Henry VIII and Francis I: The Final Conflict, 1540–1547 (History of Warfare)

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Henry VIII and Francis I

History of Warfare Editors

Kelly DeVries Loyola College, Maryland

John France University of Wales, Swansea

Michael S. Neiberg University of Southern Mississippi

Frederick Schneid High Point University, North Carolina

VOLUME 66

Henry VIII and Francis I The Final Conflict, 1540–1547

By

David Potter

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011

On the cover: Detail from The Siege of Boulogne by King Henry VIII. MDXLIV. Engraved from a Coeval Painting, at Cowdray in Sussex, the Seat of Lord Viscount Montague. Drawn from the Original, by S.H. Grimm. Engraved by James Basire, 1788. Sumptibus Societatis Antiquariorum Londini. Published according to Act of Parliament, 23rd April, 1788. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Potter, David, 1948– Henry VIII and Francis I : the final conflict, 1540–1547 / by David Potter. p. cm. — (History of warfare ; v. 66) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-20431-7 (hardback : acid-free paper) 1. Great Britain—History, Military—1485–1603. 2. France—History, Military—1328–1589. 3. Henry VIII, King of England, 1491–1547. 4. Francis I, King of France, 1494–1547. 5. Great Britain—Foreign relations—France. 6. France—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 7. Great Britain—History—Henry VIII, 1509–1547. 8. France—History—Francis I, 1515–1547. I. Title. II. Series. DA339.P68 2011 942.05’2—dc22 2011007356

ISSN 1385-7827 ISBN 978 90 04 20431 7 Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

CONTENTS List of Maps ........................................................................................ List of Illustrations ............................................................................ Abbreviations ..................................................................................... Notes .................................................................................................... Note on Presentation .................................................................... Note on Money .............................................................................. Preface ................................................................................................. Maps .....................................................................................................

ix xi xiii xv xv xv xvii xix

Introduction ........................................................................................

1

Ι. ‘Whomever I join will (God willing) be the victor’: The Road to War ................................................................................ Henry and Francis: Perpetual Allies or Wary Opponents? ............................................................................. Henry, Francis and the German Princes ................................ Pulling Back from the Brink (1541–1542) ............................. ‘To make the worlde newe again’: Henry and the Emperor ............................................................................ The French Rearguard Action for Peace with England .......

66 79

ΙΙ. ‘Dancing to the French Tune?:’ Scotland between England and France ................................................................................... Scotland and Henry VIII .......................................................... The Anglo-Scottish War, 1542–1543 ...................................... French Intervention, 1543 ........................................................ The English Invasion of 1544 ................................................... Scottish Revenge, French Intervention, 1545 ........................

86 86 93 100 107 111

ΙΙΙ. England and the Wars in Flanders, 1542–1543 .................... Border Tensions ......................................................................... Watching from the Sidelines (June 1542–June 1543) .......... Open War: Border Conflict and Wallop’s March to Landrecies (June–December 1543) .....................................

33 33 48 55

120 121 124 136

vi

contents

IV. ‘Fighting over the Bear’s Skin’: The Invasion of France (1544) ........................................................................... The Anglo-Imperial Plan of Campaign ............................... The French Attempt to Divide Their Enemies .................. A Strategy in Dispute ............................................................. Invasion: Montreuil ................................................................ Invasion: Boulogne ................................................................. French Defence Strategy ........................................................ The Fall of Boulogne and French Attempts at Recapture ............................................................................. V. An Unequal Contest? English Military Organisation, 1542–1547 ................................................................................ Command and Control .......................................................... Recruitment and Organisation ............................................. The Flanders Campaign ......................................................... By Land and Sea: The Expedition to Scotland, 1544 ........ The Army Royal in France, 1544 ......................................... Armies for the Defence of Boulogne, 1545–1546 ............. Supply, Provisioning and Transport .................................... Paying for War ........................................................................ The Panoply of War ............................................................... VI. The War in France, 1545–1546 ............................................ The Renewal of War around Boulogne, 1545 .................... Military Confrontation in France ........................................ Final Phase: Surrey and Hertford Face du Biez ................ Digging In: French and English Fortifications around Boulogne ..............................................................................

153 153 160 166 172 184 189 197

205 209 214 218 220 223 235 236 243 257 266 266 272 286 294

VII. France and England Compete for Troops: The Mercenary Market, 1543–1546 ..................................... France and the Mercenary Market ...................................... The Landenberg Fiasco: Henry VIII’s Quest for Mercenaries, 1544 ............................................................... The Anglo-French Duel in Germany, 1545 ........................ Changing Terms of Trade: 1546 ..........................................

310 316 336

VIII. The Admirals’ War ................................................................. The French War Effort at Sea ...............................................

347 347

305 307

contents

vii

The Navy of Henry VIII ........................................................... The Campaign in the English Channel, 1545 .......................

362 375

IX. ‘To entreate with the sworde in hand:’ Imperial and Protestant Mediation (1544–1546) .......................................... England, France and the Emperor, 1544–1545 ..................... The German Protestants as Mediators ................................... Charles V as Mediator Again, Autumn 1545 ........................ Protestant Mediation at Calais, Autumn 1545 .....................

391 391 399 402 410

X. The Admirals’ Peace: The Treaty of Ardres-Guînes (June 1546) .................................................................................. The Need for Peace .................................................................... A Mediator from Venice .......................................................... Preparations ................................................................................ Haggling over Terms ................................................................. ‘He never brake in his hert nor never will’: The Renewal of Amity ....................................................................................... Conclusion

The End of Two Reigns ...........................................

Appendices 1. The Battle (1544) .................................................................... 2. Planning for Wallop’s army, 1543 ...................................... 3. The Fleet for Scotland, 1544 ................................................. 4. The Rearguard, 1544 .............................................................. 5. The Retinue of Thomas Cawarden (1 August–15 September 1544) ..................................................................... 6. Coat and Conduct Money for the Army, July–August 1545 ................................................................... 7. Hertford’s Army, January 1546 ........................................... 8. Expenses of French and Scottish wars, 1542–1550: ‘A Brief declaration wherein are conteyned the greate and notable chardges of warres’ ....................... 9. Estimates for the Cost of the War for Three Months from the Time of Henry VIII’s Departure from Calais, 1544 (By Richard Rich as Treasurer of the Wars) ........... 10. Expenses of the Rearguard, 4 May 1544– 5 November 1544 ................................................................... 11. The English Garrison at Boulogne ......................................

427 428 432 438 442 456 462

485 486 488 494 498 500 503

507

514 516 518

viii

contents

12. Sir Hugh Paulet’s Account as Treasurer of Boulonnais, 13 September 1544–27 August 1546 ................................... 13. France, Summary State Budgets 1515–1549 ..................... 14. Annebault’s Embassy in August 1546 ................................ 15. French Military Resources in Royal Propaganda: 1542 ...................................................................

524

Bibliography ........................................................................................ Index ....................................................................................................

527 545

519 520 522

LIST OF MAPS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Strategic map of Anglo-French campaigns ........................ The Anglo-French-Flemish frontiers, 1537–1551 .............. The Anglo-French border, 1544–1547 ................................. The march to Landrecies, 1543 ............................................. The Anglo-Imperial Invasion of France, 1544 ................... Recruiting zones in Germany, 1544–1546 .......................... The English coast and naval war in Scotland, 1542–1544 ................................................................................. The Siege of Boulogne, 1544 ................................................. The Siege of Montreuil, 1544 ................................................ The naval battle on the Solent-Spithead, July 1545 ........... The Anglo-French naval campaign, July–August 1545 ....

xix xx xxi xxii xxiii xxiv xxv xxvi xxvii xxviii xxix

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 1. The Departure of Henry VIII from Calais, July XXV. MDXLIV ........................................................................................ 2. The Encampment of King Henry VIII at Marquison, July MDXLIV ................................................................................ 3. The Siege of Boulogne by King Henry VIII. MDXLIV ......... 4. The King’s artillery (three details from 2 and 3) .................... 5. The King’s tents (two details from 2 and 3) ............................ 6. Map of the Boulonnais by Nicolas Nicolai (1558), Caletensium et Bononiensium ditionis accurata delineatio descripta et edita a Nicolao Nicolai ........................................... 7. The Encampment of the English Forces near Portsmouth together with a View of the English and French fleets at the commencement of the action between them on the XXXth July MCXLV (The sinking of the Mary Rose) ...........

181 182 183 256 261

285

378

ABBREVIATIONS AE AMA AMSO AN ANG APC APS ASF ASM ASV BRB BnF CAF

CSPF CSP Spain

CSP Venice

CUL EHR Fraisse

GCA HHSA HMC Kaulek

Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères Archives municipales, Amiens (Somme) Archives municipales, Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais) Archives Nationales de France, Paris Acta Nuntiaturae Gallicae, correspondance des nonces en France, 16 vols (Rome/ Paris, 1961–84) Acts of the Privy Council Acts of the Parliament of Scotland Archivio di Stato, Florence Archivio di Stato, Modena Archivio di Stato, Venice Bibliothèque royale de Belgique Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris Catalogue des actes de François Ier, ed. P. Marichal et al., 10 vols (Paris: Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 1887–1908) Calendar of State Papers Foreign Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers Relating to the Negotiations Between England and Spain, Preserved in the Archives at Simancas and Elsewhere (1485–1558), ed. G.A. Bergenroth, P. de Gayangos, M.A.S. Hume, R. Tyler, 13 vols. (London, 1862–1954) Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs in Venice, ed. Rawdon Brown, C. Bentinck and others, 38 vols (1864–1940) Cambridge University Library English Historical Review J. des Monstiers Mérinville, Un évêque ambassadeur au XVIe siecle: Jean des Monstiers, seigneur du Fraisse, évêque de Bayonne (Limoges, 1895) Gloucester County Archives Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Historical Manuscripts Commission J. Kaulek, Correspondance politique de MM. De Castillon et de Marillac (Paris, 1885)

xiv L&P

MC MM NA NA

Pol. Corr.

RPCS SAD SAP SAM SHC St.P

TRHS

abbreviations Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII ed. J. Brewer, J. Gairdner and R.S. Brodie, 33 vols.(London, 1862–1932) Musee Condé, Chantilly Mariners’ Mirror National Archives, Kew A. Hasenclever, ‘Neue Aktenstücke zur Friedensvermittlung der Schmalkaldener zwischen Frankreich und England im Jahre 1545,’ in Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins, Neue Folge, 20 (1905), 224–51 O. Winckelmann, Politische Correspondenz der Stadt Strassburg im Zeitalter der Reformation (Strassburg, 1882–1892) Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1545–1625 ed. J. Hill and D. Masson, 14 vols (Edinburgh, 1877–1898) [Haupt]staatsarchiv Düsseldorf, (Landesarchiv NRW) Société des Antiquaires de Picardie Hessisches Staatsarchiv, Marburg Surrey History Centre (incorporating Surrey County Record Office) State papers Published under the Authority of His Majesty’s Commission. King Henry VIII 11 vols. (London, 1850– 1852) Transactions of the Royal Historical Society

NOTES Note on Presentation Most quotations from sources in French, Italian and German have been translated in the text to help readability but the original wording is always given in the footnotes. Note on Money In money of account the pound sterling (£) was worth between 8 and 9 livres tournois (lt.), depending on the intrinsic value of the coins in circulation and their officially declared value. Both the £ and lt. were divided into 240 units (12d = 1 sol/shilling. 20 sol/shilling = 1 £ or 1 lt.). The value of the lt. tended to fall steadily so that it was worth 2/2d sterling in 1568. The main gold coin in France in the 1540s was the écu d’or au soleil (so named for the sunburst placed usually above the royal arms on the reverse), often referred to in England as a ‘crown’ which was worth 40–45 sols tournois in that period and so about 4–5 shillings sterling according to the prevailing rate. The Netherlands florin was exchanged at 3/2d sterling in 1544. The Venetian gold ducat was worth about 5 shillings. In England the gold angel was fixed in the 1520s at 7/6d and the sovereign at 22/6d. and in 1542 the latter was worth four crowns but a re-minting of 1544 was set at £1. The marginal exchange rates were, of course, crucial for financiers and governments borrowing money. The main silver coins were the shilling in England and the teston in France (both of which bore the king’s image).

PREFACE The research for this book began many years ago for a Cambridge Ph.D. thesis on Anglo-French diplomacy. Since then, I put it aside to concentrate on research and publication on French history in the sixteenth century and later middle ages. Over the last few years, though, my thoughts have returned to my original subject and this book is the first fruit of that process. I have completely rewritten the original research and shifted the focus substantially to place diplomacy in the context of the last war between Henry VIII and Francis I. The perspective partly emerged from my work on the French armies and the culture of war in the Renaissance period. My intention throughout was to analyse the war equally from the points of view of the English and the French, though the well-known physical weight of surviving English sources sometimes makes this difficult. Nor did I wish to repeat the arguments deployed in my Renaissance France at War. As a result, the analysis of military operations concerns the English more than the French armies, though I have treated the naval campaigns equally. I have also now come to see the argument of this book as the first part of a trilogy which I envisage as a study of the last phase of the AngloFrench conflicts which began in or before 1340, the themes of which dominated Anglo-French relations until the few years after the fall of Calais in 1558. At the same time, new developments were displacing old obsessions. In particular armies and navies were deployed in war on a much greater scale and with more profound consequences. While this book is self-contained as a study of the last years of the relationship between Henry and Francis, I hope in subsequent books to study the French attempt at establishing an hegemony over the British Isles (1547–53) and the involvement in the Franco-Imperial war that led to the loss of Calais and the debacle of Le Havre (1553–62). I must express my formal thanks to the Arts and Humanities Research Council of Great Britain for the grant a research leave for the writing of this book. Without this, it would have taken much longer to write.

MAPS

Dover Dunkirk Calais

G

Gravelines

A St. Omer

Boulogne

Thérouanne

Lille

Etaples Montreuil Hesdin Arras

Abbeville

A – Ardres G – Guînes Under English control, 1544–9

Map 1

Amiens

Péronne

Strategic map of Anglo-French campaigns

xx

maps

A

L

F

C

N

D

E

R

S

G

Tou rnai sis

T

R T

cte

He

de SAINT POL

sd

St. A

O

U B OULO I E N NA

IS

A

H

B

Ost

in

N T

I

Ca

mb

rés

is

P

O

S Boundary of France and the Empire English territory T Thérouanne C Calais G Guînes Ost Ostrevant St. A. Saint Amand

Map 2

The Anglo-French-Flemish frontiers, 1537–1551

maps

xxi

CALAIS Marck Newnham Bridge Peupligues B B

Bre den ard e

Hammes St. Inglevert

B

Guînes

Griz Nez (Blackness Fort)

Andres Ballingham

FO

ARDRES

RE ST

Nielles

Wo o d

U

G

nnes

Rodelinghem F

Fie Marquise

Fiennes

O

T

IS

N

AMBLETEUSE

ES

Tourneham

Hardinghen

SELACQUE

Licques T

Andrehem Boursin Fouquesolles

Colambert

Nabringhen

Locquin

E T OF B ULOGN O

Tour d’Ordre

BOULOGNE BOULEMBERG (Mt. LAMBERT)

Le Portel

D

MONT St. ETIENNE

ES

E VR

S

Lotinghem Desvres

Viel-Moutier

FO

R.

Questrecques Pont de Hourecq HARDELOT

Samer

Map 3

ENGLISH

Quesques

FO

Pont de Bricques

FRENCH FORTIFICATIONS

Brunembert

RES

OULTREAU

Escoeuille

Henneveux

OF

Fort CHATILLON

The Anglo-French border, 1544–1547

Villages B

English bulwarks

T

Villages with fortifiable, church towers Cowswade-Cauchoire

xxii

maps

Gravelines

CALAIS

Ardres St. Omer

Boulogne

Thérouanne LILLE Tournai Etaples Béthune

Montreuil St. Pol

Hesdin

Arras

Abbeville

CAMBRAI

Doullens

Landrecies Le Catelet AMIENS

Bohain

Peronne

La Capelle Guise

St. Quentin

English/Burgundian forces French armies Charles V

Map 4

The march to Landrecies, 1543

Abbeville

Etaples

Boulogne

Fortress

Siege

The Emperor

St. Pol

Aire

Senlis

Montdidier

BEAUVAIS

AMIENS

Doullens

English

Hesdin

Montreuil

St. Omer

Gravelines

Thérouanne

NORF

Ardres

CALAIS HEN.VIII Guisnes

Map 5

Tournai

Guise

Jalons (FRENCH CAMP)

Reims

Châlons

Rethel

Mézières

St. Dizier

Montmody

Ligny

Verdun

Damvillier

Stenay

Ivoy Mouzon

AACHEN

Toul

Arlon

Düosoldori

EMPEROR METZ

Thionville

LUXEMBURG

FURSTENBERG

The Anglo-Imperial Invasion of France, 1544

Chateau-Thierry

SOISSONS

LAON

La Capelle

Landrecies

Crépy

St. Quentin

Bohaln

CAMBRAI

Villers-Cotterets (FRANCIS I)

Compiègne

Noyon

Ham

La Catelet Péronne

Bapaume

Arras

Béthune

LILLE

BRUSSELS

ANTWERP

KÖLN

maps xxiii

xxiv

maps

Hamburg

Bremen

AL

E

Cologne G

Aachen

E

Rheinbach S

I

A

L

C Frankfurt

R

Florennes T R I E

LU X E M BU RG Mézières

A–Andernach PA L AT I N AT E Metz

C–Coblenz S–Sayn AL–Aalten

FRANCE

L O R

R

A

I

N

E

Emperor’s patrimonial lands Abpc. of Cologne Lands of Philip of Hesse

Map 6

Recruiting zones in Germany, 1544–1546

maps

xxv

Broughty

Inchcolm Leith

Dunglass

Haddington

L

EDINBURGH

Tantallon

a

m

me

Eyemouth

rmuirs

Berwick

Lauder

Norham Home Roxburgh

Kelso

EAST MARCH

† Haddon † Ancrum Rig Moor Jedburgh

English strong– points

MIDDLE MARCH TYNEDALE

le Solway tab Moss † Deband a L

Newcastle

WEST MARCH English navy English land army Scottish army

Map 7 The English coast and naval war in Scotland, 1542–1544

xxvi

maps

1. Château and éperon 2. Porte Notre-Dame and tour flamande 3. Tour françoise 4. Porte des Dunes

5. Tour Gayette 6. Eglise Notre-Dame 7. Fausse-braye 8. Terre-plein

ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT MINES 2

3 KING’S CAMP

1 ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT

8 7 6

4

5

LOWER TOWN

Map 8

The Siege of Boulogne, 1544

maps

xxvii

N

D AN NS K OL IA RF ND NO RGU BU

CHÂTEAU

HESDIN GATE

MOUNT

MARCHÉ ABBEVILLE GATE Eperon

EN GLI SH

S ARTILLERY MOUNT

RUSSELL

Map 9

The Siege of Montreuil, 1544

Walls damaged after 1536

Map 10

Isle of Wight

St. Helen’s Head

Main French fleet

French galleys

Mary Rose

Southsea castle

Portsmount

The naval battle on the Solent-Spithead, July 1545

English fleet

Gosport

Shallow water

Artillery forts

KEY

xxviii maps

Map 11

Portsmouth

Le Havre

Rouen

Dieppe

Calais Boulogne

The Anglo-French naval campaign, July–August 1545

Southampton

London

KEY

Paris

English fleet French fleet

maps xxix

INTRODUCTION The last war between Henry VIII and Francis I, which formally began in July 1543 and ended in June 1546, seems at first a postscript to the long series of conflicts generated by feudal claims and national rivalries in the later middle ages and fuelled by competitive emulation of Renaissance princes in the sixteenth century. The purpose of this book is to show that, in fact, it was a far wider and more destructive conflict than it looks at first sight and had long-term implications. This was the most serious and destructive war between France and England in the reigns of Henry VIII and Francis I. In addition, France faced an enormous threat to its security which required a gigantic effort of organization to resist. For England, the war was pivotal in the redeployment of the country’s military and political resources. It was the first war since the mid-fifteenth century in which, for a while, England had to fight alone against France. There were unfamiliar developments. Irish kerne were seen parading with bagpipes in Saint James’s park in 1544. The roofs of monasteries were further stripped of their lead in a vain attempt to plug the financial caused by expenditure at levels not seen since the mid-fourteenth century. The timetable of herring fisheries and of the Icelandic herring fleet became matters of crucial concern. In 1545, the flagships of the two kingdoms sank in the greatest naval oceanic campaign before 1588. German princes were deeply involved at every stage, while English agents scoured the roads of Germany desperate to raise mercenary forces. England became drawn into the confused and exhausting struggles within the Scottish nobility and the Venetian Republic was drawn into mediation and peace-making. In every sense this began as and remained a Europe-wide war. It was also a war fought against a background of Europe-wide cyclical social and economic crisis. In August 1545, a French galley was found beached at Etaples with its ghostly crew of slave oarsmen all dead of the plague. The ship had probably come all the way from Marseilles to participate in the Anglo-French naval campaign.1 The gruesome image evoked unites two major themes: the complexity and 1 Chapuys to Granvelle, Bourbourg, 25 June 1545 and enclosure, L&P, XX, i, 1036 and 1036ii.

2

introduction

scale of the war and also the bleak social and economic background against which it was fought. All across Western Europe in the middle years of the 1540s we see evidence for harvest failure, rising prices, rising taxes and finally, the plague. The deaths at Etaples coincided with that of Charles duke of Orléans, Francis I’s younger favourite son who died, probably of plague, on campaign with his father against the English at the abbey of Forêt Montier south of Montreuil on 9 September.2 Though plague was cyclical and there is probably no automatic causal link between famine and plague in this period,3 there was clearly a peak in the 1540s and the evidence for the overlap between dearth and plague across Western Europe is compelling. Peddlers of astrological predictions in 1544 like the Netherlander Cornelis Scute safely foretold a ‘great burning and fervent sycknesses, of the which many people shall dye,’ in the spring, rumours of war to come, hard weather and ‘many new diseases,’ in the summer, great blood shedding and wars. He owed his translation and publication in England to his prediction of excellent fortune and triumph for Henry VIII in this year and of ‘great losse in his dominion’ for Francis I.4 The grim story of dearth and death is clear enough from London-based chroniclers. The summer of 1542 was exceptionally wet and flooding reduced the supply of wood the following winter. The spring of 1543 was very cold and then cattle disease broke out, causing a huge rise in the price of meat.5 This misery is confirmed by reports from Newcastle and Northumberland in September 1542, where ‘the extreme wether and rayne that hath fallen’ seriously undermined the supply arrangements for the campaign that had been planned against Scotland.6 Predictably, 2 Martin and Guillaume du Bellay, Mémoires, ed. V.-L. Bourrilly and F. Vindry, 4 vols. (Paris, 1988–1919), IV, p. 210 casts doubt on the diagnosis of plague but suggests that the whole country had been infected by bad air ‘pour la necessité que la guerre et le feu y avoient apporté.’ 3 J.-N. Biraben, Les hommes et la peste en France et dans les pays européens, 2 vols. (Paris, 1975), I, tables p, 119, 125; pp. 130–154; list of outbreaks, p. 383. 4 Cornelys Scute, A prognostication for the yere of our Lord MCCCCCXLiiii (London: R. Grafton, 1544) STC 508.5, sig.Cjv-Cij, Ejv r-v, Fj. 5 C. Wriothesley, A Chronicle of England during the reigns of the Tudors ed. W.D. Hamilton, 2 vols. II (London: Camden Society, 1875–1878), I, p. 141 [hereafter Wriothesley’s Chronicle]. 6 Norfolk and others to Henry VIII, 27 Sept. 1542, J. Bain (ed., Letters and Papers Illustrating the Political relations of England and Scotland in the XVIth Century, formerly in the Possession of the Dukes of Hamilton now in the British Museum [hereafter Hamilton Papers], 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1890–1892), I, p. 231: ‘The wether hath ben

introduction

3

some form of plague broke out in the summer of 1543, driving Henry VIII from the vicinity of London and prohibiting any Londoner from coming within 7 miles of the court. That October, the Michaelmas Law Term in London was postponed because of it and by December it had broken out at Berwick.7 The winter of 1543–1544 was particularly hard and the controls on the quality of fuel in London were relaxed by proclamation. Meanwhile in Flanders, Henry VIII’s agent, Dr. Layton, bemoaned the freeze-up, followed by a thaw that rendered the ‘dirty and devilish’ country abominable and left him groaning under effects of a severe chill that was to prove mortal.8 By 1545, plague was severe throughout the northern border regions from Newcastle to Berwick, where it was claimed that most townsmen were dead or infected. Constant military activity since 1541 and the stationing of native and foreign troops had damaged food supplies. Plague was already rife in Scotland, noted to be ‘wonder greit’ in Edinburgh and elsewhere.9 At a time when the calling of Parliament was being considered at the start of 1545, William Paget noted ‘The Derth of all Things, which will appere the rather here, uppon such a greate Assemblee as shall be at the Parliament.’10 This dearth of grain and food supplies in London in 1544 and 1545 prompted the import of supplies from northern Germany and the Baltic, which had to be paid for by special levies on the livery companies. Continuation of the plague in London prompted a new proclamation by the Queen in September 1544 prohibiting anyone from infected parts of the city

suche in this parties with excessive rayne, that much of the corne standethe yet in the grownde.’ See also Henry VIII to same, 29 Sept., ibid., pp. 238–239. 7 J. Stowe, The Annales of England (London, 1592), p. 987; Wriothesley’s Chronicle, p. 145; Edward Hall, Chronicle, ed. C. Whibley, The Triumphant Reigne of Kyng Henry the VIII, 2 vols. (London, 1904), [herafter, Hall, ed. Whibley] II, p. 345; L&P, XVIII, ii, 316; L&P, XVIII, ii, 475. 8 11 Feb. 1544, P.L. Hughes and J.F. Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, 3 vols. (New Haven/ London, 1964–1969), I, no. 226, pp. 325–326; Layton to Paget, Ghent, 12 Feb. 1544 (L&P, XIX, i, 101, 105). 9 Hertford to Paget, 5 Oct. 1545, St.P., V, p. 539 (L&P, XX, ii, 524); A Diurnal of Remarkable Occurents that have passed within the country of Scotland since the death of King James the fourth, till the year 1575 [Diurnal of Occurents] (Bannatyne and Maitland Clubs, 1833), p. 39; Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1545–1625, [RPCS] ed. J. Hill and D. Masson, 14 vols. (Edinburgh, 1877–1898), I, p. 5. 10 Hatfield, Cecil MSS, 36, fos. 21–23; S. Haynes and W. Murdin, A Collection of State Papers, relating to Affairs in the Reigns of King Henry VIII 2 vols. (London, 1740–59) I, pp. 55–56.

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from approaching the court.11 The correspondence of the Johnson family regularly records the deaths from plague in London in 1545.12 Unusual weather added to this melancholy litany of woe. In December 1543 and the summer of 1545, violent storms swept across England and France, duly observed by the chroniclers as portents of evils to come.13 At Bristol, the civic annals recorded that a great plague was endured for a year in 1544–1545, confirmed by registers which show mortality ratios of 7.7 and 5.9 in two parishes.14 The evidence of parish registers, although sparse for the period, is conclusive enough. In Essex, plague spread out from London and prevailed during 1543–1546. In Devon, where, after a catastrophic harvest in 1545, food prices were unprecedentedly high, the city of Exeter experienced a plague which rapidly spread through the county in 1546–1547 and has been judged the worst of all outbreaks in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.15 The parish registers at Norwich make it clear that this city of 12,000 people (one of the largest outside London), which was experiencing a decline of its Low Countries oriented cloth industry, experienced a severe plague in 1544–1545.16 The crisis was Europe-wide and affected France and the Low Countries just as much as England. Fear of plague was present in the Low Countries by May 1543 and had broken out at Mechelen by August.17 Gravelines was infected by July 1545 and the whole of Normandy and Picardy by August 1545.18 Nantes experienced plague and mortality in 1544–1546. At Senlis, where landsknechts had been garrisoned in 1545, plague began again in May 1546, accompanied by two months of famine, when the poor scoured the forest for wood to make toys to sell for bread. The plague was first reported at Amiens 11 Wriothesley’s Chronicle, pp. 147, 156; Procl. 18 Sept. 1544, Hughes and Larkin, I, no. 237 (L&P, XIX, ii, 246). 12 Sabine, 20 May, L&P, XX, i, 778; Ottwell, 18 Nov. 1545, Saunders, L&P, XX, ii, 869. 13 J.G. Nichols (ed.), Chronicle of the Grey Friars of London, (London, Camden Soc., 1852), [hereafter Grey Friars Chronicle] p. 45; Wriothesley’s Chronicle, pp. 156–157; Stowe, Annales, p. 994. 14 ‘Civic annals of Bristol,’ qu. By P. Slack, The Impact of Plague in Tudor and Stuart England, (London, 1985), pp. 111, 119. 15 Slack, Impact of Plague, pp. 84, 99. 16 Ibid., p. 126. 17 L&P, XVIII, i, 588; St.P., V, no. DCCCCII. 18 Thirlby and Petre to Paget, 6 July 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1124; Guidiccione to Farnese, 31 Aug. 1545, Acta Nuntiaturae Gallicae, correspondance des nonces en France, 16 vols. (Rome/Paris, 1961–1984) ANG, III, p. 306.

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in November 1544. A steady stream of cases led to the promulgation of the city’s plague ordinances in March 1545, with action taken at the same time against heretics and prostitutes. The epidemic was also present at Abbeville.19 Amiens played host to foreign soldiers brought in by the king ‘comporting themselves strangely, committing various huge blasphemies, acts of force and violence’ and also had to support 6000 landsknechts in the King’s service.20 This compounded economic problems caused by war. At Amiens, the cloth industry of saieterie went into recession with the Imperial war of 1542, which interrupted trade with the Low Countries. The poorer workers were thrown out of work, some involved in disorder others attempting to move to Rouen. Emergency work was provided on the city’s ramparts.21 Unsurprisingly, by late 1545, famine, war and plague had brought the poor relief fund into deficit.22 If the evidence for dearth and mortality seems impressionistic, it is confirmed by many of the price indices that we have for the period. Le Roy Ladurie argued that the long decline of living standards among the Languedoc peasantry began in the 1540s but the causes in that decade were more specific and relate to price rises that are almost certainly symptomatic of crises of production. The price of top-class wheat at Paris measured in nominal and real terms shot up to new highs in the middle of the 1540s, a pattern reflected also at Douai in the Low Countries and to a lesser extent at Toulouse in Languedoc and Strasbourg in Alsace.23 The cause of this widespread price spike, situated after all in a long period of steadily rising prices, is almost certainly harvest failure. This is attested statistically at Paris and

19 Chronicle of Jean Mallet, in A. Bernier (ed.), Monuments inédits de l’histoire de France, 1400–1600 (Paris/ Senlis, 1835), p. 48. AMA BB 24, fos. 89–90 (5 Nov. 1544); BB 24, fos. 125–130 (19 March 1545): ‘l’inconvenient de la peste, qui commence à regner en ceste ville.’ Abbeville: archives for the period now lost but mentioned in AMA BB 24, 9 Dec. 1546. 20 AMA BB 24, fos. 147–148 (18 June 1545): ‘vivans estrangement, faisant plusieurs enormes blasphemes, forces et violences’. 21 AMA, BB 24, fos. 219–220 (23 Nov. 1542). 22 AMA BB 24, fos. 166–167 (22 Oct. 1545). 23 J. Meuvret and M. Baulant, Prix des céréales extraits de la mercuriale de Paris, 2 vols. (Paris, 1962), I, pp. 41–42, 243–244, planche III; M. Mestayer, ‘Les prix du blé et de l’avoine à Douai de 1329 à 1793,’ Revue du Nord, 1963, pp. 137–174; E. Le Roy Ladurie and M. Morineau, Histoire économique et sociale de la France vol.I, ii (Paris, 1977), p. 936. For a general overview, J. Delumeau and Y. Lequin, Les Malheurs des temps: histoire des fléaux et des calamités en France (Paris, 1987), pp. 253–272.

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Strasbourg, where the harvests were very poor.24 In England, it is clear that the years 1544–1546 saw a sharp increase in average market prices.25 In the Netherlands, the cloth industry was severely damaged by the war of 1542–1544 and widespread poverty recorded at Ypres in 1545.26 Jeremy Goring pointed out that the combined effects of plague and the sweating sickness may have carried off a third of the population of England in the mid-Tudor period, the latter probably affecting men in their thirties disproportionately. Its consequences for military manpower are important, though not straightforward.27 Plague certainly affected war efforts at specific points, as it had in the French campaign of 1523.28 We know (see chapter 8) that it played a part in limiting the naval operations of 1545 but as early as 1543, epidemic had spread to the fleet when the Sweepstake had to be withdrawn from operations against the French because of plague.29 During Henry VIII’s campaign in 1544, weather conditions were unseasonably wet and the ground around Calais sodden.30 Plague had broken out at Dover and the King’s advisers had to hasten the shipment of men to Calais ‘suche that thinfecting of any of them might be daungerous to the army here.’ Unsurprisingly, soldiers of the Calais garrison were dying of plague in October and it did not die out there until the following May and at Boulogne until the following August.31 Plague was described by Lord Admiral Lisle in September 1545 as ‘universal’ in the English navy.32 The French navy also had to withdraw from campaign because of the

24 M. Morineau, ‘D’Amsterdam à Seville’ Annales E. S. C., 1968; Histoire économique, I, ii, pp. 951–952. 25 Y.S. Brenner, ‘Prices and Wages in England, 1450–1450’ (M.A. thesis, London, 1960), qu. in C.S.L. Davies, ‘Provisions for Armies, 1509–1550: a Study in the Effectiveness of Early Tudor Government,’ Economic History Review, 17,ii (1964), 248. 26 I. Diegerick, Inventaire analytique et chronologique des archives de la ville d’Ypres, 7 vols. (Bruges, 1853–1868), V, pp. 303–312. 27 J. Goring, ‘Social change and military decline in mid-Tudor England,’ History, 60 (1975), 185–186. 28 L&P, III, ii, 3302, 3363. 29 Lisle to Paget, 7 Nov. 1543, SP1/182, fo. 73 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 348): ‘sore infectyd with the plage.’ 30 L&P, XIX, i, 835. 31 Ottwell Johnson to John Johnson, 26 Aug. 1544, SP1/191, fo. 175 (L&P, XIX, ii, 140); Council with the King to Council with Queen, 8 Sept. 1544, SP1/192, fo. 45 (L&P, XIX, ii, 202); Sabine Johnson to John, 20 May 1545, L&P, XX, i, 778; Council at Boulogne to Council, 20 Aug. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 226. 32 L&P, XX, ii, 346.

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effects of plague. In November 1545, it was observed that, because of the plague, there were no more than 50 men left at the French fort of Outreau opposite Boulogne.33 The Regent of the Low Countries was anxious avoid the passage of German mercenaries to England in 1545 because of the spread of disease. Internal upheavals afflicted both countries. The politico-religious upheavals of 1536 had then weakened Henry VIII’s capacity to make war. The Tudor regime had barely surmounted the northern rebellion of 1536 and was faced again in 1541 with discontent and conspiracy in Lincolnshire that led to many executions. Francis I had commanded his wars against a background of social crisis before, most notably from 1521 and from 1527.34 French society had shown a degree of dynamism in the late 15th and early 16th centuries but was now beginning to enter a period of recurring crises.35 The previous one was the grande disette of the late 1520s, which was followed by a renewal of plague in 1530–1531 and social rebellion, notably at Lyon in 1529. The troubles of the mid 1540s, though, were if anything greater and to a degree exacerbated by war. When Francis, faced by new war expenditure in 1541–1542, extended the inland salt tax regime to the privileged areas of the western coast, he sparked off one of the more serious open rebellions of his reign at La Rochelle and the islands. Indeed, a French deserter, L’Artigue, even suggested that the nobility and people of Brittany ‘were never so desperate or mal content’ while the western regions subjected to the Gabelle were ‘very discontented’ and thus a likely area for English military operations.36 *

33

Council to Surrey, Nov. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 1715. Jean de Bourdigné, Hystoire aggregative des annalles et cronicques d’Anjou ((Paris, 1529), fos. 197r, 200r): weather conditions that destroyed the harvest in 1521 and 1523, accompanied by general disorder. Jean Bouchet, Annales d’Aquitaine (Poitiers: Marnef, 1557), fos. 206v–207r on disorder, 1523. Journal d’un bourgeois de Paris, ed. V.-L. Bourrilly, (Paris, 1910), pp. 82–3. Chronicle evidence is not so plentiful for the France of the 1540s. Jean Bouchet’s Annales d’Aquitaine says much about war but little on social conditions. 35 The evidence for growth is available from many sources, including tithes and land rents (see M. Baulant, ‘Le prix des grains à Paris de 1431 à 1788,’ Annales E.S.C., 23 (1968), 520–540). 36 BL Add. 28593, fos. 185–188, L’Artigue’s plan, June 1543: ‘ne fust jamais si desesperé ne si mal content.’ 34

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Against this backdrop of social upheaval, the two ageing warhorses, Henry VIII and Francis I decided on or were impelled into another round of conflict. Both were well into middle age by contemporary standards, both perhaps prematurely aged by illness. Their relations since 1515 had been marked by alternating phases of competition in war and diplomatic/cultural display. This raises the question of the attitudes of the two rulers towards each other in the last period of their reigns. It goes without saying that no documentation penetrates their minds and, other than for their two meetings many years before, they only knew of each other by report. Francis I protested in 1544 and again in 1546 that he had never really wavered in his ‘love’ for Henry, though there is every reason to see this as flim-flam. Presents were routinely exchanged. But the information flowing into France in 1540 and 1541 seems to convey the idea that Henry had become a tyrant (or at least failed to revoke the legislation blamed in France on Cromwell). The constant fear of arrest by foreign envoys on their return home, reports of faction struggles continuing between the former Cromwellians and Cromwell’s enemies who had triumphed in July 1540, gave the impression of a highly unstable polity (perhaps magnified by French reactions to Henry’s rejection of Anne of Cleves – see Chapter 1) and a discontented people. Even the ostensibly friendly Marguerite of Navarre remarked to a Cleves envoy that Henry ‘is starting to go off his head.’37 For his part, Henry had for years received reports that Francis’ throne was tottering (‘he is just a fool and he is losing his kingdom. All the French people think so’ he had been told in 1522) but sensibly treated this with scepticism.38 But his sources probably confirmed in his mind the idea that Francis had been duped by the Emperor and Montmorency. English envoys did not always find Francis easy to deal with or to get the measure of. William Howard, struggling in the snows of the Alps in December 1537, lamented that ‘yowe have sent me to a kyng that ys very strange to know.’ The French king was seriously ill in 1539 and his health became a major subject of speculation; attention turned to estimating

37 Marillac to Francis and Montmorency, 18 Jan. 1541, Kaulek, 261–262, (L&P, XVI, 466, 467); Du Boys to the duke of Cleves, 12 Jan. 1542, G. Bers, Die Allianz Frankreich-Kleve während des Geldrischen Krieges (Cologne, 1969) p. 183: ‘commence grever et perdre son entendement.’ 38 BL Cotton, Calig. D VI, fo. 353: ‘ce n’est qu’ung fol et qu’il pert son royaume. Tout le people de France le estime en ceste sorte.’

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the qualities of the Dauphin Henri.39 Both monarchs may have been gratified at stories of ill health. Henry, after all, was widely reported to have put on a great deal of weight in 1539–1540 and his recurrent ulcer problem was international knowledge. This made him moody and dangerous and provoked remarks that he had been deceived in having been ‘made’ to put Cromwell to death on false charges.40 Francis provocatively continued to encourage Henry to root out ‘Lutherans’ (as he said he had done) though both had no qualms in negotiating closely with Lutheran princes. Some insight into Henry’s attitude may be conveyed by the existence of a satirical painting, catalogued in the royal inventory of 1542 and still in the Royal Collection, depicting Francis, Queen Leonor and a Fool.41 The picture just sketched out might seem to argue that warfare in the period had nothing to do with internal stability and productive resources and was fought out of whim or caprice; this would be far from the truth. Classic French military memoirists such as du Bellay and Monluc largely ignored famine, pestilence and taxes in their histories of the wars. But monarchies strove mightily to win the support of their populations, to swing opinion behind war because, whatever their political structures, they had to extract revenues and loans.42 Royal servants such as Richard Morison backed the claims of their masters to the enthusiastic support of their subjects. In his Exhortation

39 Howard to Cromwell, Briançon, 8 Dec.[1537], Hatfield. Cecil MSS, 150, fo. 25. Wyatt to Henry VIII, 28 Dec. 1539, Muir, p. 110: ‘his master, being sickly, gyven to ese, and not aparent long lyff.’ See R.J. Knecht, Renaissance Warrior and Patron: The Reign of Francis I (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 391, 484, 495. 40 Pate’s report of count palatine Philip’s comments, 4 Oct. 1540 (L&P, XVI, 120); Marillac to Francis and Montmorency, 3 March 1541, Kaulek, 273–5 (L&P, XVI, 589, 590), J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (London, 1968), pp. 426–427. 41 Wallop to Henry VIII, 26 Jan. 1541, State papers Published under the Authority of His Majesty’s Commission. King Henry VIII 11 vols. (London, 1850–1852) [St.P],VIII, 513 (L&P, XVI, 488). On the painting at Hampton Court, see L. Campbell, Renaissance Portraits: European Portrait-Painting in he 14th, 15th and 16th Centuries (New Haven, Conn., 1990), pp. 206–207. Catalogued in 1542 as ‘oone table with pictures of the Frenche Kynge, the Queene his Wyffe and the Foole standynge behynde him.’ (M.A. Haywood, The 1542 Inventory of Whitehall: the Palace and its Keeper 2 vols., London, 2004). More study is needed of this portrait but its link the dual portrait of Mary Tudor and Charles Brandon (especially in its complete original form owned by Samual Egerton Brydges of Denton) evident. 42 This is apparent both in S. Gunn, D. Grummitt and H. Cools, War, State and Society in England and the Netherlands, 1477–1559 (Oxford, 2007) and D. Potter Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480–1560 (Woodbridge, 2008).

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of 1539, written at the height of the invasion scare, Morison argued that, given the King’s mighty efforts and fatherly care to set a defensive wall around his realm (in part to defend it against the ‘abhominable hore’ who ‘these many yeres hath soused al kyngedoms in the dragges of Idolatry’) running the risk of ‘utter enmitie with all prynces,’ was it not the evident duty of his subjects to rally to his support in the event of war? Written with a patriotic passion that looks forward to Elizabethan rhetoric, this serves to underline the need for Renaissance monarchs to persuade their subjects to war. Morison’s religious rhetoric was matched by Thomas Becon, who in 1542 declared that the men of Kent were eager to leave home and hearth to serve the King.43 The reasons for war are complex and, it will be argued here, not simply the outcome of royal personality traits and the pursuit of kingly honour. Luke MacMahon has argued in a vividly written thesis on the 1544 campaign, that the main begetter of the war was Henry himself, a monarch more than ever in command of the apparatus of power after the death of Cromwell, with a powerful sense of honour but also now grown wily and cautious, yet determined to ‘take a piece of France with him to the grave.’44 War with France might well appear the ‘default position’ of English policy in this period. Jean du Bellay thought in 1528 that ‘it is quite something to go against nature’ in trying to make the English accept a French alliance.45 Yet Henry spent much of his reign in peace with France even though he had plenty of claims to parts or all of it. Indeed at times in the late 1520s and early 1530s relations between the two kingdoms were remarkably close.46 True, Henry

43 Richard Morison, An Exhortation to styrre all Englyshe men to the defence of theyr countrye (London, 1539); The Early Works of Thomas Becon, ed. J. Ayre (Parker Society, 1843), p. 235. 44 L. MacMahon, ‘The English Invasion of France, 1544’ M.A. thesis (Warwick, 1992), pp. 4–7. 45 Du Bellay to Montmorency, 9 Dec. [1528], V.-L. Bourrilly and P. de Vaissière, Ambassades en Angleterre de Jean du Bellay: la première ambassade (septembre 1527–fèvrier 1529 correspondance diplomatique (Paris, 1905), p. 482 (L&P, IV, ii, 5016): ‘c’est grant chose que de combattre contre nature.’ 46 See the interesting comments by M.J. Rodriguez Salgado, ‘Obeying the Ten Commandments: the first war between Charles V and Francis I, 1520–1529’ in W. Blockmans and N. Mout (eds.), The World of Emperor Charles V (Amsterdam, 2004), pp. 15–67; S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII,’ in J. Black (ed.), The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe,(Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 28–51 at p. 38. G. Richardson, ‘Eternal peace, occasional war: Anglo-French relations under Henry VIII’ in S. Doran and G. Richardson (eds.), Tudor England and its Neighbours (Basingstoke, 2005). Charles Giry-Deloison has also examined the long and almost uninterrupted

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claimed formally to be King of France and often referred to Francis as ‘the French king.’ Henry’s claims were allowed to wake or sleep as circumstances dictated. Like a litigious landowner, Henry could invoke them as and when he saw fit.47 Cromwell may have spoken out in 1523 against futile and expensive wars for ‘ungracious dogholes’ in France and advised concentration on some sort of union with Scotland48 but it was the internal and external circumstances of England in the 1530s that assured there would be no foreign wars. The temptation to understand conflict between renaissance monarchies mainly in terms of the personal rivalries of monarchs is tempting but should be resisted.49 It is axiomatic that, within such polities, the king was the ultimate arbiter, especially in matters of peace and war. This was par excellence a matter of the royal prerogative and there is good reason to view the formulation of policy as a matter of the King’s decision, shaped to a greater or lesser extent by the advice of more or less trusted ministers. Henry VIII professed to be a realist and a monarch who was too wily to be deceived. Henry remarked to the French ambassador Jean de Dinteville that he knew the old French trick to: Lead people on when they are preoccupied with other problems without coming to the point but rather to use deception. But he is proof against this since he has known the world for too long. He speaks frankly and wants others to do the same.

peace from 1475 to 1513 in his ‘France and England at Peace, 1475–1513,’ in ‘The Contending Kingdoms.’ France and England 1420–1700, ed. Glenn Richardson (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 43–60 and a later period in ‘’Une alliance contre nature? La paix francoanglaise de 1525–1544’ in his François Ier et Henri VIII. Deux princes de la Renaissance (1515–1547) (Lille, 1995), pp. 53–62. 47 C.S.L. Davies, ‘“Roy de France et Roy d’Angleterre”: the English claims to France, 1453–1558’ in L’Angleterre et les pays bourguignons, Publications du Centre européen d’études bourguignonnes (XIVe–XVIe siècles), no. 35 (1995). The King instructed Suffolk and Browne in July 1544 to restrict his summons ‘to all those oonly that be within [Pic]ardy and the countie of Boullen[oys and Guynes]’ (NA SP1/190 fo. 78). His commanders replied that, as Henry was entitling himself King of France ‘all his Majestes subiectes of Fraunce showlde be named in the same.’ (ibid, fo. 85) (L&P, XIX, i, 933, 940). 48 R.B. Merriman, Life and Letters of Thomas Cromwell, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1902), I, pp. 34–43. 49 I have already considered these problems in broad terms in D. Potter, ‘Foreign Policy,’ in D. MacCulloch, The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics, Policy and Polity (London, 1995), pp. 101–134, 267–276. On the complex decision-making process around the king in this period, see most recently R. Claess and O. Poncet (eds.), La prise de décision en France (1525–1559) (Paris, 2008), which covers a broad range of decisions on internal and external policy and the persons who shaped them.

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He added that ‘his council in no way governs him, rather he governs his council; otherwise, the council would be king and not him. He is happy to receive their advice but he makes the decisions and any King should act thus.’50 It is also true that monarchs such as Henry VIII professed to order their view of the world in terms of their honour.51 Their advisers understood this and sought to accommodate it. But royal advisers tended, in their unguarded moments, to be sceptical about their masters’ foibles. Stephen Gardiner, after all, was told by Francis while on embassy to France in the 1530s, that he did not understand princes’ honour (‘I coulde noo skyl of princes honours’).52 Ministers and diplomats quite clearly had to take account of the demands of royal honour. Yet they also understood that there were other matters at stake. Nicholas Wotton, for one, was clearly sceptical about the value of war. In an unguarded moment at the start of the 1544 campaign, he remarked to Paget that the French garrison was leaving Luxemburg ‘leane, weake, famished and dedde for hunger, even like as I looke that we shall be, when we come owte of France.’ When he was approached by a French diplomat, Grignan, at Worms during July 1545, the Frenchmen suggested that, despite their masters’ quarrel they might ‘talke familiarlye to gyther without office.’ Wotton replied that: The Kinges hertes wer in Goddes hand and he turnidde theym as pleased hym from peace to warre and fro warre to peace. And then I said smylinge unto hym, when our maisters have contynuidde this warre vij or viij yeres, they will then peradventure beginne to looke yn theyr purses and perceiving summe parte of theyr money spente, they will consider that if they persever yn it, that at lengthe they shall spende a greate deale more

50 Memoir by Jean de Dinteville, Aug. 1533, N. Camusat, Meslanges historiques (1644), fo. 19v: ‘l’ancienne façon de France . . . mener et entretenir les gens pendant qu’ils en ont affaire sans venir au point mais de user de dissimulation, qui est chose par ou on ne le menera pas, car il y a trop long temps qu’il cognoist le monde, et que luy il parle franc, il veut que l’on luy face de mesme . . . son conseil ne le gouverne point, et que luy gouverne son conseil, autrement le conseil seroit Roy et non luy. Il veut bien avoir leurs opinions mais il veut conclure, et qui est Roy doibt ainsi faire.’ 51 The clearest expositions of this theme are in G. Richardson, Renaissance Monarchy: the Reigns of Henry VIII, Francis I and Charles V (London, 2002) and C. GiryDeloison, François 1er et Henri VIII. Deux princes de la Renaissance (1515–1547) (Lille, 1996). 52 J.A. Muller, The Letters of Stephen Gardiner (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 181–182 (L&P, XX, ii, 774).

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and that maye be an occasion to make theym remember that peace is as profitable as warre.53

Francis I was always conscious of his honour but had a clear enough understanding of the real bases of power. He had had plenty of time to observe Henry VIII (as will be seen further below) and it is pertinent to remind ourselves that early in 1545 he observed that Henry was a tyrant: hated by his nobility and his subjects for reasons fairly well known by everybody. Now he is weak and short of money because of the great expenses of the last two years, seeing himself invaded in his own lands by land and sea. It is to be believed that he will be abandoned by his own subjects as were most of his predecessors. 54

Yet this was the monarch who displayed shock and foreboding at Henry’s death, just two months before his own. That the interests of kings were circumscribed by the limits of their resources was well enough understood. Eustace Chapuys was sceptical in 1536 about whether Henry would ever be prepared to spend the money to conquer a kingdom that would cost him even more to hold.55 In 1559, Nicholas Bacon summed up the odds between France and England neatly at a time when Henry VIII’s windfall profit from the dissolution of the monasteries had been squandered: who is so ignorante, that knowes not that the kingdome and dominions that be under the governance of the crowne of Fraunce to be foure tymes as much as the realme of England, and the men in them iiij times as muche or more, and theirwith that the French [King] hathe and useth as large an authoritie and commaundmente to levie moneye and treasure

53 Wotton to Paget, 11 June 1544, SP1/188, fo. 100(110) (L&P, XIX, i, 678). Wotton to Paget, 21 July 1545, SP1/204, fo. 83 (L&P, XX, ii, 1242); this idea of the heart of the King in the hands of God was a commonplace. In 1536, for instance, Jean Hannart, Imperial ambassador to France, resigned himself to war, ‘toutevoies Dieu est ancores puissant pour changer les voulentez des princes.’ (HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 4, fo. 96v). 54 Camusat, Mélanges historiques, Mémoires du sieur Richer, fos. 10v–11r: ‘Hai de sa noblesse et de ses subjects pour les causes assez cogneus d’un chacun et de present foible et espuisé de deniers pour les grandes despences qu’il a soutenues depuis deux ans en ça, se trouvant envahy dedans ses dicts pays par mer et par terre, il est à croire qu’il se trouvera comme la plus part de ses predecesseurs delaissé par ses propres subjects.’ 55 Chapuys to Charles V, 22 Sept. 1536, NA PRO 31/18/2, II, fo. 202r–203v (L&P, xi, 1479, p. 195).

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introduction upon his people for the maintenance of his enterprises, as the prince heere hathe and more.

What was more, the French King’s credit was commensurately greater, his army and commanders experienced and he had access to German mercenaries ‘wher we cannot with oute greate daungers doe the like to defend us.’56 To the French, the picture looked different. Guillaume Paradin in 1550 wrote of ‘this island (which compared to other lands is no more than a fistful of land)’ but which had inflicted untold and countless afflictions on his country.57 In the mid-Tudor period, the absence of a strong grip on policymaking allowed a clearer development of common national interest (after all a concept hardly unfamiliar in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries).58 Under Henry VIII, the maintenance of honour was also infinitely flexible. The devious and complex negotiations which brought an end to the war between Francis and the Emperor Charles V are a good example of this. Nor did his honour as a Christian prince prevent Francis from exulting in the collaboration between his fleet and that of the Ottoman Sultan in 1543, even if there was also some embarrassment.59 The ‘honour of princes’ should always be viewed in the context of the geopolitical system within which they ruled. The primary job of a prince was to ensure his own and, by extension, his subjects’ security. For Henry VIII in 1540, the overriding question was how to ensure that security, especially in a dangerous international context. He had remained neutral in the Franco-Imperial war of 1536–1538 and had, as a result, found himself isolated and threatened by Charles V and Francis I in 1539. Remaining neutral in the event

56 Speech in the Privy Council, c. 15 December 1559, copy, BL Harl. 253, fos. 83v– 92v, at 87v (summary in CSPF Eliz. II, pp. 197–198). The importance of the French King’s access to credit was stressed by John Mason, 18 April 1551, see P.F. Tytler, England in the Reigns of Edward VI and Mary 2 vols. (London, 1839), I, p. 358. 57 Guillaume Paradin, Histoire de Nostre Temps (Paris, 1561), p. 463: ‘cette Isle (qui au pris & conference des autres n’est que vne poignee de terre).’ 58 D. Potter, ‘Mid-Tudor foreign policy and diplomacy, 1547–1563’ in S. Doran and G. Richardson (eds.), Tudor England and its Neighbours (Basingstoke, 2005), 106–138. 59 G. Poumarède, ‘Justifier l’injustifiable: l’alliance turque au miroir de la Chrétienté (XVIe–XVIIe siècles),’ Revue d’histoire diplomatique 3 (1997), 217–246; E. Garnier, L’Alliance impie (Paris, 2008); C. Isom-Verhaaren, ‘ “Barbarosssa and his army, who came to succor all of us”: Ottoman and French views of their joint campaign of 1543–1544,’ French Historical Studies, 30 (2007), 395–425. J. Bérenger, ‘La collaboration militaire franco-ottomane à l’époque de la Renaissance,’ Revue international de l’histoire militaire, 68 (1986), 51–66.

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(almost certain in the long run) of a renewed Franco-Imperial war was not a wise option. Gardiner, troubled by the idea of needing the promises of other princes, may have stood out for a kind of ‘splendid isolation’ by arguing in 1538 that it were better that ‘they shuld depend of us’ and the King, emperor in his own kingdom, ‘no further to care what other men doo.’60 But another counsellor had argued that, in the event of a Franco-Imperial war in 1536, Henry must join with one or the other; if with Francis this would increase his expenses without any hope of profit and also damage his merchants’ trade in the Low Countries; if with Charles, Francis’ defeat would render his debts to Henry less likely to be repaid and his victory would give the Emperor preponderance in Italy and would make him more powerful vis-à-vis Henry.61 Eustace Chapuys reasoned with Gardiner in 1542 that, though Henry was powerful at home and had no need of allies, ‘newtralitie was neyther suer nor proufytable.’62 Henry, therefore, had to decide with which of his fellow monarchs to conclude an alliance. With Francis, he had been on cordial or at least peaceful terms, as his ‘perpetual ally,’ since 1525. True, he had not come to Francis’ aid in 1536 and the pension paid by Francis (in Henry’s eyes a ‘tribute’ in place of just possession of his lands in France) had ceased to be paid in 1534. But Henry had then scarcely been in a condition to wage war against anyone except his own subjects.63 Eustace Chapuys wryly remarked in 1535 that there was no lasting regard between the two kings and that all depended on how they sought to exploit the ups and downs of their relations vis-à-vis the Emperor.64 This was a reasonable view for a Habsburg envoy to take but perhaps understated the regard between Henry and Francis. The French envoy Dinteville thought that

60

Gardiner to Cromwell, 23 Jan. [1538], Muller, Letters . . . Stephen Gardiner, p. 80. BL, Cotton, Vitellius B XIV, 12 (L&P, X, 1254), this document is highly damaged but the general meaning clear enough. 62 Gardiner, 17 May 1542, Muller, Letters . . . Gardiner, p. 99. 63 The French ambassador Jean de Dinteveille had observed in 1533 that, in the event of war, ‘le peuple se eslevera contre les Gouverneurs’ (N. Camusat, Meslanges historiques, fo. 21v). 64 Chapuys to Hannart, 24 Dec. 1535, HHSA, Frankreich, Varia, 4, fos. 142v–43r, passage in cipher 138r–v: ‘car comme les ungs et les autres sont soudains en leurs affaires, si ne peullent exploytter incontinent leur vehemence et ardeur se convertit en desdain et indignation, mesmement ny ayant comme vous dictes entre eulx grainde sincere amitié et benivolence et pense chascun d’eulx genner son compagnon, luy donnant d’entendre le dangier où il est pour la poyssance de Sa Magesté.’ 61

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Henry was the best Frenchman in England, surrounded as he was by counsellors and people who were inclined to favour the Emperor.65 Henry’s relations with Charles V were bleaker, shaped by the Break with Rome, the annulment of Catherine of Aragon’s marriage and a perceptible move towards religious reform. Relations with Charles were more or less edgy throughout the 1530s. Yet, if Henry were to re-embark on the turbulent seas of European conflict, Charles provided a more sure alliance in the sense that the house of Habsburg had inherited the role of the house of Burgundy in English views of European politics, while the economic links between England and the Low Countries predisposed English statesmen to view them as a natural ally. Charles was nevertheless an equivocal figure in England. Thomas Wriothesley expressed the view in 1546 that ‘he sometimes does things of his own head without consulting his friends,’ another way of saying that the range of Charles’ interests was difficult to cope with by an ally.66 For Francis I, the problem of England was much more than an irritant but still not to be viewed on the same plane as that of the Emperor Charles V. It was complemented by French relations with Scotland, long established and useful as a diversion for the English. Francis had established a certain rapport with Henry in 1520 and 1532 but this concealed underlying problems. Francis needed the neutrality or alliance of Henry and from 1514 to 1521 and then from 1525 to 1534 had spent substantial sums in the form of the French pension to assure this. Yet this was vexatious and there were always other calls on French cash which might divert the payments to England, as in 1534. In January-March 1532, the French crown had paid out 1,234,735 lt. in pensions, of which 513,594 went to foreign princes (English, German and the Swiss cantons) and other persons. Of this, 259,594 lt. went to England. By 1532, the normal half-yearly payments to Henry for the accumulated debt and salt equivalent were 52,368 écus.67 For France,

65 Dinteville to Chancellor Dubourg, 9 April [1537], AN J 967, no. 69: ‘de mon retour d’Angleterre . . . j’ay lessé les personnes disposez à continuer ceste annee en neutralité comme la passee et me semble que le meilleur Françoys, Anglois qu’il soit, par deça c’est le Roy d’Angleterre. Tous messeigneurs de son conseil et ordinairement le peuple vouldront plus la prosperité de l’Empereur.’ 66 Odet de Selve to Francis I, 10 July 1546, G. Lefèvre-Pontalis (ed.), Correspondance politique de Odet de Selve, (Paris, 1888), no. 6: ‘ledict seigneur faisoyt quelques foys des choses de sa teste sans le conseil de ses amys.’ 67 BnF, fr. 20502, fos. 108–110. AN J 923, no. 8/4 – Nov. 1532 saw the last payment

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the justification for these pensions was always simply a matter of realpolitik. President Charles Guillart had defended the payments in a speech on the Treaty of The More before the Parlement of Paris in August 1525. He did so by arguing that the restoration of the English pensions induced Henry, confronted by rebellion at home, to make peace with France and force the Emperor to release Francis from captivity.68 Henry’s leading councillors also received pensions and this was only reciprocated from 1532 when Francis gave his consent to pensions from Henry to Cardinal Duprat, Montmorency and Chabot. Payments ceased after November 1533.69 Henry remitted the term of May 1534 and it was not renewed the following November. It was reported to Henry that the money had been reallocated to German princes in order to stir up trouble for the Emperor.70 There is some reason to believe that pension payments continued to Henry’s councillors; Norfolk was probably still receiving his in 1540 and Cromwell (who, as far as we can tell, never received a pension from France) told

of the 49,285 écus for the Emperor’s debts to Henry, which Francis had taken on, and 7500 in salt arrears. The five payments made by Jean-Joachim de Passano 1525–1527 amounted to 672,100 lt. in money of account (AN J 923, no. 8/7) but in fact terms May 1527 to May 1529 were remitted to Francis for his military expenditure ( J 923, no. 8/2). 68 A. Pommier, Chroniques de Souligné-sous-Vallon et Flacé (Angers, 1889), pp. 140–142. 69 18 March 1534, AN J 651B, no. 22, Ordonnances des rois de France: règne de François Ier, 9 vols. (Paris, 1902–1992), VII, p. 115. 70 L&P, VII, 1554. The documentation for reallocation of the pension seems to be confined to AN J 923 no. 8/5 in which the payments are diverted to Jean Baptiste Myuntelly (?) Antoine Bonvisi and François Sauvaige, London bankers. On the French pensions, see C. Giry-Deloison, ‘Money and early Tudor diplomacy: the English pensioners of the French King,’ Medieval History 3 (1993–1994), 128–146. Idem, ‘Henri VIII, pensionnaire de François Ier’ in his François Ier et Henri VIII. Deux princes de la Renaissance (1515–1547) (Lille, 1995), pp. 121–143. Regular payments of the French pensions had ceased after the first term of 1534 (L&P, V, 222, 1065, 1504, 1554) The arrears were computed at 880,256 crowns (at 4/8d per crown = £205,393.1.4) in 1542 (St.P. VIII, p. 717, L&P, XVII, 288). This crept up to 994,737 by the start of the war. The French denied liability to payments during the war and in 1544 even argued that half the 2 millions the pension was originally based on had been paid up to 1534 and that the other half was unfounded, added to which they argued that since Henry had not come to the aid of Francis in 1536, he had infringed his obligations. So, there was ambiguity about the exact amount owed by 1546. The issue of the pensions was argued out in the negotiations that took place during the siege of Boulogne in Sept. 1544 (G. Ribier, Lettres et mémoires d’estat 2 vols. (Paris, 1666), I, pp. 572– 578) and outlined in the Instructions made out to du Bellay and Remon, St. Fuscien, 10 Oct. 1544 (BnF, fr[ançais],17889, fos. 76–77). At this point the French were offering to pay off the arrears at 25,000 écus p.a.

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the Imperial ambassador in late 1535 that all Henry’s councillors were uniformly favourable to the Emperor, ‘except that there are some as he said who were pensioners of France.’71 Admiral Chabot came to England on a grand embassy in November 1534 and, although the pension was not discussed, he reminded Henry of the suggestion put forward by Francis at their Boulogne meeting in 1532: that Henry should abandon his title to France in return for key ports and territories in the Emperor’s Low Countries. When Chabot the following year demanded the abolition of the pension, Henry exploded in anger.72 In fact, it is no surprise that the pensions ceased at this time. Henry’s negotiating stock had plummeted and, as Eustace Chapuys astutely pointed out, the king of France was not sorry that Henry should continue in his folly, thus making any Anglo-Imperial agreement impossible.73 Francis had been heard to remark by late 1534 that he had lost trust in Henry and the blank response of the English to demands for help in the spring of 1536 only confirmed this.74 Henry formally responded to Francis’ demands of 500,000 crowns aid in March 1536 with the statement that, since Francis was neutral between him and the Pope, so he, Henry, would be neutral between Francis and the Emperor.75 The participation of any kind of public opinion in the making of policy and war in this period is complex. I have argued elsewhere that the French monarchy in the period was highly attuned to the need to garner support and justify it policies. It required a complex net-

71 Chapuys to Hannart, 25 Feb. 1535/6, HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 4, fo. 101r (102r decipher): ‘oires qu’il en y ayt comme il disoyt des pensionnaires de France et de ceulx de la parcialité de la dame.’ Norfolk to Cromwell, 11 March [1540], SP1/158, fo. 23 (L&P, XV, 329). 72 Henry VIII’s reply to Chabot, Nov. 1534, St.P., VII, p. 584 (L&P, VII, 1483); Palamèdes Gontier to Chabot, 5 Feb. 1535, J. Le Laboureur, Mémoires de M. De Castelnau 3 vols. (Brussels, 1731), I, 405 (L&P, VIII, 174). Some time in 1535, Cromwell made a note ‘to know your highness pleasure and gratuyte to be shewed unto the Frensh king in remission of the pension viager and salte.’ (NA SP1/91, fo. 56, L&P, VIII, 344). 73 Chapuys to Charles V, 5 Dec. 1534, L&P, VII, 1507. 74 In October 1534, Francis was reported ‘mal content dud. Roy d’Engleterre et dit qu’il ne ce fyera jamaiz à luy et qu’il luy a cuydé faire ung mauvais tour et que jamaiz à luy ne aura fiance.’ (NA SP1/86, fo. 87, (L&P, VII, 1303); Hannart to Empress, 29 March 1536, L&P, X, 586. 75 Bishop of Tarbes to Francis I, 3 March 1536, (L&P, X, 410).

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work of publicists and local agents to put its policies across.76 In both countries, poetic criticism of war could sometimes be savage, as in the case of Clément Marot’s coqs-à-l’âne of the 1530s or sceptical as in the case of John Skelton’s Speke, Parrott of 1521.77 In the England of Henry VIII, the assembly of the Parliament in 1523 could occasion Cromwell’s carefully critical speech. As George Bernard has pointed out, the evidence for popular opinion on Henry’s supposed claims to France is contradictory. The chronicler Hall sought to record enthusiasm for the war in 1523–1524 but there were grumbles in Kent in 1525 that a campaign in France would be a waste of money.78 In the Paris of the late 1540s, preachers looked back at the invasion of 1544 as punishment of God for the sins of the people and found little to celebrate in the peace of 1544. The preacher François Le Picart later declared: Do we not have great cause and reason to return to God, seeing all parts of the earth are engaged in war and that misery and poverty are everywhere? Is this not a great advertisement to convert to God and to ask his pardon and grace for our sins?

He argued in one sermon that the fall of Boulogne was a signal to recognize the sins of the French. In another he argued of the peace of Crépy: Have you not seen that for thirteen or fourteen years we fled with fear from our enemy? And those who were supposed to protect the city left the first. In despair at having peace, peace was made. Who made it? God. God permitted things to get to the point of despair, in human terms, in order that He could intervene and it would be said: ‘God did that. This is not the work of men.’79

Clearly, then, the pulpit was not a vehicle for the straightforward dissemination of the royal view of war and foreign affairs.

76 D. Potter, Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480–1560 (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 255–286. 77 Ibid., pp. 312–315; G. Walker, John Skelton and the Politics of the 1520s (Cambridge, 1988). 78 G. Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion in Early Tudor England: Henry VIII, Wolsey and the Amicable Grant of 1525 (Brighton, 1986), pp. 3–7; Hall, ed. Whibley, II, pp. 123–125; S. Gunn, ‘Wolsey’s foreign policy and the domestic crisis of 1527–1528’ in S.J. Gunn and P. Lindley (eds.), Cardinal Wolsey, Church, State and Art (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 149–177. 79 L. Taylor, Heresy and Orthodoxy in Sixteenth-century Paris (Leiden, 1999), p. 196.

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Kings might decide policy but they still had to mobilise support among populations with varying interests. We shall see how the management of news became a real preoccupation in 1545–1546, when there were disputes over who had got the better of military encounters around Boulogne. As early as May 1544, for some unknown reason, the government was calling in and burning ‘certain books printed of News’ about the invasion of Scotland.80 Henry VIII’s victory at Boulogne seems to have been registered in public consciousness in many different ways. At the most humble level, the vicar of the Gloucestershire church of Buckland recorded in his register, ‘in this yeare, the xxvth of September, was Bullen won.’81 On another level, at Norwich, there was a procession to celebrate the fall of Boulogne.82 In France, when there were victories to celebrate, this was done in style. News of the French semi-victory at Landrecies, for instance was communicated through the governors to the whole country; the towns the bishops and clergy were to offer prayers of thanks.83 In London in May 1544, there were bonfires on Ascension Day for the victory in Scotland and the day after a sermon at St Paul’s, Te Deum and general procession.84 Peace treaties were celebrated as well. At York, the Aldermen and Sheriffs were ordered to proclaim the Treaty of 1546 by the Council of the North on 3 July and on 5th, though a drummer had to stand in for a trumpet as ordered, the mayor, sheriffs and aldermen rode on procession in their scarlet robes from the Te Deum at the cathedral ‘and at nyght to the lawde and prays of Almyghtie God to make bonfyers in he strets . . . and to make merry and honest chere.’85 In both countries, the fiscal apparatus provided, though in different ways, a vehicle to disseminate royal propaganda. In France, the mandements for the taille became by the 1520s a major vehicle for propaganda in the form of real and persuasive manifestos. That for 1543 declared that everyone must know the heavy expenses incurred by the King, ‘our good and just cause,’ the wrong done by the Emperor over

80

Procl. 18 May 1544, BL Harl. 442, 197. Gloucestershire County Archives, Marriage registers of Buckland, P 65 IN/1/1. 82 Norfolk Record Office, Norwich Murage Accounts, 1544, Y/C 45/6 (1545– 1564). 83 François de Bourbon-Estouteville to Matignon, 9 Nov. 1544, Correspondance de Joachim de Matignon, lieutenant-général du roi en Normandie, 1513–1548, ed. L.-H. Labande (Monaco, 1914), no. CXL, p. 91. 84 Wriothesley’s Chronicle, p. 147; Grey Friars Chronicle, p. 47. 85 A. Raine (ed.) York Civic Records: the House Books (Wakefield, 1945), IV, pp. 146– 147. 81

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the murder of Rincon and Fregoso, the unjust occupation of the duchy of Milan, Francis’ efforts to maintain a good peace, the Emperor’s attacks and ‘having persuaded the King of England to do the same without our having given him any cause to so so.’ In July 1544, the demand for the don gratuit from the clergy justified the extra décimes of the year by the invasion of the Emperor and Henry VIII ‘in person and with great and powerful armies.’ In February 1545, Francis justified his levy of the extraordinary solde des gens de guerre by reminding his subjects of their successful resistance the previous year, which had shown ‘the power and resistance of our realm, preserved by God our Creator’s hand, by the unity, obedience and good will of all its estates and subjects.’ Now, faced with Henry VIII’s occupation of Boulogne (which would not have fallen but for the cowardice of its defenders) it was necessary to ‘carry the war in which he has been so obstinate to the enemies lands’86 There was nothing unusual in all this. The Regent of the Netherlands, faced in 1543 with invasion on two fronts, assured her subjects that the Emperor was on his way to help but that the strategic needs of the government required 25,000 carolus d’or per month from the cities to avoid defeat.87 There was, of course, a limit to the effectiveness of such blandishments. As early as 1543, William Paget reported the reaction to a demand for a solde on top of two payments already of the taille: of whom He hath had great subsidie twyse alredy this yere, and is lyke now to have the third, for the matter is prepared to his hande. And bicause the minute people shall beare the burthen of the shock, the request is not made for any subsydie of money, but that they shall graunt to wage Him certayn men for certayn monethes; . . . Wherat I assure Your Majestye his people murmureth mervelously.88

86 Francis I, mandement for taille in Agenais, 31 August 1543, BL. Egerton Ch. 38: ‘ayant praticqué le Roy d’Angleterre de faire le semblable, sans que toutesfoys luy en ayons donné aucune cause ny occasion.’; Francis I to Bishop of Gap, 31 July 1544, BL Add.Ch. 165: Henry’s invasion ‘en personne avec grosses et puissantes armees.’; Francis I to Jean Morin, prévôt of Paris, Chambord, 22 February [1545]: F.A. Bonnardot, A. Tuety, P. Guérin (eds.), Registres des délibérations du bureau de la ville de Paris, 13 vols. (Paris, 1883–1905) [hereafter Registres, Paris], III, op. cit., pp. 47–49: ‘la force et resistance de nostre royaulme, conservé soubz la main de Dieu, nostre créateur, par l’unyon, obeyssance et bonne volunté de tous les estatz et subgectz d’icelluy . . . . . gecter en ses pays la guerre, à laquelle il est iniquement obstiné.’ 87 Mary of Hungary, proposition to the Estates of Flanders, 11 July 1543, Diegerick, Inventaire . . . Ypres, VII, p. 263, no. 2568. Mary to Ypres, 26 June 1543, ibid., V, no. 1667. The Emperor himself wrote from Pavia on 13 June to reassure his subjects of his care for their safety, ibid., V, p. 256, no. 1666. 88 Paget to Henry VIII, 2 Feb. 1543, St.P., IX, p. 285.

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The fiscal process in England did not allow for such a flowering of diverse means of communication through tax demands, though the Subsidy Acts of the period took care to justify levies by the King’s need to defend the realm. Demands for Benevolences and loans also provided an opportunity to spell out the King’s needs briefly.89 The King spoke directly to the matter in his last speech to Parliament in 1545. The links between England and France were deep and ancient but of a different nature from those between England and the Netherlands. The relationship between England and France since the 14th century had been shaped by the acquisition and defence of territorial holdings by English kings in France. These had been justified largely in dynastic terms but had to be defended, sometimes at great cost. The remnants of Lancastrian France survived in the form of Calais, increasingly pivotal in English military and diplomatic calculations on the mainland of Europe and a fortress through which the most recent ideas and military techniques entered the country. The town was a listening-post and crossroads for ideas.90 Calais continued to allow England to deploy military power on the European mainland and, for English diplomats, soldiers and travellers, the crossing to Calais assured their entry into Europe. Then the Channel Islands remained as the remnant of the duchy of Normandy, French speaking but close in culture neither to France or England. Curiously, no serious attempt was made by France to seize them in the period, possibly because then, as now, they were too useful as a trading enclave.91 Technically subject to the diocese of Coutances in church matters, the English government in 1542 went as far as to demand of Francis that he authorise the bishop to exercise his jurisdiction in the name of Henry as Supreme Head.92 Francis, generally easy-going about Henry’s religion, remained silent and in fact,

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E.g. St. P., I, 766. See above all D. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436–1558 (Woodbridge, 2008) and also S. Rose, Calais, an English Town in France, 1347–1558 (Woodbridge, 2008). 91 A.J. Eagleston, The Channel Islands Under Tudor Government 1485–1642; A Study in Administrative History (Cambridge, 1950). See the correspondence between Henry Cornish and Hertford, the governor of Jersey, HMC, Manuscripts of the Marquess of Bath Preserved at Longleat. IV Seymour papers, 1532–1686, ed. M. Blatcher (London: HMC, 1968), pp. 79–94. 92 NA SP1/170, fo. 137 (L&P, XVII, 328.3) Memorial for Francis I to instruct Philippe de Cossé-Brissac to exercise his powers ‘secundum leges et constitutiones . . . promulgatas atque eisdem modo et forma quibus reliqui episcopi anglicani iurisdictione exercent ecclesasticam et non aliter.’ 90

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the islands went their own way from the 1540s in terms of religious reformation. How did the English and the French view each other in the first half of the sixteenth century?93 In a sense this depended on the level of society, but views were not uniform. One French minister in 1542 claimed ‘we be undir one clime and of one complexion.’94 How real was this? Odet de Selve, French ambassador after the peace of 1546, lamented the inflation which had been brought about by war and taxes. His money would not stretch far enough and this would bring him into contempt for living meanly among a people who by nature, he thought, despised the French.95 Such prevailing caricatures and clichés as ‘ancient enemies’ were sketched out well before the end of the 15th century and, as their relations took on a different form after the end of the Hundred Years War, were simply refined.96 This was reiterated in many French towns where the lifting of a siege by the English decades or centuries before was to be commemorated by yearly processions.97 Characteristics of the people were to a degree stereotyped. For the French, the English countryside was rich and fertile, populated by sturdy fair people, their women exceptionally fine.98 The people were high spirited at times but they ‘take their rejoicing grimly’ and were hard drinkers.99 The term ‘Godons’ (Goddamns) for the English, well established by 1400, is still in vogue at the time of the siege of Tournai in 1513 by the ‘goddamn pigs full of beer’ and passed into common usage by 1600 for a ‘filthy glutton.’100 The English had analogous caricatures of the French, often pictured as cowards, boasters,

93 I have discussed this issue at more length in my ‘Anglo-French Relations 1500: the Aftermath of the Hundred Years War,’ Franco-British Studies, 28 (1999/2000), 41–66. 94 NA SP1/170, fo. 28 (L&P, XVII, 263). 95 Selve to Annebault, 30 Sept. 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, no. 38: ‘la nation où je suys qui est fort subjecte naturellement à contempner la nostre.’ 96 G. Ascoli, La Grande-Bretagne devant l’opinion française depuis la guerre de Cent Ans jusqu’à la fin du XVIe siècle (Paris, 1927), p. 48. 97 For example, the yearly processions at Dieppe on the Vigil of the Assumption ‘rendre graces à Dieu le createur que ced. jour les Angloys anciens ennemys de ce Royaulme, wyderent le siege de devant cested. ville.’ (orders of 1 Sept. 1548, 16 April 1550, BnF fr. 26132, no. 187; 26133, no. 504). 98 Ascoli, pp. 27–28, 30. 99 Ascoli, p. 33: ‘se rejouissaient tristement.’ 100 Dépucelage de la ville de Tournai (1513) qu. Ascoli, p. 36: ‘godons pourceaux remplis de bière.’

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tricksters and fops in their dealings and indelibly given to aggression in their policy.101 Many French continued to regard England as a semi-barbarous country in the sixteenth century and even to maintain the fable that the people of Kent had tails.102 The most well-known view was that the English were all too apt to depose and kill their Kings. Charles d’Orléans asked around 1450, ‘haven’t the English often betrayed their kings?’103 The Chancellor of France at the Estates-General of Tours in January 1484 dwelled on the deplorable fate of Edward V and his brother104 and Gaguin in 1488 talked of their ‘their pitiful custom of frequently changing kings.’105 Around 1513 the rhétoriqueur Jean Bouchet described a ‘proud nation who never could for long endure a king over them without compulsion.’106 Commynes on the other hand had praised the way in which the Parliament of England raised taxes for war and thus made the conduct of war more effective: ‘and so their kings are the stronger.’ Never was there a country ‘where the public weal was dealt with better or there is less violence done to the people.’107 This was the complement to the well-known caricature by Fortescue in the De Laudibus (written in exile in France c. 1468–1471), of the evils that stemmed ‘ex regimine tantum regale’ (the merely kingly power) that prevailed in France: an uncontrolled military, taxes by compul-

101 Hall (ed. H. Ellis) p. 520; as cowards see ed. C. Whibley, I, pp. 44, 71; as braggarts, I, pp. 87, 200, 257; ‘rufflers and gallantes of the Frenche Courte,’ I, p. 197. Merriman, The Life and Letters of Thomas Cromwell, I, p. 33: ‘want of trowth ys so depely in the Frenche Nacion enrotid, and their insaciable apetite to exent their bondes.’ 102 S. Lee, The French Renaissance in England (Oxford, 1910), p. 59. William Lambarde blamed Polydore Virgil for the story that ‘we be monsters and have tailes by nature’ in Perambulation of Kent (1576) (Chatham, 1826), p. 358 but the most likely explanation is that it stems from a joke or play on words back in the mists of time. 103 Ascoli, La Grande-Bretagne, p. 47: ‘N’ont pas Anglais souvent leurs rois trahis?’ 104 Jean Masselin, Journal des états généraux de France tenus à Tours en 1484 ed. A. Bernier, Coll. de Documents inédits (Paris, 1835), pp. 37–39. 105 Gaguin, Passe-temps d’oisiveté, quoted in Ascoli, p. 47: ‘piteux ménage / De changer et rechanger rois’. 106 Epître du feu roi Henry VII à son fils Henry VIII in A. de Montaiglon, Recueil de poésies françoises des XVe et XVIe siècles 13 vols. (Paris, 1855–1878) VI, p. 62: ‘fière nation, Qui ne voulut sans force oncque endurer / Un roi sur eux pour un long tamps durer.’ 107 Mémoires de P. de Commynes, ed. Mlle. Dupont 3 vols. (Paris, 1840–1847), I, pp. 314, 142: ‘et en sont les rois plus forts.’ ‘où la chose publique soit mieux traitée, où règne moins de violence sur le peuple.’

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sion and ultimately dire poverty for the people who, in contrast to the sturdy English peasants, ate little meat.108 Inherited from the past, too, was the idea of the great gulf that existed between the manners of the gentry, described by Froissart as of ‘noble and loyal condition’ and the brutish commons, ‘of fell, perilous, proud and disloyal condition,’ though the nobles for that reason refrained from burdening their subjects with dues.109 The English nobility and gentry were in many cases very familiar with France and members of Henry’s entourage made frequent visits to the French court.110 The rabble, on the other hand, often wallowed in a comforting and vociferous francophobia. When Admiral Chabot visited England with a lavish following late in 1534, a proclamation was issued forbidding the people to show unkindness to the French visitors. Eustace Chapuys commented on this that it was only likely to increase the hatred of the English for the French.111 The reputation of the English lower classes for violent xenophobia was well-established and confirmed by the admittedly rather limited anti-alien riots of ‘Evil May-Day’ in 1517.112 In the mid-sixteenth century a French visitor thought that ‘the people of this nation hate the French mortally as their ancient enemies. These curs, when they are in their own country, spit in our faces while when they are in France we honour and revere them like little gods.’113 The upper classes seldom expressed themselves so, though Lord Leonard Grey had to be detained in 1520 for remarking at the Field of Cloth

108

Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibis Legum Angliae ed. S.B. Chrimes (Cambridge, 1949), ch.xxxv, pp. 81–85; The Governance of England ed. C. Plummer (London, 1885), pp. 114–115. Fortescue ignored, of course, the dire long-term crisis from which the French countryside was only just beginning to emerge in the 1460s. F. Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800 (London, 1967), pp. 121–157, argues that the period 1350–1550 was one of improved diet for the whole of western Europe. 109 Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove (ed.), Les oeuvres de Froissart, 29 vols. (Brussels, 1870), II, p. 17: ‘de noble et loyale condition’ ‘de fele, périlleuse, orgueilleuse et déloyale condition.’ 110 D. Potter, ‘The private face of Anglo-French relations in the sixteenth century; the Lisles and their French friends’ in D. Grummit (ed.), The English Experience in France, c. 1450–1588 (Aldershot, 2002), pp. 200–222. 111 Proclamation, 7 Nov. 1534 Hughes and Larkin, I, no. 150, pp. 220–221; Chapuys to Charles V, 17 Nov. 1534 L&P, VII, 1437. 112 M. Holmes, ‘Evil May Day, 1517: the story of a riot,’ History Today 15 (1965), 642–650. 113 Estienne Perlin, Description des royaulmes d’Angleterre et d’Escosse (Paris, 1558), reprint London, 1775, pp. 11–12: ‘Les gens de ceste nation hayent à mort les Francoys, comme leurs vielz ennemis . . . ces vilains, estans en leur pays, nous crachent à la face, et eulx, estans à la France, on les honore et revere comme petis dieux.’

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of Gold that, if he had a drop of French blood in his veins he would cut himself open to get rid of it. Clearly too much familiarity did not always encourage a spirit of entente.114 Sometimes, though, nobles had their offspring educated by Frenchmen, as did Henry VII himself in appointing Bernard André of Toulouse as tutor to his sons.115 Henry VIII was to take great pleasure in the company of French seigneurs who impressed him, such as the father of Pierre de Bourdeille de Brantôme, a distinguised jouster who was entertained by Henry at his court for a month in 1520.116 As the reign of Henry VIII went on, a new ingredient was added to the copious pot of French clichés about the English. Henry, after all, rejected both his first wife and the Pope and seemed from the early 1530s to be favouring the cause of religious reform. This could not fail to find a reverberation in France, where the question of reformation of the Church was all too apparent in the 1530s and evoked sharp divisions of opinion. Unsurprisingly, conservative theological opinion, led by figures such as Noel Beda, was highly critical of Henry VIII. The English ambassador, Edmund Bonner, complained in 1538 about the sermons of the Franciscan preacher Pierre de Cornibus (old enemy of Erasmus and of Henry’s divorce) on Saint Thomas’s day, in the presence of Cardinal Jean du Bellay among others. The preacher claimed that he was simply aiming to exalt the name of Saint Thomas the martyr on his day as was usual on saints’ days in the Church. He claimed to have no intention of criticising the king of England and had said the same the year before. It should, though, be obvious that the question of Becket was a highly sensitive one in the aftermath of his shrine’s destruction.117 Bonner also complained about the prevention of the printing of English Bibles in France in an affair which illustrates exactly the problems of linguistic communication. Paris, as a great printing capital, was the city where many of the Bibles in English favoured by the new English establishment were being printed, most

114 Suriano to Signory, 18 July 1520, Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs in Venice, ed. Rawdon Brown, C. Bentinck and others, 38 vols. (1864–1940) [CSP Venice], III, no. 108. 115 Lee, French Renaissance, p. 44. 116 Pierre de Bourdeille de Brantôme, Oeuvres complètes, ed. L. Lalanne, 11 vols. (Paris, 1864–1882), X, p. 54–. 117 ‘Responce du Roy aux plainctes de l’ambassadeur d’Angleterre’ AN J 976, fo. 32.

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notably Coverdale’s Great Bible that was promoted by Cromwell.118 Bonner was at first told that if the Bibles were so good they could be printed in England and that since ‘the English language is not fully understood’ in France, there was no way of authorising it. All the same, in October 1538, the ambassador’s complaints were passed to President Louis Gailland of the Parlement of Paris. Gailland investigated a Bible in English found in the workshop of the printer François Regnault, given him for printing by an English merchant. Regnault was a friend of Coverdale and Richard Grafton who had been selling primers in English and missals in England for forty years but was currently being impeded by the London Stationers.119 Grafton and his colleague Whitchurch had earlier asked Cromwell to control the printing of English texts by Dutchmen who knew no English and to ensure that Regnault’s printings were only carried out in conjunction with an English speaker, which suggests that Regnault himself knew little English.120 The printing in Paris had been prevented by certain other envious printers who had taken passages of the text to the lieutenant criminal. On protests by Bonner, the text had been examined ‘by persons understanding the language of that country.’121 Gailland’s readers found that the translation was in accord with the Vulgate except for a few words where the English translator had followed the Hebrew text. He found that some of the English wording conformed to neither text and that occasionally Hebrew words had been left untranslated. He thought that this contradicted the idea that the translator was a learned scholar and gave a close critical reading of certain texts which might be thought to call in question the immortality of the soul. This could, he reported ‘spread different interpretations where unity and concord are most necessary.’122 However, he was reluctant to communicate his findings with theologians and lawyers who, he thought, simply opposed the printing on the argument that sacred texts should 118 See A.J. Slavin, ‘The Rochepot affair,’ Sixteenth Century Journal, 10 (1979). See also the correspondence of Coverdale and others, L&P, XIII, ii, 972, 1043, St.P., II, no. CXV. 119 AN J 976, fo. 32: ‘l’on n’a point de commune intelligence en la dicte langue francoyse’ A.C. Erler, ‘The Maner to Lyue Well and the coming of English in François Regnault’s primers of the 1520s and 1530s,’ The Library 6 (1984), 229–243. For an example of his work, An exposicyon after the maner of a contemplyon upon the lj Psalme called Miserere mei dues (N. Le Roux for François Regnault, Paris, 1538). 120 F.R. Amos, Early Theories of Translation, (Ithaca, NY, 1998), p. 52. 121 ‘par quelques personnaiges, ayant la langue dudict pays.’ 122 ‘engendrer diversité de intelligences, là où unité et concorde sont tresrequis.’

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never be available in the vernacular. He argued that any translation could be read wisely by a wise man or poorly by a stupid one.123 The end result of all this was that many of Regnault’s proof sheets were confiscated, though Coverdale and Grafton rescued others as well as the type, with which they were able to complete the printing in April 1539. The cultural relations between the two countries – so all-embracing in the early Middle Ages, as Frédérique Lachaud has shown124 – were shaped fundamentally by the fact the French language, current of course in England throughout the late middle ages was increasingly emphasised as a language of culture and discourse in the sixteenth century, indeed was almost the international vernacular language. In 1492, the peers appointed to accompany French lords after the treaty of Etaples were given gentlemen to interpret for them.125 Wolsey’s education had not equipped him to speak French and he habitually used interpreters with those who could not speak Latin; in 1527 he advised his staff: ‘If they speak to you in the French tongue, speak you to them in the English tongue; for if you understand not them, they shall no more understand you.’ Indeed his remarks in 1518 to an envoy who sought to compare Francis I favourably with Louis XII that ‘omnes sunt Galli’ and that gallic perfidy was notorious, testifies to a degree of francophobia which is not apparent later in his life.126 A generation later, France was a channel through which much humanist influence entered England.127 One French visitor observed: ‘In England, at least among princes and at their courts, they speak French in all their business.’128

123

Louis Gailland to Chancellor of France, 27 Oct. [1538], AN J 966, no. 13/5. F. Lachaud, ‘Les relations entre la France et les îles Britanniques vers 1250,’ Franco-British Studies, 38 (Autumn, 1999), Special issue: Franco-British Relations during the Second Millenium, pp. 23–39. 125 Letters and Papers illustrative of the Reigns of Richard III and Henry VII, ed. J. Gairdner, 2 vols. (1861–1863) II, p. 291. 126 K. Lambley, The Teaching and Cultivation of the French Language in England during Tudor and Stuart Times (Manchester, 1920), p. 70. George Cavendish, The Life of Cardinal Wolsey ed. H. Morley (London, 1887), pp. 43–44, 72. Giustiniani to Signory, 12 Apr. 1518, CSP Venice II, no. 1022; Rawdon Brown, Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII 2 vols. (London, 1854), II, p. 180. 127 Estienne Pasquier certainly thought French the international vernacular of his time, see Les Lettres d’Estienne Pasquier (1723) Book I, p. 5, though of course in the 16th century Italian was a close competitor. On humanism, see Lee, French Renaissance, pp. 44–45. 128 Jacques Peletier du Mans, Dialogues d’Ortografe (1550), p. 60: ‘En Angleterre, amoins entre les Princes et en leurs cours, ilz parlent François en tous leurs propos.’ 124

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On the other hand, knowledge of English in France was, other than for phrases gathered by merchants for practical purposes and by the legal and theological authorities (as we have seen), virtually non-existent, confined to a few burlesques and terms of abuse129 and even the ambassadors from France had little knowledge of the language beyond a few phrases. They negotiated formal treaties in Latin but it is clear that they spoke French to the English Kings and their leading ministers.130 Rabelais’s Panurge had no word of English in his multi-lingual harangues in the first edition of Pantagruel 1532; when it appeared in 1533 it was as garbled lowland Scots.131 In a rare French treatise on learning English of 1553 Gabriel Meurier admits that ‘since French is spoken at the English court and all learned people write in Latin, English is held of little account by foreigners and few take trouble to learn it.’132 No printed English work translated into French seems to have appeared before the Navigation du capitaine Frobisher of 1577. One curious consequence was the extraordinary energy shown by English scholars in the field of French grammar. After Caxton’s FrenchEnglish Dialogues of 1483 and the Pynson-Wynkyn de Worde, Lytell treatyse for to lerne Englisshe and Frensshe of 1498 came Alexander Barclay’s Introductorie to Write and Pronounce French in the phonetic manner in 1521. John Palsgrave, who went to France as chaplain to princess Mary when she married Louis XII in 1514, became French tutor to Henry VIII’s bastard son Richmond and others and for their use compiled the enormous L’Esclaircissement de la langue françoyse (1530, 1110 pp) printed by Richard Pynson, a Norman from Rouen who had settled in London in the late fifteenth century and was appointed the first royal printer in England in 1509. Palsgrave’s exhaustive systematic grammar, phonetic guide and dictionary was in every respect far in advance of anything available in France and could be called the first systematic printed French grammar though, oddly, it was printed in small numbers since Palsgrave wished to control access

129 Eg. Estienne Perlin, op. cit., pp. 11–12: ‘France chenesve,’ ‘France dogue’ ‘orson.’ For burlesques of English see Ballade en forme de déploration que fait un Anglais sur la mort de Milort Havart (June 1513) in Montaiglon, Recueil, VI, p. 95. 130 Ascoli, p. 180. 131 W.P. Kerr, Panurge’s English (Oxford, 1901) Oeuvres de François Rabelais ed. A. Lefranc, 6 vols. (Paris, 1922–1955), III, pp. 114–115. 132 Ascoli, Grande-Bretagne, p. 176: ‘puisque’on parle français à la cour d’Angleterre et que tous les lettrés écrivent en latin, l’anglais étant d’ailleurs peu estimé des étrangers et peu de personnes s’empressant de l’apprendre.’

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to it.133 Its existence, though, led the way to the more widely disseminated French Littleton of 1576 by Claude de Sainliens and to the first great monument to Anglo-French lexicography, Randall Cotgrave’s dictionary of 1611.134 Lord Berners, later deputy of Calais, was in France in 1492 and again in 1514–1515. He spent much of his leisure time translating two works from French to English, Froissart (1523–1525) and Huon de Bordeaux (c. 1530). Much of the early translation work from French to English in the era of Caxton had been of chivalric romances and this vogue continued, though with an increasing appetite for practical manuals, for example cookery.135 This was largely the result of the fact that, in this period as much later, France was seen as the source of good taste in cooking and wine by the English upper classes, as well as of deportment and dancing (Barclay appended a translated French treatise on dance to his French manual of 1521).136 Mockery of the aping of French fashions was well established by the time of Thomas More’s well-known Epigrammata of 1518.137 In 1488, Robert Gaguin called for what we now call détente between England and France: Let’s let sleeping dogs lie. Let the English be English; The Frenchman be himself; Let them be good neighbours; Peace is made; let us forget The noise and clamour of war. Long live France, long live England.138

133

Lee, French Renaissance, pp. 76–80. Claudius Holyband (Sainliens), The French Littleton ed. M. St. Clare Byrne (Cambridge, 1953), Introduction. 135 Lee, French Renaissance, pp. 95–96. 136 Ed. Furnival for New Shakespeare Society (1890), pp. clx–clxii. 137 ‘In Anglum Gallicae affectatorem’ tr. J.H. Marsden, Philomorus: notes on the Latin Poems of Thomas More (1878), p. 223 Germain de Brie replied by G. Brixii in Th. Morum (1519), to which More replied in turn in 1520. 138 Robert Gaguin, Passe-temps d’oisiveté from Epistole et orationes ed. Thuasne II, p. 409, quoted G. Ascoli, La Grande-Bretagne, p. 22. ‘Laissons le moustier où il est,/ Qui est Anglois pour tel se tienne,/Qui est François le soit de fait;/ L’ung bon voisin l’autre soustienne;/ Paix soit faicte et ne nous souvienne/De bruict, de noise, ne de guerre:/ Vive France, vive Engleterre!’ ‘Laissons le monstier ou il est’ (the correct reading) means ‘let us leave church matters to the church’ or ‘let us not alter ancient custom.’ (R. Cotgrave, A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (London, 1611), sub ‘Monstier.’ 134

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Were these optimistic hopes borne out in literary evidence? In fact, the recurrence of war kept the old hostilities alive. In 1492 Octovien de Saint-Gelais exhorted his fellow-countrymen to throw back the English from what a panegyric to Anne de Beaujeu called ‘France, cimetière des Anglois’ a term echoed in one poem of 1513: ‘It is commonly said that France is their cemetery . . . Get you gone you stinking disease-ridden filth, tailed goddamns, I would never see you more’ and another: ‘These filthy great shameful Englishmen.’139 By this time Henry VII was a regretted figure in France who had presided over an era of peace and his successor reproached with ingratitude.140 Yet the moment peace was concluded by the marriage of Mary Tudor to Louis XII, it was formally welcomed by the city of Paris with devices such as ‘France, paix, Amitié, Confédération, Angleterre.’141 In 1512, the rhétoriqueur and historiographer Jean Bouchet published anonymously his Epistre envoyee des champs Elisees au Roy Henry dengleterre a present regnant au dit royaulme142 in the form of a letter sent from beyond the grave by Henry VII to his son. Bouchet’s objective was firstly to castigate Henry VIII for ungratefulness in view of the help it was alleged that France had given to his father,143 and secondly to attack Julius II as an unworthy Pope and call for reform of the Church. Cruder material appeared at the same time under the titles Le Courroux de la mort contre les Anglais and La folie des Anglois who 139 H.-J. Molinier, Essai biographique et littéraire sur Octovien de Saint-Gelais (1468–1502) (Rodez, 1910), p. 277–; ‘L’Ainée fille de fortune’ (BnF fr. 25409 fo. 8) Courroux de la mort contre les Anglois (1513) Montaiglon, Recueil de poésies II, pp. 79–85 at 81 (qu. Ascoli, p. 22). La Folie de Anglais (1513) in Montaiglon, Recueil, II, 253–, at 267–268: ‘Ces gros souillards et infâmes Anglais.’ 140 Déploration faite par République pour la mort du catholique roi Henry d’Angleterre (Paris, 1517) (Ascoli, p. 49). 141 The entries into Abbeville and Paris were described in two contemporary pamphlets in Bibliothéque Nationale, Rés. Lb29, 50 and 51. See also L.M. Bryant, The King and the City in the Parisian Royal Entry Ceremony (Geneva, 1986). 142 There are two undated and anonymous versions. The Other has the title Epistre envoyee par feu Henry roy d’Angleterre a Henry son filz huytiesme de ce nom and bears a woodcut of the king on the title page. Bouchet later reissued the text in his Epistres familières and the text was reissued by someone else in 1544 with changes to suit the context of the war of that time. See J. Britnell, Jean Bouchet (Edinburgh, 1986), pp. 169–171, 307–308. For a related text that seems to have been printed in 1517, though probably written in 1509, Déploration faite par République pour la mort du catholique roi Henry d’Angleterre (Ascoli, p. 49). 143 This was a literary tradition dating back to Robert Gaguin (see A. Antonovics, ‘Henry VII, king of England “By the Grace of Charles VIII of France” in Kings and Nobles in the Later Middle Ages, ed. R.A. Griffifths and J. Sherborne (Gloucester, 1986), p. 186.

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treated them much as had done Saint-Gelais in 1492: ‘Goddamns, ugly tailed rogues . . . you are so foul, hideous, revolting’144 The series of grandiose festivities between 1518 and 1520 that celebrated both the treaty of Universal peace, the betrothal of the Kings’ children and above all the Field of Cloth of Gold saw the deployment of considerable literary ingenuity to the celebration of Anglo-French friendship. Yet again the renewal of war in 1522 saw the English return to their perfidious reputation. Bouchet’s Epistre was reissued in 1544 to suit the context of Henry VIII’s coalition with the Emperor Charles V against France, with changes to the references made. Charles takes the place of Julius and Francis I that of Louis XII. It is, though, surprising that the attack in satirical verse against the Emperor in France was relatively muted. Meanwhile in England a low point of creative endeavour was reached in the summer of 1543 in a pamphlet issued for the opening of the war with France. Entitled a ‘Pasquyl of Rome,’ this mocked Francis as ‘the mad man thou doest play’ and taxed him with the loss of French blood at Perpignan and for the fact the ‘unto the Turck of late thy faith thou dydest plyght’: Further more from Brytayne, a kingdom full royal Thou kepest their right, shewing they self not loial This region is Englande, in artillery exceadinge Other regions governed by Henry the royal kynge. Many townes and cities, thou kepeste wrongfully Which belong of right unto the said kinge Henry Normandy, and Picardy, Gascony and Angiers Thou kepest which shuld sound shame in thine eres. Render them agayne unto the righteous kynge Or els thou shalt repente thyne ungodly doing.145

The conception of the conflict, in this execrable ditty, as a matter of ‘rights’ reminds us that this was still a powerful, if simplistic, mobiliser of opinion.

144 Montaiglon, II, 79–85, 253– (possibly by Laurent Desmoulins – Ascoli, 50): ‘Godons, coués, crapauds . . . vous êtes si hideux détestables . . .’ ‘Crapaudaille’ is the likely allusion, meaning a ‘gang of knaves or rogues’ (Cotgrave). 145 Pasquyl of Rome to the frenche kynge/ Sendeth by wrytiges unfayned gretinge. (London: Jhon the Buys, 1543). Copy NA SP1/244, fos. 139–141. This pamphlet may have been one of many pieces of poor quality propaganda that have not survived. It is not in STC.

CHAPTER ONE

‘WHOMEVER I JOIN WILL (GOD WILLING) BE THE VICTOR:’1 THE ROAD TO WAR Henry and Francis: Perpetual Allies or Wary Opponents? In February 1540, Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, led an embassy from Henry VIII to the French court. The duke was an old hand at negotiating with the French. He had a ‘pro-French’ reputation and, though this did not necessarily mean that he followed a consistent line, he wrote to Cromwell in March 1540 that he needed the pension he still received from France.2 Such high status embassies were not unusual but the stakes were particularly high at this point. The years 1538 and 1539 had been a time of increasing anxiety in England about the improbable rapprochement between the French King and the Emperor after the Truce of Nice. This had seemed to bring an end to the Anglo-French entente which had prevailed since 1525 and reached such a degree of warmth in the early 1530s; then Francis had undertaken to pursue Henry’s case in Rome and Henry tried to inveigle his fellow monarch into following him in breaking from 1

‘Celuy au quel ie m’adiouincts (Dieu aydant) vaincra,’ motto that Henry commanded to be set up at Calais at the time of his meeting with Francis in 1532, according to Ulpian Fulwell, The flower of fame Containing the bright renowne, & moste fortunate raigne of King Henry the viii. (London: William Hoskins, 1575), fos. 31v–32r. 2 By 1532, Norfolk had been scheduled for a pension of 1500 écus sol. or 3000 lt. p.a. (roughly £375) (AN J 923 no. 84). But he had also received in 1532 plate worth 11,050 lt. ‘en faveur de plusieurs bons, grands, recommandables et louables services qu’il luy a faits, mesmement à l’entretenement de la paix, alliance et confederation qui est entre led. Sr. et le Roy d’Angleterre’ and had been in part cause of the CalaisBoulogne meeting ‘et à ce qu’à l’advenir il vueille continuer et perseverer de ayder à conserver icelle paix et amour.’ (BnF Clair. 1215, fo. 70v). In 1540, it seems that he was still being paid despite the failure of the main royal pension. He wrote to Cromwell that he needed to know ‘how we shall do with Fraunnce’ because ‘I have so burdened my self with gret number in my howse that as God be my help I am not able to mayntayne the charges theroff onles the pension off Fraunce shall contynew to me.’ (Norfolk to Cromwell, the Rye, 11 March [1540], NA, SP1/158 fo. 23 (L&P, XV, 329). Charles V had tried to offer good treatment to ‘le duc de Norphorc et autres enclins à la faction francoise, comme vous supposez et est vray semblable, à l’occasion des pensions qu’ilz en tiennent’ (Charles V to Chapuys, 11 Sept. 1536, NA PRO 31/18/2ii, fos. 349v–50r (L&P, XI, 441).

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Rome.3 Francis, in any case, had ceased to pay the pension due to the king of England even before war began with the Emperor in 1536 and there was no question of renewing it now that peace had come. Though neither Henry nor Francis wished to permit a General Council of the Church, the issue was enough to stimulate suspicion throughout the 1530s. In 1532, a new Anglo-French treaty (negotiated by Gilles de La Pommeraye, after whom it is named) had agreed mutual aid at sea in case of invasion by the Emperor and an agreement on each side not to make any treaty to the prejudice of the other. When Francis demanded aid of Henry during his war with Charles V in 1536–1537, Henry argued he had conceded simply ‘a ffrendely abstinence of payment’ of the pension but Francis had subsequently done nothing to dissuade the Pope from his Bull of Excommunication. Based on this, Stephen Gardiner, then ambassador, argued that the Pommeraye treaty had been nullified by Francis’s alliance with Clement VII and by marrying his daughter to the King of Scotland.4 At the same time Henry and Cromwell were able (not perhaps very seriously) to dangle the prospect of entering the war on the Emperor’s side before Francis’ enemy. Neutrality, formally proclaimed in August 1536, meant giving each side to understand there was a hope of catching Henry’s alliance.5

3 E. Hamy, Entrevue de François Ier avec Henry VIII à Boulogne-sur-Mer en 1532 (Paris, 1898). Francis’ intervention with Clement VII came too late for Henry, however. By 1534 he was pressing Francis to follow his example in breaking with the Pope (Mémoire of Francis I in answer to Rochford and Fitzwilliam, 24 April 1534, BnF fr. 3005, fos. 131–132: the French king saw nothing contrary to ‘le droit divin’ in Henry’s acts and accepted that he had good cause in what he had done. He could not do so himself since this would only be to ‘se perturber et travailler’ when he was at peace.). 4 Francis I to bishop of Tarbes and bailli of Troyes, 20 April 1536, N. Camusat, Mélanges historiques (Troyes, 1644) fos. 14v–17r (J. Kaulek, Correspondance politique de MM. De Castillon et de Marillac (Paris, 1885), no. 1); Henry VIII to Gardiner and Wallop, 30 April 1536, L&P, X, 760; Cromwell to Gardiner and Wallop, 8 June 1537 L&P, X, 1084; Henry VIII to Francis I, 8 June 1536, ibid., X, 1085; Henry VIII to Gardiner, 15 Feb. 1538, BL Add. 25114, fo. 282; Gardiner, instructions for his successor Bonner, 20 Aug.[1538], Muller, Letters of Stephen Gardiner, pp. 82–83 (L&P, XIII, ii, 143). The bishop of Tarbes was clear that Gardiner had been sent to answer the French demands for aid by prolonging all sorts of disputes before the French Council (Antoine de Castelnau, bp. of Tarbes to Chancellor Dubourg, 8 Feb. 1537, AN J 967 no. 3/8). 5 Chapuys to Charles V, 5, 12, 22 August 1536, NA PRO 31/18/2ii, fos. 186–187, 188–191, 197–203 (L&P, XI, 219, 285, 479). On English proclamation of neutrality, Chapuys to Charles V, 25 Aug. 1536, NA, PRO 31/18/2ii, fos. 192–193 (L&P, XI, 358).

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But what had seemed a strong position for Henry by staying out of war in 1536–1537 had evaporated by the end of 1538. Henry had not been included in the truce of Nice, as his agents insisted that Francis had promised to do in any agreement with the Emperor. This personal encounter of the sovereigns was given huge symbolic significance on both sides.6 It led Henry at the end of the year to change his truculent tone with the French ambassador for a more genial one, graciously abandoning any idea of a marriage between Mary and the prince of Portugal and insisting that, should Charles fail to return Milan to Francis, it would be none of his doing.7 Worse still, in January 1539, Francis and Charles agreed the Treaty of Toledo, which contained a ‘secret’ clause that neither would negotiate with Henry. The height of the anxiety perhaps came that spring, when it looked – though only momentarily – as though both Francis and the Emperor had withdrawn their ambassadors.8 In fact, the French embassy was rapidly filled by Charles de Marillac and, though the Emperor was to be represented by a minor diplomat, there was no complete break. Anxiety was expressed in one of the most massive programmes of fortification embarked upon by the English crown before modern times, when the coasts of England from Cornwall to Berwick were equipped with modern artillery fortresses in 1538–1539.9 The same fears were also reflected by Cromwell’s schemes for using the German Protestant princes as counterweights to Francis and Charles.10

6 In 1536, Francis had offered to Henry that he should be comprehended in any Franco-Imperial treaty but was told that Henry was accustomed to be principal contrahent in any treaty (L&P, X, 760). On the Truce of Nice, see H. Keniston, ‘Peace negotiations between Charles V and Francis I (1537–1538),’ Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 102, ii (1958), 142–147. A more recent study places the emphasis on the symbolic significance of the meetings (X. Le Person, ‘A moment of ‘resverie’: Charles V and Francis I’s encounter at Aigues-Mortes (July 1538), French History, 19 (2005), 1–27. 7 Castillon to Montmorency, 22 Dec. 1538, BL Add. 33514, fos. 7–8 (Ribier, I, pp. 333–334): ‘autant que j’ay trouvé le Roy autres foys hault et superbe, maintenant je le trouve tant doux [et] gracieux qu’on ne scauroyt plus.’ Earlier in the month, Anglo-French relations had been at a low point (Castillon to du Bellay, 5 Nov. 1538, R. Scheurer (ed.), Correspondance du cardinal Jean du Bellay, 3 vols. (Paris, 1969– 2008), III, p. 143, L&P, XIII, ii, 752). 8 12 Jan. 1539. For mention of this in Nov. 1541, Francis to Marillac, 23 Nov. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1372. 9 The programme cost nearly £290,000 over four years (H. Colvin, History of the King’s Works: IV, 1485–1660 (London, 1982) pp. 370–371). 10 R. McEntegart, Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden (Woodbridge, 2002).

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Another moment of danger seemed to come at the end of 1539, with the journey of the Emperor through France and his triumphal reception at Paris. Promises were then made that all outstanding FrancoImperial differences would be solved by the allocation of Milan to a French prince and his marriage to a Habsburg princess. That these promises would remain a dead letter on the return of the Emperor to his own territories could not then have been known. When the French and Imperial ambassadors came to notify Henry of the meeting and of the invitation to James V to join in the celebrations, the English were ‘greatly astonished, never having seen two ambassadors, both from you, Sire, and from the Emperor go together by common agreement to this court.’ Henry’s ministers seemed convinced that war was imminent against ‘leur paouvre Roy.’ Marillac described Cromwell’s reaction in particular as a sign of ‘the jealousy, defiance, fear and trouble they are in.11 From their posts with the Emperor and King at the very end of 1539, Wyatt and Bonner advised: ‘we had rather Your Majeste did yet dowt the worst, that is to say thire conclusion, than to conceive uncertain hope of thire disagreement.’ It may have helped that in private Bonner reported to Cromwell that the causes of the meeting had been, on the Emperor’s part ‘necessite, feare on all sides & very povertie’ and, on that of Francis, ‘vayne hoope, vayne glorie, folie, lightenes, and ambition’ but Bonner was a known blusterer.12 We now need to ask how quickly Henry became aware of the change in his negotiating power after this shock but also to clarify the context of the three-sided relationship of rulers who were circling each other, looking for signs of weakness, ready to seize on any opportunity to exploit. What could Henry and his fellow monarchs expect? First, Henry had been at peace with France since 1525 and had derived some benefits from that alliance. Then, his relations with the Emperor had been very poor since the repudiation of Catherine of Aragon. In the Franco-Imperial war of 1536–1538, Henry had stood on the sidelines (for certain obvious internal reasons) but had suffered the danger and

11 Marillac to Francis I, 13 Nov. 1539, BL Add. 33,514, fos. 27–28 (Kaulek, p. 143, L&P, XIV, ii, 508): ‘grandement esmerveillé, pour n’avoir veu deux ambassadeurs de vous sire et dud. Sr. Empereur aller par commung advis en ceste court.’ ‘la jalosye, defiance, peur et trouble où ilz sont entrez.’ 12 Wyatt and Bonner to Henry VIII, 30 Dec. 1539, BL Harl. 282, fo. 155; Bonner to Cromwell, 30 Dec. 1539, BL Cotton, Calig. E IV, fo. 21. W. Honnings, ‘Certain notes,’ Dec. 1539: ‘Men of good iugement that I have herd common[ly] affirme verely that nothing shalbe treated betwixt thiese two princes anewe.’ BL Cotton E IV, fo. 25v.

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ignominy of near-ostracism when Francis and Charles came to terms. If there were to be a renewal of war between those monarchs (not conclusively certain until 1541) could Henry risk staying on the sidelines again? Plainly not, yet this raised the problem of which side to join. Henry was temperamentally more drawn to Francis but the one recent experience of Anglo-Imperial conflict (in 1528), had taught that this was not a viable option.13 The obvious course was to prepare for war with France; yet, to do so openly risked reducing Henry’s negotiating power. Nor could the Scots be left out of the equation. In previous conflicts they had been used skilfully by France to impede Henry’s military operations and no war with France could be launched without confronting them. It will be the argument here that nothing was decided in terms of grand strategic alliances in 1540, that everything remained open for exploitation. As a result, the participants could not be certain of the outcome and behaved in exceptionally devious ways toward each other. Henry VIII, Francis I and Charles V may have reached middle age but his did not reduce their appetite for war. It seems, though, to have made them more cautious. The result was that it took three and a half years from Charles’ visit to France for Henry openly to declare himself against France. He had received a jolt in 1538–1539 but had one major asset. The dissolution of the monasteries, along with a series of Parliamentary grants, had given his finances a significant boost. This had enabled him to embark on a serious programme of refortification and shipbuilding with unusual rapidity. Charles V, on the other hand, was notoriously short of ready cash while Francis would take time to marshal the formidable taxation resources of his kingdom. One further point should be remembered. Both in France and England, the years 1540–1542 saw ferocious struggles for influence around the kings, involving disgrace or death for leading ministers (Montmorency and Cromwell ) and a degree of uncertainty about who now held favour. This raises unusually delicate problems about who influenced the kings in this or that direction in matters of foreign policy, generally regarded as the domain of royal prerogative par excellence.

13 S.J. Gunn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy and the Domestic Crisis of 1527–1528,’ in S.J. Gunn and R. Lindley (eds.), Cardinal Wolsey: Church, State and Art, (Cambridge, 1991) pp. 149–177.

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Henry’s technique at the moment of Charles’ visit to France seems to have been to offer some form of provocation in order to find out which way the wind was blowing. So, Thomas Wyatt with the Emperor and Edmund Bonner with Francis, both under instructions to pursue the extradition of an otherwise unimportant exile named Brancetour, caused immense offence, each of them, by accusing their host prince of ‘ingratitude’ in not allowing his extradition.14 True, Bonner seems to have gone too far15 and Henry agreed to recall him, but he was known to use such tactics to spy out the land. French envoys to the Emperor reported Charles’ opinion that when Henry ‘felt himself to be in state of malady, he was prepared to stir up trouble so the nature of the illness became clear.’ Granvelle thought that he aimed to ‘to set fire to both of their majesties by these provocative words . . . to see if anything emerged to display their thoughts.’16 Granvelle told the French envoys that the Emperor was ever more inclined to his understanding with France and saw nothing new in Cromwell’s approaches.17 Francis I, though observed by Bonner to be pensive on his envoys’ return from escorting the Emperor to Cambrai,18 let his ambassador in England, Marillac, know that all differences between him and the Emperor were on the way to being solved.19 Marillac in turn observed that the English were anxious to reinforce the French alliance in light of the complete settlement between Francis and the Emperor and the reported likely settlement between the Emperor and the Turks; both of these developments might allow the continental powers to turn their arms against England.20 This was the dilemma confronted by 14 Wyatt to Henry VIII, 3 Feb. 1540, BL, Harl 282, fo. 113 (St.P., VIII, 240, L&P, XV, 161, K. Muir, Life and Letters of Sir Thomas Wyatt (Liverpool, 1963), no. 22) makes Henry’s direct order to negotiate in this way quite clear. Hellin and Lavaur, Brussels, 6 & 10 Feb. 1540, Ribier, I, pp. 497, 499–500. On Brancetour, see J.J. Scarisbrick, ‘The first Englishman round the Cape of Good Hope?’ Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 34 (1961), 165–77. 15 Francis to Marillac, 27 Jan. 1540, Kaulek, pp. 153–154 (L&P, XV, 121); Marillac, 2 Feb. 1540, Kaulek, 156 (L&P, XV, 154). 16 Selve and Hellin to Montmorency, 4 Feb. 1540, MC Chantilly, L XVI, fos. 245–246: ‘se sentoit avoir quelque indisposition il estoit content de faire ung peu the desordre affin que la maladye se declarast.’ ‘estinceler l’une et l’autre de leurs magestés par ces propos picquants . . . et s’il en sortiroit chose qui luy peust manifester leurs pensees.’ (G. Ribier, Lettres et Mémoires d’Estat 2 vols. (Blois/Paris, 1666), I, 496; L&P, XV, 169). 17 Selve and Hellin to Montmorency, 10 Feb. 1540, MC Chantilly, L XVI, fos. 250– 252 (including reports on Wyatt’s words to the Emperor). 18 Bonner, 26 Jan. 1540, St.P., VIII, 236 (L&P, XV, 115). 19 Francis to Marillac, 22 Jan. 1540, Kaulek, p. 152 (L&P, XV, 96). 20 Marillac to Mont, 2 Feb. 1540, BL 33,514, fo. 34 (Ribier, I, 495, Kaulek, p. 157, L&P, XV, 155).

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Henry in sending Norfolk to France. What did Henry have to offer, though? Norfolk was under orders to stress to Francis the disadvantages of his understanding with the Emperor. This is hardly a surprise, but Henry was unsubtle in the way he chose to do it. First, he advised Francis of what he stood to lose: the Turkish alliance and that of the German princes. These were valid enough points but Henry (or Cromwell) thought they could poison the French king’s mind by asserting that Charles had revealed to Thomas Wyatt that he knew of a scheme mooted at Calais in 1532. By this, Henry would have given up his pension and joined in a war against the Emperor; in return he would have received the Flemish coastal towns. Henry could only think, he declared, that a member of Francis’ council had revealed this (Montmorency was obviously intended). Henry added that Charles’ words to Wyatt about Brancetour that he was not being ungrateful to Henry because a superior could not be ungrateful to an inferior revealed his ultimate aims of universal dominion (a stock propaganda theme of the period).21 As for Milan, Henry offered his aid in getting it back and, crucially, put on the table giving up all the pension arrears and half the pension, stressing a point he returned to several times in these months: that the Emperor’s resources were low and he could get no money from Spain or the Low Countries.22 Norfolk left England in haste on 14 February and reached the little fortress town of Doullens, north of Amiens, where Francis was hunting.23 He was well lodged and quickly received by Francis in an after-dinner audience. Francis seemed annoyed about the reported words of the Emperor on ingratitude and asked for them to be put in writing. The duke was glad not to have done so before the King’s departure for hunting around Hesdin. Subsequent conversation with the Queen of Navarre confirmed her dislike of the Emperor but

21 The whole matter was blown up out of proportion as a means of finding out Francis’ thoughts, as can been seen by the different accounts of the words between Wyatt and the Emperor in Kaulek, pp. 163–164. Norfolk used the device of putting Francis on his guard against the Emperor’s ambition in February 1540 (17 Feb. 1540, St.P., VIII, 254; L&P, XV, 222) and Marguerite of Navarre responded to his suggestions by exclaiming ‘Will he have no equal, will he be God?’ (ibid. St.P., VIII, 258, L&P, XV, 223). In June 1541, it was Francis’s turn to persuade Henry that the Emperor ‘n’a aultre project que de se faire grant et et aspirer à ceste monarchie tant odieuse et préjudiciable à toute la chestienté.’ (Kaulek, p. 311, L&P, XVI, 885). 22 Instructions to Norfolk, Feb. 1540? St.P., VIII, 245 (L&P, XV, 145). 23 Marillac, 14 Feb. 1540, Kaulek, 161 (L&P, XV, 202) on his departure, Norfolk to Henry, 17 Feb. St.P., VIII, 254 (L&P, XV, 222).

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caution about whether the Constable’s policy could be destabilised.24 A second meeting was scheduled at Abbeville, while on 21 February Henry told Norfolk to find out if Franco-Imperial reconciliation had any chance. If not, he was to enter clearly into talks about an AngloFrench alliance with the German Protestants, offering the remittance of part of the pension.25 Fortunately, despatches could be got to Abbeville from London in 36 hours, so Norfolk was able to use this when he met the French king again on the 23rd. He also presented the new ambassador, John Wallop, a soldier, fluent French speaker and former ambassador to Francis much more likely to be well regarded in France than his predecessor, Bonner.26 The outcome of the mission was mixed; Francis stressed he would not abandon the Emperor if he kept his promises but Norfolk claimed to have left with the impression that he was still Henry’s good friend. Moreover, he had made useful contacts with Marguerite of Navarre and Mme d’Etampes which were to be of lasting use in the coming faction struggles within France.27 Norfolk and Wallop seem to have concluded that peace was likely for the rest of the year – ‘we shall lyve in peax for this yere’ – but that the Deputy of Calais ‘shuld put all thinges in reddynes, as though ye shuld have warre.’28 In fact, reports from Wyatt confirmed the likelihood that no early agreement was possible on Milan and Marillac was clear that the English fears of war had receded.29 However, Wyatt was also careful to emphasise that some in the Emperor’s entourage had told him that that Charles and Francis would remain friends ‘in spyte of the devill.’30 Norfolk would not return to France except to lead one of Henry’s armies in 1544 but his mission in some ways set the agenda for the next two years. It showed that the Anglo-French relationship depended on the Franco-Imperial relationship and that Henry could expect nothing without exploiting the differences between his fellow monarchs. 24

Norfolk, 17 Feb. 1540, L&P, XV, 223. Henry, 22 Feb. 1540, St.P., VIII, 261 (L&P, XV, 233). 26 In a treatise on Anglo-French relations dated around 1533, Wallop is described as ‘a singular man both in court and feild, and of whome the French kinge made so great accompt that his Majestie allowed hym for a gentle man of his chamber.’ BL Arundel 151, fo. 423r. 27 Norfolk, 23 Feb. 1540, St.P., VIII, 275 (L&P, XV, 253). 28 Wallop to Lisle, 27 Feb. 1540, SP3/8, fo. 47 (L&P, XV, 270). 29 Wyatt, L&P, XV, 320; Cromwell to Wallop, 12 March 1540 St.P., VIII, (L&P, XV, 332); Marillac, 3 Mar. 1540, 26 Mar 1540 Kaulek, 167, 173. 30 Wyatt, 14 March 1540, Muir, Letters of Sir Thomas Wyatt, p. 152 (L&P, XV, 344). 25

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The drift of Henry’s policy hardly changed as a result of Cromwell’s execution. Bonner had been close to the minister but was protected by Norfolk as well. Wallop, his successor, was also close to Norfolk,31 as of course was Lord William Howard, who replaced him in January 1541, though that replacement and Wallop’s brief imprisonment were signs of Henry’s growing suspiciousness. Wallop’s task seems to have been to exploit the growing tensions in the French court caused by Francis’s disappointment at the Emperor’s delay in fulfilling his obligations over Milan. Here, his ability to cultivate the women who had reason to hate Montmorency, Marguerite of Navarre and Mme d’Etampes, was vital. Wallop’s extraordinary tête-à-tête with the Queen of Navarre in April revealed that the king ‘now of late hathe geven eare merveylously well’ to Mme d’Etampes and, though Marguerite was reluctant to act openly for fear of seeming partial, she recommended secret negotiations through Longueval, a favourite of the royal mistress.32 Marguerite went on in further exchanges to report her brother disturbed at news from the Emperor and remarked that France and the Habsburgs were like the Guelfs and Ghibellines; it was hardly surprising if agreement were difficult. Mme d’Etampes characteristically requested horses from Henry and these she duly received. Marguerite, though, was under pressure both over the proposed marriage of her daughter to the duke of Cleves and over her religious views. She claimed to have been slandered and assured Wallop of her continuing regard for Henry.33 It is fatal to regard her as uncomplicatedly pro-English; she was far from that.34 All the same, there were moments when reconciliation with Henry suited her purposes. In 1542, she reminded Paget that she had told Norfolk in 1540 that Montmorency had ‘wrought all the mischief he could against the

31 Cruser to Goghreff, chancellor of Cleves, 30 March 1541: ‘car ledit duc a tousiours grandement aimé ledit Wollop et ont esté une main.’ (SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 211). 32 Wallop to Cromwell, 18 April 1540, St.P., VIII, p. 318 (L&P, XV, 543). 33 Wallop to Cromwell, 29 March 1540, St.P., VIII, 289 (L&P, XV, 418); s to s, 18 April St.P., VIII, 318 (XV, 543); Pandolfo de Stuffa to Cavalcanti, April 1540, L&P, XV, 544; Wallop and Carne to Henry VIII, 23 July 1540, St.P., VIII, 400 (L&P, XV, 904). Wallop later said that he always kept the Queen of Navarre ‘in store’ for the checking of information (1 Dec. 1540, St.P., VIII, 487, L&P, XVI, 306). 34 H.M. Vose, ‘Marguerite of Navarre: “That Righte English Woman”,’ SixteenthCentury Journal, XVI (1985), 315–334.

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Kinges Majestie your maister’ but that she and Mme d’Etampes were now Henry’s ‘handmaydes.’35 Marillac reported in mid-March 1540 that Henry really desired amity with France and that opinion at court had turned against the Emperor; but he deplored loose talk in French taverns about a coming Franco-Imperial war. From France he was receiving instructions even from Montmorency that Francis was inclined to Henry’s friendship. A month later, Wyatt reported from the Netherlands that, as for the Emperor’s relations with France, they were ‘as cold as tho the things passid had bene but dremis.’36 Though Marillac reported Cromwell as ‘on the point toppling’ (‘en branle de trébucher’) in April 1540, he had recovered enough to be created earl of Essex and the Frenchman was taken by surprise at his arrest and execution in June–July. This raises the question of how far Cromwell’s foreign negotiations contributed to his downfall. The project for an Anglo-Protestant alliance was partly of his making, though he was not alone in promoting it; there were good reasons for it in 1539. Gardiner certainly opposed the German alliance as impracticable but Norfolk seems to have shown no serious differences of strategy in foreign affairs before June 1540. Marillac reported Cromwell and all the other ministers as eager to stress their preference for a French alliance, while opinion at court, he thought, had turned sharply against the Emperor.37 Cromwell is often assumed to have been, by preference, a supporter of the Habsburg alliance but, this being impossible, he was forced to fall back on the Germans. He was widely held responsible in France for the stripping of the English Church. Francis, in his comment on Wallop’s report of Cromwell’s arrest was quick to report his pleasure at the fall of one: Who alone has been the cause of all the suspicion and ill-will he has conceived not only against his friends but also against his closest, most loyal and best servants . . . My cousin the duke of Norfolk can very well remember what I told him about it when he last visited me.38

35

Paget to Henry VIII, 26 Feb.[1542], St.P., VIII, p. 660, no. 710. Marillac, 12 March 1540, Kaulek, p. 169 (L&P, XV, 334); same to Mont, 23 April 1540, Kaulek, p. 177 (XV, 563); Wyatt to Cromwell. 12 April 1540, Muir, Letters of Sir Thomas Wyatt, p. 166 (L&P, XV, 508) see also 18 April (XV, 543). 37 Gardiner to Cromwell, Feb. 1536, Muller, Letters . . . Stephen Gardiner, pp. 71–75. Marillac to Mont, 10 April 1540, Ribier, I, 513 (L&P, XV, 486); Marillac to Mont, 8 May 1540, Kaulek, 181, (L&P, XV, 612). 38 Francis to Marillac, 15 June 1540, Kaulek, p. 191 (L&P, XV, 785): ‘qui seul a esté cause de tous les suspections et malveillances qu’il a conçues non seullement contre 36

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Naturally, no hint of this conversation emerges from Norfolk’s despatches, though there is no reason to doubt it took place in some form. The essence was hinted at by Cardinal Jean du Bellay in conversations with Wallop. The cardinal suggested that Castillon, on his return from England in 1539, had reported rumours that Cromwell would aim to marry the Lady Mary.39 This was preposterous but grist to the mill of Cromwell’s enemies. The French clearly believed that Cromwell’s death removed a road block to an Anglo-French understanding. Marillac seemed to think, in his report of Cromwell’s execution on 29 July, that Norfolk now has ‘le principal maniement des affaires’ a term which would be equivalent to the role Montmorency still exercised in France. He also thought Norfolk sympathetic to France, a French view confirmed by Chapuys a year later.40 The role of Norfolk, though, is not that clear. By October 1540, it had become established that ambassadors should correspond with the King and the Council, rather than with an individual chief minister as in France.41 It is fairly clear that by the summer of 1540, Francis was anxious to maintain friendship with England, buoyed up by Marillac’s reports that Henry was similarly inclined. Not that such an experienced observer was being naïf; he was quite clear that Henry was as abusive about Francis to others as he was about the Emperor to him. Nevertheless, ‘he never once made mention of either pensions or tribute, not any sign of discontent about the fortification of Ardres;’ Henry did, though, drop heavy hints that friends had been preferred recently who had not been such straightforward allies as he had.42 Marillac, though a hard-headed diplomat, was also profoundly shocked at internal developments in England: treason by words, the Act of Proclamations, weakness of Parliament, all kinds of arbitrary condemnations and the despoliation of the Church. Henry, he thought, had turned himself into an object of

ses amys, mais contre ses plus privez, loyaulx et meilleurs serviteurs . . . Et se pourra très bien souvenir mon cousin le duc de Norfolk de ce que je luy en diz quant il vint dernierement par devers moy.’ 39 Abstract of letters of Wallop, 16 June 1540, BL Harl. 288, no. 47; BL Cotton, Calig. E IV, fo. 42 (L&P, XV, 792); Wallop to Henry, 5 July 1540 St.P., VIII, 376 (L&P, XV, 842). 40 Marillac to Montmorency, 29 July 1540, Kaulek, p. 207 (L&P, XV, 926); Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 22 Feb. 1541, L&P, XVI, 554. 41 Pate, 4 Oct. 1540, St.P., VIII, 443 (L&P, XVI, 122). 42 Marillac to Montmorency, 6 July 1540, Kaulek, p. 198 (L&P, XIV, 848): ‘il ne m’en feit oncques mention, n’y [sic] de pensions, ny de tribut, ny démonstration d’estre mal content pour la fortification d’Ardres.’

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idolatry (‘une vraye statue pour ydolâtres’). With the executions of July 1540, the King was in a state of ‘défiance et crainte,’ unable to trust any one minister and at court his ministers struggled to undermine each other and gain their own advantage. This was how England looked to France at this time and had been foreseen by Montmorency.43 Henry’s unpredictability was to take its toll of his servants abroad; Bonner was for while under a cloud, Wyatt was arrested in January 1541, Wallop was arrested on his return from France at the same time (by a particularly nasty entrapment worthy of Stalin) and Richard Pate, at the end of his embassy to Charles V, simply absconded to Rome in justified fear of arrest.44 Such events easily fed into the two Kings’ preconceptions about each other that we have seen already. For his part, Montmorency was assuring the Imperial ambassador in August that there would be no new alliance with England45 but the logic of the situation and his reduced favour forced him to alter his tone towards the end of the year. By then he was dealing in a more agreeable way with the English envoys, a fact complained of by the Papal nuncio.46 The reason for this is almost certainly that from August 1540, the English government started to destabilise relations with France, using time-honoured methods. The Statute of Strangers inevitably caused offence but it was the continual insistence on the extradition of an otherwise insignificant ‘traitor’ who called himself ‘Blancherose’ that gave the game away. There was no obvious reason why such efforts should have been commanded from Wallop in this domain. The sending of Gardiner on embassy to the Emperor (the purpose of which remained mysterious) was also a source of French anxiety. For their part, the French were quick to raise all their own grievances about extradition and an old grudge, the Rochepot case, used in the late 1530s especially to turn the temperature of Anglo-French relations up and down.47 Such efforts were still being prosecuted in

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Marillac to Francis and Montmorency, 6 Aug. 1540, Kaulek, pp. 208–213 (L&P, XV, 953–954). 44 Even in 1542, Henry Knyvet was under a cloud when he was recalled from the Emperor’s court and lingered at Orléans on his return from Spain until he knew what to expect (L&P, XVII, 441). 45 Saint-Vincent to Charles V, 10 August 1540, AN K 1485, no. 14. 46 Howard, St.P., VIII, p. 568, Ferrerio to Farnese, 13 July 1540, ANG, I, pp. 580– 584. 47 D. Potter, ‘International politics and naval jurisdiction in the sixteenth century: the case of François de Montmorency,’ European Studies Review, 7 (1977), 1–27; idem,

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December 1540.48 The other cause of conflict was the response (much delayed) to French refortification of Ardres on the border of the Calais Pale early in the year. From September, a small guerrilla conflict began over a patch a land between Guînes and Ardres (the Cowswade) which was certainly unleashed by the English (see chapter 3). So, Gardiner’s grand embassy to the Emperor and reports of aggressive English troop movements at Calais in December 1540 added an incentive for Montmorency to be more agreeable.49 The English accepted French offers to negotiate about the border in November.50 So, on 14 November at Fontainebleau took place the justly celebrated event, copiously reported by Wallop, in which Francis proudly displayed the panelling of his chamber and gallery, helping the English ambassador up on a bench. Wallop thought that the French could hardly have been displeased about Gardiner’s embassy, or ‘I should neither have been holp up ne down the bench.’ Shortly afterwards, Francis was getting Wallop to taste the pork and venison pies he was preparing to send Henry for the festive season.51 Inexorably, the terms of trade between England and France began to shift during 1540. By perhaps no great efforts of his own or by his councillors, Henry VIII, from having been the pariah of Christendom, metamorphosed into a sought-after ally. A telling indicator of this was a letter of advice written by Montmorency (after all struggling to maintain his foothold in the King’s confidence)52 at the end of December 1540. The ambassador in Rome had relayed word of Anglo-Imperial marriage talks and Marillac had reported a more militant attitude in England (though Norfolk and

‘The Constable’s brother: François de Montmorency, sieur de la Rochepot (c. 1496– 1551), Nottingham Medieval Studies, xlviii (2004), 141–197. 48 Blancherose: L&P, XVI, 37, 56, 57, 82, 174; Wallop to Henry, 24 Dec. 1540, St.P., VIII, 497, (L&P, XVI, 350). The identity of Blancherose as one ‘Dick Hosier’ is given in Instructions to Lord William Howard, 1541, St.P., VIII, p. 513: a ‘comen murderer remayneng there naming himself the Blaunche Rose, being his name in deade Dic Hosier.’ On this case, see J.G. Bellamy, The Tudor Law of Treason (London, 1979), ch. 3. 49 Monluc to Montmorency, 21 Dec. 1540, Ribier I, pp. 550–552. 50 Marillac to Francis, 16 Nov. 1540, Kaulek, p. 241 (L&P, XVI, 269); Francis to Marillac, 24 Nov. 1540, Kaulek, p. 245 (L&P, XVI, 289). 51 Wallop to Henry VIII, 17 Nov. 1540, St.P., VIII, 479 (L&P, XVI, 276); 31 Dec. 1540, St.P., VIII, 507 (L&P, XVI, 368). 52 See D. Potter, ‘Politics and Faction at the Court of Francis I: the duchesse d’Etampes, Montmorency and the Dauphin Henri,’ French History, July 2007, pp. 1–20; idem, ‘Anne de Pisseleu, duchesse d’Etampes, maîtresse et conseillère de François Ier’ in C. Michon (ed.), Les conseillers de François Ier (Rennes, 2011), pp. 535–56.

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other ministers were protesting themselves friends of France). This evidence indicated that Henry ‘chercheroit de se mouuoir contre vous.’ Added to which, Sire, the journey of the bishop of Winchester with such a large train to the Emperor, without your ever being able to discover the reason; considering also on the other hand what Marillac wrote about the Emperor’s ambassador in England, the discussions that go on there, the long-term preparations that are made there all give pause for thought.

This gave added reason, in his view, to redouble efforts to strengthen Ardres. This came at a time when a recent papal nuncio declared to Jean de Monluc that Montmorency was the ‘principal’ of those who favoured Henry at the French court, while the Constable told William Howard that, though he had been known as an Imperialist in his search for peace, he was more bound to Henry for the latter’s kindly treatment on his Garter embassy in 1527; Howard even described him as ‘chif setter fourth’ of Henry’s affairs at the French court (surely an exaggeration).53 What gave cause for optimism in France was the recurrence of what seemed like murderous faction fighting in England, with so many arrests in January 1541. This gave Marillac confidence to assert that, as long as the English fought each other they ‘will undertake nothing against the King of France, but will seek his friendship more than ever’ ‘and the principal ministers in England all protested their friendship for France.54 On the other hand, the recall of Wallop and his replacement by Lord William Howard, Norfolk’s brother, did not bode well for close relations. Marillac noted the trumping up of charges and was beginning to wonder whether the acts of tyranny in the past were not so much Cromwell’s doing as those of his master.55 Howard

53 Marillac’s despatches of 22 December, Kaulek, pp. 249–251, Ribier, I, p. 552 (L&P, XVI, 343–344); Marillac to Montmorency, 31 Dec. 1540, Kaulek, p. 353 (L&P, XVI, 375); Montmorency to Francis, 31 Dec. 1540, Ribier, I, p. 556 (L&P, XVI, 376): ‘Et joignant, Sire, là dessus l’allée de l’Euesque de Vincestre si bien accompagné deuers ledit Empereur, sans que vous en ayez jamais peu sçauoir l’occasion; considerant aussi d’autre part ce que ledit Marillac écrit de l’Ambassadeur d’iceluy Empereur qui est audit Angleterre, les propos qui se tiennent-là, les prouisions de longue main qui s’y font . . . il y a . . . . quelque chose à penser là-dessus.’ Jean de Monluc to Montmorency, 21 Dec. 1540, Ribier, I, pp. 548–550; Howard to Henry VIII, 10 Feb. 1541, St.P., VIII, 519 (L&P, XVI, 528); Howard, 18 March 1541, St.P., VIII, 542 (L&P, XVI, 633). 54 Marillac to Francis and Montmorency, 18 Jan. 1541, Kaulek, pp. 261–263 (at 263); 12 Feb. 1541, Kaulek, p. 267 (L&P, XVI, 533): ‘n’entreprendront rien contre le roi de France, mais rechercheront son amitié plus que jamais.’ 55 Marillac to Francis, 10 March 1541, Kaulek, p. 275 (L&P, XVI, 608): ‘il n’estoit

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was widely reported to be an agreeable youngish man of good will but not one to conduct complex negotiations. It is as though Henry were giving a signal that he would put Anglo-French negotiations on hold. How true this is difficult to say. Norfolk had been pursuing his brother’s appointment to the French court since the recall of Bonner but, according to Chapuys, had been frustrated in this by Cromwell, yet Wallop was hardly a Cromwellian.56 By the spring of 1541, the tectonic plates of international relations were beginning to shift. Charles was in Germany negotiating with the princes, rumours proliferating of a marriage alliance between him and the Lady Mary. Francis and his advisers were having to plan for war and Henry VIII was becoming increasingly moody, dissatisfied with his ministers and looking for a way out of a situation in which all he could do was try to anticipate his fellow monarchs’ plans. It is not surprising that Henry was heard to remark that he had been ‘made’ to put to death the best servant he had ever had in Cromwell.57 The factions in the courts of England and France were both in ferment especially in the light of what was thought to be impending war. Henry was strengthening his border against the Scots, warning James V not to dance to the French tune (‘danser au son des Françoys’) as was usual.58 For his part, Francis insisted he would never consent to war by the Scots as long as Henry was his ally (a rather double-edged remark at best) and, indeed, his interests could not have been served by provoking war with England at this juncture.59 On the other hand, April-May 1541 was a moment of intense speculation about war both in England and northern France.60

du tout aucteur de si piteuse tragédye, ains qu’il jouet son roolle ainsi qu’on luy recordoit.’ 56 On Howard’s appointment see his credence and instructions, 18 Jan. 1541, St.P., VIII, 511 (L&P, XVI, 464), which suggest no major démarche (though tellingly to bring up the Dick Hosier/Blancherose case when convenient), and comments by Marillac, 12 Jan. 1541 (Kaulek, pp. 257–260, L&P, XVI, 459, 450); Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 8 Jan. 1541, L&P, XVI, 436. 57 Marillac to Montmorency, 3 March 1541, Kaulek, p. 274 (L&P, XVI, 590) Rumours that Henry intended to put away his new wife and the ‘il regrette grandement son Cramel’ (Cruser to Goghreff, Blois, 30 March 1541, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 211. 58 Instruction to Jean de Taix, 25 Mar. 1541, Kaulek, p. 282 (L&P, XVI, 650). 59 Francis to Marillac, 1 April 1541, Kaulek, p. 282 (L&P, XVI, 683). 60 In June, Henry Cornish, lieutenant of Jersey for the earl of Hertford, was reporting rumours of war there and the arrest of a Jersey ship at Brest (HMC MSS of the Marquess of Bath, Seymour papers, [HMC, Bath MSS] IV, p. 79).

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chapter one Henry, Francis and the German Princes

During 1538 and 1539, as the Franco-Imperial rapprochement took shape, a small troubled cloud began to develop on the borders of the Netherlands. Charles d’Egmont, duke of Guelders, who had spent his life struggling to maintain his rights against, first, Maximilian and then Charles V, died in June 1538. Charles had been a French ally for much of his reign and had at one point (1534) recognised Francis I as his feudal lord.61 But he had finally reached agreements with the Emperor (1528, 1536) which accepted Egmont’s rights. The trouble was that the Habsburgs had inherited from Charles the Bold a claim to the duchy by purchase and the duke died childless. For the Estates of Guelders, the priority was the maintenance of their independence and in 1538 they accepted their neighbour, William of Cleves (who had an hereditary claim through his mother) as their duke.62 William in turn inherited his parents’ territories of Cleves-Julich-Berg in 1539 and looked set to create a powerful entity between the Emperor’s patrimonial lands and Germany. Both Henry VIII and Francis I were closely involved in negotiations with the duke in the late 1530s and early 1540s, William attempting as far as he could to maximise his negotiating strength with the Emperor. Charles, for his part, was determined to vindicate his right to Guelders and Overijssel and thus round off his Netherlands territories. The duchy of Cleves was not yet Lutheran but its Duke was an erasmian reformer and the territory had its own church order from 1532. William, not yet formally a Protestant, was therefore in a good position to exploit connections with the Schmalkaldic League in order to continue Charles d’Egmont’s policy of resisting the Emperor. One complication was that the Elector of Saxony was a rival for the succession to his lands; this had to be settled.63 He was a tempting ally for England and France, even though these two powers were now increasingly sus-

61 G. Bers, Die Allianz, pp. 18–20. Agreement negotiated by Jacques Colin with Charles, 14 Oct. 1534 conferring a pension and a company of 100 lances on him, in return for which he promised to ‘servir bien et loyaument ledict seigneur Roy dorenavant à perpetuité.’ (BnF, fr. 23037, fos. 33–37). 62 For an impenetrable account of the legal dispute sent by Wotton to Cromwell, 27 April 1540, St.P., VIII, p. 330 (L&P, XV, 581). 63 P. Heidrich, Der geldrische Erbfolgestreit 1537–1543 (Kassel, 1896), pp. 27–44, 49–50.

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picious of each other. Both monarchies had long-standing traditions of alliance with Guelders going back to the 14th century.64 Francis had in fact sent the sieur de Beauvais to Cleves in 1538 to encourage the duke to take up the Guelders succession, ‘being sure and certain that the King of England his good brother and perpetual ally, since they are in all things one, will not fail for his part to say the same.’65 The FrancoImperial rapprochement was to a degree offset by the conclusion of the (however shaky) Anglo-Cleves alliance on Cromwell’s initiative and for a few weeks after the marriage of Henry and Anne of Cleves all seemed well. William saw his alliance with Henry as a support in his negotiations with the Emperor and the German secular Electors. Nevertheless, there were snags. William had not been willing to commit himself in the marriage treaty to allow Henry to raise men in his territory, partly because he still hoped to reach an agreement with the Emperor. Nor was William’s brother-in-law, the Saxon Elector John Frederick, convinced that Henry was a reliable ally for Protestants. Henry’s representative with William, Nicholas Wotton, reported that there was general contentment at Anne’s reception (!) though some disappointment at the ineffectiveness of Henry’s intercession for the duke with the Emperor. This was compounded by the failure of William’s visit to Brussels in the spring of 1540, when Wotton was at first not invited, to achieve an agreement.66 By the summer of 1540 Cromwell was dead and Anne of Cleves rejected, though Henry continued to protest his willingness to be the Duke’s ‘most perfect friend’ and dispenser of advice, while making it clear that he could do nothing for him unless he were more open about his plans. In any case, Henry was mainly concerned to get the Duke’s consent to his annulment of

64 See G. Nijsten, In the Shadow of Burgundy: the court of Guelders in the late Middle Ages (Cambridge, 2004): Duke Reinald II had married Eleanor of Woodstock, Edward III’s sister. 65 Instruction of Francis I to Etienne de Laigue, sr de Beauvais, 30 June 1538, A. Hulshof, Oorkunden aangaande de betrikkingen der geldersche vorsten tot Frankrijk (Arnhem, 1912) no. LXXX, pp. 185–187: ‘estant sceur et certain que le roy d’Angleterre son bon frère et perpétuel allyé, pour n’estre eulx deux que une mesme chose, ne fauldra de sa part de faire dire le semblable.’ 66 Heidrich, Der geldrische Erbfolgestreit, pp. 48–49; Wotton to Cromwell, 22 Feb., 6 March 1540, St.P., VIII, pp. 269, 276 (L&P, XV, 242, 302). On Wotton’s negotiations throughout, see B. Ficaro, ‘Nicholas Wotton, Dean and Diplomat’ (University of Kent Ph.D. thesis, 1981), pp. 47–73.

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the marriage.67 William had to swallow this but it seems likely to have propelled the duke into the arms of France. In the course of the 1530s, France had established a complex network of covert and open allies which was designed both to undermine the Emperor and gain access to the all-important supplies of professional German troops. In the later 1530s, prompted by Cromwell, Henry VIII also entered this arena and the Cleves alliance was part of a strategy of offsetting Franco-Imperial collaboration. William embarked on a connection with the Schmalkaldic League, later by marrying his younger sister, Amelie, to the Elector of Saxony’s brother and participating in the Diet of Hagenau in 1540 (the Elector John Frederick signed a treaty with Cleves in February 1540).68 The Prince Electors in general were keen to settle the matter between William and the Emperor, while it was in the interest of Charles V to isolate the duke from the Protestants as much as possible. William, reluctant to trust the Emperor as he was, had a difficult hand to play. Guelders gave him military resources and, as Wotton reported ‘all though the cowntreys and townes of Geldres be strong and wel fortifyed, yet the rest of his dominions is not, and speciallye the Duchies of Juliers and Monte [Berg] . . . . besydes that thEmperours powre and the Dukes be not lyke.’69 Francis I had well understood the strategic importance of Guelders and hoped to foster his contacts with the Protestant princes through the Duke of Cleves.70 The rejection of Anne of Cleves opened the way for another French initiative, pushed in France by Mme d’Etampes and her protégé Longueval, and as early as January 1540 William asked for the hand of Francis’ niece Jeanne d’Albret. This was ultimately to form a firm alliance. Just as Anne of Cleves was being divorced by Henry VIII, Hermann Cruser and Martin van Rossem negotiated a defensive alli-

67

Henry VIII to Wotton, [June] 1540 BL Cotton, Vit. XXI, 201 (L&P, XV, 1735); Wotton and Clerk to Henry VIII, 11 August 1540, St.P., VIII, p. 417 (L&P, XV, 970); Karl Harst to William, 26 June 1540, K.W. Bouterwek, ‘Anna von Cleve, Gemahlin Heinrichs VIII’ Zeitschrift des bergischen Geschichtsvereins, 6 (1869), pp. 162–180. 68 The Diet of Hagenau had originally been called to arrange a peace between the princes and the Emperor (see Francis I to the German princes, 15 May 1539, SAM, 1834, fo. 1). 69 Wotton to Henry VIII, 9, 15 April 1540, St.P., VIII, pp. 307, 312 (L&P, XV, 482, 519). Nijsten, In the Shadow of Burgundy, p. 400 points out the precocious adminstrative development of the duchy of Guelders in the late middle ages. 70 J.-Y. Mariotte, ‘François Ier et la ligue de Schmalkalde,’ Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte, 16 (1966), 206–242, at 224; Heidrich, Der geldrische Erbfolgestreit, p. 48.

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ance between Francis and Duke William (June 1540)71 and a proxy marriage concluded in July.72 Francis told Cruser that Wallop had indicated Henry’s approval of the negotiation but we know that Henry was immediately on the alert, warning Wallop to ‘fish out all their purposes’ and sending Edward Carne first to France and then to Germany to explain his position on the divorce of Anne of Cleves and get Francis to persuade William to accept his sister’s divorce.73 In July, when the English envoys first opened Henry’s strategy to repudiate Anne, Francis, in a rare expression of exasperation, exclaimed: ‘Oh Jhesus, y lenveay’ (‘Oh God, he’s getting rid of her!’) and let out a great sigh.74 Francis was closely interested in the reasons for Anne’s repudiation but treated Wallop and Carne’s suggestion that Henry could help in his negotiations with William with contempt.75 In fact, neither Wallop nor Carne seem to have known at this point that the Franco-Cleves alliance had been concluded, assuming that the Queen of Navarre’s known objections had prevented it.76 The Cleves alliance also had implications for French court politics. William’s ambassador in France reported in October 1540 that Montmorency and du Bellay were seeking alliance in Germany through the Duke of Württemberg ‘to in that way get back into favour, to my lord’s ruin.’ Frotté, Marguerite’s secretary, insisted that their main aim was to prevent the Cleves marriage from taking place and advised the duke to put off demands by the Schmalkaldic princes that he openly declare himself a Protestant, arguing that it would prevent his marriage. A year later, the friends of the duke in France were listed as Tournon, Admiral Chabot, Chancellor Poyet, Annebault, the chancellor of Alençon and Mme d’Etampes, ‘qui est entierement pour

71

Francis I’s commission to conclude an alliance with Cleves, Ribier, I, 529. Cruser to William, Paris, 23 July 1540, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 97–110; Heidrich, Der geldrische Erbfolgestreit, pp. 45–56. 73 Cruser to William, 23 July 1540, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 97v (‘die konigin von Navarren Frotté an ons laten te weten dat die engelischen hedden alle ire gescheffte dem Connestable ontdect;’ Henry VIII to Wallop, 22 June 1540, St.P., VIII, 362 (L&P, XV, 801). 74 Wallop and Carne to Henry, 10 July 1540, St.P., VIII, 387 (L&P, XV, 870). 75 Wallop said to Francis that ‘yf the duke of Cleves take this matier wel according to reason, he shuld fynd your majestie redy to further his affaires, specially in his sute here . . . He answered rowndly therunto, that he woold doo therin, as he shuld see cause whie and no other wise, and therwith he departed.’ Wallop and Carne to Henry, 15 July 1540, NA, SP1/161, fos. 105–111 (L&P, XV, 890). 76 Wallop and Carne to Henry VIII, 23 July 1540, St.P., VIII, p. 400– (L&P, XV, 904). 72

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monseigneur.’77 More equivocal, of course, was Marguerite of Navarre, intensely reluctant that the marriage of William and her daughter should proceed but still keen to encourage a Protestant alliance; nor was the promotion of the Cleves alliance to be understood in France as sympathy for Protestantism any more than the domination of the court by anti-Protestant figures such as Tournon and d’Annebault excluded their support for an alliance with the princes.78 All the same, Marguerite, trying to convince the Cleves ambassador of her good will, hinted at the ill will of those around the king (‘la méchanceté d’aucuns d’entour du roy,’ meaning Tournon and Poyet, who had obviously shifted their ground).79 In December 1540, Barnabé de Voré, French envoy to the princes, sent a promise to her from the Landgrave of Hesse and Elector of Saxony not to abandon the Duke of Cleves but it is not clear whether he was working for or against the Protestants. He reported that, as for the princes’ views on the Emperor, ‘it is not possible to stir and enflame them against him more than they are’ yet within weeks there were signs of defection by the Landgrave to the Emperor and despite Marguerite’s writing to him to encourage his loyalty to the French alliance, he signed an agreement with Charles at Regensburg in June 1541. John Frederick of Saxony was more steadfast.80 The rejection of Anne of Cleves certainly had massive implications: it suggested that Henry was no longer so committed to an anti-Imperial stance but it also clarified the French position as chief patron of the (rather uncontrollable) Duke of Cleves. A papal nuncio (Poggio) even suggested that now was the time to reduce Henry to obedience and that, with the Cleves marriage out of the way, Charles V would be

77 Advis from Frotté, Oct. 1540, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 158–159; Cruser to Chancellor of Cleves, 9 Oct. 1540, 11 Oct. 1541, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 165–166: ‘pour par cela rentrer en leur credit et ruine de monseigneur.’ 78 Report of H. von der Planitz to John Frederick of Saxony, March 1541, G. Mentz, Johann Friedrich der Grossmütige, 3 vols. ( Jena, 1903–1908), II, pp. 347–349; Mariotte, p. 228. 79 Cruser to William, 16 Jan. 1541. SAD, Julich-Berg II, fo. 174 (Bers, p. 107). 80 Voré to Marguerite, Speyer, 25 Dec. 1540, V.-L. Saulnier, ‘Recherches sur la correspondence de Marguerite de Navarre’ Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 33 (1971), 34 (1972), nos. 820–821: ‘il n’est possible de les animer et enflamer à l’encontre de luy plus qu’ilz sont;’ Marguerite to Landgrave, 4 Feb. 1541, in support of Morelet du Museau’s mission. Ibid., nos. 822–821; Landgrave to Marguerite, 20 Feb. 1541, ibid., nos. 828–1.

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more inclined to Henry’s alliance.81 For his part, the rejection of Anne rendered Henry liable to suspicion over the negotiations between France and his former brother-in-law and he ordered Wotton, his envoy in Cleves, to be vigilant about the duke’s proposed journey to France.82 It was reported at the French court that the Emperor had said that Francis, in making his alliance with Cleves, was seeking to protect the duke from the Emperor but that he would make harsh war against the duke and would see whether Francis would help him. Francis affected not to believe this but declared ‘foy de gentilhomme’ that, if it were true, Charles would find that ‘I am the duke of Cleves’ friend and will give such support to him that the Emperor was never so bogged down with.’83 In the Spring of 1541, there was much talk of plans to re-unite Henry and Anne. Chapuys was sceptical, saying that Henry never took back a discarded wife, but Marguerite of Navarre was interested in the idea and passed some of Marillac’s despatches to the duke of Cleves to encourage him.84 In November of that year, with Katherine Howard under arrest, Marillac returned to the possibility of Anne’s being taken back. This, he thought ‘would be far the easiest means to make the alliance you desire and furthermore a good and firm league against the Emperor,’ especially as Anne was ‘more attractive than ever’ (‘plus belle qu’elle fut oncques’) and generally popular. Francis approved of this plan, though was sceptical whether Henry would marry again.85 As late as January 1542, Francis was assuring William that he was using his ambassador in England to promote Anne’s interests.86 For his part, Duke William sent messages to Henry’s councillors asking them to intervene to get Henry to take his sister back.87 Not surprisingly,

81

Poggio, 13 July 1540, L&P, XV, 888. Henry VIII to Wotton, 3 Oct. 1540 L&P, XV, 116. 83 Cruser to Chancellor of Cleves, 1 Sept. 1540, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 145: ‘je suys amy du duc de Cleves et luy monstreray tel secours qu’il ne fut oncques sy empesché.’ 84 Marillac to Marguerite, 29 Oct. 1541, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 343; Marillac to Marguerite, 17 Jan. 1542, Kaulek, pp. 381–383. 85 Marillac to Francis, 11 Nov. 1541, Kaulek, pp. 353–354 (L&P, XVI, 1332): ‘seroit moyen d’aultant plus aysé de faire l’aliance que désirez et daventaige bonne et forte ligue contre l’empereur;’ Francis to Marillac, 23 Nov. 1541, Kaulek, p. 368 (L&P, XVI, 1372). 86 C. du Boys to Duke of Cleves, 12 Jan. 1542, SAD, Julich-Berg II, fos. 370–371. 87 Southampton and Cranmer to Henry VIII, 12, 13 Dec. 1541, St.P., I, pp. 714, 717 (L&P, XVI, 1449). 82

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the Emperor was determined there should be no such reconciliation and pressed his envoy to get Henry promise not to help the Duke of Cleves.88 The Cleves-Albret marriage did not take place immediately because of the opposition of the bride’s parents, Henri d’Albret and Marguerite of Navarre. Nicholas Wotton, informed his master in April 1541 that William had been summoned to France for the marriage and the Wotton would not be allowed to accompany him; he thought it surprising that William had expressed no desire that Henry be informed. Henry ordered William Howard to watch his doings closely.89 Duke William travelled secretly and with a small party through the Ardennes to avoid being waylaid. Wotton reported that opinion in the duke’s territories was favourable to the marriage, though his absence deplored. He himself felt more isolated than ever and the Duke’s councillors ‘have kepte all theyr doinges as secrett from me as they cowde.’ Nevetheless, he was able to discover the complicated return route of the Duke and the fact that Francis had sent a thousand horse with him.90 As Anglo-French relations deteriorated, the Cleves alliance became ever more strategically important for France. The Cleves marriage, when it took place at Châtellerault in June 1541, signalled the end of Montmorency’s favour. It was awkward that a pamphlet appeared in France at the start of 1542, which attacked Henry’s repudiation of Anne and impugned his honour. The authorship was attributed to Givry, lieutenant-general of Champagne, captain of the guard and close to Admiral Chabot. Tackled on this, the French king was clearly embarrassed and promised to suppress the book but denied that the Duke of Cleves knew anything about it. It was a matter of folly, he asserted, at a time when it was possible Henry might still take Anne back.91 Morvilliers, passing through London on his way to Scotland in

88

Charles V to Chapuys, 26 Jan., 3 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 293. Wotton to Henry VIII, 22 April 1541, L&P, XVI, 748; Henry VIII to Howard, 27 April 1541, St.P., VIII, p. 553 (L&P, XVI, 761). 90 Wotton to Henry VIII, 13 June, 8 July 1541, BL Cotton, Vit. B XXI, fo. 215, St.P., VIII, p. 584 (L&P, XVI, 902, 980); Cruser to Chancellor Ghogreve, 25 March 1541, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 209–210 (Bers, pp. 110–111); Frotté to Cruser, Montmorillon, 8 July [1541], SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 167. On this period in general, see Ficaro, ‘Nicholas Wotton’ p. 70. 91 Paget to Henry VIII, 26 Feb. 1542, NA, SP1/169, fos. 34–40 (L&P, XVII, 128): ‘it wer a folie of him and specially now at this time for mens affections do alter and the lady Anne is yet of age to bear children and albeit the wynde hath bene contrarie it may some time turne.’ (fos. 35v/41v). 89

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December 1541, had praised the Duke to the skies, as well as the Elector of Saxony. Francis was even prepared to send William’s ambassador to him to the Worms Reichstag at the end of 1541 to make his case with the princes.92 All the same, there was a fly in the ointment for the duke of Cleves. His prospective bride clearly had no wish to join him and William was made painfully aware of this and of the opposition of the King and Queen of Navarre by April 1542.93 Provoked by an invention of Paget’s that he had heard Cleves and the Emperor were likely to come to terms, Chabot muttered that, before Jeanne was sent to Düsseldorf, the duke would have to do Francis ‘sum good service.’94 This was exactly what was being planned by Longueval, sent to Cleves in May 1542 in conjunction with the marshal of Guelders, Martin van Rossem (described by Wotton as ‘the best capteyn & manne of warre that is yn all these partyes’). He had been retained by Francis as Hauptman in October 1541 and the duke empowered to raise men anywhere he chose for the King. William seems to have had cold feet about war in May 1542, advised by his councillors not to stand out against the Empire, and had to be persuaded by pressure from Rossem and Longueval.95 So war between France and the Emperor was followed in July by an open declaration between Charles V and the Duke of Cleves.96 Pulling Back from the Brink (1541–1542) It seems that neither Henry nor Francis really wanted war in the spring of 1541 but that a momentum, compounded of rumour and real suspicions, nearly brought it about. Marillac, who had a real contempt for tavern news,97 put it cogently:

92 Chapuys to Charles V, 11 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1441; Francis I, instructions to Herman Cruser, 8 Oct. 1541, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 301–302, decipher. 93 Cruser to the Chancellor of Julich, last April 1542, and to Duke, 1 May 1542, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 379–381, 382–386. 94 Paget to Henry VIII, 22 April 1542, NA, SP1/170, fo. 27r ( L&P, XVII, 263). 95 Serrant to Chabot, May 1542, Bers, p. 227. 96 Wotton to Henry VIII, 2 April 1541, NA, SP1/165, fo. 97v (L&P, XVI, 748); Paget to Henry VIII, 15 May, 20 June 1542 L&P, XVII, 328, 418); Wallop to Council, 7 July 1542 (L&P, XVII, 464); Bers, Die Allianz, pp. 160–163; C. du Boys to Duke of Cleves, 31 Oct. 1541, SAD Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 316r (deciph). 97 Marillac, 12 Mar. 1541, L&P, XV, 334.

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chapter one A courier from the court who, as is usual with such people, speaking speculatively, has spread the rumour throughout this country that it is held for certain in France that war will be launched soon against the English. By such means, my lord, it can happen sometimes that, as a result of such reports, preparations are made by each side for their security and in the end for some trivial reason those who think they have the advantage attack roundly those over whom they think they have the advantage.98

Francis told Marillac to insist that he had no intention of inciting the king of Scotland to attack.99 At the end of April, Marillac was treated to a series of protestations by the Council, led by Norfolk, that English reinforcements at Calais were purely defensive and undertaken in the light of similar French moves. Naturally, he was pleased but suspected the reason was fear of rebellion in the north of England.100 For his part, Howard, who reported Francis’s action to suppress rumours of war, was under instruction to make the same case in France.101 This was welcome to the French. Marillac was instructed to respond positively but cautiously to Norfolk’s proposal: But in making such approaches you must do so with such delicacy that he [Norfolk] may in no way know that it comes from me and in addition you must hand over nothing in writing on your side or speak in front of witnesses.102

98 Marillac to Montmorency, 27 April 1541, Kaulek, pp. 294–295 (L&P, XVI, 763): ‘Ung courrier venant de la court, lequel, ainsi que le plus souvent telles gens parlent à l’adventure, a semé par tout ce pays qu’on tenoit pour chose assurée en France qu’on entameroit bientost la guerre aux Anglois et par telz moyens, monseigneur, il peult advenir aucunesfoys que les préparatifz estans faictz au moyen de ces rapports d’ung costé et d’aultre pour se tenir chacun sur ses gardes, à la fin soubs prétexte de quelque légière occasion ceulx qui pensent avoir l’adventaige viennent à s’attaquer à bon escient à ceulx qu’ilz estiment leurs inférieurs.’ 99 Marillac to Francis, 19 April 1541, Kaulek, 290 (L&P, XVI, 737). 100 Marillac to Francis and Montmorency, 30 April 1541, Kaulek, 293–5, (L&P, XVI, 769, 770). 101 Howard to Henry VIII, 19 April 1541, St.P., VIII, 551 (L&P, XVI, 740); Dandolo to Doge, 20 April 1541: ‘della bona volunta del quale [Henry VIII] pero il suo ambassatore ha fatto con Soa Christianissima Maestà tutto quelli piu ampli ufficii che si possono desiderare.’ (BnF, it. 1715, fo. 81). 102 Francis I to Marillac, 6 May 1541, Kaulek, pp. 300–301: ‘Mais il est requis qu’en tenant ces parolles ce soit avecques tel regard et dextérité qu’il [Norfolk] ne puisse aulcunement penser ne congnoistre que cela vienne de moy et avecq ce n’en bâillerez riens par escript de vostre part ny n’en parlerez devant aulcun tesmoing ‘ Marillac to Francis, 22 May, ibid., pp. 305–308.

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Clearly, the danger remained that the English might use evidence of this exchange to increase their clout with the Emperor. However, the fact that Marillac was reporting the defensive nature of English military preparations and Henry’s own confirmation of Norfolk’s words helped. In mid-May, Norfolk reminded Marillac of the failure of his embassy in February 1540 as a result of Francis’ vain trust in the Emperor. The French ambassador seized on this and, as instructed, spoke unofficially of his master’s inclination to an understanding and that if Norfolk could think of a plan to promote understanding, he would pass on any proposal to his master. Norfolk promised to report to the king secretly without the knowledge of his fellow councillors and recalled how they had pressed Henry to make war in 1540. This was a classic negotiating tactic but nonetheless useful. He came back next day to ask for more information and said he had been unable to speak to the King. The whole exchange is redolent of Henry’s suspicious mind. Marillac advised a cautious response in the light of past English behaviour and the fact that they were unlikely to go to war in 1541.103 How serious was this English proposal? It is inconceivable that Norfolk was not acting on instructions or that his colleagues knew nothing of what he was doing. Indeed, he was corresponding with the king about it in October.104 As we shall see, Gardiner was at the Emperor’s court to solicit an alliance, so Henry was weighing up the possibilities of two alliances. The existence of these talks, which Chapuys only discovered through his spy on Marillac’s staff in October, put a road-block in the way of an imperial alliance, though Chapuys thought the Anglo-French talks would not succeed.105 In the summer of 1541, Henry was preoccupied by the problem of the Scots, who could not be left to make mayhem in case of war (see chapter 2). For their part, the French responded favourably to Norfolk’s offers, as might be expected. Chapuys, erroneously, thought France eager for war with England in April–May 1541. It was a view reflected in reports by the Imperial ambassador in France about the eagerness for war with England on the part of French nobles and princes, such as the Guises, 103

Ibid., p. 308. On 11 June, Norfolk came to see Marillac for a ‘secret’ talk at 2 pm accompanied by 100 men in the middle of London (Kaulek, p. 314); Norfolk to Henry VIII, 31 Oct. 1541, St.P., I, p. 688 (L&P, XVI, 1304). 105 Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers Relating to the Negotiations Between England and Spain, Preserved in the Archives at Simancas and Elsewhere (1485–1558), ed. G.A. Bergenroth, P. de Gayangos, M.A.S. Hume, R. Tyler, 13 vols. (London, 1862–1954) [CSP Spain] VI, I, p. 167, p. 196. 104

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who were opposed to Mme d’Etampes.106 Despite the war scare, it did not make sense for France to attack Henry at this time, as the Venetian ambassador pointed out.107 There were also struggles for favour going on around Francis. Montmorency, who had gone on corresponding with Marillac up to the spring of 1541, was about to be publicly humiliated and exiled from court (14 June). Mme d’Etampes and her friends (including Admiral Chabot, now restored to favour) were in the ascendant.108 It is likely that Chabot, though not an unequivocal admirer of Henry VIII, would have favoured any move towards England and by August 1541 he was the King’s ministre-favori.109 Tournon and Annebault joined the dominant group as did secretary Breton. The main point was to secure at least the neutrality of England in the event of the coming war with the Emperor and for this reason offers by the Emperor were rejected for fear of prejudicing relations with potential allies. This was the crucial moment when the decision was probably taken in France to prepare for war with the Emperor.110 So, when Norfolk renewed his offers in May 1541, Francis ordered Marillac cautiously to offer the marriage of Orléans to the Lady Mary, with the cessation of the pensions as a dowry, a plan which had been mooted at Calais in 1532, when Chabot had been present.111 Indeed, Marillac was instructed to tell the English that Chabot was ‘someone who has always greatly desired and worked to maintain the king of England and me . . . in the continuance of the good and perfect friendship we have.’112 Norfolk tried to push things along by stressing that Henry was about to leave for the North and that Chapuys had received instruction to negotiate with his master (which was true). Marillac, still suspecting the ‘venom’ of a plan just to use French offers as a bargaining counter with the Emperor, played along but still refused

106 Chapuys to Charles V, 17 May 1541, L&P, XVI, 835; Saint-Vincent to Mary of Hungary, 7 May 1541 1541, HHSA, P.A. 41, fos. 46–49. 107 Dandolo to the Doge, 10 April 1541, BnF, it. 1715, fo. 71r–v. 108 Saint-Vincent to Mary of Hungary, 7 May 1541, HHSA P.A. 41, fo. 47r: ‘N’y a personne du conseil, du moings s’il veult regner, qui ose parler au Roy de chose petite ou grande, s’il ne scet premierement que madame le trouvera bon.’ 109 Capodiferro to Cardinal Farnese, 6 Aug. 1541, ANG III, 29, p. 71. 110 Francis to Marillac, 9 Aug. 1541, Kaulek, p. 325. 111 Francis to Marillac, 2 June 141, Kaulek, p. 311. Chabot himself was managing the negotiation in August (ibid., p. 331); Chabot to Marillac, 28 Aug. 1541, ibid., p. 333. 112 Francis I to Marillac, 9 Aug. 1541, Kaulek, p. 352: Chabot ‘est personnaige qui a tousjours grandement désiré et poursuivy d’entretenir ledit roy d’Angleterre et moy . . . en la continuation de la bonne et parfaicte amytié qui y est.’

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to commit Francis.113 By the time he received orders to put forward a marriage proposal unofficially, Henry had left for the North. He had in any case grasped the cardinal point that Henry would never agree to Mary’s legitimation or that her rights to the throne could be passed to a foreigner.114 Marillac was the only ambassador to follow Henry to Lincoln in August, the negotiations no doubt proving a useful pretext for observing what was for the French the very disturbing project for Henry’s meeting with James V. At Lincoln, Marillac and Norfolk delicately circled around the marriage project, Norfolk promising that legitimisation was not a problem. English unease at the prospect of a foreign king was still all too obvious, however.115 For his part, Francis was still insistent that the pensions be abolished as part of the deal and that James V be fully included in any treaty.116 At the same time, the bishop of Agde was being sent to Portugal to ask for the Infanta’s hand (a match favoured by Queen Léonor) and knowledge of this was passed on to Chapuys in England.117 When William Paget, the ambassador who had replaced Howard in September 1541, heard about this, he asked how many brides Francis proposed to give to Orléans.118 Henry was visibly shaken when he learned of the Portuguese negotiation from Chapuys.119 Charles V’s representatives made sure that the dangers of aggrandising Orléans were fully understood, including the revival of the old appanage problem. The Dauphin was warned by the Imperial 113

Marillac to Francis, 14 June 1541, Kaulek, p. 313. Francis to Marillac, 30 June 1541, Kaulek, p. 319. 115 Marillac to Francis, 12 Aug. 1541, Kaulek, pp. 326–327; same to same, 26 Sept. 1541, ibid., p. 344. Chapuys also thought that those in power in France saw the danger of agrandising Orléans too much (CSP Spain VI, i, 196, 199). 116 Francis to Marillac, 28 August 1541, Kaulek, pp. 331, 332–333; same, 17 Sept. 1541, ibid., p. 340 (Francis’ anxiety about the succession since the Dauphin as yet had no children. He instructed Marillac to enquire about Mary’s health. 117 Marnol to Charles V, 3 Nov. 1541, HHSA, Frankreich fasz. 9, ‘Villey an Karl, 1541,’ fo. 57; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 30 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1482; Francis to Leonor, March 1542; Leonor to Charles V, 1542, HHSA Frankreich, Varia, Nachtrag, fasz. 5, fos. 18–19, 160–161, on bp of Agde’s mission. 118 Dandolo to the Doge, 26 March 1542, BnF, it. 1715, p. 300: ‘dimando a questa Maestà uno di questi giorni quanto moglie che volea dare a Monsignore Oriliens.’ No mention was made in Paget’s instructions about marriage negotiations, but that was understandable given wariness of putting anything on paper (St.P., VIII, 611; L&P, XVI, 1198) Cruser reported from Tournus in October ‘du mariage Monsr d’Orleans et de la fille l’Anglois on n’en a plus ouy parler.’ (SAD Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 194r.) 119 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 30 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1482. 114

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ambassador ‘how dangerous would be the alliance of a daughter of England with a son of France already discontented, given various claims which exist in abundance in the ancient quarrel of England in Normandy and Guyenne.’ The Dauphin in particular was opposed and these tensions inevitably rendered Francis’ policy in the matter indecisive. He had for years counted on solving his problems with the Emperor by the investiture of Orléans. Now things were not so clear.120 The talks dribbled on at York and, when the court returned to London, neither side was willing to issue commissions to negotiate.121 Paget let it be known that he thought the French only wanted an end to the pension.122 Norfolk’s authority, in any case, was on the wane with the fall of his niece, Katherine Howard. His brother had already been replaced as ambassador by a figure, in Paget, of evidently lower status if greater grasp of affairs.123 At the end of the year, Marillac was ordered to freeze the negotiation on the argument that it was now obvious that the English only wanted to make their profit from it elsewhere.124 There was ferment in the French royal entourage around this time, with Tournon suffering a temporary fall from favour in January.125 A treaty with Denmark was signed on 29 November.126 Morvilliers was despatched to Scotland with the task (probably) of bringing it into this alliance. The increasing likelihood that Francis’ envoys Rincon and Fregoso, had been

120 ‘comme seroit suspecte l’alliance d’une fille d’Angleterre pour ung filz de France desia mal content, pretendant plusieurs droitz, qui d’abondant pouroit prendre l’ancienne querelle dud. Angleterre quant au pays de Normandye et Guyenne.’ Charles V to Marnol, 13 May 1542, HHSA, Frankreich fasz. 10, ‘Karl an Villey I–V, fo. 39; Credence for Jaillon, 3 July 1542, ibid., fasz. 10, ‘Viley an Krl, V–VII 1542, fos. 49v–50r. See also D. Potter, ‘Politics and faction at the court of Francis I: the duchesse d’Etampes, Montmorency and the Dauphin Henri, French History, July 2007, 127–146. 121 Marillac to Francis, 26 Sept., 14 Nov. 1541, Kaulek, pp. 341–345, p. 356; Norfolk to Henry VIII, 31 Oct. 1541, St.P., I, p. 688. 122 Marnol to Mary of Hungary, 26 Dec. 1541, HHSA., P.A. 41 fo. 23v. 123 On the crucial figure of Paget, see most recently A. Johnson, ‘William Paget and the late Henrician Polity’ (Ph.D. thesis, Saint Andrews, 2003). This is more detailed than S.R. Gammon, Statesman and Schemer. William First Lord Paget, Tudor Minister (Newton Abbot, 1973). 124 Francis to Marillac, 1 Dec. 1541, Kaulek, p. 369. 125 Francois, Tournon, p. 187. 126 Correspondance de Matignon, p. 158; CAF, IV, 260, 12214; AE Mémoires et documents, Danemark, 9, fo. 63; Mémoires du sieur Richer, ambassadeur pour les rois François Ier et Henry II en Suède et en Danemarch, (Troyes, 1625), introduction; Mémoires du sieur Richer, in N. Camusat, Mélanges historiques, fos. 1–3.

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murdered by the Emperor’s agents and the disaster of the Emperor’s defeat at Algiers led to a heightened crisis. The Council in France was in almost continuous session and the Imperial ambassador was still reporting in March that the leading ministers were distracted by the news of war, fearing blame for any failure.127 Though things settled down after the first week of January 1542, French dispositions for the coming war with the Emperor were now clearer – alliances with Cleves, Scotland, Denmark and Sweden – and had to accept a potentially hostile England. France had in effect undergone a severe diplomatic reverse revealed by Henry’s change of attitude towards Chapuys late in 1541. Marillac asked to be replaced by someone else who might save the situation. He was not aware that the security of his communications had been completely compromised by his secretary, Jean de Hons, though the effects were all too plain.128 But the overall strategy of France (delaying the start of war with the Emperor) demanded one more attempt to inveigle Henry VIII into an alliance. The thinking within the French Council as it debated the issue of peace or war with the Emperor was recorded by du Bellay and is profoundly instructive. It was argued that Henry had failed to come to the help of his old ally in 1536 and was even less likely to do so now. It was likely that he continued to resent Charles V’s welcome in France in 1539, he was ‘ulceré’ about the French marriages of James V and the fortification of Ardres. But worst of all was that Henry had been unable to entice Francis to ‘introduce change in his kingdom in the state of religion’ Yet, it was argued, there was still hope of getting him on side if only because of the ‘esteem he has for the king’s person,’ the great honour he had always held him in and ‘the small satisfaction he had had from the Emperor.’129

127

Paget to Henry VIII, 7 Dec. 1541, St.P., VIII, p. 643; Marnol to Granvelle, 3 Mar. 1542, HHSA, Frankreich 9, ‘Villey an Karl I–V,’ fo. 37v: ‘sont assez distrait de ceste oppinion de guerre, preveant le hazard et aussi qu’ilz seroient chargez du desordre.’ 128 Marillac to Chabot, 17 Jan. 1542, Kaulek, pp. 384–385; Chapuys to Granvelle, 7 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 310. Vaissière, in his detailed study of Marillac’s embassy in England, was unaware of this dimension because he had no access to Imperial archives for the period. See P. de Vaissière, Charles de Marillac, ambassadeur et homme politique sous les règnes de François Ier, Henri II et François II, 1510–1560 (Paris, 1896), pp. 42–65. 129 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 55–56: ‘muer en son royaume le faict et estat de la religion,’ ‘l’estime qu’il avoit de la personne du Roy’ ‘le peu de contentement qu’il avoit de l’Empereur.’

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Marillac, instead of being recalled, was told to take up his conversation with Norfolk again and even revive the plan, mooted in 1541, for a meeting between the kings of England, France and Scotland. Chabot and Marguerite of Navarre both expressed their backing and this time, a written commission was sent.130 In England, Marillac, Norfolk, Southampton and Gardiner met for talks in March. Marillac was under no more illusions than Chapuys about English motives (to up their price with the Emperor) and saw Gardiner as ‘as good an imperial as a bad Frenchman.’131 Parallel accounts of these meetings make clear that neither side was prepared to compromise on the crucial points. Marillac’s only hope was to prolong the talks to stop England going over to the Emperor; as it was, ‘these people do not have such a good will as they say they have that this matter be brought to a successful conclusion.’132 While Chabot persuaded Francis to compromise on Mary’s legitimacy, allowing the Act of Bastardisation to stand while taking her as legitimate, the French still insisted the pensions must go and that Henry must finance Orléans’ bid for Milan should Mary be excluded from the succession.133 By the end of April, Marillac’s only solutions were to conclude a disadvantageous agreement, to temporise for thirty days or to put forward some new proposal.134 Possibly in response, Admiral Chabot, already a ‘speceall and secret worker’ in the talks, proposed a special embassy to England.135 There seems to have been too much opposition among Francis’ other councillors, from whom Chabot had tried to conceal the matter.136 Tournon had been away from court but had now returned. Paget continued to be fêted at the French court. Marguerite of Navarre said that he ‘working hard for the marriage of Monsieur d’Orléans and the daughter of 130 Francis to Marillac, 24 Jan. 1542, Kaulek, p. 381; 11 March 1542, ibid., p. 387; 15 Feb. 1542, ibid., p. 389; full powers to Marillac, 10 Feb. 1542, Kaulek, p. 388, with Mary as ‘fille légitime;’ Paget to Henry VIII, 26 Feb. 1542, St.P., VIII, pp. 660–665. 131 Marillac to Francis, 20 May 1542, Kaulek, p. 420: Gardiner ‘aussi bon impérial que mauvais françoys.’ 132 Marillac to Francis, 4 March 1542, Kaulek, pp. 390–394 at p. 393: ‘ceulx-cy n’ont si grande volunté qu’ilz disoient avoir, que cest affaire soit conduict à bonne fin.;’ Council to Paget, 3 March 1542, St.P., VIII, pp. 668–671 (his first formal notification of the talks, ostensibly at Henry’s command.) 133 Instructions to Marillac, 13 March 1542, Kaulek, pp. 395–396. 134 Marillac to Francis, 13 April 1542, Kaulek, p. 409. 135 Council to Paget, 29 March 1542, NA, SP1/169, fos. 184–191. Paget had written to Chabot ostensibly for merchants’ suits (Paget to Chabot, 9 March [1542], Plas Newydd, Anglesey MSS, Box. 1, no. 19, fo. 34). 136 [Paget] to the Council, 19 April 1542, L&P, XVII, 254.

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England’ and the admiral’s secretary was to be sent to England.137 At this moment, with irrevocable decisions being taken in France for war with the Emperor, Chabot seems to have been striving to maintain peace with England. He was, though, in a precarious position. The imperial ambassador in France reported that the Admiral: is no longer certain and . . . assured and established in his credit and that his authority depends on the support of Madame d’Estampes, who all her life has been light and unstable. The Admiral has been told that Madame d’Estampes has held long discussions with M. de Guise.138

He had to guard against his enemies, should the talks fail and Marillac not prevent the English from joining an imperial alliance. In late April, Chabot turned all his powers of persuasion on William Paget in deploying a subtle argument for an Anglo-French alliance. Though Henry had been persuaded by his councillors to favour the Emperor, what was that worth? England is a kingdom perpetual and so is Fraunce. Our masters, their children, the succession may reyne for ever. We be undir one clime and of one complexion, we be at hande to one another.

Charles, on the other hand, headed an empire that would end with his death and what was more ‘he careth not if freende, father and all to gidre shuld sinke so as his insaciable desire to reigne might be satisfied.’ Charles was now down; ‘therefore let us take him while he is lowe before he take his breth.’ Paget was taken aback by all this but not taken in. He accepted that Chabot was probably ‘none imperiall and an utter enemy to Rome’ but realised he was ‘an old player’ at this kind of game and that, so far, despite promises, no special envoy had been sent to England.139 Chabot opted for Marillac’s third alternative, a new proposal, and a scheme was discussed for a joint Anglo-French attack on the Emperor,

137 Du Boys to duke of Cleves, 25 April 1542, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 376v– 77r: Paget ‘brasse fort le mariage de monsr d’Orleans à la fille de l’Anglois.’ 138 Marnol to Charles V, 2 May 1542, HHSA, Frankreich 10, ‘Villey an Karl, V–VII’ fo. 4r: ‘Ne se tient encores certain et . . . asseuré ou estably en son credit et que son auctorité deppend de la seureté qui se peult prendre en Madame d’Estampes, qui toute sa vie a esté legiere et instable, aussi que ledict Admiral est adverty que ladicte dame d’Estampes a tenu long propoz avec Monsr de Guyse . . .’ 139 Paget to Henry VIII, 22 April 1542, NA, SP1/170, fos. 23–33 at fos. 28–29 (L&P, XVII, 263).

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both sides claiming it had been made by the other.140 When Chabot sent his secretary, Châteauneuf, to England, it was to stress Francis’ strong desire for an agreement and to offer new proposals. These demanded as a dowry for Mary the 1 million écus arrears of the pension (or 600,000 if not acceptable, the rest to be over 8 years). The French would pay 300,000 for the life pension and possibility of a joint campaign in the Netherlands mooted.141 This was the high point of French hopes; Marillac was sorely disappointed when he met Southampton, Gardiner and Wriothesley on 4 May 1542 (they were about to meet Chapuys – see p. 73). Henry, perhaps deciding to bring the comedy to an end, was in the country, would not meet the French ambassador and dismissed the proposals at the outset. His councillors even told Châteauneuf to leave the room during discussion because he could produce no letter of credence.142 In effect, the attempt to prevent England from joining the Imperial camp had failed. The Cleves representative in France noted the furious negotiations and that ‘they hope here in this way to draw the English into war against the Emperor. But I believe that he, the English [king] will appear to go along as he is accustomed to do until he has seen the king at war.’143 Francis ordered Marillac to discontinue talks, remarking that ‘my son is of good enough house to find a wife’ (‘mondit filz est d’assez bonne maison pour trouver femme.’) Chabot had called the talks ‘le dernier sacrament’ and sighed melancholy sighs.144 For Paget,

140

‘The overtures made by thadmyrall in the conferences betwixt Mr Paget and him,’ NA, SP1/170, fos. 46–47 (L&P, XVII, 269.4); ‘Double des propoz tenuz entre monseigneur l’admiral et l’ambassadeur du roy d’Angleterre,’ Kaulek, pp. 411–412. The Venetian ambassador thought an agreement on the cards (Dandolo to the Doge, 26 April 1542, BnF, it. 1715, p. 319). 141 Francis I, Instructions to G. Gellimard sr de Châteauneuf, 23 April 1542, Kaulek, pp. 412–415. 142 Henry VIII to Southampton, Gardiner and Wriothesley, 1 May 1542, St.P., I, pp. 728–732 (L&P, XVII, 286); Southampton, Gardiner and Wriothesley to Henry VIII, 5 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 297. 143 Cruser to Duke of Cleves, 1 May 1542, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 328: ‘ilz esperont icy que par ce ilz tireront l’Anglois à la guerre contre l’Empereur. Mais je crois, il, l’Anglois, ne s’en meslera, mais que l’Anglois fera bon semblant comme il accoustumé de faire jusques à ce qu’il aura mis le roy à la guerre.’ and 13 May 1542, ibid., fos. 393–397 (Bers, p. 210): ‘Le roy eut nouvelles d’Angleterre, car le secretaire de Monsr l’Admiral qui y estoit allé retourna apportant que l’Anglois faisoit le frit donnant toutesfois esperance que le mariaige d’entre monsr d’Orleans et sa fille se pourra faire quelque iour, ce qu’il falloit que l’Anglois gaigna aucuns de ses gens qu’il dict y estre fort contraire, que entend bien par ce qu’il cherche longueur. L’empereur sollicite de l’avoir avec rien ou bien peu, la ou le Roy demande pour monsr d’Orleans beaucoup.’ 144 Marillac to Francis, 6 May 1542, Kaulek, pp. 417–419; Southampton et al. to

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in his customary vivid language, ‘these men here stande like a deere upon a launde, and wote not well, me thinketh, which way to take.’ When asked what the king would do next, the common answer had been ‘no men can tell, nor the King himself, until Neufchasteau cum out of England.’145 Now, they had their answer but the die was cast for war with the Emperor in any case. Just before war was declared by Francis on the Emperor on 12 July 1542, Paget, no doubt on orders, started to use positive words to Cardinal du Bellay and Admiral Chabot.146 Claude de L’Aubespine was sent to England with a credence in Francis’ hand and long set of instructions (maximising French military potential ), justifying his war in terms of the murder of Rincon and Fregoso and inviting Henry to join Francis in a coalition with the Kings of Denmark, Sweden, Scotland, the Dukes of Saxony, Cleves and Prussia. It was, of course, a mere formality; L’Aubespine was kept waiting at Guildford while Marillac was fully aware of Chapuys’ progress. Henry sourly reminded Francis that such a war would open the way to the Turk, that he had offered his mediation in the past but Francis had preferred to trust the Bishop of Rome and that he could not enter any treaty he had not seen; he could do nothing to prejudice his obligations to the Emperor. Paget was told to cool war talk, though, by insisting that reinforcements to Calais were purely defensive. Chapuys, through his spy on Marillac’s staff, had a copy of Francis’s letter making clear that Paget had initiated the move, but he was prepared to be indulgent; he was now much more confident of Henry’s decision.147

Henry VIII, 5 May 1542, St.P., I, pp. 732–740; same to same, ibid., IX, p. 17; Francis to Marillac, 14 May 1542, Kaulek, pp. 419–420. 145 Paget to Henry VIII, 15 May 1542, St.P., IX, pp. 26–38 (the bishop of Agde’s mission to Portugal had also failed). 146 Paget to Henry VIII, 9 July 1542, St.P., IX, p. 75 (L&P, XVII, 479); Council to Paget, 23 [July 1542], BL Cotton, E III, fo. 43: Henry’s ‘pleasure is in [ca]ce you shal chaunce to commen with thadmyral of thamytie you shal of yourself tel him that you marvayl they consider not that m[atier] of the pencion and make some honest me[ane] and divise for the satisfaction of it.’ 147 Instructions to L’Aubespine, 8 July 1542, Kaulek, p. 431 (L&P, XVII, 470, 513, 518). Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 19 July 1542, L&P, XVII, 513. Henry to Francis, 23 July 1542, St.P., IX, no. 748. The Venetian ambassador was pessimistic (to the Doge, 11 June 1542, BnF, it. 1715, p. 362). Da Thiene to the duke of Ferrara, Lyons, 15 Aug. 1542 ASM, Francia, B 18, p. 2: Report on L’Aubespine’s mission. Henry had shown scepticism about French offers ‘dimonstrando non sicurare solto della amicitia ne confederatione con lo Imperatore.’ (passage in cipher undeciphered); Marillac to L’Aubespine, 28 Aug. 1542, BnF, fr. 6621, fo. 153.

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‘To make the worlde newe again:’ Henry and the Emperor The strategic problems between Henry and the Emperor were fundamentally different from those with France. The personal relations of the monarchs were poor and the facts of Henry’s repudiation of Catherine of Aragon and Break with Rome massive stumbling blocks. Habsburg diplomacy ruthlessly sought to exploit the differences between Henry and Francis.148 On the other hand, as one adviser pointed out to Henry in 1536 ‘there is nother debt nor dominion between them in question.’149 As has been seen, the arrival of the Emperor in France in December 1539 was a moment of alarm for England and the very closeness of the trading relations between England and the Emperor’s Low Countries could always provide cause for dispute. There were some contrary indications, though. Thomas Wyatt, disposed on the whole to favour Charles over Francis, in a series of acute observations over the winter, reported the opinion of some in France that the Emperor was just stringing them along. A little later, he saw the meeting in terms of the ‘necessite of th’emperour and the conestable,’ Charles unable to reach the Low Countries through Italy, while Montmorency ‘ahorrythe from the warre ffor that himsellffe is ryche, desiryng his plesure and ese.’ He was not under any illusions but preferred to push his sickly master toward an imperial alliance rather than show ‘desperation’ about it. At the time of the Brancetour incident he noted in Charles ‘his lowder voyce, his ernester looke and specially his imperious fashon in his woordes.’150 Yet in April 1540, the French ambassador at Venice reported a view that, unable to reach an agreement with Francis, Charles: Unable to avoid war, wished to join with the King of England, even though this was against the Christian name, and also against the Pope, because if he did not do so, eventually the [French] King would.

148 For example, Chapuys to Hannart, 4 March 1535/6, HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 4, fo. 107r (deciph): ‘les affaires entre ceulx cy et les Francois ne sont clers et pource est se temps de pescher pendant que l’eaue est troublé.’ 149 Paper on foreign policy, 1536, BL Cotton. Vitellius, B XIV, 12 (L&P, X, 1254), very damaged. 150 Wyatt, 2 Dec. 1539, 25 Dec., 7 Jan. 1540, Muir, Letters of Sir Thomas Wyatt, pp. 100, 110, 127. With Bonner, 30 Dec. 1539, BL Harl. 282, fo. 155.

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They thus expected a ‘cruelle guerre.’151 News of Cromwell’s fall, though not greeted so gushingly by Charles as by Francis152 was nevertheless welcome in the Low Countries, since it helped to undermine the Anglo-Cleves negotiations. The new ambassador who replaced Thomas Wyatt in May/June, Richard Pate, archdeacon of Lincoln, was enthusiastic about a renewal of the Burgundian alliance. Early in July, he delightedly reported from Bruges: I do thincke that there is not an embassadour in this courte that belevithe not that there is an amytie betwingte owr soveraigne Lord the kinges maiestie and themperour that makith them all as I am informed to tremble: as for my parte I woolde it shoulde no lesse succede in verie dede then they feare the lyklyhode of the same.153

The self-proclaimed pro-English lord of Berghen insisted that the Emperor ‘so entierlie loved you as was not possible more’ and hoped ‘that the families of Inglond and Burgundie shuld indure and continue frindes against all adversaries for ever as in al entreprises hitherto it had byn faithfully proved.’154 In July 1540, Eustace Chapuys returned to England as ambassador, replacing a highly ineffective stop-gap. Charles de Marillac thought him unwelcome both to Henry and Norfolk and he was certainly dogged by ill health but at least he was a more experienced observer that his predecessor, Maijoris.155 The two ambassadors resided in neighbouring houses on the river at Stepney and liked to score points off each other. It was Chapuys’ corruption of Marillac’s, secretary, Jean de Hons,156

151 G. Pellicier to Montmorency, Venice, 19 April 1540, Ribier, I, p. 520: ‘Ne pouuant éuiter qu’il y eût guerre, se vouloit vnir auec le Roy d’Angleterre, encore que ce soit contre le nom Chrestien, & aussi contre le Pape: pour ce qu’en ne le faisant, en tout éuenement le Roy le feroit.’ 152 Pate to Norfolk, 16 June 1540, St.P., VIII, 355 (L&P, XV, 794); for Granvelle’s report of Cromwell’s words in the scaffold, Selve to Montmorency, the Hague, 10 Aug. 1540, A. Tausserat-Radel (ed.), Correspondance de Guillaume Pellicier à Venise (1540–1542), 2 vols. (Paris, 1899), II, p. 636. 153 Pate to Norfolk, Bruges, 9 July 1540, NA, SP1/161, fo. 72 (L&P, XV, 864). 154 Pate to Henry VIII, 31 July 1540, NA, SP1/161, fo. 209 (L&P, XV, 931). 155 L&P, XV, 885; Marillac to Montmorency, 29 July 1540, Kaulek, p. 207 (L&P, XV, 926). 156 His identity is confirmed by Chapuys to Granvelle, 7 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 310. He seems to have had contacts in Artois and sought a prebend at Arras for his brother Charles, then a student at Orléans. Chapuys was unsparing with his payments. The mystery is how de Hons was able to find the time to copy out so many ciphered despatches of his master.

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though, that proved the high point of a real diplomatic dual. This had massive significance in that it gave the Imperial ambassador the crucial edge over his competitor. Chapuys, on the surface amiable enough, told Marillac that, at his much delayed first audience, Henry ‘waited to see if he would raise anything else, and seeing that he would not, they stood there looking at each other . . . and the king was dismayed.’157 The despatch of Gardiner and Knyvett on a grand (if poorly documented) embassy to Charles in November was a significant development. It mystified the outside world, Chapuys included, though we know that Wallop was supposed to report developments to Gardiner. The Emperor’s letter of thanks was entirely non-committal.158 Marillac thought its purpose similar to that of Norfolk to France earlier in the year (to disturb the Franco-Imperial relationship) and there may be something in this, even though his assessment of English fears was a year out of date.159 All the same, Charles’ envoy in France was clear in April that the Emperor should not too obviously strengthen his frontier with France at a time both England and France were fortifying against each other, otherwise ‘this would give credence in this court to the idea that the King of England would undertake nothing without the understanding and assistance of the Emperor.’160 The French envoy to the Emperor marvelled that Gardiner could be spared from the Council table so long in view of the fact that he had as much ‘authority’ with the King as Cromwell.161 Chapuys, who did not see Henry after he presented his credentials until December 1540 and was kept largely starved of news from the Imperial court, thought the Gardiner mission was simply designed to alarm the French and bring them to better terms. In his eventual audi157 Georges de Selve to Constable, 10 Aug. 1540, Tausserat-Radel, Pellicier, II, p. 638: Chapuys ‘attendist veoir s’il luy parleroit d’aultre chose, et voyant que non, ilz demeurèrent se regardant l’ung l’aultre et . . . en fust esbahy ledict roy.’ 158 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 5 Dec. 1540, L&P, XVI, 314; Henry VIII to Wallop, 8 Dec. 1540, St.P., VIII, 496 (L&P, XVI, 318); Charles V to Henry VIII, 27 Dec. 1540, St.P., VIII, 507 (L&P, XVI, 358). 159 Marillac to Francis, 16 Nov. 1540, Kaulek, p. 241 (L&P, XVI, 269): ‘car tout homme de quelque jugement peut congnoistre que ceulx-cy, pour cuyder avoir offensé tout le monde, se deffient de tous hommes vivans, craignant les les princes chrétiens se viennent quelque jour à joindre pour d’ung commun accord faire la vengeance . . .’ 160 Saint-Vincent to Mary of Hungary, 13 April 1541, HHSA, Frankreich fasz. 9, ‘St Vincent an Marie, 1541,’ fos. 7–8: ‘l’opinion seroit confirmez qu’on a en ceste court que led. Roy d’Angleterre ne feroit riens entreprendre sans l’intelligence et assistence de l’Empereur.’ 161 Pate to Gardiner and Knyvet, 1 Dec. 1540 St.P., VIII, 489 (L&P, XVI, 308).

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ence, Henry shamelessly harped on the theme of the dangers posed to Charles by Francis’ alliances.162 Gardiner, who delayed his arrival at the Emperor’s court and did not meet him until Christmas 1540 (Charles had not wanted him to follow him to Germany) did indeed follow the Emperor to Regensburg for the meeting of the Reichstag which was designed to open reconciliation talks between Catholics and Protestants. Gardiner, it seems, was determined to shift English policy towards an Imperial alliance and had Henry’s backing. In June 1541 we learn that the English envoys had been asking for a treaty of closer friendship with the Emperor, to be made within 6, 8 or 10 months on condition that neither should make any alliance to the prejudice of the other in that time. Charles had agreed and on 11 June Henry made the same promise before Chapuys in the Council.163 The period would expire in April 1542. Fortunately, a rarely preserved set of instructions to Gardiner and Knyvet at this time reveals much of Henry’s reaction. In his narration of Chapuys’ audience, conducted confidentially out of earshot of his councillors, the King records the ambassador’s joy at the prospect for further amity and excuses for having done so little hitherto (mainly because of his health and weariness). But Henry was bothered that Chapuys made no mention of the terms of six or eight months discussed by Gardiner and that he raised the Emperor’s wish to negotiate a settlement between Henry and the Pope. Granvelle told a papal nuncio, Poggio, that Gardiner had made offers but had been unreceptive to Granvelle’s reproaches concerning the divorce and the Break with Rome; he insisted he could not risk his life by raising Granvelle’s suggestion of a reconciliation with Rome. It may be that Granvelle was telling Poggio what he wanted to hear, though there is some stray evidence to indicate that Henry had been informed of this offer. Gardiner also probably received, via Contarini, a letter from the Pope and it is inconceivable that Henry knew nothing of this.164 In fact, in his instructions, Henry reiterated testily that ‘we had gyven commaundment to you . . . to declare that the matyer of Rome should

162 Marillac to Montmorency, 22 Dec. 1540, Kaulek, p. 250 (L&P, XVI, 244); Chapuys to Charles V, 23 Dec. 1540, L&P, XVI, 347; G. de Selve to Montmorency, 8 Sept. 1540, Tausserat-Radel, Pellicier, II, p. 649. 163 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 18 June 1541, L&P, XVI, 910. 164 Poggio, 19 Feb. 1541, L&P, XVI, 548. It is interesting that Cromwell, as for the French, was ‘the cause of all the evil’ here. See also L&P, XVI, 870. The affair of the Pope’s letter raised problems with Knyvet, see later depositions in John Foxe, Acts and Monuments, ed. J. Pratt, 8 vols. (n.p. 1877) VI, pp. 165–168.

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not in anywyse be made an[y] fundatyon of our amitye, ne that wolde in anywyse to yeve eare unto it.’ It was true that Henry had accepted that, in the event of an alliance ‘no man shoulde have that auctoritye with us in thinges honorable and reasonable than he should have.’ Vague promises of discussions after an alliance would make no difference to the establishment of religion in England. When it came to renewing old alliances, Chapuys asked if this was to be the old alliance of 1521 for making Henry king of France. No, said, Henry, that was so long ago broken that all he sought was the formation of a mutual and balanced (‘indifferent’) amity. Henry then went on to describe his declaration of intent before the Chancellor and Norfolk. Gardiner was recalled during the ten months’ interval.165 How are we to understand all this? Did it mean that Henry had effectively made up his mind for war with France and for forward action in Scotland? The answer cannot be unequivocal. Henry himself seems to have made notes about this time, the main points of which were: ‘Whych way to redowbe the pacte with th’Emperour,’ ‘For a sufficient nombre to themprys off the sea’ and finally, ‘For to determyne wether the jornay oversee may be thys yere or nott.’166 But the démarche might have been designed to improve Henry’s bargaining position with France and, for Charles, to put more pressure on France. Besides, throughout the period, economic relations between England the Low Countries remained difficult because of edicts in both countries forbidding the lading of goods in the others’ ships. Mary of Hungary even thought that any closer treaty must depend on a new trade treaty.167 The talks dragged on at Brussels and London through the summer of 1541, while Henry went north to draw James V into an alliance. In the autumn of 1541, the ‘negotiations’ over Mary’s marriage, either to Orléans or the Emperor limped on. Marnol, the imperial ambassador in France, reported that a French marriage was just a tactic ‘to derail any understanding that Your Majesty could have with the King of England . . . to keep him occupied and deceive him. He can 165 Henry VIII to his ambassadors at the Diet of Ratisbon, 17 June 1541, ed. C.J. Black and C.E. Challis (pub. by the Merchant Victuallers of York, 1968) document sold at Sotheby’s 15 Oct. 1963, lot 492. 166 Memorandum in pencil, BL Add., 32,647, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 159, p. 197 (L&P, XVII, 630). The last phrase points at least to a possibility of this note dating from spring 1543. 167 Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 5 July 1541, L&P, XVI, 969.

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only take in bad part such obvious mockery.’168 In England, Chapuys was of much the same view and was able to score a real coup in getting access to the French ambassador’s ciphered correspondence, through the secretary he had corrupted. This enabled him to see clearly enough that French talk of such a marriage was a front, the obstacles too serious. He did not underestimate the problems in arranging a reconciliation with the Emperor; these included the Break with Rome and the succession and would make it difficult to get reasonable conditions from Henry.169 On the other hand, Southampton held out good hopes in November and at the very end of December 1541 Henry granted the Imperial ambassador a very long private audience which indicated well enough his inclination to an understanding and his sourness (to be expected, of course, at such a meeting) about Francis. Ever cautious, though, Henry would commit himself to nothing firm unless he saw the colour of the Emperor’s negotiating powers.170 Meanwhile, Henry sent Edmund Bonner as the new resident with the Emperor, a mixed blessing for his host. Henry’s deviousness was confirmed when Chapuys learned from his spy on Marillac’s staff how serious Anglo-French talks were in January 1542. He was not alarmed because he knew that Marillac was not optimistic and was clear that Francis simply aimed to deceive Henry in order to prevent him joining the Emperor. Henry was able to up his price with Charles and Chapuys was convinced that the price must be paid; not only Gardiner but Southampton and Wriothesley, who were Henry’s chief confidants, were in favour of it.171 He was able to take his time because, despite English claims, he knew the talks with France were not going well.172

168 Marnol to Charles V, Dijon, 3 Nov. 1541, HHSA, Frankreich, fasz. 9, ‘Villey an Karl, 1541’ fo. 57: ‘afin de divertir toutes intelligences que vostredicte Majesté pourroit avoir avec ledict Seigneur Roy d’Angleterre . . . pour l’entretenir et abuser, et ne peult estre qu’il ne pregne de bien maulvaise part une si apparente mocquerie.’ 169 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 9 Oct. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1243; to Charles V, 26 Oct. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1291. 170 Chapuys to Charles V, 19 Nov. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1390; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 30 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1482. 171 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 10 Jan. 1542, L&P, XVII, 16, app. 1; Chapuys to Charles V, 25 Feb. 1542, L&P, XVII, 124, CSP Spain VI, i, 232; ibid., VI, i, 234, 244, p. 493. 172 Chapuys to Charles V, 9 Feb. 1542 16 April 1542, L&P, XVII, 92, app. 6; CSP Spain, VI, i, no. 244 and ibid., p. 502.

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Charles was at Valladolid recuperating from the defeat of Algiers and from an attack of gout. Communications were necessarily slow. He was initially very cautious about Henry’s unaccustomed warmth, warning Chapuys to consent to nothing until he knew what Henry was prepared to offer. He need not have worried about Chapuys’ realism. The ambassador was clear in his own mind that Henry was only being friendly because he feared a Franco-Imperial reconciliation. The moment he knew that war was likely he would break off the talks and expect to reap the benefit when both the major powers were exhausted. He was able to confirm reports that Francis was preparing seriously for war on marshal d’Annebault’s advice. Henry, Chapuys thought, disliked the Emperor and tended to raise his terms when sought after but he wanted to go along with talks because by now he knew from his spy with Marillac that the French ambassador had virtually carteblanche to negotiate.173 On 14 March 1542, the Emperor finally drew up a commission for Chapuys to negotiate. Even then, it was covered by a neutral-sounding letter that was not to be physically handed over in case the English presented it to the French.174 When he saw Bonner on 2 April, Charles received Henry’s condolences for Algiers and a reminder that a timetable for negotiation had been agreed at Regensburg. Charles neatly sidestepped that by saying that it was Granvelle who had made the promise and he needed to consult him.175 In fact, when Chapuys presented the commission he found even the pro-Habsburg councillors grumbling that the ten months set at Regensburg were up and the commission was so general as to be meant simply to spy out their intentions.176 The King was more pleased when Chapuys was able to place the Emperor’s letter about his commission in his hands, though the ambassador continued sceptical. Henry, he thought, would only sign a treaty on terms very advantageous to himself and thought him more likely to remain neutral.177 The pace quickened when Bonner was finally able to get an interview with Granvelle at Valladolid, in which the bitterness of the Emperor about the French was all too 173 Chapuys to Charles V, 29 Jan. 1542, L&P, XVII, 63, app. 4; 25 February 1542, L&P, XVII, 124. 174 Charles V to Chapuys, 14 March 1542, L&P, XVII, 170, 171; Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 31 March 1542, L&P, XVII, 217. 175 Charles V to Chapuys, 6 April 1542, L&P, XVII, 239. 176 Chapuys to Charles V, 9 April 1542, L&P, XVII, 245, app. 12. 177 Chapuys to Charles V, 16 April 1542, L&P, XVII, 251, app. 13.

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apparent and clarification of the Regensburg agreements was made. True, Bonner was probably not instructed to go beyond offering a defensive alliance.178 Chapuys had lamented not having a convincing enough set of negotiating powers early in May.179 But when he met a council committee of Gardiner, Southampton, Browne and Sadler in mid-May, he was able to offer a defensive and offensive alliance with the confirmation and clarification of old treaties. This was two weeks after the failure of the talks with Marillac and followed informal talks over a glass of wine between Gardiner and the Imperial ambassador.180 This was a major development and Chapuys declared he was empowered to discuss any reasonable terms. In fact, he seems to have turned on all the argumentative powers and charm of which he was capable at this remarkable meeting, offering a wide-ranging tour d’horizon of European affairs as an argument in favour of Henry’s entering an alliance with the Emperor, mixing geopolitical insights with cynical propaganda. This exchange, conducted almost at the same time as Chabot’s equally persuasive arguments in favour of the Anglo-French alliance, deserves quoting at some length and compared with it (see above p. 63). Chapuys opened by saying that Christendom had been ‘vexed and trobled’ by the quarrels of the Emperor and the French King and also ‘infested’ by the Turks, incited by the French: In this tragedy the Kynges Maiestie hath not intermedled but geven the lokyng on. Nowe, he said, it is to be considred that this troble shal ende eyther by agrement or by force. If it ende by force, thenne if the Turke prevayleth he shal confounde al. If the French Kyng prevayle, he cannot cesse but style serch a newe troble and be intollerable; and if themperour have the upper hande he shalbe thought to gret. If the troble shulde ende by agrement, it is comenly said that those which have been newter be in such agrementes not always soo provyded for as othewise they shulde be.

Henry might be a powerful and rich prince and therefore not need either King or Emperor but he ‘shuld not let Christendom perish in his tyme.’ In doing so, he would be father not only to the Emperor but to all Christendom. Asked by Gardiner whether he meant a common war against Francis, Chapuys thought their conjoined power would

178

Bonner and Knyvet to Henry VIII, 3 May 1542, St.P., IX, p. 1 (L&P, XVII, 292); Charles V Chapuys, 3 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 293, app. 17. 179 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 7 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 307. 180 Gardiner to Henry VIII, 12 May 1542, St.P., IX, p. 23 (L&P, XVII, 319).

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bring him to reason. A just cause for war was available in the nonpayment of the pension. Soo, as he rekenyth, that with thauctoritie oonly of the Kynges Maiestie al shal be quyeted and reason ministred to al parties. And he wold the matier of the Turke to be the principal matier in open apparaunce wherby to allure the good wyl of the woorld.

Other articles could deal with details of how and when to wage war and what should be done if the Scots or Danes attacked Henry at French incitement. In the event of a new peace, the pension could be assured by the handing over of Montreuil, Boulogne, Ardres and Thérouanne to Henry. In this way, ‘the dreade of England sumwhat quykened in the French mennes hartes wherby they shal the better knowe themselves.’ Coming to his peroration, Chapuys ‘concluded that it lyeth now in the Kynges highnes handes to make the worlde newe again . . .’181 Chapuys was not to give his own account of this meeting to the Emperor until the end of the following month (possibly because he made a brief journey to Brussels to talk to the Queen of Hungary). He does not differ in general terms from Gardiner’s account though we should wonder whether the bishop significantly embroidered the case he made in order to push the case for the alliance. All the same, the cynical propaganda idea of using the threat of the Turks as casus belli was certainly borne out in the form of subsequent draft preambles of treaties and proclamations. Chapuys reports that Gardiner advised him, when discussing the treaty with Henry, not to emphasise expediency in making an alliance; his own councillors would see to that. In fact, Henry proved all too keen to discuss the practicalities in great detail. By now, the ambassador was prepared to admit a certain understanding of English nit-picking over detail. For them, he told Granvelle, it was a matter of launching out on dangerous seas and taking risks when they could easily stay neutral.182 Marillac was aware of this and other meetings with Chapuys and alarmed by them.183 He was right. Henry told Bonner that Chapuys, having argued about details, had ‘descended finally to this overture 181 Gardiner to Southampton, Browne and Sadler, 17 May 1542, NA, SP1/170, fos. 131–134 (L&P, XVII, 329); Muller (ed.), Letters of Stephen Gardiner, pp. 96–100. 182 Chapuys to Charles V, 30 June 1542, L&P, XVII, 441, app. 22; to Granvelle, 30 June 1542 L&P, XVII, 442, app. 23 – Chapuys repeated this point in his letter to Granvelle of 20 June 1542, L&P, XVII, 518. 183 Marillac, 20 May 1542, Kaulek, p. 420 (L&P, XVII, 338).

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that if themperour wold be bound at the daye prefixed to invade the said Frenche King in such place as he shulde thinke for his most commoditie with the army pre[fixed we for our part would] be bounde to doo the semblable in the parties of Picardye.’ By the end of the month, a draft treaty, containing a preface using the justification of the Turks as Chapuys had advised, was roughed out by Wriothesley. This provided for an undertaking for neither side to negotiate with another prince or to make peace without consulting the other.184 In essence, the deal had been done, though the detail had to be argued out and this was to take many more months, given the Emperor’s absence in Spain. For the direct negotiations in Spain, Thomas Thirlby was deputed at the end of June. In his instructions to Thirlby of 1 July 1542, Henry approved du Roeulx’s scheme for a quick attack on Montreuil in 1543, before it could be refortified but only on condition that Charles approved the treaty. He also proposed a major joint campaign with the Emperor in 1544. Of significance for the future, Henry staked a claim to all French territory from the Somme northward as guarantee of his pension (Charles’ rights there he was prepared to trade with his own rights in Gascony).185 Chapuys made a brief visit to the Queen of Hungary at Brussels during which he consulted the comte du Roeulx on possible war objectives (Montreuil, Ardres, Boulogne) and got Mary’s agreement to the suspension of the Edict against English shipping. By his return, the English were pressing to set a date for joint invasion of not later than 1 July 1543 and have the agreement kept secret until October.186 Henry expressed the view to Thomas Seymour, then in Vienna, that he expected war to begin early in 1543.187 June–July 1542 was, then, the crucial turning-point in Henry’s decision to ally with the Emperor, in following up the move made by Gardiner in 1541. The Franco-Imperial war was beginning and the Low Countries in need of help against a two-pronged assault. Henry neatly side-stepped this (after all, he had heard nothing from Spain).188 But

184 Henry VIII to Bonner, late May 1542, NA, SP1/170, fos. 162–167 (L&P, XVII, 360), at fo. 167; draft treaty, NA, SP1/170, fos. 168–173 (L&P, XVII, 361). 185 Instruction to Thirlby, July 1542, St.P., IX, pp. 68–73 (L&P, XVII, 441). 186 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 29 June 1542, L&P, XVII, 439, app. 21; Treaty to suspend the Edict and keep Anglo-Imperial agreements secret, 29 June 1541, St.P., IX, p. 65 (L&P, XVII, 440); Chapuys to Charles V, 30 June 1542, L&P, XVII, 441, app. 22. 187 Henry VIII to Thomas Seymour, 29 Aug. 1542, St.P., IX, 138 (L&P, XVII, 701). 188 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 2 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 562, app. 34.

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this was also the period when border skirmishes in Scotland got out of hand and developed into full-scale war. No doubt this shaped English objectives as to timing but not on fundamentals. One major problem was that the Emperor was in Spain, which might have been off the edge of the world in terms of speed in communications. The Emperor proved difficult partly because he still had not heard of Francis’ declaration of war when Bonner and Thirlby held four days of talks over the draft treaty. No agreement was possible on some knotty problems such as the terms of the defensive alliance (whether the Pope could count as an enemy), the offensive alliance stipulation that each side was to declare war against all enemies of the other (here Scotland for Henry and Denmark for Charles were involved), provisions for separate negotiations for peace, the status of the Channel Islands, treatment of rebels (crucial in that the wording might or might not include Henry’s erstwhile ally the Duke of Cleves) and the pay of troops. Had Charles known that war had already begun, his councillors might have been more flexible.189 Communications via the Bay of Biscay were dire in the summer of 1542. The Emperor commissioned Courrières to reply to Henry and accompany Thirlby back to England on 12 August at Monçon, before news of the war arrived. After delays in starting and bad weather en route, they did not drag themselves ashore separately at Plymouth and Falmouth until 5 October or reach London until 14th; meanwhile the treaty hung fire.190 Henry, though he appointed another team to negotiate (Gardiner, Thirlby and Wriothesley) was furious. He could not understand why Charles was raising such difficulties over the inclusion of the Pope or the article about rebels. Chapuys and Courrières did not wish to irritate him and kept the details for the commissioners on 17 and 21 October; these insisted that all might yet be broken off and Chapuys thought the King could be cooling. The game was clearly one of who blinked first. Chapuys and Courrières thought the matter not yet desperate enough to compromise.191 For her part, Mary of Hungary was also unwilling to com189 Charles V to Chapuys, 12 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 616; Bonner to Henry VIII and Thirlby, 24 Aug. 1542, St.P., IX, 131 (L&P, XVII, 669). 190 Charles’ commision to Courrières and letter to Chapuys, 12 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 615, 616. Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 7 Oct. 1542, L&P, XVII, 918. Thomas Wyatt, sent to meet them on 3 Oct., became ill on the journey and died at Sherborne, where he was buried (Muir, Life and Letters, pp. 215–216). 191 Chapuys and Courrières to Mary of Hungary, 18 and 28 Oct. 1542, L&P, XVII, 963, 993; Chapuys to Charles V, 2 Nov. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1017; Council to Bonner, 7 Nov. 1542, St.P., IX, p. 213 (L&P, XVII, 1044).

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promise and certainly refused to take on responsibility for accepting English terms. Charles V wanted nothing in the treaty to the Pope’s prejudice. Much hard bargaining followed.192 Time passed while both sides gave a chance for the other to budge. The delay in finalising the Treaty between November 1542 and May 1543 was almost entirely the result of slow communications. In the middle of December, Chapuys reported that he could still not get a decision and argued that, in any case, the English were waiting to see how the invasion of the Netherlands turned out; they would be unwilling to contribute to its defence, nor would they be likely to mount a joint campaign in 1543, as they insisted earlier in the year.193 At the end of the month, Mary of Hungary seemed more content to press ahead with the terms for fear of another invasion of the Low Countries, but an answer was difficult to get from Henry and his councillors as news came in of the defeat of the Scots and the death of James V. This raised all kinds of interesting possibilities that threw the English court into ferment. Indeed, Chapuys thought the recent entertainment of the French ambassador at court may have been designed to keep France at peace in order to allow Henry to attain the crown of Scotland through his prisoners.194 Messages may have taken weeks to get to Spain but the talks were not helped by Henry’s devious foot-dragging, itself partly caused by his needing the Emperor’s full agreement. Chapuys saw his councillors on 22 and 23 November but still had not received a reply by mid-January 1543. At that point, Chapuys had abandoned hope of getting the English to move against the French in 1543; Scottish war expenses and the opportunity to control the northern kingdom were diverting Henry’s energies. He hoped to be able to persuade Henry to accept the terms on offer by arguing that, by doing so, he would be able to control Scotland without trouble where otherwise the French would easily be able to hinder this.195 By late January, Charles still felt unable to accept Henry’s modifications since they concerned matters of Faith but was at least prepared to allow Chapuys to go ahead if

192 Mary of Hungary to Chapuys and Courrières, 31 Oct. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1008; same to Chapuys, 16 Nov. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1092. 193 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 17 Dec. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1212. 194 Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 22 Dec. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1229; Chapuys to Mary, 23 Dec. 1542, ibid., 1230; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 28 Dec. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1241. 195 Chapuys to Charles V, 15 Jan. 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 43; 21 Jan., L&P, XVIII, i, 63.

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the Queen of Hungary thought best. This was a crucial breakthough.196 Clauses 3 and 4 of the treaty committed each side to declare war against all enemies of the other. On 11 February Chapuys signed the draft treaty in London (sometimes erroneously called the Treaty of Barcelona197 because the Emperor’s ratification took place there) with Gardiner and Wriothesley. His explanation was that the French were again making big offers and he feared a rupture of the talks. He thus took advantage of the authorisation he had received and dealt with the matter of titles of Head of the Church and Defender of the faith by allowing them to be placed in the English copy but not in his own.198 At Barcelona on 12 April, Charles issued his commision to Chapuys to receive Henry’s ratification. A month later, Chapuys received this but the act was put off. The Privy Council reported on 13 May that the ‘matyer is not yet openly divulged here . . . albeit the same standing in the terms it doth . . . it cannot much lenger be hidden.’ Chapuys’ recurrent illness also caused delay. Finally, on 27 May at Hampton Court, before the ambassador and Council, Henry ratified the Treaty and the way was open for the English and Flemish heralds to go to France to present the common act of defiance.199 While the Treaty itself lacked the preamble drafted by the English in June 1542, the actual printed Declaration of War let rip with the full force of propaganda. Henry had been informed that Francis had been helping and inciting the Turk in his plans to invade Christendom (after all blatantly true though not necessarily of much concern to his subjects).200 What was more, Francis had long with-

196

Charles V to Chapuys, 21 January 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 69. E.g. referred to as such by a French ambassador in Feb. 1546, BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 115v. 198 Anglo-Imperial Treaty, London, 11 Feb. 1543, T. Rymer, Foedera, conventiones, literae 3rd. ed. 10 vols. (The Hague, 1739–45) VI, pp. 86–90 (L&P, XVIII, i, 471); Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 12 Feb. 1543 (L&P, XVIII, i, 150). 199 Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 7 May 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 511; Council to Suffolk, 13 May 1543, NA, SP1/178, fos. 11–16/14–18 (L&P, XVIII, i, 534); Act of Ratification, 17 May 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 603; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 29 May 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 613. 200 The preoccupation with the Turks was a favourite theme of policy makers. When Henry sought to use the Turkish threat in the Balkans to get voluntary contributions from his subjects in 1543, he was predictably cold-shouldered. C. Kitching, ‘Broken angels: the response of English parishes to the Turkish threat to Christendom, 1543,’ in W.J. Shiels and D. Wood (eds.), The Church and Wealth (Oxford, 1987), pp. 209–217. 197

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held the pension he owed Henry, paid as recompense for the crown of France and various dukedoms. So, Henry had entered a ‘strayte leage and amitie’ with the Emperor and, together they had ‘intimated’ war to Francis by heralds sent to offer reasonable terms. Francis had not received them or replied. As a result, King and Emperor intended to prosecute war with Francis until he desist from his alliance with the Turk and render them what was due to them and authorised their subjects to treat Francis and all his subjects ‘to their moost advauntage and commoditie.’201 One problem remained unresolved despite the terms of the treaty. The commitment to wage war against all common enemies remained a dead letter since Charles V did not wish to declare war against Scotland and Henry VIII did not wish to do the same against Denmark. It was a small but telling indicator of the durability of the treaty in that it was allowed to lapse for the time being.202 The French Rearguard Action for Peace with England May 1542 had been the end of the road for the Anglo-French alliance, yet war did not break out until June 1543. Why? In part, as had been seen, negotiations with the Emperor proved arduous but there was also the problem in England of assembling war materiel and men and of exploiting the fortuitous victory over the Scots. For their part the French were determined to put off the break as long as possible. William Paget used to go out in the streets incognito to sample public opinion. He found the populace unenthusiastic about the war: Of their debtes every man speketh, and all the woorld knoweth they be not hable to pay it You. For great store of money they have not, (as I am credibly enformed) not sufficient to mainteyn their numbre appointed for Piedmont, if the warre shuld contynue any season, and hath alredy grated asmuch as He can get, and that He hath gotten sithens the last warres, what with thEmperours entreteynement at his being here (which was mervailous chargeable unto Him), and the Duke of Cleves entreteyement (which was at his charge), and partely with the payment of tharrerages of pensions, and the daily continuance of the same, to Italians, Almayns, Suisses, gensdarmes and their capitaynes here at home, fortifications . . . This Chauncelour deviseth meanes to get Him money, at

201 202

For as much as by credyble meanes printed by T. Berthelot, 1543, STC 7801. L&P, XVIII, i, 120, 383, 397, 612, 632, 732, 925, 954; ibid., ii, appendix no. 4.

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chapter one whom the people murmure, and specially the Brittaynes and Normans, redy to fight in the querell, if they wist how; the one for losing their trade of salt, which was their lyving, and thother being enforced to excessive and newe impositions.203

Early in 1543, Paget reported the reaction at Paris to the solde des gens de guerre: ‘his people murmureth marvelously, not only here, but universally throught his realme, whereas we have gone; and let not to speke many sherewd wordes.’204 Ironically, with hope virtually exhausted for drawing Henry into the French alliance, Marillac was able to report July 1542 that preparations for war in England had cooled, except by sea.205 With Francis, Annebault and the King’s sons on campaign at Perpignan and in Luxemburg during August 1542, cardinal de Tournon remained at Lyon to deal with matters of state. On 23rd, he received a despatch from Marillac warning that Cheyney and Southampton had crossed to Calais with troops. He added that the imminent sending of Sir Anthony Browne to Francis might be to demand the pension as a justification for war. Browne he described as ‘the worst of those who are ill-disposed to your cause.’206 He advised delaying an audience until the campaigning season was over, an alarming change from his previous view that the English would not declare war in 1542. Francis approved Tournon’s advice to defer the audience: And so that their arrival can be delayed, if you see that they desire to obtain boats to travel here by water, you will not allow anyone to give them any.

For his part, Francis was now assured of English ill-will but did not think they would declare war before the end of the year.207 Though 203 204 205

Paget to Henry VIII, 13 June 1542, St.P., IX, p. 51 (L&P, XVII, 400). Paget to Henry VIII, 2 Feb. 1543, St.P., IX, p. 285 (L&P, XVIII, i, 106). Marillac to Francis, 2 and 16 July 1542, Kaulek, pp. 428, 432 (L&P, XVII, 453,

500). 206 Marillac to Francis, 16 August 1542, Kaulek, pp. 451–452: ‘le pire de ceulx qui sont mal enclinés à vostre dévotion.’ (Browne had been poorly treated on a special embassy to France in September 1538 (Scheurer, Correspondance du Bellay, III, p. 143)); Tournon to Marillac, 24 July 1542, Kaulek, p. 457: ‘et pour ce que le dict seigneur m’a donné charge de veoir toutes les lettres qui passeront par icy addressées à luy.’ 207 Paget was told by told the Ferrarese ambassador da Thiene ‘I assure you of one thing,’ quod he, ‘when so ever you shall ask your pension ernestly, looke to make a breche with them.’ St.P., IX, p. 116. Da Thiene in fact reported that Browne’s mission would be to persuade the French to make peace with the Emperor (to Ercole II, 30 Aug. 1542, ASM, Francia, B 18); Francis I to Marillac, 25 Aug. 1542, Kaulek, p. 458.

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Marillac was cheered by news of the war sent by L’Aubespine on his return to France, he had little good news to offer.208 Paget reported, on the basis of secretary Bayard’s view, that Francis ‘doth no longer dowbt that Your Majestye wil make warre agaynst Him’ and had consequently allocated garrisons under Vendôme in Picardy. They expected Browne to move peace with the Emperor and demand the pensions.209 To other envoys, Francis was putting on a brave face, however.210 From Jersey, Cornish reported certainty in France that there would be war; there was general disinclination to war in Normandy and Brittany but the Saint-Malo merchants were taking steps to recover their debts at Southampton before it began.211 At his post in Guînes, Wallop was expecting war any day and asked to be informed in time.212 The following months were fraught with imminent expectations of war, especially with rumours of the Anglo-Imperial treaty of February 1543. Henry may have taken the decision for war in June or July 1542. He then sent agents to Germany to raise troops and told Thomas Seymour and Heideck that he would have need of them early in the new year, though the objectives of their campaign were still

Francis I to Tournon, 28 Aug. 1542, crs. Bochetel (Villebon, liasse, 20 orig.): ‘Et affin qu’ilz y puissent arriver plustart, sy vous voyez qu’ilz ayent envye de recouvrer batteaux pour eulx en venir par eaue, vous ne souffrirez point qu’il leur en soit baillé.’ with a covering letter to be produced for the English: ‘Mon cousin, pource qu’il est bien necessairement requis pour ces nouvelles que j’ay eues d’Angleterre pourveoir à mon pays et duché de Normandye à ce que par surprise ne autrement il ne puisse venir inconvenient à ma ville et Havre de Grace . . .’ (ibid., letter sold by Pierre Bergé auction, Drouot, 22 Nov. 2010, lot 90). 208 Marillac to L’Aubespine, 23 Aug.[1543], BnF, fr. 6621, fo. 153: remarked enigmatically that ‘si ne puis asseure que le papegaud soit pour se tenir en sa cage, tant y a que s’est bien qui fera merveilles si ses papillons ne peuvent le vol aultre part, car il semble au mouoir de leurs ayles qui le soyent deliberee de veoir que font leurs plus prochains voysins.’ 209 Paget to Henry VIII, Pézenas, 7 Sept. 1542, St.P., IX, p. 150. Vendôme to Francis, 19 Sept. 1542, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 32, was confident that he had enough troops. He had been most concerned with Imperial garrisons during the summer. 210 Da Thiene to Ercole II, 18 Sept. 1542, reporting the complaints of the Admiral that Henry’s actions in Scotland and at sea ‘non esser conformi li effetti alla buona amicitia et fratellenza che era fra queste due Maestà . . . con molte altre parole dette con grandissima colera. ’ Paget had told da Thiene that Henry ‘non ha mala opinione ne animo di fare la guerra’ (ASM, Francia, B 18, p. 7 of decipher) same to same, 25 September 1542 (Ibid., p. 3 of orig. and 3 of decipher): Francis had said that ‘Sua Maestà publicamente spese de gagliarde parole che . . . non dubitava che quel Re li potesse punto nocere, perche non havea amici, nè fora nè nel suo proprio regno’ and that he could defend himself at sea and aid Scotland. Paget reported these ‘assai notorie’ words, 24 Sept. 1542, St.P., IX, pp. 173–174. 211 Cornysshe to Hertford, 4 Dec. 1542, HMC Bath MSS, IV, p. 85. 212 Wallop to Council, 19 Sept. 1542, L&P, XVII, 809.

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very vague.213 In March 1543, letters of reprisal were issued for those who claimed they had not been able to get justice in France for losses at sea.214 Despite military clashes around the Calais Pale, it was proclaimed at Boulogne in February 1543 that war with England was not to be spoken of.215 French policy suffered a severe setback by the defeat of the Scots at Solway Moss and the death of James V. France began to try to offset the Scots’ defeat by drawing them into a closer alliance (see chapter 2). At the French court, those such as Chabot who had promoted understanding with England were thinking again. The Admiral, in any case, was increasingly ill and had to withdraw to his estate near Bourges, leaving Tournon in charge of affairs late in 1542.216 The protagonists of the Cleves alliance, La Planche and Longueval, were momentarily out of favour.217 Paget continued to offer fair words but the French were under no illusions.218 However, their priority was to delay the break as long as possible and it was this reason and that Paget and his close confidant, the Ferrarese Da Thiene, were the only ambassadors allowed within striking distance of the court while Francis was in the south on campaign.219 This explains Marillac’s surely rather weary revival of the marriage negotiations alongside proposals for a spring summit.220

213 Thomas Seymour to Henry VIII, 29 Dec. 1542, St.P., IX, p. 253– (L&P, XVII, 1246); Henry to Seymour, 14 Jan. 1544, L&P, XVIII, i, 42, troop raising suspended until knowledge of the king’s pleasure. 214 NA, SP1/176, fo. 157 (L&P, XVIII, i, 329), letters for R. Burroughs, 28 March 1543 to arrest the French King’s subjects, ships and goods ‘in any place on the sea.’ 215 Wallop to Council, 27 Feb. 1543, NA, SP1/176, fo. 80 (L&P, XVIII, i, 216); same to same, 5 March 1543, NA, SP1/176, fo. 115 (L&P, XVIII, i, 249). 216 Da Thiene to Ercole II, 12 and 17 Oct. 1542 (ASM, Francia B 18, p. 2 of despatch) ‘il malo suo de quelche importancia, et molto periculoso.’ Before his withdrawal, Chabot had a row with Paget over naval conflicts (St.P., IX, p. 153). He did not return to court until February (St.P., IX, p. 289) and then fell ill again. 217 Paget to Henry VIII, 20 Jan. 1543, St.P., IX, p. 272. La Planche had not been trusted by Marguerite of Navarre since 1541, cf. Saulnier, ‘Recherches sur la correspondence de Marguerite de Navarre,’ no. 861. Du Boys to Duke of Cleves, 5 Nov. 1541, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 336–339. 218 Paget, 7 Sept. 1542, St.P., IX, pp. 150–151. 219 Da Thiene to Ercole II, 29 Aug., 25 Sept. 1542, ASM, Francia, B 18; Paget to Henry VIII, 24 Sept. 1542, St.P., IX, p. 173. 220 Council to Paget, 1 Dec. 1542, St.P., IX, pp. 226–227, same to same, 29 Jan. 1543, ibid., pp. 277–284, drawn up by Wriothesley at first as a royal letter and then amplified by him as a council letter, NA, SP1/175, fos. 98–108.

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Henry formally recalled Paget on 20 February 1543, with a promise to appoint a successor in the form of Richard Layton. Francis, shocked at the news and on Tournon’s advice, tried to delay the final break with England by refusing to release Paget, who found himself at Boulogne on 6 March virtually a prisoner of du Biez, who was under orders not to let him go until his successor arrived. Francis even sent a successor for the, by now, impossibly unpopular Marillac in the person of somewhat improbable Roger d’Aspremont, protonotaire d’Orthe. Marillac himself was held up at Calais until Paget could be released, which was only done in late April.221 Admiral Chabot died on 1 June and marshal d’Annebault, seconded by Tournon, given the maniement des affaires. The arrest on the frontier helped to delay the English declaration of war until late June, by which time it was too late for a serious joint Anglo-Imperial campaign. Henry in any case may have been reluctant to move immediately.222 It was planned to make a joint declaration of war in highly traditional style by the heralds Garter (Christopher Barker) and Toison d’Or (François de Phallaix) but this was delayed at the frontier when du Biez, governor of Picardy and Boulogne, acting on orders, refused to receive them.223 The joint ultimatum required Francis – as prefigured in the Anglo-Imperial talks of the previous year – to desist from his aid to the Turks, compensate the Emperor and pay the English pension and answer within twenty days.224 Francis sent du Biez a letter in which he professed not to believe that the harsh English demands recently sent really came from Henry VIII and demanded a signed copy with safe-conduct for a negotiator. Du Biez forwarded this letter on the King’s instructions to the Deputy of Calais and Maltravers promised to send Henry’s reply but nothing

221 L&P, XVIII, i, 182, 183, 361, 403. Paget to Henry VIII, 27 Feb. 1543, St.P., IX, pp. 322–327. The new ambassador has sometimes been confused with this brother the vicomte d’Orthe. Roger’s title was a papal one and he is found on mission to Rome in 1545 (ANG III, no. 212) but otherwise was little employed in diplomacy. Presumably, he was expendable. On Marillac at Calais, L&P, XVIII, i, 354.2. 222 L&P, XVIII, i, 754, 754(3); D’Orthe to Francis I, 7 June 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 622 (intercepted copy from Simancas). 223 Commission to C. Barker, Garter King of Arms and Instructions to Toison d’Or, NA, SP1/178. Fo. 128 (L&P, XVIII, i, 622); Garter to Council, 11 June 1543, NA, SP1/178, fo. 7 (L&P, XVIII, i, 730); Du Biez to Maltravers, 15 June, to Francis I, 20 June, Francis I to du Biez, 27 June 1543, D. Potter, Un homme de guerre au temps de la Renaissance: la vie et les lettres d’Oudart Du Biez, maréchal de France, Gouverneur de Boulogne et de Picardie (vers 1475–1553) (Arras, 2001), pp. 172–174. 224 NA, SP1/178, fo. 130 (L&P, XVIII, i, 622).

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further was heard until the French ambassador d’Orthe reported the declaration of war.225 Du Biez was told not to receive the English herald sent with the declaration of war and, as for the English articles (or ultimatum) sent for answer within 20 days, he was told to ‘gain time with the English and spin things out.’ Du Biez even forbore to respond to English provocations which at other times he could not have allowed to pass.226 Wallop at Guînes was instructed to warn the French that Henry was obliged to help the Burgundians.227 The evil hour could no longer be avoided but the process of declaring war was almost sedate. Chapuys and Henry’s Council (the King himself was absent from London because of the plague) finally agreed to make a joint ‘intimation of war’ to the French ambassador in the Star Chamber at Westminster on 22 June. The assembly included royal councillors and was led by Norfolk. Their declaration listed the alliance with the Turk, failure to pay the pension for nine years, aid to rebels and to the Scots (Blancherose was even dragged up again). Henry demanded the arrears of pension and the delivery of Boulogne, Ardres, Montreuil and Thérouanne as surety for it. Should Francis not answer within 20 days, Henry would demand also the whole kingdom of France and the duchies of Normandy, Gascony and Guyenne and a state of war would exist. Astonishingly, news of this had arrived at Francis I’s camp at Maroilles in the Ardennes by 28th, though d’Orthe’s despatch probably took longer.228 The Anglo-French war technically began on 12 July. D’Orthe took his leave about 15 July and was escorted to Calais by a herald, bearing a not unhandsome present of plate. It took until 3 August for open war to be proclaimed

225

Ibid., nos. 176, 182, 183. Potter, Du Biez, nos. 172, 176, 183: ‘gaigner temps avecques lesdictz Anglois et remectre tousiours les choses à la longue.’ 227 Council to Wallop, 18 June 1543, NA, SP1/179, fo. 63 (L&P, XVIII, i, 730); Du Biez to Wallop, 21 June, Wallop to du Biez, 21 June, Du Biez to Francis I, 20 June, 29 June 1543, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 173–174, 175–177. 228 François de Bourbon to Matignon, camp of Maroilles, 28 June 1543, Correspondance de Matignon, no.CXVII: of the English ‘puis qu’il nous a donné xx jours de terme a respondre aux articles qu’il nous demande, nous semble que au boult desdits xx jours que en pourrons bien avoir encores davantaige; mais nous ne nous en fyons point et ferons ly[sic] mieulx que pourrons pour luy nuyre.’ 226

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in London.229 Not until May 1544 were non-denizened Frenchmen expelled from the country, though this was rescinded soon after the fall of Boulogne.230

229 St.P., IX, 408, 388 (L&P, XVIII, i, 754); Council in London to Council at Court, 21 June 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 746; XIX, i, 368, v (present of plate to d’Orthe); Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 23 June 1543, ibid., 759. Du Biez to Francis I, 9 July 1543, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 180–181. Wriothesley to Suffolk [?], [16 July 1543], L&P, XVIII, i, 894. Henry VIII’s declaration of war: For as moche as by credyble meanes (London: Berthelot, [1543], undated, was proclaimed in London on 3 August (Grey Friars Chronicle, ed. J.G. Nicholls, 1852, p. 45). It was published in French at Rouen, no doubt because it was needed by the merchant community there: see Déclaration de la guerre envers le roi de France de par le roi d’Angleterre (Rouen, 1543) discussed in A. Pettegree, The French Book and the European World (Leiden, 2007), p. 28 and L. Jee-Su Kim, ‘French Royal Acts Printed before 1601: A Bibliographical Study’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Saint Andrews, 2008). 230 Procl. 16 May 1544, Hughes and Larkin, I, no. 227 (L&P, XIX, i, 512); repeated 2 June 1544, ibid., no. 233 with the option of declaring their presence before the Lord Chancellor (ibid., 613). Procl. allowing Frenchmen to stay in England, 30 Sept. 1544, BL Harl. 442, fo. 208, Hughes and Larkin, I, no. 238 (L&P, XIX, ii, 332).

CHAPTER TWO

‘DANCING TO THE FRENCH TUNE?:’ SCOTLAND BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE ‘who entendyth Fraunce to wyn with Skotland let him begyn’1

Scotland and Henry VIII Cromwell’s quotation of the famous adage in 1523 raises a number of problems in the context of the Anglo-French War. Was the intention of Henry VIII in 1543 to ‘win’ France or just make limited acquisitions? In what sense would such a campaign involve Scotland and what were the priorities between France and Scotland? The approach of war on the mainland of Europe inevitably raised the question of what role Scotland would play since, in previous Anglo-French conflicts during Henry’s reign, the country had been activated by France as a crucial diversion of English efforts.2 This had not been effective in the 1520s because of the internal state of Scotland but by 1540 James V was an adult monarch and his own man. Furthermore, though nephew of Henry VIII, James was generally hostile to the English connections of his mother, partly as a result of his hatred for Archibald Douglas, Earl of Angus, her second husband. He had moved further, under the prompting of David Beaton, towards a proFrench policy and this involved some serious ‘shopping around’ in France for a wife. He wrote to the duke of Vendôme for the hand of his eldest daughter in July 1535, had travelled to Picardy to see her in the summer of 1536 (not exactly a convenient moment) but had not found Marie de Bourbon to his taste.3 He went on the French court, 1 Common saying quoted in a speech attributed to Thomas Cromwell in 1522, R.B. Merriman, Life and Letters of Thomas Cromwell, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1902), I, pp. 34–43. 2 See J. Cameron, James V King of Scotland (East Lothian, 1998) and R.C. Eaves, Henry VIII’s Scottish Diplomacy, 1513–1524 (New York, 1971); J.D. Mackie, ‘Henry VIII and Scotland’ TRHS ser. 4, 29 (1947), 93–114. 3 Copy: BL Royal MS 18 B, fo. 19 r–v, 191v; another copy: NAS Edinburgh, GD 149/264, fo. 62; English summary: Letters of James V, ed. D. Hay (Edinburgh, 1954),

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then at Lyon, and married Francis I’s daughter, Madeleine, instead in January 1537. After her early death, he had taken as his second wife Marie de Lorraine, daughter of the duke of Guise and relative of one of the most powerful families of princes étrangers in France. This, by any standards, represented a declaration of intent to distance himself from his mother, Queen Margaret’s, dynasty. As Gardiner argued in a paper of 1538, by the French marriage, James V ‘should with such alliance be encouraged and made of a greater stomake’ and rendered more unlikely to respond to demands for justice in border violations.4 The instinctive sympathy in France for the interests of Scotland must always be remembered. The correspondence of Marie de Lorraine alone testifies to a close and intensifying relationship between the highest ranks of the French nobility and the rulers of Scotland in the 1540s.5 The Scots guard placed a body of Scots military nobility at the centre of the French court.6 Nevertheless, French help to Scotland was scarcely altruistic and not even reliable when the French were at peace with England. Early in 1540, Cromwell’s confidant Ralph Sadler was despatched to Edinburgh to explore the state of affairs there (at the same time as Henry was gauging the temper of Francis and Charles V). Sadler’s brief was partly to encourage a rift between James V and Cardinal Beaton by suggesting that the Cardinal was trying to usurp secular jurisdiction by seeking to protect certain men arrested for treason who were his friends. Sadler also pressed the case for James to consider the iniquities of the bishop of Rome and all his works, blandishments predictably sidestepped by the Scottish King. He urged James to solve his financial problems by dissolving the monasteries, as his uncle had done, since they were ‘a kind of unprofitable people, that live idly upon the sweat and labours of the poor.’ James countered that the sins of some should not require the suppression of all. But Sadler came to the main

p. 295; L&P, t. VIII, no. 1137. Du Bellay, Mémoires, III, p. 809; AMA, CC 128, fo. 82r–v; J. Bapst, Les mariages de Jacques V (Paris, 1889), pp. 241–308. 4 Gardiner, instructions for Bonner, 20 Aug. [1538], Muller, Letters, p. 84. 5 The Foreign Correspondence with Marie de Lorraine, Queen of Scotland, from the Originals in the Balcarres Papers ed. M. Wood, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, SHS, 1923–1925) (hereafter Balcarres Papers). 6 See list of the Scots guard, 17 April 1543, BL Add. Ch. 14042. On this subject in general, F. Michel, Les Ecossais en France et les Français en Ecosse, 2 vols. (Paris, 1862), I, pp. 429–465; E. Bonner, ‘Continuing the Auld Alliance in the sixteenth-century: Scots in France and the French in Scotland, in G. Simpson (ed.), The Scottish Soldier Abroad, 1247–1967 (Edinbugh, 1992), pp. 31–46.

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point, with a dash of subtle threat, when he suggested that it had been reported that James, during the recent rumours of Franco-Imperial invasion, had said ‘that look what the emperor or the French king would do against your grace, he would do the same.’ At this, James became vehement in his denials: ‘I am no bairn, neither emperor nor French king can draw me to do what they list’ and insisted that Francis had never meant any harm to Henry. But Sadler countered with a long discourse meant to show what harm had come to James’ father when he had danced to the tune of other rulers and that Henry, over a reign of thirty years had found ‘how much better it is for a prince to live within his own proper limits, with a just consideration of his own quiet and commodity.’ This piece of effrontery was, of course, typical of Henry’s approach but softened in this case by the argument that Henry was empowered to order the succession and could name James after his own son. Henry was ‘stricken in years’ and might have no further children. James should therefore work to win the good will of the English, whereas Francis could only offer him fair words. Sadler finally raised the possibility of a personal meeting, which James had claimed had been vetoed by his councillors in 1536, but which James had never really wanted. In his letter apart to Cromwell, Sadler added that the inadequacy of James’ councillors led him as a ‘prince being given, as he is, to much pleasure and pastime’ to rely on clerics who ‘inculk to him, how catholic a prince his father was.’7 Henry had not even bothered to write his sister Margaret a letter when Sadler travelled to Edinburgh and the envoy’s interview with her was perfunctory. She was considered a broken reed. But James V and his intentions had to be part of Henry’s calculations. In terms of dynastic right, James was very close to the succession in England. Moreover, Scotland remained faithful to the Pope at a time when Henry had been excommunicated. Scotland, as in the fifteenth century, was a refuge for enemies of the English crown. James V’s participation in any English conflict with France could not be excluded, indeed could be thought likely, but the question of what role Scotland was to play in Henry’s calculations vis-à-vis France remains a difficult one. Marcus Merriman argues forcefully that any plans on the part

7 On this embassy see The State papers and Letters of Sir Ralph Sadler, ed. A. Clifford, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1809) [hereafter Sadler State Papers] I, pp. 2–47 (L&P, XV, 248, 249).


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of Henry to annex Scotland by dynastic union were a consequence of James V’s death and the birth of Mary Stuart. There was certainly no real desire for Anglo-Scottish union in Scotland and little in England until 1543. Besides this, the two kingdoms were socially and culturally far apart. Though in England there was probably a degree of instinctive xenophobia about the Scots,8 there was little trade or intellectual contact between Edinburgh and London, the distances were great and there was a profound ignorance of Scottish geography in England.9 Given the close alignment of France and Scotland, no doubt, Norfolk was sent north in January 1541 to inspect the fortresses on the frontier.10 In March 1541, Henry informed Marillac that he had told the Scots ambassador passing from Flanders that he knew James was threatening to invade with 60,000 men by the advice of the King of France and that James should take care not to dance to the French tune (‘danser au son des Françoys.’) Francis, who had heard that Henry was threatening the Scots, was careful that Henry should not believe he was encouraging James and ordered Marillac to emphasise this.11 Then came Henry VIII’s journey from June to September 1541 to York, where he waited for ten days from 18 to 27 September. This has often been seen as the moment that Henry decided on war, after his nephew James rebuffed him by failing to turn up. Certain points need to be clarified here, though. First, there were other reasons for Henry to travel northwards, including a determination to stamp on any potential enemies after the recent revelations of the Lincolnshire

8 For example, Norfolk remarked on several occasions of his East Anglian tenants ‘I never saw men so well willyng to no jornay nor so desirous as they be universally to be revenged of the Skottes.’ (Norfolk to Council, 6 Sept. 1542, Hamilton Papers I, no. 149, p. 184. See also p. 172). 9 M. Merriman, The Rough Wooings of Mary Queen of Scots, 1542–1551 (East Linton, 2000), pp. 58–61. News of the death of James V on 14 Dec. 1542 took 5 days from Falkland to reach Alnwick in Northumberland but then travelled rapidly to London by the post route by 23 Dec. (L&P, XVII, 1221). News by post could travel between London and Abbeville in 36 hours if the crossing was fair (see chapter 1) with another two days to Paris. A despatch from Paris of 13 March 1542 reached London by 19th (L&P, XVII, 182); another, 9 July 1542, from Ligny in Champagne to London by 15th (L&P, XVII, 495); the reply to this reached Dijon by 22 July. Travel times for ordinary travellers were very different. Itineraries were still being used instead of maps. See ‘An abstracte for Englisshe men to know the reaulme of Scottland through out.’ NA SP1/174, fos. 64–66 (old, 54–55) (L&P, XVII, 1035.3). 10 Marillac, 12, 18 Jan. 1541, L&P, XVI, 459, 466. 11 Mémoire for Jean de Taix, 25 March 1541, Kaulek, pp. 281–282 (L&P, XVI, 650); Marillac to Francis, 19 April 1541, Kaulek, pp. 290 (L&P, XVI, 737).

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conspiracy. Then, the Border administration was poor and not easily amenable to the direction of central government. William Howard specifically asserted to Charles V’s envoy in France in September that the meeting was to take place on the terms (‘à la dition’) Henry set. The Imperial agent thought that the purpose of such a meeting was to clarify Anglo-Scottish treaties but that James’ ‘ostension’ stemmed from his awareness of the deterioration of Franco-Imperial relations. Should they improve, all trace of Anglo-Scottish agreement would collapse into conflicts (‘ennuyez et fascheries’) as had been the case in the past. Crucially, there is no real evidence that James V had ever agreed to a personal meeting but for Henry to travel all the way to York on the off-chance that James would turn up seems bizarre.12 Francis’ protestations of innocence in engineering the failure of the York meeting were contradicted by a detailed account of September 1541 by Cardinal Beaton, who was ambassador in France from July 1541 to August 1542. In this, the Cardinal transmitted Francis’ thanks to James for not meeting Henry and promised to back him up if invaded. Beaton had asked urgently for aid but at this point got little. The French were ‘disparit’ about Henry in the event of war with the Emperor, though he thought it unlikely there would be war in 1541. Nevertheless, despite the Constable’s fall, he assured James that Francis would back him. Even Marguerite of Navarre had assured the papal nuncio in France that 6000 landsknechts and 100,000 French crowns would keep Henry busy with the Scots in the event of war. Beaton’s letter is all the more significant for the likelihood that it fell into English hands.13 Beaton also took trouble to cultivate the Duke of Cleves but was complaining about his treatment at the French court in January 154214 and Morvilliers’ mission to Scotland, kept as secret as possible and on the pretext of condoling with James for the death of his mother, seems to have been inconclusive.15

12 Villey de Marnol to Charles V, 26 Sept. 1541, HHSA, Frankreich 9, berichte Villey 1541, fo. 18v (duplicate ibid., P.A. 41, fo. 15). See E. Bonner, ‘The Genesis of Henrys VIII’s ‘Rough Wooing’ of the Scots,’ Northern History, 33 (1997), 42–45 for a full discussion of the evidence here. 13 Beaton to James V, 13 Sept. 1541, BL, Add. 19,401, fo. 35v (L&P, XVI, 1178); Capodiferro to Farnese, 6 Aug. 1541, ANG III, p. 70 (L&P, XVI, 1079). 14 Capodiferro to Farnese, 11 Jan. 1542, ANG III, 49, p. 112; Cruser to Duke of Cleves, 12 Oct. 1541, SAD Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 299v. 15 Chapuys to Charles V, 11 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1441.


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There was a great flurry across Europe as Henry made threatening moves against Scotland in the summer of 1542. Finally, he delivered an unanswerable ultimatum that led, fortuitously, to total, if relatively bloodless, victory over the Scots at Solway Moss on 22 November 1542 and the subsequent death of James V. How do we explain all this? As it happened, James was cautious enough not to align himself openly with the French anti-Imperial coalition of July 1542 and sent several missions to his uncle.16 English military preparations went ahead, however. There has been much debate about Henry VIII’s ultimate objectives here. Was his strategy quite simply shaped by a determination to conquer Scotland? Pollard argued that Henry was exploiting the conflict in Europe to put into effect his imperialist plan of annexing Scotland but the argument here is not clearly sustained, as Scarisbrick pointed out. For him, conflict with Scotland was a consequence of Henry’s decision to go to war with France.17 Elizabeth Bonner has re-affirmed the idea that Henry had decided on war with Scotland in 1541, partly because he wanted to extend his dominion of the British Isles, continuing with the ideas of Cromwell, for instance, first sketched out in his 1523 speech and reflected in the creation of the kingdom of Ireland in 1541. She also suggests that Henry’s visit to York was part of a plan to provoke Francis I into war by forcing him to intervene on behalf of the Scots.18 How much continuity is there between Cromwell’s thinking and the initiative of 1542? The evidence is clearest when we consider diplomatic initiatives intended to assure Anglo-Scottish amity, for instance, the Truce of October 1533 and the Treaty of Perpetual Peace of 11 May 1534. In February 1535, James had accepted the Order of the Garter. Yet such démarches usually reflected the state of AngloFrench relations, which were unusually warm in those years. When they cooled in 1536, David Beaton was on hand to advise James to pursue a French rather than an English marriage alliance. Cromwell’s objective, through the English expert of Scottish affairs, Ralph Sadler,

16 Henry VIII to James V, 8 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 580; James to Henry, 20 Aug. 1542, ibid., 642; James V and Scottish Council to Liermonth, 20 Aug. 1542, ibid., nos. 643–644. 17 A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII (1902, 1930 edn), pp. 405–407; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (London, 1968), pp. 424–427. 18 E. Bonner, ‘The genesis of Henry VIII’s “Rough Wooing”,’ 36–53.

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was to separate James from the French alliance and from allegiance to the Pope and this continued in 1540–1541.19 It is indeed incontrovertible that Henry accompanied his serious incursion into Scotland of September 1542 with a Declaration conteyning the iust causes . . . of this present warre with the Scottes that, while it paid attention to James V’s failures as a neighbour and nephew, developed into a lengthy compilation of ‘evidence’ for the suzerainty of English kings over Scotland. The problem here is that, as Merriman has pointed out, the research for the text was not ordered until early October and the copies were not available until early November. It seems, then, to be a post facto justification for the war rather than a series of motives for it.20 It is the case that the Anglo-Scottish border was lawless and difficult to control from London. Putting a firm stamp on it would be advantageous. A Consultation Paper of 5 November 1542 even suggested settlement of the problem by the annexation of parts of the Lowlands up to the Firth of Forth but made abundantly clear that the cost would be staggering, no less than near enough £100,000 for a ‘main army’ for two months.21 Again, though, these ideas emerged only after Henry had been compelled to do something about the Borders in August 1542. At this point it is essential to recapitulate the analysis offered here in Chapter 1. Henry had not decided on war with France in 1541. The international situation was still too unclear. Henry probably decided on war with France in the Spring-Summer of 1542 but was definitely in no hurry to precipitate it. So, a provocation of Scotland to war in 1541 did not make sense while the French were still not at war with the Emperor and had spare capacity to help the Scots while Henry had no secure ally abroad. Again, in 1542 a major military incursion

19 A.J. Slavin, Politics and Profit. A Study of Sir Ralph Sadler, 1507–1547 (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 83–84. 20 Merriman, Rough Wooings, pp. 62–64. 21 ‘A consulatacion for prosecucion of the warre agaynst Scotlande,’ NA SP1/174, fos. 58–63 (old, 49–54) (L&P, XVII, 1034): if the king ‘entendeth tenlarge his frontiers to the water of Fyeth’ to extend the kingdom of England’s frontiers ‘it shall thenne be necessarye to use the force of a mayne armye at the begynneng of June next cumming’ certain provisions must be made (detailed see Chapter 4). One the other hand if Henry intended to show mercy to his nephew and ‘satisfie himself with a warre gargareable wherewith to chastise the Scottes therby to cause them to knowe themselfes to thintent they maye for avoydeng further daungier submit themselfes’ only the garrisons needed provision.


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against Scotland did not make sense if, as seems highly likely, Henry had already decided on war with France in the summer of 1542, except as a necessary prelude to that war. Otherwise, Henry was exposing himself to the danger of an ambitious campaign in the North before his alliances in Europe were assured and before he knew what the French would do. True, he could expect that the French would have too much on their plate to intervene against him in 1542 but this state of affairs would not last and the only sensible strategy in those circumstances was a swift and massive pre-emptive blow against the Scots; this is precisely what Henry did not attempt. For the Scots, who could not expect immediate French help while the Anglo-French peace continued, Henry’s invasion was the result of James V’s failure to break with Rome and reject his alliance with France.22 When the Scots knew the scale of the military operations directed against them, they offered peace talks through commissioners to meet at York. Henry told Chapuys in confidence in late September that he thought there would be no war as the Scots had already offered reparations and return of prisoners. He also claimed they had offered an alliance not to include France. James had even offered to come to meet him in London.23 There was obviously a degree of bravado here but it certainly made sense for Henry to try to achieve his objectives without full-scale war. The Anglo-Scottish War, 1542–1543 The initial English project was for a border war that would teach Scottish raiders a lesson at a moment when Henry was preparing to come out openly in favour of the Emperor. From the start, though, it was not clear what Henry’s or English objectives were. Robert Bowes was told to get his force ready on 28 July because of the continuation of Scottish raids.24 Marillac thought that the Scottish raids on 4 or 5 villages were a provocation but that the situation was made worse because of English suspicions of a treaty linking the Scots and 22 James V to Paul III. 9 Nov. 152, BL Royal MSS, 18 (L&P, XVII, 1060); Beaton to Pope Paul III, 10 Nov. 1542, A. Thiener, Vetera Monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum (Rome, 1864), 613 (L&P, XVII, 1072). 23 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 27 Sept. 1542, L&P, XVII, 852. 24 Instructions for Bowes, 28 July 1542, St.P., V, pp. 205 (L&P, XVII, 540).

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the French. He reported massive mobilisation on 22 August and that the English blamed the French for setting on the Scots.25 While Rutland, sent to Berwick as Warden with 5–6000 men, was commissioned to negotiate and not to attack unless the Scots attacked first, the Wardens of the Marches were empowered to take revenge for any attack. Nevertheless, the tone of correspondence seems to be one of wait-and-see: if the Scots attacked with a main army, then the fortresses at Berwick, Norham and Carlisle were to be put in a state of defence; battle was not to be risked until further decision from the King. 26 Exchanges continued with James V through his ambassador, James Liermonth in which Henry purported to accept his nephew’s good will but blamed incursions into English territory on the ‘yvell disposed myndes and counsailours’ of the Scottish King.27 A day after that letter was written, on 24 August 1542, Bowes was finally ordered into Scotland but his force was routed at Haddon Rig near Kelso. As a raid in force it was a disastrous failure since Bowes divided his troops and was beleaguered by faster-moving and smaller detachments. He lost about 1000 men.28 This defeat could not simply be ignored, however preposterously it was ‘spun’ for French consumption.29 At the end of August Henry furiously ordered a ‘main army’ to invade Scotland under the command of the Duke of Norfolk. Southampton was to have the vanguard (‘vaward’) with 4000 men, Norfolk the battle with 5000 and Rutland, hitherto Lord Warden, the rearguard with perhaps another 4000. With cavalry of around 2000 and the 6000 to be left under Suffolk’s command as the new Warden, there were around 20,000 men, as Ridpath claimed, though half of the Warden’s men would be ‘borderers’ rather 25 Marillac to Francis I, 1 Aug. 1542, Kaulek, p. 441 (L&P, XVII, 559); Marillac to Francis I, 23 Aug. 1542, Kaulek, p. 454 (L&P, XVII, 654). 26 Henry VIII, instruction to the Wardens, 7 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 574; Intructions to Rutland, early Aug., ibid, no. 577; Henry VIII to Rutland and his council, 22 Aug. 1542, Hamilton Papers I, no. 123 (L&P, XVII, 650). 27 James V to Henry VIII and to Leirmonth, 20 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 642, 643. Henry VIII to James V, 23 Aug. 1543, BL Add. 50825, fo. 1 (L&P, XVII, 653). 28 G. Phillips, The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513–1550: A Military History (Woodbridge, 1999), p. 148. 29 Council to Paget, 2 Sept. [1542], BL Cotton, E IV, fo. 147: ‘[the] Scottes have been a little busied [and have] taken certain of our men prisoners.’ Henry explicitly ordered the subsequent invasion to go ahead so that ‘the dishonour [of Bowes’ defeat] be in some parte purged’ and, crucially, that it should not be said that the English army in the North, though greater in numbers ‘durst not abide tencountre with the Scottes.’ (Henry VIII to Commissioners in North, 9 Oct. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, p. 261).


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than men in pay.30 Norfolk would be unlikely to have more than 14,000 men at his disposal. The Scots continued to seek negotiations and the Duke was empowered to negotiate with them at York from 18 September. Considering the assembly of a ‘main army’ was under way, most of the terms offered in Henry VIII’s instructions show some restraint, even though he was wary of the negotiations being spun out in view of the lateness of the season: Henry demanded the release of English prisoners, the surrender of rebels and traitors, withdrawal from encroachments on English territory. However, his demand that neither side aid any other prince and come to each other’s aid if invaded struck directly at the Franco-Scottish alliance and reveals Henry’s true preoccupation: to remove the Scots’ threat before his own war with France began. For the Scots to give way on this, though, would have been a real capitulation.31 When talks began, though the English, led by Norfolk, were tough in their approach, the Scots showed readiness to agree except that they needed to consult King James on the question of the French alliance and they thought the demands for highlyplaced hostages unlikely to be accepted. All the same, Norfolk and his colleagues thought they had behaved ‘unfeynidlye.’32 Henry was now insisting on James coming to see him in London before Christmas, though seems to have agreed that the new terms of the Anglo-Scottish treaty could be discussed then. Norfolk and his colleagues put this to the Scots on 27 September and on 29th Henry seemed to be prepared to accept the terms that all prisoners would be returned immediately; James would come to London and the ambassadors would remain as pledges.33 On 5 October it became clear, though, that severe divisions within James V’s council would make it impossible to agree to a meeting with Henry in London and the negotiation was broken off.34

30 Suffolk’s 6000, half borderers, half men of Lincolnshire and his tenants in Warwickshire (Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 203–204); Norfolk’s 5000 of the battle, (ibid., p. 243); Southampton’s 4000 (ibid., p. 268); G. Ridpath, The Border-History of England and Scotland deduced from the earliest times to the union of two crowns (Edinburgh/ Berwick, 1776), p. 538. 31 Henry VIII’s instructions to Norfolk, 12 Sept. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 158, pp. 190–197. 32 Norfolk, Southampton, Tunstall and Browne to Henry VIII, 19 Sept. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 167, pp. 207–210. 33 Henry VIII to Norfolk et al., 22 Sept. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 175; Norfolk et al. to Henry VIII, 27 Sept. 1542, ibid., no. 181; Henry VIII to Norfolk et al., 29 Sept. 1542, ibid., no. 189. 34 Commissioners to Henry VIII, 5 Oct. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 197, pp. 249– 252.

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Unfortunately for Henry, his army under Norfolk’s command did not prosper, despite the Duke’s close attention to planning. Southampton’s letters present a litany of misery about supplies (perhaps aggravated by his poor health) and Norfolk warned about the fast approach of the ‘ill tyme of the yere,’ so much earlier in the North. At the end of September the King seemed to accept that the dearth of supplies and the lateness of the season would make a full scale operation impossible. A devastating border raid would be an alternative.35 The start of the campaign was put off first from 6 October to 11th and then to 15th.36 There were also command problems. On 15 October William Fitzwilliam, Earl of Southampton died on the expedition. Edward Seymour earl of Hertford was sent north on 16th to replace him in command of the vanguard. The military expedition that began on 23 October was ill-fated. The army was not a well-organised force and the invasion of Scotland projected from Berwick little more than a raid towards Roxburgh (burning Kelso abbey). Then supplies ran out and Norfolk had to withdraw.37 This poor showing enraged the King and Henry ordered the leadership of the army, once the supply shortages were sorted out, to return at the start of November. The poor showing of the main English army was offset by the fortuitous destruction of another Scottish army at Solway Moss on 24 November by local English border forces under Wharton. A certain amount of luck was involved in all this. James V’s main army, raised to confront Norfolk, had disbanded on his retreat but the king was able to raise a new force from the retinues of the nobility and was anxious to exploit the advantage. The result was a large-scale raid into the ‘debateable land’ of the west march. It was never intended as a serious invasion of England and the number of casualties (apart from the loss of horses) not great. It has even been argued that Solway Moss was little more than a brawl. But the battle fought along the river Esk was a political disaster for James V in that a significant number of great Scottish nobles – including Cassillis, Maxwell, Fleming, Gray, Oliphant and Somerville – were captured and Henry VIII was encouraged to

35 Letters of Southampton, 19, 21, 27 Sept. 1542, Hamilton papers, I, nos. 166, 173, 185; Norfolk et al. to Council, 27 Sept., ibid., no. 182; Henry VIII to Norfolk et al., 29 Sept. 1542, ibid., no. 189. 36 Norfolk’s mandate, Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 226–227; Commissioners to Henry VIII, 2 Oct. 542, ibid., I, no. 193, p. 246. 37 G. Phillips, The Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 149–150.


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believe that he now had the whip hand.38 James died at Falkland on 14 December. His daughter Mary had been born on 8th. The Scottish prisoners were made much of when they arrived in London. Hertford brought them in and on 21 December John Gage accompanied the leading prisoners suitably arrayed through streets of London ‘ridinge afore them alone’ from the Tower to Westminster for their reception in Star Chamber and allocation to custody.39 Whether Henry’s discontent with the main expedition was offset by the victory at Solway Moss and the death of James V is difficult to say. At all events Henry and his agents had to confront the situation in Scotland; the fate of the newly-born Mary Stuart alone was crucial if only because of her position in the English succession. It was quickly apparent that her marriage to Henry’s son was vital to English security. There is little doubt that, in the eyes of foreign observers, Henry was optimistic about what he called his ‘greate affayre of Scotland’ during the early months of 1543.40 As the news of Solway Moss and of the death of James V came in (it was not yet clear whether the young child Mary had survived), Chapuys reported that Henry and his councillors were very distracted with business. The news was plainly the spur to frantic activity. The King, while exploiting his victory modestly and treating his prisoners well, was likely to follow the opportunity in Scotland to the end and it was this that concerned Chapuys. The ambassador naturally feared that grander projects in Scotland would divert Henry from the joint attack on France projected in the draft Anglo-Imperial treaty.41 At Christmas 1542, a Scottish ship was being fitted out in Dieppe for war, including 16–20 men of Dieppe in its crew ‘utterly geven to do Englishemen displeasure more promptly and violently than the Scottes theselves.’ Two other Scottish ‘tall ships’ – the Lion and the Mary Willoughby under John Barton Scottish vice-admiral, were haunting the Norman coast, some Scots trying to board an English ship.42 These were the ships observed by Henry VIII to be hovering for the English Bordeaux fleet and in whose absence an English squadron under Lisle 38 For two modern accounts, see Merriman, Rough Wooings, pp. 77–82; G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 150–153. 39 Wriothesley, Chronicle, I, p. 139. 40 Henry VIII to Lisle, 8 Jan. 1543, Hamilton papers, I, 363 (L&P, XVIII, i, 19). 41 Chapuys to Charles V, 15 Jan. 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 43. 42 Intelligence from Normandy, 1 Jan. 1543, NA SP1/175, fo. 33–34 (L&P, XVIII, i, 40.2).

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could intercept the Scots merchant fleet off Campfer and block the Firth of Forth. Unless argent action were taken Henry told his men in the North, Scottish affairs ‘may turn to our great displeasure and incommodity.’43 The other side of Henry’s approach was the diplomatic one. Formally, as soon as James was dead, a truce between England and Scotland came into effect.44 Ten of the 23 major Scottish prisoners in the Tower – including Glencairn, Cassillis, Maxwell, Fleming, Gray, Somerville – agreed in December 1542 to collaborate with English policy. These, along with the exiled Earl of Angus and his brother, held lands concentrated south of the Forth. On 10 January, before returning to Scotland, they signed articles agreeing to ensure that the young Queen Mary should marry prince Edward and that, if she died, Henry would take the government of Scotland into his own hands. When the ‘Assured Lords’ returned to Scotland and met the new Governor, in effect regent, James Earl of Arran, they might have seemed a threat to him but in fact he was able to use them to set aside and then arrest Cardinal Beaton, then his great rival for power. Arran seemed to be gravitating into the camp of those who wished to reform the Church in Scotland and aligning himself with Henry’s objectives seemed to serve his purpose.45 Henry’s trusted Scottish expert, Sadler, arrived in Scotland on 18 March to find a Governor apparently receptive to idea of Church reform and fresh from a successful meeting of the Scottish Parliament. The ambassador sent to London for copies of the English Bible and the acts of Parliament by which Henry had broken with Rome.46 This can only have confirmed Henry in his view that he had been given a heaven-sent opportunity to neutralise the Scottish threat to his wider plans. The subsequent negotiations in London over the details of the Anglo-Scottish treaty concerned particularly the maintenance of Scottish independence and separate institutions in the event of a dynastic union. A stumbling block was the refusal of the Scottish commissioners to abandon the French alliance or declare war against France. They also insisted on Arran’s position as Governor until the

43

Henry VIII to Lisle, 8 Jan. 1543 L&P, XVIII, i, 19. Prolonged until the conclusion of a treaty in July 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 54, 173, 239, 251, 269, 436. 45 Merriman, Rough Wooings, pp. 111–115. 46 Sadler, 1 April 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 348. 44


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majority of the Queen and that she should be kept in Scotland until the age of eight, with her marriage to Edward at the age of twelve. The arrival of Glencairn and George Douglas aided compromise and agreement reached by mid-May that included the giving of hostages. When the terms were brought back to Edinburgh early in June, a restricted meeting the Three Estates approved them and the terms were sent back for agreement by commissioners at Greenwich on 1 July in the form of the peace treaty and a related marriage treaty. This generated some optimism for English control of Scotland while Henry was at war with France, yet curiously Henry did not ratify the treaty as far as we can tell.47 This may reflect his uncertainty about the viability of the treaties. The problem with all this was that Arran’s strategy depended on a minority of the Scottish nobility and was thus inherently unstable. Arran could by no means control either the Lords of the Articles or the Council, which were fairly evenly balanced between pro- and antiEnglish factions. Beaton was now also no longer in custody and likely to be a powerful influence against the pro-English policy, while the arrival of Arran’s bastard half-brother from France brought his influence to bear against any further religious changes.48 In the course of July and August, the pro-English cause collapsed as some of the Assured Lords defected and a series of popular uprisings led by lords close to Beaton sought to gain control of the baby Queen. A Bond was signed by a group of clerics, earls, lords and lairds to oppose misgovernment on 24 July. Mary was transferred to Stirling and Arran openly came to terms with Beaton in September.49 Arran, who had no illusions about Henry VIII’s power, was reported as declaring in the Council that ‘I thinke and take it best by fare words and promises, with concluding of this peas, to deferre and put over the danger that might otherwise fall upon us.’50 How do we explain the failure of English policy in 1543?

47 Rymer, Foedera VI, pp. 93–95 (L&P, XVIII, i, 804); M.H. Merriman, ‘The Assured Scots,’ Scottish Historical Review, 1968, pp. 10–34. The point about the absence of ratification was made by E. Bonner, ‘French reactions to the Rough Wooings of Mary Queen of Scots’ Journal of the Sydney Society for Scottish History, 6 (1998) (1998), 332–333. 48 John Hamilton, abbot of Paisley, ‘of the cast of France and the Cardinal’s greatt friend’ Hamilton Papers, I, p. 520, I, p. 142 (L&P, XVIII, i, 425, p. 250). 49 Bond: Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 630–632. On all this see Merriman, Rough Wooings, pp. 121–128. 50 Parr, 6 July 1543, Hamilton papers, I, 555 (L&P, XVIII, i, 827).

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Sadler undoubtedly relied too heavily on pro-English lords such as the Douglases for information. A detailed reading of his despatches reveals the extent to which he reacted to events rather than shaped them; he was a fine reporter of meetings but probably out of his depth in the treacherous politics of Edinburgh. Nor was his personal security assured; in view of the ‘the malice of the people here to all Englishmen’ and the attempt on his life in July he thought about withdrawing to the castle of Tantallon with the Governor. Expressing relief that there would be no outbreak of fighting between the Governor and his enemies, he first transmitted extraordinarily optimistic views of the outcome of talks between the Scottish factions. He then realised that, despite his expertise in Scottish affairs, he had been in effect doublecrossed by Arran.51 Henry did not help his case by failing to ratify the Treaties of Greenwich and by arresting 16 ships form Edinburgh in August 1543 on the argument that they were bound for France.52 But there is also the effect of French intervention to be considered. French Intervention, 1543 For the French, the defeat of their ally and the death of James in December 1542 transformed the nature of their relations with England. The English Council, in view of the fact that the French might be ‘glad to get into theire handes’ the new-born Queen, sent to France on 26 December to learn what help to the Scots was to be expected from there. Paget duly reported the sending of envoys to Scotland with some resources and added that: whatsoever they worke secretly in this matier, they wilbe seen in apparence to do indifferently; and yet they can not hyde their affections, for from the highest to the lowest in this Courte every man maketh this matier of the Scottes almoost theyr owne, and wil in no wise seame to beleave these last newes of the Scottes rupture, but rather go about, by all the meanes they can, to cover theyr losses, and, saving the reverence of Your Majestie, do boste the Scottes with bragges and lyes.53

51 Sadler to Henry VIII, 17 July 1543, Sadler State Papers, I, p. 573; For the evolution of Sadler’s views, see Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 589, 591, 602. E. Bonner, ‘French Reactions to the Rough Wooings,’ 27–28. See also Slavin Politics and Profit, p. 112. 52 L&P, XVIII, ii, 47, 83, 111, 154. 53 Council to Paget, 26 Dec. 1542, BL, Cotton, E IV, fo. 99; Paget to Henry VIII, 9 Jan. 1543, St.P., IX, p. 258.


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The dowager Queen of Scotland had all too many friends and relatives at court for her cause to be ignored.54 James had drawn back from the anti-imperial coalition of the summer of 1542; the French objective now became the renewal of the alliance with Scotland by the time a war on two fronts developed. Scotland on its knees offered extra advantages to France. The English suspected that the French would try to get control of Mary Stuart, though it is not clear that this was the immediate objective.55 François Errault, sr. de Cheman and Jacques Montgommery de Lorges (captain of the Scots Guard) were sent to Scotland. Their task was to assure its rulers of French support and accompany Matthew Stuart, 4th Earl of Lennox (next line to the throne after the Hamiltons and always a useful tool as a rival to Arran) to dispute the regency as a counterweight to the ‘English’ party and act as a sort of ambassador.56 Cheman and John Stuart (of the Scots guard and Lennox’s brother) took with them 60–70 expatriate Scots and it was even rumoured (incorrectly) that the duke of Guise was at Le Havre on his way to Scotland to help his daughter.57 Arran told Sadler that Lennox’s credence from Francis had been to ask the Scottish estates to observe their old treaties with him, as he promised to do, and to promise aid with men, money and supplies should the English invade again.58 Reports sent back by agents of Beaton and Lennox in May–June were pessimistic about the position of the Queen Dowager and the Cardinal, internal Scottish divisions and the likelihood of Arran treating with the English.59 The outbreak of the Anglo-French war in June 1543 gave more urgency to French moves in Scotland and Ireland. The figure of the Irish exile Gerald Fitzgerald had been an aggravation in Anglo-French relations. He had escaped to France and then via the Low Countries to Italy. Henry’s agents had long pursued him. In October 1543, there were rumours that Francis would send him to Scotland and early in 1544 54 E.g. Jean Cardinal de Lorraine, Antoinette de Bourbon and Aumale to Marie, 1543, Balcarres Papers I, p. 87. 55 Council to Paget, 26 Dec. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1235. 56 Paget to Henry VIII, 20 Jan. 1543, St.P., IX, pp. 267–271; 2 Feb. 1543, ibid., p. 288; 4 Feb. 1543, ibid., p. 297. W. Bryce, ‘A French mission to Scotland in 1543,’ Proc. Soc. Antiq. Scotland, 42 (1908), 243–252. Francis I to Arran, 19 Feb. 1542/3, crs. Bochetel, NLS, MS 368/15. 57 Maltravers to Henry VIII, 13 Jan. 1543, NA SP1/175, fo. 41 (L&P, XVIII, i, 46). 58 Sadler to Henry VIII, 26 April 1543, Sadler State Papers, I, p. 160 (L&P, XVIII, i, 438, p. 273). 59 Grimani, 5 and 21 June 1543, ANG, III, pp. 204–205, 206.

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the Council of Ireland reported that he was at Nantes, where a navy was being prepared for Ireland.60 Ireland, though, was a sideshow at this stage. The assembly of German troops around Abbeville and of others in Normandy for despatch to Scotland was already reported in April 1543, though the Germans were unwilling to go.61 On 25 June, Jacques de la Brosse, a household officer of Francis and Jacques Mesnage, councillor of the Parlement of Rouen who was to emerge as one of the most accomplished French diplomats, were commissioned to visit the lords in Scotland who had shown an inclination for a new Franco-Scottish agreement: To which, for the great and singular affection that we have always had and have now to perpetuate that alliance . . . to negotiate in our name and agree with our said allies or their representatives the said points and articles concerning the security and strengthening of our friendship and alliance.62

There is no doubt this document and the instructions dated 27 June were expedited in June 1543 since they were recorded in an agreement of 24 October.63 But the French expedition did not leave until September. Why? It might have been the result of the King’s distraction with the Landrecies campaign but more likely delay was brought about both by slowness in assembling men and materiel and by Henry’s stationing of a fleet off western Scotland from July to mid-September. Grimani,

60 See D. Potter, ‘French intrigue in Ireland during the reign of Henri II, 1547– 1559,’ International History Review, 5, no. 2 (1983), 159–180. L&P, XV, 543; XVIII, i, 290, XIX, i, 542, St.P., III, pp. 501, 503. 61 Wallop to Council, 6 April 1543, St.P., IX, 345 (L&P, XVIII, i, 375); du Roeulx to Wallop, 7 April 1543 (L&P, XVIII, I, 380). 62 Letters of commission addressed to the ‘gouverneurs et seigneurs du royaume d’Escosse, dated at camp de Maroilles, 25 June 1543, file copy, formerly Villebon, Archives de Laubespine, liasse 21: ‘à quoy pour la grande et singuliere affection que avons tousjours eue et avons de perpetuer lad. alliance . . . de pour et en nostre nom traicter et accorder avec nosd. allies ou leursd. depputez lesd poinctz et articles concernans la seureté et corroboracion de nostred. amytié et alliance.’ This is fair copy signed by several trial royal signatures kept as a file copy. I am not sure the significance attached to it by Marcus Merriman, that the signatures show that Francis withheld the commission in June, can be sustained (Rough Wooings, p. 132) simply because the secretary, L’Aubespine, may well have been trying out the royal signature for which he was responsible on routine documents and it was quite normal to retain a copy with a mistake as a file copy. It is printed from the text of the December 1543 treaty in A. Teulet, Relations politiques de la France et de l’Espagne avec l’Ecosse au XVIe siècle 5 vols. (Paris, 1862), I, pp. 122–123. On 21 June, Dandino reported that Francis had ordered La Brosse and Mesnage to be expedited (ANG III, p. 234. 63 BnF fr. 17890, fo. 7r–v. The Instructions are not extant.


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the papal envoy sent to oppose the Reformation in Scotland and promote French aid to the Scots, reported on 12 July that the munitions had already left and 50,000 écus allocated; by the 16th, he had heard that 12 ships were ready.64 At all events, La Brosse and Mesnage made their way to Brest, where they summoned pilots from Conquet to know ‘if they knew the route to guide and conduct them to Scotland’ and employed local captains to interview English prisoners to as what number of ships Henry VIII had stationed to block the route (‘pour empescher led. passage en Escosse.’) The French fleet is known in some detail, thanks to the accounts of Jean de Vymond, trésorier de la marine, drawn up the following April. The ships included: the Marie, 200 tonnes and 90 sailors, master Pierre Persac; the Jacques of SaintValéry, 90 tonnes, 80 men, master Paullet du Bosc; the Katherine, captain Nicolas Wyard, 100 men; the Magdeleine, 40 tonnes; the Jacques, Pierre Bachelier captain and Paullet du Bosc maître; the Françoise and the barque La Vollandière.65 The French fleet, with Grimani, finally left Brest around 28 September and arrived at Dumbarton, Lennox’s stronghold, on 6 October, reported by Beaton’s agent to be ‘na gret personages.’66 In fact, by September 1543, Arran had formed an alliance with Marie de Lorraine but Lennox had become disaffected with the French cause. The main aim of the La Brosse-Mesnage mission was deliver a major store of money and munitions to the pro-French party but they quickly realised Lennox could no longer be trusted.67 They had been told to assure his fidelity and so

64 Grimani, Paris, 12 and 16 July 1543, ANG, III, pp. 209–210. Sadler reported to Henry VIII on 28 July that the Governor of Scotland had word of the coming of the French fleet, reinforced from 15 to 20 ships because it was understood the English would try to block the way (Hamilton Papers, I, p. 609). 65 Money paid by Jean de Vymont, trésorier de la marine, for the voyage to Scotland, Brest, 27 Sept 1543: BnF, fr, 17890, fo. 18–22. Enquiries ‘s’ilz scavoient la route pour les pilloter et conduire jusques aud. pays d’Escosse.’ 66 La Brosse and Mesnage to Francis I, 9 Oct. 1543, BnF fr. 17888, fo. 279; Lennox to Francis, 10 Oct. 1543, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 10; Steward of Cardonald to Beaton, Scottish Correspondence of Mary of Lorraine, ed. A.L. Cameron, (Edinburgh: SHS, 1927), pp. 33–34: ‘na gret personages, quhikis sell nocht steir all the gydder out of Dumbartayn or Gleskow quhill I hayf vord fra your lorschip.’ They left Brest with the papal legate Grimani on 27 September, (see Grimani, Brest, 27 Sept. 1543, ANG, III, p. 212. R.K. Hannay, ‘The letters of the Papal Legate in Scotland, 1543’ Scottish Hist. Rev., XI (1913), 1–26 at 14–16). Chapuys reported their arrival on 18 Oct. (L&P, XVIII, ii, 286). 67 G. Dickinson, The two missions of Jacques de la Brosse SHS, 36 (Edinburgh, 1942), p. 26 [cited here as Discours].

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informed him that he had been appointed special French ambassador in Scotland with a commission to advise on the disposal of the munitions. Lennox claimed that he had been instrumental in releasing the Queen Mother and Beaton from captivity but that they had joined Arran. As a result, he claimed, he had been asked by many lords to take the government into his hands. Marie and Beaton, though, warned against trusting him and advised putting the munitions out of reach.68 The relations of Lennox with the English were complicated. At first they deeply suspected his motives in coming to Scotland and he remained linked with Beaton and Arran until Arran changed sides in November 1543. From being chief of the French faction, Lennox gradually became Henry’s most reliable adherent in Scotland.69 On their arrival, La Brosse and Mesnage found that Lennox was ‘usually with the earl of Angus, the earl of Cassillis and the earl of Guilmar and other lords who have a pro-English reputation.’70 The French envoys put heavy pressure on Lennox and engineered a compromise between him, Marie and Beaton at Stirling in October, whereby all agreed that the marriage between Mary Stuart and Edward would be prevented, that Lennox would marry the Queen and that he would strive to uphold the Catholic faith. La Brosse and Mesnage argued that Lennox must be diverted from handing over Dumbarton to the English, otherwise ‘the kingdom of Scotland would be in great danger of being entirely lost because it would be open to attack by sea.’ Lennox would retain the French war chest at Dumbarton until Christmas as guarantee that the agreement would be carried out.71 The agreement did not hold and some French cash remained in Lennox’s hands in Dumbarton. The French envoys set themselves to ensure that at the coming Parliament, the Treaty of Greenwich would be quashed and the 68 La Brosse and Mesnage to Francis I, Dumbarton, 9 Oct. 1543, BnF, fr. 17888, fo. 279. 69 Sadler to Henry VIII, 20 March 1543, Sadler State Papers, p. 75; ibid., p. 299. 70 La Brosse and Mesnage to Francis I, October 1543, BnF fr. 17889, fo. 20r–v: ‘ordinairement avec le conte d’Angous, le conte de Cassel et le conte de Guilmar et aultres seigneurs qui sont en la reputation de favoriser le Roy d’Angleterre.’ 71 ‘le Royaume d’Escosse seroit en grant dangier d’estre entierement perdu par ce que la mer luy seroit ouverte.’ The agreement was that Lennox should marry the Queen. See agreement signed at Stirling, 24 Oct. 1543, BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 7. Original of the treaty signed 24 October 1543, BnF, nafr. 23514. But also agreement by Lennox to submit his pretension to marry the young Queen to the next meeting of the three Estates, fr. 17890 fo. 11. The nuncio’s entourage seems to have misunderstood all this and thought the French envoys had made a fatal mistake in handing over the money and supplies to Lennox (C. Burns, ‘Marco Grimani in Scotland, 1543–1544: a versified account of his legation’, Renaissance Studies, 2, ii (1988), 299–311).


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Auld Alliance restored. Besides immediately using the money they had brought to shower pensions on key lords,72 they also did all they could to sow suspicion between Lennox and the English party and persuade Arran to suppress it. They noted with satisfaction that Ralph Sadler and George Douglas had left the country but were convinced that major military aid would be needed if the Scots were to be able to resume the war against England.73 When the Scottish Parliament met, 3–11 December 1543, it was a complete success for the French. La Brosse and Mesnage were able to speak to the assembly and call for the restoration of the old treaties. The Treaty of Greenwich was repudiated, as was the marriage agreement between Mary Stuart and prince Edward; the alliance with France was confirmed and war declared against England on 11 December. The triumph was sealed by the conclusion of a new treaty with France.74 On the face of it, then, the disaster of Solway Moss had been reversed. As yet, there were pitifully few French troops in Scotland.75 La Brosse and Mesnage told Francis that Scotland would be unable to wage offensive war against England ‘sans vostre aide’ and sent the Discours to the King to explain.76 The artillery brought by the French fleet – effectively a small but well equipped artillery train – was handed over to the Earl of Argyll’s agent in January 1544.77 Francis I was understandably

72 Receipts for payments: (1) Mandate by Marie de Lorraine, Beaton, Lennox, La Brosse and Mesnage to Jean de Vymond, trésorier de la marine or his commis to pay the following: Arran 2000 écus, Argyll, 1000, Earl of Bothwell, 1000 écus, Earl of Moray 1000, Earl of Huntley, 1000, Lord Fleming, 300, Lord Erskin, 300, Lord . . . stin, 300, Lord Wemys, 300, Lord Tullibarnie, 300, chevalier de Cawdor, 400, David Paniter, secretary to Queen Dowager, 100, total: 8000 écus. Dated Stirling, [Oct.] 1543. BnF, fr. 17890 fo. 13. (2) Receipt by cardinal Beaton for 5000 écus from the ambassadors and lent for the re-supply of the French ships, 23 March 1543/4; (3) receipt of Mathurin Richer, Vymond’s commis for 1500 écus from the ambassadors and then paid to the Queen Dowager for her expenses in paying Moray 500 écus in completion of his 1000 écus and to Beaton 100 that he had lent to the ambassadors. Stirling, 24 March 1544. Fr. 17890 fo. 27. 73 Discours, pp. 37, 42; Sadler State Papers, I, pp. 338–341, 348–351. 74 Franco-Scottish treaty, Edinburgh, 15 Dec. 1543, AN J 679, no. 54; Teulet, Relations politiques, I, pp. 119–123. 75 For the payments of Vymond to 10 archers of the Scots guard and 10 hommes d’armes, 16 Nov. 1543, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 6. 76 Discours, p. 42; La Brosse and Mesnage to Francis I, Dec. 1543, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 313; same to [Annebault?], 25 Dec. 1543, fr. 17890 fo. 1. The ‘instruction’ meant here is either the Discours or the shorter report, BnF fr. 17889, fo. 20. 77 État de l’artillerie unloaded at Carrick from the Marie, the Françoise the Magdeleine, 7 Jan. 1544 (BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 41): 2 great culverins, 2 bastard culverins, 5 moyens, 2 falcons and 1 falconneau; 33 hand culverins, 39 arquebuses à croq, 5000 balls (2500 middle, 1000 batarde, 1000 great culevrins, 500 cannon); 42 and a half barrels of

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delighted at the course of events. He declared that he knew that, had he not sent his envoys when he had, ‘the kingdom of Scotland was on the way to being completely lost and all reduced to the obedience and subjection of the King of England.’ Francis expressed his gratitude especially to Beaton, ‘considering the affairs of France and Scotland the same thing.’ Mesnage and La Brosse were therefore ordered to confirm Arran in his loyalty to the French alliance. As for Lennox, he had shown instability and ill-will (‘sa grande legereté, ses mauvais deportement’) but since he still controlled part of the French money and was potentially dangerous, the French envoys were told that to treat him graciously (‘il est requis qu’on luy tienne le plus gracieux et amyables propoz qu’on pourra’) in order to entice him back to France and the prospect of a Guise marriage. A gracious letter to him from Francis brought by Baudreul sought to reinforce this.78 Lennox had joined the remainder of the pro-English lords at Leith in January and defied the Governor but their military resources were weak. He withdrew to Dumbarton but had to surrender at Glasgow. By late January 1544 the envoys had spent 41,700 lt., leaving 16,869 écus in Lennox’s hands.79 They could therefore report that Lennox and Angus had returned to at least nominal allegiance and reported the agreement of the Scottish lords to launch a border campaign against England in the 1544 season, if Francis could aid them with 2000 arquebusiers and money for 500 light horse from the start of June. Such reinforcement would enable the Scots to put an army of 25,000 into the field.80 Francis promised further aid. La Brosse remained in Scotland and Mesnage returned with

powder; 114 ‘pacques’ pikes each contain a dozen; 216 pacquets off pikes, each with 7; 300 horse collars for pulling artillery; 62 saddles; a barrel of ‘dez de fer;’ lead; a barrel of cartouches for charging artillery, full of powder; equipage for artillery. 78 Francis I, Instructions to Baudreul to convey to Mesnage and La Brosse, 12 Feb. 1544, BnF, fr. 17890, fos. 38–40: le Royaume d’Escosse s’en alloit entierement perdu et du tout reduict en l’obeissance et subgection du Roy d’Angleterre.’ ‘pour estymer les affaires de France et Escosse une mesme chose.’ Francis I to Lennox, 13 Feb. 1544, fr. 17890 fo. 37. This letter was not delivered as the envoys thought it would be inconvenient to the dominant party, see fr. 17890, fos. 24–25. 79 Francis I to La Brosse and Mesnage, 25 Feb. 1544, BnF, fr. 17890. fo. 28. 80 Ibid., ‘la delliberacion prise par lesdictz seigneurs d’Escosse de faire durant ceste annee ordinaires courses sur la frontiere d’Angleterre pour les brusler et endommaiger le plus qu’ilz pourront, mays que de mectre armee sure ou grosse forse pour campeger ils ne le pourront faire.;’ Procès-verbal of the Scottish Council, 25 March 1544, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 25v.


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a list of what would be needed for the campaign.81 Baudreul continued to shuttle between France and Scotland until arrested off Scarborough in July 1544.82 In the short term, French aims had been achieved in Scotland in the midst of a difficult situation of war on two fronts and internal confusion in Scotland but communications between the two countries became increasingly difficult. The English Invasion of 1544 Henry VIII reacted with predictable rage to the reversal of English fortunes in Scotland. He despatched a declaration to the Scottish Parliament on 20 December, denouncing their alliance with France as ‘so yvel a quarrel,’ and declaring war against them. The Estates had broken up before the message arrived but there was no doubting the meaning; the Scots had made their choice and were going to pay the price.83 There are no absolutely clear explanations for Henry’s determination to invade Scotland. It is the case that his truculent tone reflects a certain consciousness that his honour had been impugned but the decision was a grave one. It can only seriously be explained by understanding the European context. Henry was irrevocably committed to a large-scale campaign in France in 1544 and could not leave Scotland to attack England while he took the bulk of his forces to France. Suffolk, who was on the Borders, advised strongly that, if there were to be an invasion, it should be early in the year to give the Scots no time to gather forces or for the French and the Danes to come to their aid. But the earliest date possible was 1 May since only then would there be enough grass for the horses. He envisaged 20,000 men and a campaign of six weeks. The campaign would have to be short if it were not to interfere with plans for France. All the same, Suffolk offered alternatives: a systematic wasting of the Scottish border country so the Scots would not be able to invade, or, if they offered a truce, that it be accepted for one or two years. One of the more interesting aspects of this planning process is a sort of cost-benefit analysis produced by

81

La Brosse to Mesnage, Sterling, 5 March 1544, BnF, fr. 17889, fo. 41. Shrewsbury to Queen and Council, 29 July 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, p. 434; Council of North to Privy Council, 6 Aug. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 40. 83 Hamilton Papers, II, pp. 235–238; St.P., V, pp. 350–352, a more extreme draft in the hand of Paget. 82

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Suffolk for his three plans: the first would cost £44,000 plus expenses at sea, less £1500 pm. saved because there would no longer need to be an army to protect the Borders. The second would cost £9000 over three months, though for the next nine months no garrison would be needed and this would save £13,500. Should the Scots invade, an army of 20,000 men for defence would cost £20,000. The third option would cost nothing.84 Unlike in December 1542, Henry was not attracted by the cheaper options. He told Suffolk on 29 January 1544 to plan for a campaign in March with 14,000 foot and 2000 horse which would burn Edinburgh and Teviotdale to stop the Scots ‘annoying’ England during the French campaign.85 Suffolk, though, was recalled for the main royal campaign and replaced by Hertford as the King’s Lieutenant for the army in the North. Paget later summed up the invasion army in a bulletin to Nicolas Wotton: the army going by sea, 15,000, with victuals for 56 days, 26 sail and 3,000 soldiers to keep the ships. 4,000 horsemen under lord Eure advanced by land; while 3,000 horsemen under lord Wharton raided the west march.86 From the start, the army’s instructions were contradictory. In his letter of 29 January to Suffolk, Henry seemed to be envisaging a pitched battle and the acquisition of Edinbugh and other key towns. This would put pressure on the Scots to hand over Mary. But the tone of the instructions of 10 April was entirely punitive. The time allocated for the campaign, one month, was very short. Neither Suffolk nor Hertford were wholeheartedly in favour of the King’s strategy. Hertford thought there was a danger that the army would be wasted by simply devastating few towns, which could later recover. He advised instead the fortification of Leith as a bridgehead from which to put pressure on the Scottish regime but was turned down by Henry.87 The reasons are not hard to find; Hertford’s strategy was extremely sensible if the long-term objective were to control Scotland but the fortification

84

Suffolk to Council, 25 Jan. 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, no. 156 (L&P, XIX, i, 59); L&P, XIX, i, 59.2. 85 Henry VIII to Suffolk, 29 Jan. 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, no. 158 pp. 265–266 (L&P, XIX, i, 71). 86 Paget to Wotton, 14 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 501. English strategies vis-à-vis Scotland are examined by Merriman in Rough Wooings, pp. 139–163. 87 Hertford to Henry VIII, 12 April 1544, St.V, p. 371; Hamilton Papers, II, no. 209. By 23 April, Hertford had been told by the Council that Henry was determined on his punitive strategy (L&P, XIX, i, 387, St.P., V, p. 382).


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of Leith would have taken several months and this was time Henry did not have if he was to get on with the campaign in France. Nothing better demonstrates how far Scotland was subsidiary in English calculations at this time. The English fleet was paid from 18 April, when it left the Thames gathering around 200 ships, with 12,000 men, as it made its way up the east coast, delayed by bad weather. It assembled at Newcastle on 20/21 April and left on 1 May with favourable winds and arrived off Leith on 3 May.88 Hertford had ordered the strategy for disembarkation at North Shields next to Tynemouth on the eve of his departure and specified that all troops and artillery were to land at two places as close together as possible.89 The general strategy for an amphibious campaign was a sound one in that the long trek with artillery and munitions from Berwick was avoided. Arran mobilised his forces on 21 April but was obviously outpaced by English movements since there was no opposition during the English landing near Leith. They were faced by 6000 Scots gathered by Arran and Beaton. These were swept aside in a sharp encounter in which English numbers and an arquebusier company under Peter Mewtas carried the day. The rest of the Scottish force was driven off by arquebusiers and archers, the Scottish guns captured. Within a day, Leith had been taken and the English army had secured a crucial base of operations and also the main ships of the Scottish fleet. On 6 May, it was the turn of Edinburgh, where the city leaders would not surrender to the drastic terms offered by Hertford. The city itself proved impossible to defend but the castle quickly revealed itself to be impregnable to the siege equipment available to the English. All that could be done, therefore (most of the population having fled) was to burn the city down. 4000 cavalry from the English borders extended the devastation to the surrounding country. Hertford, aimed to march homewards, devastating the country on the way and two weeks after his arrival, after burning Leith and

88 See chapter 8 for a fuller discussion of the fleet. The outline of the campaign is well laid out in G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 161–169 and Merriman, Rough Wooings, pp. 144–150. For an an older but detailed account, J.P. Balfour, ‘Edinburgh in 1544 and Hertford’s invasion,’ Scottish Hist. Rev. 8 (1911). The main narrative source is the anon. ‘The Late expedition in Scotland’ in A.F. Pollard (ed.), Tudor Tracts 1532–1588 (Westminster, 1903), pp. 39–51. This gives ‘being 200 sail at the least,’ though see the planning documents (below chapter 8 and L&P, XIX, i, 355). 89 Hamilton Papers, II, nos. 227, 227.2 (L&P, XIX, i, 416).

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its harbour, the English army set off. Haddington and Dunbar were destroyed on the way and attempts of Scottish troops under Home, Seaton and Bothwell to block the way swept aside. Not even the small English garrison left at Coldingham to repress Scottish raids could be winkled out by feeble Scottish attempts. In one sense, the campaign of May 1544 was a resounding success in that it seriously intimidated the Scots and provided the necessary space for the main royal campaign in France. It also destabilised the regime by making it look militarily hopeless. Attempts to dislodge Arran by coalitions of nobles were unsuccessful, though. The Queen Dowager tried in May and again in November to depose Arran as Governor by summoning partial meetings of the Estates but was outmanoeuvred by the wily Arran; so a compromise between them was effected. A major military beating had failed yet again to achieve a real change in the government of Scotland. Lennox finally cut his losses and left Scotland after his representatives signed an ‘Indenture’ with Henry VIII’s at Carlisle on 17 May whereby he and Glencairn agreed to put Dumbarton and other fortresses in into English hands, promised to ensure the marriage of the Queen and Edward and in return were granted pensions and, in Lennox’s case, the hand of Henry’s niece, Margaret Douglas. He arrived at Chester on 9 June and proceeded to London, where he signed a treaty on 26th. In France, news of this defection provoked fury and the arrest of Lennox’s younger brother, John, sr. d’Aubigny.90 One last complication was the declaration of war against Scotland by Henry’s ally, the Emperor, on 7 May 1544, partly as a response to Scottish privateering against English ships and the use of Dutch ports such as Veere as a refuge.91 The Anglo-Imperial treaty of February 1543 had required each side to declare against ‘common enemies’ but Charles had hitherto been reluctant to do this against Scotland. Now, Henry VIII was pressing him hard. It was an act which was to have all sorts of unintended consequences; the Scottish-Imperial ‘war,’ mainly a matter of privateering and confiscations damaging in particular to the Dutch herring fisheries, dragged on long after the main Anglo-French conflict and was not settled until 1550.

90 91

Bonner, ‘French reactions’ (1998), pp. 45–47. L&P, XIX, i, 166, 318, 330, 381, 392.


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Scottish Revenge, French Intervention, 1545 At the end of March 1544 David Paniter, the Queen Dowager’s secretary and John Campbell of Lundy, her maître d’hôtel, were despatched to France, probably to seek aid. Little is known about the details except for Paniter’s arrival in Normandy at the end of April.92 Despite the arrival of a few French ships in May, which may have strengthened the Dowager’s resolve to confront Arran, little real French aid was sent and Paniter’s mission was a failure; no substantial aid was forthcoming from France to Scotland in 1544 (obviously both England and France had their eyes elsewhere). The disunity of the Scottish nobles was itself a problem. Somerville reported at the end of 1544 that Paniter had written that Francis I would only send aid if the young Queen were married to the Dauphin’s young son, François. A French envoy (probably still La Brosse) had only offered fair words and no money because of divisions in Scotland. Help would only be forthcoming when the Scottish lords united.93 This news was disconcerting enough to force a rethink in the Scottish regime. An English spy reported early in January that the Governor and Scottish Council had agreed to promise the Scottish Queen to France in return for help.94 As for Paniter, having spent months in France, he travelled on to Brussels in order to negotiate Scottish inclusion in the Treaty of Crépy, a move strenuously opposed by Henry VIII. The misery was compounded by the English Marcher commanders such as Sir Ralph Eure, who followed up Hertford’s campaign by launching a series of raids in June 1544 that led to the burning of Jedburgh, Kelso and Dryburgh and the wasting of Teviotdale.95 This, though, had the unforeseen effect of finally alienating one of

92 Mary Queen of Scots to Francis I, signed Arran, 31 March 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 268; letter of Paniter from Caudebec, 22 April 1544, Scottish Correspondence, pp. 74–75: ‘we ar weill tane with as ony men can be.’ Five French ships were reported to have arrived at St Andrews by Hertford. (Hertford to Henry VIII, 15 May 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, p. 372). Paniter had long been in France and returned to Scotland with John Hamilton of Paisley (Balcarres Papers, I, p. 93). 93 E. Lodge, Illustrations of British History 3 vols. (1838 edn), I, pp. 50–55 (L&P, XIX, ii, 709.2): ‘Mr. David Paniter sent a writing to the Governor, saying that the King of France wills the marriage of the Queen’s Grace to the Dauphin’s son; and if that were not granted he believed there should be no help nor supply come out of France.’ Lodge misdated this to Sept. 1543. 94 Hamilton Papers II, no. 394, pp. 535–538; L&P, XX, i, 5. 95 See ‘The Late Expedition in Scotland,’ pp. 48–51.

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Henry VIII’s crucial allies, Angus, whose lands had been wasted; thus, Angus joined up with Arran, when a new English border raid was mounted by Eure with a number of Scots allies early in 1545. The Scots had assembled a force of no more than 2500 but the English border force had become careless and on 17 February, returning from Teviotdale, was caught in an ambush by the Scots at Ancrum Moor. The Scots allies turned against the English in the middle of the battle and the English force was cut to pieces. Eure and Layton, captain of Norham, were killed along with 800 others and 1000 taken prisoner. This was the context in which Henry sent orders for two Italian engineers, Scala and da Bergamo, to design fortifications (which they did in the trace italienne style) at Tynemouth. In the event, these were not built.96 Though only a skirmish, the defeat caused panic on the English borders and put heart into the Scottish regime. In addition, Scotland now stood higher on the agenda of the French monarchy, freed from the Imperial war by the Treaty of Crépy, as it prepared for a major showdown with England in 1545. Scotland therefore took its place in the scheme of the vast confrontation on land and sea between Francis and Henry that dominated the year 1545. The main strategic purpose for France was to draw English troops away from Calais and Boulogne in order to make Francis’ plan to recapture the latter easier. An experienced French agent, La Croix, seems to have got to Scotland in February. George Douglas reported that he had brought 40,000 écus (a sum similar to that in 1543). Word spread that a French force of 6000 men was on its way with 400,000 écus.97 An army was indeed under preparation in France under Jacques Montgommery de Lorges.98 This was thought by Habsburg agents in February to consist of 14,000 French infantry and 8000 landsknechts as well as Spaniards

96

Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 170–171. On the arrival of this news in France: G. Bertono to Bernardo de Medici, Brest, 26 March 1545, ASF, Principato, Francia 1 (filza. 4590), fo. 208, arrival of a Scots ship from Dumbarton that set on on 12 March. The pamphlet La defaicte des Anglois par les Ecossois faicte le Jour de Jeudi Sainct dernier, et la grande bataille entre Barbe-Rousse et des galleres et carraques de l’empereur qui venoint pour avitailler Nice (Rouen, s.n., 1544) has sometimes been linked to this battle but the context of Barbarossa’s siege of Nice may place it at Easter 1543. On the Tynemouth plan, see BL Cotton, Aug. I, ii, 7 and M. Merriman, ‘Italian military engineers in Britain in the 1540s,’ in S. Tyacke (ed.), English Map-making 1500–1650: Historical Essays (London, 1983), pp. 57–67. 97 Douglas to Henry VIII, 15 Feb. 1545, St.P., V, p. 411 (L&P, XX, i, 202). 98 Merriman, Rough Wooings, p. 160.


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and Swiss, to be commanded by Admiral d’Annebault.99 The reality, though, proved very different. In April Francis seems to have offered the recently-arrived Scottish ambassador, John Hay, 2500 foot, 700 horse, 200,000 écus and munitions and that the Admiral would make his way to Scotland with 40 galleys. Hay told the Venetians that he did not believe the French King would do much and that, if France left the Scots in the lurch they would make peace with the English.100 Nevertheless, preparations at Dieppe and Brest went ahead, probably drawing some Italian troops from the Boulonnais, in May.101 On 15 May, Hay reported from Brest that Lorges’ troops were ready, ships from Le Croisic expected imminently and a fleet from Bordeaux on the way. He listed the support as 2500 foot (including 300 arquebusiers), Scots men at arms and archers of the royal guard, asserting it was the ‘fairrest support come this vc yer in Scotland.’ Moulins, Lorges’ lieutenant was sent on ahead to prepare the landing and supply for horses and departure was set for 31 May.102 An English fleet was stationed off Cornwall to intercept him and despite some losses on the way, the fleet, piloted by sailors from Le Croisic and commanded by René de Château-Chalon,103 arrived at Dumbarton on 4 June, battered by heavy seas.104 As the French had hoped, the threat to the northern

99 Intelligence sent from France by Saint-Mauris, L&P, XX, i, 619 (dated there the end of April 1545, but should be 6 February, the day after the King left Fontainebleau). On 3 Feb. Francis I had sent a commission to the governors of Normandy to raise levies partly to pay for the army and ships he was preparing for Scotland (L.-H. Labande, Correspondance de Joachim de Matignon, Paris, 1914, p. 114). 100 Hay was a nephew of Beaton and a frequent envoy abroad. He had written to the Queen Dowager on 10 March (Balcarres Papers, I, p. 136). Spy report from France, c. 30 April 1545, L&P, XX, i, 619; Alvarotti to Ercole II, 12 March 1545, ASM, Francia B 20, fasc. 4, p. 73 (75 decipher): ‘che non crede che Sua Maestà ne faccia nulla, et che è certissimo, se lei abbandona che loro per non soccomber, si accordaranno con Inglesi, et poi seranno maggiori inimici di Francia.’ Confirmed by Saint-Mauris, 31 March 1545, L&P, XX, i, p. 203. 101 Poynings, 4 May 1545, L&P, XX, I, 654. 102 John Hay to Marie de Lorraine, 15 May 1545; Arran to same, 30 May 1545, Scottish Correspondence, pp. 136–138, 139–140; Lorges to same, Brest, 18 May 1545, Balcarres Papers, I, pp. 110–111. 103 Bernardo de Medici to duke of Florence, Romorantin, 8–22 April, A. Desjardins, Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, 6 vols. (1859–86), III, pp. 153–154. Exemption from taxes for the sailors of Croisic for their services, 2 April 1546 (C. De La Roncière, Histoire de la marine française, 5 vols. (1899–1920), III, p. 411 after AD Loire-Inférieure, B, mandements royaux, 3 fo. 7v). 104 A Diurnal of Remarkable Occurents that have Passed within the Country of Scotland since the Death of King James the Fourth till the year M.D.LXXV. From a Manuscript of the Sixteenth Century, in the Possession of Sir John Maxwell of Pollock, Baronet

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border drew English troops away from the Continent and forced Henry to bring in mercenaries.105 Lorges, however, achieved very little, possibly because the Scottish leadership was so indecisive. On 28 June the Scottish Council met in Edinburgh and, in view of the French King’s showing himself a ‘gret and tender friend’ to the Queen, summoned all those who owed military service to be ready in arms at Roslin Muir by 28 July.106 Meanwhile the troops, artillery and munitions brought by Lorges were dragged slowly in poor weather to Edinburgh. A unusually complete range of musters taken in Scotland for this force, commanded overall by the sr. de Saint-Germain under Lorges as King’s Lieutenant, indicates 8 companies of around the usual 300 men, two of the companies amalgamated at the end of the year, possibly through losses. There were almost exactly 2500 men plus two companies of 50/60 mounted arquebusiers.107 Lorges had declared before the Scottish Estates that he was ready to invade England but the subsequent campaign was curiously feeble. The Franco-Scottish army encamped on the Tweed opposite Wark castle from 9 to 13 August and actually crossed the river to burn some villages but when Lorges pressed for a full invasion of English territory, Arran and his Council refused on the grounds that there was not enough artillery.108 Hertford was responsible for revenging this attack and thought carefully about his strategy.109 As in the previous year, he did not want to waste an army simply by conducting a grand raid and was now developing a vision of permanently dominating the Lowlands through a network of strongholds. So, with the help of Richard Lee and some

(Edinburgh, 1833). pp. 39–40, gives the arrival date as 31 May but this would seem unlikely if the fleet had sailed on 31 May. On the other hand, Hertford in Newcastle had heard of their arrival on 4 June (L&P, XX, i, p. 486); the fleet was described as ‘lately arrived’ in 7 June (ibid, XX, i, 887, 909). 105 Chronicle of King Henry VIII . . . Written in Spanish by an Unknown Hand, trans. M.A. Hume (London, 1889)[hereafter, Spanish Chronicle], pp. 123–127; Millar, Tudor Mercenaries, pp. 133–136. 106 Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1545–1625 ed. J. Hill and D. Masson, 14 vols. (Edinburgh, 1877–1898); [RPCS] I, p. 3; Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, ed. T. Thomson, C. Innes, 12 vols. (Edinburgh, 1814–1875) [hereafter APS], II, pp. 595– 596. 107 BnF, fr. 25793, nos. 532–545, 553 and BL Add. Ch. 13, 302. 108 G. Ridpath, The Border History of England and Scotland, p. 381. 109 L&P, XX, ii, 347, 400, 456, 533, 633.


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Italians, he drew up a scheme for fortifying the ruins of Kelso abbey in order to hold down Teviotdale. Greeted with enthusiasm at first by Henry VIII, the plan was dismissed by the Council as impracticable and the site unsuitable, so all that could be done was mount a brief, if ferocious counter-raid across the frontier. On 9 September Hertford crossed the border near Coldingham with an army of 16,000 (including 3000 border horse and 1000 men-at-arms). The force, which included a host of mercenaries, was similar to the amphibious army of 1544. The English devastated Merse and Teviodale, burning yet again Jedburgh, Dryburgh, Melrose and Kelso, where the abbey was reduced by artillery and the garrison put to the sword.110 How far the presence of the Franco-Scottish army deterred a more ambitious invasion is difficult to say. The season was already too far advanced for much else. Beaton told Francis I that there simply had not been enough time to confront the English, despite Lorges’ assembling his men and calling for action. The army had just been withdrawn and the English had only stayed 8 days.111 Hertford observed that the reasons for Scottish failure were a mixture of internal divisions (Arran and Angus were back at each other’s throats) and the prevalence of plague which, as elsewhere, was rife throughout north England and Scotland at the time. Most townsmen, he reported, were dead of it and he at least hints that the three years of campaigning in the North had made food supplies scarce and that there was a connection.112 Plague had already been reported in Scotland in July.113 A difficult return journey in bad weather awaited the French forces. Lorges did not get back until February. John Hay, who accompanied him and La Brosse, reported that they had arrived at Dieppe via the Straits of Dover on 12 February without seeing any other ships.114 Ominously, he reported none of their other ships had yet arrived. Elis Gruffydd reported that some of the Scots who were recalled in

110 Ibid., p. 382. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 172–174. S. Haynes & W. Murdin, Collection of State Papers . . . left by William Cecil, Lord Burghley (London, 1740–1759), I, p. 53 contains an exhaustive list of all places pillaged by Hertford’s army, 287 in all, including 16 castles and 243 villages, between 8 and 23 Sept. 1545. 111 Cardinal Beaton to Francis I, 5 Oct. 1545, BL Egerton 2805 (L&P, XX, ii, 525). 112 Hertford to Paget, 5 Oct. 1545, St.P., V, p. 539 (L&P, XX, ii, 524). 113 Fenix (Captain Borthwick) to Suffolk or Paget, Antwerp, 21 July 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1240; Diurnal of Occurents, p. 39; RPCS, I, p. 5. 114 Hay to Marie de Lorraine, Dieppe, 14 Feb. 1546, Scottish Correspondence, pp. 158–159.

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January 1546 travelled via Flanders, 200 of them too sick to leave hospitals at Bruges. Gruffydd reported that the survivors swore they would never return to Scotland because of the bad climate and the brutishness of the people. They claimed they had been attacked by the Scottish borderers, who killed many of them ‘chiefly for food for men and beasts of which there was a great scarcity, especially after the English burned Lothian.’ The story seems to have come through some of the gentlemen who shortly after ended up at Boulogne.115 For some of Lorges’ soldiers, the journey was even longer. The sr. de Feuillon, of the Tonnerois had served as ensign to captain de Gauge in Saint-Germain’s regiment of foot on the expedition. Feuillon’s ship was hit by a storm and wrecked on the coast of Norway. In April he and his men had managed in a pitiable state to reach Denmark, where ‘the cold weather here is worse for a very long time.’ He had to helped by the French ambassador, Richer, to get sustenance from Christian III until the weather improved.116 Lorges rode rapidly to report to Francis at Saint-Germain on 14 February. At the start of March, La Brosse was reporting arrangements for the transfer of more money to the Queen Dowager in order to oil the political works in Scotland by more pension payments. Two new envoys, d’Oysel and Mandosse, were scheduled to return with this and the Dauphin wrote a letter of encouragement.117 Scottish politics were about to be convulsed, though, by two new developments: the assassination of Cardinal Beaton, pillar of the French alliance, at Saint Andrews on 29 May1546 and the signature of the Anglo-French peace treaty on 7 June (see chapter 10). Naturally, Beaton’s murder further complicated the political-military situation in Scotland, since it was widely understood that Henry VIII had encouraged it and had indeed rewarded the conspirators. A long siege of some of the assassins in Saint Andrews castle began.118 This, followed rapidly by the

115 M.B. Davies (ed.), ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1559,’ Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of Fouad I University, Cairo, 12 (1950), 43–44. 116 Mémoires du sieur Richer, in Camusat, Mélanges historiques, fo. 16r–v: ‘les froidures qui sont icy les plus grandes qu’on ne les veit de long temps.’ 117 Guidiccione, 17 Feb. 1546, ANG, III, p. 426; La Brosse to Marie de Loraine, Paris, 3, 10 March 1546, Balcarres Papers, I, pp. 123–127; Dauphin to Marie de Lorraine, 4 March 1546, NLS Adv. MS 29.2. 1 fo. 40 (Miscellany of the Maitland Club, I, ii, pp. 212–213) (L&P, XXI, i, 329). 118 Saint-Mauris, L&P, XXI, i, p. 603.


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Anglo-French peace, raised the problem of how to respond. The treaty required Henry to undertake no new offensive against the Scots. The Scottish Parliament met on 14 August to discuss the terms of the comprehension of the kingdom in the peace and raised all sorts of objections concerning what seemed like the unwillingness of English border governors to observe the peace, the failure to release prisoners and the sheltering of Beaton’s murderers in England.119 The acceptance of the peace by the Governor was therefore hedged with qualifications.120 It is the case that attempts were made on both sides, encouraged by France, to refrain from actions on the frontier which would infringe the peace.121 Preparations in England to aid the anti-Beaton rebels holding out at Saint Andrews aggravated the situation and these problems remained unresolved when Paniter and Adam Otterburn came to London in November to press for the ratification and protest at violations of the peace terms (see chapter 11). Odet de Selve wrote to Paget on 18 November that the Scots envoys had informed him that Henry had sent soldiers and ships to land at Saint Andrews in support of the rebels, ‘which would be an open declaration against the Scots and thus a contravention of an article in the treaty.’122 It was perhaps annoyance at this challenge that led Henry a few days later to treat the Scottish ambassadors to a ferocious tongue-lashing, threatening more war. Not surprisingly, Paniter and Otterburn started pressing the French ambassador for more help, while in Scotland the Privy Council formulated a new request for aid of 200,000 écus, artillery and troops to be in Scotland by 15 February.123 It looked as though virtually nothing had changed in the north despite the new peace treaty. Nicholas Wotton told Saint-Mauris at Paris in March 1547 that, though the French were pressing for the acceptance of the Scottish ratification of the treaty, the Scots were being so aggressive at sea that there was no reason to do so. On the one hand, Paniter and Otterburn attended the

119

APS, II, pp. 473–474. Letters of acceptance by James Hamilton Earl of Arran as Governor, 17 Aug. 1546, National Archives of Scotland, Treaties with France, SP 7, no. 32. 121 Merriman, Rough Wooings, pp. 218–219. 122 Ibid., pp. 220–221; Selve to Paget, 18 Nov. 1546, NA SP1/226, fo. 117 (L&P, XXI, ii, 415): ‘qui seroyt une manifeste ouverture contre lesdictz Escossoys et par ainsy contravention à ung article du traicté’ RPCS, I, pp. 54–55. 123 Selve to Francis I, 25 Nov. 1546, J. Lefebvre-Pontalis (ed.), Correspondance politique de Odet de Selve, (Paris, 1888), pp. 60–61. 120

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coronation of Edward VI and on the other the great Scottish ship, the Lyon had been taken.124 The French government was, though, in a complicated situation. In his instructions to Christophe Richer, ambassador in Denmark, of November 1546, Francis showed he had no confidence that Henry would fulfil his commitments in the treaty and declared himself willing to assist in the negotiation of a marriage between the young Queen and Christian III’s heir, a proposal that had first been put forward by the Protestant envoys in November 1545 (see chapter 9). It seems clear that Francis was still hoping to draw Scotland and Denmark together into an alliance.125 On the other hand (see chapter 11), Francis was also trying to draw Henry VIII into a grand alliance against the Emperor and the two demands were to a degree incompatible. This in a way underlines the ambiguous and half-hearted attitude to Scottish affairs in France during part of this period. It is the case that a naval force was being prepared at Dieppe and Le Havre in February–March 1547 but the objective was not clear to outsiders and may not have been decided before the death of Francis I.126 It seems unlikely that a serious expedition was being prepared in France in response to Scottish requests before the death of Francis I. What is the overall significance of the struggle for Scotland during these years? It demanded a semi-permanent and growing English military presence of the Scottish border from 1541 onwards that in some ways further militarised the frontier. That frontier had to be controlled in order for Henry VIII to prosecute his plans in France but it became a theatre of war that absorbed ever more resources. That the Tudor state was able to sustain this burden while prosecuting full-scale war against France is remarkable. In comparison with the Scottish armies pitched against them, the forces of Henry VIII were seriously modernised, brisling with pike and shot, well equipped with artillery.127 Hertford had shown the England was able to project its power through ambitious amphibious operations. Only when a stiffening of French

124 Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 17 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte S-M an Karl, 1547, III, fos. 51v–43r. 125 N. Camusat, Mémoires du sieur Richer (Paris, 1625) in idem., Mélanges historiques (Paris, 1644), fo. 15v; Francis I to Richer, c. Nov. Dec. 1546, Ribier, Lettres et Memoires d’Estat, I, p. 606. 126 Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 12 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte S-M an Karl, 1547, III, fos. 31v–32r. 127 G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 175–177.


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troops was despatched was there much hope of serious resistance (though this was only to be fully effective after 1547).128 The Scottish wars fortuitously opened up the vision of a unification of the two kingdoms in 1543 that was in effect swept away by French intervention and the alienating brutality of English methods. Scotland was divided both in terms of personal ambition and, increasingly, in terms of religion but the lesson learned in the mid-1540s was that the primary threat came from England and had to be resisted. In the Scottish Parliament that met in October 1545 which confiscated the lands of Lennox for treason, it was declared ‘that now in tyme of weir na scotisman sall sitt under the assurance of the Inglisman.’129

128 M.L. Bush, The Government Policy of Protector Somerset (Montreal, 1975), pp. 7–39. 129 APS, II, p. 460.

CHAPTER THREE

ENGLAND AND THE WARS IN FLANDERS, 1542–1543 Edward Hall later commented of the year 1542 that ‘there was neither perfite peace, nor open warre betwene Englande and Fraunce,’ relations plagued by taking of ships and robbing of merchants.1 Henry VIII embarked on the maelstrom of European war with painful caution in 1542–1543; he had, after all, received a shock in 1538–1539 and had enough on his plate in Scotland. Added to this was the glaring fact that the English had been out of the game effectively since 1523 and had still to measure themselves against the rapid developments of fortifications, battle tactics and armament since then. In 1542, on the Scottish border, Norfolk had lamented the ‘small experience the nobilitie of this armye hath,’ while the troops, he thought ‘know little or no thing of the war.’2 Not for nothing did John Wallop sum up his experiences in Flanders at the end of 1543: In all the warres I have ben in, I have not sene suche another tyme for youghe to lerne, first for our being before Landersey, and especyally sithen thEmperours commyng, who brought wyth Hym horssemen and footemen of all nations, as as Your Majesties men here might lerne and choose what faschyon they lyeked best.3

Landrecies was indeed a baptism of fire and lessons had to be learned fast. While campaigns were planned in Scotland, preparations for war for England on the Continent took the form at first of observing of fighting around the Calais Pale. Relations between France and the Emperor worsened steadily in the early months of 1542 and formed the essential context of Anglo-French relations on the continent. Local English commanders and diplomats reported on the beginnings of war in detail, knowing Henry’s intense interest in the conflict. As has been seen, English positions around Calais had been notably strengthened and reinforced with troops during the war scare of 1541. In July 1542, 1 2 3

Hall, ed. Whibley, II, p. 341. Norfolk to Council, 13 Oct. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, nos. 209, 210, p. 267. Wallop to Henry VIII, 14 Nov. 1543, St.P., IX, pp. 550–552 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 384).

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another thousand foot were sent into garrison at Calais, Hammes and Guînes and another 500 promised for the latter.4 Border Tensions French positions had also been reinforced in and around Ardres since 1540 and there had been many minor disputes between England and France in the early 1540s, including extradition matters, decades-old cases of merchants, the Statute of Strangers and above all the border between English and French territory at Calais. Most of these were invoked in the ordinary course of relations in order to annoy or offset claims by the other side. Of all these, the border disputes around the Calais Pale proved to be the most vexatious and replete with opportunity. Henry had strengthened Calais in the late 1530s.5 The French had begun a programme of rebuilding fortresses early in 1540, including in the north Boulogne, Montreuil and Ardres. Those at Ardres were not entirely new (works had been planned as early as 1521 and begun around 1530) proved to be the most controversial. The English, a generation earlier, had objected to them on the grounds that Ardres was a ‘full unmete place to defende the borders of Pycardye,’ the implication being that it was directed only against the English.6 By the Autumn of 1540, serious disturbances were also taking place between Ardres and Guînes over a roughly triangular tract of meadow called the Coswade in English and la Cauchoire in France. It was claimed for pasture by the people of Ardres, who had a simple wooden bridge onto it, but the English asserted it was part of the Pale and broke down the bridge twice.7 Marillac reported that the Calais authorities were seeking a quarrel and that Wallop was deliberately reporting it as evidence of English coolness.8 Late in October, Wallop had a long talk with Francis; there was already a willingness on both

4

Council to Wallop, 31 July 1542, L&P, XVII, 552; 3 Aug. 1542, ibid., 564. See D. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436–1558 (Woodbridge, 2008). 6 Thomas Ruthal to Wolsey, 1 Aug. 1521, BL Cotton, Calig. E III, fos. 51–52. L&P, XV, 373, 408, 529, 795–796; Potter, Renaissance France at War; M. Cabal and N. Faucherre, Ardres Place Forte (Ardres, ACHA, 1990); M. Cabal, Ardres au XVIe siècle (Ardres, ACHA, 1995). 7 Francis to Marillac, 7 Oct. 1541, Kaulek, 228 (L&P, XVI, 130); Wallop to Henry VIII, 11 Oct. 1541, St.P., VIII, p. 443 (L&P, XVI, 144). 8 Maillac, 21 Oct. 1541, Kaulek 235 (L&P, XVI, 183). 5

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sides for the matter not to get out of hand and to settle it through negotiation and this was agreed by Francis late in November.9 There was initial dispute over the terms of these talks and the persons to be involved; the English for instance objected to Oudart du Biez, governor of Boulogne, as too closely involved but Henry accepted in the end that he was honourable and tractable. The technical expert would be a maître des requêtes, Imbert de Saveuse.10 Henry appointed the earl of Hertford and Edward Carne.11 When the talks (well documented on both sides) began at Campe on the border in March, they rapidly became bogged down in detailed assertions based on treaties as far back as Brétigny and would obviously get nowhere. Hertford thought that the French were simply prevaricating until they could finish the works at Ardres (which included the construction of a flooded moat).12 All that could be achieved was to pass the matter back to their masters, which meant that the problem would depend on the state of AngloFrench relations generally. In April 1541, the talks were overtaken by the war fever that pervaded the frontier; already in February the authorities in Calais were well aware from spies that the French were mobilising infantry in the villages of Picardy.13 Wallop, forgiven whatever offence he had given, was despatched to oversee the works at Guînes and keep an eye on the French. There he quickly reported that the French evidently feared war and were furiously stocking the granaries of Ardres with supplies. Throughout April and May of 1541 his spies reported movements of French troops around and beyond the Somme. Early in June, one reported an army of 15,000 men assembling near Abbeville but these were quickly discounted as garrison troops. For the moment, local French commanders like Oudart du Biez, showed themselves amenable and the duke of Vendôme, when he came to the frontier, invited Wallop to a meeting. By July, though, aggravation had returned to

9 Wallop to Henry VIII, 27 Oct. 1541, St.P., VIII, 460 (L&P, XVI, 204); Francis I Marillac, 24 Nov. 1541, Kaulek, 245 (L&P, XVI, 289). 10 Wallop to Henry VIII, 24 dec. 1541, St.P., VIII, 497 (L&P, XVI, 350); Marillac to Francis, 12 Jan. 1541, Kaulek, 287 (L&P, XVI, 459). 11 Henry VIII to Wallop, 2 Jan. 1541, St.P., VIII, 509 (L&P, XVI, 427). 12 French procès-verbal, translation, L&P, XVI, 637; for the English correspondence, Longleat MSS, SE/I/13, fos. 130–190 (HMC, Bath MSS, IV, pp. 16–28, especially the letter of 8 Feb. 1541, pp. 18–20). 13 Hertford to Fitzwilliam, 16 Feb. 1541, Longleat House, SE /I/13, fo. 180 (HMC Bath MSS, IV, pp. 22–23).


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the matter of who had the right to cut the grass in the Cowswade.14 Meanwhile, Guînes was, according to Wallop, set up with ‘princely workes’ and Ardres with new ramparts and three bastions.15 There was another round of fortification at Ardres during the war scare of the summer of 154216 and, with war between France and the Emperor, the Calais Pale could not fail to be drawn in or remain neutral. Burgundian soldiers used the Pale (as they had in previous wars) as a refuge and French commanders, especially du Biez, were always tempted to pursue them to the gates of the towns, claiming this was the normal practice of war. When such violations happened the air was thick with mutual recriminations.17 As an illustration of the problem: in 1541 the Master of the Saint-Inglevert hospice (to the English ‘Sandingfield’ and a mile within the Pale) claimed to know nothing of how he held his lands. Taxed with his ignorance, asserted ‘I am newtrall, and in token therof, I bere the crosse keys in tyme of warre, and the collation therof I had of the bishop of Rome, whiche enyoying for my lief I care for no more.’ Threatened with the appointment of another and better subject of Henry, he insisted ‘my house stondeth so that I must please both parties, or els be ondoon.’ It was a frequent dilemma on the Anglo-French frontier.18 On his side, Oudart du Biez had been contemplating incursions into the Pale but was restrained by the French government.19

14 Letters of John Wallop, April 1541, 14 April, 19 April, 26 April, 3 June, 22 June, 26 June, 30 June 1541, L&P, XVI, 718, 725, 739, 759, 889, 917, 929, 944. 15 Wallop to Chancellor, 26 July 1541, NA SP1/166, fo. 141r (L&P, XVI, 1036): work at Ardres had been scaled down ‘the rampire totally made within the towne and gardable’ ‘all theire fortfying at this present there ys owtwa[rd] making of three bulwarkes.’ Vendôme, 17 April 1541, BnF fr. 20521, fos. 33–34; Potter, Du Biez, pp. 155–159. 16 Wallop to Council, 17 Sept. 1542, NA SP1/173, fos. 30–31 (L&P, XVII, 801). 17 Affair of the captain of Fiennes: Council of Calais to Henry VIII, 17 Oct. 1542, NA SP1/173, fos. 247–248 (L&P, XVI, 959); Potter, Du Biez, pp. 164–167 (correspondence with Maltravers, Grey and Wallop, October 1542). For worsening relations, especially with Ardres, Wallop and Poynings to Council, 30 Jan. 1543, NA SP1/175, fo. 116 (L&P, XVIII, i, 97). 18 Longleat MSS, SE/I, fo. 133r–v (HMC Bath MSS, IV, p. 17). Peter Bredwell, then Master, made a full deposition of the house’s status (NA, SP1/243, fo. 4 (L&P, Add. I, ii, no. 1441, the date given in L&P, 1539, is wrong and it is more likely 1556). 19 Wallop to Council, 19 Sept. 1542, L&P, XVII, 809, 26 Sept. 1542, NA SP1/173, fos. 64–65 (L&P, XVII, 849); du Biez to Wallop, 26 Sept., 6 Oct. 1542, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 162–164.

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chapter three Watching from the Sidelines (June 1542–June 1543)

Henry undoubtedly saw himself as a knowledgeable strategist. At a crucial stage of negotiations with the Emperor in December 1541, he held forth at length to Chapuys (who was also able to score points off him) on the weaknesses of the Emperor’s policy, the danger posed by French negotiations in Germany and the threat to Flanders. This was high-level sparring.20 Not content with a harebrained scheme for his ships to raid in Orkney and Shetland in September 1542 that had to be gently set aside by his military advisers,21 he was not sparing with his detailed recommendations for Imperial armies.22 In June 1542, he received Chapuys in his nightgown at Hampton Court in order to treat him to a display of his wisdom on international affairs. He passed on news from Paget about French concerted strategy with Cleves and threats to the Low Countries from France and Denmark. He recommended a defensive policy in Milan and conciliation with the Duke of Cleves by offering him one of the Emperor’s daughters. Henry liked to show off the range of his knowledge but the obvious intent was to exaggerate the Emperor’s problems and thereby maximise his negotiating power.23 In July he sent Chapuys a map to warn of the Danish threat to the islands of Flielandt and Texel at the mouth of the Amsterdam channel. He thought the Queen of Hungary should mount artillery and earthworks there. Chapuys concluded that this must have been a plan mooted when Henry was an ally of the Duke of Cleves in 1540.24 During the fighting at Landrecies, he studied the plans sent him by Wallop and gave forth the benefit of his opinion about the building of mounds from which to bombard the town; the Imperial commanders 20

Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 30 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1482. Henry had made the suggestion on 29 September. On October 2, his men in the North wearily reported that they had diligently examined the proposal ‘and nowe by credible relation understonde that the Isle of Shotlande is so far distant, and the tyme of the yere so far gon, that noman dar go thither this tyme.’ Pentland Firth ‘is rekened the most daungerous place of all Christendom.’ As for Orkney, it was also ‘very daungerouse and full of rockes,’ nothing to be pillaged ‘saulve otes, and little other grayne, the pople lyveng their most by fisshe.’ (Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 240, 246–247). 22 E.g. in discussions with Chapuys, Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 27 Sept. 1542, L&P, XVII, 852: Chapuys actually asks Henry for his tactical advice and the king says the Imperial army should press on from Yvoy to Mézières, laying waste the country and not stopping before fortresses or moving further into France, where the French might cut off their retreat. 23 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 30 June 1542, L&P, XVII, app. 22, p. 730. 24 Same to same, 16, 19, 20 July 1542, ibid., app. 29, 30, 31. 21


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on the spot, no doubt unwilling to offend him, praised some of this advice though shelved the rest.25 For their part, Imperial commanders were eager to draw the English into the conflict at the earliest moment and suggested joint operations; the importance of these contacts is that they sketched out early versions of common war strategies developed in 1543–1544. The count of Epinoy, who had served Henry at Thérouanne and in 1523, offered his services again with 500 horse, while his son-in-law Adrien de Croy, count du Roeulx, Grand Master of Flanders and Governor of Artois, invited any Englishmen in Calais who wanted to see the wars to enlist with the Emperor. There was undoubtedly a supply of these. Later in the year, we find a troop of Burgundians with 50 or 60 English involved in a raid on the French village of Louches (south of Ardres). Wallop described most of those taken prisoner by the French as ‘the worst sort of rascall’ he had seen, though two were ‘tawle men’ whom he took into the Guînes garrison (the rest were consigned to the French galleys). Those English killed had been mostly ‘proper men.’26 When Chapuys was at Saint-Omer during June 1542, he met du Roeulx, who suggested that, with 4000 English foot and cavalry from Artois, he could take Montreuil within the next two months before it could be strengthened. It would then follow that supplies to Boulogne and Thérouanne would be blocked and they would surrender.27 Wallop found these plans enticing and Henry instructed him to contact du Roeulx (‘a right Burgoynyon, true man to his master and a friend to England’) to find out how many men he could supply.28 Wallop met du Roeulx quietly at his residence at Ruminghem and discussed a plan to take not only Montreuil but Le Crotoy and Saint-Valéry, followed

25 Paget to Wallop, 16 Oct. 1543, NA SP1/182, fos. 18–22 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 280); Wallop to Paget, 22 Oct. 1543, St.P., IX, 527 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 293). 26 Wallop to Cheyney, 15 June 1542, NA SP1/171, fo. 29 (L&P, XVII, 405); François de Melun count of Epinoy to Wallop, 9 June, ibid. 405, ii; L&P, XVII, 536, 541 (letters of Roeulx, 26 July, Wallop, 28 July); Wallop to Council, 20 Nov. 1542, NA SP1/174 fo. 130v (L&P, XVII, 1106). 27 Chapuys to Charles V, 30 June 1542, L&P, XVII, app. 22, p. 734. Chapuys thought this was a good way to get Henry involved in the war and it is a point that king included in his Instructions to Thirlby of 1 July St.P., IX, 68 (L&P, XVII, 447). 28 Henry VIII to Wallop, 15 July 1542, St.P., IX, 90 (L&P, XVII, 496). Wallop on 16 Aug. 1542 described du Roeulx as ‘an honest man, and as mete to serve his master in the warres for his good undrestanding and knowledge, as any I do knowe of his degree, and can very well sett a nombre of men in ordre from one thowsand unto ten and upwards hardely to be amendyd.’ NA SP1/172, fo. 109v (L&P, XVII, 632).

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by sieges of Boulogne, Ardres, Thérouanne and Hesdin. Wallop, who knew him from the wars of the early 1520s, thought he spoke ‘nothing like a Frencheman, for all that he spekyth is de bona fide’ but he had to press him to deliver his commission and get a precise answer. Du Roeulx was sure he could raise 7–800 horse and 6000 foot in a week along with eight light artillery pieces. He doubtless had a bee in his bonnet about Montreuil (the Burgundians had successfully besieged the town in 1537 after all) but also offered persuasive advice which proved influential in English planning: In case he make any warre in Fraunce, that he do not as his Majestie hathe ben wont to do: that is to saye, to invade the cuntre, and so seeke for battayle, being but a tyme lost, for the frenchemen wol abide none, nor geve, onlesse it be for there advantaige, saying thereby to seke to gett some holdes and to kepe them and so increase upon them litle and litle.29

All the same, the existing neutrality of England demanded restraint. Henry told Chapuys in September that he had to fight the Scots, who had attacked him, and that in any case the threat to the Netherlands had faded. He said his commission to discuss joint operations had been ignored.30 Henry had responded to du Roeulx’s schemes by approving the raising of some private volunteers but pressed him to take measures for the defence of his own country. Henry’s ‘secret inclination’ was to help the Low Countries but this provided nothing tangible, as du Roeulx quickly realised. The French took border fortresses and it was too late to do anything.31 These were now seriously under threat. French and Burgundians both feared each other and were short of men and money. There had been a French plot hatched for the duke of Vendôme to take Bapaume by surprise in March, though nothing came of this. However, men and troops were always in short supply on the Burgundian frontier and, on top of that, the weather was unusually bad, so this provided an opportunity for the French. It was reported by Burgundian spies that ‘the French are determined to make

29 Wallop to Council, 20 July 1542, NA SP1/171, fo. 147v, St.P., IX, 92 (L&P, XVII, 519) and Du Roeulx’s articles, ibid., 519, ii. 30 Chapuys to Charles V, 9 Sept. 1542, L&P, XVII, 759. 31 Council to Wallop, 10 Aug. 1542, St.P., IX, 119 (L&P, XVII, 594); to Chapuys, 10 Aug. 1542, St.P., IX, 122 (L&P, XVII, 595); Chapuys to du Roeulx, 10 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 597; du Roeulx to Wallop, 12 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 614; Council to Wallop, 13 Aug. 1542, St.P., IX, 129 (L&P, XVII, 618).


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war on all fronts’ and the northern legions were on notice to march.32 On his side, Du Biez took measures for the security of Ardres. As Wallop put it, ‘the frenchemen mistrusteth much themperours warris and specially concernyng the said town of the Arde for this parties of the Realme, fering therewith that the Kinges Majeste will joyne with him.’33 Thomas Barnaby, an experienced agent in France, reported to Wallop that the French ‘be in a greate fere and that he percevid of all Picardie alonge, and howe Monsieur du Bies cowde scantly hide the same, saieng if war shulde cum the wer redy to answer therunto with a galyard sprite.’34 Indeed, du Biez, with 10,000 men under his command, was joined at Amiens by Vendôme with more men and a store of artillery.35 War between France and the Emperor was formally declared on 30 July 1542.36 The French plan of war involved an attack on two fronts: in the Pyrenees against Perpignan under the nominal command of the Dauphin and against Luxemburg under that of the duke of Orléans. It was aimed to attack the latter from the south in concert with a thrust by the army that had been raised in Cleves and Guelders since late 1541 and commanded by Longueval and Marten van Rossem, the ‘marshal of Guelders.’ Plans had involved a thrust towards the disaffected city of Ghent, still in a poor state of defence, and Antwerp. Rossem’s strategy was to attack the Burgundian Netherlands through the many points of entry that existed and use France as his ultimate retreat. Rossem, though, was difficult to manage and frequently called for more troops and pay.37 The French thought him over-optimistic about leaving strongholds behind him for such a campaign but in

32 Wallop to the Council, 25 Mar. 1542, NA SP1/169, fo. 173 (L&P, XVII, 199). On the assembly of French troops in May: the gendarmerie was mustered and, though no infantry was available, the legions could raise 8–10,000 men in 4 days. Threats to Bapaume, La Montoire and Bourbourg were identified (du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 19 May, 6 June, 2 July 1542, Audience, 119, fos. 3, 7, 10: ‘les Francois sont deliberez de faire la guerre par tous costés.’ 33 Wallop to Southampton, 6 June 1542, L&P, XVII, 381; there was at this time already a plan for the English and Burgundians to attack Montreuil together (G.J. Miller, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries 1485–1547 (Charlottesville, 1980), p. 56) Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 6 June 1542, AGR, Audience 119, fo. 7. 34 Wallop to Henry VIII, 10 June 1542, NA SP1/171, fo. 8 (L&P, XVII, 393). 35 Spy report, NA SP1/171, fo. 153 (L&P, XVII, 519 (3)). 36 A. Courtois, ‘ Manifestes de François Ier, Charles-Quint et Henry VIII,’ Bull. Soc. Acad, de la Morinie, 2 (1853), 46–55. Some sources give 10 July. 37 Reports of Serrant to Francis I, 25 Feb., 11 April, 15 May, 4 June 1542 (Bers, Die Allianz, pp. 190–194, 197–199, 211–215, 234–236). On Rossem’s campaign, see Heidrich, Der geldrische Erbfolgestreit, pp. 57–58.

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August, he and Longueval were able to bring their force before the walls of Antwerp (though lacking artillery to batter it). The army then moved on the join the army under Orléans in Luxemburg.38 Initial gains, though, were lost there. Of more immediate interest to the English was the fighting in Picardy. Chapuys passed on the anxiety of the Regent’s government, with the Netherlands under attack, for English help.39 Du Roeulx warned Wallop that Vendôme had a force of 15,000 foot and 500 horse aiming to attack Arras or Béthune. Though he continued to assemble materiel for the joint campaign with the English, it was clear that he did not have enough men to defend Artois.40 Vendôme received orders from the king to form a ‘camp volant’ and destroy the small forts and castles around Thérouanne which threatened the supply route from Ardres, notably La Montoire and Tournehem.41 The duke marched north from Amiens to Thérouanne and pitched his camp first before Tournehem on 6 August.42 From the start, the English were intensely interested in the campaign. Two English lieutenants of Wallop heard the news direct at M. de Torcy’s table: how that the vj of August the dewke of Vandome came before a little castell called Eperleck, wherin entred iijc bourgonyons footemen which were comyng to Tornaham. They wold not rendre the same, wherfore at the last they were all slayne. Another lyk castell called Frolland did at the fyrst render them selfes and were taken to mercy.

This was the usual savage opening of a campaign to ensure quick surrenders later. The same witnesses went on to Vendôme’s camp at Tournehem: Where we found the Dewke of Vandome accompanied with the Count de Bryan, monsieur du Bies, the bisshop of Terrewen, who was very warlyke apareled, and with dyvers other noblemen they were in a hows nere unto the town gate of Torneham on Saynt Omers syde.43

38

Longueval to duke of Orléans, 22 Aug. 1542, Bers, pp. 269–271. Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 2 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, app. 34. 40 Du Roeulx to Wallop, 7 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 576. 41 Du Roeulx to Wallop, 24 July 1542, L&P, XVII, 528; Francis I to Marillac, 10 Aug. 1542, Kaulek, no. 434; [S. Picotté] Chronique du roy Françoys, premier de ce nom, ed. G. Guiffrey (Paris, 1860), p. 389. 42 Chronique, p. 390; BnF Clair. 50, fo. 7345. 43 Declaration of Palmer and Audley, NA SP1/172, fo. 32 (L&P, XVII, 575). 39


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The town had quickly surrendered on the 8th, largely taken by surprise.44 As du Biez reported: The garrison within this place have done a lot for us and little for themselves in thus surrendering it. I believe that our speedy and brisk approach frightened them.45

The French were eager to keep the English neutral. Torcy, lieutenant of Vendôme’s company, who was deputed to keep the English, particularly Wallop, sweet, visited him and insisted that the French would do all they could to respect English territory. He professed not to be surprised that so many English troops were sent over to Calais in the circumstances.46 Wallop sent men to make enquiries about Tournehem and was received cordially by Vendôme; this enabled them to make a fairly good estimate of the French army: 8000 foot (mainly legions) and 2000 horse.47 Vendôme was widely expected to move on to the old castle of La Montoire (nr Nielles-les-Ardres) and du Roeulx, the Imperial commander, held himself ready to protect it. Vendôme’s attitude was superficially insouciant, suggesting he would besiege the place closely and offer battle if the garrison came out.48 So, leaving du Biez at Tournehem, he moved to La Montoire, issuing a challenge to du Roeulx. His plan was to overthrow as many of the church towers in the pays de Bredenarde as possible. This was effectively done, La Montoire blown up, Bredenarde ‘sore spoiled’ and the Burgundian forces severely mauled. Du Roeulx was resigned and his resources too small.49 In fact, except for a half-hearted pursuit of du Roeulx, this was 44 Vendôme to Montmorency, Tournehem, 9 Aug. 1542, BnF, fr. 2974, fo. 6; same to Wallop, 9 Aug. 1542, NA SP1/172, fo. 53. 45 Du Biez to Montmorency, 9 Aug. 1542, Potter, Du Biez, no. 157: ‘eulx qui estoient dedans ceste place ont beaucoup faict pour cestedicte compaignye et peu pour eulx de l’avoir ainsi rendue. Et croy que la dilligence et vefve aproche que nous avons faicte d’eulx les a espouventy.’ 46 Wallop to the Council, 29 July, 6 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 519, 573. 47 Wallop to Council, 8 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 582. 48 Vendôme to Montmorency, 9 Aug. 1542, BnF, fr. 2974, fo. 6: ‘J’ay deliberé ne laisser d’executer mon entreprinse pour luy ne sa force, mais me loger si près du luy, que s’il a envye de me combattre, je luy en donneray l’occasion.’ 49 Wallop to Council, 9, 11 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 587, 606; Maltravers to Wallop, 12 Aug. 1542, ibid., 612; Maltravers to Henry VIII, 14 Aug. 1542, ibid., 624; Saint-Pol to Montmorency, 20 Aug. 1542, BnF, fr. 2997, fo. 100; Du Biez to Montmorency, 9 Aug. 1542, Potter, Du Biez, no. 157; du Roeulx to Wallop, 15 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 628; Wallop to Council, 16 Aug. 1542 L&P, XVII, 632. There was some question of restoring La Montoire in 1544, or at least of stopping the neighbouring people

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the sum total of the campaign in the area around English territory.50 Nevertheless, the brief campaign testifies to the close interest of Henry VIII in the progress of the war and possibilities for further operations. The strategic importance of the Pale as a ‘franchise’ to both sides was yet again revealed when five ensigns of du Roeulx’s defeated force, plus terrified peasantry, took refuge and furled their standards in English territory near Bowtes bulwark. War booty was being brought into the Pale for sale by the Burgundians and the French were prepared to follow them onto English ground.51 Scope for further collaboration between Burgundian and English commanders was also revealed. Wallop kept du Roeulx informed of French objectives and transmitted news sent through Calais to the French ambassador in England when it was unfavourable to the French at Perpignan.52 The French campaign in Luxemburg and the Ardennes had met with mixed success. Yvoy and Luxemburg were taken but then lost; Rossem’s attack on the Netherlands, initially very threatening, was beaten off. The Imperial army had assembled in enough force to throw them back. By the end of August, Vendôme, du Biez and their forces had joined the duke of Guise at Saint-Quentin, where they were joined by the Cleves army. They were drawn there by news of an enemy assembly at Avesnes and Maubeuge.53 The garrison at Ardres was further strengthened and Tournehem held. After that, it was time to take measures for winter garrisons. When it was suggested that some of van Rossem’s Guelders troops might be stationed in Picardy, Vendôme was quick to point out that the country had suffered much during this first campaign of the war. Laon, Soissons and Noyon, towns much to the rear, had been required to furnish supplies for the Luxemburg campaign, while Picardy itself could not accommodate extra troops. By October, he was at Mézières, which had been threatened by the Imperial army.54

pillaging its stones (Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 17 Oct. 1544, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 39). 50 Chronique du roy Françoys, p. 391; but see du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 7 Sept. 1542, AGR, Audience, 98, fo. 283: ‘Nos ennemis pillent toute la comté de Saint-Pol.’ 51 Wallop to Council, 18 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 637. See also ibid. 934, 973, 1005, 1106. 52 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 25 Sept. 1542, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 13. 53 Wallop to the Council, 30 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 706(1); Palmer to Wallop, Aug. 1542, ibid., 706 (2); Vendôme to La Rochepot, 2 Sept. 1542, Marquis de Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jeanne d’Albret (Paris, 1877), no. V. 54 Vendôme to Francis I, 19 Sept. 1542, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 32.


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The mid-winter months of 1542–1543 were, as usual, closed to active campaigning. Montreuil, Boulogne and Ardres were seriously reinforced with men.55 Wallop claimed that du Biez had planned to overrun the Pale but the marshal strenuously denied this.56 We know that Estourmel, hero of the 1536 campaign, approached du Roeulx in March through an intermediary in Cambrai but this was probably a move designed to discover Imperial plans rather than initiate talks. Neither side was serious and du Roeulx in particular was now mainly concerned with concerting plans with the English for a joint attack on France. The conclusion of the Anglo-Imperial treaty in February 1543, though not immediately widely known, gave an impetus to war preparations. Wallop had asked du Roeulx how many men he could provide in the event of an Anglo-French war. Du Roeulx was already empowered to offer 500 horse and 2500 foot and, if they had a secret enterprise, he could provide 6000 foot, 1000 horse with 3 siege cannon and 5 field pieces. He was pushing for the rapid taking of Montreuil and the allocation of 40,000 écus for its fortification as well as the destruction of Saint-Valéry, Le Crotoy and Saint-Riquier.57 As he had feared, French reinforcements were sent to Montreuil over the winter but he was again encouraging Wallop to advise his master to direct an English attack there. As before, he claimed this would have Thérouanne, Hesdin, Ardres and Boulogne at the mercy of the Burgundians.58 Relations between the French at Ardres and the English of the Pale were becoming more strained, while Wallop made suggestions for action should a final break occur, in which case ‘I wold not doubte to sarve them wyth the furst buffet.’59 For the moment, however, the French, and particularly du Biez at Boulogne, were anxious to avoid conflict with the English and went out of their way to do so while faced by the threat from the Burgundians.60

55

Wallop, 13, 17 Sept. 1542, L&P, XVII, 782, 801. Du Biez to Wallop, Potter, Du Biez, no. 161; Wallop to Council, 10 Oct. 1542, L&P, XVII, 934. 57 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 11 Mar. 1543, HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 5, fo. 107. 58 Ibid., Wallop to Council, 3 Dec. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1164; Du Roeulx to Wallop, 4 Jan. 1543 (L&P, XVIII, i, 9); 7 April 1543 (ibid., no. 386); Maltravers and Wallop to Council, 11 May 1543, ibid., no. 524; Wallop to Council, 31 May 1543, ibid., no. 619. 59 Wallop to Henry VIII, 22 Feb. 1543, NA SP1/176, fo. 56 (L&P, XVIII, i, 195). 60 Proclamation at Boulogne against talking of war with the English (Wallop to Council, 27 Feb. 1543, NA SP1/176, fo. 80 (L&P, XVIII, i, 210) and same at Ardres, Wallop, 5 March, NA SP1/176, fo. 115 (L&P, XVIII, i, 249). 56

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Early in February, it was reported that a general muster was shortly to be taken at Amiens ‘and incontynent upon the same shal enter into wages ij or iij c men, to be in a reddynes upon the border and furniche the castelles and piles of the same.’61 However, the muster was delayed until March while men were sent to work again on the fortifications of Ardres, damaged by the winter weather. Torcy came to Ardres with his company and Du Biez was back in Boulogne early in March, bringing with him Espinac, a new governor for Ardres.62 Meanwhile, Vendôme, now at Abbeville, was bringing men together at Montreuil, the objective being an attack in Artois. The French were, apparently, amazed that the English were not yet helping the Burgundians.63 At Easter 1543, Francis I decided on the provisioning of Thérouanne and ordered Vendôme to see to this. By the beginning of April, the duke’s army was ready at Hesdin and moved with 500 gens d’armes and 6000 light horse to a camp at Gournay, from which the provisioning was effected and François de Lorraine (Aumale) set out to raid into enemy territory.64 Du Bellay’s description of this campaign is detailed and is largely borne out by Vendome’s own report to the King: You will understand by this gentleman the bearer the defeat that M. d’Aumale and the troop with him in the garrison of Thérouanne inflicted yesterday on the garrison of Aire . . . the bad weather continues and gets worse that I could describe.65

On the 25th, Vendôme reported that the payment of his men fell due at the end of the month and asked for a continuation. The King decided against this as he was about to set out on campaign himself,

61

Wallop to Council, 5 Feb. 1543 NA SP1/175, fo. 160 (L&P, XVIII, i, 120). Maltravers to Henry VIII, 27 Feb. 1543, NA SP1/176, fo. 78 (L&P, XVIII, i, 216). 63 Wallop to Council, 18 March 1543, NA SP1/176, fo. 144 (L&P, XVIII, i, 293); same, late March (L&P, XVIII, i, 345); same 19 April, ibid. no. 422. 64 Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 118–123. Du Roeulx was aware of French plans: letter to Wallop, 7 April 1543, NA SP1/177, fos. 32/35 (L&P, XVIII, i, 380): ‘les allemands franchois . . . sont prestz pour marchier vers icy au ravitaillement de Therouenne.’ 65 Vendôme to Francis I, 26 April 1543, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 9: ‘vous entendrez par ce gentilhomme present porteur la deffaicte que Monsieur d’Aubmales et la troppe qui estoit avec luy en la garnison de Therouenne fesoit hier de la garnison d’Aire . . . . . le mauvays temps se continue tousiours et vont en pis et sont comme je ne vous saurois escripre.’ There was speculation in English territory about who had the best of these encounters – Wallop to Council, 1 May 1543, Sénicourt de Saisseval to Wallop, 1 May 1543 (L&P, XVIII, I, 485, 486). 62


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but Vendôme decided to use the day remaining to his army to take Lillers and the strongholds around it. Reporting to the King: I have been waiting to write to you about carrying out the enterprise planned for so long, so you would be certain of what has been done. It seems to me, my lord, you owe nothing to the sieur du Roeulx and have given him a good riposte for what he did in the Boulonnais. You have taken a good number of castles and other forts as you will learn from M. d’Estrées the bearer, who can also tell you better than I can about the taking of Lillers.66

The recent raiding by the governor of Artois had, then, been successfully avenged. The campaign seemed to be at an end when Vendôme received his orders for the garrisoning of the troops at Fervens (on the Canche) but these were soon countermanded after the King’s decision to take advantage of a shortage of troops in Netherlands to move to the attack in Hainault and lead his army in person against Landrecies. Vendôme was told to re-assemble his men at Abbeville and march across enemy territory in order to join the King.67 A conference at Montreuil in mid-May, at which du Biez and La Rochepot were both present, revealed that the Boulonnais would be denuded of troops.68 Plans were thrown off balance by a sudden attack by du Roeulx into the Ardrésis, in which he burnt many of the villages and churches. Wallop had already encouraged the Burgundians to destroy the supplies being thrown in such large quantities into Ardres. Du Biez and Créquy had assembled a force to attack strongholds in the pays de Bredenarde and du Roeulx responded energetically, attacking the ‘peels’ around Ardres. Vendôme had to make a rapid visit to Boulogne and more troops were sent to garrison Ardres.69 Once the crisis was

66 Vendome 3 May 1543: ‘J’ay tousiours actendu vous escripre l’execucion que j’ay faicte en l’entreprinse que de long temps avoye deliberé pour vous faire en tout certain de ce qui y avoit este faict. Et me semble monseigneur que ne debvez riens au sieur de Rieux et que luy avez rendu ce qu’il avoit faict en Boullenois, pour avoir prins bonne quantité de chasteaulx et autres fors telz que pourrez entendre par le sieur d’Estrees, present porteur, lequel vous en pourra mieulx informer que moy mesmes de la prinse de Lislers.’ (BnF, fr.20521, fo. 12) 67 Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 124–128. 68 Maltravers to Henry VIII, 20 May 1543, NA SP1/178, fo. 59 (L&P, XVIII, i, 574). 69 Wallop to Council, 15, 16, 18 May 1543 (L&P, XVIII, i, 557, 562, 569); Wallop to Council, 23 May 1543 L&P, XVIII, i, 587). The plan for Ardres had been discussed early in April with Wallop – du Roeulx to Wallop, 2 April, L&P, XVIII, I, 359; Wallop to Council, 4 April 1543, ibid., no. 367.

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over, however, Vendôme and du Biez returned to Amiens in order to meet the King and discuss the plan of the summer campaign. At Calais, it was reported that ‘the French Kyng preparithe a greate armye and intendythe to marche in person with the sayde army abowtes the xjth of June and hathe sworn an onavysed othe sayng that he wyll have all Artoysee, orels hit shall cost hyme his lyf.’70 Again, du Biez returned to Boulogne while Vendôme moved to Péronne to inspect the frontier. From there, he ordered Heilly, in the King’s name, to call up the Picard legion and assemble his men between Amiens and Corbie.71 At Calais, with open war imminent, grain supplies and cattle were gathered in and a serious shortage of forage reveaed.72 Vendôme’s task in the summer campaign was at first to support the thrust of the King’s army into Hainault. Early in June he reported: I shall not fail to obey your command and tomorrow will leave to go to Doullens with as many gens d’armes and light horse as I can get assemble to do you service and damage the enemy as much as possible.

From there, Vendôme marched to Gueret, where he was to meet a troop of lansquenets and ‘carry out what it has pleased you to command me.’73 Du Roeulx, summoned by the Regent to march to the help of the Hainault frontier, reported a stark and imminent threat to Artois, Arras, Bouchain, Bapaume or all three.74 In fact, Vendôme at this point marched straight to Bapaume and it is possible that this was on his initiative and against the King’s instructions to join him immediately. Certainly, du Bellay reports that, after taking the town, when he was on the point of receiving the submission of the castle, he received instant orders from the King to join him at Cateau-Cambrésis on pain

70

Wallop to Henry VIII, 26 May 1543 NA SP1/178, fo. 97 (L&P, XVIII, i, 599); order of Francis I to Lorge, captain of Norman legion, to assembble men at Montreuil, 21 May 1543, Amiens, SAP, Ch. Heilly 57, no. 28. 71 Wallop to Council, 3 June 1543, NA SP1/178, fo. 144 (L&P, XVIII, I, 641); Vendôme to Heilly, 5 June 1543, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 57, no. 44. 72 Maltravers and Wallop to Council, May 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 586. 73 Vendôme to Francis I, 9 June 1543, 12 June 1543, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 13, 14: ‘Je ne fauldray obeyr à ce qu’il vous plaist me commander et demain partiray pour m’en aller à Doullens avec le plus de gendarmerie et chevaulx ligiers que je pourray mectre ensemble pour vous y fair service et nuyre à l’ennemy de ce qu’il sera possible.’ ‘pour executer ce qu’il vous a pleu me commander.’ 74 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 5 June 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fos. 15–16.


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of incurring the king’s displeasure.75 He was thus forced to abandon the town and at the same time, Heilly, who had taken Maubeuge, received direct instructions from the King to abandon it and slight the fortifications.76 Francis had finally decided on an attack into Hainault to support the operations of the duke of Cleves. The royal army, commanded by the King in person and the Dauphin but with d’Annebault in real command, had crossed the frontier intending to take Avesnes, before word came in that it was too strong. Instead, Landrecies, viewed as the key to Artois and Hainault, was selected as the target.77 Around 20 June, the King arrived with his army and set up camp at Maroilles, joining the forces under Annebault and Vendôme together (Francis may well have remembered his campaign in the same area in 1521). The army’s first objective was Brabant, though further progress there was impossible. With Landrecies well on the way to being secured, Francis decided to head for Luxemburg (taken and then lost the previous year) as his objective. After Stenay and Arlon, the capital of the duchy fell on 11 September. Francis was determined, against better advice, to fortify it as he had Landrecies.78 The Habsburg government was clearly on the defensive in the Netherlands during 1543.79 On 20 June, Mary of Hungary called in the English ambassadors, Wotton and Thomas Seymour to convey here great ‘perplexity and fear’ at French advances to ask for Henry’s help in accordance to the alliance. On the 23rd, she sent urgently to them again to know exactly how many men Henry would be supplying and where they could join up with du Roeulx.80

75 Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 129–130: ‘sur peine de désobeissance et d’encourir sa malgrace.’ 76 Francis I to Heilly, 27 June 1543, Dohenny Mem. Library, Camarillo, Cal. 77 Order of march of the French army, BnF, fr. 20502, fo. 69, showing d’Annebault in the avant-garde, du Biez and the Dauphin in the battle and Vendôme with legionnaires in the rear. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 125–129; AGR, Audience, 1610, fos. 14–15, ‘Advertissmens venuz de Lorrayne,’ 8 Oct. 1543: ‘j’entends la bastir de sorte que l’empereur ne sçauroit garder de retenir ce que j’ay enjambé sur luy.’ 78 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 151–158. 79 Mary of Hungary, letters to Ypres, 12 June 1543, Diegerick, Inventaire . . . Ypres, VII, p. 262, no. 2566 and to Estates of Flanders, 11 July 1543 (Ibid., no. 2568) appealing for support in view of the military emergency. 80 Wotton and Seymour to Henry VIII, 20, 23 June 1543, NA SP1/179, fos. 47–48, 114.

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chapter three Open War: Border Conflict and Wallop’s March to Landrecies (June–December 1543)

As war was declared between the two kingdoms, a degree of uncertainty was removed for the French. In the Spring of 1543, as we have seen, the French were doing all they could to delay an English declaration of war, now regarded as inevitable, until the advanced season should rule out a joint Anglo-Imperial campaign. For those with responsibility for French border defence, the problem was all the greater since an English declaration of war would place the Boulonnais in a dangerously isolated position. As has been seen, Francis I’s advance on Landrecies involved his calling on Vendôme’s forces of light horse and gendarmerie and this left Picardy without enough troops. He pointed out early in June that there were no more than 2000 men on the Picard frontier, including the 1400 men of the old bands in garrison at Ardres and La Capelle; of the rest, 500 had been allocated to Ardres and 120 to Doullens.81 This was scarcely a serious wartime garrison. Du Biez was in charge of securing the border against the English. He had accompanied the Picard infantry to Landrecies early in June but was quickly sent back when relations with England deteriorated. Rumours of the arrival of troops at Calais were common in June and this is why the Ardres garrison was bolstered from 600 to 1200 foot. These, with a sufficient number of hommes d’armes would he thought, be sufficient ‘to keep it from surprise attack, while waiting to see what the English are doing.’82 The King ordered the late Admiral Chabot’s company to join du Biez at Boulogne and also 1000 men under Heilly’s command. On 7 July, du Biez went to inspect Montreuil and oversee the supply of Thérouanne. That done, he retired to Boulogne to see what the Lord Warden would do but first he appealed to Annebault for more men at Montreuil: One thousand foot and fifty hommes d’armes are still needed that I would have put into this town and Hesdin for despatch where needed; may it please you to take order. It is not possible to have fewer men here

81 Vendôme, 9, 12 June 1543, BnF, fr. 20521, fos. 13, 14; Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 125–126. 82 Potter, Du Biez, no. 173: ‘pour la garder de surprinse, actendant ce qui succedera de ces facons de faire des Anglois.’ The garrison for Ardres was Du Biez’ own company, 20 hommes d’armes and 15 archers of La Rochepot’s.


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or manage with less cost for the security of the strongholds than what I have asked for, which is 4000 men and 400 hommes d’armes. What I have is 3000 and 350.83

By the end of the month, order had been given for 2000 foot and 100 hommes d’armes to be sent to Montreuil, the most obviously threatened frontier post since the enemy knew that Boulogne, Ardres, Thérouanne and Hesdin were beyond them (‘n’est pas vyande pour eulx. Ils le sçavent bien.’)84 But Picardy was not the only frontier at risk. Lower Normandy was exposed to English raids and the garrison there was even more feeble than that in Picardy. True, the arrière-ban of the Cotentin, at the most 450 men, was summoned under a reliable commander, La Bouache, (testimony to the fact that this relic of the feudal levy was still thought useful militarily). The arrière-ban of Caen was slower to assemble and money still needed for the defences of Granville and Mont-SaintMichel. 500 foot were needed for the defence of Cherbourg (40 standing garrison men, mortespayes, had not been paid for 13 months, as was usual). Artillery and cannoneers were needed from Caen and Rouen. The arrière-ban was kept on duty for three months.85 Though d’Orthe told du Biez to expect the arrival of Lord Warden Cheyney with 10,000 men on the 12th, the latter did not arrive and he began to wonder whether the English intended instead to join the prince of Orange in the Netherlands.86 However, the threat of an English descent on the Boulonnais, either directly or via La Montoire,

83 Ibid., nos. 183, 184: ‘il s’en fault encores mil hommes de pied et cinquante hommes d’armes que j’eusses mis en ceste ville et à Hesdin pour en envoyer où il seroit besoing; à quoy il vous plaira tenir la main et n’est possible de tenir par deca moins de gens ne faire les choses à moins de fraiz pour la seureté des places que ce que j’ai demandé, que sont iiijm hommes et quatre cens hommes d’armes et j’en ay trois cens cinquante et trois mil.’ 84 François de Bourbon to Matignon, 21 July 1543, Correspondance de Matignon. no. CXXI, p. 74. 85 Francis I to Matignon, 28 June 1543, Correspondance de Matignon, no. CXVI; François de Bourbon to same, 29 June, ibid., no. CXVIII; same to same, 17 July, ibid., no. CXIX; Memoir on the defence of Cherbourg, July 1543, ibid., pp. 76–77. 86 Potter, Du Biez, nos. 173, 174; Francis I to Heilly and Vervins, 22 July 1543, BMA, MS 1150, no. 2: order to take their companies to Montreuil as rapidly as possible Francis I to Matignon, 28 June 1543, Correspondance de Matignon no. CXVI; Villebon to Matignon, 28 June, ibid., no. CXVIII; Francis I to du Lude, 28 June 1543, B. Ledain, ‘Lettres addressées à Jean et Guy de Daillon, comtes du Lude’ Archives historiques de Poitou 12 (1882), no. 4.

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still kept du Biez waiting anxiously at Boulogne,87 Other French commanders were rather over-confident. Villebon declared that ‘as for the English, since they saunter as they do through Artois and other places and dare not approach our frontiers, we think they will not do us much harm.’ A commander at Ardres, Espinac, reported in July: ‘concerning the English, since the measures you have taken for the frontier, I find them much less aggressive.’88 In a lengthy survey of all the war fronts, François de Bourbon was also sanguine: Landrecies would soon be a state of defence, the King was withdrawing the royal army from the camp at Maroilles (where the stink had become intolerable) to replenish supplies and augment it; Barbarossa, to the King’s joy, was off Marseille with, it was said, an Ottoman fleet of 200 sail and 30,000 men ready to act wherever the King wished and, as for the English, ‘we think they will not do us great harm.’ though a good watch should be kept. Only at the end of July did he register the fact that the English were indeed stirring and then thought they were just promenading through Artois.89 Such opinions were far from the mark. Henry may have been dragged into active war against France but, once the decision was taken, the formation of an expeditionary force was relatively rapid. The AngloImperial Treaty of February 1543 specified that both should keep fleets of 2000–3000 men to harry enemy coasts but little was settled about an immediate campaign. A joint Anglo-Imperial attack on France was called for within two years, each to provide an army of 20,000 men and 5000 horse to serve for four months. Charles was to prepare a force of 2000 horse and 2000 landsknechts to serve with Henry’s army.90 This was the bare minimum and, as we have seen, du Roeulx had been pressing from the summer of 1542 for a joint Anglo-Imperial

87

Potter, Du Biez, no. 185. Villebon to Matignon, 17 July 1543, 3 Aug. 1543 Correspondance CXIX, CXXV: ‘quant aux Angloys, puisqu’ilz se pourmaynent, ainsi qu’ilz font, tant en Arthoys que autres lieux, et qu’ilz n’ozent approcher noz fronctieres, penssons qu’ilz ne nous feront pas grant mal.’; Espinac to Francis I, Ardres, 30 June 1543, BnF, fr. 6616, fo. 66: ‘touchant les Angloys, depuys l’ordre que avez mise sur ces frontieres, je les treuve merveilleusement radoulcis.’; du Biez to Francis, 14 July 1543, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 182–184. 89 François de Bourbon, duke of Estouteville, to Matignon, 17 July 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, no. CXIX, pp. 71–72, no. CXXI: ‘penssons qu’ils ne nous ferons pas grant mal,’ p. 74, no. CXXV, p. 77. Barbarossa’s fleet was actually 174 sail (La Roncière, Histoire . . . Marine III, p. 380). 90 L&P, XVIII, i, 414. 88


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attack on Montreuil (see ch. 1). Du Roeulx had been informed in May of English intentions to send him aid in the defence of Flanders. In June, he was assuming that the English forces would be available with landsknecht backing. He took the view that only the open declaration of English intentions had held the French back from an invasion of Brabant. Returning to the charge about Montreuil, he urged that, should promised Spanish troops materialise, he could join the English to mount ‘the enterprise heretofore discussed against Montreuil, which would give put the kingdom of France in great fear’ and would force Francis to divide his forces and certainly block any French move to invade Brabant and join up with van Rossem.91 The outbreak of formal war saw intensive negotiations on the makeup of direct English intervention; small problems had to be solved such as the right of English troops to spend their own currency despite Netherlands edicts to the contrary.92 One complication was that Francis for the moment had withdrawn his army from Hainault, having taken and occupied Landrecies. Was Henry, as always legalistic, still bound to send troops?93 The expeditionary force was at first to be commanded by Thomas Cheyney but he proved too cautious and Chapuys pressed for the appointment of John Wallop, initially his deputy, in his place. Henry was understandably irritated by this but quickly saw that Wallop was a more combative commander who got on well with the Burgundians. Wallop was appointed on 7 July with Thomas Seymour, recalled from embassy to Brussels, as his deputy (or marshal of the camp). Wallop was anxious that his authority over his captains and men be reinforced. He was formally assisted by a council of war that included Robert Bowes, the treasurer of the army.94 Charles V later praised Wallop highly (he was clearly an effective commander). Seymour, the Emperor thought, was more ‘dry and difficult.’ Wallop

91

Instructions to Seymour as ambassador in Flanders, late April 1543, St.P., IX, 365 (L&P, XVIII, I, 473); Wallop to Council, 26 May 1543 (ibid., no. 600). Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 5, 19 June 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fos. 15–16, 17–18: ‘l’entreprinse de piecha advisee sur Monstroeul, qui mectroit gros estonnement au reaulme de France.’ 92 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 4 July 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 19: ‘il seroit estrange veu que lesdictz Anglois viengnent au service de l’Empereur de non souffrir allouer leur monnoie.’ 93 Henry VIII to Wallop, 10 Aug. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 27. 94 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 23, 24 June 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 759, 763. Instructions for Wallop, 7 July 1543, St.P., IX, 440 (L&P, XVIII, i, 831); Wallop to Wriothesley, 12 July 1543, L&P, XVIII, I, 877.

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himself (who, of course had had his difficulties with Henry) was anxious to put on a good show and at the end of the campaign, declared that his only wish was for a ‘mery loke of his highnes when his plesure shalbe that I may repeire unto his presence.’95 1500 men had been sent over to Calais before the declaration of war but Wallop decided to take 3–400 of the best men from the Calais garrison in place of a similar number of the new draft (he was always concerned to have ‘tall men’ about him); pioneers and labourers were also drafted. The force as ultimately constructed stood at 5000 foot (including 2500 from the Calais garrison) and 600 horse, many of the ‘northern horsemen’ from the Borders, who did particularly well (see chapter 4). This force (which looks so meagre in 16th century military terms) was comparable to the army which Henry V brought to Agincourt in 1415. These could hope to operate with a similar number of Habsburg troops under du Roeulx.96 But what was their objective to be? Du Roeulx was still pressing for the Montreuil plan but English envoys thought his troops too few and the French royal army too threatening.97 Objectives were still not finalised in the middle of July, du Roeulx arguing for Montreuil but Mary of Hungary pressing for help on the Hainault front, while Wallop himself even suggested a raid on the lower town of Boulogne.98 Not until 4 August did Wallop report talk in the Burgundian camp of concentrating on a siege of Landrecies, a project to which Henry only gave his grudging assent on the 10th.99 At all events, Francis’ withdrawal from Hainault released a substantial force under Vendôme to deal with the Anglo-Burgundian threat. From Guise, the King sent Vendôme to Doullens with the

95 Charles V to Chapuys, 22 Oct. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 293; Wallop to Paget, 28 Nov. 1543, NA SP1/182, fos. 124–5(133–4) (L&P, XVIII, ii, 438). 96 Wallop to the Council, 28 June 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 786; L&P, XVIII, i, 831, 832. 97 Memorandum on possible objectives of a joint force, 31 May 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 619, ii. T. Seymour and N. Wotton to Henry VIII, 5 July 1543, St.P., IX,487 (L&P, XVIII, I, 822); du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 23 July 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 22: the plan to surprise Montreuil ‘n’estoit sinon en cas que les enemis se fussent du tout rethirez. Et est lad. entrepinse ung des vrais moiens pour les bien estonner.’ 98 Wallop to Council, 13 July 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 882; Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 20 July 1542, L&P, XVIII, i, 925. Du Roeulx was unable to meet Wallop at Saint-Omer in mid-July as a result of illness (which seems to have plagued him throughout these years). To Mary of Hungary, Douai, 13 July 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 20. 99 Wallop et al. to Henry VIII, 4 Aug. 1543, St.P., IX, p. 460 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 12); Henry VIII to Wallop et al., 10 Aug. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 22.


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task of shadowing the English forces which were gradually approaching under Wallop’s command and had then reached Béthune. The Prince of Melfi was placed in command at Guise with enough light to horse to cover Landrecies under Brissac’s command, while Heilly was despatched to Montreuil to reinforce it against an imminent attack with perhaps as many as 2000 foot.100 The campaign started on 23 July with some satisfying incendiarism in French territory. Wallop’s force crossed the frontier and thrust towards Marquise through the territory of Fiennes, burning the castle there and the abbey of Beaulieu.101 Men were detached to burn Rinxent castle and the castle and abbey of Licques before part of the garrison of Calais was sent home via Bouquehault. Wallop plays down the cutting to pieces of some of the raiders of his avant-garde by du Biez’ gens d’armes, mentioning only five prisoners, yet the event seems to have generated a celebratory chanson, which was rapidly printed at Rouen in conjunction with the account of a French naval success.102 One of the English prisoners told the French that the English intended to attack Montreuil or Ardres. This had, of course, been discussed but by now the English were committed to joining du Roeulx in Artois for a joint attack on the French to the south. Du Roeulx wanted to hurry on Wallop’s army but had been ambiguous about the attack on Fiennes, which belonged to Mme. d’Egmont and was under his safeguard. On the other hand, he thought it would be better for the English to march through French rather than Imperial territory; he could not have it both ways.103 At Licques on 25th, the English were

100 Wallop to Council, 27 July, 2 Aug. 1543 L&P, XVIII, i, 960; ii, 5; Francis I to Heilly and Vervins, 22 July 1543, BM Amiens MS 1150, no. 2. 101 Beaulieu (canton Ferques, Pas-de-C) The itinerary of the army to 4 August is printed in Richard Turpyn, The Chronicle of Calais in the Reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII to 1540, ed. J.G. Nichols (Camden Society, XXXV, 1846), p. 211–, where many names are distorted, to which can be added Wallop’s despatches of 31 July, 11, 12 Aug. 1543 (L&P, XVIII, i, 979, XVIII, ii, 35, 43). 102 Chanson nouvelle faicte et compose de la prinse des Angloys qui furent amenez à Ardres in La prise et deffaicte des Angloys par les Bretons repr. in A. de Montaiglon, Recueil des poésies françoises des XVe et XVIe siècles, 13 vols. (Paris, 1855–1878), VII, pp. 201–203. Du Biez, 23 July, Potter, Du Biez, no. 187; Wallop to Council, 27, 31 July 1543, St.P., IX, pp. 452, 457 (L&P, XVIII, i, 960), Licques had been garrisoned by the Burgundians in April and described then as a strong place (Du Roeulx to Wallop, 17 April 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 412). The number of cavalry is unclear at this stage; estimates vary. 103 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 23 July 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 22: ‘J’ay encoires escript pour faire haster les Engles . . . qu’il valloit mieulx prendre leur chemin sur le pays des enemis que sur le pays de l’Empereur.’ He was, with the English,

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joined by 2000 Burgundian foot and 300 horse and the joint force went on to burn the town and castle of Alquines. Saturday 28th was spent in camp at Hallines, near Saint-Omer. On 29th, they passed within two miles of Thérouanne, where they skirmished with the garrison and there took place a remarkable and, at first sight, archaic event. Wallop challenged his old friend Villebon, governor of the place, to a tournament for the sake of their ladies, which took place the next day. Vendôme was reported already assembling substantial forces near Thérouanne but du Roeulx thought ‘when they see the English go forward, they will withdraw most of their men.’104 Thenceforth, the English force was shepherded through Burgundian territory. Camping the night by a ruined castle at ‘Lyoters’ they reached Allouagne near Béthune the next day. Wallop linked up with du Roeulx at Arras on 6 August (where the English were entertained ‘verrey chierfullye’) and was joined by a small contingent of 500 horse and 1300 foot.105 They were at Marquion near Cambrai on 10th and then swung north-east of Cambrai to Haspres on 12th. These days gave du Roeulx time enough to size up his allies. He in fact developed a rather high opinion of the English army but one that was tempered by a degree of realism about their experience and stamina in fast moving campaigns: They should not be relied upon except for a siege or a battle, for it is not possible to set them to make an enterprise against the enemy since they can only travel two leagues a day, and even when they manage three Artois leagues in a day, they need a day’s rest. But they must be employed somewhere, otherwise they will return home.106

‘fort assez pour Monsr. de Vendomme’ but needed more artillery (ibid., 4 Aug. 1543, fo. 26). 104 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, Arras, 3 Aug. 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 24: ‘quand ilz voirront les Anglois passé oultre qu’ilz rethireront la plus part de leurs gens.’ 105 For a good narrative of the campaign, the report of Ralph Eure, commander of the northern horse, to Thomas Fisher, for the attention of Hertford during his brief tenure as Lord Admiral, September–Oct. 1542, Longleat House, SE/IV/13, fos. 84–86 (HMC, Bath MSS, IV, pp. 87–89). Eure joined Wallop’s army on 6 August and reports du Roeulx bringing 500 horse and 1300 foot on 9 August and then Aerschot on 12th with 2000 horse and 2500 foot (Spaniards). On 22nd they were joined by 2500 Germans. 106 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, Arras, 4 Aug. 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 26v: ‘Ne se fault poinct attendre de soy en aidier s’il n’est pour ung siege ou pour la bataille, car de leur faire entreprinse contre les ennemis n’est possible, car ilz ne poeuvent faire que deux lieues par jour, et encoires quandt ilz ont faict trois lieues d’Arthois en ung jour, il fault qu’ilz se repozent l’aultre. Sy se fault il de les employer quelque part, aultrement faict à craindre qu’ilz s’en retourneroient.’


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He procured letters of encouragement from the Regent at which Wallop and Seymour seemed pleased (‘tresioieulx’) and reiterated: Their army is a very fine one since it contains so many horse and foot. But they must be quickly put to work, for besides being reluctant to keep the field for very long, there are already many sick.

The Burgundian commander, anxious to get on well with the English, made it clear to Wallop that he had ordered the German landsknechts at his disposal to come to the help of the English on their own territory and hoped that the English would do the same. The weather, still dire, delayed the departure from Marquion.107 Eure’s report puts the Burgundian contingent by 22 August at 6300 foot and 2500 horse. Wallop reported the combined Anglo-Burgundian force at 12,500 foot and 2500 horse, though Seymour, who had been to Brussels for discussions with the Regent, thought the Burgundians were lacking 2000 foot and 500 horse. A new camp was formed at Solesmes and hopes raised that Landrecies could be taken by surprise and, if not, to fortify a camp.108 Ralph Eure describes skirmishing with the French from 21st and news of the imminent arrival of large French forces.109 By 22nd, a new camp with better access to forage was found at Englefontaine, to the north of Landrecies.110 Wallop tells us something about English techniques of encampment. When the duke of Aerschot inspected, he was surprised that it was ‘infermed’ as he had read in the chronicles (Froissart?). The Emperor himself admired the defences of the English camp, which consisted of a wagon lager defended by a ditch a pike and a half outside it. The capture of Landrecies in June had been an opportunistic success characteristic of French military strategy in the period. Though Francis had sworn to conquer Artois, he, or his advisers, had seized the opportunity to strike at a weakly fortified position in Hainault and

107 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, camp of Marquion, 9, 10 Aug. 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fos. 30, 32: ‘Leur bande est fort belle pour ce qu’elle contient tant de cheval que de piedt. Mais il fault hatter de les mectre en oeuvre, car oultre ce qu’ilz ne sont poinct volluntiers long temps aux champs, il y en a desia tout plain de mallades.’ 108 Wallop to Henry VIII, 13 August 1543, Seymour to Henry VIII, 18 Aug. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 43, 55; Wallop et al. to Henry VIII, 13 Aug., 21 Oct. 1543 St.P., IX, 473, 522 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 43, 291). 109 Eure’s letter, Longleat MSS, SE/IV, fos. 84–86 (HMC, Bath MSS, IV, p. 88). 110 Wallop to Henry VIII, 22 Aug. 1543, St.P., IX, 481 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 65).

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render it virtually impregnable.111 At the end of July, the King retired to Guise, seeing Landrecies now in a state of defence and the Imperial forces beginning to concentrate. La Lande with his 200 horse and 1000 foot of the Picard legion was left in command, though since he was in ill health, d’Essé replaced him.112 Prodigious efforts were put into temporary fortifications to strengthen its old walls (presumably mainly earthen bastions). Wallop in September reported that ‘the frenche king had employed greate tyme and chardge, aswell in the fortificacion of the same, so that it was in as moche reputacion as was the towne of Turin in Pyemont.’113 Francis left Vendôme in command at Guise (with the job of protecting Landrecies) and this gave du Roeulx the chance to form the regular siege which was to drag on until November. Francis, before he divided his army at the end of August, is reported to have had 40,000 foot and 7000 horse twenty miles from Landrecies.114 Around mid-September in the French camp it was reported that the Emperor was approaching with 30,000 men and that the English and Burgundians already at Landrecies were starting the siege ‘on the side beyond the stream towards the forest’ though had got no further than within a cannon-shot of the walls and the garrison had given good account of itself.115 The skirmishing which took place in the middle of August around Landrecies is well known from the pen of Martin du Bellay, though certain important points are absent from his picture.116 The Emperor’s forces joined Wallop at Quesnoye-le-comte (around 13th) and it was around the 20th that word came through that the French King’s own forces were moving off east into Champagne. The King had left Melfi with Brissac’s light horse some 200 of which were heard to have been left at an abbey near Landrecies. The Emperor’s troops were commanded by Philippe II de Croy duke of Aerschot and

111 Francis I to Heilly, camp of Landrecies, 27 June 1543, Pierpoint Morgan: order to sleight the fortifications of Maubeuge. 112 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 143–144. 113 Wallop to Henry VIII, 25 Sept. 1543, NA SP1/181, fo. 152v (L&P, XVIII, ii, 218). 114 The figures were reported by French captains to the English at first as 36,000 men and then 47,000 (Eure to Fisher/Hertford, Sept. 1543, Longleat SE/IV, fo. 85r). 115 Vervins to Heilly, St. Quentin, 17 Sept. 1543, Amiens, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 60, no. 1: ‘du costé de là l’eauwe vers la forest.’ 116 Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 144–147; Wallop to Henry VIII, camp at Haspres, 13 Aug. 1543 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 43); intercepted letter of Marini to Annebault and Orléans, 16, 17 Nov. 1543, Brussels, AGR, Audience, 99 (Lettres des Seigneurs, II), fos. 365, 362.


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his second cousin du Roeulx. Thomas Seymour, ever the acid commentator, thought Aerschot ‘no manne of warre’ for his carelessness about intelligence and thought him ‘forward’ in nothing. Even worse, ‘there doth not appeare no great good wyll’ between the cousins. He declared he would rather serve three years under du Roeulx than three months under Aerschot.117 The Anglo-Burgundian command decided that M. de Licques (Aerschot’s brother) should fall upon the French light horse while the main force under Aerschot, du Roeulx and Wallop pressed on to enter the country between Cateau-Cambrésis and Bohain. This was Vendôme’s castle, in a countryside, as Wallop described it, full of strong villages and great churches. This force had just got to work pillaging and burning when Licques fell back on them in panic, having been defeated, as du Bellay has it, when the light horse escaped and managed to bring up French re-inforcements from the prince of Melfi. Wallop confirms that and adds that Licques lost most of his 800 infantry. What should have been a simple mopping up affair had thus turned to a shameful reverse and forced the main forces to retreat from Bohain.118 Vendôme, in his despatch to the King adds further explanation: The dukes of Aerschot and du Roeulx marched to Busigny near Bohain and there stopped and sent 200 horse before them, which passed through Bohain wood and, reaching the plain on this side pillaged a village named Fresnoy and sent 20 men towards my camp to see if I had wind of them. They found I had, to the extent I was already mounted up with all your gendarmerie that you left me as well as the infantry already issuing from the camp, with the sieur d’Estrées in front of me with my company, which they then realised. They ordered a retreat to Busigny where they had left their troop and passing through Bohain wood, were pressed so hard by the peasants of Bohain in support of Estrées that they were forced to leave their booty.119

117

Thomas Seymour to Henry VIII, 18 Aug. 1543, NA SP1/181, fo. 42r (L&P, XVIII, ii, 15). 118 Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 148–149; Wallop to Council, Quesnoye, 28 Aug. L&P, XVIII, ii, 92. Eure gives a vivid description of the combat which does not hide that it was a disaster (Longleat, SE/IV, fo. 85v, HMC, Bath MSS, IV, pp. 88–89). 119 Vendôme to Francis I, 16 Aug. 1543, BnF, fr. 20521, fos. 30–31: ‘ont marché lesd. duc d’Ascot et du Rieux jusques à Buzgryes [Busigny] aupres led. Bohaing et là se sont arrestez et envoye ijc chevaulx devant eulx lesquelz ont passé les boys dud. Bohains et venuz jusques en la plaine de deca, pillant ung village nomme Fresney [Fresnoy-le-Grand], et envoye xx desd . . . . . vers mon camp pour veoir ou entendre si j’avoye alarme d’eux. Et ilz ont trouvé que oy, de sorte que j’estoye ja à cheval avec toute vostre gendarmerie qu’il vous a pleu me laisser et les gens de pied semblablement

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The first stage of the siege of Landrecies was thus a humiliating reverse for the Anglo-Burgundian army. It was compounded by a dangerous mutiny between the Emperor’s landsknechts and Wallop’s men. The Germans in any case were, as usual, disgruntled about their pay and, as Wallop noted, were prone to cry for ‘gelt’ when not paid. The English in the camp had attacked the Germans during Wallop’s absence and on his return he found both sides drawn up in a square, refusing to back down. It took all the finesse of the commanders. Du Roeulx got them to retire on signal but even then the German commander came into the English camp and nearly exchanged fire with Wallop’s men. Had things gone wrong, the whole expedition would have been ruined but the German colonel was eventually induced to apologise.120 Meanwhile, du Biez, who had been to see Francis I for new instructions, was operating around Doullens aiming to damage the enemy while the siege of Landrecies remained undecided. Heilly was sent to fortify strongholds which would threaten Arras, in the course of this burning a swathe of villages with their churches and the harvest stored in them. Espinac was withdrawn from Ardres (where La Rochepot’s company remained) to accompany du Biez in a successful attack on the castle of Avesnes-le-comte and the villages around it. He had to withdraw because his infantry, the bands of Boulonnais men under Vervins’ command, were ordered by the King to join Vendôme further east. A typical remark from du Biez, which may indeed reflect the desperate shortage of men in the Netherlands, was that with 200 gens d’armes and 3000 foot, he could have taken all the strongholds as far as Arras.121 Du Biez left Crequi with his own company at Doullens and moved (via Hesdin and Montreuil) to revictual Thérouanne, at the request of Villebon. Heilly was left at Boulogne in order to continue the revictualling and undertake an enterprise against the English, probably a

estant ja sortiz du camp et le sieur d’Estrees devant moy avec ma compagnye, dequel ilz ont congoissance et de moy semblablement, et l’un d’eulx que les a fait retirer vers led. Bouzgryes où ilz avoient laisse leurd. troppe passans par les boys dud. Bohaing, où ilz ont esté pressez de telle sorte par les paissans dud. Bohaing à la faveur dud. sieur d’Estrees, qu’ilz ont esté contrains laisser leur butin.’ 120 Wallop to Council, 28 Aug. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 92; Wallop to Henry VIII, 10 Oct. 1543 NA SP1/182, fo. 3v (L&P, XVIII, ii, 266): the Germans ‘have cryed for gelt these iiij or v daies not being yet paied, wol not passe over the water to lye in the new trenche tyll they have gelt.’ 121 Potter, Du Biez, no. 188.


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scheme put forward by Gilbert de La Fayette, abbé of Saint-Josse, to break the dikes in the county of Guînes. This, though, misfired because there were not enough men to maintain the ground for three high tides.122 Du Biez and Vervins then marched east to rejoin Vendôme at Saint-Quentin, where they received orders to be ready to join the King (with his military household, gendarmerie and 12,000 Swiss) in case the expected major attack on Landrecies materialised (du Biez had left his tents and equipment at Montreuil and had to send for them). It was their job to watch over Landrecies while the King was still occupied in Luxemburg since the French also believed a major attack on Péronne and Saint-Quentin likely. Their forces were substantial; a spy report put them at 400 gens d’armes and the 3000 Boulonnais infantry, while 12,000 Swiss were on their way. However, the King thought the threat so great that he was believed to have ordered the devastation of the land around Péronne and Saint-Quentin along the lines of Provence in 1536.123 By mid-September the siege camp was established at Fontaineau-bois a little to the west of Landrecies and then moved closer to the town. The artillery was steadily battering the fortifications from the trenches but the siege was still not complete since the French could send out a wagon train.124 The Emperor was eagerly awaited but Charles had been pre-occupied with the business of conquering the territories of the duke of Cleves until the first week of September. But his forces were now gradually being sent south to join the English and Burgundians already around Landrecies. Vervins reported from the French supporting force that The Emperor approaches with a good force of 28 or 30,000 men to come to Landrecies. The English and Burgundians who were there make their approach from beyond the river near the forest.

122 Ibid. nos. 188, 190, 191. On Heilly’s enterprise, Vervins to Heilly, 17 Sept. 1543, Amiens, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 60, no. 1: ‘ne faisant doubte que les eussez bien frotez.’ See also Fouquesolles to Heilly, 29 Sept. 1543, Amiens SAP, Ch. Heilly 57, no. 59: ‘les Engles nous ont esté fort doulx depuis que les aves sy mal traités.’ Trial of du Biez: BnF, Dupuy 474, fo. 36r ‘l’an mil vc xliij le sr. de Fouquesolles et le sr. de Hely ayans la bande du mareschal du Biez et quelques aultres gens de guerre y allerent de nuyct et rompre quelques digues dont yssue grande quantité d’eaue, mais cela ne porte dommaige car il failloit attendre trois marez.’ 123 Potter, Du Biez, no. 191; Wallop et al. to Henry VIII, camp of Landrecies, 14 Sept. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 187. 124 Wallop to Henry VIII and Council, 14, 15 Sept. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 187, 189.

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Vendôme and du Biez again moved to the forward headquarters at Guise and sent as many gens d’armes as they could get into the town before the noose tightened.125 The campaign around Landrecies proved to be protracted and the four months’ term for English employment was running out.126 Francis I was back in the area of Follembray and Coucy by 25 September, determined to do all he could to hold on to Landrecies.127 The Emperor saw its recapture as essential, but his arrival at the camp was much delayed by a severe attack of gout. Ferdinando de Gonzaga, the Emperor’s chief commander, arrived at the camp on 23rd with a proposition to march on Guise (the forward headquarters of the French) in order to dishearten the garrison of Landrecies, cut it off from supplies and draw the French King into battle. Wallop was sceptical about the value of diverting men from the siege itself but Gonzaga decided to press on with a powerful Imperial force (perhaps over 20,000) leaving the English army and some new Frisian reinforcements at the siege. In fact, Guise proved an impossible objective and the Imperial forces suffered a mauling, so the Emperor ordered concentration on Landrecies.128 The English term of service, though, was running out. The third month was due to expire on 12 October and there was barely enough pay for the third month. Wallop reported that his men for the most part were ‘veray poore and few or none of theym have any greate store of money, victualz be dere, clothes wax thyn, and cold wether encreseath.’ More pay was needed by the end of October.129 The Emperor, of course, wanted Wallop’s army to stay as long as possible and, on his arrival at the camp, went out of his

125 Vervins to Heilly, 17 Sept. 1543, information from Captain Lalande’s man: ‘l’Empereur vient pardeça aveucq une bonne force de xxviij ou xxx mil hommes pour venir à Landrecy. Les Angloys et Bourguignons qui y estoient font leur approches du costé delà l’eawe vers la forest.’ 126 Seymour to Henry VIII, 10 Sept. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 167. 127 Potter, Du Biez, no. 191. On Francis I’s rapid movements, L&P, XVIII, ii, 218, 242. 128 Wallop to Henry VIII, 25 Sept. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 218; Potter, Du Biez, no. 192; Charles V to Aerschot and du Roeulx, 9 Oct. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 264; Wallop to Henry VIII, 10 Oct. 1543, ibid., no. 266. François de Bourbon-Estouteville reported a sharp defeat of the Imperial light horse at Guise and the capture of many members of the Emperor’s household, including Francesco d’Este, brother of the Duke of Ferrara (to Matignon, 10 Oct. 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, no. CXXXII, p. 84); Arcona to same, 10 Oct., ibid., no. CXXXIII, p. 85. 129 Wallop et al. to Council, 10 Oct. 1543, NA SP1/182, fos. 11–13 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 267).


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way to praise the turn-out of his allies. It was accepted by the English that they would stay as long as the Emperor paid them (in advance, as was the English tradition). There was obviously little hope of this and Charles successfully pressed his case in England for an extension. Henry’s council agreed to an extra 20 days.130 The Emperor finally arrived at the Landrecies siege camp on 19 October and a new camp was prepared for what was hoped would be the coming battle – to be the great show-down. The old towers remaining of the medieval castle had been bombarded but now mining began under the new bastion in front of it. Wallop thought the town could not hold out beyond the end of October, which would have suited his terms of service, and that the trenches had completely cut off access. One ominous sign was that the Germans’ mines had flooded because of the heavy rain.131 By now skirmishing had become virtually continuous with the French relieving forces and small reinforcements of supplies and men were got into the town despite the siege.132 After reconnoitring by Saint-Pol, Annebault and du Biez, the French army was now dug in at a fortified camp at Cateau-Cambrésis. It may be that Imperial strategy was to draw the French to a decisive battle, though this was a high risk. The Emperor’s forces (including the English) were about 40,000 foot and 8,000 horse, while the French claimed though with what reliability is difficult to say, 50,000 foot and 15,000 horse.133 The French order of battle was for Saint-Pol (Vendôme’s brother) to take the vanguard, the King and the Dauphin with their Swiss the battle, and Vendôme the rearguard.134 The climax came in the first few days of November. With the complete French army so close, battle must have seemed inevitable, so it was a desperate throw to plan a full assault on the town (2000 Italians, 2000 Spaniards, 2000 Germans and 1200 English), after a ferocious

130

Charles V to Wallop, 6 Oct. 1543 L&P, XVIII, ii, 258; same to Henry VIII, 21 Oct. 1543, St.P., IX, 526 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 292); Wallop to Charles V, 24 Oct. 1543 (ibid., no. 300); Paget to Wallop, 16 Oct. 1543 NA SP1/182, fo. 20v (L&P, XVIII, ii, 280): ‘for thenglishmen youe may say be wont to be payd alwayes theyr wages for a moneth before’; Wallop to Henry VIII, 25 Oct. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 304; Council to Bonner and Bryan, 2 November 1543, St.P., IX, 532 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 331). 131 Wallop to Paget, 22, 26 Oct. 1543, St.P., IX, 527 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 293, 310). 132 Wallop and Bryan to Henry VIII, 29 Oct. 1543 St.P., IX, 530 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 320); Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 177–185. 133 L&P, XVIII, ii, 321, 2 ‘Pour le jour de la bataille’; Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 176–177. 134 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 178–179.

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battery, on 28 October. Henry had already specified that Wallop should, in any engagement, ‘have the Spanyardes as nere your men as may be.’ The advance of the French army was classic instance of sixteenth-century strategy and in this case enabled Francis to reverse the roles of Pavia in 1525. So Charles V dared not continue the siege and withdrew all the troops in the trenches into a fortified camp in order to face down Francis. This meant, as Wallop clearly saw, that Francis had gained his objective. Landrecies would be re-supplied and ‘the glory thereof will tourne to the frenche king and what tother partie shall receave I will not take uppon me to wryte.’135 The Emperor issued his challenge to battle and began to advance on the extremely well-fortified French position. The French had indeed run provisions into Landrecies and, despite his challenge and the hotting up of skirmishing, the alternatives were unpalatable to the allies. Wallop was present at the Imperial war council that debated these on the 3rd. An assault on the French camp or laying siege to it were both discounted. As for the third option – withdrawal – it was decided that Charles might do this with honour as he had offered battle but that he should march along the flank of the French camp to Solesmes and stay there a couple of days.136 As it was, in the night of 4–5 November, the French army decamped in silence towards its own territory, executing one of the most dangerous manoeuvres in warfare137 – retreat in sight of the enemy. The Emperor pursued in vain through the forest south of Cateau-Cambrésis, though some stragglers and baggage were caught. There were losses and casualties among the English, including Sir George Carew, reported as dead but actually captured.138 Both sides could make propaganda claims. François de Bourbon reported that the French retreat was ‘as fine and without loss of men or baggage as has been seen for a long time . . . Never were two armies so close without fighting or loss of men.’ There was certainly some mockery of 135 Wallop to Henry VIII, 29 Oct. 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 44r (L&P, XVIII, ii, 321); Paget to Wallop, 16 Oct. 1543, NA SP1/182 fo. 20r (L&P, XVIII, ii, 280). 136 Wallop to Henry VIII, 6 Nov. 1543, St.P., IX, 538 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 345). 137 Monluc told Piero Strozzi at Siena in 1554, that such a fine retreat in the face of the enemy as had been accomplished by Francis at Landrecies was honorable ‘car tant de vaillans capitaines s’estoient perdus en faisant la retraicte à la teste de l’ennemy.’ Blaise de Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres ed, A. de Ruble, 5 vols. (Paris, 1864–1872), II, pp. 34–35). 138 See Trial of du Biez, BnF, Dupuy474, fo. 44v: ‘Mr Carew Anglois fut prins à Landrecy et mené à Boulongne où il attendit v ou vij jours sa rancon et cependant visita aussi la muraille et rempars et regarda les montaignes qui dominoient.’


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the French for slinking away in the night. To Wallop’s taunt that the Emperor would have wished the day longer and that he would have chased the French further, du Biez replied that Wallop would have regretted a longer day. Francis had done what he had intended; ‘We have been five days within the Empire well camped near you and the King doing what he intended . . . he withdrew in sight of your camp without loss.’ Wallop noted that he said nothing about leaving during the night.139 Spinning was already the rage; a medal was issued in France showing Francis and accoutrements of war, crowned with a laurel wreath and the inscription VIRTUTI REGIS INVICTISSIMI.140 The fact was, though, that the Imperial side, by changing its objectives, had achieved nothing at Landrecies. That town had become a powerful fortress that could threaten Hainault. The one consolation for the Emperor was that he had ended the year’s campaigning in a position much improved on that in which he had begun (Cleves and Guelders conquered and most of the Netherlands secured). On 10 November, the Emperor informed Wallop that he was dissolving his army because of the bad weather and the withdrawal of the French. The next day at Crèvecoeur they took leave. For Wallop, the outcome mixed ‘some sweete some sower fortune de la guerre.’141 The campaigning season ended in the usual way. Wallop brought his little army back to Calais with difficulty, though rapidly, along the muddy roads of Artois, reaching Douai by 14 November and trying to get as much of the artillery and supplies back to Calais before the roads became impassable. In the end it was decided to leave much of the artillery securely at Douai over the winter but most of the army was at Calais by 19th and Wallop himself by 22nd. At least, the 139 Claude Chappuys, L’Aigle qui a faict la poulle devant le Coq à Landrecy (Lyon: chez le Prince, 1543). Estouteville to Matignon, (Nov. 1543, Correspondance de Matignon, no. CXL, p. 91: ‘aussi belle et sans perte de noz gens ny bagaige qu’on feist long temps a . . . L’on ne veist jamais deux armées si prez l’un de l’autre sans combatre ou perte de gens.’; Potter, Du Biez, p. 191: ‘Nous avons esté cinque jours dedans le pays de l’Empire et logez bien pres de vous et aiant faict le Roy ce qu’il desiroit . . . il s’est retiré sans riens perdre à la veue de vostre camp.’; Wallop and Bryan to Paget, 10 Nov. 1543, St.P., IX, 543 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 365). 140 BnF, médailles, série royale, 81: no date (1538–1544) designed by Matteo del Nassaro. Ob: FRANCISCVS PRIMVS FR INVICTISSIMVS, King’s bust in armour facing left; rev: King enthroned crowned by victory and warrior and inscription as above VIRTUTI REGIS INVICTISSIMI 32.8g and 44.7mm (A. Armand, Les médailleurs italiens des quinzième et seizième siècles, 3 vols. (Paris, 1883), II, 188/2). 141 Wallop and Bryan to Paget, 10 Nov. 1543, St.P., IX, 543 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 365); Wallop to Paget, 6 Nov. 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 70r (L&P, XVIII, ii, 346).

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commanders had the consolation of banquets and good cheer in the towns through which the passed.142 In France, Vendôme was ordered by the King to ensure that Landrecies was well supplied for the winter. Some problems arose over winter quarters for the light horse and gendarmerie but du Biez, in conference with Vendôme, advised their stationing in places north of Abbeville, so as to cover the necessary revictualling of Hesdin, Thérouanne and Ardres during the winter.143 This was a manoeuvre that Wallop, ever indefatigable, was already hoping to frustrate.144 The campaign had shown clearly what Henry VIII (and some contemporary observers) would have understood: that waging war as the inferior adjunct of a great ally can be both futile and dangerous. Little solid had been achieved other than to distract French attention from England and, as Wallop rightly understood, to give English troops their baptism of fire in great power warfare.

142

Wallop to Council, Douai, 14 Nov., Calais, 25 Nov. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 385,

426. 143

Wallop to Henry VIII, Douai, 14 and 25 Nov. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 384, 420); Vendôme to Francis I, 20 Nov., 23 Nov., 26 Nov. 1543, BnF, fr. 20521, fos. 52–54, 55–56, 57; letter of Marini, AGR, Audience, 99 (Seigneurs II). 144 Wallop to Henry VIII, 4 Dec. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 453.

CHAPTER FOUR

‘FIGHTING OVER THE BEAR’S SKIN:’ THE INVASION OF FRANCE (1544) there is no worse war than between two friends who have become enemies1

The Anglo-Imperial Plan of Campaign The year 1544 was dominated by the great concerted campaign ostensibly designed by the Habsburgs and the English to crush France by a joint invasion. Henry and Charles were to march on Paris and there divide up the country. Although Champagne was to suffer the main thrust of the Emperor’s attack, he and the English had agreed to march on Paris without being held up by fortified places on the way. The plan, which looked more feasible on paper than it proved to be in practice, was subject to a degree of bad faith on the part of Henry VIII, probably more concerned with his own limited plans to extend his territories. As Blaise de Monluc acidly commented in an addition to his Commentaires, the plan to carve up France was like quarrelling over the bear’s skin before it had been killed. A united France could not be conquered without a dozen battles, given its warlike nobility and countless fortified holds. Paris might be taken but the many other cities would swallow up thirty armies.2 Du Bellay thought Henry’s Council had urged him to land in Normandy but the King had changed his mind and opted for the attack on Boulogne and Montreuil. This had afterwards led to the ruin of England.3 1 Letter about Anglo-French conflict, 22 May 1544, NA PRO31/18/3/2, fo. 133r (CSP Spain, VII, no. 107): il n’est point plus grande guerre que de deux amys quant ilz se pregnent l’ung l’aultre en ennemityé.’ 2 Monluc’s description of the Anglo-Imperial plan to carve up France (Commentaires 1521–1576, ed. P. Courteault (Paris: Pléiade, 1964), pp. 169–170): ‘c’estoit disputer de la peau de l’ours.’ 3 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 260: ‘qui a esté la ruine par après du royaume d’Angleterre.’ Henry was informed by a spy in that ‘les Normans craignent assez la descente par mer des Angloys et pour ceste cause se sont faict les monstres des arrierebandz et legionaires qui ne bougeront de pays’ NA SP1/187, fo. 239 (274) (L&P, XIX, i, 573.3).

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At the height of the campaign around Landrecies in October 1543, Henry had argued against Charles’ giving battle unless with overwhelming superiority or forced to do so as a matter of honour. He thought that Francis had been forced to spend so much in the campaigns of that year that he would be unable to face the joint invasion of the English and the Emperor in 1544. He seemed by then committed to the joint invasion plan.4 How far, though, did that commitment go? We know that Henry ultimately opted for very limited objectives. Indeed, his interest in the siege of Montreuil, Boulogne or both had surfaced in exchanges with du Roeulx in 1541–1542. It went much further back than that. During Suffolk’s campaign in France of 1523, Henry had wanted his army to besiege Boulogne rather than march south into France, where problems of supply and the fortifications along the Somme would make the campaign difficult. On that occasion, even late in the year, Henry was persuaded to go against his instincts by Wolsey’s analysis of the opportunities provided by the treason of Bourbon, with whom John Russell had been negotiating. Then, there had been some false hope the La Fayette, governor of Boulogne, would win the town for Bourbon.5 Neither Henry nor his military advisers can have forgotten the experience. As soon as the Landrecies campaign was over, the Emperor’s council began to consider the campaign for the following year. On 7 December, Ferdinando de Gonzaga, viceroy of Sicily, was commissioned to go to England to negotiate the terms of the campaign plan. Passing through Canterbury in the last week of the year, he was entertained by Lord

4

Council to Francis Bryan, 28 Oct. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 317. Thomas More to Wolsey, 12 Sept. [1523], St.P., I, pp. 131–135 (L&P, III, ii, 3320): ‘as towching the consultation of the siege to be layed to Boleyn . . . His Grace is, for the prudent reasons mencioned in Your Graces lettre, determinately resolved to have the said siege experimented; wherof, as Your Grace wryteth, what may happe to fall, who but God can tell: and all the preparations pourvayed for that way, to be now sodenly sett aside, or converted where they can not serve, sendinge his armye farre of in to thenemyes land, where we shold truste to theyre provision, of whose slaknes, and hard handeling, profe hath bene had ere this, and yit no prove had of the Dukes fastenes, His Highnes veryly thinketh, as Your Grace hath moost prudently wrytten, that there were no wisedom therin. And His Gr[ace] saith, that Your Grace hit the nayle on the hed, where ye wryte that the Burgonions wold be uppon theire owne frontiers, to thend our money shold be spent among theym.’ Same to same. 20 Sept. 1523, St.P., I, pp. 135–140 (L&P, III, ii, 3346). Russell to Henry VIII, 1 Nov. 1523, St.P., VI, p. 184. (L&P, III, ii, 3496) and Russell ‘Memorial,’ St.P., VI, no. LIX. On this see S. Gunn, ‘The duke of Suffolk’s march on Paris, 1523,’ English Historical Review, 101 (1986), 596–634. 5

‘fighting over the bear’s skin’

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Cobham with the gentry of Kent.6 In London, discussions with the Council (including Norfolk, Russell, Hertford and Gardiner) produced on 31 December a joint declaration or treaty by which the two rulers committed themselves to invade France by 20 June 1544 (the Emperor had called for 15 May), in person if possible, by a lieutenant if ill. The strategy was set as an invasion through Champagne in the east and Picardy in the north, marching as rapidly as supplies permitted to converge on Paris. Each ruler would provide 35,000 foot and 7000 horse (a considerable increase on the 1543 agreement). Henry specified (in a passage inserted by Paget into the draft) that he would use German mercenaries as supplied by the Emperor but paid by himself and reserved the right to increase the proportion of cavalry. The Emperor accepted his obligation under the treaty of 1543 to pay for 2000 foot and 2000 horse in Henry’s army. The Regent of the Low Countries would provide transport for supplies and each party agreed to furnish ships manned by 2000 men to hold the Narrow Seas during the crossing.7 There was much horse-trading involved since Gonzaga also asked Henry to contribute 2–3000 men for two months and 10–15,000 crowns for an expedition into Dauphiné to keep the Swiss from marching to French service. As for the Swiss, Henry dismissed them as ‘of small service’ more a hindrance than a help to the enemy. In turn, Henry asked for Buren to command the troops to be supplied by the Emperor and offered to add 2000 of his own to them. But Gonzaga was told in no uncertain terms that Henry had spent much treasure the previous years ‘aswell in the warres, as otherwise about matiers of Scotlande, as by the continual maytenaunce of his navye.’ The campaign against Scotland (see chapter 2) was also just entering its planning stage. Yet Henry was prepared to offer 20,000 crowns in return for 1000 arquebusiers to send against the Scots. Gonzaga had to report back to the Emperor.8 Chapuys was fairly optimistic, thinking Henry fully committed and unlikely to be diverted by his Scottish

6

Council to Cranmer, 20 Dec. 1543, BL Harl. 283, fo. 253. Charles V’s instructions, 7 Dec. 1543, BL 28593 fo. 259 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 467); agreement of 31 Dec. 1543, NA SP1/182, fos. 165–168 (181–188) including English translation (L&P, XVIII, ii, 526). On 22 March 1544 The Regent revoked a prorogation of part of the subsidy of the Estates of Flanders on the gounds that the Emperor had made this agreement to provide ships for the defence of the Narrow Seas (Diegerick, Inventaire . . . Ypres, V, p. 260. no. 1670). 8 Council to Wotton, 4 Jan. 1544 St.P., IX, pp. 576–578 (L&P, XIX, i, 6). 7

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expedition into putting off the invasion of France.9 On 7 February Charles V agreed to the terms negotiated by Gonzaga but refused the 1000 Spaniards (they were needed for Italy). He decided not to press Henry too much for the 20,000 crowns and finally offered him Buren with 2000 horse and 2000 lansquenets; Henry was to provide the pay for a further 2000 Germans.10 The question of when and why Henry abandoned the joint strategy agreed on in December 1543 is difficult to answer. One major determinant was the progress of the campaign against Scotland. This had been terminated as soon as possible in order to move resources to the Channel and measures were taken for the best troops to be moved south as soon as the campaign was over.11 Early in May, Chapuys was confident that the joint campaign would go ahead because: He will not have changed his plan but will rather hasten it as much as possible, partly out of fear that the French are building such a great army to invade his country during his absence, in which case it would be necessary to have his army ready on the south coast opposite Normandy and Brittany to resist such an enterprise. The better to resist such an enterprise the lord King has begun to order that men should be ready at a moment’s notice in the principal ports of that coast and daily sends commissaries and experienced men to provide for the garrisons as for the north coast. As I understand it, the King raises men above the ordinary troops to secure those areas as necessary. It would feared that the French would rather send men to Scotland than to attempt an invasion of this kingdom were it not that they have Cardinal Pole with them, through whom they might be able to alter the affairs of this kingdom.12

9

Chapuys to Philip, 18 Jan. 1544; to Mary of Hungary, 27 Jan., L&P, XIX, i, 39, 65. Charles V to Chapuys, 7 Feb. 1544, CSP Spain VII, 22, 32 (L&P, XIX, i, 96). 11 Privy Council to Hertford and Lisle, 15 May 1544, Hatfield MS. 231. no. 98. Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of the manuscripts of the Most Honourable the Marquess of Salisbury . . . preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, 24 vols (London, 1883–1976) [hereafter HMC Cal. Hatfield.], I., 159.] Haynes, State Papers, I, 33 (L&P, XIX, i, 508). 12 Chapuys to Charles V, 12 May 1544, NA PRO31/18/3/2, fos. 117v–118r (L&P, XIX, i, 497): ‘Il n’aura changé de propoz, ains y donnera toute l’haste possible, mesmes pour estre en quelque suspecon et craincte que les François ne font si grande armee qu’ilz ont pour invader son pays durant son absence, auquel cas seroit tres requis avoir lad. armee en la coste du ponant correspondant à la Normandie et Bretaigne, et pour mieulx resister à telle emprinse, led. sr. roy a commencé de fere mectre ordre qu’en ung subit et se retrouveront force gens de guerre aux portz principaulx de lad. coste et journellement y envoye commissaries et gens entenduz pour y proveoir et y a fait asseoir les postes comme du coustel du Nort. Et à ce que puis entendre, led. sr. roy oultre les gens ordinaires desd. costes fera quelque nombre de gens pour secourir là où la necessité le requerra. Et est à doubter que lesd. Francois envoyeront plus tost gens 10


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Shortly after this Chapuys was told that the preparations were being pressed forward urgently and he seems to have believed this.13 In June 1544, when the question arose of whether it was necessary for the two rulers to lead their troops in person, Henry was already beginning to suggest that the two armies of invasion could be diminished and part of them told off to attend the persons of the sovereigns, while the ‘enterprise of Paris’ was not important enough for them to lead it in person. Had Charles realised it, this was a telling indicator but he brushed it aside with the remark that Paris was not to be attacked with a view to occupying it but rather to compel Francis to come to terms. Pitched battle with the French King he thought unlikely since Francis had shown at Landrecies he had no taste for it (‘qu’il n’en vouloit plus menger.’)14 Such, then, was the grand strategy but it needed to be put into execution. Some time in February or March (the documents are undated), members of the Council put certain alternatives to the King in a series of consultation papers. One of them suggested a march through Flanders to where Suffolk had crossed the Somme in 1523, near Nesle. Provisions could be available in the Emperor’s lands and victuals brought from Calais used from the Somme onwards. This would take 12 to 14 days and then the route to Paris would lie though territory well supplied with food and little fortified. Moreover, the German mercenaries would not have to be paid until the crossing of the Somme. Dates of disembarkation for the three corps of the army slipped from 1, 6 and 12 to 6, 12 and 15 June. The vanguard would cross first, of course, and make some attempt on Ardres while awaiting the King.15 A second, slightly later, consultation was more open about possible routes: first to the causeway beyond Calais, then to Guînes or Lisques to await Buren’s Germans. A route to cross the Somme between Le Crotoy and Abbeville would take 6 or 7 days; victuals would be needed for the whole route and for 10 days more since no wheat had been sown in the Boulonnais. A crossing near Braye further up the Somme

aud. Escosse que non d’entreprendre par ailleurs l’invasion de ce royaulme n’estoit qu’ilz eussent avec eulx le Cardinal Pole au moyen duquel se pourroient les afferes de ce royaulme alterer.’ 13 Chapuys to Charles V, 17 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 518. 14 Charles V to Chapuys, 3 June 1544, CSP Spain, VII, 188; L&P, XIX, i, 626. 15 ‘Considerations which way is thought by the Council to be most convenient for the King’s Majesty to set forward with his royal army this summer to invade the realm,’ St.P., I, p. 761 (L&P. XIX, i, 271.3).

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would take 9–10 days and no provisions needed until that point. On routes: some men of trust which knowe both the ways maye be spoken withal and of them lerned also in what cace for forage and victualles either of them be and the progresse of both ways with the distaunce of the myles from place to place lerned aswel betwene Guisnez and the ryver of Somme as from the sayd river to Paris, so thereupon his heighnes may determine which was is best to passe.16

It might come as a surprise that, so late in the day, consultations about possible routes still needed to be made. Already, the route through Boulonnais was being considered but how seriously is difficult to say. The tenor of advice was certainly to opt for the crossing of the Somme from Imperial territory, yet clearly Henry ultimately decided against it.17 Why? Luke MacMahon has argued persuasively for the positive interpretation of Henry’s strategy in his later years and that Henry had planned all along to make Boulogne and Montreuil his principal objectives. He had learned through experience that he was likely to be left in the lurch by allies and that large-scale ambitious excursions into France were unlikely to succeed. Henry had been in favour of a siege of Boulogne in 1523, the failure of which he attributed to lack of logistical support from the Low Countries; he been dissatisfied with the outcome of the Landrecies campaign.18 In June 1542, the King had demanded to know from Wallop some ‘knowledge how Bouloigne was fortified within.’ Wallop reported that there was a ‘rampire’ (presumably a terre plein) 24 foot thick between the castle and the Notre-Dame gate.19 Yet the existence of the planning documents discussed above and the fact that Norfolk and Russell remained in the dark to some extent about their objectives even when they crossed over to France should caution us about assuming that Henry had definitively made up his mind before weighing up the options in June 1544, especially when he was still

16 An example of the kind of report on routes envisaged is attached to La Vigne’s letter of 24 May 1544 to Henry VIII, NA SP1/187, fos. 239–242 (274–277) (L&P, XIX, i, 575.3). 17 ‘A consultation concerning the provision of victuals to furnish the King’s Majesty’s army that shall pass over into France.’ L&P, XIX, i, 271.4. 18 MacMahon, ‘English Invasion of France,’ pp. 29–33. More to Wolsey, 20 Sept. [1523], St.P., I, pp. 135–136. 19 Wallop to Henry VIII, 11 June 1542, NA SP1/171, fos. 10–11 (11–12) (L&P, XVII, 397).


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undecided whether to cross the Channel himself. Above all, in a world in which a Franco-Imperial rapprochement was always a possibility, could Henry afford to jeopardise his alliance with Charles V? Nor can it be assumed that the insertion of qualifying words into the agreement with Gonzaga show that Henry was already contemplating a get-out clause.20 However, it is certainly the case that there was a tradition that Henry had kept his plans secret recalled in an historical tract published in 1575 by Ulpian Fulwell. Henry, he claimed: in the ende was fully mynded to passe into Fraunce very secretly with a mightie & puissant power, which in deede was wrought so priuily, that he imparted his minde in this matter vnto no man, sauing only to the Duke of Suffolk, but caused a rumor to be spread that hee was determined to goe ouer vnto Parys.

The trustworthiness of this account is open to question, though it is larded with details of conversations to give verisimilitude. It is the case that Norfolk was uncertain about the King’s plans and Fulwell adds here: The Duke of Norfolk . . . hearing of the kinges pryuie passage into Fraunce, maruailed with him selfe what shoulde bee hys pretence: And thought some vncurtesie y t he might not haue been made pryuy therof, he being one of the kings pryuy counsail. Wherupon he sent a letter vnto Sir Anthony Brown the maister of ye kings horse, wherin he declared that he mused what the kinges purpose shoulde bee, desiring Sir Anthony Browne to resolue him by his letters of this doubt. This letter was brought when the kinge lay at Calyce to passe into Fraunce.21

This is contradicted (as will be seen below) by messages to Norfolk which seem to indicate that Henry thought that Duke also knew his plans and, indeed, it is difficult to imagine the planning of a campaign of this magnitude without a clear idea of its strategy in the minds of all its executants.

20 In the texts of the agreement NA SP1/182, fo. 165v and 168r the words ‘comme la commodité luy pourra servir’ (or in English ‘bythe passages which they shall fynde most easie and commodious to passe’) apply specifically to the strategy of crossing the Somme not as L&P, summary indicates, as a general qualifier: ‘as strategy, victuals and the enemy shall permit.’ 21 Ulpian Fulwell, The flower of fame Containing the bright renowne, & moste fortunate raigne of King Henry the viii. (London: William Hoskins, 1575), fos. 34–35 (dedicated to Cecil). Fulwell was a bad clergyman but a better satirist and comic playwright. Though he relied on standard chronicles he got his information on 1544 from his friend Edmund Harman, a member of Henry VIII’s household.

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In fact, guesses about Henry’s probable intentions are fairly futile, unsusceptible as they are to any proof. We can, however, infer strongly from the strategic situation that the sieges of Boulogne and Montreuil were virtually imposed by the military assumptions of the time. A plunge deep into France was no more thinkable for Henry VIII than it was for Charles V. The experience of the Imperial army was not that different. Charles, too, was bogged down in lengthy and costly sieges at Ligny and Saint-Dizier. If the latter town had held out as long as Boulogne, it would have been impossible for the Emperor to advance any further into France. As it was, Charles’s slightly earlier start, gave him the edge in getting the sieges out of the way before the season made further campaigning impossible. The French Attempt to Divide Their Enemies Throughout 1544, Francis I and his advisers conducted an able and ultimately successful diplomatic campaign to divide Henry and the Emperor. It must be admitted, though, that they were knocking at an open door. Suspicion was endemic between the two allies both before and after their treaties had been sealed in 1543. The reason is fairly obvious; the two rulers were pursuing different objectives. Charles aimed to use the campaign to reduce Francis ‘to a good and firm peace’ which would consolidate the Emperor’s primacy in Christendom and allow him to pursue his vague long-term aims of restoring its unity.22 For Henry, the aims were decidedly more local as well as rather opaque. The Emperor was on his guard in the early months against Henry’s being diverted by affairs of Scotland and also of the danger the French might use a ‘practique’ to divert Henry from their common enterprise.23 Granvelle passed on to Wotton, ‘intelligence’ he said he had received from Cardinal Farnese, who had been in France, that the French would do their best to sew distrust and beguile the English into thinking that Francis would persuade the Scottish Queen Dowager to hand over the young Queen, even though in reality they would never do so.24 Wotton was further bemused by the arrival of a French Herald, Guyenne, at Speyer, whose objective remained unclear

22 23 24

See the letter to Vasquez de Molina, L&P, XIX, i, 861. Charles V to Chapuys, 7 Feb. 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 96. Charles V to Chapuys, 23 Feb. 1544, CSP Spain. VII, 42 (L&P, XIX, i, 129).


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except that he seemed to have some charge to the Reichstag. Other rumours were circulating. It was said the cardinal de Lorraine was in Germany but he may have been mistaken for Jean du Bellay, who along with other envoys had been sent to Speyer to put Francis’ case to the Reichstag.25 So, quite apart from the difficulties caused by the Emperor’s resistance to declaring war on Scotland and Henry’s equal reluctance over Denmark, there was room enough for suspicion. Charles was wise to be concerned. At the end of March 1544, Oudart du Biez made overtures to the English by sending a local gentleman he sometimes used to spy on English territory, Nicolas des Marquais, sr. de Saint-Martin, to an acquaintance in Calais, Francis Hall.26 SaintMartin proposed that the English allow French ambassadors to come to treat for peace but Hall was dubious about the authenticity of the offer until du Biez sent a signed statement that Saint-Martin was speaking on royal instructions. The English Council’s response in any case was luke-warm.27 Du Biez was persistent, though, and declared that Francis was prepared to offer sureties for the pensions, make the Scots desist from war and be reasonable about Ardres.28 The obvious deduction here is that Francis was prepared to offer almost anything to prevent his kingdom being invaded on two fronts. Perhaps he was also trying to gain time. Henry kept Chapuys informed and the latter pressed hard for the proposals to be rejected. Henry was naturally unwilling to risk his relations with the Emperor and so ignored the offers. In any

25

The Herald’s name was François Mailliard and he had for most of his career been interpreter for the German language at the French court (L&P, XIX, i, 132, 134, 137). 26 For details about Saint-Martin, who played a vital part in Anglo-French talks throughout the summer of 1544, see depositions at the marshal’s trial, 16 Aug. 1549, in Potter, Du Biez, pp. 300–301. ‘Led. mareschal se aydoit de Nicolas des Marquaiz pour espye et luy promist avoir saulvegarde des Anglois affin de pouvoir mieulx hanter avec eulx . . . combien qu’il fust bien adverty que led. des Marquaiz pendoit plus du costé des ennemyz que de nostre et ne venoit jamais au pays de Boulenois que les ennemyz incontinant apres ne fissent quelque ravage et tel estoit le commung bruict et que led. des Marquaiz estoit traistre et faisoit plusieurs advertissmens aux ennemis.’ While Saint-Martin himself insisted ‘que par le commandement dud. mareschal il print lad. saulvegarde pour mieulx frequenter au pays des Anglois et scavoir leurs secretz et luy promist x escus par mois et aultrement à son frere Me Arnoul qui avoit moyen de scavoir à cause de la compaignie charnelle qu’il avoit d’une chambriere du bailly de Guynes.’ (Henry Palmer). Saint-Martin was a landowner on the edge of the Calais Pale. 27 Copy sent to Brussels, L&P, XIX, i, 291; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 13 April 1544, CSP Spain XVII, 68; L&P, XIX, i, 291, (ii). 28 L&P, XIX, ii, 292.2; St.P., IX, 391, mistakenly labelled as a letter from d’Orthe to the Council, 1543. Potter, Du Biez, pp. 192–193.

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case, war in Piedmont (the French victory at Ceresole on 14 April) and the defence of the frontier absorbed the energies of the French military and possibly altered Francis I’s perspective. It was, after all, the first major French military victory in Italy for a generation and, though without consequences, was widely celebrated in France.29 Bad news, on the other hand, travelled slowly for those on the other side. At the start of May, it was still unclear in Brussels what the outcome would be; while the Imperial government was trying to play down the outcome, Dr. Layton thought that the news must be bad since a victory would already have been celebrated. Blame started to be apportioned by opinion at the Imperial court with suitable ‘spinning’ of the event, reported by Wotton, to minimise its significance.30 In May, a dual initiative was mounted by France to arrange a deal with Henry, Charles or both. First, Cardinal du Bellay responded positively to an approach by Queen Eléonore’s confessor Gabriel Guzman, who had had conversations with Pedro de Soto, the Emperor’s confessor, at Speyer. Once back in Paris, du Bellay wrote to de Soto suggesting that, had the Cardinal been heard at Speyer, there may have been hope for peace with the Emperor.31 On the other front, there had been a shadowy approach to England possibly by the Cardinal’s brother, Martin, sr de Langey, recently returned with the French infantry from Piedmont. From fragmentary mentions, it seems possible that Langey had sent or brought a present of wine to Henry accompanied by a letter from Francis, dated at Saint-Germain, 9 May, expressing surprise that Henry should be his enemy in view of their past friendship. What the point of this was is difficult to say and Henry unsurprisingly seems to have rebuffed it by pointing out that his troops had burned French land the previous year and so it should be obvious that he was Francis’ enemy. Paget told Charles V at Speyer about this, at which Charles ‘laughed out hartely at the fynesse of the French letter, and at the princely and frendely writing’ and remarked on Francis’ subtlety in insinuating that his correspondent had devised the practice.32 Meanwhile, Francis was reported by Henry’s spy (but in fact a 29

See Potter, Renaissance France at War, p. 65. Layton to Paget, 1 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 454; Wotton to Henry VIII, 7 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 478. 31 Jean du Bellay to Pedro de Soto, 9 May 1544, Scheurer), Correspondance du cardinal du Bellay, III, pp. 259–262 (L&P, XIX, i, 486), copy sent to England. 32 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 18 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 530; Summary of what Paget said to Mary of Hungary, 23 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 578.2; Paget to Henry VIII, 30


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French double-agent) to think that Henry had been duped into fighting the Emperor’s wars for him.33 Further developments came with approaches to the Emperor by the Cardinal de Lorraine through his nephew, the new duke of Lorraine, at the end of June.34 From information sent by Chapuys, there can be no doubt that at the start of the campaign Charles was beginning to form the view that Henry was likely to leave him in the lurch and unlikely to march forward into France. The special envoy he sent to Henry’s camp in mid-July, Courrières, reported that Henry would not press forward until he had taken Boulogne and Montreuil and this was unlikely to happen.35 For her part, Mary of Hungary thought that the continual complaints she was receiving from English transport and victualling agents were as likely to form a basis for Henry backing out of his commitments.36 Legend has long claimed that Mme. d’Etampes and her ally Longueval betrayed French secrets to the Emperor and led to a disadvantageous peace.37 It is, of course, true that Mme. d’Etampes, like many at court, was hoping for a good peace rather than a massive military confrontation in the summer of 1544. At the end of July, with the way for talks opened by lesser negotiators, Berteville and Gabriel

2 June 1544, St.P., IX, p. 682– (L&P, XIX, i, 619) The original correspondence with Francis has not survived. The references to messages from ‘de Lange’ are difficult to attribute to anyone other than Martin du Bellay, sr. de Langey. 33 Baptiste de La Vigne to Henry VIII, 24 May 1544, NA SP1/187, fos. 335v–36r (L&P, XIX, i, 575): ‘je me trouve souvent à la salle là où le Roy mange et ay entendu de luy mesmes qu’il expere si bien pourveoir a ses affaires que ses ennemys ne luy feront riens. Il est bien vray qu’il ne saict pas tout ce que je say, car il dit que vous vous repentez de luy avoir commancee la guerre, et que I’Empereur vous a trompé de le vous persuader, qu’il ne croit point que vous luy voullez mal, et que tout cella vient de la fraude dudit Empereur, qui c’est vanté en Allemaigne et en Ytalie qu’il vous a fait croyre ce qu’il a voullu, et dit tout hault quil faisoit faire la guerre à son ennemy par ung autre qui ne l’est gueres moins, tenant ces propos pour s’escuser envers le Pape, qui n’est pas contant de ce qu’il est allyé avecq vostre Magesté; comme il monstre bien, car il a desja commancé à fournir une grosse somme de deniers à ce Roy pour se deffendre contre vous et banquiers à Lyon pour y contribuer tons les moys.’ (inaccurate passage in cipher, corrected). Francis certainly wanted Henry to think this and deliberately expressed these views to convey them to Henry. 34 Charles V to Chapuys, 27 June, 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 794. 35 Chapuys, 18, 28 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 730, 799; Instructions to Courrières, ibid., no. 921, Courrières’ despatch, ibid., no. 956. 36 Mary of Hungary, 11 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 897. 37 For a dissection of this nonsense, see Paulin Paris, Etudes sur François Premier, roi de France, sur sa vie privée et son règne, 2 vols (Paris, 1885), II, pp. 301–307; see also D. Potter, ‘Anne de Pisseleu, duchesse d’Etampes, maîtresse et conseillère de François Ier’ in C. Michon, Les conseillers de François Ier pp. 536–56.

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Guzman via the Emperor’s confessor, Mme d’Etampes and Longueval, sent similar messages to the Emperor.38 A meeting took place near Bar between Mme d’Etampes, Longueval and Mailly, bailli of Dijon on the French side and Granvelle and Gonzaga on the Imperial.39 It is, of course, inconceivable that such talks should have been initiated without the King’s full knowledge. They opened the way and arrangements could then be made for Annebault and L’Aubespine to take up the talks formally.40 Saint-Martin also kept up his contacts at Calais41 and when Henry crossed the Channel in July he was called into the King’s presence, despite having been reported to Henry by Norfolk as a ‘falls knave.’ Told that Francis would avow the proposals, Henry said he regretted nothing had come of them but that he was bound to the Emperor. He hinted that, should a reasonable approach to the Emperor be refused, he would not be bound to continue the war and that a meeting with Francis was a possibility.42 This brought an immediate response from Francis, with letters of credence to Robert de Framezelles, an official at Boulogne claiming to have received ‘good and honest propositions from you.’ This was a fairly obvious ploy.43 The Imperial commander Buren was well aware of these comings and goings; both Norfolk and Suffolk were anxious to insist there was nothing in it, despite Imperial suspicions. Norfolk added of Framezelles

38

Longueval to Granvelle, 18 July 1544, HHSA, P.A. 55, fo. 441. Navagero to Council of Ten, 28 July 1544, A. Rozet and J.-F. Lembey, L’invasion de France et le siège de Saint-Dizier par Charles-Quint en 1544, (Paris, 1910). p. 456. Charles V to prince Philip, 14 Aug. 1544, Calendar, Spain, VIII, p. 612. 40 F. Nawrocki, ‘L’amiral Claude d’Annebault: faveur du roi et gouvernement du royaume sous les règnes de François Ier et Henri II’ 2 vols. (Thèse de doctorat, Paris IV, 2009), I, pp. 343–352. 41 Letter to Henry Palmer, L&P, XIX, i, 553; CSP Spain VII, 107, Some of the documents on these exchanges are in E. Deseille, L’année boulonnaise (Mémoires de la Société académique de Boulogne-sur-Mer, 8 (1885–1886), 401–407. 42 Norfolk to Henry VIII, 11 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 95(105) (L&P. XIX, i, 674); Saint-Martin to Francis I, 17 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fo. 74 (L&P, XIX, i, 929). 43 Francis I to Henry VIII, 20 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fo. 103 (L&P, XIX, i, 953.1): ‘bons et honnestes propos . . . proceddans de vous.,’ letter signed in autograph ‘Vre bon frère [et*] cousin et allye’; Framezelles, autograph note, 20 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fo. 104 (L&P, XIX, i, 953.3). Deposition of Saint-Martin, 17 Aug. 1549, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 301–302: ‘Au paravant led. des Marquaiz advertist led. mareschal du Biez que si le feu Roy vouloit payer aud. Roy d’Angleterre des arrieres de sa pension et faire bresche à Ardres, il ne feroit aulcune descente.’ 39


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He could well seek to negotiate but he [Norfolk] was sure that the King his master would make no agreement without the Emperor being satisfied by the King of France and that the said King would renounce for ever the Scottish alliance and pay the King his master all he owes him as well as the costs of this war . . . Coquart, a Frenchman, said at the duke of Norfolk’s table that the Emperor was happy to have English help and without them the French would have expelled the Emperor from his lands.44

In fact, Henry was most of all determined to establish that Francis had sued for peace and his demand for hostages before talks could begin was a non-starter.45 The propensity for double-dealing and distrust between the allies was therefore well established before fighting began. Though Henry was kept informed of the peace feelers put out by Mme d’Etampes, Mary of Hungary told her brother with extraordinary foresight that: I fear greatly that he could well do otherwise and that, if he captured Boulogne and Montreuil, he would negotiate to keep what would be convenient for him . . . and if he saw he could not capture them, he would negotiate an honourable retreat, for, as I understand it, he seems to have no great desire to move further forward . . . I fear that, should he enter further into these talks and give ear to the French as he seems prepared to do, that he present some terms to Your Majesty that he will judge reasonable and, if you do not accept them, that he will negotiate for what he is owed to escape from the costs of war.46

44 Maximilien d’Egmont to Mary of Hungary, 31 July 1544, HHSA, P.A. 55, fos. 105–106: ‘Qu’il povoit bien charcher de practiser, mais qu’estoit asseuré que le Roy son maistre ne feroit nul appointement sans que premierement l’Empereur ne fut content du Roy de France et que led. Roy renoncea à jamais à l’aliance d’Escosse et payat au Roy son maistre tout ce que luy doit et remboursa les frais fait pour ceste guerre . . . Cocquart, françois, dit à la table du duc de Norfock que l’Empereur estoit bien heureux d’avoir l’ayde des Engles, et que sans eulx le Roy de France eust chassé l’Empereur hors de tout les pays de Sa Maiesté.’ 45 Letter of Francis, NA SP1/190 fo. 103 and Henry’s draft reply corr. by Paget, NA SP1/191, fo. 61; Framezelles to Saint-Martin, 18 Aug. 1544, NA SP1/191, fo. 119. 46 Mary of Hungary to Charles V, 24 July 1544, HHSA, P.A. 55, fo. 88: ‘Je suis en merveilleuse doubte qu’il pourroit bien faire aultrement, et s’il emportoit Boulongne et Monstreul, vouldroit traicter pour retenir ce que luy est convenable . . . et s’il voit qu’il ne les scauroit emporter, traicteroit pour retourner en son royaulme avec reputacion, car, à ce que je puis entendre, ne semble avoir grant envie de passer plus avant . . . et suis en craincte que, s’il entre plus avant en ceste praticque et vueille accouster les francois comme il semble estre intentionné, qu’il ne face presenter à Vostre Maiesté quelques conditions qu’il jugera raisonnables et, si ne les acceptez, qu’il traictera son deu pour soy desmesler des fraitz de la guerre.’

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It could, of course, be the case that such suspicion is exactly what Francis and his ministers wanted to sew. These talks also illustrate well how ambiguous was Henry’s alliance with the Emperor. The day of the fall of Saint-Dizier, 17 August, the Emperor issued a safe-conduct for Annebault as a result of unofficial talks between French and Imperial representatives, initiated by contacts between Queen Léonor’s confessor and Mary of Hungary. Official talks began with the French at Saint-Amand on 29 August; despite his victory, Charles had lost many casualties and his supply lines were fragile.47 At the same time, a low-level French negotiating team was making its way to Boulogne. A Strategy in Dispute As the decisions necessary for the war approached, Henry bunkered down in Whitehall. Over the winter of 1543, he had moved around as usual from Ampthill and Bisham in November, to Woking early in December and then to Hampton Court for Christmas and the New Year. After the middle of January he returned to London and hardly left Whitehall (except for a brief excursion to Greenwich in late April– early May). He even passed over the job of presiding at the Order of the Garter to Suffolk there in the last week of April.48 The reason seems to have been that he was ill. Chapuys reported that he was suffering from his leg ulcer again at the end of March and was still recovering on 12 April and again he was incommunicado in mid-May, taking pills. As it was, there was enough disquiet on both sides of the Channel about Henry’s fitness to lead an army in person. The Emperor even sent Chantonnay (Granvelle’s son) in April to find out the truth.49 If Chapuys is to be trusted, even the King’s own advisers were doubtful about his crossing.

47 C. Paillard, L’invasion allemande en 1544: fragments d’une histoire militaire et diplomatique de l’expédition de Charles-Quint (Paris, 1884), pp. 367–367; Rozet et Lembey, L’invasion de France et siège de Saint-Dizier, pp. 163–167, 284–286, 571–573; Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), I, pp. 343–344. 48 Commission to Suffolk, 21 April 1544, BL Harl. 304, fo. 136 (L&P, XIX, i, 363). 49 Chapuys, 30 March 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 263; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 12 April, and to Charles V, 17 May 1544 (L&P, XIX, i, 318, 518); Charles V, credence for Chantonnay, 15 April 1544, ibid., 339.


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The reasons why some of those around the lord King would not, as I understand, wish him to go personally on campaign are, among other things, fear for his person and also because they assume that, should he go in person, all matters would be delayed, for it would be necessary to march much more slowly because of the weight and illness of the said lord King and because of the greater anxiety about risking his person. I believe, as your Majesty can all too well understand, that he would be worse should he continue to make known that he will actually cross to Calais.50

He even recommended pushing Beltran de la Cueva y Toledo, duke of Albuquerque, who had recently made a very favourable impression on Henry, for a leadership role in the invasion. Again in May, Chapuys reported on Henry’s lack of fitness. His entourage had tried every means to dissuade him from a personal campaign but to no avail. Chapuys alerted the Emperor to the real possibility that the English army would not be in place on the agreed date (20 June) and was brutal in his analysis: The delay would only be from the keenness, nay the obstinacy of the lord King in aiming to go in person, since for his security so many precautions need to be made that things will not be ready for several days. My foolish opinion is that the lord King could not undertake the journey prudently in person. For whatever his stoutness of heart, other than his age and weight, he has the worst legs in the world, such that those who have seen them are amazed he does not stay in bed all the time and judge that he would not be able to endure the least hardship in the world without endangering his life. However, no one dares tell him. It is clear that his presence would serve the expedition well if he were well enough but that if he went there is apparent danger to his person, from which problems would arise.

He therefore advised that ‘all means should be sought to rid the expedition of his person and that the King meanwhile should stay at Calais to watch over and promote matters.’ Chapuys thought that only the Emperor’s intervention could work since Henry would regard it as dishonourable not to go if Charles were on campaign, so if both rulers

50 Chapuys to Charles V, 13 April 1544, NA, PRO31/18/3/2, fo. 80v (L&P, XIX, i, 324): (italicised passage in cipher) ‘Les causes pour lequelles pluseurs de ceulx qui sont autour dud. Sr. roy ne vouldroient comme j’entendz qu’il se treuve personnellement en l’emprinse sont entre autres la craincte de sa personne et aussi qu’ilz presupposent que soy y retreuvent [sic] en personne, tous les afferes se rendroient plus tardifz, car il fauldra marcher beaucoup plus lentement pour la gravité et indisposicion dud. Sr. roy et aussi avec plus grand soing et respect pour non le hazarder, et croy qu’il ne seroit le pire pour beaucoup de respectz que vostre majesté peult trop mieulx entendre, pourveu qu’il face continuer le bruyt d’y aller et qu’il passe jusques à Calaix.’

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were to stay at the frontier, this would still have an effect and allow the campaign to move more swiftly.51 Charles, on Chapuys’ advice, would have been prepared for Henry not to go or at least stay at Calais to direct his army from there but could not give up his own campaign. Chantonnay had found Henry apparently determined to lead in person. On 17 May, Paget was suddenly despatched to the Emperor, calling first at Brussels where he spoke to the Regent on 23rd about arrangements for logistical coordination between their forces, and then rode on rapidly (complaining as usual of his piles – he was ‘a man of many others the unmetest to ryde’) to Speyer for an interview with Granvelle and the Emperor on 28th.52 Though instructions do not survive, it is clear enough that there was an emergency and the objective was also clear: cards on the table about French attempts to negotiate and above all to find out whether Charles still intended to lead the army in person. It can hardly be fortuitous that Henry charged Paget to suggest to Charles that he need not lead the army himself in view of his age and gout (Charles was, of course, a decade younger than Henry). Paris, he now asserted was not an important enough target for them to go in person (‘n’est chose tant importante qu’ilz y doibvent aller en personne’); its wealth would have been carried off by its people; the progress of the Emperor’s army would be slow because of his gout, as well as through resistance on the

51 Chapuys to Charles V, 18 May 1544, NA PRO31/18/3/2, fo. 123r–v (L&P, XIX, i, 529): ‘Ne sera cause de tardance autre chose synon l’affection [voyre?] qui l’oseroit dire, l’obstinacion que led. Sr. roy monstre tousiours de vouloir aller en personne, pour la sheureté de laquelle convient et est necessaire de faire tant de choses que je crains ne seront achevees de quelques jours. Et me semble pour dire ma folle opinion que led. Sr. roy ne fera prudentement entreprendre led. voyage en personne, car quelque bon cueur qu’il ayt, oultre l’eaige et la pesanteur de sa personne il a les pires jambes du monde et telles que ceulx qui les ont veu s’esbahissent comme il ne demeure continuelement au lit et jugent qu’il ne scaura endurer le moindre travail du monde sans dangier de sa vye, et que toutesfois personne ne luy ose remonstrer. Il est tout cler que sa presence pourroit beaucoup servir à lad. emprinse si sa disposicion le permectoit, mais ainsi qu’il se retreuve il y aura manifeste dangier en sa personne, dont suyveroient les inconveniens.’ ‘l’on devroit sercher tous les moyens à despescher led. voyage de sad. personne, laquelle se pendant pour pourveoir plus commodement aux affaires et les favorizer se pourroit tenir à Callaix pendant lad. emprinse.’; to Mary of Hungary, 18 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 530: ‘Car oultre l’eaige il est si tres mal des jambes que eust merveille qu’il se peult soustenir, et s’il est question (apres long sejour où il a esté) de se mectre en travail s’en jour perdre.’ 52 Paget’s credentials to Charles V, Mary of Hungary and Granvelle, 18 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 525–527. Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 17 May 1544, ibid., 520. Paget to Henry VIII, 23 May 1544, St.P., IX, p. 679 (L&P. XIX, i, 566).


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way. Winter would soon be upon them and all they would be able to do was sack Paris. What about the dishonour of taking no permanent conquests? Then there was the possibility that Francis would attack their own territories while they were on campaign. So Henry put forward a revised plan: instead of armies of 42,000 led by the sovereigns, they should be commanded by Lieutenants with 30,000 or 32,000. These could march more rapidly to Paris. Moreover, while it would not be honourable for a prince simply to ravage territory and capture nothing (here came a pointed reference to the Emperor in Provence in 1536), it would be so for a lieutenant. The two rulers could wait on the frontiers in support with the rest of their armies. All this may well have been designed to provide an escape route for Henry but the Emperor was having none of it; in a memorandum replying to Henry’s points, he observed that Henry was the older man and ‘he has left off for a long time travelling outside his kingdom’ while the ‘change of air and bodily exertion’ would be dangerous for his health, in particular from a ‘discharge (flux d’humeurs) in his legs.’ As for himself, Charles insisted that his health was fine and that the gout did not bother him in the summer. In view of Francis’ actions the previous year in invading his patrimonial lands with such swagger; of his promise to the Estates of the Empire; of the dishonour of not pressing forward; and finally (and probably most crucially) the fact that his army was made up of ‘men of many different nations where there are various chiefs, colonels and captains who, as experience has shown . . . can only be commanded and disciplined through respect for his presence’ he had to go. As for Henry’s suggestions about diminishing numbers, Charles argued that, should Francis realise this, he would concentrate all his very formidable forces against one of his enemies. Large numbers were needed to break down Francis’ prepared fortifications. As we have already seen, Henry’s suggestions about Paris were brushed aside. For Charles, the capture of the capital was to put pressure on Francis and bring him to the negotiating table (‘le constraindre à faire la raison’). Perhaps the deciding point was that Charles was prepared to accept the lower number of English troops on offer if Henry did not lead them and they moved immediately.53 This, of course, was 53

‘Ce que a esté consideré et advisé sur la charge de sr. Messire Guillaume Paget’ enclosed in Charles V to Chapuys of 3 June, NA SP1/188, fos. 46–49 (51–54) , PRO31/18/3/2 fo. 148 (L&P, XIX, i, 626): ‘en cas que led. sr roy ne iroit personellement en l’armee, que il pourroit suffire qu’elle fut de trente mil homes.’ (fo. 49)

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an offer Henry could not in honour accept. Neither Henry’s own discomfort nor the misgivings of his advisers would therefore come into play but those misgivings reveal a serious breakdown in agreement on overall strategy that was to have disastrous consequences. Paget was in such a hurry to get back to England that, passing Brussels on 9 June, he declined to disturb the Regent from hunting and got on with his journey.54 Paget’s return signalled a change in strategy. It may be that being forced to face the reality of an expedition in person revitalised the brutal energy that had been masked for so long by Henry’s ailing and ungainly body. At Calais on 21 July, Chapuys, not habitually starryeyed about Henry, observed that that ‘I never in my life saw the lord King more joyful then we saw him today.’55 By mid-June, the King avowedly abandoned his idea of remaining at Calais during the campaign and signalled to Norfolk, by then across the Channel, that he intended to ‘go forwards.’ No longer was Norfolk to have a full war chest of £160,000 as was decided when Henry ‘was partly minded to have remained upon the frontiers’; that ‘first resolution upon another consultation’ had been changed. Yet where was the Duke to go? Norfolk was still assuming that the English forces would ultimately cross the Somme, yet on 13 June Paget told Lord Cobham (appointed on 17 June as Deputy of Calais) that the King’s armies ‘shalbe so nere Calais allwayes’ that no ‘extraordinary crewe’ would be needed for the garrison there, as had originally been planned.56 This is as close as we can get to pinning down Henry’s change of strategy. Henry saw Chapuys and Charles’ special envoy Courrières on 14 June and reiterated his cautions against Charles’ personal campaign, stressing again the fact that his own illness was ‘only by chance’ while Charles’ was chronic and especially dangerous in autumn. He also per-

‘il a delaissé de long temps de voyaiger hors de son royaulme’ plus the danger of ‘changement d’air et le travail corporel.’ ‘gens de diverses nations et y a plusieurs chiefz, collonelz et capitaines lesquelz comme l’experience la demonstré . . . difficillement se pourroient regler et tenir en discipline, ne faire bon effect sans sa presence et respect d’icelle’ On Charles’ role as an general in this period and in particular his growing determination to command in person, see J.D. Tracy, Charles V: Impresario of War (Cambridge, 2002). 54 Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 11 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 676. 55 Chapuys to Charles V, Calais, 21 July 1544, NA PRO31/18/3/2, fo. 201 (L&P, XIX, i, 955): ‘je ne vis oncques en ma vie led. Sr. roy plus joyeulx que l’avons veu aujourd’huy.’ 56 Council to Norfolk, rec. 17 June 1544 (later copy), BL Harl. 6980, fo. 119 (L&P, XIX, i, 690); Paget to Cobham, 13 June 1544, BL Harl. 283, fo. 188 (L&P, XIX, i, 691).


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ceptively warned against plunging deeply into French territory without guaranteed supplies and in the face of serious French preparations, while to count on the rebellion of the people of France was just ‘vanity’ (such after all had been the experience of 1522–1523).57 Henry insisted that he would cross in person initially with 30,000 men and decide on his objectives once he got to Calais. Paget had told Chapuys explicitly (‘assez clerement’) that Henry, despite ‘the most urgent request of his councillors and other important people of the kingdom to excuse his going personally on the expedition’ would certainly go but the ambassador feared that Henry would be very unwilling to send his army far into France (in view of the difficulties he was harping on), unless he had news of the Emperor’s success in his invasion. Charles received this report at Metz on 27th and resigned himself to Henry taking the field, though he insisted that the English should commit themselves to sending at least 30,000 men into France, otherwise Francis would not be constrained to divide his forces. He continued to insist that Paris was a viable objective.58 Relations were not improved by the disastrous outcome of negotiations with Landenberg (see chapter 7) which threatened to unleash his unpaid troops into the Emperor’s patrimonial lands or provoke them to take French service. Wotton gloomily reported from Metz that it was being said in the Emperor’s entourage ‘the the Kinges highnesse dothe not much mynde this warre against France.’ Granvelle told him the decision was ‘marvellous ill tidings, and of great importance and of hard digestion.’ Chapuys’ protests to the Council just drew the truculent response that ‘they cared not a gooseberry’ if Landenberg went over to France. It would just embolden Francis to give battle, which was what they all wanted! Henry himself was blasé about Landenberg’s intentions, thinking him unlikely to go over to France in view of his personal grudge against Francis. At all events, news of a minor Imperial victory in Lombardy had encouraged him in his plan to cross the Channel.59 There were also problems

57 Henry had been told before that the people of France were about to revolt and this had never happened (e.g. the spy report of 1522, BL Cotton, Calig. D VI, fos. 353–354). 58 Chapuys to Charles V, 18 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 730; Charles V to Chapuys, 27 June 1544, ibid. no. 794: ‘la tres instante requeste de ceulx de son conseil et aultres bons personnaiges du royaulme d’excuser son allee personnelle en lad. emprinse.’ 59 Wotton to Paget, 23 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fo. 38(56) (L&P, XIX, i, 765); same to Henry VIII, 24 June, St.P., IX. 718 (L&P, XIX, i, 770); Chapuys to Charles V, 29 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 799.

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of coordination. Though communications with the Regent in Brussels were easy enough, on many matters the Emperor had to rule and letters in post were taking ten days from London to Metz by the time Charles arrived there.60 It cannot have given Charles much confidence in his ally to learn at the end of June that Henry, though now much more likely to take part in the campaign in person, would stick at the campaign for no longer than the agreed term of 4 months agreed in 1543 ‘and that he will soon tire of it, because money is not so abundant with him as was thought.’61 Invasion: Montreuil Despite extensive long-term preparations for the campaign (see chapter 5) a great deal was also left to the last minute. Not until 25 May did a letter go out to the Dean and Chapter of Wells to send 400 foot to Dover by 12 June. On the same day, the Lord Mayor of London was summoned to the Council to answer its command ‘for the fynding of souldeours to the kynges warres.’62 By late May the vanguard (‘vaward’) of the English army under Norfolk’s command, was crossing the Channel, at first in small detachments with delays caused by difficulties with the Flemish transport and escort ships.63 These two formations should have consisted of 18,623 foot (equally divided between the two corps) but only a paltry 915 horse. This army was thus numerically the strongest in theory of the two deployed by Henry but was dependent heavily on the Burgundian auxiliaries and German mercenaries for cavalry.64 Norfolk himself crossed on 8 June, to find that intelligence at Calais was hopelessly ineffective, little more than women’s gossip. He proposed to send an agent into France but he knew nothing yet of current developments, though trumpeters sent to arrange ransoms were able to report some movements on the French

60 L&P, XIX, i, 770 Letters between London and Speyer were taking 8–9 days in April-May (Chapuys’ despatches of 13 April, 18 May). 61 Chapuys to Charles V, 29 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 799. 62 HMC, Calendar of the MSS of the Dean and Chapter of Wells 2 vols (London, 1914), II, p. 257; Goring, ‘Military Obligations,’ pp. 264–273. 63 For a series of warrants signed by Norfolk at Lambeth on 5 and 6 June for conduct of small detachments of soldiers, L&P, XIX, i, 632, 634.3 and 4, 655, 663. 64 L&P, XIX, i, 274, 275, 276.


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side.65 Russell was scheduled to follow shortly after with the rearguard, the two corps to operate as one army. It has been argued that Norfolk was too dilatory and cautious in his leadership and that English strategy was undermined by rivalry between Norfolk and his co-commander, Russell, and lack of co-operation from the Burgundians. The Duke took nearly a month from his landing at Calais to begin the siege of Montreuil.66 As we have seen, Norfolk was still probably unaware that Henry had changed his mind about overall strategy and was still planning for a crossing of the Somme. When, a few days later, he consulted a messenger from du Roeulx who had sent to find out what his strategy was, Norfolk had to ask du Roeulx’s advice. This was clear: Ardres and Boulogne should be avoided as they were too strong. Norfolk should encamp before Montreuil, which was winnable unless it was further reinforced by 6–7000 men. Du Roeulx also passed on current Imperial assessments of French troop strengths: the main army to face the Emperor would consist of 15–16,000 Swiss, 6–7000 Germans, 8000 French and 1500 light horse and 1500 hommes d’armes. But in Picardy it was thought that Vendôme would have 1500 hommes d’armes, 8–900 light horse and 10–12,000 foot from Boulonnais, Picardy, Normandy and Brittany (obviously legionnaires). At Montreuil, Norfolk could be supplied from Flanders and supported by du Roeulx and Buren. As for crossings of the Somme, du Roeulx ruled out the one below Abbeville (presumably the same used by Edward III in 1346) as too deep; instead he pressed for a crossing of the Somme at Braye (between Péronne and Corbie). Above all, du Roeulx was ‘ever more laying lode upon that in no wyse your highness shulde consume no tyme in laying siege where was no lycklyehode in brief tyme to wynne the same.’67 These points were rammed home by du Roeulx when he met Norfolk in person at Calais on 14 June: Montreuil should be attacked first but only if its garrison were not more than 2000. Ardres and Boulogne would take at least two months to reduce. Once Montreuil was taken, the English could march directly south to cross the Somme between Le Crotoy and Abbeville and thereafter live off the land or be supplied by French peasants. If Montreuil were not taken, the English should march through Imperial 65

Norfolk to Council, 9 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fos. 79–81(89–91) (L&P, XIX, i, 654). MacMahon, ‘English Invasion of France,’ pp. 79–82, 85–89. 67 Norfolk et al. to Henry VIII, 11 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fos. 94–95 (102–103) (L&P, XIX, i, 674). 66

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territory and cross the Somme further up. Corbie was suggested as an initial objective, equivalent to the Emperor’s proposed objective in Champagne.68 The count of Buren had promised to be at Aire by 20 June.69 When he came to talk to Norfolk on 21 June he pushed the same view as du Roeulx: Montreuil should be the objective but should be left alone if it had a garrison of 5–6000. Otherwise, the English should march to cross the Somme, plainly a strategy favourable to the Imperial cause.70 Du Roeulx had been thoroughly enthusiastic about a siege of Montreuil for two years; now he had changed his mind. There seems every reason to suppose that he was under orders to stop the English getting bogged down and move them on to the Somme as soon as possible. By the end of June, though, du Roeulx was pretty pessimistic: ‘I fear that if they do not follow another course from what they do they will do nothing serious this year.71 One of the main problems was supplies. Burgundian objectives were undermined by two facts: first, Henry was determined not to play along; second, supply lines were extremely difficult even for the 20,000 men or so of the van and rearguards marching on Montreuil. The campaign began uncomfortably for Norfolk and continued so. He had been complaining about the high cost of food at Calais since his arrival. The supply of his forces on the march was even more precarious and he claimed not to know the wage rates of German soldiers to be brought by Buren. He moved out of the town on 15 June and lodged at Leubringhen on the borders of English territory on the road to Marquise (7 miles off ).72 The ordnance followed via Nieullay. The problem was that, though there was forage, there was no standing corn except on the estates of the master of St. Inglevert hospice (which formed the boundary of English territory). However, Calais could now be prepared for Russell and his contingent (he was there by 20th). Du Roeulx, who knew the territory like the back of his hand,

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Norfolk et al. to Henry VIII, 14 June 1544, St.P., IX, p. 708 (L&P, XIX, i, 700). Buren to Henry VIII, Mechelen, 2 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 617. 70 Norfolk et al. to Henry VIII, 22 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 758. 71 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, Saint-Omer, 30 June 1544, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 34:’ ‘si crains je bien en cas qu’ilz ne prendent aultre fachon de faire qu’ilz ne feront poinct grandte chose pour ceste annee.’ 72 A detailed itinerary of Norfolk’s march can be reconstructed from his correspondence and from Elis Gruffydd’s chronicle in M.B. Davies (ed.), ‘The “Enterprises” of Paris and Boulogne,’ Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of Fouad I University, Cairo, XI, i (19.), p. 10– (in which the dating is askew). 69


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was clear that the cavalry forces stationed by the French at Thérouanne were a crucial danger to English supply lines. Norfolk turned down the idea of raising 500 Artois infantry to protect the supply lines and du Roeulx thought on 6 July that is the English took no other action they would starve.73 Norfolk had two problems: strategy and supplies. Incredibly, he still had no clear idea of his objectives. In fact, the Council (in the persons of Wriothesley and Suffolk) rebuked him by writing that the King thought he understood what he was to do; at all events they reiterated that he should ‘marche forwards and laye siege’ to Montreuil and, should cavalry still be short, move back to attack Ardres using mortars. He was also rapped over the knuckles about German pay, which he was told he could have found out from Thomas Chamberlain. Yet even Suffolk and his colleagues with the other army said they were still in the dark until 10 July about what Henry intended to do and even then they were told to keep the plans secret from the Emperor’s representatives. Encamped at the abbey of Beaulieu (burned the previous year) on 22nd, with Russell a mile away at Fiennes, Norfolk was again warned by Buren that, if Montreuil had been reinforced up to 5–6000 men he should on no account waste his time there but instead march to the Somme. Yet at the same time, they told him that Vendôme was waiting at Abbeville with 10,000 foot and 500 hommes d’armes and that he had devastated the country around Montreuil. Promises of supplies via du Roeulx’s post at the castle of Renty must have sounded unpromising.74 By this point, the fundamental strategic misconceptions of the campaign are pretty clear and must have been so to the commanders. Henry certainly realised that deep inroads into French territory were potentially very risky without logistical back-up. In his own sphere, he was invited to cross the Somme while leaving several heavily fortified strongholds behind him besides Boulogne and Montreuil. Amiens was out of the question and Péronne, which had resisted a siege of several

73 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 6 July 1544, Audience, 119, fo. 35: ‘s’ilz ne mectent autre ordre au convoy de leurs vivres avant qu’il soit trois jours, ilz ne auront poinct à menger.’ 74 Norfolk’s despatches of 13, 14, 15, 19, 22 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 700, 701, 709, 738, 746, 758. Council to Norfolk, 20, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 121 (L&P, XIX, i, 741), same to same, 26 June 1544, ibid., no. 781. Suffolk and Browne to Norfolk, Russell and Cheyney, 8 July 1544, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 129 (L&P, XIX, i, 872). See also L&P, XIX, i, 849, 863.

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weeks in 1536, had been extensively refortified. Few exploits would have been more dangerous than to press on south from the Somme; Calais would be left exposed and the French border fortresses could easily interrupt supply. The alternative – the course of action Henry eventually opted for – was to attack neighbouring strongholds at Boulogne and Montreuil, scarcely moving from the English base. Yet this had two major drawbacks; it effectively tore up Anglo-Imperial strategic agreements and it left English forces exposed to a powerful French counter-attack should both or either of those fortresses be taken. All in all, the alternatives were unpalatable, though the ultimate decisions concerning objectives can be understood. Norfolk received the Council’s testy order by 23rd and announced that he would head towards an old castle called Alembon, 6 miles southeastwards, in order to meet du Roeulx and decide whether to attack Montreuil or Ardres; Russell would stay at Fiennes. This involved a march south-eastwards along the borders of French and Imperial territory. Everything depended on the advice of the Imperial commanders as the state of forage on the 40–50 km march to Montreuil was unknown and the quality of English dray horses (e.g. for the portable ovens) was very poor. But when Buren and du Roeulx came to Alembon, they repeated their advice not to ‘meddle’ with Boulogne or Ardres and it was agreed to try Montreuil, though the Burgundian commanders could not guarantee success, especially as the Dauphin was expected with an army of 15,000.75 With Russell now at Licques, Norfolk camped at Alquines on 28th and continued his talks with the Burgundians. The latter were gloomier than before and pressed for a march to the Somme once the King had arrived; not even Montreuil could be fully encircled with the troops they had and they proposed a siege on one side. Russell ‘said I had not harde of eny towne wonne which was not besieged rounde abowtes.’ Norfolk and his fellow commanders were pessimistic about the Burgundians; ‘thies men do moste desire that with thexpense of the kinges money we shulde defende their cuntries,’ while they were not even helping with supplies. The soldiers had had nothing but water to drink since the morning of 27th and no likelihood of any beer until the evening of 29th.76 This was

75

Norfolk et al. to Council, 23, 26 June 1544, L&P, i, 763, 786. Norfolk et al. to Council, 28 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fos. 97–99 (128–129) (L&P, XIX, i, 795). 76


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the day it was decided to swing back south-west and unite the forces under Russell and Norfolk at Bourthes, mid-way between Montreuil, Thérouanne and Boulogne. The following day, Henry ordered the siege to be pressed in earnest without taking too much notice of du Roeulx and Buren (their advice was just to be followed about supplies) and the King characteristically sounded off about the best place to lay a siege – on the eastern and southern sides.77 For his part, Russell was even more acid about the campaign objectives by the time they got to Bourthes; he likened the campaign to others he had seen involving great English expenditure: And now this iourney, as hit may be called a wylde warre as hit hath ben used in tymes past, considering that we do here but wander dispending your Majestes treasour after this sorte without any gayne, and enterprising that whiche thorough the lacke of victualles . . . we shall not be hable to atteyne.

All this would only encourage the French to ‘sett lytle by’ Henry’s main army when it arrived. He was convinced that the best objectives would be Ardres and Boulogne.78 The army moved very slowly again south-eastwards to Wicquinghem. Finally, on 6–7 July, Norfolk and Russell marched towards Montreuil itself via an encampment on the east bank of the Canche, then crossing to Brimeu on 8th; from there had could advance quickly to survey the layout of Montreuil – one mile away – for the first time.79 Montreuil occupies an elevated position except to the south. After the siege of 1537, Francis I had ordered the construction of new bastioned fortifications around the upper town but these were only partially complete. To the east, the old 14th century walls remained around the lower town, pierced by the Hesdin gate, but the approach to them was rendered difficult by marshy ground. As soon as they arrived, the English commanders noted the existence of a ‘great bullwarke without Abbeville gate’ which their spy had not noted before and that ‘none of

77

Council to Norfolk et al., 30 June 15 44, St.P., IX, p. 725 (L&P, XIX, i, 806). Russell to Henry VIII, 1 July 1544, NA SP1/189, fos. 116–118 (151–153) (L&P, XIX, i, 816). At the same time he told Browne that after four campaigns in France Henry ‘hathe not in France oone foote more then he had fourtie yeres paste.’ (1 July 1544, NA SP1/189, fo. 118 (153)v (L&P, XIX, i, 817). 79 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 6 July 1544, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 35: ‘Le camp des Anglois est allé camper à Brimeu. Touttesfois ilz avoient conclud d’aller à Clenleu jusques à avoir nouvelles du Roy d’Angleterre.’ 78

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us have ever sene in any place a bullwarke made to serve to so good a purpose.’ It was able to beat all the ground in front. According to Russell, the town ‘wantith neyther plattformes, mountes nor rampires with the which they most anoye us and as for other defences they have none,’ though it is difficult to think what else were needed except ditches. The plan drawn by Jean Errard at the end of the 16th century shows a distinctive mount on the eastern side of the new fortifications.80 Three gates remained open; the others had been ‘mured upp’ since the Burgundians captured the town in 1537. It was ‘as dangerous a towne to be approched as ever I saw any’ though the use of artillery had forced the garrison to abandon some of their outer defences.81 To the north, the town was covered by the river Canche and marshy ground. Several days were taken up in arguments over tactics between Norfolk and Russell and between both and the Burgundian commanders du Roeulx and Buren. When the siege started on 10th, it proved impossible, as du Roeulx had warned, to invest the town completely. Russell took up position with his force opposite the walls from the Abbeville to the Hesdin gates, Norfolk and the Burgundians opposite the fortifications damaged in the siege of 1537 to the east (the Hesdin gate side). The Burgundians refused to take up their position to the west and close the siege. They argued that the siege camp should not be divided because of the danger that Vendôme might approach with his 10,000 men. They may have had a point early in July but by early August, many of Vendôme’s troops had been drawn away and in any case he could not have marched so rapidly from Abbeville as to surprise the siege. Russell offered to take up his position to the west and allow Norfolk to move his men around to the south but the Duke vetoed this. Russell seems to have done his best to undermine Henry’s confidence in the Duke; both commanders asked for neutral observers to come to assess progress of the siege.82 That Norfolk and Russell disliked each other seems certain; Elis Gruffydd amply recounts their

80

BL Add. 21117, no. 41. Norfolk and others to Suffolk, 13 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fo. 27v (L&P, XIX, i, 907); Russell to Henry VIII, 16 July 1544; same to Paget, 16 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fos. 45v, 49v (L&P, XIX, i, 919, 920). 82 ‘He saith hit is no place mete for me to lye in, being so dangerous.’ Russell also told the King that Norfolk had alienated du Roeulx by writing ‘somwhat sharplie’ to him over the slackness of supplies. It is clear he thought the Duke inept in strategy and in handling the allies. (ibid., fos. 45v–46r). 81


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petty rivalries. Russell was the younger man but both were getting on. Norfolk was over 70 and Russell nearly 60. Both, as we have seen, were experienced in the disappointments of French wars. There was even uncertainty in the army as to which of them was in charge of the vaward or rearward, as will be seen (chapter 5).83 Russell made a camp in a hollow and brought up artillery to sweep the defences in order to provide some relief for his men. Only then (24th) could mining begin towards the Abbeville gate but progress was painfully slow. The construction of artillery mounts that would enable to town to be properly bombarded took prodigious efforts and was not finished until the start of August.84 Meanwhile, hardly any progress against the Hesdin gate was made by Norfolk’s force, probably encamped in the valley of Ecuires, described by Gruffydd as very damp. His troops seem to have been concentrated on the maintenance of supplies from Saint-Omer. Constantly harassed by the garrison of Thérouanne. Even the setting up an artillery bombardment of the town seems to have had limited effect. Despite all the effort put into building the artillery mound in front of the Abbeville gate and evidence that inner defensive trenches were being built in case the Abbeville gate bastion were lost, Norfolk still thought that artillery was unlikely to do the job and was relying on ‘mynes and tombelyng trenches.’85 The real problem, though, continued to be the failure of circumvallation. Gruffydd thought that 60,000 men would not have been enough to ensure this and called it a ‘half siege.’ His anecdotal narrative of the siege gives the impression that the absence of assaults indicated a lack of determination on the part of the English; there was certainly much more skirmishing with a spirited garrison than there was at Boulogne.86 Supplies were dribbling into Montreuil throughout August. Meanwhile, the besiegers were themselves weakened by lack of food and drink, to the extent that the soldiers even had to buy their food from the local peasantry.87 Gruffydd’s narrative of the overthrow of a supply expedition to Saint-Omer led by Norfolk’s man Hussey, though it might 83 Elis Gruffydd in M.B. Davies, ‘Enterprises of Calais and Boulogne,’ pp. 11–12, 18. Gruffydd said that even he ‘could not get any certain knowledge of the matter.’ (p. 11). 84 L&P, XIX, i, 965, 976; ii, 9. 85 Norfolk et al., to Council, 2 Aug. 1544, NA SP1/191, fo. 8r–v (L&P, XIX, ii, 9). 86 Gruffydd, ed. M.B. Davies, ‘Enterprises of Calais and Boulogne,’ p. 22. 87 Gruffydd, ‘The Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne,’ pp. 22–23.

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be embroidered, gives a clear enough picture of the problems of bringing food in convoys over thirty miles.88 After this, orders came from the King to hold Etaples and get supplies from England direct. By the end of August, there was some shaky occupation of Etaples established under Sir John Fogge, though Gruffydd suggests that the route remained too insecure.89 Intelligence during August stressed the ability of the French garrison to get supplies even though they were short and reduced to eating their horses. Their artillery emplacements at the Abbeville gate were formidable.90 Some success was had in devastating French territory when at the start of September a raid was led by Buren, Surrey, Sussex, Mountjoy and lord William Howard which burned Saint-Riquier, Rue, the suburbs of Abbeville and the town (though not the castle) of Le Crotoy. Norfolk claimed that a vast booty had been brought back and, with the discipline of the men, nothing like it had been seen during the campaign.91 But conditions in the English camp were deteriorating in the midst of filth, disease and hunger throughout August and early September. An army of 20,000 men could simply not be maintained in such conditions. The conclusion of the Treaty of Crépy on 18 September, entailed the withdrawal of Imperial support on 29th. Now the bulk of the French royal army under the Dauphin and Vendôme, released from guarding against the Emperor’s invasion, could bear down on the English. The order for withdrawal came on 25 September, a day when Norfolk reported that no more than 13,000 active soldiers were left in his army.92 This was followed by something of a sauve qui peut in which much of the equipment and the wounded were left behind. English forces were withdrawn to the defence of Boulogne against the French counter-attack. Mounting a siege both at Montreuil and Boulogne had proved beyond the capability of the English military system. The siege works at Montreuil, though not starved of equipment, were undermined by

88

Ibid., pp. 24–31. Ibid., pp. 31–33; L&P, XIX, ii, 248. 90 Intelligence from the French camp, August 1544, NA, SP1/26, fo. 192 (L&P, III, 2706, misdated to 1522). This also, perhaps improbably, claimed that the leaders of Amiens, in the event of an English siege, had agreed that ‘ilz ne se feront poinct battre, et sy vous apporteront les clefz.’ 91 Norfolk to Council with King, 2 Sept. 1544, G.F. Nott, The Works of Henry Howard Earl of Surrey, 2 parts (London, 1875), appendix, no. xvi (L&P, XIX, ii, 176). 92 Norfolk to Council, 25 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 297. 89

Illustration 1 The Departure of Henry VIII from Calais, July XXV. MDXLIV. Engraved from a Coeval Painting, at Cowdray in Sussex, the Seat of Lord Viscount Montague. “The Meting of the Kinge by Sr. Anthony Brown upon the Hill Between Callis and Morgvison.” Drawn from the Original, by S.H. Grimm. Engraved by James Basire, 1788. Sumptibus Societatis Antiquariorum Londini. Publish’d according to Act of Parliament, 23rd April, 1788. (1–5 from copies printed in W.H. St John Hope: Cowdray and Easebourne Priory, London 1919).

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Illustration 2 The Encampment of King Henry VIII at Marquison, July MDXLIV. Engraved from a Coeval Painting, at Cowdray in Sussex, the Seat of Lord Viscount Montague. Drawn from the Original, by S.H. Grimm. Engraved by James Basire, 1788. Sumptibus Societatis Antiquariorum Londini. Publish’d according to Act of Parliament, 23rd April, 1788.

Illustration 3 The Siege of Boulogne by King Henry VIII. MDXLIV. Engraved from a Coeval Painting, at Cowdray in Sussex, the Seat of Lord Viscount Montague. Drawn from the Original, by S.H. Grimm. Engraved by James Basire, 1788. Sumptibus Societatis Antiquariorum Londini. Publish’d according to Act of Parliament, 23rd April, 1788.

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divided counsels; supplies were never adequate. Henry would have liked to take both places but the emphasis was inevitably on the siege he was conducting himself. Invasion: Boulogne We can assume that the unsatisfactory reports from his commanders in France and his suspicion that neither Landenberg’s troops nor logistical support from the Low Countries would be forthcoming had concentrated Henrys’ mind on Boulogne and Montreuil by the end of June 1544. MacMahon rightly stressed that the sieges of Montreuil and Boulogne were equally important for Henry, both suggesting the advantage of a useful extension of the security of English territory. Henry had been nagged into attacking Montreuil by the Burgundians since 1542 and was reasonably informed about the fortifications of Boulogne.93 The principal division of the royal army, the Battle, consisting of nearly 10,000 foot and over 3000 horse, followed Norfolk’s and Russell’s force by a few weeks and was to be commanded by Henry’s old favourite and companion in arms, the duke of Suffolk. At the very end of June, Chapuys reported that Suffolk would leave London early on 30 June accompanied by Gardiner, as co-ordinator of supplies, and Browne, master of the Horse. With him travelled Gage, comptroller of the Household and expert on supplies, Arundel as Master of the camp and St. John, lord Chamberlain. In effect, the military heavyweights of the Privy Council were about the cross the Channel.94 St. John and Gage (assisted by his servant Otwell Johnson) were specifically charged with transporting the Battle and ensuring the passage of transport horses from Dover and Sandwich.95 Suffolk passed through Gravesend to Dover and crossed to Calais on 3 July.96 The town and Pale had been churned over by Norfolk’s army, so he quickly marched

93 See the reports of Wallop, 11, 17 June 1542, NA SP1/171, fos. 10–11, 35–36 (L&P, XVII, 397, 411). MacMahon, ‘Invasion of France,’ pp. 38–46. 94 Chapuys to Charles V, 29 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 799; Hall, ed. Whibley, II, pp. 348–349. 95 Otwell Johnson to John Johnson, 29 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 801; Gage and St. John to Council, 30 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 807. 96 See the vivid anonymous account, ed. W.A.J. Archbold, ‘A Diary of the Expedition of 1544,’ EHR, 16 (1901), 5–37.


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on 5th to a camp at Coquelles in the Pale and then with the bulk of the Battle towards Marquise, where there was forage in the villages between that town and the sea at Wissant, where they camped. There he could wait for Buren’s auxiliaries and, 1500 troops from Norfolk and Suffolk who had been delayed and Henry’s own military following.97 At Wissant, Suffolk, Browne and the others were finally told their objective would be Boulogne and received a ‘plott of Boleygne in moolde’ to begin planning. Paget informed them of the King’s usual pontifications about the practicability of mining (he dismissed the difficulties which had been raised) but laid out very clearly Henry’s tactical objectives: To make mountes in places without to shote from in to the town and, the housing standing thick and nere unto the walles, to bear them down and the shoote over in to the towne and with contynuall shot of his ordynance and of his mortars, the town being very little within to mak any succour or defence against the same to make . . . . terrible frayes unto them and with the terror and trouble therof so to astonne and torment them that they shuld be fayn to fall to composition.98

Henry had clearly made up his mind to take advantage of his one really convincing military arm, his artillery. At Whitehall on 7 July, the necessary instruments for the Regency in the King’s absence were promulgated.99 Henry left Whitehall on 11th and travelled via Gravesend, Rainham, Faversham and Forde to Dover. On 14th, he crossed to Calais and took up residence at the Exchequer house, holding talks with Suffolk and the others and sending Admiral Lisle, Cobham and Hoby to find out what on earth was going on at Montreuil. On 18th, Suffolk rode back to Marquise to begin a reconnaissance of Boulogne’s defences. Though it must have been worrying that Suffolk had insufficient horse to guarantee their onward journey to Montreuil, preparations for Henry’s advance to Boulogne in one day were eased by having the baggage train of his corps forwarded first to Marquise. Suffolk’s report was optimistic as far as the possibility of trenching was concerned and his camp was

97 Suffolk to Henry VIII, 4 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 835; Suffolk, Gage and Browne to Henry VIII, Wissant, 10 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 882. 98 Paget to Suffolk, Gravesend, 12 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fos. 23–24(289) (L&P, XIX, i, 903). 99 L&P, XIX, i, 864, 890.

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finally established their on 20th.100 But Boulogne was no easy target. The basse ville could be set aside as it was only very lightly fortified. The upper town, of course, was situated on a height, though the natural approach in any case lay in the north to north-west, where the land slopes gently away from the walls. Here it had been equipped with fausses brayes (as was usual in the period), as well as an éperon outside the castle and round artillery bastions outside the tours Nostre-Dame and Françoyse which had been under construction throughout the time Oudart du Biez had been governor. Both the Cowdray frescoes and the British Library drawing (Cotton, Aug.I.ii, 116) show the fausse braye and round bastions characteristic of the first half of Francis I’s reign, the tour Francoyse decorated by the king’s salamander device.101 The ancient Roman lighthouse, the Tour d’Ordre, was lightly garrisoned but would present no problem.102 Lisle also reports the existence of the ‘Green Bulwark’ to the south of the old town. He also approved Suffolk’s boldness and the energy by which the siege was immediately pressed forward.103 True, arquebusiers were short as was light cavalry for skirmishing but Bowes was again on hand with his northern horsemen to go cattle-raiding, no doubt a familiar activity to them. The basse ville was entered with hardly any fighting on 21st, the Tour d’Ordre was taken in short order and trenches quickly established. It comes as a surprise, though, to note that only at this point was thought given to establishing a naval blockade of the rade. Nevertheless, when Lisle and Jennyns of the Privy Chamber arrived on 20th with the troops from Scotland, they did so by sea, so the harbour was at least open.104

100 Suffolk and Browne to Henry VIII, Marquise, 18 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 932; Paget to Suffolk, 18 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 933; Suffolk et al. to Henry VIII, 20 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 947. 101 E.g. Potter, Du Biez, no. 46 (1528). In June 1542, Henry had been informed that the ‘rampire’ from the castle to the Notre-Dame gate was 48 feet thick ‘which they trust not so muche upon as a towre called franchois, the towre Nostre Dame, the gate of the towne and to the castell, in the which ether be lowpis a lowe, that apperith not . . . not serving for any other purpose, but for flanckes oonly.’ Nothing was known about vaults or trenches but the south gate was also being fortified. (Wallop to the Council, 17 June 1542, NA SP1/173, fo. 35v(37v) (L&P, XVII, 411). 102 ‘la tour d’Ordre fust rendue par ung nommé Grand Jehan Charpentier . . . sans endurer le canon et ouvrit la porte aux Anglois sans endure le canon.’ BnF, Dupuy 474, fo. 12v. 103 Lisle to Paget, 20 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fos. 96–97 (L&P, XIX, i, 949): ‘I suppose ffewe soche stronge townes as this ys hathe byn so nere aproched ffrom the fyrst daye.’ 104 Ibid. Suffolk et al. to Council with King, 21 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 957. L&P, XIX, ii, 424 (diary of siege based on BL Cotton, Calig. E IV, fos. 59–68).


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Getting Henry and his troops to the siege was like conveying an ungainly and threatening totem into the midst of the war; there was no doubt his presence was an encouragement but it also had its penalties. Days were taken up in preparing a suitably well-watered and airy site for his camp and cavalry detailed to meet him half-way at Marquise. Henry set out from Calais on 25th accompanied by his military retinue, the guards, companies of men-at-arms, demilances and light cavalry and Henry’s favourite, the duke of Albuquerque with 150 brilliantly decked out horsemen.105 After camping uncomfortably in the rain at Marquise, where he was met by Anthony Browne, the King arrived at the camp on 26th. At the end of July the Imperial representative Courrières was sceptical whether the English were up to conducting an artillery bombardment either at Boulogne or Montreuil, thinking them inexperienced (‘guesres experimenté [en] tielles negoces.’)106 All the same, the siege works were being pressed energetically, with trenches dug towards the bastion outside the castle and mounds being built to bombard the ramparts directly. Henry was able to report to the Queen that the battery had begun on 4 August and that he expected to reduce the town in twenty days. Three batteries had been established, under Suffolk, Seymour (Master of the Ordnance) and Lisle and nearly 100 pieces were employed, half of them the larger sort, as well as 50 mortars in reserve. Thirty-five salvoes per piece per day were budgeted for and this meant that, for cannon alone, there were 700 shots in two days.107 As it happens, the siege of Boulogne is one of the best visually documented in the period, both from the copies of the frescoes commissioned at Cowdray for Sir Anthony Browne and the large scale drawing of the aftermath of the siege now in the British Library (see illustrations). Both make clear the huge scale of operations and the closeness with which the town was invested.108

105 M.A.S. Hume (ed. trans), Chronicle of King Henry VIII. Written in Spanish by an Unknown Hand, (London, 1889), pp. 112–115. The Spanish chronicler asserts that Albuquerque played a significant leading role in the siege and it is the case that he commanded English troops in France under Mary I. 106 Courrières to Chapuys, 31 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 1024. 107 Artillery: NA SP1/190, fos. 252–259 (L&P, XIX, i, 1034); Council with King to Queen, 5 Aug. 1544, St.P., X, p. 21 (L&P, XIX, ii, 35). 108 The frescoes were engraved by James Basire from drawings by S.H. Grimm and published by the Society of Antiquaries in 1788, Accompanied by an essay entitled A Description of some Ancient Historical Paintings preserved at COWDRAY in Sussex (Society of Antiquaries, London, 1788). Joseph Ayloffe had already published ‘An account

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The operation was much tougher than Henry had expected. Though he had dismissed the problems of mining, the shallowness of the soil before rock was hit meant that mines would be difficult and the supply of earth for the artillery mounds was limited.109 The artillery bombardment dragged on inexorably without much effect and early in September Hertford reported that, while he had thought the town would fall by 1st ‘you shall undarstand that bi [reson of moche f ]owlle wethers that felle here and allso [our] lak off powdar hath causid the tyme to be defarid, the which I assur you in mi jugment and . . . in others, it canot be long after the cuming of the powdar the which I trust shalbe here within towe dayes.’ The castle braye had already been won and despite the delays, Hertford reported Henry was as ‘mery and in a good helth as I have senne his Gras att eny tyme this vij ye[re].110 Contrary to Henry’s earlier pronouncements, it was mining that brought the attackers close enough to the walls for Hugh Paulet to mount a successful assault on the fausse braye on 1 September. This gave the opportunity to prepare for a general assault the following day but the French resistance was so ferocious, involving boiling oil, pitch and massed arquebus fire, that the attackers were driven back. Henry ordered further mining from the breach to the fausse braye below the ‘Flemings Tower.’ But time and gunpowder were running short. Desperate measures had to be found to scour up the latter in England and the Low Countries; the weather was turning even worse and (perhaps most dangerous) money to pay Buren’s Germans would run out on 22 September.111 The mine under the Flemings Tower was exploded but failed to bring it down. It took another week for another massive mine under the castle to be ready while Spanish arquebusiers were withdrawn from Montreuil to participate. Henry himself put pen to paper in a letter to the Queen on 8 September to report that, with the ditch taken, he had no doubt that ‘with Godes grace the castell and towne shall sortly follow.’ That very day ‘we begyne thre bateryse and

of some English Historical Paintings at Cowdry, Sussex’ in Archaeologia, 3 (1774), pp. 238–272. The paintings were destroyed by fire in 1793. 109 Suffolk, Gage and Browne to Henry VIII, 12 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 882 (top soil no more than 1 foot); Suffolk and Browne to same, 18 July 1544, ibid., no. 932: ‘And then for the nature of the [ground] for casteng of or trenches we have caused or p[ioneers] to dygge in dyvers places upon the syde towa[rdes the] castell, who have tryed in proofe that for 9 fo[ot] or thereaboutes it is faire earth.’ 110 Hertford to Council with Queen, 2 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 74. 111 L&P, XIX, ii, 174, 187, 192.


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have iij mynys goyng bysyd won whiche hath done hyh execution in scakyng and terying . . . oon off theyre grettest bulwarkes.’112 An order of the day divided the assault into two fronts, Suffolk’s camp with 2500 men and Lisle with 2100 to be supplemented by 500 more. Half of the third section of the siege camp (under the Lord Chamberlain and Cavendish) was detailed to join the assault. The assault was to advance in two waves but, crucially, those in the first wave were to be selected by the captains ‘as they feale the disposition of ther souldyours.’ The mine was blown up on 11th and another massive assault given. Though this did not fully succeed, enough of a foothold on the ramparts was attained to make the town indefensible.113 French Defence Strategy Francis, like Henry, was ailing in the first months of 1544. After inspecting the Norman ports in April and May, he returned to spend most of June and July in and around Paris, much of July at the château of Saint-Maur where he was reported ‘very ill and has not been out of bed for ten days with a fever.’ After the victory of Ceresole, bad news became the norm. Further encounters in the Milanese went against the French and Luxemburg (where supplies ran out) was lost on 6 June. On 11 July Francis appointed the Dauphin his Lieutenant-general throughout the realm and not until the very end of the month did his health improve.114 He spent most of August at a forward headquarters at Villers-Cotterêts, from where he made a fleeting visit to Epernay, near the prepared defence camp at Jalons, early in September. How did the French commanders opposing Henry respond to the challenge? Monluc recounted that it was thought by the French that they were facing joint forces of 80,000 foot, 20,000 horse and ‘infini’ artillery, which seems to indicate a fairly precise knowledge of the

112

Henry VIII to the Queen, 8 Sept. 1544, BL Cotton, E IV, fo. 58v, autograph. The order of the day for this assault is probably NA SP1/192, fos. 69–71 (L&P, XIX, ii, 221). Mason to Honnings, 11 sept. 1544, NA SP1/192, fo. 63 (L&P, XIX, i, 216): ‘We asssayled yesterday the castle to play with all, and therefore we ended in like sorte without any thing and [that] the defense was so erneste as a great nombre of our men are [hurt] and sume slayne. Among is Jheronimo the deviser whiche I thinke is vm pounde in the kings way.’ 114 C. Paillard, L’invasion allemande, pp. 305–307, ‘fort malade, et a desjà plus de dix jours quy ne bouge du lit d’une fièvre.’ 113

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Anglo-Imperial strategic plan.115 The figures are very vague, but we can be reasonably certain that Charles’s own corps, led from Speyer to Metz, amounted to 16,000 and Gonzaga’s force, which joined the Emperor at Saint-Dizier, 27,000 (43,000). After the siege of Saint-Dizier, though, these forces had dropped through desertions to 33,000.116 With a similar number under Henry VIII, the French were facing combined forces or more like 70,000. A spy report to Henry VIII (in fact one that was planted by the French through a double agent, La Vigne) at the end of May noted that Francis would be pitting 40,000 foot, 1200 light horse and 1500 lances against the Emperor under the command of the Dauphin and Annebault. For Picardy under the command of du Biez ‘qui est ung diable’ and Vendôme with 1000–1200 lances, 7–800 light horse and an unknown number of infantry. The King himself would have the Swiss, a certain number of aventuriers, 1500 lances and his guards. These figures agree well with the estimate by Ferdinand Lot based on du Bellay’s brief assessment of 40,000 foot made up of 16,000 Swiss and Grisons, 6000 lansquenets, 12,000 French and Italians withdrawn from Italy and a certain number of legionnaires. There was talk of 80,000 men ultimately assembled at the camp of Jalons in August but this was a huge exaggeration.117 The planted spy report just mentioned stressed that in Picardy ‘the countryside is well scoured, for everything has been brought into the fortresses that could be and at the present nothing is to be found.’118 Du Bellay reports that, immediately after the victory of Ceresole, Francis recalled his crack troops from Piedmont: 6000 infantry of the old bands and 6000 Italians. In view of the King’s need to concentrate forces in order to meet the Emperor and Henry in a great fortified camp, Picardy was ‘very short of men’ and the duke of Vendôme ‘poorly accompanied’ in the defence of Ardres, Boulogne, Thérouanne, Montreuil and Hesdin.119 Elsewhere, there were fears of an English descent on Normandy in March.120 In the early stages of

115

Monluc, Commentaires (ed. Courteault), p. 170. Rozet et Lembey, L’invasion de France, pp. 22–24. 117 NA SP1/187, fos. 239v–240r (274v–275r) (L&P, XIX, i, 575.3); F. Lot, Recherches sur les effectifs des armées francaises des Guerres d’Italie aux Guerres de Religion 1494–1562 (Paris, 1962), pp. 103–104. 118 Spy report, May 1544, NA SP1/187, fo. 239v(274v) (L&P, XIX, i, 573.3): ‘la campanye est byen razé car on a tiré tousiours dedans les places fortes ce qui sera assez à faire à voyre et de ceste heure ne se treuve ryens.’ 119 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 236, 8: ‘fort dépourveue d’hommes’ ‘mal accompagné.’ 120 Correspondance de Matignon, ed. Labande, no. CXLVI. 116


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the campaign, du Biez, as Vendôme’s deputy, was responsible for the strengthening of the garrisons. Reports coming in during May indicated a build up of Spanish troops around Gravelines, Saint-Omer and Aire and the marching of the Italians into Luxemburg. Du Biez countered with reinforcements at Hesdin and Thérouanne.121 Further south, Vendôme, from La Fère as his headquarters, undertook the reinforcement of Landrecies with 800 horse and some infantry before withdrawing to Guise.122 He heard that forces were concentrating in Hainault and called Jean de Créquy to join him with his company.123 But with Buren at Valenciennes it was difficult to take appropriate measures, especially as an English army was assembling at Calais.124 French uncertainty about English objectives is clear in intelligence reports that: 20,000 English have landed at Calais, 500 making a thousand, brought by the duke of Norfolk and that the King of England is to arrive shortly with another 20,000; that ovens are mounted on carts that they are to take with them. Their intention is to aim for Ardres to attack it and if that is not possible to move on the Boulogne and Montreuil.

The German troops at Valenciennes were likely to enter French territory through Bray and Corbie in order to join in an attack on Montreuil. In July the situation became more ominous when Heilly (governor of Hesdin) reported the imminent junction of the forces under Buren and du Roeulx with the English.125 On the 12th, Heilly’s agent sent further word:

121 Du Biez to Heilly, 1 May 1544; Villebon to du Biez, 16 May 1544, Potter, Du Biez, nos. 196, 197. 122 Bailli of Avesnes to M. de Bermerain, 30 May 1544 (AGR, Audience, liasse 20); Aerschot to Mary of Hungary, 3 June 1544, AGR, Audience, liasse 21. 123 Vendôme to Heilly, 22 May 1544, BM Amiens, MS 1150, no. 25; Bouchet to Heilly, 15 May 1544, SAP Ch. Heilly 57, no. 47. 124 Du Biez to Heilly, 9, 10 June 1544, Potter, Du Biez, no. 198, 199. 125 ‘Nouvelles des ennemys rapportees à Monseigneur de Heilly,’ 15 June 1544, SAP Ch. Heilly, 59, II, no. 46: ‘Qu’il est descendu vingt mil Angloys à Calays, les vc faisant le mil, que le duc de Norfocq a amenez, et que le Roy d’Angleterre doit descendre de brief avec autres xxm Angloys; et qu’on faict faire des fours sur chariotz qu’ilz meynent avecques eulx. Leur deliberacion est dresser leur chemyn à Ardre pour l’essayer et s’ilz n’y peuvent riens eulx dresser à Boullogne et Montreul.’; news letter, 1 July 1544, ibid., no. 47; Heilly to Vendôme, 1 July 1544, SAP, Ch. De Heilly, 57, no. 2.

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chapter four He says that they are determined to attack Montreuil with a great fury and if they unable to take it will withdraw to their country without moving further on. He fears that 800 English are camped before Boulogne.126

At Ardres, where the Constable’s brother La Rochepot was in command with his company and an augmented garrison, the men were restive for lack of pay and he had to make this up himself. Nevertheless, he seems to have solved the problem and Ardres was judged too strong to attack.127 At the start of the campaign it looked as though the French in the north would be able to field 10–12,000 foot (Normans, Picards and Beauvoisiens); they also expected 8000 Italians and 300 Germans. The Dauphin was imminently expected on the northern frontier to take command against the English while the Duke of Orléans faced the Emperor in Champagne.128 Early in July, it was reported that the Dauphin would advance into Picardy with 30,000 men to block the English advance.129 The companies of the Dauphin and Vendôme were expected at Doullens on 10 July and then at Abbeville at the end of the month. It is clear, though, that the Dauphin was having trouble raising men: du Roeulx reported on 1 August that ‘the Dauphin does what he can to assemble men; but according to news I have received today, he will find few infantry and still less money to pay them, while the King of France lies ill at Saint-Denis.’130 The Dauphin did indeed advance as far as Amiens with his own suite, taking order for supplying Vendôme with such money and troops as were available.131 But money was delayed (causing looting) and news of the Emperor’s advance was so alarming that he was recalled to join the King’s camp forming near

126 News letter, 12 July 1544, SAP Ch. Heilly, 59, II, no. 48: ‘Dict qu’ilz sont deliberez d’assaillir Montreul d’une grant furie et s’ilz ne le scavent emporter se retireront en leur pays sans passer plus oultre. Et craint que les Angles, qui sont a huit cens, se campent devant Boulogne.’ 127 La Rochepot to Vendôme, 25 July1544, HHSA, P.A. 55, fos. 445–446. 128 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 9, 23 June 1544 AGR, Audience [liasse 21] Paillard, p. 312. 129 Rozet et Lembey, p. 256, Ferrufino to Ercole II of Ferrara, 5 July 1544. 130 Letters of du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 23, 28 June, 10, 11, 15, 31 July, 1 August (AGR, Audience, [liasses 22–23]) Paillard, L’invasion allemande, p. 313: ‘Le Daulphin fait ce qu’il peut pour assembler gens; mais, aux nouvelles que j’ay eu aujourd’huy, trouvera bien peu de gens de pied et encores moins d’argent pour les payer, et que le roy de France est malade à Saint Denys.’ 131 Vendôme to Dauphin, 31 July 1544, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 23.


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Château-Thierry. There were, then, to be no extra troops for Vendôme in breaking the sieges except the 2000 brought by the Dauphin.132 This, in effect, determined the course of the defence against Henry. By 10 August it was being reported that the Dauphin had even taken his cavalry towards Champagne, perhaps in the knowledge that the English would be confining themselves to local action near Calais. This left Vendôme with no more than 2000 horse.133 Thus, other than the garrison troops, Vendôme had only small cavalry forces at his disposal. Norfolk reported in mid-June that the French had ‘sparkeled all their companies into their fortresses, thinkyng surely that we woll laye siege to Boloyn, Arde or Monstrell.’134 When the English main battle landed at Calais at the beginning of July, du Biez was left in the front line to face them. Early in June, he was putting on a brave face when an English trumpeter arrived, ‘wondrefully galyardly trimmed, mustering his men,’ 100 hommes d’armes with a fine complement of horses and 1500 foot.135 When it became clear that a powerful force was advancing on Montreuil under Norfolk’s command and had been joined by Buren’s forces, he took part of the Boulogne garrison and set up his command at Montreuil, leaving his son-in-law, Vervins, at Boulogne (the origin of the latter legal attack against him was the erroneous claim that Vervins and his fellow commanders were inexperienced).136 Du Bellay gives fairly precise details of the garrisons left: at Montreuil under du Biez himself, two companies of hommes d’armes, half of his own and the Constable’s (150 lances, or 375 men), 4 ensigns of French infantry under Genlis (presumably legionnaires) or 1200 men, 1000 Italian infantry under count Berenger and another 1000 under Francisque de Chiaramont. This gives a total of around nearly 4000 men. At Boulogne, the complement was weaker according to du Bellay. Vervins had half of du Biez’s company and

132

Norfolk to Council, 2 Aug. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 9; Council to Norfolk, 15 Aug. 1544, ibid., no. 89. 133 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 10 August 1544, Paillard, L’invasion, p. 317 (AGR, Seigneurs, II, 427); Council with King to Norfolk and Russell, 15 Aug. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 89. 134 Norfolk to Council, 15 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 140(156) (L&P, XIX, i, 709). 135 Norfolk to Council, 9 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 80(90)r (L&P, XIX, i, 654). 136 D. Potter, ‘A treason trial in sixteenth-century France: the fall of marshal du Biez, 1549–1551’ English Historical Review, 105 (1990), 595–623; Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 238–239; Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 9 July 1544, Brussels AGR, Audience, ‘le seigneur du Biez leur a respondu ce que ung homme de bien doibt respondre.’

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for infantry Lignon with 500 and two other bandes of foot (numbers unspecified) under d’Aix and Philippe Corse. Of these, only Corse was described as experienced, the others as ‘peu expérimente’ or ‘jeune homme.’137 How reliable are these figures? At his later trial, du Biez produced detailed evidence on his dispositions. He was accused of knowing in advance about the English plan and, indeed, he admitted that, a year before the siege, he sent warnings to the King that the English would attack Boulogne. However, on receiving a royal commission he claimed to have taken careful steps to provision the places under his command.138 This chimes with the earlier estimate of his opponent, du Roeulx, that he was ‘the commander on this frontier most to be feared.’139 The garrison he left at Boulogne comprised 4 bands of 300 under Lignon, Colinet, Pocques and d’Aix, a band of 200 Italians under Philippo Corso, half of his own company (52 hommes d’armes and 100 archers), plus the ordinary garrison of 100 mortespaies and plenty of pioneers. The total would thus be something around 1650 men, very close to the English trumpeter’s estimate. Ardres was powerfully garrisoned with 1000 foot and 50 hommes d’armes under La Rochepot, provisioned for four months.140 Vendôme, moving between Hesdin and Thérouanne, oversaw measures to break the blockade where possible and reported to the Dauphin: I have dedided to leave this town [Doullens] tomorrow to go with the captains of the companies here sleep at Hesdin. From there I shall go to Thérouanne to try whether it will be possible to do something to help Montreuil.141

137 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 238–239. An extensive compilation of miscelleous material on the siege was made by A. Marmin in Le siege de Boulogne en 1544 . . . avec des notes historiques par M. Alexandre Marmin (Boulogne, 1825). This seriously exaggerates the numbers of the besieging army. 138 Trial, 23 Aug. 1549, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 304–305: ‘Et par confession plus au long confesse qu’il en fut adverty des environ ung an auparavant et le fit entendre au feu Roy, le suppliant pourveoir aux affaires lequel luy envoyoit commission pour munir la ville et suyvant icelle fit mener de St Vallery à Boulongne cent cinquante muydz de bled et voyant que ce n’estoit assez fit ung ravage et arrester grande quantité de vins estrangers, tellement que quand il partit dud. Boulongne pour aller à Monstreul y laissa vivres pour nourrir unze mois deux mil quattre cens bouches. Laissa xlij ou xliij caques de pouldres au pris de ijc lt. pour cacque, grande quantité de salpestres et de charbon avec deux molins pour en faire.’ 139 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 19 May 1542, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 3: ‘le capitaine sur ceste frontiere le plus à craindre.’ 140 Norfolk, 9 June, L&P, XIX, i, 654. 141 Vendôme to Dauphin, 31 July [1544], BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 23: ‘J’ay deliberé partir


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Supply lines from Saint-Omer were, as has been seen, a major weakness of the English position at Montreuil. His resources were limited, though he promised as stout a defence at Boulogne and Montreuil as at Saint-Dizier. At any rate, an attempt by Saint-André late in July to get into Boulogne by sea was foiled by the English occupation of the haven and the land around the town.142 Vendôme’s attempt to attack the supply convoys for the English troops at Montreuil early in August was only partially successful but the resistance of the garrison there was fierce enough.143 The English mounted a battery of 18 cannons on 2–3 August and followed it up with seven assaults, but the bulwark in front of the Abbeville gate stood up well and the defenders were able to report 5 or 6000 casualties in the assaults (400–500 of them defenders).144 On 12 August, Vendôme, at the Dauphin’s command, at least managed to get 200 pioneers into Montreuil, with powder and saltpetre, one more measure of English incompetence. He also started making plans to cut the sea routes by which the besiegers at Boulogne were being supplied but could do little about the land routes.145 On 13 August, the English at Montreuil began a new battery of the Abbeville (marché) gate and Vendôme’s spies suspected mining in that area of the walls. Intelligence about Montreuil was pessimistic and reports of constant skirmishing with the few French companies of hommes d’armes not reassuring.146 A

demain de ceste ville [Doullens] pour m’en aller coucher à Hesdin avecques les cappitaines de compaignyes quy sont icy et delà m’en aller à Therouanne pour essayer s’il sera possible faire chose qui puisse favoriser Monstroeul.’ 142 Vendôme to Orléans, 31 July [1544] ibid., fo. 24. 143 Norfolk to Council, 2 and 4 Aug. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 9, 27. 144 News sent out to Heilly, 4 Aug. 1544, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 59, II, no. 59: ‘que depuis le samedy deuxiesme jour d’aoust jusques au dimenche sept heures du matin noz ennemys donnarent cinquante vollees de canon chacun vollee de xxviij canons et depuis lesd. sept heures jusques à dix dud. jour donnarent sept assaultz dont le premier dura environ une heure où il fut tué de quatre à cinq mil homes dont on extime en y avoir environ quatre cens de la ville.’ 145 Vendôme to Francis I, 12 Aug. 1544; to Dauphin, same date, BnF, fr. 20521, fos. 26–27, 25. 146 Vendôme to Francis I, 14 Aug. [1544],: BnF, fr. 20521, fos. 73–74. Intelligence reports stressed the optimism of the English at Montreuil: ‘Advertissment’ of 10 Aug. 1544, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 72: a returning French prisoner had reported: ‘avoir oy aulchuns gentilz hommes du camp de Monstroeul dire que leur cas alloit bien et qu’il avoient iiij milles cloies et six milles grosses bouvrees prestes et la ville fort crouste, pour battre incontinent que le conte de Bures aures prins Boullongne. Ung aultre prisonnier de Cressy dict que jeudi de la nuict ont mis plusieurs pieces d’artilleries sus ung hault mont de terre pour battre dedens la ville.’

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the start of September, a message was sent through the lines from Montreuil that there were only enough supplies to last 6 weeks, rather than 2 months. Francis I was highly indignant, telling the messenger that, if so, he might be forced to make a disadvantageous treaty with the Emperor to rescue Montreuil. Du Biez claimed at his trial to have got out the message that, by economies which had made his garrison discontented, he could make supplies last for two or even three months. At this, Francis was relieved.147 There had in fact been fires in the munition stores and a young 16-year-old English soldier was captured with a fuse and matches in his possession. Blamed for not executing him, the marshal declared that an Italian captain had sued for his life and saying that he was young and handsome.(‘dist que led. Anglois estoit beau et jeune.’)148 Of course, Boulogne was increasingly the main danger point; relatively weak in its garrison and confronted by Henry VIII’s main forces. A French spy report indicated that ‘they are suffering greatly at Boulogne.’ On the 12 August, Vendôme reported an imminent assault, in view of ‘their great bombardment.’ However, little news was getting out of the town because spies were unable to get through the much tighter English lines, a problem compounded by Boulogne’s remoteness and relative isolation from the rest of Picardy.149 The contrast with the relative ease by which du Biez was able to get messages out of Montreuil is striking, though at least one of these was intercepted and later testimony at his trial suggests a certain element of cloak and 147 Trial, 9 Sept. 1549, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 307–308: ‘Surce led. mareschal confesse que le feu Roy fut mal content de ce qui luy avoit mandé qu’il n’avoit vivres que pour deux mois et se esbahissoit commant il y avoit mis si mauvais ordre et que s’il estoit contrainct le secourir dedans led. temps fauldroit qu’il fist ung traicté avec l’empereur à son grand desadvantaige. Dont adverty, led. mareschal . . . envoya led. Caron devers luy pour luy donner entendre que . . . ce neantmoins il en avoit pour aller jusques au troisiesme au moyen du bon ordre que luy et le sr de la Guyche avoit mis aux vivres, dont les soldards n’estoient contans et non obstant que bonne partie desd. vivres eussent esté perduz par le feu qui sy y mist par deux fois. Dist que led. feu Roy en eut grand contentement comme il luy escrivit par led. Caron.’ 148 Ibid., p. 308. 149 ‘Advertissment’ of 10 Aug. 1544, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 72: ‘ilz ont fort à souffrir à Boulongne.’ . . . ‘la grande batterie qu’ilz font.’ The most detailed and evocative French source for the internal conditions at Boulogne is to be found in the long verse chronicle kept by the priest Antoine Morin, published by François Morand as ‘Chroniques du siège de Boulogne, en 1544, ou Journal de ce siège, en vers, composé par A. Morin,’ Revue des Sociétés Savantes, ser. 4, vol. II (1866), 60–67, 129–145, 244–261. This makes abundantly clear the sense of isolation and abandonment felt by the population: ‘Souuerain Roy de Franche, nous laisra tu mourir?’ (p. 253).


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dagger.150 It should not be supposed, though, that Vendôme was prepared to write Boulogne off and we know of one successful venture mounted by him from Thérouanne to cut the English supply routes from Saint-Omer which reveals the limited numbers of troops he had at his disposal (perhaps 1500–2000 horse). He had word that a supply train was moving from Saint-Omer to resupply the camp at Montreuil protected by 800 cavalry, 1200 lansquenets and four culverins. The forces he had were his own gendarmerie company (100 lances, 350 horse) and those of Villebon, Estrées, Esguilly, 50 lances of the Dauphin’s company and 50 under Sénarpont (perhaps in total 1000 horse). He had 200 more lances (Créquy and Heilly) in reserve but, according to du Bellay, did not need them to break up the supply train and take 800 prisoners to Thérouanne. More than that, he was unable to do and nor were the several attempts of the young sr. de Saint-André to get into the town by sea successful.151 The Fall of Boulogne and French Attempts at Recapture The course of events was being dictated in Champagne. The Emperor had become dangerously bogged down after his rapid advance and marched past the French camp at Jalons on the other side of the river, not even laying siege to Châlons. Peace discussions were well under way by 16 September when he reached Château-Thierry. For form’s sake, the Emperor had asked Henry for his terms should a peace be possible, but the English King was unenthusiastic, putting forward preposterous terms not even translated into French.152 But with the arrival

150 Du Biez to Vendôme, 31 Aug. 1544 copy sent to Emperor, Potter, Du Biez, no. 202; testimony of Nicolas Caron, 9 Sept. 1549, Potter, Du Biez, p. 207: ‘Et quant led. Caron et son guyde partirent dud. Monstreul furent toutte la nuyct dedans les maretz et le lendemain se retirerent aux bois où ilz furent attendans la nuyct et à la nuyct allerent à Abbeville devers monsr de Vendosme, qui le despescha et dela au lendemain led. Caron vint à Reims où il trouva Saint Germain et de Reims luy et led. sr de Saint Germain allèrent à Iternay où le Roy estoit et le trouva led. Caron en sa garde robe où luy fit sa messaige dont led. Sr fut bien aisé et luy commanda venir en ceste ville de Paris où led. sr vint et y despecha led. Caron et luy bailla lettres de credit pour advertir led. mareschal de la paix faicte avec l’empereur et que luy envoyroit le roy qui est à present pour le secourir. Dist oultre que le feu Roy luy bailla L écus et promesse d’une place des gardes.’ 151 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 261–263, 275–276. 152 3 Sept. 1544: copy sent to Wotton: St.P., X, p. 52; original sent to Emperor (in English): HHSA, England, Varia, 3, konv. 3, fos. 69–70 (L&P, ii, 180.2 and 3).

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of cardinal du Bellay, Pierre Remon and Claude de L’Aubespine in the English camp on 10 September, it might have seemed that a general peace was in the offing. Francis was prepared to offer a return to the status quo ante, to pay reasonable arrears of the pension and resume the yearly payments. If Henry were to raise the sieges, Francis would offer noble hostages for the carrying out of his commitments. He even offered to come to terms with Henry separately if he could not do a deal with the Emperor. Elis Gruffydd passed through Hardelot at this time and reports these talks, with the rumour that the French had offered Ardres, but also dryly comments Henry would not listen.153 Henry was still dismissive of peace offers. Even the Constable’s brother La Rochepot, in command at Ardres, sent out for a safe conduct to make some offer. Henry was having none of it, though La Rochepot’s trumpeter told du Roeulx in confidence that the Constable’s party were deeply discontented.154 Negotiations were derailed, and with dire long-term consequences, by the capitulation of Boulogne and by the rapid conclusion of the Franco-Imperial treaty. The broad terms offered by the French would have represented a real coup if the Emperor had been left out. The treaty of Crépy, a return to the status quo of 1542 (with a secret religious clause) was not signed until 20th at Crépy-en-Laonnois but it had been likely for some time and the Emperor had sent to Henry VIII at Boulogne for his consent. Henry, though he himself had been entertaining French peace offers, was outraged as he saw himself as on the verge of taking the town.155 He seems to have made the mistake in discussions with the bishop of Arras of giving the impression that he would approve of Charles ‘making as good an end for himself as he could.’ What Henry insisted later that he had said was that Charles would do least ill ‘if he embraced the overture for Milan.’ The Imperial envoys, who were anxious to be gone from the camp, found him pensive and by no means his usual boastful self. At all events, Granvelle

153 Norfolk insisted that du Bellay was [vain]‘glorious’ and wondered how to deal with him (L&P, XIX, ii, 176). How he had formed this view remains a mystery, though he may have been baffled by the subtlety of the man. For the French instructions, Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay, III, pp. 263–266. Gruffydd, ed. Davies, ‘Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne,’ p. 36. 154 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 11 Sept. 1544, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 37: ‘le connestable et tous ses parens, serviteurs et amis estoient pis traictez que jamais.’ 155 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 1 Aug. 1544, Brussels, AGR Audience, 99, showing Habsburg awareness of Henry’s dealings with the French.


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drafted a full justification for Charles’ abandonment of his ally which was convincing enough for the Emperor.156 Announcing the treaty to Vendôme, who, by then, was back at La Fère, Francis I declared that; Considering that the English might make some difficulty over the conditions of peace and that in this case I am determined to succour my towns of Boulogne and Montreuil, I inform you that I write presently to my son the Dauphin to march straight to Montreuil with my army . . . for my army is easily sufficient to dislodge the English and give them a drubbing.157

The switch of French forces came too late for Boulogne, however. Vervins, despairing of help and with his defences ruined, sent his lieutenants Saint-Blimont and Aix out to the English camp on the morning of 13th. Vervins’ trial, however one-sided, makes it clear that a range of the town’s civil leadership did not wish to surrender and offered to continue fighting.158 Vervins must have known, though, that the next assault would leave no room for quarter according to the laws of war. He agreed terms which allowed all those who wished to

156 Courrières and Chapuys to Charles V, 26 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 304; Council to Wotton, Leedes, 2 Oct. 1544, ibid., no. 346. Granvelle’s justification for the Treaty of Crépy: C. Weiss (ed.), Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle, 9 vols (1841–1852), III, p. 26 (L&P, XIX, ii, 250): ‘And as to saying that the King of England may be displeased, and pretend that you have thereby contravened the treaty; the retreat, also, could not, by the treaty, be made without his consent. It is a maxim to regard the reality of treaties in conjunction with what is possible, and not to run risks for the sake of groundless scruples. Taking the principal treaty and that afterwards passed between the King of England and Don Ferrante, it is clear that from the commencement England has not fulfilled them, for he promised to enter France by 20 June and did not do so until 15 July; and, instead of marching in the common enterprise he has halted with his whole army (although he informed your Majesty that, at the least, by 10 July, he would march 30,000 men into France to co-operate with your army, and retain the rest to besiege some place in his frontiers), leaving you alone in the principal enterprise. As to the practice of the peace, it is clear that the King of England entered it first; and you may remember what the Queen of Hungary wrote of her fear that he might do us a bad turn.’ 157 Francis I to Vendôme, 17 Sept. 1544, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 75: ‘D’autant que l’Angloys pourroit faire quelque difficulté sur les condiscions de lad. paix et que en ce cas je me delibere secourir mes villes de Boullogne et Monstreul, je vous advise que j’escriptz presentement à mon filz le Daulphin marcher droict aud. Monstreul avecques mon armee . . . car mon armee est assez suffisante pour faire desloger lesd. Angloys et bien leur rompre la teste.’ 158 The safe-conduct is dated 7 p.m. on 12 Sept. and was to be activated within 2 hours. L&P, XIX, ii, 219 but the diary of the siege, ibid., no. 424 states that the French came out at 9 a.m. on 13th.

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remain to do so if they took the oath to Henry and the rest to leave with their moveable goods for Abbeville. Naturally, all arms and military equipment were to remain in the town. The terms were agreed on 13th and Vervins formally surrendered the town to Henry VIII on 14 September.159 Martin du Bellay, no friend of Vervins, gives the well-balanced judgement that, after the first great English assault and the loss of his best commander, the Corsican captain Philippe, Vervins came to the conclusion that he was too weak to hold out. The people of the town desperately tried to prevent the surrender, but Vervins had negotiated good terms for his men and was determined to avoid the horrors of a successful assault. The fact that he held to his word even after a great storm had damaged the English camp was a failure in duty to his prince, argued du Bellay, compounded by the nearness of the French army. It is obvious, however, that later accusations of treason were manufactured. The priest Antoine Morin, whose verse chronicle is the nearest we can get to an account from inside the town, makes no complaint about Vervins and indeed accepts that there was no alternative but slaughter; gunpowder had run out.160 The garrison marched out (still nearly 1600 in number) followed by nearly 2000 women and children, 87 wounded (in all 4500 people) and 100 waggons. Henry watched them on the Montreuil road, no doubt with bloated satisfaction and with the sword borne naked before him by Browne. Suffolk took the surrender from Vervins and entered the town. Henry did so formally on 18th. The English were fortunate; a terrible storm began on 14th that lasted until 25th, blowing down tents and wreaking general havoc.161 The panorama, which may have been commissioned by Henry for a fresco at Whitehall and (unlike those at Cowdray) never executed, shows the town in the aftermath of the siege, the church of

159

L&P, XIX, ii, 222. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 274–275. For the accusations against Vervins, which essentially argue that the town remained defensible after the assault of 12 September, BnF, Dupuy 474, fos. 1–12. Potter, ‘A treason trial in sixteenth-century France: the fall of marshal du Biez, 1549–1551’ English Historical Review, 105 (1990), 595–623. We know the depleted nature of the remaining food supplies in Boulogne from the accounts of Anthony Birkes’ widow, E351/180: 120 qu. wheat, 64 qu. barley, 98 qu. malt. Morand (ed.), ‘Chroniques. . . . par A. Morin:’ ‘Veruins, qui de son corps nous deffendre eust grand peine’ (p. 247), ‘Le pourre estoit failly, on ne sceut s’en deffendre’ (p. 257). 161 Hall, ed. Whibley, II, pp. 349–350; Order for the troops to enter Boulogne with the King (in Mason’s hand), NA SP1/192. Fo. 75–77 (L&P, XIX, ii, 223). This consisted of 3073 foot of the King’s Battle in their original retinues; L&P, XIX, ii, 424. 160


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Notre-Dame partially ruined, walls dilapidated and the siege trenches still visible. In the foreground, refugees wend their way out.162 Negotiations with Cardinal du Bellay and his colleagues had been put on hold and the French envoys sent to Hardelot, holding some discussions with Gardiner, St. John, Rich and Paget. On 14th, though, Henry received them in his camp and put forward serious but impossibly harsh conditions: abandonment of the Scottish alliance, 1 million écus arrears of pensions and a life pension of 100,000; for war reparations he demanded either 2 million or Ardres and the county of Guînes. He would keep ‘what he could take . . . especially Boulogne’ in perpetuity, rich hostages to be given until the conclusion of a full peace. Shortly afterwards, they received their recall because of the treaty of Crépy and were ordered to return, informing Henry that Francis would accept the Emperor’s mediation between them. They bad farewell to Henry on 23rd.163 The King, with characteristic barefaced lying devised surely to save face, told Wotton (still with the Emperor) that the French envoys had accepted all his demands. No doubt he was trying to increase his stock with the Emperor but this can hardly have convinced him.164 When Henry formally received the news that his ally had made peace, he maintained an unusual degree of calmness but was clearly agitated by the news that the French army was on its way.165 Francis, as soon as he received the news, directed all his available forces to march under the Dauphin’s command to confront the English, a danger that had been threatening since the start of the campaign. Vendôme, on hearing of the news from Boulogne, reported it to the King on 17 September and took steps to hold up the Emperor’s envoy to Henry, the bishop of Arras.166 Having met the Emperor at Ribemont, he prepared to join the Dauphin’s army at Auxi-le-château.167 Henry

162 BL Cotton, Aug.I.ii, 116, reproduced in S. Doran (ed.), Henry VIII, Man and Monarch (British Library Exhibition Catalogue, 2009), pp. 238–239. 163 ‘ce qu’il pourroit prendre . . . mesme Boulongne’ The main source is the ‘Sommaire de la negociation’ in Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay, III, p. 272. This places the interview with Henry on Sunday 11 September but in fact Sunday that week fell on 14th. The audience must have taken place before the formal surrender of Boulogne because of the phrase ‘pourroit prendre.’ On initial talks at Hardelot, Mason to Honnings, 11 Sept. 1544, NA SP1/192, fo. 63 (L&P, ii, 216): the French ‘have ben thiese three dais at Hardlow castell.’ 164 Henry VIII to Wotton, 15 Sept. 1544, St.P., X, p. 271 (L&P, XIX, ii, 234). 165 Chpuys and Courrières to Mary of Hungary, 23 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 281. 166 Vendôme to Francis I, 17 Sept. 1544, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 77. 167 Nicolas Wotton, 20 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 207.

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VIII finished the campaign by conferring the reward of knighthood in the town of Boulogne on figures such as Cawarden.168 Having inspected the place and made up his mind about what needed to be done for its defence, he left Boulogne in a hurry, realising that his forces would be unable to meet the French in open battle. For a moment, he toyed with the idea of remaining to see if the French would ‘taste battle’ but his councillors were completely against this and even asked the Imperial envoys to tell him that he could honourably withdraw.169 Henry’s flexible sense of honour was able to cope with this. Norfolk and Russsell, as we have seen, abandoned the siege of Montreuil on 28th and set up their camp on the hill opposite the town on the other side of the Liane. The arrival of French skirmishers, though, was an indication of worse to come and the high command decided to evacuate the bulk of their forces to Calais and then to England on 3 October. Whether they were acting on orders is not clear. Paget was assuming on 30 September that Norfolk and his army would be at Calais by 2 October but on 4 October, Henry admonished all his commanders for leaving Boulogne without first knowing his pleasure and on the following day ordered them to ‘redubbe’ their fault by going back to Boulogne.170 It was far too late for this. Norfolk and Suffolk left only a small garrison to man the ruined walls of Boulogne, about 3,300 men with much of the equipment that could not be got back to Calais in time. The French army of some 40–50,000 (23 ensigns of French infantry under de Taix, 20,000 Swiss and Grisons and 4000 Germans commanded by the Rhinegrave) left Auxi for Hesdin on 20th with Vendôme commanding the vanguard and the Dauphin the rest. They were across the Authie by 27th.171 It may have been Vendôme’s cautious advice which prevented the army pressing forward immediately to take advantage of the precipitate English retreat and this has been attributed to the habitually defensive mentality

168

30 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX.ii, 334. Courrières and Chapuys to Charles V, 27 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 318. 170 Paget to Cobham, 29 Sept. 1544, BL Harl. 283, fo. 190 (L&P, XIX, ii, 331); Council to Council at Boulogne, 4 Oct. 1544, ibid., no. 347; Council to Norfolk et al., NA SP1/193, fo. 29v (L&P, XIX, ii, 352). 171 Norfolk to Council, 20 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 278; Courrières and Chapuys to Charles V, 27 Sept. 1544, ibid., no. 318. Heilly to Francis I, 20 Sept. 1544, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 57, no. 44; Norfolk to Council, 5 Oct. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 356. Wallop later estimated French forces at 60,000 foot, 2000 hommes d’armes and 2000 light horse, obviously exaggerated (ibid., XIX, ii, 779). 169


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of French commanders at the time.172 At any rate, the French took the upper road, skirting the fosse Boulonnaise to Licques by 5 October and then on to Marquise, where the road from Calais to Boulogne could be blocked.173 French troops were encamped at Marquise and Fiennes, as had Norfolk and Russell early in the summer.174 The Dauphin, with his brother Orléans and Admiral d’Annebault had to decide quickly on strategy. After a few hours rest, it was decided to move straight onto the attack and make a rapid overnight descent on the lower town at Boulogne (the famous ‘Camisado,’ so named because, as in all night attacks, the troops wore their white shirts on top of their gear for visibility). Monluc, who was there, recounted that a man from Boulogne had come to Fouquesolles, du Biez’ other son-in-law, and told him that the lower town was defenceless and easily taken. Once seized, the upper town would be isolated. Monluc and Taix made an early morning reconnaissance with about a hundred horse and found the sentries around the artillery between the Tour d’Ordre and the town very slack. So they reported back to the Dauphin and the decision was taken to go ahead. Fouquesolles was to command the force with de Taix in support. The Rhinegrave wanted to be in the attack but was overruled in favour of San Segondo’s Italians (a decision Monluc regarded as fatal to the success of the expedition). So, the French force consisted of Taix’s French infantry (10,000 maximum), an uncertain number of Italians and 6000 Swiss in support at the Tour d’Ordre. This was the night of 12/13 October. The fate of the conflict hung in the balance. For England, the alternatives were bleak; if the French manoeuvre had succeeded, Henry would have been massively humiliated and would have wasted prodigious amounts for no gain; if the English clung on, the war would be prolonged. The lower town was still only defended by trenches and was easily taken; but too little attention had been paid to the English in the high town. Du Bellay, writing with hindsight, observed that a force of 10–12 ensigns should have been told off to seal off the upper

172 G. Salles, ‘La Guerre et négociations entre François Ier et Henry VIII du traité de Crépy au traité d’Ardres,’ Positions des theses de l’Ecole des Chartes, 1893, pp. 65–76 at p. 66. 173 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 277. 174 Annebault to Granvelle, camp of Fiennes, 10 Oct. 1544, Nawrocki, ‘Annebault,’ II, pp. 762–763 (L&P, XIX, ii, 405).

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town but this was not done. and, while the French were busy looting and killing their enemies, 5 or 6 ensigns issued out of the high town and cut them to pieces, killing Fouquesolles and putting many to flight. Monluc’s narrative of the encounter is one of the most vivid he ever wrote, not perhaps to be relied in detail or in terms of memory but one of the most convincing accounts of confusion in street battle.175 Monluc thought that the outcome would have been different if the main army had followed up the assault force quickly but co-ordination was poor.176 If it was indeed the case that the Dauphin wanted to advance to save the day, he was advised against it; the rain and wind washed away what was left of French ardour and supplies were low. The French army had advanced too rapidly and the nearest supply base was at Abbeville; the roads were deep in mud and the land scoured by fighting. No fodder for horses was to be found between Boulogne and Abbeville let alone food for the men.177 This was the turning-point. The impossibility of feeding such an army in a ravaged countryside forced the Dauphin to retire to Montreuil (by 21st), where the mercenaries were discharged and du Biez left in command to watch to English.178 Early in November, the King gave the order to pay off the Swiss and reduce the garrisons to winter quarters, retaining only 6000 foot.179 The outcome thus condemned both countries to a prolonged and even more expensive conflict.

175 Du Bellay, IV, p. 278; Monluc, Commentaires (ed. Courteault, Pléiade), pp. 173– 180. His approval of Andelot’s bravery, despite his disapproval of his later Huguenotism is particularly convincing. Elis Gruffydd’s accounts is equally vivid (‘Enterprises of Calais and Boulogne,’ pp. 52–56). 176 Ibid., p. 178. 177 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 279. 178 Ibid., pp. 278–279 Commission of Dauphin to Jean Pocques to raise 300 foot for the defence of places in the Boulonnais, 21 Oct. 1544, A. De Calonne, ‘Jean et Raoul Pocques, seigneurs d’Alincthun en Bouonnais (1516–1550) d’après des lettres inédites, Mém. Soc. Antiquaires Picardie, 28 (1885), 514–515; Francis I to du Biez, 15 Oct. 1544, Potter, Du Biez, no. 196. 179 Francis I to count of San Segondo, 2 Nov. 1544, Pierpoint Morgan Library: ‘Pour ce que je delibere ne retenir cest yver que six mille hommes de pied en Picardie, scavoir est ijm Francois, ijm Italliens et ijm lansquenets, je vous prie à ceste cause reduire voz benndes Italliennes à deux mille hommes et que pour le moyns il y ayt trois cens hommes pour enseigne.’ Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 279 says that du Biez was left with the French and Italians from Piedmont.

CHAPTER FIVE

AN UNEQUAL CONTEST? ENGLISH MILITARY ORGANISATION, 1542–1547 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Henry VIII shrank from facing the full might of the French armies in 1544.1 Francis made sure Henry knew he had 103,000 men under arms in 1542, though a more realistic figure is 70,000, and he assembled an army of 45,000 men in the camp at Jalons in 1544 to resist the Emperor (with perhaps 20,000 on other fronts). He could spend about 1.75 million lt. on his navy and around 4 million on the land army in 1545 alone.2 If this represents around £700,000 sterling, it should be compared with the £426,000 spent on war by Henry over the period September 1544–January 1547, a period over twice as long (see Appendices 7 and 11). This is perhaps not so great a disparity when we remember that the population of England in 1541 has been reliably estimated as 2.77 millions. That of France, much less certain, probably rose from about 16 to 18 millions in the first half of the sixteenth century.3 Both countries had to fight wars on two fronts, though the commitments of France were of course greater. The unequal nature of the military resources of the two countries, so evenly matched in the later middle ages, was spelled out by Nicolas Bacon in1559 when he remarked that France had at least four times the resources and manpower of England.4 The late medieval English military machine had made up in armament and organisation for its lack of numbers but this was no longer so telling. Louis de La Trémoille, faced by a similar invasion threat in Picardy in 1523, reported that ‘I shall never fear the English and, were it not 1 I have discussed the organisation of French armies in this period in my Renaissance France at War, passim but see also P. Contamine (ed.), Histoire militaire de la France (Paris, 1992), pp. 233–256; G. Dickinson, Fourquevaux’s Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre (London, 1954), pp. xxiii–lxxxi; D. Potter, War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy, 1470–1560 (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 155–199. 2 Potter, Renaissance France at War, p. 64. See below Appendix 15. 3 E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofied, The Population History of England, 1541–1871. A Reconstruction (Harvard UP, 1981), Table &.8, pp. 209–209. I have tried to summarise the state of France in my History of France 1460–1560: The Emergence of a Nation State (London, 1995), pp. 7–11. 4 BL Harl. 253 fo. 87v.

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for the large number of Flemish and Hainault cavalry they have with them, they could not have endured; they are a poor nation.’5 The dependence of the English on their Flemish allies was to be as significant in 1544. Monluc in his description of the fighting of 1545 remarked that ‘we were all under the illusion passed on by our fathers that one Englishman was worth two Frenchmen; that an Englishman never took flight and never surrendered.’ Having experienced them at close hand at the Camisade of Boulogne, he thought their reputation for toughness simply stemmed from their need to get up close in battle because of the nature of their main weapon, the longbow. The French, now quite used to firearms, would deal with all that. Elsewhere, Monluc declared that ‘I knew them to be men of poor spirit and think they are fight better on water than on land.’6 David Grummitt has argued persuasively that the population of England was more ready for war under Henry VIII than any time since the great victories of the 14th century. There was certainly a degree of pride and swagger in the way the towns of England fitted out their contingents for war.7 For the English, wars fought on foreign soil were not as problematic as for the French, whose King employed so many foreign mercenaries and whose border territory was so frequently fought over. Some English were apt to purvey the view that, though they were pricing themselves out of markets by paying themselves excessively, the English ‘by the reason of their stronge feadinge be mouche hardier and stronger in the warres then be the french Pezantes.’ When Norfolk was rapped over the knuckles by the King for playing up the numbers of French troops opposing him in 1544, he was told ‘be they all for the most part Frenchemen and my lord of Norfolk hath Englishe men with hym.’8 Yet doubts about the decline

5 La Trémoille to Montmorency, 8 Nov.[1523], BL Egerton 22, fos. 125–126: ‘je ne craindray jamais les Anglois et n’eust esté le gros nombre de chevaux Flamens et Henuyers qu’ilz avoient avec eulx le Anglois n’eust point duré et est une pouvre nation.’ 6 Monluc, Commentaires (ed. Courteault), pp. 188, 179: ‘estions tous abusez sur ce que nous avions ouy de nos predecesseurs, qu’un Anglois battoit tousjours deux François, et que l’Anglois ne fuioit jamais ny ne se rendoit.’; ‘je les cognus gens de peu de coeur, et croy qu’ils vallent plus sur l’eau que sur terre.’ 7 D. Grummitt, ‘The reputation of the English soldier, 1400–1550’ (forthcoming, paper delivered at the 2010 Fifteenth Century Conference). 8 ‘Polices to reduce this realme of Englande vnto a prosperus wealthe and estate’ (1549), E. Power and R.H. Tawney (eds), Tudor Economic Documents 3 vols (London, 1924), III, p. 329; Paget to Suffolk, 12 July 1544, NA SP1/190 fo. 24v (L&P, XIX, i, 903).

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of population and husbandry were also widespread as an explanation of military failures. Morison, whose enthusiastic defence of the obligations of all to serve the King in 1539 have already been noted (pp. 9–10), recorded the remark of a foreign ambassador that English warlike action ‘is nothinge so nowe. I se neyther harneyes, ne weapons, of manhood amonges them, they haue ben of good hartes, coragyouse, bolde, valiant in marciall feates: But those Englyshe men are deade.’9 We have to be careful here; the military lore of all European countries was replete with traditional clichés, such as that the French were vigorous in attack but quick to give up, that Germans were dogged on the battle-field but not so useful in siege warfare. The Swiss not unlike the English, regarded themselves as worth two Frenchmen.10 There was a real consciousness that English military power was not what it had been but Henry and his advisers were also able to deploy the machinery of a formidable and growing state in galvanising military and naval power that enabled it to take on France seriously. In earlier decades, Henry and Wolsey had managed the power politics of the time in such a way as to minimise problems with resources by maximising the negotiating clout of England between Francis and the Emperor. The acquisition of financial resources through the dissolution of the monasteries helped to sustain a long military effort in the 1540s. But problems remained. Both in terms of numbers and arms, profound doubts were being expressed by English commentators in the 1540s. The author of the Discourse of the Commonweal of 1549 argued that inflation, enclosures, population decline left the kingdom militarily weak. Sheep were eating up men.11 Those that remained were no longer able to draw a bow: decay of tillage led to ‘great decay of artillery: for that we do recken that shepeherdes be but yll artchers’ argued one commentator.12 Jeremy Goring calculated that the proportion of archers within all able bodied men in the shire musters dropped from one third to one quarter between 1522 and 1557.13 This had important implications for the

9 Richard Morison, An Exhortation to styrre all Englyshe men to the defence of theyr countrye (London, 1539). 10 Potter, Renaissance France at war, pp. 124, 126. 11 A Discourse of the Commonweal of this Realm of England, ed. M. Dewar (Charlottesville, 1969), pp. 36, 89. 12 Certayne causes gathered together, wherin is shewed the decaye of England onely by the great multytude of shepe (London: Hugh Syngelton, 1552), sig.Bjv. 13 J. Goring, ‘Social change and military decline in mid-Tudor England’ History, 60

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quality of the troops that could be raised, since the rest of those surveyed as ‘billmen’ were effectively without any useful skills, though often substantial enough to pay taxes.14 ‘Bills’ were equated with halberds by some; Audley, for instance, thought that they should only be used around the standards and that otherwise pikes were necessary, as in German formations.15 But the demands of war in the period were also changing. As Gervase Phillips and Bert Hall have shown in different ways, the triumph of firearms over archers in the sixteenth century was neither rapid nor uncomplicated. The cost of a hand-gun remained greater than that of a longbow (5–8 shillings as opposed to 2 s. for a bow); archers had a far longer range and accuracy and could still fire more rapidly than arquebusiers (one arquebus shot per 40 seconds against 6 arrow shots). On the other hand, the penetrative power of arrows was less than that of guns at short distance and the cost of the best imported yew bows was increasing. Perhaps most telling, though, was the dominance of positional warfare in the 1540s; the construction of trace italienne fortresses and fortified encampments with revetments. These were much more suitable theatres for the deployment of hand-gunners than for bowmen, who needed to stand up to shoot.16 At Landrecies in 1543, with the French ensconced in the marshes outside the town, du Roeulx sent forward 200 English archers, who ‘shot right honestly against as many as appered owt of the shedgges of the

(1975), 184–197, at p. 193. idem., ‘The general proscription of 1522,’ EHR, 86 (1971), 681–705 at pp. 694–695. 14 As an example, Herefordshire, Hundred of Wormelow: of the 8 ‘billmen’ listed with harness at the villages of Much and Little Birch in Herefordshire in 1542, most had jacks, saletts and just a ‘staff.’ Some had a pair of ‘splyntes,’ arm protectors. There were no archers. (NA E36/16, fo. 36v). These parishes had 15 taxpayers between them in 1546, 6 of whom were listed as ‘able bodied’ in 1542. In the 1547 survey of ‘houselings’ there were 40 communicants at Little Birch. At Goodrich (E36/16, fo. 40v), there were 30 billmen and 5 archers in 1542 only 6 of whom are listed among the 24 taxpayers in 1547, when the survey of houselings reported 165 communicants (M.A. Farady, Herefordshire Taxes in the Reign of Henry VIII (Woolhope Club, 2005), pp. 218, 252, 348, 393, 397). 15 Thomas Audley, ‘Order for the warres,’ BL Harl. 309, fos. 6v–7r. 16 G. Phillips, ‘Weapons technology and technology transfer in early modern England,’ Technology and culture, 40, iii (1999), 576–593. B.S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe (Baltimore, 1997) In 1545, yew was being sought in Ireland (see payments to Wm. Hatcher, Ric. Morris and John Collye, ‘for their charges and transportation into Ireland for the putting in order of certain yew for munition,’ £40 L&P, XXI, i, 643.v). For useful points on armaments in general, see O. Chaline, ‘Faire la guerre au temps de la Renaissance’ in La Renaissance des années 1470 aux années 1560 (Paris, 2002), pp. 262–276.

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marrys but doing small hurt’ while the French gunfire ‘flew abowt so freely amongst us and lyke to doe moche hurt.’17 The decline in demand for archers, then, had a profound effect on the processes of recruitment of English armies. Foreign mercenaries supplied much of the fire-power in 1543–1546, though still mixed with archers in a support role. Thomas Audley, writing in 1546–1547, was clear that the Germans had the secret of infantry warfare: no excessive over-reliance on ‘shot’ (either bows or arquebus), separation of pike and shot ‘for the mo that you do apoynte for shotte the weaker is the body of the battell when it shall cum to pushe or fight.’18 Command and Control One of the clearest features of the English command system in the later years of Henry VIII is the gradual displacement of the military heavyweights of the earlier reign, the Dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, by younger men. This is only to be expected. Just as the King aged, so did his generals. Norfolk, threatened with appointment as Warden of the Marches in 1542, wrote despairingly that he was too old to cope with the cold winter weather in the North.19 Suffolk served as the King’s lieutenant on the northern border from January 1543 to March 1544, taking over after Norfolk’s less than brilliant showing but in the aftermath of the fortunate victory of Solway Moss. He too was in declining health and Henry chose not to put him in command of the invasion of Scotland for which he had been planning. But he continued to be a reliable commander and indeed distinguished himself by his energy (as well, it must be added, a degree of good fortune) in 1544.20 In the last years of his reign, whenever serious problems copped up, the King called on the men who had emerged from the struggles for influence in the late 1530s and early 1540s as courtiers with some military competence. While Norfolk hardly shone as commander against Scotland, Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford took command of the vanguard in Norfolk’s army on the death of William Fitzwilliam, Earl

17

Eure to Fisher/Hertford, Sept. 1542, Longleat MSS, SE/IV, fo. 84v. Thomas Audley, ‘Order for the warres,’ BL Harl. 309, fo. 6v. On this see also, J. Davies, Thomas Audley and the Tudor ‘Arte of Warre’ (2002). 19 Norfolk to Gardiner and Wriothesley, 12 Oct. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 264–265. 20 S. Gunn, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk, 1484–1545 (Oxford, 1988), pp. 183–193. 18

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of Southampton in October 1542 and eventually replaced Suffolk as commander in the north. The death of Southampton, experienced in the wars of the early 1520s as captain of Guînes, and then a prominent courtier, was deeply felt by Norfolk and his colleagues. While he thought Anthony Browne, Master of the Horse, ‘shall prove a man of service,’ he was preoccupied with the cavalry. Norfolk suggested the Lord Admiral, Russell, as ‘most mete.’ Southampton would have commanded 4000 infantry, mostly from the south, ‘his frendes in dyvers parties and also the Duchie of Lancashire’ who would have followed Russell willingly since ‘every man knoweth how gret frendes they wer.’ Otherwise, he thought Hertford would be willing to serve and ‘of good estymacion being the princes uncle, and also hath be in the warrys beyond the se both with me and my lord of Suffolk. He is my nere kynsman and shuld be very welcome to me.’21 Few military appointments are better illustrated in terms of their assumptions. At first, Hertford was in a difficult position, with no background in northern border warfare. Henry was obviously concerned with the loyalty of Southampton’s personal following and wrote on 16 October, that: to thintent suche as were in the retynue of the said lord privy seale shuld doo their partes with the better will and courage, we have also sent with our said cousin our trusty etc. Sir John Gage knight, comptroller etc. to be also in the vauntgard undre our said cousin of Hertford being a dere freende and allyance to the said lord privy seale whom we have also determyned to preferre to the rome of the chauncellorship of the duchie if God shuld dispose his will of our cousin of Southampton that aswel the household servantes and famyliers of the said lord privy seale as the tenantes of our duchie may be the better directid and serve us the more gladly.22

Gage, a courtier and logistics expert who could be described as a ‘safe pair hands,’ was close friend to Southampton and father-in-law to Anthony Browne, who had gone north with his half-brother Southampton; he welcomed Gage at Berwick.23 Gage himself pointed out Hertford’s problems as lord Warden in his lack of ‘alliance’ with the local nobility and gentry, so the problem was a real one.24 21

Norfolk to Council, 13 Oct. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 210, p. 267. Henry VIII to Norfolk and others, 16 Oct. 1542, BL Add 32648 fo. 65, Hamilton Papers, I, p. 272 (L&P, XVII, 953). 23 Browne to Gage, Berwick, 19 Oct. [1542], BL Add. 32648, fo. 82 (L&P, XVII, 970). 24 Gage to Wriothesley, 22 Oct. 1542 (L&P, XVII, 976) Hertford himself reported that his colleagues Norfolk, Gage and Browne considered Cumberland much ‘meeter’ 22

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Hertford quickly emerged as a very able military commander in the north, who could envisage a form of economic warfare against the Scots, enforced by a strictly organised blockade of the Firth of Forth.25 But he was also a general of vision, who took the view that the Scottish problem could only be solved by an effective control of the Lowlands through English strongholds (see chapter 2). At the same time, Russell took over Southampton’s post as Lord Privy Seal and John Dudley, Viscount Lisle succeeded Russell as Lord Admiral.26 Suffolk, on the eve of the invasion of Scotland he had in part planned, was recalled for the French campaign and replaced by Hertford as King’s Lieutenant in the North. Hertford’s ingratiating letter to the duke apologising for his lack of experience and asking him to ‘redubbe with your goode worde’ any disapproval at court of his actions is a classic of the genre.27 Hertford had wished in this letter that he might be with Suffolk in France, ‘where most service is to be doon.’ He was, in fact, recalled and replaced as Lieutenant-general in the North by Shrewsbury on 10 June 1544. But initially this was to attend the Privy Council (late June) and he remained with the Queen’s Council after Henry’s departure on campaign. His expertise was too valuable for him to be left at home, however, and by the end of August he was with the King in the siege camp at Boulogne.28 When a firm grip was needed at Boulogne in the early months of 1546, it was to Hertford that Henry turned. Similarly, when the post of Lord Admiral was given to Lisle in January 1543 a new era opened in which the lord Admiral actually commanded the fleet. Between them, Hertford and Lisle virtually ran the war in 1545. Norfolk, just short of 70, actually did command an army in the war of 1544, though he must still have found the weather trying enough in

for the post in view of his ‘lands, kindred and alliance.’ Parr, Lisle and Dacre were also better qualified. Hertford to the Council, 29 Oct. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1002; same to same, 30 Oct. 1542, HMC, Manuscripts of the Marquess of Bath, IV, p. 29. See also B.L. Beer, Northumberland: The Political Career of John Dudley, Earl of Warwick and Duke of Northumberland (Kent State UP, 1973), p. 14. 25 ‘A Remembraunce to my lorde warden for annoyance of Scotland by our navie over the sea,’ Longleat MSS, SE/III/46, fos. 140–141 (HMC Bath MSS, IV, pp. 56–57). 26 D. Loades, John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, 1504–1553 (Oxford, 1996). Hertford was appointed very briefly as Admiral in December 1542 but Henry changed his mind in January 1543. 27 Hertford to Suffolk, 19 April 1544, Longleat House, SE/IV/no. 1, fo. 1 (HMC Bath MSS, IV, pp. 103–104). 28 L&P, XIX, i, 656, 670, XIX, ii, 174.

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that atrocious summer. The army royal of 1544, as was traditional, was divided into three corps, the Vaward (Vanguard), middle ward (or Battle) and the Rearward (Rearguard). French armies were divided in exactly the same way. Norfolk received his appointment as Lieutenantgeneral of the whole army of the Vanguard and Rearguard and chief captain of the Rearguard on 6 June.29 This coincided with the recall of Hertford from the northern frontier and the appointment of Shrewsbury as Lieutenant-general in the north.30 On 10 June, John, Lord Russell, rather younger than Norfolk at 60 but still no spring chicken, was appointed chief captain of the Vanguard and thus co-commander with Norfolk in the first corps of the army. Problems, though, were bound to arise from the fact that no mention of the terms of his subordination to Norfolk was made in his commission. The decision had been taken by 4 May, when Chapuys reported that Norfolk would cross the Channel around 20/25 May and move out from Calais to make room for the Rearguard.31 There is, though, some uncertainty about whether Norfolk or Russell was deemed to be in command of the Vanguard.32 Suffolk’s appointment was only finalised on 3 July. Like his master, he seems to have had one last burst of energy before age and illness overwhelmed him. Each corps of the army had its own staff, including an under-treasurer to make payments to the troops and suppliers. These were Richard Southwell for the Battle, Robert Dormer for the Rearguard and John Harrington for the Vanguard.33 Dormer’s account gives a good picture

29 His commission is printed in Rymer, Foedera, 2nd ed. XV, p. 40, 3rd ed. VI, p. 115 and, though undated, is placed by Rymer in July. This cannot be right as Norfolk had been in post for a month by that time. Suffolk’s commission was made out in terms identical to that of Russell but was dated 3 July. Shrewsbury’s appointment was made on 10 June. The exact dates are recorded in a note by Cecil, L&P, XIX, i, 888. 30 Henry VIII to Hertford, 10 June 1544 L&P, XIX, i, 656; Council to Hertford, 11 June 1544 L&P, XIX, i, 670. 31 Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 4 may 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 462. 32 In correspondence with the Council, although it is clear that he is the King’s Lieutenant-general, Norfolk is sometimes called ‘captain of the vantguard’ (BL Harl. 6989 fo. 119 while at others Russell is ‘captain of the voward’ (ibid., fo. 128v). Gruffydd said that even he ‘could not get any certain knowledge of the matter.’ (‘Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne,’ p. 11). 33 L&P, XIX, i, 610 (appointment 21 May 1544). Sir Robert Bowes is named for the Rearguard in this document but the account of Sir Robert Dormer (BL Add. 35206, L&P, XIX, ii, 552) makes it quite clear that he was vice-treasurer of the Rearguard throughout and had been appointed on 4 May 1544. BL Add. 5273 is a collection of warrants addressed mainly to Southwell.

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of a bureaucrat in the midst of war, making himself comfortable in the camp, with four canvas tents, lace for the windows, buckram, candlesticks, furniture, canvas bags for cash and a board of greencloth, as well as servants and 6 clerks and, of course plenty of ink and paper.34 The vice-treasurers in turn were responsible to Sir Richard Rich as High Treasurer of the Wars for the invasion of France in conjunction with Wriothesley.35 Rich’s tenure of this position was controversial; almost inevitably, by the end of the campaign the King was dissatisfied with his performance, shadowed as he was by accusations of corruption. Rich was effectively empowered to make payments on bills signed by the Council committee for war provisioning, by the under-treasurers of the army corps and by the Master of the Ordnance and could scarcely satisfy them all. John Mason was appointed Master of the Posts while the King was on campaign and had to ensure rapid communications with London.36 The commanders of the two main army corps were each assisted by a staff of advisers. Suffolk’s army (the Battle), with the King present, naturally had a war council, including Anthony Browne as Master of the Horse, Arundel, Sir John Gage (provisioning) and Thomas Seymour as Master of the Ordnance. As Stephen Gunn has pointed out, Suffolk was surrounded by his friends and allies.37 Naturally, the royal household also played a major part in the leaderships of the Battle; Sir Richard Cromwell was Master of the camp in the King’s army.38 The Norfolk-Russell corps also had masters of the ordnance in the persons of Arthur Darcy, Richard Caundyshe and Henry Johnson.39 Norfolk, too, was advised by his close relatives and friends: his son Surrey, his brother Lord William Howard, Thomas Cheyney (Lord Treasurer of the Household as well as Lord Warden), John Wallop and Francis Bryan. But having to co-operate with Russell made his command much more acrimonious than Suffolk’s.

34 BL Add. 35206. £580.18.0d. was spent in this way (including Dormer’s salary, of course). 35 Appointment, 21 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 610.1. Thomas Wriothesley also acted as High Treasurer of the Wars: Jan. 1544 (L&P, XIX, i, 368) April 1545 (XX, i, 557). 36 L&P, XIX, i, 835 (fo. 89). The post was quite fast. A letter leaving Whitehall at 7 p.m. on 26 June was with Norfolk at Alquines on 28th (L&P, XIX, i, 781). 37 S. Gunn, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk, p. 192. Seymour was appointed Master of the Ordnance in succession to Browne in April 1544 (L&P, XIX, i, 442 (23)). 38 L&P, XIX, i, 835 (fo. 57). 39 L&P, XIX, i, 784.

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chapter five Recruitment and Organisation

Jeremy Goring argued that the English army, in terms of recruitment and military obligations, stood at a crossroads in the mid-Tudor years. It retained many ‘semi-feudal’ characteristics, which meant that the crown continued to rely heavily on raising troops through the nobility and gentry, who in turn were obliged to raise able-bodied men among their tenants and household servants. There are many signs of this ad hoc system persisting in the 1540s but Goring draws attention to the fact that the great nobility were no longer so dominant in the field and that the crown had to rely on a much greater number of lesser gentry, whose resources and capacity to raise men were difficult for the crown to ascertain.40 In France, the great and middle nobility played their part in recruiting their retinues into the companies of gendarmerie. As for infantry, though, the crown retained much stronger control of recruitment and administration by commissioners sent into the parishes, for the francs archers, later the gendarmerie and the new bands of infantry.41 One further element of this quasi-feudal regime needs to be brought in, though. David Starkey has shown how the retinues of the Gentlemen of the Privy Chamber ‘formed a small army-within-an-army’ for the Boulogne expedition of 1544 and argues that generally the Privy Chamber ‘was crucial to the Tudors’ military power.’ David Grummitt has also underlined the importance of the court in the mobilisation of noble military power.42 The pattern was already well established. In both the Flanders expeditionary force of 1543 and the army of Scotland in the Spring of 1544, the royal household was well represented; Thomas Cheyney, Treasurer of the Household was due to lead the expedition of 1543, though replaced, and Thomas Seymour (of the Privy Chamber) was Wallop’s deputy as marshal of the camp. Captains included members of the Privy Chamber with interests in: Essex

40 J. Goring, ‘The Military Obligations of the English People, 1511–1558’ (London, Ph.D. thesis, 1965), pp. 112–137. 41 Potter, Renaissance France at War pp. 117–119. For a vivid example see Hertford’s report, 16 Feb. 1541, Longleat, SE/I/no. 13 fo. 182 (HMC Bath MSS, IV, p. 23). 42 D. Starkey, ‘Intimacy and Innovation: the rise of the Privy Chamber 1485–1547’ in Starkey et al., The English Court from the Wars of the Roses to the English Civil War, (1990), p. 90. D. Grummit, ‘The court, war and noble power in England, c. 1475–1558’ in The Court as a Stage: England and the Low Countries in the Later Middle Ages, ed. S. Gunn and A. Janse (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 145–155.

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(Thomas Darcy), Huntingdon (Richard Cromwell), London (Peter Mewtas), and Berkshire (John Wellesbourne), all scheduled to lead companies from their own counties as well as their own retinues (see Appendix 1). The expedition to Scotland included retinues led by John Cary (Essex) and John Jenyns (Sussex), grooms of the Privy Chamber.43 Mewtas, of French extraction and son of a secretary of the French tongue to Henry VII and Henry VIII, proved a particularly able leader of infantry as well as something of a cloak-an-dagger operator.44 So, however unsatisfactory it was, the quasi feudal system continued. In addition, a new dimension in assessment and recruitment was becoming important: what Goring called a ‘national’ system which built upon the centuries-old obligation of all those with £10 in land or 20 marks in goods to keep arms in readiness to serve the King. This underwent a revival from the ‘General Proscription’ of 1522 and the appointment of JPs and others as muster commissioners from 1535 onwards to take three-yearly musters in order to discover the numbers of able men and arms in every hundred.45 The problem here was that the musters revealed, rather as with the attempts to reinvigorate the franc-archers in France from 1521,46 a very patchy resource in terms of military potential, archery often in decline and both harness and arms in short supply, this at a time when, as will be evident, demands for manpower were being made on an unprecedented scale. What the immensely ambitious enquiry of 1522 did was to inform the crown of some of the military and financial resources of its subjects. In the 28 counties for which returns survive, Henry VIII could have learned that there were 128,250 able men available. As yet, the full range of readiness might not be clear, since the returns did not connect the able-bodied with the armour available, but in 1523, there is some sign that assignation of arms and harness to able-bodied men was becoming more systematic.47 At the same time, the enquiry reinforced the effectiveness of the semi-feudal system by making it possible for the crown to ascertain the numbers of tenants of landowners and therefore

43

NA SP1/183, fos. 107–110 (L&P, XIX, i, 135.ii) Mewtas’ father, John, counter-signed many of the royal letters sent to foreign rulers in the earlier 16th century. He is described as a ‘Pickarde or Frenchman’ in the account of the Evil May-Day riots in Stowe’s Annales (J.G. Nicholls (ed.), Chronicle of the Grey Friars of London (London, Camden Society, 1852), p. 99). 45 J. Goring. ‘The general proscription of 1522’ and idem., ‘Military obligations,’ 20–39. 46 Potter, Renaissance France at War, pp. 102–112. 47 Goring, ‘General Proscription,’ 697–698. 44

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of their capacity to ‘make’ men, though some of the information was necessarily out of date and information below the level of the greater landowners may have been sketchy.48 When men were formed into companies and shipped, they were placed under captains and petty captains in companies of roughly 100. While some were leaders of their own tenants, others were appointed by patrons. Thomas Audley, who famously remarked that it was ‘a grievous pain to set to battle with untrained men’ acidly commented that captains should be men of strength ‘and not to chose them as captains be chosen in England by favor.’49 There were indeed English captains who were incompetent and amateurish but, as Luke MacMahon has shown, there was also a solid core on commanders who had served in many campaigns.50 The most important permanent body of troops outside the royal household was the ‘retinue’ (often called the ‘old crew’) or garrison of Calais. In 1541, the population of the town was numbered as just over 4000, of whom 1,785 were accounted for by the garrison.51 Calais was therefore a highly militarised town. As David Grummitt has shown52 most of the additions to the garrison after 1539 were provided by traditional ‘quasi-feudal’ methods. While commissions of array were sent to the localities and royal servants assembled their military followings as usual,53 additional soldiers were largely provided by the ‘service nobility’ or by the members of the Privy Chamber, giving a greater role to courtiers than established regional magnates or gentry families. King’s trusted courtiers played a central role. When Norfolk was sent to the Scottish border as King’s lieutenant in 1542, he was ordered to

48

Goring, ‘Military Obligations,’ pp. 113–114 and appendix III. Thomas Audley, ‘Book of Orders for the warre . . . at the command of Kinge Henry the viij’ BL Harl. 309, fo. 8r. J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450–1620 (London, 1985), pp. 165–167. 50 L. MacMahon, ‘Military Professionalism in the early Tudor armies in Renaissance Europe: a reassessment’ in D.J. Trim (ed.), The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism (Leiden, 2003), pp. 187–190. 51 Longleat House, SE/I/16, fo. 203 (HMC Bath MSS, IV, p. 27). The purpose of this census was for the enumeration of rations needed by the town’s population for six months. Lisle had enumerated 3858 in 1538 of whom 848 were English born, the rest born in Calais or strangers (Longleat House, SE/I/10, fo. 89 (HMC Bath MSS, IV, p. 12). 52 D. Grummitt, ‘Calais, 1485–1547: a Study in Early Tudor Politics and Government’ (Ph.D., London, 1997), pp. 158–159. 53 In December 1545 the Council register notes the origin and number of reinforcements: ‘For the Pale at Calays: Bucks’ CCCC; Cambridge CCC; Northampton CCC; Beds’ CCC; Huntingdon C; Warwyk CC; Hertford CC; Middlesex CC’ (APC, I, 572). 49

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take with him certain gentleman from Suffolk ‘with all such hable men as they canne make of their oune servants tenantes or in their romes and offices’ and to ‘levye and take out of our said country . . . all your oune tenantes and others within your romes and offices there, and such other as youe shall think mete.’54 This certainly provided the men but it was up to commanders to ensure they were equipped properly. Norfolk reported in September 1542 that many of the gentlemen he had brought with him from East Anglia were complaining that the cost of corselets (‘Almain rivets’) in the region was prohibitive at 20s. the rivet and asked for a maximum to be proclaimed as in London.55 Thus, in July 1542 the Council informed Wallop, as Lieutenant of Guînes, that, as well as the 200 men of Sir Thomas Poynings’s retinue already sent, another 500 men were to be sent to Calais, raised by various nobles and members of the Privy Chamber. Norfolk, Lord Chancellor Audley and the Earl of Oxford contributed 100 each, as did Richard Rich, Chancellor of Augmentations. Sir Richard Long, a Gentleman of the Privy Chamber contributed another 100 and Wallop commented that for the most part they were ‘all right tawle men in very good ordre, warlike appointed and many good archers.’ Those sent on to Guînes were not so satisfactory. The 200 sent with Poyninges were in good order but ‘the most parte of them cam without swords in white cotes homely trymed’ though ‘those sent from Master Longe . . . be tawle men [always an important feature for Wallop] and right warlike trymed, yet lacking swords the more part of them.’ The bishop of Ely had authorised his captain to follow Wallop’s instructions in upgrading his contingent, which included not only swords but cloth to make them surcoats in appropriate colours.56 These methods of recruitment are present in every army raised by the English state between 1542 and 1546. To show how they interacted, we shall consider a number of key armies assembled during this period in terms of recruitment and organisation: Wallop’s Flanders army of 1543, Hertford and Lisle’s amphibious operation of 1544, the Boulogne army of 1544 and Hertford’s army of early 1546. All have much in common, though it should be obvious that the assembly of the Army Royal of 1544 was on a much grander scale than the others. 54

Henry VIII to Norfolk, 28 Aug. 1542, Hamilton papers, I, no. 129, pp. 159–160. Norfolk to Council, 2 Sept. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 144, p. 172. 56 Council to Wallop, 31 July 1542, SP 1/172, fos. 4–5 (L&P, XVII, 552); Wallop to Council, 26 Aug. 1542, ibid., fo. 129r–v (L&P, XVII, 683). 55

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chapter five The Flanders Campaign

The army for the ‘Flanders’ campaign was a relatively small one for the period but it was the first expedition to the mainland of Europe by an English army for twenty years. Its planning went through several stages in the early summer of 1543. As we saw in chapter 3, decisions about leadership were changed at a late stage; Sir Thomas Cheyney, Treasurer of the Household and Warden of the Cinq ports, was set aside under Imperial pressure because he was too cautious. Sir John Wallop was known and liked by Imperial commanders. He was in a good position, as we have seen, to assemble men and advise on effectiveness since he had been Lieutenant of Guînes since the end of his stint as ambassador to France. A fluent French speaker, he was all the more able to liaise with his Imperial counterpart, du Roeulx. The army was scheduled to consist of 5000 men, mostly infantry with a small (400) component of cavalry. In the first stage of planning, half the infantry and almost all the cavalry were to be raised by selected gentlemen who were either courtiers, royal pensioners (the two Carewes, Breane, Keleway, Blunt, Granado, Markham, Knowles and Pollard) or trusted gentleman of military reputation. At a later stage these were re-grouped and the cavalry provided by gentlemen from the Scottish border (Bowes, Ellerker and Dacres), known as the ‘northern horsemen.’57 These were effectively light horse, a formation highly praised by Thomas Audley.58 In addition to this component of personal followings of selected gentlemen (2000), there were levies from the landowners of the shires of south-east England, many of them assembling at Malden, amounting to 2000 foot, bulked out by 100 London men, 200 (possibly arquebusiers) under Peter Mewtas of the Privy Chamber and 100 labourers from Guînes (see Appendix 2). At a later stage, these followings were re-grouped, mostly under the first list of trusted captains, whose companies (ranging between 100 and 200) included their own followings plus levies from (usually) one county. In a few cases, one captain seems to have had command of more than one company. Thus there were 17 companies amounting to 2026 men.59 This, of course, now 57

There are 13 separate texts, some copies of each other, some with significant emendations: NA SP1/180, fos. 1–38 (L&P, XVIII, i, 832 nos. 1–13). 58 Order for the warres, BL Harl. 309, fo. 9r. 59 NA SP1/180, fos. 30–36 (L&P, XVIII, i, 832.12).

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only produced half the necessary numbers. The disparity is partly explained by Wallop’s decisions once he had taken command. In a planning document of about this time the Calais garrison was listed as 4000 men, 3330 of them ‘hable men.’ With the 1500 ‘sent over lately,’ this made 5500. 2000 were selected to garrison Calais, Guînes and Hammes (800 of the garrison, the rest labourers). This provided 3500 for the expeditionary force with a further 1900 to be sent out.60 These arrangements were confirmed when at the end of June 1543, Wallop reported that the 1500 men had already been sent out but he would leave 3–400 of them at Calais and take the same number from ‘tholde crewes,’ the Calais garrison, ‘for they be expert men wel in ordre and can right well carry theire weapons and of thother many be yet unmete for the same.’ Those he considered would pass muster were Cheyney’s company, both horse and foot, Cobham’s and Mewtas’ 200 (all described with his usual approval as ‘tawle men.’) Of the rest, most ‘woll passe honestlye saving onely iij or iiij C whiche be right hable and sufficient men to tarry at home and kepe the garrisons and frontiers being as yet not do mete to be ledde into a strange cuntrye as tholde crewes.’ He also asked for 21 of his own servants at Guînes castle to go as his halberdiers, or personal guard, at his own cost. Some of the 300 labourers from Guînes had been training to shoot ‘half hakes’ by John ap Richards, ‘a very warlike person’ and he suggested some northern horsemen for Guînes for scouting (‘skult’). Other outstanding items were the provision of wagons for transport of war materiel and the despatch of beer from Calais as Flemish beer was ‘very evill.’61 Artillery was decided on before Wallop took over. 150 draught horses would be needed for the transport of 2 culverins and 120 iron shot; 4 sakers, 200 iron shot; 6 falcons, 240 iron shot; 6 falconets, 80 shot, all pieces to be taken from Calais. 58 gunners and two master gunners would take charge of them. The army also needed to take, in about 60 waggons, a whole range of equipment: 800 barrels of powder, 3000 bows in 40 chests, 5 barrels of bowstrings, archers’ stakes, 100 chests of arrows, bills and morice pikes from the Tower plus a vast range of tools. No mention is made of arquebuses or equipment for them.62 60

NA SP1/180, fos. 25–28 (L&P, XVIII, i, 832.9), figures are several times re-arranged. Wallop to the Council, 28 June 1543, NA SP1/179, fos. 116–117 (L&P, XVIII, i, 786). 62 NA SP1/180, fos. 24, 34–36 (L&P, XVIII, i, 832). 61

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How well did the English troops perform in the campaign? One of the more successful formations, according to Wallop, was the band of ‘northern horsemen’ commanded by Bowes, Eure and others. These were effectively used as were light horse in European armies and acted as scouts and skirmishers. While 100 remained at Guînes under Ellerkar, the rest followed the army and before the end of July ‘dyd their partes very wel’ in skirmishing near Thérouanne. In October at Landrecies, their commander, Robert Bowes, also treasurer of the army was deploying them ‘after the maner used upon Your Majesties Border toward Scotland, the which was well praised by the light horsemen Imperiales.’63 In the main, as we have seen, the Emperor and du Roeulx were complimentary about the quality of Wallop’s army. They fought with determination and some of the captains were killed in action at Landrecies. By Land and Sea: The Expedition to Scotland, 1544 Hardly had Wallop’s army returned to Calais in late November 1543 than the political and strategic situation dictated the planning of an ambitious amphibious landing in Scotland in May 1544. As we have seen in chapter 2, plans for this were being drawn up from January 1544. For the first time in the period, adequate sea transport for a significant number of men had to be arranged. In September 1542, when the fleet had also been sent north, if only to supply Norfolk’s army, there had been real problems in finding enough fishing boats to transport supplies and men. The Duke had reported that the boats had only just returned from Iceland, many with their catch still unloaded, and those that had done so ‘stynke so sore of the saied fisshe that no man being not used to the same can endure it.’64 In 1544, the whole operation was planned much more meticulously between the middle of January and the end of April. Suffolk forwarded a schedule to the King in January that detailed the pressing of 112 ships into service from London, Ipswich, Yarmouth, Lynne and Hull with an assembly 63 Wallop, 28, 31 July, 28 Aug., 29 Oct., 6 Nov. 1543, St.P., IX, pp. 457, 538; L&P, XVIII, i, 967, 979; ii, 92, 321, 345. 64 Norfolk to the Council, 7 Sept. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 151, p. 186. On the significance of the North Sea herring fisheries in politics: J.D. Tracy, ‘Herring wars: the Habsburg Netherlands and the struggle for control of the North Sea, c. 1520–1560,’ Sixteenth-century Journal, 24 (1993), 249–272.

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point at Newcastle (where further ships would have been picked up). The fleet was to be ‘wafted’ by 12 royal ships (see Appendix 3) and would carry a complement of 13,758 sailors and soldiers.65 The ‘wafters’ were probably increased in numbers to 48 English ships and 10 foreign by the time the fleet left the Thames on 18 April.66 In the second stage of planning, Stephen Gardiner drew up further specifications for how to carry 15,000 soldiers and sailors to be supplied for two months. Here, the ships supplied by London were replaced largely by those from the northern ports, probably to leave tonnage available for the invasion of France, while far more ports of the east coast were brought in. Each ship had a designated number of soldiers, related to the size of the ship and its company and was supposed to carry a proportion of the munitions and supplies. These were to be loaded at Newcastle, to a saving of £5000 to the crown, but cheating on the part of suppliers revealed a deficit in the beef, a shortfall of 2300 dozen loaves and the rest mouldy and herring, purchased by the crown at 4 a penny when the market rate was 7. These were fairly normal problems for supplying a large army in the 16th century but they were important in providing lessons for the supply of the army royal for France.67 Gardiner specified that each ship would carry two men per ton of shipping, each with one month’s supplies. 15,000 men would require 7500 tons of shipping, plus 3750 for supplies and 500 for horses and artillery. For this, the northern ports would supply 5600 tons (half of which came from Newcastle), the East Anglian ports 7300. This left over 1150 tons available in Suffolk which could carry 2300.68 Finally, Paget’s news bulletin for consumption in the Imperial court spelled out the main lines of the army: 15,000 men for the amphibious assault plus 3000 sailors and 26 escort ships. 4000 cavalry advanced by land under Eure and another 3000 under Wharton advanced in the west march to keep the Scots busy there.69

65 ‘The army by sea into Scotland’ 18 April 1544 NA SP1/185 fos. 192–195 (L&P, XIX, i, 355); there were changes in the composition of the escort squadron by April with the addition of 7 ships and deletion of 2. This made a total of 15, some of them capable of carrying 500 men, Hamilton Papers, II, no. 227 (L&P, XIX, i, 416). 66 L&P, XIX, i, 643, 8 June 1544:48 ships (tonnage 2690) with 2175 sailors and soldiers and 10 foreign with 340 sailors and soldiers, total cost for 53 days, £2078.5.4. 67 Hertford et al. to Henry VIII, 21 April 1544, Hamilton Papers II, no. 220 (L&P, XIX, ii, 366). 68 L&P, XIX, i, 140.6. 69 Paget to Wotton, 14 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 501.

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The purely military component of this expedition is known through narrative accounts, muster-books and correspondence. A payment to Lisle who had ‘prested’ certain men to join the fleet for Scotland had details of those companies recruited attached. These specify the costs of the movement of infantry to London for embarkation in FebruaryMarch 1544. Lisle himself was to bring 300 men from his own estates in Staffordshire and a number of other gentlemen, some of them of the Privy Chamber such as Jennings and Cary, were to bring just over 1000 men in all from Wales, Somerset, Shropshire, Sussex, Warwickshire, Lincoln, Essex and Kent, £408 in total. Much more substantial was the £8767.16.0 paid out in conduct money for the northern levies.70 The expedition was not far from the army estimated by Suffolk at the start of the year as likely to cost £44,000. In a muster book drawn up the end of March 1544, the northern counties were allocated 11,000 men, of whom Yorkshire contributed the lion’s share at 4500, Lancashire, 2800, Durham 800. Otherwise, Cheshire, Derby, Stafford and Nottingham just contributed a few hundred each. The soldiers and sailors from the southern counties were scheduled to be 4213. These levies were entirely of tenants of the main landowners.71 Companies raised through the network of militarily experienced gentlemen and courtiers were still the norm. The captains and petty captains of the expedition, many of them the gentlemen who had raised the troops, were listed in a muster book taken at the time of the burning of Leith, this time of 9100 men. As with Wallop’s army, the original personal musters were amalgamated into companies under selected captains. These included 77 companies of 100 each and four others of 200 under a ‘grand captain’; Peter Mewtas was again serving as he had in

70 NA SP1/182, fo. 181 (list of those captains paid and those left unpaid); ibid., 183, fos. 107–110 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 543; XIX, i, 135.i). Lisle was at first supposed to bring 300 but then 230, 200 from Dudley and 30 from Warwick. Conduct money for the northern levies, 1 May 1544, HMC, Bath MSS, IV, pp. 69–71. Longleat MSS, SE/III, fos. 197–226 gives the daily orders for conduct money from muster points in Lancashire, Derby, Yorkshire etc to Newcastle. 71 Muster book, late March 1544, HMC, Bath Manuscripts, IV, pp. 58–60. Cf. an estimate, misdated in L&P, but almost certainly from this period, ‘Musters of men for the Invasion of Scotland:’ Yorkshire, horse, 400, foot, 7000; Durham, horse, 60, foot, 2000; Northumberland, horse, 1000; Cumberland, horse 1000, foot 300, Westmoreland, horse 40, foot 500; Lancashire, foot, 3000; Nottingham, foot 400, Cheshire, foot 600; Derby, foot 300, NA SP1/181, fo. 184 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 237 and XIX, ii, 140). Here the large number of border horse is raised essentially for diversionary purposes during the main invasion.

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the army of Flanders, with a company of 500 arquebusiers and 4 petty captains, who did crucial service in sweeping aside Scottish resistance outside Leith at the start of the campaign.72 Mewtas was knighted by Hertford as a result. Heavy equipment for the force marching overland from Berwick (about 4000) was comparable to that for Wallop’s army: 2 bastard culverins, 3 sakers, 8 falcons with shot, 3000 bows, 4000 sheaves of arrows and 4 barrels of strings.73 The expedition was in its own terms a success but the effects of campaigning are summed up graphically by Hertford himself. By the end of May the soldiers were penniless and without tents because they came by sea: the soldiers had lain nightly in their clothes for two months, and for a fortnight every night in the field without covering, so that most of them, ‘with cold and great travail and scant victualling, have caught diseases in their bodies and swelling in their legs, and are so wearied, that few are meet to serve; and besides, they are out of apparel and money to buy it.’74 Already, though, the machinery of state was swinging into action for the campaign in France. The Army Royal in France, 1544 Planning for the Army Royal was well under way by the start of war in 1543. Early in 1544, a paper entitled Things to be ordered by the King’s Majesty or by such as shall please his Highness t’appoint to the same seems to be among the earliest broad planning papers from the Privy Council and lists decisions to be taken on the role of the Council itself, the composition of each army corps, the numbers of archers in each company, battle standards, embarkation and transport, musters for the Germans. This was an agenda for action on several fronts before major decisions had been made.75 Slightly later than this, two papers were discussed: one on the detailed places for embarkation by 20 May and the numbers of hoys needed and places; the other (discussed in chapter 4) concerned possible routes. Any time in March or April is possible for these papers.76 Other papers, which 72 Mewtas’ 500 gunners, 4 captains and 4 petty captains cost £500.8s. in wages for 36 days and £83.6.8d in coat money, Feb–March 1544 (Longleat MSS, SE/III, fo. 1982). 73 Morris to Hertford, Berwick, early April 1544, HMC, Bath MSS, IV, p. 62. 74 Hertford, Lisle and Sadler to Henry VIII, 18 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 531. 75 L&P, XIX, i, 271.2. 76 L&P, XIX, i, 271.1 and 3.

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involved input from Norfolk and Paget, dealt with provisions and the transport of horses.77 A dozen papers have survived with extremely detailed planning for the provisioning of each ward or army corps (these will be discussed below).78 The most crucial initial process, of course, was the assembly of the army itself but how did the crown know the military resources it could draw on and how did it select from them? We have seen that the fairly regular militia musters since 1522 gave the crown an idea (probably inflated) of the crude resources available. The previous general musters had been carried out at various times in 154279 and on 31 March 1543 letters were sent out to all landowners judged capable of ‘making’ men to declare the state of their tenants and servants. The returns submitted to the King’s secretary by 7 Devonshire gentlemen have survived and reveal how the system worked and the range of detail available.80 These surveys were certainly the basis on which the Privy Council in 1544 was able to estimate the brute military resources of 29 English shires south of the Trent (including London) and Wales as 90,183 able men. Of these, 26,652 had some form of harness.81 A closely related list of 21 (mainly southern and south-east) shires produces a figure of 71,093 able men, of whom 18,552 had some harness.82 It is certainly from those with harness and armed as ‘principal’ bowmen in the individual shire returns that the recruits for the invasion army were found and worked up into the Army Books in 1544. It is clear that a selection was made. Of the 44 Buckinghamshire gentlemen surveyed in 1543 (with 547 able-bodied men) and included in the Army Book of 1544, only 12 actually sent or led retinues (147 men) to join the Rearguard, where the Buckinghamshire men served.83 The army was to consist of the usual three corps (or ‘wards’) of any 16th century army: Vanguard/vaward, Battle/middle ward, Rearguard/rearward. At an early point in the process, a paper, prob77

Ibid. 271.4 and 5. Ibid. 272.4–13. 79 L&P, XVII, 882. 80 NA SP1/179, fos. 167, 178, fos. 65, 244, fo. 129 (L&P, XVIII, i, 480, 579, Addenda, 1589). 81 NA SP1/184, fos. 214–215 (L&P, XIX, i, 273.2). Thus, the returns for the Devon gentlemen in 1543, NA SP1/177, fos. 167, 178, fos. 54–59, 244, fo. 126 (129) correspond almost exactly to the survey in the 1544 Army Book, SP1/184, fo. 162(171), 161v (171v), 163 (173). 82 NA SP1/184, fos. 212–213 (L&P, XIX, i, 273.2). 83 Goring, ‘Military Obligations,’ appendix III; below, appendix four. 78

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ably by John Mason for the Imperial ambassador made up the agreed number of 42,000.84 Only the English infantry component of the Battle corresponds very closely to the army as eventually mustered. The failure of negotiations with Landenberg in June–July 1544 meant that the army would be short of a substantial portion of the 8000 German infantry and 4000 German cavalry planned for. But part of Henry’s forces were supposed to be made up of an army corps under the count of Buren to consist of 2000 hommes d’armes in 13 of the 30 companies of Netherlands bandes d’ordonnance, equivalent to the French heavy cavalry. With this, Buren was to bring 2000 Netherlands infantry paid for by the Emperor and also raise 2000 lansquenets in 5 ensigns at Henry’s expense.85 Henry remained short of 6000 men, only partially provided by small detachments of north German horse under Leuchtmacher and others.86 From lists of the various ‘wards’ or corps of the army, we can identify a broad strategy by the end of May 1544. Roughly 18,000 infantry and a few hundred horse would be formed into one army under Norfolk and Russell but this needed serious cavalry support from Buren’s force bringing it up to over 20,000 men. The King’s own army would amount to another 18–20,000 men but this would have to include the German mercenaries under Landenberg, who of course never arrived. The main Battle therefore was seriously under strength. The next stage of planning envisaged a force of 38,865 including 5,226 cavalry. The infantry was to be grouped in 337 companies each with a captain and petty captain.87 From a warrant of 1546, it is clear that each company was likely to have drum, surgeon, standard bearer, ‘phiphe’ and priest paid at 1d. the mile instead of the ½d. for ordinary

84 ‘Les gentz de guerre du Roy sont divisés en trois regiments,’ NA SP1/184, fo. 218(225) (L&P, XIX, i, 273.5): gave the composition of the army as: Vanguard (Norfolk): Foot: 3000 High Germans, 7000 English; Horse: 2000 High Germans, 1000 English. Battle (King, Suffolk): Foot: 2000 High Germans, 9500 English; Horse: 1000 High Germans, 3500 English. Rearguard (Russell): Foot: 3000 Germans, 8000 English; Horse: 1000 Germans, 1000 English. 85 BRB, Bibliothèque de Bourgogne, MS 20411, p. 301, Buren’s patent (see Paillard, L’invasion pp. 2–3). Articles agreed with Buren, 8 April 1544, NA SP1/185, fos. 127–128 (142–143) (L&P, XIX, i, 308.2). For the delays in mustering these troops and arguments over the numbers per ensign, Palmer et al. to Council, 3, 10, 15, 21 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 622, 667, 710, 752. 86 Leuchtmacher had just over 300 horse ready for muster at Utrecht in mid-June (L&P, XIX, i, 753). 87 L&P, XIX, i, 273.6.

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foot soldiers.88 The principal muster-book for the Army Royal, which catalogued the retinues of most courtiers, peers and the southern shires, yielded a smaller figure of horsemen 3,684 cavalry and 31,955 infantry.89 The army as ultimately mustered was smaller still. The Vanguard had 372 horse and 9,406 foot, the Battle with much the largest component of English cavalry (3,159) and 9,688 foot. The Rearguard, to be combined with the Vanguard in the siege of Montreuil, was to be 547 horse and 9,018 foot. At 28,112 foot and 4078 cavalry, this total of 32,389 troops (lacking a substantial portion of the expected landsknechts) fell far short of the 42,000 contracted in the agreement with the Emperor in December 1543.90 So, the Army Royal now had of necessity to rely much more heavily than had been planned, on English levies, but the means of recruitment for the three different corps varied widely. It should be stressed that the Army Royal was recruited mainly south of the Trent. When southern gentlemen made preparations in March to summon their tenants in the North (even as far as the Borders), Hertford opposed this strenuously.91 For the Vanguard and Rearguard, the semi-feudal system of recruitment through county landowners predominated. For both, the bulk of the small cavalry components and substantial segments of the infantry were provided by the commanders themselves and the peers. For the Vanguard, this meant that the peers provided 250 horse and 2830 foot. Lord Ferrers alone provided 1000 foot. 21 counties provided the bulk of the infantry with heavy concentrations on levies from East Anglia and other areas influenced by the Howard family, the largest numbers coming from Norfolk, Suffolk and Warwick. To take the contingent from one particular county, Kent provided 299 foot for the Vanguard (only one small contingent from the county marched with the rearguard). These were drawn from a county which had been assessed at 6428 able men, including 1529 with harness and 1750 archers.92 The parcels of troops corresponded very closely to the survey of military resources carried out in the early months of 1544. This had listed 32 horsemen (mostly armed with javelins) and 598 88

L&P, XXI, i, 643.v, 16 March 1546 payment for Greenfield’s men from Devon. L&P, XIX, i, 273.1. 90 Global figures from L&P, XIX, i, 274, 275, 276. More systematic lists from Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 201, fos. 3–21. 91 Newcastle. Hertford, Tunstall, and Sadler to Henry VIII, 20 March 1544. BL Add. 32, 654, f. 33. Hamilton Papers, II., No. 189 (L&P, XIX, i, 223). 92 NA SP1/184 fos. 212–214 (L&P, XIX, i, 273.2 and 3). 89

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infantry.93 The relatively small number who actually served from Kent is explained partly by the fact that some landowners had been withdrawn from the survey as reserved for the ‘seven hundredths’ of the Lord Warden of the Cinq Ports (Thomas Cheyney), who provided 100 horse and 500 foot. In addition, Lord Cobham had just been appointed to Calais and almost certainly took some of his military resources with him. Sir Thomas Wyatt’s 100 foot are not included in the earlier muster-book, but of the other 199 listed in the Vanguard, 74 seem to be archers.94 In commending Cheyney’s ‘good order’ as captain of the horsemen in the Vanguard, Norfolk specifically pointed out that ‘[M]any of the sent men fro suche as sent small nombres [are] not well chozen’ but that Cheyney ‘is a fyne [fel]low as all ye know, and worthie to be cherysed.’95 The structure of the Rearguard was very similar, though it seems that it was initially under strength: both versions of the list show that around 6200 foot had to be supplemented by late levies (including 200 arquebusiers from Knyvet’s garrison at Portsmouth)96 well as bakers and brewers to make up the numbers to 9000.97 The peers provided 168 horse and 2480 infantry. The rest of the infantry and a proportion of the cavalry (279) came from a 17 counties, only 7 of which also contributed (usually small) numbers to the Vanguard; here the greatest numbers were contributed by Bedford, Dorset, Devon and Northampton. The counties supplying troops to the two corps were therefore in the main distinct. The size of the shire levies used obviously depended on their basic military resources and also to some extent on the presence of substantial landowners. In the Rearguard, Devon supplied 462 foot and Hereford only 164 (with 6 horse), though it also sent 96 foot to the Vanguard. This reflected the 4000 estimated able-bodied men revealed by the militia musters for Devon and the 2500 for Hereford.98 Yet the Herefordshire gentry had declared 93

NA SP1/184. fos. 138–144 (L&P, XIX, i, 273.1). L&P, XIX, i, 274 compared with NA SP1/184, fos. 138–144 L&P, XIX, i, 273.1, muster book. 95 Norfolk to Council, 12 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 685. 96 On this see L&P, XIX, i, 659, ii and the lists of the rearguard. 97 NA SP1/185, fos. 49–52 (L&P, XIX, i, 276); Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 201, fos. 3–5. The fact that the King had explicitly ordered the bakers and brewers to be paid by the treasurers of the wards is clear from Council to Norfolk, 26 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 781. The effect was indeed to fill out the numbers though the King declared that this was because they had no treasurer of their own. 98 Rearguard list, L&P, XIX, i, 276 and list of able-bodied, NA SP1/184, fos. 214–215 94

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509 foot earlier in the year; the largest contingent came from the estates of Sir John Scudamore who was prepared to send 14 mounted archers, 2 javelins, 467 billmen and 20 archers. In fact, he supplied 6 horsemen and 100 billmen.99 Sir George Cornewall (of Berrington Hall near Leominster) served in the Rearguard with 50 foot (20 archers and 30 billmen) having declared 9 horsemen with javelins, 40 archers and 42 billmen. Cornewall was a middling landowner of his district (to become a Subsidy Commissioner and J.P. by the end of the reign); he held lands worth £70 in Berrington and Stoke Prior.100 In his case, we have a curt note ordering his servant Richard Capull (or Capell) on ‘payne of dethe’ to prepare his men to march to London so as to be at Dover by the last day of May: where I wyll be god wyllyng and all so to command yow to make the tenants to fynd also mare or geldyng to bring yow to London and at my lady Brugys yn London there yow shall fynd yowre brother Jeamys Capill tarrying for me abowt my tent.101

Cornwall’s father-in-law was Sir John Bridges of Sudeley (also a Herefordshire landowner at Lugwardine) who was well-known at court and (though he had served at Thérouanne in 1513) was preparing at the age of 52 to join the King’s Battle with Gloucestershire levies of 21 horse and a number of infantry.102 In fact, the 500 foot contributed belatedly to the Rearguard by Walter Devereux, Lord Ferrers, were also mainly from Herefordshire and the Welsh Marches.103 In both Vanguard and Rearguard the levies were to a degree supplemented by special categories of troops. In the Vanguard, Irish kerne, late levies from individual gentlemen not attached to a county, 300 men from London and levies from the Cathedral chapters. In the Rearguard there were also 200 Londoners, more Irish kerne and levies from Cathedral chapters (Appendix 4). In both Vanguard and Rearguard we

(L&P, XIX, i, 273.3). The Militia Musters of 1542 give a rather larger number of ablebodied for Hereford. See NA E 36/16 (L&P, XVII, 882, M. 4). None of the Devon gentry whose 1543 returns for Devon survive (see above) were actually employed in 1544. 99 NA SP1/184, fos. 155–157, at 155 (L&P, XIX, i, 273.1). 100 M.A. Faraday (ed.), Herefordshire Taxes in the Reign of Henry VIII (Woolhope Club. 2005), pp. 157, 211, 227, 383. 101 Cornwall to Capull, NA SP1/188, fo. 20 (L&P, XIX, i, 608); Rearguard: XIX, i, 276; Muster-book declaration: NA SP1/184, fo. 155. 102 L&P, XIX, i, 275. Bridges received command of the castle of Boulogne as a reward. 103 Hatfield House, Cecil MSS, 201, fo. 19.

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find northern horsemen (which the King had summoned from the Scottish borders as early as March).104 The Battle in effect represented the personal military potential of the King and his Court. Rather than recruiting through the shires, it relied almost exclusively on the royal household both for service in person and as a means of raising troops from the estates of courtiers. Here, as might be expected, cavalry was more in evidence. 3200 horsemen were contributed by members of the Council and household, only 123 of them from county levies. These were made up of men-at-arms (heavy cavalry), demi-lances, mounted archers, javelins, northern staves and demi-hakes (mounted hand-gunners). Around 1000 horse were contributed by councillors, including 150 from Suffolk himself. Of the infantry, as for 1978 archers, 770 were contributed by councillors and peers, 565 by the Privy Chamber, 143 by the Chamber and the rest by the household (including the Yeomen of the Guard) and Gentleman Pensioners. Of the 5123 billmen and pikes, 1470 were contributed by councillors and peers, 1575 by the Privy Chamber, 140 by the Chamber and the rest by the household and pensioners. Preliminary lists were drawn up of the retinues of the staff of the Privy Chamber (2484: 807 archers, 181 demi-hakes, 380 pikes, 50 ‘sprinkilles,’ 1073 bills) and a similar one for the Chamber (1623) and Household (195: 12 demi-lances, 28 javelins, 2 northern staves, 6 archers on horseback, 39 archers on foot, 107 billmen, and 1 handgun.).105 Quite clearly, not all these resources were drawn on. Of course, the division between household and shire levies is artificial in some ways. The 500 foot contributed by Sir John Gage and the 524 by Sir Anthony Browne were drawn from their estates in Sussex and the duke of Suffolk explicitly pointed to the lateness in coming over of 1500 infantry from Suffolk and Essex.106 In all, the list preserved in the State Papers only accounts for 7101 out of the 104 Council to Hertford, Tunstall and Sadler, 21 March 1544, Hatfield House, Cecil Papers 231. no. 51, Haynes, State Papers, 16, [Cal. of Hatfield MSS, I, 118.] (L&P, XIX, i, 227). 105 NA SP1/185, fo. 39(46)– (L&P, XIX, i, 275.4 i and ii). The 50 ‘sprinkles afote’ contributed by Thomas Cawarden are almost certainly ‘springals,’ youths from his office of the Revels. 106 Suffolk, Gage and Browne to Henry VIII, 10 July 1544 L&P, XIX, i, 882 (Suffolk and Essex as Shires contributed 230 foot to the Battle). Gage had declared 21 horse and 300 foot for the musters and Browne 350 horse and 500 foot. (NA SP1/184, fo. 77(87)v. In the Hatfield MS, they are listed with 21 and 300 horse respectively and 500 and 524 foot respectively but in the earlier SP list (L&P, XIX, i, 275) with 150 and 100 foot. Browne, in any case, had a retinue of 536 horsemen attached to him as Master of the Horse (NA SP1/185, fo. 36, L&P, XIX, i, 275.3).

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9688 infantry in the Battle. The rest can be more clearly identified in the list of the Battle in the Hatfield House MS (see Appendix 1). In this, the Shire levies are shown to have contributed 224 horse and 1265 foot and Mewtas of the Privy Chamber his 500 men. In addition, in this version the contributions from the councillors and peers were substantially increased.107 We know that in addition to these, there were 300 cavalry from Calais, 200 miners, 200 Irish kerne and 1,000 transport personnel. The Council had wanted to recall 4000 men from Hertford’s army in Scotland in May but the condition of the men was so poor that only 1450 were judged in a good enough state. These included the very important formation of 500 arquebusiers under Mewtas (listed in the Hatfield survey under the Privy Chamber retinue of Mewtas) and 200 men of Lord Cobham but Hertford’s promise to send them immediately to Calais was not kept; though some were at Calais in early June, the rest did not arrive at Boulogne until midJuly, though Mewtas seems to have been back and forth across the Channel during the summer.108 The contradictions in these documents show clearly enough that the exact composition of the King’s Battle was in a state of flux until the eve of departure. The best documented retinue of the Battle is that of Thomas Cawarden, Master of the Tents and Revels, whose landed power lay in Surrey and Berkshire. Cawarden was an unlikely commander in some ways. Son of a sheerman, London mercer’s apprentice in 1528 but by 1540 (presumably through Thomas Cromwell’s promotion) a gentleman of the Privy Chamber, Cawarden was an outstanding organiser of equipment and events. He was also scheduled to lead a retinue of 55 horse and 200 foot in the King’s battle. In fact, his following amalgamated the militarily active staff of the Tents and Revels with his own military retinue and consisted of nearer 600 men. The soldiers were drawn from his estates at Newbury, Nonsuch and Bletchingley. In the first, the musters had declared 24 gunners, 44 archers and 84 pikes and ‘clubs.’ From Nonsuch and Bletchingley came a further 60. These were added to 41 foot and 64 light horse and over 200 craftsmen of 107 L&P, XIX, i, 275; Hatfield House, CP 201, fos. 7–14 (Calendar, Hatfield MSS, I, no. 16). 108 Hertford, Lisle, Sadler to Henry VIII, 18 May 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, no. 240 (L&P, XIX, i, 531); Lisle to Russell, 20 July 1544, Calendar Hatfield MSS, I, no. 175; Council to Norfolk, 6 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 634; Council to Hertford, 9 June 1544, ibid., I, no. 172; Suffolk et al. to Council with King, 21 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 957. L&P, XIX, i, 424. Ibid., XIX, ii, 252, 280.

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the Revels. In the event, conduct money was paid for 390 men.109 Cawarden’s men were ultimately organised in five companies of 100 foot (some entirely soldiers, some partly made up of craftsmen from the Revels and Tents) and around sixty light horse commanded by men-at-arms (see Appendix 5). In addition, each company had a captain, petty captain, a ‘whiffler’ a drum and fife with surgeons, chaplains and 1 mounted ‘gythorne’ (gittern player) shared, bringing the total retinue to 593 men.110 The precise state of one company’s readiness in the first half of August listed 48 gunners (of whom one was dead and 7 were in need of a bill), 30 pikemen (3 of whom had no weapon and 2 had only clubs), 9 club men 6 bowmen of whom 3 were ‘not here.’111 One of the more unusual components, and one which testifies to the desperate need to find troops, was the appearance of the Irish in the ranks.112 St. Leger, the Lord Deputy of the recently-created kingdom, actually suggested raising 3000 ‘kerne’ (catharnach), 1000 to join Hertford in Scotland and 2000 to march to London to join the king’s army. This was optimistic; there was grumbling that insufficient time had been given and that Englishmen ‘wolde not be so suddenly rered to departe the Realme.’113 In the event, by March 1544 only 1000 could be raised, though the Council of Ireland held out the hope that more could be had if they were treated well. The Irish Council pointed out that men would hardly be willing to go ‘being never trained to the thing’ without some Irish noblemen to lead them. One was found in Ormond’s nephew Lord Power, with Piers Butler, brother of Lord Dunboyne as his deputy.114 By 7 May, those raised had been sent over. Recruitment was by royal warrants to the Irish nobles and, as with English recruitment, each small detachment of men had their own captain before amalgamation into proper companies. Two kerne usually had a ‘boy’ (in fact a serving man) to carry their equipment; this was changed to one boy per 4 kerne on this campaign. Thus, in the list of those recruited, there were 1154 kerne and 234 boys (thus leaving

109 SHC, LM/24/8; LM/26, conduct money from Newbury, Bletchingley, Nonsuch and London (for the craftsmen and horsemen) to Dover. 110 SHC, LM/24/14, pay for the first half of August 1544. 111 SHC, NL/24/27 pay list for Maxell’s company, 1–14 Aug. 1544. 112 W.G. Strickland, ‘Irish soldiers in the service of Henry VIII,’ Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland, 13, i (1923), 94–97; D.G. White, ‘Henry VIII’s Irish kerne in France and Scotland,’ The Irish Sword, 3 (1958), 213–235. 113 Council of Ireland to St. Leger, 24 March 1544, St.P., III, p. 492 (L&P, XIX, i, 240). 114 Ormond to Henry VIII, 6 May 1544, St.P., III, p. 495 (L&P, XIX, i, 473).

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920 fighting men). It may be because of this that the captains of the kerne were paid at a lower rate (3s. 4d p.d.) than those of English companies (4s) even though the kerne themselves received the same pay as English soldiers.115 Though usually depicted as just wielding broad swords, some of the companies (notably Ormond’s and Butler’s) consisted of about a quarter gunners, though how general this was is difficult to say.116 Roughly 400 were allocated to Hertford’s army in Scotland. The Earl found them ‘very unruly . . . their weapons are swords and darts; not past 40 can shoot in hackbuts.’ They were ‘by nature wild.’117 The well-known engraving of Irish kerne preserved at the Ashmolean has been attributed to 1544. This may be the case but the image created is more akin to French depictions of the Brazilian Indians as noble savages in the 1560s. The rest of the kerne marched to London to join the King’s army. Holinshed’s Chronicle records that in May ‘passed through the citie of London in warlike manner, to the number of seaven hundred Irishmen having for their weapons, darts and handguns, with bagpipes before them; and in saint Iames parke besides Westminster they mustered before the king.’118 Early on in the campaign they earned plaudits for skirmishing around Ardres alongside some English cavalry.119 Henry must have found them acceptable enough in that many were incorporated in the ‘Battle’ of the army.120 But their ‘savagery’ was remembered by the people on whom they were quartered; during the siege of Montreuil, they burned the 200 houses and some boats in the village of Berck and another 270 houses at Verton.121 Troops such as these could only provide an exotic, perhaps alarming, tinge to the main army.

115

L&P, XIX, ii, 552. Council of Ireland to Henry VIII, 7 May 1544, St.P., III, p. 497 (L&P, XIX, i, 477.2), Names of the lords and gentlemen . . . which send kerne; ibid., 4 List of names of the kerne supplied; ibid., 5 conduct costs; John Lynne to Hertford, Westchester, 6 May 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, no. 231 (L&P, XIX, i, 471). 117 Hertford et al. to Henry VIII, 25 May 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, no. 244 (L&P, XIX, i, 575). 118 Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland, 6 vols, (London, 1808), p. 838. 119 Norfolk to Council, 9 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 80(90)r (L&P, XIX, i, 654): ‘where dyverse of the Irische men dyd very well and folowe the frenchemen very nere theyr gate and skyrmysche very galyardly and reckoned by the frenchemen as the prysonners say, to be gens mervelous sauvaige and also gens experimentés à la guerre.’ 120 L&P, ii, 275.2. 121 AN, J 1017, fos. 381r, 384r. 116

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Each corps of the army was equipped with an artillery and armament train. Unfortunately, only the plans for the Vanguard are preserved in any detail but it shows that that number of great siege pieces envisaged in March–April was relatively small: 2 cannons, 2 demicannons, 4 demi-culverins and 18 sakers and falcons (smaller field pieces).122 At the end of June, Russell was complaining about shortages of valuable pieces as well as of shot and powder, some of which had to be brought rapidly from the Tower.123 The King’s camp at Boulogne (and presumably by then Norfolk’s at Montreuil) had a serious siege train: 8 cannons, 9 demi-cannon, 7 culverins, 10 demi-culverins with, of the smaller pieces, 27 sakers and eventually nearly 20 falcons and bombards. Divided into three batteries, these were serviced by companies of 4–500 pioneers.124 In addition, Henry took with him his ‘privy ordnance’ as well as his own store of weapons, transported from Whitehall to Saint Katherine’s docks and thence across to Calais.125 Armaments, though largely supplied from within England, had to be supplemented by procurement from the Low Countries. John Gage had both experience and a useful staff behind him and had already been organising supplies of arms and armour through his contacts in the Low Countries, notably the Johnsons, for some time.126 Keeping order in an army made up of such varying components was bound to be a problem. In French armies, each army corps had staffs of prévôts des marchéchaux; this seems not to have been the case in English armies at this period, though similar functions were carried out. In fact, unlike in France, the war of 1544 was accompanied by the printing of War Ordinances, partly modelled on those of 1492 and 1513. All such works are now rare but they were printed in some numbers.127 As soon as he arrived in France, Norfolk called for the

122 ‘The proporcyon off ordenaunce, artylery and habyllymentes of warr for the furnyture of an armye ryall wythe all maner of munycyons necessarye for the same. Fyrst for the forewarde’ L&P, XIX, i, 273.13. The total for powder: 34 last 1 bar. 80lb.; shot 5,820; carriages 225. 123 Russell to the Council, 26 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 784.2; ibid., no. 990 (27 July). 124 NA SP1/190, fo. 252 (L&P, XIX, i, 1034); Additions made in NA SP1/190, fo. 258 (XIX, i, 1034.5). 125 John Rogers’ account, BL Add. 5753, fo. 116v (L&P, XIX, ii, 104), mentioning ‘shrimps’ (an early form of gun) with 54 gunners, 100 ‘basses’ of iron, ‘swordes of the engynnes’ and brass pieces ranged around the King’s tent. 126 Anthony Cave to John Grant, 28 April 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, App. 7, iii, 2. 127 Statutes and ordynances for the warre, Londini (In Fletestrete by Thomas Barthelet printer to the kinges highness, Anno M.D.XLIIII. [1544] STC 9334. The only copy in

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despatch of the ‘new printed [books o]f ordres to be kept in the feld.’ The Council sent him 200 copies, which indicates that they expected them to be in the hands of each captain and petty captain.128 Norfolk himself imposed discipline severely, ordering the execution of those soldiers who left the camp without permission.129 Nearer the end of the campaign, a royal proclamation ordered the imprisonment of all who had left the camp and returned to England without royal permission.130 We should not underestimate the ferocity of the fighting and the fact that even commanders were affected. So, Thomas Cawarden lost a leg in the operations at Boulogne, though he recovered and was knighted. Cheyney was shot through the thigh and his son John was killed at the siege of Montreuil. Lord Grey of Wilton was also shot through the shoulder at Montreuil while serving ‘only in a cutt jerkin.’131 With the siege of Boulogne dragging on, it was decided to raise new levies. On 11 September, letters went out from the King’s camp for new shires musters of 4000 men to be ready at one hour’s notice, though these were countermanded on 21 September.132

BL is severely damaged. Of the 1513 version, Hereafter ensue certayne Statutes and Ordinances of the Warre (London, R. Pynson, 1513) STC 9333, the only copy in the Bodleian Library, is incomplete, though excerpts can be found in the description of a copy formerly in the Loseley MSS, A.J. Kempe, The Loseley Manuscripts and Other Rare Documents (1836), p. 109–. The 1492 version is Here begynneth certayn statutes and ordenaunces of warre (London, R. Pynson, 1492?) STC 9332, Soc. of Antiquaries copy, is also severely mutilated (BL copy is a microfilm of this). 128 Norfolk to the Council, 12 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 685; Council to Norfolk, 26 June, BL Harl. 6989, f. 123 L&P, XIX, i, 781. 129 2 July 1544, BL Add. MS, 10110, f. 204. L&P, XIX, i, 821. 130 10 Sept. 1544, BL Harl. 444, fo. 206. 131 His heir, More, testified in 1560 that Cawarden had served he King at Boulogne ‘one of his previe Chamber with king Henry the eight and of greate creditt with him, he served at Bulloigne with a hundred light horse of his owne and left one of his legges in his service’ (SHC, LM/425/17). Russell to Paget, 22 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 965. A Commentary on the Services and Charges of William Lord Grey of Wilton, ed. P. de Malpas Grey Egerton (London: Camden Society, 1847), p. 65. 132 NA SP1/192, fo. 60 (L&P, XIX, ii, 214). Wriothesley to Council with Queen, 1544, St.P., I, ii, no. CCI, confining the levy to London, Kent, Surrey and Middlesex because of the urgency; L&P, XIX, ii, 452: accounts 300 from Hertfordshire, 600 from Essex and probably 800 more from Norfolk and Suffolk, expenses for transport of 1700 from Ipswich and Harwich. Conduct money for 620 men from Middlesex to London, Sept. 1544, NA E101/676/23. Though counter-manded, their expenses still had to be paid. The cost of prest money and return for 1620 men at Tower Wharf (ordered 25 Sept.) was £956.7.6. (L&P, XX, i, 517.v).

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Armies for the Defence of Boulogne, 1545–1546 Two major military efforts in France were made in the remaining 20 months of conflict. During the summer of 1545, though the most serious English effort was put into the navy and defence of England itself, a land army which may have been envisaged for as many as 12–15,000 men was planned during July and August to face up to the serious threat to Boulogne. Relatively little is known about this projected army as there are no planning documents, though from no doubt incomplete warrants to pay coat and conduct money there are records of 6973 infantry plus 2600 Spaniards being transported either to Dover or to Boulogne (Appendix 6). A substantial proportion of these were levied from London and records of coat and conduct survive for 1582. The city of London, like most great cities of the age, had a military capacity that could be drawn on. In 1544, it was assessed as having 2000 able men, 1000 of them archers.133 In the three corps of the armies in that year, there were bands of 200–300 foot soldiers from London. The crisis of 1545 saw a larger effort. On 24 July, the City sent 1,500 men to Portsmouth because of the French invasion threat, mustered in St George’s field. Having reached Farnham, though, they were turned back because the danger to the Isle of Wight had receded. In early August 1545, Charles Wriothesley recorded that: The citie of London sent a 1,000 souldiers, of gonners, bowemen, morris pykes, and billes, which mustered in Finsbury feild, and there had every man a newe white coate, and so went from thense to Tower wharfe, where they toke barges to Gravesends, and to goe from thence to Dover.

They were led by the city Sword-bearer and conduct money to Dover was 2/6d, when they would enter into the King’s wages.134 For the rest, companies of 100 or 200 were being sent from the southern and southeastern shires, a rather more restricted area of recruitment than in 1544. In the event, only 5000 troops crossed for service with Surrey after the death of the Duke of Suffolk. When Hertford was placed in charge of the army to stabilise Boulogne and oversee the fortification of Ambleteuse in January– March 1546, he was equipped with a force of just over 11,000 drawn from the full range of southern counties (Appendix 7). Sir John Harrington, 133 134

NA SP1/184, fo. 214 (L&P, XIX, i, 273.1). Wriothesley, Chronicle, pp. 158, 159–160.

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who had been Treasurer of the Vanguard in 1544, was appointed Treasurer for this army.135 Here the stages of planning are much clearer, with a preliminary survey of available troops, lists of retinues by shire of those actually sent and a substantial range of coat and conduct payments. The counties which contributed most troops were those which had sent similar companies in 1544: Devon, Somerset, Essex, Gloucester, Warwickshire, Leicester and Norfolk. On this occasion, Hereford also sent 500 men, commanded by Cornewall again among others. Supply, Provisioning and Transport The supplying of an army in the field was a severe test for any early modern state. After all, the army of invasion for France in 1544 was the size of a major city in England. Soldiers were expected to pay for their daily ration of 1–1.5 lb of biscuit, 1–1.5 gallons of beer and a pound of beef out of their daily pay, but getting such quantities to the right place in sufficient quantity was always a problem. Of necessity, there could be no permanent military commissariat because campaigns were so sporadic and there was no standing army. When wars were waged, either merchants were encouraged to provide supplies at a market for the soldiers or the government could arrange for the supplies through its own commissioners. In an emergency, signet letters went out to South East shires to raise the necessary supplies.136 In 1544, the Netherlands government was also under obligation to provide supplies at market rates. Purveyance was widely used and, though unpopular, not out of line with market prices.137 Organising supplies for armies on the northern border had its own problems, caused by the severe lack of local resources and the distance from London by sea. In 1542, Norfolk found that the price of wheat and barley in East Anglia was being driven up from 8s the quarter to

135

L&P, XXI, i, 643.v. The commissioners for Surrey were required to assemble 150 oxen with yokes and carts without damaging tillage and then countermanded (signet letters to C. Moore and J. Skinner, 16 Sept., 23 Sept. 1545 (SHC, LM 6729/13/4, ibid., 6729/4/2.). 137 C.S.L. Davies, ‘Supply services of English Armed Forces, 1509–1550 (D.Phil., Oxford, 1963) and conveniently summarised in his ‘Provisions for Armies, 1509–1550; a study in the Effectiveness of early Tudor Government,’ Economic History Review, 17, ii (1964), 234–248. 136

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11s largely as a result of the prices offered by merchants from the North.138 The Duke promised to have as much biscuit made as possible for shipping to Newcastle but one of the main problems with the army in the North (partly stemming from general poor harvests) remained lack of supply. East Anglian merchants had shipped to Alnwick and Berwick by 8 August substantial quantities: 3500 qu. of malt, 732 of wheat, 806 of barley, 200 of rye and 400 of peas and beans. More was about to be sent early in September (1500 qu. of malt for instance) but shortages still prevailed.139 Such quantities would only serve for a first provisioning. In a series of very gloomy reports, Southampton reported that the supply situation remained dire: ‘the contrea is not able to minister grayne to serve for bred and drinke’; he was ill at the thought that ‘so grete a nombre of men shuld be called to gether and no maner of victailles in a redynes to furnish them’; ‘how bare the contrea is as well of grayne as all things ells, saving fishe.’140 On Fitzwilliams’ death, the experienced courtier Sir John Gage, controller of the household, was sent to the north to sort out supply shortages. From Berwick he reported: I fynde scheche scasete of bredde herre, as I amme sorey in my hartte to se the pepeylle in scheche a lake, and as I parseve the scassety comeytt for lakke of gryndeynge, the veche canne notte be holppeyne, the sende to awlle the myllers in the contery, to swmme xvj mylleys of, verre by the contery ys sorre dysapeowntheydde and the nessesyte herre notte releveydde.141

When an army had been projected in December 1543 against the Scots, Suffolk called for Gage’s assistance, and did so again in February 1544.142 The supply of the army for the invasion of Scotland in 1544 was much more effective than that of 1542.143 By 1544, it was normal for a committee to handle the provisioning of each army, with Gardiner figuring on most such bodies. In 1544, a

138 Norfolk to Henry VIII, 2 Sept. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, p. 172. Account of Sir John Harrington, Treasurer of Norfolk’s army, NA E315/212. 139 Ibid., pp. 173–174. 140 Southampton, 19, 21, 23 September 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, nos. 166, 173, 177. 141 Gage to Wriothesley, Berwick, 22 Oct. 1541, BL Add. 32648 fo. 84, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 222, p. 281 (L&P, XVII, 976). 142 Suffolk to Henry VIII, 3 Feb. 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, no. 161 (L&P, XIX, i, 86), Gage was to join Lisle and Hertford for this Scottish campaign. It seems unlikely that Gage actually went north on this occasion. 143 Davies, ‘Provisions for armies,’ p. 245.

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group of councillors, Gardiner, Lord Saint John (Great Master of the Household), with Peckham and John Rither (of the royal household) were empowered to present bills for provisioning to the Treasurer of the Wars.144 Sir John Gage, who accompanied Suffolk’s army, played a pivotal role in the organisation of transport and supplies for the army for the invasion of France, for which he contributed 21 horse and 300 foot. His second son James, a master of the Household, was Master Victualler of the Middle Ward of the Army.145 The use of staff, especially the clerks, of the royal household in military supply was long established146 and, though the reforms of 1526 and 1539 had sought to avoid the diversion of household men from their duties, their skill as administrators was too great to ignore. Otwell Johnson was alerted to the likelihood of going over with his master, Gage, in March but seems to have stayed in London when Gage left for Dover at the end of June. John Johnson was supposed to meet him either there or at Calais.147 Otwell joined his master for the campaign and reported on the sieges of Boulogne and Montreuil to his brother in London.148 In July Suffolk praised the diligence of Gage and his colleague St. John in getting the army over to France.149 Gage, then, was one of the key administrative experts for the campaign. He stayed on with Norfolk and Suffolk at Calais until late October receiving with them the stinging rebuke by which Henry VIII chastised his councillors for seeming to abandon Boulogne.150 The Boulogne campaign is notable for the elaborate character of its supply train, some 2,100 men, though the army under Norfolk at Montreuil fared less well, partly as a result of its supply from the Netherlands.151

144

L&P, XIX, i, 610.1. L&P, XIX, i, 273, Muster-book of the Army against France. Gage was to be accompanied by his son-in-law Baynham but this was deleted. James Gage: NA, E351/573. See D. Potter, ‘Sir John Gage, Tudor Courtier and Soldier (1479–1556)’ English Historical Review, 117 (2002), 1111–1146. 146 R.C. Braddock, ‘The Royal Household, 1540–1560’ (Northwestern University, Illinois, Ph.D. thesis, 1971), p. 31. 147 Otwell to John Johnson, 2 March, 29 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 149, 801. 148 Otwell to John Johnson, 28 July, 19, 26 Aug. 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 998, ii, 111, 140. 149 Suffolk and Browne to Council, 2 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 819. 150 The letters signed by Gage and other commissioners with Norfolk at Calais are printed in G.F. Nott, The Works of Henry Howard Earl of Surrey and of Sir Thomas Wyatt the Elder, 2 vols. (reprint, New York, 1965) I, appendix, pp. xlvi–lvii. 151 Davies, ‘Provisions for armies,’ pp. 243–244. 145

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What were the main problems in provisioning and transporting the armies in 1544? The usual method of commissioning purveyors or individual merchants to find and transport supplies was employed. Henry Leigh was commissioned to have custody of part of the supplies brought in by various merchants and purveyors from England from July to October 1544 and disburse those supplies to officers such as the yeoman and captain of the bakehouse, Richard Warde, victualler of the Rearguard, George Stonehouse, with the same charge for the Vanguard (both members of the royal household) and Sir Anthony Rowse, surveyor of victuals in the Boulogne camp. To take one example, Leigh received 10,086 dozen loaves (‘loftbreads’), mostly delivered to the victuallers of the three wards, though 323 dozen went mouldy in ships at Calais and 575 dozen were lost in what Leigh called the ‘great skyrmishe’ (i.e. the Camisado) in October 1544.152 Leigh drew the bulk of his supplies from Anthony Birkes, victualler of Calais and Clerk of the Comptroller of the Household, Gage. Birkes in turn drew his supplies from a range of merchants and purveyors in England (for grain most notably Thomas Woodehouse of Norfolk) and went on to be victualler for the garrison of Boulogne in 1545. He thus accounted for 5370 quarters of wheat, partly left over from the siege and partly left by the French garrison. Unfortunately for him, Birkes was captured by the French during the fighting on 27 August 1545 and may have died in captivity.153 Wood was supplied from Appledore and Tenderden in Kent by Robert Hammond in the form of 809,000 billets at a cost of £807.154 Supplies, especially for Norfolk’s army, were chronically slow to be transported from the Netherlands, prices in the camp driven up by shortages. Suffolk had apparently joked that one or two of the bureaucrats in the Council (Wriothesley?) should join the campaign so that ‘by your wisdoms your rates might have been followed’ but the problem remained chronic at Montreuil.155 The most serious problem was that a large proportion of supplies (certainly for the army before

152 Account of Henry Leigh, NA, E351/573. This account in part was drawn up to justify the losses of supplies in the lower town during the Camisade. See Leigh and Birkes to Council, 27 Oct. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 491. 153 NA, E351/180, account of his widow Katheryn Birke. The spelling is variously Berkes, Brickes and Birkes. Birkes in royal household, L&P, XVIII, ii, 530. In 1544 formally a member of the royal household in the Battle (L&P, XIX, i, 275). 154 NA, E351/177. 155 Norfolk to Council, 13 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 694.

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Montreuil) had to be sent from Imperial territory, mainly through Saint-Omer. This required serious transport, which the government of the Netherlands was committed to supply. As was seen in chapter 4, this posed problems of security but also simple problems of transport. The English were demanding more (2556 chevaulx lymmoniers, draught horses for artillery and 2260 four-horsed wagons for supplies – 11,596 horses) than the Netherlands could supply. This was at a time when the same country was having to supply horses for the Emperor’s artillery. Mary of Hungary was only prepared to offer 4000 for supplies and bargain over the artillery horses. Unsurprisingly, English agents thought the resources of the Netherlands countryside could easily produce the necessary waggoners (especially as they would serve under favourable conditions receiving their forage) and that the Dutch ports could easily provide the hoys needed. Joint investigations of resources were eventually agreed and Layton managed to get agreement for 2400 lymoners and 200 wagons by 11 May.156 In fact, the Regent did send out orders to the cities of Flanders in May but this was still not enough.157 The wagons and horses provided were inadequate for the job and Francis Hall was commissioned to find 500 wagons and 1100 lymoners in the Low Countries late in June for the Vanguard and Rearguard.158 All formations received, as has been seen, ‘coat and conduct’ money to get them to their point of embarkation or formation. Many lists for these survive but perhaps the most salient point, besides the considerable cost, was the maintenance of the social hierarchy. So, the allowance per mile for an earl was 10d, for a lord 7d., for a captain 4d., petty captain 2d. and a common soldier, a halfpenny.159 Moving soldiers across the Channel had its own problems. The Emperor had undertaken to supply 200 ‘hoys’ to transport the English troops. 300 ‘playtes’ and ‘hoys’ (small coastal vessels sometimes flat-bottomed) were identified at Amsterdam. The English agent John Broke reported the arrange-

156 Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 1 April 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 284; Layton to Council, 3 April 1544, St.P., IX, p. 634 (L&P, XIX, i, 289) Ibid., no. 289.2 and 4; Layton to Council, 1 May 1544, ibid., no. 453; 11 May 1544, ibid., no. 495. 157 Mary of Hungary to Ypres, 10 May 1544, Diegerick, Inventaire . . . Ypres, VII, p. 270, no. 2801: order for 11 dray horses for the king of England’s army. 158 Council to Hall, 22 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 755; Hall to Council, 24 June, L&P, i, 766. 159 SHC, LM/1330/98, fo. 5. Figures confimed by conduct money of men from Dudley to London, 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 182.

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ments for these in mid-May: they were ‘prested’ at 28 stuivers (3s. 6.d) the ton and allocated to the following ports: Ipswich, 48 16 May Ramsgate, 21 20 May Margate, 20 20 May Sandwich, 26 20 May Winchelsea, 21 20 May Rye, 20 20 May Hythe, 5 20 May Folkestone 15 20 May (also 10 more to be there on the 24th), Dover 25 20 May (and other 27 to be there on the 24th), London and into the Thames, 62, 24 May.

The rest were held back because of French raiders and the ineffectiveness of the Admiral of Flanders in putting out to escort them; there was some problem of ships being held up at Dover so that Ipswich was short. The Regent complained that the English were trying to do everything at the last minute, which hardly seems unfair.160 In mid-June, the Council passed on to Norfolk the King’s order that, in order to avoid Kent being eaten up by the passage of troops to Dover, East Anglian levies should be embarked at Ipswich and Harwich and those from the south at Rye and Winchelsea, which had presumably been the point all along. Norfolk was required to send back the boats that had transported his men to carry the Battle and the agents responsible were busy in mid-June turning boats around and getting them back to London and Ipswich.161 Security was assured by and Anglo-Flemish fleet. Lisle was in command of the English warships commissioned to hold the Narrow Seas along with the Flemings during the crossing.162 Getting the troops across was still a major undertaking. Russell observed recruits loafing around the wharfs in London because the winds were contrary, wasting their money and evidently not eager to get going. The winds were in NNE and so ships needed to tack out of the Thames estuary and he advised getting more men by land to Dover.163

160 John Broke to Layton, 21 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 546; Layton to Council, 29 May, ibid., no. 598; Broke to Council, 29 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 599; Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 31 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 606. 161 Council to Norfolk, 11 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 672; Griffith Appenryth and John Broke to the Council, 26 June 1544, ibid., no. 783. 162 Order of Charles V, 10 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 665. Admiral of Flanders to Henry VIII, L&P, XIX, i, 699. 163 Russell to Council, 11 am and 6 pm, 15 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 707, 708.

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Part of the reason for borrowing money in the Netherlands was the need to advance money in Netherlands carolus to the waggoners provided in that country. After the problems of getting enough transport (and there was never enough throughout the campaign), such money had to be advanced and on 7 June, Francis Hall of Calais was paying out £4854 for 500 carts and 1100 dray horses.164 None of this absolved the English supply staff from their work in transporting horses and wagons from England. Late in June, Gage and St. John, as court officials with the greatest skills in getting men and materiel around, were furiously busy shipping dray horses from Sandwich and ‘road’ horses from Dover.165 After the stabilization of Boulogne, a Council committee of experts on military supply consisting of Gardiner, Gage, Rich, Rous and John Ryther, cofferer of the prince’s household, took charge of supplies for the King’s new acquisition.166 The most active in this group were Gardiner, Gage and Ryther.167 They (or any two of them) were empowered by periodic Council warrants to issue bills and draw funds from the Exchequer and allocate them for expenses on arms and victuals.168 As an example, we have the payment of £180 out of £2000 authorised by them for oxen and feed procured by the commissioners in Kent for victuals beyond the sea and another £100 for Romney Marsh animals.169 Individuals were commissioned to supply specific items direct. So John Guyldemyn, gentleman servant of the Woodyard, received £910 from the Mint and Exchequer for stockfish and hops for Boulogne in late

164

Certificate by Hall, L&P, XIX, i, 642.4. St. John and Gage to the Council, Dover, 30 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 807. 166 See J.A. Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction (London, 1926), pp. 113–114. For Gage’s letters with John Ryther in 1545–1546 to Cobham acting for the Council, concerning supplies for Calais (BL Harl. 283 fos. 297, 337). A John Rither was listed by Gage as one of his servants at court who accompanied him to Firle for his final days (PRO PROB 11/38, fo. 51r). 167 Cobham wrote to the three of them for the supplies of Calais, eg. 15 April 1545, BL Harl. 288 fo. 51 (L&P, XX, i, 526). 168 See the numerous warrants to the Exchequer during 1545 L&P, XX, i, 215, 228, 259, 358, 1095, 1119, ibid., ii, 33, 413, 441; XXI, i, 41, 414, 432, 1433, 1472. The Privy Council allocated specific funds to them on by warrant of 18 Feb, 9 March, 3 July1545, 20 Sept. (L&P, XX, i, 215, 467, 1095.3, ii, 413); 21 May, 9 Aug., 24 Oct. 1545, 14 Feb. 1546, 18 & 21 March, 8 & 17 Aug. 1546 see J.R. Dasent et al., Acts of the Privy Council of England, new series, 46 vols (London, 1890–) [hereafter APC], I, pp. 166, 226, 262, 208, 347, 351, 518. 169 Privy Council to Sir John Williams, 20 Aug. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 1478. 165

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1544 and early 1545.170 Warrants accounting for £12,193 have survived for this kind of expenditure authorised by Gage and others.171 The bulk of expenditure on supplies for Boulogne was processed through Augmentations. In the year after the siege, at least £16,742 was paid out for all sorts of major and minor items from shipments of grain to timber, nails, shovels, baskets, livestock and mattresses; Boulogne in effect needed everything to be supplied from England. In the following year to Michaelmas 1546, a further £18,155 was paid through Augmentations. Receiving the larger sums were the Treasurer, Sir Hugh Paulet and the victualling commissioner, Anthony Aucher, who took charge of everything from buildings to food supplies.172 The council committee continued its work through 1545 and 1546. Gage continued to procure arms in the Low Countries through the Johnson brothers173 and in the Privy Council, he obtained a guarantee against losses for Flemish transport ships taking supplies to Boulogne (which otherwise would not have sailed).174 He also seems to have been arranging for the supply ships to rendezvous with Lisle’s fleet in the summer of 1545.175 Paying for War Despite the extensive archival material preserved for the planning of the campaigns of the 1540s, there is no complete sequence of accounts which laid out their exact costs and how they were paid for; a number

170 NA, E351/184. Thomas Maltby, London fishmonger supplied a range of commodities including bacon, cheese, honey and butter for £1129 between Jan. and Nov. 1545 (NA, E351/186). 171 L&P, XX, i, 110, 215, 228, 259, 270, 358, 467, 1119, 1164, 1303; ibid., ii, 33, 105, 141, 202, 210, 413, 441, 471, 502, 558. 172 These figures are computed from the Augmentations payments books, NA E 315/249, E 315/253 (L&P, XIX, i, 368; XX, i, 517; XXI, i, 643), in each case section v., figures rounded up to the nearest pound. For the supply of 620,000 rough nails and 150,000 sprig nails, tile pins and 60 loads of laths, at cost of £71.6.10, NA E 101/207/10. 173 Otwell to John Johnson, 9 June 1545, NA SP1/202, fo. 18 (L&P, XX, i, 900), B. Winchester, ‘The Johnson Letters, 1542–1552’ 4 vols (London Ph.D. thesis, 1953), II, p. 328: ‘this is chiefly to desire you in my maisteres behalf to write to some trusty and diligent frende of youres at Antwerpe to provide him jC Cullen cliffes [Cologne pikes?] of xxj fote of lenght’ and 50 javelin staves as long as possible, ‘for he doubteth to have nede of them sooner than anny wil be bought hier for him.’ 174 20 Dec. 1545, APC, I, p. 295 (L&P, XX, ii, 1010). 175 Lisle to Gage, 17 Aug. 1545, St.P., I, p. 816 (L&P, XX, ii, 151).

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of different sources need to be compared. The most widely used is a detailed general analysis of expenditure, based on accounts of war treasurers which have not fully survived, drawn up by the government of Edward VI in 1552 after the end of the French and Scottish wars. This helpfully divides expenditure since 1542 (and in some cases even earlier), under several distinct headings, by period (see Appendix 8).176 If used carefully, this can reveal the detailed costs of war. First, the Landrecies campaign cost £36,500. Then the Boulogne campaign cost £ 586,718.2.4 and the war down to the end of the reign (including fortifications at Boulogne) another £ 426,306.19.5. (A useful context for this is Wriothesley’s estimate of the cost of war from Michaelmas 1544 to Michaelmas 1545 as £560,000.)177 Fortification and garrison at Calais from 1538–1547 cost £276,765.9.7. The Scottish wars from 1542–1547 cost 350,243.2.2 and the navy in the same period £265,024.4.3. Finally, fortification of the English coast from 1538 to 1547 cost £203,205.13.0. So, out of a total of £2,134,784.1.0 military expenditure, mainly from 1542 to 1547, the direct conflict with France absorbed £1,049,525.9s and including war in Scotland £1,399,768.11.12, but if we add the costs of the navy this rises to £1,664,792.8.2; of course most of the other expenditure is related in some way to the AngloFrench War. A number of other army estimates in the period can be used as comparisons. The consultation of November 1542 for a possible invasion of Scotland put the cost of an army of 17,000 foot and 6000 horse for two months at £55,552 (£91,555 if border defence was factored in).178 Suffolk estimated the cost of an army of 20,000 for 6 weeks against Scotland in January 1544 at £44,000.179 Accounts of High Treasurers of the Wars are not well preserved but some of Sadler’s are. Sadler was appointed High Treasurer for the War in Scotland on 17 February 1544, obviously for the English invasion, and his account until November 1546 reveals that he received £123,709.11.0ob. After a large initial injection of £30,000 on 24 February, sums of £5–8000 followed regularly until another subvention of £20,000 in July 1546. Of this £93,861 was spent on wages and conduct for the soldiers (trans-

176 The costs of Henry VIII’s wars are examined by R. Hoyle, ‘War and Public Finance’ in D. MacCulloch (ed.), The Reign of Henry VIII (London, 1995), pp. 75–99. 177 Wriothesley to Petre, 8 Sept. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 324. 178 NA SP1/174, fos. 50v–51v(59–60) (L&P, XVII, 1034). 179 L&P, XIX, i, 59.

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ferred to John Uvedale, treasurer for the pay of the garrisons) and £4241 on the hire of ships.180 By far the largest single item in the overview of 1552 was the campaign of Boulogne and Montreuil in 1544, as might be expected. The components of this were made of many different items, perhaps the largest single one being the cost of wages. One paper (by Wriothesley with contributions from Rich as war treasurer) in April–May 1544 estimated the likely cost of the campaign and some other smaller items from the King’s departure for Calais and therefore for three months as £250,000.181 (Appendix 9) This was a serious under-estimate since most of the troops, conduct money included, had to be paid for four months. A paper drawn up to estimate the cost of an army of 5200 cavalry and 33,639 infantry (rather larger than the one actually mustered) puts the monthly cost of wages (wagoners and dray horses included) as £44,853.10.0 or £179,376 for four months.182 This too was an under-estimate. The 1552 survey gives the cost of wages in the army during the siege as £353,916.19.6 plus coat and conduct as £ 59,028.0.8 (Appendix 8). These figures do not seem to include money written off after Landenberg had been paid and then dismissed without serving. As the campaign was beginning, there was some question of a war chest of £160,000 being made available to Norfolk but this was rescinded when Henry definitely decided to go in person and Norfolk was provided with £59,000 instead.183 To re-assure Henry, his Council with the Queen sent him out a ‘mass’ of £40,000 at the end of July.184 Norfolk reported very quickly that his £59,000 would last only to 8 July and that a further £40,000 would soon be needed.185 Only the account by the vice-treasurer of the Rearguard has survived for June

180 There are two complementary versions of his account: SHC LM/1330/98 and NA E101/674/2 (neither is complete). Receipts are exactly the same in both accounts but the expenditure on different purposes. Total expenditure listed in the two accounts is £118,187. 181 L&P, XIX, i, 272.2. 182 NA SP1/184, fo. 220 (L&P, XIX, i, 273.6). 183 Council to Norfolk, rec. 17 June 1544 (later copy), BL Harl. 6980, fo. 119 (L&P, XIX, i, 690): ‘His M., hath for the tyme caused nine and fifty thousand pounds to be delyvered to his treasurer of the vauntgard and reregard . . .’ and the rest brought with the battle. 184 Council letter 17 July NA SP1/190, fo. 68. 185 Norfolk to Henry VIII, 19 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 192 (L&P, XIX, i, 738): ‘of the which is paide cotes and conducte money and the wagies of hireng of caryages . . . . and also the wages of this armye unto the eight of Julye.’

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to November and this seems to indicate that that corps was provided with £60,258 for the whole period of the campaign, which cannot be complete (see Appendix 10);186 this was to cover the cost of conduct, pay and incidentals for four months. If the Vanguard received £59,000 plus another £40,000 and the battle about the same, this would account for about £250,000 in running costs during the campaign, well short of the sum declared in the 1552 account. Unless the Battle was markedly more costly (certainly a possibility), the difference must be accounted for by the cost of bringing over reinforcements during the siege. One further insight is provided by Rich’s account (or rather ‘Brief declaration’) as High Treasurer for the Wars from 24 September to 30 October, thus at the very end of the campaign. From this we can learn how he functioned in this role. At the start of the period, his cash reserve was down to £16,000 but then bolstered by £33,000 from England and £12,000 from Edward Wotton, Treasurer of Calais and others (£65,730 in all). He used these funds partly by transferring large amounts to the Treasurers of the three ‘wards’ of the army, to Paulet as Treasurer of the newly occupied town of Boulogne or to various lesser accountants.187 As for expenditure after the end of the siege of Boulogne, this is given as £426,306.19.5 in the 1552 document. This includes £318,884.3.4 for pay of soldiers and £47,166.18.3 for fortifications (Appendix 10). Sir Hugh Paulet’s account as Treasurer of Boulogne (Sept. 1544–August 1546) (Appendix 12) accounts for £169,904 as wages of the garrison in the same period, the difference almost certainly accounted for by the cost of Hertford’s army in 1546, administered by its own Treasurer. He spent only £23,676 on fortifications, the difference here probably explained by work on Ambleteuse for which he was not responsible.188 Other accounts are more limited in scope. A note of the cost of Boulogne, including fortifications, from September 1544 to October 1545 puts the total at £112,873.9.3.189 This is fairly close to the estimate of money spent on Boulogne since the King’s departure but unfortunately with no date, £115,721.4s.190 On the other hand, Paget estimated

186 BL Add. MS. 35,206 (L&P, XIX, ii, 552), paper roll headed ‘duplicata.’ The receipts from Rich came in several parcels, the greatest being £25,000 on 11 June. 187 L&P, XIX, ii, 506. 188 NA E101/207/1. 189 Lambeth Palace MS 306, fo. 56 (L&P, XX, ii, 558). 190 Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 150, fo. 24 (Calendar Hatfield, I, no. 188).

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six months’ total military costs as £104,000, of which Boulogne accounted only for £36,000, which must be an under-estimate.191 Seven months’ garrison costs at Boulogne and Guînes in April–November 1546 were estimated at £61,835.0.6., though 3–4000 were to be added for extra troops at Calais over and above the ordinary garrison but a scheme for the garrison at Boulogne and its forts (1300 foot) for a whole year after the peace treaty put the cost at only £24,506.19.8.192 Wages, as at all times, were the greatest cost burden. The earlier planning document discussed above makes clear that ordinary infantry would be paid at the traditional 6d per day and cavalry 9d. Infantry captains would get 4s and petty captains 2s, while cavalry captains would get 6s and petty captains 3s.193 The planned army for Scotland in 1542 would have included 17,000 infantry, also at at 6d p.d., commanded by 180 captains (4s) and the same number of petty captains at 2s., so the wage rates were standard as was the convention of one captain and one petty captain for about 100 men.194 Food advanced to the troops was deducted from their wages. The pay scales for foreign troops employed by Henry are difficult to compare. An agreement with Buren specified 4 florins p.m., which even at a favourable rate of 3s. 2d. would have been a little over 5d per day but the difference was that approximately one eighth of Buren’s troops were to be on double pay (a common feature in French and Imperial armies which does not seem to have applied in England).195 The Spanish horsemen serving at Boulogne in 1544 received 4 ducats a month (£1 or 8d. pd.), though it is revealing that when they mutinied they declared they were not in Henry’s service for the pay alone but the ransom they could earn.196 How did soldiers’ wages compare with those of others? The question 191 Hatfield House, CP, 36, fos. 21–23; S. Haynes and W. Murdin A Collection of State Papers, relating to Affairs in the Reigns of King Henry VIII . . . (London, 1740– 1759) I, pp. 55–56, (Calendar Hatfield., no. 189). 192 NA SP1/216, fos. 52–55 (L&P, XXI, i, 499), text damaged; SP1/216, fos. 64–72 (L&P, XXI, i, 505). 193 NA SP1/184, fo. 220 (L&P, XIX, i, 273.6). See also wage rates specified for Richard Lee’s company of 200 men divided into 2 companies of 100), by Hertford, Newcastle 26 April 1544, NA, E 101/612/60. 194 NA SP1/174, fo. 50. 195 L&P, XIX, ii, 247.A further agreement of 5 fl. of 20 stuivers p.m. (12s. 6d) would be 5d p.d. (L&P. XIX, i, 419). When eventually mustered these were 5 ensigns are 1,842 persons receiving 2,666 1/2 pays, ‘besides the hault officers.’ Their monthly pays was 13,640 fl. 6 stivers, at 20 stivers the florin (Henry paid half of this). (L&P, XIX, i, 773). 196 Hume (ed. trans), Chronicle . . . Written in Spanish, p. 120.

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is fraught with difficulty because of a constant if mild rise in prices throughout the first half of the 16th century but we know that 1514 Statute of Artificers attempted to fix the wages of skilled craftsmen at 6d. per day (4d without food), while other labourers were set at 4d and ‘common husbandmen at 16s. 8d pa. (or a half penny p.d.). By 1565, the going rate for skilled craftsmen was 10d to 1s per day, so it is reasonable to assume that the rate of 6d per day was on the low side for skilled men in 1544.197 Higher commanders, unsurprisingly, were not paid in the same way but instead received ‘diets.’ For instance, Lisle as Lord Admiral and Hertford as Lieutenant-general in the North received 5 marks (£3.6.8) p.d. in diets.198 In the army of 1544, Russell received 100s a day in diets from 11 June to 3 November 1544 (145 days, thus £725), earls, 10s., knights and squires, 6.8d. The total cost of wages in the account was £34,488.3.10d.; 9000 ordinary soldiers for 145 days at 6d. per day would have cost £32,625, though it is clear from the account that not all of them were paid for that maximum period.199 Soldiers of the Boulogne garrison were being paid 8d. p.d. from 1546, which certainly reflects understanding the higher cost of living there.200 The obvious question to ask is: how was money found for all this expenditure? Any answer can scarcely be straightforward. Here, the absence of clear statements about yearly crown revenues is, to say the least, an impediment. The ordinary (non-Parliamentary) revenues have been estimated at £90,000 in the 1520s. This was why the French pension (bringing in over £20,000) was so important. Of course, crown income was substantially increased in the 1530s by clerical taxation and the dissolutions of the monasteries. From 1535, the Court of First Fruits and Tenths was drawing in around £42,000 annually, while Augmentations saw surpluses of around £25,000 p.a. rising to a peak of just under £50,000 in 1541. Then from 1539 to 1542, the crown sold 197 Statutes of the Realm, printed by command of His Majesty King George III, 11 vols (London, 1810–1828), III, pp. 124–126 (6 Henry VIII, c. 3); L. Garnish, ‘The 1522 Muster Role for West Berkshire,’ part 3 (Vale and Downland Local History Series) gives useful indications on the movement of wages between 1522 and 1565. 198 L&P, XXI, i, 643.v; XX, i, 517.v (8 March). 199 BL Add. 35206, Dormer’s account for the Rearguard, (L&P, XIX, ii, 552): soldiers pay ‘begynynge and endinge at divers and sondrie days.’ 90 captains of foot (the maximum) would have been paid £2250). The pay period for all the men cannot have extended from June to November. It would seem more likely that the ordinary soldiers were paid until early October. 200 NA SP1/16, fo. 64 (L&P, XXI, i, 505).

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land worth about £66,000 annually. Part of these revenues was transferred to reserves, some to the cost of fortification but Henry must have doubled his revenues in the late 1530s, though at the cost damaging his future revenue base.201 Henry had spent about 1 million on the war of 1512–1514, much of it drawn from reserves. In contrast, the cost of war in 1522–1524 was relatively small (£400,000 at the most) much of it defrayed by extraordinary revenues such as loans. The massive expenditure of over 2 millions in 1543–1547 can only be explained by what Richard Hoyle has called ‘the most breathtaking acts of will’ by the King, though whether this displays the ‘singularity and success of Henry VIII’s fiscal policy’ as argued by Richardson is highly dubious.202 Wriothesley, in effect chief finance minister and ‘of great authority with his master,’ wrote a series of despairing letters to Paget in September–November 1545 that reflect the extraordinary hand-to-mouth nature of the revenues, expedients being all that could be hoped for. On 27 September he uttered: ‘God help us. For myne oune parte it makethe me wery of my life.’ And in November: ‘You [bid me] runne as though I coulde make money. I [would] I had that gift but for oon yere for [His] Majestes sake.’203 He declared in September 1545 that since the start of 1544 the King had spent 1.3 millions: and his subsidy and benevolence ministring skant thre hundrethe thousand therof as I muste sustyene where the rest being so greate a summe hathe been gotten soo the landes being consumede, the plate of the realme molten and coyned, wherof moche hathe assay, I sorowe and lament the daunger of the tyme to com.204

Though he was anxious to have the planned meeting of Parliament go forward in September 1545, since without it ‘I see not howe we shal lyve without some present helpe,’ Wriothesley was right to be doubtful whether lay taxation could cope with the problem.205 Subsidies and

201

Hoyle, ‘War and Public Finance,’ pp. 77–84. Hoyle, ‘War and Public Finance,’ p. 91. W.C. Richardson, ‘Some financial expedients of Henry VIII, Econ. Hist Rev., ser. 2, 7, i (1954) p. 33. Richardson’ opinion that ‘economically the country was stable and prosperous’ (p. 35) also has to be questioned. 203 Selve to Francis I, 10 July 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, no. 6: ‘homme bien estimé . . . et de grande aucthorité à l’entour de son maistre.’ Wriothesley to Paget, 27 Sept., Nov. 1545, 11 Nov. NA SP1/208, fos. 75, 210, fos. 43, 68 (L&P, XX, ii, 453, 746, 769). 204 Wriothesley to Council, 14 Sept. 1544, NA SP1/207, fo. 172(174), (L&P, XX, ii, 366). 205 Wriothesley to Paget, 2 Sept.[1545], NA SP1/207, fo. 66v (L&P, XX, ii, 272). 202

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Fifteenths voted by Parliament were inevitably slow to come in. The Subsidy voted in 1543 was to be paid by three instalments in February 1544, 1545 and 1546; it brought in £408,642 by the end 1545. The Subsidy of 1545 (paid in 1546 and 1547) brought in another £59,000. So, Parliamentary taxes accounted or well under a quarter of the total costs of the war. ‘Loans’ of 1542 and 1544 (the first retrospectively converted into a grant by Parliamentary Act in 1543, the latter not a success) yielded £125,159.206 In January 1545 a Benevolence, in effect a subsidy without Parliamentary vote like the Amicable Grant of 1525 (though legalised by the 1545 Subsidy Act), yielded another £119,581.207 It had caused some resistance, though not as much as might have been expected. The Benevolence is of interest in that a councillor, probably Paget, drew up a paper in which he analysed projected military expenditure for six months, December 1544 to May 1545, as £104,000. Subsidies were bringing in money but expenditure plus existing debt would still leave a gap of £44,000. The paper was in effect an argument against calling a Parliament in February 1545, which would be slow to bring in money and also to some extent inequitable (‘If we shuld regard our private Commodyties, we woold desyre rather a Parliament, then none . . . It shalbe thought also a grevous Lawe tappointe men to pay, which have not wherwithall’). Far better to raise a Benevolence on those who could afford to pay so ‘the common People shall not be greved.’ This would bring in the £50–60,000 needed. Parliament could then be called at Michaelmas and, either with the continuation of war a Subsidy could be voted and the money ready for the following spring if war continued or used for other colourable ends if peace were made.208 With clerical subsidies in 1543 and 1545 at about £84,000, this gives us a grand total of nearly £800,000 between 1542 and 1547 with which to defray expenditure of over 2 millions. If ‘ordinary’ revenue was still bringing in about £200,000 then there was still a hole of 1 million.209

206 The loan of 1544 was levied on lords temporal, Bishops and Deans (St.P., I, p. 766; L&P, XIX, i, 1032). 207 Incomplete summary of county returns for the Benevolence, L&P, XX, ii, app. 4. Hoyle, ‘War and Public Finance’ p. 93. 208 Hatfield House, CP, 36, fos. 21–23; Haynes, State I, pp. 55–56, (Calendar Hatfield., no. 189). 209 Figures in Hoyle, p. 93. The yield for the Benevolence in 1545 is given as only £70,723 according to a document in Strype (L&P, XX, ii, App. 4.3).

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The Wriothesley-Rich paper of April–May 1544 listed £134,000 of money in hand from which to defray the estimated cost of £250,000. The largest items here were £40,000 from the sale of lands and £50,000 ‘from beyond the sees of the merchantes’ (i.e. loans). Vaughan was borrowing small amounts (£500) in Frankfurt during April but in May was reported as seeking to obtain loans of 100,000 ducats a month on the Antwerp market. This horrified Mary of Hungary, who thought it would drive up rates and she relied on loans to anticipate taxation; Henry simply replied that he was constrained to it by the cost of exchange in paying for services in Flanders, from which the country there would hardly use.210 Rich proposed to raise another £162,000 by expedients including another £20,000 from sales of land and a massive £50,000 of lead (presumably stripped from the monasteries and carefully stored by the Court of Augmentations).211 In this early example of ‘flogging off the family silver,’ the initial idea proposed by Vaughan seems to have been to offer a guarantee to a syndicate of bankers headed by the Welsers, who were prepared to advance 100,000 ducats (£25,000) at the (then fairly moderate) rate of 10.5%; the house had already advanced 800,000 crowns to the Emperor.212 It was reported by the middle of July that 12,485 fothers (roughly 12.5 million kg.) of lead were ready to be shipped to the ports for export. The scheme hit the buffers when it became clear from Vaughan’s reports that, unless the international market in lead were cornered (and England and Spain were the main suppliers), the merchants could simply make their own price, knowing that England was desperate to sell. This is what England tried to do between July 1544 and May 1545, without success.213 Finally,

210 Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 25 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 587; Chapuys to Mary, 31 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 604. 211 Appendix Nine, NA SP1/184, fo. 44v ‘Towardes the furniture wherof shalbe made as it is thought before his majestes passage of the water of Somme these folowynge.’ Regional commissioners had been in charge of lead since the dissolutions. In the Western counties, Sir John Scudamore: BL Add. 11041, fos. 73–76, letters concerning royal lead concessions, e.g. to the Florentine Antonio Guidotti in August 1546. 212 Vaughan and Dymock to Wriothesley, Suffolk and Browne 17 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 725. The exchange rate of the £ st. to the ducat was 1:4 (ibid., 768). 213 The whole affair is explored in Richardson, ‘Some financial expedients of Henry VIII,’ 33–48. The document referred to by Richardson as indicating a sale of 12,085 fothers. The document sent in a Council letter of 17 July NA SP1/190, fo. 69 (L&P, XIX, i, 927, ii) adds up to 12,065.5 fothers. The ‘fother’ of lead, 19.5 or 20 cwt., 1000 kg.), was valued at £9.10s at York in 1552 (which would have yielded about £115,000 in 1544). The price had been at £4.6s in 1520 (York Civic Records, III, 72). See P.M. Tillott (ed.), The City of York (VCH History of the County of York) 1961,

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the lead was sold in a deal with two Spanish merchants at Antwerp who had the farm of alum at Civita Vecchia in the Papal States. The price obtained was eventually £4.13s the fother, not bad in the circumstances but Henry found himself weighed down with 30,000 quintals of alum in a country that only consumed 4000 a year.214 There is no doubt that the sale of monastic land was speeded up, yielding about £900,000 in the period 1541–1551.215 Sales of £165,691 in the year ending Michaelmas 1544 rose to £237,888 in that to Michaelmas 1546.216 In 1545, the crown dissolved the Chantries by Parliamentary statute which explicitly appealed to the ‘excedinge greate & inestimable charges, costes and expences . . . of theis present warres’ but returns were slow to come in.217 Debasement, which began in May 1544, undoubtedly filled part of the deficit and was bound to have a serious effect in a society in which coinage in any case was not in plentiful supply. As Wriothesley put it when sending off £20,000 in November 1545, £15,000 of it came from ‘the Myntes, our holy ancre.’218 In May 1544, new prices for gold and silver were set and new coins, the Sovereign (£1) and the Teston (12d), introduced. It is estimated that the profit from debasement from 1544 to 1551 yielded £1,270,000, of which nearly 600,000 was made by the death of Henry VIII.219

pp. 122–135. Ultimately Vaughan was able to get offers on little more than £4 the fother at Antwerp in 1544. 214 Richardson, ‘Financial expedients,’ pp. 42–44. L&P, XX, ii, App. 41. Thus a sale of 12,065 fothers would now yield £56,100, near enough Wriothesley’s original estimate for sale in 1544. 215 Figures in F.C. Dietz, English Public Finance 1485–1641, 2 vols 2nd ed. (London, 1964), p. 217. See also W.C. Richardson, The History of the Court of Augmentations 1536–1554 (Baton Rouge, LA, 1961), p. 235. 216 W.C. Richardson, Tudor Chamber Adminsistration 1485–1547 (Urbana, Ill, 1950) pp. 270–272; idem, ‘Some Financial expedients,’ pp. 36–37. 217 Statutes of the Realm, 37 Hen.VIII, c4, III, pp. 988–999. 218 Wriothesley had sent of £15,000 to Southwell for Boulogne, £10,000 for Guînes and £2000 to Rither for victuals (to Paget, 1 Sept. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 268). Wriothesley to Paget, [5 Nov.] 1545, NA SP1/210, fo. 12 (L&P, XX, ii, 729). For this £15,000, Augmentations contributed £3000, the duchy of Lancaster and Court of wars £1000 each. Tenths and First Fruits had nothing and the Exchequer only £1000 earmarked for the navy. 219 Proclamation on the coinage, May 1544, Hughes and Larkin, I, no. 228, pp. 327–329 (L&P, XIX, i, 513 and ibid. 513.3 and 4 on the profits of the mint in recoining at news rates for gold). C. Challis, ‘Debasement of the coinage, 1542–1551,’ Ec.H.R. 20 (1967), 454; idem., The Tudor Coinage (Manchester, 1978) It does not seem possible to establish net profits year by year from Challis’ figures, though a quick calculation of gross profits down to early 1547 can be made from the tables in ‘Debasement’ pp. 457–466 (approx. £588,400).

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The impact of all this is revealed by two documents: the accounts of Hugh Paulet as Treasurer of Boulogne (mentioned above) and a paper called A Shorte Abridgement of the Money sent to Bulloyn, Callays and Guysnes since Henry’s departure from France and probably drawn up in August 1545. Paulet’s account, running from 13 September 1544 to August 1546 is a comprehensive statement of receipt and expenditure for the keeping of Boulogne. It reveals that the total allocation for Boulogne in that period was £200,085, of which no less than £105,000 was transferred from the Mint (the next highest sources were the Exchequer, Parliamentary taxation, at £23,672 and Augmentations at £14,653).220 The profile revealed by the second document can be summarised as: Boulogne: From Court of Tenths Augmentations Exchequer From Mr Peckham Calais: Court of Tenths Augmentations Exchequer Mr. Peckham TOTAL

2840.7.4 18,433.6.8 3666.13.4 34,080 6678 8020 19,107.6.8 18.030 115,720.34s

The substantial contribution of the Court of Augmentations has been discussed above. Sir Edmund Peckham, was both Cofferer of the Household and Master of the Mint and as such collected both the profits of the Mint and the Benevolence of January 1545, though in view of Paulet’s account it is clear that Peckam was essentially supplying money from the mint.221 However, of £15,000 received direct from England by Edward Dymock, Treasurer of Boulogne, from August to September 1545, £9000 came from the Mint and of £1129 paid to a particular food supplier in the same period, £809 was from the Mint.222 At all events, the acceleration of expenditure after the summer of 1545 is clear.

220 NA E101/207/1. The account was declared under royal letters of 22 Dec. 1546, to the Council of Boulogne by Paulet’s heirs after his death. 221 Hatfield House, CP, 150, fo. 24 (possibly enclosed in Wriothesley to Paget, 27 Aug. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 231). 222 NA, E351/575; E351/186.

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When all these expedients are factored in, at the end of the period 1540–1551 there was still a deficit of between £150,000 and £250,000, depending on the calculation.223 Interest on loans on the international market has to be considered. The need to provide cash rapidly meant that all these expedients had to be brought into play, yet still this was not enough. Cash, especially for payments abroad to mercenaries and suppliers, required loans on the international markets. The long term debt burden had severe implications for interest rates at a time of currency devaluation. Chapuys acutely summed up the problems in June 1544, when he reported that Henry would only continue the war for the minimum period because of shortage of money: He has already borrowed a good sum in Antwerp and spoke very secretly to various merchants, foreigners and others, to stand surety for him at Antwerp up to the sum of 400 or 500,000 écus and more; he intends to take this money and only repay it at Christmas on which the interest will be very high, which seems strange. He is taking a loan in this city for a sum will scarcely help him, namely 20,000 £ sterling, assigning a rent of 12% on it, which he would have been unlikely to do had he had enough money. It is true that he likes to have full coffers and he may have done this to prepare for all eventualities.224

The forced loan of 1544 we know not to have been particularly successful and it became clear that the crown’s demands for cash could not be met within England.225 Cash was available on the international markets but Henry could not control the outcome so easily. The extensive correspondence of Stephen Vaughan, financial wizard based in the Low Countries makes the problems abundantly clear. In March, Vaughan and Thomas Chamberlain were commissioned to negotiate

223

Hoyle, p. 95. Chapuys to Charles V, 29 June 1544, NA PRO 31/18/3/2 (L&P, XIX, i, 799): ‘Il a desja fait quelque finance de quelque bonne somme en Anvers et parloit en grand secret toutesfois à divers marchans tant estrangiers que autres pour estre fiance pour luy aud. Anvers jusques à la somme de iiij ou v c M escuz et davantaige; et entend de prendre led. argent pour le rembourcer tout seullement à noel dont l’interest montera beaucoup et davantaige [qui?] semble bien estrange. Il fait ung emprumpt sur ceste ville d’une somme que ne luy peult gueres ayder assavoir xxM livres sterlins donant assignation sur rente à compte de douze pour cent, ce que n’est vray semblable qu’il feroit estant bien fourny d’argent. Vray est que comme il est amy d’avoir tousiours davantaige en ses coffres pourroit estre qu’il fait tout ce que dessus pour prevenir de bonne heure de toute necessité.’ 225 F.C. Dietz, English Government Finance 1485–1558 (Urbana, Ill., 1920), p. 165. 224

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with Buren over two problems: the extra 2000 men Henry had decided he wanted Buren to raise for him and also talks at Speyer (along with Wotton) to prepare the conduct money (£5000 through the Fugger Bank) for Landenberg’s troops.226 Vaughan had taken gold from Wriothesley in England but for these transactions, he had also by the start of May borrowed £523.4s from the Sorers in Frankfurt.227 The basic problem, it need hardly be said, was short loans and high interest rates. Augmentations was regularly paying out large sums in 1544–1546 for ‘the King’s debts in Flanders.’228 Vaughan got himself into complications in June 1544 in the course of his campaign to raise 100,000cr. at Antwerp, since his guarantors, the Bonvisis, had stopped operations and his letters of credit were no good. The leading bankers were very wary of advancing money, which in that year was in any case in short supply, but Vaughan was convinced that, once he had obtained 100,000 he could get more. Such a sum would yield £ 33,333.6s. 8d. Fl. and carry interest of £3,500 Fl. and this enabled him to despatch £15,000 st.(60,000 ducats) to pay for Norfolk’s troops.229 In all, Henry seems to have borrowed just short of £1 million st. during 1544–1547; he borrowed £100,000 at Antwerp in August 1546 alone and still owed £75,000 at his death.230 To do this, he had to rely on guarantees by the Bonvisis and the Vivaldis but the interest rates were still high at 12–14% and the crown sometimes had to accept loans in kind in which the commodities were overvalued. Going to the international market, then, was inevitable but dangerous.231

226 227 228

Instructions to Vaughan and Chamberlain, undated, L&P, XIX, i, 208. Vaughan to Paget, [2 May] 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 427. £20,000 in 1544–1545 and £20,000 in 1545–1546 (L&P, XX, i, 517; XXI, i,

643). 229 Vaughan and Dymock to Wriothesley, Suffolk and Browne, 17 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 174v (L&P, XIX, i, 725): ‘we thinking no lese, but that after we have them ones in for a C M ducates, we shall the easilier prick them to credite us for more.’ Same to same, 18 June, ibid., no. 733. Consequent obligation of the English Councillors, 23 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 759. 230 Receipt for 152,000 Flemish pounds repaid by Henry VIII to Anthony Fugger, Antwerp, 24 Sept. 1546, BL, Cotton, Galba, B X, 336. 231 See R.B. Outhwaite, ‘The trials of foreign borrowing: the English crown and the Antwerp money market in the mid-sixteenth century,’ Econ. Hist. Rev., ser. 2, 19, ii(1966), 289–305.

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Illustration 4

The King’s artillery (three details from 2 and 3).

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The Panoply of War A degree of archaic chivalric combat remained in the midst of the cannon and arquebus fire and the financiers’ leveraging. In August 1543, as we have seen, the English army passed within two miles of Thérouanne, where they skirmished with the garrison and there took place a remarkable and, at first sight, archaic event. Sir John Wallop challenged his old friend Villebon, governor of the place, to a tournament for the sake of their ladies, which took place the next day.232 Nor was this isolated. A few weeks later, Sir Ralph Eure recorded seven Burgundian gentlemen running at the ring with English captains, including Edward Poyninges.233 Besides being a matter of organization of brute force, war in this period and long after remained to some extent a celebration of the aristocratic and chivalric idea. This element continued in the midst of the grimmer side of chivalric warfare.234 War thus demanded a degree of conspicuous display. Sir John Gage ordered in Flanders a tent and a pavilion with 20 of the finest halberds, possibly gilded, for his retinue.235 The accounts for the Rearguard, include payments to ‘heraldes, wiflers, ensign bearers, drums and fyvethes.’236 It is likely that every company of 100 men had a ‘whiffler,’ drum and fife. Gage went to considerable lengths to acquire such celebrants, through his agent Anthony Cave, at Bruges. Cave reported that they were in short supply since so many were seeking their services and none would serve for less than 2s (four times the infantryman’s pay) or move without an angel in advance: ‘Sir, it is happe you hyred them, for treue[th it] ys non in all this quarters abowte that wyll serve under iiij mens wages. Sir Thomas Poynynges would have vj dromes and vj phyffes and never a one that I can gett under ijs. st. a day, and yet they be but easye players.’ As it happened, Gage had 232

Chronicle of Calais, p. 211–, (L&P, XVIII, I, 979). HMC, MSS of the Marquess of Bath, IV, Seymour papers, p. 88. 234 On all this see D. Potter, ‘Chivalry and professionalism in the French armies of the Renaissance’ in D.J. Trim (ed.), The Chivalric Ethos and the development of Military Professionalism (Leiden, 2003), pp. 149–183, where I argue that chivalry and professionalism are two sides of the same coin and cannot be separated and L. MacMahon, ‘Military Professionalism in the early Tudor armies in Renaissance Europe: a reassessment,’ ibid., pp. 183–216, which minimises the ‘negative’ effects of chivalric warfare, especially in comparison with European armies; and S.J. Gunn, ‘Henry VIII’s foreign policy and the Tudor cult of chivalry’ in C. Giry-Deloison (ed.), François Ier et Henri VIII. Deux princes de la Renaissance (1515–1547) (Lille, 1995) balances the rival demands of reputation and realpolitik and Henry’s wars. 235 Anthony Cave to John Crant, 28 April, 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, App. 7, iii, 3. 236 BL Add. 35206. 233

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found men through Stephen Vaughan, while one of Cave’s hired men was a drunk and so he suggested they be told to wait for the coming over of the army or passed on to Poynings.237 Banners were of crucial importance. When Admiral Lisle brought his ships from Scotland to the Channel in June 1544 they were reported as ‘no greate shipps but they be well apparelled and triumphantly decked for the war.’238 The depiction of the King’s ships in the Anthony Roll of 1546 shows them decked out with long streaming banners depicting the cross of Saint George and the Tudor livery colours of green and white. The King’s newly refitted ships in 1539 were to have 14 streamers painted by Wright, the King’s painter but the 180 flags and 600 pennants posed problems of materials.239 It has been argued that these were impractical in time of war, yet Admiral Lisle’s first instruction of August 1545 makes it quite clear that the placement of battle flags was crucial for the identification of ships in the melee of battle.240 The tabellionage of Rouen contains a range of contracts for the supply of banners and pennons for the French fleet in 1545 which testify to the importance attached to such objects. In June 1545, Charles de Moy, sr de La Meilleraye, vice-admiral ordered ‘franges de laine’ for the marmoutiers and standards of his ships in the King’s colours. He contracted with Charles Baratte, painter of Rouen to paint 78 taffeta ensigns in the colours of the King, Dauphin and Duke of Orléans with their arms in fine gold, silver and azure, surrounded by the collar of the order and surmounted by crowns and coronets. La Meilleraye also paid 1696 lt. for 8900 rolls of cloth in back red and yellow for standards for the fleet. The cost of a dozen of his own standards with the anchor of vice-admiral was 45s each. Bolts of cloth in blue and yellow were ordered for banners with the king’s arms, and Vimont, tresoriergénéral de la marine, paid Guillaume de Courtelle, maître brodeur of

237 Letters of Cave to Grant, Antwerp, Calais, 19, 28 April, 17 May 1544 NA SP1/196, fos. 21–11 (241–242) (L&P, XIX, ii, App. 7, iii, 1–3). 238 Russell to Council, 17 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 172(193)r (L&P, XIX, i, 724). 239 T. Wilson, ‘The Flags,’ in C.S. Knighton and D.M. Loades (eds.), The Anthony Roll of Henry VIII’s Navy (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 28–30; W. Gonson to Cromwell, 23 Sept. 1539, L&P, XIV, ii, 213. 240 St.P., I, ii, no. CCXXVI. See also Julian S. Corbett, Fighting Instructions, 1530–1816 Publications Of The Navy Records Society Vol. XXIX.(London, 1905), p. 22.

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Rouen 135 lt. for sowing on the fleurs de lys and 27 lt. 10s for painting the colours of the King and his sons.241 Some commanders expected to go to war in luxurious style. The quadrireme galley La Couronne built at les Damps near Pont de l’Arche was decorated luxuriously with fittings costing 250 écus and interior panelling for the cabins, carried out according to drawings that specified portraits and other images at 150 écus.242 When Polin de La Garde took to sea in his galley La Réale in 1545, he insisted that there were cloth of gold and crimson hangings with the arms of Francis I and the salamander.243 As Suffolk sailed out of Dover harbour on 3 July 1544, he was met by Admiral Lisle with ‘trumpis shames and shutyng of greyt peces of ordynances that it was greit wonder to here the greyt noyse’ and he received a similar welcome sailing into Calais harbour from the Rysbank fort.244 When Henry himself left for France on 14th, he took with him the latest gilded armour to display himself to best possible effect.245 His army was also equipped with all the necessary articles of conspicuous display. As he marched out of Calais on 25 July, he was preceded by banners, drums and fifes, then Garter King of Arms with the royal banner, next to the King ‘armed at all pieces upon a great courser, followed by Lord Herbert with the King’s helmet and spear. Next came the henchmen ‘well horsed and appointed.’ At the gates of Calais, he was met by the Duke of Albuquerque and his company as well as men-at-arms under Essex and Darcy. Here the procession reformed with, first, the light horse, demilances, archers and gunners of the foot guards. In their midst was the sacred totem of the King himself with the pikes and men-at-arms. The procession was brought up by mounted archers and gunners. They were met at SaintInglevert by the royal Guard embattled with banners displayed and all proceeded to encamp at Marquise, where it rained all night. The scene is finely depicted in the copies of the Cowdray frescoes showing

241 Tabellionage of Rouen, 1 June, 5 June, 6 June, 19 June, summarised in E. Gosselin, Documents authentiques et inédits pour servir a l’histoire de la marine normande et du commerce rouennais pendant les XVI e et XVII e siecles (Rouen, 1876), pp. 48–49. 242 Gosselin, Documents, p. 48. 243 Inventory of La Réale, April 1545, AD Bouches-du-Rhône, B 1260 fo. 440; BnF Moreau 737, fo. 169. 244 ‘A Diary of the Expedition of 1544’ ed. W.A.J. Archbold, EHR, 16, no. 63 (1901), 503. 245 The King’s Armoury, 16 July 1544, BL, Cott. Appendix, XXVIII.f. 69 (L&P, XIX, i, 917).

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Sir Anthony Browne meeting the King at Saint-Inglevert and then of the camp at Marquise.246 Banners were ubiquitous. Many of the troops were in Henry’s personal colours of blue and yellow.247 Landenberg’s gave his cavalry and infantry ensigns ‘of white and green, and red crosses.’ Cavalry standards bore the King’s arms in the middle of the cross. He thought these were the King’s colours, and said that ‘if he had had time, all the horsemen should have been in the colours of the King’s Majesty’s battle.’248 The impresario for all this was Thomas Cawarden, a gentleman of the privy chamber but, crucially, Master of the Tents and also (from 1545) of the Revels. Cawarden was immensely experienced in the construction of temporary buildings for ceremonies and performances at court as also for the vast array of tents for the use of the King and his entourage, tents so vividly portrayed in the Cowdray frescoes.249 In May, he paid Anthony Totto (alias Antonio del Anunziato, d. 1554), sergeant painter,250 £20 for the painting of coats of arms on the King’s tents, including 150 6-foot square ‘vanes’ with hatchments in gold and colours and 36 hatchments ‘of an elle square of the kinges armes with beastes crowned, the garter and the kings worde in fine golde and other colours.’251 Two other serjeant painters, Bartholommeo Penni (brother of Luca) and the Frenchman Nicholas Lezard/Lisory (d. 1571), painted imitation jasper and marble walls for the king’s great wooden house built at Whitefriars.252 This edifice (displayed prominently in the

246 ‘The order how the King’s Majesty departed out of the town of Calleys’ Friday, 25 July, dated 12 Oct 1544, BL Calig. E. IV., f. 57, Rymer, Foedera 2nd ed. XV, p. 52, 3rd ed. VI, pp. 120–121. (L&P, XIX, ii, 424). 247 Gruffydd, in M.B. Davies ed, ‘Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne’ p. 10; Narrative of the French campaign, L&P, XIX, ii, 424. Henry had ordered ‘12 drummers and 12 fifers, of the best, to be employed in these wars’ from his agents in Germany in June (Council to Fane and Wyndebank 12 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 682). 248 Fane and Wyndebank to the Council, Aachen, 16 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 716. 249 ‘Skilfull and delyghtinge in matters of devise’ (H. Colvin, History of the King’s Works, IV, part ii, (London, 1982), p. 93). 250 Toto was the son of Nunziato d’Antonio di Domenico, a jobbing painter of Florence who was best known as a ‘bombardiere’ or pyrotechnician. Antonio (or Toto) del Nunziata came to England with Torrigiani in 1519 and stayed. He is known to have painted pictures for Henry VIII none of which have been identified but is best known as an heraldic painter (L.A. Waldman, Se bene era dipintore di fantocci. Nunziata d’Antonio, Painter, Pyrotechnician and Bombardier of Florence (forthcoming). 251 SHC, LM/1892/1 and 1893, bill for £20, 31 May 1545; Folger Shakespeare Library, Loseley MSS, Lb. 261: ‘delyveryd at the Charterhouse for thuse of the kynges highness tentes and pavilions’ 12 July 1544, £42. 252 SHC, LM/127; Folger SL, Loseley MSS, Lb. 258.

an unequal contest?

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261

The King’s tents (two details from 2 and 3).

Cowdray frescoes) seems to have combined features of a wooden house and tent, since it had deal ‘mastes’ 58’ long and 2’1” thick at the base and deal floorboards 28’×16”. It was known as ‘The Kinges lodging of Tymber for the warres’ and was under construction at least from 15 April 1544 but probably started as early as July 1543. This may be the same as the ‘tymbre house’ ‘all of ffyrre paynted and gylded’ with a tower at each corner and ‘covered with whyte

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plate . . . sylyd withyn with paste worke, paynted, wyndowes of horne.’ It is shown in two of the Cowdray frescoes.253 Cawarden (‘Mr Carden’) was in charge of an extensive staff as well as of a reserve of both tents and wooden ‘houses’ for the royal household at Boulogne in 1544. From his papers, we learn that 2696 men could be housed in 30 ‘rownde howses’ and 108 ‘ruffes.’ A list of the tents for the king’s camp made on 18 July 1544 assembles 132 ‘hales’ (open tents mainly for horses), 72 round houses, 8 ‘roufes without howses,’ 62 ‘tresentes,’ 49 hatchments, 12 partitions plus stakes and waggons. There were ‘hales’ for Dr. Butts to treat the wounded and another as a ‘house of relief’ for the royal guard.254 The office of Tents continued to be responsible for the accommodation of English armies on campaign after 1544; Hertford’s army in 1546 needed extensive shelter in the field and this was provided by Cawarden’s department.255 When the earl of Hertford went to France as lieutenant general of the King’s army in 1546, he found himself without even the basic royal banner and flag of Saint George and had to send twice to Sadler in England to retrieve these from the Great Wardrobe. Paget had already spoken to Cawarden, obviously the man in charge of such equipment.256 Hertford also drew on the services of the King’s tents for this campaign.257 At the lowest level of service, display was still important. If we follow the Essex gentleman Thomas Josselyn, we find that he was alerted in March 1544 to be ‘in a redynesse’ at one day’s notice and given a 253 Folger SL, Loseley MSS, Lb. 3, check book for work on the timber lodging, 15 April–22 June 1544: this indicates the vast logistical problem of transporting materials from Wapping and Anthony Knyvett’s house at Ratclyff to Whitefriars; SHC LM/11, book of wages for work on the King’s new tent of timber, July 1543–March 1544. SHC LM/59/110. 254 SHC, LM/59/91 (‘An estimate what the howses wyll holde’); LM/59/101. LM/24/1–28; LM 5/5; LN 8/1 and 2; LM/10 (payments by Southwell to the office of Tents, 1 July–2 Aug. 1544). LM/14 payments for the building of pavilions, 5 weeks to 15 July 1544. Inventory of tents, 1544, LM/59/141. 255 Warrants from Hertford for Harrington, war treasurer, to pay John Bridges, Yeoman of the Tents, June 1546, SHC, LM/59/4–7. 256 Hertford to Paget, 27 March 1546, NA SP1/216, fo. 2r (L&P, XXI, i, 471): ‘I hartely requyre you to give ordre for the sending hither with diligence a banner of the Kinges Majestes armes and an other of St George to be had from Mr Sadleyr out of the Great Wardrobe.’ Paget added a note to a repeated demand by Hertford on 21 April: ‘Mr Carden, God comfort him, was spoken unto in it.’ (NA SP1/217, fo. 49r (L&P, XXI, i, 637). 257 Hertford, orders to Harrington, treasurer of the army, April–June 1546, SHC, LM/59/4–7.

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schedule by the Sheriff which specified that every soldier should have a coat of blue cloth ‘after suche ffashion as all footemens cotes be made here at London,’ to be ‘garded’ with red, also in the London manner. The left sleeve was to be ‘trymed’ with the Captain’s own choice though no kind of badge was to be allowed. The men were to provide their own hose, the right red and the left blue with a broad strip of red on the outside left leg from the ‘stockes’ down. Every man was to have a cap to go under his sallett (helmet) of the kind available from William the capper of Ludgate as 8d. each.258 It is difficult to know how seriously to take this order, which reads rather like a boarding-school list, and whether it applied solely to Essex is also unclear. Josselyn was relatively rich and influential, brother in law of John Gates, his wife Dorothy connected to the household of the Queen and his brother placed in the royal household as Serjeant of the Pantry. In fact Thomas, in response to the Sheriff’s warning, had declared that he had 20 men ready at one hour’s notice, including 6 able bowmen and 7 able billmen; he in fact provided 20 foot soldiers for the Vanguard to serve at Montreuil.259 Heralds remained an essential component of war,260 both for formal declarations such as that attempted by Henry in June 1543 by Garter King of Arms, Sir Christopher Barker, and for routine communications since they often possessed language skills. Norfolk ordered payments for Richmond Herald, Rougedragon poursuivant and their servants for travelling to Dover in June 1544.261 William Harvey, Bluemantle Poursuivant, had been sent to Speyer in April 1544 with Council letters for the negotiations with Landenberg.262 He succeeded to the place of the deceased Richard Radcliffe, Somerset herald, in July 1545. Hammes Poursuivant, Edmund Atkinson, who was active in errands to and from the Low Countries in 1543–1544, was promoted as Bluemantle and Paget asked Norfolk (as Earl Marshal of course)

258

NA SP1/187, fo. 64(70) (L&P, XIX, i, 440). Muster book: NA SP1/184, fo. 86(106); Vanguard: L&P, XIX, i, 274. 260 See Francis Thynne (Lancaster Herald), ‘A Discourse of the Dutye and Office of an Hearaulde of Armes’ (1605), in T. Hearne, A Collection of Curious Discourses (Oxford, 1720). 261 BL Add. 11320, f. 39. (L&P, XIX, i, 632) Norfolk: warrant (5 June 1544) to Harington to pay Richmond herald his conduct money from London to Dover, 60 miles at 4d., and Rougedragon pursuivant the same at 2d., their three servants at 1/2d. each and coats for the three servants at 4s. 262 Vaughan to Paget, 22 April 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 380. 259

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to promote one of his servants to the place of Hammes, ‘a prety fellow . . . that spekyth French well well and late and understandyth also Italyen and Spanysh.’ This may have been the Nicholas Tubman actually appointed.263 Christopher Barker had been Richmond Herald before his promotion. His successor in that post, Gilbert Dethick, was employed extensively in messages to the Scots during the 1544 campaign and was sent to northern Germany in 1545 to convey Henry’s answer to an offer of service by the count of Oldenburg.264 Payments for troop movements in April 1544 include those for 1 herald, 1 poursuivant and 4 trumpets to be transferred to the Emperor for service against France.265 Formal arrangements were made for each of the corps of the Army Royal to have suitable heralds attached: for the Battle, Garter and Clarencieulx kings of arms, for the Vanguard and Rearguard Wyndsore and Somerset heralds and Portcullis, Bluemantle, Risebank, Hammes and Guînes pursuivants, paid at the rate of 6s a day for Kings of Arms, heralds at 4s, poursuivants 2s and servants at 6d.266 Trumpets were routine messengers between enemies in the field and between commanders and their colleagues. Norfolk complained about a ‘slothful’ trumpet who had taken 10 hours in a message to Etaples, 5 miles away. Nevertheless, they were ubiquitous in the field.267 When Norfolk sent York Herald (Bartholomew Butler) to summon Montreuil to surrender in July 1544, marshal du Biez courteously gave him him gold and silver surcoat, venison and wine for the duke ‘to make merry as if to welcome him to the country.’ His message was of commendations to Norfolk, whom he was bound to honour especially as his siege of Hesdin in 1522 ‘was the cause of his rising to his present ascendancy.’ Du Biez wished him good hunting during the fine weather.268 We know rather less about the Heralds in the French and Imperial camps. We have seen that François de Phallaix, Toison d’Or king of arms, was deputed to declare war alongside Garter in 1543 and sent by Charles to obtain Henry’s terms for peace in September 1544.269 France,

263

Paget to Norfolk, 17 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 136 (L&P, XX, i, 1210). L&P, XIX, i, 159, 162, 173; Council to Richmond Herald, 26 May 1545, L&P, XX, i, 814. 265 L&P, XIX, i, 368. 266 Appointment of Heralds, 9 June 1544, BL Add. 11,320. f. 89v (L&P, XIX, i, 651). 267 Norfolk to Council, 18 Sept. 1544 L&P, XIX, ii, 248. 268 Gruffydd. ‘Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne’ ed. M.B. Davies, p. 19. 269 L&P, XIX, ii, 181.2. 264

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besides the King of Arms Montjoie Saint-Denis, employed some thirty heralds, many inherited from the apanage principalities and an unknown number of poursuivants (e.g. Montpensier).270 Guyenne Herald (François Maillard), who had been employed an interpreter for French diplomats in Germany, was newly appointed as a Herald when he was sent to the Imperial court in spring 1544.271 There seems little reason to minimise the extent of the English military effort in the middle of the 1540s; it was in many ways a prodigious effort of will. How effective was it? The answer rather depends on an understanding of objectives. Judged against the grand strategic objectives laid out in 1543, the returns were minimal and counter-productive. Nor could any English army face a main French army in the field. On the other hand, Henry VIII had made some useful acquisitions in France and embarked on an ambitious programme in Scotland even if as a side-issue. The English had demonstrated the power of their artillery but only a limited capacity for siege warfare. Henry had amplified his bargaining power vis-à-vis his fellow monarchs but at the risk of returning to the isolation he had found himself in during 1539–1540. The effort required for all this tested the Tudor monarchy to its limits.

270 271

See C. Parry, Les hérauts d’armes à l’époque moderne (Paris, 2005). L&P, XIX, i, 132, 134, 137.

CHAPTER SIX

THE WAR IN FRANCE, 1545–1546 Owr commune inemy sall have this symmer handis foulle.1

The Renewal of War around Boulogne, 1545 The year 1545, rather than seeing a running down of the war, saw both sides prepared to throw the dice again; conflict was racheted up on several fronts. This was also the first year since 1492 in which England found itself locked in conflict with France (and Scotland) without the help of allies, this time, though, beleaguered on several fronts. The capacity of the Tudor state to deploy its power was tested to the limit. The Council informed Wotton in December 1544 that ‘the Kinges Majestie doubteth not but that the French King this somer next ensuyng will employe the uttermoste of his power tattempt the recovery of Boulloyn’ and in particular ‘by see for thannoyaunce of his highnes and his subgectz.’ Such intelligence was both accurate and daunting.2 The Welsh soldier Elis Gruffydd recalled that Francis had in the meantime sought to ‘put enough hemp on the King of England’s distaff to keep him busy until the summer came.’3 The French were likely to take the initiative; Henry VIII held Boulogne and to some extent the advantage in Scotland and the only way to disturb the status quo was for France to attack. Such an attack had to take place on several fronts. In early February 1545, intelligence sent to the Emperor reported a French plan to continue the war with England in three theatres: the first at Boulogne itself, where a fort was planned to stop the English garrison dominating the country to the south; the second in Scotland with an army under Enghien, the victor of Ceresole; and the

1 Letter of John Hay to the Queen Dowager of Scotland, 15 May 1545, Balcarres Papers, I, p. 137. 2 Council to Wotton, [17 Dec. 1544], NA SP1/195, fo. 235 (L&P, XIX, ii, 752). 3 Elis Gruffydd, Chronicle, extract in M.B. Davies, ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,’ Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of Fouad I University, Cairo, XII, i (19509), p. 4.

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third a naval campaign from Normandy attacking England directly. Ships were already being assembled from the Mediterranean galley fleet and it the western ports, though the problem was that, at this point the English were stronger at sea. For this, 3 million lt. was being raised in taxation. At the same time, illness continued to take its toll on the rulers. Francis was again severely ill from the probable effects of venereal disease, which had a devastating effect and left him prostrate for several weeks at Fontainebleau; so planning and action inevitably passed into the hands of his minister-favourite Annebault and other chief advisers.4 Royal letters sent out to demand contributions from the French walled towns in February 1545 for the 3 million lt. declared that the enemies of 1544 had been thrown back by stout defence (‘la force et resistance de nostre royaume’) and that Boulogne would still have been held had its commanders shown enough spirit. Only the King of England, who had rejected reasonable peace terms, remained in arms against France. Thus, it was necessary to expel him from France and carry the war to him (‘nous efforcer à gecter en ses pays la guerre.’) The King therefore projected a large army in the Boulonnais and a powerful fleet to invade England.5 The decision to renew war was thus

4 Intelligence report sent by Saint-Mauris, CSP Spain Cal. VIII, no. 115, pp. 217– 230 (L&P, XX, i, 619), wrongly dated to August. The CSP Spain (Simancas Estado 641) gives details of the illness which L&P, omits: ‘for a long time past, the commencement of his indisposition being a slow fever that he caught . . . lasting on one occasion for five days. . . . it was discovered that he had a gathering under the lower parts, which distressed and weakened him so much that he could not stand, and he had to keep his bed. For the cure of this gathering the most expert doctors and surgeons of Paris were summoned. After purging the King they applied a cautery to the abcess, in order to open and destroy it. This treatment was continued until the abcess broke: but instead of discharging in one place only, as they expected, it broke out in three, in very dangerous positions: and there is at present no assurance that he will live. He has even fallen into extreme fainting and exhaustion, but he has always retained consciousness and still does so. . . . As the abcesses did not discharge properly, the physicians have applied three fresh cauteries, and this has caused three issues, whence infected matter flows in great abundance. In order the better to recover from his malady, the King has commenced a course of Chinese wood [sandalwood], which his physicians say he must continue for 20 days. All the medical men are of opinion the malady proceeds from “the French sickness” . . . The King expects to be able shortly to go into the country in a litter, going first towards Blois and thence to his native place, Cognac.’ The cutting of the abcess took place on 7 Jan. (Desjardins, Négociations . . . Toscane, III, p. 142). See Knecht, Renaissance Warrior, p. 495. 5 Registres des délibérations du bureau de la ville de Paris, ed. F. Bonnardot, A. Tuety, P. Guérin, (Paris, 1883–1886) [hereafter Registres . . . Paris] III, pp. 47–49, royal letters, 22 Feb. 1545 to prévôt de Paris.

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made in principle as early as February 1545, despite peace negotiations. Detailed planning seems to have taken place at Romorantin in the second half of April.6 Both sides employed networks of agents to observe what was happening on the other side. For the English these operated mainly out of Calais along well established lines; the lord Deputy and governors of Guînes and Boulogne received regular reports from agents in France.7 There were a few Frenchmen who entered English service, though whether they could offer much is unclear. L’Artigue, as we shall see (chapter 8), probably contributed the galley programme. Jean de Fontenay, sr. de Berteville (more properly, Bretteville) was probably a Norman gentleman acting as a double agent. He seems to have fled France in 1545 when his family had been under a cloud, had fought at Landrecies and Saint-Dizier and was to do so at Pinkie in 1547. Already, at the end of 1546 he was offering his services to the French ambassador.8 Less is known about French intelligence networks, though they must have existed. In October 1545, the Antwerp merchant Pierre Moucheron (most famous for the magnificent family portrait in the Rijksmuseum) was commissioned by the French ambassador in the Low Countries to report weekly on English affairs: numbers of troops, how well paid, whether they were stationed at harbours, foreign mercenaries, whether the people were heavily burdened with taxes, public opinion about the keeping of Boulogne, the state of food supplies and war munitions, passage of troops to Calais and Boulogne, number of ships maintained. Quite a tall order but really the kind of questions any state needed to know. Moucheron then proceeded to report on English troops.9 The military confrontation by land between the French and English armies after 1544 necessarily revolved around Boulogne and can be described in terms of three main crises. First came the moves, unsuccessful, made by the French to establish a fortress to confront the English in the early weeks of 1545. Next came the part played in the

6

According to du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 282. A typical example: Report by John Irish, trumpeter of Calais, March 1546, NA SP1/216, fos. 3–4 (L&P, XXI, i, 471(2)). 8 L&P, XX, ii, 1016 (21 Dec. 1545); 1030; XXI, ii, 29; XXI, ii, 480, 518. For his activities in the 1550s, see E.H. Harbison, ‘French intrigue at the court of Queen Mary,’ Am.Hist.Rev. 45, iii (1940), 533–551, at p. 540–542. F.A. de La Chesnaye des Bois, Dictionnaire de la noblesse, 15 vols. (1770–1786) VI, p. 510. 9 Instruction au sr. de Bolle, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 70–73. The identity of Bolle with Moucheron is revealed in Mesnage’s journal, fr. 17889, fo. 125, 128. Letter of Moucheron, fo. 32. 7


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Boulonnais campaign as part of the overall grand strategy of confrontation initiated in July and lasting until September: the building of the Outreau fort, the attack on the low country of Calais, the terre d’Oye, and the naval campaign in the Channel. Finally there were the somewhat smaller-scale battles of January 1546. A climax was reached in French attempts to tie down the English by implanting a new fortress in July and August 1545. Then, as France strove to prevent Henry VIII’s plan to raise mercenaries in Germany under colonel Reiffenberg and defeat the English in the Channel, the French King ordered a diversionary attack on the Calais Pale under marshal du Biez.10 The fact that all this was happening while peace talks were under way is arresting. The lesson that Henry affected to draw was that it was up to the French to make the offers, since they had attacked him on his own land and his resources were still adequate for defence. Paget also remarked that the talks had had the effect of cooling the efforts of the French in the construction of forts around Boulogne.11 The war in the Boulonnais, which continued for twenty months after the fall of Boulogne and the Franco-Imperial peace, was essentially positional. Both sides committed themselves heavily to large-scale fortifications which could only be taken by isolation and starvation. The war consisted mainly of attempts to create or break blockades of strategic places and both sides proved, because of logistical and organisational problems, unable to succeed in their primary aims. As had been the case since 1543, both sides used the Emperor’s territory to secure their loot or as a base from which to attack the other. This was regarded as normal though everyone protested about it. Francis I claimed that self-styled ‘wild Englishmen’ (‘ceulx qui se font appeller Anglois sauvaiges’) constantly used the Emperor’s territory as a base of operations, whereas, of course, the French had never done so.12 The impact of such fighting on the local population was predictably intense. In France, the burden of war was felt both in taxes and in direct enemy operations for several years. Norfolk’s march to Montreuil revealed one of the commonest stratagems of the people of the area, vaults or caves carved in the rock near the village of Alquines, where 10 Du Bellay, IV, pp. 314–321; Monluc, Commentaires, pp. 182–188; On all this, see below chapter 7 and D. Potter, ‘The international mercenary market in the sixteenth century: Anglo-French competition in Germany, 1543–1550’ English Historical Review, 440 (1996), 24–58. 11 Van der Delft and Scepperus, 21 Aug. 1545, CSP Spain, VIII, pp. 237, 239. 12 Memorandum of Mesnage, 1 Dec. 1545, BnF, fr. 17889, fos. 88–89; Francis I, rec. 10 Dec. 1545, BnF, fr. 17889, fo. 106v.

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the local people had been storing their valuables in wartime since 1513.13 The area to the south of Boulogne was most directly hit, both by the English and the passage of French and Imperial troops. For instance, the inhabitants of Berck, a fishing village technically subject to the Emperor but enclaved in French territory, reported that in 1544 they had had to abandon their homes for six months ‘as a result of the pillage, abuse and oppression that the English and Irish committed against them while encamped at Montreuil.’ 200 houses and some of their boats had been destroyed. The Dauphin’s army had occupied the village, cutting down fruit trees. Then in summer 1545, when Francis I assembled his army to recover Boulogne, the royal army’s French, landsknechts and Italians stayed for three months. All this left 250 inhabitants out of 1800 and 20 houses out of 300.14 Nearby Verton suffered attacks by French armies in 1542 and 1543 and then in 1544 by the English. The village was abandoned for nine months and, as at Berck, they found 270 of their 300 houses burned by the Irish troops of Henry VIII. Then in 1545, as at Berck, the landsknechts came and cut down their trees. As the inhabitants summed it up, ‘in present lifetimes the village will never again be seen as it was before in quality and value because some of the inhabitants were captured and killed by the English, others dead of the plague and poverty and the rest forced to beg their bread.’ At Merlimont, another fishing village already damaged in 1542–1543, the inhabitants were forced to pay contributions to the English siege army before Montreuil. Again, in 1545 there were raids by both French and English.15 All the other villages of this region – Groffliers, Saint-Aubin, Argoulles, Noyelles and Waben – suffered in the same way. The villages around Thérouanne and Ardres reported severe losses both in 1543 and 1544. At Fauquembergues, an army of 20,000 men camped for 12 days in 1543.16 Elsewhere, villages suffered devastation on the march of Wallop’s army to and from 13

Gruffydd, in M.B. Davies (ed), ‘The enterprises of Paris and Boulogne,’ pp. 12–15. AN J 1017 fo. 381r: ‘au moien des pillaiges, foulles et oppressions que faisoient sur eulx les Anglois et Irlandois estans lors campez devant Monstroeul.’ Technically, the English were able to attack this territory because it had been seized by way of compensation for his losses in Flanders by the duke of Vendôme. 15 Ibid., fo. 384r: ‘de memoire d’homme l’on ne verra led. villaige en telle nature et valleur qu’il estoit au paravant par ce que partie des habitans ont esté prins et occis par les Anglois, les aultres mors de la peste et povreté et le reste des aultres sont constrains mendier leur pain.’; 386r. 16 Ibid., fo. 458r–505r, villages of the bailliage of Saint-Omer, damage during the march of the sr. de Buren to join the English in 1544. 14


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Landrecies.17 In fact, the whole of Artois was badly damaged as a result of military operations in 1544. Adrien de Croy-Roeulx summed up the state of destruction and famine at the end of 1544: ‘I never in my life saw the people of Artois so desolate and in such despair as they are now.’18 From the start, neither side succeeded in establishing exclusive control over the estuary of the river Liane, which formed the harbour of the town, and this created a stalemate difficult to break. We also have to ask whether the English or the French were able in any sense to control territory. The strategy of the English, for instance, seems to have been to rely on fortresses which could be revictualed from the sea. Was the inland territory of the Boulonnais possible to control at all? Henry left 3000 men to hold Boulogne in October 1544. In February 1545 there were 5000 in all the garrisons, in August 1545, 8065 but in February 1546 only 4400 (though there was a field army about to be deployed).19 English military resources were stretched very tightly in 1545. Faced by the French attack at Boulogne, Henry aimed to send another 5000 men to Boulogne in July but commitments were already great: he was having to put 1000 into Portsmouth, 2000 into the Isle of Wight, 3000 into the fleet and 2000 had already been sent out to Calais and Boulogne. The new troops for Boulogne therefore had to be raised in the eastern counties through Norfolk’s commission.20 (Appendix 11) Could numbers in the range of 4–8000, with the garrisons of Calais and Guînes have been able to control the territory? The answer is probably yes, though only if unchallenged; how far the garrisons operated outside their bases is questionable. The French could not be prevented from penetrating between Boulogne and Calais when they had sufficient military power, at least until the construction of a serious scheme of fortification. Throughout 1545–1546, for instance, the captain of Samer, Jean de Roquetun, and his men were able to ‘annoy’ the English moving between Calais and Boulogne.21

17

E.g. Sauemont in the bailliage of Arras, ibid., fo. 31v. Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 21 Oct. 1544, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 41v: ‘je ne veys jamais en ma vie le peuple d’Artois si desolé et desesperé qu’il est ad ceste heure.’ 19 L&P, XX, i, 8 (?) 26 Feb. 1545; XX, ii, 200 (23 Aug. 1545); XXI, i, 300 (Feb. 1546). 20 Council to Norfolk, 26, 31 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 137, 138. 21 Hertford to Henry VIII, 30 March 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 489. Roquetun was a member of du Biez’ company and later captain of Fiennes. 18

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After the failure of the Dauphin’s initial attempt to recapture Boulogne by surprise, the onset of winter and a breakdown in supplies required the withdrawal of the main French army, though Marshal du Biez was left at Montreuil with his French and Italian ‘bandes’ to watch the English and observe their building at the Tour d’Ordre.22 The Marshal, however, was forced into activity by the King’s impatience to recover Boulogne and a scheme emerged by December 1544 for the building of a fort which would dominate the harbour there and for which the Court promised 4000 extra men.23 The English naturally expected the French to attempt to recover Boulogne, though their assumption that this attempt would take place during the following summer did not deter immediate and frenetic work on the re-fortifications. Moreover, at the end of January the high command in the city was reorganised; the experienced Thomas Poynings was now King’s lieutenant (replacing Lisle), with Thomas Wyatt and Thomas Palmer serving under him.24 Advancing first to Hubécourt early in January with 8000 men and 4000 pioneers, du Biez initially attempted to achieve surprise by concealing his intention to build a fort, but from the outset his plans began to go awry. Du Bellay reports continual rain while, as usual, money for the newly-raised men was slow to arrive and both wood and construction workers were in short supply.25 In fact, the difficulty of finding reliable workers proved an almost insurmountable problem to both sides in these years. The English experienced great problems in pressing men into service for their own large-scale works at Boulogne and, early in 1546, the French even tried to compel gypsies to such

22

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 280–281; du Biez to Francis I, 1 Jan. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 206. 23 Letter-patent of Francis I to Matignon, 12 Dec. 1544, Correspondance . . . Matignon, p. 109. 24 Instructions to Hertford, L&P, XX, i, 121 Lisle’s service was now necessary at sea so Poynings was appointed as he ‘hath ben longest acquaynted in the warres with the Frenchmen uppon the frontyers, and best knoweth their natures, and speketh also their language, which is a thing very necessary for our service’ (St.P. X, p. 252, L&P, XX, i, 121). 25 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 280; Du Biez to Francis I, 1 Jan. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 206; Francis I to Matignon, 10 Jan. 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, no. CLXIV: he is raising 8–10,000 men ‘en Picardie, pour executer quelque entreprise’; an Imperial intelligence report of 6 February puts the French force at 6–8000 foot plus cavalry (L&P, XX, i, 619), Italian reports 10,000 foot, both French and Italian (B. de Medici to Cosimo I, 9, 11 Feb. 1545, ASF, Mediceo, f. 4590, fo. 96r, 98v. Lack of food was already encouraging Italians to desert to the English.


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works, on the principle, perhaps, that, if they were to be expelled, they might as well be put to good use first.26 As the French operations got under way, an Italian captain, Paolo Orsini, predicted disaster because of the scoured state of Picardy, which had now been fought over for three successive years.27 To the problems of providing fodder was now added the ruination of the dray horses by muddy roads and overwork. This in itself slowed down the transport of the necessary wood from the forest of Hardelot. Du Biez himself reported to the King that the lack of progress was to be explained: Both because of the bad weather, which is incredible, and because of our shortage of horses and supplies for them, for which we have received no help from Normandy.28

Not even fifty hangings had been sufficient to halt the disintegration of the construction force by abscondment and arrears of payment had aggravated the soldiers’ ill-temper at dear food and poor conditions.29 The result of these delays was that du Biez had not had the time effectively to fortify his position on the hill facing Boulogne when, on 5 February, the Earl of Hertford attacked in force. With du Biez narrowly escaping capture, the rout would have been worse, according to du Bellay, had not Captain Villefranche rallied the retreating French. Italian mercenary captains put the French losses as high – over 1000 dead and four pieces of artillery lost – and recriminations ensued between du Biez and the Italians, who claimed that they had rescued their own artillery in the retreat, while du Biez accused them of lying.30 26 Council of Boulogne to Privy Council, 21 Feb. 1546. See also Monluc’s comment on du Biez’s problems in September: ‘car tous les pioniers l’avoient laissé, s’estans dérobés, comme c’est l’ordinaire de ceste canaille, qui ne veille sur eulx.’ Commentaires (ed. Ruble), II, p. 81. 27 Alvarotti to Ercole II,? Jan. 1545, ASM, Francia B 20, fasc. 3, pp. 75–76: Orsini thought that insufficient arrangements had been made to feed the French army ‘per esser tutte quelle frontiere, et tutti quelle luochi frusti, et consumati d’ogni interno che tien per fermo che totto lo exercito che passara di la, debba morirsi de fame, perche dalla prima provisione in fuori la quale si tiene che sea gagliarda, non li faranno piu.’ Orsini listed French forces as 300 Italians formerly in the Emperor’s service and 12,000 French (Picards and Normans – presumably legionnaires). 28 Du Biez to Francis I, 3 Feb. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 207: ‘Tant pour l’indisposicion du temps, quy est incroyable, que pour la necessité que nous avons desdictz chevaulx et vivres pour iceulx, dont n’avons esté nullement secourus de Normandye.’ 29 Henry VIII, instructions to Wotton, L&P, XX, I, 146, p. 68: French mutineers desert for lack of wages and victuals. 30 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 10. Feb. 1545: ‘che sono certa vij m fanti che erano presso Bologna si sono retirati a Monteruol con qualche poco danno, perche pare che sia sopragionto novagente dell’isola d’Inghilterra’; 11 Feb. 1545: ‘con perdita di piu di

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Henry VIII exulted in this victory, which he claimed had been won by 5000 against 14,000 French. The wine captured from du Biez’s baggage was swiftly sent off to Wotton in the Low Countries to sample.31 French confidence in their Italian soldiers was shaken.32 The French had failed in their objective of building a fort from which to bombard Boulogne and were in a confused state. Captain Girolamo da Modena, ensign under Count Berlinghieri, describing the battle and its consequences, confirmed by the engineer Antonio Mellone, that an opportunity for a greater English victory had been on offer: If the English had pressed on and crossed the bridge, where there was a small guard, they had broken the whole French force and pillaged Montreuil so gaining control of the whole of Picardy, because all the French men who had been in camp here had been withdrawn from Montreuil and other places.

French forces were now reduced to 900 Italians, 2000 landsknechts and Picard foot and 1000 cavalry, all in garrison.33 Attention in the frontier war shifted to Ardres, now almost isolated in English-controlled territory. Shortly after the English attack on du Biez’ forces, the Marshal reported the loss of the outlying tower at Autingues, near Ardres.34 Though he minimised the shame by noting the great number of cannon-shots required to enforce the surrender of its small garrison, we learn from Italian sources that the French had just not thought to fortify it and that the garrison of Ardres was mille huomini, perche questi di Bologna con un’grosso socorso che le era venuto dal’isola uscirno fuori . . . et ancho perche molti Italiani del campo francese erano gia passati nel campo di la’; 6 March: captain Melone affirmed that the French lost four cannons and that the defeat had been spurred by the flight of ‘le quatro insegne che erano all guardia del ponte’ forcing 2500 men (Italians, Picards and Gascons) and 35 horse to retire. ASM Francia B 20, fasc. 4, fos. 7–10, 11–12, 46. B. de Medici to Cosimo I, 11 feb. 1545, ASF, Med. f. 4590 fo. 99. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 280, says Surrey was the leader of the English attack, confusing this with the battle of January 1546. Carne reports the English leader as Hertford (Carne to Paget, 10 Feb. 1545, L&P, XX, i, 170; Council to Shrewsbury, 12 Feb. 1545 ibid., XX, i, 180, giving French losses as 6–700. 31 Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 152; Wotton to Paget, 10 Feb. 1545, L&P, XX, i, 169). 32 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 14 March 1545, ASM Francia, B 20, fasc. 4, fo. 82v: du Biez had been heard to accuse the Italians of being the ones who had lost their artillery. 33 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 14 March 1545: ‘Se Inglese spingevano inanti, et passavano il ponte ove erano per guardia quelle poche compagnie, che rompevano del tutto le gente francese, et piglianavo Monterulo et erano patroni di tutto la Picardia perche tutte le genti de Francesi che erano quivi in campa qua erano tratti di Monteruolo et delli altri suoi luochi.’ 34 Du Biez to Francis I, 19 Feb. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 210.


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reduced and poorly supplied.35 The direct route from French territory to Ardres was now cut. February saw du Biez preoccupied with Ardres, planning a muster of men at Thérouanne who could use the cover of Imperial territory to run supplies into the town by night, during the period of full moon. The King, hearing du Biez’ account of the fall of Autingues, was not disheartened since the road from Thérouanne was still open and the loss of the direct route ‘cannot stop you, with the force I have given you from putting supplies into Ardres in such quantity that I shall be able to rest assured.’36 Du Biez was still confident that Ardres could be revictualled and Vendôme was at Abbeville ready to move men to Therouanne.37 But by mid-March the marshal had sent his half-brother to court to report an alarming build-up of English pressure against Ardres. So desperate was the situation, that Enghien and Taix were ordered to lead the young gentlemen of the Court (always anxious to seek action) to re-enforce du Biez, much to the contempt of the Italian captains on the spot.38 Ardres was in fact relieved by the despatch of Dampierre.39 As a result of a joint expedition from Montreuil and Therouanne in early May, by the middle of that month Count Berlinghieri at last got through and resupplied the

35 Alvarotti, 14 March 1545: captain Melone reported only 300 men foot and 450 ‘some’ of supplies. The English had prevented further supplies from getting in (ASM Francia, B 20 fasc. 4, fo. 82r–v of decipher). B. de Medici to Cosimo I, 14 March 1545, ASF, Med. f. 4590, fos. 123v–124r: the English were threatening to cut Ardres off completely. 36 Francis I to du Biez, 23 Feb. 1545, Potter, Du Biez: ‘ne poura empescher à la force que je vous laisse que vous ne mettez vivres dedens Ardres en telle habondance que j’auray occasion d’en demourer en repos.’ 37 C. de Riart to deputy of Calais, 2 march 1545, BL Harleian 288, fo. 90 (L&P, XXI, i, 296). 38 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 20 March 1545: ‘che Anglesi facevano les trenziere intorno di Ardes, pero che se Sua Maestà non la soccoreva tosto che portava gran pericolo: Sua Maestà ha expedito subito a chiamar Monsr d’Anghiun et Monsr de Thes et sotto il governo loro disegna di mandar quello maggior numero che contra di questi gioveni et camerieri che sono in Corte . . . Me dice Melun che quando siano 800 overo 1000 che serano tutto il mondo et la maggior parte di essi inexperti, di modo che per questo rispetto, et perche Inglesi all impresa di Ardres sono 1200 bravi cavalli et vj m fanti . . .’ he expects no good result. (ASM Francia, B 20, fasc. 4, fo. 111 (decipher); 21 March 1545: English now reported to be 10,000 foot 1200 ‘bravi cavalli’ and that ‘si vi andaranno questi gioveni della corte, che si ragiona, che morirano o tutti, o la maggior parte, perche Inglesi combatteno et non stimano presento il moror.’ (ibid., fo. 116 (decipher). 39 Du Biez to Francis I, 30 March 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 214; Alvarotti to Ercole II, 15 April 1545, ASM Francia, B 20, fasc. 4, fo. 75 (decipher); Chapuys to Bave, 19 May, CSP Spain VIII, no. 54 (L&P, XXI, i, 771).

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place, opposed only by a screen of fifty English horsemen.40 Claude de Clermont, sr. de Dampierre, an excessively brave commander perhaps, was unlucky at Ardres. Early in June, he led a sortie against the English and lost 100 foot and 20 horse. Finally, he was killed in September in what became known as the ‘windmill skirmish.’41 The success at Ardres was a welcome development in the war for the French, for the English had just managed to recapture Hardelot, a castle a few miles south of Boulogne, which commanded the route from Montreuil. In March, du Biez had asserted that more money was needed for its repair after the English had taken it in 1544 but that it could not be retaken. This, though, is exactly what happened in May when the castle, ‘an ‘evil neighbour’ to the English, garrisoned by 96 men, surrendered easily at a time when French forces in the area were weak. An English garrison of similar number was stationed there.42 There were broader aspects to the struggle in the Boulonnais. 1545 was the year in which the English and French were competing vigorously for the services of German mercenaries (see chapter 7). Already, as we have seen, a grand strategy of a three-pronged attack on England was being discussed early in 1545.43 Du Biez reported to his master in February that the English were expecting reinforcements from Germany in order to attack the French base at Montreuil,44 while the French were obviously in the same market. Both sides had used 40 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 8 May, 1 June 1545, ASM, Francia, B 20, fasc. 4, fo. 147, deciph, fo. 170, deciph: ‘et non vi ha havuto una difficulta al mondo, comparvero solo 50 cavalli de inimici.’ 41 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 9 June 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, fos. 182–186 (decipher 185v); 22 September 1545, ibid., fasc. 2, fo. 61, ‘la scaramuzza del molino’ Council to Hertford, 5 Sept. 1545, St.P., V, p. 508: Grey and Surrey, having arranged to meet by the river on 2 Sept. ‘the alarum was given, whereupon the Lord Grey retourning tooke order for the saveguard of his men . . . and anon . . . the horsemen of Guynes entered in to skarmuche the thennemy, wher was slayn Monsieur de Dampierre captayne of Arde, and many other to the number of 100 and above.’ For the story of the transport home of his decaying body and the mishaps on the way, see royal letters of remission for Jean de Vizean, sr. de Trueil, his maître d’hôtel, Jan. 1546, AN JJ 257B, no. 26, fo. 8r–v. 42 Du Biez to Francis I, 30 March, Potter, Du Biez, no. 214; Poynings was appointed its captain (Poynings to Henry VIII, 11 May 1545, L&P, XXI, i, 708). Hardelot remained in English hands until the French advance in July 1545. The French began to rebuild it and it again became an ‘evil neighbour’ (Poynings to Henry VIII, 13 July 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1187). B.-J. Thobois, Le château de Hardelot (Montreuil-sur-Mer (1905), pp. 73–4. 43 Undated Intelligence from France, 1545, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 115 (L&P, XX, I, 619). 44 Du Biez to Francis I, 19 Feb. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 210 warrant for payment to mercenaries, 29 Jan. 1545, L&P, XX, i, 111.


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German landsknechts in the previous year and now Francis I had commissioned the Rhingrave and the Hessian Captain Reckerodt to raise 6000 men for service in Picardy.45 The English were both unlucky and incompetent in their negotiations and allowed themselves to be out-manoeuvred by French envoys, both at the Imperial Court and in the recruiting-ground of the Rhineland. On the other hand, the arrival of the considerable body of Germans for French service seems to have tipped the fortunes of war decidedly against the English at Boulogne.46 In his survey of military needs early in the summer of 1545, Paget thought that: At Boulloyn, the have victails and men ynoughe, and ther is delivred to the Treasorer 16000£ for the same, and Mr Lee hath commaundement, on your behalf, to send 300 pyoners thither more.47

But French forces were becoming formidable, on paper at least. The gendarmerie companies of Vendôme, the Constable, du Biez, La Rochepot, Villebon, Heilly and Dampierre had already been ordered into position in Picardy early in March, the hommes d’armes summoned to the colours in neighbouring provinces. In April, Francis summoned to their garrisons the Norman companies of Estouteville, Montpensier, Annebault, Boutieres, Curton and La Meilleraye and in June the companies of the Dauphin, Orléans, Boisy, Maugiron, Brissac, La Roche du Maine and Escars were summoned from Languedoc to Picardy. The royal army was reforming.48 French infantry companies were also being assembled. Four companies were initially directed from Normandy and Brittany to Honfleur but were then redirected to Abbeville for the land army. These companies were those of Kerrouen, La Moyenne, Renouard and Saultrice; Kerrouen’s (from Brittany) directed via the étapes set up for the naval troops.49 Du Bellay recalled that the army was to consist of 15,000 landsknechts under the Rhinegrave, Reckerodt 45 Francis I to du Biez, 23 Feb. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 211 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 280–281; Potter, ‘Les Allemands et les armées françaises’ p. 4. 46 An Imperial report in June 1545 noted serious problems with the landsknechts who had arrived in Champagne and were disorderly. They would not march from Noyon until they were paid (L&P, XX, i, 1036). 47 The State of thinges, as well within the Realme, as at Calays, and Boullon, and the Marches, St.P.I, ii, no. CCXI, corrected by Paget. 48 Francis I to Matignon, 3 March, 10 April, 21 June 1545, Correspondance de Matignon pp. 114–115, nos. CLXX, CLXXIII, CLXXXIII. 49 Francis I to Matignon, 2 May, 18 June 1545, ibid., nos. CLXXIV, CLXXIX.

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and Ludovic, 10,000 French from Gascony and Languedoc, all under the command of marshal du Biez.50 Once the landsknechts had arrived, the order went out for du Biez to recommence work on the fort opposite Boulogne, adequate to accommodate 4–5000 men and command entry into the harbour. According to du Bellay, this formed part of a wider strategy decided in May 1545 to hem in Boulogne by land and sea and then proceed to an attack on Guînes in order to put pressure on Calais and the terre d’Oye. The King intended to be present himself. This time construction workers, carts and horses were in plentiful supply and the weather smiled on French efforts.51 But subsequent events tell a different story. For a start, the forces allocated to Picardy were simply not in place quickly enough. As late as 2 July, Francis I was deploring this dilatoriness: Of all the gendarmerie I had ordered for Picardy, only a hundred horsemen are to be found at the moment, at which I have very great cause to be discontented with the chiefs and captains, since the hour approaches to start work on the fort I wish to build before Boulogne.52

Du Biez assured the King that the fort would be completed by the middle of August and the court left for Normandy to observe the naval campaign planned against the English in the Channel during the summer. Almost immediately, problems of command began to affect French plans: the Germans refused to sit by protecting the construction workers, as they had been ordered, while du Biez had problems finding seamen to man the covering ships.53 Throughout his account of these campaigns, Martin du Bellay is hostile to du Biez, condemning his faulty decisions. In fact, it seems difficult to condemn the Marshal for lack of drive or courage and the subsequent mess looks more like the result of the usual administrative confusion.

50

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 284. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 282–284. 52 Francis I to Vendôme, 2 July 1545, BnF, Fontanieu 254, fo. 168; BN fr. (Béthune 8535), fo. 110: ‘de toute la gendarmerye que j’avoys ordonné pour la Picardie, il ne s’y retrouve pas à ceste heure cent hommes à cheval, de quoy j’ai merveilleusement grant occasion d’estre mal content des chefs et cappitaines d’autant qu’estant l’heure venue qu’il fault commencer à frapper à l’oeuvre du fort que je veulx faire devant Boulloigne.’ 53 Francis I to Matignon, 26 July 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, p. 127. 51


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Du Biez arrived with his main forces – 16,000 foot and 6–700 horse – on the 6th July. For the moment the English were too weak to attack this force while it was still in the open without encampments. English chroniclers were impressed. Hall recorded that a French army had 20,000 men and that, although they could not defeat the English garrison, they managed to start the building of their new fort.54 The interrelatedness of the problems at Boulogne and in the Channel is revealed by Paget’s and the Council’s despatches from Portsmouth. Paget was concerned both with defence against the French fleet and with the looming crisis at Boulogne when he reported the establishment of three French camps: of 400 cavalry on the ‘hill towards the see,’ 6000 Germans with artillery on the ‘slant of the hill’ leading from Montreuil and 4000 French and 800 Italians around Pont-de-Bricque, where they were busy building a bulwark. By the end of July, they reported the French fortress as so threatening ‘as if the same be not taken from them in tyme the commodite of the haven is lyke to be taken from’ the English.55 When Martin du Bellay, who was sent by Francis to inspect progress, arrived in the middle of August he found the fort still incomplete and, in his opinion, sited in the wrong place, on the hill of Outreau instead of at the entrance to the river Liane, controlling the harbour. Du Bellay, attacked the influence of the Italian engineer, Antonio Mellone, in this decision, though it is likely that du Biez took the decision himself in opposition to Mellone’s opinion. Du Biez in fact told du Bellay that the riverside site was impossible; it lacked water and was inhospitable. When Monluc arrived from Le Havre with his Gascon troops, the curtain-walls facing Pont de Bricque were still unfinished and du Biez ordered his soldiers (in vain) to take a hand with pick and shovel. Finally Monluc (as he claims) led his men by example into the works creating a happy stakhanovite atmosphere with songs and sufficient food to get the work done.56 Moreover, it

54 Poynings to Henry VIII, 6 July 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1122; Hall, ed. Whibley, p. 351, Hall got the date of the advent of French forces (7 June) wrong. Wriothesley recorded it as ‘about’ 5 July (Chronicle, p. 156). 55 Paget to Norfolk, 17 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 136 (L&P, XX, i, 1210); Council to Norfolk, 26 July 1545, ibid., 6989, fo. 137 (L&P. XX, i, 1276). 56 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 305–306. Monluc was rather more sympathetic to du Biez’s position, pointing up the usual difficulties with construction workers ‘comme c’est l’ordinaire de ceste canaille qui ne veille sur eulx.’ (Commentaires, ed.Courteault, pp. 179–181; ed. de Ruble II, p. 81). Inevitably, Monluc uses this as a lesson on how to get soldiers to work willingly by showing a good example.

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seems that du Biez had not neglected to site a battery down by the harbour, while according to English observers, the fort was going ahead apace at the beginning of August.57 Francis I and Annebault moved at the end of August with a large army to Forest-Montier, near Rue, a position from which they could oversee the works at Boulogne and decide what to do with his forces, estimated by du Bellay at 12,000 lansquenets, 12,000 French foot, 6000 Italians, 4000 legionnaires, 1000–1200 hommes d’armes and 7–800 light horse; these figures are probably inflated and certainly greater than available to English intelligence.58 It was at Forest-Montier that the death of the King’s son, Orléans, took place (9 September), with all its consequences for change in French policy; reconciliation with the Emperor was now virtually impossible, while talk of a truce with England receded (see chapter 9). Meanwhile, according to du Bellay, du Biez, apparently alerted to an English move from Calais, took the decision to take all available forces across the Liane and camp on Mont Lambert (later called the Boulogneberg fort) in order to cut the English road to Calais and leaving 4000 men in the new fort. Perhaps he realised the hopelessness of the fort-building operations and wanted to save his reputation by forcing the English to come to battle. Du Bellay criticised this move on the grounds that it would expose the workmen at Outreau to English attack and that an English attempt to revictual Boulogne by land was unlikely in view of their inferiority in numbers. Boulogne continued to be supplied readily by sea and it was this that posed the real problem. He also asserted that Francis I himself had remarked that du Biez was not so interested in recapturing Boulogne as retaining an army in which he could command great lords and princes.59 However, in view of the fact that Mont Lambert later became a crucial part of the Boulogne defences, du Biez’ decision need not seem so 57

L&P, XX, i, 1160, 1197 (p. 582); XX, ii, 8, 200. Estimate in du Bellay, IV, pp. 307–308. A detailed French spy report to the English, NA, SP68/15, fos. 72–73 (CSPF Edward VI, Calais papers, no. 161, ii –misdated to 1548) gives 7–8000 Germans, 3000 Picards, 9 ensigns of old bands of Piedmont (c. 3000), 4000 arrière-ban and 500 hommes d’armes. The date is revealed by the King’s recent visit to Sénarpont (thus the end of August). 59 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 307–308. Alvarotti to Ercole II, 20 August 1545, ASM, Francia B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 234 (decipher), presumably means Boulogneberg when he reports: ‘intendendo per vero non essersi fatto ne principiato quel forte fra Bolgna e Cales, di modo che da quella parte quelli di Bologna et di Cales vanno l’uno dall’altro sena arme in dosso.’ 58


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eccentric. Du Bellay goes on to describe the skirmishing (between the castle of Boulogne and the tour d’Ordre) between the English and the young nobles like Enghien, Aumale, Nevers and La Trémoille, who again flocked from Court to take part, in the best tradition of chivalric action. This probably explains its inconclusiveness, as du Bellay explicitly states that ‘it must be understood that the English easily came off best.’60 The arrival of news in France that the English had at last got their mercenaries near the borders of Champagne caused to Francis to move eastwards to watch them. He left du Biez with instructions so to devastate the Pale of Calais that, should the Germans get through, they would find no sustenance there.61 In fact, the English-paid mercenaries were on the verge of mutiny in Liège, but the English had other supplies of mercenaries already at Calais and the commissaries were told to persuade Reiffemberg’s Germans to devastate the French borders for a month and then return to Coblenz for payment; a hopeless cause, of course.62 The ensuing campaign around Calais and Boulogne is recorded by du Bellay, Monluc and Elis Gruffydd with differing emphases. The plan to attack the low country of the Calais Pale (the terre d’Oye) had been in place for some time since, on 27 August, du Biez wrote that he would be ready to put it into effect as soon as de Taix arrived with his ‘bandes.’63 Italian observers tended to the view that the army would be led by Admiral d’Annebault and that its objective would be the tour d’Ordre or Guînes. Others even suggested that he would seek out means of negotiating with the English at Calais. Annebault left for the fort on 10 September, accompanied by the prince of Melfi, Maugiron and Martin du Bellay, but by 18th had had to withdraw with a fever and in fear of the plague.64 All the same, as du Biez’s letter makes clear, the objective of the expedition seems to have envisaged the terre d’Oye from the start. It seems that 20,000 soldiers were left by Francis for this purpose, consisting of gendarmerie, light horse, new French infantry (under de Taix) and legionnaires. Du Biez’s army first reconnoitred the

60 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 309–310, 312–314: ‘fault entendre que l’avantage estoit grand pour l’Anglois.’ 61 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 314–315. 62 Council to Fane and others, 19/20? Sept. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 403. 63 Du Biez to Francis I, 27 Aug. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, p. 212. 64 Guidiccione to Farnese, 18, 22, 30 Sept. 1545, ANG, III, pp. 391, 392–393, 393–397.

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defensive works of the Pale, the ditches and block houses in particular that marked the limits of the marsh land. The French seem to have invaded the Pale by passing through the pays de Bredenarde around 19 September. Gruffydd recollected being at Bootes bulwark, seeing to the garrison and looking east to see the fires burning in the low country. On 20th, Cobham reported he had sent out a small force to find out where the French were encamped and which ‘cut off the tayle of the rereward.’ The French were then encamped at ‘Seint Martyn’s house’ (presumably the residence of Nicolas des Marquaiz, the peace negotiator of 1544). Cobham thought their main intention was to revictual Ardres ‘and in the meane tyme attempt some exploict (if they shall suppose they maye doo convenyently) upon the low countre’ and by 27th break up their army.65 This proved complacent. The ‘low country’ of the terre d’Oye was a relatively lightly defended zone since the English tended to expect and attack from Ardres. One of the block houses was taken and the canals crossed. Brissac’s light horse defeated, according to du Bellay, 2000 English (Monluc says 10 or 12 ensigns) sent out from Calais. Du Bellay says they were defeated but, according to Monluc, if these English had been attacked, Calais would have been left defenceless; instead they were left to withdraw and Monluc implies that the fault was that of du Biez. Both du Bellay and Monluc note the onset of heavy rains and the lack of boats to cross the canals, which forced the French to withdraw.66 This battle, involving 8,000 English soldiers – many, according to Elis Gruffydd, merely ‘callow boys’ – and 6000 foreign infantry and 2500 foreign cavalry, was, according to the Welsh chronicler a display of remarkable military confusion, with the foreign cavalry failing to come to the support of the infantry and forcing a general retreat to Calais.67 But the French were too slow to take advantage of the poor tactics employed by Cobham that had left Calais and Guînes unguarded. The commanders at Calais were too timid to mount an effective counter-attack, a point made by Richard

65 Cobham to Council, 20 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/208, fo. 36 (L&P, XX, ii, 415). English documentation of this incursion is very thin. 66 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 316–318; Monluc, Commentaires, (ed. Courteault), pp. 182–188 gives a much more vivid account particularly of the taking of the block houses. 67 The Italian captains in Calais reported to Cobham that the fiasco resulted from the failure of the Cleves cavalry, 1000 men, to come up in support (Report to Cobham, signed by Pallavicino, Zabarelli, Moreni, Bologna and Marengo, BL Harl. 296, fo. 28 (L&P, XX, ii, 464).


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Blount, who complained to Paget that ‘some of our captains do not attend upon their charge but remain nightly in the town, leaving the poor men (that is, the farmers of the Low Country) like sheep without a shepherd.’68 The French attack on the terre d’Oye was alarming and humiliating; Cobham, of whom Gruffydd had a low opinion, sought to maximise the number of French dead (200) and minimise losses at about 1000 marks. The Welshman estimated the burnings in the parishes of Oudekerque (Vieille Eglise), Niewkerque (Nouvelle Eglise) and Offekerque as seven farms worth £7000 each and 500 farmers’ houses worth £100.69 It is true that the raid had little permanent result yet it is remarkable, in view of the vulnerability of the Pale that it revealed, that the Privy Council rapidly moved to reallocate the garrisons at Calais on the very day the French were supposed to have withdrawn.70 At the end of July, the English Council had decided on a re-inforcement for Boulogne of 5000 men, despite countermanding the levies from Surrey on 20 July.71 These, with 3000 of the Calais garrison and 2300 from that of Boulogne, were to face a French force of 12–13,000. Then a more ambitious plan emerged: once the emergency in the Isle of Wight had passed, on 27 July 1000 soldiers were levied for Boulogne in the City of London and were mustered on 4 August. They took ship on 6th from Tower wharf and thence to Gravesend and Dover for the crossing to Boulogne.72 This evidently formed part of a new expeditionary force that was being planned in England to defend Boulogne against the French attack. At some time (which remains unclear) the Duke of Suffolk, who had had been involved in coastal defence, was appointed Lieutenant-general of this force, with Surrey as captain of the Vanguard and Dorset of the rearguard. Suffolk’s death on 22 August seems to have completely transformed this strategy; Cobham and Wallop were recalled for ‘consultations’ with the Privy Council as was Lisle about the sea battle.73 Instead of an army of 12–15,000 men, 68 Elis Gruffydd, Chronicle, ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,’ pp. 29–32 (Gruffydd dates the events on month later, 21–22 October); L&P, XX ii, 787. See also Millar, Tudor Mercenaries, pp. 151–153. 69 Elis Gruffydd, Chronicle, ‘Boulogne and Calais’ pp. 35–36. 70 Council to Cobham and the Council of Calais, 27 Sept. 1545, BL Harl. 283, fo. 201 (L&P, XX, ii, 454). 71 Council to nobles and gentlemen of Surrey ‘that have the conducte of men,’ Portsmouth, 20 July 1545, SHC, LM 6729/10/8. 72 L&P, XX, i, 1303, 1304, 1321, 1322. Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 159. 73 Paget to Norfolk, 25 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/206, fo. 156(219) (L&P, XX, ii, 209): ‘my lord of Suff whose soul god pardon was appointed to have been Lieutenant for

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what was now envisaged was a return to a smaller operation based on the 5000 that Surrey had already taken over, perhaps no more than 8000 men. John Gage had been on the Sussex coast reporting the movements of the French fleet in the narrow seas74 and acting as liaison between his kinsman, the Admiral Lisle and the Council. He told Lisle of Admiral d’Annebault’s movements out of the narrow seas and transmitted Lisle’s news.75 After the withdrawal of the French fleet, pressure on Boulogne continued and in September Gage was commissioned to cross to Calais and thence to Boulogne to join Lisle ‘to reyse the seige’ and ‘to dysease our ennymes.’76 This was the ‘Armye Royall’ scheduled for the ‘defence of our towne of Bulloyne and repulse of our ennemyes the Frenchemen’ for which the King called on supplies on 16 September.77 That all this was a result of a declining French threat seems unlikely, though English commanders may now have been more confident about resistance. The ailing Poynings, faced by a full-scale French royal army and the fleet off his coast with a force of 15,000 aboard, was not convinced that the initial reinforcement plan would work. He died on 18 August, though, and on 3 September Henry Howard, earl of Surrey was commissioned as deputy and had to make the best he could of the troop allocation of 5000; his brief from the King as outlined by Paget, was not to take risks.78 Despite this, he seems to have acted rapidly. On his

the levieng of the siege besides Boloyn, my lord of Surey to have had the vauntgarde, my lord Marques the reregarde and my lord of Arundel marshal of the campe and my lord of Suff decessing[?] this lief saturday at after none my lord marques and my lord of Arundel discharged, and nowe also for as moche (as) my lord Poyninges is departed this life upon this day seveninght, my lord Graye appointed to the charge of my lord of Surey, who went over only with v M men according tothe first appointement ordered to be general of all the crewes at Guisnes being a goodly bande about viijM men . . . I thinke that which shalbe don towards thenemyes shalbe attempted by him, the deputy of Calays the lord Gray and Mr Wallopp.’ 74 Suffolk and others to Paget, Portsmouth, 2 and 3 Aug. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 14, 24. 75 Lisle to Henry VIII, 12, 18, 21 Aug. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 108, 158, 183. Letters of Privy Council to Gage and Sussex justices, 11 Aug. APC, I, p. 226 (L&P, XX, ii, 94). 76 John Johnson to Anthony Cave, 12 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/212 fos. 220v–222r (L&P, XX, ii, app. 43.21), B. Winchester, ‘Johnson Letters’ II, p. 402; same to Southwick, 13 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/212 fos. 222v–23r, ‘Johnson Letters’ II, p. 407. 77 Signet letters to C. Moore and J. Skinner, 16 Sept. 1545, SHC, LM 6729/13/4. 78 Council of Boulogne to Privy Council, 1 Aug. 1545, St.P., X, p. 547 (L&P, XX, ii, 8); L&P, XX, ii, 162, 163; Paget to Hertford, 13 Aug. 1545, L&P, XXI, ii, 118; appointment of Surrey, 3 Sept., L&P, XX, ii, 279, no. 8. Surrey had first been nominated on 9 August, then Suffolk, who died soon after. Next, Grey, governor of Guînes. (Council letters, BL Harl. 256 printed in Nott, Howard, appendix pp. lix–lxiv). Paget to Surrey, 25 Sept. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, App. 30.


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Illustration 6 Map of the Boulonnais by Nicolas Nicolai (1558), Caletensium et Bononiensium ditionis accurata delineatio descripta et edita a Nicolao Nicolai reprinted in Abraham Ortelius, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Antwerp, 1570), fo. 36 (‘Descripta & edita Nicolai Delphinate Parisiis 1558’).

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return to Boulogne, du Biez found that the English had attacked and almost succeeded in taking Outreau. According to du Bellay, 7–8000 men, which would have been more or less the entire English garrison, crossed over by night at low tide (with water up to their knees) to attack Outreau, where the ramparts were still possible to scale without ladders. Despite this, the French commander, Thibault Rouault, sr de Riou, an experienced if unsavoury commander, routinely kept watch during the night and the French were well enough prepared to fight off the attack.79 The placing of the fort was a mistake in two ways; too far away, it made the bombardment of the lower town at Boulogne difficult, and it was difficult to supply from the sea. In fact, though, the whole strategy of building a fort at all seems to have been fundamentally ineffective. Even when, several years later, the French had an effective fort at the entrance to the harbour, they could still not take Boulogne by force. Nevertheless, it could not be concealed that the establishment of the Outreau fort was a severe setback for English strategy in the Boulonnais. Final Phase: Surrey and Hertford Face du Biez The negotiations for an Anglo-French peace under Protestant or Imperial mediation failed in December 1545. Surrey’s main preoccupation over the winter was the isolation of the French fortress of Outreau. This was garrisoned by new infantry companies from Taix’s regiment, commanded by Riou, Dessé, Villefranche and Montmar but the troops there were ravaged by plague.80 Surrey took steps to intercept convoys of supplies either by sea or through the forest of Hardelot where a French base camp was established at Neufchâtel for that purpose.81 A French force was ambushed early in December and it seems, also, as though there was a raid on shipping at Etaples, though this is not well documented.82 Surrey had put forward a strategy

79 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV. pp. 318–319; Saint-Mauris to Charles V, October 1545, AN K 1485, no. 106 (microfilm). For his part in these skirmishes, see Monluc, Commentaires (ed. Courteault), pp. 188–189. 80 BnF, fr. 25973, no. 554, 558, 562. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 326–327. 81 Letter from Heilly dated at the camp of Neufchastel to Francis I, 23 Oct. 1545, Amiens, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 57, no. 5. 82 Surrey, 4 Dec. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 929 (Nott, Howard, I, pp. 181–186); Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 327–328 (misdated). On mentions of the Etaples raid, see Paget to


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of starving out the French fort but had been told to put it on hold until the outcome of peace talks were known. Once these had failed, Surrey was empowered to ‘geve order for the warres’ early in January. He reported that two approaches were necessary: to ensure the safe arrival of supplies to Boulogne by sea and to reduce the French fort before it became impossible to take. Both purposes could be assured by the establishment of a camp near the fort with trenches; this may be assumed to be somewhere around Saint-Etienne, in the trenches used in 1544. This could oversee supplies from le Portel as well as besiege Outreau. In his view, half an army would be necessary to assure its full supply and the weather was not suitable for this. If the plan went forward, the fort could be starved out before the campaigning season began.83 Everything therefore turned on du Biez’ ability to supply his men in Outreau. On the basis of his confidence that the French would be unable to revictual their fort, Surrey seems to have been taken by surprise on 7 January.84 Advancing from Montreuil, du Biez attempted to run in his convoy under cover of an army of 3000 foot and 400 horse. What happened will remain a matter of doubt, as both opposing commanders, anxious to save their reputations, claimed the victory. We also have two contrasting accounts by du Martin du Bellay and Elis Gruffydd, with some observations by Monluc. Du Bellay (no admirer of du Biez) says that the marshal, aware that supplies in Outreau were running short, assembled a force of 50 hommes d’armes, the Rhinegrave’s regiment of 4000 landsknechts and 200 arquebusiers. When he advanced from Montreuil, he was confronted by Surrey at Saint-Etienne-auMont with 6000 men. Despite being outnumbered, he advanced and the battle was ‘long et furieux.’ Finally the English were forced to retreat with the loss of 7–800 and 140–160 prisoners. Surrey only just escaped. Monluc, on hearsay, adds that du Biez, did an ‘acte de vaillant homme’ when, with his cavalry in flight, he dismounted and took up a pike to lead the infantry (not surprisingly, Monluc calls him ‘ce

Petre, 5 Dec. 1545, ibid., XXI, ii, 945; Instructions to Thomas Clere, n.d. 1545, ibid., XX, ii, 245; Council to Gardiner et al., 15 Jan. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 65. 83 Henry VIII to Surrey, 29 Dec. 1545, L&P, XX, ii1052; Surrey to Henry VIII, 5 Jan. 1546, and annexe containing the military plan, NA SP1/213, fos. 24–28 (ibid., XXI, i, 18). Du Bellay also records an outbreak of plague at the French fort at this time, Mémoires, IV, p. 326. 84 Council of Boulogne to Henry VIII, 8 Jan. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 33.

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vieux chevalier’ as he was at this time about seventy).85 Gruffydd puts the French force at 10,000 and criticises Surrey for not waiting for troops from Calais, wanting hog the glory to himself at a time when the English garrisons were in a bad way through lack of food and pay. The English cavalry under Ellerkar advanced on the French and attacked the waggon train, destroying the food. However, they could not withstand the main force of the French infantry, mainly Germans. Ellerkar reported that that the French were too strong and that the English (still strung out in line of march) must take to the trenches that he been constructed by the French a year before. The Welshman declares that Surrey treated his men with contempt in driving them forward to battle. Exchanges of gunfire on both sides were followed by the flight of the main body of the English foot and the death of 22 of their captains. Gruffydd adds the telling point that, when Surrey histrionically called on Sir John Bridges and others to run him through with their swords for the shame, a common soldier told him to turn back on the enemy who ‘would would finish him off quickly enough.’ On their shamefaced return to Boulogne that night, the English leaders set about constructing a story for the king which would put the blame on some of the lesser captains.86 This is indeed borne out by the report of the battle by the Council of Boulogne, which claimed breathtakingly that ‘ther was no defaulte in the rulers, nor lacke of courage to be geven them, but an humour that sometyme raigneth in Englisshe men.’ Surrey and his colleagues insisted that the bulk of the enemy’s supply train had been intercepted but that the English infantry had panicked.87 The most likely explanation is that du Biez’ German mercenaries crushed the English infantry opposing them at the village of Saint-Etienne and inflicted severe losses while the English cavalry broke up the French supply train and prevented an adequate revictualing of the fort. Du Biez obviously put the best interpretation on the encounters in the letters reporting the battle and was told by the king that ‘never was master more contented with servant as I am with you.’ In a long account sent (strangely) to Montmorency, he gives his own account. He tells us that he could not wait for reinforcements that were on the way because of the state of the fort. He therefore moved 85

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 328–329; Monluc (ed. Courteault), p. 190. Elis Gruffydd, Chronicle, ‘Boulogne and Calais’, pp. 39–43. 87 Council of Boulogne to Henry VIII, 8 Jan. 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 3–5 (L&P, XXI, i, 33). 86


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up with about 50 hommes d’armes, 3000 landsknechts and 600 men from the garrisons. The battle at Saint-Etienne was taken on because du Biez could not retreat and keep his supply train safe. Two thousand (out of 6000) English foot were slain but The enemy horsemen, seeing their infantry defeated, took to flight near the place where our supply train was marching, where they pillaged some of the supplies.88

The English claimed that only 20 carts had been allowed to enter the fort. So, whereas at first the French Court rejoiced, it later claimed that the battle had been a draw. On the other hand, Surrey’s reputation inevitably suffered and this hastened his replacement as Lieutenant at Boulogne.89 Reports of this battle suggest a formidable aptitude for news management on both sides. Both magnified the enemy’s numbers and minimised their own.90 On 15 January, the English Privy Council wrote to Gardiner and others in the Low Countries that, in view of the fact that the French might try to misrepresent what had happened, the true figures were 180 English and 600 French killed. Of 70 supply wagons, all but 10 had been destroyed. The loss of seven or eight English captains was caused by their excessive courage. The French would be expected to turn this into a great victory because they captured some battle standards. When he received this, Gardiner got to work to produce a public account that magnified English successes: ‘I con[cluded] that [I never] had in my lief [in so s]mall a matier soo good a chaunce.’ A news report was prepared – called a Vrai Reaporte etc. – and, together with the Imperial councillor de Praet, Gardiner edited it appropriately; A[nd w]e made our men, retourning from Bolen with myrth a[nd re] joyse, to ha[ve] doon a [feate of war] with soo lytel losse, being noon [of any note] slain . . . Oone thing sumwhat troubled us in the tale sent from

88 Francis I to du Biez, 11 Jan. 1546: ‘jamais maître ne se contenta plus de serviteur que je fais de vous.’; du Biez to Aumale, 14 Jan. 1546, Du Biez to Montmorency, 14 Jan. 1546: ‘veoyant lesdictz ennemys gens de cheval leurs gens de pied desfaictz, se mirent en fuytte du costé par où marchoit nostre charrroy ou ilz rompirent quelques vivres,’ Potter, Du Biez, pp. 213–215. 89 See the slightly menacing tone of Paget to Surrey, 18 Jan. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 81: the king is ready to understand, there is always fortune of war, but why has he not heard more? Surrey was recalled on a pretext on 21 March, at the time of Hertford’s appointment (L&P, XXI, i, 433). 90 On the distribution of news to the papal nuncio in France, see Guidiccione to Farnese, 16 Jan. 1546, ANG, III, pp. 420–421.

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chapter six the Lord Deputie: howe it shuld cum to passe that our men distresed sum of the cartes overnight and sum in the mornyng. Herin we wer soo bolde of our horsemen as to make them tary in the felde all the night, partely chacyng Monsieur de Bies, and d[istressing] the cartes and v[ict] ualles, wherof they made an ende in the mornyng. [Herin] we kept the grounde of the truth of that was doon, and facioned it with circumstaunces mete for the same.

This account was distributed to ambassadors and was on its way to Italy. The French King had commanded bonfires to celebrate a victory but then had to admit that it was not such a victory after all ‘and soo nowe the Frenchmen divide the hurte with us by ther own confession.’ Most people, Gardiner ruefully remarked, thought that shame and infamy only hurt insofar as they were physically felt.91 Clearly, the French fort was still in dire straits and minds began to turn towards a full-scale renewal of war. A plan emerged to use the French fleet in conjunction with de Biez’ forces to re-supply the fort, stay there for a week and then move on to Ardres.92 This revictualing was scheduled to take place at the end of February supported by 400 hommes d’armes, 5000 foot, 18 ships and 6 galleys, hastened by news that an English army was soon to arrive. The cavalry would then be stationed at Desvres, Samer and Etaples until the main French army arrived at the end of March. The Rhinegrave would bring 24 ensigns of Landsknechts to join the old bands, 6000 Gascons and 6000 pioneers (as well as 4000 gypsies). Du Biez was to retire, ‘moche blamed for his advice for the placyng of the ffortresse,’ to be replaced by Taix. Plans were active for a new fortified harbour at Etaples for galleys, to be commanded by Salcedo, the governor of Hardelot.93 The re-supply of Outreau sems to have been carried out by sea to Portel early in March and nothing could be done to stop it.94 Surrey, who continued to skirmish with the Outreau garrison to the end of his time as governor of Boulogne, argued that the preservation of ‘this jewell shuld depende upon the successe of any there enter91 Council to Gardiner, Thirlby and Carne, 15 Jan. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 65; Gardiner to Paget, 27 Jan. 1546, Muller, Letters of Gardiner, pp. 227–228 (L&P, XXI, i, 128): the final remark: ‘si saxum in caput id vere malum est; pudor autem et infamia tantum mali adferunt quantum senciatur, si non senciatur sunt ne mal quidem.’ 92 Du Biez to Aumale, 3 Feb. 1546, Potter Du Biez, pp. 215–216. 93 Council of Boulogne to Privy Council, 20, 21 Feb. 1546, Nott, Howard, pp. 207, 209 (L&P, XXI, i, 250, 262). 94 Council of Boulogne to Privy Council, 9 March 1546, Nott, Howard, p. 217 (L&P, XXI, I, 364). This only mentions it in passing.


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price but to be furnysshed of men and victuales of himselffe, which howe tyme, th’enemy and the visitacion [of] God may wast, the yere past m[ay serve] you for a precedent.’95 The appointment of Hertford as Henry’s Lieutenant beyond the seas signalled a more determined approach; the Earl had the calibre to take matters in hand and stop the rot. The new English army, to be commanded by Hertford, was well advanced in planning by this stage. 2000 foreign cavalry had been maintained over the winter and Conrad Pennick had been commissioned to bring 6000 landsknechts by the end of March. Gamboa’s 1300 Spaniards were being transported from Newcastle. This would, in theory, produce and army of 16,000 English, 2000 Italians, 2000 Spaniards, 6000 Germans and 4000 horse. But in addition a navy of 40 ships of 800 tons, 25 others including galleys armed with artillery amidships was to be available; there would be 16,000 sailors. Clearly this would have been a very substantial force, comparable to that of 1544. The main objective was to establish the fort at Mont Lambert (discussed below). Early in March, Henry approved a plan for a first camp beyond Guînes from where Hertford set out with a small troop to Ambleteuse on 30 March. Here, the army oversaw the construction of the first phase of the Ambleteuse fort.96 Du Biez, who had himself intended to seize Ambleteuse, was left at Hardelot and in the words of Hall ‘durst not once come forth to set on our men, notwithstanding his former preparacion and device.’97 Du Biez, after a brief recall to court which seemed to presage his fall from favour, returned to concentrate on the fortifications of Étaples.98 These had certainly become an object of English attentions. The port had rapidly been turned into a major station for the French galley fleet and so it became one of the possible objectives of Hertford’s army. An

95

Surrey to Paget, 15 March 1546, NA SP1/215, fo. 89r (L&P, XXI, i, 394). Paget to Mont, 25 Feb. 1525, St.P., XI, p. 59 (L&P, XXI, i, 272); Davell, Shafto and others to Cobham, Newcastle, 25 Feb. 1546, BL Harl. 282, fo. 353 (L&P, XXI, i, 274); Privy Council to Cobham, 8 March 1546, BL Harl. 282, fo. 357 (L&P, XXI, i, 355); commission of Hertford as lieutenant beyond the seas to invade France at discretion, 21 March 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 431; Hertford to Henry VIII, 30 March 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 489. 97 Hall, ed. Whibley, II, p. 354. 98 Du Biez to Heilly, 2 April 1546, Potter, Du Biez, p. 217. A new galley harbour was being constructed at Etaples in March 1546 and garrisoned by 6–7000 men (L&P, XXI, i, 481); Hertford and others to Henry VIII, 21 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 48r (L&P, XXI, i, 636): ‘Monsr de Bees came yesternight to Estapes with ijc men of armes and that he shall enjoie the rome and office he before had.’ 96

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Imperial agent reported these preparations in April.99 English commanders reported at the start of April that it had been made too strong by the work of 5 or 6000 pioneers and now had a massive citadel. The French garrison was as large as the English force (spies reported 24 ensigns of Germans) and the wind might not serve the English fleet to bring up support. They recommended action against Desvres and Samer instead. Henry was not at first pleased by this news and they had to return to the plan, drawing up a list of ‘doubts’ which centred on the weakness of the army in terms of numbers.100 The landsknechts of Conrad Penninck were now nearing Calais and Hertford had 500 German cavalry at his disposal. Lisle suggested the combined force advance to Etaples to cut off supplies but eventually Henry was persuaded to allow his army to concentrate on Hardelot, Desvres and Samer.101 All the same, Hertford returned to the problem of Etaples, which was obviously proving to be a major threat, and advised that, should the current peace talks break down (and it was clear that the French, like the English, were determined to negotiate ‘sword in hand’),102 the army, reinforced by a further 3000 men, should imme-

99 HHSA, P.A. 62, fos. 113–114: ‘Le Roy de France a deliberé de fortiffier ung port appellé Estappes estans à deux lieues pres de Boulongne qui est entre led. Boulongne et Ardres. Et icelluy faire profonder pour y mectre ses galleres avec vingt navires armees pour avec icelles galleres et navires garder que l’Anglois ne renvituaille Boulongne du coustel de lad. marine. Et du couste1 de terre il a deliberé de construyre cinq fortz, l’ung en ung village entre Boulongne et Calaix pour garder que les Anglois ne puissent venir ny assister ceulx dud. Boulongne, deux aultres desd. cinq fortz se construyront sur la riviere qui serviront affin que l’Anglois ne puisse passer oultre lad. riviere pour addomager la Picardie.’ A smaller fort was to be built to guard that of Outreau, and the fifth was an addition to Oultreau ‘de laquelle l’on baptra plus aisement Boulongne.’ This spy predicted an improbably massive attack on the Tour d’Ordre but sensibly pointed out that ‘ilz ne feront l’amas de gens de guerre jusques ad ce qu’ilz verront quel chemin prandra l’Empereur, doubtans fort qui ne leur face la guerre en Piedmont ceste annee, et aussi quelle issue aura prins la diete de Reinsbourg.’ 100 Lisle to Henry VIII, 1 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 507; Hertford and others to Henry VIII, 3 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 529; Paget to Lisle, 3 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 527, 527.II. A company of Albanian horse in Boulogne were able to raid as far as Etaples and took the prisoners from whom the intelligence was derived (L&P, XXI, i, 577). 101 Paget to Hertford and Lisle, 12 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 586; Pay for German cavalry, 21 April 1546, BL Add. 5753, fos. 190–191 (L&P, XXI, i, 638); Lisle to Council, 18 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 622; Hertford to Henry VIII, 21 April 1546, ibid., XXI, i, 636. 102 Lisle to Henry VIII, 26 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 102r (L&P, XXI, i, 682): ‘either it shulde seame that the French Kyng wold have yt appere to entreate with your maiestie with the sworde in hand as your highnes doth or elles he meanith to be doyng by tymes in cace thynges prove not to his pleasure.’


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diately attempt to take it. Henry approved the scheme, while opting to use the soldiers aboard his ships who were dying of disease at sea.103 Fighting continued around Boulogne and Calais even as the peace negotiators began their work (see chapter 10). The garrison at Guînes made a successful raid as far as Ardres in the middle of April and Wallop even suggested an assault by Gamboa and his Spaniards. This aroused some interest at home but the high command were sceptical about this in view of the strength of the garrison and absence of siege equipment. However, a successful raid was launched against a supply column retreating to Thérouanne from Ardres in which 11 hommes d’armes, 60 foot and 100 carts were taken.104 Rather more serious was a clash, again over revictualing for the French fort at Boulogne, on 25 April. The Albanian cavalry (captained by Cavaliere Tommaso Boa) asked to lie in ambush for the supply train. They were to attack a body of French cavalry on Saint-Etienne and meanwhile Grey, now lord Deputy, deployed the garrison in support at Pont-de-Bricque. The Albanians retreated exhausted and so Ralph Ellerkar took the hill with his light horse and sent for infantry support. The French supply train now retreated through the forest of Hardelot and Ellerkar pursued them towards Neuchâtel but was let down, according to English accounts, by the Albanians. He was killed and several prominent officers including the marshal of Boulogne were taken. The skirmish was a minor disaster, quickly blamed by Paget on the Albanian and German cavalry.105 Du Biez remained in the field until the conclusion of the peace. French plans to attack, should the talks near Calais fail, were therefore not needed and both sides began to concentrate on securing a strong position for the next round, which, in the nature of compromise agreements in the 16th century, could be a matter of a few months, or at most a few years, away. The fighting in the Boulonnais had been debilitating on both sides, inconclusive yet inevitable given the strategic objectives of both sides. It rendered the settlement of the peace treaty more difficult and also 103 Hertford and Lisle to Henry VIII, 28 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 693; Council to Hertford and Lisle, April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 707. 104 Hertford to Paget, 13 April, to Henry VIII, 17 April, Lisle to Council 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 594, 612, 622. 105 Lisle to Henry VIII, 26 April, Grey to Hertford, 26 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 682, 683. Lisle was amazed that Ellerkar, a man of experience, had taken this bait. Paget to Petre, 28 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 691.

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demanded from both sides (but especially the English) and enormous investment in terms of fortification and naval establishment. The treaty of June 1546 simply preserved the status quo at Boulogne. For France, the fighting had absorbed the attention of the government for 18 months, with a result that little was done elsewhere. Digging In: French and English Fortifications around Boulogne Henry VIII himself took a close interest in the refortification of Boulogne after its capitulation.106 It was perhaps for this purpose that the recently exhibited panorama of the town from the north-west heights above it was drawn. This shows the town with ruined walls and stretched from the ‘Master of the Horse’s camp’ (later Boulogneberg) towards the port and was probably made for Henry as a basis for the décor of a chamber at Whitehall.107 At the same time (September 1544) Henry appointed John Rogers ‘surveyor of all the fortifications and works’ at Boulogne with a staff of master mason, master carpenter, chief smith and clerk of works. Shortly afterwards, Thomas Palmer, treasurer of Guînes castle, was appointed to oversee the harbour works, which may indicate that Henry was wary of trusting one man. As time went on, though, his confidence in Rogers outweighed his suspicions and Rogers was given charge of works throughout the Boulonnais, planning the work on a meticulous basis and with remarkable plans that owed much to the rapid development of scaled maps in the first half of the century.108 Rogers often differed from his aristocratic superiors but was usually backed by the King. Paget thought him ‘playn and blunt, which must be borne withall as long as he is well meanyng and myndith the service of the Kinges Majesty.’109 There is no doubt that the trust reposed in Rogers by Henry VIII gave him an unusual degree of authority until the king’s death; he gave little heed to the sensitivities of his social superiors and controlled the work on nine building projects by summer 1546.110 106

L&P, XIX, ii, 424. BL Cotton Aug. I, ii, 116. S. Doran (ed.), Henry VIII Man and Monarch (British Library, 2009), no. 237, p. 238. 108 L.R. Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer (Oxford, 1967), p. 55. 109 [Paget] to Surrey, 8 March 1546, NA SP1/215, fo. 35v (L&P, XXI, i, 356). 110 Shelby, Roger, pp. 86–91. 107


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In the 1552 summary of expenditure on the wars 1543–1550 (Appendix 8) we find that £122,696 had been allocated to the Boulonnais for works in that period, with £47,166 allocated from January 1545 to the end of Henry’s reign. This by any measure was a substantial sum and should be compared with the £27,457 allocated to Scotland for the same period, though far short of the £181,197 that had been spent on fortification in England between March 1539 and January 1547 and £120,675 on Calais and Guînes (where major new works were being built).111 The explanation is in one sense simple; the necessary works to hold on to Boulogne were inevitably very costly but could not be considered as vital as the defence of Calais and the English coast. The fundamental problem, as Shelby has shown, was how to secure a town that was, at first at least, effectively isolated and had to rely on reinforcement from the sea. This demanded work on the harbour and on outlying works to protect the town on the northern and eastern side. In the town itself, the lower part was poorly fortified and the garrison scarcely sufficient to hold it, as the ‘Camisado’ had shown in October 1544.112 The costs of the various works was also itemised from 1545 down to their surrender in 1550: Boulogne (high and low) with outworks Old Man (Tour d’Ordre) Boulemberg New Haven (Ambleteuse) Blackness

82,474.13.4 12,350.5.6 5,147.6.4 15,731.7.5 7,051.10.10

The main problem at Boulogne itself was that the opposite side of the Liane from the town had not been held. There were obvious reasons for this, since an outlying garrison there could only be backed up with difficulty during the building of any fortress. Henry realised this costly mistake himself and ordered the south bank and the hill of Outreau to be occupied; nothing was done.113 Henry had commanded a ‘bastilion’ to be built on the other side of the river to command the harbour but

111 NA SP10/15 no. 11, fos. 18–29 (see Appendix 8) the Calendar of State papers, Domestic series, of the Reign of Edward VI, ed. C.S. Knighton (London, 1992), pp. 258–263 has a useful summary though there are some mistakes which require consultation of the original. 112 The clasic study is P. Héliot, ‘Les fortifications de Boulogne sous l’occupation anglaise (1544–1550), Revue du Nord, 40 (1958), 5–38, which should be read in conjunction with Shelby, John Rogers: Tudor Military Engineer. 113 L&P, XIX, ii, 352.

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Norfolk and Suffolk had been anxious to leave and not risk the French counter-attack. Henry was outraged: Yett if you my lordes of Norfolk and pryvie seall had reamayned your selfes uppon the topp of the hill of the other side of the water and yet my lord of Suffolk encamped abowt the Old Man you shuld both have byn hable to have defendyd the haven and basse Bulleyn and also have letten the frenshe from making of any other bastelian there.114

The same day Norfolk and his colleagues confirmed that Lee, Rogers and the others thought such a construction impossible before the winter adding that they were not very experienced. Henry, unsurprisingly, thought they should have waited for his opinion ‘for that knowledge that they have lerned only at our hand.’115 More amenable was the site of the Roman lighthouse, the Tour d’Ordre (Old Man), where Palmer was called in and the initial earth and wood emplacements for cannon ready in early December. This initially took the form of a circular parapet (see Rogers’ Survey I). By Spring 1545 this had developed into a triangular structure with curtain, angle bastions and ditches, again constructed of earth, described by Martin du Bellay as ‘un fort de terre bien flanqué.’ Palmer in March 1546 described a structure which includes three ‘bulwarks’ and a ‘mount,’ the ditches being 50 feet wide and 11 foot deep. The rampart was finished, 9 foot high and 50 foot thick. In April 1546, the ‘flankers’ were redesigned. Only after 1547 were any masonry works added.116 The Tour d’Ordre was crucial in that it was the only vantage point from which English artillery could command the harbour. As for Boulogne itself, the upper town, obviously the strong point, had received new circular bastions in the early 16th century (the tours Notre-Dame and Française), some of which are visible on the 1544 view, equipped with the King’s salamander device. The same plan also reveals an éperon (horseshoe-shaped artillery emplacement) and fausse-brayes had been constructed throughout. Work on restoring 114 Norfolk and others to Henry VIII, 5 Oct. 1544, Nott, Works . . . of Surrey, appendix no. xvii (L&P, XIX, ii, 353); Council to Norfolk and others, 5 Oct. 1544, NA SP1/193, fo. 28 (L&P, XIX, ii, 352). 115 Henry VIII to Norfolk and others, . . . Oct. 1544, NA SP1/193, fos. 69v–70r (L&P, XIX, ii, 383). 116 Shelby, Rogers, p. 61, plates 19, 20, 21. To these may be added the early 17th century plans of Boulogne in BL 21,117, fos. 5, 22. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 318. Palmer to Henry VIII, 25 March [1546], Hatfield, Cecil MSS, 150, fos. 18–19; Hertford and others to Henry VIII, 7 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 565.


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this system was quite slow but urgent attention was given to the corner of the town where the castle was located and which had proved vulnerable. Here Rogers constructed an extensive earthen bastion (the Green Bulwark), sixty feet in depth, which enveloped the castle and a section of the curtain wall. Otherwise, an extensive network of earthen artillery emplacements was added outside the walls. In July 1545, artillery could be mounted on such emplacements at the Tour Gayette and the porte des Degrés to beat French emplacements on the other side of the river.117 In the south-west corner of the lower town, a completely new citadel was started in July 1545, built of stone, in order to secure the arsenal, the harbour and to be proof against French bombardment. Paget reported in July 1545 that the German troops on the other side of the river ‘have been very busy of late in shotyng to a bulwark of stone in building at the south west side of the basse towne but our men have nevertheless finished theyr work, for now thenglishmen have lerned to contemne the gonne shot.’118 Otherwise, the ramparts of the lower town, extremely vulnerable, remained incomplete. Clement’s bulwark, in the south-east corner, was still not finished in 1549. Still, stone ramparts were started to connect these constructions and to link them with the high town.119 The commanders at Boulogne reported that the new ‘braye’ from the Tower Gate to the stone bastion in the lower town was hardly started and could not be completed in 1546; nor could the works connecting the Tour d’Ordre and the lower town. A further part of this network was started under Rogers’ direction in the summer of 1545. This was the Young Man (to the French ‘le Jardin’), another triangular fort, half-way between the Tour d’Ordre and the Citadel. This went ahead slowly and was still being adjusted in early 1547. It was built of brick and prevented the Tour d’Ordre being isolated from the town as well as commanding the harbour. Surrey was to describe it as a ‘cavillere’ over the harbour but by March 1546 observed that the work there was ‘dampned and in place therof an other worke devised of more travail and chardge, and as me seemethe of morre daungier and lesse defence.’ It is clear from the works agenda of April 1546 that

117 Shelby, Rogers, pp. 64–66; Paget to Norfolk, 17 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 136 in describing this artillery, calls the Porte des Degrés as the ‘Bulloyn gate of the upper towne.’ 118 Paget to Norfolk, 17 July 1545, BL, Harl. 6989, fo. 136 (L&P, XX, i, 1210). 119 Shelby, pp. 66–68.

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the nature of this redesign had not been decided. Some time in 1545, an outer ditch was started to protect all these works.120 The harbour also needed to be protected from bombardment and the citadel had incorporated a stone jetty, 300 feet long, 16 wide and 26 high, for this purpose. This was suggested in September 1545 and largely completed by April 1546. It was only after 1547 that another stone (fortified) mole was added on the other side of the harbour, partly to prevent silting but party to act as a fortification. This was the Dunette, a remarkable construction which much impressed the French.121 Inland from Boulogne, the Master of the Horse’s Camp from the siege (on what is now called Mont Lambert) was garrisoned. Du Biez had occupied the position during the great crisis of the summer of 1545 and not until Spring of 1546 did Lord Grey decide to turn this into a fortress to counter the one being built on the other side of the river at Saint-Etienne by the French. He ordered Rogers to draw up a plan for what would be called Bullemberg or Boulogneberg but, though Rogers was optimistic that he would have it finished in June (it was well laid out with ditches by then), it was still in an indefensible state by the time the peace treaty was signed and the issue of its completion became acrimonious.122 The fort was an earthen one, with four angle bastions.123 There is no detailed plan but a memorandum about what was needed there in 1547 declared that it was still not ‘made upp according to the platte’ and was exposed to enemy action. The circuit of the bastions was 600 feet and each bastion needed 100 men. The report called for a ‘bastilion’ on the top of the hill between

120 The Young Man and the Old Man are shown on the Italian plan, BL Cotton, Aug. I, ii, no. 67, suppl. 10 but bear little relation to the plans as shown in Rogers’ drawing. This may well be the earliest phase. On the Young Man, Surrey to Paget, 15 March 1546, NA SP1/215, fo. 88r (L&P, XXI, i, 394); on lack of progress, Council of Boulogne to Privy Council, 29 March 1546, L&P, XXI, I, 481. Hertford and others to Henry VIII, 7 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 565. 121 Shelby, pp. 70–73. On the jetty or mole, see Council letter, 8 Sept. 1545, APC, I, p. (L&P, XX, ii, 323); Hertford and others to Henry VIII, 7 April, 26 June 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 565, 1159. For a large-scale drawing of the Dunette, BL Harleian Roll, E.E. 14 (reproduced in A. de Rosny, Album historique du Boulonnais,(Neuville-sousMontreuil, 1892), pl. XVII. 122 L&P, XXI, i, 1016, 1017, 1472; ii, 731; Nicholas Arnold was sent to have charge of the fort in July 1546 (APC, I, p. 465). 123 Shelby, pp. 73–75 Hertford reported in June 1546 that the French, before their departure had ‘begonne a forte at Saincte Estiens after the same sorte and fassion of the master of thorse campe.’ NA SP1/220, fo. 141(144)v (L&P, XXI, i, 1074).


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Boulogneberg and Pont-de-Bricque to prevent the French from cutting of water supplies, which had been a problem.124 By 1546, English land communications with Calais had to be secured and this was done by two new fortresses on the coast. The one at Ambleteuse was not begun until the Spring of 1546 but was one of Rogers’ major enterprises (several plans by him of it survive).125 Little is heard of the ‘New haven’ (as it was then called) until the start of 1546. Elis Gruffydd recalled (in perhaps a garbled form) that at first it was the French who had intended to seize Ambleteuse (‘Tempylton’) and cap Gris Nez in order to create a port for galleys all year round and so dominate the Narrow Seas. But Henry, hearing of this, sent a force to occupy these places.126 Surrey thought that, divided by two rivers and six miles distant, it could ‘hardly let attempts against this town by an enemy that has his country at his back.’127 At all events, by the beginning of April 1546 a military camp had been established there and there was discussion of its value (Hertford at first seemed to think little of it) and it was surveyed by Thomas Wyatt and Rogers on 27 March, when they were not optimistic about the idea of creating an extra harbour for English supplies. However, the actual haven as it stood in 1546 had never been managed and there is some doubt whether any large vessels other than ‘rowbarges’ could have used it.128 Hertford quickly changed his mind; on 3 April he declared himself ‘dayly more and more in love with yt and trust to see the same one

124

‘Necessary thynges [so that] this peace may be [defended if] it shalbe besieged’ SHC, LM/1329/193. See also the related report by Nicholas Arnold, NA SP68/15, fo. 159 (CSPF Edward VI, Calais Papers, no. 165). Arnold was bemoaning the state of Boulogneberg in Jan. 1547 (to Paget, 21 Jan. 1547, L&P, XXI, ii, 731) and submitted a devastating statement of its neglect in November 1548, NA, SP68/15, fos. 86–95. 125 Crucial to any study of Ambleteuse is the survey by Jacques Méreau, ‘Les fortifications anglaises d’Ambleteuse,’ Bulletin des amis du fort d’Ambleteuse 43 (1988) and idem, ‘Les fortifications anglaises d’Ambleteuse. Hypothèses de reconstitution’ ibid., 44 (1988). I am grateful to M. Daniel Leunens for drawing my attention to this. 126 Elis Gruffydd, Chronicle, ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,’ Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of Fouad I University, Cairo, XII, p. 44. The same point was made by Hall, ed. Whibley, II, pp. 353–354. 127 Surrey to Paget, 15 March 1546, NA SP1/215, fo. 89 (L&P, XXI, i, 394). 128 Hertford observed on his arrival in France that sacks of supplies being embarked at Dover could probably not be off-loaded at Ambleteuse because of the neep tide. He was awaiting that moment before visiting it to estimate its problems (to Paget, 23 March 1546, to Cobham and Paget, 25 March L&P, XXI, i, 449, 459). His verdict after Wyatt had inspected the harbour was pessimistic (to Paget, 27 March 1546, ibid., XXI, i, 471) but Wyatt and Rogers themselves reported that the harbour was one fathom deep at the worst tide (to Hertford, 27 March 1546, L&P, XXI, I, 472).

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of the best on thisside.’ Indeed it was he who suggested changing the name of the place from ‘Hamultu’ to ‘the New Haven in Boloynoys’ on the argument that ‘the owld name was not perfetly knowen.’ Thomas Wyatt even went so far as to lobby for the captaincy though it eventually fell to lord Stourton.129 On 18/19 April orders went out to supply this emplacement.130 Henry himself sent a plan for a fort with five bastions, though the local experts questioned whether the ground would serve for it. They ultimately decided four was better (Rogers produced a plan for a basically triangular fort with a fourth, smaller, bastion on the side facing the harbour.)131 Henry again rejected this, so at the end of April Rogers produced a plan for a five-angle fort and a barrage across the river Slack completed by another bastion. Work began on the site well before final plans were decided, ground being cleared in the first week of April, every company of 100 men responsible for 100 feet of rampart. Bedrock proved not to be difficult to work.132 The fort was to occupy the emplacement of the existing village. Shelby’s ‘Plan D’ shows some remarkable features and is not by Rogers. It shows some evidence for Italian influence on the internal layout of the fort as well as for the construction of a fine harbour by the use of sluice gates in the barrage across the river ending in a sort of ravelin, itself surrounded by ditches. The design of the bastions is highly original, combining round artillery platforms (paralleled at Château Trompette at Bordeaux) with angle bastions in which the ‘ears’ bend inwards and form part of a fausse braie. This variant was not constructed but is close to Rogers’ final plan for the five-angled fortress. Shelby’s ‘Plan C’ is by Rogers and represents a rationalised version of Plan D. On a hill slightly to the south of the main fort, the English also constructed an earthwork fortress referred to as ‘Sellacq’ by the French after the river. The plan was drawn up in April 1546 for ‘a bulwark newly to be made uppon a hill nere this forte.’ Modern archaeology shows it to have been a quadrangular fort with angle bastions. At all events, the works

129 Hertford to Paget, 3 April 1546, NA SP1/216, fo. 103 (L&P, XXI, i, 530); Wyatt to Paget, 13 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 595. On the name, there was real confusion at the time. Lisle thought it called ‘Hable estue’ in old French because the haven was round like a tennis ball. (Lisle to Paget, 7 April 1546, St.P., I, p. 841 (L&P, XXI, i, 563). 130 Documents on the foundation of the camp and fortress: L&P, XXI, i, 520, 595, 619, 700; APC, I, 390 (18 April); Proc. 19 April (L&P, XXI, i, 626). 131 Lisle to Henry VIII, 1 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 507. 132 Lee to Paget, 8 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 574.


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at Ambleteuse were well advanced by February 1547, though the port works, barrage and ravelin were probably never constructed.133 The other major work was at cap Gris Nez, the ‘Blackness fort.’ This was begun later and only the cellars were in being by February 1547. Here again, a harbour was envisaged by Rogers, who persuaded Hertford that a port in this position would ‘do more service for keeping the narrow seas than all your havens on this side.’ This proved too expensive. He designed the main structure as a quadrilateral fort with angle bastions. No contemporary plans exist134 but this building has been the subject a serious archaeological study since its listing as a protected site in 1988. This has revealed a substantial masonry structure with four angle bastions. In fact, the plan is remarkably complete and the archaeology has revealed much about the internal layout of the structure.135 One of the problems for this fort was supply. Despite plans to make a naval base of it, there was no harbour and so it had to be supplied by land; this raised constant problems into the reign of Edward VI.136 Blackness fort thus completes our understanding of the fortification strategy of the English government in the Boulonnais. Curiously, we know much less about the strategy behind the analogous French fortifications in Boulonnais during this period at Outreau, Saint Etienne and le Portel. Rather less documentation for these is available than for the English works, though we have important narrative sources and some plans. The French wanted to control entry to the harbour either by stationing a fleet off it or by of blocking it. One of the more strange ideas of 1545 was for an underwater bar, made of several pillars bound together by iron, to be sunk at the entrance to the harbour to make it impossible for ships to get in or out.137 133 Shelby, pp. 75–83; L&P, L&P, XXI, i, 394, 471, 472, 507, 565; esp. Hertford to Henry VIII, 27 April 1546, NA SP1/217 fo. 114r (L&P, XXI, i, 686); Stourton to Somerset, 18 Feb. 1547, CSPF Edward VI, pp. 305–306. Méreau, no. 43, pp. 24–28. 134 Shelby, pp. 83–85; L&P, XXI, i, 1159. 135 Germain Mocquot, ‘Un ouvrage fortifié du seizième siècle en Boulonnais: le fort du Cap Gris Nez,’ Bulletin des amis du fort d’Ambleteuse 42 (1987). 136 E.g. report of Stourton, 4 Feb. 1547; ‘thrugh want of an havin,’ SP68/13, fo. 16v (CSPF Edward VI, Calais Papers, no. 8); John Rogers to Somerset, 27 March 1547, SP68/14, fo. 12 (ibid., no. 86): ‘yt is almost unposyble to make sodenlye onny such harbor.’ Rogers even later proposed cutting off the fort from the land by a vast ditch. 137 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 9 June 1545, ASM Francia, B 21, fo. 185 (deciph.): ‘disegna inoltre Sua Maestà di fabricare in una nave 3 overo 4 pilastri di preda ben ligati et firmati con arpesi et cateni di ferro et questa condurla nella boccha del porto di Bologna et fondarla, et a questo modo fare come ci dire uno scoglio dentro adesso porto, accio non possino uscire quelli di dentro et meno venire dentro di quelli di

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The main French work, started abortively in January 1545 and definitively in the August of that year, was the fort of Outreau, on the most prominent hill on the opposite side of the river from Boulogne, precisely the area that Henry VIII had ordered occupied in October 1544. Marshal du Biez was later criticised severely for the siting of this, has been seen, but certain strategic constraints applied. The only way a fortress could be started on the south bank of the river was for the most dominant topographical feature to be occupied. Otherwise the workmen could not be defended. A fort constructed nearer the entrance to the harbour would be impossible to defend from bombardment during its construction Furthermore, before the construction of the fort at Mont-Saint-Etienne, works at Outreau and in its area were always subject to intervention from the garrison of Boulogne. The most detailed account of the construction of the Outreau fort is that of Martin du Bellay, who was sent by Francis to report on progress. Du Bellay was generally hostile to du Biez and this needs to be borne in mind, but the details are informative. According to him, Francis decided on the building of a fort while at Romorantin in late April. Its objective was ‘to hold the garrison of Boulogne in such subjection that they should have no means to cross the water into his country, similarly by building at the promontory opposite the Tour d’Ordre, to impede the entry of ships into the harbour.’ He reports that du Biez had promised Francis that the fort would be ready in the middle of August. Du Bellay found little progress. It had not been placed on the point opposite the Tour d’Ordre but on the hill of Outreau and so could not impede entrance to the harbour. As we have seen, a report of the French movements in mid-July indicated that, when the German troops pitched their artillery on the slope opposite the town (protected by mounds), they could easily shoot as far as the market-place of the Old Town.138 The problem seems to have been that this was unsuitable as a place for a permanent fort. Du Biez explained that the lack of water at the point and the winds made working there impossible. Du Bellay thought that he had relied too heavily on the

fuori, perche se questi di fuori voranno venire in Bologna, veniranno a rompere come in uno scoglio.’ 138 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 283: ‘tenir ceux de Boulongne en telle subjection qu’ils n’eussent moyen de passer deça l’eau en ses pais, et semblablement le faisant sur la poincte vis à vis de la tour d’Ordre, empescher à coups de canon que navires ne peussent entrer dedans le havre.’ Paget to Norfolk, 17 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 136.


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Italian soldier and engineer Antonio Mellone. It is in fact the case that Mellone, a frequent informant of the Ferrarese ambassador, had been instructed by the King as early as February 1545 to construct the fort.139 Du Biez was relying on the king’s engineer. Mellone had planned a pentagonal fort with five bastions. In order to finish it quickly, he had planned the bastions, ramparts and ditches to be 40 feet wide and 18 feet deep, the ramparts only to consist of a parapet in view of the fact that the structure was on a hill top. Du Bellay’s view was that he had got his measures wrong, particularly in forgetting the slopes (talus) of the bastions so that the bastions were too small for the mounting of artillery. Within, there was only room to accommodate 5–600 men, not 5000. So it became necessary to fill up the ditches while cutting down masses of trees in the forest of Hardelot to hold up the rampart. Two months’ work had been wasted. Du Bellay made his report to the King but du Biez sent another messenger with the report that the work would be finished in a week. A spy for the English at the end of August adds to this picture the fact that the water supply at Outreau had proved difficult and that there were 4 ensigns of the old bands under de Taix already in garrison.140 Visual evidence is provided by two Italian plans. One is damaged, probably made during the building of the fort, which indicates a rampart of 20 feet in thickness and that one of the bastions (all shown as with orillons) had collapsed once and was weak. The other is a large-scale plan of the fortresses of Boulogne and Outreau but which is primarily designed as a detailed plan of the French fort and which gives the names of the bastions and their measurements by 1547. This shows distinctly elongated bastions with orillons marked as 80 feet (‘piedi’) deep and with counter-scarps 10–12 feet thick.141 This is much the most detailed plan to survive. Also useful is a plan of the French works drawn up probably in August

139 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 5 Feb. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 20: the King had told Mellone that he decided to build a fort ‘presso Bologna alla marina per victare il smontare di qua a Inglesi, e per questo effetto se ne a andato a quella volta.’ An Antonio Melloni wrote a military treatise c. 1560, Particelli e fragmenti (Venice, 1598). The adviser on the abortive construction in January 1545 was described by an imperial report as Venetian (L&P, XX, i, 619). 140 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 283, 305–308; NA SP68/15, fo. 72v (CSPF Edward VI, Calais Papers, 161, ii). 141 BL Cotton, Caligula E II, fo. 271r; Cotton, Aug. I, ii, no. 67, Suppl. 10, damaged in one corner.

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1545 (Shelby’s Survey I of Boulogne), though probably not by Rogers.142 This shows the fort surrounded by the camps of du Biez, the Germans and the Picards (as described by Paget in July). On the bastions: ‘Thise outher three bowlwarkes be not yet so forwards nor yet so fortyfied as thouther . . . from one bowllwark to thouther is a Cxliii passe. The Sircuit of every bowlwark is Ccxlviii passes.’143 This is completed by Rogers’ Survey II, probably drawn up for Hertford in June 1546, showing much the same design for the fort and also now a quadrangular fortress at Saint-Etienne.144 Saint-Etienne had certainly been started in the spring of 1546 and so was exempt from the prohibition of the peace treaty against starting new fortifications. It was crucial to prevent English military action to cut off Outreau by crossing the river at Pont-de-Bricque. Two other works were more controversial. These were forts at Le Portel, crucial for securing the supply of Outreau by sea, and another at the point later called fort Châtillon. The latter was a triangular bastioned work as is shown in Rogers’ ‘Survey III’ probably drawn up in the summer of 1546. These were thrown down by an English expedition on Grey’s initiative on 5 September 1546 and the tacit approval of Henry.145 As has been noted, Etaples had received a massive programme of fortifications by April 1546 and had become central to French strategy. Hertford and Lisle judged in April that: There is not the like of yt uppon . . . all thisside of the mouth of the Seane lyke to kepe subiect tholl countrey of Boullenoyes, without whych also your enemyes could not revictuall neyther Ardres, Hardelowe nor the newe fort neither to have any armye in the field without thassistence of Themperours low countryes

It had also been equipped with a citadel.146 Both sides channelled formidable energies and significant treasure into the fortification of their positions around Boulogne. For this reason, perhaps, the fighting remained inconclusive and despite the objectives of the two Kings, settlement could only be made elsewhere.

142 Shelby, pp. 98–99. It is not easy to reconcile some of the details with the Italian plan just discussed. 143 BL Cotton, Aug. I, Suppl. 5, Shelby, p. 173. 144 BL Cotton, Aug. I, ii, 77; Shelby, p. 173. 145 Shelby, pp. 105–106. 146 Hertford and Lisle to Henry VIII, 28 April 1546, NA SP1/217 fo. 125r (L&P, i, 693).

CHAPTER SEVEN

FRANCE AND ENGLAND COMPETE FOR TROOPS: THE MERCENARY MARKET, 1543–1546 The Almaynes, who be accompted among all nacions the flower of the world for good orders of footemen1

Neither England nor France could fight the war with their own troops alone; both needed access to the market for professional troops that was overwhelmingly concentrated in the German territories of the Empire. France was well used to drawing on German, Italian and Swiss troops for its armies.2 Henry, as we have seen, wrote into his agreement with the Emperor in 1543 a provision for making up part the army by troops from Germany and the Low Countries. Historians have often stressed the importance of mercenaries in European warfare of the sixteenth century. As both infantry and cavalry, it is plain that they were the professional soldiers needed by every army to stiffen its attack capability.3 It was normal to lament reliance on such foreign troops. In 1545, having to cope with the aftermath of a disastrous attempt at recruitment, Stephen Gardiner thought peace the best way to ‘to eskape the thrawldam to such noughty mennes service.’ At the end of the war, William Paget, after a particularly dire performance by foreign cavalry at Boulogne, lamented that: every tyme [they] leave us in the durt, sumtyme thalmaynes and sumtymes the Albanoys. I besech God direct all thinges so as for this tyme

1

Description by Thomas Audley in his ‘Order for the warres,’ BL Harl. 309, fo. 6r. D. Potter, Renaissance France at War pp. 124–151. 3 See C. Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1937), and other basic surveys: J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450–1620 (London, 1985), pp. 146–152; A. Corvisier, Armies and Society in Europe, 1494–1789 (trans. Indiana, 1979). M. Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy (London, 1974), argues that the condottiere had become an increasingly stable and aristocratic, as well as professional, force in Italian warfare. On internal landsknecht organization: H.M. Möller, Das Regiment der Landsknechte (1976); F. Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce (2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1964–1965). 2

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chapter seven we leave to have non of them and against the next tyme to be able to have a gret force of our own horsemen.4

Nevertheless, infantry (landsknechts) and light horse drawn mainly from the Empire but also from Italy and the Balkans were essential to all armies. This chapter will concentrate mainly on German mercenaries if only because the survival of substantial French, English and German sources for the engagement of mercenaries from the Empire in the mid-1540s allows an examination in depth of how the two countries competed for the services of military professionals. It also throws light on the practical processes of recruitment and on the interaction of war and diplomacy in the period. Yet it should be obvious that similar problems bedevilled the market in other troops as well. As we have seen, the duke of Albuquerque, a favourite of Henry’s, accompanied him in 1544 with a mounted retinue. A small corps of Spaniards, 450 men, served in 1544 and was then augmented in 1545 by another 700 under Pedro de Gamboa as marshal of the camp. These served at Boulogne, Portsmouth and Scotland in 1545 and Ambleteuse in 1546. An anonymous Spanish chronicler insisted on Henry’s high regard for them but on their quarrelsomeness.5 During the fighting of 1545, Poynings was eager to entice the disgruntled Italians in French service but the coming of peace in 1546 opened the way for both Spaniards and Italians to be enticed into the army being prepared by the Emperor against the German Protestants.6 The duel that took place on 15 July 1546 at Fontainebleau between Julian Romero and Antonio Mora, two Spanish captains in Henry’s service, proved an embarrassment for the recent peace between the kingdoms. Romero accused Mora of betraying his oath to Henry. His victory was gratifying to Henry but did not derail the peace.7 4

Gardiner to Paget, 7 Nov. 1545, Muller, Letters, p. 180 (L&P, XX, ii, 749); Paget to Petre, 28 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 121r (L&P, XXI, i, 691). 5 Hume (ed.), Chronicle . . . written in Spanish, pp. 100–131. 6 Poynings to Henry VIII, 4 May 1545, L&P, XX, i, 654; count Berlinguero, commander of the Italians in French service in Boulonnais, came to court at this time to threaten that, either his men should be paid or sent back to Italy. Otherwise they would defect to the English. 1800 out of 2000 remained unpaid (Alvarotti to Ercole II, 1 June 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, p. 170 (172 decipher). Selve to Francis I, 8 July 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, no. 5, p. 9. 7 Selve to Francis I, 4, 18 July 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, no. 1, 10. Knyvet to Henry VIII, 17 July 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 239–245; Brantôme, ‘Discours sur le duels’ in Oeuvres completes, ed.L. Lalanne, 11 vols. (Paris, 1864–1882).

france and england compete for troops

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In the celebrated case of Ludovico da l’Armi we have a clear enough instance of how easily a government could be taken in by a plausible operator who promised a supply of seasoned troops.8 Da l’Armi came to the royal camp at Boulogne in 1544 to offer his services and was sent back to Venice to gather men.9 That he was a turbulent and violent conspirator, under suspicion by both the Venetian and Papal governments, did not impede the issue of a royal commission and the money to raise 6000 men in Venetian territory (at a time when the market was brimming with unemployed condottiere). Fleeing Venice in the summer of 1545, he saw some fighting at Boulogne and then returned to Venice to participate in a shadowy scheme to create an Anglo-FrenchVenetian alliance at the end of 1546. Only Henry VIII’s death allowed him to be arrested and beheaded at Venice in 1547. Da l’Armi had also tried to seduce the followers of the Strozzis from French service in January 1545 and Francis ordered his representative at Rome to ask the duke of Ferrara to arrest him and send him to Rome.10 France and the Mercenary Market France had long experience in raising troops in the territories of the Empire which enabled Francis to recruit professionals easily in times of emergency. The relative weakness of native French infantry formations led the French crown from the late fifteenth century to rely increasingly on German lansquenets (landsknechts) and, regularly from 1515, on Swiss pikes for its crack troops.11 One result of this 8 E. Harrison, ‘Henry VIII’s gangster: the affair of Ludovico da l’Armi,’ Journal of Modern History, 15, iv (1943), 265–274. 9 Heads of an agreement of Ludovico da L’Armi of Bologna, Count Bernardo di Santo Bonifazio of Verona, Philipp Pino of Lucca with Henry VIII, Plas Newydd, Anglesey MSS, Box 1, no. 24 (fos. 41–44). 10 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 11 Jan. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 20, fasc. 3, p. 39: ‘M. Ludovico dalle Armi che hora si trova nei servitii del Re d’Inghilterra con lx angelotti al mese di provisione, che sono dicono questi, lxxxx scudi, ha scritto une lettera qui à un capitano Martino Toscano, huomo di questi Strozzi, et tenuto persona di credito, esortandolo di voler partirsi dalli servitii di Francia et andar al servitii di Inghilterra, che lo farà riconoscer et ben trattare’ adding that he was about to go to Venice to raise men. The count of Mirandola told Francis I that he thought da l’Armi would not be able to raise men in Papal or Imprial territory (ibid., 25 Jan. 1545, p. 69 (decipher). Alvarotti, 24 March 1545, ibid., B 20 fsc. 4, p. 126v. 11 On the development of the French mercenary network and its conditions of service, see D. Potter, Renaissance France at War, pp. 131–143; idem., ‘Les Allemands et les armées françaises au XVIe siècle. Jean-Philippe Rhingrave, chef de lansquenets:

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was the development of an exceptionally well-attuned diplomatic network in the Empire that was used by France both for the negotiation of alliances and for the maintenance of links necessary to the raising of troops. Ambassadors often doubled as high-level secret agents for troop recruitment. There was still a desire to create a more reliable French infantry, partly, at least, under the influence of the prevailing nostrum, more often honoured in the breach, that reliance on foreign troops was dangerous. The idea culminated in the creation of the ‘legions’ of 1534. Yet, for various reasons, these did not solve the problem, and mercenaries remained central to French infantry recruitment: from 1500, lansquenets formed important components of all major French armies and the French crown was experienced in dealing with them. Sometimes these mercenaries were commanded in effect by a single chief like Wilhelm von Fürstenberg (especially in the Piedmont campaigns of 1536–1537), but this brought its own problems: Wilhelm proved difficult to manage.12 In its extensive use of German troops in the 1540s, France relied on a number of different colonels. A large levy of lansquenets had been planned for 1542, possibly as many as 21,000, but the war in Hungary meant that the best men had been recruited for that campaign, though Francis I, in his propaganda, claimed that he could call upon German troops at need.13 In 1543 there were at least three German regiments (probably of eight ensigns each) in French service on the north-east frontier under Reckerodt, von Deben and Rognac. The outbreak of the Franco-Imperial war in 1542 was accompanied by a proclamation (Recess of Regensburg) in the Empire against service with France against the Emperor or the Empire. The penalty was to be confiscation of goods, exile of families and ultimately execution on return. French terms on offer to a number of captains in 1541 were (1) service to the King against all princes except the Empire étude suivie de sa correspondance en France, 1548–1566,’ Francia XX, 2 (1993), 1–20, and esp. XXI, 2 (1994), 1–63. For French problems with infantry formations, see P. Contamine, ‘Naissance de l’infanterie française (milieu XVe–milieu XVIe siècle,’ in Quatrième centenaire de la bataille de Coutras. Colloque de 1987 (??place, 1989), pp. 63–88. 12 J.V. Wagner, Graf Wilhelm von Fürstenberg, 1491–1549, und die politisch-geistigen Mächte seiner Zeit (Stuttgart, 1966). R. Peter, ‘Les lansquenets dans les armées du roi. Le capitaine général Guillaume de Fürstenberg,’ in Charles-Quint, le Rhin et la France (Strasbourg, 1973), pp. 95–109. 13 Instruction of Francis I for Claude de L’Aubespine, 9 July 1542, HHSA, P.C. 223 fos. 54–55, copy; transcript, NA, PRO 31/18/3/1, pp. 599–601; imperfect summary in L&P, XVII, 517.


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(2) payment by French officials as hitherto, (3) one month’s warning for assembly and (4) six months’ warning before departure from service. Van Rossem’s terms of service were to serve the King ‘even against the Emperor, though not against the Holy Empire and the duke of Cleves.’14 The penalties against service against the Emperor were draconian but usually ineffective. Cornelius Schepper, councillor to Mary of Hungary reflected on this in 1542. He saw the reasons in a failure to name the guilty individuals or carry confiscations into effect as a result of princely intervention. Most importantly, Francis had always promised his employees that he would never make peace with the Emperor without making terms for them, a promise he had always observed.15 Fürstenberg, the most prominent German commander for France in the 1530s, had his lands in Swabia confiscated by the Emperor for ‘treason’ against the Holy Empire and given to his brother in 1537. It was therefore necessary for Francis I to compensate him with property in France.16 Fürstenberg was turbulent and fell foul of court intrigue in France; he left French service in 1539. After a brief attempt to return to French service in 1542, he offered his services to Charles V and led a force to attempt the recapture of Luxemburg in the summer of 1543. He even offered his services to Henry VIII; a pension was offered and a draft contract for 4000 landsknechts was drawn up. In fact, during the campaign of 1544 he led 8000 men for the Emperor but was captured and imprisoned in the Bastille, only released by an enormous ransom, to which the Emperor did not contribute.17 The approach of war in 1542 involved a frenetic quest for landsknechts in Germany. Van Rossem was commissioned to raise a regiment of 10,000 men and given an annual pension of 2000 écus. The French agent La Croix was active in recruiting men in Danish territory for Van Rossem’s army, described as a fine force because long established (‘pour avoir esté longuement ensemble.’) Longueval noted that the wars in Hungary

14 Paget to Henry VIII, 7 Dec. 1541, St.P., VIII, p. 639 (L&P, XVI, 1427); Bers, Die Allianz, p. 161: ‘mesmes contre l’empereur, réservé le Sainct Empire et monseigneur le duc de Cleves.’ 15 Schepper, memorandum for the Regent, 29 Jan. 1542, Bers, Die Allianz FrankreichKleve, pp. 185–186. 16 Peter, ‘Les lansquenets,’ p. 101. 17 Peter, ‘Les lansquenets,’ p. 103 and note 14; du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 193. Draft contract with Henry VIII, L&P, XXI, i, 581 (should be dated 1544, XIX, ii, p. 447); contract for 8000 men, 1544, ibid., no. 581.2. Fürstenberg’s correspondence with Mary of Hungary, AGR, Audience, 1610(1).

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and the approaching Franco-Imperial war had produced a good market for troops.18 The effect of the Emperor’s personal campaign in 1544 was to make the position of German captains rather more difficult, as they could contract for defence of France but not for direct confrontation with their feudal superior. Only a few remained in French service during the war, though they were crucial for the French war effort.19 The Landenberg Fiasco: Henry VIII’s Quest for Mercenaries, 1544 While the French crown quickly recognized that the legions would be inadequate in serious warfare and continued to rely overwhelmingly on mercenaries, England under Henry VIII found this a difficult course to take, if only because of the expense and complexity of the recruitment process. With her very intermittent participation in European warfare, England arrived rather late in the field of raising professionals abroad. As has been seen, Henry relied heavily for his limited campaigns in France on semi-feudal recruitment, but it is also clear that England, like many other European countries, experienced the need to produce an effective native infantry. Attempts to raise a well-trained and reliable militia were, though, still rudimentary.20 One historian has pointed out that the Tudors used mercenaries and auxiliaries from 1485 onwards, but until the renewal of war with France in 1543 little serious thought had been given to the mercenary market.21

18 Contract with van Rossem, Oct. 1541, Bers, pp. 160–163; Longueval to Serrant, May 1542, ibid., pp. 216–217. 19 For the problems posed in 1542 for mercenary captains by the Franco-Imperial war, see the report of Paget, Lyons, 31 July 1542, L&P, XVII, 554, and the report of Cruser to the Duke of Cleves, 1 May 1542, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 382v. The muster rolls for lansquenets are extensively preserved for 1543: BnF, fr. 25791, nos. 386–387, 424, 431, 434, 447 (von Deben’s troops under the Count of Altembourg); nos. 428, 435–436, 446 (Reckerodt’s regiment); nos. 426–427 (Rognac’s regiment). There are fewer rolls for 1544, and they indicate that Italian and Swiss formations were relied on more in that campaign. French sources on the army facing Charles V at Jalons are poor: see F. Lot, Recherches sur les effectifs, pp. 102–103. An official act, BnF Clair[ambault] 330, no. 7599, simply lists ‘les lansquenets’ in the avant-garde. 20 J. Goring, ‘The Military Obligations of the English People’, and C.G. Cruickshank, Army Royal: An Account of Henry VIII’s Invasion of France, 1513 (Oxford, 1969). On mercenaries in particular, see G.J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, 1485–1547 (Charlottesville, 1980) is fairly full on the events of 1544, but does not cover 1545–1546 in depth. 21 See ibid., pp. 26–48. Henry VIII sent Thomas Seymour to Vienna in 1542, with


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From then on, however, Henry turned his attention to the acquisition of a substantial band of mercenaries to reinforce the army committed for the joint campaign with the Emperor in 1544. Even before he declared war on France in June 1543, Henry VIII was negotiating in Germany for professional troops to bolster his armies. He realised, as did all major European powers, that there could be no effective army without professional mercenaries. From 1540, a royal ‘servant’ had been retained (presumably by Cromwell) in the person of Georg von Heideck, a follower of the Elector Palatine with lands near Hagenau, to report on events in Germany. While on mission in Cleves, Nicholas Wotton was careful to observe movements of landsknechts, list their commanders and speculate about whether they were being raised by France.22 In July 1542, Thomas Seymour was negotiating at Vienna with mercenary captains and Henry told them that he would have need of them early in the following year. In December 1542 Henry ordered Seymour to meet Heideck and Ludwig von Fleckenstein at Nuremburg to ask if they could come to Calais to serve against the French. They readily promised 6000 landsknechts and 3000 horse but were adamant that they needed a month to raise them. Nor could they serve against the Emperor since their overlord in Alsace was the King of the Romans. Despite Seymour’s disgruntlement, this was an ambitious timetable. In any case, Henry decided to decline their offer of service, while paying them 100 and 200 crowns respectively for their expenses.23 Interestingly the routes they proposed coincided almost exactly with those used in following years, while Fleckenstein emerged as a notable commander in French service. John Wallop, the commander of the English Landrecies expedition, established a list of captains, especially of Cleves horsemen, who were willing to serve, including one Gymynyck from the region of Cologne, already an English pensioner, described as ‘a very honest man.’ Cavalry

letters to Baron ab Heideck: see St.P., IX, 73. In August 1542 Henry was hoping that Heideck would lead his troops to Calais early in the new year and Seymour was also told to look into the mercenary market (ibid., p. 139). Heideck was the elder brother of a mercenary in French service (ibid., VIII, 640, IX,.101) under his cousin Count Fürstenberg, a phenomenon paralleled by the Rhinegrave in the later 1540s whose brother was in English service. See Potter, ‘Les Allemands et les armées françaises,’ 3. 22 Wotton to Henry VIII, 4, 16 April, 25 May 1541, St.P., VIII, pp. 548, 570 (L&P, XVI, 687, 731, 862). 23 Instructions to Seymour, 12 Dec. 1542, St.P., IX, pp. 231–233; Henry VIII to Seymour, 14 Jan. 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 42.

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from the lower Rhine duchies had been very prominent in the first phase of the war and was to continue to be so. Count Albrecht III of Mansfeld, commander of landsknechts in north Germany, and Alessandro Gonzaga had also offered their services, but Wallop’s view of the Italians was that ‘it is evyll medling with theym, having had good experience therof this yere.’24 In the event, Henry’s experiences with mercenary captains during the Boulogne campaign were bleak. The King had needed to find mercenaries to strengthen his English troops to the contingent of 42,000 agreed with the Emperor for their common campaign; in March 1544 this was planned to include 8,000 high German foot and 4,000 German horse. In practice, Henry raised only an English army of 32–33,000 and 4,000 auxiliaries from the Emperor led by Buren; 4,000 mercenary foot were to be provided by Christoff von Landenberg zu Schramberg and extra cavalry drawn from a number of lesser captains.25 Money always posed a problem in the relations between ‘warlords’ like Henry VIII and Francis I and the German colonels they hired, because a certain amount of credit was often involved. In 1544, assemblies of men were going on all over Germany in the early months of the year, agents from the major powers hovering and ready to do deals. An assembly in Holstein, ostensibly for the French, had to be countered by the Habsburgs.26 Nicholas Wotton found himself embarrassed by lack of cash in March 1544, when he was finding it difficult to enlist captains who would serve for as little as Landenberg.27 The colonel would receive his Bestallung, or contract, and then hired as many captains as he thought he would need to raise the stipulated number of men. Either credit would be advanced by the captains, or they received money in advance from ther colonel to recruit men under licence (the Werbepatente).28 Guarantee of payment was therefore crucial as costs were substantial. For England, the monthly pay of 6,000 foot and 1,000 24 Wallop to Paget, 26 Oct. 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 40 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 310); to Henry VIII, 14 Nov. 1543, St.P., ix, 550–552; to Council, n.d.[Nov. 1543], NA SP1/182, fo. 98 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 385): ‘as touching the Clevoys horssemen, the kinges Majesty can lack none.’ One troop of 1000 horse was offered in 1542 to France, commanded by Dietrich Hoen, lord of Horsen. Others were commanded by Jobst II count of Hoya (Bers, Die Allianz, pp. 219–220). 25 Army plan drawn up in French, spring 1544, NA SP1/184, fo. 228 (L&P, XIX, i, 273[5]). Landenberg/Landsberg himself was from the area round Zurich. 26 Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 14 Feb. 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 111. 27 Wotton to Paget, 19 March 1544, NA SP1/184, fo. 4 (L&P, XIX, i, 217). 28 Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser, pp. 40–41.


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horse was calculated at £8,216 7s. 3d. in March 1544; landsknechts would receive 12s. 4d. p.m., but there would be 10 per cent double pays, while the 37s. received by the cavalry was doubled for ‘barded’ horse.29 Francis I was probably right to dismiss the seriousness of these negotiations. Heideck, who had seemed a reliable agent in 1543, was preoccupied by serving his master, Count Palatine Otto Heinrich of Neuburg.30 As early as March 1544, Gymynick absconded with his advance, but the main problems concerned Landenberg. The latter had agreed to provide 4,000 foot and 1,000 horse, but when he arrived at Aachen he proceeded to haggle furiously over his conditions of service (including, crucially, the rate of exchange to be used for the florin). Stephen Vaughan was in a quandary because, with musters scheduled both in Imperial and Netherlands territory, he could not easily assemble enough coin of different kinds and he had to pacify Landenberg’s rages about having assembled his men without means to pay them.31 Eventually, with Aachen established as the muster-place and the date 20 June, Vaughan actually paid over (through letters of exchange with Sorer of Frankfurt) conduct money of 16,000 fl. to Landenberg and 10,000 to Sickingen.32 At the start of May, Vaughan recommended that muster commissioners be appointed ‘that be men of skyll and suche as know both horse and armour and to warne them to have vigilant yee to them at theyr mustryng for there wolbe made many craftye shyftes.’33 This proved to be an understatement. The muster was little short of a calamity for the English. The Regent of the Netherlands had expected them to be directed from Aachen through Hainault

29 Calculation of wages, probably for Landenberg’s force of 6,000 foot and 1,000 horse, NA SP1/184, fo. 24 (L&P, XIX, i, 247). Buren’s articles of service, 8 Apr. 1544: with 2,000 foot in companies of 400, each including 50–60 arquebusiers, 30 halberdiers and the rest pikes, see NA SP1/185, fos. 142–143 (L&P, XIX, i, 308.2), article 4 on pay. Payments were usually accounted in Flemish money. The florin of 20 patards/stivers flemish was then worth 3s. 1d. st., the philippus of 25 patards was 3s. 2d. The French écu was worth 38 stivers and the daller 28 stivers. The relation of pounds sterling to the Flemish pound (money of account) was 15:19. Thus the English crown was worth 6s. 8d. fl. and 5s. 0d. st. 30 Wotton, 19 March 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 216. 31 Vaughan to Henry VIII, 13 April 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 328. 32 Vaughan to Paget, 22 April 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 380. There was a problem of losing money by exchange. Of £12,900 received by Chamberlain in May to pay Germans only £2419 arrived in ducats. The rest in angels etc. had to be exchanged with the loss of at 6d in every angel (L&P, XIX, i, 583). 33 Vaughan to Paget, 2 May 1544, NA SP1/187 fo. 73(82)v (L&P, XIX, i, 457). L&P, XIX, i, 583.2, a paper on possible combinations of muster commissioners.

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towards Aire.34 The muster commissioners, Fane and Windebank, were impressed by Landenberg when they first met him, though he seemed cagey about details of his men.35 Seeing that he had the whip hand, Landenberg increased his terms to the point of demanding substantially more than the Emperor paid his landsknechts. In the end, so fearful were the English commissioners that they had to flee the camp and Stephen Vaughan was threatened with death. The main reason for all this was that England simply did not yet have the advantages of proximity and the network of acquaintance necessary to play the market successfully. Mansfeld, for instance, was thought to be ‘too distant’ for effective negotiations. William Paget, in close touch with all these dealings, remarked that the German captains ‘like merchantes make their markettes nowe with your Majeste and others for it is their fayre tyme.’36 At this point Henry decided to write off the £9,266 that he had already paid Landenberg without any effective service from his infantry, though his cavalry captains were invited to join Henry’s forces independently.37 When negotiations between Wotton and Hans von

34

Commission by Mary of Hungary, 29 May 1544, BL Add. 28593, fo. 323 (L&P, XIX, i, 600). 35 Fane and Wyndebank to Council, 2 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 618. 36 Millar, Tudor Mercenaries, pp. 76–81. Cottereau to Card. du Bellay, 5 Apr. 1544, Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay, III, no. 633, p. 253: ‘Le Roy ne crainct point ses ennemys . . . et combien qu’il luy ait parlé du Landeberg, toutesfois il ne croit que le roy d’Angleterre face rien contre luy pour des raisons que sçavez.’ Paget to Henry VIII, Antwerp, 8 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fos. 75–77 (L&P, XIX, i, 648): Fane and Windebank ‘stande in dred of their lyves whenne they be amonge them, and sayth that the Almaynes sweare that if Mr Vaughan had bene with them they woold have hewen him all to peces.’ R. Fane to Council, 25 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fos. 98–107 (L&P, XIX, i, 76); Windebank and Fane to Paget, 16 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fo. 66 (L&P, XIX, i, 926). [Fane] to Landenberg’s captains, 26 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fo. 120 (L&P, XIX, i, 788). The Regent of the Netherlands was complaining about the non-payment by Henry of Landenberg’s troops since they proceeded to rampage their way through the Emperor’s lands. See Instruction of Mary of Hungary to d’Eyck, 1 July 1544, HHSA, P.A. 55, fos. 192–193; and the Instruction to Jean de Waudripont, 26 June 1545, ibid. Scepperus to Fane, Liège, 6 July 1544, NA SP1/189, fo. 215 (L&P, XIX, i, 857): requiring the payment of Landenberg’s men ‘y joinct que lesdicts gens pourroient facillement tirer en France, comme aussi c’est une chose de tout temps accoustumee de payer retour aux gens de guerre.’ 37 For Landenberg’s receipts for advance cash as ‘primarius capitaneus’ for 16,000 fl., 13 April 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 328(2); as ‘Obrister über zwelf hundert Pferdt und zehen Feindlein Landsknecht . . . das ich von höchstgedachten K.M. Kreigscommissarien Reinharten Weidenbanks unde Raffe Fains meinen leiben herrn und frundten . . . in gold pfangen habe,’ see BL, Add.MS 5753, fos. 182 (4,000 cr.), 183 (1,000 cr.), 184 (6,113 cr.), 185 (2,000 cr.), 10–15 June 1544 (L&P, XIX, i, 726). See ibid., fos. 180–181, payments to captains of Landenberg’s 4,000 foot at Aachen, 4 June 1544 ‘to be rebated owt of there munthes wages.’


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Sickingen at Speyer for 1,000 heavy cavalry fell through, only Mathies Leuchtmacher brought any substantial numbers of cavalry to Henry’s army of invasion, and then with some difficulty because of the heavy demands for men in north Germany. Otherwise, the army included small detachments of many other origins, including two companies of Spaniards as well as Buren’s force.38 In addition, it is likely that the muster commissioners appointed in 1544 were inexperienced. The major English diplomats in the field: Paget, Wotton and Mont, were able to co-ordinate information, but much of the burden fell on Thomas Palmer and Thomas Chamberlain, with Stephen Vaughan handling the provision of cash and Ralph Fane, Richard Windebank, Francis Hall, Thomas Averey, Edward Vaughan, John Brende, John Brygantyn (or Brigenden) and John Dymoke acting as muster commisioners for German troops from 1544 to 1550. Stephen Vaughan had had long diplomatic and financial experience in the Netherlands, and Chamberlain had spent time there as governor of the English merchants at Antwerp. None of the rest had much diplomatic experience, though many of them came from the milieu of the Calais garrison. Hall and Windebank were military men based there. Fane was a gentleman of Kent, a soldier knighted at Boulogne and distinguished in Scotland in 1547 who was later executed as a partisan of Protector Somerset. Brende, who sometimes used the alias William Watson on foreign missions, was a military expert whose friendship with Paget got him, too, into difficulties in 1552.39 Much of the negotiation 38 Leuchtmacher to Chamberlain, 21 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fos. 8–9 (L&P, XIX, i, 753): ‘tout le pays de Brunswycke et la ville de Godtleer et la ville de Bremes et plusieurs contes et ducs et aultres grans singners quy prendent journellement et amassent gros nombres de gens de cheval et à piedt en telle maniere que nulles gendarmes ne à peydt ne à cheval ne puelent paser par les villes à cause qu’il son tenus comme serré.’ See also receipts for payments of 31,000 philippus to Clevois and north German cavalry captains for the Boulogne campaign, Oct. 1544, BL, Add.MS 5753, fos. 170–178, (L&P, XIX, ii, 401). BL, Add. 5753, fo. 186, payment in prest of £50 to Leuchtmacher, 29 Oct. 1544. L. MacMahon, ‘The English Invasion of France, 1544,’ pp. 49–61. 39 Chamberlain’s list of money paid and Paget’s draft list of the muster commissioners, May 1544, NA SP1/188, fos. 7–9 (L&P, XIX, i, 583) assigns Palmer, Vane and Chamberlain to Buren and Leuchtmacher, S. and E. Vaughan and Windebank to Landenberg. Chamberlain became ambassador in the Low Countries under Edward VI; on Vaughan, see W.C. Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial Agent of Henry VIII (Baton Rouge, 1953); on Windebank, see muster of Calais garrison, 1533, in Chronicle of Calais, ed. J.G. Nicholls (Camden Soc., 1846) p. 137 – he went on to be deputy of Guînes and member of the council of Boulogne. Thomas Averey and Edward Vaughan were both royal pensioners. Brende, MP for Thetford in 1547, was mainly engaged in the North and Scotland as fortification expert and muster master: S.T.Bindoff (ed.), The House of Commons, 1509–1558 (London, 1982), I. 492–494. His alias as Watson is

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with the captains seems to have been done in French or Latin, but we know that Fane had to use an interpreter in dealing with the linguistically gifted Netherlands minister, President Schore ‘forasmyche as I have matter to saye to yowe and have not sufficient langage to declare the same unto yowe.’ Though they were all familiar with the Low Countries, only Vaughan seems to have had any extensive dealings in Germany before this time.40 The Anglo-French Duel in Germany, 1545 Despite the problems of the Boulogne campaign, the year 1545 saw England more seriously involved in the market for mercenaries. The splenetic old Welsh soldier of Calais, Elis Gruffydd, scarcely exaggerated when he recorded that the army around Calais in the summer of 1545 included many depraved brutish foreign soldiers from all nations under the sun – Welsh, English, Cornish, Irish, Manx, Scots, Spaniards, Gascons, Portingals, Italians, Arbannoises, Greeks, Turks, Tartars, Almains, Germans, Burgundians, Flemings who had come there from the French king who was very angry with them for going to have a good time under the king of England who by nature was too hospitable to foreigners.41

It is plain that Henry’s unsatisfactory experiences in 1543–1544 had not discouraged him from looking again to Germany in 1545, as the

clear from the instructions of Dec. 1547 in SP 68/1, pp. 310–313. Brygantyn, stepson of Edward North, Chancellor of Augmentations, was envoy to Germany under Edward VI and MP for Huntingdon in 1558 (ibid., p. 496). 40 Fane to the Council, 25 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fo. 103v (L&P, XIX, i, 776): ‘why sayde le seigneur Score, how shall then the quenys majeste understande yowe ?’ Ralph Fane is described in the quittances of the German captains, June-Oct. 1544, as one of the ‘höchtsgedachten K.M. Kriegs Commissarien’ (BL, Add. MS 5753, fo. 183 etc.). He was knighted by Henry on 30 Sept. 1544. Francis Hall was controller of Calais and had some part in abortive peace negotiations with Saint-Martin in 1544. Brende was a Latin scholar who had already carried out minor missions in Italy and Germany in the early 1540s: see H. Davis, ‘John Brende: Soldier and Translator,’ Huntington Library Quarterly i (1937), 421–426. 41 Much-quoted extract from Gruffydd’s chronicle, in Davies, ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,’ 14–15. In fact, the account kept by Sir Thomas Chaloner, clerk of the Privy Council, for payments to foreign soldiers and diplomats, 17 May 1545– 2 Feb. 1551, NA, E 351/43, indicates not only Germans but, especially among the cavalry in 1549, Italians, Hungarians, Albanians and Spaniards. The Albanians, commanded by Petro Sanga, were almost certainly Christian refugees from the Adriatic coast who had settled in Italy from the late fifteenth century.


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renewal of active campaigning with France became likely. The failure of this renewed quest for mercenaries can be followed in detail from the angle of the English, French and German princes. The situation in 1545 certainly attracted France and England to Germany as source for fighting men. Henry VIII built on his small Spanish contingent of 1544. In 1545 he first appointed Pedro de Gamboa ‘Master of the Camp’ over all Spaniards in his service, but these troops, mainly demi-lances and mounted arquebusiers sometimes of ‘Burgundian’ or Netherlandish origins, were quarrelsome.42 For solid foreign infantry, Germans were still the best bet. The Emperor was now neutral between France and England and, despite some noises, made no real effort to interrupt the recruitment of mercenaries in the Empire, though the English still needed his licence for their recruits to pass through the Netherlands. For the English in particular, it was easier to draw troops from Germany than, say, from Italy, as ‘conduct money’ would be cheaper. For both French and English, military conflict drove their approach to Germany. For the German princes who controlled the main sources of supply, the question was strategic: how to assure allies for the coming struggle with the Emperor. The days of the early 1540s, when the princes still felt able to spurn French approaches, were now gone. Two issues were therefore intertwined: the intense diplomatic and intelligence struggle between France and England in Germany, and the problems of the Schmalkaldic League which led the princes repeatedly to seek pacification between their potential allies. The major land objective for both countries was the defence or capture of Boulogne and this required both a supply of mercenaries and the obstruction of access to them by the enemy.43 France was also again employing lansquenets in 1545 on a large scale, many of them raised by the Rhinegrave, the current favourite French military entrepreneur. Martin du Bellay

42

On Spaniards in Henry’s service, see M.A.S. Hume (ed.), Chronicle of King Henry VIII of England . . . Written in Spanish (London, 1889), pp. 112–214 passim. The Spanish captains, who tended to command bands of horse and arquebusiers, were exceptionally quarrelsome. Brende in 1548, from experience in Scotland, argued that they were ‘chardgeable’ and ill-furnished, prone to deceit and should not be allowed to command both horse and foot: see J. Bain et al., Calendar of Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary Queen of Scots, 1547–1603 12 vols (Edinburgh, 1898–1952) [hereafter Calendar Scotland], I, no. 336. 43 While England was negotiating with Maurice of Saxony in October–November 1544, France was probably doing the same in January 1545. See Philip of Hesse to Maurice of Saxony, 17 Jan. 1545, in E. Brandenburg (ed.), Politische Korrespondenz des Herzogs und Kurfürsten Moritz von Sachsen 4 vols (Leipzig, 1900–1904), II, no. 643.

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mentions that there were as many landsknechts employed in the siege of Boulogne as French infantry and other sources reveal something about the problems in paying them and getting them to Picardy from Champagne.44 England, though, had a much tougher struggle, not helped by the equivocal attitude of the German princes.45 In the Spring of 1545, Francis I told his envoys in Germany to persuade his allies to work to ‘block the King of England’s enterprise so that they do not allow him to draw any help from Germany contrary to his [Francis’] interests.’46 The Worms Reichstag in the Spring of 1545 saw French envoys hard at work. Louis Adhémar de Grignan, one of the main French experts on the intricacies of German affairs, was there ostensibly to observe the assembly and talk to the Emperor’s ministers; in reality he was under orders to negotiate with the Duke of Bavaria and to stir up the fears of the Protestant envoys.47 In fact, the first despatch received by Grignan and his colleagues Bassefontaine and Mesnage was mainly concerned with talk of English activities amongst the German princes and rumours that Maurice of Saxony was preparing to enter English service. Mesnage, as resident ambassador to the Emperor, complained to Charles about the activities of Maurice, du Roeulx and Martin van Rossem, who were thought to be raising men for England; he added for good measure complaints that the English were drawing supplies from the Netherlands. Charles was

44 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 307–308. Potter, ‘Les Allemands et les armées françaises au XVIe siècle,’ p. 4. 45 J.-D. Pariset, Les Relations entre la France et l’Allemagne au milieu du XVI e siècle (Strasbourg, 1981); H. Duchhardt and E. Schmitt (ed.), Deutschland und Frankreich in der frühen Neuzeit (Munich, 1987); J.-Y Mariotte, ‘François Ier et la Ligue de Schmalkalde,’ 232–233, 234, n. 91; and R. McEntegart, Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden (Woodbridge, 2002). 46 Annebault to Jean du Bellay, 16 March [1545], Scheurer (ed. ), Correspondance, III, p. 294: ‘empescher l’entreprise du roy d’Angleterre à ce qu’ils ne permettent qu’il puisse à l’encontre de luy tirer de la Germanie aucun secours.’ 47 Letter of credence of Francis I to Strasbourg for Grignan, 15 Mar. 1545, in O. Winckelmann, Politische Correspondenz der Stadt Strassburg im Zeitalter der Reformation Urkunden und Akten der Stadt Strassburg, series 2 (Strasburg, 1882– 1892) [hereafter Pol. Corr.), III, no. 59; and Sleidan to Jakob Sturm, 13 Apr. 1545, in H. Baumgarten (ed.), Sleidans Briefwechsel (Strassburg, 1881), no. 22. The best information on this mission is contained in Bassefontaine’s Diplomatic Journal, part of which was printed by Louis Paris in his Négociations, lettres et pièces diverses relatives au règne de François II tirées du portefeuille de Sébastien de L’Aubespine, évêque de Limoges (Paris, 1841). Some of the documents from the same archive for 1545–1546 were published in J.-D. Pariset, ‘La France et les princes allemands. Documents et commentaires, 1545–1557,’ Francia, x (1982), 229–301.


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just evasive.48 The other envoys were told to ask the Reichstag ‘to tell duke Maurice to leave off such an enterprise in view of the fact the English King has sent no procuration to accept his comprehension in the treaty by the Emperor.’49 Grignan was also to stress the small profit to be gained from an English alliance. The French, then, faced two problems: the English might possibly obtain the troops necessary for their summer operations, and they might even try to supplant the French as the traditional patrons of some German princes. All this posed a threat to France and great efforts were made to frustrate the English, master-minded by Jean des Monstiers, seigneur du Fraisse. Fraisse was sent to Germany in late July 1545. Grignan, was again at the Imperial court from August and seems to have been acting as director of operations while Mesnage busied himself with the talks being held under the Emperor’s mediation. Grignan passed intelligence to Fraisse, advising him on the general strategy of his activities, and introduced him to the Landgrave of Hesse.50 It was Grignan who pointed out the essential fact that the Anglo-French talks in the Netherlands could be used to sow doubt in Germany and so diminish the number of troops likely to enter English service. It was Grignan, too, who made clear the French policy of setting the Landgrave and the Duke of Brunswick against each other in order to restrict troopraising opportunities. Fraisse in turn kept Grignan informed of the

48 A mémoire of Mesnage’s complaints, with the Emperor’s replies in the margin, was sent to St Mauris, Imperial ambassador in France. This is to be found among the St Mauris papers at Besançon and was printed in C. Weiss (ed.), Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle, III, 104. On the role of Mesnage in this period, see D. Potter, ‘Foreign Policy in the Age of the Reformation: French Involvement in the Schmalkaldic War, 1544–1547,’ Historical Journal x (1977), 525–544. 49 ‘de voulloir admonester ledit duc Morice de laisser telle entreprise, attendu que ledit Anglois n’a envoyé aucune procuration pour accepter la compréhension qui a esté faicte de luy par l’empereur.’ Francis I to Grignan etc., 19 Apr. 1545, copied into Bassefontaine’s Journal, in Paris, Négotiations, pp. viii–ix. For the attitude of the Protestants to Maurice and help to the belligerents, see Phillip of Hesse to Maurice of Saxony, 17 Jan. 1545, Brandenburg, Politische Korrespondenz, no. 643, and Maurice to Philip, 2 Feb. 1545, ibid., no. 646. 50 Grignan to Fraisse, 21 Aug. 1545, in J. des Monstiers Mérinville, Un évêque ambassadeur au XVIe siecle: Jean des Monstiers, seigneur du Fraisse, évêque de Bayonne (Limoges, 1895 [hereafter Fraisse]), p. 47; Grignan to Landgrave, 10 Aug. 1545, SAM, Politisches Archiv des Landgrafen Philipps des Großmütigen [hereafter SAM, Pol. Arch.], 1836, fo. 27.

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progress of his talks with the princes.51 Grignan also played an important part in the raising of money for Fraisse’s activities.52 Fraisse was an old hand at cloak-and-dagger work in Germany.53 The main centres of his operations were western Germany and the area around Bremen and Hamburg, French fears were well grounded.54 Bucler and Mont, the English representatives at Frankfurt, were busy in July and August negotiating with the Protestants for aid against the French.55 Unofficial contacts with the Hessian captain Friedrich von Reiffenberg were crucial. Reiffenberg had come to Nicholas Wotton at Cologne in May, offering to raise twenty ensigns of foot and a thousand horse.56 Wotton had thought that Henry was likely to have little use for them and recent experience with Landenberg did not promise well.57 Reiffenberg’s offer, though, brought a speedy response from England.58 By June, he was summoned to England, and by the end of the month the articles agreed with him had been signed, despite

51 Grignan to Fraisse, 6 and 8 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 74–75, 77–78; Fraisse to Grignan, 4 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 64–66. 52 Grignan to Fraisse, 8 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 77–78. Grignan to Mesnage, 19 Oct. [1545], BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 157: ‘Monsieur, le Roy vous faict presentement une depeche sur ce que vous verrez il sera besoing que incontinant vous envoyes queryr Pierre Moucheron; ce que plusamplement en respondes aud. Seigneur et sur tout il faut qu’il declare en quel temps ilz fournyront l’argent si n’estoyt ceste alarme des lansquenetz.’ 53 On Fraisse see the Introduction to Fraisse, and Pariset, Les Relations, passim and p. 38, n. 28. He had been employed as an envoy to Denmark and Hesse in August 1543: CAF, IX, 34; Mémoires du sieur Richer (Paris, 1625), fos. 4–8; Mariotte, ‘François Ier,’ 234, no. 90. In April 1544 Richer was described as ‘craintif, et n’entendant les affaires comme Fresses’ (Cottereau to Card. du Bellay, Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay III, p. 252). Fraisse had been involved in negotiations with England in October 1544 (Fraisse to the Chancellor of Hesse, 4 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 66–68). Royal instructions to him on the occasion of his mission to the Emperor in October 1544 to seek the latter’s mediation of a peace with England, see BnF, fr. 17888, fos. 57–58. 54 Though his instructions do not survive among his papers, virtually all his correspondence for the crucial period of August and September 1545 does and is printed in Fraisse. 55 Bucler and Mont to Henry VIII, 5 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/205, fos. 87–88 (L&P, XX, ii, 46). See the Excursus in Max Lenz (ed.), Briefwechsel Landgraf Philipps des Großmüthigen von Hessen mit Bucer, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1880–1887), II, pp. 358–362, and the correspondence of Bucler and Mont with the Landgrave in SAM, Pol. Arch., 1801, fos. 99–101, 100, 141, 143–144 (May to July 1545). 56 Wotton to Paget, 9 May 1545, NA SP1/200, fos. 220–221 (L&P, XX, i, 693). On Reiffenberg, see Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser, pp. 112–113. 57 For this, see the important letter of Christoph Haller to Maurice of Saxony, Nov. 1544, in Brandenburg, Politische Korrespondenz, no. 635. 58 Reiffenberg to Henry VIII, 12 May 1545, NA SP1/201, fos. 32–33 (L&P, XX, i, 721).


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concerns about his youth and inexperience.59 In July, Reiffenberg was busy obtaining from Vaughan in Antwerp the money for which he had letters of credit from the English government.60 The relative speed with which these negotiations were pushed through between May and July 1545 shows the anxiety of the English to get the mercenaries moving. In July also, the Fleming Claes Taphoren was despatched on a mission from Bois-le-Duc to Bremen to negotiate with the cavalry commanders Peter of Guelders and Eytel Wolff of Goetenberch to bring men to join Reiffenberg.61 English objectives for these these troops changed with the strategic situation. At the beginning the aim may have been to transport the Germans direct to Boulogne but by September, a diversionary operation in Champagne, in order to draw French troops away from Boulogne, had become the objective.62 The French seem to have been fully aware of this and took measures accordingly. Already concerned in April about levies by Peter of Guelders, they were even more disturbed in May by news that Hamburg was about to supply England with ships.63 From July 1545 there were reports that troops were being assembled by the Duke of Cleves, 12,000 infantry and 2000 horse, for service with the English at Boulogne. Duke William was thought to be hostile to France as a result of the collapse of his marriage alliance with Jeanne d’Albret. By 59

Philip of Hesse to Henry VIII, 14 June 1545, NA SP1/202, fos. 66–67 (L&P, XX, i, 947): the Landgrave grants his permission for the raising of twenty ensigns of foot and 1,000 horse. Articles with Reiffenberg, NA SP1/203, fos. 15–18 (L&P, XX, i, 1079). Henry VIII to Philip of Hesse, 4 July 1545, NA SP1/203, fos. 15–18 (L&P, XX, i, 1079). 60 Stephen Vaughan: to Paget, 21 July, NA SP1/204, fos. 82–83; to Paget, 24 July, NA SP1/204, fos. 127–128; to Paget and Wriothesley, 30 July, NA SP1/204, fos. 151– 152 (L&P, XX, i, 1239, 1266, 1299, 1316, 1317). 61 Council to commissioners, 30 Aug. 1545, BL, Add.MS 5753, fo. 162; for Taphoren’s expenses, 2 July–4 Aug. 1545, ibid. fos. 163–169 (L&P, XX, ii, 249). 62 Council to the English commissioners, Sept. 1545, NA SP1/208, fos. 12–19. The reason was given that ‘undoubtedly the Frenchmen, being advertised of your entreprice, have sent from their campe which lyeth not far from Boulloyn a good bande of thorsmen and sum fotemen . . . for the let of that entreprise which you should have executed and that is to destroye the cuntrey three or four days journey allaboutes: fo. 14r–v (L&P, XX, ii, 403). Martin du Bellay, who is exceptionally reliable at this point, being employed by the King in various duties around Boulogne, says that the King, on receiving news of the approach of the Germans, removed to La Fère to strengthen the defences there: see du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 314–315. 63 The King had received news that Peter of Guelders was raising 4,000 foot for the King of England in north Germany: see Francis I to Mesnage, 24 Apr. 1545, BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 62v. The King’s reaction had been to order the arrest of the Hamburg ships in French ports, but the news turned out to be no more than unfounded rumour: see Francis I to Mesnage, 6 May 1545, ibid. fo. 60v.

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September, this estimate was revised to 6,500 foot and 2,000 horse, but the threat was still enough for an agent to be despatched with 4000 écus to buy them off.64 Fraisse was sent in response to Reiffenberg’s activities; despatched late in July, he got to Cologne early in August. From there, despite English attempts to waylay him, he went on to Andernach, four leagues from Coblenz and two from Reiffenberg’s muster-ground at Sayn.65 From there, held up by illness, he announced his arrival to the Landgrave and Elector Palatine. Next day, getting to Sayn with difficulty, he discussed the likely plan of the muster with some captains there. He decided that, since Hesse was short of supplies anyway, the best way to stop the passage of the troops was to block the route through the archbishopric of Trier. Then, after another visit to Cologne, he travelled back up the Rhine to Coblenz, which he thought the place ‘most suitable from where to find out what is happening, being on two great rivers and in the midst of all these princes we have dealings with.’ After just a night there, though, he pressed on to Trier, where he put three requests to the Archbishop: first, to republish the Emperor’s edict of neutrality; second, to send horsemen, even at French expense, to prevent the passage of the levies through his territory; and last, to ask his allies for help. At first the Archbishop prevaricated, alleging illness and the absence of his advisors, but eventually seems to have agreed.66 From Coblenz, Fraisse began to exploit French influence with the Rhineland princes and raise the spectre of a threat to the civil peace of the Empire. Hesse was in a difficult position. Bing, the Chancellor, denied Fraisse’s allegations, but tried to assert that the Landgrave, as a neutral, could allow his subjects to serve France or England.67 In fact,

64

Gherardino to Farnese, 29 July 1545; Guidiccione to same, 4 Aug. 1545; same to same, 30 Sept. 1545, ANG, III, pp. 382, 384, 397. 65 Fraisse to Grignan, 14 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 83–89, esp.p. 88; to Francis I, undated [Sept. 1545], ibid., pp. 63–64. Heideck had proposed to make his musterground the Coblenz area in 1543: Seymour to Henry VIII, 29 Dec. 1542, St.P., IX, p. 254. 66 Fraisse to Longueval, 1 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, p. 53: ‘le plus propre pour de toutes cestes entendre ce qu’il se faict, estant sus deux grosses rivieres et au mylieu de tous ces princes desquelz nous avyons affaire.’ 67 See Fraisse to the Landgrave, 17 Aug. 1545, SAM, Pol. Arch., 1836, fo. 29; cf. also Fraisse to Bing, same date, ibid., fo. 30; Bing to Fraisse, 21 Aug. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 48–49. On Fraisse’s strategy at this time, see Pariset, Les Relations, p. 42.


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Hesse was trying to have the best of both worlds.68 The main aim of the Protestants remained to reconcile the adversaries, not to declare for one or the other, and Bing offered his master’s services as mediator.69 Fraisse was not satisfied with this, especially when another request to Bing at least to delay Reiffenberg as long as possible met with another equivocal reply;70 but he probably realized that Philip’s growing hostility to Henry of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel would discourage him from allowing troops to go abroad. French policy was designed, for this reason, to stir up trouble between them (‘entretenir ce divorse entre led. duc de Brunsvig et le landgrave’). Both Hesse and Brunswick were anxious for the support of France, and in fact the Brunswick war was to come to its climax with the capture of Henry by Philip’s forces at Northeim on 21 October.71 Fraisse’s dealings with the Elector Palatine were simpler and a request for a delay to possible troop movements accepted.72 The Palatine, though his nephew the Palsgrave Philip was

68 Reiffenberg had to have the Landgrave’s permission: cf. Philip to Henry VIII, 14 June 1545, NA SP1/202, fos. 66–67 (L&P, XX, i, 947); Philip of Hesse to Reiffenberg, [11] Sept. 1545, SAM, Pol. Arch., 1801, fo. 93r–v, draft; Reiffenberg to Philip of Hesse, 14 Sept. 1545, ibid., fos. 91–92. While the Landgrave’s correspondence with Henry VIII is decidedly anti-French in tone (Philip to Henry VIII, 24 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/206, fos. 217–218 (L&P, XX, ii, 207), he took care to send the Schmalkaldic diplomat, Dr Ulrich Chelius, to France to deny that he favoured Reiffenberg’s recruitment campaign: Pol. Corr., III, no. 645. 69 When Bruno, one of the Protestant mediators, reported French suspicions that the Evangelical princes were aiding the levy, he admitted that he had tried to assuage these suspicions in order to safeguard the peace negotiations. Nothing indicated better the intense embarrassment caused to Protestant diplomacy by the troop-recruitment: Bruno to Jakob Sturm, 21 Sept. 1545, Pol. Corr., IV, no. 1. 70 Fraisse to Bing, 29 Aug. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 66–68 (for the original of this, see SAM, Pol.Arch., 1836, fos. 38–39; Fraisse dates this wrongly as 4 Sept. 1545). Bing to Fraisse, n.d., reply to above, SAM, Pol.Arch., 1801, fo. 42, draft. See also Bing to Fraisse, 3 Sept. 1545, where he makes it clear that Hesse was more worried about the assembly of men by Brunswick and wanted to know whether the French had anything to do with it: ibid., fo. 37, draft. 71 Fraisse to Longueval, 1 Sept, 1545, Fraisse, pp. 53–55; Fraisse to Cardinal du Bellay, 3 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 59–60. Similar fears were expressed by Philip’s envoys at the Diet at Frankfurt early in 1546: F. Küch, Politisches Archiv des Landgrafen Philipp des Großmütigen von Hessen 2 vols (Leipzig, 1904–1910), I, 527. See S. Issleib, ‘Philipp von Hessen, H. von Braunschweig und M. von Sachsen, 1541–1547,’ Jahrbuch des Geschichtsvereins für das Herzogtum Braunschweig, 2 (1903), 1–80. 72 Grignan to Fraisse, Brussels, 8 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 77–78; Fraisse to the Palatine, 2 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 56–57; Fraisse to the Palatine, 13 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 82–83. Concerning the Palatine’s defeat of 200 landsknechts, see also the Palatine to Fraisse, 19 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 102. Mont at Frankfurt was aware of Fraisse’s negotiations and admitted that the Palatine had turned back some soldiers: Bucler and Mont to Henry VIII, 15 Sept. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 588–590.

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offering his services to England, was a much closer French ally than the Landgrave, and the French expected more of him in their interest.73 On Francis I’s instructions, Fraisse also took care to foster French relations with the archbishops of Trier and Cologne.74 These ecclesiastical princes, especially, were in need of strong support and would prove useful.75 It was clear by this time that diplomatic pressure on the princes would not be enough. In his report of 1 September to Longueval, Governor of Champagne, Fraisse outlined his task: the frustration of Reiffenberg’s levy at Coblenz, a town then subject to the Archbishop of Trier, in the county of Sayn and in Limburg and the various lands subject to the Landgrave of Hesse. The Palatine had already done his duty (‘très bien faict son debvoir’), and both archbishops had promised not to allow the soldiers through their lands. He had not confined his attention to the Rhine, and had already sent to Frankfurt to require the cessation of the levies in that area. He had told the authorities at Frankfurt that it would be strange if they were to defy the Imperial edicts and declare themselves against the Emperor, all for ‘for a foreign ruler from whom they could expect nothing.’76 French concern with English influence among the German princes is thus seen in the policy of depicting England as a useless ally. Fraisse, though, was as concerned about the levies in north Germany under Brunswick’s nephew, Duke Franz of Lauenburg. Brunswick had offered to take up men around Bremen to avoid their entering English services but the Landgrave was anxious to convince the French that Brunswick was a double-dealer and had offered Lauenburg’s services to Henry VIII.77

73 Philip Duke of Bavaria, to Henry VIII, 6 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fo. 105 (L&P, XX, ii, 317); Cardinal of Ferrara to Ercole II, 16 Mar. 1546, p. 2, ASM, Casa e Stato, Carteggio tre Principi Estensi, 1360/147, passage in cipher. 74 Francis I to Fraisse, 3 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 57–58, making clear the importance attached by the court of the good disposition of the ecclesiastical Electors. 75 The archbishops of Mainz and Trier were frequently reported ill in the autumn of 1545 (e.g. Fraisse to Francis I, 3 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 59–60), while Cologne was, of course, under threat from the Emperor and Pope for the reformation of his diocese: Archbishop of Cologne to Henry VIII, 26 Sept. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 450;. M. Deckers, Hermann von Wied, Erzbischof und Kurfürst von Köln (Cologne, 1840). 76 Fraisse to Longueval, 1 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 53–55: ‘ung prince estranger, duquel ilz ne peuvent rien espérer.’ 77 Francis I to Fraisse, 3 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, p. 58; Fraisse to Francis I, 4 Sept., ibid., pp. 61–62. Bucler and Mont to Henry VIII, 15 Sept. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 588–590.


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From September 1545 onwards, especially in north Germany, Fraisse was working closely with Captain Henrick Hacfort,78 a Guelders mercenary who regularly served the King of France until his desertion to England in 1548.79 Francis I’s instructions when he joined Fraisse ordered that: You will confer together on how he can best be used to my advantage, chiefly for breaking up these assemblies, if it can be done, and if it cannot he will take steps to entice away some of the captains and their men. But my main objective, and the most needful, is to break them up.80

This proved a far more complex problem than the Francis imagined.81 Fraisse was short of cash. While he was reluctant to put his master to great expense, buying off some of the mercenaries would require money. Simply recruiting them without muster would also damage the King’s reputation. So, he wrote to Grignan for money; the latter had already stressed that the break-up of the English levy was a ‘grand

78 Hacfort was born about 1516 or 1517 at Nymegen in Gelderland and lived after his marriage in 1541 at Forcht. He was thus a subject of the Emperor after 1543. Arrested at Arnhem for failure to take the oath in March 1546, his replies to the articles put to him furnish interesting information on his activities as a captain for Philip of Hesse during the Brunswick war: cf. HHSA, P.A. 71, fos. 186–192. He seems to have worked at the same time for Philip and the King of France: see his correspondence with the Landgrave in SAM, Pol. Arch., 752, fos. 4–27, especially Philip’s commission to him to raise four ensigns, 8 Oct. 1545, fo. 12. He seems to have served the French consistently until his arrival in England in March 1548 with the Regent Mary’s permission to command 3,000 horse. 79 In 1545, he admitted that he had offered his services to Francis I against the English, but that nothing had come of this. This was certainly a lie, as the Queen of Hungary remarked – ‘il semble notoirement que ledit Hacfort en tout ne dit verité’ – and as is shown by the Fraisse correspondence. Fraisse, he claimed, had first approached him at Bois-le-duc and had asked him to recruit men for France, but again nothing had come of this. He was in France presenting his services in August 1545, when he was asked to go and join Fraisse at Coblenz: ‘Confession et Responce faite par Henry Hackfort,’ HHSA, P.A. 71, fos. 189r–90v, letter of Mary of Hungary to Charles V, 23 Mar. 1546. 80 Francis I to Fraisse, 3 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 57–58: ‘Vous adviserés tous ensemble en quoy il se pourra employer pour le bien de mes affaires, et principallement à rompre ces assemblées, si faire se peult, et là où il ne se pourroyt faire, il mectra peyne d’en retirer une partye des capitaines de leurs gens. Mais le principal de mon intention et le plus necessaire seroyt de les pouvoir rompre.’ 81 Here Hacfort’s account is informative: ‘luy furent donnees lettres de par icelluy seigneur Roy au seigneur de Frez lors estant aud. Covelens lesquelles il luy présenta; et declaira icelluy seigneur de Frez à Hackfort le contenu d’icelles lettres, disant que s’il fut venu deux ou trois jours plus tost il l’eust mis en venure pour détourner et rompre lad. assemblée s’il eult peu, conforme à l’intention dud. Roy de France, mais qu’il venoit trop tard pour ce que lesd. gens de guerre avoient fait serement au Roy d’Angleterre ung jour devant.: HHSA, P.A. 71, fo. 190r.

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conséquence’ for the King’s service.82 The King told Longueval that he had ordered Grignan to send 2,000 écus from the Netherlands to add to the 2,000 to be sent by Longueval himself. He added a caution, however, that one of these two sums was to be kept in reserve and the other spent only on the best ensigns or, as Longueval put it, for emergencies (‘sous l’extrême necessité’). Fraisse himself thought it wise to promise the King that he would only use the money in matters of great importance.83 The English commissioners who were so ably outwitted by Fraisse were Thomas Averey and Thomas Chamberlain, joined by Sir Ralph Fane and Francis Hall from Calais. Their commission was not dated until the 21 August, by which time Reiffenberg had already sent over his lieutenant, Leuchtmacher, to enquire why they were so late and beg that they be sent over as soon as possible, considering all sorts of problems would arise from delay and Germany stirred up against them.84 Their instructions give the commissioners powers to extend the payment of the troops even if not needed. This was in response to an urgent request from Reiffenberg, who feared the loss of his reputation otherwise. A separate levy of 2,000 men under John Dymoke in north Germany was delayed, and the commissioners were authorized to take on 2,000 ‘speceall good men undre the leading of a notable captayne,’ raised ‘by thappointment of Reiffenberg.’85 They arrived at Antwerp on the 24th, and spent some time with Vaughan, dealing with their money and – incidentally – complaining to the Council that their funds would be less than the amount necessary.86 On the 26th, Hall arrived at Antwerp to request from the Queen-Regent a passport or at least letters of recommendation. Both requests were refused, though permission was granted for the commissioners themselves to

82

Fraisse to Francis I, 14 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 89–93; 4 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 61–62. Extract of a letter of Francis I to Longueval and Longueval’s covering note to Fraisse, 14 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 100. Fraisse to Francis I, 21 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 117–118. 84 BL, Add. MS 6362, no. 5 (draft in Paget’s hand); Reiffenberg to Paget, 19 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/206, fo. 37(43) (L&P, XX, ii, 172): ‘quod inde mali, quod damni instaret, quod denique malae famae totam Germaniam (ex hoc) adversus nos incendet.’ Hall to Paget, 29 Aug. 1545, ibid. 245. 85 The Council to the commissioners, 30 Aug. 1545, BL, Add. MS 5753, fos. 147– 148 (L&P, XX, ii, 248), recd. Andernach, 11 Sept. Dymoke to Paget, 31 Aug. 1545, ibid. 259. 86 Fane, Chamberlain and Averey to Paget, 27 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 20–23 (L&P, XX, ii, 234). 83


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cross Imperial territory.87 The refusal may well have taken place after the Emperor’s interview with Mesnage.88 The English did not reach Cologne until 4 September, when they heard Reiffenberg’s complaints about French interference.89 They say little of their stay there, which we know from Fraisse’s correspondence to have been rather unsuccessful, and they left by boat up the Rhine for Andernach, where they arrived on the 8th. They decided to make their headquarters there, as Coblenz was in the territory of the proFrench Archbishop of Trier, and it was at Andernach that Reiffenberg showed them his troops quartered in the neighbouring villages on the east bank. There, too, they learned of French intrigues against them, but they still hoped to take the muster on the 14th.90 This was the signal to Fraisse to step up his activities, and he promised to do all in his in his power to frustrate them.91 Information obtained from an English agent by his secretary finally convinced him that the levy was for the English,92 though news sent by Grignan suggested that the money for pay had been late in leaving Antwerp.93 When Fraisse arrived at Cologne, he was able to persuade the magistrates of the city to prevent artillery and munitions from being sent to Reiffenberg’s camp, despite the appeals of the English commissioners to the close trade links with England. He was even able to report optimistically of the English enterprise that ‘without outcome, it will 87

Hall to Paget, 29 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 38–41 (L&P, XX, ii, 245). Mémoire of Mesnage [to the Admiral?], Aug. 1545, draft, BnF, fr. 17888, fos. 125– 126. It seems, in fact, that the Queen of Hungary actually sent to Francis I some kind of guarantee that she would not allow German troops to cross the Netherlands to serve the English: see Francis I to Mary of Hungary, n.d. [late 1545], HHSA, P.A. 69, fo. 36. 89 English commissioners to Paget, 4 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 91–92 (L&P, XX, ii, 298); Reiffenberg to the English commissioners, 4 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 93r: ‘ea nocte qua ego vobiscum eram, de meis trecenti equites et propemodum mille milites pedestres de alia mea cohorte recesserunt, quod ab instinctu et per insidias inimicorum factum esse non est dubium.’ 90 The English commissioners to the Council, Andernach, 11 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fo. 149r: ‘owre hoste in thys town told us that the Frenche Kynge before our cumyng had a Commissary hyere, whyche now (he saithe) is att Covelyns, spyinge, entysynge and doing whatt he can to lette and hynddyr thys the Kynnggis Majestis enterpryse’ (L&P, XX, ii, 352). 91 Fraisse to Francis I, 4 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 61–62. 92 Mont to Paget, 5 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 102–104 (L&P, XX, ii, 310). Gode to Fraisse, 5 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 70–71; Gode to Fraisse, 7 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 72–74. 93 Grignan to Fraisse, 8 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 77–78. See Grignan’s enquiry to Mesnage, 19 Oct. 1545, BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 157. 88

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put your enemy to great expense.’94 While at Cologne, Fraisse again contacted the Protestant princes to persuade them to abandon their connections with the English. This was the moment he chose to put pressure on the Landgrave by pointing out that, though Chancellor Bing had said his master wished to remain neutral, Fraisse would have to inform Francis of rumours that the Landgrave was not truly neutral between France and England. Fraisse was convinced that Reiffenberg, for one, wanted to identify the cause of England with that of the Evangelical Princes and warned Bing of the dangers of this, especially as some men were trying to turn the King against the Landgrave and his allies.95 Fraisse had some reason for satisfaction; he had already seen his cultivation of the Palatine bear fruit in that prince’s defeat of 200 landsknechts crossing his territory. Communications between England and Germany were necessarily slow and secrecy caused misunderstandings. Henry’s agent, Christoff Mont, at Coblenz early in September, still thought Reiffenberg’s levy might be for the French, and his mind was not set at rest until he had talked to Reiffenberg himself.96 Fraisse was also confused at first about the real nature of the levy. He had observed the slowing down of the musters and heard that Reiffenberg had called for support from the neighbouring towns for common defence and maintenance of the Gospel. He could see no reason why Henry VIII should delay the levy as matters stood at Boulogne. Yet the day before, he had written to Longueval that it was sure they were being raised for Henry VIII. No wonder he would write to Cardinal du Bellay: ‘To sum up, everything is full of doubt and if there ever were a time to try something in this country it is now.’ However, by 3 September he was quite certain of Reiffenberg’s intentions and wrote to the King that ‘he is revealed by his preparations.’ Nevertheless he suspected that, with war likely in north Germany, Reiffenberg’s men would eventually be turned by the Landgrave against his enemies there.97

94 Fraisse to Francis I, 9 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, p. 78; Fraisse to Francis I, 14 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 90: ‘sans effect, elle mectera vostre ennemy en grande despence.’ 95 Fraisse to Bing, 18 Sept. 1545, SAM, Pol.Arch., 1836, fos. 38–39; Philip of Hesse to Jakob Sturm, 20 Sept. 1545, Pol.Corr, III, no. 603. 96 Mont to Paget, 5 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 102–103; Bucler and Mont to Henry VIII, 15 Sept. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 588–590. 97 Fraisse to the Palatine, 2 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 56–57: Reiffenberg’s call ‘pour la défense et conservation de leur pays’ and ‘pour l’entretènement de la parole de Dieu.’; to Longueval, 1 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 53–55: ‘il n’y a rien plus asseuré qu’ilz


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Fraisse seems to have had little respect for his adversaries when he reported: I know nothing of the affairs of this world if this is not the maddest and most poorly led enterprise ever attempted if they have no assurance of passage through the Emperor’s lands, which at the moment is not so easily done.98

Elsewhere he compares the levy to ‘the poets’ tale of people in hell drawing water with a sieve.’99 Fortune, he thought, had been over-kind to the English commissioners; as they were landing near Andernach, they had only just escaped capture with all their money. For this reason, they had gone straight to the camp and so had, to some extent, placed themselves in the power of the mercenaries. Yet Fraisse himself was increasingly in danger; by the middle of September he was threatened within the walls of Coblenz itself. The mercenary leaders told the burgomaster that, if Fraisse stayed there longer, they would treat the town as an enemy and all its dependent villages would suffer. This naturally placed a town which wanted to remain on good terms with France in a difficult position, though after the burgomaster’s initial request, no attempt seems to have been made to dislodge the French envoy before his departure early in October.100 The long-delayed movement of the German levies immediately alerted Fraisse and caused him to move in pursuit. By the 26th, the crossing of the Rhine had been completed with twenty ensigns of foot (lacking 500 or 600 men), 1,000 of Reiffenberg’s horse and 540 of Eytel Wolf’s. Their column set out for Rheinbach, in the archbishopric of Cologne, via Breisach.101 Evidently, they had taken the northern route, which Fraisse had seen as the only alternative to the southern

ont esté retenus au nom du roy d’Angleterre.’; to Cardinal du Bellay, 3 Sept., ibid., pp. 59–60: ‘Somme, tout est plein de suspeçons, et si jamais il a esté besoing dextrement manyer quelque chose en ce pays, c’est à ceste heure.’; to Francis I, 3 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 58–59: Reiffenberg, ‘son appareil le descouvre.’ 98 Fraisse to Grignan, 14 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 88: ‘Je n’entends rien aux affaires de ce monde ou c’est la plus folle et la plus mal conduicte entreprise qui fust jamais faicte, s’ilz n’ont assurance de passer sans aulcung empechement par le pays de l’empereur qui n’est pas encore à cette saison bien facile.’ 99 Fraisse to Francis I, 26 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 123: ‘ce que les poètes feignent de celles qui aux enfers puisent l’eau avecques un crible.’ 100 Fraisse to Francis I, 14 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 93. 101 Hall to Paget, 28 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/208, fos. 96–97 (L&P, XX, ii, 468). English commissioners to the Council, 29 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/208, fos. 100–103.

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through Trier and past Luxemburg.102 Their way would lie through Aachen into the archbishopric of Liège, thus avoiding the Emperor’s territory. The whole situation was changed, however, by the arrival, on the day of the crossing, of letters from the English Council.103 These contained the orders reversing previous policy and directing the army towards Champagne in a diversionary expedition. The troops were to burn, waste, and kill for a month before returning; their leaders were requested to await payment with patience until then. The reason for the English government’s change of plan is not difficult to find: the invasion scare of the summer of 1545 had by now passed; the French fleet was out of the Channel; and the only threat which remained was to Boulogne. Here a diversionary expedition would be of use. However, the stipulation that only two months’ wages and conduct were to be paid effectively ruined the expedition: payment had begun on 5 September, leaving by now only just over a month to reach France, undertake some exploit and then return. Though Reiffenberg appeared to agree to this new plan, it is plain that he had serious doubts about the feasibility of the expedition and feared for his reputation among the men. So, from the start, things began to go wrong with English plans. First of all, from Aachen, Averey had to be sent post haste to Antwerp to obtain another ten or twelve thousand crowns in order to satisfy the growing demands of the men, though the Council, on the commissioners’ request, despatched £44,000 to Aachen on 8 October plus 12,000 crowns for the parfyght ending of all thinges to thintent his grace be nott by any meane trobled with any odde rackoninges or demandes among them . . . butt that they may be quyte rydde away wythout great reason of any quarrel, ffor the which ordre His Majeste maketh none accompt of iiij or vM over or undre.104

The English Council was evidently under the impression that it could get rid of the levy simply, but this was not the case. From Aachen, as

102 Fraisse to Francis I, 14 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 94–95. There were a limited number of alternatives. In December 1542, Heideck had proposed to move from Coblenz to Luxemburg, though things had changed since the Emperor went to war with France: Seymour to Henry VIII, 29 Dec. 1542, St.P., IX. 254. 103 Council to the English commissioners, n.d. [Sept. 1545], NA SP1/208, fos. 12–19 (L&P, XX, ii, 403). 104 English commissioners to the Council, Rheinbach, 29 Sept. 1545, ibid.XX, ii, 474; Aachen, 1 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/208, fos. 139–142 (L&P, XX, ii, 509); Council to commissioners, 8 Oct. 1545, BL, Add.MS 5753, fo. 151 (L&P, XX, ii, 548).


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the troops marched into Liège, it is clear that relations between the commissioners and the soldiers deteriorated badly. Reiffenberg stuck to his demand for four months’ wages, arguing that this is what had been agreed and that otherwise little could be done with the expedition; he also added an extra demand for pages for the horsemen. To this, the Council in England retorted that there was no custom for fixed agreements on length of service with landsknechts and enclosed contracts with the French King and the Emperor to prove it.105 To what extent was French influence responsible for the debacle which followed? Fraisse certainly detected the slowness with which the troops were receiving payment and seems to have taken the opportunity to entice away some of the captains.106 There is no evidence that these negotiations were with Reiffenberg himself, rather than with his subordinates, for he himself complained late in August that Fraisse was corrupting his men. He later attributed the desertion of 300 horse and 1,000 foot to French intrigue,107 but Fraisse was working on fertile ground. Neither Reiffenberg nor his followers were anxious to leave Germany and they wrote to offer their services to the Landgrave and the Protestant estates.108 Fraisse reported that, even after the binding distribution of coin to each of the men (completed by 21 September), desertions were occurring for two main reasons: firstly, the rumours of Anglo-French peace talks; and secondly, the word spread by the French that other princes, among them the kings of France and Denmark, were in need of mercenaries. John Dymoke and Claes Taphoren, the clerk of the musters, had reported ominously as early as August that little was to be expected from Reiffenberg.109 Mont, from Coblenz early in September, saw clearly how French agents were urging the local princes to break up the levy. He himself

105 Council to the commissioners, 14 Oct. 1545, BL, Add.MS 5753, fo. 153 (L&P, XX, ii, 585). 106 Fraisse to Longueval, 20 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 112–114. 107 English commissioners to Paget, 27 Aug. 1545, L&P, XXI, ii, 234; Reiffenberg to his clerk Hans Ulrich, 4 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fo. 94. 108 Reiffenberg was quick to offer his men to the Evangelical princes once the expedition to France had broken down. Reiffenberg to the Landgrave, Florennes, 27 Oct. 1545, SAM, Pol. Arch., 752, fo. 48r–v: his instruction, ibid., fos. 49–51, same place and date. 109 Dymoke to Paget, Hamburg, 31 Aug. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 259; Taphoren to same, 31 Aug. 1545, ibid. 255. Christophe Richer claimed to have persuaded Christian III of Denmark to impede the passage through his states of troops being raised in Mecklenburg for English service (Mémoires du sieur Richer in N. Camusat, Mélanges historiques, fo. 13r.

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could do little about it.110 Only during October, with the expedition dragging its way to an ignominious halt at Florennes, did the full extent of French activities become apparent to the English. An agent of Longueval’s, returning from the Archbishop of Liège, was intercepted and questioned. His papers and confessions revealed not only that the Archbishop was favourable to the French, which might have been assumed anyway, but also the extent of Fraisse’s intelligence. The confession indicates that Fraisse had followed the army to Liège and was extremely well-informed as to its progress, even predicting its likely return without crossing the French frontier.111 The march of the troops came to a halt at the abbey of Florennes on 28 October, the day after Reiffenberg wrote offering his services to the Landgrave, with the detention of Henry’s commissioners by the ‘guidons’ of the infantry, who declared they would put them, Reiffenberg and his officers in irons if they were not paid. In the next few days the commissioners became convinced that Reiffenberg himself was staging the mutiny, especially since his lieutenant Wolf Slegher was ‘the cheffe begynner of this muteny.’ On 30 October, 500 arquebusiers ‘of the rascalles’ came to assault the abbey. Negotiations followed over how much had been paid to Reiffenberg and whether they would have their month’s return pay ‘according to their bestellinge.’ Insisting on what they had already paid out, the commissioners were then ignominiously led on foot ‘in the fowlest waie they culde devise . . . whedir we were cariede more like theves then comyssaries’ to the camp, where they had to enter the ‘ring,’ the famous circle of the lansquenets, formed when disputes arose. With Reiffenberg and Slegher orchestrating events on horseback, they ‘causide to be offride us a drome to [sit] on, whiche we reffuside and as it is tolde us the same is amonge them taken in derision.’ Having been forced to listen to the demands of the ‘commons,’ and protesting that Reiffenberg had already been paid, they eventually agreed to disburse some more money. Chamberlain, especially, was threatened with hanging since he had insisted on making full account of money already paid out and had thus made an enemy of 110 Mont to Paget, 5 Sept. 1545; Bucler and Mont to Henry VIII, 15 Sept. 1545, L&P, ii, 310, 381. 111 ‘Memoire de ce que l’homme de Monsieur de Fresse a apporté,’ NA SP1/209, fos. 100–101 (L&P, XX, ii, 636/2). See also Chamberlain to Paget, 28 Oct., sending him the cipher of the Frenchman ‘who was servant to the Frenche Kinges man that laie at Confluence for to have distorbed our armie, as it now makethe me suspecte he did’ NA SP1/209, fos. 151–152. The cipher is enclosed, fos. 152–153.


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Reiffenberg. They were then led on to Givey and Chimay until released on the intervention of an Imperial agent in return for a promise of safe-conduct for Reiffenberg to go to the Emperor’s court. In all they had disbursed several thousand crowns more than they thought was due to the Germans by the time they managed to get back to Antwerp by 22 November.112 The Council in England denounced ‘the lewd and ontrue procedinges of Reyfenberg and others.’ Henry promised his agents would not be out of pocket ‘and therefor prayeth you to pluck your hartes unto yow and play the men for the tyme.’ A trusted man was sent to the Emperor’s court to obtain the commissioners’ release, and Reiffenberg was to be told that Henry ‘doth know more of ther dooble dealinges and secrett practizes then they think.’ The King’s ambassadors in the Low Countries, one of whom was Gardiner, sent comforting letters, and it is a measure of the reaction that even Gardiner, normally so hostile to France, was now prepared to admit that peace with her was necessary in order to ‘escape the thrawldom’ of the German captains and in view of ‘our wantes at hom.’ Paget himself issued Reiffenberg with an extraordinary letter, surely reflecting Henry’s coruscating anger, denouncing his ‘desloyal et mauvais service’ and threatening in effect to ‘put out a contract’ on him: If you do not do as instructed you can be sure, and His Majesty has also told me to write thus, that wherever you might find yourself, anywhere in Christendom you will forfeit your life, even if His Majesty has to pay 50,000 crowns for it.113

The commissioners were given leave by the Council to retire on 28 November, leaving Chamberlain in Antwerp to attempt to recover the money lost. Ironically, when, in 1549, Fane was swept up in the political troubles that brought Somerset down, it was put to him (preposterously)

112 Fane and Averey to the Council, 28 Oct. 1545, ibid., fos. 156–160 (L&P, XX, ii, 680); 1 Nov., NA SP1/209, fos. 209–212 (L&P, XX, ii, 710); 10 Nov., NA SP1/210, fos. 67–70, esp. 68v (L&P, XX, ii, 766); commissioners to Council, 22 Nov. 1545, NA SP1/211, fos. 25–26 (L&P, XX, ii, 847). 113 Paget and Petre to the commissioners, 2 Nov. 1545, BL, Add. MS 5753, fo. 155; Gardiner, Thirlby and Carne to same, 3 and 5 Nov. 1545, ibid., fos. 156, 158; Gardiner to Paget, 7 Nov. 1545, in Muller (ed.), The Letters of Gardiner, p. 180; Paget to Reiffenberg, 2 Nov. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 215 (L&P, XX, ii, 716): ‘si vous ne faictes ce que dessus soyez bien asseuré et aussi Sa Majesté m’a commandé vous escripre, que en quelque part que soyez en toute la Chrestienté il vous coustera la vie, encore que Sa Majesté en paye pour ce cinquante mille escuz.’

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‘that he should robb King Henry when he went for the Almaynes to be brought to Bulleyne.’ At the same time, it was hinted that Dr Bruno of Metz, one of the Protestant mediators between England and France, had been ‘the menes the army went not forward.’114 While it was certainly the case that the Protestant diplomats did not want to see the Anglo-French war encouraged, there is no real evidence that they, rather than the Landgrave, were in a position to act in this way. Naturally, Fane and Chamberlain concluded that the collapse of the expedition had been intended from the start. In the course of the mutiny they reported that they thought Reiffenberg had always intended to stay close to the Rhine, in order to ‘breake upe for to go to serve his master the Landsgrave’ if needed, and that he had never intended to enter France. His ‘brentmaister’ had told them that, when he had discussed levying protection money in France, Reiffenberg had said this was not the moment as they might both find themselves in French service.115 It seems, too, that the Landgrave’s Hofmarschall, von Baumbach, was requested by the English government to ask his master to provide an explanation for Reiffenberg’s betrayal and the rumour that the Landgrave had actually encouraged the mutiny.116 There is no direct evidence of collusion between Fraisse and Reiffenberg, though it is possible that, when the latter became convinced that the English were trying to get away with spending as little as possible, he began to make approaches to the French. Reiffenberg was a complete opportunist: English suspicions of this were rife late in 1545 and confirmed in the following year, when Mont reported his conversations with French agents. The Landgrave, for his part, tried to convince Mont early in the following year that the fiasco was nothing to do with him and hinted that grants made since by the Emperor to Reiffenberg revealed the true author of the affair.117 We know that Reiffenberg latter offered

114 Council to commissioners, 28 Nov. 1545, BL, Add. MS 5753, fo. 160 (L&P, XX, ii, 883). Anonymous Chronicle, BL, Add. MS 48023, fo. 351v. 115 Fane and Chamberlain to the Council, 22 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fos. 94–99 (L&P, XX, ii, 636); the same to the same, 28 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 157r–v (L&P, XX, ii, 680); commissioners, 22 Nov. 1545, NA SP1/211, fos. 25–26 (L&P, XX, ii, 847): Reiffenberg had turned down the idea of ‘a large ransome for brandesakking of howses, to saye, for savinge them from brennynge’ in France. 116 Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 13 Nov. 1545, Pol. Corr. III, 637; Mont and Bucler to the Landgrave, received Cassel 24 Nov. 1545, SAM, Pol. Arch., 1801, fos. 76v–77r (Reiffenberg had been saying openly that the Landgrave himself had encouraged the mutiny). Landgrave Philip to Reiffenberg, 28 Nov. 1545, ibid., fos. 66–68, draft; Reiffenberg’s reply, 5 Dec. 1545, ibid., fos. 56–58, dealing with three articles of accusation. 117 Paget claimed, in talking to Sturm in November 1545, that ‘the Lansgrave . . . hath


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himself to France early in 1546, though his price was high. Despite this, Francis I cautiously accepted his plan to seize English money for troops in Germany, and thereafter he was regularly to serve France.118 Fraisse himself went as far as Liège and then returned to France, probably concluding that his task was complete. Ironically, he then went straight to Ardres to take part in peace talks there with the English. In an undated report to his master, though, he concluded exultantly that I have not only concluded my operation but, but in addition . . . when there was a possibility of these troops entering your kingdom, not only did they mutiny and break up, but they destroyed their banners, imprisoned the King of England’s commissioners and took all their money, for which he will be for ever mocked and despised here.

Henry, he said, would never try the same plan again.119 The French, however, remained wary of Reiffenberg’s army until its complete breakup; they continued to fear for the safety of the frontier and Mézières in particular, especially when the army arrived at Florennes.120 Francis I was at La Fère from 9 to 13 October and from there he despatched Enghien to Guise, Martin du Bellay to Mézières and Longueval to raise the Champagne levies. French military preparations to resist served the King of late very il for his army of Almayns,’ and Sturm had to defend Philip by saying that Reiffenberg’s knavery had been without the Landgrave’s knowledge. Fane et al. to Council, Antwerp, 22 Nov. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 847; Paget to Petre, 27 Nov. 1545, NA SP1/211, fo. 91r. See also Mont to Henry VIII, 10 Feb. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 191; 1 May 1546, NA SP1/217, fos. 160–163 (L&P, XXI, i, 730). 118 Francis I to Bassefontaine, Montargis, 18 Apr. 1546, orig. crs. Bayard, AE Acq. ex., vol. 11: ‘affin de se servir de chacun selon ce qu’il se peult faire, sans entrer en despence inutille, vous tiendrez aud. Reiffenberg bons et gracieulx propoz de ma part, luy disant qu’il n’est point de besoing qu’il vienne pardevers moy, mays que s’il veult prendre les deniers des Angloys je l’advouheray tresvolontiers de ce qu’il aura faict; et davantaige, je recognoistray ung tel service, de sorte qu’il aura occasion de s’en contenter.’ 119 Fraisse to Francis I, undated, Fraisse, pp. 8–9: ‘je suis non seulement venu à bout de mon entreprise, mais encore . . . car quand il a esté question de faire entrer ces bandes dedans votre royaume, non seulement elles se sont mutinés et départies, mais ont rompu les enseignes, prins les commissaires du roi d’Angleterre prisonniers et ravi tout l’argent, dont il sera à jamais mocqué et vilipendé par deça.’ The English reported that he reached Liège and then returned to France: NA SP1/209, fo. 157 (L&P, XX, ii, 680). His short account written in the following year makes it clear that, after his activities in the Rhineland (‘Ou, Dieu mercy, nous fusmes assez heureux’), he went on to Ardres: Fraisse to Marie de Guise, 3 Mar. [1546], Balcarres Papers, I, 247–248. 120 Germain le Lieur, agent in Antwerp, to Mesnage, 12 Oct. 1545, copied into the ambassador’s Diplomatic Journal, BNF, fr. 17889, fo. 128r, describing a conversation with a Scotsman recently arrived from London: ‘Davantage m’a dict avoir parlé à deux courriers venans d’Angleterre lesquelz luy ont dict qu’ilz alloient audevant les Allemans pour les faire haster et partir pour venir à Boullogne et le reste à Mésières.’

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the German troops on the north-east frontier were extensive during October.121 Francis warned Mesnage that he had heard That the Germans who assembled to enter the King of England’s service are six leagues from Binche and the rumour runs among them that they will pass through the Emperor’s lands to join the English near Calais and that they are keeping as far as possible from my frontier out of fear of being obstructed in the journey.

The King affected to disbelieve this, in view of the assurances of the Imperial envoy that the Emperor would not allow it, but asked for warning so that, should the Emperor have changed his line, ‘I may change the instructions I have issued for resistance.’ Mesnage still feared the success of the English enterprise later in October, and Grignan described himself as ‘merveilleusement desplaysant’ at the news that the army had crossed the Imperial territory of Brabant into Liège, despite the Emperor’s assurances. The discomfiture of the English must have been obvious by the end of the month, though, when the King wrote again of the Germans that ‘they seem to be doing nothing if not getting ready to retreat, for they have sent away their supplies like men with no intention to stay around long.’122 Changing Terms of Trade: 1546 The Reiffenberg débâcle was most certainly not the end of AngloFrench competition, especially as the issue of troop-raising in north 121 See Martin du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 320–321. In October 1543, commissions were sent out to experienced gentlemen on the north-eastern frontier to raise infantry ‘pour obvier et resister à l’entreprise d’aulcuns Allemans et autres gens de noz ennemys’; royal letter of remission, Mar. 1546, AN, JJ 257B, no. 106, fo. 34r. Picard adventurers under Belleforrière were mustered at Vervins ‘pour resister aux entreprinses que font sur lad. place et autres circonvoisins . . . aulcuns gens de guerre allemans soubz . . . le roy d’Angleterre’ (BnF, fr. 25793, no. 548). 122 Francis I to Mesnage, 14 Oct. 1545, Pierpont Morgan Library, RF (MA 147): ‘que les Allemans assemblez pour aller au service du Roy d’Angleterre sont à six lieues de Baings et que le bruict qui court entre eulx est qu’ilz passeront par les pays de l’Empereur pour aller joindre aux Angloys vers Calais et qu’ilz s’esloignent le plus qu’ilz pourront de ma frontiere de peur d’estre empeschez en leur passaige.’ ‘. . . je puisse changer l’ordre que j’ay donné pour y resister.’; Mesnage to Admiral d’Annebault, 26 Oct. 1545, copied into Mesnage’s Diplomatic Journal, BnF, fr. 17889, fo. 120r. Grignan to Mesnage, 15 Oct. 1545, ibid. fos. 53–54; Francis I to Mesnage, [20 Oct.– 9 Nov. 1545], ibid., fr. 17890, fo. 52: ‘ilz facent apparence de rien faire, synon de bien t[ost se retirer], car ilz ont desia faict descharger leurs munici[ons . . .] comme gens qui n’ont pas deliberé d’aller longue[ment . . .].’


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Germany remained unsettled. The kaleidoscopic strategic picture was changing yet again; where the Germans could afford to be uncooperative in August and September 1545, the Emperor’s plans to subdue Germany were becoming more obvious by the end of the year. This was to be seen in the desperate efforts of the Protestants to breathe life into their earlier offers of mediation. Another indication was the even greater embarrassment of the princes during the first months of 1546 at seeing the French and English locked in dispute within the Empire. English strategy also began to change. The difficulties of bringing men from the Rhineland and the events of the Schmalkaldic War led the English to turn their attention much more to northern Germany, and in particular to the area around Hamburg and Bremen, as a source of men who could, at need, be transported directly by sea. The area was replete with men eager for employment, though few contemporaries knew clearly for whom the levies made around Bremen and Hamburg in the summer of 1545 were ultimately intended: the Duke of Brunswick, the King of Denmark, and the kings of France and England were all suggested as the true paymasters. There is some reason to suppose that the bands of Peter of Guelders were originally hired by the English, though later on English sources suggest that they were in French pay. It seems that Duke Henry of Brunswick was receiving payments from both French and English. The French suspected in July 1545 that the Mecklenburg levies were destined for England,123 though a little later Schmalkaldic diplomats believed, that those in Brunswick were inspired by the French (Brunswick was at the time an enemy of the League). Such uncertainties were the result of secrecy and suspicion. The French denial of this suggestion is instructive. In a letter to the Council of Thirteen at Strasbourg, Francis I admitted to paying the Duke of Brunswick to break up the levies raised for the English in north Germany, but added that he had made no levies of his own.124 This should, of course, be read in conjunction with Grignan’s rather more honest analysis of the situation, though it does display well the French anxiety to retain the goodwill of the Protestants. Doubt about all these northern levies was complicated by the defeat of the Duke of Brunswick. Henry VIII had been deceived, as usual, in his dealings with Brunswick but the negotiations with Captain Conrad

123 124

Jean Petit to Mesnage, 4 July 1545, BnF, fr. 17888, fos. 318–319. Francis I to the Council of Strasbourg, 8 Oct. 1545, Pol.Corr., III, no. 614.

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Pfenning or Pennynck (‘Courtpenninck’), begun by John Dymoke and Claes Taphoren in September 1545,125 eventually ended in Pennynck’s signature of his contract for the supply of 3000 lansdsknechts and collection of an annuity in January 1546.126 The French seem quickly to have got wind of these activities127 and, of course, were just as active on their own part, especially after the failure of mediation talks with the English held by the envoys of the Protestant princes late in 1545. Hacfort was sent to north Germany to recruit troops on behalf of the French government.128 The French ambassador Mesnage reported English negotiations with mercenary captains there. He was under orders to tell the Emperor that French agents in Germany were there ‘to break up the King of England’s negotiations there and stop him from drawing men to make war on me,’ and then to protest at news of levies of cavalry for Henry VIII by the Emperor’s commander, Buren.129

125

Dymoke to the English commissioners, 2 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 68–70 (L&P, XX, ii, 274); Council to the English commissioners, 30 Aug. 1545, with Taphoren’s account-book attached, BL, Add.MS 5753, fos. 161–163. 126 Council to Paget, 29 Dec. 1545, NA SP1/212, fos. 147–148 (L&P, XX, ii, 1054). Contract with Pennynck, 22 Jan. 1546, cf. NA SP1/213, fo. 152 (L&P, XXI, i, 112/ ii), though Henry VIII’s notification of appointment has ‘drei dusent dutsche landsknecht’ in ensigns of 400, ibid., fo. 151 (L&P, XXI, i, 112/i). See also the Council to Brende and Brygantyn, Jan. 1546, NA SP1/214, fos. 1–6 (L&P, XXI, ii, 172). For German comments on this, see Christoff von Carlowitz to Maurice of Saxony, 27 Feb. 1546, in Brandenburg, Politische Korrespondenz, no. 868. 127 Mémoire of Mesnage to d’Annebault, 24 Dec. 1545, BnF, fr. 17889, fos. 98–99; Mesnage to Francis I, 25 Dec. 1545, ibid. fos. 96–97. 128 Henrick Hacfort to [Mesnage], 6 Jan. 1545/6, BnF, fr. 6616, fo. 95: ‘par commission du Roy il s’est asseuré de quatre mil pietons et cinq cens chevaulx et qu’il entretient les cappitaines à ses frayz; et depuis lad. commission à luy baillée, il n’a eu argent ne nouvelles du Roy. . . . Il dict aussi que led. Hacfort s’est allyé d’aucuns protestants pour plus seurement faire lad. levée et led. Hacfort ne luy a nommé lesd. protestants mais il croict que c’est le Landgrave et l’Evesque de Meunstre.’ By February, Hacfort had been imprisoned in Guelders for levying men without the Emperor’s licence: see Chamberlain to Paget, 20 Feb. 1545/6 (L&P, XXI, i, 256). 129 Mesnage to Francis I, 10 Jan. 1545/6, BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 18: ‘pour rompre les menees et praticques que y faict le roy d’Angleterre et empescher qu’il n’en tire gens pour me faire la guerre’ ‘le personnaige qui m’a apporté la lettre de creance du cappitaine Hacfort m’a dict qu’il venoit dud. lieu de Bresme et que pour certain il avoit veu commission du Roy d’Angleterre à Martyn van Hard, capitaine du pays de Frise . . . pour lever douze enseignes et a promys les passer en Angleterre et les mener en Escosse. Aussi a veu commission dud. Roy à Cort Pannich, cappitaine demourant à Bresme, pour lever dix huict enseignes et les mener à Callaix et Boullongne; et disoient lesd. cappitaines et autres de la compaignie de ceulx ausquelz il avoit congnoissance que au commencement du Caresme seroit faicte lad. levée.’ Francis I to Mesnage, 28 Feb., 8 Mar. 1546, Pierpont Morgan Lib. RF (MA 147).


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The new English commissioners, Brende and Brygandyn, were more successful then the predecesors, though in more favourable circumstances. Instructed on 1 February 1546, they collected £3,000 from Vaughan at Antwerp and £2,000 from Hamburg merchants on Henry’s letters of credit, arriving at Bremen with the necessary money by 4 March.130 Even so, they seem to have had to deal with the efforts of French agents to disperse the troops when they were waiting for permission to cross the Netherlands at Aalten on the border of Guelders and Cleves.131 The commissioners were pleased with the calibre of the men: 2983 in 8 ensigns, ‘of electe personages and old lanceknightes, armed and weaponed according as it is covenanted.’ But they claimed that ‘betwene this and Hambrough we were put by every wher from our muster place and therfore came hether being ground wher commenly the men of warre assemble for all princes.’ The abbess of Aalten certainly did not agree and the territory was technically under the Emperor as duke of Guelders. The Queen Regent was horrified at the idea of such an army marching across her territory at a time of famine and was anxious not to offend France; she threatened to have them cut to pieces and Pennynck hanged. So, much bargaining had to be done by Edward Carne. The troops had to cross the Rhine and Maas and were eventually able to cross the Netherlands in small groups, mostly through Dorte in Holland and thence through Zeeland and the coast of Flanders. Inland routes via Cleves were shut.132 They arrived at Calais early in April and some were reported by the Rhinegrave as having crossed the sea with difficulty.133 In the circumstances, it was a

130 Brende and Brygandyn to Henry VIII, 6 Mar. 1546, NA SP1/214, fos. 217–218 (L&P, XXI, i, 330). For their account, see NA E 351/13, 1 Feb.–20 July 1546, rendered 28 Aug. 1553. 131 Brende and Brygandyn to Henry VIII, 27 Mar. 1546, NA SP1/216, fos. 7–10 (L&P, XXI, i, 473). 132 Carne to Brende and Brigandyn, 31 March 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 495; Brende and Brigandyn to Henry VIII, 3, 7 April 1546, NA SP1/216 fo. 105v (L&P, XXI, i, 531, 569); same to Carne, 3 April 1546, NA SP1/216, fo. 111r (L&P, XXI, i, 534); Mary of Hungary to van der Delft and Scepperus, 17 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 615. 133 Pennynck to Cobham, 7 Apr. 1546, BL, Harleian 288, fo. 71 (L&P, XXI, i, 568). Brende and Brygandyn, 7 Apr. 1546 L&P, XXI, i, 569; Brende and Brygantyn to Paget, 14 Apr. 1546, NA SP1/217, fos. 8–9 (L&P, XXI, i, 599). Georg Reckerodt to Simon Bing, 21 May 1546, SAM, Pol.Arch., 1839, fo. 4r. Earlier reports had led the Landgrave to think that Pennynck’s force had been lost at sea (letter to Mont, 14 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 129 (L&P, XXI, i, 834/i). Pennynck’s eight ensigns of foot had 400 men per ensign. Each man received one daller conduct money and each ensign received 3,054 philippus per pay. Brende and Brygantyn disbursed £fl. 7523 to them from February to July: NA E 351/13.

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triumph to have got them there. They were destined to bulk out and give some attack to the new army being prepared at Calais under the command of Hertford. In February, Paget wrote that this would be ready around 20 March and would consist of 16,000 English, 2,000 Italians, 2,000 Spaniards, and 6,000 Germans being levied by Pennynck, ‘who is already aboutes it’ and would arrive ten days after, as well as 4,000 horse, part German, part Italian. By June 1546, Hertford’s forces at Boulogne included a substantial contingent of north German, Clevois and Albanian cavalry who had served before and would do so again.134 Mesnage’s informants had proved remarkably accurate in their reports of all this. Mesnage himself made efforts to persuade Josse, the Emperor’s secretary, to order a stop to Pennynck’s passage through the Emperor’s patrimonial lands.135 Mesnage seems in these months to have had a general brief to watch English activities, not only in Germany but also in the Netherlands, Italy and Scandinavia. Most of his information, though, came from sources in Germany, especially after he had reported the acute danger that the Germans would soon reach Boulogne to join with the English in pillaging French territory.136 One of Mesnage’s agents in north Germany, wrote to him from Hamburg that ‘you and M. de L’Aubespine have brought me good luck since I have obtained here what the King demanded.’137 This was almost certainly a

134 Paget to Mont, 25 Feb. 1546, St.P., XI. 60: Paget’s clear doubling of Penninck’s numbers is an indication of how even an English envoy could be deceived by hs own government. In another note to Petre he is clear that Pennynck had 3000 men, with each band armed with 150–200 arquebusiers (L&P, XXI, i, 614, ii) Chaloner’s account for the payment of foreign troops, NA, E 351/43, indicates, for cavalry, that Leuchtmacher (148, incl. 18 from Pomerania), Hoen (37) and Vanderlugh (53) were paid for eight months, 8 Apr. 1545–1547 Feb. 1546, 250 horse. BL, Add. MS 5753, fos. 188– 197, receipts, Apr.–July 1546, of Leuchtmacher (80 horse), Vollard Vanderlugh (250), Peter Hoen (250 Dutch horse), Christoff von Vrsberch (?Prysborch) (415 horse), Otto Count of Rytberg, Capt. Salablanca (66 arquebusiers), Hans van Winsigenrot; many of these were also stationed at Boulogne in October 1544. In 1549, Dymoke recalled that Rytberg ‘I do knowe well for to be a greatte muttyner, for he dyd serve before Bullen with Edel Volff and what ado he made ther ys no unknowe to some of my lordes of the councell:’ to Somerset, 11 May 1549, SP68/3, p. 696. 135 Mesnage to Bassefontaine, 28 Apr. [1546], BnF, fr. 17890, fos. 2–3. 136 Mesnage to Francis I, 30 Mar. 1546, ibid., fo. 106: ‘Sire, les advertissements ne contiennent que pour certain le Roy d’Angleterre faict faire toute diligence possible d’assembler bas Allemans pour les rendre dedans ung moys prestz d’entrer dedans voz pays, esperant que par telle diligence il vous previendra que voz forces ne seront encores assemblées pour les pouvoir empescher de se joindre à Callaix et Bollongne avec quelque nombre d’Angloys qu’il y veult faire descendre . . . ’ On Mesnage in this period, see D. Potter, ‘Foreign Policy in the Age of the Reformation,’ 538–539. 137 Roland Guyneau to Mesnage, Hamburg, 20 Apr. [1546], BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 15r–v:


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promise from the Hanseatic towns not to supply ships to the English. Claude de L’Aubespine, royal secretary, attended the Diet of Princes at Frankfurt in January–February 1546 with his brother Bassefontaine. The latter was observed by Mont with Reckerodt in conclave with the Landgrave.138 Though his main task was to direct negotiations with the Protestants, with a view to spurring them on to war with the Emperor, he seems to have taken considerable interest in the English levies. On 23 April 1546, he outlined his plans: As for me, I shall leave by tomorrow to go to Heidelberg on business and from there straight to Frankfurt to discover some English plot, for I begin to get wind that he wants to make a levy of some High Germans. For a day or two there have been two of his war commissioners at Frankfurt to exchange money and to recruit lansquenets. Conrad Phenin, colonel of the English levies, the one who sent levies from Lower Germany, has already sent 3000 men.

Bassefontaine was pleased to report that Mont had tried to take up the men around Worms, but without success.139 He was also in contact with the Protestants through the diplomat Ulrich Geiger (alias Chelius) and it was Chelius who seems to have been informing him of the movements of Mason and Mont and of the whereabouts of the now anti-French colonel, Count Wilhelm von Fürstenberg.140 Francis I was kept informed of everything. Acknowledging Bassefontaine’s report on ‘what the English King does through duke Philip’ [i.e. the Palsgrave] by various promises, the King’s opinion was acid:

‘vous et Monsieur de L’Aubespine m’avez apporté bonne fortune car j’ay obtenu par deçà ce que le Roy demandoit.’ 138 The Hessian ambassadors Walter, Günterode and Aitinger to the Landgrave, 27 Jan. 1546, SAM, Pol. Arch., 842, fos. 475–476, quoted in Pol. Corr, IV, 32, n. 14. Bassefontaine was offering French subsidies to the princes at Frankfurt. Johann Sturm to [Fraisse], 10 Feb. 1546, ibid., no. 25. Mont to Henry VIII, 10 Feb. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 191. 139 Bassefontaine to Mesnage, dated Good Friday 1546, BnF, fr. 17890, fos. 91–92: ‘De moy, je partiray d’icy demain pour aller à Hedelberg pour quelque affaire et de là incontinant à Francfort pour descouvrir quelque menée de l’Angloys car je commence à sentir qu’il veult fayre levée de quelques haultz Allemans: depuys ung jour ou deux il a eu deux commissaires de ses guerres à Francfort pour fayre quelques eschanges d’argent et pour aussi fayre descendre quelques lantzquenetz. Conrad Phenin, collonel dud. Angloys, celuy qui passoyt gens ès Basses Allemaignes a faict desia passer iii mille hommes.’ 140 ‘Peterman’ (Ulrich Chelius) to ‘Vogelstein’ (Bassefontaine), 27 May 1546, BnF, fr. 6616, fo. 108. See also Bassefontaine to Hacfort, Regensburg, 24 July [1546], SAM, Pol.Arch., 1834, fo. 10; ‘Vogelstein’ to Günterode, 24 July, ibid., fo. 11.

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chapter seven I think that he [Henry VIII] will keep no promises. Those he approaches understand very well why he makes such offers. As for me, I consider them such friends and so clear-sighted that they will be careful not to go along with him.141

Mesnage and Bassefontaine worked together closely in monitoring English manoeuvres.142 Mesnage’s informants led him to believe that the levies had become crucial; the King of England would have to make his greatest efforts that year, since his subjects’ ability to support the war was virtually exhausted.143 Hence it was crucial to frustrate this last effort in order to obtain the best possible terms at the peace which had to come sooner or later. When Mesnage reported that Fürstenberg, that old thorn in the French side, was raising troops for England, he asked Bassefontaine to make representations to the Elector Palatine and Landgrave ‘so he ceases to serve your enemy.’144 A little later he again asked Bassefontaine to approach the Palatine in order to stop his nephew, the Palsgrave Philip’s, activities on Henry’s behalf.145 In fact, though Hans Bruno of Metz made strenuous efforts to recommend Fürstenberg, who had planned to offer his services to the English King with a letter from the Emperor, nothing resulted.146 The assembly

141 Francis I to Bassefontaine, 3 May 1546, AE Acq. Extraord. 11: ‘ce que l’Angloys faict par le duc Philipes’ ‘Je pense qu’il [Henry VIII] n’en tiendra aucune. Mais ceulx à qui il s’adresse entendent tresbien à quelle fin il faict telles offres, et quant à moy je les extyme tant mes amys et si cler voyans qu’ilz n’ont garde d’y voulloir entendre.’ 142 Francis I to Bassefontaine, 17 May 1546, from Fontainebleau, orig. crs. Bayard, ibid. For an eighteenth-century copy of this, cf. BnF, fr. 6620, fo. 1. 143 Mesnage to Francis I, 13 Apr. 1546, draft, BNF, fr. 17890, fos. 88–89: ‘le Roy d’Angleterre est en necessité de faire ses plus grands effors ceste année contre vostre Magesté pour ce qu’il ne peult plus longuement soustenir la guerre, tant pour la sterilité et charté de vivres qui sont en ses pays que aultres grandes necessitez que souffrent ses subjectz.’ 144 Ibid. Mesnage to Francis I, 17 Apr. 1546, BnF, fr. 17889, fos. 90–92: ‘affin qu’ilz le facent cesser de servir à vostre ennemy.’ 145 Mesnage to Bassefontaine, 6 May 1546, ibid. fos. 210–211. Philip, Duke of Bavaria, Count Palatine of the Rhine (d. 1548), was receiving a pension of £833 6s. per half year from Henry VIII: NA, E 351/43. He had offered his services to Henry in June 1545 and been invited to visit England in March 1546 to show what he could do: see L&P, XX, i, 885; XXI, i, 137, 297, 469, 550. Fraisse to Francis I, Mar.– Apr. 1546, in Ribier (ed.), Lettres et mémoires d’estat, I, pp. 603–606: ‘le duc Philippe est en extreme necessité tellement malade en Angleterre, que l’on n’espere pas qu’il en revienne jamais.’ 146 Mont to Henry VIII, 30 Mar. 1546, St.P., xi, 86–88; Mont to Paget, 30 Mar. 1546, ibid. 88–89. On Bruno, see G. Zeller, Le Réunion de Metz à la France (2 vols., Strasbourg/Paris, 1926), pp. 82–83.


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of soldiers around Frankfurt and Worms in April and May 1546 remained outside English reach, and the English offers to Fürstenberg, made by Mont when the Count was taking the cure in Württemberg, came to nothing because of Fürstenberg’s unwillingness to accept the meagre terms proposed.147 The English displayed even more anxiety about French manoeuvres in Germany during the first half of 1546, than vice versa. Mont reported Bassefontaine’s arrival at Frankfurt for the Diet, in the company of Georg von Reckerodt.148 He was highly suspicious of the Frenchman’s insinuating himself into the counsels of Hesse and Saxony, and for the rest of the year Bassefontaine’s activities were observed.149 Though Mont felt that the Germans were bound to favour England for confessional reasons,150 the obvious successes of French diplomacy in the spring of 1546 led to serious efforts by the English to discredit the French. So Paget, in a letter to Bruno, characterized Bassefontaine and Reckerodt as papal spies who saw and knew everything around the Landgrave.151 In March, Mont taxed the Landgrave with his friendly dealings with a king so opposed to his faith, and was told, quite fairly, that it would be foolish for the Germans to alienate the French King before they were sure of England, whose alliance had so often been sought and never obtained.152 In April, when Mont offered the Landgrave a retainer of 10,000 fl. if he would retain captains to serve Henry in case of need and prevent troops going to French service, he described Bassefontaine, Reckerodt, La Planche and Fraisse as liars who wanted the Germans to serve the French King as slaves and spill their blood in his cause. Philip naturally pointed out that to prevent troops going to Henry’s enemies would be tantamount to an act of war against France. The latter had helped him in the past and was quite capable of stirring up

147 Mont to Henry VIII, 1 May 1546, NA SP1/217, fos. 160–163 (L&P, XXI, i, 730); Henry VIII to Palsgrave Philip, Sept. 1546, NA SP1/224, fos. 1–13 (L&P, XXI, ii, 2). 148 On Reckerodt (1500–1559) see a brief note in Pariset, Les relations, p. 37, n. 25. A servant of Philip of Hesse, he had been a French pensioner since 1540: see CAF, IV, 174, 11802. 149 Mont to Henry VIII, 7 Jan. 1546, St.P., XI, 1; Mont to Henry VIII, 27 Jan. 1546, NA SP1/213, fos. 174–175 (L&P, XXI, i, 129). 150 Mont to Henry VIII, 10 Feb. 1546, NA SP1/214, fos. 34–35 (L&P, XXI, i, 191); Mont to Paget, 10 Feb. 1546, St.P., XI, 40–43. 151 Paget to Bruno, 25 Feb. 1546, ibid. 62–63. 152 Mont to Paget, 27 Mar. 1546, ibid. 83. Bruno had sent to England a copy of Francis I’s letter to the Protestant states in which he rejected their requests that he tone down the persecution of heretics, 19 Feb. 1546, NA SP1/214, fo. 114r.

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his enemies in Germany.153 Mont’s inability to offer a firm alliance rendered his grandiloquent language useless; it remained the policy of the Protestant princes to seek firstly an Anglo-French alliance, and then, after June 1546, to take advantage of the Anglo-French peace treaty to obtain aid from both. Bassefontaine, as we have seen, had intended to go to Heidelberg at the end of April and French efforts now focused on the Palatinate, the most reliable French ally in Germany as a result of the Emperor’s abandonment in 1545 of the Elector Frederick II’s claim, through his wife, to the Danish throne.154 Mont, returning from his visit to Fürstenberg, found Bassefontaine and Reckerodt hard at work entertaining leading members of the court and seeking a muster-ground for the soldiers brought together at Frankfurt.155 Not surprisingly, John Mason’s mission, accompanying the Palsgrave Philip back to Germany, was largely designed to improve Anglo-Palatine relations, damaged by the omission of English congratulations for Count Frederick’s elevation to the electoral title; a religious and political league was now proposed. In this, the interruption of troop supplies to France would play a major role.156 The situation had gone too far, though, and the Elector’s secretary had already been sent to France.157 Mason’s description of his negotiations shows how keenly he was aware of being out-manoeuvred by Bassefontaine who, though he had left Heidelberg, had accomplished

153

Paget to Mont, 10 Apr. 1546, St.P., xi, 99–101; reply of the Landgrave to Mont, 13 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fos. 137–138 (L&P, XXI, i, 834/ii): ‘si militem a Gallo averteremus et ad Serenissimum Anglie Regem admitteremus, aperte nos belli socium contra Gallum constitueremus.’ 154 Partly by the treaty of Speyer, May 1544, and in the approach to Christian III of December 1544: cf. M. Roberts, The Early Vasas (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 146–147. 155 Mont to Henry VIII, 1 May 1546, NA SP1/217, fos. 160–163 (L&P, XXI, i, 730). 156 Mason’s instructions are in St.P., XI, 97–98, n., and NA SP1/216, fos. 178–181 (L&P, XXI, i, 582), draft corrected by Paget ‘. . . being enformed that the French King our enemye hath dayly conversant with thElectour, Bassefontayn, Rikerode and Volpesleger, who ar suffred to levye daylye men of warre in those partes against us . . . and doubting not but that esteming moch more the syncerite of our amitye towardes him then the colorable and pretensed freendshipp of the French men, which do nothing with dedes but altogether in wordes, he would be glad to gratify us in this cace . . . ’ Reckerodt left Heidelberg about the middle of May and went on to the French court via Württemberg: cf. Reckerodt to Bing, 21 May 1546, SAM, Pol.Arch., 1839, fos. 3–5. 157 For the arrival of Hubertus at the French court, cf. Francis I to Bassefontaine, 3 May 1546, AE, Acq. ex., 11; and for his departure, cf. Francis I to Bassefontaine, 17 May 1546, ibid.


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his work well. When the Chancellor of the Palatinate tried to minimize the influence of the French, Mason claims to have replied: Is it not knowen. . . . the longe tyme that Bassefowntayn, Rycrode, and others have haunted here? Howe frendelye they have ben entreteigned? And what chere and revell they have made here? It is to be thought that they have doone all this for their owne pleasures; the town being so unpleasaunt.

Mason was pessimistic about the possibility of using the Elector Palatine to stop the levies, in view of the French sympathies of his councillors, and was well aware of the practical problems of preventing recruitment: and for the stayng of any men either to be levyed or to be passed for Fraunce, the Palzgrave as I am enfourmed, can not do that we thinke he may do [though] he wolde thereunto employe him self. Well he might mak proclamation no man so hardy to go from his house and then they that have any thing to lefe wolde tarye. But idle and unmarryed men which have litle to take to might go owt of his cowntreye as though they had to do at Argentyn or in the marquisate of Bade or in Swytherlande and the Palzgrave never the wyser.158

Though Mason’s mission was largely unsuccessful, and nothing could be done to stop the French levies, the conclusion of peace saved the worst consequences. The French efforts in Germany were part of the precautionary measures devised in case Henry VIII decided to renew active warfare. In fact, diplomacy and financial necessity forced an uneasy compromise in the Anglo-French treaty (7 June). The peace, therefore, made Bassefontaine’s task of obstructing English moves in Germany needless, at least for a while, and the King able to suspend his activities: Since the negotiations hitherto entered into for the pillage of the money that the King of England had ordered for the levy of soldiers in Germany to serve him against me are no longer appropriate at this time, considering I am in peace and amity with him, you will make known to those who wanted to be of my service that the enterprise is no longer necessary.159

158 Mason to Henry VIII, Heidelberg, 11 May 1546, St.P., xi, 158–159; same to Paget, 11 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 68v (L&P, XXI, i, 797). 159 Francis I to Bassefontaine, 13 July 1546, orig. crs. Bayard, AE Acq. ex. vol. 11: ‘Et pour autant que les practicques qui avoyent esté par cy devant dressées pour destrousser les deniers que le Roy d’Angleterre avoyt ordonnez pour faire levee de gens de guerre en Allemaigne affin de s’en servir alencontre de moy ne sont plus apropos pour

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With the peace of June 1546, troop-recruitment in Germany ceased for a while to involve direct Anglo-French competition. The interests of the Protestant princes now became concentrated on obtaining from the newly reconciled monarchs the help of which they were in such desperate need. Even in February 1547, however, it was reported that Francis I was assembling his mercenaries in Picardy and had vowed to recapture Boulogne or die in the attempt. With the death of Henry VIII and the accession of Henri II in France, Anglo-French relations rapidly cooled. Hertford, now Duke of Somerset, became increasingly preoccupied with Scotland, and the French determined to intervene there. Boulogne, too, remained a major issue of dispute between the two countries, and the old pattern of competition for recruits began to appear, with both France and England continuing to draw mercenaries from the Empire.160 The diplomatic duel with France continued: the Emperor’s victory at Mühlberg, though it crippled the power of the Schmalkaldic princes, left room for lesser nobles and diplomats to conspire to bring France back into German affairs as protector of German liberties; while the accession of Edward VI gave England a prominence in the Protestant cause it had not hitherto known.

ceste heure que j’ay paix et amityé avecques luy, vous regarderez de faire entendre à ceulx qui desyroient estre avouez de moy qu’il n’est plus besoing qu’ilz facent telle entreprinse . . . ’ This clearly refers to the plan for Reiffenberg mooted in April. 160 Spy news from France, Feb. 1546/7, BL, Harleian 288, fo. 57. M.L. Bush, The Government Policy of Protector Somerset (Montreal, 1975), pp. 7–39.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE ADMIRALS’ WAR The said lord King has levied such a fine and large navy that its equal has not been seen for a thousand years.1

The naval campaign in the Channel during the summer 1545 fittingly balanced the accidental blowing up of Admiral d’Annebault’s flagship, the Philippe, with the débacle of the Mary Rose. It was also the most serious cross-Channel conflict in the first half of the sixteenth century. A fleet of at least 250 ships – the largest assembled by France in the Channel since the 14th century, some said not for a thousand years – was joined in Normandy by an army of 25–30,000 men.2 At what stage was the decision made in France to transform the war into a grand naval confrontation? The naval war needs to be understood in context. The French War Effort at Sea It was usually difficult to restrain the enthusiasm of privateers when war approached. At the start of 1543, it was reported from Normandy that ‘Frenche shipps preparing to warfare . . . howbeit the same was not 1

Declaration of Marin de Montchenu to the city of Paris on behalf of Francis I, 11 July 1545 (Registres . . . Paris, III, p. 58): ‘Ledict seigneur . . . a levé une si belle et grosse armée de mer qu’il n’en fut veue une pareille, passé à mil ans.’ 2 On the war in the Summer of 1545, from the French point of view: see C. de La Roncière, Histoire de la marine française, III, pp. 409–431. François Nawrocki, ‘L’amiral Claude d’Annebault (vers 1495–1552): Faveur du roi et gouvernement du royaume sous les règnes de François Ier et Henri II’ (Thèse de l’Université de Paris IV, 2009), I, pp. 370–391 Knecht, Renaissance Warrior and Patron, pp. 501–503. On the English point of view, see D. Loades, The Tudor Navy: an Administrative and Political History (Aldershot, 1992); Loades, John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, 1504–1553 (Oxford, 1996). On sources: Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 283–310; Monluc, Commentaires (ed. P.Courteault, Paris, 1964), pp. 179–190; Spanish Chronicle, pp. 120–123; E. Gosselin, Documents authentiques et inédits pour servir à l’histoire de la marine normande et du commerce rouennais pendant les XVIe et XVII e siècles, (Rouen, 1876), pp. 44–46.

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by any commaundment of the Frenche Kynge, but by the fantasye of the owners and mariners of the shippes for theire owne sake. For of late before many good and ryche pryses were taken by some of them.’3 A French fleet had been occupied in the North Sea, where Jean de Clamorgan had been sent with a squadron to Denmark to claim the aid due to France by the treaty of 1541 (six ships and 1000 troops).4 Francis was obliged under the treaty of 1541 to contribute 100,000 écus to Christian III’s expenses but, as he brought no money, the Danish king was not prepared to move. This made it all the more difficult for Francis to ask Christian for aid in 1545, when he promised to transfer funds to Strasbourg should Christian agree to join the sea war. All Clamorgan achieved was to capture some rich ships from a merchant fleet taking Flemish goods to Spain.5 The mission of a squadron sent to Scotland in May–June 1543 was even less happy. These had set off from Dieppe, by their own account, to waylay the Flemish Iceland fleet, specifically instructed not to attack the English. Their leading ship the Sacre managed to repel borders from the Minion and the Primrose off Orfordness in July but of 16 ships, half were lost before they took refuge in the Firth of Forth.6 An engagement took place on 22 July 1543 between ships from Barfleur and Brittany and an English squadron attacking Cherbourg. A couple of Breton ships drove them back to Barfleur, where there was an artillery exchange. There, the Great Martin of London was sunk and 80 prisoners, including a ‘gros millourt,’ taken.7 The squadron prepared to escort the French expedi3 Intelligence from Normandy, 12 jan. 1543, NA SP1/175, fos. 33–34 (L&P, XVIII, i, 40.2). This was encouraged by a French royal ordinance of March 1543 which permitted the seizure of goods on ships of the king’s enemies ‘affin que nosdictz subiectz reprennent leur curage et ayent . . . desir et occasion d’equipper navires en guerre.’ Article xliii added that since ‘aucuns de nosd. alliés et confederez vouldroyent porter grand faveur à noz ennemys et adversaires que à nous’ the contracts of lading were to be presented in the Admiralty courts. NA SP1/176, fo. 172 (L&P, XVIII, i, 344). 4 Mémoires du sieur Richer, fo. 2r, 11v. 5 La triomphante victoire faite par les Français sur la mer par Monsieur de Serres capitaine coronal des trois galeres tant de Honfleur que du hable le Roy (Rouen: Jehan Lhomme, xx jour de juing 1544), BN Res 8, Lb/30, no. 93 (repr. Rouen, 1899, ed. M. De la Germonière). Gosselin, Documents authentiques pour . . . l’histoire de la marine normande. Rouen, 1874, p. 25, ‘Chanson faicte sur le triomphe que les Dieppois ont fait sur la mer.’ 6 Sadler to Henry VIII, 22 July 1543, Hamilton Papers, I, p. 586; L&P, XVIII, i, 796, 807, 810, 827, 844, ii, 69, 70, 84, 85. J.D. Tracy, ‘Herring Wars,’ 249–272. 7 Francis I was alert to the threat to Cherbourg and Granville in June (to Matignon, camp of Maroilles, 23 June 1543, Correspondance de Matignon, no. CXVI); Mémoire on what is necessary for the defence of Cherbourg 26 July 1543, ibid., pp. 76–77;

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tion to Scotland in the summer of 1543 was seriously impeded by the stationing of an English fleet in the western route. Henry VIII also ordered the fitting out of a squadron to impede the French herring fisheries in December 1543, though one of the ships, the Sweepstake, was unable to sail because of plague.8 In that month, another engagement exploded off Le Havre. The Catherine of Rouen and another ship gave chase as far as Portland.9 For most of 1544, French naval forces remained dispersed in the face of the joint Anglo-Imperial invasion. A French galley squadron was operating off the Maas estuary but the English lost only one other major vessel in a fight with Dieppe pirates, though some Flemish ships were taken off Falmouth.10 Clearly, up to the end of 1544 naval combat between England and France was characterised by either skirmishing in the Channel or by transporting forces to Scotland (Scottish privateers were as noisome to Dutch fishing fleets as to the English) but there are signs that a broader strategy was being considered in 1544. An anonymous letter acquired by the Imperial ambassador, reported a French captain as saying: The King of France has visited all the ports of Normandy and in all of them has had prepared and laden all the ships for war; among them is a carrack of 500 tons. These ships are being prepared for an invasion of England. The captain-general is the vicomte of Dieppe. The ships are to land at a port I understand is called Southampton and from there they shall go further to a place called Rye

This clearly indicates that as early as May 1544 a scheme of invasion involving the Great Carrack (the Philippe) was being considered and that the objectives developed in 1545 were already in mind.11 A spy Estouteville to Matignon, 3 Aug. 1543, ibid., p. 77, on the treatment of prisoners; La prinse et deffaicte des Angloys par les Bretons devant la ville de Barfleu près La Hogue au pays de Costentin, duché de Normandie. Nouvellement imprimé à Paris, 1543 (BnF Res NFG-11) reprint in A. De Montaiglion, Recueil es poesies françoises, VIII, pp. 198–203. 8 Lisle to Paget, 7 Nov. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 348. 9 La Roncière, Histoire de la marine, III, p. 401. The Catherine was equipped at Le Havre to raid into the Channel from 1543 onwards (AM Le Havre, EE 78). 10 Tracy, ‘Herring Wars,’ p. 261; 23 June 1544 (La triomphante victoire faite par les Français sur la mer. repr. Rouen, 1899); 7 July CSP Venice, V, no. 312; 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 345; XIX, ii, 349, 364. 11 ‘Lettre d’un inconnu à un Anglois?,’ 22 May 1544, NA PRO31/2/3, fo. 133 (CSP Spain VII, no. 107): ‘Le roy de France a visité tous les portz de Normandie et comment que à tous lesd. portz il a fait apprester et affreter tous les navires à la guerre; entre lesd. navires il y a ung carracon qui porte cincq cens tonneaulx, lesquelz navires sont prepareiz pour descendre au pays d’Angleterre. Et est capitaine general desd. navires le visconte

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report of the same period indicates that 4 great galleys and 5 great ‘nefs’ were being transferred from Marseille and that, at Le Havre, there were two galleys and two carracks and several other great ships and at Honfleur two galleons and several other types. These were being armed and supplied under the cover of letters of marque against the Portuguese.12 The commissioning of Jean Ango of Dieppe to oversee the supply of the King’s ships in January 1544 is perhaps a further indication of serious plans.13 Clearly, though, there were other problems to be faced by France in 1544. After the end of the Anglo-Imperial campaign, the French responded to English naval raids in Normandy in October 1544 designed to divert French efforts from Boulogne. Thomas Seymour, appointed Vice-Admiral, was charged with conveying supplies to Boulogne at the end of October and then, having found a squadron of French warships at Etaples too strong, went on to attempt to raid French ships in the Seine estuary. He was defeated by the bad weather.14 The French Admiral d’Annebault gave orders to the governor of Normandy, Matignon, to ready the galleons Canada and the Dives to counter this and himself went to Normandy to organise shipping there and in Brittany.15 In December 1544 it was reported that at the French court ‘all the maps of England and Scotland have been consulted to understand the routes necessary. The Admiral intends to command the navy.’16 The Ferrarese ambassador noted at the same time talk of a plan ‘to make war against the island of England’ and that ‘His Majesty is so committed to this enterprise that he will do everything to pursue it.’ and that the Admiral would lead the fleet in person.17 On 3 January,

de Dieppe; et doivent descendre lesd. navires en ung port, si j’ay bien entendu, lequel se nomme Hamptonne . . . et dud. port s’en doibvent aller dedans le pays d’Angleterre en ung lieu qui se nomme la Rye.’ The vicomte de Dieppe was Jean Ango. 12 Spy report, May 1544, NA SP1/187, fo. 241r(276r) (L&P, XIX, i, 573.3). 13 E. Gosselin, Documents, p. 25 (11 Jan. 1544). 14 L&P, XIX, ii, 281, 580. 15 Annebault to Matignon, 20 Oct. 1545, Francis I to Matignon, 20 Oct. 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, pp. 106–107. 16 Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 28 Dec. 1544, HHSA, Frankreich, 10, ‘Berichte Saint-Mauris an Karl V, 1544, XII,’ fos. 19–35: ‘l’on a visité les cartes d’Angleterre et d’Escosse pour entendre la navigation qui fauldra tenir, et fait son compte l’amiral de conduire l’armee de mer.’; the point was repeated in an intelligence report c. 6 February 1545 (L&P, XX, i, 619). 17 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 18 Dec. 1544, ASM, Francia, B 20, fo. 108r: ‘per fare la guerra all’isola d’Inghilterra.’ . . . ‘Sua Maestà è tanto animata à questa impresa che farà ogni prolia per esequirla.’

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Francis instructed Richer in Denmark to ask Christian III (though that king’s alliance had already proved shaky) for a powerful contribution to the powerful navy (‘puissante armée de mer’) he was assembling as the best way compel Henry to return Boulogne and make amends for all his wrongs.18 It may be around this time that Francis, in a rare autograph letter, declared that ‘I have given order to publish general letters of permission for my subjects in Normandy to arm their ships to go and make war against my enemies.’19 Then the King issued letters patent on 7 January forbidding commerce with the Channels Islands, while on 10 January Matignon was ordered to prepare supplies for the army of 8–10,000 men being assembled along the Somme (see chapter 6).20 In May, Saint-Mauris reported that the French intended to invade ‘an island’ (presumably Wight) with 300 ships.21 Naval preparations therefore went hand in hand with the planning of the land war but the scale of the operations envisaged suggest that, in private at any rate, the idea of challenging English naval power in the Channel had been discussed for some time. The French fleet was made up of two components: the l’armée de mer du Levant (the galley fleet stationed in the Mediterranean) and l’armée de mer du Ponant (stationed in the Atlantic and Norman ports).22 Both fleets were commanded by a lieutenant-général (in the Mediterranean this was the duke of Enghien in 1543) and only very unusually by the Admiral of France.23 Claude de Seyssel had argued powerfully in 1515 for the maintenance of a powerful nucleus of a permanent navy

18 Instructions to Richer, 3 Jan. 1545, N. Camusat, Mémoires du sieur Richer (Paris, 1625); idem, Mélanges historiques (Paris, 1644), fo. 10v. Francis promised Christian conquests in England. Thge least he expected, though, was that Danes would not be allowed to serve Henry VIII. 19 Francis I to Admiral Annebault, 1544–1545, Libr. of Hist. Assoc. of Pennsylvania, Gratz Coll.: ‘J’ay donné ordre de fayre publyer les lettres de congyé general pour que mes subgects de Normandye peussent armer leurs vaysseus et aler en mer fayre la guerre à mes ennemys par quoy vous prye byen veylyer en vos cartyers à que les dytes lettres soyent myses à pronte et deue execucyon et y presser le mouvement, car c’est choze quy importe au bien de mon servyse et necessyté du present.’ 20 Correspondance de Matignon, pp. 110–111. 21 Saint-Mauris to Los Cobos, 7 May 1545, L&P, XX, i, 682. 22 Types of ship: La Roncière, Histoire de la marine, II, pp. 460–489. On a later period, see D. Buisseret, ‘The French Mediterranean fleet under Henri IV,’ MM 50 (1964). A. James, The Navy and Government in early Modern France, 1572–1661 London, 2004). 23 28 April 1543, CAF, IV, no. 13021.

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which could be augmented in time of war.24 The key development in this was the foundation of Havre-de-Grâce as the Channel naval base by Francis I. At around the same time, a group of contrôleurs, trésoriers and commissaires de la marine began to emerge for the financial administration of royal ships; this is apparent in the transformation of the commissions for payment of the Ponant and Levant (issued in 1517 and 1519) into offices in 1519 and 1531 respectively. In the reign of Francis I (as in the England of Henry VIII) there is no single overall command structure; naval administration remained collegial.25 The Admiral of France from the start of 1544, Claude d’Annebault, was unusually active in his office,26 though normally this involved judicial authority over the network of admiralty courts. Vice-admirals such as La Meilleraye in Normandy and Polin de La Garde in Provence, the governors of Brittany, Normandy, Guyenne and Languedoc also had significant authority in naval matters. In December 1544, the experienced naval commander Antoine Escalin sr des Aymars, baron de La Garde (called ‘le capitaine Polin’), as lieutenant général de l’armée de mer venant du Levant, was sent to Marseille with 90,000 écus to assemble the galley fleet of 26 vessels.27 The main problem was always that the galley fleet was not well adapted to Atlantic conditions. The Ferrarese ambassador noted that it was ‘a long journey and some say very dangerous because the English seas are so uncertain.’28 A transfer in the opposite direction (La Rochelle to Marseille) in July–August 1561 illustrates the point. The commander, Carcès, was forced to put in to Lisbon by bad weather. Even though this was the height of summer, the journey was laborious.29 As should be

24

Claude de Seyssel, La Monarchie de France, ed. J. Poujol (Paris, 1961), pp. 199–201. M. Mollat, ‘Etre roi sur la mer,’ in P. Contamine, Histoire militaire de la France, vol..I (Paris, 1992); G. Zeller, Les institutions de la France au XVI e siècle (Paris, 1948), p. 353; R. Doucet, Les institutions de la France au XVI e siècle 2 vols (Paris, 1948), II, pp. 652–654. P. Hamon, L’argent du roi Les finances sous François Ier (Paris, 1994), p. 282; on Le Havre, see A. Corvisier (ed.), Histoire du Havre et de son estuaire (Toulouse, 1983); P. Manneville, ‘La fondation du port du Havre (1517) et son premier développement,’ in P. Masson and M. Verge-Franceschi (eds), La France et la mer au siècle des grandes découvertes (Paris, 1993), pp. 323–328. 26 Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), II, pp. 553–562. 27 Letters of provision, 22 Jan. 20 March 1545, BnF, Moreau 778, fo. 136, 207. 28 Alvarotti, 28 Dec. 1544, ASM, Francia, B 20, fo. 108r: ‘un’longo camino, et alcuni vogliano dire pericolosissimo perche quei mari d’Inghilterra fano grandissime fortune.’ 29 Carcès to King of Navarre, Lisbon 26 July 1561, BnF fr. 15875, fo. 80: ‘je n’ay voulu fallir de donner advis à vostre magesté de l’arrivé des gallaires en ce lieu, où j’ay esté contraincts à venir prandre port à cause du mauvais temps, ayant esperance en 25

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obvious, the galley fleet depended on crews of slaves (forcés/forsados), whose physical condition was usually poor. Polin de La Garde was charged with moving the fleet in the winter, commissioned in March 1545 to bring the galleys separately from the ‘navires et vaisseaux rondes’ In fact, the task of suppressing the Vaudois of Provence delayed him until the end of May and this delayed the great naval enterprise in the Channel, much to the King’s dismay. Another unfortunate consequence was the emerging feud between La Garde and the Strozzi brothers, Florentine exiles whose role in the galley fleet was critical. This was made worse when La Garde conferred command of the vaisseaux rondes on Claude de Manville instead.30 Early in June, 12 galleys, 4 galleasses and three ships of the avant-garde were signalled off Malaga. The rest, the arrière-garde, did not pass the Straits of Gibraltar until two months later, though this still left well over 30 ships for the guard of the Mediterranean coast.31 La Garde himself took up his station in his flagship, the magnificent La Réale, a quinquereme garnished with cloth of gold and crimson satin hangings and ornamented with the salamander of Francis I, crowned Fs and fleurs de lys.32 As for the Atlantic fleet, problems were revealed at the end of 1544. An enquiry into how many ships of 300 t. were available in Brittany revealed according to Jacques Cartier that there were none capable of putting to sea of more than 100 t. though others claimed some of 200 t.33 However, during 1544 six more galleys were being built under

Dieu de me rendre à Marseille pour le xvme du moys prochain. Je feray aspalmer les gallaires auparavant que passer le detroict de Gibertaire pour aller plus surement. . . . de La Rochelle icy sommes venuz en trente deux jours, joinct le peu d’arrest qu’avons faict en chemyn, n’aians touché en terre d’Espaigne que à Caliz, Gibelhar, Cartagenes et Roys, et encores ce a esté seullement pour y prendre de l’eaue et rafrechissemens.’ Same to same, Marseille, 15 Aug. 1561, BN fr. 15875, fo. 132. 30 BnF Moreau 778, fos. 75–76, depositions of the baron de La Garde; M. François, Le cardinal François de Tournon, homme d’état, mécène et humaniste, 1489–1562 (Paris, 1951), pp. 201–208; La Roncière, Histoire de la marine, III, p. 412. 31 C. Fernandez Duro, L’armada Española desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de Aragón, 9 vols. (1895–1903), I, pp. 432–433. Compte of Michel Veyny for 1545: 32 galleys, some fregates, 2 galleasses, 1 galleon, 6 carracks, 22 other ships (BnF fr. 17329, fo. 193). 32 Inventory of La Réale, April 1545, AD Bouches-du-Rhône, B 1260 fo. 440; BnF Moreau 737, fo. 169. 33 Depositions in response to royal letters ‘pour faire rolles de navyres de troys cents tonneaux.’ Saint-Malo, 17 Dec. 1544 (F. Jouon des Longrais, Documents sur Jacques Cartier (Rennes, 1888), p. 59).

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the supervision of Pierre de Caux, capitaine général des galères, and designed by Baptiste Auxilia in the Norman ports of Dieppe, Rouen and Pont de l’Arche. Gosselin, who studied the notarial (Tabellionage) acts concerning shipping in the Seine, noted that there was an enormous increase of activity in 1544 and 1545, with the King building 150 ships and 20 galleys.34 Most of the ships being gathered were ‘navires’ (galleons, vaisseaux rondes). Terminology for ships is ambiguous in this period, but basically the main division in French was between bateaux longs (galleys) and bateaux ronds (sailing ships), the difference in ratio of length to width being 1:3 and opposed to 1:4 or 5. Though the term navire was employed, one of the most common terms for sailing vessels was nef, a development from the medieval cog and up to 3–400 tons (but sometimes used of ships as small as 60 tons). It had a square mainsail and was of carvel rather than clinker construction. The great ship (grosse nef ) of 500–1000 tons was certainly a feature of the 16th century, such as the Grosse françoise being built at Le Havre in 1522. The Grande Maistresse had been built around 1520 and belonged to the Grand maître René de Savoie. This illustrates neatly the point that in France it was fairly common for great ships to be commissioned and owned by leading courtiers and employed by the crown on active campaigns. The Grand Maistresse formed part of Mediterranean fleet against the Duke of Bourbon in 1524 but was paid its monthly wage costs of 1500 écus by the crown. More is known about it than for most other French royal ships because of legal disputes concerning its acquisition by the crown.35 Described usually as a grand nef, sometimes a galion, she was bought from René’s widow in the summer of 1526 for 30,000 lt. (fittings included but not artillery). Valuations of the hull of the ship alone varied from 3 to 4000 écus (roughly, 6–8000 lt.) on the argument that, at 6 years old, it was half way through its maximum life, so the equipment was clearly a major factor.36 The Grand Maistresse was struck by

34 E. Gosselin, Documents, pp. 46, 44–45 (e.g. contract with Auxilia, 5 June 1544 for metal galley fittings, including ‘les chaines qui seront necessaires pour attacher les forçats’). 35 M. Guérout, La Grande Maîtresse, nef de François Ier (Paris, 2001), pp. 19–29, 49. See also P. Hamon, L’argent du roi, p. 237. For his earlier detailed study of the French royal ship in 1512, see his Le dernier combat de la Cordelière (Paris, 2002). 36 Valuations in Guérout, La Grande Maîtresse, pp. 41–157 passim. ‘Attendu que ladicte nef est de six ans, qui est la moictié du service qu’elle peut faire ou à plus près.’ (p. 111) Guérout, p. 262 points out the life expectancy of a Mediterranean ship was

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lightning and burned out in the port of Toulon in September 1533. Another ship of the same name had taken its place in the fleet by 1545, this time probably a galley or a galiace (partially oared ship) of which there were a number in the royal fleet as well as smaller types such as barques, chaloupes and carvelles.37 Francis I took continuing interest in the fleet and harbour at Le Havre throughout his reign. There, he had ordered the laying of the keel for a monster warship called the Grande Françoyse in 1520 as a rival to the Henry Grâce à Dieu. But the project was dogged with failure. The first historian of Le Havre, Guillaume de Marceille, claimed it was to be of 2000 tons and 52 toises (nearly 100 m) long; its fittings were fabulously luxurious, including a fort, chapel, kitchens and many sculptures. Unfortunately, it proved too big to get out of the port in 1524. In October 1534, Francis was planning to go there to inspect his ‘grant navyre,’ and other ships and had sent large supplies of artillery and gunpowder for them and in 1537 a final attempt was made to launch it, again met by failure.38 In 1544–1545, all the ports from Bordeaux to Dieppe were charged with assembling ships, though it seems that the strongest contingent was from Dieppe, with 46 vessels.39 A planning document for early 1547 lists the royal ships at Rouen as great ships, galleons and nefs, though as far as we can tell there was little difference in the carrying capacity of the two latter: the Gallaire royalle, the Dauphine, the Duchesse, the Gallion du roy, the Prior of Capua’s nef, the nef of Nix Johannin his lieutenant, the galleon de la Renterie, the galleon Sermanie, the galleon Vento, the nef de Vento, the nef Bilhoty, Hubert Rostaing’s nef and Cabogne’s nef. 40 Most of them carried 2–400 soldiers with crews

more like 7 years in view of accidents and events. F.C. Lane suggested ten years for Venetian ships. 37 On terminology, see J. Bernard, Navires et gens de mer à Bordeaux (vers 1450– vers 1550), 2 vols. plus appendix (Paris, 1968). R. Gardiner and R.W. Unger, Cogs, Caravels and Galleons: the Sailing Ship 1000–1650, Conway History of the Ship (London, 1994). 38 G. de Marceilles, Mémoires de la fondation et origine de la ville de Françoise de Grâce ed. J. Morlent, 1847. News report, 24 Oct. 1534, NA SP1/86, fo. 86 (L&P, VII, 1302): ‘Le Roy s’en va en Normandie au partir de ce pays de Touraine weoir son grant navyre et autres navyres pour les faire mectre en ordre. Il y a faict mener grant quantité d’artillerie.’; same, 25 Oct. 1534, L&P, VII, 1303. Francis did not get to Le Havre until April 1535. 39 C. Desmarquets, Mémoires chronologiques pour servir à l’histoire de Dieppe, et à celle de la navigation française; avec un recueil abrégé des priviléges de cette ville, 2 vols (Paris, 1785), I, p. 117. 40 Nawrocki ‘Annebault’ (2009) II, p. 841 (BnF Moreau 737, fos. 169–173). This

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ranging from 50 to 90. The Gallaire royale carried 400 soldiers and 80 mariners. To these should be added the Philippe (usually described as a carracon/ carrack, a vessel a little lighter than a great ship but still formidable) and the Grande Maistresse. Venetian vessels were also commandeered. These were the Contarina, the Ragazzona and the Foscarina, the first of which had to be used as his flagship by the Admiral when the second Grand Maîtresse struck a reef in July 1545.41 An inspection of 1548 recorded 18 galleys (including three quatriremes), 1 ‘fuste’ (a light galley) and a frigate in the Atlantic fleet; all were in good order.42 Galleys, though, were generally expensive to run (roughly three times the cost of a nef ), despite the availability of forsados. The trésorier de la marine came to Marseille in 1539 with no less than 60,000 écus for the pay of the galleys contained in a coffer and six barrels. In 1545, Alexandre de Manille received 4725 lt. for the pay of his two galleys, maintained at his own expense, for three months.43 Vessels were brought from Dieppe and Bordeaux to assemble at La Havre. At Rouen, Jean Ango, as commissaire pour l’advitaillement de l’armee de mer, took charge of the organisation and supply of the fleet.44 Commanders included not only La Garde but the Italians Piero Strozzi and Leone Strozzi, Prior of Capua, galley commanders with whom La Garde’s relations had deteriorated further, partly as a

fleet is almost certainly the one described by Saint-Mauris in March 1547: ‘le roy fait armer plusieurs grosses navires de guerre tant à Dieppe que au Havre de grace qui n’est à autre fin sinon pour aller rober en mer les subgectz de vostre Majesté’ (in revenge for the loss of a ship of the Admiral) ‘je puis sire adjouster à ce que dessus que tous les capitaines des galleres ont esté appellez en la cour.’ Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 12 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte S-M an Karl, 1547, III, fos. 31v–32r; ‘Toutes leurs galleres se mectent en ordre, et fut livré nagueres argent aux capitaines d’icelles pour les rendre en tout prestes naviguer deans la fin d’avril et se arment environ de dix à douze grandes navires.’ (ibid., fo. 68v, 25 March). 41 CSP Venice V, p. 131; Guidiccione, 21–22 July 1545, ANG, III, p. 378. 42 La Roncière, III, p. 414 mentions Pierre de Blacas d’Aulps as capitaine general des galeres du Ponant. (AN X/2a 97) Declaration by Jehan de La Motte, ‘Argosin royal’ of the galleys of the Atlantic fleet that all ships are in good condition: 2 (one a quatrireme) under St. Blancard, 3 (one a quatrireme) under Baccio Marteli, 2 under Piero Strozzi, 2 (one a quatrireme) under Villegaignon, 2 under Moret, 1 under the sr. de Morlet, 2 under sr. de Carcès, 2 under capt. Parisot, 1 under Bernard Dornezan, sr. de Montargut, 1 under the sr. de Cipierre (BnF fr. 26132, no. 211, 27 Oct. 1548). 43 Tabellionage of Rouen, 2 March 1545, Gosselin, Documents, p. 48. P. Hamon, « Messieurs des finances » Les grands officiers de finance dans la France de la Renaissance (Paris, 1999), p. 121.The galley L’Arbaletrière cost 900 lt. p.m. in 1537, whereas the nef Grand Maistresse cost 300 lt. p.m. (CAF, VIII, 3024; BnF fr. 20502, fo. 86). 44 On the famous Ango see P. Gaffarel, Jean Ango (Rouen, 1889).

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result of his failure to appoint them as his lieutenants.45 The records of the Tabellionage of Rouen are full of detail on the fitting out of the fleet in 1545. In March 1545, Pierre de Saint-Martin, captain of three galleys, contracted for their supply for three months, consisting of 200 queues of cider, 40 muids of wheat, 5 of beans and 3 of peas with 50 barrels of beer, bacon, meat both salt and live. Artillery was brought to the fleet from a number of repositories, including Compiègne, which contributed 5 cannon, 6 batards, and 20,000 livres of powder.46 Raiding in the Channel became a constant problem in 1545. Early in February, the English were reported as having taken 50 or 60 ships and as having a fleet of 80 to 100 in the Channel. In March they took in Seine estuary a huge prize in the form of a ship belonging to naturalised Spaniards at Rouen worth 30,000 écus.47 Then late in April a squadron of 7 French galleys appeared off Boulogne (perhaps some of them the newly-built vessels from Normandy). These were being driven north-eastward but caused alarm about security in the narrow seas.48 In mid-May the English captured a galleon and drove a galley ashore at Boulogne.49 Some thought, in any case, that galleys would not serve effectively in northern seas; they were oared by convicts whose stamina would neither survive the winter nor the current outbreak of plague. One observer reported a galley abandoned at La Crotoy, all its slaves having died of plague.50 The assembly of the French fleet was pressed on energetically, by Matignon, armed with special powers to defend the coast, assemble supplies, ‘to have oversight of all matters concerning the coast of our land of Normandy . . . and power to assemble provisions’ and order expenditure by the trésorier de la marine de Ponant. These powers were amplified once the fleet had sailed, in the form of authority to

45

AN K 1485, fo. 178. Gosselin, Documents, pp. 47–48, acts dated 2 and 27 March from the Tabellionage of Rouen. 47 Habsburg intelligence report, 6 Feb. 1545, L&P, XX, i, 619, wrongly dated; Alvarotti, 12 March 1545, ASM, Francia, B 20, fasc. 4, p. 70 (decipher). 48 Chamberlain to Paget, 1 May 1545, L&P, XXI, i, 633; Cave to Johnson, 2 May 1545, ibid., no. 640. 49 Chapuys to Bave, 19 May 1545, L&P, XX, i, 771 (reported during Chapuys’ brief visit to Flanders). 50 Chapuys to Granvelle, Bourbourg, 25 June 1545 and enclosure, L&P, XX, i, 1036 and 1036ii. An undated mandate of Francis I orders malefactors to be handed over to a captain of galleys because all his rowers are dead of plague (CAF VII, 461,25722). 46

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commandeer ships and supplies for the fleet on campaign.51 The assembly of a navy in the 16th century had many characteristics in common with that of a land army. Each ‘bande’ of 1000 foot or of 100 hommes d’armes were to have 100 pieces of chicken and 200 livres of bacon as well as beef and lamb in the étapes. Infantry troops had to be moved and embarked. Four companies were initially directed from Normandy and Brittany to Honfleur but were then redirected to Abbeville for the land army but in May 10,000 Gascon foot being brought from Guyenne were allocated étapes for their journey to Le Havre.52 3000 pioniers were summoned. Pierre de Salcedo, of Spanish origin though naturalised in France, was responsible for finding wine (200 tonneaux) and cider (400 tonneaux) for the fleet, for which 3000 lt. was allocated; in the event the cider proved impossible to buy and was substituted by wine.53 Then in June, the King gave orders for the feeding of the 25,000 men he had now assembled for the fleet during the 12 days they would be waiting for muster and embarkation, despatching 6000 lt. for this. At the end of June, the prince of Melfi was commissioned to oversee the musters and embark the men.54 One side-effect of the creation of this great force in the context of the subsistence crisis of 1545 was that soldiers with no commission were flocking into Normandy to live off the land. Francis gave orders for them to be cut to pieces.55

51 Correspondance de Matignon, pp. XLII, LV, 124 n. 1 (letters patent of 24 July 1545): ‘avoir l’oeil et regard a toutes choses qui concerneront la seureté de la coste de nostre pays de Normandie . . . et pouvoir de faire amas et provisions de vivres’; 128–129 Letters patent, 30 July 1545: ‘faire provision d’artillerie, boullets, poudres et monicions’ and act as ordonnateur of expenditure; no. CLXXIII. 52 Monluc recounts that he brought 50 or 60 ensigns from Gascony as maître de camp (Commentaires, p. 179). The point about the resemblance of a naval force to a land army is made by Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 183. 53 Francis I to Matignon, 2, 26 May 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, nos. CLXXIV, CLXXV; order of Matignon to Bray, 22 May 1545, ibid. p. 117, n. 1; Francis I to Matignon and La Meilleraye, 14 June 1545, ibid., no. CLCCVII. The four companies redirected to Picardy were those of Kerrouen, La Moyenne, Renouard and Saultrice. Salcedo: Francis I to Matignon, 21 June, 6 July 1545, ibid., nos. CLXXXII, CLXXXV. He was naturalised in February 1546 (CAF, 14789) and was also active in the provision of supplies in Picardy. 54 Letters-patent for Matignon, 13 June 1545, ibid., p. 118, n. 1; Francis to Matignon, 14, 26 June, ibid., nos. CLXXVIII, CLXXXIV. The number 25,000 is confirmed by a quittance by the sr. de Pontaucourt, élu of Arques, for expenses in levying a tax for the supplies of 25,000 men to be embarked at Le Havre (BnF, nafr. 3644, no. 1043). 55 Letters-patent for Matignon, 5 July 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, p. 123, n. 3.

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It had been thought since December 1544 that Annebault would lead the fleet in person. Not until 27 June, however, did he receive his powers as lieutenant général du roi en son armée de mer.56 The King himself came to Touques and Harfleur early in July to witness the sailing of the fleet. The slowness on the part of La Garde in bringing the Mediterranean fleet inevitably delayed the whole project but at the end of May, having picked up some vessels on the way, he arrived at Brest with 60 ‘nave grosse’ to join another 80 from Bordeaux and La Rochelle. The ships from the western ports had luckily been able to take the cover of a Flemish merchant fleet to avoid the hundred or so English ships waiting for them under Carew, Hawkins and Wynter.57 Shortly after, Lorges sailed with his fleet to Scotland as if to underline the serious strategic threat to England.58 The reality of these plans requires some certain knowledge of numbers. When finally assembled at Le Havre, the fleet was estimated by Monluc, not an enthusiastic sailor, as ‘more than two hundred and fifty sail and the finest ships in the world, with the galleys.’59 This at least implies that the galleys were counted separately, making perhaps 300 in all. 150 of them were ships of the largest size. Francis I himself, in an instruction for the information of the King of Denmark claimed a force of 300 ships, 35,000 foot and 3000 horse. His land army was to be 10,000 landsknechts, 3000 Italians, 15,000 French and 1,200 hommes d’armes.60 How far can we trust these figures? 25,000 men were paid at the rate of 5 lt. pm for soldiers and 4 for sailors. The 56 For the report of Annebault’s likely command in December 1544, see Alvarotti to Ercole II, 18 Dec. 1544, ASM, Francia, B 20, fasc. 2, fo. 108r: ‘se dire ancho che Monsignor l’armiraglio andarà personalmente quale sul mare à questa Impresa, et è verisimile essendo questo la principal’ sua carica d’haver cure delle cose del’mare.’ For his patent of appointment in June 1545: Matignon, p. 123 n. 1; Pinard, Chronologie historique militaire 8 vols. (Paris, 1760–1772), II, p. 235. La Roncière, Marine, III, p. 417 asserted that Annebault’s appointment came at the last minute and disturbed the expected command structure: Enghien as Lieutenant general with Taix and Guigues Guiffrey de Boutières as his lieutenants. There is no good evidence for this. Enghien had been suggested as commander of the Scottish expedition (L&P, XX, i, 619) but the idea that Annebault was inserted at the last minute is absurd. 57 B. de Medici to Cosimo I, 27 May 1545, Desjardins, Négociations . . . Toscane, III, p. 162; Nawrocki ‘Annebault’ (2009), I, pp. 374–375. 58 Guidiccione, 1 June 1545, ANG III, pp. 357–359. 59 Monluc, Commentaires, (ed. Courteault, Pléiade), p. 179: ‘plus de deux cents cinquante voiles et des plus beaux vaisseaux du monde, avec les galères.’ 60 Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, p. 286; ‘cent cinquante gros vaisseaux rondes, sans compter soixante flovins et vingt cinq galleres.’ Francis I to Christophe Richer, Touques, 5 July 1545, (letter in cipher sold privately in 1980).

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cost would have been around 300,000 lt. per month, a colossal sum, though one which of course did not reflect the initial investment cost in ships.61 Land forces were simpler; as a point of comparison, the cost of 16,300 troops in garrison throughout northern France for a month in 1558 was 377,781 lt. and a major field army in the 1550s cost between 500 and 700,000 lt. pm62 Monluc later recalled that ‘the King’s desire for vengeance on the King of England put him to massive expense.’63 As it happens, the total expenditure on the French crown for naval affairs in 1545 is known; it was 1,929,845 lt., of which 1,379,248 lt. was for extraordinaires, in other words for the campaigns in the Channel and Scotland.64 This was the most expensive year for the navy in Francis I’s reign. In the middle of June, the English Admiral, Lisle, was preparing a pre-emptive strike against the French fleet before it was ready by sailing into the Seine estuary. This illustrates some of the contrasting tactics of the two navies. Lisle, alerted to the assembly of French ships between Harfleur and Le Havre in ‘le Fosse,’ aimed ‘eyther to make a present of sum of the best of them unto Your Highnes, or at the leest to set fyre on them.’ To do this, he aimed to set some small ships to appear to pursue some old hulks (then under arrest in the Downs) into the estuary of the Seine, have them fire some artillery before withdrawing so he could deploy the whole fleet in an attempt to capture the Philippe and its neighbouring ships and set them on fire.65 Appalling weather and the fact that the English fleet had still not assembled 61 Saint-Mauris to Covos, 7 May 1545, L&P, XX, i, p. 382: mentions 300 ships. Cavalli, Relazione, in L. Firpo, Relazione di ambasciatori veneti al senato 14 vols, (Turin, 1965–). F. Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), I, p. 375, using an Etat de prévision (BnF Moreau 737, fos. 169–173) for the fleet being assembled early in 1547 (see below, Conclusion) notes that 44 ships (mainly galleys) were scheduled to transport 5000 troops. Five times as many in 1545 would have required 220 ships but the galleys could not have carried more than 50 soldiers and only the great ships between 300 and 500 men. The total number of ships must therefore be closer to 300. Nawrocki computes the cost of 300,000 lt. by extrapolating from the cost of this fleet, 72,709 lt. for the first month. 5000 soldiers were to be paid 25,000 lt. p.m. The ‘soulde et entrenement’ of a galley for one quarter in peacetime was 2700 lt. (Quittance of Villegaignon, 15 Feb. 1550, BnF fr. 26133, no. 438). 62 BnF Clair. 346, fos. 77–92; Potter, Renaissance France at War, p. 218. 63 Monluc, Commentaires (Pléiade), p. 179: ‘le désir que le Roy avoit de se venger du Roy d’Angleterre le fit entrer en une extreme despense.’ 64 See Potter, Renaissance France at War, appendix 6 based on BnF fr. 17329 fos. 82–112. 65 Lisle to Henry VIII, undated but around mid-June 1545, St.P., I, no. CCXII, pp. 787–788 (L&P, XX, i, 987).

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delayed this project. Lisle was only able, just before 24 June, to send the Newe Barke, the Jennett (a galley) and some boats from of Rye to scour the sea as far as Dieppe.66 Van der Delft reported on 27 June that Lisle had left to attempt some exploit against the French fleet. The only substantial account of his attempt to enter Le Havre is by Edward Hall, who recorded that the English shot off their artillery into the French fleet off Le Havre but that the French galleys came out against them ‘whiche Galies had greate advauntage, by reason of the calm wether: twyse eche part assaulted other with ordinaunce but sodainly the wynd rose so greate, that the Galies could not indure the rage of the seas.’ For their part, the English had to withdraw to Portsmouth for fear of sandbanks. A Spanish agent at Rouen reported on 3 July that ‘nuestras galleras’ had put to flight the English armada which came to Le Havre, ‘with great loss to the English.’67 Lisle returned to Portsmouth, where he attended Council meetings with the King to prepare coastal defences.68 The sailing date had been set for 8 July and all was thus ready for the grand review of the fleet by Francis I from the neighbouring cliff tops of Chef-de-Caux on 12th.69 The fleet was drawn up around the Admiral’s great flagship, one of the most powerful of the age, the great carrack Philippe, constructed of 800 t. under Admiral Chabot and carrying 100 bronze cannons.70 The kitchens were working overtime to entertain the great princes and nobles and by some misfortune they caught fire. The fire quickly got out of hand and the fact that the flagship was carrying an enormous store of powder and artillery ready primed made the vast explosions worse. Built to be unsinkable, the ship

66 Lisle to Council, c. 24 June 1545, St.P., I, no. CCXIV, pp. 791–792 (L&P, XX, i, 1023). 67 Hall, ed. Whibley, II, p. 351; Van der Delft, 2 July 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1087; ‘French news’ 3 July 1545, NA SP1/203, fo. 57 (L&P, XX, i, 1101): ‘con gran perdida de los yngleses.’ Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 284–285 places this attack ‘peu de jours’ after the King’s arrival at Toucques on 27 June. He records that ‘trente cinq navires anglesches, qui tirerent à coup perdu en terre’ but that they retreated before the galleys. See also Bernardo de Medici to Duke of Tuscany, 14 July 1545, Négociations de la France et de la Toscane, III, p. 166 and Saint Mauris to Los Cobos, 27 July 1545, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 104 reports that Lisle’s raid caused panic in Francis I’s entourage (he was three leagues away), with his baggage being prepared for flight. 68 Loades, Northumberland, p. 69. 69 NA SP1/203, fo. 57: ‘la magestad del rey ha mandado que a los ochos deste mes salga toda l’armada.’ Saint Mauris reported the day of the incident as 15th (letter to Los Cobos 27 July, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 104). 70 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 286.

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burned fiercely but slowly, destroying a vast store of munitions, valuable provisions and expensive armour. Though the Admiral was safe, 1200 soldiers and sailors were killed.71 There was much rejoicing in England when this news arrived. Charles Wriothesley recorded that the: great carycke called Rumpye La Conte, by misfortune of fyre was burnte; many lords, ladyes, and gentlemen beinge in hir, with great ordinance and substance and a million of goulde in hir, which was to have payd his men of warre their wages, was burnt and lost and noe creature saved.72

Monluc recalled in an addition to his Commentaires, that from the time he saw the great carrack destroyed, ‘I had a bad feeling about our campaign.’73 At all events, the Admiral was able to transfer to the Grande Maîtresse and the fleet put out into the Channel. The Navy of Henry VIII What kind of navy could the English bring out against this monster fleet? Opinions varied about its size and quality. Some observers thought that the English were stronger in the Channel74 while others thought the fleet had been allowed to deteriorate. The Duke of Suffolk thought the fleet disorganised and that nothing was ready and there had certainly been problems. Wyndham, for instance, in June 1544 was despatched westwards with the New Barke, but ‘so goodly a vessel, so well fournysshed with ordnance hathe but halffe a barrel of powder.’75 On the other hand, we know that it was precisely in the 1540s that the organization

71

For the sources on this, see Nawrocki, I, pp. 376–377. Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 157. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 286 says that the King’s money was saved. Wriothesley put all this in the context of unusual tempests and lightning strikes in France and England. Why he produced such a strange name for the great carrack is uncertain. 73 Monluc, Commentaires (ed. Courteault, Pléiade), p. 179: ‘j’eus mauvaise opinion de nostre enterprise.’ 74 The view of the informant of the Imperial ambassador in France in February 1545, L&P, XX, i, 615. 75 La Ronciere, Marine, III, pp. 410–411 (references do not coincide) gives an excessively bleak view of the English fleet; Suffolk was, though, generally negative about the state of the fleet in the summer of 1545: e.g.: ‘many of Your Hieghnes maryners and souldiours have fallen sick, and many of them not able to contynue the sees, whiche we thinke groweth by the greate hete, and the corrupcion of ther victuall, by reason of the disorder in the provision, and strayte and warme lying in the shippes.’ (St.P., I, i, no. CCXX) See also St.P., X, pp. 303, 368. Russell to the Council, 17 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 172(193) (L&P, XIX, i, 724). 72

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of the navy took much clearer form, with the nucleus of the Navy Board in being by 1545, including the vice-admiral, controller and treasurer. The Navy Board seems to become visible in the archives from about 1545 though some innovations (for instance Cromwell’s appointment of Stephen Vaughan as agent for the purchase of naval supplies in the Netherlands) probably go back to the late 1530s. The initiative for this may stem from the energy of John Dudley, viscount Lisle, appointed Lord Admiral in January 1543 in succession to Russell, a post he kept until the end of the reign. There is good reason to think that he was a more energetic and interventionist Admiral than many of his predecessors, from the start spending time at the Deptford dockyards and displaying a clear grasp of essential detail.76 At the beginning of Henry VIII’s reign, an ad hoc network of agents (such as the clerk of the ships) received disbursements of funds from the Council for every small item of expenditure. The Clerk of the Ships was largely responsible just for the Portsmouth dockyard founded by Henry VII. This developed into a coherent administrative structure in which the Treasurer of the Navy, from the 1530s down to his suicide in 1544, William Gonson, a ship-owner and merchant based at Deptford, received large sums from direct taxation or the Augmentations Office to spend on his own initiative. So, in 1539, Gonson was allocated £500 for naval expenditure; Loades has argued that normal peacetime naval expenditure stood at around £5000 p.a. in the 1530s, rising to £10,000 in the crisis of 1539. Alongside Gonson was John Winter (d. 1545), Treasurer for Marine causes, who also received sums direct from Augmentations, and whose son William was already one of the most active naval commanders. The Treasurers of the navy in 1545–1546 received payments of at least £22,214 and probably more.77 This was only the tip of the iceberg. As has been seen, Henry VIII’s total naval expenditure between 1542 and 1547 was £265,024.4.3 (see chapter 5 and Appendix 8).

76 E.g. his letter to Paget from the King’s house at Deptford, 7 Nov. 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 73 (L&P. XVII, ii, 348). 77 The best studies of all this are C.S.L. Davies, ‘The administration of the royal navy under Henry VIII: the origins of the Navy Board,’ EHR, 80, no. 315 (1965), 268–288 and Loades, Tudor Navy, pp. 74–102, who suggested that Lisle was the dynamic force behind change in the 1540s. In general terms, most recently, N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea. A Naval History of Britain, vol. I, 660–1649 (London, 1997, pbk, 2004). For naval disbursements, 1545–1546: L&P, XX, i, 782, 881, 1268; ibid., ii, 156, 1051; ibid., XXI, i, 100, 116, 208, 386, 635.

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In that period, the sum allocated for shipbuilding and repair was £45,230.18.8, though this was dwarfed by the cost of wages (£127,846.10.7). There were a few ‘great ships’ of 1000 tons or above (the most famous example being the Henry Grace a Dieu/ Great Harry built in 1513), medium sized ships of around 500 tons and a host of lesser types, including conscripted merchant ships. Early in 1535, Norfolk and Fitzwilliam arranged to show Chapuys two new ships, one nearly finished the other much less so, being built on the Thames in the Deptford dockyard that Henry had developed since the 1520s. The ships were probably the Sweepstake (300 tons) and the Less Bark (400 tons), though the unfinished vessel could also have been the rebuilt Mary Rose. Norfolk in particular was bullish, repeating ‘that it was a fine thing for a king of England to have such ships to give pause for thought to those who would attack him’ praising their size, structure and armament. Chapuys was clear about the message he was meant to receive: with such ships Henry ‘could fight the whole world.’78 In the crisis of spring 1539, a fleet of 120 ships had been put together according to Marillac.79 The King at that time probably had, at the most, 47 ships of his own (all but ten over 100 tons).80 This was an exaggeration. In 1540, asked for his assessment of the English fleet, Marillac reported that the King had 13 or 14 ships of his own at the most (a serious underestimate), three of which, the Great Harry (a monster that could carry 700 men, 400 of them soldiers), the Mary Rose and the Peter Pomegranate, were ‘great ships’ of 1000 to 1500 tons. The rest were lighter but well stocked with artillery. Otherwise, there were in England only 7 or 8 ships of greater than 400–500 tons, these belonging to courtiers and rich London merchants. As for the rest, 78 Chapuys to Charles V, 14 Jan. 1535, NA PRO31/18/2/2, no. 127, fo. 8 (CSP Spain, V, i, no. 126; L&P, VIII, no. 48). ‘que c’estoit une belle chose à ung roy d’Angleterre d’estre pourveu de telz vaisseaulx pour faire penser ceulx qui luy vouldroyent courir sus’ ‘pourroit combatre tout le monde.’ Chapuys says that the dockyard was half-way between London and Greenwich, which must mean Deptford (he was living at Stepney). The Deptford shipyard was fully operational, though it is often claimed to date from 1542. 79 Marillac to Francis I, 15 April, Kaulek, p. 90: ‘il n’y a pas moings de quatre vingts à cent navires de guerre pretz et appareillez pour combatre.’ 5 or 6 ships were constantly on patrol in conjunction with the coastal beacons. (the corresponding despatch to Montmorency for this day is corrupted but seems to hint at 150 sail). Same to same, 20 May 1539, Kaulek, p. 98: plans to form a fleet of 120 ships carrying 10,000 men. 80 M. Oppenheim, A history of the administration of the Royal Navy and of merchant shipping in relation to the Navy from 1509 to 1660 (London, 1896), pp. 49–51; Loades, Tudor Navy, p. 94.

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there were light vessels, only suitable for local seas and not passing further than Bordeaux. At need the government also hired ships from friendly Hanseatic cities or arrested Ragusan, Genoese or Venetian ships. Fifty decent ships was the limit for war even though the English claimed they could call on 100 and ‘if they could assemble 70–80 sail, that would be the greatest effort they could make in an emergency.’81 Marillac also noted in 1540, of sailors in the English fleet, that ‘la pluspart sont estrangiers.’ This perhaps reflects the increasing shortage of recruits by the 1540s. In response to this, in January 1545, the death penalty was imposed by proclamation for desertion from the King’s ships. On the same day there was an increase in wages from, 5s a month to 6/8d at a time when it was estimated that 5000 men would be needed, though likely to be raised with difficulty.82 Another response to the problem was an extraordinary attempt to create an equivalent to French galley slavery for the King’s oared ships. Rogues and ruffians were to be scoured up for this purpose. Nevertheless, when a French galley was taken, its ‘forsados’ were well treated and Admiral Lisle, for one, showed a degree of compassion for them. When taking the Galley Blancard round from the Thames to Boulogne he had them towed ‘to kepe the forsados in ure and breth as they must contynewally be, otherwise they wilbe shortly nothyn worth.’ He had them provided with new clothes since they were ‘most miserable without any manner of thyngs to hange upon theym.’83 All the same it had to be accepted that there were too many alternative sources of employment. The Duke of Norfolk reported in June 1545 that all the sailors of Norfolk and Suffolk were either serving the King or gone to Iceland for the fishing.84 Privateering also provided an

81 Marillac to Francis I, 1 Oct. 1540, Kaulek, pp. 226–227 (L&P, XVI, 110): ‘s’ilz faisoient jusques à soixante-dix ou quatre-vingtz voiles, ce seroit le plus grand effort qu’ilz pourroient faire en un extrême besoing.’ ‘Ledict seigneur, Sire, a communément environ treize ou quatorze naufz sciennes pour le plus’ though in very good order, built in the previous years of emergency and including the three ‘great ships.’ Loades, Tudor Navy, p. 93, has interpreted this as ‘30 or 40’ and indeed 13 or 14 must be too low. 82 25 Jan. 1545, Hughes and Larkin, I, nos. 244, 245 pp. 346–348. 83 Proc. 26 May 1545, L&P, XX, i, 812: inveighing against ‘detestable vices and fashions commonly used at the Banke and such like naughty places, where they much haunt and in manner lie nightly for the accomplishment and satisfying of their vile, wretched, and filthy purposes,’ such ‘ruffyns, vagabondes, masterles men, common players and evil disposed persons’ are to picked up for service in the King’s galleys. Lisle to Paget, 15 July 1546, NA SP1/221, fo. 200 (L&P, XXI, i, 1281). 84 Norfolk to Paget, Orfordness, 27 June 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1045.

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attractive alternative form of work for sailors. As James MacDermott has shown, the 1540s saw a significant increase in this activity as well as of its strategic significance. In September 1544 William Hawkins and two others were commissioned to raid the King’s enemies in a private capacity though drawing on supplies from the West Country.85 The other reason for the shortage of sailors was the expansion of the navy. It is the case that royal ship-building was in the doldrums before 1540 and largely confined to rebuilding. In January 1539, a survey of the King’s ships in the Thames revealed that the Mary Rose, Peter Pomegranate and Mynyon, were ‘new made’ but their masts, although ready, were not set up and would take 3 months more. The Primrose and Sweepstake were also new made and could sail at 20 days’ notice, while the Great Galye, Lesser Barke, Genet and Lyon would be ready in 20. Only the Trinity was ‘in good poynte.’86 Some of these ships were in origin very old: the Mary Rose (1510, rebuilt 1536–1539), Peter Pomegranate (1510, rebuilt 1536–1539), the Great galley/Barke (1515, rebuilt 1538–1539) and the Henry grace a Dieu (1514, rebuilt 1539). But though they might have seemed antiquated (the average life of a ship in the Mediterranean, as we have seen, was 12 years, though in northern waters this may have been longer), they were fully reequipped for the wars of the 1540s. The same ships were being surveyed again in 1542 by Gonson, most of them needing planks replaced or ‘skarfe’ removed in dry dock.87 There was a rapid programme of new building after 1542 when 18 new ships of 300–450 tons were built. A programme of building rowbarges was particularly evident in 1546 after the 1545 campaign revealed the value of oared vessels (the Cloud, Double Rose, Flower de Luce, Gillyflower, Harp, Maiden Head, Portcullis, Rose in the Sun, Rose Slip, Sun, Three Ostrich Feathers).88 In 1544–1545, 11 ships, mostly galleasses over 100 tons, were added by various means to the fleet (including the Anne Gallant, Brigandine, Greyhound, Great Mistress, Hare, Hind, Roo, Sakre, Swallow). Prizes (L’Artigue’s La Ferronière renamed Lartique, the Mary James and Salamander, all taken in 1543), were also brought into service. In 85 James MacDermott, England the Spanish Armada: The Necessary Quarrel. (New Haven, Conn. and London, 2005). ch. 1. L&P, XIX, ii, 340 (6) grants to Hawkins. 86 Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 201, fo. 39v, ‘The number and state of the Kinges . . . shippes in the Tamys.’ 87 Ibid., fo. 4: ‘The opinions of William Gunson paymaster and controller and Edward Water, Clerke of the Kinges majsties ships.’ (1542). 88 Oppenheim, Administration, pp. 50–51.

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March 1546, 4 new ships were being built at Deptford (together, 1,000 tons, 720 men).89 In addition, in 1544–1545 the crown hired, and often later bought, a number medium to large sized ships (for example the Jesus of Lubeck, 600 tonnes) which did duty in the vanguard of the fleet in 1545. Also pressed into service were ‘hulks’ (heavy merchants ships, carvel or clinker) from Germany, Spain and Italy, 4–500 tons with crews typically of 26–28, which were already equipped with a range of small artillery pieces, firearms and slings.90 By 1544–1545, then, the royal navy formed a nucleus of 60–70 vessels to which conscripted merchantmen could be added at need. While some English ports, such as Southampton and the Cinq Ports, were in decline, others such as Bristol and Newcastle were flourishing. In 1546, half of Newcastle’s 50 ships were reported as ready for the King’s service.91 Navigation was still largely the domain of the ship’s master; the captain had a different role. The King’s ships were captained sometimes by experienced sailors but often by soldiers and, judging by the navy lists throughout these years, captains were not regularly attached to one particular ship. Between 1544 and 1545, the captaincies of the royal ships were completely changed. To take a couple of examples, in 1544 the sailor Adam Outlawe was in command of the Great Shallop and then the Cavendish Shallop (both of Dover) when he ferried the Duke of Suffolk over to France. Later in the year, he was captain of the royal ship the New Barke. Outlawe died at the end of 1544 and the New Barke was then captained by William Tyrell (who had captained the Swallow in 1544) in the summer of 1545.92 In 1544, the royal ship Sweepstake was captained by Edward Wates but in the summer of

89

L&P, XXI, i, 498. For dates of construction in the light of recent research, C.S. Knighton and D. Loades, The Anthony Roll of Henry VIII’s Navy: Pepys Library 2991 and British Library Additional MS 22047 with related documents (Aldershot: Navy Records Society, 2000), appendix II, pp. 160–168. The most comprehensive list, drawn up in 1550 is ‘The declaration of names of such shipps as did serve in the warrs againste Fraunce’ from Feb. 1545–July 1546 in CUL, Dd.XIII. 25. On hulks: ‘Shippes in the ryver of Thames xxviij July 1545 thought meate to serve’ NA SP1/204, fo. 150 (L&P, XX, i, 1295). 91 G.V. Scammel, ‘War at sea under the early Tudors,’ Archaeologia Aeliana, 38 (1960), 73–. 92 Archbold (ed.), ‘Diary of the expedition of 1544,’ p. 503; 1544 lists: L&P, XIX, ii, 502.4; Gonson’s accounts, ibid., XIX, ii, 674. Outlawe’s will: NA PROB 11/30. 1545 list, Hatfield House, CP, 201, fo. 57. Outlawe and Dustone Newdigate had been operating off the east coast in 1543 (L&P, XVIII, i, 200). 90

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1545 by the Hereford gentlemen Sir George Cornewall, who had led his retinue in the siege of Montreuil the previous year.93 ‘Great ships’ were essentially battle-fighting machines, heavily equipped with artillery and high fighting castles; they could be rather unhandy. Carracks were lighter but still deep draught ships, broad and round with tall castles. In 1544, three ships of over 400 tons were built: the Pauncey, the Grand Mistress and the Anne Gallant. The latter two were four-masted galleons of 450 tons, with two gun decks. They were in some sense hybrid vessels. They also had oars and so should be defined as galleasses, though were principally sailing vessels, forerunners of the galleons of the Elizabethan era.94 Seven ships of similar size were built. The Salamander was captured in 1544. Most English ships shared the characteristics of their competitors. Where they had the edge, and this was often noted, was in artillery. There was a wide variety of bronze and iron guns but the numbers grew significantly between 1500 and 1540. Then, the 1540s saw a rapid development of the iron industry in the Weald, masterminded by parson Levett, Henry VIII’s curiously chosen commissioner for cannon balls. In 1543, Levett employed Ralph Hogge at Buxted and Maresfield, advised ironically by the French iron master Pierre Baude, to cast the first iron cannon there. This made the mass production of reliable and cheaper cast iron cannon possible.95 By the end of the war, the courtier Sir John Gage was receiving grants of iron works in the area.96 The Mary Rose had 96 guns, six of them the heaviest. Even relatively modest ships such as the Lion (160 tons) had 33 guns. What is more, it was precisely in the middle of the 1540s that the idea of the broadside seems to have emerged.97 The evidence for this is apparent in a comparison. The 93

L&P, XIX, i, 502.4, Cecil MSS, 201, fo. 57. Loades, Tudor Navy, p. 95. 95 John Stowe, The Annales of England (London: R. Newbery, 1592), p. 986: ‘This yere [1543] the first cast pieces of yron that ever were made in England were made at Buxteade’; C. Ffoulkes, Gun-founders of England with a List of English and Continental Gun-Founders from the XIV to XIX Centuries (Cambridge, 1937), pp. 71–81; J.S. Hodgkinson, The Wealden Iron Industry (Stroud, 2000); B. Awtry and C. Whittick, ‘The lordship of Canterbury, iron founding at Buxted and the continental antecedents of cannon-founding in the Weald,’ Sussex Archaeological Collections, 140 (2004 for 2000), 71–81. Parson William Levett was ordered to prepare over 1000 iron balls in July and was paid £200 for iron pieces and shot in August 1545 (APC I, pp. 213, 230). 96 A royal grant of 1546 to Gage included a ‘forge or style or of iron’ in the forest of Ashdown, a ‘furneys’ in West Hoathly, ‘certain iron mills’ formerly leased to Sir Anthony Browne (ESRO, G 19/6). 97 Loades, Tudor Navy, p. 96. 94

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‘Book of Orders for the War by Land and Sea’ was written at Henry’s command by Thomas Audley. At this time, port-firing guns had been in use for about twenty years but were still seen as of use mainly for the confusion of the enemy. Hand-to-hand fighting remained the main preoccupation.98 Lisle issued his own fighting instructions in 1545 which, in their preoccupation with formation and distance between ships, at least imply a ‘line abreast’ formation for most of the navy which would enable the use of broadside shot once the first line of ships in ‘line ahead’ had penetrated the ranks of the enemy: It is to be considered that the ranks must keep such order in sailing that none impeach another. Wherefore it is requisite that every of the said ranks keep right way with another, and take such regard to the observing of the same that no ship pass his fellows forward nor backward nor slack anything, but [keep] as they were in one line, and that there may be half a cable length between every of the ships . . . The first rank shall make sail straight to the front of the battle and shall pass through them, and so shall make a short return to the midwards as they may, and they [are] to have a special regard to the course of the second rank; which two ranks is appointed to lay aboard the principal ships of the enemy, every man choosing his mate as they may, reserving the admiral for my lord admiral.

After the employment of gunfire, the main objective, which was still ‘laying aboard’ the enemy could be carried out with a greater hope of success.99

98 ‘A Book of Orders for the War both by Land and Sea,’ BL Harl. 309, fo. 42; J.S. Corbett, Fighting Instructions, 1539–1816, Navy Record Society, 29 (1905), pp. 15–17. 99 ‘Lord Lisle’s instructions from the Fleming MSS,’ ibid., pp. 20–23; Loades, Tudor Navy, pp. 132–133. See also Instructions of 10 Aug., St.P., I, ii, no. CCXXVI: ‘1. First, yt is to be consithered, that every of the capitaignes, with the saied shippes, appointed by this order to the Vanwarde, Battaill, and Wyng, shall ryde at ancker, according as they be appoynted to saile by this saied order; and that no shipp of any of the saied Wardes or Wyng shall presume to comme to an ancker before thAdmirall of the said Ward. 2. Item, that every capitaign of the saied Wardes and Wyng shalbe in every thyng ordered by thAdmirall of the same. 3. Item, when we shall se a convenient tyme to fight with thenimies, our Vanward shall make with ther Vanwarde, if they have any; and if they be in one compenye, our Vanward (takyng thadvauntaige of the wynde) shall set uppon ther foremost ranck, bryngyng them oute of order; and our Vice-Admirall shall seake to bourd ther Vice-Admirall, and every capitaign shall chose his equall, as nere as he maye. 4. Item, thAdmirall of the Wyng shalbe alwayes in the wynde, with his hole compenye; and when we shall joyne with thenimies, he shall kepe still thadvauntaige of the wynde, to thentent he, with his compenye, maye the better beate of the gallies from the greate shippes.’

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It is easy to forget that the English fleet in this period needed oared vessels, primarily galleys, of course.100 The Great Galley, though, was rebuilt as a sailing ship by 1540 and re-named the Great Bark. The Galley Blanchard was captured from the baron de Saint-Blancard in 1546 but the Galley Subtle, sometimes called the Roo (or Row) Galley, was for a long time the only true galley among the King’s ships. Marillac reported the plan for six ‘gallères subtilles’ in November 1540, designed the more easily to maintain communications with Calais and patrol the coasts at times when the winds were unreliable. A year later there were payments to William Gonson for building a ship already called the Gallye Suttel. It may have been completed by the summer of 1543.101 Galleasses looked very much like great ships though were somewhat lighter and could be rowed by a bank of oars on the lower deck at need. There were also the new oared vessels, the ‘rowbarges,’ much smaller and lighter vessels which were very handy in combat when the weather was unreliable. A key figure here was a Frenchman, Pierre de Bidoux, sr de L’Artigue, nephew of Prégent de Bidoux, who had commanded the French Mediterranean galleys against Henry in 1513. L’Artigue was himself vice-admiral of Brittany and had led galley fleets in the wars of the 1520s. He had been captured on his ship La Ferronière (thereafter a prize and renamed the Lartique), described by Lord Admiral Lisle as ‘a tall barke and well appoyntyd,’ on the way from Scotland shortly after the start of the Franco-Imperial war in 1542, accused of piracy. The French government protested but he continued to be held.102 In a statement in 1543, he claimed to have made seven voyages to the west coast of Scotland, the last in 1524 when a French army accompanied Albany to Scotland, and outlined the com100 E.R. Adair, ‘English galleys in the sixteenth century’ EHR, 35, no. 140 (1920), pp. 497–512 argues that, in the light of ambiguous terminology, the formula that where a ships had a greater complement of soldiers and sailors than its tonnage, then it was a galley. See also J. Bennell, ‘The Oared vessels’ in Knighton and Loades, Anthony Roll, pp. 34–38; D. Childs, ‘Shock and Oar: Mary Rose and the Fear of French Galleys’ History Today, April 2007. 101 Marillac to Francis I, 16 Nov. 1540, Kaulek, p. 243; L&P, XVII, 258 (fo. 54); XVIII, ii, 231 (28 Nov. 1541); Lisle to Henry VIII, 11 July 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 867. 102 Remonstrance of Nicolas Roussel, Nov.–Dec. 1542, Caius College Cambridge, MS 597/362, p. 201 (L&P, XVII, 1159.2): ‘remonstre que revenant de voyage d’Escosse il fut prins le long de la coste d’Engleterre par les Angloys avec tous ses compaignons et la nef appellez La Ferronniere. Puis peu de jours en ca, ilz ont esté delivrez de prison.’; Paget to Henry VIII, 2 Dec. 1542, St.P., V, no. DCCXCIII; The Council discussed the case of Lartigue and other French sea captives on 6 April 1543 APC, I, p. 106. (L&P, XVIII, i, 372), Lisle to Paget, 7 Nov. 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 73 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 348).

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modities of the ports around Dumbarton. He also suggested that the English might have as many pilots from Brittany as they wanted.103 At the start of the Anglo-French war (8 July 1543), perhaps anxious to be free, he accepted a pension of £50, increased to £75 in 1545 and seems to have offered a rather foolhardy plan for a descent on Brittany for the capture of Le Conquet and other places at the far west of Brittany such as Brest as well as of western ports such as La Rochelle.104 L’Artigue’s expertise was in the construction and command of galleys and he had offered his services to Henry for this purpose; the French ambassador just before his departure got hold of a plan offered by L’Artigue for doing harm to Francis I. Though there is some evidence that he was a double agent, he certainly submitted a plan for the building of four galleys in 100 days with advice on the treatment of timber and on their manning by Venetian sailors.105 Only the Galley Subtle was built in these years (1543/4) but the King commanded the building of 9 more galleasses and 13 rowbarges in which L’Artigue may have played a part.106 These were highly active in the conflicts of 1545–1546. Information from French naval experts proved valuable in other ways. Marillac remarked in October 1540 that many of the pilots and mariners in English service were foreigners.107 Many of these were Normans or Bretons, perhaps exiles banished for crimes such as piracy, including Jean Ribauld and Jean Rotz of Dieppe.108 Rotz, 103

Offer by L’Artigue, 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 541. Copy of L’Artigue’s plan intercepted by the Imperials BL Add. 28593, fos. 185–188 (L&P, XVIII, i, 662, ii); ibid., ii, 107(11). 105 D’Orthe to Francis I, 7 June 1543, Imperial intercept, L&P, XVIII, i, 662; SaintAulbie to L’Artigue, 29 June 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 196 (L&P, XVIII, ii, app. 16): L’Artigue had passed on his advice to Cardinal de Tournon in France, namely ‘l’advis que vous avez baillé pardelà du chemin que une armee de mer doit tenir.’ Tournon had replied that ‘vous luy faictes merveilleusement grant service’ and those places would be secured. He would be awarded 1200 cr.; ‘Qui seguitanno gli nomi de li fortamenti et apparelliamento d’una galea fatto et nominato per Lortigua del Paeze de Franza,’ NA SP1/182, fos. 192–196 (L&P, XVIII, ii, app. 15). A French pilot who had entered English service, was taken in the fight off Barfleur in July 1543 and afterwards beheaded. (La prise et deffaicte, ed. Montaiglon, Recueil, p. 200). L’Artigue, who associated with Berteville and other French traitors, died in poverty at York in October 1547 (Lefebvre-Pontalis, Correspondance politique d’Odet de Selve, 62, 234). 106 Bennell, ‘Oared Vessels,’ p. 34. 107 Marillac to Francis I, 1 October 1540, Kaulek, p. 227. 108 E.-T. Hamy, ‘Jean Roze, hydrographe dieppois du milieu du XVIe siècle’ Bulletin de Géographie Historique et Descriptive, 2 (1889), 90–91. E.G. Taylor, Tudor geography 1485–1583 (London. 1930), p. 63; idem., ‘French cosmographers and navigators in England and Scotland, 1542–1547,’ Scottish Geographical Magazine, 46 (1930); P. Barber, ‘England I: Pageantry, Defense and Government: Maps at Court to 1550’ in 104

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of Scottish descent from a family long settled in France, presented Henry VIII with a meridional compass and a Treatise on navigation in 1542, followed by an elaborate Boke of Idrography copiously equipped with detailed naval charts prepared in the late 1530s.109 Rotz, who was given denizenship and an annuity, was required to provide maps and expertise for English fleets operating in the North Sea against Scotland as well as in the narrow seas, though, with the preparation of a new campaign against the Scots after Henry VIII’s death, he and Ribauld were anxious to return to French service by early 1547.110 What was life aboard a great English warship like? We now have, of course, the priceless evidence of the near-completely excavated Mary Rose to penetrate this world, with all its rich evidence on the daily lives and needs of a community of soldiers and sailors at sea.111 In addition, the Anthony Roll of 1546 gives a comprehensive survey of the King’s ships. From the latter,112 we learn that the ship, rebuilt to 700 tons and thus the second largest ship of the fleet, normally had a complement of 185 soldiers, 200 sailors and 30 gunners. She was to carry 91 guns on three decks with the 14 heaviest on the main deck. These included 15 carriage-mounted bronze guns (including two of the only four bronze cannon in the fleet). The rest were a mixture of iron guns and smaller anti-personnel weapons. There were 52 handguns, 250 longbows (with chests found in excavation that would account for between 8500 and

D. Buisseret (ed.) Monarchs, Ministers and Maps (Chicago/London, 1992), pp. 36–41. Less is known about Ribauld. The Council authorised his pay of £35 for an annuity on 7 April 1546, when he was detailed to serve with Lisle’s ships in the Narrow Seas (APC, I, p. 371 (L&P, XXI, i, 561); records of the payment survive for 1545 (L&P, XX, ii, 707). 109 Jean Roze, Boke of Idrography, ed. H. Wallis (Oxford, 1981) contains a survey of practically all that is known about Rotz. 110 Ribauld seems to have been assigned for service in October 1546 but whether at Boulogne or in Scottish waters is unclear (APC, I, p. 370); Lefebvre-Pontalis, Correspondance politique de Odet de Selve, no. 43; ibid., pp. 85, 118–119. The subject is fully explored in E. Bonner, ‘The recovery of St Andrews Castle in 1547: French naval policy and diplomacy in the British Isles,’ EHR, 111, no. 442 (1996), 578–598. She argues, p. 583, that both Roze and Ribauld passed on their accumulated knowledge of English plans to Henri II and Montmorency. 111 M. Rule, The Mary Rose (1982); D. Childs, The Warship Mary Rose: the Life and Times of King Henry VIII’s Flagship (Chatham, 2007); A. McKee, ‘The complement of the Mary Rose’ MM, 72 (1986); J. Watt, ‘The surgeons of the Mary Rose: the practice of surgery in Tudor England’ MM 69 (1983); D. Loades and C.S. Knighton, Letters from the Mary Rose (Sutton: 2003). 112 Knighton and Loades, Anthony Roll, pp. 15–19.

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9000 arrows), 300 staff weapons and 480 darts. Artillery found in the excavation revealed that most of the guns had been cast between 1536 and 1543. In 1543–1544, the English divided their fleet between keeping the Narrow Seas secure and protecting operations in Scotland. In addition, Henry himself was keen to use his ships to cripple the Franco-Flemish herring fisheries and ordered the Pansy and the Lesse Gally and eight other ships into action in November, even though they were not prepared and the effect on relations with Flanders was difficult.113 In April 1544, for instance, there were just 8 royal ships in the Narrow Seas, including the Lesse Gallyas, the Primrose, the New Bark, Dragon, Mary James, Great Pinnace, Small Pinnace, Caundish ship, with crews of 870 and costing £283.19.4 p.m. Plainly this was just a covering squadron. Real English sea-power was put forth against Scotland at the time in support of the landing at Leith commanded by Hertford in May 1544, with a squadron of royal ships to escort the nearly 200 merchant ships (see chapters 2 and 5). As for the numbers of ships the English could command in 1545, an intelligence report sent to Charles V in February suggested that after recent captures of French vessels, the English could now send out 80–100 armed ships.114 At the end of May, an estimate was made for the money needed for 3600 men under Carew’s command over and above 2400 who were already with the fleet. The pay at 6/8d a month was £1,200 and the total cost with conduct and victuals £3,500.115 At the start of June, Lisle had assembled 160 ships with 12,000 men aboard.116 Nonetheless, assembling the full complement of the fleet was a major problem in view of the terrible weather in the Channel. Just before 24 June, Lisle’s squadron had moved westwards beyond Wight but had then been driven back by south-westerlies to the narrow Seas. Here he pondered his options. Should tack back westwards?: whiche I thought not convenyent, conjecturing that with those streynable wyndes, the rest of tharmye comyng out of Thames, and also the Henry, with the Mary Roose, sholde be in the Downes: whiche place, althought it was more paynfull, thenne to have come in with the Wight, we made

113 114 115 116

Lisle to Paget, 7 Nov. 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 73 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 348). L&P, XX, i, 615. Estimate 28 May 1545, SP 1/201 f. 126 (L&P, XX, i, 823). Hall, Triumphante Reigne, ed. Whibley, II, p. 351; L&P, XX, i, 823.

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The problems of assembling all the ships in one place are evident. The summer of 1545, with the French naval attack looming, required a feverish response in English coastal defence. Commissions of array were issued on 7 May and 14 June. Leading councillors, Norfolk, Suffolk and Russell, took charge of sections of the coast. Along the East Anglian coast the Duke of Norfolk inspected the beacons and reported the people in good heart and anxious to cut any French army off from its ships should they land. Only Yarmouth seemed to him vulnerable to a major landing and here good progress had been made on a bulwark. The country was stripped of troops in the summer of 1545 and Norfolk was required to raise 5000 men for Boulogne from his ‘commission.’118 Locally, reliable courtier gentry were commissioned to act as liaison. John Gage, for instance, was on the Sussex coast reporting the movements of the French fleet in the narrow seas.119 He acted as liaison between his kinsman, Lisle, the fleet and the Council, informing Lisle of admiral d’Annebault’s movements out of the narrow seas and transmitting Lisle’s news.120 He also seems to have been arranging for the supply ships to rendezvous with Lisle’s fleet.121 Local agents proposed that the guidance beacons at Spanish Nok, Land’s End and in the Thames estuary at Whitstable and Reculver be taken down so that no great ships could enter those waters without danger.122

117

Lisle to Council, undated but c. 24 June 1545, St.P., I, ii, no. CCXIV. Norfolk to Paget, Orfordness, 27 June 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1045; Council to Norfolk, 26 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 137. 119 D. Potter, ‘Sir John Gage, Tudor Courtier and Soldier,’ English Historical Review. 474 (2002), 113–114. Suffolk and others to Paget, Portsmouth, 2 and 3 Aug. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 14, 24. 120 Lisle to Henry VIII, 12, 18, 21 Aug. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 108, 158, 183. Letters of Privy Council to Gage and Sussex justices, 11 Aug. 1545, APC, I, p. 226 (L&P, XX, ii, 94). 121 Lisle to Gage, 17 Aug. 1545, St. P., I, p. 816 (L&P, XX, ii, 151). 122 L&P, XX, i, 1174, 2. 118

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Early in the summer Paget drew up a paper for the King which listed the strengths and weaknesses of coastal defence.123 The Campaign in the English Channel, 1545 The French fleet finally made its way out of Le Havre on 17 July. Annebault, as a result of the disaster of the great carrack, had been forced to delay his departure but only for a few days. Having transferred to the new Grande Maîtresse, he put out in command of the main battle (the terminology of land armies of course retained), with Taix in command of the van and Boutières of the rear-guard. Salvoes of artillery were answered from the cliffs where the King was stationed. The Papal nuncio, writing from Harfleur, put the fleet at 300 sail, carrying, besides the sailors, 15,000, ‘tutti bone genti’ either Gascons or Spaniards, 4000 pioniers (‘guastatori’). Nobles had flocked to serve and as a result caused problems of precedence with Leone Strozzi, but the King forbad too many from going because of the likely dangers.124 What were the fleet’s strategic and tactical objectives? Invasion of England was the primary aim, possibly to establish a foothold on or near the Isle of Wight as a bargaining counter for Boulogne. One observer had heard in May that the plan was to rendezvous off Cornwall with a Scottish fleet, land in two or three places to take and hold some fortresses, and then move on to the Narrow Seas to secure the building of the new fort at Boulogne.125 However, there were major strategic limitations.126 The supply of an expeditionary force, however substantial, was bound to be problematic unless lines of communication were assured and only the elimination of the English fleet could guarantee

123 St.P., I, ii, no. CCXI: a paper endorsed 1545 corrected by Paget: For the sea coasts: The Lord Chamberlain and Master of the Horse shared one region including the Isle of Wight, arrangements for their support and munitions for Portsmouth. Seymour at Dover with gentlemen of Kent to have special commission. Auchar in Thanet with artillery and 300 men. Artillery for the cliffs of Kent. Darcy in Essex and bulwarks planned at Lowestoft Roads and Yarmouth. 124 Guidiccione to Farnese, 18 July 1545, ANG III, p. 375. 125 Desjardins, III, p. 163: ‘pigliare une due o tre luoghi, e fortificarli, lasciandovi dentro guardie competenti.’ 126 Loades, Northumberland p. 69 argued that ‘such a scheme makes little tactical sense’ and that the main objective was Boulogne but it seems to me unlikely that such an unprecedentedly great fleet would have been assembled simply to support the army at Boulogne. That could have been done with half the ships. The opportunistic seeking of a major battle in the Channel seems more likely.

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that. To capture a town such as Southampton or Portsmouth might seem attractive but holding on to it against counter-attack when supplies of labour and building material for fortifications were limited made such a plan hazardous. The Isle of Wight had some advantages as an objective in that, cut off from the mainland as it was, a place could be fortified on it with reasonable security. Even this, though, could scarcely be held on to without absolute control of the Channel. For these reasons, it is not surprising that the French campaign developed effectively into a massive raid without long-term consequences. A permanent base on Wight would have meant diverting the fleet from pressure on Boulogne. Martin du Bellay, after all fairly high in the French command structure, summed up the objectives as the dislodgement of the English from Boulogne by pressure on land and sea. The French fleet would be great enough to be able to meet the English fleet and interrupt communications between England and Boulogne while the land army advanced ‘and as the opportunity presented itself, land in England.’127 Put like that, the invasion of English territory seems more like the icing on the cake than a primary objective. Misfortune seemed to pursue the French Admiral. The fleet crossed the Channel fairly quickly; du Bellay says it was off the Isle of Wight by 18th. Reconnaissance up to Saint Helen’s Point (Nettlestone’s Point) revealed an English fleet of 60 good ships at Spithead and in the Solent, which came out of harbour to fight, favoured by the wind, though then retreated under cover of the fortresses around Portsmouth, which had been strengthened in the summer of 1544.128 Their anchorage in Portsmouth Harbour was an inestimable advantage. In addition, the keel of Annebault’s galley had been damaged on a reef as it came out of Honfleur harbour and the vessel began to ship water. It had to put back to Dieppe and then Le Havre for repairs. Annebault transferred to the Venetian ship, the Contarina, his third flagship.129 The following day, 19th, Annebault disposed his centre on the Contarina with 30

127 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 282–283: ‘et où l’occasion se presenteroit prendre pied en Angleterre.’ 128 See reports of Knyvet 10, 17 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 659, 718; action was advised to prevent a French landing on Portsea Island at the same time ‘it is but oon nightes sailing from the New Havon, Dieppe, Treport, Harflete, Hondflete and the river of Seyne thider. And what fayr and easy landing thennemyes maye have two myles togeders within the said isle if they attempte an entreprice.’ (List of ordnance at Portsmouth, June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 166(188)v (L&P, XIX, i, 719). 129 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 286–287; La Roncière, Marine, III, pp. 420–424.

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other ships; to his right was Boutières’ squadron with 36 and Curton on the left with a similar number. The battle plan was for the galleys to go out first to challenge the English in their anchorage, firing their artillery to provoke them to attack. They would then fall back on the main fleet if the wind changed.130 The English had the worst of the weather in the morning and the galleys were therefore at an advantage but there were no notable losses except for the humiliating sinking of the Mary Rose in full view of Henry VIII, who had come down to Portsmouth to view the battle from Southsea castle. Du Bellay claimed that it was sunk ‘à coups de canon.’ The Mary Rose was an old ship but had been extensively rebuilt in 1536. It was generally reported in England that, overloaded and with her lower gun ports open near the water-line, she was the victim of a freak accident when a gust of wind caused her to keel over. Recent research, though, has raised the possibility that the great ship was indeed sunk by a French cannon shot.131 Lisle, on the Great Harry was also under pressure until the weather turned in favour of the English. The English rowbarges (light galleys) showed their superiority in manoeuvre at this point and the French galleys came under attack. Leone and Piero Strozzi, in command of the galleys, turned to stand against them and Annebault was about to signal the whole fleet to join in the counter-attack, when, according to du Bellay, the English retired. Annebault, fearing a trap, called off the attack.132 Annebault seems at this point to have been trying to provoke the English to abandon their defensive posture. Du Bellay tells us that he ‘decided to try other means to draw them out.’ He knew Henry was present watching the battle from the shore and decided to land on the

130 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 288–289. Martin du Bellay seems to have had access to the order of battle for the day. 131 M. Rule, The Mary Rose, pp. 36–38; D. Childs, The Warship Mary Rose, passim; Dominic Fontana http://userweb.port.ac.uk/~fontanad/maryrose; Van der Delft to Charles V, 24 July 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1263 makes clear contemporary belief about the gun ports. For discussion, Loades, Northumberland, p. 70. 132 Du Bellay is clear about the advantage of the rowbarges: ‘Il y a une espece de navires particulieres, dont usoient noz ennemis, en forme plus longue que ronde et plus estroitte beaucoup que les galleres, pour mieulx se regir et commander au courantes qui sont ordinaire en ceste mer; à quoy les hommes sont si duits qu’avecques ces vaisseaux ils contendent de vitesse avecques les galleres, et les nomment ramberges.’ The rowbarges also had artillery mounted ‘en pouppe.’ He also stressed how long it took for the French galleys to turn themselves around. French losses were ‘quelques forçats et de quelques soldats privez.’ (Mémoires, IV, p. 290).

Illustration 7 The Encampment of the English Forces near Portsmouth together with a View of the English and French fleets at the commencement of the action between them on the XXXth July MCXLV (The sinking of the Mary Rose). Engraved from a Coeval Painting, at Cowdray in Sussex, the Seat of Lord Viscount Montague. Drawn from the Original, by S.H. Grimm. Engraved by James Basire, 1788. Sumptibus Societatis Antiquariorum Londini. Publish’d according to Act of Parliament, 23rd April, 1788.

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Isle of Wight and burn the country so as to provoke his indignation ‘such that he would make his ships sally forth in support.’ From 21 July, the French landed on the island and burned the villages until they met opposition from local cavalry. Daily the troops were evacuated and daily they landed again.133 Such tactics could not go on for long and Annebault had to decide what to do next; stay on the Isle of Wight and establish a base or move to support the French army at Boulogne. Du Bellay tells us that on 23 July Annebault assembled all the captains and pilots on his galley to hold a council of war. The Admiral put the case for attacking the English head on and called in evidence his superiority in numbers of men and ships. The pilots, though, raised doubts about the possibility of approaching the shore without ‘evidente perte.’ The approach into Portsmouth Harbour would only allow four ships to advance in line, so the channel could easily be defended. The fleet would be at the mercy of the current and the winds. The fortifications would bring artillery to bear on them. When it was suggested that the fleet could fight at anchor to offset the currents, the pilots pointed out that cables could break or drag. Annebault at first thought all this cowardice, while the Strozzis called loudly for attack. But when the Admiral asked them to put their opinion down on paper, they refused and when he asked them to sign up to the opposite point of view, they also refused, much to his exasperation. The incident revealed what was to become an increasing problem on the French side: the breakdown of trust between the French Admiral and his Italian galley commanders.134

133 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 292–294: ‘resolut de tenter par autres moyens de les attirer’ .. ‘tant qu’il feroit partir ses navires pour aller au secours.’ 134 Alvarotti, the Ferrarese ambassador, was informed of this exchange by Thomaso del Vecchio: ‘che mentre l’armata di Francia era all’isola di Voich et la Inglese dentro di quell porto, che Mons. Almiraglio voleva andare a combatterla, perche dubitava di nostra vere acqua a bastanza, convoco tutti i piloti et demando il parer loro, se credevano che haveria acqua assai da potere intrare et andare per combattere. Dissero tutti che non haveria piu di uno braccio d’acqua, molti dicono che questa fu una finta per mostrare voluntà di combattere; sia come si voglia il signor prior di Capua et Pietro Strozzi dissero che vi saria piu di 4 braccia d’acqua et che si poteva combattere. All’hora, Monsr Almiraglio fece loro presentare inanzi uno folio di carta, dicendo che si sottoscrivessero, perche su la parola lora voleva andare a combattere. Risposero che non lo volevano fare, perche non erano piloti. S. Ex. disse sottoscrivete dunque il contrario. Risposero anco non volerlo fare per la medesima ragiione, di modo che S. Ex. Reste molto malsodisfatta da loro, et per quanto mi ha ditto il signor Ludovico Biraga, scrisse a Sua Maestà il tutto condamnandoli per huomini rotti et periculosi, et non da governo.’ (to Duke Ercole II, Dieppe, 14 Aug. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 210 (decipher).

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The next morning, three pilots and three captains went out to reconnoitre the entrance to the haven. It was, they reported, impossible to attack.135 What, then, was to be done? The captains decided whether to move on to the Narrow Seas in order to overawe Boulogne or to occupy the Isle of Wight. A place had been spotted by de Taix and the engineer Jean de Saint-Remy, but it would have required the army to occupy it for three months, when supplies could not be guaranteed. The easy way out was taken: to await the King’s instructions. Du Bellay, unusually, expressed his own view. While deferring to Taix and Saint-Rémy, ‘it seems to me that, in view of the King’s wish to secure himself against his enemy the King of England, an opportunity was there to do this which does not happen very often. But God disposes of matters as he pleases.’136 One last encounter happened on the Isle of Wight when the galleys stopped to take on water somewhere around St Catherine’s point, the captain of the Ponant galleys, Blacas d’Aups was killed by the English in an ambush on 21 July.137 The second phase of the campaign now began but first it was essential for Annebault to make good the losses he had suffered. The Grande Maîtresse and other ships were still under repair and it was necessary for him to get his colleague Tournon to push this forward in the Norman ports.138 Supplies were also running short and Annebault had to urge Matignon to get them moving since ‘the enemy’s navy gets stronger daily and ours weakens.’139 Annebault set sail for Dover along the English coast, landing raiding parties at Newhaven and Brighton.140 135

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 294–298. Ibid., IV, pp. 297–298: ‘il me semble que veue l’affection et le moyen qu’avoit le Roy de se mettre en repos contre son ennemy le roy d’Angleterre, il se presenta une occasion pour ce faire, laquelle mal aisement de long temps s’offrira; mais Dieu conduit les choses en la forme qu’il luy plaist.’ Du Bellay also thought that the 400 men and 3000 pioniers ultimately left at Boulogne could have been landed on Wight and maintained themselves for a month (ibid., IV, p. 300). 137 Du Bellay, IV, p. 298. La Roncière, Marine, III, p. 423. 138 Tournon to Matignon, 31 July, 2 Aug., 3 Aug. (‘de faire extreme diligence ou radoub de la Grande Maistresse et autres navires’), 4 Aug., 5 Aug., 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17 Aug. 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, pp. 130–140 all pushing for the repair of ships. 139 Annebault to Matignon, rade of Boulogne, 4 Aug. 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, no. CCII, pp. 132–133: ‘l’armée de l’ennemy se fortifie journellement et [l]a nostre se affoiblit.’ 140 Stowe, Annales (1592), p. 994; Council to Norfolk, 31 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 138: P.S. ‘The Frenchemen be nowe upon the cost towards Dover between Hithe and Lyde, eight miles from the lande. They have sent their galees to Boloyn. They have made two or three descentes but all to our advantage.’ For a study of whether 136

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Then he crossed the Narrow Seas to Boulogne, where he had arrived in the roads by 4 August.141 There he was able to land 4000 soldiers and 3000 pioniers to concert plans with marshal du Biez for the establishment of the Outreau fort.142 But the wind in the south, the French fleet made towards the English coast and was sighted off Rye on 9 August, estimated at about 200 sail. Warned that Lisle and the English fleet were approaching, Annebault was in a dilemma; the seas were exceptionally rough and the winds unpredictable. The galleys may have been difficult to handle. He risked being driven towards Flanders or trapped against the English coast. Faced with the decision, he decided that, should the wind die down, he would make out into the Channel and take advantage of the French coast for shelter and to be able to use his galleys, presumably hidden behind headland. The winds were bad the next day but moderated the next. Annebault transferred to a galleon in which he hoped to confront the English Admiral in person. All was ready for a major confrontation, when the galleys sighted the English fleet on 14 August.143 Was it the case, as Annebault thought, that the English fleet was getting stronger? To face the French, Lisle at the end of July had 62 ships and 10,390 men, though these were to be joined fifty sail from the West Country and Bristol, including seven great hulks of 888 tons each, and 1,200 of soldiers beside sailors. Most of the western ships, galleasses, shallops and rowbarges, were detailed to the wing of oared vessels on 10 August.144 In his instructions of 10 August he the well-known drawing of the French raid on Brighton in the BL represents that of 1545, see A. Anscombe, ‘Prégent de Bidoux’s raid in Sussex in 1514 and the Cotton MS. Augustus I(i).18’ in TRHS, ser. 3, 8 (1914), 103–111. Stowe’s entry makes fairly clear that the drawing does represent 1545. 141 The report that Annebault was suffering from an ear abcess at this time, propagated by La Roncière, Marine, III, p. 424 and based on CSP Spain VIII, p. 223 is misdated both in that compilation and in L&P, XX, i, 615. It should be dated February 1545; on raids on the English coast, APC, I, pp. 213–214. 142 La Roncière, III, pp. 424–425. Alvarotti to Ercole II, Caudebec, 4 Aug. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 201r: Prince of Melfi told him ‘che Mons. Almiraglio era anchora quivi in terra à quell forte di qua da Bologna, che si faccia gagliardamente, et l’armata era quivi in quelli contorni, di modo che non poteva venire uno vello di Inghilterra senza fare conto seco et che havea preso 3 navi di vivere.’ 143 Du Bellay, IV, pp. 300–303 gives a detailed account of all this, though it is at times difficult to follow. La Roncière, III, p. 426 attempts a perhaps imaginary clarification. 144 Cecil MSS, 137, fo. 76 (L&P, XX, ii, app. 27): a corrected version of Lisle’s first instructions, gives 64 ships plus the victuallers’ which be eight good ships.’ The corrected version of the 3 August paper that mentions that the fleet is ‘to be joined to the forsaid battle’ by 50 Western ships, seven of which are great hulks of 888

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was able to list 104 sail and 12,000 men, still half as many ships as the French.145 He had, though, finalised his battle plans on 3 August. Part of these concerned communications, the display of Saint George banners in particular places by different parts of the fleet. The watchwords ‘God Save the King’ to be answered by ‘long may he reign’ were established. The first of these documents was drawn up by 3 August. It has been argued that this shows the influence of Spanish naval tactics. The Admiral proposed to order his ships in a vanguard in three ranks, composed of the most powerful hired merchant ships and the king’s own galleons and great ships, and supported by a strong rearguard of smaller armed merchantmen. The key was to have two wings of oared ships, galleasses and rowbarges. The vanguard was to be ordered in three ranks rather like a blunt wedge. In the first rank come eight of the large merchantmen, mainly Hanseatic vessels (the Samson and Johannes of Lubeck, the Trinity, Morion, and ‘Sepiar’ of Danzig and the Mary of Hamburg);146 in the second, ten of the King’s ships and one private vessel; in the third, nineteen second-rate merchantmen. The tactical aim was clearly that the heavy Hanseatic ships should receive the first shock and break up the enemy’s formation for the royal ships, while the third rank could then be in position to support. The wings, which were specially told off to keep the galleys in check, contained all the king’s galleons of the latest type.147 Lisle modified this arrangement in a new set of instructions on 10 August. His fleet had been increased by the arrival of some of the west-country ships, but the formation still retained the blunt wedge design, though simplified. There was now to be a vanguard of 24 ships, a ‘battaill’ or main

(qu. 300?) ton apiece, and there are 1,200 soldiers, besides sailors. (For a list of 29 western ships soon to be ready, see L&P, XX, ii, 17.)The fleet list compiled before the sinking of the Mary Rose (Hatfield House, CP, 201 fo. 57) lists 68 ships and 10,811 men. That compiled after the sinking and at the start of the second half of the campaign (NA SP1/205, fo. 46, L&P, XX, ii, 27.2) gives 69 ships. 145 Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, I, p. 77. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 301: ‘cent bons navires.’ 146 In May 1545, Francis I had complained to the Emperor ‘que ceulx d’Embourg et aultres Ostrelins ont envoyé une partye de leurs navires armees en guerre en Angleterre pour en servir ledict Roy d’Angleterre.’ The Hanse had sent other ships into France for trade claiming that their ships in England had been arrested but Francis knew better and had arrested them. (Francis I to Mesnage, 3 Oct. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fos. 58–59). 147 Instructions of 3 August: Julian S. Corbett, Fighting Instructions, pp. 20–22; L&P, XX, ii, app. 27 for a version with amendments in the Cecil papers which suppressed the idea of two wings.

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body of 40 ships, and one ‘wing’ of 40 oared ‘galliasses, shallops and boats of war.’ Ships were moved around from the earlier dispositions (the Argosy of Southampton formerly in the vanguard, was now in the battle, for instance though the Hanseatic ships were still in the front line) A note was added in the revised version: ‘All these are but one wing and are appointed to be in the weather gage-to attend only upon the galleys.’ The ‘wing’ however, was still capable of acting in two divisions, for, unlike the vanguard and ‘battaill,’ it had a vice-admiral as well as an admiral.148 Lisle had been left uncertain after Annebault’s departure from the Solent about which way to move but he finally left Portsmouth on the morning tide of 12 August and struggled to make headway to Beachy Head, with the wind in the east to south-east. Finally, he made visual contact with Annebault’s fleet on 15th. At 10 in the morning from the Henry Grace a Dieu, offshore near Shoreham, he reported to the King that: thenymyes and we have sight one of thother, stryving who shalle gett thadvauntage of the wynde; theyr gallys rowth faste for yt, and our Wyng dothe thayre beste; they have yet thadvauntage of the same; never the les they make no haste, soche as they mought do, and yf they were disposed to fyght. Wherfor I thinke we shall not fyght this daye. They have wether, as they wold wishe, for it blowth littell wynde; . . . They seame to be many more shippes in nomber then we be; but the victorye restyth not allwayes in the nombers of shippes, nor men, but only in the goodnes of God, workinge with Him, as moche as men maye, to serve the towrne; wherin, God willinge, we shalle do that may ly in us, accordinge to our dutys. And if it shalle plese Him to sende us a comodyus wynde, I have good hope Your Majeste shalle here soche news of our procedinges with theym, as shalbe extable unto the same, to the lawde and prayse of Allmyghty God, who graunt yt so.149

The location of the conflict is given by one of the Italian galley commanders in French service as ‘in a very calm sea more than 25 miles from the port of Wight.’ which would fit the seas somewhere between Shoreham and Beachy Head.150 This is the conflict described by Paget in dramatic terms: between Lisle and the French fleet ‘was such shott

148

Instructions of 10 August: Fighting Instructions, pp. 23–24; St.P., I, ii, 810. Lisle to Henry VIII, 15 Aug. 1545 St.P., I, ii, no. CCXXVII. 150 ASM, Francia B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 226r (Alvarotti, 18 Aug. 1545, information from captain Turchetto): ‘in una calma grandissima et lungi dalla isola et porto di Vuich più du 25 miglia.’ 149

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at least Ml shott of canon . . . and the lyke hath not been harde of a great tyme and yet thankes be to God no hurte don to us save the breaking of thee howres and our ordinaunce hurde crasheng in their shippes and galees.’151 The following day was one of inconclusive manoeuvring in changing winds that generally favoured the galleys: and all the same daye, frome noone untill night, they assailed us with ther gallyes, but ther hole fleete approached us not, untill it was after son settyng; before which tyme ther gallies were repulced, and then both they and we came to ancker, within a leage one of an other: and yarly in the mornyng they were dislodged; for by the tyme yt was daye, they were asfarre into the wynde of us, as we might escrye them oute of my mayne top.152

However, Lisle singled out parts of his fleet that had done well against the galleys: the Mystres, thAnne Gallaunt, the Greyhounde, with all Your Highnes shalupes and roweng peeces, dyd ther partes right well; but especially the Mystres, and thAnne Gallaunt, dyd so handle the gallyes, aswell with ther sydes, as ther prowes, that your greate shippes in a manier had letill to doe. Ther hole fleete dyd still kepe thadvauntaige of the wynde, makyng no hast towardes us, untill the son was almost set, by which tyme ther gallyes were well beaten, and repulsed towardes them.153

The French account of the combat is necessarily different in detail though not in outcome. According to La Garde’s report to the Dauphin, drawn up on 23 August, he led the galleys forward against the English vanguard and damaged two of their ships. Then, repeating his manoeuvre in the Solent, he withdrew, tempting the enemy to follow and come up against the main French battle under Annebault. When the wind changed, though, the Strozzi brothers decided to modify the plan. Piero Strozzi, close to the Dauphin was reported as saying that

151 Paget to Norfolk, 25 Aug. 1545 NA SP1/206, fo. 156(219) (L&P, XX, ii, 209) – the combat ‘satersday was sevenight’ i.e. 15 August. The account goes on ‘and yet the fight endured from Friday ij a clock after dinner until Saturday eight at nyght at which tyme the wynde rising my L Admyral hoist his sayles . . . and ankored nere them and in the night fearing we wold have faught with them, as in dede, the wynde somewhat ryseng, was determined by my L Admyral, they dislodged and gone clere out of sight.’ 152 Lisle to Gage, from the Henry Grace a Dieu, off Beachy Head, 17 Aug. 9 pm, St.P., I, ii, no. CCXXVIII (L&P, XX, ii, 151). 153 Lisle to Henry VIII, 17 Aug. 1545, St.P., I, ii, no. CCXXX.

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Because of the cowardice of captain Paulin many actions which would have been to the honour of the King were left undone, denouncing Paulin . . . saying that Sunday 25th of last month with the English navy out of its port in the straights and not yet in order of battle, that, after much dispute they had together, captain Paulin, the lord Prior [of Capua] and San Piero in the end agreed to attack with their galleys and judged victory likely.

Then Polin de La Garde left the battle with his galleys ‘and this he was lacking in his duty.’ Nor surprisingly La Garde put his own point of view to Francis I.154 This, with the differences that had already arisen in the Solent, led to a major campaign on the part of the Italians to blame La Garde and Annebault for the failure of the campaign.155 The result had been massive confusion in the galley squadron and, though Du Bellay does not mention this quarrel, he stresses the fury of the combat.156

154 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 4 Sept. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 2, fo. 9: ‘per causa et vigliacheria del capitano Polin si era restate di fare molte fattioni che si havrebbono potuto fare ad honore et utile del Re querelandoso del prefatto Capitano Polino . . . dicendo che il sabbato che fu all 25 del passato, qualche videro l’armata inglese fuori del porto in quella bonazza, et che non era ancho molto unità, che dopo il molto ragionamento che hebbero insiemi, il capitano Polino il s. Priore et esso S. Pietro, che al fine conclusero di andare con le loro galere ad assalirla, guidicando di ripportarne vettoria.’ ‘et che in questo egli ha manchato del debbito suo.’ 155 Yet again Giulio Alvarotti conveys the thinking of the Italian galley commanders on this battle. Gian Paolo Casella had come back to court with Piero Strozzi, who said ‘che hano veduto l’armata inimica alli x, all 13, alli 14 et alli 15 di questo et che quasi ogni volta havriano potuto combattere ma che in somma questa nostra non ha mai volute combattere, non sa dire la raggione . . . . cosi conferma uno capitano Cesarino da Genova che era pur in questa galera. Dicono che alli xv tutte due le armate se videro verso la isola Voich; tre galere fra le quale era questa del signor Pietro Strozzi andarono à taccare quattro navilii inimici, i quali per haver vento prospero haveriano gelato à fondo dette galere se il signor Priore non le soccorrea; le galere ingrossaro fin al numero di xvi et donaro di molte canonate alle navi inimiche ma non ne acciaro pero alcuna al fondo. Due galere abandorono et furno cacciate di modo che fin hora non hanno se siano salve o perdute. L’armata nostra vedeva il tutto, né mai se mosse, di modo che questo soldati dicono apertamente che in fato monsr almiraglio non ha volute combattere.’ (to Ercole II, Dieppe, 17 Aug. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, p. 217v (decipher). Paris Corregrano and Captain Tuchetto, in Strozzi’s galley, said that on the Sunday morning, 15th, they spied the English fleet and went into attack but that ‘Il Capitano Polin come vide quel gran tirare d’artigliarie volto indrieto et con lui tutte le altre galere, excetto il signor Prior che con le tre sue ando acanto al signor Pietro, et tirava grandemente egli ancora alle navi .. concludeno che ne Polino ne Monsr Almiraglio hanno volute combattere’ (Alvarotti to Ercole II, 18 Aug. 1545, ibid., B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 228r–v, 223r. 156 ‘Relation du combat naval entre les François et les Anglois en l’année 1545, le jour de Nostre-dame d’aoust.’ (Sénarpont, 27 août 1545) ed. M. Chambois, Bulletin historique et philologique du Comité des travaux historiques, 1891, pp. 325–329. Du Bellay, IV, pp. 304–305: ‘L’escarmouche fut bien chaulde, car le matin il fut veu en

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Finally, though, Lisle had to conclude that the French had slipped away during the night. Annebault had in fact decided to put an end to the campaign, perhaps exasperated by the indiscipline of the Strozzis, perhaps despairing of the weather. At all events, his fleet was back at Le Havre on 16 August, a month after his departure. The same day the Admiral himself put in to Dieppe to join Francis at Arques. Du Bellay says that he had to refresh his ships and land the sick.’157 Lisle, who was then back in the Solent, had spies out who reported Annebault’s homecoming: thAdmirall went on lande to the towne of Newhavon, with a greate nomber of gentlemen in his compenye; but there was neither shotyng of ordnaunce, nor any other apparaunce of rejoysyng at his commyng. . . . but ther men of warr comith daillye from ther shippes, bringyng on land ther harnes, ther coffers, with other ther necessaries; and such a nomber of sick and miserable creatures, as comith oute of the shippes, they never sawe. They seye it is not possible for ther armye to retourne any more to the sea, this yere, both for skarcitie of victualles, and for lack of men. For the moast part of theis, that have been oute, had rather be hanged, than go furth agayne. There ys no maner of couraige nor gladnes, nor apparaunce of comforth amonges them. The common people (talking as they dare) grudgeth, seyeng ther Kyng hath been at greate chardges and nothyng doon.158

The cold welcome for Annebault at Le Havre was not necessarily a mark of royal disfavour but one ambassador certainly reported that the withdrawal of the French fleet to Le Havre left the king of England ‘signor del mare.’159 There is no doubt that supplies were desperately short. One galley commander affirmed that the fleet had consumed in a month provisions assembled for three, without damaging the

mer plusieurs corps morts et forces pieces de bois, et ne fut pas tiré moins de trois cens coups d’artillerie tant d’un costé que d’autre.’ 157 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 305: ‘refreschir son armée et descendre grand nombre des malades.’ 158 Lisle to Henry VIII, St. Helen’s Point, 21 Aug. 1545, St.P., I, ii, p. 823, no. CCXXXII. Loades, Northumberland, p. 72 suggests that that this outbreak of plague may explain why Annebault seems so ineffective in this campaign. It is, though, difficult to imagine how much longer he could have kept his ships supplied. 159 ‘Da M. Thomaso del Vecchio et dal vicino ho inteso che Sua Maestà ha fatto la maggior chiera dela mondo à Mons. Almiraglio, et ha ditto che non poteva portarsi et goverarsi al mondo meglio di quello che ha fatto.’ But the same source went on to claim that neither the Admiral nor La Garde wanted to fight. (Alvarotti, 20 Aug. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 232. Guidiccione, 31 Aug. 1545, ANG, III, p. 386.

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enemy.160 On the face of it, the massive effort expended by the French on this campaign does seem to have evaporated into thin air. It has been argued that, given a little more luck and better winds, the French Admiral could have defeated his English opposite number.161 Yet time after time, the employment of galley tactics in the Channel, with such a theoretical edge in times of changing winds, seems not to have served its purpose. The English were throughout inferior in numbers but consistently managed to avoid the traps set for them. As the Venetian ambassador Marino Cavalli commented, Annebault withdrew from the Isle of Wight with little honour and, unable to escape the English fleet, all he could do was to land men at Boulogne to build the fort of Outreau, a fortress that seemed unlikely to achieve its purpose.162 Lisle, as we have seen, returned to Portsmouth (24 August) after the main engagement, assured that the French fleet had returned to port. Yet until 23 August there were still French ships in the narrow seas, as Wriothesley commented, so that supplies could only be got to Calais and Boulogne by night.163 Lisle received orders to send ships to ‘keep’ the narrow seas, revictual his ships, and then proceed to attack the French coast, evidently in revenge for the ravages of the French the previous month.164 Consequently, on 2 September he sailed to Normandy to capture Tréport, where he burned the town, some villages and manor houses and an abbey, destroying thirty ships in the harbour. But his own ships were now infected with plague and he had to call a halt and return to base.165 How was the outcome of the campaign viewed in England? Once Lisle had returned to England and the campaign was over, a solemn Te Deum was sung at Saint Paul’s 160 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 17 Aug. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 217v, information from Gian Paolo Casella. 161 Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), I, p. 386. 162 Relazione of Marino Cavalli, Alberi, Relazioni degli ambaciatori veneti, ser. I, 6 vols (1839–1862) I, pp. 275–6 (L. Firpo, Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti, (Turin, 1965–), V, pp. 219–20. 163 Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 160. 164 ‘An order devised for . . . my Lord Admiral,’ NA SP1/207, fos. 8–10 (L&P, XX, ii, 229): Lisle is to ‘set hym self towards the French cost and . . . shall take his commodite as the wynde and weder will sorte to burne and wast such townes and villages and other places . . . as he shall may burne conveniently.’ 165 Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 160 misdates this 18 September. Hall, ed. Whibley, II, p. 353 does not give a date. Guidiccione to Farnese, Amiens, 5 Sept. 1545, ANG III, p. 203. Council to Hertford, 5 Sept. 1545, St.P., V, no. DLXI, p. 508; Lisle and others to Henry VIII, 14 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fo. 176 (St.P., I, p. 833): only 8488 men were left uninfected and of these 4784 were available for the fleet at sea after coastal defence had been arranged.

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‘to give laude and prayse to God for the victorie that God had sent the Kinges Majestie in Scotland, and that the French armie was departed from Bolleyne.’166 No such pomp is recorded in France. The two fleet commanders had in a sense to account for their actions. Despite the attacks on Annebault’s valour and honour by the Strozzi brothers, Francis I, though he was undoubtedly dismayed by the outcome of the campaign (followed shortly after by the death of his favourite son), seems not to have held him personally responsible. François Nawrocki has made a good case for the diligence and prudence of the Admiral as a commander but admits that he was not made for battles at sea.167 This is not to re-emphasise Charles de La Roncière’s surely exaggerated and mistaken idea that the French fleet was in a state of chaos by 1547 as a result of L’Artigue’s defection and poor administration.168 As for England, Lisle, an habitually introspective man, told Paget that he was ‘not of the estimation to have the mayning of so mightie a chardge, I do thynck I shuld have doon his majeste better service in some meaner office, wherin to be directed’ rather than himself be director. Great commands, he asserted belonged to those who had great credit and were feared.169 He had not sunk the French fleet but had fought it off and exacted some revenge on the French mainland. Of course, unlike his French counterpart, he had no serious attacks on his honour to contend with and had benefited from royal patronage over the previous year to the extent that he had become one of the richest landowners in England. Nevertheless, if he expected to reap the reward of a greater office such as that of Lord Great Master (in succession to the recently-deceased Suffolk), he was to be disappointed.170 Naval conflicts continued in the Narrow Seas right up to the signature of the peace since the crossing had to be controlled to ensure regular supplies to the garrison at Boulogne and Ambleteuse. This is despite the King’s apparent desire to lay up his great ships on the argument that the French were unlikely to come forth that year. ‘Wafters’ were still needed for victualling and the French threat had not gone

166

Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 161. Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), I, pp. 385, 388, 390. 168 C. de La Roncière, Marine, III, pp. 453–454; idem, ‘Henri II, précurseur de Colbert,’ Bib. Ecole des Chartes, 66 (1905), 633–654. 169 Lisle to Paget, 17 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/208, fo. 2r (L&P, XX, ii, 391). 170 Loades, Northumblerland, pp. 72–73. 167

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away.171 Spies reported to Lisle at the start of April 1546 that a supply fleet of 100 ships was ready at Bordeaux to be escorted to Etaples by three new galleasses from Bayonne of 300 t. each, two great ships of Bayonne of 400 another another of Brittany of 600. There were 16 ships ready at Dieppe (led by the Sacre) and two galleys. Fifteen ‘tall ships’ were ready at Le Havre to take on soldiers and at Honfleur there were three galleys with 15 more being rigged at Rouen. Lisle was only waiting for the King’s ten rowbarges and a tall ship from the West Country led by Reskymer to intercept the Bordeaux fleet if not attack the base at Etaples.172 On 10 May, Lisle, having left the peace talks for a while to rejoin his fleet in the Downs, noted that Paget dyd see sume of the gallys take theyr helys, and in case the wether had not byn so extreme and also so contrary to come to the resycue of theym, you shold have hard of better sporte. Never the les they do reioyse little in this wether for yf yt were but only this wether that puttith theym from theyr feate, I do here saye that the bekens a built fayre lenghe in Sussex were fyred this daye. I do moche merveyle yf it be soo that they wold rayse the contreys for so smalle a nombre.173

Polin de La Garde and the baron de Saint-Blancard had up to 18 galleys based at Etaples, detailed to help supply the French fort and to interrupt English communications. On 21 May 1546 there was encounter in which Saint-Blancard’s galley was captured.174 The action seems to have begun with an attempt by the French galleys at Portel to capture some supply ships coming into Boulogne. The next day, lord William Howard came into the harbour, there was an exchange of fire and on the following day the main English fleet including the Great Mistress, Anne Gallant, Salamander and Greyhound, came in view. A later prize hearing by the Admiralty Court gives a picture of the battle very similar to the final stages of the campaign of the summer of 1545. Witnesses from the French crew claimed that the French galleys, seeing the English ships approaching them, Polin de La Garde sent a frigate around the galley fleet to single out six of the best to ‘take

171 Council to Lisle, April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 517; Lisle to Paget, 2 April, ibid., 520; Lisle to Council, 4 April, ibid., 538. 172 Lisle to Paget, 7 April 1546, St.P., I, 841 (L&P, XXI, i, 563). 173 Lisle to Paget, 10 May 1546, Plas Newydd, Anglesey MSS, Box 1 no. 8, fos. 13–14. 174 Bernard d’Ornezan, baron de Saint-Blancard was the son of the galley commander Bertrand (d. 1539), who led the famous expedition to the Levant in 1538 about which Juan de la Vega wrote Le voyage de la croisière du Baron de Saint-Blancard. The younger Saint-Blancard remained in captivity in England until January 1547.

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the wind’ of the English ships and the others to be ready (‘every man naked with his oar in his hand’) for the assault. If the attack failed, La Garde was to fire the warning shot for all to retire. The French galleys gave chase towards Cap Gris Nez firing continually, when the English ships turned and La Garde fired his warning shot. Saint Blancard’s ship was taken when he stayed to fire several shots at the English ‘for his pleasure.’175 Admiral d’Annebault protested against this capture when he came to England for the ratification of the peace and ‘warme wordes’ ensued between him and Lisle.176 Odet de Selve continued the pressure after the restoration of diplomatic relations and the ship was probably released by Somerset in the spring of 1547 in return for English prisoners.177 Henry Golding’s ship, the Bark Ager had been captured by the French in 1545 and was refitted in Normandy for a voyage to Brazil only to be recaptured by Golding early in 1546. Golding was then commissioned in May 1546 to put to sea as a privateer.178 It took months for privateering between the two countries to die down. Lisle made clear in April 1546 that merchant ships coming from Spain, Portugal or Flanders were being robbed by English ‘adventurers’ sometimes pretending to be Scots and sometimes completely in disguise and feared that the Emperor’s subjects would soon be besieging the English government with complaints. Lisle continued his activities as Admiral until the end of the reign. During his visit to France for the ratification of Peace in the summer of 1546, he met the navigator Nicolas de Nicolay, sr. d’Arfeville, who later recalled that Lisle had taken him back to his ships where Jean Ribauld was also serving. He was present in March 1547 when Lisle (now Earl of Warwick) captured at Dover a small Scottish fleet (including the Lion) and the Scottish ambassadors on their way to France.179 175 Hertford to Henry VIII, 21 May 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 874; BL Harl. 249, fo. 1 (L&P, XXI, ii, 319). The presence of the captain of the Galley Subtle among the Admiralty commissioners simply suggests that he may have been present at the action. 176 Council to Wotton, 31 Aug. 1546, St.P., XI, p. 284 (L&P, XXI, i, 1530). 177 There was an agreement to return the galley to France (though the slaves were freed). It is not clear whether this was carried out (L&P, XXI, i, 1344; ii, 116, 129, 158, 405, 662). Adair, ‘English galleys’ pp. 500–501 argues convincingly for the spring of 1547. Saint-Blancard was unlucky enough to have a prize ship he had taken between England and Scotland taken in 1547 (Marillac to Henri II, 13, 27 Oct. 1548, Henri II to Marillac, BnF fr. 3098, p. 87). 178 Hall, Chronicle, ed. Whibley, II, p. 358; APC, I, p. 420 (L&P, XXI, i, 853). For his activities after the peace, ibid., XXI, i, 1462; ii, 11. 179 ‘Observations touchant la diversité des navires’ by Nicolas de Nicolay, BnF, fr. 20008, pp. 51–55.

CHAPTER NINE

‘TO ENTREATE WITH THE SWORDE IN HAND:’1 IMPERIAL AND PROTESTANT MEDIATION (1544–1546) England, France and the Emperor, 1544–1545 The Anglo-French war should logically have ended in September 1544 but it continued until the summer of 1546. Why? The problem of peace and war could not be separated from the relations of both Francis and Henry with the Emperor Charles V and affairs in Germany. Charles had sought in the peace to tie Francis in to a programme of settlement of their conflicts and common action against Protestantism. This was bound to have implications for their relations with Henry VIII. As we have seen, Charles had been warned by his sister Mary in July 1544 that, should Henry gain possession of Boulogne and Montreuil, he would negotiate for a separate peace. There was thus little trust to begin with. Charles’s line with his own subjects was that he had not started negotiations with Francis until he knew that Henry had started talks of his own, that Henry had let him down and that he had not even had enough artillery for the siege of Montreuil.2 Immediately after the peace of Crépy, Charles had tried to arrange an Anglo-French peace in order to cover his ostensibly dishonourable action in abandoning his English ally; Nicolas Wotton observed that it would be as well to assume that this would not succeed.3 The bishop of Arras was sent to Calais and assured Annebault that that Charles’ representatives had pressed Henry non-stop in favour of peace (‘ont continuellement fait instance pour rendre led. roy d’Engleterre enclin à la paix.’) Cardinal du Bellay and president Rémon (who had been involved in the talks before the end of the siege) were appointed and instructed on 10 October to return to Ardres to negotiate through Granvelle as

1

Lisle to Henry VIII, 26 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 102r. Mary of Hungary to Charles V, 24 July 1544, Vienna HHSA, P.A. 55, fo. 88. ‘L’alternative du traité de Crespy’ ibid., Frankreich, Varia 6 (no fol.), Papiers de Granvelle, III, p. 76. 3 Wotton to Paget, 26 Sept. 1544, St.P. X, p. 90 (L&P XIX, ii, 309); Charles V to Henry VIII, [Sept. 1544], St.P. X, p. 101 (L&P, XIX, ii, 343). 2

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mediator. At Calais, they held talks chaired by the bishop of Arras with Henry’s remaining councillors on the Continent: Norfolk, Suffolk, Gardiner, Hertford and Paget.4 Though the outlines of the peace as ultimately agreed were on the table, Francis was adamant about Boulogne and declared that ‘he would not hand over an inch of his kingdom’s land,’ though would pay the life pension and commit himself to the perpetual pension and the arrears. The English insisted that Henry would not give up Boulogne unless France abandoned Scotland. When the French referred to the arbitration of the Emperor, talks broke down. Tournon told the bishop of Arras that the French ‘are stirred up against the King of England’ and Bayard added that ‘they will sell wives and children to get him out of Boulogne.’5 Not surprisingly the talks scarcely got going. The French envoys hung around at Gravelines for three more weeks while Gardiner and Hertford went to Brussels to find out where the Emperor stood. Then they gave up and went home.6 Late in September 1544, a state visit led by Queen Eléonore to Brussels enabled the French to hammer out the details of the treaty of Crépy. Several problems remained unresolved, notably whether Henry VIII should keep Boulogne and what to do about Protestantism. Cardinals de Tournon, Lorraine and Meudon also went to Brussels to seek agreement here and it was this that in effect, though not openly,

4

Du Bellay and Remon to Granvelle, 14 Oct. 1544: ‘nostre principale addresse est à vous, qui estes pour l’empereur le moyen de ceste communication.’ Documents on this negotiation, from HHSA, are in transcripts in NA PRO 31/18/3/2 (Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay, III, nos. 639–641). Instructions to du Bellay and Remon, 10 Oct. 1544, BnF fr. 17889. fos. 76–77; Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay, III, no. 638. Pierre Remon drew up a ‘Sommaire’ of all these negotiations some months later (ibid., no. 642). The ambassadors with the Emperor forwarded a French set of peace terms on 22 November (St.P., X, pp. 218–219). Even Granvelle ‘estemed them not’ and thought them ‘slender.’ Imperial narrative of the talks: Arras, Chapuys and Courrières to Charles V, 19 Oct. 1544, HHSA, England, Berichte, 11, fos. 175–178. 5 ‘il ne leur baillera ne laissera ung seul pousse de terre en [son] royaume.’ Francis told Arras that Henry’s demands for retaining Boulogne and for the restoration of the pension were unacceptable and that ‘il aymeroit mieulx perdre quatre satoulles que de laisser ung palme de terre aud. Roy d’Angleterre.’ Arras to the Emperor, 24 Oct. 1544, HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 5, fos. 171r, 172v: ‘tous sont fort animez contre le Roy d’Angleterre’ . . . ‘l’on vendra femme et enfans ou l’on le mettra hors de Boulogne.’ A year later, Francis was still saying that ‘sans la restitution de Boullongne et la comprehension des Escossoys je continueroys la guerre jusques au dernier jour de ma vie.’ (to Mesnage, 3 Oct. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 58v). 6 Scheurer, Correspondance, III, pp. 273–275.

‘to entreate with the sworde in hand’

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that cut Charles’s support for Henry.7 Charles, in return for peace and the recovery of territories lost in 1543, would have in effect to renege on his alliance with Henry VIII. The French had their losses of 1544 returned, gave up on their Turkish alliance and agreed to cease operations in North America and the West Indies. The provisions in the secret article of Crépy about the General Council were to be carried out and Francis’ younger son, Orléans, would be invested with Milan or the Netherlands. On Boulogne, Francis would not compromise. Henry, in any case, had been outraged at what he thought of as Charles’s ‘betrayal.’ While all this was going on, Gardiner and Hertford were sent by Henry to put the Emperor under pressure to support him and assert Henry’s claim that he had not consented to the Emperor’s separate peace. They reported from Brussels on a puzzling variance between the Imperial ministers and the Emperor, who ‘doth the best he canne with the Frenchmen.’8 The King’s councillors at Calais submitted an advice paper to Henry on 6 November which concluded that no hope was to be had of the Emperor. More startlingly, they advanced the argument that the pension of 100,000 crowns, though a ‘goodly revenue,’ was scarcely worth the expense of trying to reclaim it. Better to demand Ardres and Boulogne in its place. The pension could sleep and his son reclaim it if he chose.9 Henry’s advisers were being cautious here not to ruffle their master’s feathers; after all, the prospect of Francis’ granting Ardres and Boulogne to Henry in return for the pension was remote, to say the least. Watching from Calais, Paget was half-despairing, halfacerbic in a private observation. Peace he thought unlikely because Francis would never accept the conditions on offer and, if forced to do so, would only accept them at the Emperor’s hands. Charles would send to Henry about this: For it will never synk in to my hed that he will entre the warre again. This peax which he hath taken hath marred all, for though he will be

7 The mémoire that Tournon presented to the Emperor specified that Henry could only be accepted in the treaty on giving up Boulogne, François, Le cardinal de Tournon, p. 198. 8 Hertford and Gardiner to Council, 31 Oct. 1544, NA SP1/194, fo. 192 (L&P, XIX, ii, 518). 9 Council to Henry VIII, 6 Nov. 1544, St.P., X, pp. 175–177 (L&P, XIX, ii, 563): on the pension: ‘bycause that for to recover it the charges groweth to so muche, which commenly in all apointementes, both pryvate and publique, the playntif obteynith never againe.’

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chapter nine contented to declare hym self enemy to the French, what avantage or socour shall the Kinges majeste have towarde the defence of Bullen whereto by the treaty he is not bownde? He shall mak a guerre garyable for the facon sak but never wil enter again the warre with a mayn force . . . This I must tel youe my folishe fantasy which maketh me to moorne when I see the untrew practises of the world against a prynce that meanyth always trewly, and to trewly for such as they be; I woold to Godes passion his majeste could cretizare cum Cretense.10

Paget had put his finger on the problem that undermined the Emperor’s position vis-à-vis Henry; he remained technically his ally but no longer a reliable one. Relations with the Charles continued to cool. On the borders of Calais, Burgundian commanders rapidly changed from allies to unfriendly neutrals, for instance in denying supplies to the English.11 Henry’s proclamation of 20 December 1544 authorised coastal communities to equip ships ‘for the annoying of His Majesties enemies,’ which effectively meant the shipping between France and the Low Countries. The renewal of Franco-Imperial relations meant a vast booty of Flemish goods carried in French ships was open for plunder; lawsuits about this constituted much of the work of English envoys in Flanders over the next two years. It is clear from his dealings with Francis that Charles had no intention of inclining to Henry’s demands for aid against the French and the Scots, nor would he license the passage of mercenaries for Henry through the Low Countries.12 Charles, at least in appearance, made further offers of mediation in March 1545.13 But it may reasonably be concluded that he was not unhappy to see France and England at each others’ throats, whatever he said in public. The Emperor had looming problems to cope with. Compensating Francis by investing his younger son with significant territory may have been a way out of war in 1544 but was not in the realms of practical politics. As Henry’s envoys to Charles observed, the peoples of the Low Countries could not just be handed over. ‘Here they aske why they have payd ther money to be defended from Fraunce, 10 Paget to Petre, 3 Nov. 1544, SP1/194, fo. 218v (L&P, XIX, ii, 544). Paget was fond of this Latin proverb and repeated it with the same point in a letter to Petre of 16 Mar. 1545, L&P, XX, i, 373. 11 Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 17 Oct. 1544, AGR, EA, 119, fo. 39. 12 BL Harl. 424, fo. 16; Grey Friars Chronicle, p. 48; Morette and Mesnage to Francis I, 29 Jan. 1545, 8 Feb. 1545, BnF, fr. 17889, fos. 59–60, 45–6. Francis I to Mesnage, 6 May 1545, BnF, fr. 27890. fo. 60. 13 Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, 25 March 1545, St.P. X, p. 359 (L&P, XX, i, 425).


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and nowe shuld be offred up unto them.’14 As the Emperor’s relations with Francis I soured, his old interest in nourishing hostility between England and France began to re-emerge. Scotland also remained one of the thorniest points of conflict. As has been seen, the return of Beaton in 1543, French intervention and the repudiation of the Treaty of Greenwich, the English invasion and burning of Edinburgh of May 1544, the Convention of Stirling (November 1544), the re-establishment of the Auld Alliance, all these firmly placed Scotland in the French camp. Should Scotland be included in a peace and on what terms? The northern kingdom had been left out of the treaty of Crépy and was thus still at war with the Emperor; Henry VIII strenuously opposed its inclusion.15 If Francis had ever contemplated throwing Scotland as a bone to Henry in return for peace, he soon forgot this. David Paniter, the Scottish envoy who had been sent to get help from France in 1544, moved on to Brussels to press the Scottish case there with the help of the French envoys Morette and Mesnage (envoy to Scotland in 1543, now ambassador to the Emperor). It rapidly became clear that French backing for Scotland was incompatible with peace with England. For all these reasons, then, the settlement of a peace between England and France became extremely difficult. In an unusual letter of thanks for a gift of wine from Jean du Bellay (January 1545), Francis Bryan, an old friend who met him again at Calais in September 1544, remembered that he had been strongly in favour of peace. In a veiled and allegorical passage, he remarked that God was mistaken in teaching the Apostles to seek and find without suggesting where to look. At Calais, du Bellay had not tried the right way; when a dissonant note entered a song, a new one should be tried to attain harmony and Bryan offered his help.16 An impetus to peace was provided by Francis’ mistress, Mme d’Etampes, generally more hostile to the Emperor than to Henry.

14

Hertford, Gardiner and Wotton to Henry VIII, 22 Nov. 1544, St.P., X, p. 219. Gardiner told Olivier at Calais on the inclusion of Scotland that ‘il ne voit point que cela fut mis en avant, sinon pour fascher son maistre et le tenir tousjours en querelle’ (BnF fr. 2937, fols. 55–59, ‘La somme des propos d’entre le chancellier et l’évesque de Wincestre, du quinziesme novembre.’) In December 1544, Francis instructed Mesnage to press the Emperor to persuade Henry (BnF, ms Fr. 17889, fols. 2–4, instructions, 9 December 1544). M. Merriman, The Rough Wooings, pp. 186–190; E. Bonner, ‘The French Reactions to the Rough Wooings’ (1998), p. 54. 16 Francis Bryan to Jean du Bellay, 26 Jan. 1545, Scheurer, Correspondance, III, pp. 288–289. 15

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It is true that in February 1545, the Venetian envoy Cavalli reported that, despite her previous preference for peace with England, she had decided in favour of continuing war with Henry VIII on the argument that it would damage the reputation of Admiral d’Annebault, once her protegé but now resented by her as too independent. Thus: Madame d’Estampes, knowing that all the responsibility will fall on the shoulders of the Admiral, whose total ruin she wants, is in agreement with this plan, hoping that the many difficulties and problems of this enterprise will overturn the Admiral. I have all this from the best source.17

Yet April 1545 saw a curious episode in which Mme. d’Etampes’s secretary was sent to explore peace with England. This followed an informal exchange of letters in March between Paget (then in Brussels) and the Queen of Navarre. The game was a dangerous one in that the letters seem to have been passed on to the Emperor’s ministers and showed Paget in an uncomplimentary light, calling the Emperor a hypocrite. He lamented that ‘it is looked we shuld speke furst and as it wer sue for the thing, which I like not and moche the worse for that they use our overtures.’ ‘Every other man is for himself, not ruling their affayres by the straight lyne of honour and equite but wring honour and equite as they fantazie.’ Why should the English not do the same? At the Emperor’s court, ‘dissimulation, vanitie, flatery and unshamefastnes reign’ while the French, ‘looke for nothing yet, for they have layde here suche a bayte for them that they will byte at no other thing untill they se they be deluded.’ The exchange is a vivid testimony to Paget’s sense of frustration.18 It is, of course, possible that the French ministers were seeking to capitalise on English panic induced by the imminent build-up of the French fleet in the Channel in order to extract a cheap peace deal. This is unlikely in view of the serious efforts of mobilisa-

17 ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Capi, Lettere di ambasciatori, Francia, busta 10: Marino Cavalli to chiefs of Council of Ten, 3 Feb. 1545 (CSP Venice, V, no. 327, p. 132): ‘Madama di Tampes, conoscendo che tutto il carrico serà su le spalle del armiraglio, del qual lei desidera la total ruina, è concorsa anchor essa in opinione, sperando con le molte difficultà et contrarii che vi è in questa impresa, precipitar il ditto sr armiraglio. Tutto questo ho saputo per ottima via.’ 18 Paget to Henry VIII, 10 March 1545, St.P., X, p. 333 (L&P, XX, I, 334); same to Petre, 11 March 1545, SP1/199, fo. 9 (L&P, XX, I, 342); Paget to Henry VIII, 16 March 1545, St.P. X, p. 347 (L&P, XX, ii, 372); same to Petre, 16 March 1545, SP1/199, fos. 49–50 (L&P, XX, I, 373); Paget to Petre, 25 March 1545, SP1/199, fos. 89–90 (L&P, XX, I, 426).


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tion already in train and just as likely was the tendency for Tournon and Annebault to pass on confidential information to the Emperor in an attempt to improve Franco-Imperial relations.19 A full account of the exchange with Mme d’Etampes was given by the Privy Council when it described how a prisoner at Boulogne had asked to return to France and arrange an exchange between him and Sir Richard Wingfield. While at the French court, Longueval had told him that, if Henry had any inclination to peace, he would be active and Mme d’Etampes would help. The message was passed back to Henry, who said he would listen for the quiet of Christendom. But when her secretary arrived at Boulogne to demand its restitution, he was dismissed.20 A somewhat different account was given by Italian envoys in France. According to the Ferrarese Alvarotti, Mme d’Etampes’s secretary was indeed sent around 1 April with a safe-conduct from Henry VIII ‘negotiate for peace, which it seems the King of England has no small desire for.’ He was back by the middle of the month asking for a better safe conduct and reporting Henry’s unfavourable response.21 Bernardo de Medici also confirmed that the envoy had not been able to pass Boulogne and had only spoken to Lisle, with whom he had established some form of personal contact. There was talk of demolishing the fortifications of Boulogne and payment of the pension and arrears (as high as 1,300,000 écus) as the basis for a peace but he added that he had brought no great hope of a conclusion. The French Council saw in this no great taste for peace.22 Despite all this, Mme d’Etampes renewed her efforts over the following months. Cavalli may have been wrong about Mme d’Etampes’ ultimate objectives but there can be no doubt that, despite all these efforts for

19 Marino Cavalli to Council of Ten, 6 Jan. 1544/5, ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Capi, Ambasciatori, Francia, busta 10: ‘l’armiraglio et Tornon erano su una strada di palesar tutte le cose sue a Cesare, et che la negociatione del Dandino tutta, anche cerca le offerte contra Anglesi era sta mandata a monsr di Granvella.’ 20 Council to Wotton and Carne, 28 April 1545, St.P. X, p. 408 (L&P, XX, i, 593). 21 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 3, 15 April 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, pp. 20–21: ‘trattar la pace, della quale pare che Inghilterra non habbi minor desiderio’ (15 April 1545, pp. 71–80). 22 Bernardo de Medici to Cosimo I, 22, 25, 29 April 1545, ASF, Mediceo, filza 4590, Desjardins, Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, III, pp. 153, 156–157, 158–159: ‘non ci essere buono appicco di pace.’ The Imperial ministers also heard the same story and used the talks to explain why the Emperor’s offers of mediation had got nowhere. See Wotton to Paget, 27 April 1545, St.P., X, p. 401 (L&P, XX, I, 588).

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peace, early in 1545 a decision was taken in France to renew the war with England on a grand scale (see chapter 6) even though Francis was seriously ill for while at Fontainebleau. Yet preparations for war went hand-in-hand with peace talks. The very report to the Emperor (February 1545) that spelled out Francis I’s grand military strategy against England also suggested that the ultimate objective was a truce with England so that pressure could be put on the Emperor to fulfil the terms of the peace of Crépy-en-Valois in handing over an inheritance to the duke of Orléans. Naturally, as was widely known, the Dauphin opposed this and can be found among the war party.23 Further peace talks have to be understood in this context. In the summer of 1545, with naval and land war in full swing, Henry again made another attempt to get the Emperor to, as he would have seen it, discharge his obligations under the treaty of 1543. On 23 June, he wrote to Charles and instructed Nicholas Wotton to tell him that he expected, under the terms of their treaty, that the Emperor would provide aid even before the expected French invasion. In a series of meetings through July, it became obvious, if had not been before, that Charles was simply not prepared to do this. Both he and Granvelle argued that the Emperor had been forced to make a separate peace with Francis because Henry had failed to march beyond the Somme with his army. They urged Henry to make peace with Francis but were told that Henry could not compromise on Boulogne, a town he had ‘bought so deare.’ For his part, Charles was mainly concerned to avoid the enmity of either side while his negotiations in Germany were in such a delicate state. Henry’s ambassador at Worms was clear about his case: now the war had started again in earnest, Henry had to think about his honour; his claim to the pension arrears was clear but he was willing for Charles to arbitrate about the costs of the 1544 campaign. As for Boulogne, he had won it in fair war and would not give it up without substantial compensation. Charles told his sister Mary that, however hard he had tried, he could find no means to get a compromise on either side. He thought it unlikely there would be peace without his arbitration but told Mary they should both show willing ‘without however pressing either side further than their incli-

23 Intelligence sent to Emperor by Saint-Mauris, early 1545, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 115 (L&P XX, i, 619) (this is dated in L&P late April but should be dated accurately as 6 February).


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nation shows and they show willing to be persuaded for the reputation on which it seems both base their cases. Otherwise both would perhaps become suspicious of us.’ By the end of July, Henry had ceased to marvel at the Emperor’s excuses and Wotton was quite clear in letters to Paget and Wriothesley that ‘colde or hote, I can not perceive that they make enye haste to grawnte enye ayde yet.’24 For the Emperor, the embarrassment was deservedly exquisite, especially when the French tried to do exactly the same. Towards the end of September, Jacques Mesnage was told by Charles that Henry would seek his aid to repel the attack on the terre d’Oye, to which the French ambassador replied that the Emperor was only obliged to help defend the territory that Henry had held in 1543, not the land he had acquired since. Charles said that this indeed was true and that he would not contribute aid to defend Boulogne but the terre d’Oye was a different matter. Mesnage then raised what became the standard French argument to ward off Habsburg interference; Charles need not give aid to Henry when the French invaded English territory as a consequence of the war over Boulogne. Charles, bemused by this, said that this was one point of view (‘ce que dessus est une glose sur le texte dud. contract.’) The French envoy then had recourse to flattering Charles’ role, through brokering peace, of settling the ‘heresies et inconveniens’ of Christendom.25 The German Protestants as Mediators The problem with Charles as a mediator is obviously that he had no long term interest in getting his fellow monarchs to make peace. In the months following the treaty of Crépy, a much more active role in peacemaking was taken by German Protestant diplomats. Their good offices were used on the eve of the naval war, though with little

24 L&P XX, i, 1013, 1132, 1133, 1203, 1204, 1226, 1242, 1261, XX, ii, 132. Quotations from Wotton to Henry VIII, 7 July 1545, St.P. X, p. 508 (L&P, XX, i, 1132) and Wotton to Wriothesley, 19 July 1545, SP1/204, fo. 64 (L&P, XX, i, 1226). Charles V to Mary of Hungary, 6 Aug. 1545, BnF, fr. 7122, pp. 326–345: ‘sans toutesfois presser ni l’une ni l’autre des parties plus avant de ce qu’ils verront l’inclination et qu’ils pourront apperçevoir qu’elles mêmes desireront d’être persuadés pour le reputation, en quoy vraisemblablement l’une et l’autre des parties se fonderont, car autrement ce seroit occasion d’entrer en suspicion par adventure en l’endroit de tous deux.’ (pp. 344–345). 25 Mémoire of Mesnage for Annebault, Sept. 1545, BnF fr. 17888, fos. 25–6.

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hope of success.26 In the course of 1545, the anxiety of the Protestant princes to arrange a settlement between England and France for their own security intensified. The discussions of Philip of Hesse with Jean du Fraisse indicate the Landgrave’s concern to maintain the balance between England and France and to seek a settlement of their disputes.27 Fears about a ‘secret’ clause in the Treaty of Crépy induced the Princes to seek the French alliance during 1545, as events seemed to indicate a renewal of the Emperor’s attempts to impose religious uniformity on Germany.28 From the 1545 Schmalkaldic Council onwards, the Princes were working for peace between the two Kings who were the best guarantors of their liberties.29 Total reliance either on England or on France by the Protestants would have been unwise in view of the recent unpredictability of both.30 The Hessian minister Simon Bing told Fraisse in August 1545 that the Landgrave Philip was ‘a neutral person who is in amity with both kings’ and it was for this reason that he and his allies had sent envoys to both Kings to negotiate peace.31 But Phillip was not regarded by Henry as neutral; to him he was suspect over the German levies, as the cause of his difficulties there (‘de milite Germanico, quasi autor sit eius incommodi’), in other words, he regarded him as partly responsible for the failure of English troop recruitment under Reiffenberg.32 Meanwhile,

26 L&P, XX, I, 682; ibid., 1207 (16 July 1545). R. McEntegart, Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, pp. 208–209. 27 H. Baumgarten, Sleidans Briefwechsel, 39, 45, 61. Fraisse, introduction. 28 A. Hasenclever, ‘Die Geheimartikel zum Frieden von Crépy von 19. September 1544,’ Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, 45 (1926), 418–26, based on the copy in BL, Egerton 990, fos. 412–413. The ‘secret clause’ was an annex to the treaty signed by Francis I at Meudon. It committed him to help the Emperor in the ‘reduction et pacification dud discord de lad. religion en la Germanie . . . pour y induyre, persuader et faire consdescendre les estatz d’icelle’ and to declare himself enemy to all those who opposed such a settlement. See also Fraisse’s allusion to a secret French promise to help the Emperor against the Lutherans, Archives curieuses de l’histoire de France, 1st ser. 3, 278. 29 This despite grievances since 1540, see J.-Y. Mariotte, ‘François Ier et la ligue de Smalkalde,’ 206–247; McEntegert, Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, pp. 203– 204. On French policy in Germany in this period, see also D. Potter, ‘Foreign policy in the age of the Reformation: French involvement in the Schmalkaldic War, 1544–1547,’ Historical Journal, 20 (1977), 525–544. 30 Fraisse put the situation exactly when, in September, he transmitted the French case against the English to Simon Bing (Fraisse to Bing, 18 Sept. 1545. SAM, Pol.Arch. 1836, fo. 45r). 31 Bing to Fraisse, 21 Aug. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 48–49: ‘persona media, et quia ambos reges pro amicis habet.’ 32 Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 13 Nov. 1545, Winckelmann (ed.) Pol.Corr., III, 637.


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the French were anxious to monopolise the benefits of a German alliance.33 The French believed that Suffolk might have influenced Henry to rely on German mediation.34 Rory McEntegart, in his re-evaluation of Anglo-Schmalkaldic relations, rightly incorporated the religious dimension into the making of English policy in the 1530s but he also noted that the years after 1540 were ‘an anti-climax,’ it seems largely because the political dimension of Anglo-Schmalkaldic relations was uppermost. The renewal of contacts by Henry’s agent Mont in August 1544 and February 1545, an initiative created by the swing towards the evangelicals in English court politics, was, McEntegart thinks, an opportunity thrown away. Yet the years 1544–46 saw some of the most intensive contacts between England and the German Protestants.35 Talk of Protestant mediation began at the 1545 Worms Reichstag. There were discussions between the key French agent in Germany, Bassefontaine, and the Strasbourg diplomat Jakob Sturm in April that raised the possibility of an Anglo-French peace.36 Sturm, even though he knew little French himself, was a key power broker in Schmalkaldic politics, under whom Strasbourg became a nexus for communication with France. There he assembled a group of French-leaning scholars and diplomats such as Johann Sturm, rector of the Latin School, and since his student days an agent of Cardinal du Bellay, Dr. Ulrich Geiger (Chelius), the historian Sleidan and the latter’s father-in-law, Hans Niedpruck of Metz.37 German sources,38 indicate that the initiative was

33

This is the impression given by Fraisse when he was trying to convince Hesse of the value of the French alliance: Fraisse to Bing, 18 Sept. 1545, SAM, Pol.Arch. 1836, fo. 45v. 34 Longueval to Fraisse, 19 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, p. 103: ‘Je ne scay si la mort de Monseigneur d’Orléans l’aura retardé aussy que le duc de Suffort est mort qui menoyt cette praticque.’ On Suffolk’s exaggerated reputation as a favourer of German contacts, see Gunn, Charles Brandon, pp. 199, 203–205. 35 McEntegart, Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, pp. 203–206. 36 Bassefontaine’s journal in L. Paris (ed.) Négociations . . . François II, pp. vii–viii. On him, see J.-D. Pariset, Les relations entre la France et l’Allemagne au milieu du XVIe siècle and idem., ‘La France et les princes allemands,’ 229–301. On Jakob Sturm, see H. Baumgarten, Jakob Sturm (Strasbourg, London, 1876) but more recently T.A. Brady, Protestant Politics: Jacob Sturm (1489–1553) and the German Reformation (Humanities Press, 1993). Sturm was both the chief secretary and diplomat of the city of Strasbourg. 37 T.A. Brady, The Politics of the Reformation in Germany. Jacob Sturm (1489–1553) of Strasbourg (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1997), pp. 124–142, 201–213. 38 A. Hasenclever, ‘Neue Aktenstücke zur Friedensvermittlung der Schmalkaldener zwischen Frankreich und England im Jahre 1545,’ in Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins, Neue Folge, 20 (1905), 224–251, [hereafter NA] and idem, Die Politik der

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taken by Jacob Sturm when he approached Henry’s envoy Christopher Mont late in May 1545.39 The Dauphin and Jean du Bellay were probably sounded by Bassefontaine or Grignan, and Johann Sturm and Ulrich Chelius set out for France late in July.40 Charles V as Mediator Again, Autumn 1545 As we have seen, the French were aiming to stop the Emperor helping Henry VIII by encouraging his role as mediator between them; once again the Emperor’s confessor was active in this. Charles, preparing for his campaign against the German Protestants, had no wish to see them play a central role in diplomacy. Protestant mediation thus ran in parallel with talks at the highest level under the Emperor’s aegis held at Bruges in November 1545 and led on the French side by Admiral d’Annebault, Chancellor Olivier and Secretary Bayard and on the English side by Gardiner, Thirlby and Carne. Francis gave his assent in principle to the talks at the start of October, on the basis proposed by Charles that there should be a truce for two months and that the two sides would negotiate in his presence. On 17th, he empowered his ambassador with the Emperor to conclude such a truce.41 The idea of

Schmalkaldener vor Ausbruch des Schmalkaldischen Kriegs (Berlin, 1901), pp. 53–96. This focuses on German diplomacy. G. Salles ‘Une médiation des protestants d’ Allemagne entre la France et l’Angleterre au milieu du XVIe siècle,’ Revue de l’histoire diplomatique, (1899), 27–46 is thin. C. Oberreiner, ‘Sleidan, Jean Sturm et Bruno en mission diplomatique en 1545’ in the Revue d’Alsace, vol. 68 (1920) relied almost entirely on English sources. 39 Christoff Mont (Mundt) was a native of the Rhineland who had taken service with Cromwell in the early 1530s and had been sent back to Germany as the virtually permanent English representative with the princes. He managed rather neatly to retain his position even after Cromwell’s fall. 40 C. Schmidt, La vie et les travaux de Jean Sturm, premier recteur du Gymnase, de l’Académie de Strasbourg (Strasbourg, 1858) is not informative about this mission. Ulrich Chelius (al. Geiger) had had close contacts with the France since at least the 1530s. He kept the court of France informed about affairs in Germany, e.g. his letter to Francis I of 22 Nov. 1545, from Strasbourg, on the Frankfurt Reichstag and the capture of the Duke of Brunswick. (BnF, fr. 17889, fos. 119–20) See also Bruck to Elector of Saxony, 31 May 1545, Hasenclever, NA, pp. 225–226; Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 21 June 1545, ibid., pp. 227–228; Jakob Sturm to the Council of 13, 19 July 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 588. 41 Francis I to Grignan and Mesnage, 3 Oct. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fos. 58–59; Instruction to Mesnage, 17 Oct. 1545, ibid., fo. 56 and fr. 17888, fo. 142. By the end of the month, when Reiffenberg’s levy had broken up, Annebault had decided to go without the prior conclusion of a truce.


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a prior truce was soon put aside as impracticable and other problems quickly arose. The suggestion that Admiral d’Annebault would lead the French party was put forward early on but only on condition of a truce. Francis played hard to get here, insisting that Annebault must deal first with Henry’s mercenaries on the French frontier. In any case, he was suspicious that Granvelle had told the English that Annebault would also be negotiating a closer alliance with the Emperor; Francis thought this had only encouraged Henry to seek his own closer alliance with Charles and expected Franco-Imperial talks for a closer alliance to take priority.42 Gardiner and his colleagues received their instructions on 17 October, charged to ‘searche and enquyre out the very cause of his [Annebault’s] cumming,’ to ‘let and empeche’ Franco-Imperial negotiations and finally, if he found that the Emperor was working against Henry, to ‘insinuate himself by such meanes as tyme and occasion shall best minister, to the sayd Admyrall’ so as to block Franco-Imperial understanding.43 Francis had promised in the ‘secret’ schedule of 1544 not to make peace with Henry VIII without including the Emperor and to declare against Henry in the event of an Anglo-Imperial war.44 Henry had similar obligations to the Emperor under the Treaty of 1543. The Bruges talks thus became hopelessly entangled with fears of double-crossing on both sides. Annebault and his colleagues arrived on 7 November and a long series of meetings followed, revolving around a new Franco-Imperial marriage plan and the settlement of peace with England.45 Annebault and his colleagues were instructed to consider the marriage of prince Philip with Francis’ daughter Marguerite and accept the abandonment of Milan to the couple in return for the remaining territories of Piedmont not in the King’s hands; compensation would be arranged for the duke of Savoy as well as a possible marriage of the prince of Piedmont to Jeanne d’Albret. Talks along 42

Francis I to Mesnage, 21 Oct. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 54. Instructions to Gardiner, Thirlby and Carne, 17 Oct. 1545, St.P. X, p. 630 (L&P, XX, ii, pp. 227–228). 44 BL Egerton 990, fos. 412–413. 45 Navagero to Venetian Senate, 11 Nov. 1545, ASV, AP, Germania, fos. 318–319; Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland. Erste Abteilung: 1533–1559, 14 vols (Gotha, Berlin, Frankfurt, 1892–1981), VIII, Nuntiatur des Verallo, ed. W. Von Friedensberg, p. 409n. For the Emperor’s point of view, see CSP Spain VIII, 109, 130, 131, 146, 147, 169, 172, where the emphasis is on the fact that an Anglo-French settlement was impossible without the Emperor’s mediation and that the Emperor’s relations with both England and France placed him in a favourable situation (see ibid., 173). 43

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these lines remained inconclusive since too many causes of aggravation remained. In Francis I’s instructions, the question of Henry VIII was linked to the Protestants and the Turks: If by chance the Emperor asked them that the King undertake to make war on the Protestants and the Turk, the said lord will agree to defensive aid against them, as long as he has peace with the English [King], provided the Emperor will agree to the same against the English, the Turk and even the Protestants if they attacked him. But if war were to continue with the English, the King will agree an offensive and defensive league as long as the Emperor were to do the same against the English. However, if such a negotiation could be avoided it would be better and if a reply about the Turk were necessary, at the worst it could be avoided by the terms of the last treaty.46

The Anglo-French talks began under Granvelle’s chairmanship on 10 November. Gardiner was agreeably surprised by Annebault, who had been described to him as having ‘the name oonly, without wytte or memory.’ He reported the French Admiral and his colleagues as gracious and prepared to work for peace. When they came down to terms, though, the French demanded the return of Boulogne and the inclusion of the Scots; only then would they acquit their obligations to England. For their part, the English demanded the pension, which was immediately rejected by the French as impossible in wartime.47 A private meeting took place between Gardiner and Olivier. Though he was impressed by Bayard, the bishop disliked the French Chancellor from previous experience (he thought him a crypto-Lutheran) and still thought him a liar. The meeting, though, threw up some interesting ideas on why Boulogne was such a sticking point. Olivier freely owned that Francis I’s ‘bottom line’ was the recovery of Boulogne but both ministers speculated on why such a place, that cost so much on both 46 Instruction to Annebault and colleagues, 31 Oct. 1545, BnF, fr. 3196, fos. 320–22, printed in Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009) II, pp. 833–835: ‘Et si d’advanture led. Empereur leur faisoit faire instance que le roy se voulsist obliger a faire la guerre aulx protestantz et au Turc, led. seigneur accordera, au cas qu’il aye paix avec l’Angloys, ayde deffensive contre lesd. Protestantz et Turc, telle que led. Empereur le luy vouldra accorder contre l’Angloys, le Turc et les mesmes protestantz, s’ilz luy venoint courre sus. Mais si la guerre duroit encores avec l’Anglois, le roy accordera ligue offensive et deffensive, pourveu que l’empereur pace de mesmes contre l’Angloys. Toutesfois, qui se pourra passer d’en traicter, ce sera le meilleur; et sy l’on est contrainct de respondre du Turc, pour le pis, il en fauldra eschapper suivant le dernier traicté.’ 47 Gardiner and Thirlby to Henry VIII, 6 Nov. 1545, St.P. X, pp. 652–654 (L&P, XXI, ii, 740, p. 352); Gardiner, Thirlby and Carne to Henry VIII, 11 Nov. 1545, St.P. X, pp. 666–667 (L&P, XXI, ii, 772).


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sides to defend or attack, should be so much of a stumbling block. Gardiner remarked that ‘when contencion for any thing dependith upon honnour the reasons upon charge be not estemed’ (Francis had after all told him in 1538 ‘I coulde noo skyl of princes honours’), yet thought it dangerous for Francis to be allowed by his advisers to think that he could never ever relinquish a place. Other rulers had always had to compromise. Olivier’s answer was that ‘ther coulde noo labour prevayle as he thought in it the french king hath it soo to hart.’ The overall impression is of two technocrats baffled by the demands of royal honour.48 We know that at the same time the Duke of Norfolk, on Paget’s prompting, wrote to his son the Earl of Surrey ‘that ye animate not the King too much for the keeping of Boulogne; for who so doth, at length shall get small thanks.’ The Duke sent his son an even sterner rebuke through his servant Thomas Hussey: ‘for what his grace and the rest of the cownsell workith in for the render of Bowleyne and the conclewding of a pease in vj days, you with your letters sett bake in sixe owers.’ Norfolk ‘sertenly knowith the realme of England nott possible to beare the charges of the same.’ Yet Gardiner reported to Paget that ‘I am wondrous desirous of peace, but I assure youe I cannot awaye with al to leve Bolen as the French men wold have it.’ He also suspected that the French wanted to create the impression that they could come to terms with England without the Emperor. That would be the worst outcome ‘and yet I wyl ease that matier wel ynough.’49 The impression created by these exchanges is that of a real debate going on behind the scenes among royal advisers about the point of the war. Thereafter, the talks moved to Antwerp; there the Franco-Imperial discussions continued without result from 18th to 24th, when the French

48 Gardiner and Thirlby to Henry VIII, 15 Nov. 1545, SP1/210, fos. 130–131 (L&P, XXI, i, 798): on Olivier: ‘because I knew him sumtyme for a Lutherian, and was wel acquaynted with hym in Fraunce, and nowe and thenne disputed togither.’ On Bayard: ‘he is very wise, very sobre, and, as went from him by stertes, by conjecture, seen in good lernyng. He spake sumtyme Laten, for his purpose apte, apposite, et eleganti pronunciacione. He is coleryk and, in his angre, with auctorite annexed, very stowte . . . I thinke they have noo man canne speke more ne better in ther affayres thann he canne.’ (Gardiner to Paget, 11 Nov. 1545, Muller, Letters, pp. 181–182) (L&P, XX, ii, 774). 49 Norfolk to Surrey, 1 Oct. 1545, Nott, The Works of Henry Howard Earl of Surrey, p. 178; Hussey to Surrey, 6 Nov. 1545, SP1/210, fos. 28–29(30–31) (L&P, XX, ii, 738); Gardiner to Paget, 14, 15 Nov. 1545, Muller, Letters, pp. 191–194 (L&P, XXI, ii, 794, 799).

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envoys left. The only achievement by the French was to assure themselves that the Emperor’s main objective was the gathering of funds for his war in Germany and that, in the words of Martin du Bellay, who was present, ‘as long as the Emperor did not start war with him, he was determined not to do so against him.’50 The resident French ambassador, Mesnage, pressed Granvelle not to entertain approaches from Gardiner. Francis, he said, thought the Emperor a Catholic prince who would not enter closer alliance with a schismatic ruler other than to persuade him to return to the Church. Granvelle swatted that piece of cheek by pointing out how many times Francis had negotiated with Henry. The Emperor’s confessor passed on to Mesnage, through his confidant, Guzman, now abbé de Longpont, ‘the desire of the Emperor to treat for friendship with me and declare himself enemy of the King of England.’ Francis was notably unimpressed.51 The English had three general objectives: to make peace with France if possible; to clarify the Anglo-Imperial Treaty of 1543 and the rescue the English commissioners held by Reiffenberg (see ch.7). On the last point, nothing was achieved and Gardiner characteristically blamed Philip of Hesse for their plight.52 As for the French, Gardiner reported them in no mood for compromise; he was also particularly averse from a peace brokered by the Protestants.53 In fact, Gardiner was remarkably ambivalent in his attitude to peace in these talks. At the start, he seemed rather gung-ho, claiming that whether Boulogne was kept or lost, English reputation was high (perhaps he had been influenced by flattering remarks in Flanders). All the same, he was in favour of peace: ‘I esteeme nothing Bolen in comparyson of the mastery we have

50 Annebault to Mesnage, 30 Nov. 1545; same to Jean de Monluc, BnF, fr. 17889, fos. 344, 17890, fo. 191; Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), II, pp. 772–773; du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 322: ‘là où ne le Roy ne luy commenceroit la guerre, il n’estoit pas deliberé de la luy faire.’ 51 Mesnage to Annebault, 28 Nov. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 115–118; Francis I to Mesnage, 3 Dec. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 51; Francis to Mesnage, 14 Dec. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fos. 49–50): ‘la volunté que ledict Empereur avoit de traicter amytié avecques moy et se declairer ennemy du Roy d’Angleterre.’ ‘tous les propos que vous tient ledict confesseur et ceulx aussi que vous dict l’abbé de Longpont viennent certainement de la bouche de Granvelle et que l’on ne leur dict riens que ce qu’ilz veullent que nous saichions.’ Mesnage was to get what he could out of them and give the impression that Francis’ affairs were ‘gaillards’ and ‘en si bon estat de tous coustez que je ne suis point pour m’estonner quelque manace que l’on sceust mectre en avant.’ 52 Gardiner to Paget, 5 Nov. 1545, SP1/210, fos. 22–25 (L&P, XX, ii, 732); Muller, Letters, p. 161. 53 Ibid., p. 162.


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wonne in kepyng of it, and defendyng our realme alone.’ A few days later he was generally gloomy about the prospects (as his colleague Paget was to be again in 1549): We be in warre with Fraunce and Scotland; we have an enemyte with the Bishop of Rome; we have no frendeshippe assured here; we have receyved such displeasour of the Lansgrave, chief captayne of the Protestantes, that he hath cause to thinke we be angrye with hym; our warre is noysom to the welth of our owne realme, and it is soo noysom to al marchauntes that must trafique by us . . . as they crye out here wonderfully. Herwith we see at hom a gret apparaunce of lak of such thinges as the continuaunce of warre necessarily requireth. And whenne, to put awaye this warre, we shewe ourself content to take a peace, we may have it, but soo miserable to saye truth, as the French men offre it, that therby the Kinges Majesties noble courage shuld be soo touched as we ought to feare the daungier of his person . . . to syt styl with such a peace as to rendre Bolen and let the Scottes alone, oonly for a lytel money, not payd but promysed. I call two myllyons a lytel money to us that have spend fyve. . . . In consideration herof we must saye, Fye of such a peace as might be soo displeasaunte. And yet in the warre is miserie.

Perhaps Henry might be able to sacrifice his honour for expediency ‘or elles, for his gret lernyng, understand that to be most honnorable that is most expedient for the realme.’ But there was much doubt about ‘expediency’ especially if used to accept a treaty that reduced English prestige and clout. ‘I feeare me that shal not be thought expedient.’ A Franco-Imperial agreement in any case would annul the Emperor’s obligations to Henry for the defence of Boulogne and if peace were brokered by the Protestants, the realm would be corrupted by their ‘most abhominable and monstrose opinions.’ He could not believe the Protestants had better terms to offer than Annebault and Bayard, favourites of Francis and Mme d’Etampes. What then should England do? Should it accept poor peace conditions? No, the King would never live with them. Should the war be continued while the Emperor was a ‘doubteful freende’? Probably not. The problem was that there was no third way. Gardiner had argued himself into a corner and was perhaps unnecessarily pessimistic.54 He underestimated the problems for France.

54 Gardiner to Paget, 7 Nov., 13 Nov. 1545, SP1/210, fos. 51–52, 127–132 (L&P, XX, ii, 749, 788); Muller, Letters, pp. 185–190.

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Gardiner stayed on in the Low Countries to negotiate the other part of his commission, the revision of the 1543 Anglo-Imperial Treaty. Here the problems were delicate, though a solution more attainable. Article 6 of the Treaty had only committed the Emperor to defend Henry’s existing territories on the Continent, not Boulogne. Article 24 guaranteed free passage through the Emperor’s lands for troops coming to English aid. In both cases, circumstances had changed and art.6 was reinterpreted while art.24 was among those removed. An agreement was reached on 20 December and the treaty (of Utrecht) was signed on 16 January 1546. This signally failed to include Boulogne in the Emperor’s commitments.55 Unsurprisingly, ratification of the revised treaty was delayed into the spring by the Emperor’s denial of owing a subsidy under the old treaty. Whatever worries Charles and Granvelle may have had about Henry and Francis making peace through Protestant mediation, they were not prepared to commit themselves to defending Boulogne for England.56 For the French, of course, their priorities were exactly the reverse; that the Emperor should not commit himself to defend English territory. Jacques Mesnage had been under orders throughout late 1545 to ensure this. By early February Francis I had wind of the new treaty and wrote to Mesnage to ask if it included a commitment to defend Boulogne. The Emperor, who called the treaty a simple ‘declaration,’ denied this categorically but when Mesnage pressed further to argue that Charles was not committed to defend any other of Henry’s territories, on the grounds that Francis, in order to recover Boulogne, was entitled to wage war on Henry in any of his territories, the Emperor sheltered behind vague words that Francis should not undertake too much (‘trop plus entreprendre’) against Henry. Granvelle emphasised this point by saying that the Emperor was now less obliged to Henry than he was before.57 55

Treaty of Utrecht, 16 Jan. 1546, L&P XXI, i, 71, ratified in February. Francis I was still concerned in March about ‘quelle asseurance l’evesque de Wincestre sera party d’avec l’Empereur.’ (letter to Mesnage, 8 March 1546, Pierpoint Morgan MA 147. 57 Mesnage to Francis I, Utrecht, 30 Jan. 1546: ‘Ung personnaige se disant affectionné a vostre service m’a ce jourd’huy dict que l’Empereur a traicté avecques le Roy d’Angleterre telz articles comme ilz avoient traicté à Barselonna en l’an vcxliii, et dict l’avoir entendu d’homme qui a veu lesd. articles. Il ne m’a peu dire si par led. traicté ilz ont promis estre amys d’amys et ennemys d’ennemys.’ BnF, fr. 17890, fos. 133–134; on 9 Feb. Mesnage reported the details of the treaty as excluding Boulogne pretty accurately (ibid. Fos. 125–126); Francis I to Mesnage, 15 Feb. 1546, BnF fichier Charavay, 271,161; Mesnage to Francis I, 24 Feb. 1546, BnF fr. 17890, fos. 115–23. 56


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The death of Francis I’s younger son, Orléans, in September 1545 had prompted the need to re-negotiate the agreement, included in the Treaty of Crépy, for settling outstanding disputes by his marriage to a Habsburg princess. In his response to Mesnage’s report of the Emperor’s lack of commitment to Henry, Francis had expansively welcomed the idea of a new marriage alliance between his daughter and prince Philip; the causes of war between them might be great but their good will towards each other would prevail and ensure that concord (‘ses pays et les miens ne seroit que une mesme chose’) and that their union would lead to renewal of Christendom. But this was an unciphered letter and likely to have been for the Emperor’s consumption.58 This raises the difficult question of the extent to which French policy was coherent or torn by struggles for power between the various advisers of Francis I, Annebault, Tournon and Mme d’Etampes.59 François Nawrocki has now begun to clarify the problem, especially in his insistence on the closeness of outlook between Annebault and Tournon and their independence of Mme. d’Etampes.60 It has been argued that Annebault and Tournon wished for a closer understanding with the Emperor while cardinal Jean du Bellay stood for a closer alliance with the German princes.61 This is probably too tidy a picture. Judging by the terms of his instructions already quoted, Francis was using the Bruges talks to test Anglo-Imperial understanding.62 Despite Annebault’s subtle handling of the direct talks with the English envoys after the Emperor’s departure, there was no hope of compromise over Boulogne and at this stage the impression of double-dealing created late in 1544 remained. Martin du Bellay, a member of Annebault’s suite, described Gardiner as ‘this wicked bishop of Winchester, I wish the devil had taken him, along with his master and all his subjects. I fear greatly that the music will clash and our pipes will sound dissonant.’63

58

Francis I to Mesnage, 28 Feb. 1546, Pierpoint Morgan MA 147. Annebault’s real aim may have been to negotiate a marriage between Marguerite de France and Philip and thus secure an Imperial alliance, replacing the original project of 1544 for a marriage between Orléans and a Habsburg princess. This is apparent from CSP Spain, VIII, 172. The English were informed about this by Granvelle. 60 Nawrocki, ‘Annebault,’ part II, pp. 356–358, 386–390, 414–417. 61 M. François, Le cardinal de Tournon, p. 203. 62 Instructions, October 1545, see note 46 above. Francis outlines the offers made to the English so far and states that, despite soundings, Henry has refused to submit his case to the arbitration of the Emperor, Instruction to Fraisse, c. June/July 1545 (BnF fr. 17888, fos. 57–58). Annebault left Brussels about 27 November. See his letters to Mesnage, 27 and 28 Nov. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fo. 289; 17890, fo. 154. 63 ‘ce meschant évesque de Vincester, je vouldroye que le dyable l’eust emporté, 59

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Francis I was also disillusioned by the outcome of Annebault’s mission. Once the Admiral and Gardiner had been recalled, he thought, ‘the Emperor will regret not having used any other language’ since the Protestant envoys had told him that Henry and Charles could not agree. From that point he began to place greater hope in an alliance with the Protestants.64 On the other hand, such an alignment could not prosper while he was at war with England. For their part, the Protestants were convinced that the key to their security was Anglo-French peace. On 19 August, well before the failure at Bruges, the Schmalkaldic envoys had received their instructions.65 They were Ludwig von Baumbach, Christoff von Venningen,66 Hans Bruno von Niedpruck of Metz,67 Johann Sturm, and Sleidan.68 Their brief was to promote talks, attempt a truce to last until Easter 1546, suggest that until outstanding disputes over Boulogne and the pension was settled, Boulogne could be transferred (‘sequestrated’) into Schmalkaldic hands and a peace con-

son maistre et tous ses subjectz avec. J’ay grand peur que la musique ne vauldra rien et que ne pourrons accorder noz challumeux.’ J.-T. Leblanc, ‘Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron durant les guerres de Piémont et du nord de la France (1545–1552), Bull. Des Travaux du Comité des Sciences historiques, 1895, 25–83, at p. 26. See also Nawrocki, II, pp. 359–362. 64 Francis I to Annebault, 25 Nov. 1545, Pariset ‘Les relations des Rois de France et les princes protestants allemands,’ no. 3: ‘led. Empereur sera bien marry de n’avoir parlé autre langage’; Guy de Marillac to Jean du Bellay, 21 novembre [1545]: ‘le roy demoure tousjours et persiste en ceste voulenté de ne riens faire avec l’empereur et gouste tous les jours de plus en plus ceste alliance avec les protestantz.’ (Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay, III, p. 329). 65 Philip of Hesse to Jakob Sturm, 19 Aug. 1545, Hasenclever, NA, pp. 234–235; Philip of Hesse to Venningen, Baumbach, Sleidan and Bruno, 19 Aug. 1545, ibid., pp. 235–236. Philip to Bucer, 1 Aug. 1545, Lens (ed.) Briefwechsel Landgraf Philipps, II, 358, urging on the peace negotiations. Memorandum of the Schmalkaldic committee at Worms, NA, pp. 228–229; Instructions to the envoys, ibid., pp. 229–231. 66 Baumbach had been on several missions to England in the late 1530s for his master, Philip ot Hesse, notably in May and December 1539 when he negotiated with Cromwell for an alliance. See Küch, Politsches Archiv des Langrafen Philipp, II, pp. 454–455. Venningen was the representative of the Duke of Wurtemberg. 67 On Bruno’s connections in France see Zeller, Réunion de Metz à la France, I, pp. 82–83, About 1535, he was charged with several missions to Germany by Francis I and in 1539 he became an official agent of the Schmalkaldic League. In 1545, he obtained pensions for himself and his sons from England and became an informant for the English in Germany. 68 A. Hasenclever, Sleidan Studien: Die Entwicklung der politischen Ideen Johann Sleidans bis zum Jahre 1545 (Bonn, 1905). H. Baumgarten, Sleidans Leben und Briefwechsel (Strasbourg, 1881).


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ference arranged.69 Sturm and Chelius had probably concealed these aims from the French while holding out the prospect of Boulogne. As a result, they obtained French consent in a series of meetings with Secretary Bayard and then with Francis himself. The King insisted, as his maximum demand, on the immediate return of Boulogne and the full comprehension of the Scots.70 On the English side, the talks near Calais in November/December 1545 were largely managed by William Paget,71 using Bruno and Sturm as intermediaries with those in France favourable to peace. There, Marguerite of Navarre and Mme d’Etampes were crucial and, not surprisingly, the latter’s favourites, Longueval and La Planche, were involved.72 After the failure of approaches via her secretary in April 1545, Mme d’Etampes sent another envoy in July and in August was still pushing for talks, using a Florentine merchant named Bartholomeo Compagni as an intermediary. The terms on offer for Boulogne were: the renewal of the pension and some sort of financial indemnity for Boulogne but the sum was not thought adequate in England.73 How did the negotiators at Bruges view the Protestant mediation talks? It is possible that Annebault and Bayard used the talks with the 69 Additional Memorandum, ‘Was an Frankreich und Engellandt geworben soll werden.’ Hasenclever, NA, pp. 231–233. 70 Johann Sturm and Chelius to the Council of 13, 13 Aug. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 592. 71 See S. Gammon, Statesman and Schemer, see also Johnson, ‘William Paget.’ 72 Nicolas Bossut de Longueval, member of the royal council since 1543. La Planche was maître d’hôtel to the duke of Orléans. ‘Of mean estimation at court though noted witty’ according to Paget in 1542 he was experienced in negotiating with the English (L&P, XVII, 838), he was also experienced in troop levies in Germany (Francis I to Tournon, 28 Sept. 1542, BnF fr. 6616, fo. 110). 73 Van der Delft, 17 Aug. 1545, CSP Spain, VIII, pp. 232, 237. The Protestant envoys in December noted that Compagni ‘qui avait faict deux voyages en cour de la part des Ang1ais’ had already presented the same proposals which they, the Protestants, had brought when they arrived at the French Court (NA, PRO 31/3/13, fo. 155, transcript). The Ferrarese ambassador reported on 14 September that the Venetian Ambassador had heard ‘da uno Bartholomeo Compagno che è pur andato in anzi e indrieto per questa pace tra queste Maestate’ that Henry VIII had proposed a marriage between his daughter and the Duke of Vendôme (ASM, Francia, Busta 21, fasc. 2, pp. 44–48, passage in cipher). Paget to Norfolk, 25 Aug. 1545: ‘Bartil Compeigne, passeng towardes Italy, spake with Madame d’Estampes but their conference cam to none effect’ NA, SP1/206, fo. 219 (L&P, XX, ii, 209). It is likely that Paget was being less than honest with Norfolk. There was a connection between the Protestant terms and those mentioned by Compagni. Compagni, like Francesco Bernardo and Antonio Guidotti after him, seemed to regard it as their mission to bring about peace between France and England. See D. Potter, ‘The Treaty of Boulogne and European diplomacy, 1549–1550,’ Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 55, no. 131 (1982), 50–65.

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Emperor to undermine them and Michel François certainly argued that they used their influence against a Protestant alliance in this period whereas du Bellay used his in favour. Tournon remained at court and may have used his crucial influence against peace.74 Francis I in October had ostensibly made it clear to Granvelle that he had put off the negotiations through the Protestants as long as possible and much preferred the Emperor to mediate a peace than the Protestants.75 On the other hand, Annebault later in 1546 seems to have had no objection to a Protestant alliance. It is far more probable that now, as in the recent past, two policies were being actively pressed by different groups around the King, with the latter waiting to decide according to the success of each.76 In England, it may be that Gardiner was kept in the dark about the Calais negotiations, though this seems unlikely. He guessed that the sending of Annebault and his colleagues to Bruges suggested that Francis ‘myndeth not ernestly with youe there, or the Emperour meanith not ernestly with us here.’77 Paget hinted to Sturm that the reason for Gardiner’s mission was to get him out of the way but this may have been by way of reassurance.78 He also told La Planche that Gardiner was under orders to act in accordance with advice from

74 M. François, Le Cardinal François de Tournon, pp. 201–203. Tournon’s antiProtestant stance is one of the themes of this book. Guidiccione, the Papal legate, said that Tournon and Bayard constituted the King’s Council for the purposes of interviews with the Protestants: ‘in consiglio, dove che non c’è intervenuto, salvo che Mons. Tornone, et i1 generale Baiardo.’ See ANG, III, pp. 205, 304. 75 Francis I to Mesnage, 21 Oct. 1545, BnF fr. 17890 fo. 54. 76 Saint Mauris reported French courtiers annoyed at the departure of Annebault for the Imperial Court, since they felt that differences with England should have been settled first. It is difficult to fault their analysis; the unsettled nature of relations with England were bound to give the Emperor the whip hand in any talks and when the Admiral returned unsuccessful the English were more difficult to deal with than ever. (CSP Spain, VIII, 180, Saint Mauris to Ferdinand, n.d.). 77 Henry VIII to Paget, 29 Nov. 1545. St.P. X, p. 730: ‘all which overtures We woold have you kepe secrete to your self, without declaring the same to my lord of Winchestre.’ Gardiner was consistently suspicious of Protestant motives and did his best to undermine Protestant credibility. Gardiner to Paget, 6 Nov. 1545, Muller, Letters of Stephen Gardiner, p. 176. He recognised the ambiguity in motives which lay behind the talks at Calais and the Admiral’s mission (letter to Paget, 4 Nov. 1545, Muller, Letters . . . Gardiner, p. 156): ‘Nowe may you there easely fishe out whither the Protestantes geve in dede the French King a more lightlyhwode of good conditions by ther meanes thenne ye be pryve unto.’ 78 Paget to Henry VIII, 2 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, p. 745: ‘if he wer at home, he might peraventure devise sum meanes to pluck this practise out of our handes, and therefor it is good to keep him yet out of the waye for a while, till our thinges here be in sum better forwardnes.’


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Paget and that he would be recalled in parallel with Annebault. Francis thought that this was because Paget ‘ayt envie que tout vienne de son cousté.’ At any rate, the French King ordered Annebault to return and that Paget be given the impression this had been done on his request.79 Fraisse, recently returned from his success against English troop recruitment in the Rhineland also acted as an intermediary. The initial confidence of the Protestant envoys did not last long. Gathering at Strasbourg late in August, they crossed into France from Metz, where they collected Bruno and his colleague, Caspar Grammaut.80 Of their party, Bruno and Sturm were by far the most significant. It was they who initiated the proposals of their colleagues to Henry VIII and corresponded with Jacob Sturm at Strasbourg, their command post. All five were received in audience by Francis I the day Baumbach and Sleidan left for England (13 September).81 Despite the grief caused by the recent loss of his favourite son, Orléans, the King received them courteously. Tournon and Bayard took part in the discussion and dealt alone with the Germans on the following day. The talks centred on a set of proposals handed to the King by the Protestants, now prefaced to the “Avis” of December 1545.82 The French ministers thought a truce unsuitable, but the Protestants made clear their willingness to negotiate the matter of Boulogne and to accept it temporarily in sequestration.83 The French answer was not ready until 19th, when Tournon and Bayard again called the Germans to court. Though few points were directly refused, the French glossed the terms in such a way as to refuse one proposal to ‘infeudate’ Boulogne to the young duke of Vendôme, the first prince of the blood, or allow the demolition of Ardres, though they did admit, for the first time, the possibility of compensation for Henry’s war costs of up to 100,000 crowns. In their turn, the Protestants made two more suggestions: peace and the renewal of the pension should be accompanied by the marriage of Vendôme or his brother Enghien to the Lady Mary and that the marriage of Mary Stuart to the

79

Francis I to Annebault, 25 Nov. 1545, Pariset, Francia, 10 (1982), no. 3. Caspar Grammaut was a Protestant from Metz who had fled the anti-Protestant rising there in 1542; becoming close to Johann Sturm, he was frequently used in Schmalkaldic diplomatic negotiations (Schmidt, Jean Sturm, p. 95). 81 Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 21 Sept. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 604. 82 NA, PRO 31/3/13, fos. 153–155. 83 Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 21 Sept. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 604. 80

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Prince of Denmark should cement an alliance between the Danes, the Scots, the French and the English.84 Sturm, in his report of 21 September, describes the reaction of various members of Francis I’s entourage. Mme d’Etampes ‘dealt sincerely and openly with us’ but Tournon and Bayard were obstructive85 and in their opposition, they were backed by Papal pressure, exercised by Girolamo da Correggio, who told the King that ‘things done by devilish hands do not last long.’86 The influence of Bayard on German affairs continued into 1546,87 but that of Chancellor Olivier and Mme d’Etampes was probably outweighing that of Tournon and Bayard in the King’ s mind. It has been suggested that Annebault was favourable to peace and tipped the balance.88 This is not confirmed by Chelius, who drew up a list of those he did consider favourable: besides Mme d’Etampes, Longueval and Cardinal du Bellay, there are the King and Queen of Navarre, the Chancellor, Pierre Remon, premier président of Rouen, and the Cardinal de Lorraine.89 Even the Dauphin was to realise the advantages of Protestant connections.90

84 Ibid. Alvarotti several times reported that the marriage of Vendôme to one of Henry’s daughters was in the air, (to Ercole II, 1and 16 Oct. 1545, ASM, Can.Est. Francia, B. 21, fasc. 2, pp. 70–75, ibid., fasc. 3, pp. 171–173). The scheme for a Scottish-Danish marriage was revived in 1546, cf. Francis I to Richer, Ribier, Lettres et mémoires, I, pp. 606–607. 85 Pol. Corr. III, 604: ‘syncere et candide et blande nobiscum egit.’ A generous description when compared to Chelius’ description of Tournon as ‘ein bose, listig Katz’ – a letter to Bing, 2 Nov. 1545, NA, p. 243. This certainly confirms the hard line taken by Tournon with the Venetian ambassador at the same time, when he told him ‘che il Re Christianissimo non e mai per fare la pace senon ha Bologna, et che non lasciara mai la prottettione di Scotia.’ (Alvarotti to Ercole II, Amiens, 15 Sept. 1545, ASM, Can.Est., Francia, B 21, fasc. 2, pp. 51–52, passage in cipher). 86 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 29 Oct. 1545, ASM, Can.Est., Francia, B 21, fasc. 2, pp. 138–143: ‘le cose fatte per mani diaboliche sono mai ne lunghi ne durabili.’ This is especially valuable as the despatch of Correggio describing this audience is missing, cf. ANG, III, no. 211. 87 Certainly until the end of July, with two isolated cases in September. After that, he is replaced entirely by L’Aubespine both in the correspondence with Bassefontaine and that with Mesnage. 88 Gaston Zeller, La réunion, pp. 81–82. 89 Chelius to Bing, 2 Nov. 1545, Hasenclever, NA, p. 244. This report was occasioned by Chelius’ mission to the French Court to explain the position of the Landgrave on Reiffenberg. 90 Though he was not so enthusiastic as his late brother, he was quickly to realise the usefulness at a connection with Wurtemberg in the next year. See A. von Druffel, Beiträge sur Reichsgeschichte, 1545–1546 4 vols (Munich, 1873–1876), I, 3, 4, 5, 16, 24, 35, 37, 40, 46, 48, 52.


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After discussions between Mme d’Etampes and Sturm, it was decided to send Grammaut to England to offer talks on the frontier. Sleidan and Baumbach had already been received graciously (‘benigne et humaniter’) at Windsor by Henry on 20 September, and after discussions with Paget, councillors were appointed to determine the matter in the light of the news brought by Grammaut. But, though at first pleased with his success, Sleidan was more doubtful about the prospects in early October.91 Henry proved willing to appoint envoys but not to consider giving up Boulogne. At any rate, Grammaut returned with this news to France only to find that Mary of Hungary’s envoy, Noirthon, was at court (at the abbey of St. Fuscien near Amiens).92 This was unwelcome news to the Protestants, since it represented an attempt by the Emperor to out-manoeuvre them. While Noirthon was led by Tournon into the royal presence, the Protestants were told to talk to Bayard.93 When full talks did begin again, it was clear that the French considered Henry’s reply inadequate. Grammaut therefore had to go back to England,94 only to return on 18 October with a harsher answer. A breaking-point had thus been reached; the Protestant envoys left the French Court and Sleidan had some bitter words to say to Paget.95 He stayed in England long enough, though, to hear, at an audience on 9 October, that Henry had appointed Tunstall, Paget and Tregonwell to treat with the French.96 The spectre of failure receded as quickly

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Sleidan to Henry VIII, late September 1545, Baumgarten, Briefwechsel, no. 43, St.P. X, p. 607. There was a possibility that Francis would fail to send envoys to Calais: ‘si Sa Maiesté n’aura pas depuis Calais nouvelle de nous, qu’elle nous tienne pour excusez.’ Cf. Baumbach and Sleidan to Paget, [7] Oct. 1545, NA, SP1/208, fo. 198 L&P, XX, ii, 560). 92 On Noirthon’s missions, cf. Charles V to the Regent of the Netherlands, 6 Aug. 1545, BnF fr. 7172, fos. 326–361, Charles V to St.Mauris and Noirthon, 2 I Sept. 1545, ibid., fos. 377–380. These are both copies from Besançon. Imperial correspondence gives the impression of a determined move to outflank the Protestants. 93 Sleidan to Paget, 24 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 114 (L&P, XX, ii, 649): ‘Nous scavons tresbien (et il y a long temps que le scavons) que d’aultres s’en meslent, l’authorité desquelz rabaisse paraventure celle de noz estatz . . . Si cecy est vray, certes noz princes ont esté mal advisez de s’en mesler . . . Le voyage de l’Evesque de Wincesters pardevers l’Empereur mectra noz princes en suspecon.’ Sleidan to Sturm, 12 Nov. 1545, Baumgarten, op. cit., no. 56. 94 Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, Ham, 10 Feb. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 617. 95 Sleidan to Paget, 24 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 114 (L&P, XX, ii, 649). 96 Baumbach and Sleidan to Henry VIII, 24 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 110 (L&P, XX, ii, 647). The commission is dated 9 Oct. 1545. A corrected fair copy (NA SP1/208, fo. 195) originally made out for Thirlby and Carne, has Gardiner’s name added. At this

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as it had arisen and Sleidan and Baumbach left for Calais. Henry had pressed them to work hard and that once they had ensured that Francis would send his own envoys, the English would be sent to Ardres. When Sturm sent his colleagues’ letter to the French Admiral, an answer came back immediately, ordering the envoys to go to Calais to arrange the conference. Francis would send some of his ‘wyse and dyscret counsell’ there.97 Paget and his colleagues were ready to leave by the end of October.98 The Protestants, of course, once they arrived at Calais, did their best to persuade each side that the other had given away more than was actually the case. This was natural to get talks started.99 Francis I now seemed convinced that Paget and his colleagues were prepared to do business (‘soient en bonne volonté de faire quelque chose’) and that Paget had full powers to direct the talks both at Calais and at the Imperial court, certainly an exaggeration.100 A truce, of course, had to be arranged and after Bruno and Sturm had suggested one to last from the 15th to the end of November, the French agreed on condition that the English did the same.101 Mutual suspicion stood in the way of the

point it was probably meant for the negotiations at the Imperial Court. All the names are crossed and those of Paget, Tunstall and Tregonwell substituted. The reference to powers to treat for a truce is erased. 97 Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 23 Oct. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 622. Venningen, Bruno and Sturm to Baumbach and Sleidan, 22 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 92, a contemporary English translation. Bruno to Sleidan, 22 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 93. Baumbach and Sleidan to Henry VIII, 23 0ct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 118. The actual commissioners were: the Bishop of Soissons, Pierre Remon, and Philibert Babou, sr. de La Bourdaisière. 98 Paget to Sleidan, 28 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 143 (L&P, XX, ii, 675). Paget had, as usual, some misgivings about the crossing, which he said he would not normally do in winter for 50,000 crowns, especially before receiving news of the French Commissioners. 99 Sleidan told Paget that the French King had consented to Henry’ s temporary occupation of Boulogne and was prepared to ‘faire beaucoup’ for a final settlement. (Baumbach and Sleidan to Henry VIII, 30 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 184). Sturm informed Annebault on 4 Nov.that Henry had agreed to talks on a truce or on peace without making preconditions (‘il ne vault avant le pourparler, estre lié ne abstrainct de traicter de telz ou telz poinctz.’ (Pariset, ‘La France et les princes allemands,’ no. 1). 100 Francis I to Annebault, 25 Nov. 1545, Pariset, ‘La France et les princes allemands,’ no. 3. 101 Pol.Corr. III, 637. The English Council, in fact, conceded a truce for the duration of the talks (letter to Cobham and Grey, Oatlands, 10 Nov. 1545, BL Harl. 283, fo. 334). In the preparation of terms, Johann Sturm was the most active, negotiating with the Governor of Calais, whom he declared ‘vir bonus est et studiosus una cum uxore nostrae religionis,’ and with the Captain of Ardres on the means of getting


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appointment of envoys of the highest rank. Though Annebault offered to serve if Hertford did so, Henry’s brother-in-law was not appointed so the scheme fell through, as did the idea of appointing Nevers to lead the French delegation.102 “Face” was all-important; in the view of Sleidan and Sturm, they knew negotiators were deceptive but results were what mattered.103 English and German sources reveal the crucial importance of the secret negotiations conducted by the Protestants in France, both directly and through La Planche and Fraisse. Fraisse had left Liège (where he had been working against the English troop levy) on 15 November and La Planche his post at Mézières a little earlier.104 The latter was at Ardres by the evening of 20 November with letters of credence from Longueval to Bruno and a commission to say that Francis was being worked on by him and Mme. d’Etampes; he added that the King would prefer the peace to be negotiated by the Protestants than by the Emperor. Henry’s inclusion in an alliance of France and the Protestant estates was to be agreed and he was to be sounded out on this without the knowledge of Annebault’s mission to the Emperor.105 Astonishingly, the Protestant idea of sequestration, so opposed by Tournon, was accepted in these proposals, as was that for the marriage of Mary Stuart to Edward. This surely shows the unofficial nature of their origin. They were read and discussed with La Planche on the night of 20th and the next day

round the obstinacy of both Kings about Boulogne. He did show a degree of naiveté, however, in supposing that a meeting of the two Kings could settle the issue. To the earlier proposal for marriage between the Lady Mary and the Duke of Vendôme was now added one for Edward to Jeanne d’Albret. (Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 13 Nov. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 657: Sturm thought it ‘non nimis durum puellae pudicae’ to wait five years or so for Edward’s maturity, for Marguerite de France was still uncertain about her match at the age of 22. (The Lady Mary’s matrimonial prospects were even worse.) 102 Paget to Sleidan, Windsor, 2 Nov. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 631. Paget to Sleidan, 11 Nov. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 635. Sleidan to Sturm, 12 Nov. 1545, Baumgarten op. cit., no. 56. Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 13 Nov. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 637. 103 Sleidan to Sturm, 12 Nov. 1545, ibid.: ‘Technas illorum et artes intelligimus et cupimus quamprimum hinc expediri’ Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 13 Nov. 1545, ibid.: and Johann Sturm, ‘vides, quo in loco nostra actio constat. nec confidere nec desperare possumus.’ 104 Chelius to Bing, 2 Nov. 1545, Hasenclever, NA, p. 244. 105 ‘er lieber wolt, das durch uns dann durch die keiserischen der friden gemacht wurd.’ Here we have the counterpart to Henry’s instruction to Paget to keep things from Gardiner. See Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, from Villers-Cotterets, 10 Dec. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, p. 680.

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Fraisse arrived to confirm them and bringing letters from du Bellay encouraging Sturm and Sleidan in their efforts.106 Bruno and Sturm hinted at the secret commission when, on 22nd, they brought letters from Paget to Longueval which renewed the contacts between the two men. Sturm put forward the French proposals when he saw Paget at Calais on 23rd and says that at their first meeting, Paget was optimistic (‘das Paget ein gute hoffnung darzu hett’), though the secretary admitted that he would have to write for fresh instructions. Later, though, in Cobham’s presence, he raised objections to details.107 Paget, in his own despatch, characteristically omits these details, and in a verbatim report, emphasises his firm, sceptical line. He does, however, reveal something about the secret diplomacy in Sturm’s confidential words: And though I make thoverture to you as of myself, to see what you will saye to it, yet the trueth is that Madame d’Estampes, Monsr le Doulphin and Monsr Longuevale, which labour to set thAdmirall besides the cushyn, and desyre (specially Madame d’Estampes) thonour of making this peax, have willed me to open the same.

Though Paget affected to be shocked by the notion that the English should retain Boulogne only as a guarantee and made no mention of the idea of keeping Mary Stuart in Scotland until she came of age,108 Sturm took away from this meeting a more optimistic view than Paget sent to his master, saying that Paget had told him he would truly further the cause with Henry.109 The formal negotiations, in tents pitched on each side of the frontier between Guînes and Ardres on 26th (Paget gives the date as

106 ‘und was La Planche mit mir geredt hatte, hat Fraxineus bestetigt,’ 22 Nov. 1545, Baumgarten, Sleidan’s Briefwechsel, no. 57. Du Bellay was not at court during this period and so was not directly involved in the negotiations. 107 Both Paget and Sturm left detailed descriptions of this meeting. Cf. Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 10 Dec. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, p. 681. 108 Paget portrayed himself as rather off-hand with the German, but he did sense the importance of Sturm’s secret commissions ‘howbeit, asfar as I perceyve, if any thing cum to passe, it is like to be by this Sturmius private practises, who is in good credit with the French King, and others about Him, such as be not the great favourers of the Bishop of Rome, wherof both thAdmirall, Bayard, and Tournon ar chief capitains.’ (Paget to Henry VIII, 23 Nov. 1545, St.P., X, p. 712, 714). 109 Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 10 Dec. 1545, Po1.Corr. III, p. 681: ‘Da hab ich ine uf das höchst ermanet und bin also guter hoffnung vom im gangen, das er die sach treulich fürdren wurd bei seinem könig.’


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25th), started while skirmishes went on between the two sides, one in particular on the coast at Wimille.110 The talks at first produced no resu1t, except for a conversation between Paget, Remon and Philibert Babou.111 The French confirmed Sturm’s hopes about Mme d’Etampes, while Sturm afterwards even suggested that she and Longueval might come to Calais. But the problem was that the French commissioners seemed to know nothing of the unofficial proposals put forward by the Protestants, at which Paget professed to be amused.112 Nor, in the light of the Reiffenberg débacle of the previous summer, was he impressed by Sturm’s offer for Philip of Hesse to provide a guarantee.113 The next days were taken up by separate talks by Bruno and Sturm with the French (on 27th) and with Paget (on 28th). Francis’ high hopes for peace at this time may reflect favourable reports from Calais.114 La Planche probably left for court on 30th to obtain a copy of the proposals signed by Francis himself, and, when Sturm heard from Fraisse that La Planche had returned, he assumed success and went to Paget to ask him if the terms were acceptable; the Secretary’s answer was reported as: yes, as long as Francis’ signature had been

110 Described in a letter from Ardres, 28 Nov. 1545, Leblanc, ‘Lettres à Gui de Maugiron,’ 1893, p. 30. 111 Accounts cf this meeting may be seen in Pol.Corr. III, pp. 682–683, English Commissioners to Henry VIII, 27 Nov. 1545, St.P. X, p. 723f. The English date the meeting on 25th, the Germans on 26th. Elis Gruffydd descibes the two tents of the parties on each side of the frontier (Davies, ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,’ p. 38). See also the ‘Harangue des deputez des Princes et Estatz Protestans aux Ambassadeurs assemblés pour traicter la paix entre les Roys de France et d’Ang1eterre l’an 1545.’ BnF fr. 23515, piece 5 (transcript PRO 31/3/13, fos. 149–150). After the meeting, La Planche went to court to report and received an instruction of 27th which he brought to Ardres on 30th. This is lost, but notice of it is preserved in a French instruction of early December, PRO 31/3/14, fo. 261v. 112 ‘In good faith,’ quod I, ‘I laughed in my sleve to here you talke all togidre frenchely and yet I laughed more afterward when the Frenchmen sayd they never had herd of the matter before.’ Paget to Petre, 27 Nov. 1545, NA SP1/211, fo. 90v (L&P, XX, ii, 881). 113 ‘Now,’ quod he, ‘rex Galliae habet animum exeleratum et recens memoria Bullonie pendet adhuc in animo but if this conclusion were ones taken and a peax made, our prynces and specially the Lansgrave woold never ceasse til he had obteyned of the French King a clene renunciacion of Bullen for sum little contribucion of ayde and entryng in to a straiter amitie.’ ‘The Lansgrave,’ quod. I, ‘hath served the King of late very il for his army of Almaynes.’ Paget to Petre, 27 Nov. 1545, NA SP1/211, fo. 91r (L&P, XX, ii, 881). 114 Annebault to Mesnage, 28 Nov. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 154: ‘Il m’a ce matin apporté lettres du Roy et, par ce que ledict Seigneur me mande, il semble qu’il y ait bonne esperance que ses depputez feront quelque chose de bon du costé de Calais.’

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obtained.115 Paget did not tell his master this and it was certainly not in accord with Henry’s instructions of 28th.116 However, it mattered little since, when Sturm returned to Ardres on the 1 December, he was told by Fraisse and La Planche that Francis had changed his mind under Tournon’s influence, persuaded that the terms, especially for Scotland were unworthy.117 Sturm concealed this setback from Paget at first, sending word by Bruno on 2nd that he was going back to court. In fact, once Bruno was back at Ardres, they decided to send Sturm and Fraisse back to court to find out what had happened and come to some agreement on a Franco-Protestant alliance. Sturm was to talk to Tournon, Annebault and the King, while Fraisse reported to Mme d’Etampes and Longueval.118 The discussion probably produced the mémoire entitled Avis d’aucuns moyens, drawn up for presentation to the King. First, noting the contacts with the Emperor, which they suspected were designed to frustrate their negotiations, they made four proposals: (1) Francis to satisfy Henry’s claims and the latter to keep Boulogne as a guarantee; (2) the Protestants to arbitrate the time and method of payment; (3) the Protestant estates to negotiate the liquidation of the perpetual pension in order to end all future sources of dispute; (4) Mary Stuart to be guarded in the name of the Protestants until she reach marriageable age. The sting in the tail was the holding out of the Protestant alliance to ‘whichever of the two kings showed themselves most favourable to peace.’119 When, on 5th, Sturm and Fraisse arrived at Villers-Cotterêts, they talked first to Tournon and were then joined by L’Aubespine. Sturm outlined the proposals in the Avis, concealing from Tournon the proposed Franco-English-Protestant alliance, and though Tournon raised considerable difficulties, the interview with the King on 7 December went well.120 Francis agreed both to let the English keep Boulogne

115

Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 10 Dec. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, p. 684. Henry VIII to Paget, 29 Nov. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 730–733. Paget was to put forward more claims – to Ardres, for instance – in order to see if greater offers would be made and what means would be suggested for guarantees. 117 Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 10 Dec. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, p. 684. 118 Ibid., p. 685. 119 NA, PRO 31/3/13, fos. 153–157: ‘celluy des deux Roys qu’ils auront trouvé plus equitable et prompt à la dicte paix.’ 120 Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 10 Dec. 1545, Po1.Corr. III, p. 687. 116


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as a guarantee and, provided the Scots were included in any treaty, hinted that the marriage of Mary Stuart and the prince of Denmark could go forward as long as the Scots agreed; all this was on condition that it was proposed by the Protestants and not by his own envoys.121 He promised, too, not to co-operate with Pope or Emperor against the Protestants. The same evening, Marguerite sent her secretary, Frotté, to Sturm to tell him ‘the negotiation goes well and both she and Madame d’Estampes favouring it.’122 The success at the peace party seemed assured when, of all people, Tournon and Annebault produced on 9th a mémoire by which Francis promised to pay what he owed Henry, leaving Boulogne as a gage. Of the sums in dispute he was prepared to accept Protestant arbitration, and, as for Scotland, he promised to send to the Governor to ascertain his opinion on the young Queen’s marriage. Should all this be unacceptable, he would agree to a truce for two or three years.123 All this seemed very hopeful and Francis even decided to let his official negotiators at Ardres, hitherto subordinate, into the secret.124

121

Ibid., p. 687. Francis had already informed the Protestants that if there were any treaty or truce ‘seront comprins les Royne douairyere d’Escosse et petite Royne, leurs estats, royaulmes, lieus et loyaulx subgectz.’ (Pariset, ‘La France et les princes allemands,’ no. 2). 122 Ibid., p. 687: ‘das die sach wol stünd, auch was sie und die madama des Thamps in der sach handelten.’ 123 Ibid., p. 689 (9 Dec. 1545). This is very close in contents to a document preserved in copies in the BnF. It has become attached to the French instructions for 1546 and its significance has not, therefore, been understood. It is an instruction from Francis I to his official negotiators, Soissons, Remon and Philibert Babou, superseding former instructions of the 27 Nov. 1545. Here they are told that if the English will not come to terms on Boulogne and the Scots ‘qui sont les deux principaux poincts de la dicte negotiation’ they are to inform the King of English demands. Even it the King were to agree to the marriage of Edward end Mary Stuart for the sake of peace, this would only mean he could send trusted persons to persuade the Queen Mother and Parliament. He was prepared to promise, though, that if they refused, he would stop aiding them. As for the pension, he would be willing to increase it, but on no account would he let the English keep Boulogne. There are some obvious discrepancies between this and the document handed to the Germans, notably about Bou1ogne and the length of the truce proposed. Nevertheless, its contents indicate that the two documents must be contemporary, and the differences may be explained by the possible desire of the French to make the Protestants believe they were more willing to come to terms than was actually the case. (transcript, NA, PRO 31/3/14, fos. 260r–261v.) 124 This is shown by the final part of Francis’ instructions to his commissioners (c. 9 Dec. 1545: ‘Le Roy entend que La Planche déclare au dict sieur de Soissons et ses collègues ce qu’il a appris des protestants et de Paget, et des articles que le dit sieur a vue, et sentira comme de luy mesme des Protestants s’il luy est possible quelle

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The cause of this second reversal of French policy may be seen either in a struggle for influence around the King or in French fears of the Emperor, itself the product of a very real fear of Gardiner’s activities at the Imperial Court. Bruno told Paget that Francis had been annoyed at La Planche’s original proposals but that, when he received a cool answer from the Emperor, he fell into a rage and called for the proposals of 9 December to be penned out.125 This certainly reflects the sequence of negotiations going on at this time between the abbé de Longpont and the Emperor’s confessor for a joint declaration of enmity against England.126 By 1 December, such a plan had been poisoned by the Emperor’s complaints about French troop-movements,127 but France was still trying to keep its options open.128 Pressure from favourites cannot be ruled out, but Francis was strong enough to resist it when necessary. In December 1545, it seemed that everything was to be gained by an agreement with England if an Anglo-Imperial understanding could thereby be avoided: hence the proposals of 9th.

responce ils auront eue d’Angleterre sur les dicts articles. Si n’entend pas toutesfois le Roy jamais qu’on parle qu’il les ayt entendu, mais si les Protestans en parloient au dict de la Planche on pourra respondre doucement comme de luy selon la teneur de cette instruction. Pareillement de ce qu’il remonstrera aux dicts Protestants et fera entendre à Paget comme de luy-mesme tant sur le retour de Monsieur l’Admiral que sur l’entrevue des dicts deux Roys et aultres choses quelconques, que le dict sieur Roy entend que le dict de la Planche die qu’il en advertira les dicts sieurs deputez cy-dessus, est ce que la Planche a donné par escript à Messieurs les Deputez le dernier jour de Novembre au matin de ce que luy fut, le vingt septieme du dict mois de Novembre, commandé,’ transcript, NA, PRO 31/3/14, fos. 260r–261v. This document clearly indicates that La Planche had received an earlier instruction on 27 November, countermanded in all but minor points here. La Planche had therefore gone back to court after the first formal meeting on 26th. 125 Paget to Henry VIII, 15 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 774–745. 126 Francis I to Mesnage, 3 Dec. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 51, on ‘la volunté que led. Empereur avoit de traicter amytié avecques moy et se declairer ennemy du Roy d’Angleterre.’ 127 ‘Double du memoire porté au Roy par Malestroict,’ 1 Dec.[ 1545], BnF fr. 17889, fos. 88–9; Mesnage to Annebault, 28 Nov. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 115–118: ‘Je suis en doubte si les propos dessusdictz sont pour acheminer les ambassadeurs au Roy d’Angleterre à faire ce que l’Empereur demande.’ 128 Mesnage to Francis I, 8 Dec. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 108–109. Mesnage told the Emperor’s confessor that Francis did not really wish for peace with England. In other words, the French Court was attempting to see which was the best bargain that could be obtained.


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Paget had to wait until 14th to hear of the proposals of 9th.129 Given the instructions he had already received,130 it is not surprising that he rejected them out of hand as providing nothing new131 but this was a serious mistake. As Bruno rightly pointed out, the terms of 9th were the product of a temporary mood produced by the cooling-off of Francis’ relations with the Emperor.132 Paget’s unwillingness to descend to his lowest terms destroyed any chance of success133 and was itself a product of unsettled English business with the Emperor; he was instructed not to give way should Gardiner’s talks with the Emperor look like being successful.134 The news had not come through before the collapse of the Calais negotiations and the responsibility must lie between Paget’s mismanagement and his master’s wish to have the best of both worlds. Francis I testily remarked to the German negotiators that he was glad they now saw Paget’s ‘peu de foy,’ especially the ‘mocquerie’ of his having dragged up all the old demands over Normandy and Aquitaine that he been sleeping for 60–70 years. He commiserated on the waste of their time.135 When, on 20th, Henry decided to accept virtually the

129 Paget and Marguerite had exchanged letters in which she pledged herself and Mme. d’Etampes to work for closer amity with England and vouched for the proposals already put forward by La Planche. The latter had to make excuses for the fact that Marguerite had leaked a letter of Paget to the Imperials earlier in the year, much to his embarrassment (Paget to Henry VIII, 5 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 757–758 and p. 347). The initiative pre-dates Francis’ reversal of policy by several days and may thus indicate Marguerite’s influence. La Planche’s methods in holding out the unlikely prospect of a French rejection of the Papacy, indicates some understanding of English preoccupations, though it grossly over-estimated Paget’s credulity. For the promise of French rejection of Papal supremacy, cf. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 472–475, especial1y for the affair of June 1546. 130 The instruction of 29 November (St.P., X, pp. 730–733) orders Paget to stand out for Ardres to see if the French would offer anything more. That of 4 December (ibid., pp. 749–752) prescribes four further degrees to which Paget might descend, but only ‘upon a manifest apparance that they woold rather breake up then assent to the first.’ These degrees are to be found in a memo in Petre’s hand, possibly for a Council meeting (NA SP1/211, fo. 158). 131 Paget to Henry VIII, 15 Dec. 1545, St.P. X, pp. 768–778. 132 Ibid., p. 776. 133 ‘this night musing in my bed I thought, if it wer possible to induce Your Majestie, for the quiet possession of Boulloyn and Ardre with the whole countyes of Boullonnoys and Guisnez, to remitt the debtes alredy past, and thinterestes of the warre, with the pension perpetual, it wer a happy bargain for the French King,’ ibid., p. 776. 134 Council to Paget, 18 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, p. 785–. 135 Francis I to the Protestant ambassadors, Dec. 1545, Pariset, ‘La France et les princes allemands’ Francia, 10 (1992), no. 4.

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same terms as those proposed by Marguerite, Mme d’Etampes and Longueval, it was too late.136 By 22nd, Bruno had decided that the best that could be done was to fix up a truce, though he promised to persuade the two ladies to lead Francis away from the Pope and the Scottish alliance.137 However, when Sturm again returned from the French Court it was to report a new hardening of the French attitude; even a truce would now be made dependent on the inclusion of the Scots. An English copy of a proposed truce138 contains no mention of the Scots and at the last moment both sides refused to budge on this vital question, despite the frantic efforts of the Protestants.139 A meeting of the English Council in mid-December had decided that the exclusion of the Scots was ‘very expedient,’ agreed to further negotiations on 1 May but rejected finally Protestant arbitration of the disputed debts.140 By 30th, the Council’s attitude had even hardened141 as had that of the French Court. Sturm hinted at the reason: ‘the French King is as nere a conclusion with themperour as the Kinges Majeste is and that themperour hath requyred hym to send unum ex intimis which he will do.’142 Yet again, mutual suspicion had destroyed trust. In the winter of 1545, the great fear of both sides was the coalition of the other with the Emperor. Paget was therefore right to expect the French to suspend talks until the outcome of Friar Gusman’s mission became known.143 We also know that Mesnage was sending back reports that the English were telling the Emperor that they were only dallying with the French.144 136 137 138 139

Henry VIII to Paget, 18 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 799–801. Paget to Henry VIII, 22 Dec. 1545, BL, Cotton, Calig. E IV, 80. BL Harleian 7571, fo. 37. Tunstal, Paget and Tregonwell to Henry VIII, 29 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 815–

816. 140 Memorandum of a discussion in the Council, mid-December. On the truce (and here Hertford is noted particularly) the Council ‘thinke it very expedient to leave out the Scottes yf it be possible. And yf not, to comprehende them with condicion that themperour etc. so as the tyme for truex continue according to the former instruction, viz. the last of October. And in that case of comprehension that Mr Paget do dispatche to my Lord of Winchester for themperours consent.’ NA, SP1/212, fo. 116r–v (L&P, XX, ii, 1036). 141 The excuse that the Scots could not be comprehended without the Emperor’s consent could not be used in case the French ask him for it and he grant it. See Council to Paget, 30 Dec. 1545, NA SP1/212, fos. 157–158 (L&P, XX, ii, 1060). 142 Paget to Petre, 26 Dec. 1545, NA SP1/212, fo. 128r (L&P, XX, ii, 1040). 143 Paget to Petre, 26 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, p. 809 (L&P, XX, ii, 1039). 144 Mesnage reported a message from England that, while Francis was doing his utmost to obtain peace, ‘ledict Roy d’Angleterre asseure l’Empereur par ces lettres


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This would be a clear signal for the French to withdraw any tentative commitments for fear of being compromised with the Emperor. The ultimate reason for the failure of the Protestants was the chronic suspicion engendered by tripartite diplomacy, in this case exacerbated by the simultaneous negotiations at Calais and the Imperial Court. Alongside concerns about honour, there was a degree of pragmatism in both courts which could envisage the success of either approach and the use of one negotiation as a bargaining counter for the other. That the result was failure should not be surprising. The Protestants were by no means unequal to their task. Though Sleidan may have been relatively young and inexperienced at this time and Baumbach something of a sleeping partner, this did not detract from the abilities of Bruno and Sturm both of whom Paget praised highly.145 Their connections at the French Court with French diplomats who had worked in Germany proved extremely useful in opening up secret talks. Their fundamental aim in offering their mediation – to ensure an alliance which would protect them against the Emperor’s imminent attack – was wise though admittedly over-optimistic in the context of the history of Franco-Protestant relations. That both Kings were anxious not to offend them is indicated by the subsequent relations of both Henry and Francis with them. The texts of both Kings’ letters to the Protestant Estates on the occasion of the breakdown of talks survive and confirm this. Both were anxious to put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the other, while the English Council instructed Paget to warn them against the Franco-Imperial negotiations ‘mayned by Frere Gosman.’146

qu’il luy tiendra promesse et qu’il entretiendra seullement le Roy en bonnes parolles sans traicter paix avecques luy.’ (Mémoire of Mesnage to the Admiral and Tournon, 24 Dec. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 198–9; Mesnage to Francis I, 25 Dec. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 96–97). 145 Paget to Henry VIII, 15. Dec. 1545, St.P., X, p. 774; on 2 December: Paget had written to the King that ‘This Sturmius, Sir, is a great practisioner, and whatsoever he sayth is all togidre French; but yet if he had not ben, the rest of his colleges be such shepe, except Brewno, who is more witty and grave then inventive, we had broken up er this tyme.’ St.P., X, p. 747. 146 Henry VIII to the States of the Schmalkaldic league, Westminster, 30 Dec. 1545, Ludwig von Seckendorf, Commentarius historicus et apologeticus de Lutheranismo (Frankfurt, 1692), bk. III, sect. 32, 124; additio II, p. 572; Francis I to the same, 9 Jan. 1545, St. Germain, copy in NA SP1/213, fo. 53r–v; Council to Paget. 29 Dec. 1545, SP1/212, fo. 147r–v.

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The disappointment of the Protestant envoys was palpable but, as Rory McEntegart has argued, the fact that peace was concluded six months later may owe something to the fact that they had got the powers to the negotiating table. Henry may have revived his interest in talks with the Protestants in the spring of 1546, probably mainly aiming to gain their help in recruiting mercenaries for his continuing war with the French. If so, he received a cool answer, for the Schmalkaldic League was now threatened by a direct attack from the Emperor.147 In the final analysis, though, the success of Protestant mediation was more important for the German princes than for the French and English governments which, though nearing the end of their financial tether, believed themselves still to have reserves of strength. All this is demonstrated by the persistence of Protestant interest in Anglo-French relations. Their belief in the help to be obtained by the co-operation of Henry and Francis persisted until the battle of Mühlberg brought about the collapse of the League. Meanwhile, the military options had not yet been exhausted in the Anglo-French war.

147 McEntegart, Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, p. 210; Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p. 465.

CHAPTER TEN

THE ADMIRALS’ PEACE: THE TREATY OF ARDRES-GUÎNES (JUNE 1546) On 7 June 1546, in the gently rolling fields between the French fortress-town of Ardres and the English stronghold of Guînes and not far from the site of the pomp and extravagance of the Field of Cloth of Gold,1 two negotiating teams led by the English and French Admirals, John Dudley, viscount Lisle, and Claude d’Annebault, met in a tent to put their names to a treaty which was to end the last war between Henry VIII and Francis I. The name ‘Admirals’ Peace’ is appropriate, especially in the light of the extravagant poem by John Leland which ends with plaudits for the two Admirals and their work.2 The treaty does not have the reputation of other great diplomatic events of the sixteenth century and there has been a certain amount of misunderstanding about its provisions. Thus, figures given for the sum agreed to by France in terms of indemnity range from 800,000 to 2 million écus and, while some claim the guarantee to the Scots was worthless, others that it was calculated to bind English policy. In France it has seemed a bad deal, extracted from an ageing Francis I after a period of failure and in England as a fatal bargain which, by maintaining Henry VIII’s conquest of Boulogne, undermined the finances of the crown and generated a massive social and economic crisis.3 That apart, 1 The name of the Treaty is ambiguous, variously given as Ardres, Andres, ‘Campe’ etc. There is no doubt that the boundary between French and English ground ran near the villages of Ballinghem, Andres and Campagne and that the Field of Cloth of Gold extended between this and the hamlet of Campagne, the main street of which marked the boundary of the Calais pale (‘Campe . . . whiche is a village therin half your highness and the other parte the Frenche Kinges.’ Longleat MSS, SE/I, fo. 132v). The dating clause of the treaty gives: ‘Acta fuerent haec sub Tentoriis in Agro prope Villam vocatam Campensem in confinibus Ardreae & Guysnarum’ Rymer, 3rd ed. Foedera VI, p. 137. Original copies of the treaty: AN, J 651/B, no. 18bis (English), NA, E/30/1318 (French) L&P, XXI, i, 1014. 2 Dana F. Sutton, John Leland, Two Poems on the French War pub. by the Univ. of Birmingham Philological Museum Project (electronic text: www.philological.bham .ac.uk/warpoems). It is perhaps significant that no comparable plaudits seem to have been published in France (see below Conclusion). 3 G. Salles, ‘Guerre et négociations,’ pp. 65–76, sought to exploit English sources for a French audience but offered little judgment other than that the financial circumstances compelled both sides to come to terms.

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the treaty deserves attention as the last major event of the turbulent and complex relations between Henry VIII but we need also to try to understand it in terms of the pressures of the time and ask why Francis was willing to conclude a treaty which ostensibly left him dispossessed of a strategic outpost of his kingdom. The signing of the peace by two evenly balanced negotiating teams also reflects the symmetries of the end of the two reigns, with both ageing and jaded kings nominally allied to the Emperor Charles V but anxious about his intentions, both deeply suspicious of the other and anxious to capitalize on the alliance of German Protestant princes. It had proved exceptionally difficult to achieve this peace; as with the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis a dozen years later, it took two attempts and some false starts before acceptable terms could be agreed. The existence of a wide range of sources in German and Italian archives, as well as the well-known English and sparse French sources justifies a thorough re-examination of the treaty in the context of the multi-faceted relations between France, England, the Emperor Charles V and the German Protestant princes. The Need for Peace What, then, ultimately prompted Henry and Francis to agree to the peace in June 1546? For the Parisian preacher François Le Picart, the upheavals of 1544 provided an object lesson in divine providence. True peace could only be made by God and the fall of Boulogne to the English was a sign of God’s anger; until the people of France mended their ways, they would continue to fear both king and Emperor.4 Naturally, historians are apt to seek for more mundane explanations. As has been seen, stubbornness on both sides had repeatedly delayed the conclusion of peace. Henry VIII undoubtedly saw Boulogne as the great achievement of his old age. Francis I could not accept its loss and was prompted perhaps by a general consensus of his inner advisers late in 1544 in favour of peace with the Emperor.5 From what we

4

L.J. Taylor, Heresy and Orthodoxy in Sixteenth-Century Paris, pp. 196–197. La Hargerie to Mesnage, 21 Feb. 1545, BnF fr., 17889, fo. 232: ‘j’ay entendu que plus que james le Roy a [au] coeur l’affaire du Boulenoys.’ A report to Charles V from France at this time: ‘Sire, je trouve en extreme demonstracion tous ceulx qui gouvernent que j’ay veu trescontens de la paix avec vostred. Majesté, et mesmes m’a dit en passant le cardinal de Tournon que en vingt ans qu’il menoit affaires il n’a veu appoinctement que plus doige durer . . . mais tous sont fort animez contre le Roy d’Angleterre, mesmes Bayard 5

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have seen of the reports of Gardiner and Paget, some of Henry VIII’s key advisers had come to the conclusion that Boulogne was not worth the cost of hanging on to it, though they were by no means in the majority. Again, we have seen that Surrey at Boulogne was rebuked for encouraging the King to hang on to the town. Yet, it is also clear that military preparations were being stepped up in the early months of 1546. Van der Delft thought that this was primarily for defence but was probably wrong.6 Preparing for war both by land and sea had the advantage of preparing for all eventualities. Peace talks might well break down again; on the other hand, it was essential to negotiate from a position of strength. Protestant mediation had proved a failure and John Mason’s return empty-handed from the Rhineland early in May convinced Paget, for one, of the uselessness to England of a German alliance. I am sure the k.m. by this tyme seyth what frendship his highnes may looke for in Almayn, which in my poore opinion is nothing; and therfor I am sure his gret wisdome will considre there is litle trust to be geven there, not moche to thEmperor and none to any other frend that I can see.7

The need for peace was obvious, though it remained to convince the King about Boulogne. Here, the role of Paget may have been crucial, since the secretary told the French ambassador in the following year that he had pushed for peace in the teeth of opposition from the rest of the Council.8 New talks were Paget’s last attempt to achieve peace in the face of this hostility. In France, the talks at Calais under Protestant mediation may have been pushed by opponents of Tournon and Annebault in order to gain the credit for making peace (though this remains uncertain). But the final negotiations of April–June 1546, again under neutral mediation, involved Annebault closely, with Tournon

qui dit que l’on vendra femme et enfans ou l’on le mettra hors de Bologne.’ (HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 5 fo. 169). 6 Van der Delft to Charles V, 10 March, 10 March 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 365. 7 Paget to Petre, 14 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 126r (L&P, XXI, I, 831). See also Philip of Hesse to Mont, 13 May 1546, SP1/218, fos. 137–138 (L&P, XXI, i, 834 (2,3)). Paget’s strategic analysis is very close to Gardiner’s, cf. Gardiner to Paget, 13 Nov. 1545, Muller, Letters, p. 187. 8 Odet de Selve to Montmorency, 29 Aug. 1547, Correspondance politique d’Odet de Selve, no. 217.

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staying in the background.9 As such, they perhaps showed that the Admiral thought little was to be hoped for from the Emperor. After the breakdown of the negotiations in December 1545, both sides began to rearm. Saint-Mauris reported from France that in early December that ‘il s’est publié’ that war would be resumed in the coming year under the Admiral’s command and that a major expedition to Scotland was planned.10 There were, though, significant practical problems in the way of renewing the fighting. The French were counting on the German princes to make life difficult for the Emperor, though this would be of little use against England.11 Lack of money was their main problem (Francis had already borrowed 700,000 écus from Lyon) and the rise in food prices meant that it would be difficult to equip a new army until the next harvest.12 In January 1546, as we have seen, a new English expeditionary force was ready to cross to Boulogne under the command of the Earl of Hertford in order to fortify Ambleteuse, while pressure on the French fortress of Outreau led to the drawn battle between the earl of Surrey and marshal du Biez.13 Henry’s pride prompted him to negotiate “sworde in hand”14 but financial problems were bearing down on him.15 A plan was mooted for the storming of Etaples should further talks fail, but the King only accepted it while still hoping for peace: his highnes myndeth nott so moch this enterprise butt he can be well contented to have an honorable peax.16

The English suspected that the French intended an immediate renewal of war17 but this was not the case. Cardinal Ippolito of Ferrara, Francis’

9 This is to a degree speculation and should not detract from the essential political unity between Annebault and Tournon throughout 1545 and 1546 (Nawrocki, ‘Annebault,’ II, pp. 385–391). 10 Saint-Mauris, newsletter, 7 Dec. 1545, AN K 1485 (microfilm). 11 Cardinal of Ferrara to Ercole II, 16 Mar. 1546, ASM, Principi Estensi, B 60/147, p. 2, in which Francis dwells on his close relations with the Protestant princes: ‘eso Conte (Palatino) et Signori Protestanti s’intendevano ben con Sua Maestà Christianissima et si sforzavano di mostrarle il buon’animo che hano verso lei . . . .’ 12 HHSA, P.A., 62, fo. 114. For the pressure of war expenditure on France in the mid-1540s, Hamon, L’argent du roi, pp. 46–47. 13 Potter, Du Biez, pp. 50, 213–217; Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 327–329. 14 Lisle to Henry VIII, 26 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 102r. 15 See above ch. 5 and Hoyle, ‘War and Public Finance’ pp. 75–99. 16 Hertford to Henry VIII, 28 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 125v. Council to Hertford and Lisle (late April 1546), NA SP1/217, fo. 135r. 17 Council to Petre, 11 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 40r: ‘We have also sent letters


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rich, cynical and entertaining boon companion, remarked that Francis was counting on peace in 1546 and would only strengthen his frontier fortifications in case the English refused to come to terms.18 True, the French may have feared the Emperor’s intentions in Piedmont and were to do so for the rest of the decade,19 but on the whole Francis was counting on the Emperor’s pre-occupation with Germany in 1546.20 Basically, neither the English nor the French could afford, financially, to start large-scale hostilities in 1546, especially as the Europe-wide economic crisis was at its height in that year. This was to override the unsolved problems of Boulogne and Scotland. Actually, the monthly cost of non-routine military expenditure in France (the extraordinaire

to my lorde of Hertforde to be in a readines in case of the breache of communicacion of peaxe to prevent the Frenchemen in taking of the poincte againste Bolen haven on the other side the water.’ (L&P, XXI, i, 790). Jacques Granada, who had spoken to Du Biez and to the Rhinegrave, claimed that, if peace were not made, the French would take the field and attack the new fort at Ambleteuse after the Almain Hill, a plan strikingly similar to the French attack of 1549 (SP1/218, fos. 31–32, L&P, XXI, i, 779). That a forward policy was not part of French intentions has been shown, but what is important about this is that the English believed it likely. 18 Ippolito d’Este, Cardinal Protector of France, was closer to the King than many at this time (M. Hollingsworth, The Cardinal’s Hat: Money, Ambition and Housekeeping in a Renaissance Court (London, 2006)). His letters are crucial. In March he sent his brother, Ercole II, an extremely important appraisal of French policy in which he observed: ‘ne io penso che habiamo da veder per questo ano altra guerra che quel . . . d’Inghilterra, che a mio iudicio anco non sara senon quanto vora eso Inglese perche questa Maestà non intende di far per adeso altro che restara veder quelche vora far il nimico et atendera guardare et conservar queste sue frontiere che habi segnato di fortificare questo fine ne quali non manca di fare fa gli ardamante tute queste provisioni di munitioni, viveri et altre cose necessarie a questo effeto. quando anco vedesi chel nimico volse pasar piu oltre et facese sforzo ha di gia anco provisto et cosi fa tenir prestido dici mila Suiceri et altre fanti ale mani da volersene poi quando sara il bisogno; et credo ben che in tanto non manchera d’andar in volla pratiche di pace et d’accordi tra questo Re et quel d’Inghilterra et tra questa Maestà et la Cesarea.’ Cardinal Hippolito of Ferrara to Ercole II, Limours, 16 Mar. 1546, ASM, Casa e Stato, Carteggio tre principi Estensi, B 60/147, n.p., p. 3, passage in cipher. 19 Despatches of Saint-Mauris, March–May 1547, HHSA, Frankreich, 14–16 passim. 20 Saint-Mauris may have overestimated Francis’ fear of the Emperor in 1546. The Cardinal of Ferrara observed that Francis was, unusually, sanguine about the Emperor’s intentions. Mesnage, said the French King, had received warm words of friendship when he asked the Emperor about his negotiations to end the state of war with Scotland. Charles had said that his relations with England remained the same as in the previous year and that he contemplated nothing in conjunction with England. ‘mi dise anco come pur scrisi che non pensava che sto fuse per fare per questo ano inovatione ne cosa alcuna contra di Lei, anzi che da questo et altri segni parea che si dimostrase d’alcuni giorni in qua piu amorevoli et grati propositi, il che Sua Maestà pensa che proceda dal haver trovato sto questi principi protestanti piu duri et piu difficili . . .’ (Cardinal of Ferrara to Ercole II, 16 Mar. 1545/6, p. 2, cit. sup., my own decipher).

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des guerres) had been at its height in 1544 and dropped sharply in 1545 and further in 1546. The cost to France of the war roughly halved after the peace with the Emperor but it was the accumulation of expenditure, inexorable since the start of war in 1542, that was to tell.21 (Appendix 12) What is remarkable is that the two monarchies were sustaining broadly comparable war finance efforts in 1544–1546. Henry VIII’s war expenditure in 1542–1547 has been calculated at £1.6 million, or four times the cost of the campaigns of the early 1520s. £560,000 was spent in the year from Michaelmas 1544 alone. There was more than a hint of desperation in Wriothesley’s letter of September 1545: ‘yet you write to me still pay, pay, prepare for this and that.’22 A Mediator from Venice The origins of the neutral mediation that brought about the peace are well-documented, though the motives remain obscure. The chief mediator of the peace was a Venetian nobleman and ship-owner, Francesco Bernardo, who had seen two of his ships arrested for service in England.23 One of his preoccupations in 1546 was the salvage of goods from his ship the Sancta Maria and Sanctus Edwardus, laden with goods bound for Leghorn, which sank off Southampton in July. He commissioned a syndicate also involved in the Mary Rose salvage operation.24 At the time, Venice was only represented in England by a secretary, Zambon, until the conclusion of the peace but on 20 March

21 P. Hamon, L’argent du roi. The global burden of the taille attained 4.6 million livres in 1544–1545 (ibid., p. 66). Monthly expenditure on the extraordinaire dropped from 520,000 lt. in 1544 to 131,157 in 1546 (ibid., pp. 44–47). Nevertheless, the year’s expenditure on the extraordinaire in 1545 was still 2,893,929 lt. (dropping to 1,581,091 lt. in 1546). Directly attributable military expenditure stood at 4,069,018 lt. in 1545 and 2,801,260 lt. in 1546 (BnF fr. 17329, fos. 82r–112v.) 22 Hoyle, ‘War and Public Finance,’ pp. 91–93, Wriothesley to the Council, L&P, XX, ii, 366. The French money of account, the livre tournois stood at between 8 and 9 to the £ sterling. French expenditure on purely military matters can be calculated at 5,999,183 lt. in 1545 (between, 600,000 and 700,000 £ sterling in a country with five times the population). BnF fr. 17329, fos. 82–112. 23 Francesco’s father was Ser Benetto and grandfather ser Francesco and all his family are listed as knights (CSP Venice, V, nos. 523). G.B. Crollalanza, Dizionario Storico delle Famiglie Nobili e Notabili Italiane (1886), ‘Bernardo di Venezia.’ 24 G. Ungerer, ‘Recovering a black African voice in an English lawsuit: Jacques Francis and the salvage operations of the Mary Rose, c. 1545–1550,’ Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England (2005), 255–271.


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we learn that the Venetian Ambassador in France, Marino Cavalli, had told Giulio Alvarotti, the Ferrarese ambassador, ‘that a Venetian gentleman of the house of Bernardi, nephew of M. Maffeo Bernardi, who usually lives in London, recently arrived on business’25 Bernardo came from a family established in banking but which had experienced difficulties as a result of his uncle Maffeo’s sailing close to the wind in the 1530s. He had possibly been trying to corner the Anglo-Venetian wool trade and was certainly accused both of quarrelling with the Venetian envoy in England, Carlo Capello, and denigrating the Republic. As a result he had been banned by the Venetian government from England.26 Ser Maffeo seems to have transferred his interests to the Levant and left those in England to his nephew. But further murky complications arose from Maffeo’s murder later in 1546 by the notorious Ludovico da l’Armi. This took place at a time when warrants were out for the arrest of Maffeo Bernardo for divulging state secrets to France. Da L’Armi had his own dealings with France and may have been aiming to silence Maffeo.27 Francesco Bernardo was a man with contacts, but how these had developed is unclear. After the peace, Giulio Alvarotti reported that, when a new papal nuncio was scheduled to come to France, one of his objectives was to reconcile England with the Church using Bernardo as intermediary even though, as the nuncio thought, ‘he does not have that much credit with this king’ The Venetian ambassador replied that, though Bernardo had not been open with him, he was sure ‘that if this gentleman could hope to have the honour of such a negotiation, that he would seize the opportunity with both hands.’ This is a clear

25 Alvarotti to Ercole II, Paris, 20 Mar. 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 2, fo. 100r: ‘che uno gentil’huomo Viniciano di casa Bernardi, nipote di M. Maffeo Bernardi, il quale per ordinario sta in Londra, è venuto hora qui per alcuni suoi negotii.’ In the absence of the Venetian ambassador’s reports for this period, Alvarotti is the best source; he was in the confidence of both that ambassador and the Cardinal Hippolyto of Ferrara. 26 CSP Venice, III, no. 474 (13 June 1522); no. 561 (1 Oct. 1522); IV, no. 864 (15 March 1532); nos. 910–911, (June 1533). 27 E. Harrison, ‘Henry the Eighth’s gangster: the affair of Ludovico de l’Armi’ in Journal of Modern History, 1943, p. 272. Maffeo’s goods in the Levant had been returned to him by the intervention of the French envoy Rincon in 1541 (A. Tausserat-Radel, Correspondance politique de Guillaume Pellicier, I, pp. 202, 216, 319) which implies Maffeo was a member of the Consiglio dei Dieci at some period.

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enough opinion of his motives.28 Alvarotti himself was in no doubt of Bernardo’s contacts: he went to the court to speak to the Admiral as if on his own initiative about peace between England and France, though nevertheless was sent by the Admiral of England with a broad patent, which the Venetian ambassador has seen. He spoke to my lord Admiral one evening, who did not show him much cheer. Nevertheless, he referred all to the King and the following morning he had him inspected by M. Monluc to see if he knew him. The latter affirmed that he was a Venetian gentleman and that he knew him.

This brought a gentler attitude from Annebault, who was now prepared to listen and enquired after Bernardo’s lodging. The latter replied that he was staying with his friend and relative Cavalli, the Venetian ambassador, and the Admiral asked him not to reveal anything about his negotiations. Needless to say, this was in vain. Alvarotti even learned that Annebault had prepared an even more ample commission than Lisle’s.29 The story is broadly confirmed by a report to the Emperor.30 This adds the suggestion that Bernardo had told Annebault that Henry was reluctant to continue the war and that he was willing to hand over Boulogne when all the arrears and 5 millions for war expenses had been paid. Apparently Francis had persisted in his refusal to accept English occupation of Boulogne, but was willing to give hostages and

28

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 28 June 1546, ASM, Francia, B 23, fasc. 1, fo. 78v (deciph.): ‘egli na tanto credito con quel re.’ ‘che se detto gentil’huomo potra sperare di haver honore di un tal negocio che vi entrara dentro con le mani et con le piedi.’ 29 Alvarotti to Erco1e II, 24 Mar. 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 2, fo. 118v (decipher): ‘ando alla Corte a parlare à Mons. Almiralgio come da se de intromettersi à parlare della pace tra Inghilterra et Franza, ma nondimeno in fatto egli era mandato dallo Almiraglio d’Anghilterra con una patente grandissima, la quale esso Ambasciatore Veneto ha veduta; parla con Mons. Almiraglio una sera, il quale non li fece troppo buona chiera. Nondimeno, refer’ il tutto al Re, et la mattina sequente li fece vedere a Mons. Monluch per vedere se lo conosceva. Gli affirmo ch’egli era gentil’huomo Vinitiano et che lo conosceva.’ Much the same information is given by Guidiccione, papal nuncio, who adds that Bernardo was also nephew to Pietro Lippomano, bishop of Verona, counted Admiral Lisle among his friends and that Monluc had been instrumental (to Cardinal Farnese, 29–30 June, ANG, III, pp. 437, 439). 30 HHSA, P.A. 62 fos. 113–14, news report c. 14 April 1546: ‘Il y a environ trois sepmaines que ung nommé Francisque Mapheo [sic] marchant venicien demeurant à Londres se treuve en court de France, et fit tant qui parla à l’admiral dud. France, luy disant qu’il estoit là envoyé par l’admiral d’Angleterre pour enfformer oud. coustel de France si l’on vouldroit accommoder à quelque paix, et que le Roy d’Angleterre n’estoit deliberé de continuer la guerre, car il prevoit que tous deux se destruysoient.’


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guarantees for the debt of 1 million.31 Lisle and Paget later claimed that Jean de Monluc had been the ‘principall worker in this mater’ and had broached it to the Venetian ambassador in France, who in turn had approached Francesco Bernardo.32 Later rumour had it that Bernardo, who had had an understanding with Monluc before the talks began, had promised the English Council the retention of Boulogne, payment of the pension and the Scottish marriage.33 This may have been an attempt by the English to cover up the fact that Bernardo had started his mediation in England but it is clear enough that his proposals were quickly welcomed in France. The Venetian government had its own motives and was anxious to distance itself from any implication that it was involved, in order not to offend the Emperor.34 Yet, the involvement of the ambassador in France is all too clear. Venetian policy was involved through Jean de Monluc, brother of Blaise, who latter acted as a kind of sponsor for Bernardo. Monluc had been on embassy to Venice in 1543–1544 and then to the Ottoman Empire in 1545, when Franco-Imperial relations were warm enough to warrant a move on the part of France to arrange a peace between the Sultan and the Emperor’s brother Ferdinand. Having travelled via Venice, it is highly probable that he was in contact with Maffeo Bernardo, whose interests in the Levant were important.35 But Francesco Bernardo’s claim that he had a written commission from Lisle, confirmed by Alvarotti and Saint Mauris,36 contradicts Lisle’s claim that Monluc made the first approach. It is clear that Monluc had a personal interest and was, additionally, described by Paget as

31 Report from France sent to the Emperor, 14 April 1546, HHSA, P.A., 62, fos. 113–114: ‘le Roy d’Angleterre seroit content que l’on le paya à six termes des arrerages des pensions’ starting from the beginning if any term were defaulted on and providing security in international bankers. ‘Davantaige que led. François paya pour une fois à l’Anglois cinq millions d’or pour les interestz et fraiz de la guerre.’ Boulogne would be retained until full accomplishment of these payments. ‘Mais quant à soy retenir Boulongne . . . le François le rebouta plattement.’ 32 Lisle and Paget to Henry VIII, Calais, 20 April 1546, St.P., XI, p. 105. 33 Van der Delft to Charles V, 27 May 1546, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 266, L&P XXI, i, 938. 34 CSP Venice, V, no. 381. 35 P. Tamizey de Larroque, ‘Notes et documents inédits pour server à la biographie de Jean de Monluc, évêque de Valence,’ Revue de Gascogne, viii (1868), 397–410, at 404–407; for his report from Constantinople, E. Charrière, Négociations de la France dans le Levant, 4 vols. (Paris, 1848), I, pp. 596–612. 36 Saint Mauris to Covos, 1 April 1546, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 233. This was the first Saint-Mauris had heard of Bernardo.

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‘thadmyrales mynyon bycause the ff. King favoryth hym well.’ According to Saint Mauris’s informant, the King ordered him immediately to accompany Bernardo to England but later countermanded him when he suspected that Henry was dissembling and preparing to descend on France.37 Directly after his interviews with Annebault, Bernardo returned to England to confer with Henry and the Council and was back in Paris by 4 April, though on this return journey, he was detained for a while at Calais.38 Bernardo told the Venetian ambassador that Henry was willing to make peace on condition that he retain Boulogne and its confines until Francis repay the pension owed and English war expenses (this time 6 millions in gold); dates could be arranged. He would be content for the Scots to be included as French allies and for all outstanding difficulties to be settled by a meeting of commissioners at Calais.39 This account agrees closely with the instructions given to Lisle and Paget on 17 April, the only differences being that the English were to seek to retain Boulogne permanently at first, and only afterwards agree to restore it on terms. War costs were to be estimated at 3 million crowns.40 Bernardo went to see Annebault at Fontainebleau, speaking with him a long time, and the latter had then seen the King, but whether anything would result Alvarotti could not tell, especially as Bernardo had been taken ill. Actually, he was lying in a fever at the Admiral’s house and had been bled by the Cardinal of Ferrara’s physician. However, when Alvarotti talked to the Cardinal about the negotiations he found out that Bernardo had told Annebault about English troops being sent over to besiege Mont Saint Etienne.

37 Paget to Petre, 20 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 46r (L&P, XXI, i, 633); HHSA, P.A. 62, fo. 113v: ‘Et ainsi se partit led. Maphio de court pour retourner en Angleterre, avec lequel le Roy envoya Monluc pour parler à l’admiral dud. Angleterre et encheminer en quelque ville sur les frontieres l’entrevue des deux admiraulx. Mais ainsi que led. Monluc estoit desja à deux lieues oultre Paris, le Roy le contremanda à diligence pource que ou mesme instant il avoit heu advertissement que l’Anglois ne faisoit faire lesd. ouvertures sinon que pour l’abuser.’ 38 Lisle to Paget, 1 April 1546, ‘and as tochenge f. b., he was stayed here lenger then nedyd and cold nat be sufferyd to departe tyll I came . . . The cause was alledged that he shold nat see the marching of the armye, but ther was way enoghe ffor the trompett to have lede him bye.’ NA SP1/216, fo. 77r–v (L&P, XXI, i, 509). This is the first mention of Bernardo in English sources. 39 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 4 April 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fo. 19 (deciph). 40 St.P. XI, p. 102.


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No doubt he hoped in this way to persuade the French that the time had come to talk.41 By 6 April, Alvarotti knew Francis’ answer: willingness to give Henry 1 million crowns in return for Boulogne, to be guaranteed by the merchants of London, Antwerp, Lyon or Venice. Bernardo had replied that he could do no more as the English, who wished to retain Boulogne as a gage, would not be satisfied. The Admiral had finally agreed to this condition and they had then begun to speak about the amount of pension arrears. Bernardo claimed that the English had received nothing for thirteen years, a debt which, with the 100,000 cr. owed to an English duke and the 5,000 a year due to another English grandee amounted to 1,560,000 crowns. This did not include war costs (‘l’interessi della guerra’) amounting to six millions.42 Bernardo was to return to Lisle in three or four days and ask him to send a man to Guînes. Meanwhile, Monluc was to go to Ardres: and has an explicit commission from my lord Admiral, on the part of the Most Christian King, to do what he can to get them to accept one million in gold and restore Boulogne, liquidate the arrears and make an agreement together.43

In fact, it seems that Bernardo went back to London first and did not arrive at Ardres until 8th, while Monluc was there by 14th.44 Meanwhile, the English instructions, drawn up by Paget and amended by him, were issued along with a commission made out originally to Paget and Lisle alone but with the names of Hertford and Wotton added as an afterthought.45 Besides the points mentioned already, the commissioners were empowered by the King to delay the date of payment of the arrears, if the French were unable to scrape together the money. Paget, though, arranged to have a clause added ordering special regard to the

41

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 4 April 1546, cit. supr. Alvarotti to Ercole II, 6 April 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3. fos. 26–7 (deciph.). 43 Ibid., same to same, 12 April 1546, ibid., B 22, fasc. 3, p. 56 (deciph.): ‘et ha stretta commissione da Monsignor Almiraglio, per parte di Sua Maestà Christianissima, di far quanto potra perche concentino di accettare un millione d’oro, et restituire Bologna, et dello restante liquideranno et l’aranno d’accordio insieme.’ 44 Lisle & Paget to Henry VIII, 20 April 1546, St.P. XI, pp. 105–106. 45 For the instructions, NA SP1/217, fos. 16–19 (L&P, XXI, i, 610); for Paget’s own copy of them Anglesey MSS, Box 1, fo. 33 (no. 18); for a draft of the commission SP1/217, fos. 20–21. Wotton was included in the commission when it was heard that Remon was to be sent on the French side to pen the treaty. 42

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preservation of the Anglo-Imperial treaty. On the day before the sealing of this commission, Henry had revealed something of the negotiations to Cornelius Scepperus, Charles V’s envoy. No, doubt his aim was to prevent the talks being used against him by the French and to gain the advantage of claiming from the start that he was being sought by them.46 This news cannot have been too welcome to the Emperor and Scepperus told Carne on his return to the Netherlands that the French merely wished to attack the English ‘a l’improviso’ under cover of negotiations. Paget, for one, considered this unlikely: such foles as I am do rather beleve them to be nothing but reedes sowen to kepe downe the corne, and to put bees in our heddes as we woold also suspect they myght do the lyke with the Frenchman. I do not beleve that armyes though they have winges can flye.47

Preparations In any negotiation, certain basic imperatives apply: clear objectives, a bottom line beyond which compromise is not possible and a willingness to walk away from talks if agreement is not possible. In addition to this, it is obviously essential to have some understanding of the objectives and limits of the other side. The complexity of Renaissance diplomacy stemmed partly from the fact that initial positions were frequently taken up (honour, rights) which often did not sit comfortably with ‘interest’ (to set aside for the moment any idea of ‘national interest’). The advisers of rulers clearly understood this problem in wrestling with it. The statement of extreme demands, though, had a useful rhetorical effect in concentrating minds on more realistic objectives. How were these imperatives worked out in practice? From Paget’s arrival at Calais on 20 April, the reports from the English envoys come in a continuous stream and give a full picture of the English side of the negotiation. Unfortunately, the French despatches have not been preserved (partly through archival accident and probably also because much information was conveyed in person to the court by Monluc), though Alvarotti gives many insights into policy in the royal entourage. In fact, the French ministers must have been given some hint

46 Scepperus and Van der Delft to Charles V, 16 April 1546, CSP Spain VIII, no. 246. 47 Paget to Petre, 14 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 125v (L&P, XXI, i, 831).


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of a reasonable attitude on the English side. The Cardinal of Ferrara remarked that By what the Venetian gentleman you know gives me to understand, my lord Admiral hopes to come to a good conclusion because he indicates that the English Admiral has a commision to come to reasonable terms. On all this, though I may hope, I shall hold nothing for certain until I see the outcome . . .48

Actually the French commission is dated 21 April and is made out to Annebault, Bochetel and Pierre Remon, premier président at Rouen.49 Presumably, the undated French instructions were issued at the same time. These ordered the commissioners to set aside the conflicting arguments on the rights and wrongs of the pension issue and offer for arrears a total of 1,251,841 écus (made up of 994,737 for the arrears of the 2 millions contracted in 1525 and 142,104 for the arrears of life pension to begin on the full payment of the 2 millions in 1545 and 115,000 for salt arrears) with 300,000 for Henry’s expenses at Boulogne, with Boulogne to remain as a gage for payment. The total French offer on the table was thus 1,551,841 écus. Any payments for the arrears of pension due during wartime, however, were specifically excluded.50

48 Cardinal of Ferrara to Alvarotti, Montargis, 20 April 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fo. 69r (copy enclosed in Alvarotti’s despatch of the 23rd, ibid., fos. 95–100): ‘per quel che fa intendere quel gentilhuomo Vinitiano che sapete, Monsignor Ammiraglio spera di haverne à fare qualche buona conclusione, percio che colui significa che l’ammiraglio Inglese porta comessione di condescendere à cose ragionevoli. Di che se ben’ anch’io ne spero ogni bene non voglio pero tenirne niente di fermo sin che non ne vegga il successo.’ The Admiral had left Montargis on 21st to meet Lisle and Paget. Bernardo told the French that the English would get quickly to work, so he was giving the maximum encouragement to both sides. (Lisle and Paget to Henry VIII, 20 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 44r, (L&P XXI, i, 632). He had a1ready written to his uncle, Maffeo Bernardo, that there was ‘grete hope of agreement . . . which God grant to take effect’ (Harvel to Paget, Venice, 24 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 91, (L&P, XXI, i, 675). 49 Powers to negotiate, 21 April 1546, NA E 30/1315 (CAF, V, 70, 15024), and inserted in the original of the treaty (AN, J 651B, n° 18bis); L&P XXI, i, 640. 50 Instructions: copies (17th–18th c) in Paris, AE, Mémoires et Documents, Angleterre 3, fols. 85–94; BnF, fr. 2937, fos. 103–114 and fr. 17829, fols. 25–38v (18th c.) Transcript: NA, PRO 31/3/14, fos. 255–260. After referring the commissioners to the arguments detailed in the instructions to Soissons, Remon, and Babou, likely still in Remon’s possession, Francis I ordered his commissioners to set the arguments aside and come to a discussion of what was legally due. ‘Et premierement mond. sr l’admiral et autres deputez pour la premiere offre diront que le roy est contant de satisfaire au roy d’Angleterre de ce qui se trouvera vallablement et veritablement deub par les traictez passez entre le roy et luy.’ The King was willing to pay the remainder at the loan of 2 millions negotiated in the Treaty of 1525 (994,737 écus). As for the arrears

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As an initial negotiating position, it looks as though Francis was now seriously committed to negotiations – ultimately he was prepared to pay the vast sum of 2 million écus over eight years – but still not prepared to compromise on Boulogne. The imperial ambassador had a accurate idea of the French negotiating position and reported that ‘as these conditions are acceptable to the English king, it is assumed that he will accept them.’51 The demands of prestige required secrecy on both sides. Paget and Lisle, who were taking the lead on the English side, therefore decided that, in the light of Annebault’s delay and with Monluc only at Ardres, Lisle should return to the camp to await Hertford while Paget remained at Guînes, on the pretext of the King’s military affairs.52 This separation, however, was later to cause some complications. Preliminary exploratory talks between Paget and Monluc delayed the first meeting until 6 May. The problem was that Annebault was unwilling to risk his reputation and wished to come only for the final meetings. Paget, however, would not agree and demanded the Admiral’s presence. Monluc finally proposed an agenda: the figure for the recompense of Boulogne, the position of Scotland, and the amount of the county of Boulogne to be kept as a guarantee by the English.53 Paget occupied the rest of his time in clarifying his instructions and establishing clear authority for a second line of articles to be put to the French on their inevitable

of the life pension of 100,000 écus p.a., of which 142,104 écus would be due on the first of May, the King refused to pay this as it was accumulated during the war ‘car il seroit bien estrange qu’une pension causee pour entretenement d’amitié qui n’a debte ny obligation precedente, fust payee à un ennemy durant le temps de la guerre.’ Francis was reluctant, too, to pay the 11 ½ years arrears for the salt – 115,000 – due under the Treaty of 1527. Nevertheless, if agreement could not be reached in any other way, Francis agreed to pay the 142,000 and the 115,000 with another 300,000 for the expenses of English fortifications at Boulogne. In total, this was 1,551,841 écus. The rest of the instruction is concerned with the details of how the money was to be paid, how the English were to hold Boulogne during its temporary occupation, and with the King’s obligation to continue the life pension. Strangely, Scotland is hardly mentioned at this stage, except to say that it was to be comprehended ‘sans prejudice.’ 51 Saint-Mauris to commendatore of Leon, 1 May 1546, AN K 1486, no. 63 (microfilm): ‘come les dictes conditions sont à l’advantage de l’Anglois, l’on presume qu’il les acceptera.’ 52 Lisle and Paget to Henry VIII, 21 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 51 (L&P, XXI, i, 639); Monluc to Paget, 22 April 1546, SP1/217, fo. 58r), excusing the slowness of the French communication with their court to Paget ‘comme celluy qui scavez la distance qui peult avoir entre cy [et] Montargis’ (L&P, XXI, i, 654); Lisle to Paget, 23 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 622. 53 Paget to Henry VIII, 24 April 1546, St.P. XI, p. 111.


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rejection of the first.54 Meanwhile, messengers – Saint Germain and La Touche – sped back to the French Court.55 After another interview with Annebault, Bernardo saw Paget on 30 April and told him that the Admiral now wanted the meeting on the Boulogne frontier in order to dispel English fears of his re-victualling Ardres (he would require nine or ten carts plus pack-horses for his suite).56 The English would have none of this and Paget’s patience had already worn thin.57 By 1 May, the English had prepared a second set of offers for Henry’s approval. The French were to re-commence payments due under the treaties and to pay the arrears in full, half immediately and the rest at intervals. On the payment of all the war expenses claimed by the English, Boulogne was to be surrendered, but until then they were to enjoy peaceful possession. The inclusion of Scotland was to be made dependant on the handing over of Mary Stuart.58 Henry assented to these terms but grumbled about including the Scots; only realism brought him to agree, should the French insist.59

54 Li.sle and Paget to Petre, 30 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 139, Paget’s hand (L&P, XXI, i, 711); Paget to Petre, 1 May 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 153 (L&P, XXI, i, 724). In these negotiations, in fact, Paget is seen at his best, busying himself with the details of safe-conducts, requesting clarification of unclear points in his instructions, giving advice to his fellow secretary, Petre, and reflecting on the general situation. 55 Alvarotti was told by the Cardinal of Ferrara on 5 May that M. de Saint Germain, who had gone with Annebault as far as Montreuil, had returned. Annebault had sent Monluc to Calais ‘a dire all’ Armiraglio d’Inghilterra ch’egli era quivi, et che li faceva intendere che se Sua Excellentia non havea commissione di rendere Bologna et volere che Scocesi fossero compresi per confederati in questa pace, che non accadea che loro si vedissero.’ Annebault had since sent La Touche to say that Lisle ‘li mando a dire per Monsignor de Monluch che S. Ex. non guardasse a questo, ma che so vedissero pur che sperava non al partiriano da uno, se non ben satisfatto l’uno dell’altro. Monsignor de Monluch volse stuccicarlo per cavare qualche cosa, ma non fu mai remedio, et in fine S.Ex. li disse, noi parleremo insieme, et io diro a. S.Ex. quanto io porto et vengo in commissione dal mio Re.’ (Alvarotti to Ercole II, Melun, 5 May 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, p. 131 (deciph.). 56 Lisle, Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, 30 April 1546, St.P. XI, p. 120. 57 Clearly, Paget felt considerable irritation at this stage by the traditional delays and approaches which preceded negotiations in the 16th century. ‘had it not bene that we gret personages have sum tyme gretter regard to our pryvat reputacions then to the avauncement of the matter which we have in hand, the French Admyral and we had mette by this.’ While both sides quibbled about commissions ‘the matter passith little forward and the tyme moche away.’ (Paget to Petre, 30 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 140r). He repeated the point in chastising Lisle for his withdrawal to fight French ships in the Channel. ‘I woold wish that when the K.M. is to be served, every man woold leve apart his own private reputacion” (NA SP1/218, fo. 80v). 58 St.P., XI, p. 124; Paget to Henry VIII, 1 May 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 122–125. 59 Council to Paget, 2 May 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 135–136.

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Though both sides were by now anxious to get talks going, for fear of another failure, the French were still intensely suspicious. Cardinal Ippolito suspected that the negotiations were intended by the English to gain time to complete the harbour at Ambleteuse.60 Tournon was of much the same mind and told the Venetian ambassador on 6th that peace was impossible without the restitution of Boulogne. He seemed disturbed by Scepperus’ mission to England.61 The Papal Nuncio, though, thought peace assured if the French offered enough money.62 The Admiral was naturally anxious to avoid another failure, having committed his prestige; the safe conducts were expedited at his request and the difficult question of a truce put off.63 Haggling over Terms When the six commissioners and Monluc met on 6 May, in a tent in the same field as the previous November (near Balinghem), the usual process of making preposterous demands and then descending step by step began. At Lisle’s demand for 8 million écus as the price for Boulogne, the French professed incredulity; all Christendom could not gather such a sum! Of course, neither side accepted the other’s proposals, especially as the French still professed to be unable to give way on Boulogne. However, by a process of hard bargaining the English financial demands were beaten down to 3 millions from 8 and the English suggested the delivery of Mary Stuart as a condition for the inclusion of Scotland. As Annebault claimed to have no power to increase his offer by more than 50,000 crowns, deadlock was reached and both sides agreed to consult their masters.64

60

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 5 May 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fo. 131v. Alvarotti to Ercole II, Melun, 6 May 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fo. 139 (deciph.); M. François, Le Cardinal de Tournon, pp. 203–204. 62 J. de Vega to Charles V, 30 April 1546, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 253. 63 The Admiral said ‘that he sawe thabstinence could not be parfaicted in due ordre without tract of tyme,’ NA SP1/217, fo. 175 (Lisle, Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, Guînes, 4 May 1546). An English safe-conduct was dated 30 April but not delivered. For the English safe-conduct (copy) and the original of the French signed by Annebault, Remon and Bochetel, 2 May 1546 – for 300 persons and for 30 days, cf. Anglesey MSS, box 1, fo. 21 (no. 11), fos. 29–30 (no. 16), fos. 31–32 (no. 17). The French safe-conduct was renewed on 30 May for 4 days, ibid., fos. 24–25 (no. 13). 64 Lisle, Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, Guînes, 6 May 1546, St.P. XI, pp. 127– 134. An argument took place about whether the Scots were included in the Peace of Crépy: the English, technically correct, said they were not, Annebault that they 61


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The English commissioners estimated that the French were likely to increase, their offers by 5 or 600,000 cr. at the most for war expenses and would probably ‘patche up sum blinde couvenant’ for the Scots. Meanwhile Bernardo tried to find out from Annebault whether the French would up their offer to 2 millions and Lisle warned Monluc that he would have to put to sea to combat the French fleet rumoured to be in the Channel.65 Paget was privately depressed, since he thought another breakdown imminent and considered peace to be essential for both sides.66 His continual stressing of the need for peace at this time certainly bears out a remark made by him to Odet de Selve a year later that he had been the principal cause of Henry’s promise to restore Boulogne and that he had maintained this against both King and Council when no one else had dared to do so.67 Gardiner was probably lukewarm to the peace and probably Lisle was none too anxious to be associated with it.68

were by the Emperor’s verbal promise. However, as the English pointed out, Paniter’s mission to Flanders early in 1545 had tried to obtain confirmation of this and failed. (Paniter to Morette and Mesnage, 16 Feb. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fo. 42, also instructions to Mesnage, ibid, fos. 2–4). On the English proposition of the delivery of Mary Stuart as the condition for Scottish comprehension, the French submitted certain articles for effecting this. These were sent by Paget to Petre on 7th; the Scots were to be comprehended without mention of the Treaty of Westminster (1543), the French to recommend Mary’s marriage to Edward on her reaching marriageable age. Alternatively, the treaty should state that the Treaties of neither country with Scotland should be prejudiced. St.P., XI, p. 136. 65 Lisle to the Council, Guînes, 6 May 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 192r–v (L&P, XXI, i, 751). 66 E.g.: ‘you shall perceyve how untoward this peax is. What remedy? As god will, so be it; al is for the best. I pray you procure our answer with diligence which, forasmoche it shalbe at our next meting eyther the conclusion of the peax at this tyme or thentry to a mortell warre and a dawngerous for one of the partes’ (Paget to Petre, 6 May 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 189r (L&P, XXI, i, 750). When he received a rebuke from the King for mentioning peace too often in his letters, he added: ‘I see, and so doth all His Majesties Counsail, as both I and you have herd them say, when they ar togiders, the contynuaunce of the warre, for the charge therof so incertain, the wayes and meanes for the relief therof so strait, and at such en ebbe, and thende in this cace of the warre so daungerous, as my hart bledith in my body, when I think of it.’ (Paget to Petre, 6 May 1546, St.P. XI, P. 139; Paget sent another letter to Petre, to be shown only to the King, which indicates his anxiety about royal favour, NA SP1/218, fo. 17r.) For a French safe-conduct for a messenger to England., dated 7 May and addressed to Baron de la Garde, Anglesey MSS, box 1, fo. 28 (no. 15). 67 Selve to Montmorency, 29 Aug. 1547, Lefebvre-Pontalis, Correspondance de Selve, no. 217. 68 Gardiner (as we have seen) was not totally opposed to peace with France and in November 1545 had recognised that it was necessary ‘to eskape the thrawldom’ of dependence on men like Reiffenberg and, by implication, ‘our wantes at hom.’ He considered

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Meanwhile Monluc had left for the French Court on 7th and arrived at Fontainebleau with a letter of credence from Annebault in the early morning of 9th. Alvarotti’s narrative indicates the urgency of the matter: the King was still in bed so he went to Cardinal de Tournon who immediately called together the conseil étroit to enable Monluc to declare his message. When the King’s business time approached, Tournon led Monluc into his chamber to present his credence. Afterwards, the King went to mass with the Cardinal of Ferrara and Monluc returned to the Council with Tournon where they remained discussing the report through dinner: which Council remained in session until the dinner hour, with food brought to the table of the lord Cardinal de Tournon, and went on an hour longer than that . . .

Then Monluc went to give his news to Mme. d’Etampes before returning to Melun to take a boat for Paris on his return journey. Alvarotti could not find out what message he had been given to take back. The secretary of the Venetian ambassador approached Monluc and was told that he had been sworn to silence; all he could get out of Monluc’s secretary was that the French had commission to offer 1,800,000 crowns on condition that Boulogne was returned immediately.69 The Cardinal of Ferrara, after all in a position to know the King’s mind, reported to his brother that: a good conclusion can be expected from all this nor is there any doubt that the King is ready to agree to more than reasonable terms. Already they are in agreement about the place where the payment is to be made such that Venice being proposed, because the English showed they were content and if not would enter into further wrangles, it seems to me that only a good ending can be expected.70

English honour assured by her having held Boulogne without help and feared to jeopardise that honour by further war (letter to Paget, 7 Nov. 1545, Muller, Letters . . . Gardiner, p. 180). However, he tended to support the Habsburg alliance as England’s ‘stay.’ In 1547, advising Somerset, he wrote: ‘For of Fraunce it must be taken for a rule, they be so wanton they cannot do wel lenger then they see how they may be scourged if they do not.’ (ibid., no. 117, p. 267). 69 Alvarotti to Ercole II, Melun, 9 May 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fos. 163r–164r (deciph.): ‘il qual Consiglio stette adunato tanto che essendo venuta l’hora del disnare et essendo stata portata la vivandia in tavola del prefatto Signor Cardinale di Tornone, essa vi stette piu di una grossa hora innanzi.’ 70 Cardinal of Ferrara to Ercole II, Fontainebleau, 9 May 1546, ASM, Casa e Stato, carteggio tre principi Estensi, B 60/147: ‘ne possa seguir buona conclusione, nè dubito punto che’l Re per questo sia per restar di condescendere à cose piu che ragionevoli.


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Monluc was back at Calais on 12th and found a situation, indeed, in some turmoil. He had brought a message from Annebault regretting the appearance of the French galleys which had led Lisle to take to sea to clear the Channel. Bernardo had been disturbed by Lisle’s departure and brought an order from Annebault that his ships should retire if Lisle would do the same ‘for the tyme.’71 Paget passed on the message to Lisle, who was then with his ship, the Pansy off the Downs. Lisle replied by a letter in his own ‘raggyd hand’ that, had it not been for the weather, he would have given the French a good beating; as it was, they had had to retire. He promised to be back on 11th.72 Paget’s honourable words about Lisle soon turned to anger and irritation, however, when the latter failed to turn up. The Admiral’s excuse of contrary winds may have been true, but Lisle was at this time showing such reluctance to take part in the negotiations that it must be supposed that he had little wish to see them succeed until he knew which way the King’s mind was going.73 Paget had further cause for worry in that Annebault was refusing to conclude the negotiations without Lisle and this seems to have convinced Lisle, who was back in Calais by 13th.74 Et gia sono d’accordo del luogo dove far il deposito, parcio che essendosi proposto Vinegia, perche Inglesi mostrino di contentarsene, si che senon vi entr’altro garbuglio, non mi par che se ne possa senon sperar buon fine.’ Another courier had arrived from Annebault after the departure of Monluc. This reported that the English would have their answer from Henry on 11th and proposed a meeting for 12th ‘si puo anco giudicare che questa pratica non anderà molto in lungo et tanto piu che, come V. Ex. sa ben, Monsignore Ammirag1io non sta molto volontieri fuora, et che questo Re anco non ha piacer di mantenir le pratiche con molte parole.’ This judgement of the Admiral is very close to Paget’s. 71 Paget to Lisle, 10 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 36 (L&P, XXI, i, 784), sent as a cover to Paget’s letter to Petre, same date, St.P., XI, pp. 144–145, in which Paget included intentionally flattering remarks about Lisle. 72 Lisle to Paget, [10] May 1546, dated ‘this mondaye nyght,’ orig. hol., Anglesey MSS, box 1, fos. 13–14 (no. 5): ‘Sir, I thanke you for that yt pleased you to tarye for me and allso for your kyde writing to Mister Peters towcheng me. Thus I leave to trouble you, trusting to be with you to morro oon tyme of daye lest that my absens . . . be some occation of thadmyrale to thinke more then nedithe.’ The matter is minor and Lisle can soon be back again. 73 D. Loades, John Dudley, pp. 77–79, however, argues for the positive role that Lisle played in the negotiations and, indeed, the credit he gained from their success. 74 Paget rebuked his colleague frankly. Rather than stay in the vain hope of revenge against the French, he should have returned to fulfil his commission, from which he had not yet been recalled. ‘this maner departing from thexecucion of your charge semyth in my poore judgement (undre correction) nother honorable for the Kinges Majeste nor yet for your lordship . . .’ Paget to Lisle, Guînes, 12 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 80, hol. (L&P, XXI, i, 806). This was sent by Lisle to Petre with a spirited defence

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For the meeting which took place at noon on 14 May, the English had received a clarification of their instructions which demonstrates the overriding importance of Boulogne to the King and his lack of real concern about the pension. The French were to be told that, as they seemed to desire Boulogne so little as to offer only 200,000 for it, Henry would give a good deal more to keep it. He would remit all the war expenses and arrears in return for possession of the county of Boulogne as far south as Hardelot. If this were unacceptable, then the perpetual pension would be remitted. If this were to be rejected, the French must be told to pay 2 millions for it and leave the County north of the Liane in Henry’s hands until it were paid with resumption of the pension. Should even this be impossible, then the English were authorised to conclude a truce for two years.75 A series of articles was drawn up by which the French would pay, for the arrears and expenses in fortifying Boulogne, 2 millions in gold to be paid by 1554. Where the English claimed that Francis I owed them 512,000 écus by the Treaty of 1529, this was to be remitted to arbitrators within two months. Should these say yes, then the French would pay, if no, then the matter would be taken to four doctors of Padua or any other neutral university. The life and perpetual pensions were to be continued, Boulogne north of the Liane was to remain in English hands until the repayment, the Scots were to be included without prejudice to other treaties and were to be immune from invasion without new cause, the Emperor was to be included by both sides, and a proposal was made that the Dauphin should visit England.76 It thus looks as though the real problem which arose at the first meeting had been dealt with by reducing the figure demanded to 2 millions and dressing it up with other schemes which were bound to be unacceptable to the French. In

and a claim that Paget ‘dothe me a little wronge.’ Lisle had been commanded by the King’s letters to pursue the French, whose action had to be revenged (Lisle to Petre, Calais, 13 May 1546, SP1/218, fo. 98r–v (L&P XXI, i, 816). 75 Henry VIII to Lisle, Paget and Wotton, 9 May 1546, St.P. XI, p. 140. 76 St.P., XI, p. 163. There are two copies, in a French secretary’s hand, of these proposals in BL Cotton, Calig. E III, fos. 112–113, 114. The first is underlined and annotated in the margin in an English hand. The notes ‘le roy s’accorde’ are to be found against the articles for the 512,000 cr. and the inclusion of the Scots. Some notes about the proposed frontier are now unreadable. The Emperor is to be included as under the terms of the Anglo-Imperial Treaty. In addition, no further fortification is to be commenced (these last two articles are added in the English hand). Memoranda are added by the English concerning the exchange-rate of English against French crowns and the manner of the eventual French take-over of Boulogne.


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the other major matter – the inclusion of the Scots – Henry showed he strongly opposed to the French terms. However, Paget considered this latest offer as ‘godly honorable large for the Frenchmens honour and profit and a meanes to take all quereles away.’77 The meeting of 15th was a great success as far as the personal relations of Lisle and Annebault were concerned. The two men tramped around the field talking over the naval campaign of the previous summer and agreeing on their relief the result had not been a decisive battle. Annebault suggested that, once God had changed the minds of their masters they would be allies for the rest of their lives and their joint fleets could outface any other prince. The French Admiral treated his opposite number to a display of falconry by M. de Canaples.78 In recommending the proposals of 14th–15th to their King, the English commissioners pointed out several advantages. Lisle thought that they could be used to gain time and pointed out, rather cryptically, that, when the time came for repayment, either the French would not be able to find the money or ‘there wilbe some naughty money or broken crowns or some soche matter, you know what I meane.’ Apparently, Remon pointed out as much to Paget. Once peace were made, the French were sure to find themselves at war with the Emperor.79 Even the article about arbitration could be used to advantage ‘for the grement uppon the choyse of the doctors and the tyme of theyr determynation I think wilbe dyfuse and occupye moche tyme and allways to be a bukler to refuse the reste.’80 Paget put the matter more succinctly by quoting the old story of Louis XI and his favourite ass, which a condemned man agreed to teach to talk in return for his life. Why worry, he replies to his friends; the ass might die, the King might die or the ass might talk.81 All these comments, of course, were designed to convince the King that, though he agreed to give up his conquest at a set date, there was still a good chance of keeping it. On the French side, Monluc seems to have made another rapid journey back to court, starting on 16th, the day he saw Paget about

77

Paget to Petre, Guînes, 13 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 100r (L&P, XXI, i, 817). Lisle reported a favourable impression of Annebault: ‘the man ys a right proper man and very gentill and well spoken, and very fyne in his aparell.’ Henceforth they were to conduct something of a private dialogue (Lisle to Petre, Guînes, 15 Mar 1546, NA SP1/218, fos. 143–144 (L&P, XXI, i, 837). 79 Lisle to Petre, 15 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 144r–v (L&P, XXI, i, 837). 80 Lisle to Petre, 15 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 145r–v (L&P, XXI, i, 838). 81 Paget to Petre, 15 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 150–51r (L&P, XXI, i, 840). 78

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the boundaries and the fortifications at Ambleteuse,82 and returning on 18th. Between these two dates took place some of the most interesting meetings of the negotiations. Annebault had already sent back one messenger who arrived at Fontainebleau and went to see the King at his hunting retreat nearby. There, the King called in Tournon and Bayard for advice and the messenger was sped on his way.83 Shortly afterwards, however, Monluc must have arrived at court on 17th with his news of the meeting of 5th. In the evening, he sent a postilion to the Venetian Ambassador at Melun to say that he was about to leave Fontainebleau and that, if the ambassador had a boat ready for him on the Seine at 1 a.m., he would give him an account of the negotiations. The ambassador warned Alvarotti and they were both there at midnight but, seeing he would not come, they went to bed leaving the Venetian’s servant to wait. When Monluc eventually did arrive, late, at 2 a.m., he told the Venetian that he was unable to say as much as he would have liked as the King had commanded him to secrecy. He did, however, mention Lisle’s naval activities and the French suspicion that they were being misled. The commissioners had met all day on Friday 14th, disputing mainly two articles, one of which was about the amount of money; on all this they had been unable, yet again, to agree: Monluc does not say how much, but because he says he had taken letters from the Admiral to lord Cardinal de Tournon and to Bayard that they should persuade His Majesty not to stick over money, especially as it will not be lacking, and the fortified territory of Boulogne when regained would be worth more the seven millions in gold.

These (presumably Bayard and Tournon) had persuaded the King to agree to pay the 500,000 debt plus the private arrears and that, at 2 millions for Boulogne, they had got a good bargain; if the arrears and damages amounted to 1,500,000, an extra 500,000 for Boulogne was good value (the actual proportions were somewhat different). The other article in dispute had been that of Scotland. The English had wished the inclusion to be worded in such terms that it would have been meaningless. Other than that he could say no more.

82

Paget to Petre, 18 May 1546, St.P. XI, p. 667. Alvarotti to Ercole II, Melun, 17 May 1546, ASM, Francia B 22, fasc. 3, fo. 187r (deciph.). 83


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My lord Admiral writes to His Majesty that the English Admiral seems of good mind and well disposed but that the negotiations have very much cooled since the first meeting.

On the day after the meeting, Monluc had met Bernardo alone and had agreed certain articles concerning the talks of the day before, showing them to Lisle and Annebault, both of whom thought they were good. Annebault sent Monluc with his copy to Fontainebleau. There, the King, who was with Tournon and Bayard, resolved to send him back to conclude on the basis at these terms. At this point, Monluc thought that, if the English government agreed, peace would be achieved within eight or ten days.84 When, after dinner the next day, Alvarotti went to ask the Cardinal of Ferrara about all this, the latter confirmed it all and said there was nothing else he could add.85 The meeting fixed for four days hence was delayed, much to the resentment of the French, who had their master’s answer by 18th, when Monluc returned. The English Council replied on 17th with Henry’s general agreement to the plans put forward in the latest round, though stipulating care to avoid all trouble later. He wished to get more details about the boundary and insisted on a line which would make the harbour at Boulogne tenable.86 In fact, the boundary problem was to be the most difficult from now on. Monluc had already indicated on 15th that the French would like to take as their boundary the source of the Liane which would enable them to get to Ardres an their own land. As it was, their territory was severely squeezed between the Emperor’s lands and the English

84 Alvarotti to Ercole II, Melun, 18 May 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22. fasc. 3, fos. 193–194 (deciph.): ‘il che dette gran dubbio ch’ei non havesse ucellato li Francesi, et non volesse piu tornare, o vero tornando non mutasse lingua, et proposito non si sa se andasse chiamato dal suo Re, o vero per propria satisfattione.’ ‘detto Monluc non disse la quantita, ma perche disse che havea portato lettere di Monsignor Almiraglio al Signor Cardinale Tornone et à Baiardo che dovessero suadere Sua Maestà a non la guardare in denari, si perche non le mancariano, si anco perche sul Territorio di Bologna vi trano fortifatti da Inglesi che importavano piu di vii millioni d’oro.’ ‘scrisse Monsignor Almiraglio a Sua Maestà Christianissima che l’Almiraglio Inglese li pareva che fusse di buon animo et ben disposto, ma che il negocio era molto piu riffreddato del primo abbocamento.’ 85 Alvarotti to Ercole II Melun, 18 May 1546 (no. 2), ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fo. 202r (deciph.). 86 Council to Lisle, Paget and Wotton, 17 May 1546, St.P. XI, pp. 165–166. On the part the engineer John Rogers played in preparing the plans for these boundary negotiations, see Shelby, John Rogers, pp. 94–101.

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possessions on the coast. They were also asking for the fortifications at Boulogne to be stopped.87 The English needed specific answers to each of the articles, however, and these were not to hand by 18th. Troubles accumulated; Paget had been down with fever which had left him very low and unable to work, Annebault was becoming more impatient at the delay and, anxious about his absence from court, threatened to leave (he too was ill ).88 The English army had been stirred to mutiny by the foreign mercenaries.89 Meanwhile, there were fresh rumours that the French were preparing a coup should the negotiations fail, while the English Council ordered Lisle to sea again to clear the Channel.90 Monluc seems to have lost his temper and warned that the Admiral would not risk losing his reputation as the Constable had done in 1540.91 Altogether, the situation seemed to be on the point of collapse, agreement having been closer than for three years. No wonder Paget claimed his fever had been brought on by ‘hope, desyre and care.’ In fact the English commissioners did not have a full set of instructions until the day fixed for the next meeting, the 23rd. In his first instruction, of the 20th, the King required the harbour of Boulogne and the whole river up to its source. Use of the haven could only be granted to the French as a courtesy and not written into the treaty. But in a subsequent modification the King was willing that the river, from the Pont de Bricque up to its source, should be held in common. If the French were to demand land for a free passage to Ardres, Lisle and the others were to agree an area where they could move an sufferance. It is unlikely that the English received a third instruction dated 23rd – which provided for a deferment of the first French payment – 87

Paget to Petre, 18 May 1546, St.P. XI, pp. 167–168. Alvarotti to Ercole II, 26 May 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3. 89 Paget to Petre, 18 May 1546, NA, SP1/218, fo. 173r (L&P, XXI, i, 856); Lisle to Paget, 18 May 1546, Guînes, NA SP1/218, fo. 174 (L&P, XXI, i, 857). Letters to the French Court dated 19 May reported that Bernardo had been sent that day by Lisle to Ardres ‘per fare con soa Ex. uffitio di iscusatione se anchora non era ritornato il gentilhuomo stato mandato in Anglia, con la scrittura et capitoli, simile appunto a quella che porto Monsignor di Monluch a questa Maestà.’ (ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fo. 216). 90 Ibid., Somerset Herald to Paget, 19 May 1546; NA SP1/218, fo. 181r (L&P, XXI, i, 851); Council to Lisle, 19 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 178r–v (L&P, XXI, i, 860); Lisle, Paget and Wotton to Petre, 19 May 1546; St.P., XI, pp. 169–170; Paget to Petre, 19 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 185r (L&P, XXI, i, 863). 91 Lisle, Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, 21 May 1546, NA SP1/219, fos. 5–6 (L&P, XXI, i, 871). 88


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until after their meeting.92 Meanwhile, Paget and his colleagues had decided not to allow the extradition of French traitors.93 The French had, as has been seen, been told to agree on the sum of money and on the Scottish question. On other matters, however, it is obvious that they had been told to drive the best bargain they could. They therefore pushed hard to give the first article the meaning that the French might have Boulogne any time within the eight years if they could make the payment. On the boundary question and almost every other point they held out for the best terms. So the meeting broke up in disagreement, except that there was an understanding to communicate, via Bernardo, on each article after further consideration. Thus, on 24th Bernardo brought the French to agree on the first article, payment to be completed at Michaelmas 1554. Then, after nearly breaking off, Monluc was induced to concede the harbour at high water up to the Pont de Bricque. Next came an agreement for the first pension payment to be made in the following November and then for the French to use the Boulogne harbour facilities in time of war. Finally the Emperor’s inclusion was worded as Henry had wished it, a form to which the French had put up some opposition. Agreement had therefore crystallised at least around the articles agreed by Bernardo and Monluc with the modifications desired by Henry VIII and it is easy to see why. Henry, as Lisle pointed out, had safeguarded his possession of Bou1ogne and the French, as Monluc said to the Venetian Secretary, thought they had got a good bargain in financial terms.94 Wotton and Remon were to draw up the articles in Latin as agreed, while Bochetel and Paget were to ride over the boundaries and settle an agreeable line; a truce for a few days was drawn up and the two Admirals were to go hunting together.95 Already, Paget was thinking

92 Instructions of 20, 22 and 23 May 1546, St.P., XI pp. 170–172, 173–175, 175–176. The Cardinal of Ferrara told Alvarotti that letters from Ardres of 22nd said that the English gentleman who had taken the articles over to Henry had returned and on that day ‘il Bernardo era stato in Ardres a dir la medesima venuta del prefatto gentilhuomo di Anglia allo Ex. Armiraglio di Francia, alla cui Ex. haveva anchora detto, da se pero, che le cose in Anglia erano state trovate buone, di modo che dona buona speranza di presenta conclusione’ (ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fo. 16). 93 Paget to Petre, 23 May 1546, NA SP1/219, fos. 43r–44r (L&P, XXI, i, 891). 94 Lisle to Henry VIII, 24 May 1546, NA SP1/219, fo. 64 (L&P, XXI, i, 904): ‘leaving your moste noble actes and conquestes a memory to the world to your majesties perpetuall renoone.’ Alvarotti, 18 May 1546 (see above), p. 193v: ‘se non passarano dui millioni, ne haverano buono mercato.’ 95 Lisle, Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, Guînes, 24 May 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 176–178;

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in terms of suggesting Wotton for the post of resident ambassador and Cheyney as special messenger to Francis I on the conclusion of the treaty.96 Bernardo, who returned to England with the despatches, was commended as an ‘honest witty gentleman’ who, if ‘he had not ben with us to tempre these Frenchmen, the Devil woold have made them to marre all.”97 Van der Delft’s reports to the Emperor from London make it clear that the peace was publicly assured, though he was wide of the mark in his understanding of the terms agreed.98 As for the reaction at the French Court, Alvarotti had heard by the 26th that Mme. d’Etampes was claiming the King had received a letter from Annebault to say that Bernardo assured them that Henry agreed to the articles and that Monluc was on his way with the agreement.99 At the same time, Tournon’s withdrawal from the court with ‘sciatica’ indicates his possible discontent with the agreement. The same day, the Cardinal of Ferrara, who was on a hunting expedition with the King near Fontainebleau, described Monluc’s return to Alvarotti: he was quickly summoned to His Majesty and, when they had spoken long together, His Majesty turned to my lord the serene Dauphin, the Cardinal de Lorraine and me who were eating with him and said that peace could be considered concluded; Monluc had come to learn his decision on one article which alone remained unagreed. This was now

Lisle to Henry VIII, 24 May 1546, NA SP1/219, fo. 64; Lisle to Petre, 24 May 1546, SP1/219, fo. 66r: ‘to morro he and I metith to gyther a huntinge in the feldes and so we shalle be occupyed of all handes.’ 96 Paget to Petre, 24 May 1546, NA SP1/219, fo. 68r (L&P, XXI, i, 906): ‘for which office Mr Wotton wer mete at the begyning though he taryed there the shorter while, both bycause he has a personage of peax and for that also beyng a sobre discrete man beaten now in these matters and not over hasty in practises, the French men, who no doubt will strait be in hand with new devises, may with his demeureness and temperance be put of the better.’ Henry agreed to this plan, cf. St.P., XI, p. 179. 97 St.P., XI, p. 178. 98 Van der Delft to Charles V, 27 May 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 938. He thought that the English would surrender Boulogne for 2 million crowns and that the French would renounce their Scottish alliance. Word of the likelihood of peace had reached London by 25 May: Lodovico Montio di Modena to Ercole II, London, 25 May 1546, ASM, Inghilterra, busta 1, (on the taking of an English pinnace by the French, which is expected to be returned: ‘la conclusione della pace o della guerra è ridotta a questo giorno, che per ultimo se devono ritrovare insieme li due amiragli fra Guines et Ardres, a la quale a nome di V. E. io ho confortato le Maestà hora a bocca, et per lettere gli lo scrissi ancora; molte scaramuzze si sono fatte, et li Francesi porò guadagnano certo la Nostra Maestà ha ridotto il suo forte, che fa a buon termino che le navi francese non haverano più ricorso là.’ 99 Alvarotti to Ercole II, 26 May 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fo. 217.


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clarified so that, if the English agree and the decision put into effect, with this last difficulty solved, the matter can be considerd concluded.100

The negotiations were prolonged for another two weeks, partly by Henry’s desire for better terms at the last moment and partly by failure to agree over the boundaries. Henry ordered his representatives to use Bernardo in obtaining from the French an agreement which would allow the continuance of English fortifications in the Boulonnais but prohibit the French.101 The trouble over the boundary was that the Liane had six possible sources, this meant a great deal of exploration and Paget had been led through so many woods and marshes that he had fallen out with Bochetel and had been mocked by the guide; both had gone home with frayed tempers. Only the tributary which rose near Queques and la Fontaine-Sainte-Marguerite would give the French sure access to Ardres over their own territory, while the English claimed the more southerly stream which rose near Vielmoutier and included the village of Lotenghen.102 Chagrin and frustration brought out of Paget one of his most bellicose letters: Mr Peter, in stede of the grace and peax which I sent to you last help to send unto us now on thisside fyre and sworde, for other thing cannot bring these false dogges to reason . . . god gyve them a pestilence, false traitors.

The French, he said, had broken their agreement and he wished to be recalled.103 Another difficulty arose when the French wanted a clause for the restoration to French subjects of their property in the Boulonnais and the French included this in the Latin articles they

100 Cardinal of Ferrara to Alvarotti, 26 May 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fos. 228–232 (ciphered copy with decipher): ‘qual subito fu chiamato da Sua Maestà et poiche hebbono parlato lungamente insieme, prefatta Sua Maestà si torno verso Monsignor Serenissimo Delphino, Cardinale di Lorena et me che mangiavanno seco et ci disse che la pace si poteva tenere per conclusa perche se benedetto; Monluch era venuto per intendere la sua volonta sopra un’articolo, che solo era restato sospeso. ella pero havea di gia chiarito la mente sua del modo che hora si contentano gli Inglesi, et che la risolutione era in camino, si che essendosi accomodata questa ultima difficulta la cosa si puo mettere per fatta.’ Already, according to this letter, the plan was on foot for an English envoy to come to hold the Dauphin’s new daughter at the font. 101 Henry VIII to Lisle, Paget and Wotton, Greenwich, 26 May 1546, St.P. XI, p. 180. 102 Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, 27 May 1546, St.P., pp. 181–183; Council to Wotton, 31 Aug. 1546, St.P., XI, p. 285. 103 Paget to Petre, 27 May 1546, Guînes, NA SP1/219, fo. 110r (L&P, XXI, i, 943).

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submitted as a draft treaty on 29th. At first, the English refused it but were persuaded at last to let their King see it.104 Bernardo worked feverishly in these last few days of the negotiations – ‘almost out of his witt,’ Paget says – while Paget himself was ‘so moche unquieted as I think never man was.’105 In fact, a resort to arms was seriously considered, but, as has been seen, Francis I had given his agreement and the French were holding out for the last time. Annebault sent a message by Bayard’s son that, since Monluc’s return, some difficulties had arisen over final terms: From which it seems to my lord Admiral that the English, wishing to get the greatest advantage they can, aim to spin out the negotations as long as possible and threaten to leave, though it is doubtful they will really do so.

He claimed that this had done the trick and that he had heard from Remon, Bochetel and Monluc that ‘the English have accepted all that we on our side have offered. With Bernardo’s return from England with Henry’s decision on the article at issue peace would be made.106 Clearly, Annebault was determined to show that the terms he had obtained were the best possible, though this was hardly the case. Francis seems finally to have been satisfied,107 though it was believed

104 Lisle, Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, 29 May 1546, St.P. XI, pp. 183–186. The articles 9 to 18, in Yetsweirt’s and a French secretary’s hand, are to be found in NA SP1/219, fo. 116. No. 15 is the offending clause; numbers 1 to 8 had already been agreed (they were basically the earlier articles). The others are all in the final treaty, though in a different order. 105 Paget to Petre, 3 May 1546, NA SP1/219, fo. 125r–v. Bernardo had said to Rosetto, the Cardinal of Ferrara’s servant, on his return from England on 2 June ‘che se questa pace non si fara, sera per una piccola cosa.’ (Alvarotti to Ercole II, 7 June 1546, ASM., Francia, B 23, fasc. 1, p. 66 (deciph.). Bernardo had some connections with Ferrara. After a cordial reception at the French Court in September 1546, he returned to Italy and called at Ferrara to convey to Ercole II a suggestion of Lisle’s for the marriage of the Lady Mary to Alfonso, the Duke’s son. (Instructions to B. Sala, 30 May 1547, ASM, Inghilterra, B 1, fo. 4). 106 Cardinal of Ferrara to A1varotti, Fontenay, 1 June 1546, copy, ASM, Francia, B 23, fasc. 1, pp. 1–2: ‘Onde parendo a Monsignor Ammiraglio che li Inglesi con il voler tirare le cose piu a loro vantaggio che ponno, cerchino di mandarle anchora piu in longo che è loro possibile, mostro di volersene partire, onde essi dubitando che non facesse da vero.’ . . . ‘li Inglesi haveano accettato tutto quello che essi nostri haveano loro offerto.’ 107 Horatio Farnese had heard Francis I say to the Dauphin on 1 June: ‘Mon fi, non accadera pui che restiate le armi contro Inglesi per che la pace si puo metter per fatta; pero mettetevi in ordine per far di belle feste et cavalerie.’ (Alvarotti to Ercole II, Me1un, 2 June 1546, ASM, Francia, B 23, fasc. 1, p. 5 (part cipher).


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at the French Court that Gardiner was deliberately delaying the peace because he did not want a renewal of the Anglo-French amity.108 Though the English were actually instructed to stick at the restoration of property and demand a whole new set of articles should the French prove obdurate (Henry seems to have suspected that his representatives had already agreed to French terms, and told Bernardo so), it seems that they had not gone this far when an agreement was finally reached with Remon’s secretary and Monluc on 4th, leaving out the offending article and assuring the wording of the Emperor’s inclusion as Henry had wished it.109 A tacit agreement was made that, when the commissioners met to settle the boundary, they should decide on whichever of the two tributaries was the longer.110 Henry’s consent to the signing of the treaty was now agreed was sent on 6 June.111 The central terms of the agreement were now fixed: article 9 restored the life and perpetual pensions of 1525 of 94,736 écus d’or soleil p.a. plus to 10,000 salt money agreed under the 1527 treaty; article 10 obliged the French to pay 2 millions écus sol. at Michaelmas 1554 for the restitution of Boulogne (this sum comprising the outstanding pension arrears and Henry’s expenses in the last war; article 11 submitted the outstanding obligation of 1529 of 512,022 crowns to negotiation; article 12 gave Henry possession of Boulogne and all its county north of the Liane up to 1554; article 16 comprehended the Scots in the Treaty but obliged Henry to make no war on the Scots without new occasion. The next day (7th), in the evening, the treaty was signed in the tents where the talks had taken place and preparations for a renewal of normal diplomatic relations could begin.112 Paget hastened

108 Cardinal of Ferrara told Alvarotti ‘che pare che Monsignor di Vincestre sia stato lui causa del fare tanto tardare questa conclusione di pace, perche desiderava che la non si facesse’ (Alvarotti to Ercole II, 10 June 1546, ASM, Francia, B 23, fasc. 1, p. 27). 109 Henry VIII to Lisle, Paget and Wotton, 2 June 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 192–196; for the English protocols with the articles in the same order as in the Treaty (corrected by Gardiner), see NA SP1/219, fos. 154r–62v (including the offending article 15); for the draft treaty (final form) see NA SP1/219, fos. 164r–78v. Paget to Petre, 3 June 1546, NA SP1/220, fos. 1r–2v; Lisle, Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, 4 June 1546, SP1/220, fos. 7r–13r. 110 As is indicated by the Council’s letter to Wotton, 31 Aug. 1546, St.P., XI, p. 285 and Wotton to Henry VIII, 22 Sept. 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 306–307. 111 BL Cotton Calig. E IV, 169 (old no.), though at the same time the Council ordered the maintenance of forces until the French could be trusted, cf. NA SP1/220, fo. 36r. 112 Annebault to Mary of Hungary, Ardres, 8 June 1546: ‘hier au soir fut conclutte

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to Dover where, recovering from sea-sickness, he wrote to his master of the conclusion and ‘of the good newis for the whiche all we have cause moost humbly and hartely to thanke god and Your Maiestie.”113 Annebault returned to the French court to foster the arguments for peace, bolstered perhaps by Marguerite of Navarre’s praise as ‘vostre fidèle et heureux admiral.’ There he must have received Henry’s letter requesting the continuance of his work for peace and shortly afterwards, he and Claude de L’Aubespine visited Tournon, who was ill.114 ‘He never brake in his hert nor never will:’115 The Renewal of Amity The peace was proclaimed simultaneously on 13 June at London and Paris. The French capital was treated to a proclamation to the sound of trumpets, 50 salvoes of artillery and a solemn procession, with bonfires in the evening, ‘though not very great fires’ noted the Ferrarese ambassador.116 For the moment, ceremonial prevailed. While d’Essé was sent to England, Sir Thomas Cheyney, Lord Warden, was sent to Paris to receive Francis’ ratification of the treaty and to begin other arrangements, such as the crafting of Henry’s present to Francis, a gold salt.117 On 25 June, Francis ordered the Paris municipality to receive him honourably and make him as fine a present as any ambassador had received.118 From there, Cheyney was honourably escorted by river to et arrestee bonne paix, alliance et renovation d’amytié entre le Roy et le Roy d’Angleterre.’ The Admiral had been told by Francis I to inform her of the Emperor’s inclusion in the peace and the assumption that he would be glad for ‘le bien universel de toute la Chrestienté’ and that Francis would remain ‘meilleur frere, amy et allyé’ to the Emperor (HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 6, nachtrag). 113 Paget to Henry VIII, Dover, 8 June 1546, NA SP1/220, fo. 59r (L&P, i, 1024). 114 Génin, Lettres de Marguerite d’Angoulême II, no. 142, pp. 256–258; Henry VIII to Annebault, 15 June 1546, St.P. XI, p. 218 (L&P, XXI, i, 1086); Alvarotti to Ercole II, 20 June 1546, ASM, Francia B 23, fasc. 1, fo. 49r. 115 Words of Francis I to Thomas Cheyney, July 1546, NA SP1/221, fo. 97r (L&P, XXI, i, 1200). 116 London: Wriothesley’s Chronicle, p. 163; Van der Delft to Charles V, 14 June, 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 1058. Paris: Saint-Mauris to prince Philip, 17 June 1546, CSP Spain VIII, no. 279, L&P, XXI, i, 1083; Alvarotti to Ercole II, 13 June 1546, ASM, Francia, B 23, fasc. 1., fo. 41v: ‘ma non pero grossi fuoghi.’ 117 Cheyney’s letters, 2 July, 3 July, NA SP1/221, fos. 70, 72–73 (L&P, XXI, i, 1184, 1185). One problem was the imminent duel between the Spanish captains in English and French service, Romero and Mora (see Spanish Chronicle, pp. 127–142) which Cheyney was required to defer. 118 Registres, Paris, III, pp. 64–65.


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Melun and thence on horseback to Fontainebleau, his comportment minutely observed by the Ferrarese ambassador.119 As in the old days, Cheyney was shown the King’s apartments and like his predecessors was duly impressed – the chamber was ‘gloriose’ and the gallery ‘very gallant and costly.’ Henry had agreed to be godfather to the Dauphin’s (his godson’s) new daughter, Elisabeth, and this was duly confirmed at Fontainebleau on 4 July when Cheyney held her at the font. The night before, Francis, the Dauphin, the Admiral and many ladies serenaded Cheyney beneath his window ‘syngyng as swetlye as I ever harde, the Kyng him selfe beyng onne of them that sang. Such a tryumph at a christnyng as I thinke was never sene nor harde of as this is lycke to be.’120 Francis protested that he had never broken his friendship for Henry in his heart and never would. The Dauphin was dressing every day in the Tudor colours of white and green. On 8 July Francis ratified the treaty.121 There can be little doubt that Francis and his entourage were determined to send an unambiguous message that the good old days had returned. The treaty, of course, was not complete until the – somewhat delayed – exchange of ceremonial embassies by the two Admirals for the reception of the oaths to the Treaty by the two kings, scheduled to be completed within forty days.122 To a degree, this all symbolised the return to the magnificence and emulation of early periods of the reign; the transition from war to peace and grandeur. The new French ambassador, Odet de Selve, was the first to arrive at his post.123 119 Cheyney to Paget, 2 July 1546, St.P. XI, p. 227 (L&P, XXI, i, 1185); Alvarotti to Ercole II, 30 June 1546, ASM, Francia B 23, fasc. 1, fo. 84r–v: Cheyney was given a mule caparisoned in black velvet, Cheyney himself dressed in black velvet, ‘magro et di honesta grandezza per quello che si è potuto vedere, barba bisa curta et tagliata alla gheghesia.’ He described Cheyney again at his presence during the diner du roi on 2 July, standing between Annebault and Morette at the king’s shoulder, Francis dressed in gold and silver cloth (ibid., 2 July, fo. 90). This can be compared with Cheyney’s own account. 120 Henry VIII to the Dauphin, 15 June 1546, NA SP1/220, fo. 129 (L&P, XXI, i, 1066); June 1546, ibid., fo. 130r (L&P, XXI, i, 1067); 15 June to Annebault, ibid., fo. 130v (L&P, XXI, i, 1066, 2); Cheyney to Paget, 3 July 1546, SP1/221, fos. 96–97 (L&P, XXI, I, 1200). 121 Francis I, act of ratification, Paris, 8 July 1546, NA E 30/1326. Powers to receive Henry VIII’s oath and for Odet de Selve to exchange letters of ratification in England, Fontainebleau, 8 July (NA E 30/1317, 1316). 122 Passports and instructions to the ambassadors, 2 July 1546 NA SP1/221, fos. 57–59 (L&P, XXI, i, 1177). Tunstall actually drafted his own commission. 123 J. Lefevre-Pontalis, Correspondance politique d’Odet de Selve pp. 3–5. Selve had received commission, dated 8 July, to take Henry’s oath if necessary, NA, E 30/

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Uncertainty about Annebault’s intentions (he claimed that affairs between the Emperor and the Protestants were monopolising his attention) meant that Lisle did not arrive at Paris, along with Tunstall and Wotton, the new English ambassador, until 26 July and so the initial time-limit for oath-taking had expired.124 Lisle finally received the King’s oath at Fontainebleau on 1 August in the presence of several cardinals. Unlike the Emperor, Francis had never baulked at recognizing Henry’s titles of Defender of the Faith and Supreme Head of the Church.125 These meetings, the way in which Francis went out of his way to show his high regard to the English envoys and show off Fontainebleau and his collections seemed to revive the warmth of earlier ententes between the two kings.126 Only after some delay did Annebault set off for Dieppe to take ship for England on a very different mission from that of the previous summer. The Governor of Scotland, the Earl of Arran, did not accept the comprehension of that kingdom at Edinburgh until 17 August and there may have been uncertainty.127 Cheyney had advised, in the light of his sumptuous entertainment, that ‘the court may be well furnished of all sortes as well of men as of women . . . and that with the very best and of suche as be most metest for the purpose.’128 In fact, meticulous attention was given to the sumptuous welcome for Annebault, questions such as where and by whom he should be welcomed, where he should be lodged on the way to court, even who should sit and who nos. 1316, 1317. Henry VIII, letters of prolongation of the ratification, AN J 651B, no. 14. 124 The French claim was that Annebault was delayed by Tournon’s illness (Wotton to Browne, 5 July 1546, NA SP1/221, fos. 102–104 (L&P, XXI, i, 1218) but payments for equipping Lisle’s elaborate embassy began on 29 June (SP1/221, fo. 147, L&P, XXI, i, 1235). Tunstall, the first to leave became increasingly fretful as the time approached and so the commission had to be altered and three weeks had to be added to the time for ratification (Selve to Paget, 16 July 1546, SP1/222, fos. 1–2, L&P, XXI, I, 1291). Agreement between Odet de Selve and Lord Russell to prolong the time for oathtaking by 20 days, London, 17 July 1546, NA E30/1320. 125 Francis I’s oath, 1 Aug. 1546, NA E 30/1041. Notification that Francis I had ratified the treaty in the presence of the dauphin, cardinals of of Lorraine, Ferrara, du Bellay, Châtillon and Meudon and among princes, Enghien (Louis de Bourbon), Montpensier, Guise, Nevers as well as Annebault, Aumale, Laval and the bishop of Soissons (NA, E 30/1045, Rymer, 2nd ed. XV, p. 98, 3rd ed. VI, p. 138). 126 Lisle and Tunstall to Henry VIII, Corbeil, 3 Aug. 1546, NA P1/222, fos. 3–5 (L&P, XXI, i, 1405), St.P. XI, pp. 261–263. 127 Letters of acceptance by Earl of Arran as Governor, 17 Aug. 1546, National Archives of Scotland, Treaties with France, State Papers 7, no. 32. 128 Cheyney to Council, Fontainebleau, 8 July 1546, NA SP1/221, fo. 146 (L&P, XXI, i, 1239).


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should stand at the banquets.129 Annebault fittingly crossed the Channel from Dieppe in a galley squadron led by his Grand Zaccarie and 14 others, which were needed in view of the fact that he was leading a delegation of 54 notables and nobles who, with their own suites (his own was 200 strong) amounted to 1075. (Appendix 14) His squadron was met at sea off Dover and then off Queenborough by Cheyney and the Kentish gentry. As it processed up the Thames, bedecked with colourful pennons, past Deptford and Gravesend, cannon fire from the galleys was answered by the King’s ships and from all the forts that had been stocked with shot for the purpose. Received at Greenwich on 20 August, he arrived at the Tower of London 21st (more cannonades ‘as heaven and earth should have gonne together’). He processed through the City, to be greeted by the Mayor, Aldermen and livery companies in full fig, was harangued in French and slept at the Bishop’s Palace. On 23rd, he came to Hampton Court 23rd and the following day he received Henry’s oath to the treaty in the chapel.130 The grandeur and sumptuousness of the embassy and the splendour of its reception was amply recorded by Wriothesley’s chronicle: ‘banqueting and huntinge, and riche maskes everie night.’ This is amply confirmed by the records of the Offices of the King’s Tents and Revels.131 Wotton was told on the day of Annebault’s departure, 31 August, that the French envoys ‘sayd they never saw the like both for plentifulnesse, magnificence, ryches and also the good ordre.’ Cranmer’s secretary later recorded the

129 BL Cotton, Vespasian, C XIV, i, fo. 67; Appendix, XVIII, fo. 101 (L&P, XXI, i, 1384 and 1384.2). 130 Francis I’s commission to Annebault to receive the oath, PRO E/30, no. 1327. For Henry’s oath and ratification, AN J 651, no. 18bis Musée AE III, no. 33. Both ratifications were drawn up with highly elaborate illuminations of the kind impossible to incorporate in the treaties themselves and which were designed to emphasise the artistic patronage of the two kings. It has been argued that Henry’s initial portrait was executed in the tradition of document portraiture well established in England and influenced by Holbein (E. Auerbach, Tudor Artists (London, 1954), pp. 59–72). S. Béguin, on the other hand, has argued for Nicolas da Modena (‘Henri VIII et François Ier, une rivalité artistique et diplomatique’ in C. Giry-Deloison (ed.), François 1er et Henri VIII. Deux princes de la Renaissance (1515–1547) (Lille, 1996), pp. 63–75. 131 Wriothesley Chronicle, vol. I, pp. 171–173; Grey Friars Chronicle, p. 52. This is partly confirmed by the delivery of ‘cloth of gold, clothes of sylver tyncelles and other silkes’ on 14 August by Cawarden ‘against the coming of the French Admyral’ some purchased from a Paris merchant, John Lange (SHC, LM 59/142 and 143); Folger Shakespeare Library, Loseley MSS, Lb 5, accounts for masques and revels at Hampton Court, 16 July–5 Sept. 1546, ‘thAdmyral of Fraunce being there with other nobles from thens.’ E.g., 200 yards of gold and silver lawn from Lange, fringes of gold and silver thread for cushions.

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construction of ‘three very notable great, & sumptuous bancketing houses’ in the park.132 The visual programme for the celebrations was overseen by Nicholas Bellin of Modena (Niccolo da Modena), Henry’s stuccatore at Nonsuch, who had earlier worked on Fontainebleau before he had been forced to flee France and who may have illuminated Henry’s ratification of the treaty.133 More serious political discussions saw Annebault’s attempt to shorten the period of repayment swiftly brushed aside but more telling perhaps was the attempt made by the Admiral to open up the idea of a religious alignment between France and England on the basis of a common rejection of the papacy and a common liturgy of the mass. It was even suggested that the Emperor should be exhorted to do the same on pain of war. This account also tells us that Annebault left early from these celebrations, summoned home urgently by his master.134 This demarche took Papal attempts at reconciliation with England via the French in a completely new direction.135 How far either side took it seriously has always been difficult to judge. Henry may have taken it up with momentary enthusiasm but for both parties it was the implication of their reconciliation for an alliance with the 132 Council to Wotton, 31 August 1546, NA SP1/223, fo. 190 (L&P XXI, i, 1530). £1614.11.6 was allocated for plate to be given to the French envoys with Annebault (NA SP4/1, Sept. 1546, no. 11). 133 E.g. ‘To Nycholas Modena painter for viij garments of here upon lether for wild men to serve for torchberers with theyr hed peces, showes and clubbes’ £15 (Folger SL., Loseley, Lb5). M. Biddle, ‘Nicholas Bellin of Modena, an Italian artificer at the courts of Francis I and Henry VIII,’ Journal of the British Archaeological Association, ser. 3, 29 (1966), 106–21. W.R. Streitberger, ‘Records of royal banqueting houses and Henry VIII’s timber lodging, 1543–1559,’ Jour. Society of Archivists, 15 (1994), 187–202. 134 Ralph Morice, the secretary to whom Cranmer dictated his record: ‘If I should tell what communication betwene the kynges hyghnes and the sayd Ambassadour was had concernyng the establishyng of sincere Religion then, man would hardly haue beleue it: nor I my self had thought the kynges hyghnes had bene so forwarde in those matters . . . that the kynges Maieste and the Frenche kyng had bene at this pointe, not onely within halfe a yeare after to haue chaunged the Masse in both the realmes into a communion, as we now vse it, but also vtterly to haue extirped and banished the Byshop of Rome and his vsurped power, out of both their Realmes and dominions.’ Foxe, Acts and Monuments. Book VIII, pp. 1426–1428 (1570 edition) Variorum edition, http://www.hrionline.shef.ac.uk/foxe. This passage has been much discussed among Reformation historians. It should be apparent that it does not allow us to know on whose initiative the discussion began. 135 L&P, XXI, i, 1215, 1309 A papal servant, Guron Bertano, seems to have been received some time in August at Francis I’s request and only dismissed in October for fear of giving the impression that reconciliation with Rome was intended (LefebvrePontalis, nos. 39, 41).


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Protestant princes of Germany that mattered. At all events, Annebault left England loaded down with sumptuous presents of plate, one coffer of which was valued at 2000 marks.136 At the end of their reigns, then, Henry and Francis not only sought to outdo each other in ceremonial but everything now seemed set for a re-orientation of English and French policy towards an alliance against the Emperor. One participant in the celebrations found the peace a mixed blessing. Francesco Bernardo later claimed that he had sustained heavy costs in the conclusion of the peace ‘per opera mia.’ He had also lost his ships in the 1545 war for which his uncle Maffeo lent him 1800 ducats in August 1546 to replace them but which he had to repay in nine years. As was reasonable, he was awarded pensions both by Henry and by Francis for his pains. Indeed, it was he who brought the rather belated news of Henry’s death to the English ambassador in Venice, Edmund Harvel. Unfortunately for him, he was ordered to renounce these pensions in July 1547 as contrary to the laws of the Republic and went on for several years unsuccessfully to contest this until his death, of ‘inward sorrow’ in 1557.137

136

Wriothesley’s Chronicle, pp. 172–173. ‘An annuitie of a thousand crownes for Sr Fraunces Bernardo knight during his lief ’ (12 July 1546); denization (11 July), NA SP4/1, fo. 93v. CSP Venice, V, no. 480, 523, 525, 730, 731, 902. 137

CONCLUSION

THE END OF TWO REIGNS Edward Hall astutely observed at the end of his chronicle that ‘Although this peace pleased, both the Englysh and the French nacions, yet surely both mistrusted, the continuance of the same, considering the old Proverbe, that the iye seeth, the harte rueth, for the French men styll longed for Bulleyn, and the Englyshmen minded not to geve it over.’1 Can a balance sheet of advantages be drawn up and how was the treaty viewed at the time? The Venetian ambassador Marino Cavalli thought that Henry VIII had achieved a treaty more advantageous than his predecessors’ and that Francis I had spent much more without return.2 In part this was because he saw that Francis had committed himself to payments without the immediate return of Boulogne. Saint-Mauris, the Imperial ambassador in France, had been told the terms by Queen Léonor by 4 June. He reported that ‘the people’ were ill-content with the terms because the English retention of Boulogne would cause further trouble. Public opinion, he thought, held that the King had agreed to the treaty to counter Habsburg plans but also because of the dire necessity to which the kingdom had been reduced.3 A month later he reported the ‘spin’ that was being put on the treaty in France: that Henry was bound to aid Francis in any war with the Emperor and that Scotland had been included unconditionally. Saint-Mauris commented himself that the French did not consider themselves bound to anything by the treaty and thought that if, after eight years, France had not promoted the marriage of Mary Stuart to prince Edward, the English would not hand back Boulogne. Those around Annebault were also hinting at a secret Anglo-French deal to help the Protestants and

1

Edward Hall, Henry VIII, ed. C. Whibley, II, p. 360. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. I, vol. I, pp. 231–232. 3 Saint-Mauris to Prince Philip, 4 June 1546, AN K 1486 (microfilm): ‘En conclusion, Syre, la voz publica y segura opinion es que el Rey de Francia no ha tratado la dicha paz sino par traversar a los negocios de Vuestra Alteza, con la pura necessitad, constrenza a esto por que su reyno esta tan causado y el pueblo tan enpobrecido que a penas se saben ella sostenar.’ 2

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that this was another ‘cut’ at the Pope.4 Less than a year later, SaintMauris speculated further along these lines that the French: Do not want to maintain this amity with the English out of a considered good will but only, through it, to harm Your Majesty, which is their main aim. They are not content just to say this but repeat often that they would not have treated recently with the English as shamefully as they did, had it not been in order to impede the objectives of Your Majesty.5

In England, The Earl of Hertford knew how to play on his master’s susceptibilities when he reported to Henry that he had secured ‘not only a jewel, but also as plesante and profitable a countrey as I have seen’ and mentioned nothing about its return to France.6 When Van der Delft suggested to Henry that he could count on keeping Boulogne since the French were unlikely ever to find the 2 million écus, he noted that the King simply smiled.7 By August the English government was encouraging colonisation.8 John Leland, who had celebrated the capture of Boulogne in 1545 with his swaggering and triumphalist Bononia Gallomastix now in 1546 published ΕΓΚΩΜΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΣ Laudatio Pacis, celebrating the arts of peace and praising extravagantly not only the French and English Kings for their pacific achievements but also those of their ministers. Leland’s work is fairly derivative and drew on the well-worn Renaissance motifs used in France and elsewhere to praise peace. Nevertheless, it was ambitious and, printed at

4

Saint-Mauris to Philip, 4 July 1546, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 289 (L&P, XXI, i, 1213). Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 17 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte S-M an Karl, 1547, III, fo. 53r: ‘Ne desirent pas d’entretenir l’amitié avecq l’Anglois par charité bien ordonnee ains seullement pour, avec ceste occasion, pouvoir nuyre aux affaires de vostre Majesté qu’est seullement le but principal où ilz visent; et ne se peuvent contenir de ainsi le dire, voire repetent ilz souvent qu’ilz n’eussent traicté dernierement avec l’Anglois si honteusement comme ilz feyrent n’eust esté le respect de vostre Majesté et pour empescher les dessaings d’icelle.’ 6 Hertford to Henry VIII, 13 June 1546, NA SP1/220, fo. 94 (L&P, XXI, i, 1055). 7 Van der Delft to Charles V, 14 June 1546, L&P XXI, i, 1058. The point was repeated by Saint-Mauris to Mary of Hungary, Poissy, 20 May 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 15, berichte, 1547, V, (no fol.): in pondering the La Garde treaty, thought that the new English Council had offered to hand back Boulogne in return for an early payment in order to have peace ‘bien aussi considerans qu’il leur seroit impossible de jamais mectre lesd. deniers ensemble ny avoir moyen de les leur rendre’ and they had been able to make this offer, seeing Francis ‘du tout animé lors, à entreprendre guerre contre l’empereur.’ 8 7 Aug. 1546, Hughes and Larkin, I, no. 273, pp. 376–377. 5

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the time, a testament to contemporary views.9 One other Latin poem, by Walter Haddon, probably commemorates the treaty.10 Admiral d’Annebault had his hands full in justifying the terms he had negotiated. The peace was proclaimed at Paris, as it was in London, on 13 June, the day the Admiral arrived and was kept in private conclave by Francis for three hours. Marguerite of Navarre declared her pleasure at the peace and the King rewarded his minister financially.11 By arguing that the 2 million crowns to which France was obliged included only 800,000 for the recovery of Boulogne (the rest for arrears), it seems that he was able to claim that he had got a good bargain and that the fortifications to be acquired could not have been constructed for twice the sum.12 The line pushed in France, reflected by Martin du Bellay writing a decade or so later, was that Francis would have to pay only 800,000 écus ‘both for the arrears and the cost of war,’ in return for which Henry would in eight years have to return all the old as well as the new fortifications.13 Guillaume Paradin, writing four years later, expressed the view that the peace had been concluded because Henry VIII could not continue the war and, even though it was unlikely that the English were genuine, the treaty had been concluded ‘to the great joy and contentment of the poor people, who were tired of so many wars.’14 As Jean Bouchet had pointed out in August 1545, no sooner had the peace been concluded with the Emperor than a solde had been promulgated for an extra 800,000 lt. on top of the taille and, from his vantage point at Poitiers, the end of the Imperial War had simply meant the ravages of demobilised soldiers.15

9 John Leland, Bononia Gallomastix (London: John Meyler, 1545) 8pp; idem., ΕΓΚΩΜΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΣ Laudatio Pacis (London,: Reyner Wolf, 1546), 16pp. See J. Hutton, ‘John Leland’s Laudatio Pacis,’ Studies in Philology, 58 (1961), 616–626. 10 First printed in a collection of 1567, it can be found in Walter Haddon, Poematum, (London: Serres, 1576), 2 vols. II, no pag.: e.g. ‘Si tu maiestas, rex inuictissime, salua/Cuius inest omnis nostra salute salus./Gallia te, nostra causa, conspexit in armis,/ Anglia te laetum, est laeta sequunta ducem.’ 11 CSP Spain, VIII, no. 279 (L&P XXI, i, 1083); Nawrocki, II, p. 375; G. Génin, Lettres de Marguerite d’Angoulême, sœur de François Ier, reign de Navarre 2 vols. (Paris, 1841–1842) II Nouvelles lettres, pp. 256–258, no. 142, early June 1546. 12 Nawrocki, II, p. 372, citing the letter of Saint-Mauris to the grand commander of Leon, Melun, 4 July 1546, Simancas K 1486 (AN microfilm). 13 Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 330: ‘tant pour les arrerages de sa pension et pour les frais de la guerre.’ 14 Paradin, Histoire de Nostre Temps, p. 465: ‘à grand ioye & contentement du poure peuple qui s’ennuyoit merueilleusement de tant de guerres.’ 15 Jean Bouchet, Annales d’Aquitaine (Poitiers, 1545), fos. 243v, 244v–245r.


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Unlike in England, literary effusions in France were muted. Gilles Corrozet had published the usual poetical encomium for the Treaty of Crépy in 1544 in the form of Le Retour de la paix. The only surviving publication of the 1546 peace was printed in Rouen and used François Sagon’s earlier Chant de la paix written for the Truce of 1538 as its celebratory poem.16 Though Ronsard was to publish a celebrated Ode to peace in 1559, his short ode on the treaty of 1546, dedicated to his friend Maclou de la Haie, poet of Montreuil, is decidedly downbeat in celebrating the peace with the island people (‘ce peuple que la mer baigne’) with their archers (‘ses fleches en l’air volantes’): Now is the time to drink, And by sweet forgetful wine, Make us forget The cares of our repining ease. That it was forbidden Before now to enjoy. But now peace has returned And repose to be enjoyed!17

We are still left to explain why Francis was prepared to accept the deal. Marguerite of Navarre congratulated her brother shortly before the conclusion of peace ‘as for something most needful for you and all yours,’ noting that the King’s enemies in Spain would not welcome the treaty but that neither would some of his own subjects ‘for they take pleasure only in crying war.’18 Necessity there certainly was, born of a combination of fears concerning the Emperor’s intentions and 16 La Publication du traité de la paix faicte et accordee entre Françoys, roy de France et Henry, roy d’Angleterre . . . chanté par les trois Estatz (Rouen: N. Le Roux, 13 June 1546) BnF Rés. 8–Lg 6–28. 17 My rather dull translation of Pierre de Ronsard, Oeuvres complètes, ed. G. Cohen, 2 vols. (Paris, 1950), II, p. 710: Il est maintenant tens de boire, Et d’un dous vin oblivieus Faire assoupir en la memoire Le Soin de nostre aise envieus. Que c’estoit chose deffendue Au paravant de s’esjouir, Ains que la Paix nous fust rendue Et le repos pour en jouir!, published in Livre III of the Odes of 1550 and suppressed in the edition of 1553. 18 Marguerite of Navarre to Francis I, early June 1546, Génin, Lettres de Marguerite d’Anglouême, II, no. 142, pp. 256–258: ‘comme d’une chose très necessaire pour vous et tous les vostres’ . . . ‘car ils n’ont plesir que de crier la guerre.’

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shortage of money. Within days of the treaty, the King had ordered the entire gendarmerie (heavy cavalry) to stand down to spare his people the heavy cost of supporting them.19 But the Treaty was a compromise which the French in particular could not tolerate in the long run. Scotland was a problem swept under the carpet rather than solved. The ambiguities of the border agreement alone were bound to cause problems, while disputes over whether various fortifications at Boulogne had been begun before or after the Treaty became increasingly acrimonious. Bernardo’s services were still in demand for soothing ruffled feathers.20 The French could present the treaty as a good bargain but the recovery of Boulogne was put off and part of the price was the restoration of the vexatious English pension arrangement that had been in abeyance since 1535. The first term of the resumed life pension was paid in November 1546. The banker Antonio Bonacorsi had been commissioned on 30 June to make the payments but did not receive royal authorisation for the first half-year payment of 53,000 écus until 13 October. He had then had to ride to Lyon to collect the gold and transport it to Calais by 1 November. This was the last such payment ever made.21 The provision in the Treaty for negotiations on the debt of 512,000 crowns under the obligation of 1529 led to a stalemate by the end of September, when commissioners met in the same place as the treaty had been signed. By this time, it was clear that the French had decided not to pay it.22 These, together with disputes over fortifications around Boulogne, plagued Anglo-French relations for several months, until the conclusion of La Garde’s Treaty. The celebrations of the summer of 1546 could not conceal the reality from William Paget. In his masterly tour d’horizon of international affairs, Paget asserted that the Emperor and Francis were still only ‘our dissembling freendes,’ the one never likely to give up his allegiance to the Pope and the other determined to recover Boulogne. If Francis could be assured that Henry was not a threat, he would concentrate on

19 Francis I to Jean d’Annebault sr de La Hunaudaye, Paris, crs. Bayard, 16 June 1546, Archives Départementales, Puy-de-Dôme, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 7, no. 44 (copy) 20 L&P, XXI, ii, 145, 189. 21 BnF fr. 10375, fos. 29–39, account of Bonacorsi submitted to Chambre des Comptes. 22 The English negotiators were Peter and Dr. May, Dean of London. L&P, XXI, i, 1395, 1515; ii, 9, 25, 29, 47, 48, 65, 133, 137, 142, 153, 160; Petre and Maye to Henry VIII, 25 Sept. 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 312–314.


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recovering Milan and then return to Boulogne. As for the Protestant alliance, this would be costly and might allow France and the Emperor to coalesce. The main objective should be to prevent France and the Emperor from co-operating and so the best way to achieve this was to encourage peace between the Emperor and the Protestants – ‘tagree themperour and thalmaynes by all meanes possible.’ It is clear, then, that Paget saw the long-term interests of England and France as contradictory.23 Not surprisingly, Annebault was distrustful of him and suspected him of working against Anglo-French peace.24 Immediately after the treaty, du Biez’s army dissolved ‘for lack of bredde,’ having begun work at the fortress of Mont Saint Etienne to face the one the English had started at Boulogneberg (Mont Lambert); there was an understandable rush to begin work before the prohibition enjoined in the treaty came into force.25 This was an element of the treaty which was rapidly to give rise to conflict: which works had been begun before the treaty? Moreover, the treaty had been necessarily vague about the line delimiting English-occupied territory; it simply specified the river Liane and left it up to commissioners to settle which of its many tributaries was the true source.26 Very soon after the treaty, du Biez was complaining about continuing work at Boulogneberg. For their part, the English had difficulty in asserting their authority in the localities which they deemed to be north of the Liane and therefore in their territory: villages like Brunembert, Boursin and Bournonville. There was reluctance to come in and take the oath, while as late as May 1547, Jean Pocques, the captain of Monthulin, was trying to assert his authority there.27 Anomalies like the château of Fiennes remained to confuse matters; the English claimed it as part of the Boulonnais, the French as part of the bailliage of Ardres, while its owner, the Burgundian countess of Gavre, wanted possession. The

23 BL Cotton, Titus B II, fos. 79–82, undated but likely from internal evidence to be August 1546. 24 Wotton to Paget, Beaune, 22 Sept. 1546, L&P, XXI, ii, 145. 25 Hertford to Council, 16 June 1546, NA SP1/220, fos. 141 (144) (L&P, XXI, i, 1074). 26 Hertford to du Biez, 11 July 1546; Du Biez to Hertford, 13 July, Potter, pp. 218– 220. 27 Hertford to du Biez, 4 July 1546 Potter, p. 218. The sr. de Boursin and his family had been instructed not to take the oath by the authorities at Ardres until a new treaty (Grey to Council, 26 Dec. 1546). In January 1547 the English seized the church (Grey to Council, 1, 3 Jan. 1547, Council to Grey, 21 May 1547, APC I, pp. 478–479.

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people of Fiennes, in fact, were in a sort of no-man’s-land without any recognised jurisdiction.28 The whole peace nearly collapsed in August when, claiming that their works had been begun before the treaty, the French began to build a fort on the hill above Le Portel to secure a harbour for the fort of Outreau.29 This led to some high-handed action by Grey against the French, tacitly and with some pleasure authorised by Henry.30 This was done on 5 September but the French returned a few days later and du Biez only gave up under intense diplomatic pressure. Renewal of war was reported as likely early in September but Odet de Selve, in an audience with Henry at Guildford on 14th, tried to stress that Annebault was the strongest support for peace in France. Back in London, the Council tried to impress on him the need for the French to leave off their new works.31 The essential context of all these moves was, in fact, the disquieting plans of the Emperor in Germany and French attempts to buttress the resistance of the Protestant princes. The latter required Anglo-French cooperation and this, for the French, provided an incentive to come to an agreement with the English, who could not be allowed again to drift into the Imperial camp. All this is reflected in the negotiations which took place to settle the Anglo-French boundary in the autumn of 1546. The first round took place in August and the French negotiators were Heilly, Courtebourne, Honvaulx, Lagy under the supervision of du Biez (in other words, a mixture of military men and local landowners). It proved abortive, since the French seem to have wished to re-open the whole treaty.32 In October, with the tensions of September calmed, a new round of talks began, this time with du Biez, Heilly and Estourmel on

28 On Fiennes, see Hertford to Paget, 6 July 1546, L&P XXI, I, 1228; Wallop to Somerset, 3 April 1547 CSPF Edward VI, Calais Papers, 96. The English continued to try to control Fiennes and Boursin (Blérancourt to Council of Calais, 23 March 1548, BL Harl. 288, fo. 82). 29 Deputy and Council of Boulogne to Henry VIII, 29 Aug. 1546, SP1/223, fo. 186r (L&P XXI, I, 1524). 30 Henry VIII to Grey, 5 Sept. 1546; Grey to Henry VIII, 6 Sept. 1546, exchange with Capt. Baron, L&P XXI, ii, 32; Du Biez to Grey, 5, 7, 9 Sept. 1546, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 222–223; Grey to Henry VIII, 15, 18 Sept. 1546; Wotton to Henry VIII, Tournus, 11, 17, 22 Sept. 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 294, 300–301, 303–307. 31 Odet de Selve to Annebault, 14 Sept. 1546; to Francis I, 19 September, LefèvrePontalis, nos. 29, 31. 32 Instruction to Grey Moyle, Wotton and Palmer, 7 Aug. 1546; Survey of Boulonnais, 11 Aug. 1546; Commissioners to Council, 12 Aug. 1546; Moyle to Paget, 19 Aug. 1546; Du Biez to Grey, 29 Aug. 1546, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 221–222.


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the French side.33 The terms of reference were now wider and all tributaries and fortifications would be examined. The report of the French commissioners makes their dilemma quite clear; the treaty had stated that the longest tributary would form the boundary. The trouble was that this was the most southerly and would make direct access to Ardres on French territory impossible. They therefore wanted to push for one of the sources near Nabringen.34 Eventually, a compromise agreement was hammered into a draft treaty and powers given to baron de La Garde to negotiate definitive terms in England as part of a comprehensive renewal of the alliance.35 The treaty was concluded in London on 11 March 1547 and gave the Quêques branch as the source. This just about made French communications possible but the quid pro quo was a licence for English works at Boulogneberg, Blackness and Ambleteuse while the French were forbidden to continue theirs at le Portel and the mouth of the Boulogne harbour. The French were, though, able to continue at SaintEtienne and the English to evacuate Boursin, now defined as part of the French county of Guînes.36 The treaty of La Garde was never given much of a chance. Already, in November 1546, the English feared that du Biez would try to attack Boulogneberg and, soon after a visit to court by the marshal in December new plans were announced for works at Le Portel.37 Though strategic logic was encouraging France and England to co-operate at the very end of Francis I’s reign, persistent reports of French troop movements were a source of disquiet to the English.38 Reports of a spy at Corbie told a tale 33 Agreement on the exact course of the boundary was not reached. In October, Cobham, Deputy of Calais, Thomas Seymour and Edward Wotton were commissioned to negotiate with the French (L&P, XXI, ii, 330; 25 Oct. 1546, SAP Ch. Heilly, 59 II, no. 52). It was found then that the Vielmoutier branch of the Liane was the longest (Cobham and Seymour to Henry VIII, 18 Nov. 1546, St.P., XI, p. 347). 34 Commissioners to Henry VIII, 25 Oct. 1546; Moyle to Paget, 31 Oct. 1546; Mémoire of French commissioners, 13 Sept. 1546, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 225–227. Francis I to Heilly, 8 Dec. 1546, Bnf, nafr. 23167, fo. 11, revoking their mission in view of La Garde’s crossing to England. 35 Negotiations of 15–17 Nov. 1546. The Vielmoutier branch was found to be the longest, as the French had feared. Cobham and Seymour to Henry VIII, 15 Nov. 1546, L&P XXI, ii, 422; Palmer to Paget [19] Nov. 1546, ibid., no. 424. Draft treaty, L&P XXI, ii, 3302. Francis I, commission, La Muette, 15 Feb. 1547; Definitive terms, 4 March 1547, CSPF Edward VI, no. 47, Rymer 2nd ed. XV, p. 13, 3rd ed. VI, pp. 148, 152–153. 36 Rymer, 2nd ed. XV, pp. 35–39. 37 Grey, 6 Nov. 1546; Grey to Paget, 27 Dec. 1546; to Henry VIII, 4 Jan. 1547, L&P, XXI, ii, 358, 623, 665). 38 CSPF Edward VI, Calais Papers, 117.

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of growing preparations. Were these being directed against the Emperor (as the English were told) or against the English (the story given to the Emperor)?39 Francis I sent Christophe Richer to the King of Denmark in November 1546, asking him not to conclude any treaty with the King of England (he had heard that Henry had offered his daughters to Christians III’s sons!). In his instructions, Francis seemed quite clear that he thought Henry unlikely to return Boulogne and thought he would have to find other means. Nor had he any illusions about the Emperor’s ambition to submit Germany to his will.40 For that reason above all, both France and England needed peace with each other and for the rest of 1546 royal advisers were content to gloss over difficulties. These were great. Towards the end of the year, Anglo-Scottish relations worsened again and it was clear to the French that a new war was being prepared (see chapter 2). Nor was Henry averse from such gamesmanship as giving fairly frequent audiences to the Imperial ambassador, Van der Delft, when he moved to Windsor in October. These were duly reported to Francis. Selve carefully observed mysterious movements of large sums money from England to the Low Countries in November and speculated on their meaning. They might be destined to repay debt, to help the Protestants or even the Emperor. The more likely reason, though, was to purchase arms. All this testified to continuing lack of trust.41 But, as we have seen, Annebault had tried to draw Henry into some kind of religious alignment in during his visit to England in August 1546. One of the objectives seems to have been to get the English to act as mediators with the princes and open the possibility of joint aid to them. It could also help to put pressure on Pope Paul III, who had been too pro-Imperial in French eyes. The General Council of the Church, so long in the planning and so suspected by Henry, was about to open at Trent and French envoys

39 Wallop to Council, 5 March 1547, CSPF Edward VI, Calais Papers, 55; Edward Wotton, 25 March 1547; intelligence from a spy at Corbie, 7 Feb. 1547, BL Harl 288, fo. 57; Edward Wotton to Cobham, 28 March 1547, BL Harl 284, fos. 16–17. 40 N. Camusat, Mémoires du sieur Richer (Paris, 1625); idem., Mélanges historiques (Paris, 1644), fo. 12r, 15bis: ‘ledict Roy d’Angleterre faict cognoistre chascun iour par plusieurs effaicts & demonstrations qu’il n’est deliberé effectuer ledict traicté pour le regard de la restitution de Boulongne. En quoy faisant le Roy par raison ne luy pourroit demourer ami.’ 41 Selve to Francis I, 18, 28 Oct., 17 Nov. 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, nos. 44, 47, 57.


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already despatched with the objective of fending off any interference in French affairs.42 If Scotland remained an insoluble stumbling block to AngloFrench rapprochement, the relationship with the Schmalkaldic princes remained by far the most important common Anglo-French interest. As the Emperor’s army took all too visible shape, Henry and Francis exchanged notes through their envoys on the scope of the threat. Henry mischievously harped on the idea that Charles was really intending to attack Francis in Piedmont, not such a far-fetched idea in France.43 French diplomacy in Germany gained momentum as the threat from the Emperor grew with his capture of Donauwörth in August 1546,44 while Sturm in France and Bruno in England solicited concerted aid from both kingdoms. Serious subventions of money were sent to Germany via the Lyon bankers.45 However, neither Francis nor Henry was willing to move without first being sure of the other, to the point that the English Council feared that Francis would ‘slip to the Emperor’ if England concluded an agreement with the Germans.46 On the other

42

A. Tallon, ‘Claude d’Urfé ambassadeur de François Ier et de Henri II au Concile de Trente-Bologne,’ Revue d’histoire diplomatique 1997, 197–217; A. Tallon, La France et le concile de Trente, 1518–1563 (Rome, 1997). 43 Selve to Francis I, 8, 14 July 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, nos. 5, 8. 44 Bassefontaine, in particular, was active in Germany during the rest of 1546 and was at Regensburg in July (cf. his letter to Reckerode, 24 July 1546, SAM, Pol.Arch. 1837, fo. 10). La Croix was sent to the Landgrave (cf. Ribier, Lettres et mémoires, I, pp. 607–609) and Bassefontaine to the Elector of Saxony, ibid., pp. 609–610). 45 On the Hilfgesuch missions to England and France, it should be noted that, besides the information in L&P there is much information to be derived from Pol. Corr. IV, 270–609 passim, the correspondence of Sturm and Burckhardt, Protestant envoys in France, with the Landgrave and Elector of Saxony. ibid., 376 is a report by Bruno an his mission to England. The letters of Francis I to Bassefontaine, Aug.–Dec. 1546 are also essential. See Archives du Château de Villebon (Eure-et-Loire), liasse 21 (mostly now in AE, Acq. extraord. 11). On financial aid, D. Potter, ‘Foreign policy in the age of the Reformation,’ 525–544. 46 L&P, XXI, ii, 619. Sturm observed that Francis’ conditions for aiding the Protestants were: (1) the election of a new Emperor by a Protestant League; (2) the entry of Henry VIII into it; (3) the sequestration of Boulogne into Protestant hands until all the money owed should be paid. Cf. Sturm’s report, dated October 1546, printed in H. Baumgarten, ‘Zur Geschichte des Schmalkaldischen Kriegs’ Historische Zeitschrift, 36, (1876), p. 69. In December, when Sturm, Burckhardt and Lersner had audience with Francis I, he again stressed that an offensive-defensive alliance was impossible without English co-operation. Cf. C. Schmidt, La vie et les travaux de Jean Sturm, cit. sup., p. 69, and the letter of Sturm to Jakob Sturm 4 Jan. 1547: when they were received by the King on 22 Dec. ‘benigne et clementer audivit, respondit etiam benigne causam belli honestissimam esse se iudicasse semper, belle etiam se causam nostram, et nobis optare quot volumus, societatem belli nobiscum facere non posse absque rege

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conclusion

hand, had Francis moved war against the Emperor without Henry’s firm guarantee of aid, the English King was all too likely to take advantage. What the French were not prepared to countenance was English mediation of a peace between the Protestants and the Emperor. Word leaked out in October 1546 that this was exactly what Mesnage was talking to Thomas Thirlby about in the Emperor’s entourage. Mesnage, who had been used to talking affably with the English ambassador since the summer of 1545, received a sharp rebuke and had to grovel. Yet he was quite lucid about the centrality of the Emperor’s plans for both France and England: When the Emperor had decided to make war against the Protestants, many of his followers said publicly that that if he started that war, the King would have peace not only in Piedmont but also in all his other territories and thus would have better means to make war on the King of England. Since the peace made between these two kings, they have been saying that their Majesties could be certain that the Emperor would do them no harm while he was at war with the Protestants and that their Majesties would not wish the Emperor either to completely subject them or come to terms with them, whatever agreement to his advantage he could make, for fear that the Emperor, once united with Germany, would attack them.47

This view that the Emperor’s triumph in Germany could only harm the interests of both England and France was the opposite view from that of Paget in the summer of 1546: that English security could only Angliae . . .’ (SAM, Samtarchiv, 66, 34a, fo. 9r–v). In October and November, Longueval and La Planche were canvassing the possibility of an Ang1o-French-Protestant understanding beginning with a French rejection of the Papacy. Paget was dubious about all this and thought it designed to get back Boulogne before time (St.P., XI, pp. 329–330). 47 Fragment of a letter in cipher either from Tournon or Annebault, Oct. 1546, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 306: ‘ce sont choses où il ne se fault iamais ingerer sans bien expres commandement du maistre.’ Mesnage to [Tournon?], Oct. 1546, BnF, fr, 17890 fos. 14–15: ‘Quant l’Empereur eust conclud faire la guerre contre les Protestans, plusyeurs de sa suite disoient souvent publicquement que s’il commencoit lad. guerre, ce pendant le Roy seroit en paix non seullement pour le Piemont mais pour tous autres ses pays et qu’il auroit meilleur moyen pour faire la guerre au Roy d’A[ngleterre.] Depuys la paix faicte entre cesd. seigneurs Roys, ilz ouy[sic] dire que leurs maiestés estoient bien certains que l’Empereur ne leur feroit dommaige durant le temps qu’il feroit la guerre contre lesd. Protestants et que icelles leurs maiestés ne vouldroient pas qu’il pensoit forcer ny mectre en sa suiection lesd. Protestants ou se reposer avec eux, [quelque] composition que fust à son advantage [de] crainte que led. Seigneur Empereur, uny avec la Germanie, ne les feust offenser.’ Thomas Thirlby’s despatches, thin for this period, do not shed much light on his relations with Mesnage, except that he used the French ambassador’s post to send letters to Wotton on France.


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depend on the reconciliation of the Emperor and the Protestants. More surprising, perhaps was Thirlby’s suggestion that the English staple be transferred from Antwerp to France on the grounds that it would be cheaper and that the English government would always be better disposed to France. Mesnage wondered whether this might not just be a way for the English to surprise a French harbour.48 At all events, Mesnage was well aware that Anglo-French relations had again gone into a freeze at the end of 1546 because of the insoluble problem of Scotland (see chapter 2) but continued his friendly talks with Thirlby, advising his master that ‘the Emperor will do what he can to divide the friendship between you and the King of England.’49 Francis was willing enough to encourage the princes to oppose the Emperor and on the very eve of his death told the Germans he would send to England to negotiate an alliance to help them.50 Effectively, the Anglo-French relationship was crucial to a general league against the Emperor.51 Elsewhere, it was hoped to draw Venice into this league52 and the Fieschi in Genoa were encouraged in their conspiracy against the ruling Doria regime. Despite protestations by the King and his ministers of loyalty to the alliance with the Emperor,53 it is certain, then, that Francis I was planning war with the Emperor when he died. Henry professed astonishment early in November that Francis had scaled down his military mission to the Protestant camp and was fortifying his frontiers; he thought Francis must be planning another war in Italy. This was just fishing.54 In one of 48 Instruction for what Malestroict is to say to the Admiral and Tournon, Nov. 1546, BnF fr. 17889, fo. 36v. 49 Mesnage to Francis I, 20 Jan. 1547, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 250–251 (draft), Ribier, Lettres, pp. 593–600 (from orig.): ‘l’Empereur fera ce qu’il poura pour diviser l’amitié d’entre vous et le Roy d’Angleterre.’ 50 Francis I to Bassefontaine, 17 Feb. 1547: ‘n’y manquez pas, jusques à ce que vous le voyez bien deliberé (i.e. the Elector of Saxony) et resolu à soûtenir la guerre contre l’Empereur, luy donnant toutes persuasions à cette fin dont vous vous pourrez adviser,’ printed in Ribier, Lettres et mémoires d’estat, I, pp. 617–618. SAM, P.A. 921, fos. 31–34, Pol. Arch., IV, pp. 683–685 (report dated 18 April 1547). 51 Pariset, Les relations entre a France et l’Allemagne, p. 62. 52 Council of Ten to Giustiniani, 24 Dec. 1546, BnF it.1716 (CSP Venice V, p. 188 no. 448). 53 Francis told Saint-Mauris via his agent at court in December 1546 that ‘ne scaurons prendre meilleure alliance que celle de l’Empereur’ and that Mesnage should only communicate with Thirlby to get information from him, without giving anything away. (Malestroict to Mesnage, 12 Dec.[1546], BnF fr. 17888, fos. 214v–215v) This letter was in cipher and so unlikely to have been meant for Imperial consumption. 54 Selve to Francis I, 4 Nov. 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, no. 49.

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conclusion

Francis’ last letters to Mesnage, he noted the Emperor’s protestations that he would never again go to war with him but wryly indicated that he had put his defences in order.55 In his last – and masterly – survey of Francis’ intentions before his death, the Imperial ambassador Jean de Saint-Mauris, relying as usual on a range of informants, some highly placed, in the royal entourage, reported a crisis gathering at court of the provincial governors and military chiefs. Orders were issued for the fortresses to be put in a state of defence, 2000 light horse to be raised for Piedmont under Brissac and for the legions to be mobilised as secretly as possible. Saint-Mauris considered this ‘tressuspecte.’ He asked his informants what it portended about the King’s war plans. Firstly, he was told that the King and all his people were fearful (in a ‘mirable craincte et grande perplexité’) that the Emperor would declare war over Piedmont. Francis had hoped that his negotiations with the princes would keep the Emperor busy but the Emperor’s successes had convinced the French that, once Germany was under control, the Emperor would move the Reichstag to demand the return of Piedmont and would declare war when Francis refused. Francis was advised to take measures for defence by all his ministers, including the Dauphin, on the argument that none of them could be construed by the Emperor as aggressive and, according to these informants, he intended no aggressive war against the Emperor or the King of England. But Francis could not but fail but fear the ‘grandeur et prosperité’ or be jealous of the Emperor and would undoubtedly seek to draw the Turks in against Charles. From Queen Léonor, SaintMauris learned that Francis had ill-will (‘quelque chose de maulvais en son estomach’) against the Emperor and had some plan to be carried out at the right moment. This may have been conjecture but the ambassador had no doubt ‘that the King could not have a worse attitude towards Your Majesty than he has.’56 In England, as the end of the year 1546 approached, it was evident that Henry’s health was worsening. Selve reported regularly on the ups-and-downs of Henry’s health from his arrival in England; the King was ill in July and mid-September but was told it was only stom55 Francis I to Mesnage, 17 Feb. 1547, Ribier, Lettres et Mémoires, I, pp. 616–617. In his last letter, March 1547, Francis came close to breaking with Charles, ibid., I, pp. 626–627. 56 Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 12 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, ‘Saint-Mauris an Karl V, berichte, 1547, III, fos. 28r–30v: ‘que led. roy ne scauroit avoir pire volunté encontre vred. Majesté de celle qu’il a.’ An intelligence report to England in February observed the same events: ‘Tous les capitaines des ordonnances et chevaulx legiers ont esté mandez à la court.’ (NA SP68/13, fo. 30).


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ach trouble or a cold; again Henry was ill at Windsor in mid-October and then taking medicinal baths at Whitehall in November. The fatal recurrence of the King’s ulcer in December required Hertford to conduct the audience with Selve on 1 January. The King disappeared from public view and was rumoured dead as early as the first week of January. Despite optimistic reports, Selve was sure he was dying but details remained concealed.57 Furious power struggles were going on behind the scenes in view to the succession. By December Surrey was in the Tower awaiting execution and Norfolk and Gardiner now in danger. The King’s death on 28 January 1547 inevitably brought further uncertainty to relations with Francis I. On 21 March a requiem mass was celebrated at Notre-Dame in Paris well attended (‘où il se trouva bien grande multitude de peuple.’) There to report in detail was, fortunately, Jean de Saint-Mauris. Leading the attendance were cardinals Givry, Meudon and Armagnac and for the princes, Enghien, Montpensier and Aumale. There followed the ambassadors, (the nuncio, because Henry was a schismatic, and Portugal, because of ilness did not attend the heralds’ summons). Six bishops walked behind them. Other than the accustomed service, there was a ‘déploration’ in French in which Henry was highly praised (‘l’on loua principallement de sa magnanimité, liberalité et prudence.’) This seems to have been the Oraison, composed by the scholar Jacques Peletier du Mans, which indeed focuses on Henry’s cultural achievements as restorer of letters and careful patron.58 As recorded by Saint-Mauris, this praise of Henry’s publication of learned books was followed by more political observations: This eulogy concluding, Sire, that where the late King of England had finally treated the last peace so as from then on to take his ease, God gave him this fruit, and added to this at the end an exhortation to the English in the form of an admonition that they should take care to keep their young king in good and perpetual peace with the King, who for his part desired to do the same in good faith.

57 Selve to Annebault, 19 Sept., to Francis I, 28 Oct., 10 Nov. 1546, 1, 8, 10, 31 Jan. 1547, Lefèvre-Pontalis, nos. 32, 47, 52, 83, 88, 90, 106. 58 The only entry in the city registers is a brief note that the obsequies began on 20 March and were completed on 21st (Registres . . . Paris, III, p. 117). BnF Latin, 4813, fos. 43–45, MS corrected by Peletier, extracts by C. Jugé, Jacques Peletier du Mans (1517–1582). Essai sur sa vie, son oeuvre et son influence (Paris/Le Mans, 1907), pp. 44–45: ‘quel prince a jamais aspire à plus grandes choses? . . . Or a bon droit, nous pouvons donner cette gloire et pre-eminence d’avoir fait naître les lettres en son royaume, lesquelles auparavant y étoient en nulle ou bien petite recommandation.’

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conclusion

Saint-Mauris said that the greater part of the nobility had attended and that the cardinals had spent time talking to the English ambassador, Nicholas Wotton, underlining that the King wished to nourish the amity with the new king of England.59 The death of his old rival was undoubtedly a shock for Francis. It was reported that the dying Francis was in ‘a remarkable fear of dying, which began when an English gentleman came recently to report the death of the late King of England and give on his master’s part a message on the point of death that he should remember that he was mortal. This admonition astounded him . . . and from that time he fell ill.’60 Even more of a shock was the realisation that Henry’s death had removed the coping stone from the anti-imperial alliance. The new regime in England, more concerned with Scotland, was unlikely to send help to Germany, as the Venetian envoys discovered.61 The status of Boulogne also remained a problem. Francis seems to have begun to hope for an early return of Boulogne by the new regime in England and in less than a month La Garde, who had been in England since early December trying to settle the matter of the Boulonnais boundaries, had concluded this business and also concluded a treaty of defensive alliance that more or less confirmed the treaty of Ardres-Guînes.62 This immediately alerted Habsburg observers. Saint-Mauris thought that the French council ‘show willingness or pretend to wish to maintain peace with the English’ letting it be known 59 Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 22 March 1547, HHSA, Fr. 14, ‘Saint-Mauris an Karl V, berichte, 1547, III, fo. 52: ‘Tombant, Sire, lad. harenge en ceste conclusion, que où led. feu Roy d’Angleterre avoit en fin traicté la paix derniere, pour des lors vivre à repos, Dieu luy avoit voulsu donner ceste fruytion et joinctement en conjoignant à la fin d’icelle se feyt une exhortation aux Anglois et avec forme d’admonition qu’ilz deussent tenir soigneuse advertance à contenir leur jeusne Roy en bonne et perpetuelle amitié avec le Roy, lequel desiroit de sa part y correspondre playnement et de bonne foy.’ This is especially valuable as Wotton’s despatch describing this event has not survived; indeed his depatches are very poorly preserved for this period. 60 Saint-Mauris to Granvelle, Paris, 25 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, ‘SaintMauris – Karl V’ 1547, III, fos. 69–72: ‘une mirable craincte de morir en laquelle il entre dez que ung gentilhomme anglois luy vint naguerres declarer le trespas du feu Roy d’Angleterre et dire de sa part selon qu’il l’avoit ainsi enjoinct à l’article de la mort qu’il deust penser qu’il estoit mortel comme luy, laquelle admonition l’estonna . . . lors et advint que au mesme instant il tomba malade.’ 61 Giustiniani and Cavalli to Doge, 5 Feb. 1547, BnF, it. 1716, pp. 27–33. 62 De La Garde negotiated two treaties on 11 March 1547, one of confirmation or defensive league (Rymer, Foedera, 3rd ed., VI, pp. 153–155; CSPF Edward VI, no. 46) and the other for clarification of frontier disputes discussed above. (Rymer, Foedera, VI, pp. 135–139). A draft of this treaty is to be found in BnF fr. 5120, fos. 95–102. Though the Treaty was signed and sealed in England, Francis I died before the ratification and Henri II never agreed to ratify it.


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that they were happy with La Garde’s negotiations and ready to make the first payment of the perpetual pension in October.63 However, there was a complex inter-relationship between France and the affairs of England and Germany. One of the last instructions issued in Francis I’s name dwells on what had proved the insoluble problem of England and Germany: ‘Concerning the duke of Saxony’s desire that the King declare war on the Emperor, the said lord cannot easily do it at the moment since he has a good understanding with the English to recover Boulogne shortly, which is what he wants most in the world.’ The French envoys in England hoped that the English would aid Saxony with a great sum of money ‘and it is greatly to be feared that if the English see him in open war with the Emperor, they would change their view, both concerning the restitution of Boulogne and in contributing aid, which must be avoided.’64 News from Germany was ominous. In January 1547, Duke Ulrich of Württemberg came to terms with the Emperor and the cities of Ulm and Frankfurt submitted. In Italy, the conspiracy of the Fieschi collapsed. Despite all this, Francis remained ambiguous about the English until his death. As late as mid-March 1547, he was complaining to the English ambassador about the sending over of reinforcements to Calais and Boulogne, materials for fortifications and the keeping of a fleet on a war footing. This, he said was hardly a way to maintain the amity (‘ne pouvoyent bien convenir à conservation de bonne amytié.’) For his part, Wotton simply asserted that these were security arrangements set up by the new government in England to cover all eventualities and in turn complained about the preparation of a galley fleet at Le Havre. The purpose of this fleet mystified observers. Saint-Mauris thought that the death of Henry had diverted these from helping the Scots to the Mediterranean, some said because Francis intended to start war in that theatre during the next year. A document which probably stems 63 Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 22 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, ‘Saint-Mauris an Karl V, berichte, 1547, III, fo. 52: ‘demonstrent ou faignent vouloir entretenir paix avec le Roy d’Engleterre.’ 64 Instructions to Bassefontaine, dated Rambouillet, 21 Mar. 1547 Ribier, Lettres et mémoires d’estat, I, pp. 628–630 at 629: ‘A l’égard de ce que ledit Duc (de Saxe) desire que le Roy ouvre la guerre à l’empereur, ledit Seigneur ne le peut pour cette heure bonnement faire, pour autant qu’il est en tres-bon propos avec les Anglois, de recouvrer en bref Bologne; ce qu’il desire sur toutes choses de ce monde.’ . . . ‘et est merveilleusement à craindre que si les Anglois le voyoient en guerre ouverte avec l’empereur, qu’ils changassent d’opinion, tant touchant la restitution dud. Bologne, que de fournir ladite ayde, à quoy il faut obvier.’

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from this naval mobilisation indicates that the fleet was a very substantial one.65 The ill intentions of the King against the Emperor were confirmed by the fact that ‘the French and English have a good understanding at the moment.’ The French ministers had pursued this and its was said the English were even prepared to accept the inclusion of the Scots in the peace, even that the Scots would attack the Emperor’s land assisted secretly by the French. Saint-Mauris could discover little about the La Garde treaty, though he dismissed the rumour that it involved a grand coalition between France, England and Venice to force the Emperor to back down in Germany. It was true that ‘all here never cease saying that they will do all they can to prevent His Majesty from increasing his forces’ and the English would have been in accord with this argument. Words spoken by Wotton to a confidant about the discontent of the English with Charles V gave Saint-Mauris reason to suppose that the La Garde treaty had something in it against the Emperor. As for Boulogne, he had not heard of any new agreement but thought the English intended to keep it while giving hope of returning it. The French had left off the dispute in order to harm the Emperor.66 Wotton did not receive his commission to take Francis I’s oath to the new Anglo-French treaty until after the King’s death.67 Hardly had La Garde returned from England than Francis’s health, delicate at best through 1546, began to worsen. Unlike in the case of Henry, Francis I’s deathbed agonies were minutely chronicled by observers. In the first days of March, his fever returned and by 12th he was grievously ill with his ulcer. On the night of 21st, the ulcer was so painful that it caused him to cry out with through the night. An incision relieved him on 24th but he began to go downhill on 27th. He breathed his last at Rambouillet in the night of 30–31 March.68 With the close of both

65 Etat de la provision qu’il fault faire pour l’armee de mer que le roy veult dresser (BnF, Moreau 737, fos. 169–173, printed in Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009) II, pp. 841–847. 66 Saint-Mauris to Mary of Hungary, 25 March, 1 April 1547, HHSA Frankreich 15, ‘Berichte Saint-Mauris an Marie, 1547’: ‘les Franchois et Anglois sont en bonne intelligence pour le present.’ . . . ‘tous ceulx d’icy ne cessent de dire qu’ilz empescheront par tous les moyens qu’ilz auront que sa majesté n’accroisse plus ses forces.’ Saint-Mauris gave further information on the treaty in his despatch of 12 April and conjectured that the treaty ‘avoit esté pour le regard de la monarchie à laquelle ceulx d’icy dient que l’empereur aspire.’ 67 Council to Wotton, 1 April 1547, CSPF Edward VI, no. 48. 68 Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 1, 9, 25, 31 March 1547, HHSA, Fr. 14, ‘Saint-Mauris an Karl V, berichte, 1547, III.


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reigns, policies began again to shift and undermine the precarious balance of the last months of 1546. In France as well as in England there was a serious upheaval in policy-making, reflected in Saint-Mauris’ gratified reporting of the sudden shift in policy towards the Emperor in the first week of April. War, expected imminently, would not happen that year. Nicholas Wotton was by no means so contented and felt the death of the King and the dismissal of Francis’ old councillors keenly: Saying that their mutual affairs had been well assured, to the extent that they were at peace during the term of eight years before Boulogne is to be restored. Notably, he regrets the loss of the Admiral, who, he said, was very well disposed to their cause. I learn from a good source, Madame, that by the command of the King of France the Admiral had accepted a secret pension from the King of England, as also did Bayard.

In the other direction, it was thought that La Garde had induced the new governors of England to accept pensions themselves.69 Whether or not these assertions were true, they testify to strong assumptions of sympathy between the ruling groups in France and England before the death of Francis. On 19 April Nicolas Wotton was told by the French Council that the new treaties, full of ‘obscuritez et absurditez’ had been sent back for renegotiation and, though the treaty of June 1546 would be observed, the new treaties would have to be modified.70 That was the last to be heard of them and the scene was set for the descent of Anglo-French relations into new hostilities in Scotland and Boulogne. The new court despatched Vieilleville to re-negotiate the treaty to bring the Scots into it and to raise a protest against the English harbour workers at Boulogne which were to develop into the famous ‘Dunette’ and the Tour d’Ordre. It was a mission doomed to failure.71 War seemed imminent in 69

Saint-Mauris to Mary of Hungary, 12 April 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 15, ‘Berichte Saint-Mauris en Marie 1547, IV’ fos. 9–14: ‘Tenant propoz que leurs affaires avoient esté tresbien asseurez avec eulx et tellement que ilz fussent demeurez hors de guerre, du moins jusques au terme des huyt annees que Boullongne se doibt rendre. Signamment il regrete la perte dud. admiral, lequel il dit estoit du tout affectionné à leur party; et j’ay sceu de bon lieu, Madame, que par le commandement du Roy de France led. admiral avoit acepté une pension secrete du Roy d’Angleterre et Sidus (Bayard) aussi.’ 70 BnF, fr. 18153 fo. 3r–v, procès-verbal, 19 April 1547; Council to Cobham, 21 May 1547, APC, II, 499; to Wallop, 13 June, ib. 508; to Cobham, 13 June 1547, ib. 509: ‘if the Frenchmen did breke with us, it would be within this iij wekes.’ 71 Council to gov. of Ambleteuse, 5 April 1547, APC II, 465–466; Grey to Somerset, 8, 18 April 1547, CSPF Edward VI, Calais papers, 47, 121.

480

conclusion

Picardy but then, in May 1547, the Emperor’s defeat of the Elector of Saxony at Mühlberg seemed to overthrow the whole central European power structure. The French were more than ever fearful of Charles V’s monarchia and restraint had to be placed on the escalating conflict with the English. It seems, too, that the return of the Constable to power had some effect. The relaxation of tension brought about new possibilities and we know that when Coligny, as colonel-general of the infantry, visited the frontier places in May and June, he surveyed the Boulonnais and had talks with Grey and Bridges at Boulogne.72 Coligny even offered to demolish Fiennes castle, an offer which was declined in favour of French evacuation.73 In August, the king visited the frontier in person, reaching Ardres and Thérouanne on 24th and 25th, but with no hint of planned aggression and by October Nicholas Wotton had managed to negotiate an agreement with France to settle depredation disputes and restore full commercial intercourse.74 For the moment, it looked as though some stability had been achieved, but the English triumph in Scotland again upset the whole agreement. From late 1547, Henri II was being pressed increasingly to aid to defeated Scots and this inevitably dragged relations with England down with it. The commencement of war was thus only a matter of time, though for a number of reasons it was delayed for another 18 months.75 The last act of our story takes place in Saint Paul’s Cathedral in London on 19 June 1547. Just as Henry’s death had been marked at Paris by a solemn requiem mass, so in London on that date solemn vespers for the dead were held for Francis, involving a ‘sumptuous herse,’ 200 torchbearers, archbishops, bishops, six lords as chief mourners and the foreign ambassadors, the mayor and aldermen in their liveries. Selve described it as done with solemnity ‘as great or greater than anything ever done in such cases in this country.’ The following day Archbishop Cranmer celebrated the requiem mass in pontificals and the bishop of Rochester gave the eulogy, praising (by stretching the truth somewhat)

72 Instruction to Coligny for negotiations, AE, CP Angleterre VIII, fos. 91–92; ‘Cy ensuyt la visitation que les srs. de Chastillon et d’Estrees ont faicte’ BnF, fr. 6637, fos. 293–294; Grey to Somerset, 6 May 1547, Calais Papers, 129; Council to Bridges, 20 June 1547, APC II, 510–511 (Instructions for negotiations with Estrées). 73 Council to Bridges, 23 Dec. 1547. 74 Cobham to Schets, 17 Aug. 1547, BL Harl. 288, fo. 91. 75 Cobham to Adrien de Croy, Oct. 1547, BL Harl. 288 fo. 95v: after the defeat of the Scots ‘nous vivons icy plus paisiblement avec les Francoys’ proved an optimistic view.


481

Francis I’s setting forth of the Bible in French, establishing the equivalence of his piety with that of Henry VIII. The Scottish ambassador excused himself on the argument that his colleague in France had not been invited to the ceremony for Henry VIII in Paris.76 It was at least a fitting end to a relationship which had shaped Anglo-French relations for the best part of 40 years, had seen heights of display and rivalry and depths of betrayal and destruction; one which had finally culminated in a conflict of massive proportions which was to shape the histories of both countries for years to come.

76 Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 184 gives the date as 29 June. This is corrected by Selve to Henri II, 22 June 1547, Lefèvre-Pontalis, no. 178.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE

THE BATTLE (1544) ‘The names of such persones with ther nombre apppoyted to go in the Kinges Majesties batail.’ Hatfield House, Cecil MSS, 201, fos. 7–17. Category

Horse

Foot

Council Privy Chamber Chamber Household Stable Pensioners Shires TOTALS

974 (1034) 494 (488) 895 (922) 58 (74) 181 (182) 484 (385) 224 (123) 3159

3716 (2240)1 2048 (2140) 1696 (1553) 269 (349) 158 (189) 660 (674) 1265 (---) 9688*

*Numbers made up by the following: Calais 300 Miners Irish kerne Brewers and bakers Men for victuals Men to attend to K’s carriages Men of all sorts, ordnance Carters for victuals

200 200 235 119 1000 1000 1000

1 Figures in brackets for cavalry and combined archers and billmen in L&P, XIX, i, 275.

APPENDIX TWO

PLANNING FOR WALLOP’S ARMY, 1543 L&P XVIII, i, 843. Horse Gentlemen Cheyney Wallop T. Semour T. Darcy R. Cromwell A. Darcy R. Raynsforth J. St. John H. Stafford, jun E. Baynton W. Parr J. Gascoigne G. Carewe J. Wellesbourne G. Harper J. Berkeley W. Stafford Dr. Lee E. Rogers W. Herbert Fauconbridge E. Ellerton T. Culpeper E. Warner Devereux Gawyn Carew N. Arnolde W. Calawaye H. Markham F. Knolles R. Phane T. Palmer E. Vaughan H. Wingfelde W. Blunt

118 20 30

Foot

4 4 3 2 4 4 30 7

500 100 100 200 100 70 100 100 100 100 100 40 10 100 30 10 100 [50]+ 10 10 2 10 10 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 10 4

4

4

12 20

10 6

10

appendices J. Granado R. Bowes TOTALS Shires Kent Sussex Essex Hants Suffolk Surrey Middlesex Berkshire Hertford Cambridge Oxford London Peter Mewtas Pioneers at Guînes Totals

2 100 400 (390) 10

10 400

487 2 15 1967 377 255 333 60 97 228 58 180 109 106 200 100 200 100 2403 4370 (4400)

APPENDIX THREE

THE FLEET FOR SCOTLAND, 1544 NA SP1/185, fos. 192–195. (L&P XIX, i, 355) “[The] army by sea into Scotland.” 18 April 1544. “A [book] conteyning the numbres of ma[riners] in every ship appointed to[recei]ve in men, with a calcul[ation how] many men eche ship is ord[ered to] transporte besides the said mariners.” [Giving in columns the names of the ships, numbers of mariners, numbers of “men to be taken in” and totals.] The names of the ships are: – “Out of the port of London.” – The Mary Grace of Lee Mary John of Calais Mary John of London James of Blakney Trinite of Alisford Flee of Anserdan John of Maldon Mary of Calais James of Hadley Michel Anthony of Dordrigh Edwarde of Hampton James of Fowye Trinite of Barkinge Esel of Armewe Cuthbert Lawson Anne of Antwerp Mary of Antwerp Mawdelyn of Antwerp George Goldesmyth George of Antwerp Christopher Hunte George of Hamborough Mary of Hamborough Gryffyn of Hamborough Bartilmewe of Hamborough

12 14 11 14 10 7 7 7 7 12 6 13 12 13 6 12 12 10 10 21 14 17 20 19 20 40

68 66 69 66 70 73 73 33 33 48 54 57 58 37 44 88 88 90 90 99 106 103 130 131 160 200

80 80 80 80 80 80 80 40 40 60 60 70 70 50 50 100 100 100 100 120 120 120 150 150 180 240

appendices Raven of Lubeck Swanne of Hamborough [Total

489

30 40

210 320

240 360 2040]

“Out of the port of Ipswiche.” – The James Osee Mary James (sic) Mary Fortune Marlyn Peter Christopher of Simon “Bl.,” Anne Fraunces Kateryn Christopher of Alexander “Sq.,” Mary James Andrewe Trinite Marlyon Thomas Peter of George Copinge Peter of John Momforde John Evangelist Jesus John Thomas of Wm. Barkers Mathewe Nicholas of Wm. Dryver Cicely Nicholas George James Edwarde Michel Thomas of Thomas Smyth Kateryn Julyane +

32 28 8 20 16 18 14 10 8 10 10 10 8 10 12 10 8 14 12 10 18 20 10 8 12 12 6 16 10 12 12 12 6

118 116 42 42 54 82 66 50 32 40 40 50 32 50 68 50 32 66 68 50 82 100 50 32 58 68 34 64 40 58 58 68 34

150 140 50 150 80 100 80 60 40 50 50 60 40 60 80 60 40 80 80 60 100 120 60 40 70 80 40 100 (sic) 50 70 70 80 40

“Out of the port of Yermouthe.” – The John Evangelist Mary Grace Anne Frances + Mary Wyllyam James Anne

22 18 12 10 10 12 20

98 82 58 50 50 58 100

120 100 70 60 60 70 120

490

appendices

Nicholas James Trinite Wyllyam Mawdelyn Mary Anne Thomasyne Mary Elizabeth Mary Grace Mary George John Anthony Edmonde Jesus George Mathewe Margaret James John James Little Mary George

12 16 14 10 15 17 26 24 18 22 14 15 12 15 13 11 18 9 16 12 21

58 74 74 50 65 73 104 126 82 78 58 65 68 65 57 49 82 41 54 48 79

70 90 80 (sic) 60 80 90 130 150 100 100 70 (sic) 80 80 80 70 60 100 50 70 60 100

“Out of the port of Lynne.” – The George of Newcastel James of Newcastel James of Newcastel Mary of Selbye Jesus of Newcastel Martin of Newcastel Martyn of Newcastel Trinite of Roclif Andrewe of Rosyndale Pellycane of Dordrigh George of Rosyndale Mary James of Lynne Peter of Lynne George of Lynne Margaret of Brickelsye Hoy Barke

8 9 9 6 11 9 9 7 5 5 8 13 12 10 7 10

72 91 71 64 109 51 51 43 35 75 72 67 68 50 43 50

80 100 80 80 120 60 60 (repeated) 50 40 80 80 80 80 60 50 60

“Out of the port of Hul.” – The Trinite of Hul (120) Trinite of Beverley Mary Kateryn of Hul (55) Mary John of Hul (120) Wyllyam of Hul (50) Mary James of Hul

20 24 16 24 12 20

100 116 64 116 48 80

120 140 80 140 60 100

appendices John of Beverley John Baptist of Hul (80) Trinite of Newcastel Nicholas of Sowholde Maryon of Lubecke John Baptist of Leistofte (80) Mawdelyn of Yermouthe (100) George of Yermouthe

12 18 20 7 20 10 20 10

491 48 82 100 33 120 50 100 50

60 100 120 40 140 60 120 60

“The wafters also be appointed to transporte, besides the men they have already, such numbers as follow.” [In this case there are only three columns, viz. “men taken in already”, names of ships, then the numbers to be added.] – The Paunsey Great Galias Mynyon Swepestake Swallowe John Evangelist Mary Grace Julyane of Dertmothe Peter of Fowye Anthony Fulforde Farnando Peter

300 300 197 197 140 110 115 80 80 80 120 115

180 190 91 90 52 82 90 64 64 64 192 185

Gardiner’s list of shipping in the Northern ports, with tonnage: L&P XIX, i, 140. 6ii York Michael Bynckes

33

Selby Mary Strynger

33

Thorney Barbara

30

Rateclyf Trinity Mary

36 34

492 Laurence Margant Trynitie Hull Trinite Trinite Taylour Antony Mathew John Bonaventure John Baptist Magdalen Mary John Mary Katherin Galland Margarett Mary Katherin Mary John Barbara William Trinite Folbery John Evangelist Mary Rose Mary Wylfryde Petre of Hull Mary Edward Petre Mary James

appendices 30 30 30 120 110 80 120 140 80 100 120 55 80 60 90 50 80 50 50 70 40 36 30 50 30 80

Flamborough Barbara Mary Erasmus Clement

30 40 40 30

Scarborough John Baptist Margaret Mary Kateryn Christofer Bartylmewe Cuthbert Gabryel Blyth Trinite Thomas Trinite

60 40 ? 30 40 30 40 30 30 30 40

appendices Whitby Elisabeth Mary James Mychall Mary Jermayn Newcastle Elisabeth Trinite Antony James of Newcastell James John Mary Grace John Evangelist Jhesus George Martyne Mary Anne James Robert Jesus Christofer Mary Anne Mary Gallon Christofer Bonventure John George Kateryn John Trinite Mary Fortune Anne James Peter Nicolas Pynke

40 30 40 50 160 130 100 100 100 100 90 100 100 100 66 75 10 70 60 56 70 50 50 60 80 60 60 60 40 40 40 40 30 40 30

South Sheilds and Tynemouth John

82

Berwick Mary kateryn

50

493

APPENDIX FOUR

THE REARGUARD, 1544 SP1/185, fos. 49–52 (L&P, XIX, i, 276). Cecil MSS, 201, fos. 3–5. The lord Privy Seal* Earl of Wourcestour* E of Huntingdon* E of Bathe* Bp. of Welles Lord Gray of Wilton* Lord Powes* Lord Wyndesor* Bp. of Exeter The dean and chapter of Exeter Beds.Sir Fras. Bryan* Sir John Seinct John* Sir John Gascoigne Sir Thos. Rotheram* Lewes Dyve Gerarde Harvye Sir John Mordaunt Thos. Dycons Bucks.Justice Baldewyne Sir Ant. Lee* Sir Robt. Dormar* with his son Arthur Longvilde Leonard Reade Robt. Cheyney Geo. Gifforde Wm. Fawkonar John Conwaye Ralph Gifford Fras. Pygott Nic. Gifford Ric. Willoughby

Horse 100 20 6 12 20

100 6

12 4 4 1 2

Foot 1000 500 150 100 100 150 120 100 100 100 300 60 10 60 10 6 20 2 20 20 36 6 12 2 2 12 2 2 5 5 2

appendices Rutland.Edw. Sapcottes* Dorset.Sir Thos. Ponynges* Sir Giles Strangweys* Sir John Horssey* Kent.John Norton of Norwodd*

495 100

50

400 100 100

2

12

Devon.Sir Thos. Dennys Sir Ric. Grenfild* John St. Legier* Hugh Stukley* Ric. Chidley* Rog. Gifforde* Rog. Bluett* Thos. Pomeroy* Walt. Reyglegh Hen. Beamount John Chichestre*

100 100 60 40 20 30 40 50 6 10 16

Northampton.Sir Thos. Griffith Sir Wm. Newenham* 10 Sir Thos. Thressham* Sir Robt. Kyrkham* Ant. Catesby Valentine Knightley John Hasillwoode Humph. Stafforde* with his father’s aid Thos. Brudenell Robert Browne Bobt. Catlyn Thos. Cave Vyllers

24 90 40 50 6 30 12 100 20 4 1 12 24

Somerset.Sir Hen. Capell* Roger Basing* John Wyndham John Drewes Robt. Leversage Thos. Baumfield Thos. Phillipps

2 2

60 8 15 2 8 4 4

496 Mr. Legh* Sir Edw. Gorge John Sydenham Fras. Stradling John Light Heref.Sir Ric. Vaughan John Scydmour* Nic. Fytton* Geo. Cornwall*

appendices 4

6

26 30 20 3 10 8 100 6 50

Herts.Sir Hen. Parkar* with my lord Morley’s men Sir Ralph Verney de Pendeloo* Sir Ph. Butler John Brokket

100 50 20 8

Glouc.Sir Edm. Thame Sir Walt. Dennys Maurice Dennys*

122 50 20

Warw.Sir Walter Smyth* Sir Ric. Catesby Sir Foulk Grevylde* Robert Throgmarton*

8

20 6

60 30 34 100

Worc.Sir John Russell*

100

Midd.Sir Arthur Darcye*

100

Denbigh.John Salisbury* John Salisbury the younger

200 40

Glam.Sir Geo. Herbert* Walter Herbert

20

120 80

Carm.Wm. Morgan* of Newport

20

80

447

6289

Total

appendices

497

In another hand Northern horsemen

100

Footmen:Chief officers appointed to have oversight of the victuals Bps., lords, deans, and gentlemen newly appointed Bakers and brewers Sir Ant. Knevete’s soldiers From the sea The Irishmen Out of London

55 813 650 200 400 200 200

Grand total

horsemen 547

footmen 9,017

* These names are marked with the letter “g” (for gone or going?) prefixed.

32 13

12

13

11 7

26

21

12

1

63

83/88

10

5

100

98

101 101/86

3

101

38/26

30

4

Figures drawn from pay schedules for (1)1–15 August, (2)16–31 August and (3)1–15 September 1544. Where figures differ substantially. The first is for (1) and the second for (2) or (3). Sources: SCA, LM24/7–27; 1330/5.

John Winchecombe/ 41 Adam Aldaye Edmond Aucher/ 35 Robert Stradlyng John Maxell/John 71/60 Bernard soldiers Thomas Shelton/ John Bridges John Shokisborowe/ 78/68 Thomas Hale soldiers Anthony Aucher/ William Herne/ Robert Aucher

Company: captain/ Archers gunners morrispikes Clubs billmen Craftsmen demi- javelins Northern Ensigns, Total petty captain lances staves whifflers, drums, fifes

THE RETINUE OF THOMAS CAWARDEN (1 AUGUST–15 SEPTEMBER 1544)

APPENDIX FIVE

appendices LM 24/14 fo. 3r, summary of the retinue: 500 foot 60 horse 5 whifflers 4 drums 2 ensigns 30 light horse and northern staves 1 gythorne on horseback 3 surgeons 2 chaplains 5 captains 5 petty captains 4 clerks Total: 593 Thomas Cawarden and Anthony Aucher his lieutenant. Origins: Conduct money for 390 foot: 150 Newbury to Dover, 110 miles 36 from Loxley and Warwick to Dover, 120 miles 40 from Nonsuch to Dover, 70 miles 20 from Bletchingley to Dover 74 miles 154 artificers from London to Dover, 60 miles 12 petty captains, Newbury to Dover, 110 miles 66 horsemen, London to Dover, 60 miles Sum total: £157.18.4d. (SCA, LM/26)

499

APPENDIX SIX

COAT AND CONDUCT MONEY FOR THE ARMY, JULY–AUGUST 1545 L&P, XXI, i, 643.v 28 June, Brian Randolphe, conduct money of 100 men at 1/2d. and himself at 4d. the mile, from Guildford to Dovour, 90 miles, and their coats at 4s. each, 40l. 5s. Wm. Jervice, coats and conduct of 100 men from Ipswiche to Dovour, 40l. 5s. Thos. Weidon and John Norris, for coats and conduct of 40 persons from Berkshire to Dovour, 16l. 13s. 4d. 2 July, Ant. Cooke, coats and conduct of 200 soldiers from Colchester to Dovour, 72l. 8s. 7 July, Ant. Hungerfford, coats and conduct of 200 soldiers from Sarum to Dovour, 98l. 6s. 8d. Thos. Hothersall and Ric. Smythe, coasts and conduct of 151 soldiers from Berkshire to Dovour, 71l. 5s. 2 July, Sir Thomas Palmer, conduct of four captains, at 4d., four petty captains, at 2d., and 20 soldiers at 1/2d. the mile, from London to Dovour 12l. 18d. 29 July, Ant. Hussey, for the transportation of 1,000 men from London to Bolloigne, 100l. James Isley, captain of 100 men, “for his coat and the coat of his petty captain, with their conduct money,” 38s. Edw. Goodman, for his master Sir Thos. Gruffin, coats and conduct of 500 men out of Northamptonshire, 167l. 10s. 3 Aug., Robt cotton, coasts and conduct of 500 men out of Leicestershire, 190l.

appendices

501

Thos. Forster and John Paxton, the like for 500 out of Bedfordshire, 212l. 10s. George Medley, the like for 1,000 out of London, 125l. Edw. Russell, to be conveyed to Lord Morley for coats and conduct of 400 Soldiers out of Herefforde shire,’ (Hertfordshire) 76l. 18s. 4d. 5 Aug., John Hornyolde, to be conveyed to the Duke of Norfolk, at Ypsewiche, for coats and conduct of soldiers out of Norfolk, Suffolk and Huntingdonshire, 1, 200l. 6 Aug., Ric. Wakerlie, for conduct of himself and his retinue from London to Dovour, 13l. 10s. Edw. Russall and John Dellwoode, for conduct of 300 soldiers out of Hertfordshire to Dovour, 40l. 10s. Wm. Palmer, conduct of 100 men from London to Dovour, 13l. 18s. 7 Aug., Fras Kevell, John Brokesbye, Hugh Doder, Hen. Sacheverell and Wm. Parvin, each for conduct of 100 men from London to Dovour, 13l. 10s. John Cope, for conduct of himself and 100 men from London to Dovour, 14l. 8s. John Redine coats and conduct of 100 men from London to Dovour, 14l. 8s. 8 Aug., Chr. Doffe and Robt. Paine, coats and conduct of 300 soldiers and 3 captains out of Huntington to London, 93l. 15s. 9 Aug., Thos. Tirrell, to be conveyed to Sir Thos. Chenie and Sir Thos. Seymer, for wages of certain Spaniards for one month and transportation of 2,600 soldiers to Callice, 378l. 9 Aug., Thos. Saunders, coats and conduct of himself and 100 men from London to Dovour, 13l. 18s. 11 Aug., Robt. Castell, conduct of himself and 100 men from Huntingtonshire, 13l. 10s. Wm. Croftes conduct money for himself, his petty captain and 100 men out of Huntingdonshire, 13l. 10s. 12 Aug., Wm. Castell, conduct of himself, his petty captain and 100 men out of Huntingdonshire, 13l. 10s.

502

appendices

17 Aug., Ralph Standisshe, to be delivered at Dovour to the Lord Warden and Sir Thos, Seymer, for wages of soldiers arrived there, 282l., and for his own costs, 13l. 6s. 8d. Thos, Stuuclie. for coats and conduct of 200 soldiers out of Warwickshire, 98l. 6s. 8d. 7 Sept., Wm. Stone, to be delivered to Dunstan Ames for conduct of 182 soldiers from London to Dovour and so to Callice, 13l. 6s. 8d. Provisional total 6973 plus 2600 Spaniards.

APPENDIX SEVEN

HERTFORD’S ARMY, JANUARY 1546 20 Jan. 1546. SP1/213, fos. 109–124 (L&P XXI, i, 91.2), second version of the muster list to be found in ibid. XXI, i, 91 (with conduct money warrants to Augmentations, XXI, i, 643, paid in the course of March 1546). Beds

300

Sir John St. John, Sir Thos. Rotheram, Sir John Gaskoyn,! Thos. Foster!

Bucks

300

Sir Rof Verney, Ric. Greneway!, Arthur Longvile!, Young Dormer.!

Berks

300

Alex. Umpton, Fras. Inglefeld, John Cheney, Young Winchecombe, Parkyns!, Young Hide.!*

Cambs

200

Thos. Cotton, Robert Chestre, Young Alington.

Devon

500

Sir Ric. Grenfeld,* Hugh Stukeley, Roger Blunt,* John St. Clere.* (16 March, Sir Ric. Grenefilde, for conduct of 200 soldiers from Tavistock to Dover at 1/2d, the mile, their coats at 4s the piece, his own conduct at 4d., two petty captains at 2d., and the drum, surgeon, standard bearer, ‘phiphe’ and priest at 1d, the mile, and their coats, 158l. 4s. 2d.; to Roger Blunte, the like for 80 out of Devonshire, 77l. 5s. 10d.); to Thomas Stukeley, for 100 out of Devonshire, 73l. 19s. 4d.

Dorset.

100

Husey, late of the Rodes.* (Edm. Hussey, the like for 100 out of Dorsetshire, with himself, his petty captain and fife, 73l. 12s. 5d.)

Cornwall 300

John Reskymer,* Ric. Chamond (Ric. Chamounde, the like for 100 out of Cornwall, with himself, his petty captain, and “five officers,” 92l. 3s. 4d.)

Essex

400

[The earl of Oxford, the earl of Essex, Sir Thos. Darcye, Sir John Raynesford 200, Sir Giles Capell, Sir John Smyth, Geo. Norton 200, Eustace Sulyarde, Wm. Bonham, Edw. Burye, John Corbet.]**

504 Glouc.

appendices 700

Sir Walter Denys,* Sir Nic. Pointz, Sir Ant.* Hungerford, Sir Ant. Kingston, Thos. Throgmerton.* (Thos. Throgmerton, for 200 out of Gloucestershire, 116l. 6s. 8d.; Sir Walter Dennis, for 200 out of Gloucestershire, 113l. 12s; James Armerer and John Webbe, for 200 out of Gloucestershire, 110l. 18s. 8d.

Hunts

100

Myles Forest, Wm. Coney of Yaxley.*

Herts

300

Sir Hen. Parker, Robt. Lytton, Wm. Berley,* John Brocket,* Rouland Lytton.*

Heref.

500

Sir Jas. Baskervile, Miles ap Henry, Nic. Phitton, Young Baskervile,* Sir Geo. Cornewal.* (3 March, Thos. Hauard, coats and conduct of 400 soldiers out of Herefordshire to Dover, 170 miles, 221l. 3s. 4d.; 18 March, Jas. Baskervile, “conduct of himself, his petty captain and other” from Hereford to Dover, 4l. 19s. 2d.

Kent

300

+ cancelled+

Linc.

300

Sir John Candissh, Sir Fras. Askue, Ric. Markham, Edw. Sheffeld,* – Hollys

Wilts

500

Lord Sturton,* Sir Thos. Seymour,* Sir Edw. Darell, Sir Wm. Wroughton, Davers,* Clifford.*.* (Lord Sturton, the like for 400 out of Wiltshire, with himself, two grand captains, four petty captains and “other officers,” 232l. 9s. 4d.)

Warw.

500

Sir Fulke Grevil, Reynold Digby, Thos. Ardern, Sir Hugh Willoughbye, Walter Hort (Hortone in * 3).

Leic.

500

Sir Ambrose Cave, Thos. Nevel, Brian Cave, Thos. Neele, John Moyle (7 March, John Brabson and Wm. Lane, the like for 400 out of Leicestershire, 196l. 13s. 4d.; Thos. Neele and John Broughton, for 200 out of Leicestershire. 9l. 17s. (sic); Lord Graye and Ambrose Cave, for 200 out of Leicestershire. 6l. 17s. (sic);

Notht

400

Sir Wm. Newenham,* Sir Thos. Tresham, Sir Robt. Kyrkham, Sir Robt. Stafford,* Sir Humphrey Stafford.*

appendices

505

Midd.

200

Thos. Wrothe, Edw. Taylour.

Norf.

500

[The duke of Norfolk, the earl of Sussex, Sir Rog. Townesend, Sir Edm. Knyvett 200, Sir Wm. Fermour, Sir Edm. Wyndham, Sir John Clere 100, Sir Fras. Lovell, John Robster 100, Hen. Bedingfelde, Wm. le Straunge 100]**

Oxford

300

Edm. Horne,* Leonard Chamberlayn,*

Rutland

100

Kellam Digby, Sir John Harrington.*

Staff.

400

Sir Geo. Griffith,* Thos. Gifford, John Peirsall,* Humfrey Swynerton.*

Surrey

200

Sir Hen. Knevet, Nic. Legh of Adyngton, Copinger,*

Worc

500

Sir Geo. Blount,* Ric. Palmer, Chr. Savage, Jerome Palmer.* (4 March, Sir George Blunte, the like for 400 out of Worcestershire, 176 miles. 231l. 13s. 3d.) (20 March, Sir George Blunte, coats and conduct of 200 men out of Worcestershire to Dover, with “his petty captain and other officers,” 7l. 9s. 4d. (sic)) (Jerome Palmer, for 200 out of Worcestershire, 6l. 12s. 8d. (sic))

Suff.

300

[The lord Wentwarthe, Sir Thos. Tyrel of Gyppyng, Sir John Jerningham, Sir Wm. Drury. Sir thos. Jermyn, Ph. Calthrop, Thos. Barnardeston, Chr, Glemham, John Harman.]**

Soms

600

Sir Morres Barkley,* Sir John Luttrel,* John Sydenham, John Windeham,* Thos. Dyer,* Young Sydenham.* (John Sydenhame, for 100 out of Somersetshire 66l. 15s); 17 March, Sir Morres Barkeley, for 200 out of Somersetshire, 125l. 15s.; Sir John Lutterell, John Windehame and Thos. Dier, for 300 out of Somersetshire, 213l. 10s

Lanc.

200

Sir Thos. Holcroft.* (Sir Thos. Holcrofte. coats and conduct of 200 soldiers out of Lancashire to Dovour 154l.)

Notts, Salop

100

Wales

1,000 (altered from 700)

+ cancelled

506 The Spaniards

appendices 1,000

The Clevois

300

Mr. Deverox

300

Total

11,300

! marked with a circle on list of ‘capitaynes first appointed to have goon with others sithens apoynted and . . .’ presumably those since appointed. ** Not included in the second list, 2. *also on final list 3.

APPENDIX EIGHT

EXPENSES OF FRENCH AND SCOTTISH WARS, 1542–1550: ‘A BRIEF DECLARATION WHEREIN ARE CONTEYNED THE GREATE AND NOTABLE CHARDGES OF WARRES’*1 BL Harl. 353 fos. 90–102 SP10/15, no. 11, fos. 18–29 The Warres against Fraunce and Scotlande [1] ‘Bolloigne and Newhaven with all the fortes and peces in the countie of Boullonoys betwene the First of Januarye anno xxxvjto2 Henrici [octavi] and the firste of Maye anno iiijto Edwardi sexti.’ 1. Coat and conduct: of the captains, victuallers etc. (a) During the siege (b) 14 Sept. 1544–28 Jan. 1547 (c) Ditto 28 Jan. 1547–1 May 1550 TOTAL 2. Diets and wages of army royal, pay of officers etc. (a) During siege (b) 14 Sept. 1544–28 Jan. 15473 (c) 28 Jan. 1547–1 May 1550 TOTAL

59,028.0.8 8,808.16.11 3,798.11.11 71,735.18.11 353,916.19.6 318,884.3.4 196,751.16.8 869,552.16.24

* ‘Expenditure before the death of Henry VIII is shown in bold.’ 1 ‘which chardges are gathered and collected out and from thaccomptes of divers and sondrie highe treasorers, vicetreasorers of the warres, officers of . . ., mr victuellors, purveyors, paymasters of fortificacions and buildinges and upon conference with sondrie officiers of the Kinges Maiesties severall receptes and Treasurer.’ 2 This would be 1 Jan. 1545, though the sense seems to be 1 Jan. 1544 3 The term used from this point is ‘in the time of the saide late Kinge.’ 4 Recte £869,552.19.6

508

appendices

Empciones (purchases) 3. Ordnance, powder, munition, artillery etc. (a) During siege (b) 14 Sept. 1544–28 Jan. 1547 (c) 28 Jan. 1547–1 May 1550 TOTAL 4. Horse and transport (a) During siege 7 hoyes etc.: (a) During siege 5. Sundry provisions: (a) During siege (b) 14 Sept. 1544–28 Jan. 1547 TOTAL

94,000.7.6 25,989.8.7 20,127.17.2 140,187.13.45 14,412.5.9 1,328.17.2 14,412.5.9 5,166.7.11 19,578.13.9

[Total Empciones

174,402.16.7]

6. Frieght, lighterage, keelage etc. (a) During siege (b) 14 Sept. 1544–28 Jan. 1547 (c) 28 Jan. 1547–1 May 1550

21,761.1.3 8,174.2.11 31,1084.18.6

7. Timber for houses, tents etc during siege

9,789.0.8

8. King’s stable during the siege

2,085.0.10

9. Posts, rewards, ambassadors (a) During siege (b) 14 Sept. 1544–28 Jan. 1547 (c) 28 Jan. 1547–1 May 1550 TOTAL

7,995.17.1 3,182.15.6 13,993.14.6 25,172.7.1

10. Fortifications6 (a) 14 Sept. 1544–28 Jan. 1547 (c) 28 Jan. 1547–1 May 1550 TOTAL

47,166.18.3 75,529.5.3 122,696.3.6

5

Recte £140,117.13.3 Places itemised: High and basse Boulogne, Old Man, Boulogneberg, Ambleteuse, Blackness (Gris nez) 6

appendices 11. Losses and waste, grain etc. (a) During siege (b) 14 Sept. 1544–28 Jan. 1547 (c) 28 Jan. 1547–1 May 1550 TOTAL 12. Losses, victuals and implements (a) During siege (b) 14 Sept. 1544–28 Jan. 1547 (c) 28 Jan. 1547–1 May 1550 TOTAL

509 982.16.3 3,663.11.3 3,615.1.11 8,261.9.6 8,040.8.4 5,270.15.2 14,560.10.2 27,871.13.8

SUM TOTALS (a) During siege (b) 14 Sept. 1544–28 Jan. 1547 (c) 28 Jan. 1547–1 May 1550 GRAND TOTAL FOR FRENCH WARS

586,718.2.4 426,306.19.5 329,526.11.11 1,342,552.3.8

[2] Calais and Guînes, 30 Sept. 1538–31 July 1552 1. Fortifications (a) 1538–47 (b) 1547–52 TOTAL

120,675.19.0 30,736.13.1 151,412.12.0

2. Wages and diets (a) 1538–47 (b) 1547–52 TOTAL

156,089.10.7 63,926.16.2 220,016.6.9

GRAND TOTAL FOR CALAIS

371,428.18.1

[3] The Wars in Scotland, 9 Sept. 1542–1 May 1550 1. Coat and conduct (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1550 TOTAL

38,951.13.1 29,720.14.1 68,672.7.2

510

appendices

2. Diets and wages of officers and men in various camps and castles7 (a) 1542–1547 235,383.8.5 (b) 1547–1550 423,652.17.4 TOTAL 659,035.5.10 3. Empciones – horses, victualling equipment (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1550 TOTAL

6,021.0.11 11,172.13.8 17,193.13.7

4. Freight and land carriage of grain (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1550 TOTAL

10,060.8.1 22,962.16.4 33,023.4.5

5. Rewards, prisoners, posts, ambassadors (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1550 TOTAL

19,823.14.3 42,332.3.1 62,155.17.3

6. Munitions, ordnance (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1550 TOTAL

5,984.10.3 22,079.13.4 28,064.3.7

7. Fortifications8 (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1550 TOTAL

27,457.14.8 39,685.8.6 67,113.3.2

8. Loss of grain (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1550 TOTAL

2,784.11.11 1,534.18.4 4,319.10.3

7 Itemised as, for the borders: ‘Berwick with sundrie invasions and campes besid the ordinary garrison’ (£582,942.11.1) and then Warke, Holy Island, Farne Island, Billie Tower, Castlemilk, Carlisle, Tynemouth; for Scotland: Broughty Craig, Haddingon, Lauder, Roxburgh, Eymouth, Dunglass, Fast castle, Jedburgh, Hume. 8 Itemised as Berwick, Holy Island, Wark, Carlisle, Tynemouth, Lauder, Broughty Craig, Inchcolm, Haddington, Dunglass, Roxburgh, Dundee, Eyemouth, Hume.

appendices

511

9. Victuals and equipment wasted (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1550 TOTAL TOTAL LOSSES

3,706.0.6 10,761.11.10 14,557.12.4 18,872.6.6

SUM TOTALS FOR SCOTTISH WARS (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1550

350,243.2.2 603,872.16.6

GRAND TOTAL FOR SCOTTISH WARS

954,135.18.8

[4] The Navy and Wars at Sea 1. Materials for building and new rigging of ships (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1552 TOTAL 2. Coat and conduct (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1552 TOTAL 2. Wages (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1552 TOTAL

45,230.18.8 51,152.11.5 96,383.10.1 2,315.13.2 5,070.1.5 7,485.14.7 127,846.10.7 78,263.3.8 206,109.14.3

3. Freight for provisions (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1552 TOTAL

3,582.4.7 2,451.14.10 6,033.19.5

4. Post, docks, storehouses (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1552 TOTAL

502.4.6 1,609.4.6 2,111.9.0

5. Supplies (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1552 TOTAL

65,610.10.4 64,844.17.3 130,455.8.8

512

appendices

6. Loss of Mary Rose

559.8.7

7. Losses of munitions incl. Mary Rose and Lion of Lubeck (a) 1542–1547 19,276.13.10 (b) 1547–1552 10,455.16.8 TOTAL 29,722.10.7 SUM TOTALS FOR NAVY (a) 1542–1547 (b) 1547–1552

265,024.4.3 213,837.10.0

GRAND TOTAL FOR NAVY

478,861.14.3

[5] The Journey to Landrecies, 1542 Coat and conduct

36,500

[6] Fortifications in England, 6 March 1539 to Michaelmas 15529 1. Building work (a) 1539–1547 (b) 1547–1552 TOTAL 3. Wages (a) 1539–1547 (b) 1547–1552 TOTAL GRAND TOTAL FOR FORTIFICATIONS

181,179.12.7 35,228.18.2 216,408.9.0 22,026.0.5 52,228.5.4 74,254.5.9 290,662.16.6

9 Itemised as Kent: Dover, Deal, Walmer, Sandown, Queenborough, Gravesend, Milton, Higham. Sussex: Camber. Cornwall: Pendennis, St. Mawes. Hampshire and Wight: Portsmouth, Haslar, St. Andrews, Calshot, Sandown, Hurst, Yarmouth, Cowes, Sconce point, St. Helen’s, Carisbrook. Dorset: Portland, Sandsfoot. Yorkshire: Hull. Essex: Harwich, Languard Point, St. Osyth, Mersea, Brightlingsea, Tilbury. Islands: Alderney, Scilly, Jersey.

appendices

513

[7] Suppression of the rebellions of 1549 1. Coat and conduct 2. Diets and wages 3. Necessary purchases 4. Necessary charges, breaking bridges etc.

6,446.12.2 18,827.19.6 47.11.8 2,008.4.3

TOTAL

27,330.7.7

TOTAL CHARGES Under Henry VIII, 1538–1547 Under Edward VI, 1547–1552 GRAND TOTAL

2,134,784.1.0 1,356,687.18.5 3,491,471.19.5

APPENDIX NINE

ESTIMATES FOR THE COST OF THE WAR FOR THREE MONTHS FROM THE TIME OF HENRY VIII’S DEPARTURE FROM CALAIS, 1544 (BY RICHARD RICH AS TREASURER OF THE WARS) SP1/184, fo. 44 L&P XIX, i, 272.2 COSTS: 1. Wages for the whole army 2. Cost of the navy in the Narrow Seas 3. Navy in the west 4. Army in the North 5. Portsmouth 6. Garrisons of Calais and Guînes 7. Queen’s household 8. Prince’s household 9. Reserves TOTAL

200,000 6000 4000 12,000 3000 8000 5000 2000 10,000 250,000

RESOURCES: 1. Money now remaining in Mr. Riche’s hands 2. Of the revenue of the Augmentation 3. Of the subsidy 4. Of first fruits and tenths 5. Of the sale of lands 6. Of the victualling money 7. “From beyond the seas, of the merchants,” 8. Of “the revenues of the surveys” TOTAL

10,000 6,000 8,000 4,000 40,000 6,000 50,000 10,000 134,000

appendices

515

DEFICIT, £116,000, TO BE FILLED BY: 1. “the sale of more land after the rates that sales hath been made already” [10,000l.] 2. “by the sale of land part to be paid in hand and the rest at days not exceeding a xij month day”----[20,000l.] 3. “of lead to be sold or laid to gage”----- [50,000l.] 4. “of English merchants”-----. [10,000l.] 5. “of merchants strangers in London besides those which be already in hand”-----. [10,000l.] 6. “by the practice of Mr. Vaughan,”-----. [20,000l.] 7. “of Sorer at his coming hither” -----. [10,000l.] 8. “of such as hath the King’s fees”-----. [10,000l.] 9. “of the bishops, deans, etc.”-----. [6000l.] 10. “of the Mint”-. [6000l.] 11. “of the King’s debts and revenues”-----. [10,000l.] TOTAL “clxijm li.” (in Riche’s hand).

APPENDIX TEN

EXPENSES OF THE REARGUARD, 4 MAY 1544– 5 NOVEMBER 1544 BL Add. MS. 35, 206 (L&P, XIX, ii, 552). Sir Robert Dormer, vice-treasurer of the rearguard Received: From Rich 50,188 from Masters of the Victuals 4,820 from John Dymocke and Thomas Locke, Antwerp, 22 July 5,250 TOTAL:

£60,258

Paid out: 1. Coats and conduct money to Dover 4,804.19.3. 2. Wages and diets of commanders and soldiers etc. 38,488.3.10 1/2d. 3. Half diets of Buren, and the half wages of those under him (besides the like sums paid by the treasurer of the Vanguard under the Duke of Norfolk) 3,540.0.6. 4. Wages of two captains at 3s. 4d., two petty captains at 20d. and 505 kernes at 6d. (19 June–16 July) 160.16.0 5. Hire of wagons 3,118.16.8. 6. Posts 2.3.0. 7. Wages of 2 French spies, at 9d. p.d. 2.5.0. 8. Reward of one messenger sent to Regent of Flanders 5.0.0. 9. To Peter Johnson, mariner, for transport of certain men and stuff to Calais, 56.11.4. 10. Conduct of gentlemen and soldiers homewards 2,038.15.10. 11. Miscellaneous payments (specified) 7,462. 12. Purchase of cart horses and charges of transport 141.11.8. 13. For accountant’s own diets and necessary expenses of his office 340.0.0 TOTAL:

£60,210.10.4 1/2d. [Accountant owes 40.16.4 1/2d.]

appendices

517

The summary re-arranges the figures thus: Coatt and conduct: Wages of warre Carriages Rewardes Transportacion Preste money Allowance to thaccomptant

6843.15.2 42,148.10.4 3108.16.8 9.18.0 1594 7462 580.18.10

APPENDIX ELEVEN

THE ENGLISH GARRISON AT BOULOGNE Payments for garrison: 29.1.45 1666.13.4 26.2.45 2000 27.09–27.10.46–7 70.066.3.0 Apr.–Nov.46 est 41,5521.13.4 May 46 German foot Spanish foot Italian foot Italian foot Spanish horse Cleves horse Italian horse English band Wages etc

XX, i, 110 XX, i, 270 XXI, i, 499 3715.15.4 XXI, i, 687 1775.10.0 927.16.0 (Salerno) 202 (Tiberio) 330 1499.2.0 916.15.0 3750 3400

Numbers of garrison: 26.1.45 5000 14.6.45 foreign: 635 foot 125 albanians 14.6.45 8065; foreign 737 02.45 4400 Mar., 46 5000 05–11.46 5544

XX, i, *** (list of diets) XX, i, 941 XX, i, 941 XXI, i, 300 XXI, i, 438.2 XXI, i, 499

Hertford’s army March 1546: County levies 9000

XXI, i, 363.2

Cost of officials: 1546 est 24,506.19.8

XXI, i, 505

Pay for victuals: 7.45 1551.17.4

XX, i, 941

APPENDIX TWELVE

SIR HUGH PAULET’S ACCOUNT AS TREASURER OF BOULONNAIS, 13 SEPTEMBER 1544–27 AUGUST 154610 Receipt from: Riche, High Treasurer of the Wars, 1. Oct.–2. Nov. 1544 16,000 Treasurer of Chamber 2000 Augmentations 14,653.6.8 Exchequer 23,672.13.4 First Fruits and Tenths 2650 Treasurer of the Mint 105,000 Duchy of Lancaster 1000 King’s coffers 2992.2.0 John Harrington, Treasurer of Hertford’s army 3000 Council orders 662 Sales of ordnance supplies 853.1.0 Ditto 68.4.4 Sales of victuals 1279.10.4 Ditto 6780.0.6 Ditto 318 Ditto 9563.14.5 Ditto 9289.19.8 Foreign receipts 252.12.0 ob TOTAL 200,085.5.0.ob Expenditure: Wages for English soldiers, Boulogne and Old man 145,360.5.5 Wages for strangers, Italians, Spaniards, Albanois 24,654.14.3 Fortifications: Boulogne (high and Low) Young Man 10,402.7.4 Old Man 8124.18.1 Boulogneberg 5147.6.4 Victuals 2765.16.5 Ordnance 601.18.2 Foreign payments 275.13.4 Prest money 82.10.0 TOTAL 199,305.9.4 Surplus 779.15.8 (of which 181.19.0.ob is discharged)

10 This account runs formally from 13 Sept. anno 36 (1544) to 29 Jan. anno 37 (1546), though the expenditure extends to 27 August anno 38 (1546) NA E 101/207/1.

Military Tresorerie des Suisses Ordinaire de la Guerre Extraordinaire de la guerre

Navy Marine de Ponant – ord – extraordinaire Marine de Levant ord – extraordinaire

Garrisons Mortespaies-Picardie – Normandie – Champagne – Languedoc – Guyenne – Bourgogne

Royal household Chambre aux deniers Ecurie Officiers domestiques Argenterie Menus affaires Maison militaire100 gents – archers de la garde – Suisses

19,156

19,223

1,161,732 1,471,777 1,555,550 2,248,137 3,060,441

17,912 21,527 1950

144,337 16,300

88,230 16,300

18,017 20,835 3900

64,220 71,562 129,905 115,511 7644 29,628

1516

80,536 95,978 98,237 99,147 6186 29,940

1515

70,075(’28)

67,424 86,419

75,074

1529

408,873

289,326 *7

14,800 1,092,874 535,797 286,374

324,380 758,107 1,581.091

302,866 94,641

13,400

3900 59,670 *6

3420

128,904 15,600 7973 26,190

29,640

1548

46,544

150,030 16,400

91,111 175,767 302,253 256,243 119,350 86,886

1549

1,018,501 2,348,523

245842*12

202,150

315,974 1,325,852 2,373,055

57,877

283,543

[98,109]*11 30,163 4500 4500

35,364

136,585 16,400

70,128 131,390 304,585 142,885 143,695 *1 108,234 86,019 88,800

119,472 84,566 192,190

1546

______*4

97,212 15,600 *3

89,939 88,009 199,328 21,425 86,756 85,866

1545

106,900 164,035 618,483 463,304 783,929 *8 2,893,929

12,000

5740 13,320

12.035 26,640 12,000

11,040 10,134

98,436 16,233

181,774

71,149

1531

11,322 22,268

97,796 26,400

70,796 77,545 169,500 43,762 37,266 86,424 *2

1530

FRANCE, SUMMARY STATE BUDGETS 1515–1549

APPENDIX THIRTEEN

1515

13,072

Ambassades

49,174

75,710

154,949 8936

191,957

295,058

293,722 10,870

350,045 1,347,075

36,000 426,764 75,176 _________ 10,130

1545

372,830

1,063,504

487,324 22,600

818,979 4,738,488

278,686

36,000 162,975 274,407 259,490 *9 29,643 58,167 *10

1546

160,680

312,369

554,438

726,473 63,406

155,109 208,632 3087 172,766

43,030

1548

Source: BN fr. 17329, fos. 82r–112v, Estats abrégés de ce que monte la despense from 1515 to 1562, drawn up, 1571 1. One year and a half down to last June 1547. Note that the wages of the royal chapel and the chevaucheurs d’écurie 2. Half-year accounts doubled up 3. Half-year accounts doubled up 4. Figure for 1546 represents 2 years up to June 1546 6. Four years 3 months to 31.III.1546 7. Includes both ordinaire and extraordinaire 8. 17 months to July 1531 9. 1545 and 1546 10. Jan.–Oct. 1546 11. Sum for Jan. 1535–June 1548 12. 1547 and 1548 13. BN fr. 4523 fos. 35v gives 175,418

34,489

52,041

17,304

10,431

165,795 3873

216,152 26,753

362,242 812,370

36,070

1531

568,301 190,896

229,733 1,811,936

35,553

1530

169,125

1529

134,258 341,833 1,061,176

29,735

1516

Dons et recompenses 198,401 Deniers par 14,904 mandements Deniers par ordonnance 125,346

Bâtiments du roi Officiers des cours Political payments Pensions Deniers par acquict

Ordinaire de l’artillerie 28,536 Extraordinaire artillerie 314,753 Reparations- Picardie – Champagne – Normandie – Piedmont

Table (cont.)

117,361*13

175,408

631,812

627,265 37,655

40,507 221,910 119,655 70,782 45,608 204,430

1549

appendices 521

APPENDIX FOURTEEN

ANNEBAULT’S EMBASSY IN AUGUST 1546 BL Cotton, Vespasian, XIV, i, no. 67 (L&P, XXI, i, 1384) iii. ‘A copy of the bill of names of noblemen and gentlemen coming with the Admiral of France’: Monsieur l’Admiral et ses gentilz homes de sa maison et ses officiers, 200 persons, Monsieur Devirix (Gabriel Le Veneur, bishop of Evreux) et sa suite 50, M. de Canaples (Jean de Créqui, sr. de) 100, M. de Thes (Jean de Taix) 30, M. de Conte de Manteul (Nanteuil) 40, M. le President (Pierre Remon) 20, M. de Sacy (Guillaume Bochetel) 16, M. Do (Jean d’O) 30, M. de la Meilleray, visadmiral (Charles de Moy, sr. de La Meilleraye) 20, M. de la Hunauday (La Hunauldaye – Annebault’s son) 20, M. Despinac (François d’Espinac) 20, M. de Harcourtt 12, M. de Morrette (Charles de Solliers, sr de) 25, M. Dorformliers (sic) 6, le capten Renouarte (capitaine Renouard, sr. de Bailleul) 6, M. le Conte de Villars (Honorat de Savoie) 20, M. de Tavanes (Gaspard de Saulx, sr de Tavannes) 8, M. Dessey (André de Montalambert, sr. d’Essé) 12, M. de Vasse et son frere (Antoine Grognet, sr. de Vassé) 20, M. de Mountpesat (Antoine de Lettes, sr des Prez et Montpezat) 10, M. de Raconn’ (François de Raconis) 60, M. de Montoyson 6, M. de Crevecueur 10, Le capitaine Francisque Barnardin 10, M. Dallegre (Yves, baron d’Allègre) 8, M. de la Bosse (La Brosse) 6, M. du Repayre 4, M. de Senarpont et son frere (Jean de Monchy, sr de Sénarpont) 10, M. de Baquevile (. . . Martel, sr. de Bacqueville-en-Caux) 8, Roquefeuil 4, le Sieur de Monlue (Blaise de Monluc) 4, le Sieur de Ranbuillet (Jacques d’Angennes, sr de Rambouillet) 4, le Sieur de Comgueres 3, M. de la Roche Posse (La Rochepozay) 4, M. de la Baron de la Hays (La Haye) 4,

appendices

523

M. le Baron des Gueres 6, Mons, de Lenencourt (Lenoncourt) 6, M. de Bellegarde (Pierre de Saint-Lary, baron de Bellegarde) 6, M. de Sennes 4, M. de Lieramon (Lieramont) 6, le Capitaine Vieupont 6, le Capitaine Martyn (Martin d’Iriart) 4, M. le Conte Scot 6, M. le Conte Beranger 6, Mons. le Fontaynes 6, Le Sieur de Villequir (Villequier) 4, Messieurs de Compigney 6, Le Sieur de Beauregard (Jean du Thiers) 4, le Capitaine Salcede (Pierre de Salcedo) 20, Mons. le Baron de la Garde, coronel des galleres, lep cappens et leur suite 60, M. le Capitaine de Dieppe et sa suite 30, M. de Cleres et sa suite (Jean de Clères) 40, M. de Breaute et sa suitte (Bréauté) 15, le Capitaine Salcede et sa suitte 30.

APPENDIX FIFTEEN

FRENCH MILITARY RESOURCES IN ROYAL PROPAGANDA: 1542 [Source: Instructions of Francis I for Claude de Laubespine, envoy to England, 9 July 1542, Copy by E. Chapuys in HHSA, Vienna, PC 223, fos. 45–54; L&P XVII, 517, NA, PRO 31/18/3/1, pp. 599–601] In Luxemburg 14,000 lansquenets under Longueval 2,000 German horse 13,000 lansquenets under duke of Orléans 6,000 Champagne legion 6,000 Norman legion 4,000 Picard legion 1,200 hommes d’armes 1,200 light cavalry leaving 30,000 foot, 2400 cavalry + 36 large pieces of artillery. With the King on his projected campaign 13,000 lansquenets 10,000 Swiss of last levies 4,000 old bands of Piedmont 4,000 Italians [12,000] legions of Guienne and Languedoc ? other foot 46/7,000 foot (less 6000 lansquenets sent to Navarre) 40,000 1,600 hommes d’armes 500 of the military household) 3,000 light horse (2,000 brought from Piedmont) 45,100 60 large artillery pieces (incl. 24 double cannons)

appendices

525

With the King of Navarre for the Guyenne enterprise 6,000 lansquenets 2,000 Gascon foot 6,000 raised by king of Navarre 4,000 Italians 18,000 Garrisons left in Piedmont For 12 large and 150 smaller ones: 6/7000 Swiss 6/7000 old bands (French, Gascons, Italians) 14,000 foot 500 hommes d’armes 7/800 light horse total: 15,200. TOTAL: at least 103,000 foot; 8800 horse; 96 large artillery pieces Estimate of the arrière-ban for the winter of 1542–1543 70,000–80,000 men divided in two corps, one for Spanish, one for the Flanders frontier

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INDEX Aachen (Aix-le-Chapelle) (Nordrhein Westfalen), 313, 330 Abbeville (Somme), 31n, 40, 89n, 102, 122, 132, 152, 157, 173, 175, 178, 180, 192, 200, 204, 275, 277, 358, plague in, 5 Aerschot, Philippe II de Croÿ, 1st duke of (1496–1549), governor of Hainault, 142n, 143, 144, 145 Aix, Jean d’, French captain, 194 Albanians, 292n, 293, 305, 316n, 340, 518 Albret, Henri d’, b. 1503, King of Navarre (1516–55), 54; see also Jeanne Albuquerque, Beltran de la Cueva, 3rd duke of, (c.1478–1560), Viceroy of Aragon, 167, 187, 259, 306 Alembon (Pas-de-Calais), castle, 206 Algiers, siege of (1541), 61, 72 Alnwick, 89n, 237 Alquines (Pas-de-Calais), 142, 176, 213n, 269 Alvarotti, Giulio, ambassador of Ercole II duke of Ferrara to France (1544–60), 385n, 397, 414n, 433n, 434–38, 441n, 444, 448–9, 451n, 452, 455n Ambleteuse (Pas-de-Calais), fort of, 235, 246, 291, 295, 299, 301, 306, 388, 430, 431n, 442, 448, 469, 508n Amiens, 39, 127–8, 132, 134, 175, 180n, 192, plague in, 4–5, industry of, 5 Ancrum Moor, battle of (17 Feb 1545), 112 Andernach (Rhein-Pfalz), 322, 327, 329 Jean Ango, of Dieppe (1480–1551), ship-owner, navigator, vice-admiral, 350, 356 Angus, Archibald Douglas, 6th Earl of (c.1489–1557), 86, 98, 104, 106, 112, 155 Anne of Cleves, 8, 49–52 Annebault, Claude d’, maréchal (1538) and amiral (1544) of France, 5, 52, 58, 72, 80, 113, 135–6, 149, 164, 166, 190, 203, 267, 277, 280, 281, 284; negotiations in 1545, 391, 396–7, 402–7, 409–14, 417, 420–21;

and naval war, 347–90 passim; and peace of 1546, 437–55 passim; and re-establishment of peace, 402, 464, 467–70, 522–3 Anthony Roll, 258, 372 Antwerp, 127–8, 315, 326, 327, 330, 333, 405, 473; money markets in, 251–2, 254–5, 321, 339, 437; ships of, 488 Ardres (Pas-de-Calais), 74–7, 84, 126–131, 133, 136–8, 141, 146, 152, 157, 161, 173–7, 190–94, 198, 201, 232, 274–6, 282, 292n, 293, 304, 335, 391, 393, 413, 416–18, 420–23, 427, 437, 440–41, 449–50, 453, 467, 469, 480; fortifications of, 43, 45–6, 61, 121, 123, 132 Arms, 208–9 Argyll, Archibald Campbell, 4th Earl of (1498–1558), 105 Arnold, Nicholas (c.1509–1580), of Gloucestershire, captain of Queenborough, captain of Boulogneberg, Lord Justice of Ireland (1564), 298n, 299n, 486 Arran, James Hamilton, 2nd Earl of (c.1519–1575), duke of Châtellerault, Governor of Scotland, 1542–53, 98–101, 104–6, 109–17, 458 Arras (Pas-de-Calais) Arras, bishop of, see Granvelle Artillery, English, 118, 124, 185–9, 219, 233, 240, 263, 368, 373 Arundel, Henry Fitzalan, 12th Earl of (1512–80), Master of the camp, 1544, 184, 213, 284n ‘Assured Scots’ see Cassillis, Fleming, Glencairn, Gray, Maxwell, Oliphant, Somerville Aucher, Anthony (d.1558), paymaster of Dover, chief victualler of Boulogne, 243, 498 Audley, Thomas, soldier and writer, 208–9, 216, 218, 369 Audley, Thomas, Lord (1487/8–1544), Lord Chancellor (1532–44), 217 Augmentations, Court of, 217, 243, 248, 251, 253, 255, 363, 503, 519 Aumale, see Lorraine

546

index

Authie, river, 202 Auxi-le-château (Somme), 201 Averey, Thomas, muster commissioner, 315, 326, 330 Avesnes-le-comte (Pas-de-Calais), castle, 146 Avesnes-sur-le-Helpe (Nord), 130, 135 Babou, Jean, de la Bourdaisière (1511–69), 416n, 419, 421n, 439n Bacon, Nicholas (1510–79), Lord Keeper, 1558, 13, 205 Bapaume (Pas-de-Calais), 126, 127n, 134 Barbarossa, Khair-ed-din (d.1546), Ottoman admiral, 126n, 138 Barker, Christopher, Garter King of Arms, 83, 263–4, 259 Bassefontaine, Sébastien de L’Aubespine (1518–82), bishop of Limoges, envoy to Germany, 318–19, 341–45, 401–2, 471n, 477n Baudreul, sr. de, French envoy in Scotland 1544, 106–7 Baumbach, Ludwig III von, Hofmarschall of Hesse, Ambassador for Protestant Estates from 1539, 415–16, 425 Bavaria, Wilhelm IV, duke of (1508–50), 318; see also Palatine, Philip duke of Bavaria, count Bave, Josse, Emperor’s secretary, 275n, 340, 357n Bayard, Gilbert, French contrôleur des guerres, secrétaire des finances (d.1547), 81, 392, 402, 404–7, 411–15, 418n, 448–9, 479n Bayonne, 389 Beaton, David, (c.1494–1546), cardinal, 1538, Archbishop of Saint Andrews (1539), 86–93, 98–9, 101, 103–6, 109, 115–7, 395 Beaulieu (Pas-de-Calais), abbey of , 141, 175 Beauvais, Etienne de Laigue, sr. de, French envoy to Cleves, 1538, 49 Beda, Noel (1470–1537), Parisian theologian, Head of the Collège de Montaigu, 26 Bedfordshire, troops from, 216n, 227, 494, 501, 503 Bellin, Nicholas (c.1490–1569), of Modena, painter, 459n, 460 Berck (Pas-de-Calais), 232, 270 Berlinghieri, count, Italian soldier in French service, 274, 278, 306n

Berghen, Antoon 7th lord of (1500–41), 67 Bernardi, Maffeo, Venetian merchant in England, 433–5, 439n, 461 Bernardo, Francesco, Venetian nobleman and merchant, 432–7, 461, 466 Berners, Jean Bourchier, 2nd Lord (c.1467–1533), Deputy of Calais (1520–26, 1531–3), 30 translator Berteville, Jean de Fontenoy sr. de, 163, 268, 371n Berwick-on-Tweed, 3, 35, 94, 96, 109, 210, 223, 237, 493, 510 Béthune (Pas-de-Calais), 128, 141–42 Bing, Simon (1517–81), Kammersecretär to Philip of of Hesse, 322–3, 328, 400 Birkes, Anthony, victualler, 200n, 239 Blackness Fort (cap Gris Nez), 295, 301, 469, 508 Blancherose, see Hosier Bohain-en-Vermandois (Aisne), 145, 146 Boisy, Claude Gouffier, sr. de (1510–70), marquis de Boisy and Caravaz, Grand Ecuyer de France, 277 Bonacorsi, Antonio, banker, 446 Bonner, Edmund (d.1569), bishop of Hereford and London, ambassador to France (1538–40), 26–7, 36, 38, 40,41, 44, 47, 66, 71–4, 76 Bordeaux, 97, 113, 300, 355–6, 359, 365, 389 Bothwell, Patrick Hepburn, 4th Earl of (c.1512–1556), 105n, 110 Bouchain (Nord), 134 Bouchet, Jean (1476–1557), Poitevin, rhétoriqueur, chronicler, 7n, 24, 31–2 Boulogne, 6, 7, 18, 20, 21, 74–5, 83–4, 112, 116, 121, 125–6, 131–40, 146; Fortifications, 294–304; Planning of siege, 153, 154, 158, 173–7; Siege of (1544), 19, 184–8; Camisado, 197–204; English occupation of (1544–50); governors of, see Du Biez, Poynings, Surrey Boulogneberg (Mont Lambert), fortress of, 280, 294, 298–9, 467, 469, 509, 519 Boulonnais, 113, 133–7, 146–7, 157–8, 173, 267, 269, 271, 276, 286, 295–5, 301, 453, 467, 476, 480 Bourbon, Charles duke of (d.1527), connétable, 154, 354 Bourbon, see Vendôme, Saint-Pol Boursin (Pas-de-Calais, Boulonnais), 467, 468n, 469

index Bourthes (Pas-de-Calais), 177 Bowes, Robert (c.1493–1553), Warden of the Middle March, 1545, 93–4, 139, 186, 212n, 218, 220, 487 Bowtes / Bootes bulwark (Pale of Calais), 130, 282 Brabant, duchy of, 135, 139, 336 Brancetour, Robert, English exile at Imperial court, voyager to Persia, 38–9, 47n, 66 Brantôme, Pierre de Bourdeille, abbé commendataire de, soldier and biographer (c.1540–1614), 26 Bredenarde, pays de (Pas-de-Calais), 129, 133, 282 Bredwell, Peter, master of SaintInglevert (Sandingfield), 123 Breisach (Baden-Wurttemberg), 329 Bremen, 320, 321, 324, 337, 339 Brende, John (alias William Watson) (1490–1560), muster-commissioner and translator of Quintus Curtius, 315, 316n, 317n, 339 Brest (Finistère), 103, 113, 359, 371 Breton, Jean, sr. de Villandry (d.1542), contrôleur des guerres, secrétaire des commandements, 141n, 348, 371 Bridges, Sir John, of Sudeley (c.1492–1557), 1st Baron Chandos, 1554, captain of the castle of Boulogne, lieutenant governor of Boulogne (1547), 228, 262n, 288, 480 Bristol, 4, 367, 381 Brittany/Bretons, 7, 81, 156, 173, 277, 348, 350, 352–3, 358, 370–71, 389 Browne, Sir Anthony (c.1500–48), Master of the Horse (1539–48), 73, 80–81, 159, 177n, 184–8, 200, 210, 213, 229, 260, 368n Brissac, Charles de Cossé, count of (1505–63), Grand Fauconnier (1540), colonel des gens de pied, colonel des chevaux légers of Piedmont, 141, 144, 277, 282, 260, 368n Bruno, Hans, von Niedbruck, physician of Metz (c.1495–1558), father-in-law of Sleidan, Protestant diplomat, 323n, 334, 342–3, 410–11, 413, 416, 417–25, 471 Brunswick, Braunschweig-LüneburgWolfenbüttel, Heinrich V (1489–1568), Duke of, 319, 323–4, 337, 402n Brussels, 49, 70, 74–5, 111, 139, 143, 162, 168, 170, 172, 392–6 Bryan, Francis (d.1550), courtier and ambassador to France, 1533, 1535–6,

547

1537, 1538, to the Emperor, 1543, vice-admiral (1543), 213, 395, 494 Brygantyn (Brigenden), John, muster commissioner, 315, 316n, 339n Buren, Maximiliaan van Egmont, count of (1510–48), stadhouder of Friesland, 155–7, 164, 173–78, 180, 185, 188, 191, 193, 225, 247, 255, 312, 313n, 315, 338, 516 ‘Burgundians’ / Netherlanders, 84, 125–7, 130–3, 139, 143–4, 147, 173, 176, 178, 184, 316, 394–5 Butts, William (c.1486–1545), royal physician, 262 Calais, 6, 45, 56, 65, 80, 83, 122, 130, 134, 151, 157, 164, 167–8, 170–4, 184, 191, 193, 202–3, 212, 220, 227, 230, 238–9, 242n, 253, 259, 268, 271, 280–1, 284, 292–3, 295, 299, 311, 336, 339, 340, 387, 391–2, 395, 466; Garrison, 80, 121, 125, 129, 136, 140, 216–7, 219, 230, 244, 247, 271, 282, 283, 288, 315–6, 477; Strategic position, 22, 112, 176, 282, 394; ships of, 488; costs of, 509, 514; Pale of, 82, 120, 269, 281–2, 427, see also Bowtes bulwark; Lord Deputies of, see Maltravers, Cobham Cambrai (Nord), 38, 131, 142 Campbell, John, of Lundy, maître d’hôtel to Queen Dowager of Scotland, 11 Campfer, Holland, 98 Canche, river, 133, 177–8 Canaples, Jean IX sire de (and Créquy) (d.1555), prince de Poix, 447, 522 Capello, Carlo, Venetian ambassador in England (1531–35), 433 Carcès, Jean de Pontevès (1510–82), comte de, grand sénéchal of Provence, 352 Carew, George (c.1504–1545), captain of Rysbank, lieutenant general of horse (1543), vice-admiral (1545), 150, 218, 359, 373, 486 Carlisle, 94, 110, 510 Carne, Edward (c.1496–1561), ambassador to Cleves, 1538, to the queen of Hungary (1541–42, 1544–48), 51, 122, 274n, 339, 402, 438 Cartier, Jacques (1491–1557) of SaintMalo, explorer, 353 Cary, John (c.1491–1552), of Plashey, groom of Privy chamber, vice-admiral (1542), 22, 215

548

index

Cassillis, Gilbert Kennedy, 3rd Earl (c.1517–1558), 96, 98, 104 Cateau-Cambrésis (Nord), 134, 145, 149, 150 Catherine of Aragon, Queen of England, 16, 36, 66 Catherine Parr, Queen of England, 3, 187, 188, 211, 245, 263 Cavalli, Marino (d.1572), Venetian ambassador in France, 387, 396–7, 433–4, 462 Caundysshe/Cavendish, Richard (d.1554), master of Ordnance, military engineer, 213 Cavendish, William (1508–57), Treasurer of the Chamber, 189 Cawarden, Thomas (c.1514–1559), gentleman of the Privy Chamber, Master of the Tents and Revels, 202, 229n, 230–1, 234, 260–2, 459n, 498–9 Ceresole, battle of (14 April 1544), 162, 189, 190, 266 Chabot, Philippe, sr. de Brion (1492–1543), admiral of France (1526) and governor of Burgundy, ambassador to England (1534), 17–18, 25, 51, 55, 58, 61–3, 65, 73, 82–3, 136, 361 Chamber, Royal, 229, 294 Chamberlain, Thomas (c.1504–1580), agent in the Netherlands, 175, 254, 315n, 326, 332–4 La Chambre du roi, 45, 444, 457, 485 Channel Islands, 22, 47n, 81, 512 Chantonnay, Thomas Perrenot de Granvelle, sr. de (1521–71), 166, 168 Chapuys, Eustace (d.15556), Imperial ambassador to England (1529–39, 1540–45), 13, 15, 18, 25, 43, 53, 57–9, 61–2, 65, 67–78, 84–5, 90, 93, 97, 103, 124–6, 128, 139–40, 155–7, 160–3, 166–72, 184, 187, 199, 212, 254, 364, 392 Charles V, Archduke of Austria, Burgundy, King of Castille and Aragon, Emperor (1519), 77; Relations with Henry VIII, 14, 16, 48–55, 153–72, 391–410; Relations with Francis I, 14, 35, 37–8, 189–97; Military commitments, 120–205 passim; Relations with the German princes, 336–47; As mediator between France and England, 391—9, 402–10; Relations with Scotland, 110

Château-Chalon, René de, naval commander, 113 Châteauneuf, Guillaume Gellimard, sr. de, secretary to Admiral Chabot, 64–5 Chelius, see Geiger Cheman, François Errault sr. de, maître des requêtes, garde des sceaux (1543–4), French envoy to Scotland (1543), 101 Cherbourg, 137, 348 Cheshire, 222 Chester, 110 Cheyney Thomas (1485–1558), Warden of the Cinq Ports (1536), Treasurer of the Household, special ambassador to France (July 1546), 80, 125n, 137, 139, 213–4, 218–9, 227, 234, 452, 456–9, 486 Chiaramont, Francisque de, Italian captain in French service, 193 Christian III, King of Denmark (1533–59), 116, 118, 331n, 344n, 348, 351, 357, 359, 470 Cinq Ports, 218, 227, 367 Clement VII (Giulio de Medici), Pope (1523–34), 34 Cleves, Amelie princess of, 50 Cleves, Anne of (1515–57), Queen of England, 1540, 8, 48–54 passim Cleves-Jülich-Berg, William, duke of (1539–92), b. 1516, duke of Guelderland (1539–43), 41, 48–55 passim, 61, 65, 76, 79, 82, 90, 124, 135, 147, 309, 321 Cleves, troops in, 127, 130, 151, 282n, 311, 339, 518 Cloth of Gold, Field of (1520), 32, 427 Cobham, George Brooke, 9th Baron (c.1497–1558), Deputy of Calais (1544–50), 155, 170, 185, 219, 227, 230, 282, 283, 291, 418, 169n Coinage and the Mint, xvi, 242–57, 515 Coldingham (Berwickshire), 100, 115 Coblenz (Confluence) (Rhein-Pflaz), 218, 322, 324, 327–9, 331 Coligny, Gaspard II de, admiral of France, 480 Cologne (Köln), 311, 320, 322, 324, 327–9 Commynes, Philippe de (1447–c.1511), politician and historian, 24 Compagni, Bartholomeo (1503–1561), Florentine merchant stranger in London. Agent for raising cash in Anwerp, 1544–6, 411 Conseil du roi / des affaires, 39, 61–2

index Corbie (Somme), 134, 173, 174, 191, 469 Cornish (Cornysshe), Henry, lieutenant governor of Jersey, 1541–50, 22n, 47n, 81 Cornwall/Cornish, 35, 113, 316, 375, 503 Cornewalle, Sir George, of Berrington Hall Hereford, 228, 236, 368, 494 Corrozet, Gilles (1510–58), Parisian writer and printer, 465 Corse/Corso, Philippe, Italian captain in French service, 194 Cotentin, 137 Cotgrave, Randall (c.1587–1630), dictionary compiler, 30 Courrières, Jean de Montmorency (d.1563), governor of Lille, 76–7, 163, 170, 187, 199n Court, English, 3–4, 26–9, 42, 44, 47, 87, 211, 214, 229, 401; see also Chamber, Privy Chamber, Gentlemen Pensioners, Yeomen of the Guards, Tents and Revels Court, French, 25, 41, 46–7, 51–3, 58, 62, 82, 87, 100, 163, 289, 309, 425, 452, 458 Coverdale, Miles (1488–1569), translator of the Bible, 1535, 27–8 Cowdray, Sussex, 186–7, 200, 259, 260, 262; frescoes at, see list of illustrations Cowswade (la Cauchoire), disputed territory between Ardres and Calais, 45, 123 Cranmer, Thomas (1489–1556), Archbishop of Canterbury, 459, 480 Credit, international, 243–57 passim Créqui, Jean VII, sire de (d.1547), 133, 146, 191, 197, 522 Cromwell, Richard, 213, 215 Cromwell, Thomas, King’s secretary and Lord Privy Seal (ex. 1540), 8–11, 17, 19, 27, 33–43, 46–50, 67–9, 86–8, 91, 230, 311, 363, 402n, 410n Croÿ, see Du Roeulx Cruser, Hermann, Cleves diplomat, 50–5, 59 Da L’Armi, Ludovico (ex.1547), nephew of Cardinal Campeggio, conspirator, 307, 433 Da Thiene, count Ludovico (1474–1554), of Vicenza, condottiere, ambassador of Ferrara in France, 1540–42, 82 Dampierre, Claude de Clermont, baron de (d.1545), commander at Ardres, 275–7

549

Dandino, Hieronimo (1509–59), papal nuncio in France, 1540–41, 1543–44, 1546–47, bishop of Caserta, Cardinal (1551), 102n, 397n Dandolo, Matteo, Venetian ambassador to France (1540–42), 56n, 58n, 59n, 64n Darcy, Arthur (1505/16–1560/61), Master of Ordnance, lieutenant of the Tower, 213, 496 Darcy, Thomas, of the privy chamber 259, 375, 496 Dauphin, Henri de France (1519–59), 9, 59–60, 111, 116, 127, 149, 180, 189–90, 192–204, 258, 270, 272, 277, 384, 398, 402, 414, 446, 452–58, 474 Dauphiné, 55 Denmark, 60, 61, 76 see also Christian III, king of Deptford, 363–4, 367, 459 Derby/Derbyshire, 222 Desvres (Boulonnais), 290, 292 Devonshire, 4, troops from, 224, 226n 227–8, 236, 495, 503 Dieppe, 23n, 97, 113, 115, 348–50, 354–6, 361, 371, 376, 386, 389, 458–9 Dinteville, Jean de (1504–55), bailli de Troyes, French ambassador in England (1533), 11–12, 15–16 Dormer, Robert, Treasurer of the Rearguard, 212–3, 248n, 503, 516 Dorset, Henry Grey, 2nd Marquess of (1517–54), later duke of Suffolk, 283 Dorset, troops from, 227, 503 Douglas, Sir George, of Pittendriech (c.1490–1552), 99, 105, 112 Douglas, Lady Margaret (1515–78), Countess of Lennox, niece of Henry VIII, 110 Douglas, see Angus Doullens (Pas-de-Calais), 39, 134, 136, 140, 146, 192, 194 Dover, 6, 172, 184–5, 228, 235, 241–2, 259, 263, 283, 367, 380, 390, 456, 459 Du Bellay, Jean (1493–1560), cardinal, bishop of Bayonne and Paris, ambassador in England, 1527–29, 1531, Rome, 1547–55, lieutenantgeneral at Paris (1536), 10, 17n, 26, 43, 51, 161–2, 198, 201, 328–9, 391, 395, 401–2, 409, 412, 414, 418, 430, 458n Du Bellay, Guillaume (1491–1543), military commander, governor of

550

index

Piedmont, ambassador to Germany, historian, 9, 61 Du Bellay, Martin (d.1558), infantry commander, lieutenant of Picardy, 1547–48; memoirist, 9, 132, 144, 153, 163n, 190, 193, 197, 200, 203, 204n, 272–3, 277–82, 286–8, 296, 302–3, 317, 321n, 335, 376–7, 380, 385–6 Du Biez, Oudart (c.1475–1553), governor of Boulogne, maréchal of France, 83–5, 122–3, 127, 129–38, 141, 146–52, 161, 186, 190–7, 200, 203–4, 264, 269, 272–82, 286–91, 293, 302–4, 381, 430, 467–9 Dumbarton, 103–4, 106, 110, 112–13, 371 Dunbar (East Lothian), 110 Duprat, Antoine (1463–1535), cardinal (1527) and chancellor of France (1515), 17 Du Roeulx, Adrien de Croÿ, comte (d.1553), Grand Master of Flanders and governor of Artois, 75, 102, 125–35, 138–46, 148, 154, 173–8, 191–4, 198, 208, 218, 220, 318, 394 Dymock, Edward, of Scrivelsby, Linc, Treasurer of Boulogne, 1545, 253 Dymoke, John, muster commissioner, 315, 326, 331, 338, 516 Edinburgh, 3, 87–9, 99–100, 108–9, 144, 395, 458 Edward III, King of England (1327–77), 49n, 173 Edward, prince of Wales (1537–53), later Edward VI, 98, 105, 462 Egmont, Françoise de Luxembourg, comtesse douairière d’, dame de Fiennes (1495–1557), 141 Egmont, see Buren Eléonore (Léonor), of Austria (1498–1558), Queen of Portugal, 1518–21, Queen of France (1530–47), 9, 59, 162, 166, 462, 474 Ellerkar, Ralph (c.1549–1546), Marshal of Calais (1542), Marshal of Calais (1544), 218, 220, 288, 293 Empire, Holy Roman of the German Nation, Reichstag of, 55, 69, 161, 318–9, 401, 474; Estates of, 169, 420, 425; Princes of, 1, 9, 17, 35, 39, 48–55, 308, 317–20, 322, 324, 328, 331, 337–

8, 341, 344, 346, 400, 409, 426, 428, 430, 461, 468, 470–75 Enghien, François de Bourbon, count of (1519–46), 266, 275, 281, 335, 351, 413, 359n Enghien, Louis de Bourbon, count of, later prince de Condé (d.1569), 475, 458 England, population of, 6, 205–7 English people, attitudes to the French, 25–32 English army, structure of, 205–66; recruitment of, 205–9, 214–7; pay of, 247–8; finance of, 205–6, 243–56; supply of, 236–43; Vaward, 94, 172, 179, 212, 224; Battle, 94–5, 184–5, 193, 200n, 212–13, 224–30, 232, 239n, 341, 246, 260–4; Rearward, 179, 212, 224; Ordinances of war, 233–4 Espinac, Pierre d’, captain of 50 hommes d’armes, lieutenant-general in Burgundy, 132, 138, 146, 522 Epinoy, François de Melun, count of (d.1547), chambellan to the Emperor, 125 Essé, André de Montalembert, sr. d’ (1483–1553), lieutenant-general of the French army in Scotland, 1547–8, 144, 456, 522 Estrées, Jean d’, grand maître de l’artillerie, 1547, sénéchal of Boulogne (1550), 133, 145–6, 197, 480n Essex, recruitment in, 214–5, 222, 229, 234n, 236, 262–3, 487, 503; plague in, 4 Estourmel, Jean d’ (d.1557), général des finances, 131, 468 Etampes, Anne de Pisseleu (1508–80), duchess of, favourite of Francis I, 40–2, 50–51, 58, 163, 164; and negotiations with England, 395–7, 407, 409, 411, 419–20, 423n, 424, 444, 452 Etaples (Pas-de-Calais), 1–2, 180, 264, 286, 290; fortifications of, 292–2, 304; harbour of, 350, 389, 430 Eure, Ralph (1508–48), Warden of the Middle March, 111–12, 142n, 143–5, 180, 220–1, 257 Eure, William, 1st baron (c.1483–1548), 108 ‘Evil May Day’, 1517, 25, 215n Exchequer, 242–3, 519 Exeter, plague in, 4

index Fane, Ralph (c.1510–1552), of Kent, Cromwell servant and muster-master, client of Somerset, 314–6, 326, 333–4 Fauquembergues (Pas-de-Calais), 270 Ferrara, Ippolito II d’Este (1509–72), cardinal of (1538), 430–31, 433n, 436, 439, 441n, 444, 449, 451n, 452, 4563n, 454n, 455n, 458n Ferrers, Walter Devereux (c.1489–1558), 2nd Baron, Viscount Hereford (1550), 226, 228 Fiennes (Pas-de-Calais), 123n, 141, 175–6, 203, 467–8, 480 First Fruits and Tenth, Court of, 248, 252n, 514, 519 Fitzgerald, Gerald (1525–85), 11th earl of Kildare, 101 Fitzwilliam, William see Southampton Flanders, 3, 21n, 116, 139, 155n, 173, 240–1, 251, 339 Fleming, James, 4th Lord (1533–58), 96, 98, 105n Flielandt and Texel, islands, 124 Florennes, abbey of, 331–2, 335 Fogge, John, Kentish gentleman, commander at Etaples, 1544, 180 Fontainebleau, château, 45, 267, 306, 398, 436, 444, 448–9, 452, 457–8, 460 Forêt-Montier (Somme), 2 Fortification / trace italienne, 35, 112, 120, 208; English, 246, 269, 272, 294–304; French, 132, 135, 169, 177–8, 184, 244, 291 Fraisse, Jean des Monstiers sr. du (1514–61), bishop of Bayonne (1550), envoy in Germany, 1543,1545–6, ambassador to the German princes, (1551), 319–20, 322–32, 335, 341–43, 400–1, 409, 413, 417–20 Framezelles, Robert de, sr. de Verchocq (d.1557), 164 France, population and economy, 4–5, 205 Francis I, king of France (main references): relations with Henry VIII, 8–9, 16–17, 33–4, 36, 39, 42–3, 55–6, 61–4, 80–81, 84–5, 160–61, 189–204, 427–61 passim, 464–5; relations with Charles V, 16, 35, 36–7, 38, 40–1, 78, 160–66, 473; and Scotland, 88–90, 106; and the Germans, 48–9, 50–51, 53, 55, 307–10, 316–36 passim, 399–402, 410–26 passim; strategic

551

options, 7, 21, 37, 47, 60, 65, 132, 142–4, 150, 160–66, 189–90, 280–81, 302; strategy in 1545, 266–7, 277–9; and honour, 12, 13; health, 8, 189, 267, 476, 478–9; death, 478–9 Fregoso, Federigo, French ambassador to the Turks (k.1541), 21, 60, 65 French people, attitudes to the English, 18–32 Froissart, Jean (c.1337–c.1405), of Valenciennes, chronicler and poet, 25, 30, 143 Fulwell, Ulpian (1545/6–1584/6), satirist and playwright, 33n, 159 Fugger Bank, 255 Fürstenberg, Wilhelm von (1491–1549), Landsknecht chief, 308–9, 311, 341–4 Gage, Sir John (1479–1556), comptroller of the Household (1540–47), 97, 184, 210, 213, 229, 233, 237–9, 242–3, 257, 284, 368, 374 Gaguin, Robert (1433–1501), humanist, 24, 30 Gailland, Louis, president of the Parlement of Paris, 27–8 Gamboa, Pedro de, Spanish mercenary, 291, 293, 306, 317 Gardiner, Stephen (1495–1558), bishop of Winchester, ambassador to France (1535–38), to the Emperor, (1540–41), 12, 15, 34, 42, 44–5, 57, 62, 64, 68–78, 87, 155, 184, 205, 209, 221, 237–8, 242, 287, 289–90, 305–6, 333, 335, 392–5, 402–10, 412, 415, 417, 422–3, 429, 443–5, 475, 491 Gascon infantry, 4n, 278–9, 290, 316, 358, 375, 525 Geiger, Ulrich (al. Chelius, Petermann) (1500–1558), medical doctor of Strasbourg, Schmalkaldic diplomat, 323n, 341, 401–2, 411, 414, 417 Genlis, François de Hangest, sr. de (d.1569), colonel of the Picard Legion, 193 Gentlemen Pensioners, 229 Givry, François d’Anglure, baron de, lieutenant-general in Champagne (d.1544), 54 Givry, Claude de Longwy (1481–1561), bishop of Mâcon, cardinal de (1533), 475

552

index

Glasgow, 106 Glencair, William Cunningham, 3rd Earl of (d.1548), 98–9, 100 Gloucestershire, 20, 228, 236, 504 Gonson, William (d.1544), Treasurer of the Navy, 363, 366, 370 Gonzaga, Alessandro, 312 Gonzaga, Ferdinando/Ferrante de (1507–57), Viceroy of Sicily, 1535–46, Governor of Milan, (1546–54), 148, 154–6, 159, 164, 190 Grafton. Richard (c.1511–73), printer and historian, 27–8 Grammaut, Caspar, of Metz, Protestant diplomat, 413, 415 Grande Maîtresse, French warship, 354, 356 Granvelle, Antoine Perrenot de (1517–86), bishop of Arras, cardinal (1561), 198, 201, 391–2 Granvelle, Nicolas Perrenot de (1484–1550), chief minister to Charles V, 38, 67n, 69, 72, 74, 160, 164, 168, 171, 198, 199n, 203, 301–2, 398, 403–4, 406, 408–9, 412 Gray, Patrick, 4th Lord (1515/20–1584), 96, 98 Gravelines (Nord), 4, 191, 392 Great Harry / Henry Grâce à Dieu, 355, 364, 366, 377, 383 Grey of Wilton (1508/9–1562), William, 13th Baron, lieutenant of Hammes, 1530, lieutenant of Boulogne, 1546, of Guînes (1554–8), 234, 276n, 284n, 293, 298, 304, 468, 480, 494, 504 Grignan, Louis Adhémar de (d.1557), governor of Provence, ambassador to Germany, 12, 318–23, 325–7, 329, 336–7, 402 Grimani, Marco (d.1544), Patriarch of Aquilea, papal nuncio to Scotland (1543–4), 102–4 Gruffydd, Elis (c.1490–1556), Welsh soldier and chronicler, 115–16, 174n, 178–80, 198, 204, 212, 260, 264, 266, 270, 281–3, 199, 316, 419 Guidiccione, Alessandro (d.1552), papal nuncio in France, 1544–6, 412n, 434n Guillart, Charles, president of the Parlement of Paris, 17 Guzman, Gabriel, confessor to Queen Eleonore of France, 162, 164, 406, 422; see also Longpont Guelderland, Charles d’Egmont, duke of (d.1538), 48–9

Guelders, duchy of, 48–9, 50, 55, 130, 151, 339 Guelders, Peter, bastard of, Landsknecht chief, 321, 337 Guînes (Pas-de-Calais), 45, 81, 84, 121–3, 125, 147, 157, 210, 217–20, 247, 264, 268, 271, 278, 282–4, 291, 293–5, 418, 427, 437, 440, 469, 476, 487, 509, 514 Guise, see Lorraine Guise (Aisne), 140–41, 144, 148, 191 Hacfort, Henrick (b.1517) of Nijmegen, mercenary chief, 325, 338, 341 Haddington, 110, 510n Haddon Rig, battle (1542), 94 Hagenau, Diet of (1540), 50, 311 Hainault, county of, 133–5, 139–40, 143, 151, 191, 206, 313 Hall, Edward (1497–1547), historian and chronicler, 120, 361, 462 Francis Hall (d.1552/3), controller of Calais, 161, 240–42, 315, 316n, 326 Hamburg, 320–21, 337, 339–40 Hamilton, John (1510/11–1571), abbot of Paisley, Treasurer of Scotland and Keeper of the Privy Seal, 1543, Archbishop of Saint Andrews (1546), 99n, 111 Hamilton, 99n, 111; see also, Arran Hammes, castle (near Calais), 121, 219, 264 Hampton Court, 9n, 78, 124, 166, 459 Hanseatic League, 341, 365, 382–3 Hardelot (Pas-de-Calais), castle, 198, 201, 273, 276, 286, 290–3, 303, 446 Harfleur, 359–60, 375 Harrington, John (d.1553), Treasurer of the Vanguard, 212, 235, 237n, 262n, 505, 519 Hay, John, Scottish envoy in France, 113, 115, 266n Heideck, baron Georg von (1587–1551), landsknecht chief, 81, 311, 313, 322, 330 Heidelberg, 341, 344–5 Heilly, Adrien de Pisseleu (d.1559), sr. de, governor of Hesdin, 134–6, 141, 146–8, 191, 197, 277, 468 Henri II, King of France (1547–59), see Dauphin Henry VII, King of England, 26, 31 Henry VIII, king of England (main references only): and honour, 12, 14, 202, 398, 407, 430; relations of with

index Francis I, 5, 8–9, 16, 33–48, 41–3, 45, 55, 61, 64–5, 81, 83–4, 162–3, 165, 397, 427–61 passim; relations of with Charles V, 16, 66–79, 153–60, 166–72, 393, 398–9, 402–10; attitudes to Scotland, 47, 57, 59, 86–93, 395, 447; strategic options, 7, 10–11, 13, 15, 18, 36–9, 41, 57, 69, 153, 156–7, 159, 160, 169–75, 198, 266, 405; military abilities, 74, 120, 124, 126, 130, 138, 140, 150, 154, 170, 175, 177, 184–89, 197–205, 224, 300, 373, 377; and the campaign of 1544, 166–72; and military commanders, 210, 211, 296; and the Germans, 48–55, 305–46 passim, 400–2, 410–26; and religion, 26, 34, 460–61; and factions, 46, 47, 57, 405, 429; health, 3, 9, 166–9, 474–5; death, 475 Heralds, 78–9, 83–4, 160–1, 257, 263–5, 475 Herefordshire, 208n, 227–8, 236, 368, 504 Hertford, Edward Seymour, Earl of (ex.1552), later Duke of Somerset and Lord Protector, 96–7, 108–9, 11, 114–5, 118, 122, 144, 155, 209–12, 214n, 217, 223, 226, 230–2, 234–5, 237, 246, 248, 262, 271–4, 276, 286–94, 299, 300–01, 304, 340, 346, 373, 392–3, 417, 424n, 430–1, 437, 463, 475, 503, 518 Hesdin (Pas-de-Calais), 39, 126, 136–7, 146, 152, 190–1, 194–5, 202, 264 Hesse, Philip the Magnanimous (der Grossmütige) (1504–67), Landgrave of (1518), 52, 319, 322–3, 324–5, 328, 331–2, 334–5, 338n, 339–43, 400, 471n Hoby, Philip (1504–58), ambassador, 185 Holland, county of, 339 Home, George, 4th Lord (d.1549), 110 Hons, Jean de, Secretary to Charles de Marillac, 61, 67 Hosier, Dick, English exile posing as ‘Blancherose’, 44, 45n, 84 Howard, William, 1st Lord Howard of Effingham (c.1510–73), ambassador to France (1541–3), 8–9, 41, 46–7, 53–4, 56, 59, 90, 180, 213, 389 Hull, 220, 492, 512n Iceland, 1, 220, 348, 365 Inflation, 23, 207

553

Ireland, 91, 101–2, 208n, 231 Irish, 1, 228, 230–2, 270, 316, 485, 497 Jalons (Marne), camp, 189, 190, 197, 205, 310n James V, King of Scotland (1513–42), 36, 47, 59, 61, 70, 77, 82, 86–97 Jeanne d’Albret (1528–72), princess, later Queen of Navarre, 50, 54, 321, 403 Jedburgh (Roxburghshire), 111, 115, 510n Jenyns, John, groom of the Privy Chamber, 186, 215, 222 Johnson family, merchants, 4, 184, 233, 243 Johson, John, 6n, 238, 284n Johnson, Otwell, 6n, 184, 238 Johnson, Henry, master of ordnance, 213 Katherine Howard, Queen of England (1540–41), ex. 1542, 53, 60 Kelso Abbey (Roxburghshire), 94, 96, 111, 115 Kent, 10, 19, 24, 155, 222, 226–7, 239, 241–2, 315, 375n, 459, 487, 495, 504, 512n King’s Lynn, 220, 490 Knyvett, Henry (1510–46), ambassador to the Emperor, 1540–41, 68 La Brosse, Jacques de (c.1485–1562), French envoy to Scotland (1543), 102–7, 115–6, 522 La Croix, Nicolas de, valet de chambre du roi, abbé commendataire de Buscodon (1540–51), French agent in Scotland, 1545, in Germany (1546–7), 112, 309, 471n La Fayette, Antoine Motier de, governor of Boulogne, 154 La Fayette, Gilbert de, abbé of SaintJosse, 147 La Fère-sur-Oise (Aisne), 191, 199, 321, 355 La Garde, Antoine Escalin des Aimars (c.1498–1578), ‘le capitaine Polin/ Paulin’, général des gallères, 1544, ambassador to the Sultan, (1542), 259, 352–3, 356, 359, 384–6, 389–90, 443n, 463, 466, 469, 476–9, 523 La Meilleraye, Charles de Moy, sr. de, Vice-admiral and lieutenant-general of Normandy, 258, 277, 352, 522

554

index

La Montoire (Pas-de-Calais), castle, 127n, 128–9, 137 La Planche, agent of Longueval, 82, 343, 411–12, 417–23, 472 La Pommeraye, Gilles de, French ambassador to England (1531–2), 34 La Rochelle, 7, 352–3, 359, 371 La Roche-du-Maine, Charles Tiercelin, sr. de (d.1558), 277 La Rochepot, François de Montmorency, sr. de (d.1551), governor of Picardy and Ile-de-France, 44–5, 133, 146, 192, 198, 277 L’Artigue, Pierre de Bidoux, sr. de, French (Breton) deserter, nephew of admiral Prégent de Bidoux, 7, 268, 366, 370–71, 388 La Trémoille, Louis II sr. de (1460–1525), 205 La Trémoille, Louis III sr. de (1521–77), 281 Lancashire, 210, 22, 505 Landenberg zu Schramberg, Christoff von (d.1546), Landsknecht chief, 171, 184, 225, 245, 255, 260, 263, 310, 312–15, 320 Landrecies (Nord), 20, 102, 120, 124, 133, 135, 136–52, 154, 157–8, 191, 208, 220, 244, 268, 271, 311, 512 Landsknechts, 4–5, 90, 112, 138–9, 143, 146, 226, 270, 274, 277–8, 287–9, 290–91, 292, 305–46 passim, 359 Languedoc, 5, 277–8, 352, 524 Laon (Aisne), 130 L’Aubespine, Claude de, baron de Châteauneuf (1510–67), French secrétaire des finances/commandements, 65, 81, 102n, 164, 98, 308n, 340–1, 414, 420, 456, 524 (Saxe-)Lauenburg, Franz I (1510–81), duke of, nephew of the duke of Brunswick, 324 Layton, Brian, captain of Norham, 112 Layton, Richard, Dean of York, ambassador in Flanders (1543–4), 3, 83, 162, 240 Le Croisic (Loire-Atlantique), 113 Le Crotoy (Somme), 125, 131, 157, 173, 180, 357 Le Havre (Seine-Maritime), 101, 118, 279, 343, 350, 352n, 354, 355, 358n, 359, 361, 375–6, 386, 389, 477 Le Picart, François, Parisian preacher, 19, 428

Lee, Richard (1513–75), engineer, 114, 247n, 296 Legions, French, 127, 129, 134–5, 144, 153n, 173, 190, 193, 273, 280–1, 308, 310, 474, 524 Leicestershire, 236, 500, 504 Leith, 106, 108–9, 222–3, 373 Leland, John (1502–52), antiquary, 427, 463–4 Lennox, Matthew Stuart, 4th earl of (1516–71), 101, 103–6, 110, 119 Leuchtmacher (‘Lightmaker’), Mathies, lieutenant of Reiffenberg, 225, 315, 226, 340 Lezard, Nicholas (d.1571), serjeant painter, 260 Liane, river, 202, 271, 279–80, 295, 446, 449, 453, 455, 467, 469 Licques (Pas-de-Calais), abbey of, 141, 176, 203 Licques, Philippe de Lens, baron de (d.1588), 145 Liège, archbishopric of, 281, 330–2, 335–6, 417 Liermonth, James, Scottish envoy, 1542, 94 Lignon, captain, 194 Lillers (Pas-de-Calais), 133 Limburg, 324 Lincoln, 7, 59 Lincolnshire, 67, 89, 95n, 222 Ligny-en-Barrois (Meuse), 89n, 160 Lisbon, 352 Lisle, John Dudley (1504–53), viscount, earl of Warwick, lord Admiral of England (1543–47), 6, 97, 185–7, 189, 211, 222, 241, 243, 248, 258–9, 283–4, 292, 304, 347–90, 427–61 Longpont, abbé commendataire de (1544–50), see Gabriel Guzman Longueval, Nicolas de Bossut, sr. de, chambellan of duke of Orléans, gentilhomme de la chambre, 1544, lieutenant-général of Champagne, (1545), 41, 50, 55, 82, 127–8, 163, 309–10, 324, 326, 328, 332, 335, 397, 401n, 411, 414, 417–20, 424, 472, 524 London, plague in, 3–4; and war, 20; and military recruitment, 215, 217–8, 220–22, 224, 228, 235 Long, Richard (1494–1546), gentleman of the Privy Chamber, 217 Lorges, Jacques Montgommery, sr. de, French envoy to Scotland, 1543. 101, 112–16, 359

index Lorraine, Claude, 1st duke of Guise (d.1550), 57, 63, 87, 101, 130, 458n Lorraine, François de, comte d’Aumale, 2nd duke of Guise (d.1563), 132, 281, 458n, 475 Lorraine, Jean de (1498–1550), cardinal (1518), 161, 163, 392, 414, 458n Louis XII, King of France (1498–1515), 28, 29, 31–2 Low Countries, see the Netherlands Luxemburg, 12, 80, 127–8, 130, 135, 147, 189, 191, 309, 330, 524 Lyon, 7, 80, 87, 430, 437, 466, 471 Madeleine de France, Queen of Scotland (d.1537), 87 Maijoris, (Philippe) Imperial ambassador to England, (1539–40), 67 Maltravers, Henry Fitzalan, Lord (1512–80), 12th Earl of Arundel, 1544, Deputy of Calais, 1540–44, 83, 123n Mandosse, Diegue de, French courtier and agent in Scotland, 116 Mansfeld, Albert III (VII), count of, Hinterortische linie (1501–1560), landsknecht chief, 312, 314 Margaret Tudor (1489–1541), Queen of Scotland, 87, 88 Marguerite d’Angoulème, Queen of Navarre (d.1549), 8, 39n, 40–1, 51–4, 62, 82n, 90, 411, 421, 423–4, 456, 464–5 Marillac, Charles de, French ambassador in England (1539–43), to the Emperor, 1547–51, archbishop of Vienne (1557), 35–6, 38–47, 53, 55–74, 80–83, 89, 93, 121–2, 364–5, 370–1, 390n Marnol, Nicolas Villey, sr. de, Imperial ambassador in France (1540–42), 59n, 60n, 63n, 70, 71n, 90n Marie de Bourbon (1515–38), daughter of the duke of Vendôme, 86 Marie de Lorraine (1515–60), duchess of Longueville, Queen of Scotland, 1538, Queen Dowager, 1542–, Regent (1553–60), 87, 101, 103, 105, 110–11, 113, 116, 160 Maroilles (Nord), camp of, 84, 135, 138 Marot, Clément (1496–1544), poet, 19 Marquise (Pas-de-Calais), 141, 174, 185–7, 203, 259–60 Marseille, 1, 138, 350, 352, 356

555

Mary, Queen of Hungary (1505–58), Regent of the Netherlands (1531–55), 7, 21, 70, 74–8, 124, 128, 134, 140, 143, 155, 163, 165, 166, 168, 170, 172, 199n, 240–41, 309, 313, 325n, 326, 327n, 339, 391, 398, 415 Mary Tudor (1496–1533), Queen of France, duchess of Suffolk, 9n, 29, 31 Mary I, Queen of England (1553–58), ‘the lady Mary’, 29, 35, 43, 47, 58–9, 62, 70, 413, 417n, 454n Mary Stuart, Queen of Scotland (1542–67), ex.1587, 89, 97–9, 101, 104–5, 108, 111n, 413, 417–8, 420–21, 441–2, 443n, 462 Mary Rose, 347, 363, 366, 368, 372–4, 377, 432 Mason, John (c.1503–1566), clerk of the Privy Council, French secretary, Master of the Posts, envoy to Germany, 1546, ambassador in France (1550–51), 14n, 189n, 200n, 213, 225, 341, 344–5, 429 Matignon, Joachim de Goyon de (d.1549), lieutenant-general in Normandy, 350–1, 357, 380 Maubeuge (Nord), 130, 135, 144n Maugiron, Guy de, sr. d’Ampuis, (d.1565), governor of Dauphiné, 277, 282, 410n Maurice, see Saxony Maxwell, Robert, 5th Lord (c.1494–1546), 96, 98 Mechelen (Malines), 4 Medici, Bernardo Antonio (1476–1552), Florentine ambassador in France (1544–45), to Charles V (1547–51), 112n, 397 Melfi, Antonio Caracciolo, prince of, 141, 144–5, 381, 358, 381n Mellone, Antonio, Italian engineer, 274, 279, 303 Melun, captain, 275n, 276n, 444, 448, 457 Mercenaries, German, 305–46 passim; Italian, 79, 149, 190–2, 203, 270, 272–4, 279–81, 306, 312, 340, 356, 359, 385, 519, 524–5; Spanish, 188, 247, 306, 317, 358, 456n, 518, 525 Mesnage, Jacques, sr. de Caigny, conseiller of Rouen, envoy to Scotland, 1543, ambassador to Charles V, 1544–47, to the Swiss (1547–50), 102–7, 268n, 318–20, 327, 336–8, 340,

556

index

342, 382, 392, 395, 399, 402–3, 406, 408–9, 422n, 424, 472–4 Metz, 171, 190, 413 Mewtas, Peter (d.1562), gentleman of the Privy Chamber, governor of Guernsey, commander of arquebusiers, 109, 215, 218–9, 222–3, 230, 487 Mézières (Ardennes), 130, 335, 417 Milan, duchy of, 21, 35–6, 39–41, 62, 124, 189, 198, 393, 403, 467 Modena, Girolamo da, Italian ensign, 274 Monluc, Blaise de Monluc (1502–77), infantry commander, lieutenant of Guyenne, memoirist, 9, 150, 153, 203–6, 279, 281–2, 286n, 287, 358n, 359–60, 362, 522 Jean de Monluc (d.1579), protonotaire, envoy to Constantinople, 1536, 1545, intermediary with England, 1546, bishop of Condom, Valence and Die, 46, 406n, 434–8, 440–55 passim Mont, Christopher (1496/7–1572), envoy in Germany, 315, 320, 328, 338, 331, 334, 341, 343–4, 401–2 Montmorency, Anne duc de (d.1567), grand maître (1526) and connétable (1538) of France, 8, 17, 37, 39–46, 51, 54, 58, 66, 288, 372n Montmorency, see La Rochepot Montpensier, Louis de Bourbon, duke of (1513–82), 277, 458n, 475 Montreuil (Pas-de-Calais), 2, 74–5, 84, 125–6, 131–3, 136, 139, 140–1, 146–7, 153, 272, 274–6, 279, 287, 441n, 465; siege of (1544), 154, 158, 160, 163, 165, 165, 172–88, 191–93, 195–7, 200, 202, 204, 226, 232–34, 238–40, 245, 263–4, 269–70, 368, 391 Morette, Charles de Solier, sr. de (1480–1564), ambassador to England (1534–5), 395, 457n Morison, Richard (1510–1556), propagandist, gentleman of the privy chamber (1539), ambassador to Denmark, 1546–7, to Charles V (1550–51, 1552–3), 9, 10, 207 Morvilliers, Jean de (1507–77), bishop of Orléans (1555), diplomat, garde des sceaux (1568), 54, 60, 90 Pierre Moucheron (1508–67), of Normandy, French wine merchant and agent in Antwerp, 268, 320n Mountjoy, Charles Blount, 5th Baron (1516–44), 180

Navarre, see Albret, Marguerite, Jeanne Navy, English, 362–75; administration, 363–4; and transport of troops, 220–22, 240–42, 488–93; dockyards, 363–4; shipbuilding, 364–5; artillery, 368 Navy, French, 347–62; Ponant, Levant, 351–4; galleys, 353–4; administration, 351–2; shipbuilding, 354–7 Netherlands/Low Countries, 4–7, 16, 18, 22, 39, 48, 64, 67, 70, 75, 77, 101, 124, 126–8, 130, 133, 135, 137, 139, 146, 151, 155, 158, 184, 188, 225, 233, 236, 238–40, 242–3, 263, 268, 274, 289, 305, 313, 315–19, 326–7, 333, 339–40, 363, 393–4, 408, 438, 470 Neufchâtel (Pas-de-Calais), 286 Newcastle, 2–3, 109, 221, 237, 291, 367, 493 Nice, Truce of (18 June 1538), 33–5; siege of (1543), 112n Nicolay, Nicolas de, sr. d’Arfeville (1517–83), geographer, 390 Nieullay (Newnham Bridge), 174 Noirthon, sieur de, agent of Mary of Hungary, 415 Nottinghamshire, troops from, 222 Norfolk, troops from, 222 Norfolk, Thomas Howard, 3rd duke of (1473–1554), 17, 33, 39–47, 56–60, 62, 67–8, 70, 84, 89, 94–6, 120, 185, 191, 193, 198n, 202, 206, 236, 238–9, 241, 245, 255, 263–4, 296, 364–5, 374, 501, 505, 516; planning for campaign, 155, 158, 170, 202; military command, 172–84, 209–13, 216–7, 220, 224–7, 233–4, 269; and diplomacy, 1545, 392, 405, 475 Norham (Northumberland), 94, 112 Normandy, 4, 22, 32, 60, 81, 84, 102, 111, 137, 153, 156, 173, 190, 267, 277–8, 347–52, 357–8, 387, 390, 423 Northamptonshire, 216n, 227, 500 North Shields, Tynemouth, 109 Norwich, plague in, 4; and war, 20 Noyon (Oise), 130, 277n Oliphant, Laurence, 3rd Lord (d.1566), 96 Olivier, François, chancelier d’Alençon, Chancellor of France (1545), 395n, 402, 404–5, 414 Orkney and Shetland, 124 Orléans, Charles de France, duc d’ (d.1545), 2, 58–64, 67, 70, 127–8,

index 192, 203, 258, 277, 280, 393, 398, 409, 411n, 413, 524 Orléans, Charles duc d’ (1394–1465), 24 Orthe, Roger d’Aspremont, protonotaire d’, French ambassador to England (1543),envoy to Rome 1545, 83–5 Otterburn, Adam (d.1548), lord of Session, Provost of Edinburgh, French envoy in England, 1546, 117 Outlawe, Adam (d.1544), ship’s captain, 117 Outreau, fort, Boulogne, 7, 269, 279, 280, 286–7, 290, 295, 301–4, 381, 387, 430, 468 Oye, terre d’ (Calais Pale), 269, 278, 281–3, 399 Oysel, Henri Cleutin, sr. d’ (1510–66), French ambassador and lieutenantgeneral in Scotland, 116 Paget, Sir William, (1505–63) 1st baron Paget of Beaudesert, ambassador in France (1541–3), Principal Secretary (1543–48), 3, 12, 21, 41, 55, 108, 117, 124, 155, 170–1, 185, 221, 224, 246, 249–50, 262–3, 269, 279, 283–4, 289n, 293–4, 297, 304–5, 314, 333, 340, 343, 375, 383, 388–9, 393–6, 399; ambassador in France, 59–65, 79–83, 94, 100; envoy to Charles V, 102, 168–70; negotiations with the French 1544, 201–2; and peace negotiations, 1545, 405, 407, 410–26 passim; and treaty of 1546, 427–61 passim; and diplomatic strategy, 1546, 466–7, 472 Palatine, Elector, Frederick II (1544–56), 311, 322–4, 328, 342, 344–5 Palatine, Otto Heinrich, count of Neuburg, Elector Palatine, 1556–9, 313 Palatine, Philip of Bavaria (Wittelsbach), Count Palatine of Neuburg (1503–48), ‘the Palsgrave’, younger brother of Otto Heinrich, 9, 223, 341–4 Henry Palmer, bailli of Guînes, 161, 164n Palmer, Thomas (c.1496–1553), Treasurer of Guînes (1543), Captain of ‘Old Man’ (Tour d’Ordre) (1545), 272, 294, 315, 500 Palsgrave, John (d.1554), grammarian, 29 Palsgrave, see Bavaria, Philip of Paniter, David (d.1558), bishop of Ross (1545), secretary to Queen Dowager

557

of Scotland (1543), envoy to France and the Emperor (1544–5), 105n, 11, 117, 395, 443n Paradin, Guillaume (d.1590), historian, 14, 464 Parlement of Paris, 17, 27, 102 Parliament of England, 3, 19, 22, 37, 43, 104; and war taxation, 248–50, 252 Pate, Richard (1503/4–65), archdeacon of Lincoln, ambassador to the Emperor (1533–37, 1540–41), 9n, 44, 67 Paul III (Alessandro Farnese), Pope (1534–49), 18, 26, 34, 60, 69, 76–7, 88, 92, 421, 424, 463, 466, 470 Paulet, William (c.1474/5–1572), 1st baron St. John (1539), 1st Marquess of Winchester (1551), Lord Great Chamberlain (1543), Lord Great Master (1547), Lord Treasurer (1550), 184, 201, 238, 242 Paulet, Hugh (c.1510–1573), Treasurer of Boulogne (1544–6), 188, 243, 246, 252, 513 Peckham, Edmund (1495–1564), Cofferer of the Household, Master of the Mint, 238, 253 Peletier du Mans, Jacques (1517–82), humanist and poet, 28n, 475 Pellicier, Guillaume (c.1490–1568), bishop of Montpellier (1539), French ambassador to Venice, 1540–42, 67n, 68n, 69n, 433n Penni, Bartholomeo, serjeant painter, 260 Pennink, Conrad / ‘Courtpenning’, landsknecht chief, 292, 338, 340n Pensions, French, paid to England, 14–18, 33–4, 39–40, 43, 48–9, 60, 62, 64, 74–5, 79—84, 105, 110, 161, 201, 248, 392–3, 397–8, 404, 410–11, 413, 420, 435–61 passim, 464, 466, 477, 479 Perpignan (Pyrénées-Orientales), 32, 80, 127, 130, siege of (1542), 32, 80, 127, 130 Phallaix, François de, Toison d’Or Herald, 83, 264 Philip, see Palatine, Hesse Philippe, or Great carrack, French warship, 347, 349, 356, 360–1 Picardy, 4, 32, 75, 81, 83, 86, 122, 128, 130, 136–7, 155, 190, 192, 196, 205, 273–4, 277–8, 346, 480

558

index

Piedmont, 79, 162, 190, 292n, 308, 403, 431, 471–2, 474 Plague, 1–7, 84, 115, 270, 281, 286–7, 349, 357, 386n, 387, 466 Poggio, Giovanni (1493–1556), cardinal, 1551, Papal nuncio to Charles V, 52–3, 69 Pocques, Jean, French captain of Monthulin, 194, 204n, 467 Pole, Reginald, cardinal, 156–7 Polin/Paulin see La Garde Pont-de-Bricque, Boulogne, 279, 293, 299, 304 Le Portel (Boulonnais), 287, 290, 301, 304, 389, 408–9 Portsmouth, 227, 235, 271, 279, 306, 361, 363, 376–7, 379, 383, 387, 514 Portugal, Luis, Infante (1506–55), duke of Beja, 35 Poynings, Thomas, Baron, (1512–45), Lieutenant of Boulogne (Jan. 1545– August 1546), 217, 258, 276n, 284, 306 Poyet, Guillaume (c.1473–1548), Chancellor of France (1538), 51–2 Praet, Louis de (Lodewijk van Praet) (1488–1555), Imperial councillor, Stadholder in Holland and Zeeland (1544–6), 289 Privy Chamber, 214, 216–8, 22, 229–30, 260, 485; gentlemen of, see Jennyns, Darcy, Mewtas, Wellesbourne, Cary, Cawarden Privy Council, 12, 17–18, 43, 45, 53–7, 63–4, 68–9, 72–4, 76–8, 84, 100, 149, 153m 155, 157, 161, 171–2, 175–6, 184, 202, 211, 213, 217, 223–4, 229–30, 234, 238–9, 241–3, 245, 266, 279, 283–4, 289, 26, 330–1, 333, 361, 397 Protestant Princes of Germany (Schmalkaldic League), 1, 9, 17, 35, 39, 47–8, 500–5, 317–20, 322m 323–4, 328, 337–8, 341, 344, 346, 400, 410, 426, 471; see also Hesse, Philip the Magnanimous, Landgrave of; Saxony John Frederick Elector of Prussia, Albert I, duke of (1525–68), 65 Pynson, Richard (c.1449–1530), printer of Norman origins, 29, 234n Quêques (Boulonnais), 453, 469

Rabelais, François (c.1494–1553), writer, 29 Reckerodt, Georg von, of Hesse, landsknecht chief, 277, 308, 310n, 341, 343–4 Regensburg, 52, 69, 72–3; Recess of, 308 Regnault, François, Parisian printer, 27–8 Reiffenberg, Freidrich von (1515–95), of Hesse, landsknecht chief, 269, 320–4, 326–36, 346, 400, 406, 419 Remon, Pierre sr. de Courcelles (d.1553), president of the Parlement of Rouen, commissioner for treaty with England (1546), 17, 198, 391–2, 414, 419, 421n, 437n, 439, 447, 451, 454, 455, 522 Rhine, river, 312, 322–4, 327, 329, 334, 339 Rhinegrave, Jean-Philippe, count of Salm (1520–66), chief of Landsknechts in French service, gentilhomme de la chambre du roi, 202–3, 277, 287, 290, 311n, 317, 339, 431n Ribauld, Jean (1520–65), navigator, 371–2, 390 Rich, Richard (c.1497–1567), 1st baron, Chancellor of Augmentations, High Treasurer of the Wars, Lord Chancellor (1547), 201, 213, 217, 242, 245–6, 251, 514, 516, 519 Richer, Christophe (c.1514–1552/3), French ambassador to Sweden and Denmark, 1541, Denmark (1547), 13n, 60n, 116, 118, 320n, 331n, 359n, 470 Rincon, Antonio, French ambassador to Hungary and Poland, 1532, to the Ottoman Sultan, 1530, 1532, 1541 (k.1541), 21, 60, 65, 433n Riou, Thibault Rouault, sr. de, captain of Outreau, 1545, Corbie (1547), 286 Rither/Ryther (d.1552), John, of the Household, 238, 242, 252n Rogers, John (d.1558), engineer, 233n, 294–301, 304, 449n Romorantin, château, 268, 302 Ronsard, Pierre de (1524–85), poet, 465 Rossem, Martin van, marshal of Guelders, commander of the duke of Cleves, 50, 55, 127, 130, 139, 309–10

index Rotz, Jean, sailor and cartographer and hydrographer, 371–2 Rouen, 5, 29, 85n, 102, 137, 141, 258–9, 349, 354–7, 361, 389, 141, 439, 465 Rowse, Anthony, surveyor of victuals, 239 Roxburgh, 96, 510n Rue (Saint-Esprit-de) (Somme), 180 Ruminghem (Pas-de-Calais), 125 Russell, John, Baron (c.1485–1555), 1st earl of Bedford, 154–5, 158, 173–79, 184, 193, 203, 210–13, 225, 230, 233, 241, 248, 363, 374, 458 Rutland, Thomas Manners, 1st Earl of (c.1497–1543), Warden of Three Marches (1542), 94 Rye, 241, 349, 361, 381 Sadler, Sir Ralph, Principal Secretary (1540–43), High Treasurer of the Wars in Scotland (1544–5), 73, 87–8, 91, 98, 100–1, 103–5, 244, 262 Claude de Sainliens (Holyband), linguist, 30 Saint-Blancard, Bertrand d’Ornesan, baron de, navigator, naval commander, 370, 389, 390 Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne), 160, 166, 190, 195, 268 Saint-Etienne-au-Mont (Pas-de-Calais), 287–9, 293, 298, 302, 304, 469 Saint-Gelais, Octovien de (1468–1502), rhétoriqueur and poet, 31–2 Saint-Germain, sr. de, soldier in Scotland, 114, 116 Saint-Germain-en-Laye, château, 112 Saint-John, see Paulet Saint-Inglevert (Pas-de-Calais), (Sandingfield), hospice, 123, 259–60 Saint Leger (1496–1559), Anthony, Deputy of Ireland, 1540–48, 231 Saint-Malo (Ille-et-Vilaine), 81 Saint-Martin, Nicolas des Marquais, sr. de, 161, 164–5, 316n Saint-Maur, château (Val-de-Marne), 189, 351 Saint-Mauris, Jean de (d.1555), conseiller d’état de Flandres, Imperial ambassador in France, (1544–49), 117, 356n, 430–31, 435n, 462–3, 473n, 474–9 Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais), 125, 142, 179, 191, 195, 197, 240, 270n

559

Saint-Pol, François de Bourbon, comte de, duc d’Estouteville, 149, 277 Saint-Pol, county of, 149 Saint-Quentin (Somme), 130, 147 Saint-Remy, Jean de, engineer, 380 Saint-Riquier (Somme), 131, 180 Saint-Valéry (Somme), 102, 125, 131 Saint-Vincent, François Bonvalot (d.1560), abbé de, Imperial ambassador in France (1530–32, 1538–41), 58n, 68 Salcedo, Pierre de, soldier, victualling commissioner, captain of Hardelot, 290, 358, 523 Samer-au-Bois (Pas-de-Calais), 271, 290, 292 Saveuse, Imbert de, sr. de Lozinghem (d.1560), bailli of Amiens (1534), maître des requêtes de l’hôtel, 122 Savoie, René, bâtard de (1473–1525), count of Villars and Tende, 354 Savoie, Honorat de, count of Villars, 522 Saxony, John Frederick (1503–54), Elector (Kurfürst) of (1532), 48, 52, 55, 477, 480 Saxony, Moritz (Maurice) (1521–53), Duke of, Elector, 1551–3, 65, 317n, 318n, 477 Saxe-Coburg, John Ernest, duke of (1521–53), brother of John Frederick I, 50 Sayn, county of (Rhein-Pfalz), 322, 324 Scarborough, 107, 492 Scepperus, Cornelius (Cornelis de Schepper) (1501–55), councillor and envoy of Mary of Hungary, 438, 442 Schmalkaldic League, see Protestant princes Schore, Louis (Lodewijk van) (1492–1548), jurist, councillor of Leuwen, president of Mechelen, 316 Scotland, Scots, 2, 3, 11, 16, 20, 34, 56, 60–2, 65, 76–7, 295, 346, 349, 359, 372–3, 388, 420–21, 430, 458, 462, 488, 507, 509; English attitudes to, 86–93; Henry VIII and, 70, 77, 86–120 passim, 392, 395, 407, 418, 431, 440, 442, 448, 466, 471, 473 Scute, Cornelis, astrologer, 2 Sénarpont, Jean de Monchy sr. de, captain of gens d’armes, governor of Boulogne (1550), lieutenant-gen of Picardy (1559), 197, 280n, 385n, 522

560

index

Seaton, George, 5th Lord (c.1508–1549), 11–, 177 Selve, Odet de, French ambassador in England (1546–49), 23, 390, 443, 457–8, 468, 470, 474–5, 480 Seymour, Thomas (c.1509–49), envoy to France, 1538, to Ferdinand I, 1542, Lord Admiral (1547), 75, 81, 135, 139, 143, 145, 187, 213–4, 310n, 311, 350, 375n, 469n, 504 Seymour, see also Hertford Seyssel, Claude de (d.1520), jurist, bishop of Marseille, 351 Ships: Carracks, 349–50, 356, 361–2, 368, 375; Galleys, 1, 112, 125, 259, 267–8, 290–1, 299, 348, 350–7, 359–61, 365–6, 370–1, 376–7, 379–87, 390, 445, 459, 477; Galleasses, 353, 355, 366, 368, 370–1, 381–2, 389; Nefs, 350, 354–6; Rowbarges, 299, 366, 370–1, 377, 381–2, 389 Shropshire, 222 Skelton, John (1460–1529), poet, 19 Soissons (Aisne), 130 Solent, 376, 383–6 Solway Moss, battle of (1542), 82, 91, 96–7, 105, 209 Somerset, duke of, see Hertford Somerville, Hugh, 4th Lord (c.1484–1549), 96, 98, 111 Somme, river, 75, 122, 154, 158, 170, 173–6, 251, 351, 398 Southampton, 349, 367, 376, 432 Southampton, William Fitzwilliam, 1st earl of (c.1490–1542), Treasurer of the Household (1525–39), Lord Admiral (1536–40), Lord Privy Seal (1540–42), 62, 64, 71, 73, 80, 94, 96, 101n, 209–11, 237, 364 Southampton, see Wriothelsey Southwell, Richard (1502/3–1564), Treasurer of the Battle, 212, 252n, 262n Speyer (Rhein-Pfalz), 160–2, 168, 190, 255, 263, 315 Staffordshire, troops from, 222 Statutes/Acts of Parliament: of Artificers (1514), 248; of Proclamations (1539), 43; of Strangers (1540), 44, 121; Subsidy Acts (1545), 22, 228, 249–50; for Dissolution of the Chantries (1545), 252 Stirling, Convention of (November 1544), 395

Strasbourg, 5, 6, 337, 348, 401, 413 Strozzi, Piero (1510–58), naval commander and marshal of France (1544), 150n, 307, 353, 356, 377, 379, 384, 385n, 386, 388 Strozzi, Leone, Prior of Capua (1515–54), knight of Malta, galley commander, 356, 375, 377, 379, 384 Stuart, John, sr. d’Aubigny (c.1519–67), 101, 110 Sturm, Jakob (1489–1553), councillor of Strasbourg, 334n, 335, 401–2, 411, 413 Sturm, Johann (1507–89), rector of Strasbourg gymnasium, 410–2, 410, 412, 419, 414–21, 424–5, 471 Suffolk, 221, 226, 234n, 365, 501 Suffolk, Charles Brandon, Duke of (c.1484–1545), lieutenant in the North, 1543–4, commander of the King’s Battle (1544), 94–5, 107–8, 154, 164–6, 175, 184–7, 189, 200, 202, 209–13, 217, 220, 222, 229, 235, 237–8, 244, 259, 293, 296, 362, 367, 374, 388, 392 Surrey, 230, 234n, 236n, 283, 487, 505 Surrey, Henry Howard, earl of (ex. 1546), lieutenant of Boulogne (1545–46), 180, 213, 235, 274n, 276n, 283–4, 286–91, 294, 297, 299, 405, 429–30, 475 Sussex, 215, 222, 229, 284, 374, 389, 485 Sussex, Henry Radcliffe, 2nd Earl of (c.1507–1557), 180, 505 Sweden, 61, 65 Swiss, 16, 113, 147, 149 ,155, 173, 190, 202–4, 207, 305, 307, 310n, 524–3 Taix, Jean de (1510–53), colonel des gens de pied (1546), 47n, 89, 202–3, 275, 281, 286, 290, 303, 375, 380, 522 Tantallon castle (East Lothian), 100 Taphoren, Claes, Reiffenberg’s clerk of musters, 321, 331, 338 Tents and Revels, department of, 229n, 230–1, 260–2, 459, 508; see also Cawarden Teviotdale, 101, 111–12, 115 Thames, river, 109, 221, 241, 364–7, 373–4, 459 Thérouanne (Pas-de-Calais), 74, 84, 125–6, 128, 131–2, 136–7, 142, 152, 175, 177, 179, 190–1, 197, 220, 228, 257, 270, 275, 293, 480

index Thirlby, Thomas (c.1500–1570), bishop of Westminster, 1540, Norwich, 1550, councillor of state, 1544, ambassador to the Emperor (1542, 1545–48, 1553–4), 75–6, 125, 412, 415n, 472–3 Torcy, Jean de, lieutenant of Vendôme’s company, 128–9, 132 Totto, Anthony alias Antonio del Anunziato (d.1554), painter, 260 Toulon, 355 Toulouse, 5, 26 Tour d’Ordre (Old Man), Roman lighthouse at Boulogne, 186, 203, 272, 281, 295–7, 302, 479 Tournehem (Pas-de-Calais), 128–9, 130 Tournon, François de (1485–1562), cardinal, conseiller du roi, lieutenantgénéral at Lyon (1542), 51–2, 58, 60, 62, 80–3, 371n, 380, 392–3, 387, 409, 411–18, 420–21, 428–30, 442, 444, 448–9, 452, 456, 458n, 472n Treaties: Brétigny (1360), 22; AngloFrench, The More (30 Aug 1525), 17; Pommeraye’s (23 June 1532), 34; Perpetual Peace with Scotland (30 June 1534), 91; Toledo, FrancoImperial Treaty of (12 Jan 1539), 35; Anglo-Imperial (15 Feb 1543 ratified at Barcelona, 31 March 1543), 66–79 passim; Greenwich (1 July 1543), 99–100, 104–5, 395; Crépyen-Laonnois; (18/20 Sept 1544), 19, 111–2, 180, 198–9, 201, 391–3, 395, 398–9, 400, 409, 442, 465; Utrecht, Anglo-Imperial (16 Jan 1545), 428; Ardres-Guînes (Campe) (7 June 1546), 427–61 passim; of La Garde, London (11 March 1547), 463n, 466, 469, 476n, 478 Trent, river, 224, 226 Trent, General Church Council at, 470–71 Trier (Trèves), Archbishopric of, 322–4, 327, 330 Tunstall, Cuthbert (1474–1559), bishop of Durham (1530), 415–6, 457n, 458 Turks, 38–9, 65, 73–5, 78–9, 83–4, 316, 393, 404, 474 Valenciennes (Nord), 191 Valladolid, 72 Van der Delft, François (1500–50) Imperial ambassador in England

561

(1545–50), 361, 377n, 411n, 429, 452, 463, 470 Vaudois, heretics of Provence, 353 Vaughan, Edward, 315–6, 486 Vaughan, Stephen (c.1502–1549), ambassador to Mary of Hungary, 1538–9, governor of the Merchant Adventurers, agent in the Netherlands, 251–2, 254–5, 258, 313–5, 321, 326, 339, 363, 515 Vendôme, Antoine de Bourbon, duke of (1518–62), King of Navarre (1555–62), governor of Picardy (1538–55), 81, 86, 122, 126–30, 132–6, 140, 142, 144–8, 152; in the campaign of 1544, 173, 178, 180, 191–202, 270; in that of 1545, 275, 277; and English marriage proposal, 411n, 413–4, 417; and treaty negotiations, 413 Venice, Venetian Republic, 307, 432–61 passim, 473, 478 Venningen, Christoff von, agent of duke Ulrich of Württemberg, 410, 416n Vervins, Jacques de Coucy, sr. de (ex.1549), lieutenant of Du Biez’s company, captain of Boulogne, 137n, 141n, 144n, 146–7; at Boulogne in 1544, 193, 199, 200 Vieilleville, François de Scépeaux, sr. de count of Duretal (1509–71), soldier and diplomat. Marshal of France, 479 Vielmoutier (Pas-de-Calais, Boulonnais), 453, 469n Villebon, Jean d’Estouteville sr. (d.1556), governor of Thérouanne, lieutentantgeneral in Picardy and Normandy, 138, 142, 146, 197, 257, 277 Villers-Cotterêts (Aisne), château, 189, 420 Voré, Barnabé de, sr. de La Fosse, French envoy in Germany (1540), 52 Wales, troops form, 222, 224, 228, 316, 505 Wallop, John (c.1492–1551), gentleman of the Privy Chamber 1526–47, marshal of the Rearward in France, 1522–3, captain of Guînes, 1541–51, captain-general of the army of Landrecies, 1543; ambassador to France (1528, 1532–37, 1540–41); Ambassador in France: 40–7, 51, 68; captain of Guînes: 81–4, 121–34; and army of Landrecies, 120, 136–52,

562

index

218–20, 486; in 1544–5, 158, 184, 213–14, 217–9, 257, 270, 283–4, 293, 311–12 Wark castle, 154 Warwick, earl of see Lisle Warwickshire, troops from, 95, 222, 226, 236, 499, 502 Wells, Dean and Chapter of, 172 Wharton, Thomas, 1st Baron (c.1495–1558), Warden of the West March (1542), 96, 108, 221 Whitehall, palace of, 9n, 166, 185, 200, 213n, 233, 294, 475 Wight, Isle of, 235, 271, 283, 351, 373, 375–6, 379–80, 383, 387, 512n Windebank, Richard (d.1556), soldier, deputy of Guînes in 1553, 314–5 Winter, John (d.1545), merchant sea captain of Bristol, Treasurer for Marine causes, 363 Winter, William (1525–89), Admiral, 363 Wingfield, Richard, governor of Portsmouth (1552–4), 397 Wissant (Pas-de-Calais), 185 Worms, Reichstag of (1545), 12, 55, 318, 398, 410 Wotton, Edward (c.1489–1551), Treasurer of Calais (1540), 246, 469n Wotton, Nicholas (1497–1567), Dean of Canterbury, ambassador to Cleves (1540–41), to Mary of Hungary (1543–4), to Charles V (1544–45), to

France (1546–49), 12, 49–50, 53–5, 108, 117, 135, 160, 162, 171, 201, 255, 266, 274, 311–15, 320, 390–91, 398–9, 437, 451–2, 458–9, 476–80 Charles Wriothesley (1518–62), herald and chronicler, 235, 362, 459 Wriothesley, Sir Thomas (1505–50), baron, earl of Southampton, Principal Secretary (1540–44), Lord Chancellor (1544–7) , 16, 64, 71–6, 78, 175, 213, 239, 244–5, 249, 251–3, 255, 387, 399, 432 Württemberg, Ulrich, duke of (1503–50), 51, 477 Wyatt, Thomas, the Elder (1503–42), poet, soldier and diplomat, ambassador to Charles V (1537–39), 36, 38–40, 42, 44, 46, 66–7 Wyatt, Thomas, the Younger (c.1521–1554), soldier, captain of basse Boulogne (1545), 227, 272, 299–300 Yarmouth, 220, 374–5, 512n Yeomen of the Guard, 229 York, 20, 60, 89–91, 93, 95, 491 Yorkshire, troops from, 222 Ypres, 6 Zambon, Giacomo, Venetian secretary (chargé d’affaires) in England (1544–48), 432 Zeeland, 399

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