Human Immortality and Pre-Existence

HUMAN IMMORTALITY AND PRE-EXISTENCE

BY THE SAME AUTHOR. STUDIES IN THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC.

8».

STUDIES IN HEGELIAN COSMOLOGY. 8s.

A COMMENTARY ON HEGEL'S LOGIC.

8s.

SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION, los. 6d. net.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY AND PRE-EXISTENCE BY

JOHN M'TAGGART

ELLIS M*TAGGART

LiTT.D. (Cambridge), LL.D. (St. Andrews) FBLLOW AND LBCTURER OF TRINITY COLLKGB IN CAMBRIDGE FBLI.OW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

SECOND IMPRESSION

LONDON

EDWARD ARNOLD 1916 .

[All rights reserved\

'

/

/.

I

PREFACE The two as

parts of this

Chapters

entitled

III.

work

and IV.

Some Dogmas of

originally appeared of

a

larger

work

Religion, published

tions

of

less

which deals with quesimmediate practical concern.

They

are

now

issued separately in the hope

in

1906, the rest of

that they

may be

of readers than

of interest to a larger circle

would be

attracted to the study

of the other parts of the original work.

They have been of a

reprinted with the alteration

few phrases only. J.

Trinity College,

Cambridge, yuly, 1915.

E.

MT.

CONTENTS PART

I

Human Immortality

9

PART

Human Pre-existence

II

71

vu

HUMAN IMMORTALITY AND PRE-EXISTENCE PART

I

HUMAN IMMORTALITY I

DO not propose

to offer here

any arguments

in support of the positive assertion that

are immortal. exist,

and

that,

men

beheve that such arguments in spite of the difficulty and

I

obscurity of the subject, they are of sufficient strength to justify a belief in our immortality.

But

expound these arguments would require an elaborate and lengthy treatise of techto

nical

metaphysics,

for

they

could

proved by a demonstration of some theory of the fundamental nature of

My

present design *

is

only be idealist reality.^

merely to consider some

Cp. Postscript at the end of the present volume.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

10

arguments against immortality which have been based on certain facts of ordinary observation,

and on

certain results of physical science.

endeavour

shall

are invalid,

and

to

show

that those

that the

arguments

presumption against

immortality, which they have

in

produced

people, should be discarded.

many

is

better to speak of the immortality of

self,

or of men, than of the immortality of

It

the

I

the soul. views.

The

phrase suggests untenable For, in speaking of the identity of a latter

man during different periods of we do not usually say that he is but the same

self,

or the

use a different word

his bodily

life,

the same soul,

same man.

when we

And

to

are discussing

the prolongation of that identity after death,

up the idea of an identity less perfect than that which lasts through a bodily life. The form in which the question is put thus calls

implies that the answer

negative after

—

that a

death as he

man is

is is

before

to

be

in

not as it,

some degree

much

even

if

escapes from complete destruction.

himself

something

HUMAN IMMORTALITY Moreover,

man

say that a

Now

it

is

customary, unfortunately, to

has a soul, not that he

our question

if

man an immortal it

?'

So

one.

is

put in the form

is

soul

would be absurd. anything

ii

*

Has

an affirmative answer far as

would mean

it

that the

would mean

man

himself

was the body, or something which died with the body at any rate was not immortal and

—

—

that something, not himself,

during

life,

was

and

it

What

I

own

seems better not

For these

account.

to speak of the soul,

form

*

Arc men

?'

reasons are there for supposing that

our existence

me

its

to put our question in the

immortal

death to con-

set free at his

tinue existing on

reasons

which he owned

is

only temporary

?

bodies which behave so like

I

see around

my

own, that

conclude that they are related to other con-

same way that my body But from time to time myself.

scious selves in the is

related to

these bodies are observed to cease to behave in this

way, and to become motionless, unless

moved from

outside.

Shortly after this the

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

12

dissolves into

body

form and identity

as a

of the past leads

to the conclusion that the

now

my

existing, including

How

does this

existence

It

?

my

effect of

same thing

shall cease

clear that

body—a

when

also clear that,

if

own.

if

form of

am

I

its

a

mere

activity

the body ceases.

And

I

is

could not exist without this

I

be a sign that

will

—

it

particular body, then the destruction of

body

my

the question of

affect

is

will

human body

the future to every

in

happen

Its

are completely

body

The experience

destroyed.

me

constituent parts.

its

I

have ceased

But, besides death, there acteristic of nature

is

the

to exist.

another char-

which tends

to

make us

doubt our immortality. Of all the things around us, from a pebble to a solar system, science of

tells

them

us that they are transitory.

Each

arose out of something else, each of

them

will

What

is

a

man

this universal

into

something else. that he should be exempt from

pass

law

Thus we have

away

?

three questions to consider

:

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

an activity of my body ? (2) Is present body an essential condition of the

(i) Is

my

my

self

existence of

my

self

suppose that

to

my

self

does not share the

the material objects around

With regard is

my

large part of

me

all

?

self

my

begin with, that

much and mental

my body

A

continuously.

life is

made up

in-

of sen-

Sensations are continually produced

sations.

connection with

in

recognize in

I

to the first of these questions,

certain, to

fluences

any reason

(3) Is there

?

which

transitory character

it

13

organs of

my

changes

the

in

body, and, so far as

sense-

we know,

they are never produced in any other way.

And

the course of

my

thoughts and emotions

can be profoundly affected by the state of body.

If

my

body gets no food

for

my

twenty-

four hours, they will be affected one way. I

introduce whisky or opium into

be affected another way. fatigued, the ordinary life

will

it,

they will

my body current of my If

be entirely suspended

in

If

is

very

mental

profound

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

14 sleep,

or completely broken

by dreams.

If

any of these processes is carried far enough, my body dies, and I cease to have any relation to it for the future, which is certainly an imevent for me, whether

portant

I

survive

it

or not. It

is

equally certain that the

the body.

according

mind

on

acts

My limbs, on many occasions, move And the normal beto my will.

haviour of the body can be altered by the

mind, as

much

mind can be fear, or anger,

as the

altered

normal behaviour

by the body.

can produce bodily

of the

Grief, or illness,

and

even death.

—

Now

each of these groups of events the effects of body on mind and of mind on body could be explained on the hypothesis that

—

the

self

realities,

and the body were two separate neither of which was the mere

product of the other, though each affected the other, and caused changes in it. And it

might be thought that

this

would be the most

natural conclusion to adopt, since the action

HUMAN IMMORTALITY appears to be reciprocal as

much There

as

body

acts

15

— mind acting on body

on mind.

however, a very strong tendency to adopt the view that the self is a

mere

is

always,

activity of the

— or

any rate to hold that the only escape from this view lies in accepting some form of revealed religion

which denies

it.

body

The cause

at

of this

tendency

in the first plate, the

incomplete nature of the explanation which would be furnished by is,

the recognition of the self and

its

body

as

independent realities/ All ultimate explanation endeavours to reduce the universe to a unity. Spirit

The

self is spirit,

and matter, taken

the body

is

matter.

as independent reali-

ties,

are very heterogeneous to one another.

It is

evident that a theory which makes either

matter to be the sole reality in the universe, introduces a greater degree of unity spirit or

By independent I do not here mean isolated, or unconnected realities, but such as stand on an equal footing, so that though each is connected with the other, neither ^

is

subordinate to the other.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

i6

than a theory which makes them to be equally real.

Monism or idealism,

whether

then, is

of inquirers

more

be materialism

attractive to the majority

than dualism

consider the various

make

it

a materialistic

We

is.

must now

causes which tend to

monism more

plausible

than an idealistic monism, and which impel us to the conclusion that matter reality,

while

human

than one of the matter

human

when

it

body.

spirit

activities is

in

(It

is

the

is

is

the only

nothing more

which characterize special

form of a

immaterial for our pre-

purpose whether the adherents of this view suppose matter to exist as a substance, sent

to

which these

activities belong, or

whether

they say that the activities are the matter.

The

difference

is

insignificant,

although the

sometimes put forward The as a great improvement on the first.

second alternative

is

essential point is that the spiritual

is

in either

case reduced to a temporary form of an activity

whose fundamental nature

is

non-spiritual.)

HUMAN IMMORTALITY One

causes

these

of

17

the fact, so con-

is

upon the

notice of every man,

that the nature of matter

almost entirely incannot create matter,

tinually pressed

dependent of his will. and there are narrow to

which

I

can alter

bread the stone which ever passionately

I

is

I

limits

I

the

extent

cannot make into

I

it.

to

How-

see and touch. desire that

may

it

should

be bread, however serious the consequences to

myself and others of

a stone

it

remains.

By

a transition

natural though illegitimate that whatever

is

remaining a stone,

its

we tend

which

to believe

so independent of our will

must be independent of us altogether. To some extent, indeed, the will can

But the amount

matter.

paratively insignificant.

human

of

com-

effects is

beings can only affect the surface of

earth,

in its influence

the

its

affect

All the exertions of

and that very other hand, matter seems the

is

on

temperature

absurdly

trivial

spirit.

of

a

slightly.

On

the

more powerful The diminution of

far

single

planet

episode in astronomy.

is

an

But,

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

i8 if

the planet were our earth,

end

to the only conditions

as our observation goes,

Since

to exist.

weaker

made

is

to

is

it

possible for spirit

it is

then, appears so

on

to give

we can

much

way

it

is

?

observe a unity and a

which may belong

not obviously belong to

to spirit but

it.

Spirit

we

does only

the form of separate individuals, set in

the midst of matter, which

means by which they with one another. as far as for

as far

reduce the one to the other,

In matter, too,

know in

under which,

when they are taken strange that, when an attempt

spirit that is called

persistence

would put an

matter

than

separately,

spirit,

it

forms the only

are able to

No human

spirit

we know, been open

much more

communicate has ever,

to observation

than a hundred years, and the

lower animals only slightly exceed this limit. Matter forms one vast system, which history informs us has existed for thousands of years,

while science extends the period to millions.

And,

again, the

amount

of

knowledge which

science gives us about matter

is

far greater

HUMAN IMMORTALITY than the amount which

On

the one side

gives us about spirit.

the whole vast extent of

is

the physical sciences.

have only psychology

On

the other side

—and

we

not the whole of

For the psycho-physical side

psychology.

that science deals as

does with

it

19

much

of

with matter as

it

spirit.

All this increases the apparent importance of matter,

and seems

to render

bable that matter, rather than

it

more

spirit, is

pro-

the sole

would be the way in which matter behaves under certain circumreality.

stances. said

that

different

then,

Spirit,

And the

in

support of this

activity

forms.

of

matter

The same

it

does take

energy,

informs us, which sometimes shows heat,

shows

itself at

again, as electricity. it is

asserted

by the

a

human

emotion.

science itself

as

other times as motion,

or,

And

this

materialist,

under other circumstances in

may be

body — into

same energy, is

transformed

—when thought,

it

is

found

will,

and

Certainly, he admits, thought, will,

and emotion are not very

like heat, motion,

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

20

and

But then

electricity.

electricity are not very like if

they can

unity,

all

one another.

be reduced to

why should

and

heat, motion,

this

And,

common

not the forms of conscious-

ness share the same fate

?

These conclusions depend, it will be seen, on the proposition that matter can exist independently of it

For

spirit.

if

this

would obviously be absurd

were not

to explain

the separate reality of spirit by making of

temporary forms which the

the

of matter takes.

show us

so,

away one

it

activity

Deeper inquiry will, think, is no reason to believe that I

that there

matter does

exist.

If

this

is

we

the case

cannot be entitled to consider the

the

self as

activity of its body.

Of what nature which,

is

it

is

the matter supposed to be

asserted, can exist independently

conceived as having

all

the qualities which, in ordinary language,

we

of

spirit

?

It

is

not

ascribe to matter. it

is

soft,

We

say of an orange that

yellow, sweet,

and odorous.

But

these qualities are not held to belong to the

HUMAN IMMORTALITY when

orange

it

not

is

being observed.

observer is

orange it

than

all,

In

be quaHties of

strictness they are not held to

the orange at

21

but effects excited in the

by qualities of the orange. The no more yellow when no one sees

it is

desired

when no one knows

of

its

existence.

But the object is conceived as having other qualities which really do belong to it, and give it

that nature

observation,

which

and

has independently of

no one observes

position in space,

it.

size, its

shape,

and

impenetrability are of this nature.

is

its

its

if

it

these qualities, or others of the

its

same

Its

motion, It

nature,

which have the power, under certain circumstances, of exciting in the observer the sensa-

tions of softness, yellowness,

The

which

qualities

belong to the

primary

matter

qualities.

The

and the held

are are

often

like.

really

called its

others are called

secondary qualities, though, on this theory, is

scarcely correct to call

object at

all.

them

to

its

it

qualities of the

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

22

Matter, then,

and

position,

is

to

held to be extended, to have

be capable of motion inde-

pendently of observation.

It

is

also

impeneno two of matter can is, pieces occupy the same position in space. But it has no colour, it is neither hard nor soft, it trable

— that

has no

This

no smell, and no sound.

taste, is

matter as

science.

may

It

conceived in physical be said also to be the ordiit

is

nary conception, for although

we speak

of an

orange as yellow, yet the idea that it is not yellow in the dark is generally known and generally accepted.

What

reason can be given for a befief in the

existence of matter belief it is

?

I

conceive that such a

can only be defended on the ground that

a legitimate inference from our sensations.

This view has been contested, but that the objection to

standing. truth, that

it

rests

I

believe

on a misunder-

It

has been said, and with perfect

my

belief in the existence of matter

does not arise as an inference from tions.

I

do not

first

my

become aware

sensaof

my

HUMAN IMMORTALITY sensations and then

On

an orange. the

the

my

am

knowledge,

sensations

of

in

first.

am

I

doubtful of the

may then consider and so on,

touch,

sight,

If

of

knowledge of the object. most cases I never do consider the

sensations at

dren

I

am aware

my

connected with

But

I

the orange

studying psychology or validity of

the existence of

infer

the contrary,

of

existence

23

who

And

all.

there are

chil-

young

are quite aware of the existence of a

material world, but

who have

never realized

that they have sensations.

These

facts are sufficient to refute the view,

which has

sometimes

belief in a material

world arises as an inference

But they are quite

from our sensations. relevant

to

whether our

the

been held, that our

question

now

belief in a material

not be justified^

if

it

is

to

be

justified at

all,

very serious confusion.

as

And when

facts are used, as not infrequently

pens, as bearing on this question,

—

world must

an inference from our sensations.

such

us

before

ir-

it

hap-

involves a

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

24

The

belief in a material

fication.

one

It is

who

world requires

justi-

natural, in the sense that every-

has not reflected on the subject holds

the belief as a matter of course, together with

many

of those

who have

it is

not inevitable.

it.

Many

there

is,

any

rate,

contradictory in

on the subject — theories

its

have done

And

so.

nothing obviously

denial.

one out

which deny the existence is

false,

self-

Berkeley's theory

to take only

whether true or

But

it.

possible to disbelieve

It is

philosophers at

on

reflected

of

many

of matter

not obviously

—

self-

contradictory.

Since disbelief in the existence of matter is

neither impossible

nor contradictory, the

question becomes inevitable fication

more

of

the

pressing,

belief

—what And

?

because

in

is it

many

the justi-

becomes cases our

judgements as to the existence of matter are admitted to be wrong. In the first place, the quite unreflective consciousness has no more doubt that the world than

it

of

matter

is

coloured

has that the world of matter

is

ex-

HUMAN IMMORTALITY But

tended.

either this or the

more

25 reflective

judgements of science and the modern world must be wrong here, since they disagree. Again,

if

a man,

who

sees a cloak hanging

up before him

by moonhght, believes that he sees the body of a dead friend, it is obvious

that

he

has completely mistaken the character of the

matter before him. to

And

if

our judgements as

what the external object

wrong,

we have

little

are so often

is

justification for

assuming

without inquiry that our judgement that there is

an external object

There

is

is

ever right.

For

a stronger case than this.

in

dreams we do not only make wrong judgements as to the nature of matter, but as to the existence of matter.

If

a believer in the

existence of matter dreams that he sees a roc's egg, he

no more doubts, during

his

dream,

that the roc's egg exists as independent matter,

than he doubts, during waking

life,

table exists as independent matter.

that

And

his yet,

on waking, he will admit that in his dream he was neither observing a roc's egg nor any

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

26

other really existing matter which he mistook

Not only was

for a roc's egg. '

this is a roc's

belief

was it

*

this is

'

egg

mere credulity

table's

mistaken, but his dream-

independently existing matter,'

also mistaken.

is

his dream-belief

existence

And

if

this

is

mistaken,

to trust his belief in the

without examination.

For

no stronger and no more evident than the other had been previously.

that belief

On

is

what can we base a

belief in the

Nothing

They

are

is

independent existence of matter

there,

and they are

we

we experience

are

We

certain.

may

the sensations as such at

We

observing matter

sensations

analogous to the qualities in the matter.

?

except the sensations.

available

never believe that unless

justification of the

we

more or

less

believe to exist

not be conscious of all.

Indeed, as was

we never are conscious of them. But whenever we look for them, on such occasions, we find them. And the sensations are certain. I may be said above, in the majority of cases

wrong

in

believing that

matter exists inde-

HUMAN IMMORTALITY pendently of me.

am wrong

27

But the suggestion

that

I

beHeving I have a sensation is absurd. The behef is not sufficiently separable from the sensation for the possibility of error.

in

may, of course, be wrong had a sensation in the past,

in believing

I

that

I

may

deceive me.

And

general terms which

when

I

I

I

for

memory

may be wrong

in the

apply to a sensation,

attempt to classify

it,

and

to describe

knowledge that I am having the sensation which I am having is one of those ultimate certainties which it is it

But

to others.

my

impossible either to prove or to deny.

And we

find that although the sensations

are generally ignored, as sensations,

when

the

correctness of the judgement about the matter is

not doubted, yet, as soon as

I

myself, or

other people, entertain a doubt of the correctness of the judgement, the situation

is

changed. believe to be an

suggested that what I experience of matter of a certain sort If it is

a

dream or a

tions

which

delusion, I

I fall

is

really

back on the sensa-

have experienced, and consider

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

28

whether they can be accounted

on any

for

other hypothesis than that of the existence of the matter in question.

consider that

I

was

If

right in

I

they cannot,

my

judgement

that the matter did exist.

And we must arises,

a doubt

if

the

this or that matter exists, but

correctness

matter of any sort is

same way

not merely of the correctness of our

judgements that of

act in the

of

exists.

impossible to deny

sensations.

Are we

all

is

judgements that The fact which it that

we have

entitled to conclude

the

from

world really exists, and that the natural judgement that it does exist this that the material

—

which

is

not,

however, as

inevitable or universal It

judgement

evident that the

is

we have

—

is

sensations

themselves the matter in question. tion

is

not matter, and

from the

self to

whom

it

it

since they begin to exist,

correct are

A

?

not

sensa-

cannot exist apart

belongs.

no independent existence.

seen, an

It

can have

But the sensations, must have causes.^

1 This step might not be accepted by any one who denied the universal vaHdity of caiisaHty. A thinker,

HUMAN IMMORTALITY Now

it

cannot be said to be obviously impos-

that

sible

should

all

my own am

But

lie

nature.

It

might be

my

cer-

is

within that part of I

am

conscious, for

my

sensa-

Leibniz has

said, as

sensations arise out of the

my own

unconscious nature, and

a self has once

come

into existence

independent of outside influences in sensations as a clock, when once wound

is

up,

when

it

all

depths of

its

do not

nature of which

said, that

it

my own

sensations

my

not conscious of producing

tions.

that

causes of

the

within

lie

tain that they

I

29

as

is

in the

But there are

in striking.

way

no time to

of this

enter,

view into which we have

and

I

do not wish

weight on the possibility of its prepared to admit what seems

—

—that

more probable view tions have causes which the

anything in myself.

difficulties

to lay

truth. to all

I

any

am

me by far my sensa-

are not myself nor

Such causes must

in

each

however, who denied the universal validity of causality could not, as far as I can see, have the least justification for a belief in the existence of matter.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

30

case be merely part-causes.

did not

my

exist,

am

unquestion-

my own

ably one of the causes of for, if I

I

sensations,

sensations also

would

not exist.

may thus be admitted that my make it, at any rate, highly probable It

reality exists,

which

sensations that

some

not myself or anything

is

within myself, but exists independently of me.

But we have not got to matter. A reality which exists independently of me need not be matter spirit. it

—

We

it

might, for example, be another

do not

possesses the

given above.

call

anything matter unless

primary qualities of matter

These

qualities

correspond to

certain sensations, or elements in sensations,

and the presence

of the sensation in

me

is

held to prove the existence of the corresponding quality in the material object.

But

is

this

legitimate

The independent

?

be the part-cause of the sensations, but that does not prove that reality has

been admitted

to

Causes do not necessarily resemble their effects. Happiness in A does it

is

like

them.

HUMAN

IMiVlORTALITY

not resemble the misery which to the

envious B.

31

may cause An angry man does not

A

resemble a slammed door.

it

ray of sunshine

does not resemble a faded water-colour.

And, on of

all

mental events do not resemble those

When

events. I

this very theory, the external causes

I

see a sphere of red-hot iron

have sensations of form, sensations of colour,

and

Now

(if

I

am

near enough) a feeling of pain.

the ordinary theory of matter makes the

matter the cause of the sensations of colour

and

of the feeling of pain, as

sensations of form.

matter

is

Yet

red or painful.

it

much

as of the

denies that the

Here, therefore,

is

an external cause of mental events which does not resemble them.

It is

therefore impossible

back on the principle, that the external cause of mental events alw^ays resembles them.

to fall

And what

other principle have

we

to justify

us in ascribing the primary qualities to the external causes of the sensations ^

?^

It must be noticed that the resemblance which the theory attributes to the sensations and their external

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

32

The

distinction

between the primary and

secondary quahties renders the theory of the existence of matter less tenable than it would In the

otherwise be.

first

place, there

which we have

inconsistency,

the

just noticed, of

we can argue from some

asserting that

is

of

our

sensations to a resemblance in their causes,

our perception of the secondary qualities varies from time to time, and from individual to individual, so also does

and not from

others.

If

our perception of the primary

qualities.

If

our perception of the primary qualities exhibits a certain uniformity from time to time, and

from individual

to individual, so also does

our

perception of the secondary qualities.

And,

in the

second place, matter, while ex-

causes is very limited. The causes are not sensations, nor are their qualities sensations. All that can be said to define, certain prethat, in some way not too easy dicates of the causes resemble the content of some of the sensations which are the effects of those causes.

is

But it is not necessary for my argument to follow out the ambiguities and difficulties which follow from this elaborate combination of similarity and difference between sensations and matter.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

33

tended and impenetrable, is destitute both of colour and of hardness, since these are secon-

Now

dary qualities.

the sensations of exten-

and impenetrability only come to us by When they come by sight sight and touch. sion

they are invariably conjoined with sensations of colour,

when

they

come by touch they

are

invariably conjoined with sensations of hardness.

a

We

sensation

cannot even imagine to ourselves

which

gives

extension without

giving either colour or hardness.

Thus

the theory which

causes of our sensations

makes the external material

reaches a

climax of inconsistency. Its one defence was the principle that the causes of the sensations

must resemble the sensations they cause. But now it turns out that that which the causes are to resemble

is

a

mere abstraction from our

naked extension, which is so far from being a sensation which we experience, that we cannot even imagine what such a sensations, a

sensation Is

it

would be

like.

possible to avoid this inconsistency 3

by

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

34

dropping the distinction between primary and secondary qualities ? Shall we say that matter has not only shape,

but

impenetrability, smell,

some

and

taste

size, position,

also

motion, and

colour,

hardness,

This view certainly avoids

?

more ordinary does not make an arbitrary and

of the objections to the

theory.

It

gratuitous difference in the treatment of two sets of qualities.

And

not utterly unlike

it

gives matter a nature

our experience, and not

by us. But on the other hand the theory would no

utterly unimaginable

longer have the support of physical science.

For that science

treats matter as

secondary qualities, and that

it

devoid of the

endeavours to show

the primary qualities of matter, under

certain circumstances, excite in us the sensations of the secondary qualities.

Of course the independent existence and ultimate nature

of

matter

is

a

metaphysics and not for science. fore a metaphysical ses^ses the

question for

And

there-

theory that matter pos-

secondary qualities as well as the

HUMAN IMMORTALITY primary cannot science,

its

finds

it

view,

by the own more

that

fact

upset

working from

of

point

be

35

superficial

convenient to treat

matter as possessing only the primary qualities. If

science keeps to

clash with

its

own

sphere,

it

cannot

any metaphysical theory.

If

at-

tempts are made to treat its results as if they were metaphysical truths, they have no claim to validity in this sphere,

theory ible

is

none the worse

and a metaphysical for being

incompat-

with these misapplications.

But the theory

that matter exists

very largely for its plausibility

depended on the illegiti-

mate support which it obtained by taking and if it science as if it were metaphysics loses this support, as it must in the suggested ;

new but

form,

much

it

of

loses, indeed,

no

real

what caused people

As has been already

strength,

to believe

said, the fact that physical

science treats matter as independent of

and

it.

spirit,

that physical science forms a vast system,

coherent, accepted, and, from point, irrefutable, has

its

done much

own

stand-

to strengthen

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

36

the real,

that

belief

and

matter, if

that,

one

at

of

least,

must

be

the two must be

explained away by the other, it is spirit which must go, and matter which must stay. The inference

quite illegitimate, since nothing in

is

physical science touches, or

buestion

of

But

matter.

the it

existence

independent

is

an inference which

And when

quently made.

can touch, the

is

of fre-

the theory of the

independent existence of matter defines the nature of that matter in a manner completely different

science,

from it

the

will

definitions

of

no longer be able

physical to

gain

in this

way. apparent support Nor does the amended theory, while less inconsistent than the original form, altogether

The red-hot sphere

avoid inconsistency. iron

is

now admitted

of

not only to be a sphere,

independent of any observer, but to be red, independent of any observer. still

is

remains.

It is

painful, although

the pain

is

But the pain

not asserted that the iron it

causes

me

pain.

Now

a result produced in the observer

HUMAN IMMORTALITY which and

is

quite as real as the sensations of form

colour,

and quite

observer's will.

The

iron

is

It

not

will

independent of the

as

likewise just as uniform.

me

give

the

except under certain conditions. see

it

have

to

my

be red,

for

eyes shut.)

it

effect

cause in this case.

am

blind, or

will inevitably give

Yet nothing resemis

Why

attributed to the

should a difference

be made between this case and the others

we amended

And, even tions, the

if

For,

inconsistency.

theory does not escape

even

if

the

impossible to assert that matter

change for I

which

it

?

limit ourselves to sensa-

qualities are predicated of matter,

sensations

not

And, under certain con-

the feeling of pain.

bling the mental

sensations (I shall

I

if

example,

ditions, quite as definite,

me

37

causes.

me from moment

secondary remains

it

is

like the

These sensations to

moment.

If

look at a thing under one set of conditions,

and shade, I get one sensation of colour from it if I change the conditions next minute I get quite a different sensation.

as to light

;

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

38

And

two men

if

look at

it

simultaneously

conditions of light and

under the

different

shade they

will have, simultaneously, the

different

sensations

Now

successively. that

the

And

colours.

colour must

two

it is

has

object if

it

differ,

sensations

colour which

of

I

two

had

impossible to suppose

at

once two different

has only one, then that at least,

from one

experienced

observers, since these

the

two

differ

from

the

other

by

sensations

of the

one another.

The same

is

the

case

with

secondary qualities. And it is also the case with the primary qualities. Two men who look at a cube from different positions simultaneously have two quite different sensations of

its

shape

— not merely numerically

but sensations which do another.

shapes

at

Yet

an

object

not

different,

resemble one

cannot

once, and each of these

have two

men

would,

under normal circumstances, agree about the shape

of

the

object,

from non-resembling

although they started sensations.

It

is

clear.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

39

shape attributed to the object cannot resemble the sensations of shape which it causes, since they do not resemble

therefore,

the

that

one another.

Now

if

once admitted that the qualities to the external object do not

it is

attributed

resemble the causes,

we have no

qualities to for

qualities

it

at

the

of

sensations

it

reason to attribute those

The only

all.

reason

we had

supposing the causes of our sensations to

have these qualities was the supposed resemblance of the qualities to the sensations.

now

it

attributed

becomes to

clear

the

resembling the

causes,

sensations,

them completely. a sensation

may

of the sensation

that

It

lack it

the

But

qualities

although partially

do not resemble

follows that a cause of

some

causes.

of

the

And

qualities

in that case

there seems no reason for denying the possibility of its

none It

being quite different, and having

of the qualities in question.

may be

replied,

no doubt, that

it

is

never-

theless possible that the causes of the sensa-

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

40 tions

do possess

The causes

the sensations.

have some qualities

qualities partially resembling

And

qualities.

exist,

may be

it

which they have, and would be

any support

They may

far too

these

so they

be entitled to the name of matter. a possibility

and must

may

But such

vague to give

to the theory that matter exists.

possess these qualities, for there

is

no reason why a cause should not resemble its But there is no effect in certain respects. reason to believe that they do possess them, or that their

possession

of

them

degree probable. A man a lobster red may have a red face slightest

nothing to

prevent

it.

But

his

is

the

in

who

boils

—there

is

action

in

causing the redness of the lobster gives us no reason to suppose that his face ^

The statement

that the

bare

is

red.^

possibility

of

the

remains open must be taken as referring only to the arguments in this I believe that further consideration should chapter. convince us, for reasons somewhat analogous to those of Hegel and Lotze, that all substance must possess certain external causes being material

still

which are essential to the nature of spirit, and incompatible with the nature of matter. If this characteristics

HUMAN IMMORTALITY The

result

is

that

matter

is

in

41

the same

position as the

Gorgons or the Harpies. a bare possibiUty to which

Its

existence

is

would be

foolish to attach the least import-

ance, since there preferable to

is

nothing to make

it

at all

it

any other hypothesis, however

wild.

we

If

mass

of

ask, then,

what

of

reality the

vast

knowledge holds true which science

and everyday life give us about matter, we must reply that it holds true of various sensations

which occur

to various

men, and

of the

laws according to which these sensations are

connected, so that from the presence of certain sensations in

certain conditions,

me I

I

can infer

that,

under

shall or shall not experi-

ence certain other sensations, and can also infer that,

under certain conditions, other

men

will or will not experience certain sensations. It

view

book

will

be objected that

—

this is

not what

is right a question beyond the purpose of this to investigate the existence of matter Mrould be

—

positively disproved.

42

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

common

experience and science profess to

When we

do.

say that this bottle contains

champagne, and

this vinegar,

about

sensations.

ing

our

we are And

not talkphysical

science deals with such things as planets, acids,

and nerves, none It

quite true that

is

the conclusions of

science

in

pendent in the exist

which are

of

terms which

have

and shorter

usual to express

experience and of

assume the

matter.

of

inde-

Most people

believed that matter does

independently

moulded by

is

common

existence

past

it

sensations.

;

our language has been

this belief,

to express

and now

it

is

easier

our conclusions in this

way. Besides this, most people at present do hold the metaphysical opinion that matter exists independently, and tend to express themselves accordingly.

But the conclusions remain

we

just as true,

if

take the view that matter does not exist.

Something has been changed, no doubt, but what has been changed is no part either of

common

experience or science, but a theory

HUMAN IMMORTALITY which forms no part

of metaphysics

And

so

we

nor the results of science by

We

denying the existence of matter.

only

we

a theory of metaphysics which

sacrifice

have already seen cannot be I

of either.

sacrifice neither the experience of

life

everyday

43

in

say,

ordinary language, that this

champagne and that there

justified.

is

this

neither

is

vinegar.

is

Supposing

champagne nor vinegar

as matter existing independently of observation,

but that

it

remains true that a certain

group of sensations of sight and smell trustworthy indication certain

taste

that

I

can

by performing certain

is

a

secure a actions,

and that another group of sensations of sight and smell is a trustworthy indication that I can secure a different similar

actions.

taste

Does not

by performing

this leave a per-

experience of

and coherent meaning to the everyday life, which fits every

detail of that

experience as well as the more

fectly definite

common

theory does, and only differs from

on a question

of

metaphysics

?

it

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

44

the same with science.

It is

made by

vation

which

every uniformity established, every statement as to the

is

past or the future

have

Every obser-

its

science,

which

it

The

meaning.

asserted,

would

still

observations would

inform us of what had been experienced, the uniformities would tell us the connexions of various experiences, the statements as to the past

and future would

will

be experienced, or would be so

necessary

desire to tell us

tell us, ?

us what has been or

were

conditions

more does science it

tell

If

present.

or what

to tell us

science

and

but

— guage and

of

its

more could

expressed does

matter,

metaphysics

uncritical

What

more, and to imply the inde-

existence

pendent

the

the language in which

scientific results are generally

seem

if

— the

that

is

not

unconscious

metaphysics of ordinary lanrejection does not involve the

rejection or the distrust of a single result of

science.

Science

requires,

no doubt, that

experi-

ence should exhibit certain uniformities, so

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

45

that a certain experience can safely be taken as

an indication of what other experiences will

follow

it

under certain conditions.

But

this

proves nothing as to the independent exist-

ence of matter. sensations,

nature, the

If

and

I

the external causes of myself, have

a

which are

sensations

result will exhibit uniformities.

my

constant

their joint

And

a non-

material cause can have a constant nature just as easily as a material cause could have.

Science also requires that experience should have a community of nature between different persons, so that

it

shall

be possible for us to

from any experience what the experience of another person would be under coninfer

ditions

more or

less

similar.

This,

again,

can be explained as easily without matter as with it. If my nature and that of other persons were not more or less the same, our

experience would the nature of

natures

its

resemble

not

be similar, whatever

external cause.

one

another,

But then

if it

our is

obvious that the action on us of the same

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

46

would produce

external cause

results

which

resembled one another.

The

denial of matter,

it

must

also

does not lead us towards solipsism say, to the denial

my

—that

by each individual

is

to

of all

The arguments which

reahty except himself.

prove that

be noticed,

sensations

must have causes

which are not myself, nor in myself, but are some other reality, lose none of their force if

we

decide that these causes are not of a

material

And

nature.

against solipsism is

— the

the other arguments consideration of which

apart from our present object

—are

just as

strong on the hypothesis that matter does not exist.

might be supposed that the theory I have been advocating was a form of agnosticism. It

Agnosticism holds that we can know nothing but phenomena. Beneath these phenomena lies

of

a

reality

this

know

on which they are based, but

reality,

nothing.

agnosticism declares, If

we

ternal causes of our

only

know

we can

of the ex-

sensations that they do

HUMAN IMMORTALITY cause the sensations, have

we

47

not in effect

taken up the agnostic theory that the reality

on which phenomena depend is unknowable ? But this is not the case. Agnosticism says that we can know nothing whatever of the reaUty behind the phenomena. this,

it

such a

contradicts

For

itself.

exists,

reality

And, it

and that

in saying

asserts that it

stands

in

Thus phenomena. we do know something about it, and it is certain

relations

therefore

to

not the

nothing about

the

case

that

we can know

it.

But the theory which

have put forward does not say that we can know nothing about the causes of sensations.

we do

not

know

tion they cause.

I

It

only says that

that they are like the sensa-

Even

if

this

should destroy

knowledge of them except of the fact that they were causes, it would not be a general

all

assertion of the impossibility of

any knowledge and so there would no inconsisbe them, tency in saying that we knew they were

of

causes.

To know

m

of

anything

is

incon-

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

48

about

it,

but

it is

ing nothing about

Nor does else

know anything

with being unable to

sistent

it

quite consistent with it

know-

except m.

we know nothing our sensations if we

follow that

about the causes of

cannot conclude that they resemble the sen-

might be possible, as various philosophers have maintained, to determine the qualities which must belong to every subsations.

It

being a substance. And might turn out that this could give us a con-

stance in virtue of it

siderable

its

of the

knowledge

substances.

We

nature

of

these

might, for example, be led

to the conclusion that all substance

was

spirit.

But we cannot here do more than point out the possibility of such a result.

And we have

I

thus,

original contention that the self of the activities of its

proved our cannot be one

think,

own

body.

If

the self

were, as such a theory would require

it

to

merely a way in which matter behaved under certain circumstances, it would be be,

possible

to

explain

the

self

satisfactorily

ij^

HUMAN IMMORTALITY And

would be possible state of things should exist in which circumstances, which determine the

terms of matter. that a

those

nowhere

occurred

it

matter to take the form of

activity of

being the case that, as

no reason

and

to

from

far is this

we now

see,

we have

suppose that matter exists at talk of matter existing without

to

consciousness

is

not a reality at

Matter

absurd.

from being the sole is only an activity, is

of matter without

But so

any consciousness.

spirit

universe, which

the

in

would then be a universe

all,

49

all.

reality, of

that,

so

far

which the

self

taken

The only

is

by

itself,

things

it

which

have, in any sense, the qualities attributed to

the

matter,

are

selves.

In place of an independent reality

sensations

experienced

events in men's minds which are real,

find

indeed, but not an independent reality. is si

by

we

mply our

illegitimate inference

Matter

from these

events.

This is

one

may be

put in another way.

of the activities of

my

If

my

self

body, then, smce 4

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

50

what appears

my

as

some conscious

life of

be events in the It is

clearly

But

it is

to

body, as

myself, for then

I

only events in the

is

being,

life of

absurd

my

activity of

life.

body

my

being.

suppose that

am

my body

self

B,

it

A

But how about

another

B?

known to in my own

If

wiii recur in an

my

self

own body

In that case life

By

of another

the same rule

have to be events in the

self.

an

is

activities of its

by some other self. would be events in the

also will

I

equally impossible that

as perceived self

also

some conscious

should be events

should be one of the

the

must

self

life

of

this self is A^ the absurdity

For then

aggravated form.

A

would be the events which happened in a self which was itself events in A, But if we say that

B

is

events in the

life

of a third self C,

the same question will arise about C, and so

on without end.

all.

series

And

self is self,

we have reached

plicable until

at

every

some other

in the life of

infinite

If

—that

so

we

is,

no

self

only events

no

self is ex-

the end of an is

explicable

are brought back to the

HUMAN IMMORTALITY conclusion that the of

its I

51

cannot be an activity

self

body.

may be thought

sarily

on

have dwelt unneces-

to

this point.

it

Surely,

may be

said,

obvious that the theory that the self is an activity of the body must fall with the theory it is

of the

independent existence of matter. Surely no one would maintain that the body only

existed for spirit, and at the spirit

was an

Men

been done.

what

that

activity of

of ability

matter

call

I

same time, that body. Yet this has is

thoughts and sensations, and, that

my

have maintained nothing but at

my

the same time,

thoughts and sensations are nothing

but an activity of

my

brain

—which,

being be thoughts and sensations The bearing of this discussion on the question of our immortality is that it disproves a matter, will itself

!

hypothesis which would render immortality incredible.

body,

it

If

the

was an

would be impossible

continue to exist to exist.

self

We

when

might

activity of the

that

it

should

the body had ceased

as well suppose, in that

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

52 case, that

as that the self did.

now

have

reduce any

But the body,

only exists for the

seen,

which observe

the

survived

the digestion

it,

self to

and we cannot,

body

we

as

selves

therefore,

be an activity of

its

own

body. It

has been admitted, indeed, that there

reality external to

myself

—the

reality

my

includes the external part-causes of

tions — although we are not

ing that reality as material.

we have

may be a product or reality, and one which to exist

which sensa-

justified in regard-

And

nothing that

said excludes the possibility that

self

activity of is

when some change

is

my

some other

destined to cease takes place in

its

cause.

view has not been refuted, there is not any reason, that I can see, why it should be held to be true, or even probable.

But while

There

is

this

no reason why we should regard our

selves as the product or activity of

no reason why, we did regard them as such products or

reality whatever, if

any other

and there

is

HUMAN IMMORTALITY activities,

we should

consider

53

them

likely to

cease/ If

the external reality had been indepen-

dently existing matter,

In that case there

different.

as

would have been

it

we saw

would have been,

above, a strong tendency to regard

matter as the only ultimate reality, and the self as an activity of its body. The tendency

would not be due the facts, as

to a logical necessity, since

we have

seen,

would not be

consistent with the hypothesis that spirit

in-

and

matter were independent, though connected, realities.

strong,

But the tendency would be very

owing

to our desire to find as

unity as possible in the universe.

an independent

is

reality.

reality,

it

is

If

much

the self

a non-material

And, granted the independent

exist-

^

It is commonly held that human selves are not products of non-divine realities, but that they are all

produced by God.

I

have given in Some Dogmas of

Religion (Chapter VI.) the reasons v^rhy this view does not seem to me to be necessary. But, supposing that they are produced in this way, we should have no ground for supposing that their divine production involved their

subsequent destruction, though it compatible with such destruction.

is

not, of course, in-

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

54

ence of matter, more unity would be gained

by denying the independent reality of spirit. But without independently existing matter the case

is

by making the thing

No

changed.

else,

known

self

increased unity

gained a mere activity of some-

unless that something else

and

to exist

is

to

is

already

be of a non-spiritual

Independently existing matter would, of course, be of a non-spiritual nature. But, nature.

when we have to believe

rejected this,

that

have no reason

the reality outside myself

and so

non-spiritual,

I

I

should gain no

is

in-

creased unity for the universe by denying the

independent

And, body,

it

again,

if

is

But

my

the self

must be

the body matter.

reality of

self. is

an activity of

a temporary activity, since

only a temporary combination of if

the

some non-material would be nothing

self

were an

activity of

reality outside itself, there

to disprove the

permanence

which produces the self course, there would equally be

of the state of things

— though,

of

its

nothing which proves that permanence.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

We

must now pass on

My

tion.

of

my

But

my

self

is

it

possible that the

still

makes the perception

my

present body, by

self or

necessary condition of In that case

self.

our second ques-

to

cannot be a form of the activity

self

body.

nature of

55

the

of

existence of

when my body be known as a body

inference that

dissolves,

ceases to

at all,

also.

exists, is necessarily

the

cessation

of

my

would be an inevitable

it

must have ceased

my

other selves, a

If

my

and self

Aj whenever

it

accompanied by B, then

B

a

is

sure

sign

of

the

cessation of A,

What a view

evidence In

?

plenty of bodies, selves

the

is

there in favour of such

first

we have who possess

place, while

experience of selves

we have no indubitable experience of who exist without bodies, or after their

bodies have ceased to

exist.

Besides

this,

the

existence of a self seems to involve the experi-

ence of sensations.

Without them, the

would have no material feeling,

and

it

is

self

for thought, will, or

only in these that the

self

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

56

Now

exists.

seems

there

reason

good

to

suppose that sensations never occur in our minds at present without some corresponding modifications of the body. This is certainly the case with normal sensations. if

the evidence for

And, even clairvoyance and thought-

were beyond dispute,

transference

it

could

never prove the possibility of sensation without bodily accompaniments.

exclude — indeed, —the existence of

For

it

seems rather

it

could to

not

suggest

bodily accompaniments of

an obscure and unusual kind. But, after

all,

the most, go

necessary to

body

was

these considerations would, at

to

my

show self,

that

some body was

and not

that

Have

we,

necessary.

its

present

after

the

any reason to suppose that the death of the body must indicate anyresults already reached,

thing more than that the self had transferred its

manifestations

to

a

new body, and

had,

therefore, passed from the knowledge of the

who had only known it through body ? The apparent improbability

survivors,

the old

HUMAN IMMORTALITY of this

think, simply in our instinctive

lies, I

recurrence to the theory that the activity of the body. it

57

self is

In that case, no doubt,

would be impossible

that

should

it

successively connected with two bodies. that

theory

The most

we have seen

supposition

would

fit

the

of

accompaniment

to

body can be

that a

that

the

an

self.

be

But

be untenable. is

an essential

And

then the

has another body

self

the facts quite as well as the sup-

position that the self has ceased to exist.

There seems no reason why such a change should not be instantaneous. But even if it were not so, no additional difficulty would be created. of

a

self,

a

body is essential to the action the self would be in a state of If

suspended animation its

possession of

we might

almost

existence.

But

what happens,

as

its

in the interval

two bodies —

call

this far

between

a state

which

one of temporary nonis

nothing more than

as

we can

observe, in

every case of dreamless sleep. During such a sleep the self, so far as we know, is un-

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

58

conscious

—as

unconscious

as

could be

it

without a body. Yet this does not prevent its being the same man who went asleep and

who woke up

again.

Why

should the

culty be greater in a change of bodies

And

we any

then, have

diffi-

?

reason, after

all,

to

suppose that a body is essential to a self ? It seems to me that the facts only support a

different

very

proposition

while a self has a body, that

connected with the

self's

For example, no conscious unless

mental

it

self

— namely,

body

mental

essentially

life.

can be conceived as

has sufficient data for

This material

activity.

is

is

and sensations

its

only given,

as far as our observations can go, in the of sensations,

that,

form

again, as far as

our observations can go, seem invariably connected with changes in a body. But it does not follow, because a self which has a body cannot get

data except in connexion with

its

would be impossible for a body to get data in some other

that body, that self

without a

way.

It

it

may be just

the existence of the

body

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

59

which makes these other ways impossible present.

If

a

man

is

at

shut up in a house, the

transparency of the windows condition of his seeing the sky.

is

not be prudent to infer that,

he walked out

if

an essential

But

it

would

he could not see the sky because there was no longer any glass through which of the house,

he might see

it.

With regard

to the

connexion of the brain

with thought, the chief evidence for to

it

appears

be that diseases or mutilations of the brain

affect the course of thought.

not prove that, even while a his thoughts are directly

Many which

But

man

this

does

has a brain,

connected with

it.

things are capable of disturbing thought, are not essential to

its

existence.

For

example, a sufficiently severe attack of toothache may render all consecutive abstract

thought impossible. But if the tooth was extracted, I should still be able to think. And, in the

same way, the

state of the brain

may

fact that

affect

an abnormal

our thoughts does

not prove that the normal states of the brain are necessary for thought.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

6o

Even if the brain while we have bodies,

when we ceased

it

essential to thought

would not follow

we could

have brains

that

not

The same argument

them.

without

think

to

is

applies here as with the organs of sense.

It

might be that the present inability of the self to think except in connexion with the body

was a

presence of with

which was imposed by the the body, and which vanished

limitation

it.

We

have

now considered the two arguments

against the immortality of the self

from the death

of

the body.

said nothing as to the bearing

on

which spring But we have this question

of stories as to the ghosts of the dead. stories,

Such

however numerous and well authen-

ticated,

could

never

evidence that the

self

us

any positive was undying. At the

give

most they could prove that it survived its body for a few centuries. But indirectly the evidence could be of considerable importance.

For

it

survived

might the

possibly

death of

prove its

that

body.

the

self

Now

the

HUMAN IMMORTALITY death of that

its

body

we have

And

tahty.

for if

is

by

6i

reason

far the strongest

doubting the

self's

immor-

the appearance of ghosts could

prove that this reason had no weight, they would have removed the greatest difficulty in the

way

Much is

of the belief.

on

this subject

doubtless utterly untrustworthy.

But there

of the evidence offered

good deal which investigation has failed break down. And there is much to be said is

a

support of the view that, after

have been made for fraud, ence, there

is

still

a

all

error,

sufficient

to in

deductions

and coincidresiduum

to

such apparitions are in some cases caused by the dead man whose

justify the belief that

body they represent. But the mere proof

that there

connexion between the dead apparition

dead man of effects is

would not

this causal

man and

the

prove that the had survived his death. A chain

may

destroyed.

chief

was

causes

suffice to

exist long after its original cause

Chatham may be one of

the

pride

of the

which England

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

62

an Englishman to-day, but this proves nothing as to Chatham's present existexcites

ence.

in

as

And,

apparitions

as

far

I

know,

all

stories

would be equally well explained

by the theory

that a

man

might, before his

death, initiate a chain of circumstances

would cause death, alive.

of

which

his apparition to appear, after his

under certain conditions, to men still In this case, nothing would be proved

about his existence after death.

This

may appear

improbable.

But, on the

other hand, any attempt to prove empirically

man

that

could survive death would have to

struggle with such an tive

evidence that

would

its

enormous mass

of nega-

antecedent improbability

also not be small.

Investigation

may

give us more evidence, and evidence incompatible with vival.

have

any theory except that of surBut at present it seems to me that we

much more chance

of proving our im-

mortality by metaphysics than

by psychical

research.

We

now come

to the third

question.

Is

HUMAN IMMORTALITY there any reason to suppose that

share

not

the

recognize in

me What

all

transitory

63

my

self

does

character which

I

the material objects around

?

When

exactly

is

science says that a material object

— ceases

human body mean ? It does

planet, or a

does

it

thing

is

annihilated.

which were combined

now combined changed. before

character

this transitory

is

not

It

means

that any-

that

in a certain

units,

way, are

The form

otherwise.

—a

what

to exist,

mean

?

has

But everything which was there there now.

We

need not inquire whether this distinction between an unchanging matter and a changing form can have more than a rough approximate correctness.

It

is

sufficient to

—

note that the

analogy of science whatever be attached to it does not give

—

weight may us reason to suppose anything to be transitory except combinations.^ *

I do not mean to imply that science necessarily accepts any units as indivisible and imperishable. My

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

64

the self a combination

Is

It

?

certainly re-

sembles a combination in one respect, for differentiated

can have

and contains a

different

moment, and

sensations

sensations, thoughts,

But

follow from this that a self

is

whole

a

if

is

same

and desires it

does not

a combination.

a combination

which could

the

at

is

We

plurality.

can exist simultaneously.

For

it

it is

built

up

without being combined in that way, while the combination could not exist without them. If the bricks of a

of parts

exist

were destroyed, the wall would be destroyed too. But the wall might for

wall,

instance,

be destroyed by being taken to pieces, and the bricks would remain unchanged.

Do to

the parts of the self stand in this relation

Could

it ?

my

emotions, exist tions,

when my

thoughts,

my

isolated, or in self

volitions,

my

new combina-

had ceased

to exist

?

It

it tells us that whatever does perish does so of the parts of which it is comthe separation only by posed. Those parts may themselves be combinations.

point

is

Thus

it

that

is

infinitum.

may perish, and so on ad But nothing perishes but combinations.

possible that they

HUMAN IMMORTALITY seems for

me — the

clear to

too ultimate

is

point

65

discussion — that they cannot.

incon-

It is

ceivable that a thought, a sensation, a volition, or an emotion should exist outside of a

And

it is

inconceivable that the same thought,

which was once

sensation, volition, or emotion

my mind

part of

body

The

else's.

plex, but not a it

is

could ever be part of some-

we must

self,

compound.

It

say,

depends on them, they depend on it. self,

its

exist as united in

separate from

it.

For

parts. it,

If

com-

For, while

it

much

just as

cannot cease by the

therefore,

separation of

is

has parts, but

not built up out of them.

The

self.

its

parts

only

and therefore could not it

did cease to

exist,

it

only be

could

only that

is It not by annihilation. the form would have changed, but

form and content

that the

alike

would have

perished.

Now

there

is

no

analogy in

suggest the probability of treats

this.

science to

For science

nothing as perishable except combina5

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

66 tions.

This, indeed, does not give us any safe

analogy for the persistence of the first

place, there

is

reason to doubt the absolute

between content and

validity of the distinction

form,

In the

self.

which science

finds

convenient to

it

And, in the second place, the difference between a self and matter is too great for make.

an analogy from one to the other to be very

But

conclusive.

at

rate science gives

any

no

analogy against us. All this assertion

still

of

leaves us very far from a positive

death of the body destruction of the

decomposed

Even though

immortality.

into

no argument

is

and the

self, its

is

it

parts,

self

view has been held

idealism.

It

may be

in

the

for

cannot be

still

possible

that the self should not be immortal. this

the

And

many systems

of

maintained, for example,

that finite individuals only exist to carry out

some divine purpose, and that an individual

may

that

it

is

possible

cease to be necessary

for such a purpose, and so cease to exist.

was

Lotze's view.

Or

again,

it

This

may be main-

HUMAN IMMORTALITY tained that

there

is

in the idea of a self,

reality,

something contradictory which prevents us from

an

adequate expression of and that therefore there is no reason

regarding

to

as

67

it

that

any particular self shares the eternity which is characteristic of true suppose

reality.

To meet such doubts

as these

it

would be

necessary to construct a complete metaphysical should have to determine what system.

We

was the

general

nature of

all

reality,

and

whether that nature involved the existence finite selves.

And

if

in this

of

way we reached

the conclusion that the existence of finite selves

was

eternally necessary, the question

arise

whether each

self

was

would

eternal, or whether,

on the other hand, there was an unending succession of transitory selves.

And,

if

the

former alternative were accepted, we should have to consider the relation between eternity

and immortality. All that I have endeavoured to do here has been to show that the more obvious arguments against immortality

—those

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

68

which have most weight with most people have no vaUdity. In spite of

all

—

arguments, however, the idea

that the self cannot be immortal continually

returns to us.

Reflection

may

but in unreflective moments

We

seem

so small,

It

great.

when

it

drive

it

away,

besets us again.

it

and the transitory seems so

— there are times — believe that impossible

always hard

is

seems

to

each of us can be a permanent element in a universe in which nations and planets are but

momentary shapes.

And more the

the belief in immortality seems

incredible believers.

when we

Many

because they wish

it

consider

people

to

be

blinding their judgments.

all

the

many

believe

in

of it

true, their desires

Many

believe in

it

on the authority of some religion claiming to be revealed most of which must, on any

—

hypothesis, be untrustworthy.

It

is

illogical

to conclude that a belief cannot be true be-

cause

it

has generally been believed for mis-

taken reasons, but

it is

difficult, in practice, to

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

69

from spreading from the reasons to the beUef. Yet I think that reasons for the belief in immortaUty may be found of keep our

distrust

such strength that they should prevail over difhculties.

all

PART

II

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE I

WISH here

thinking that,

point out

to if

men

some reasons

are immortal,

it

is

more

probable that the beginning of the present in

which each

for

life,

now, was not

of us finds himself

the beginning of his whole existence, but that

he lived before

as he will live after

it,

wish, secondly, to

consider the

which

true,

this theory,

if

would

of the facts of our experience,

what would be the immortality as

The present to

the

it

some

to consider

practical value of

such

can offer us.

attitude of

doctrine

I

explanation

afford of

and

it.

of

most western thinkers

pre-existence

Of the many who [regard our

is

life

curious. after the

death of our bodies as certain or probable, 71

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

72

scarcely one regards our

before the birth

life

of those bodies as a possibility

And

discussion.^

and by

Plato,

and

yet

it

it is

which deserves

was taught by Buddha

usually associated with

the belief in immortality in the far east.

men who

should that

we

shall live after this life

the hypothesis that

the end of a sideration

The

life

Why

are so anxious to-day to prove

as

we have

is

ended regard

already survived

one which

is

beneath con-

?

explanation of

this,

modern western thought

I

suppose,

is

that in

the great support of

the belief in immortality has been the Christian religion.

Under

of the belief

that religion

these circumstances a form

which was never supported by was not likely to be considered

any importance. And, for some reason, Christians have almost unanimously rejected those theories which placed pre-exiwStence by of

the side of immortality, although there seems 1

Lotze, for example, treats it as a serious objection to a particular argument for immortality, that it would lead conclusion of preto the strange and improbable '

existence.

'

Metaphysic, Section 245.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE in

nothing

any

accepted as

which

dogmas

effective

way

of

involved a life.

of Part

I.,

at all, as

of proving that the

is

directly that the nature of

present

man was such

But, as

believe

that

both before and after the

life

said at the beginning

I

such a demonstration,

I

generally

bound up with the immortality would be to prove

doctrine of pre-existence

it

are

fundamental to Christianity.

The most doctrine

incompatible with

pre-existence

the

of

73

it

would be

to be,

the scope of this book, since a determination of

some

mental characteristics of

if it is

it

far

possible

beyond

would involve

of the

most funda-

reality.

must content myself with stating in a more general manner my grounds for believing that I

any evidence which will also

ways

in

will

prove immortality

prove pre-existence.

which a proof

attempted. physical way.

the nature of

The

first

We man

is

There are two

of immortality is

the

may be

directly meta-

may attempt

to

show

that

such that he cannot cease

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

74

to exist while the universe continues to exist

or that his nature

is

eternal,

and

nature cannot have an end in time

some

;

that an eternal

or pursue

;

similar line of argument.

In this

succeed

means

in

case

seems

it

to

me

proving immortality, considerations which

of

it

will

we

if

that,

be by

would

also

prove pre-existence. I do not see how existence in future time could be shown to be necessary in the case of existence in past time

necessary. a

If

is

the universe got on without

hundred years

me

what reason could be

ago,

might get on without Or if it is cona hundred years hence ?

given for denying that

me

any being whose admitted not to be

sistent

with

my eternal

it

nature that

manifestation should begin at time, could

we

its

temporal

some point

in

find any reason for supposing

that the cessation of that manifestation at

some

point in time would be inconsistent with that

nature

?

I

do not see

reason could be, nor do that has

been made

of I

what kind such a

know

of

any attempt

to establish one.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

75

another way in which attempts have been made to prove immortahty. This

There

is

consists in demonstrating that the universe

the

work

of

is

a benevolent creator, or has a

purpose harmonious with our ideals of morality, and then arguing that the absence of immortality

would be inconsistent with the benevo-

lence of such a creator, or with such a moral

Arguments of this type could prove immortality more readily than they could purpose.

No wrong

prove pre-existence. to the

made

non-existent, a

it

it

could hardly be

goodness of the had waited a long time before

reproach

universe that

and

can be done

to

the

produced a particular person. But, once produced, any person has certain moral claims, it

and

if

it

could be shown that his annihilation

was inconsistent with those

claims,

we could

argue from the goodness of the universe to the impossibility of his annihilation.

Can we, however,

validly conclude

from the

goodness of the universe to the impossibility of a particular evil ? It cannot be denied that

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

76

some

evil

reality,

does

then,

existence of

that

evil.

And when

we hope

any particular

ultimate nature of

incompatible with the

not

is

some

admitted, can

The

exist.

this is

a priori proof too bad to be con-

for an

evil is

sistent with the nature of the universe

seems to

me

that

be

cannot, and that

?

It

we must

arguments which attempt prove that a thing is unreal because it would

therefore reject to

we

once

all

evil.

We

may

call

arguments

of this sort ethical,

since they involve the conception of the good.

Modern demonstrations

of

immortality have

almost always been of this character, and not purely metaphysical, and this it

explains

why

has often been held in modern times that

immortality was proved, although pre-existence

has almost always been disbelieved.

Even

the

arguments of the eighteenth century, which were attacked by Kant, had an ethical element in them. Their supporters endeavoured, indeed, to prove by purely metaphysical considerations that the nature of man's spirit was

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE such that

it

^^

could not be destroyed in the

But they held that ordinary course of nature. each man had been created by an act of the divine will, and they admitted that a similar In order to

act could destroy him.

God

never would will to destroy a

he had once created, they either

show

that

man whom back on

fell

the asserted evidence of revelation, or con-

tended that such destruction would be inconsistent

with what

character, in

we knew

which case

God's moral

of

their

argument had

passed over into the ethical class. If, as I have maintained, ethical arguments of this sort are invalid,

we

are forced back

on

the purely metaphysical arguments, and here

we seem future

unable to treat the past and the

differently.

My

conclusion

is,

then,

any demonstration of immortality is likely to show that each of us exists through all that

time to

—past

be

We

and future

— whether

time

is

held

finite or infinite.

must now inquire what consequences would follow from the truth of pre-existence

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

78

and immortality.

Each man would have

at

one before

it,

least three lives, his present life,

and one

after

seems more probable, would not be all, and that It

it.

however, that this

his existence before

would lives,

and

after his present life

be divided into many each bounded by birth and death. This each

in

case

doctrine of a plurality of future lives and of past lives

may be

conveniently referred to as

the doctrine of plurality of lives.^

There

is

much

to be said for the

view that a

would be the most probable even on a theory of immortality

plurality of lives alternative,

which did not include pre-existence. We do not know what is the cause which produces the limitation of our present lives by birth and death, but

some cause there must

be,

and a

cause which produces so important an effect In one sense, of course, a belief in pre-existence and immortality is itself a belief in a plurality of lives, since ^

it

is

a belief in three at least. But it will, I think, be to reserve the name for the belief

more convenient

—

mentioned above that for each of us existence on one or both sides of the present life would be divided into

more

lives than one.

HUMAN PKE-EXISTENCE one which plays a great part

is

ence, as long as If

it

continues to

our

in

—and

this is the

though plurality

of

most

lives

causes,

is

whatever

plurality

common opinion,

frequently than pre-existence the

exist-

act.

we accept immortaUty and reject a

of lives

that

79

accepted more

—we

must hold

they are, which

operate on each of us so as to cause his death once, will never operate again on any of us future time.

all

through

not impossible.

The

be such that there

This

is,

of course,

true nature of death

may

bility, of its

no need, and no possiBut I do not see that repetition.

we have any

reason to believe this to be even

is

probable. It is

quite clear that a

life

which stretched

on unendingly without death would in many respects be enormously different from our

An

attempt to imagine how our present lives would be transformed if neither present

we

lives.

ourselves, nor our fellow-men,

any chance of death,

A

believer

in

will

make

immortality

had

in future

this evident.

who

denies,

or

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

8o

regards as improbable, the doctrine of phirahty of

must

lives,

assert,

the

or regard as

probable, that the death which ends his present life for

each of us

will

change profoundly and

permanently the conditions And for this there seems no If

we

of all future justification.

are immortal, the value of our exist-

ence either remains permanently present level, or rises or the

first

life.

case,

suppose that

would not

about

at

falls after

death.

we should have no it

was so changed

recur.

impossible that

it

As

I

have

should be

In

reason to that death

said, so.

its

it

is

not

But when

anything has a particular characteristic, the presumption is that, if that thing continues to exist, its characteristic will

The presumption

not suddenly vary.

certainly not strong,

is

and

can give us no firm belief. But it is, I think, sufficient to render it rather more it

probable that the characteristic of periodic mortality will not be left behind at the end of

our present I

lives.

do not think

that

this

would be very

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE generally denied. of lives

our

death. that is

do not remain

It is

it

is

denial of the plurality

generally based on the belief that

is

lives

The

8i

same

level after

men have

died once

at the

not because

held that they cannot die again.

because

it

is

It

believed that after death they

much above the other much below it.

are in heaven or hell, the one level of earthly It

is

this

life,

the

contended that the change effected

in

manner renders further deaths improbable.

This

especially maintained with regard to

is

heaven.

might be admitted that a state of absolute perfection would render further death improbable. But even the best men are not, when It

they die, in such a state of intellectual and

moral perfection as would fit them to enter heaven immediately, if heaven is taken as a state of absolute perfection

further sible.

of

all

improvement unnecessary and imposThis is generally recognized, and one

two alternatives

meet

which renders

it.

The

first

is is

commonly adopted to that some tremendous 6

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

82

improvement

—an improvement out of

all

pro-

portion to any which can ever be observed in life

—takes

moment of death, at those who die under

place at the

rate in the case of

any

For

certain conditions.

this, so far as

The

there are no arguments.

probable alternative

that

is

I

other and the

know,

more

process of

gradual improvement can go on in each of us after the

But

death of our present bodies.

our existence immediately after our

if

present

life

is

imperfect, and a state of im-

provement and advance,

it

has not yet reached

which might make future deaths improbable. And it seems to that

me

absolute perfection

that the natural inference

though those

is

it

who

not

hold

this

view

drawn by the majority it

—

is

followed by others like its

from

that this life will

— of

be

each separated from predecessor and successor by death and

re-birth.

it,

For otherwise we should be limited

to the hypothesis that a process of develop-

ment, begun in a single life bounded by death, would be continued as an indefinitely long

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE life

And

83

not divided by birth and death at

all.

to suppose, without

any reason, such a change from the order of our present experience seems unjustifiable.

Should any persons be destined to attain a state of great and permanent degradation, there would be that this

still

less

would exclude

reason for supposing all

death from their

Death may possibly be

future existence.

in-

compatible with absolute perfection, but it has no characteristic which can be suggested as incompatible

with

degradation.

In addition to this

the

extreme

as in the case of heaven, that

able to

moment

it

of

human

we may is

urge,

unreason-

suppose an extreme change at the of death, and that, even if the com-

pleted degradation was likely to exclude death,

there could be no reason for supposing that the process towards it would do so from the first.

Again,

processes

sometimes finished incomplete.

We

begun in this life are in it, and sometimes left

continually find that death

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

84

leaves a fault without a retribution, a retri-

bution without a repentance,

a

preparation

without an achievement, while in other cases,

where the process

men

If

is

life

has so

we must

survive death,

death, will if

a similar

complete between birth and death.

these processes,

And

has lasted longer,

when

expect that

not worked out before

be worked out

in

a future

life.

the content of our existence after death

much

similarity, in essential features,

our present

with the content of

presumption

is

changed so

far

lives,

the

increased that they have not as

to

shaken

have

off

the

necessity of periodical death.^

There seems,

good

therefore,

reason for

regarding plurality of lives as the least im-

probable alternative, even

if

we

accept immor-

without accepting pre-existence. But pre-existence is also accepted, the case for

tality if

a plurality of lives

becomes

then the death which *

On

Hope.

this subject

we may

alters

stronger.

my

present

For life

refer to Browning's Evelyn

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

85

no longer an unique event in my existence. One life, if no more, came to an end for me is

before

my

life

present

Thus any

could begin.

theory would be false which should try to reject the plurality of lives on the ground that

was probable that death could only occur once in a man's existence. And the plurality it

be regarded as improbable, there was reason to suppose that an event,

of lives could only if

which happened twice in a man's existence, would never happen a third time. Now while it

I

—

might be contended though, as I have said, do not think it could be rightly contended

—

that there

made

it

were features about death which

probable

it

a man's

existence,

slightest

ground

is

would only occur once it

is

difficult

to

see the

for the suggestion that there

anything about death which should make

it

it

should occur three times, was known that it occurred twice.

improbable that although

in

it

We

can only accept immortality and preexistence, while rejecting the plurality of lives, if

we hold

that the

causes which break off

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

86 a

by a death,

life

after

remaining dormant

from the beginning of our existence, act twice within an interval of from five minutes to about a hundred years, and then never act again through

The

result

all

future time.

seems

that pre-existence

to

is

be

even granting there can be no

that,

certain,

absolute demonstration of plurality of lives,

but that the plurality of lives probable still

supposition

in

any

is

the

case,

more probable on the hypothesis

more

and

is

of pre-

existence.

There are various features life

of

our present

which can be explained more

satisfactorily

on the theory of pre-existence than on any other. I do not, however, wish to suggest that

the

ease of

explaining

them on

hypothesis, or the difficulty of explaining

without

it, is

this

them

so great as to form any proof of

the doctrine of pre-existence.

That doctrine,

be proved by metaphysical arguments of the type mentioned at the beI

believe, can only

ginning of this chapter.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE The most important be found

who

of these features

little

of

to

is

Two

in personal relations.

have seen but

87

people each other are

drawn together by a force equal to that whicb is generated in other cases by years of mutual trust and mutual assistance.

often

The

significance of

think, very

explained,

this

has been,

fact

much underrated.^ when any attempt at

It is

I

generally

explanation

is

made, by the capriciousness of sexual desire. This explanation is inadequate, because the found with as great proportional frequency in friendships which have no connexion with sexual desire.

fact to

1

be explained

The same may be

is

said of

the love of one particular

Philosophy and theology,

all

facts

men's love seriously, generally confine for

God, or to a passion

for

connected with

human being for when they profess it

another. to take

either to a love

mankind as a whole.

It is

rarely that the writings of a philosopher or a theologian find anything in a young man's love for his sweetheart

except a mixture of sexual desire and folly, or anything in a young man's love for his comrade except folly pure and simple. Hegel is, I think, to be regarded as an exception. Possibly, also, the writer of the first epistle of St. John.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

88'

On the

theory of pre-existence such relations

would naturally be explained by the friendThe love which comes ships of past lives. and the love which grows up through many years in this life, would be referred to similar causes, whose similarity at first

sight,

would account

for the similarity of the effects.

Each would have

arisen through long intimacy,

and the only difference between them would be that in one case the intimacy had been suspended by death and Again, as a

and

qualities

re-birth.

man grows up make

themselves

They cannot be

him.

certain tendencies

entirely

manifest

due

to

in

his

environment, for they are often very different in people whose environment has been very

We

similar.

character,

with

it.

call

these

and assume

the

that he

Such tendencies and

man's natural

came

into life

qualities, since

they are not due to anything which happens after birth,

present

may be

life is

called innate, as far as the

concerned.

Now when we

look at the natural characters

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE of

men, we find that

possess

quaUties

which, as

we

in

strongly

learn

many

89

cases they

resembhng those

by direct experience, can

be produced in the course of a single life. One man seems to start with an impotence to

which exactly resembles the impotence which has been produced in another man by continual yielding

resist

some

particular temptation

same temptation. One man, again, has virtue which through life a calm and serene

to the

another gains only by years of strenuous effort. Others, again, have innate powers of judging in emercharacter, or of acting with decision

which give them, while yet inexperimen enced, advantages to which less fortunate them at all, only by attain, if they attain to Here then we have the experience of years.

gencies,

characteristics

which

are

which closely resemble

born with

we know

densed results

of experience.

to

doctrine of pre-existence, these

also

as

and

characteristics which,

in other cases,

explain

us,

be due to the con-

we

being

If

we hold

shall

the

the

naturally

condensed

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

90

results of experience

ence

an

in

But, these

earlier

of

the

life

theory

accepting pre-existence sonal

relations,

would help us it

is

can

said,

our

features of

means

in this case, of experi-

life.

may be

it

—

we

quite

of

not explain as well

heredity,

by

without

In the case of per-

?

do not see that heredity I have admitted that all.

I

at

not impossible to explain the facts other-

The

wise than by pre-existence.

may be simply due acter of each of

many

cases

something in the charthe two persons, though in to

we cannot

see

In this case

could be.

attraction

what

it

is

that something

possible that the

element in question has been produced by

But there

heredity.

which should make produce

is it

nothing in heredity likely that it should

this result rather

than another, and

so the abstract possibility that the attraction is

due

to

some undetected element

characters

is

two

not increased by the suggestion

that the characters

On

in the

were produced by heredity.

the theory of pre-existence, however,

we

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

91

can regard the effects as produced by a cause which would be likely to produce this result another

than

rather

formed

in

an earlier

— have is

cannot —

ancestors

loved

my

if

But

explains

sins,

my

ancestors

my

innate

friend,

loving

is false

and therefore there I

inherit

him

may have

or resisted them,

aptitudes.

pre-existence

nothing in the fact that

that

relations

produce a more

can

explanation of

satisfactory

by

is,

life.

however,

Heredity,

My

— that

at

from them first

sight.

yielded to certain

or

practised

certain

supposing that I can inherit the results which they have acquired,^

activities,

there

and

then,

would be a reason why

I

should have an

innate strength or weakness in certain direc-

which

tions,

teristics

their

closely

resembled similar charac-

which other men have acquired by

own

action in the course of their present

lives.

We 1

The

must,

however, remember that such

possibility of this,

highly uncertain.

however,

is,

to say the least,

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

92

where

innate dispositions often occur in cases

nothing of the sort can be traced among the even if, as sometimes happens, the ancestors

—

ancestors themselves can be traced for

many

possible, no doubt, generations that the acquirement of some more remote ancestor may have remained dormant through

back.

It

is

now

the intervening generations and have

appeared,

much

but

the

probable than

less

is

explanation it

naturally

in the

is

where the ancestral acquirement

is

re-

cases

known

to

have existed. But, as

I

have

said,

while

regard the

I

explanation of these facts by pre-existence as better than any it,

I

which can be offered without

do not regard the superiority

explanation as sufficient to give by

of

the

itself

any

appreciable probability to pre-existence, if

established at

more

all,

which,

must be established by

directly metaphysical arguments.

Whether acquired or not, there

tendency for

is

qualities can

be inherited

no doubt that there

men — not

is

a certain

merely their bodies

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE but themselves

And

it

—to

93

resemble their ancestors.

may be thought

that this

would be an

objection to our theory of pre-existence.

man's character lives,

how can

is it

body was generated ? There is, however, no

may have

a

determined by his previous be also determined by the

character of the ancestors by

We

If

whose bodies

his

real difficulty here.

reason to believe that a man's

character resembles to

some extent

that of

would be impossible to demonstrate, and there is no reason to believe, that there are no elements in it which could his ancestors, but

not

it

On

be derived from that source.

the

other hand, the doctrine of pre-existence does not compel us to deny

all

influence on a man's

character of the characters of his ancestors

The

character which a

man

has at any time

is

modified by circumstances which happen to

him

at that time,

and may well be modified

by the fact that his re-birth descended from ancestors of character.

is

a

in

a

body

particular

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

94

Thus the two ways in this Hfe

in

which the character

said to be determined

is

need not

be inconsistent, since they can both co-operate in the determination, the tendencies inherited

with the body modifying the character as

was

left at

the end of the previous Hfe.

it

But

no impossibihty in supposing that the characteristics in which we resemble the

there

is

ancestors of our bodies, characteristics

due

may be

to

some degree

to our previous lives.

walking through the streets of London, extremely rare

shows no

fit

it

is

meet a man whose hat

to

sort of adaptation to his head.

in general

In

Hats

their wearers with far greater

accuracy than they would

if

each man's hat

were assigned to him by lot. And yet there is very seldom any causal connexion between the shape of the head and the shape of the

A

hat.

man's head

is

never

made

to

fit

his

hat, and, in the great majority of cases, his hat is

not

made

to

fit

his head.

comes about by each man hats

made without any

The

adaptation

selecting,

from

special reference

to

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE his particular head, the hat

particular

This

head

which

will suit his

best.

help us to see that

may

95

possible to hold that a certain characteristics

it

would be

man whose nature had when he was about to

be re-born, would be re-born

scended from ancestors

in a

body de-

of a similar character.

His character when re-born would, case,

be decided, as

tion went,

by

his

in

far as the points in

this

ques-

character in his previous

and not by the character of the ancestors his new body. But it would be the char-

life,

of

acter of the ancestors of the similarity to his character,

new body, and

its

which determined

he was re-born in that body rather than another. The shape of the head the fact

that

—

go back to our analogy— does not determine the shape of the hat, but it does determine the to

selection of

this

particular hat for this par-

ticular head.

But how,

it

may be

person, in this case,

with the

new body

asked,

would each

be brought into connexion that

is

most appropriate

to

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

96

him

I

?

know

do not see any various

that

chemical

substances

affinities for

We

difficulty here.

which have

one another

will

meet

and combine, separating themselves, to do so, from other substances with which they have been previously

And we do

connexion.

in

not

find anything so strange or paradoxical in this

make us unwilling

result as to

There seems

truth.

to

me

to

to recognize

its

be nothing more

strange or paradoxical in the suggestion that

each person enters into connexion with the body which is most fitted to be connected with him.

And,

if

there were

supposition,

it

is

any

in

difficulty

a difficulty

this

which would be

just as serious for the theory

adopted by most

who

reject pre-exist-

believers in immortality ence.

If

no man existed before the formation

of his present body, the question

how

did he

still

arises

become connected with

a

—

body

such that his character resembles the characters of

the ancestors of that body

question would not arise

if

?

we supposed

The that

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE the whole

character of the

But

produced by the body. ordinary view.

self

was simply

this is not the

would be

it

Indeed,

97

difficult

to hold this without also holding that the self,

was produced by the And such a view as this would be all

as well as

body.

its

character,

but incompatible

—

if

not quite incompatible

—

with the belief in immortality. Again, the question of

how

the connexion

is

determined, might be considered to have been

answered

if

created the

it

were held that the parents

new person

generated the body. difficultes

which, as

I it

not discuss the

will

seems

volved in this view, since the

I

to

am

me, are

in-

dealing with

consequences of pre-existence, and not

with the theories which deny cient to

remark here that

that

the

parents of

person his

supreme power

And

is

body,

it.

suffi-

It is

this is not the

The common

most generally adopted. is

time that they

at the

created,

but

view

belief

not by the

directly

by the

of the universe.

then the question

still

remains

— how 7

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

gg

does this person get into connexion with the appropriate body, since they

come

into exist-

?

It

seems that there are

only two alternatives.

It

may be

ence independently

connexion

is

due

to a special

said that the

act of divine

providence in each case. But, if mate to invoke such a special act

it

surely just as legitimate to invoke

it

is

legiti-

at all,

it

is

make

to

a connexion for a previously existing person as for a

newly created person.

be said

that

the

Or

else

it

may

appropriate connexion

is

brought about by some general law. And there can be no greater difficulty in supposing

such a law to act on persons who had previously existed than in supposing it to act on persons newly created. fore,

who deny Is

if

there

one,

is

difficulty, there-

no greater

for those

accept pre-existence than for those

who

it.

the

truth

How much to

is

The

of

pre-existence

desirable

?

would an immortality be worth us which was coupled with pre-existence ?

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE The most

99

serious objection relates to

memory. do not now remember anything of any If, nevertheless, we have lived previous Ufe.

We

and have forgotten

previously,

no reason

to expect that

we

it,

there seems

shall

remember

our present life during subsequent lives. an existence that is cut up into separate

none

in

vious

lives,

which memory extends to a premay be thought to have no practical

of

life,

We

value.

been

Now

said,

might as well be mortal, it has as be immortal without a memory

beyond the present life. The question becomes more serious if not only pre-existence, but also the plurality of lives

is

true.

For

might reasonably be feared that we might lose memory, not only twice in our existence, but an indefinitely large number of times.

then

it

Sometimes, indeed, it has been asserted that such a state would not be immortality at all. Without memory of my present life, it is said,

my

future

life

would not be mine.

ceases at the death of it,

and

I

am

my

not immortal.

body,

If I

memory

cease with

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

100

had

no continuity with its successors, and no effect on them, then indeed there might be Uttle meaning in caUing them If

each

life

the same

lives of

But we cannot

person.

suppose that this could be the case.

same

self

the

passes through various lives, any

change which happens

to

it

sequent, and, through this, in re-birth,

any time must

at

time immediately sub-

affect its state in the

Death and

If

all

future time.

no doubt, are of

sufficient

importance to modify a character considerably, but they could only act on what was already present, and the nature with which each individual

moulded by

identity It

his

And

the past.

starts

in

any

life

would be

experiences and actions in

this

is

between the

sufficient to

make

the

different lives real.

has also been objected that the re-birth

of a person without a

memory

of his previous

would be exactly equivalent to the annihilation of that person and the creation of

life

a

new person

(By

this

it

is

of

exactly similar

not meant that the

character.

new person

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE would be exactly

moment

similar to the old

loi

one

at

the

of the latter's annihilation, but that

he would be exactly similar to what the old person would have been if he had undergone the process of re-birth.) Now, it is argued, I should not regard myself as immortal if I

knew even

that if

I

was

I

knew

to

be annihilated

at

death,

that an exactly similar person

would then be

created.

And

concluded, re-birth without

therefore,

memory

it

is

cannot be

considered as real immortality of the

self.

But the objection supposes an impossibility. There could not be another self which would have a character exactly similar to what mine

would have been under the same circum-

The

stances.

whose nature

The

self is

is

not a 'thing in

independent of

its

itself,'

qualities.

a substance with attributes, and

self is

it

has no nature except to express itself in its attributes. If the character of the new self,

under

certain

similar to

my

cumstances,

circumstances,

were

exactly

character under the same cir-

its

attributes

would be exactly

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

102

similar to

my

Then

attributes.

the substance

would be the same, and I should not be But if there were a new annihilated at all.^ also

self,

then the difference between the selves

must be expressed by some difference in the Then the new self would not be attributes. what

of exactly similar character to

should

I

have been under the same circumstances, and therefore the creation of a

new

be exactly equivalent to

my

exact similarity of attributes

self

would not

re-birth.

Thus

is

suffi-

always

cient to prove personal identity, not because it

would be

sufficient

the substance were

if

1 It will be seen that I am assuming here that there cannot be two different substances with exactly similar It does not lie within the scope of this book attributes.

to

discuss

Identity of

this

principle, Indiscernibles.

commonly known It

is

sufficient

present purpose to remark that the principle by most philosophers of the present day.

is

as

the

for

our

accepted

And

those

who deny it, and assert that things which are exactly similar may yet be numerically different, would not hold that the annihilation of one thing and the creation of another could be exactly equivalent to the continuance of the first, even though the second was exactly similar to the

first.

For, although exactly similar, they

would be numerically

different.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE but because

different,

stance

is

We of

proves that the sub-

the same. say then that, in spite of the loss

may

memory,

is

it

same person who Hves in But has such immor-

the

the successive lives.

immortal

for the

any value

tality as this

person

who

is

?

do not propose

I

it

103

has

immortality

maintain that

to discuss

all

Some people

value.

any

human

however favourable the

whether any

existence

conditions.

is

evil,

Others

regard existence as of such value that they

would be prepared

man on

those

Among

annihilation. violently,

to choose hell rather than

some regard the

who

life

it

life

is

earth at present as of positive value, it

as valuable

the necessary preparation for a better

which

to follow.

is

the value of differences

life

as

prolongation. is

less

of the average

while others will only regard if

differ

,

Such differences

as to

must obviously produce great to

the value of

All that

that the loss of

I

shall

its

unending

maintain here

memory need

not render

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

104

immortality valueless

would not have been

if it

valueless without the loss of If

memory.

beyond the present life is not improve, and yet immortality is

existence

expected to

regarded as valuable, it must be because a life no better than this is looked on as possessing

Now

value.

it

is

certain that in this

remember no previous because

we have

we

it

be

whether

lives,

forgotten them, or because

there have been none to remember. this life has value

life

without any

And

if

memory beyond

have value why without memory beyond themselves ? In that case a man will be better off for his immorshould not future

itself,

tality,

since

amount

of

it

will

valuable

limited amount. that he

more if

had

give

this

lives

him an unlimited

existence,

And

a

instead of a

man who

believed

immortality would have a

desirable expectation of the future than

he did not believe

it.

If,

indeed, a

man

should say that he takes no more interest in his

own

fate, after

memory

of his present life

had gone, than he would take

in the fate of

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

105

some unknown person, I do not see how he could be shown to be in the wrong. But I do not beUeve that most men would agree with him, and to most men, therefore, the existprospect of a continuance of valuable

ence, even with the periodical loss of

would

still

But

seem

be desirable.

to

immortality

desired because

our present

it

those people

who

not

is

or

chiefly,

more

life like

only,

will give us Its

life.

memory,

attraction

is

chiefly for

believe that the future

life

any rate for many of us, a great improvement on the present. Heaven is longed be, at

will

for,

not merely because

but because

Now for

it

it

will

it

will

be unending,

be heaven.

might be said that our chief ground

hoping

for a progressive

death would be destroyed

improvement if

memory

after

periodi-

might be argued, would not only remove us from the field of our activity, but would deprive us of all cally

ceased.

Death,

it

what we had done, and therefore whatever was gained in one life would be lost

memory

of

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

io6 at

We

death.

no

could

more hope

for

a

permanent improvement than a man on the treadmill can hope to end higher than he started.

We are

not discussing the chance of future

progress, but only the relative chance of such

progress ask,

if

memory

therefore,

We

ceases at death.

what elements

must are

value

of

carried on

by memory from the present to the And then we must consider whether

future.

they can be carried on without memory. I think I shall be in agreement with most

when

people

I

say that

memory

is

value in our lives in three ways. place,

it

may make

chiefly of

In the

The

us wiser.

first

events

which we have seen, and the conclusions which we have arrived, may be preserved

memory, and

so

In the second virtuous. it

add

present

place,

it

The memory of circumstances temptation.

in

to our present

may

knowledge. make us more

a temptation, whether

has been resisted or successful,

various

at

help us

may under

in

resisting

In the third place,

it

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE may now

tell

107

whom we are whom we have

us that people with

related are

the

people

loved in the past, and this

enter as an

may

element into our present love of them.

The value means the virtue,

of

past

memory,

may

and the love

then,

serve the of

is

that

its

by

wisdom, the

the present.

past could help the present in a like

the

If

manner

without the aid of memory, the absence of memory need not destroy the chance of an

improvement spreading over many Let us consider wisdom

first.

lives.

Can we be

wiser by reason of something which

Unquestionably we can. not merely, or chiefly, amassed facts, or even

forgotten is

we have Wisdom

?

recorded judgements. It depends primarily on a mind qualified to deal with facts, and

form judgements. Now the acquisition of knowledge and experience, if wisely conducted,

to

may

strengthen the mind.

Of

we have And so a man that

sufficient evidence in this

life.

who men

knowledge

dies after acquiring

acquire some

— might

enter his

—and new

all

life,

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

io8

deprived indeed of his knowledge, but not deprived of the increased strength and dehcacy of mind which he had gained in acquiring the knowledge. And, if so, he will be wiser in the second

because of what has happened

life

in the first.

Of course he

loses

But

actual knowledge.

does not lose

advance of a

And

advanced. a gain

it

is

in losing the

sufficient

if

not is

retreat

even

not

as

memory never

as

far

this loss

ceased,

of

he

better fate could

we wish

they really

know-

would soon

become overwhelming, and worse than

What

if

Most progress is like the whose waves advance and

For the mere accumulation

?

ledge,

tide,

do

but

retreat,

all.

something

useless.

for than to

leave such accumulations behind us, preserving their

greatest

which

have

acquisition

With

the

mental faculties

value

in

been

strengthened

by

their

?

virtue

the point

For the memory

perhaps clearer. of moral experiences is of no is

value to virtue except in so far as

it

helps to

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE form the moral character, and,

Now we

has been forgotten.

which

number I

acter.

next

life

so a

event which

my

left

present

a trace on

man may

the

forgotten

good and

the

of

must have

And

have

I

have done in

yet each

done,

loss to

cannot doubt that a character

may remain determined by an greater

this is

memory would be no

the loss of the virtue.

if

109

acts

evil

And

life.

my

char-

carry over into his

the dispositions and tendencies which

he has gained by the moral contests of life,

and the value

this

of those experiences will

not have been destroyed by the death which

has destroyed the

memory of them. There remains love. The problem

here

is

more important, if, as I believe, it is in love, and in nothing else, that we find not only the but also the supreme

supreme value

of

reality of

and, indeed, of the universe.

The

life,

life,

gain which the

us here

is

that the

memory memory

of the past gives

of past love for

any person can strengthen our present love of him. And this is what must be preserved, if

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

no

the value of past love

is

not to be

knowledge we acquire, and the

we make,

helps us

brought

efforts

which

are directed to ends not themselves.

But love has no end but it

The

lost.

little

that

itself.

we keep

If it

has gone,

anything

it

has

us.

But past hours of love are past, whether we remember them or not. Yet we do not count their value to be

brance makes

love

lost,

in

remem-

since their

the

present stronger

and deeper. Now we know that present love can also be stronger and deeper because of Much has past love which we have forgotten. been forgotten lasted

in

any friendship which has

for several years within the limits of

a single

life

—many confidences, many

many hours

of

services,

But

happiness and sorrow.

they have not passed away without leaving their mark on the present. They contribute,

though they are forgotten, to the present love which is not forgotten. In the same way, if the whole

memory

swept away

at death, its

of

the love of a

value ia not lost

life if

is

the

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE same love

is

stronger in a

what passed before. Thus what is won served in another, the

first

second, and

second because

it

we any ground ditions will

be

have

is right,

lions of lives,

Now life

hope

first.

many

me no

him

is

may be prewho love in

people in the in

greater

the

Have

two con-

that these

?

We

lives

I

because of

in the first.

shall,

if

—perhaps

and perhaps an

the fact that

gave

my

theory

many

infinite

mil-

number.

loved a person in this

reason to suppose that

should

I

any other, then the whole value love would be as much confined to a single

love of

if

love

fulfilled

Let us take the

life

same

the

was there

to

life

the people

their

if

one

in

if

love

life

new

iii

life

as

if

in

there were no immortality.

And

in

might perhaps be said that the value of life was equally confined, and that that case

it

immortality, though real, was worthless.

The chance

of a love recurring in

any future

must depend primarily on the conditions which determine where and how the lovers life,

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

112

are born in the future

life.

does not survive death,

it

for love to

mine the

If

if

memory

be impossible

will

which people the conditions which deter-

occur in any

do not meet.

For

life in

circumstances of

our

birth,

and

through them our juxtapositions throughout life, were themselves determined by chance, or by sity,

some merely mechanical

external neces-

the probability of meeting our friends in

another

This

life is

would be too small

to

be regarded.

a consideration of great importance,

does not affect the question of the comparative value of immortality with or without but

it

memory. Let us take the more ordinary view according to which our existence after loss of

this life will

possibility of

be one and unbroken, with a

remembering

events which occur in of this

life.

If

it,

in

it,

not only the

but also the events

the course of that future

life

determined by chance, or by mechanical necessity, there will be no reason for hoping

is

we shall meet beyond death the people whom we have loved in this life. Nor w^ould

that

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

113

there be any reason for hoping that the love

thus denied fruition would be able to remain

unextinguished separation

through

and new

unlimited

ages

of

Once admit

activities.

events to be determined in this way, and there

no comfort

be gathered from immortality, whether with or without memory, either for is

to

love or for any of our other interests. If

immortality

to give us an assurance or

is

a hope of progressive improvement,

be

if

we have

reason

to

interests of spirit are so

it

can only

believe that the

predominant a force

in the universe that they will find, in the long

run, satisfaction in the universe. case, the constitution of

And, in this the universe would be

whether with or without memory, love would have its way. I will not here such

that,

inquire whether the ultimate

significance of

But it will anything except love. least of all by those who scarcely be denied

spirit

is

—

feel the difficulties

which

I

am now

consider-

— ing that the

significance of love for spirit

very great.

And,

if

this

is

so,

is

then the 8

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

114

emotional relations which exist between people

must be highly tions towards

significant of their real posi-

one another

in the

scheme

of

the universe.

who

In other words, people

are joined

by

love cannot be dependent for their proximity

each

to

other

— and

possibility of their love

consequently

—on

for

the

some chance or

mechanical arrangement whose recurrence we could have no reason to expect. Their love is not the effect of proximity, but their love fact that

is

the

its

cause.

For

expression of the ultimate

each of them

is

more

nected with the other than he

is

closely con-

with people

And

proximity in a particular life, like everything else, is the effect or, rather, in general.

the

manifestation

—

under

particular

circum-

stances — of those relations which make up the eternal nature of the universe. If,

this

two people in we have, on the assumption we have

therefore, love has joined

life,

been discussing, good that their existences are

reason for believing

bound up with one

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE another, not for one

life

115

only, but for ever.

This would not involve their meeting in every life, any more than it would involve their

meeting every day of each

survive occasional absences, and

stronger for them. large scale,

What we

And

Love can

life.

often even

is

the universe

is

on a

which might require long absences.

are entitled to believe

is that,

while

time remains, their eternal nearness must confind

tinually

temporal ,

As

its

expression

in

proximity in

life.

for the

second condition

;

if

friends are

not to be separated, then certainly the value of love in one life need not perish because there is

of

no memory of it in the next. If by means it we make our relations stronger and finer,

then they will be stronger and finer next meeting. What more do we want past

but

not preserved separately in

is it

exists,

present.

example

at ?

the

The

memory,

concentrated and united, in the

Death of the

is

thus

the

'collapse into

that mysterious phrase of

most

perfect

—

immediacy' Hegel's where all

—

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

ii6 that

was before a mass been

has

tions

of hard-earned acquisi-

merged

in

the unity of a

developed character. If we still think that the past is lost, let us ask ourselves, as I suggested before, whether we regard as lost all those incidents in a friendship which, even before death, are forgotten.

do not deny

I

that in each particular

the prospect of the loss of of

it

will

memory

end

at the

appear to some extent a loss and

a breach of continuity. lose that in

memory we

In losing

which we have found great

Arguments may convince us I

life

—as

I

have

think that they ought to convince us

we do

not lose

highest

value,

all

but

value. said,

— that

the value, or any of the

only

the

comparatively

worthless form, a form which the lapse of years would change to a positive

no doubt we

shall

we come

shall shrink

We

may,

Yet

I

believe

to understand life better,

from such a I

But

always have a tendency to

shrink from the loss of memory. that, as

evil.

loss less

and

we

less.

think, fairly conclude that the

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

117

value of immortality would not be lessened

by pre-existence. For the loss of memory which pre-existence renders probable, seems to me the only ground on which much,

it

if

at all,

has been held to diminish the value of

immortality.

indeed,

Pre-existence,

as

we have

seen,

renders more probable a plurality of future lives.

lives I

And

—perhaps an

think,

number

the prospect of a great infinite

number, though

could be disproved

prospect of

many

dangers,

— gives many

of

this,

us the

conflicts,

an indefinitely long future. many griefs, Death is not a haven of rest. It is a startingin

point for fresh labours. great, so

is

the recompense.

here by our

own

circumstances.

because so

But

if

We

much by Above all, we folly,

many good

the

trials

miss

are

much

unfavourable

miss much,

things are incompatible.

We

cannot spend our youth both in the study

and

in the saddle.

We

cannot gain the benefit both of unbroken health and of bodily weakness, both of riches

and

of poverty,

both of

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

ii8

comradeship and of and of obedience.

isolation,

We

lessons alike of Galahad

both of defiance learn

the

of Tristram

and

cannot

and

of Caradoc.

yet they are

learn.

And Would it

not be worth

able to

hope that what we missed

all

so

to

good

much in

to

be

one

life

might come to us in another ? And would it not be worth much to be able to hope that we might have a chance to succeed hereafter in the tasks which It

may be

we

failed in here

?

that the change, the struggle,

and

the recurrence of death, are endless, or, again, it

may be

destroy

that

itself,^

the

process will eventually

and merge in a perfection which time and change. Such an end

transcends

all

may come,

perhaps, but at any rate

it

cannot

be near.

But though the way is long, and perhaps endless, it can be no more wearisome than a single ^

'

life.

For with death we leave behind

As a God self-slain on his own strange Death lies dead.'

Swinburne

:

A

altar,

Forsaken Garden.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

119

And

us memory, and old age, and fatigue. surely death acquires a

new and deeper

when we regard

sig-

no longer as a single and unexplained break in an unending nificance

life,

but as part of the continually recurring

rhythm of progress and as benevolent left

it

youth behind

the sunrise.

—as

inevitable, as natural,

us, as at

They

will

We

have only noon we have left

as sleep.

both come back, and

they do not grow old.

POSTSCRIPT In the nine years which have passed since I first wrote these pages, I have become more firmly convinced that the nature of reality can be shown to be such as to justify a belief both in immortality

and

in pre-existence.

I

hope

some

future time to publish my grounds for this conviction, as part of a treatise on the at

general question of the fundamental nature of reality. July, 1915.

BILLING

AND

SONS, LTP., PRINTERS,

GUILBFeRD, ENGLAND

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