries turned regular government departments into independent or semi-independent organizations. However, their relationships with the departments of central government have not diminished, and a number of coordinating and managing network configurations have been shaped to regulate and account for their activities. In their books, Goldsmith & Eggers and Kamarck focus on these relations and network configurations. A kind of network government that is very similar to the former is called outsourced government [10]. Here we are dealing with completely independent or privatized commercial organizations that execute outsourced government tasks. However, they are continually held accountable to central government or to supervisory institutions. The relations and more or less temporary groupings organizing this accountability can be analyzed as network configurations. Currently, outsourcing in government and in the economy is increasingly practiced by networks of a large number of contracting and subcontracting corporations. A fourth kind of network government deals with the political relations of the government with citizens or societal organizations and communities. It is called online democracy or digital democracy [15, 16, 17, 18]. Here networks, and particularly the Internet, are used as a medium of political participation. A last kind of network government is that of so-called global networking [19]. This concerns, first of all, the networks of national governments and their departments in official associations or unions such as the UN, the WTO, NATO and the EU and, secondly, the networks of NGOs, of global corporations and of lobby groups circulating around these international organizations. Increasingly, the internal and external networks of national governments have to compete for power with these global networks. According to Slaughter, the global networks become evermore powerful as compared with national governments. From this section onwards we will focus on joined-up government. Other important conceptual distinctions in this type of network government are those between interorganizational, intra-organizational and interpersonal networks. In the context of government, cases of inter-organizational networks are collaborations between ministries, provinces, municipalities and separate administrative and executive organizations as a whole. Inside modern organizations in general, for instance in matrix organizations, more and more project groups and teams with specific tasks appear and cut through original divisions of departments, in this way also adapting, the shape of the network. This also goes for government organizations, among which an increasing number of collaboration projects are occurring that consist of a combination of inter-

240


organizational, intra-organizational and interpersonal networks. In the collaborating government departments at large, similar project teams and task forces are created that cooperate and simultaneously shape new formal interpersonal networks of civil servants across large organizational distances. During the daily practice of the social networking required in these collaborations, informal interpersonal networks also appear. The following functions are performed by the heterogeneous set of network configurations appearing in the evolution of joined-up government: a) Deliberation. Often both formal and informal consultations between government departments are required in order to realize particular tasks of contemporary complex government, among them tasks of e-government and electronic services on the Internet requiring input from many actors. These deliberations are often more or less institutionalized in the shape of a particular network configuration. b) Direction and Management. When collaborations, provisions and technologies acquire a permanent status, participating departments and civil servants need to be directed by a more permanent leadership in a longer-lasting type of organization. However, this organization is still different and separate from management in the official governmental hierarchy. It has a higher degree of freedom and acquires the form of a network configuration. c) Coordination. At a lower level of collaboration the separate activities of government departments can be coordinated by simply attuning these activities (without requiring the direction of a central body). The communication needed for this gearing of activities can be practiced in more or less formal coordination networks. d) Execution. To execute complex innovative tasks of government that require the cooperation of several government departments, often special administrative and technical bodies are shaped that become semi-autonomous in the execution of these tasks. In tasks related to information and communication technology, the technical departments of official government organizations and subcontracting firms in the field of information technology, computer networks and software fill these bodies. Even before the massive introduction of ICTs in government, all kinds of network configuration with one or more of these functions appeared at all levels of government. They multiplied with the introduction and incorporation of ICTs, especially those based on computer networks and shared services of formally separate departments. In every country with an advanced ICT infrastructure in government, hundreds or even thousands of network configurations of all kinds, cutting through the dividing lines of existing departments, bridging and sometimes embracing them, have emerged [20]. Apparently, the traditional hierarchical model of government organization alone, based on geographic divisions with a particular level of governing autonomy, is no longer appropriate for the tasks of large-scale and increasingly complex governance facing contemporary governments. To manage these tasks, governments have adapted the traditional model by means of a growing organizational fragmentation and new divisions of labor that cut through existing divisions. This trend has been supported by the processes of privatization and the growth of formal independence of government institutions as well as by new governance strategies such as New Public Management and Reinvented Government. However, the traditional model with its organizational divisions and partial autonomy of local and regional governance has been basically maintained. This is also true for the context of the rise of network configurations as


241

described above. The essential question is whether they only reinforce the already existing process of government fragmentation, remaining within the confines of the traditional hierarchical model of governance, or if they create an altogether new mode of governance called network government.

3. Three ideal-type modes of governance: hierarchy, market and network Thompson et al. [21] and in particular Powell [22] have analyzed the most important modes of general coordination in society according to their view by means of three ideal types. In fact they are general modes of organization emphasizing principles of steering or governing. They can be applied to the economy, to public administration and to the government as a whole. According to Powell, a form of economic organization developed over the course of the twentieth century that is neither market nor hierarchy, but rather a network type of organization. He places this type next to the earlier modes. Van Dijk has elaborated Powell’s typology and applied it in characterizing the structure and organization of the network society, locating this type between the hierarchy and the market because it shares characteristics of both of these types. See Table 1. FORMS

Markets

Networks

Hierarchies

Organizational basis

Contracts, property rights

Complementary strengths

Employment relationship

Relation of actors

Independent

Interdependent

Dependent

Goals of organization

Profits

Reciprocal gains

Careers

Means of organization

Prices

Relationships

Routines

Mode of organization

Competition

Competition and cooperation

Cooperation

Control

Horizontal

Horizontal and vertical

Vertical

Coordination

Horizontal

Horizontal and vertical

Vertical

Conflict resolution

Dealing, going to court

Trust, reputation

Administrative fiat, supervision

Flexibility

High

Medium

Low

CHARACTERISTICS

Table 1: Forms of economic organization Source: Jan van Dijk (2006). The Network Society. Adapted from [22].

It would require too much space here to explain the whole table; a choice is therefore made for the characteristics of networks being applied to the potential modes of contemporary governance in government. Traditionally, tasks of the government could only be executed by civil servants or be outsourced to the market with a particular contract. In contemporary government more complex divisions of labor are appearing, based on the cooperation of government units or of government units and completely independent parties, for example in the context of public-private partnerships. This cooperation is able to assume the shape of a network.

242


Its basis is not a relationship of employment or subordination (a command), nor does it function on the basis of a contract. It is a more or less temporary cooperation in which all parties engaged use each other’s complementary strengths. All parties are interdependent. Cooperation is focused on reciprocal gains and not on the gain of each party itself, nor it is it focused on the strengthening of a party’s organizational position. A clear common task and some kind of supervision and accountability are crucial for successful cooperation. After all, the classical modes of governance of the hierarchy (political and administrative authority) and the market (competition and profit maximization) no longer work to serve and evaluate the success of common operations. One of the most important functions of networks is reaching common goals in a society with far-reaching divisions of labor [3]. This also goes for the government. Its fragmentations and partitions are a result of an extreme division of labor within the traditional hierarchical model, in which the overview from the top is lost. The ensuing growth of independent and semi-independent public organizations and privatization have only reinforced this trend. The crossroads between formerly divided organizational units that are made in the network configurations are only reparation tools, a kind of first-aid bandage for a division of labor that has gone too far. In these configurations achieving common goals is not the result of the invisible hand of the market and its prices, nor of the visible hand of (government) management and its routines, but of the reciprocal gains that can be achieved in explicit agreements of more or less independent actors and their relationships. However, networks are not a mode of organization based on pure cooperation. In the whole of human history they have been a combination of cooperation and competition [24]. The basic reason for this is that actors participating in networks are both (inter)dependent and independent. The modern economy is a combination of strategic alliances, with monopolies and oligopolies on one side and relentless competition on the other. Similarly, contemporary government is a complex system that on the one hand tries to act as a unitary whole and on the other hand, through the autonomy of lower governmental departments and through sharp organizational divisions, stimulates internal competition for all means and positions. This conflict also rules the network configurations of joined-up government and public-private partnerships that are supposed to bridge these divisions and show a united face. The most important characteristic of using networks as a mode of governance is the combination of horizontal and vertical control and coordination [25]. This mode does not work with vertical control and coordination such as the hierarchy, nor with their horizontal alternatives such as the market, but on a mix of centralized and decentralized structures. This is the ‘secret’ of the potential gains of networks as a flexible organizational form [3]. With the aid of information and communication technology the combination of central registration, coordination and control with decentralized execution, adaptation to the environment and coordination can be realized much better than before [26, 25, 3]. The popular view of networks as a flat, horizontal mode of organization is very one-sided. Networks are only ‘flat’ in comparison with hierarchies. Networks also have centers and central modes of steering and governance. In cases where they don’t have them, networks as forms of cooperation in government easily fall apart. However, central governance is not able to maintain network configurations when the basis for internal agreement the mutual trust of participating actors does not occur or disappears. Trusts rests on frequent communication among participants, on


243

cultural similarity and on equivalent structural positions. Mutual trust and known reputations of participants will have to resolve differences of opinion and conflicts. Neither central authority (in this case, of institutional government) nor judgments in court or even mediation are able to resolve conflicts here. In theory the government may be considered as a unit; in practice a lack of internal communication, cultural similarity and equivalent positions often kills attempts to cooperate in networks with a particular task. Every instance of a governmental organization in a particular phase of development is characterized by a particular combination of the three ideal-type modes of governance composed above. In the phase of traditional government, described below, the hierarchy dominates. Here the market and networks are subordinate: the market in the function of financial accounting and networks in the shape of informal communication. In the current phase of turning government, initiated in the 1980s and 1990s by the perspectives of liberalization and New Public Management, we are able to observe the rise of the market (by means of outsourcing and privatization) and of networks (in the shape of a number of semi-autonomous public organizations jointly executing government tasks and in the shape of joined-up government departments). In the perspective on the future of network government, the network mode of governance has become dominant both as a type of organization (network organization) and as a type of technology (computer network infrastructure). However, even in transitioning government and in network government, hierarchies and markets remain important modes of governance, for example in the shape of more or less democratic political and administrative rule and of more or less outsourcing to the market economy. In the next three sections we describe what these combinations of modes of governance in the three successive phases of government organization look like, including visualizing them in models.

4. Traditional government Traditional government has the shape of a pyramid. It has a top-down structure. The first characteristic of a hierarchy is that the lower levels are fully included in the higher levels. The second characteristic is that the lower levels are superseded by the higher levels (top-down). This mode of governance is appropriate for a territorial division of the State and the principle of limited governmental autonomy of lower levels. Here political governance of organizations of the public administration occurs at all levels of society and of governmental order (national, regional, local). In democratic States this governance is enacted by parliaments and constitutional governments. The public administration sector is considered to be an executor. Figure 2 contains a visual model of traditional government drawn with symbols that enable comparisons with the other models to follow. In traditional government the relations of information, communication and governance are supported by the traditional media of face-to-face communication, the press, broadcasting and telephony. With these media the government approaches citizens and corporations by means of external communication. Reversely, citizens and corporations use the same means in their own channels: sending written or typed letters and forms, having talks with politicians and civil servants, using the telephone and visiting service desks. This is why the model contains two separate opposing arrows.

244


Figure 2: Graphic model of traditional government

Traditional government itself emphasizes internal communication partly composed of informal talks. Already in traditional government the shape of networks within and between government departments can be reached. For the purposes of budget administration and allocation, the procedures of the market economy can be applied.

5. Turning government Turning government means leaning over to the more horizontal modes of governance of the market and networks. Within the confines of a hierarchy that remains, the modes of the market and networks become more important. As has been claimed above, this has been expressed in the processes of privatization and growing independence of (semi-) government organizations since the 1980s. Also within the remaining core of central


245

government, organizational shapes appear that cut through or overlap traditional divisions of governmental departments. They are all kinds of steering committees, task forces, coordinating commissions, formal and informal consultation groups, project teams and temporary management teams. To begin with, they account for a strong increase in the number of organizational units because all traditional units remain. In all advanced high-tech societies with a full-fledged infrastructure of ICTs, in this field only, hundreds if not thousands of organizational units taking the shape of a network have appeared in order to realize particular tasks of e-government, to link government networks and their databases and to share computer services. They are the main actors of joined-up e-government. Their tasks require continuous cooperation and some autonomy to execute them. Simultaneously, they need direction from the official hierarchy because otherwise no decision or step to be taken acquires official status and can be realized. However, frequently it is not clear who exactly is supposed to give this direction because so many parties are engaged in the cooperation. The call for some central direction from the government varies from an appeal for a special minister coordinating all e-government activities across departments to a request for clear policies and decisions of parliaments in the field of e-government. The transitional phase of turning government is a time of permanent struggle because all organizational units engaged in the process are continuously maneuvering to get a bigger share in current decision making and future structures of government, among others in the field of e-government. For example, in many countries there is competition between the ministerial hierarchies and their own executive administrations, and between these administrations themselves. It is a struggle for control of the units of cooperation described above and for the management of computer network infrastructures and architectures. A recurrent issue of disagreement is whether direction should be more central or more decentralized. The transitional phase might take a long time; perhaps it is safe to say that it will take at least a human generation. We presume that the phase will end with a fully operational, government-wide, all-embracing ICT infrastructure and a complete organizational restructuring of the government and public administration around this backbone. For that matter, this does not mean that the organization of future government and public administration will become fully determined by technology. Political motives of transparent, accessible and democratic governance and demands posed by the scale and complexity of organization also shape the restructuring concerned. A generation is the minimum time span that is needed for such sweeping large-scale technological and organizational processes with great political and economic impact. Frequently, organizational reconstructions are proposed to the governments and public administrations of contemporary developed societies. Mostly, they address problems of level and scale: shifts from national to local government or the other way round, the removal of provincial or other intermediary levels, the reduction of the number of national ministries, the fusion of municipalities and the like. These proposals are often related to changes in the current or future integrated infrastructure of ICTs. This infrastructure seems to promote the merger or dissolution of formerly separate executive administrations. However, generally speaking, these administrations reach more power in the phases of turning and network government. The move of turning is visible in Figure 3 by the dotted lines of ICT infrastructure that turn from vertical to horizontal and by the central location of the administrations of control and execution. Here a common direction of basic registers of several currently separate administrations (of people, housing, land, means of transport, etc.) serves as an

246


example of a network configuration that backs or shapes the backbone of turning government.

Figure 3: Graphic model of Turning Government

6. Network Government The overarching organization principle of networks is not a hierarchy but a heterarchy (literary: the rule comes from elsewhere). In a heterarchy lower levels are only partially included in higher levels [23]. Units at both levels are related via an overlapping network structure, so they cut right through all levels and connect these levels. As a mode of organization, networks realize complex interactions within and between levels. They are able to increase the flexibility of government organization as a whole. This means that the levels of society, organization and individual are linked, cutting through existing geographic and other partitions. It also means that the highest levels do not fully determine lower levels, but the opposite is not true, either. Instead, a very complicated picture appears of determination from below, determination from above and determination at the semi-autonomous level in focus itself [3]. As emphasized above, networks have both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies. In describing turning government, we have already observed that classic territorial divisions are cut by a uniform infrastructure and architecture of computer networks with databases of registries that connect national and local government levels. This infrastructure is managed by a common direction. This is not to say that physical geographic divisions are no longer relevant in a network society or network government.


247

After all, people remain physically, mentally, socially and culturally anchored to local environments [3]. It does mean that structures of links emerge that, when backed by a ubiquitous infrastructure of ICTs, shorten the lines of information, communication and management in politics and in public administration. For the first time in modern history the utopia of a government as a flexibly operating and transparent organism or machine, or a single organism, becomes somewhat real. In its ideal-type description, network government has turned upside-down completely. Vertical structures have become horizontal, supported by an all-embracing infrastructure of information technology and its network management. As has been argued above, in the days of the Internet hype some derived that in network government vertical structures will be completely replaced by horizontal structures, thereby becoming fully decentralized. Networks are supposed to be flat, lacking centers. Simultaneously, the traditional political mode of steering, the hierarchy, would marginalize as the virtual State becomes a ‘hollow’ State not ruled by substantial politics but by technology [7]. Again, it should be stressed that this draws an incorrect picture of networks and network government. The ideal type is not equal to the reality of network government. In reality modes of determination from above and forms of hierarchy also remain in the context of network government. Moreover, network government is not hollow but it is filled by policies from ‘above’ (the political government and the professional administrative organizations that remain) and ‘below’ (networked civil society). Principally, this happens in two ways. First, the bureaucracy of traditional government evolves into infocracy [26]. Henceforward, control is taken into account inside information technology, in this case the computer network. However, this does not mean that this technological rule is neutral from a political and governance point of view. Substantial politics is inserted because, additionally, networks also have centers – think about a spider in a web – they even have a plurality of them. Only, they work differently from classical hierarchies, enabling local degrees of freedom in the context of a central direction [25]. The second manifestation of determination from above in network government is political direction, be it with potential (democratic) support from below. The infocracy as a form of technocracy leaves sufficient space for a substantial, normative governance of all social-cultural and political levels of society. Perhaps this will become a political direction on main lines and a completion of local details. Similarly, the mode of governance of the market remains in network government, at least in market economies. Depending on political preferences, government action is bigger or smaller, stronger or weaker with regards to the market. ‘networked government’ (partnerships) and ‘outsourced government’ (outsourcing) are able to extend ‘joined-up government’. A common infrastructure of ICTs is the backbone of network government. The management and control of this ICT infrastructure will serve the role of the infocracy. The remaining organizations of the public administration that will be restructured in the coming decades to meet new organizational and technological demands will be draped like flesh around this backbone, so to say. This structure of network government is portrayed in Figure 4.

248


Figure 4: Graphic model of Network Government

7. The clash of modes of governance It might take a generation before such an all-embracing infrastructure of ICTs is realized. There are not only several technical and juridical problems to solve. Most significant, particularly in the phase of turning government, is the basic clash of modes of governance. We want to illustrate this statement by means of the history of the PDirekt project in the Netherlands, which in 2005 was considered by the Dutch Parliament and public opinion to be a notoriously failing project that was wasting millions of euros. The organization of this project is a typical example of a network configuration surrounded and partly directed by a hierarchical government and by the market. The PDirekt project is a cooperation between all ministries of the Dutch government (except for the ministry of Defense) to install a shared electric service of employee and salary administration. The cooperation should be realized through a common computer network provision and a shared services center for all personnel departments and salary administrations. The core of this is a central basic registration with shared data supplemented by proprietary data and facilities of the participating ministries. The principle in charge of this project was the Minister of Governmental Renewal and Relationships of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which falls under the Ministry of Interior Affairs. This minister had the political responsibility for the project and regularly


249

had to report to the Cabinet of Ministers about the progress being made. In the current 2008 Dutch government this minister is replaced by a Secretary of State. The deputy general secretaries of the ministerial departments are responsible for a successful transition of ministerial work to the project PDirekt. In this way the official hierarchy managing the project is described. The first network configuration installed in the project was the APO (Dutch abbreviation for General Project Leaders’ Consultation), which consists of all ministerial project leaders working on behalf of the deputy general secretaries named above. They each carry a mandate from their respective ministerial departments. The third party in this project is the market. In the year 2004 the Dutch government ascribed a clear role to the market in the construction and maintenance of the shared services provision concerned. In the same year an external party on the market was solicited according to the tender rules of the European Union. This was to be responsible for the design, construction, exploitation and management of the infrastructure required according to market standards. The IBL consortium comprising IBM and LogicaCMG was the ‘lucky’ winner of this tender. The specific task of the PDirekt project as a whole was to create a shared employee and salary administration for all ministries using common standards and procedures in shared software. Currently, more than five years after this task was charged, it has still not been realized. Every ministry continues with its own personnel management and registration with proprietary task divisions, routines and standards. Every ministerial personnel department holds its own responsibility and accountability for a specific number of tasks explicitly defined for that ministry. These departments keep being managed by their own hierarchies that are held accountable by the government and the political representation as a whole. Therefore, it is no surprise that the managerial hierarchies had different requests to the PDirekt project in terms of procedures and standards. At the end of 2005 it was officially observed in the Dutch Parliament that the project did not match expectations. This happened after two detailed project designs made by IBM and LogicaCMG were rejected by the ministerial representatives in 2004 and 2005 and after the final date for project result deliverance was postponed to January 1, 2007. A remarkable fact was that only during the preparations of the second design were there talks between the coordinating Ministry of Interior Affairs and the other ministries about the specific functional criteria of acceptance that had to be realized in this design. On October 14, 2005 IBM withdrew from the project with a claim for damages of more than 20 million euros because this company itself had to fund in advance all costs made. After this dramatic event the project was not officially halted. Instead, it was launched again. A task force of the project consultation group APO, mentioned above, was established to elaborate a rescue scenario called ‘New Course’. In addition to this task force and APO a number of working groups, consisting of representatives from all ministries, were created with the common task to work on a continuing transition to PDirekt. The special task force, the APO and the working groups can be called network configurations. Re-launching the project started in June 2006 with a letter from the Dutch government and the minister responsible for the project explaining that the most important building stones could be further developed in anticipation of an audit report of the official budget control organization (Algemene Rekenkamer) charged by Parliament. The ministry in charge is the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and the executors are the three ministries left after the rest had pulled out.

250


The history of the PDirekt project is a clear example of a clash of the three modes of governance discussed in this article. The market consortium expected a detailed order exactly describing the task, functionality, standards and price of the desired system at the start of the project. The ministerial hierarchies were not able to meet these expectations on time. They were sticking to the demands, routines and responsibilities of their departments. Simultaneously, they were shifting the burden of organizing PDirekt onto the shoulders of the network of project leaders (APO). However, lacking direction form the Ministry of Internal Affairs, this network was not able to clear this job on its own [27]. After all, this network wanted to execute the job as efficiently as possible, optimally benefiting from the relations of cooperation between participants. Through this example we see that prices (the market requiring detailed demand), routines (the hierarchy) and relations (the network) clash as means to determine the standards and other organizational characteristics required for a shared services provision.

8. Principles for network management in government Such collisions will catch on in the phase of turning government. As described earlier, every instance of a governmental organization in a particular phase of development is characterized by a particular combination of the three ideal-type modes of governance hierarchy, market and network. After the hype, in the phase of turning government, the network mode of governance will be stronger in the management mix of the three idealtype modes of governance. But the popular view of networks in which management is based on pure horizontal control and coordination, as self steering, is wrong. Network management via mutual agreements between the individual government organizations in the network alone, is not sufficient. There must be an overview of the network of governmental organizations as a whole. Governance is not possible without government [28]. The question arises as to how networks can be managed or directed in the phase of turning government. In this phase they are not able to function completely independently from governmental hierarchies. Moreover, both in the turning phase and in network government they have to be directed administratively and politically, possibly in democratic ways. In the dissertation project of the second author of this chapter a number of guidelines for the management of networks in joined-up government will be framed after a number of empirical studies of the network configurations concerned (publication expected in 2009). In concluding this chapter we will formulate a number of such guidelines in anticipation. These are based on extensive research of the international literature on managing networks and on first explorations of joined-up government projects in the Netherlands such as Pdirekt, GBO.overheid and Personal Internet Page. The main sources for finding network management guidelines are Mandell [29, 30], Rhodes [31, 32], Kickert et al. [20], de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof [33], Milward & Provan [8, 34], de Bruijn, ten Heuvelhof & in ’t Veld [35], Goldsmith & Eggers [10], van Dijk [3] and Kamarck [13]. The guidelines summarized below apply only to joined-up government in the current phase of turning government and are a mix of three ideal-type modes of governance hierarchy, market and network.


1.

2.

3.

251

Political-administrative governance or direction remains necessary in the phases of turning government and network government. There has to be an agency that provides and continually guards the conditions of cooperation in network configurations, the goals expected and a number of crucial technical and organizational means such as hardware and software, office means and personnel discharges. Downsizing or increasing the productivity is one of the strategies which Kamarck [13] mentioned to create reinvented public-sector organizations. This agency should design the conditions for horizontal and vertical control and coordination which is a characteristic for network government [3]. A good design of the network is crucial for a successful network approach [10]. The agency has to keep an overview and is held accountable to responsible bodies of the government. The more extended the network, the higher this agency should be in the political and administrative hierarchy. For example, the conditions, goals and means (such as standards) of a nationwide system of basic registers in a country being the backbone of all future ICT architectures should rest with a single ministry or official agency that has full control over this architecture on behalf of central government. Otherwise all other ministries, administrative bodies, provinces and municipalities concerned cannot be coordinated. A network configuration in charge with this task would have an impossible job without this common direction. Political-administrative governance also means general democratic accountability of the representative bodies concerned for activities performed by the network configurations in charge. Accountability is a weak spot of network configurations in government [10]. These configurations usually work on a larger distance from representative bodies than traditional governmental hierarchies. However, those responsible are not allowed to shift risks and accountabilities to these network configurations; instead they must give political support to the configurations. Democratic accountability means watching and measuring the way the policy is implemented and making interventions on time when measurements indicate non performance in implementation. Legislative bodies will have to learn to carry out oversight of the new forms of government. Much of the oversight that the public sees comes in the form of ‘fire alarm’ oversight, investigations into large-scale problems in the conduct of executive branches [13]. However, the network configuration should be granted sufficient autonomy to independently work within these confines. The means of organization in a network are based on relationships [3]. To realize these relationships, network structures have to be created that contain comparatively few intermediary links or steps, enabling network participants to easily reach each other. These structures should enable an optimal exchange of ICT resources within the network without charging it with redundant connections. Such a structure prevents governments departments from working in uncoordinated ways due to the lack of direct links. It also avoids that departments hinder each other by sticking to the traditional hierarchical model and thus maintaining many superfluous lines of control. Within this structure there is place for innovation and exploration, for example by the creation of relationships with organizations that are not already in the configuration. An ethos of innovation, experimentation, and cross-agency work replaces the ethos of rule making,

252


4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

another strategy which Kamarck [13] mentioned to create reinvented publicsector organizations. Tasks and responsibilities of network configurations should be made explicit and clearly demarcated from those of the hierarchical divisions of the government. A government agency should not let its historical processes, current organizational charts or existing capabilities dictate what activities should be pursued under a networked approach [10]. When a network configuration is charged with particular tasks and responsibilities that remain within the existing routines of the hierarchy, traditional ways to perform tasks will not really change. The use of networks entails neither the wish to centrally decide about everything, nor to decide about nothing or about a few things. The job is to govern and settle according to required performances instead of processes prescribed in detail. This also goes for hiring the market (commercial agencies). A management pitfall of traditional bureaucracy is the adherence to process. In Reinvented Government the attention to service delivery increases [13]. An important step is to properly identify and weigh the appropriate outcomes and metrics. An outcome is the end result, not to be confused with inputs or outputs. Rather than focusing on the number of nurses, teachers and police officers in service, outcomes measure performances such as the health of patients, the quality of people’s education or the level of pubic safety [36]. An emphasis on important values and clarity of outcomes, coupled with flexible processes, moves the initiator-participant relationship from an adversarial one to one of cooperation and shared goals [10]. There has to be a need for cooperation. The ‘sense of urgency’ in the cooperation process is very important [35]. The participants of a network of cooperating government departments have to acknowledge that cooperation serves a mutual advantage. In networks, goals of organizations are based on reciprocal gains [3]. Commitment between partners does not grow in artificial organizational constructions that are only driven by the obligation from above to cooperate or by the strategic goals of participants that only try to gain influence for themselves. Mutual advantage is created by sharing (ICT) resources in a relation of mutual dependency. Participants expect from each other that they will invest in their relationships contributing to the common resources benefiting all. These resources are not individually possessed but commonly produced. Making investments in common resources, the participants build social credit, a reciprocity rule in networks [33]. Managing networks means gaining insight in the different interests of participating actors. In networks of cooperating government departments both formal and informal interests serve the success of cooperation. Insight into these interests is gained by making distinctions between three types of networks: inter-organizational, intra-organizational and interpersonal. Attuning all interests, strategically and tactically, is the main job of managing networks. Monge and Contractor [14] propose a multi-level approach to analyze the different interests. De Bruijn, ten Heuvelhof and in ’t Veld [35] mention the importance of protecting the core values of the participants when managing the process of cooperation. The progress and internal accounting of networks do not rest on direct supervision from above, nor on a contract, but on mutual trust and the


253

reputation of participants [3]. Trust is the bedrock of collaboration. Without it, people will not collaborate or share knowledge [10]. Trust has to be continually built by the governmental people in charge placing trust in the network and by incessant internal communication within the network and between the network and its external taskmasters. In this communication one has to take into account the cultural differences between participants. 9. The identity and image of the network and its organizational participants have to be developed in the same way. The network should obtain its own face. Otherwise insufficient commitment between partners grows and the network will dissolve easily. The identity and image of the network depends on the purpose of the network and is related to the social outcome. Goldsmith and Eggers [10] and Kamarck [13] explore different types of networks. Each network participant should have the opportunity to make a valuable contribution to the outcome of the network as a whole. This complementary strength forms the organizational basis of networks [3]. 10. The performances of networks(according to their tasks) should continually be watched and measured, first of all by the network participants themselves who use the same channels of communication for this purpose as described above. For the coordination and monitoring of the network performance, an integrator is required. The integrator coordinates and aligns the values and incentives to the total outcome [10].

9. Conclusion Contrary to the utopian and dystopian expectations of some visionaries in the days of the Internet hype at the turn of the century, network government has not revolutionized the ways governments and public administrations work. These ways have not, for instance, turned vertical relationships of governance into horizontal ones, nor can the opposite turn be observed. Instead, network government remains a perspective of a particular mode of governance that has to compete with other, more traditional modes of governance: the government hierarchy and the market. The only thing that can be observed is the gradual rise of several kinds of network government, in the context of the nascent network society with its ubiquitous social and organizational networks linked by computer networks: joined-up government, networked government, outsourced government, online democracy and global networking. In this chapter we have described this gradual rise in the sequence of three historical epochs: those of traditional government, turning government and network government. A few years ago a new Internet hype appeared that is fairly similar to the one discussed, the 1990s Internet hype. This is known under the perspective of Web 2.0 and the rise of participatory media. In this hype the overarching principles and opportunities of networks and their horizontal dimensions are also stressed and assumed to be on the winning side of history. Only, this time something has happened to the Internet. Currently, there are many more active users as creators on the web than ever before, participating in all kinds of applications such as web-logs, peer-to-peer networking, social networking sites and civic online journalism. In the 1990s the Internet was mainly used in a relatively passive and consuming way. This shift has once again launched a hype of networking as a revolutionary type of large-scale cooperation and economic

254


democracy, replacing markets and hierarchies. Benkler and Tapscott and Williams have argued that social production on the Internet transforms markets and freedom [37, 38]. They observe networks as a mode of governance competing with traditional markets and hierarchies in the media. They scarcely pay attention to the State and its hierarchies. Others have shown more interest for the (e-)participation of citizens in the perspective of Web 2.0. However, all make the same mistake of overstating the horizontal dimension and autonomy of networks and understating the power and legitimacy of hierarchies in governments and markets. It is no matter of necessity that the final epoch of network government will dawn. If it does, we know that it will take quite some time, but we don’t know exactly how it will look. Future epochs will continue to show particular compromises or syntheses of the three types of governance explained in this chapter: hierarchies, markets and networks. Moreover, we have acknowledged that network government is appropriate for particular problems but is not a solution for everything. It is able to reduce complexity, to enhance flexibility, to support innovation (such as the introduction of ICTs in government) and to personalize government-citizen relationships. Finally, we emphasized that network government requires a particular management approach that is only beginning to be discovered.

References [1] [2]

[3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18]

M. Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Vol. I: The Rise of the Network Society, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996. J. van Dijk, Models of Democracy and Concepts of Communication, in K. Hacker and J. van Dijk (eds.), Digital Democracy, Issues of Theory and Practice, 30-53, Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 2000, J. van Dijk, The Network Society: Social Aspects of New Media, 2nd edn. Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 2006. T.L. Becker and C. Slaton, The Future of Teledemocracy, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2000. J. Guéhenno, The End of the Nation-State, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1995. J. Katz, Media Rants: Postpolitics in a Digital Nation, Hardwired, San Francisco, 1997. P.H.A. Frissen and C. Emery, Politics, Governance and Technology: A Postmodern Narrative on the Virtual State (New Horizons in Public Policy), Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999. H. Milward, B. Provan and K.G. Provan, Governing the Hollow State, Journal of Public Administration and Theory 10, 2 (2000a), 359-79. O. Gandy, The Panoptic Society, Westview, Boulder, CO, 1994. S. Goldsmith and W. Eggers, Governing by Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector, The Brooking Institution, Washington, D.C., 2004. Accenture. Leadership in customer service: New expectations, new experiences: Accenture, 2005. Available: www.accenture.com/ xdoc/ ca/ locations/ canada/ insights/ studies/ leadership_cust.pdf E. Ebbers and J.A.G.M. van Dijk, Resistance and Support to Electronic Government: Building a Model of Innovation, Government Information Quarterly 24, 3 (2007), 554-75. E. Kamarck, The End of Government as We Know It: Making Public Policy Work, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder, 2007. P.R. Monge and N.S. Contractor, Theories of Communication Networks, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003. B. Hague and B. Loader, Digital Democracy:, Discourse and Decision Making in the Information Age, Routledge, New York, 1999. K. Hacker and J. van Dijk (eds.), Digital Democracy: Issues of Theory and Practice, Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 2000. P.M. Shane (ed.), Democracy Online, The prospects of Political Renewal through the Internet, Routledge, New York and London, 2004. A. Chadwick, Internet Politics: States, Citizens and New Communication Technologies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.


255

[19] A-M. Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2004. [20] W.M. Kickert, E.-H. Klijn en J. Koppenjan, Managing Complex Networks, Strategies for the Public Sector, Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1997. [21] G. Thompson, J. Frances, R. Levacic en J. Mitchell (eds.), Markets, Hierarchies and Networks: The Coordination of Social Life, Sage, London, 1991. [22] W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organizations, in B. Slaw (ed.), Research in Organizational Behaviour 12 (1991), 295-336. Greenich, CI: JAI. [23] K. Kontopoulos, The Logics of Social Structure, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 2003. [24] J.R. McNeill and W.H. McNeill, The Human Web: A Bird’s-eye View of World History, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London, 2003. [25] L. Applegate, In Search of a New Organizational Model: Lessons From the Field, in G. de Sanctis and J. Fulk (eds.), Shaping Organizational Form: Communication, Connection, Community, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1999. [26] A. Zuurmond, De Infocratie; Een Theoretische en Empirische Heroriëntatie op Weber’s Ideaaltype in het Informatietijdperk, Phaedrus, Den Haag, 1994. [27] P. Lievense, P-Direkt: Wat er Mis Ging, Digitaal Bestuur 1, 2 (2005), p. 54-59. [28] F. Ankersmit and L. Klinkers (eds.), De Tien Plagen van de Staat: De Bedrijfsmatige Overheid Gewogen, Van Gennep, Amsterdam, 2008. [29] M.P. Mandell, Network Management: ‘Strategic Behaviour in the Public Sector’, in R.W. Gage and M.P. Mandell (eds.), Strategies for Managing Intergovernmental Policies and Networks, 46-56. Praeger, New York, 1990. [30] M.P. Mandell, Getting Results through Collaboration, Quorum Books, Westport, 2001. [31] R.A.W. Rhodes, Policy Networks: A British Perspective, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2, 3 (1990), 293317. [32] R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1997. [33] J.A. de Bruijn and E.F. ten Heuvelhof, Management in Netwerken, Lemma, Utrecht, 1999. [34] H. Milward, B. Provan and K.G. Provan, How Networks Are Governed, in L.E. Lynn, C. Heinreich and C. Hill (eds.), Governance and Performance: New Perspectives, 238-262. Georgetown University Press, Georgetown, 2000b. [35] J.A. de Bruijn, E.F. ten Heuvelhof and R.J. in ’t Veld, Procesmanagement: Over Procesontwerp en Besluitvorming, Academic Service, Schoonhoven, 2002. [36] M. Cole and G. Parston, Unlocking Public Value: A New Model for Achieving High Performance in Public Service Organizations, John Wiley and Sons, Inc, Hoboken NJ, 2006. [37] Y. Benkler, The Wealth of Networks, How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2006. [38] D. Tapscott and A. Williams, Wikinomics, How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything, Portfolio (Penguin Group), London, 2006.

256


Unraveling and understanding the e-government hype Kees Boersma, Albert Meijer and Pieter Wagenaar

1. Belief in new technologies This book has reviewed the e-government hype: the enormous expectations that were held regarding the potential contributions to governments by new, web-based technologies. In the last decade of the twentieth century these new technologies, particularly the Internet, were hyped in many ways and advocated as new forms of organizing government. Around the globe, advocates of the hype were convinced that this new technology would bring tremendous opportunities and fundamental changes to the way people organize and interact. The Internet was seen as a revolutionary tool, an opportunity to reshape the material basis for organizations, communities and governance; indeed for society as a whole. The technology that triggered the hype is the Internet and, more specifically, the World Wide Web. This network of computers enables world-wide real-time communication. The Web was supposed to offer new modes of production, new modes of development and – in the end – a new social structure: the network society [1]. In other words, the Internet was the promising technology [2] and was advocated so strongly that it became a hype in the late 1990s. The hype started in the private sector but spread into the domain of public administration. The Internet hype was perhaps most visible in the rise of Dotcom businesses [3]. Companies started to experiment with the Internet not only to improve their customer services by building websites for on-line purchasing, but also by using the Internet to transform the very fundamentals of their companies. The Dotcoms’ organizational structures, and in many cases also their products, were based on network technologies [4]. The promise of the Dotcom organizations collapsed when the Internet bubble burst. The problem with the new concept had been that the Dotcom organizations were not built on proper financial ground. Although they were based on the principles of the stock market, for a long time their stocks (e.g. in on-line services) were only promises [5]. But it was not just the weak economic basis that made the operation of the new web-based organizations problematic. The Dotcom organizations became a metaphor for the Internet as the promising technology that would fundamentally change our society yet a tool that in itself is empty. They were the hype and the bubble at the same time. The fall of the Dotcom industry at the beginning of the twenty-first century challenged the high expectations that had arisen. After so much hype, the unmasking of the Dotcoms as simply a new mode of organizing came as a shock. And it soon became clear that only those organizations that had invested in building structures based on the principles of the ‘old’ economy would survive.

K. Boersma et al. / Unraveling and Understanding the E-Government Hype

257

It was not only the private sector that had made huge investments in the web-based technologies. Governments all over the world had invested in these new technologies, since these were supposed to make government more efficient, effective, democratic and legitimate. As this book has shown, the new technology was often placed high on the agenda of policy makers as the promising instrument to support and even broaden the tasks of government. Governments all over the world expected much − as we now know, too much − from the Internet. ‘E-government’ followed a pattern similar to that of the Dotcom organizations: it was hyped but could not meet the huge expectations. One could conclude that we have all been lured into thinking that technology makes everything different. We can see that we should now be more ‘realistic’ and careful not to get carried away by technological utopias. This may be true, but this new understanding does not tell us much about the character and the function of the hype, nor how to recognize and deal with hypes in the future. Throughout this book the various authors have analyzed the hype at different levels. The chapters provide us with insights into the ideologies underlying the hype, the reasons why the high expectations could not be realized and the slow changes that did eventually take place. We aim to go beyond a dichotomous approach – carried away by dreams versus being realistic – to understand how these dreams influence the actions of actors in the public sectors and the resulting changes. What happened in the public sector during the hype, and what is happening now that the hype has ended?

2. Ideology behind the hype: ‘Resistance is futile’ Hypes are not value-free but are based on ideologies [6]. The kind of future we desire plays a role in how we see and treat current trends. Throughout this book we have seen many examples of web-based technologies, such as the Internet and web services, being introduced to governmental organizations among high expectations. Most of the chapters about the relation between ICTs and citizens highlighted how the gap between citizens and governments (including local governments) became a sensitive issue in political terms. The new technology was seen as a helpful means in bridging it. If governmental security organizations started to dysfunction because of insufficient coordination, new technological systems were introduced to overcome these problems. When the public infrastructure proved inadequate, again it was electronic means that were introduced as the final answer: e-health, e-learning and e-governance. What is the ideological basis of these ‘solutions’? We will examine this in the paragraphs below. Three aspects of this ideology are important to consider. First, the rhetoric of the 1990s and the implementation of so many new technologies in government were based on a strong and deterministic belief in technology that embraced the positive effect of new technologies [7]. ‘Determinism’ in this sense refers to the idea that new technologies develop autonomously, come to us like ‘manna from heaven’ and determine organizations, people’s behavior and, in the end, society at large. This book provides various examples. Ter Hedde and Svensson indicate in Chapter 3 that the Internet in general, and discussion forums in particular, were expected to lead to new, more participatory and more deliberative forms of democracy. Moody’s analysis in Chapter 7 shows that Geographical Information Systems would, according to ‘believers’, increase the transparency and rationality of decision-making processes. These systems would also lead to nation-wide information sharing. Another example is provided by Pieterson, who stresses in Chapter 5 that it

258


was widely believed that web channels would make the telephone and front desks obsolete. This deterministic belief underlying these expectations of the impact of new technologies has been criticized heavily on the basis of empirical research. The day-today practices of the new technologies in-use, as Orlikowski [8] would call it, make clear that ICTs are demanding rather than promising technologies [9]. Technology is, moreover, an outcome of social interactions between a variety of actors and does not determine these interactions through its characteristics. The ideology underlying the hype fails to take this social complexity into account. Second, as this book has shown in many cases, the strongest advocates of Internet as a tool for bridging the gap between citizens and government treated the new technology as a neutral phenomenon [10]. In Chapter 11, Poole et al. show how the idea behind Decision Support Systems is that these systems will enable American planners and decision makers to act more rationally and responsively to the needs of citizens. In Chapter 8, Gil-Garcia and Luna-Reyes indicate that the introduction of Digital Community Centers is supposed to help creating a national information society in Mexico. Meijer explains in Chapter 4 that the publishing of school performance indicators on Dutch government websites is supposed to lead to better school choice and eventually better education for everyone. Lips, Taylor and Organ (Chapter 6) describe how smart card applications are presented as means to make government more citizen-centric rather than organization-centric. Similarly, Rotthier and De Rynck (Chapter 12) discuss how e-government is supposed to lead to integrated service delivery to citizens. The use of all these systems is supposed to be in everybody’s best interest. After all, who could oppose more rational decision-making, the spread of knowledge in society, better education, citizen-centric government and integrated service delivery? That means that in these narratives the technology itself is never questioned – it is considered to be unproblematic. Kling [11], however, shows that technology cannot be treated as a neutral phenomenon. Values are a key attribute of technologies, which the technologies attain from their contexts of design and development. Technologies trigger controversies and cannot be regarded as being neutral. Technology can become an instrument for setting the development for organizations and society as a whole and has built-in political dimensions [12] that can have both intended and unintended consequences for the social system in which it is introduced. In the third place, a recurring element in this book concerning the hype is that the new technology was introduced not only with high expectations and in a rather deterministic way, but also as the final answer to any problem. The new technology, the Internet, was regarded to be a technological fix [13, 14]. This means that technology was regarded to be the problem solver for any dysfunction in social systems. Huge benefits were expected to be reaped from the introduction and implementation of the new technologies in public services. It came to be viewed as a panacea. Networks of computers, web-based technology, the Internet, and e-services were introduced to literally fix the problems of citizens and government. Many authors in this book provide examples of a technological fix. Gil-Garcia and Luna-Reyes describe how the deployment of Digital Community Centers is seen as a means to create economic growth and social development in Mexico (Chapter 8). Bannister and Connolly show how the new technologies are seen as a fix for the desire to organize Irish government in a more decentralized manner (Chapter 14). The new technologies are presumed to bring about the ‘death of distance’: employees of government agencies


259

could work anywhere, since web-based technologies enable interactions over large distances. Wagenaar et al. make a similar argument in Chapter 9 concerning coordination between different government organizations. They indicate that the use of integrated emergency center systems in the Netherlands was supposed to fix all coordination problems between the police, fire brigade and ambulance service. The idea of a technological fix fails to take social and institutional contexts into account. The context in which the new technologies were implemented and used turned out to be far more problematic than was envisioned. The contexts of economic and social development in Mexico, of decentralization of Irish government and of cooperation in emergency centers in the Netherlands proved to impose important limitations on the potential for technology to truly fix problems. Fixing problems requires creating complicated collaborations between various societal actors. Technology can be an aid in fixing them, but it can never fix the problems by itself. Determinism, neutrality and technological fix present the future as an unavoidable and better place for everyone. The past, differences in power, administrative traditions and political culture do not matter. New technologies solve major problems in the public sector, and those opposing the new technologies are seen as luddites who should be convinced of all the benefits that the new technologies offer. The promises of the new technologies, proponents argue, are only properly understood by technologists who know about the new technologies, and laymen should follow them in their judgments. We qualify this ideology behind the hype as a non-democratic ideology. The future is not considered to be something which is created in democratic interactions between a variety of actors but rather as a technological given. In Star Trek terms: ‘Resistance is futile’.

3. Unraveling the backlash: The hype as a new utopia In practice the new technologies never succeed in realizing their promises. The ‘backlash’ was highlighted in all chapters in this book. Rein de Wilde, in his book De Voorspellers (The Predictors) [15] gives an analysis of why such images are doomed to be proven false. De Wilde discusses the phenomenon of futurology, utopias and hypes about technology and mentions four fundamental reasons for failure, all based on a naïve belief in technology. First of all, new technologies will be used in different ways than could be foreseen. This is because a technology always becomes part of social practice, which has its own dynamics, and no social practice is the same. The introduction of ICTs can even lead to a reinforcement of existing practices instead of opening up new directions. Unforeseen uses of new technology emerge from various chapters. Wagenaar et al. show in Chapter 9 that different operators use codes in integrated emergency center systems in different ways. The disciplinary backgrounds – police, fire brigade, ambulance service – condition patterns of use. Meijer’s findings in Chapter 4 show that even though public school performance indicators were meant to be used by parents, their use by school administrators accounts for some of the more important impacts. In Chapter 13 Pardo, Gil-Garcia and Burke highlight that record-keeping in the system for maintaining information about the West Nile Virus did not take place as intended because reporting certain findings was too tedious and was therefore avoided by local authorities.

260


In addition, the success and failure of any new technology is highly dependent upon complementary innovations. A new technological device is never a stand-alone technology; it always becomes interconnected with other technologies. This means that the introduction of a new technology asks for a re-design of the system in which it is implemented, and that is a difficult job in itself. In Chapter 11, Poole et al. highlight how a comprehensive Decision Support System can only function when there is an adequate underlying IT infrastructure. The absence of such an infrastructure makes it impossible to realize the potential offered by the Decision Support System. Moody’s research (Chapter 7) shows that public participation was hampered by the fact that not everybody owns a personal computer or has access to the Internet. In their analysis of e-government in Flanders, Rotthier and De Rynck (Chapter 12) show that incompatibility of technological packages forms an important obstacle to technological innovation. Further, the success of a new technology not only depends on the superiority of the new technology, but also, and perhaps even more so, on social factors. Opposing the deterministic idea of technological development, technology should be seen as the product of social interactions. Social factors appear in most chapters in this volume. Poole et al. describe several political and legal constraints for the use of Decision Support Systems in urban planning (Chapter 11). They argue that term limits for elected officials has a direct influence on the use of these systems since these officials may divert from the logic of these systems in view of their own political goals of being reelected. Ter Hedde and Svensson also highlight how political logic limits the impacts of new technologies (Chapter 3). They indicate that politicians are hardly interested in digital debates and that therefore this mode of communication plays a minimal role in debates between elected representatives. Moody emphasizes that organizational politics are important: Geographical Information Systems facilitate information sharing, but many organizations wish to retain their autonomy and are therefore reluctant to share information with others (Chapter 7). Rotthier and De Rynck (Chapter 12) emphasize that leadership is a crucial factor that needs to be studied in order to understand the impacts of e-government technologies on Flemish local governments. Finally, De Wilde argues that history can triumph over the future. That means that in some social settings, people choose to continue the use of old technologies instead of embracing the implementation of new technologies. Wagenaar et al. indicate that in spite of the availability of integrated emergency center systems, police officers still heavily rely on their mobile phones (Chapter 9). Meijer’s research shows that parents continue to rely on traditional information about school performance, such as stories from other parents, and make little use of government websites with school performance indicators (Chapter 4). Pieterson describes that in the presence of web portals Dutch citizens still widely prefer contact with government officials over the telephone (Chapter 5). Similarly, Schellong highlights in Chapter 2 that American citizens also prefer to contact governments over the telephone. The analysis of the ‘backlash’ shows us that hypes fail to heed the complexity of the social, political and administrative settings in which these technologies are used. Unforeseen uses, complementary innovations, social factors and old routines condition the development and use of new technologies. Social actors do actually influence technological trajectories, and they make relevant choices. A failure to take this complex social and institutional setting into account leads to deception. An understanding of the interactions between social and technological characteristics is needed to understand resulting technological practices. A focus on these resulting


261

practices also leads to new insights: the chapters in this book highlight how, in the end, the introduction of new technologies leads to significant transformations in the public sector.

4. Transformations in ICT and governance Talking about the Internet and government as a hype does not mean that nothing has changed. The opposite is true. New technologies have been introduced in governmental organizations and practices and these organizations have indeed changed. The technologies in-use have also contributed to some transformations government went through. Some of the transformations were planned transformations; others were just emerging from discursive and recurrent practices in the organizations in which the new technologies were introduced (see, for example, Wagenaar et al. in Chapter 9). Often the use of the new technologies such as the Internet and other web-based ICTs led to unintended consequences. In the introductory chapter we already indicated that routines shift at a deeper level. The institutional transformation taking place can first be analyzed at the domain of citizen-government interactions. These changes take place at the level of steering: new technologies seem to lead to transformations in the way governments try to steer citizen behavior. •

•

Informational steering. Traditionally, governments steer citizens’ behavior through punishments and rewards. Access to information seems to have developed into a new form of steering. Gil-Garcia and Luna-Reyes show that even though the introduction of Digital Community Centers is a slow process, over time these centers have enhanced Mexican citizens’ access to information resources (see Chapter 8). Moody shows in Chapter 7 how geographical websites have enabled citizens to understand the plans for their city. In Chapter 4, Meijer highlights a similar development in the Netherlands: citizens have much greater access to information about the performance of schools than they had before. Governments increasingly release specific information to citizens to steer their behavior in a certain direction. Mexican citizens are supposed to use the information for economic growth; Dutch citizens will create a stimulus for schools to improve education. Access to information has certain effects on citizen behavior and can be labeled as a new form of steering. Specific and continuous steering. Traditional incentives imposed on citizens by governments focus on fines and financial rewards. These punishments and rewards are imposed in a limited and general manner. Lips, Taylor and Organ show how smart cards can be used to impose new rewards (see Chapter 6). They indicate that governments are trying to stimulate the ‘good behavior’ of citizens through the attribution of smart cards and loyalty points. These cards enable governments to impose incentives in a much more specific and continuous manner than through traditional means.

This book also provides information about the institutional transformation taking place at the domain of interactions within governments:

262


•

•

Fading boundaries between organizations. Government has been designed into separate unions with distinct responsibilities. These distinctions seem to be fading under the influence of the use of information and communication technologies. Wagenaar et al. indicate that even though systems for cooperation between police, fire brigades and ambulance services have been implemented slowly, these systems result in stronger cooperation and fading boundaries between these three organizations (Chapter 9). Pardo, Gil-Garcia and Burke show how American governments find it difficult to share information concerning the West Nile Virus but, eventually, sharing results in increasing reliance on a common data pool (Chapter 13). Increased external focus. Government organizations traditionally have had a strong internal focus. The analysis by Meijer of the effects of publishing school performance indicators shows that the net effect is that schools shift their focus more to their environment (Chapter 4). Pardo, Gil-Garcia and Burke show how governments increasingly use external information for their response to the West Nile Virus (Chapter 13). The environment can acquire more information about public organizations, and these organizations can acquire more information about their environments. The network character of government (see Van Dijk and Winters-Van Beek, Chapter 16) forces government organizations to pay more attention to their stakeholders.

This overview of institutional changes is far from complete and does not mirror the impressive description of resulting long term changes – ‘after the hype’ – presented in the various chapters. The goal of this overview was to emphasize that, in the end, institutional transformation in government is taking place. Citizen-government interactions are transforming, and these transformations result in new, specific forms of steering and new, networked forms of government organizations. The hype has played a role in these transformations because it has been a trigger for change. How can the relation between the hype – as a narrative – and institutional transformations be understood?

5. The functions and dysfunctions of hypes In doing justice to hypes, it is not enough to analyze their reasons for failure. We also need to look into their functions and dysfunctions. An interesting framework for analyzing the function of hypes was presented by Bekkers and Homburg in Chapter 15. They conceptualize hypes as myths and argue that these can be seen as beacons which show us the way to a desirable future or, in this case, to a new and better public administration. They argue that hypes can be important since they play a role in defining the construction of policy problems and solutions, create a ‘common grammar’ among different actors and legitimize organizational transformations and policy changes. These functions are clearly present in the analyses presented in this book. Myths about citizen-centered government, for example, define the solution as new ways of organizing service delivery, create a grammar that focuses on citizen interactions and legitimizes transformations in service delivery organizations. The changes are much slower than foreseen and the impact may be quite different from the intended outcome, but the hype has nonetheless created a trigger for change, whereas without it the status quo would have continued.


263

Additional functions can be identified on the basis of the material presented in this volume. First of all, the hype of the web-based technology has a role in agenda setting [16]. That means that if a new technology is hyped the choices of the broader audience are influenced. The hype shows that technological developments have been made a priority. Information sharing has become a priority in thinking about cooperation between government organizations, and a citizen focus dominates thinking about service delivery. Technological hypes have played a supportive role in moving these issues onto the public, political and administrative agenda. Second, hypes can challenge individuals and organizations to think about cooperation. Cooperation is always a difficult issue because it may seem to offer all kinds of advantages but will in the end lead to a reduction of organizational autonomy. The chapters clearly show that the hypes provide a new incentive to create organizational collaborations. Hypes form a shared story about renewal and can therefore help different organizations to overcome differences and start changes. The ‘common grammar’ mentioned by Bekkers and Homburg (Chapter 15) plays an important role here. Finally, hypes can be a rhetorical means to overcome deadlocks. Hypes about new technologies can be used as a narrative of change [17]. Institutional and cultural barriers may form important inhibitors to change. Many of the chapters show how government organizations are slow to change their orientation towards service delivery, openness to citizen signals, cooperation with other governments, etc. A story about change which is both unavoidable and desirable may form a means to break through deadlocks and force actors to rethink current arrangements. Does this mean that hypes always have a beneficial impact on government? The answer is plain and simple: certainly not! We have highlighted the non-democratic ideology underlying these hypes. Laymen are not supposed to be involved in discussions about hypes since they lack a thorough understanding of these new technologies. This means that technological hypes may take us into directions which are not called for. Meijer & Zouridis [18] emphasize that e-government should be understood as an institutional transformation and that a public debate about the nature of this transformation is needed to prevent the creation of a type of government that we do not want. Government could take the form of a calculator without attention for values, morals and perspectives. If hypes are to be functional, they need to be opened up to public debate.

6. How hypes should be approached in the future This book about the hype surrounding new ICT technology and its relation to governmental change has shown that societal problems (e.g. communication between governments and citizens) cannot be solved by technology. A strong and deterministic belief in a ‘technological fix’ has been proven wrong. New technologies can help solve technical problems, and of course, technology that is currently being applied can be an enabler for the improvement of social practices. However, the idea that the Internet can solve complex social questions in the governance of the educational system, health care, infrastructures and water works, to mention but a few − along with the assumption that technologies can be used unproblematically to solve governmental problems (such as the gap between citizens and government), make government more transparent and link organizational functions − is rather naive.

264


What is important to consider in dealing with hypes about web-based technologies is that the technology we talk about is the outcome of social interaction, contrary to the deterministic idea of technological development. The introduction of new technologies should not be seen as unproblematic. Bringing new technologies into government means hard work and a constant rethinking of the motives and reasons behind the implementation. In the end, it means the actual reshaping of the function of government, leading to a mutual change of both the technological devices and the organizations in which they are implemented. This means that technology is the outcome of negotiations between developers and users and must always be enacted in daily practices. Coming back to the question of how to deal with hypes, we will provide a different answer to scientists and practitioners. Let us start with the scientists and, again, De Wilde’s thinking [19, p. 127-51] can inspire us. He suggests that scientists need to do the following four forms of analysis: • • • •

Rhetorical analysis. Scientists need to extract the central concepts upon which the perspective of the future is built. How is government conceptualized? What kind of conception of democracy underlies the hype? Normative analysis. The norms underlying choices need to be made explicit. What is the norm for public sector performance that underlies the hype? How is organizational collaboration valued? Consistency analysis. Find inconsistencies and paradoxes in the perspective. How can legal quality and a focus on the citizen be created without creating a tension? Why would representatives value direct forms of democracy? Action patterns. Leave the level of language and analyze patterns of actions that are influenced by the perspective. The focus on action patterns has been the dominant focus in this volume. The authors have provided insights into the actual actions resulting from efforts to realize the promises offered by the hype.

Together, these four forms of analysis can help scientists to reveal what is behind the hype. This type of knowledge can provide a starting point for a public debate and form the basis for a more democratic perspective on the future. This democratic perspective could influence advice to practitioners, but more strategic advice is also possible. Politicians and administrators could use hypes to propel the changes they support. Hypes can be used to present certain changes as beneficial and needed. Efforts to strengthen collaboration can be supported by using the Internet hype as both a means to realize cooperation and a mandate for it, since the new technologies make cooperation imperative. A politician or administrator who manages to use hypes to his/her advantage can be influential. What could these answers mean for the reactions of scientists and practitioners to the new hype Web 2.0? The term Web 2.0 was coined by Internet guru Tim O’Reilly in 2004. Interactive tools – based on Web 2.0 technologies like Wikis, YouTube and blogs – are supposed to enable the user to become a more active participant on the Internet. For example, Wallace, in her book The Internet in the Workplace [20] introduces netcentric work, an idea based on the innovation of interactive Internet tools. Netcentric work implies that Web 2.0 information can also become a useful tool for governmental bodies such as safety organizations [21, 22]. The term Web 2.0 has


265

become immensely popular and resulted in terms such as Democracy 2.0, Government 2.0, Enforcement 2.0, etc. On the basis of our analysis, scientists should question the foundation of this hype by asking questions about conceptualizations, norms, inconsistencies and practices. Practitioners could use the Web 2.0 strategically to realize their goals. We as authors of this chapter and editors of this book think that it is most important to have a democratic debate about Government 2.0. The Web 2.0 hype tends to be dominated by people with technological knowledge who tend to believe that the Future 2.0 is both unavoidable and desirable. This volume has clearly shown that neither of these qualifications holds true and that therefore debates about the future of government should be opened up to all kinds of input. Government is too important to be left to technicians. References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]

[14] [15] [16] [17] [18]

[19] [20] [21] [22]

M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society. Volume 1. Blackwell, New York, 2000. H. van Lente, Promising Technology: The Dynamics of Expectations in Technological Development. Eburon, Delft, 1993. R. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2000. W.H. Davidow and M.S. Malone, The Virtual Corporation. Structuring and Revitalizing the Corporation For the 21st Century. Harper Business, New York, 1993. M. Veenswijk, Identities en Relationships in the Theatre of Dotcom Industries, in: W. Koot, P. Leisink and P. Verweel (eds.), Organizational Relationships in the Networking Age: The Dynamics of Identity Formation and Bonding, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2003, 223-44. R. de Wilde, De Voorspellers. Een Kritiek op de Toekomstindustrie. De Balie, Amsterdam, 2000. M.R. Smith and L. Marx, Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994. W.J. Orlikowski, Using Technology and Constituting Structures: A Practice Lens for Studying Technology in Organizations, Organization Science, 11, 4 (2000), 404-28. F.K. Boersma and S.F. Kingma, From Means to Ends: The Transformation of ERP in a Manufacturing Company, Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 14 (2005), 197-219. D. MacKenzie and J. Wajcman (eds.), The Social Shaping of Technology. Second Edition. Open University Press, Buckingham, 2002. R. Kling (ed.), Computerization and Controversy: Value Conflicts and Social Choices (2nd edition). Academic Press, San Diego, 1996. L. Winner, Do Artifacts have Politics?, Daedalus, 109 (1980), 121-8. G. Currie and M. Kerring, The Limits of a Technological Fix to Knowledge Management. Epistemological, Political and Cultural Issues in the Case of Internet Implementation, Management Learning, 35, 1 (2004), 9-29. L. Rosner (ed.), The Technological Fix. How People Use Technology to Create and Solve Problems. Routledge, New York, 2004. R. de Wilde, De Voorspellers. Een Kritiek op de Toekomstindustrie. De Balie, Amsterdam, 2000. M.E. McCombs and D.L. Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, Public Opinion Quarterly, 36, 2 (1972), 176-87. B. Doolin, Narratives of Change: Discourse, Technology and Organization, Organization, 10, 4 (2003), 751-70. A. Meijer and S. Zouridis, E-government is an Institutional Innovation, in: V. Bekkers, H. van Duivenboden and M. Thaens (eds.), Information and Communication technology and Public Innovation. Assessing the ICT-Driven Modernization of Public Administration, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2006, pp. 219-29. R. de Wilde, De Voorspellers. Een Kritiek op de Toekomstindustrie. De Balie, Amsterdam, 2000. P. Wallace, The Internet in the Workplace. How New Technology is Transforming Work. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. D. Mendonça, T. Jefferson and J. Harrald, Collaborative Adhocracies and Mix-and Match Technologies in Emergency Management, Communications of the AMC, 50, 3 (2007), 45-9. D.K.J.E. von Lubitz, J.E. Beakley and F. Patricelli, Disaster Management: The Structure, Function, and Significance of Network-Centric Operations, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 5, 2 (2008), article 42: 1-24.


ICTs, Citizens and Governance: After the Hype! A. Meijer et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

267

Author Index Bannister, F. Bekkers, V. Boersma, K. Burke, G.B. Connolly, R. Courtney, J. De Rynck, F. Gil-García, J.R. Groenewegen, P. Homburg, V. Kuijper, J. Lips, M. Lomax, T. Luna-Reyes, L.F. Meijer, A.

198 217 3, 119, 256 180 198 150 168 99, 180 119 217 135 66 150 99 3, 38, 256

Moody, R. Niemantsverdriet, P. Organ, J. Pardo, T.A. Pieterson, W. Poole, M.S. Rotthier, S. Schellong, A. Svensson, J. Taylor, J.A. ter Hedde, M. van Dijk, J. Vedlitz, A. Wagenaar, P. Winters-van Beek, A.

83 119 66 180 50 150 168 13 21 66 21 235 150 3, 119, 256 235




ICTs, Citizens and Governance: After the Hype! Volume 14 Innovation and the Public Sector

Innovations in Public Governance - Volume 15 Innovation and the Public Sector

Public Services Delivery (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability) (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability Series)

Public Services Delivery (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability) (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability Series)

Trinidad and Tobago: Ethnic Conflict, Inequality and Public Sector Governance (Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance)

Innovation in the Public Sector: Linking Capacity and Leadership (Governance and Public Management)

Innovation and the Forest Sector

Fiscal Management (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability) (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability Series)

Participatory Budgeting (Public Sector Governance)

Representing India: Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions (Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance)

Representing India: Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions (Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance)

Participatory Budgeting (Public Sector Governance)

Information And Communication Technology And Public Innovation: Assessing the Ict-driven Modernization of Public Administration (Innovation and the Public Sector)

Local Governance in Industrial Countries (Public Sector Governance and Accountability)

Local Governance in Developing Countries (Public Sector Governance and Accountability)

Public Expenditure Analysis (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability Series)

Public Expenditure Analysis (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability Series)

Organizing Innovation: New Approaches to Cultural Change and Intervention in Public Sector Organizations (Innovation and the Public Sector)

Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption (Public Sector Governance and Accountability)

Governance of Public Sector Organizations: Proliferation, Autonomy and Performance (Governance and Public Management)

Operations Research and The Public Sector

Operations research and the public sector

Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance

Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance

Developments in e-Government: A Critical Analysis - Volume 13 Innovation and the Public Sector

Citizens' Report on Governance and Development 2007

Public Sector Ethics: Finding and Implementing Values (Routledge Studies in Governance and Public Policy, 1)

Organization Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth

Organization Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth

Everyday Politics: reconnecting citizens and public life

Governance, Citizens and Consumers: Agency and Resistance in Contemporary Politics (Consumption and Public Life)

ICTs, Citizens and Governance: After the Hype! Volume 14 Innovation and the Public Sector

Innovations in Public Governance - Volume 15 Innovation and the Public Sector

Public Services Delivery (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability) (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability Series)

Public Services Delivery (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability) (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability Series)

Trinidad and Tobago: Ethnic Conflict, Inequality and Public Sector Governance (Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance)

Innovation in the Public Sector: Linking Capacity and Leadership (Governance and Public Management)

Innovation and the Forest Sector

Fiscal Management (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability) (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability Series)

Participatory Budgeting (Public Sector Governance)

Representing India: Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions (Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance)

Representing India: Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions (Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance)

Participatory Budgeting (Public Sector Governance)

Information And Communication Technology And Public Innovation: Assessing the Ict-driven Modernization of Public Administration (Innovation and the Public Sector)

Local Governance in Industrial Countries (Public Sector Governance and Accountability)

Local Governance in Developing Countries (Public Sector Governance and Accountability)

Public Expenditure Analysis (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability Series)

Public Expenditure Analysis (Public Sector, Governance, and Accountability Series)

Organizing Innovation: New Approaches to Cultural Change and Intervention in Public Sector Organizations (Innovation and the Public Sector)

Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption (Public Sector Governance and Accountability)

Governance of Public Sector Organizations: Proliferation, Autonomy and Performance (Governance and Public Management)

Operations Research and The Public Sector

Operations research and the public sector

Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance

Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance

Developments in e-Government: A Critical Analysis - Volume 13 Innovation and the Public Sector

Citizens' Report on Governance and Development 2007

Public Sector Ethics: Finding and Implementing Values (Routledge Studies in Governance and Public Policy, 1)

Organization Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth

Organization Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth

Everyday Politics: reconnecting citizens and public life

Governance, Citizens and Consumers: Agency and Resistance in Contemporary Politics (Consumption and Public Life)

Recommend Documents