Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion 1572-1596

HENRY IV OF FRANCE AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION 1572-1596 N.M. SUTHERLAND HENRY IV OF FRANCE AND THE POLITICS OF REL...

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HENRY IV OF FRANCE AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION

1572-1596

N.M. SUTHERLAND

HENRY IV OF FRANCE AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION 1572-1596 Volume I

____________________________________________

A bronze bust of Henry IV of France, possibly by Hubert Le Sueur.

HENRY IV OF FRANCE AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION 1572-1596

N. M. SUTHERLAND

VOLUME I

HENRY OF NAVARRE: HUGUENOT PROTECTOR AND HEIR PRESUMPTIVE, 1572-1589

Printed in Paperback in UK in 2002 by Elm Bank, an imprint of Intellect Ltd, PO Box 862, Bristol BS99 1DE, UK Published in Paperback in USA in 2002 by Elm Bank, ISBS, 5824 N.E. Hassalo St, Portland, Oregon 97213-3644, USA Copyright © 2002 A. M. Sutherland All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission.

Consulting Editor: Production:

Keith Cameron May Yao

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Electronic ISBN 1-84150-843-8/ISBN 1841508462

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe, Eastbourne

IN MEMORY OF MY LIFELONG FRIEND HONOR WESTMACOTT

TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I: HENRY OF NAVARRE, HUGUENOT PROTECTOR AND HEIR PRESUMPTIVE, 1572-1589 Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... xiii Preface......................................................................................................................................xv Introduction................................................................................................................................1 Map ..........................................................................................................................................11 Chapter I: The Collapse of Peace i) ii iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix)

Navarre’s First Abjuration, September 1572 .........................................13 Alençon and Navarre Escape from Court...............................................14 The Peace of Monsieur, May 1576.........................................................16 The Ambitions of the Guises ..................................................................17 The Influence of Philippe Duplessis-Mornay.........................................21 The Search for Religious Peace ..............................................................23 The Estates-General ................................................................................29 The Netherlands Entanglement...............................................................31 Navarre, Spain and the Papacy ...............................................................36

Chapter II: Navarre, the Succession and the Catholic League i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix) x) xi)

Philip II Tempts Navarre.........................................................................45 Duplessis-Mornay Seeks a Protestant Coalition ....................................48 The Huguenots Seek Royal Support ......................................................53 Spain and the Catholic League ...............................................................54 Navarre’s Proposed Solution, March 1584 ............................................61 Épernon’s Mission to Navarre, 1584 ......................................................64 The Problems of the Netherlands ...........................................................70 The Netherlands and the Catholic League .............................................76 The Treaty of Joinville, 31 December 1584...........................................78 The Bungled Rebellion ...........................................................................80 The Declaration of Péronne, 31 March 1585 .........................................84

Chapter III: The Rejection of Navarre i) ii) iii)

The King’s Hesitation .............................................................................89 Navarre’s Attempt to Save the Kingdom ..............................................94 The Hostile Peace of Nemours, July 1585 .............................................96

viii

Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion, 1572-96 iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix) x)

The King Relies on Navarre’s Conversion.............................................99 The Papacy and the Catholic League .................................................. 103 The Advent of Sixtus V........................................................................ 106 The Changed Situation in Rome.......................................................... 113 The Excommunication of Navarre, September 1585.......................... 115 Explanations and Effects ..................................................................... 118 The Reaction of Navarre ..................................................................... 121

Chapter IV: The Tripartite Campaign, 1587 i) ii iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix)

Navarre Prepares for Action ................................................................ 125 The Desire for Peace ............................................................................ 129 The Pressure to Convert ....................................................................... 133 The Conference of Saint-Brice, 1586-7............................................... 135 The Parallel Conflict in Rome ............................................................. 140 Spain Seeks the Renewal of Civil War ............................................... 142 The Fear of Navarre’s Foreign Army .................................................. 146 Coutras and the Aftermath .................................................................. 149 The Tripartite Campaign, 1587............................................................ 156

Chapter V: The Fugitive King i) ii) iii) iv) v)

The Politics of Navarre’s Religion ...................................................... 161 The Requirements of Spain ................................................................. 166 Conspiracy in Paris .............................................................................. 171 The Barricades, 12-13 May 1588 ........................................................ 179 The Fugitive King ............................................................................... 188

Chapter VI: The Denouement i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix) x)

After the Barricades ............................................................................. 193 The Demands of the duc de Guise ....................................................... 199 The Edict of Union, 15 July 1588........................................................ 204 Guise Returns to Court......................................................................... 207 The Affiliations of the Nobles ............................................................. 211 The Papal Legate ................................................................................. 213 Expectations and Preparations ............................................................. 215 The Estates-General, 1588-9................................................................ 220 Gallican Liberties and the Quarrel with Rome.................................... 223 The Limit of Endurance ....................................................................... 225

Table of Contents

ix

Chapter VII: The ‘Traité de la Trève’, April 1589 i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii ix) x)

Revolution in Paris ............................................................................... 231 The Emergence of Mayenne ............................................................... 233 The Spanish Reaction .......................................................................... 236 Mayenne Assumes the Leadership ...................................................... 238 The Question of the Cardinals ............................................................. 239 Henry III and Navarre .......................................................................... 246 The ‘Traité de la Trève’, April 1589 .................................................. 251 The Monitorium .................................................................................. 256 The Involvement of Italy ..................................................................... 261 Regicide ............................................................................................... 262

VOLUME II: THE PATH TO ROME Chapter VIII: The Accession of Henry IV, August 1589 i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi)

First Steps ............................................................................................. 269 The Protestant King ............................................................................. 272 The Need to Prevail.............................................................................. 275 The Plight of Mayenne......................................................................... 280 Reluctant Allies .................................................................................... 282 The Disputed Succession ..................................................................... 288

Chapter IX: Henry IV and Pope Sixtus V i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix)

The Disposition of Sixtus V................................................................. 291 The Legate’s Instructions..................................................................... 294 Caetani’s Legation in France ............................................................... 299 The Pope’s Dilemma............................................................................ 308 The Mission of Luxembourg to Rome ................................................ 312 Olivares’ Protestation........................................................................... 317 After the Battle of Ivry......................................................................... 324 The Death of ‘Charles X’..................................................................... 331 Sixtus V, Evasive to the End................................................................ 335

Chapter X: The Importance of Paris i) ii) iii)

Caetani and the Royalists..................................................................... 341 The Peacemakers ................................................................................. 345 Parma and Mayenne ............................................................................ 347

x

Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion, 1572-96 iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix)

The Siege of Paris ................................................................................ 348 The Failure of the Siege ....................................................................... 357 Stalemate After the Siege..................................................................... 361 Parma’s Task ........................................................................................ 363 Proposals for Peace .............................................................................. 365 The King’s Isolation............................................................................. 368

Chapter XI: The Hostile Papacy, Gregory XIV i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi)

The Spanish Prevail in Rome............................................................... 373 The Plight of the Royalists................................................................... 380 The Spiritual Censures ........................................................................ 382 The Gallican Reaction.......................................................................... 384 The Prelates and the ‘Parlement’ ......................................................... 387 Mayenne Under Threat ........................................................................ 389

Chapter XII: The Rouen Campaign, 1591-2 i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix) x) xi)

The Normandy Agreement, July 1591 ................................................ 397 The Arrival of Essex, August 1591 ..................................................... 405 The Queen’s Misapprehension ............................................................ 409 The King’s Distress.............................................................................. 414 Parma’s Negotiation............................................................................. 417 The Relief of Rouen ............................................................................. 421 The Mission of Sir Thomas Wilkes ..................................................... 423 The End of the Rouen Campaign......................................................... 427 The King’s ‘Misserable Estate’ ........................................................... 429 Villeroy’s ‘Expedient’ ......................................................................... 432 Complex Negotiations.......................................................................... 438

Chapter XIII: The Problem of Conversion i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix) x) xi)

The King’s Dilemma............................................................................ 443 Pope Clement VIII................................................................................ 445 The ‘Voyages de Rome’....................................................................... 447 Conflict in Rome and the Concerns of Italy........................................ 450 Prelude to the Estates-General ............................................................. 454 Mayenne and Feria ............................................................................... 459 The King’s Perilous Position ............................................................... 462 The King’s Misgivings......................................................................... 464 The Intervention of the Grand Duke of Tuscany ................................ 464 Stages of Commitment......................................................................... 468 The Dual Problem of Religion............................................................. 471

Table of Contents xii) xiii) xiv) xv)

xi

The King’s Proposal for Peace ............................................................ 476 The Final Quest for a ‘Firm Foundation’ ............................................ 480 The Intervention of the ‘Parlement’ .................................................... 482 The Election is Abandoned .................................................................. 484

Chapter XIV: The Conversion of Henry IV i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii)

The Ceremony at Saint-Denis.............................................................. 489 After the Abjuration ............................................................................. 496 The Instructions for the King’s Envoys............................................... 499 Nevers and the Reaction in Rome........................................................ 502 The Embassy of Nevers ....................................................................... 511 Spain, Mayenne and the Peace Negotiations....................................... 516 Relations with England ........................................................................ 521 Trouble with the Huguenots................................................................. 524

Chapter XV: Henry IV and Rome i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix) x)

The Coronation..................................................................................... 529 The Recovery of Paris.......................................................................... 531 The Return to War................................................................................ 534 The Pope’s Anxiety.............................................................................. 535 Gondi Restores Communication.......................................................... 541 The Intrigues of Mayenne .................................................................... 545 The Declaration of War, January 1595................................................ 548 D’Ossat’s Negotiation in Rome........................................................... 554 The Spanish War ................................................................................. 562 The Submission of Mayenne................................................................ 565

Chapter XVI: The King’s Absolution i) ii) iii) iv)

Du Perron’s Instructions ...................................................................... 571 The Negotiation in Rome..................................................................... 573 The Bull of Absolution......................................................................... 583 Coda ...................................................................................................... 588

Appendix............................................................................................................................... 593 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 599 Index .................................................................................................................................... 609

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The publication of this book has been assisted by a grant from the late Miss Isobel Thornley’s Bequest to the University of London. The frontispiece is reproduced by kind permission of His Grace the Duke of Buccleuch and Queensberry, K.T.

PREFACE I would like to express my gratitude to the following colleagues and friends: to Professor H.G. Koenigsberger, who kindly read part of the script at an early stage, and offered some excellent advice; to Dr. Gillian Lewis, for reading the complete work with careful attention, and for steady encouragement over the years; to Professor Howell A. Lloyd, for the benefit of his expertise on the Rouen campaign; and to Dr. David Thomas of the Public Record Office, for kindly providing photocopies of several documents. I owe an especial debt of thanks to Professor Keith Cameron: he has always been sympathetic and supportive, and was finally instrumental in getting the book published. My colleague, Professor Caroline Barron, has provided help and constructive suggestions at several different junctures. I would also like to thank Mr. John Ross of Church Hanborough, Oxfordshire, for his advice and generosity in setting up my computer, and for his patience with my problems. Finally, I am deeply grateful to Mr. John Anderson and his colleagues in the computer department of Royal Holloway College for converting obsolete discs into the requisite form – help without which I could not have proceeded.

Chichester, May 2002

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this book is to chronicle the problems and difficulties which traversed the conversion to catholicism in 1593, and the Papal absolution in 1595, of Henry IV of France. Despite their great international significance these two distinct, yet indissoluble episodes, have never been elucidated. The religion of Henry of Navarre, whether as a Bourbon prince, heir presumptive, or king of France, was always crucial to the complex, protracted, struggle against the predominance of Philip II of Spain. While it is now maintained that the power of Philip II has been exaggerated, that is not relevant to the perception of contemporaries; the fact remains that Philip II posed a mortal threat to Henry IV. This book is not a biography; it is not the history of any reign or country, nor of the wars of the Catholic League. It rather seeks to place this octopus-subject – and its civil war background – into the wider European context. By correlating the diverse elements in this way, it is possible to reach a fuller and more coherent understanding of Henry’s conversion and absolution than has so far been attempted. Any effort to penetrate the politics of sixteenth-century France will trigger condemnation for relegating the supreme importance of religion to the leading protagonists. It is, however, precisely for this reason – the paramount importance of religion, and its consequent interpenetration of politics – that the book is entitled ‘Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion’. Critics, according to their predilections, will deplore the omission of this or that aspect, and body of material. Other aspects, however, belong to other studies. As none can possibly be exhaustive or complete, it is to be hoped that scholars will use and build on this work. While numerous facets could be selected for extended study, the focus here is deliberately placed on Henry of Navarre himself. The conversion and absolution of Henry IV has attracted remarkably little direct attention, despite its importance to the mainstream history of western Europe. The conversion has been the subject of two American works: Ronald S. Love, ‘The Religion of Henry IV. Faith, Politics and War, 1553-1593’ (unpublished Ph.D., University of Southern California, 1987) and Michael Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV. Politics, Power and Religious Belief in Early Modern France (Cambridge, Mass., 1993).1 Neither study covers the absolution; indeed, apart from cursory and misleading summaries in old general works, the conversion has consistently been divorced from the absolution and treated in isolation. This leads to distortion, not least because evidence relating to the

1

In addition to one short book by Y. de la Brière, La Conversion de Henri IV. Saint-Denis et Rome (Paris, 1905), there are two somewhat dated articles: Pierre de Vaissière, ‘La Conversion de Henri IV’, Revue d’histoire de l’église de France, xiv (1929), 43-58, and Adair G. Williams, ‘The Abjuration of Henry of Navarre’, The Journal of Modern History, v (1933), 143-71. Mark Greengrass has made a rather more probing contribution in his brief article, ‘The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henri IV’, in Keith Cameron, Ed., From Bourbon to Valois. Dynasty, State and Society in Early Modern France (Exeter, 1989), 107-26.

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Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion, 1572-1596

latter helps to explain the former. Thus, only the first half of this dual subject has, so far, been partially studied.2 The advent of the protestant Navarre as heir presumptive to the throne in June 1584, dominated contemporary thought above all other issues, prompting a serious challenge to the royal authority. ‘Pamphlets, treatises, letters and memoranda all resonated with the burning question of [Navarre’s] faith’. This is the subject of Wolfe’s book. The polemicists laboured to establish Navarre’s exclusion from the throne, even though he was ostensibly unlikely to succeed to a king so close to himself in age. Wolfe defined the role of this ‘public opinion’ in the struggle over Navarre’s religion, as an expression of the ‘collective mentality of the established elite’. To him, the important question is how French catholics came to believe the king to be sincere and to accept his conversion. As Love observed, Wolfe focused less on the king himself than on the debates which raged about him. This is one approach, but it does not yield the why and the wherefore of the abjuration and absolution.3 The two principal problems of interpretation have been seen as the timing of the king’s long-delayed conversion, and the sincerity versus opportunism of his action – a rather spurious debate about ill-defined concepts. What, after all, constitutes sincerity, and was it only of one kind and one degree? Furthermore, Henry’s sincerity is liable to be confused with his motivation, which is not the same thing. The Papacy, incidentally, held a distinctly mundane view of ‘sincerity’ which, measured by conduct, could only be determined later. Since, after 1593, Henry IV remained a catholic, sincerity had to be conceded. The question of timing may variously refer to the long delay until 1593, to the timing of the decision to convert, or to that of the event itself. A problem over ‘timing’ was inevitable since Henry IV has been criticised, by contemporaries and posterity alike, for failing to convert at a much earlier date. Wolfe, in particular, insists that he categorically refused to convert, employing the words ‘dogged’ and ‘stubborn’.4 To Love, one significant moment at which Henry ‘failed’ to convert was after his victory over the Catholic League at the battle of Ivry in March 1590. Had he been a sceptic or an opportunist, the argument goes, he would quickly have consolidated his success by converting and being crowned; that was allegedly the logical step. But, to postulate obstinacy, or to plead this kind of integrity, does nothing at all to explain the timing of Henry’s conversion; it was far more complex. Prompted by the appearance of Wolfe’s contribution, Love returned to the field in 1995 with his definitive reflections. He still felt that the king’s conversion was ‘plus célèbre que connue’, and that fundamental questions about the motivation and timing remained to be answered.5 Both the timing (in the sense of the decision to convert), and 2 Since this book was finished, Ronald S. Love has published a book, based on his thesis, Blood and Religion. The Conscience of Henri IV, 1553-1593 (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal and Kingston, 2001), pp. xii + 457). 3 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, pp. 1, 3, 4. 4 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, pp. 92, 50, 188. 5 Ronald S. Love, ‘Symbiosis of Religion and Politics. Reassessing the Final Conversion of Henri IV’, Historical Reflections, xxi (1995), 27.

Introduction

3

Henry’s sincerity were said by Greengrass to pose unanswerable questions, while Wolfe noted that no one knows what Henry IV believed when he converted. He therefore concentrated on segments of catholic opinion rather than on the king himself. The desire to know what the king believed is related to the vexed question of ‘sincerity’ – which his adversaries naturally disparaged for political ends. To Love (who objected that no one had ever tried to ascertain what Henry believed, p. 28), he was a genuine Calvinist for whom religious motivation was quite as potent a force as ambition or dynastic obligation. Love also believed in Henry’s profoundly devotional attitude to life; and this is well attested. Thus, Henry would always insist that religious instruction must precede change. Love concluded that Henry’s conversion proved to be an unpalatable necessity; consequently he refused to renounce his convictions until he was forced to do so. While this deduction is partly true, it is far from being the whole story. It is clear, Love says, that Henry’s preference was for tolerance and peaceful coexistence – even, one might add, religious reunion. That, however, was not an essentially Calvinist attitude. The latest historian to consider the conversion of Henry IV, albeit in passing, is Thierry Wanegffelen.6 In this vast work, Wanegffelen maintains that the history of ‘religious sensibility’ now prompts a reassessment of Henry’s abjuration; this, he also maintains, has not yet been convincingly explained. While, in some respects, Wanegffelen seems to be making similar points to Love, and totally excludes an opportunist interpretation, their conclusions are diametrically opposed. From 1584 onwards, when Henry of Navarre became heir presumptive, he is said to have been pressed to convert for purely political reasons. That is incontestable. But, Wanegffelen asserts, Henry refused to comply until he felt himself to be, in conscience, catholic. Thus, the opportunism pertained to others and was firmly rejected by Navarre. Wanegffelen illustrates, at some length, Henry’s lively consciousness of divine providence. His central conviction, that he was destined by God to restore France to peace and prosperity, welded religion and politics together and guided his decision to convert in 1593. Wanegffelen believes the king to have been strongly influenced in this decision by Jacques Davy Du Perron – himself a convert – and René Benoît, curé of Saint-Eustache in Paris. It is significant that these two men held differing religious views. From the time of Henry’s accession in 1589, Du Perron had urged him to convert, suddenly and at once, because nothing less would suffice. But Henry was never prepared to do that. What effects, good or disastrous, such precipitate action might have had were – and are – hypothetical matters of judgement. Du Perron was also wrong in dismissing as ephemeral the grim opposition of the huguenots, and gravely incorrect in assuming the joyful compliance of the Papacy. By the time he mediated the king’s absolution in Rome in 1595, Du Perron had learnt better. Furthermore, he is categorised as ultramontane which no king of France, however catholic, could ever be. Thus, Wanegffelen argues with erudition, it was René Benoît who offered a solution to Henry’s awful, inherited predicament: how both to 6

Thierry Wanegffelen, Ni Rome ni Genève: Des fidèles entre deux chaires en France au XVIe siècle (Paris, 1997), book ii, part iv, chap. v. A slightly different version of this chapter appears as ‘Henri IV, roi catholique?’ in Patrice Marcilloux, Ed., Laon, 1994: Henri IV, la Ligue et la ville, 61-87.

4


respect his conscience and to fulfil his divine calling to be king. This is a crucial point. If the role attributed to Benoît is correct, then he must have propounded a different view of catholicism from that of Du Perron. This should at least help to eliminate simplistic and otiose discussions of ‘sincerity’. Of course it is true that no one knew exactly what Henry really believed when he converted; nor do we know exactly what he believed at any other time. Subjected, as he was, to so much importunity, his religious persuasions can hardly have been immutable over a period of some twenty years. Besides, how many catholics, then or ever, believed with total ‘sincerity’ every article of the Roman faith, and how many thought that necessary? It was in fact exemplified by Henry’s own instructors that acknowledged catholics might comprehend things differently. Indeed, as religion and politics were inseparably intertwined, for Henry it was probably more a question of what he was able to believe – an approach to be examined below. In any case, as Greengrass observed, it was essential for him to keep his counsel, and the world guessing. But whatever Henry believed, survival was both his first purpose and his first duty in the crisis which followed his accession. Wolfe shows how the murder of Henry III in August 1589 shattered the foundations of authority and splintered society. This desperate expedient added anarchy to the existing civil war. Furthermore, unprecedented problems were instantly posed by the fact that the legitimate successor was a protestant. This juridical quagmire had long been anticipated by the pamphleteers already referred to. The French succession had, for instance, traditionally been regulated by custom rather than law; what were the merits of heredity versus election; was the catholicity of the crown a fundamental law; was fundamental law itself anything more than passionately held conviction; must the Salic law be preserved; could a king of France be excommunicated, and could a relapsed heretic be absolved? During the years of war between Henry’s accession and his conversion, these profoundly serious questions, to which there were no correct answers, were to be endlessly exploited by ultramontane catholics and aspiring usurpers. To Wolfe, the bitter conflicts which ensued over Henry’s faith were ‘primarily religious wars’, albeit allowing that politics and other issues also had their place (p. 5). While polemicists may have represented the wars as religious, the principal protagonists, including successive popes, were demonstrably not deceived by the contemporary religious idiom, which they themselves freely exploited. The common assumption that Henry’s catholic enemies desired, and would have welcomed, his conversion is seriously mistaken. It is well known – and will be seen – that the wars of the Catholic League began as a rebellion against Henry III, the most profoundly catholic of kings. After his murder, in August 1589, the existing rebellion turned upon the disputed succession of Henry IV. Both the King of Spain and the duc de Mayenne, leader of the French Catholic League were, like a posse of other aspirants, perfectly clear about that objective. Had they been waging a war of religion, they must have facilitated and applauded the conversion of the legitimate king, together with Papal participation and absolution – a political absurdity. Of course there were those – and of every persuasion – to whom the religious issue was both vital and predominant. It was also deeply believed, and intensely desired

Introduction

5

by catholics across the spectrum, that the King of France must himself be a catholic and conform with the past. The religion of the victor was necessarily of paramount importance to everyone; but that is not to say that the wars were primarily about religion. Royalist catholics – below the leadership level – such as Villeroy, Bellièvre, Jeannin, Schomberg, J.-A. de Thou, and Renaud de Beaune, to name just a few of Henry’s close advisers, did most earnestly and urgently desire both the king’s conversion and absolution; and they loyally supported him while struggling to facilitate the process. But, as unremitting peacemakers, they were perfectly acquainted with the true nature of the wars, both civil and foreign, on the leadership level. Quite simply, Navarre’s catholic enemies were fiercely determined to exclude him from the throne of France, despite his legitimate claim and no matter what his religion. For that reason, they effectively blocked his path to Rome throughout some six years of sustained conflict. When, despite their efforts, he contrived to abjure – Gallican style – in 1593, they persisted in their refusal to recognise him. They continued to pursue their wars against him, and they systematically obstructed his absolution in Rome. They were well aware that, without Papal absolution, his conversion could always be challenged. A vital, missing link in all previous studies is a proper consideration of the feasibility of Henry’s conversion, and of the circumstances in which he was to perform what so many thought – and apparently still think – he ought to have done. That a precipitate conversion was actually impossible, has been largely overlooked; and few contemporaries showed any awareness of the technicalities involved. Branded as relapsed as well as excommunicate, Henry could not simply change his religion by decree or declaration and expect to be believed, and received as a catholic. He could not convert, and be recognised as converted, without both ecclesiastical assistance and the participation of the Papacy. But, it will be seen, the tragedy of Henry III resulted in a crippling severance of relations between France and Rome, which Henry IV was powerless to amend. The circumstances of poverty and danger in which Henry constantly laboured and, after 1585, his excommunication, make it very unlikely that he ever held precise, and preconceived, opinions about whether he would, or would not, convert. It is apparent, during the years in question, that he was constrained by events. Only one thing can be said for certain: Henry struggled with all his might to avoid converting before he had established what he himself called a ‘firm foundation’. By this striking phrase, Henry meant the conditions in which he could command obedience, recognition, and peace. But, having so far failed in this endeavour, Henry was overwhelmed by the summer of 1593 and found himself compelled to convert at a most inauspicious juncture. Thus we shall never know what – given freedom of action – Henry would have tried to build upon his ‘firm foundation’. Both the vexed circumstances, and the timing, of Henry’s conversion can, in fact, be sufficiently established; but it can only be done by paying detailed attention to chronology and timing, and by integrating the Papal dimension.

6


Part I: Henry of Navarre, Huguenot Protector and Heir Presumptive It has already been noted that Henry of Navarre, who was raised as a protestant, was saddled with an inescapable conflict: namely that between respect for conscience and the duty of a prince in a catholic kingdom. Furthermore, as the son of Jeanne d’Albret, queen of Navarre, reputedly the most intransigent Calvinist lady of her time, Henry was the huguenots’ natural, princely leader. Born in December 1553, Henry grew to manhood during the first three civil wars. He therefore inherited the implacable hatred harboured by the Guises – the house of Lorraine – for the Bourbon princes. This enmity was central to the wider rivalry among the nobility, without which there would have been no civil wars. Henry’s own father, Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, died in October 1562 during the first civil war. Similarly, Henry inherited the particular enmity of Spain for the kings of Navarre. Spain, furthermore, was the traditional enemy of France, and especially hostile to heretics everywhere. After his abrupt accession, on 2 August 1589, Henry IV was instantly faced with all the problems and issues relating to his survival, conversion, and absolution which had already arisen during the reigns of Charles IX and Henry III. Consequently the period covered by these reigns must be carefully studied in this particular respect. The most crucial factors were Henry’s first abjuration in September 1572, performed under duress, and his excommunication in September 1585, extracted from the new pope, Sixtus V, by Spain and the French Catholic League. Henry’s first abjuration – about which very little is known – derived from his disastrous marriage, on 18 August 1572, to Marguerite de Valois, sister of Charles IX, and from the massacre of St. Bartholomew six days later. The massacre precipitated the fourth civil war. Brought to the court for the celebration of his marriage, Navarre was accorded neither dignity, office nor command. He did not feel secure, even in time of peace; in time of conflict he could not remain. He was therefore obliged to flee from court in February 1576; the following June he reverted to his Calvinist faith. By this serious step, believed to be necessary for survival, Henry incurred the crippling charge of being a relapsed catholic. This disastrous impediment later facilitated the Papal excommunication, designed by catholic enemies to destroy his claim to the throne. Furthermore, it rendered his re-conversion and absolution very nearly impossible, at least so long as Spain retained control of the Papacy. As the youthful Navarre emerged into public life, the revolt of the Netherlands against Philip II of Spain was beginning to internationalise the civil and religious conflicts of western Europe. Strategically placed between France and England, the Netherlands was an area in which both countries had a traditional interest, and an acute rivalry. Friendly relations between the huguenots and the Netherlands’ rebels were established during the third civil war (1568-1570) and became a critical factor in the massacre of St. Bartholomew in 1572. Concern for the Netherlands – in addition to dynastic ambition – sustained the malevolent interest of Philip II in the internal affairs of France. As confessional allegiances defied national frontiers, faction struggles began to fracture and complicate traditional conflicts. Spain necessarily desired to weaken her old enemy, France, in order to prevent her from supporting England or meddling in the Netherlands. While Henry III preferred inaction, his heir presumptive, the duc d’Anjou,

Introduction

7

began in 1578 to pursue his own advancement in the Netherlands. With open English support, Anjou ostentatiously assumed Philip’s title, duke of Brabant, on 19 February 1582. Sick, exploited and incompetent, he irretrievably compromised his brother the king, with disastrous consequences for France. Philip II, who was bound to retaliate, thenceforth nurtured and exploited an incipient Guisard rebellion. The Guises were also potentially useful because, as kinsmen of Mary queen of Scots, they were enemies of queen Elizabeth. They were therefore reliable in respect of the Netherlands while, in France, they could be used to counterbalance any impulse of the English queen to support Navarre and the huguenots. Every time that Philip II prepared to strike a blow against England, he required the protection of a simultaneous and crippling conflict in France. In the hope of reciprocal help, this service was usually rendered by his French allies – and that explains a good deal. It was from the revolt of the Netherlands and the Spanish hostility to England that the French Catholic League derived its origins – in its historic form.7 Furthermore, it was this collusion between the Catholic League and the King of Spain, together with their manipulation of the Papacy, which effectively bedevilled the life of Henry of Navarre in his successive capacities – as prince of the blood, as heir presumptive, and as king of France. For these reasons it is essential to study the rebellion of the Catholic League. The international conflict, centred in the Netherlands, and the incipient domestic strife were both serious and complex by the time of Anjou’s death in June 1584. Anjou left behind him unfinished business, while the protestant Henry of Navarre succeeded him as heir presumptive to the throne. Henceforth, Navarre’s status and religion became the focus of a civil war which would also engulf the weak and vacillating Henry III. From this alone, it is apparent that the ensuing contest was not simply the war of received opinion between catholics and protestants; Navarre himself had long since attracted a considerable catholic following. Far from being an homogenous group, the catholics themselves were deeply divided. It was this fragmentation of the catholics – not Navarre or the huguenots – which came to pose a genuine danger to religion, finally raising the spectre of schism from Rome. How to reunite the catholics in France was the acute concern of both Henry III and the Papacy. Neither, however, possessed the requisite capacity while, in other respects, their interests conflicted. The formalisation of the French Catholic League occurred under Spanish auspices, when they signed the treaty of Joinville on 31 December 1584. Renewed civil war followed in 1585. This Guisard rebellion was about the control and exercise of Henry III’s royal authority, as well as the succession, from which Navarre was to be excluded. The elimination of heresy, by then notoriously impossible, was proclaimed as their purpose by the leaders of the League. While the catholic king could hardly repudiate this objective, at least in principle, only the protestant Navarre stood between him and the Guises who were out to destroy him. Despite being faced with a Spanish-backed rebellion – of which the Papacy was not wholly innocent – Henry III was consistent only in rejecting Navarre and the support that he offered. Perplexed, afraid, and out-manoeuvred, 7

This is not to suggest that there would not otherwise have been a catholic rebellion in France.

8


the last Valois drifted steadily towards his own perdition, while the consequences of his folly topped the poisoned chalice of Navarre’s inheritance. The League rebellion of 1585 led to increased pressure on Navarre to convert. In any tripartite struggle, two sides will have to merge against the third. Henry III believed that if he could only persuade Navarre to abjure, the League would thereby be destroyed; but Navarre did not think so, and it transpired that he was right. The earliest demands for Navarre’s conversion had, however, dated from the conflicts which followed the collapse of the peace of Monsieur, May 1576, when the likelihood of his accession to the throne was quite remote. Influenced by his friend and mentor, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, the attainment of religious peace, both in France and elsewhere, was Navarre’s preferred solution to the prevalent confessional strife. Peace was to be attempted through the operation of synods and a free and legitimate general, or national, council. While the conception of holding councils was traditional and respectable, that of religious reconciliation was alien to the contemporary ethos. Nevertheless, it will be seen that Navarre’s aspiration was evidently sincere, and he resisted all demands for his conversion. It would, in any case, be much more difficult than Henry III ever cared to admit. Navarre could not wantonly abandon the huguenots who had made him their ‘protector’. Neither could he hope to survive, or to dispose of any means of action, without their support. Then, from September 1585, his excommunication effectively barred the path to Rome throughout the reign of pope Sixtus V (1585-90) and several proSpanish successors. The subtle and prevaricating policy of Sixtus V, gravely detrimental to the affairs of France, has been widely misinterpreted. Following his excommunication, Navarre authorised and published a series of remarkable, constructive policy documents, composed by Duplessis-Mornay.8 Had their proposals been heeded, Henry III and Navarre might, together, have averted the worst catastrophes of the reign and the perilous tribulations of the next. To Navarre, the only viable solution was to uphold the authority of the crown against their common enemies, and to preserve the kingdom from the League and from Spain. This is what Navarre was trying to do as early as 1583. Supported as he already was by a mixture of protestants and catholics, Navarre never saw his conversion as a precondition of royal service. But to Henry III, Navarre’s religion remained the insuperable obstacle until – critically late in time – his scruples were shattered by terror and ruination.9 The efforts of Henry III to induce Navarre to abjure, and those of Navarre to avert catastrophe in France, are not widely known. Even the rise and rebellion of the Catholic League is rather notorious than familiar. Various momentous aspects of the ensuing conflicts must be re-examined and interpreted: for example, the conduct of Navarre after the victory of Coutras (1587), the so-called war of the three Henrys; the critical role of his enemy Henri duc de Guise between 1585-8, and the day of the barricades in Paris (May 1588) which culminated in the flight of Henry III. For the next six years Paris, with its 8

It is impossible to distinguish to what extent Navarre may have been responsible for the content of these documents. 9 Henry III’s scruples were not only a matter of principle; he feared the Papacy, excommunication, and the loss of catholic support.

Introduction

9

own municipal extremists, was to be the strategic power base of the Catholic League. Conversely, the vital need to recover Paris was the essential preoccupation of Henry IV for some four and a half years. It was the expulsion – or flight – from Paris of Henry III which presaged the murder of the duc de Guise, and of his brother the cardinal de Guise, the following December. The murder of a cardinal entailed the severance of normal relations with the Papacy. This unfortunate breach greatly strengthened Navarre’s catholic enemies who exploited their own channels of communication and propaganda. Finally, in France, it was regicide – completing a tragedy of Shakespearean proportions – which brought Henry IV to his disputed throne, unexpectedly, and in time of war. Henry’s accession instantly rendered his conversion to catholicism the inescapable, burning issue. The calamitous circumstances, and the recent alienation from Rome, only served to compound the new king’s initial problems. Given the fortune to succeed to the throne in time of peace, everything would have been different; this crucial factor has all too often been overlooked. First and foremost, Henry IV had to survive: thus in all his efforts, from August 1589 to the peace of Vervins in 1598, war and the requirements of war, must be recognised as his unavoidable priority.

Part II: The Path to Rome Part two shows how Henry IV gradually overcame his contested succession and began to obtain recognition as the King of France. What Henry really wanted was peace, enabling him to arrive at a general settlement of the affairs of church and state. But exactly what such a general settlement might comprise was naturally never defined. Unfortunately, Henry lacked the means and the support to impose his authority. Consequently he failed to win sufficient recognition without first converting to catholicism – precisely the timing he had been striving to avoid. His conversion was greatly feared by the huguenots, and greatly desired and demanded by his catholic supporters; but it was steadily impeded by the Catholic League, their ally Spain, and by the Papacy. The invasion of France in 1592 by Spanish forces from the Netherlands under the duke of Parma, was the principal factor which nearly brought Henry IV to his knees. Not content with making war in several provinces, Spain also made a direct and open bid for the crown of France. During this time, Spanish domination of the Papal conclaves enabled her to contrive the election of successive popes who either did not wish, or did not dare, to oppose her political will. Consequently much of the ensuing struggle – to be examined – actually occurred in Rome. The manner in which Henry’s ‘Gallican’ conversion was finally achieved, is extremely interesting, involving – for reasons of his own – the intervention of the grand duke of Tuscany. But without Papal absolution, the effects of the conversion remained limited and uncertain. The ongoing struggle to oust the legitimate king from his throne was promptly transferred from opposition to his conversion, to the obstruction in Rome of his absolution. During that time, Henry was suspended betwixt and between: no longer a protestant, he was not, in the eyes of his adversaries, properly a catholic. His protestant allies were offended, his friend Duplessis-Mornay was distraught, and the virtual

10


rebellion of the huguenots nearly brought the king to perdition. On the other hand, Henry’s conversion did facilitate his coronation in February 1594 followed, in March, by the vital recovery of Paris; it also helped to accelerate the collapse of the Catholic League, which was now of minimal use to Spain. Consequently Henry was able to launch his reconquest of France. These were important advances. In the end it was, paradoxically, not his Papal absolution which enabled him to repossess the kingdom, but rather the fear engendered by his early successes in the field which constrained the pope to grant it. The two processes – in the field and in Rome, war and diplomacy – were very closely interrelated. In each sphere the timing proved to be crucial, as Spain reassembled her forces in 1595 and the king’s initial success quickly turned to disaster. It is therefore necessary to understand how the demise of the Catholic League, and the Spanish war, openly declared in January 1595, affected the negotiations in Rome for Henry’s absolution.

Part III: Reconciliation with Rome The negotiation of Henry’s absolution was conducted in Rome by Jacques Davy Du Perron and Arnaud d’Ossat between 12 July and 17 September 1595. Their instructions closely followed a shrewd analysis by d’Ossat of the vital points to be defended. These essentials related to the ancient conflict between the temporal and spiritual authority. The sovereignty of the king must be sustained at all costs. The negotiation was stubbornly traversed by the Spanish ambassador and his many supporters: he tried to suborn the college of cardinals, and to protract the transactions to such an extent that they would fail. The discussions, however, were all deliberately conducted in secret. Consequently we know more about the opposition to the negotiation than about its nature and progress. Pope Clement VIII remained timid, irresolute, and predominantly hostile, except that he was desperate to avert the threatened schism and the definitive loss of France. At no point was the successful outcome a foregone conclusion. Not only were immense difficulties encountered, but external events were repeatedly exploited to delay, firstly the pronouncement of the absolution, and then the delivery of the bull. It was in this way that every step came to hinge upon agonisingly precise timing. The absolution, granted on 17 September 1595, was an immense achievement of patience, reticence, and consummate skill. Each side was enabled to claim victory where it mattered most; face was saved and reputation protected. Ultimately, the pope had needed the King of France more than Henry IV needed the Papacy. The sixteen conditions of the agreement contained no political clauses and nothing impossible or excessive. The only French concessions lay in the spiritual sphere. It was, however, unfortunate that promulgation of the Papal absolution coincided with a desperate stage in Henry’s war against Spain. Consequently this consummation, so devoutly desired and so doggedly pursued as the supreme necessity, failed to contribute to that general settlement of all his affairs of church and state to which Henry of Navarre had always aspired. Such a felicitous outcome eluded him, then and for ever.

CHAPTER I: THE COLLAPSE OF PEACE I: Navarre’s First Abjuration, September 1572 Henri de Bourbon, king of Navarre, was raised as a Calvinist from the age of seven. His religion therefore became a political problem as soon as he entered public life. He was only fifteen when he became the nominal leader of the huguenot party, and not yet nineteen when he was married, on 18 August 1572, to Marguerite de Valois, sister of Charles IX.1 To Catherine de Medici, the queen mother, the purpose of this ill-fated match was reconciliation, to cement the peace of Saint-Germain, 8 August 1570, with the huguenots. Given the necessary good will, this treaty might have ended the civil wars, since the huguenots were thereby granted adequate terms under which they could live. But to Navarre’s uncle, the cardinal de Bourbon, the marriage was rather a means of bringing the young Bourbon princes, Navarre, Henri prince de Condé and other cousins, safely back into the catholic fold. Without the protection of their rank, the huguenots would be seriously weakened. Navarre’s conversion to catholicism was not made a precondition of the marriage, which was hurried through without the Papal dispensation. It was, however, always intended that he should be induced to convert. Not only Bourbon, but also the dukes of Montpensier (a Bourbon prince) and Nevers were detailed to achieve this.2 After the wedding, however, and the massacre of St. Bartholomew on 24 August 1572, less than a week later, the king is said to have threatened Navarre and Condé with death if they then refused to abjure.3 Tutored or constrained by their cardinal uncle, Navarre, his sister Catherine de Bourbon, Condé, François prince de Conti and his half-brother, Charles de Bourbon comte de Soissons, all abjured on 29 September 1572, and shortly received Papal absolution.4 This enforced conversion was to be profoundly unfortunate for Navarre because, later on, it exposed him to the charge of being a 1

Navarre was born at Pau on 14 December 1553 and succeeded his father, Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre in October 1562. 2 Hurtubise, Correspondance du nonce en France, Antonio Maria Salviati, i, 161-4, 21 July 1572, Salviati to Boncompagni, 211-16, 2 September 1572, Salviati to Galli (cardinal Como). 3 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres Missives, i, p. xxxiv. Pierre Hurtubise provides some very interesting details relating to the Bourbon marriage, for which the pope certainly meant to make abjuration a condition. In the event, it became a condition of validation. Hurtubise, ‘Mariage mixte au XVIe siècle’, Archivum Historiae Pontificae, xiv (1976), 104-28. 4 Saulnier, Le Rôle politique du cardinal de Bourbon, 61-9. According to the nuncio, Salviati, Condé converted on 18 September. Salviati gave no date for Navarre’s conversion and no details relating to it; nor does his correspondence hint at any sort of duress, of which he might well have been unaware. Hurtubise, Correspondance du nonce en France, Antonio Maria Salviati, i, 235-7, 19 September 1572, Salviati to Galli, 238-43, 22 September 1572, Salviati to Galli. The Holy Office in Rome criticised the form of the abjuration as being incorrect, and Salviati was commanded to obtain and send authenticated copies of all the relevant documents. It is not clear whether he ever did so. While the abjurations were pending, the pope made several efforts to have the princes separated from their wives, forcing them ‘to abstain’, but Catherine de Medici refused to co-operate. The absolution for Navarre, Condé and others, as well as the dispensation for the princes’ irregular marriages, were all dated 27 October 1572. Ibid., 296-8, 30 October 1572, Galli to Salviati, 300-2, 3 November 1572, Galli to Salviati.

14

Henry of Navarre: Huguenot Protector and Heir Presumptive, 1572-1589

‘relapsed’ catholic; and that carried serious implications in canon law. It is clear that the princes regarded themselves as prisoners, and equally clear that their abjuration can only have been nominal. Navarre and Condé are said to have made a first attempt to escape from court during the bizarre siege of La Rochelle in 1573. The massacre of St. Bartholomew, during Navarre’s first experience of life at court, ended a two-year eclipse of Guise predominance since the peace of Saint-Germain in 1570.5 Consequently the massacre also marked the beginning of a new phase of the old Guise/Bourbon rivalry. This has usually been misleadingly expressed in terms of catholics versus protestants, although most of the Bourbon princes remained catholic, as did the Montmorency clan. The rivalry was now between the young king of Navarre and his cousin Henri prince de Condé on the one hand and, on the other, Henri duc de Guise, his brother Charles de Lorraine comte, and in 1573, duc de Mayenne, and other relatives.6 The assault upon Gaspard de Coligny, admiral of France, which preceded the massacre, had partly arisen from a quarrel between the factions over foreign policy and, in particular, an apparently imminent war with Spain. The massacre effectively averted further huguenot intervention in the Netherlands in support of William of Orange – for in fact that operation had already begun.7 William himself believed the massacre to have thwarted the overthrow of the duke of Alba, captain-general in the Netherlands (156773); Alba’s manifest relief tended to support that view. So the struggle continued, together with its French dimension.8 The nascent trust between the crown and the huguenots, which derived from the peace of Saint-Germain, was now destroyed; the massacre precipitated the fourth civil war. After that, the huguenots became more radical and aggressive seeking not only more liberal terms, but also much greater security. This, in turn, stiffened the catholic resistance.

II: Alençon and Navarre Escape from Court. It was in these troubled circumstances that François duc d’Alençon, the king’s youngest brother, emerged into public life. He soon attempted to resume some aspects of the huguenots’ disrupted policy.9 Alençon was not of course a protestant. Nevertheless, by virtue of his rank he quickly became the principal opponent of the house of Lorraine. In this capacity, he attracted the support of queen Elizabeth, with whom his former marriage

5

On the massacre of St. Bartholomew see Jean-Louis Bourgeon, L’Assassinat de Coligny, which contains extensive bibliographical information. 6 Condé died on 5 March 1588. 7 The nuncio, Salviati, stated in his final report that, but for the fortuitous massacre, he would never have been able to prevent a French intervention in the Netherlands; and that was a major item in his instructions. Hurtubise, Correspondance du nonce en France, Antonio Maria Salviati, i, 65. 8 Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 297 n.14. 9 Alençon was born on 18 March 1554. In August 1568, Louis prince de Condé and the admiral Coligny contracted a formal alliance with William of Orange committing the parties to mutual support. See, Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 164-5; Groen van Prinsterer, Archives ou correspondance, série i, vol. iii, 282-6. Evidence is lacking that this treaty was ever signed, but it is always supposed to have existed.

Chapter I: The Collapse of Peace

15

negotiations were shortly resumed, fitfully pursued, but finally abandoned in 1582.10 Alençon was also supported by Louis of Nassau and John Casimir of the Palatinate, foreign connections which rendered him potentially dangerous.11 The civil war issues, reopened and exacerbated, were not settled by the hurried and limited treaty of La Rochelle in July 1573. Consequently, the now massive huguenot demands were formulated into a protestant petition of 25 August 1573.12 The forces of opposition – the huguenots, the Montmorency and many catholic malcontents – formed a large and menacing coalition behind Alençon. Their first rebellions, in February and April 1574, miscarried.13 As a result, Alençon, Navarre and two marshals of France – Cossé and Montmorency, who were still at court – were all arrested.14 Persons of such rank could not simply be abandoned in prison. Further rebel forces were therefore being raised when Alençon succeeded in making a dramatic escape from court on 15 September 1575. To maximise his support, Alençon incorporated the huguenots’ petition into his strongly antiGuise manifesto, launched only two days later.15 Navarre soon followed Alençon, and also escaped from court, on 5 February 1576. By this time German forces, under Condé, were already entering France. So it was that Henry III, when he succeeded his brother on 30 May 1574, inherited a widespread and complex rebellion, supported from abroad. Only the firmest action could have imposed the king’s authority upon such a dangerous situation. Henry III, however, was incapable of formulating and pursuing any clearly defined policy. Weak, wayward and unreliable, he was repeatedly forced into unwise decisions which he often sought to evade. Fabio Mirto Frangipani, nuncio extraordinary, observed in 1576 that Henry III was a ‘bon seigneur’ but not a ‘bon roi’. Weak and ignorant, the nuncio declared, nothing evoked in him reactions worthy of a king adding, for good measure, that Alençon also was worthless, inexperienced and gullible.16 Navarre’s experience at court, between his marriage and his escape, is regrettably obscure. It is doubtless significant that he received neither dignity, office nor command. It 10

On the Alençon/Anjou marriage negotiations with queen Elizabeth, see Susan Doran, Monarchy and Matrimony. The Courtships of Elizabeth I. 11 Louis of Nassau had instigated the huguenots’ incursions into the Netherlands in 1572. He was killed in action, together with his brother Henry, in April 1574. 12 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 213-17, 360-1; Haag, La France protestante, x, 110-14, text of the peace of La Rochelle, 114-21, text of the petition of August 1573. On the organisation of the huguenot ‘state’, see Sutherland, ‘The Edict of Nantes and the Protestant State’, Annali della Fondazione Italiana per la Storia Amministrativa, ii (1965), 199-202; Garrisson-Estebe, Protestants du Midi, part ii, chap. ii. 13 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 219-22. 14 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 39-40. On Alençon, 1574-76, see ibid., chap. iii; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 219-28. Artus de Cossé, comte de Segondigny, seigneur de Gonnor, marshal 1567, ‘gouverneur’ of Anjou, Touraine and Orléans 1570; François, duc de Montmorency 1567, succeeded in 1579 by his brother, Henri de Montmorency-Damville, ‘gouverneur’ of Languedoc 1563, marshal 1567. 15 B.N., Mss. fr. 3342, ff. 4-5, 17 September 1575, Alençon’s declaration. Queen Elizabeth had assisted Condé in raising German forces. 16 Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 266, 11 March 1576, Frangipani to Ptolomeo Galli, better known as the cardinal di Como (March 1565), secretary of state to Gregory XIII. This name is rendered in a number of different ways.

16


appears that Guise had hoped to win and bind Navarre to himself in order to strengthen his position against Alençon. Navarre suspected Guise and endured a vigilant, personal surveillance in order to penetrate the duke’s secret designs. Later, Navarre maintained that he was always in danger; had he remained much longer, he would probably have been seized as a hostage.17 Navarre had little in common with Alençon, but circumstances impelled them in the same direction. In rank, Navarre stood next after Alençon, the heir presumptive; consequently they both obstructed the advancement of the house of Lorraine. It is therefore unlikely that the Guises could have accepted Navarre in any position of distinction at court; they could not, after all, endure the presence of Coligny – well connected but of far lesser rank – Alençon, or the king’s future favourites. After Navarre’s escape, any possibility of friendship between himself and Guise, was at an end. The duke is said to have dissembled his vexation until the death of Alençon. Then Navarre became the mortal enemy whom Guise pursued until his death in 1588.18 There is some mysterious evidence that the king may have abetted, or secretly approved, Navarre’s escape from court. He was, for instance, restored to his ‘gouvernement’ of Guyenne, and some of his property was sent after him.19 Two weeks later, on 19 February 1576, a delegation representing Navarre, Alençon, Condé and Damville-Montmorency handed the king a remonstrance consisting of ninety-three articles, the first of which demanded complete freedom of religion.20

III: The Peace of Monsieur, May 1576. This massive, if ephemeral, coalition forced upon the helpless king a complete capitulation, and that augured ill for the rest of his reign. By the peace of Monsieur (and edict of Beaulieu) 6 May 1576 Alençon, now the duc d’Anjou, extorted significant benefits including a large appanage. Free from Guise tutelage, he had acquired dangerous protestant and foreign contacts. The huguenots obtained most of the demands originally contained in their petition of August 1573.21 These were better terms than they had ever won before, or were ever to receive again; and now they were supported by DamvilleMontmorency, ‘gouverneur’ of Languedoc, who commanded a considerable catholic following.22 It was not, however, wise to have demanded so much, backed by an impressive show of force. As such an edict had no hope of peaceful execution in the

17

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, i, 81-3, [?January 1576], Navarre to his kinsman, Moissens; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 539-45, 6 July 1583, ‘justification des actions de Navarre’. 18 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 439-40. 19 Ritter, ‘Le Roi de Navarre et sa prétendue fuite de la cour en 1576’, Bulletin philologique et historique, ii (1972), 675-7. This was apparently the opinion of the nuncio, Frangipani. 20 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 63-4, and n.99. 21 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 228-31; 361-2, analysis of the edict; Haag, La France protestante, x, 127-41, text of the peace of Monsieur. 22 Henri de Montmorency, comte de Damville, duc de Montmorency 1579, younger son of the constable Anne duc de Montmorency, ‘gouverneur’ of Languedoc 1563, marshal of France 1567, constable 1593, died 1613. Damville’s support for the huguenots was inconstant.


17

provinces, the consequences were to be very serious.23 The Guises had to be forced to attend the ‘lit de justice’ in which the edict was registered, whereupon they solicited the towns to reject it.24 This was probably the origin of that connection between the Guises and the cities which was shortly to become an essential aspect of the Catholic League. Thus the divisions in the state were manifestly more factional than religious, however much religion was invoked. The refusal of the Guises to accept the situation established by the peace of Monsieur caused an ultimately fatal rift between themselves and the king. According to the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Francesco Moresini, the Guises were also encouraged in their opposition by the nuncio, Frangipani, acting in the name of pope Gregory XIII.25 It was one point of view, often expressed by his successor, Sixtus V, that Gregory XIII bore a heavy responsibility for the troubles which were about to overwhelm the kingdom of France. This same conflict also engulfed Navarre: it generated the insuperable difficulties which beset him both as heir presumptive and upon his accession as Henry IV in August 1589. Here we have, already, the principal elements of an extraordinary, tripartite conflict which culminated in the destruction of Henry III and the disputed accession of Navarre in time of war. It is therefore essential to study this conflict, and to understand the relations between the king, Navarre, the Guises and the Papacy. Only in this context can Navarre’s ultimate path to Rome become comprehensible.

IV: The Ambitions of the Guises The Guise faction had been led by Charles cardinal de Lorraine since the murder of his brother, François duc de Guise, in February 1563.26 There were rumours that Lorraine’s death in December 1574 disrupted their projects. It is possible that he had groomed his nephew, Henri duc de Guise, to exploit the weakness of Henry III who could never successfully oppose the huguenots.27 However this may be, they were evidently determined to frustrate the execution of the edicts of religion, thereby hoping to remain in arms. Already in January 1576 – some three months after Alençon’s manifesto – Dr. Dale, the English ambassador, had reported the existence of a secret league between the ducs de Guise, Nemours and Nevers. It also included the chancellor, René de Birague, who was doubtless their mole at court.28 The League was against ‘all that would have any 23

Frangipani pronounced the peace to be neither practicable nor durable. Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 279, 25 June 1576, Frangipani to Como. 24 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 68. A ‘lit de justice’ was a procedure by which the king obliged the ‘parlement’ to register an edict. 25 Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 45, 5 May 1576, Moresini to the doge and senate (sic). 26 Sutherland, ‘The Assassination of François duc de Guise’, in Princes, Politics and Religion, 139-55. 27 De Thou affirms that Guise was the ‘depositaire des projects secrets que le cardinal de Lorraine avoit formé’, Histoire universelle, vi, 439. 28 Jacques de Savoie, duc de Nemours, married the widow of François duc de Guise; Louis de Gonzague, duc de Nevers, prince of Mantua, ‘gouverneur’ of Champagne and Brie; René de Birague, ‘gouverneur’ of Lyonnais, Forez and Beaujolais, chancellor 1573, cardinal 1578.

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peace, and if it [peace] should be made, to begin a sharp war again’. That neatly describes what transpired.29 Accusations were not lacking that the Guises were supported by Spain and the Papacy. ‘Supported’ is doubtless too precise, for Guise – born in 1550 – was young and inexperienced. Nevertheless he did – almost inevitably – acquire Spanish and Papal contacts. He was in touch with don John of Austria, governor-general of the Netherlands, from October or November 1576. Don John offered help against the huguenots in the war of 1577; that autumn Guise sent him 4000 men to help in the Netherlands. Guise also became involved in don John’s mission to conquer England – having first of all settled the Netherlands (sic) – an absurd Spanish project supported by Gregory XIII.30 In Rome, the cardinal de Pellevé, significantly enough protector of the affairs of Scotland and Ireland, acted as agent of the Guises.31 England was to be subverted in favour of Mary queen of Scots and, in France, the huguenots were to be destroyed. While everyone knew that to be impossible, the Guises might still profit from their illusory objective, and the attempt began forthwith. In this connection, Jean David, a Parisian advocate, left for Rome on 22 June 1576, in the company of Pierre de Gondi, bishop of Paris. David is alleged to have been well received by Pellevé and to have seen the pope. When, upon his return journey, David died in Lyon, his papers fell into protestant hands. Among them was a highly subversive memoir, said to have been part of a ‘plus ample discours des choses dessignées au consistoire Romain’.32 Some elements of the memoir are exaggerated and ridiculous; the Guises dismissed it as huguenot propaganda. However, Saint-Gouard, the French ambassador in Rome, obtained a copy of the pope’s report of the consistory meeting which was sent to Philip II.33 The David memoir was either substantially accurate or else uncannily prophetic. True or false, it was influential, and cannot be disregarded. Its proposals presumably represented extremist aspirations, laced with fantasy, and not necessarily what the duc de Guise himself intended to attempt in every respect. Nevertheless, it is important to examine its proposals, since the ambitions of the Guises largely determined the fortunes of Navarre for approximately the next twenty years. The David memoir revealed the long-term objective of the Guises to be the downfall of Henry III – no less; this, in later years, was never doubted. In theory at least, this proposition was nothing new. The alleged descent of the house of Lorraine from Charlemagne and their consequent claim to the throne, had already been publicised before 29

CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 233-4, 24 January 1576, Dale [to Smith and Walsingham]. Don John of Austria was an illegitimate half-brother of Philip II of Spain, and governor-general of the Netherlands, 1576-8 d. In the service of Pius V, he commanded the fleet of the Holy League at the battle of Lepanto, 7 October 1571; CSPRome, 1572-8, p. 344, 27 October 1577, news letter sent from Brussels to Madrid, 352-3, 25 November 1577, Sega, nuncio in Spain, to Como; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 234-8; Sutherland, ‘William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands: A Missing Dimension’, in Princes, Politics and Religion, 222-36. 31 Nicolas de Pellevé, archbishop of Sens 1562, cardinal 1570; a Guisard. 32 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 2-7; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 240-4. 33 Jean de Vivonne, seigneur de Saint-Gouard, marquis de Pisani 1586. Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 756. 30


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the civil wars began. But to subvert the succession, when the throne was occupied by a young, legitimate king, was no simple task; hence, perhaps, a certain ambiguity and pragmatic obscurity in the procedures of the Guises. The first and biggest step was to obtain control of the government by the manipulation and intimidation of a feeble king. The David memoir contains measures intended to elevate the duc de Guise, supersede the authority of the king and subvert the succession; proposals for crippling the princes of the blood; arrangements for opposing the introduction of Calvinism, for organising the country into local or regional catholic leagues, and for raising forces to be used, if necessary, where and when the estates-general were in session. The estates-general were summoned by the king, on 6 August 1576, according to the terms of the peace of Monsieur. Doubtless the huguenots intended to have their edict declared fundamental law. But, according to the David memoir, the Guises meant to pack the assembly through the work of envoys sent out to the provinces. It was then to be exploited to destroy the huguenots (‘fosse faite aux heretiques en laquelle ils tomberont’), and to advance Guisard objectives. The subservient assembly was to declare the duc de Guise lieutenant-general – the status demanded and expected by Anjou. The nascent catholic leagues were to recognise no other leader (‘chef’) but Guise himself who, as lieutenant-general, would rank above Anjou. But, if the heir presumptive was to be grossly affronted in this way, he could not be permitted to remain at large. Consequently Anjou was somehow to be framed, and submitted to a ‘pugnition exemplaire’ under the threat of force. Navarre and Condé were to be induced to attend the estates, or else to be declared rebels. This item was as sinister as it was transparent, since their respective fathers had been arrested at the estates-general of Orléans in 1560. They are presumed to have survived only on account of the premature death of Francis II. Thereupon the queen mother, Catherine de Medici, seized the regency for Charles IX, and was able to release the princes.34 Besides declaring Guise lieutenant-general, the estates were to abrogate the normal succession and declare their own control of it – which meant, of course, control by the Guises. Any prince who opposed the move was to be declared inapt (debarred from the succession), degraded, and his property forfeit.35 Thus, by one means or another, the princes were either to be physically trapped or otherwise eliminated from the succession. Such treatment could only lead to war. The estates would, furthermore, swear allegiance to Rome, and publish the decrees of the council of Trent. That was a direct challenge to the ‘parlements’ which rejected the decrees as an infringement of Gallican liberties. In return the Papacy, whose protection was always sought by the Guises, was to be requested to ratify the transactions of the estates by a form of pragmatic sanction. Such an invitation to the Papacy to interfere in the domestic affairs of France was obviously an outrage. In theory all catholic France would, according to the David memoir, be bound to the Guises and opposed both to the heretics and to the Valois dynasty. The fate of the 34

Sutherland, ‘Antoine de Bourbon, King of Navarre and the French Crisis of Authority, 1559-1562’, in Princes, Politics and Religion, 55-72. 35 This was eventually achieved through the excommunication of Navarre and Condé in 1585.

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king, upon which many people entertained dark imaginings, was necessarily veiled in obscurity. Given the projected degree of Papal support, it would not be difficult to frame a king who had, in 1576, granted the heretics freedom of religion. In the event, the Guises were never to win more than qualified support and little material help from successive popes – though they always claimed to have their backing. Nevertheless, Papal interference was to be highly mischievous. This revolutionary memoir was communicated to the king, presumably by the huguenots. It was published just before the opening of the estates-general on 6 December 1576. The David proposals may appear altogether too crude for execution, and guaranteed to antagonise the huguenots, the Gallicans, the ‘parlements’, and the merely patriotic. Nevertheless, most of these objectives were to be tenaciously pursued in the 1580s when the Guises came close to destroying the state of France. The burden, and the endeavour, of Navarre was to avert that destruction before it was too late, and to preserve his own inheritance. Naturally the Guises could not subvert all France in the seven months from the peace of Monsieur to the opening of the estates-general in December 1576. But they lost no time in opposing the new edict and peace. About the same time as David went to Rome, in June 1576, Jean d’Humières, ‘gouverneur’ of Péronne in Picardy, issued a manifesto announcing a holy, catholic league.36 In view of the similarities between the two papers, it appears that the memoir submitted by David to the pope was derived from the intended manifesto.37 The manifesto of Péronne amounted to a declaration of war against all opponents including, by implication, the king. He was only to be protected if he obeyed the League. Like the memoir, it referred to the formation of provincial organisations, as well as to an oath of loyalty to the ‘chef’, to be designated by the estates. The king was to be presented with certain articles recalling his coronation oath which bound him to oppose heresy. That might prepare the way for publication of the decrees of Trent and, conceivably, for the king’s excommunication. These items would be a giant stride towards his deposition, of which he was already afraid. Thus the manifesto of Péronne, following the David memoir, created a very serious situation by which Navarre was closely affected. Indeed, it was in that same month of June, 1576, four months after his flight from court, that Navarre reverted to his former Calvinist faith. Whatever religion may have had to do with this, there was no other way in which Navarre could survive the gathering storm.38 It was, nevertheless, a struggle in which many moderate, non-League catholics were also to support Navarre, doubtless for a miscellany of reasons.

36

The city of Péronne had been granted to Condé by the peace of Monsieur as a stronghold within his ‘gouvernement’ of Picardy, but he was not permitted to take over. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 23840; Maimbourg, Histoire de la Ligue, 24-9, says that Guise himself composed the manifesto. Haag, La France protestante, x, 141-2, June 1576, ‘traité de la confédération conclue á Péronne, dite la Sainte-Ligue’. 37 Féret, Henri IV et l’Église’, 238, says precisely that: David took the manifesto to Rome for the approval of Gregory XIII; but he neither approved nor condemned it. David also submitted a memoir describing the sorry state of France and proposing a change of dynasty in favour of the house of Lorraine. 38 Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 45.


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V: The Influence of Philippe Duplessis-Mornay After his return to Calvinism in the summer of 1576, Navarre was joined in Agen by the Calvinist scholar Philippe Duplessis-Mornay. Navarre was not yet twenty-two and his brief adult life had been traumatic and tumultuous. His position was precarious, and he might well have been swayed or controlled by the extremist elements in the huguenot organisation. Duplessis became his close friend and mentor, and the guiding influence upon the public conduct of the young prince. It is therefore necessary to know something of the background of this distinguished man, later dubbed ‘le pape des huguenots’. Duplessis-Mornay, only about five years senior to Navarre, was born into a family of the lesser nobility which inclined to the new religion when it was still clandestine.39 Duplessis was a humanist scholar versed in Latin, Greek and Hebrew. He also studied law, and learnt German which was unusual at the time. He supported the huguenots in the second civil war but was badly wounded. After the peace of Longjumeau in 1568, he embarked upon a grand tour. Together with his tutor he travelled to Switzerland, Italy, Savoy, Germany and the eastern confines of the Empire, and back again to Cologne by the winter of 1571. By this time Duplessis was a convinced protestant, having acquired from his studies an unshakable faith. With a facility for debate and exposition, he delighted in current disputations. In Cologne he was in contact with protestant refugees from the Netherlands; thus began his life-long interest in the Low Countries and his championship of their cause. Duplessis composed two remonstrances which were sent to William of Orange and distributed in both French and Flemish. In these works he urged the oppressed people to reject their Spanish garrisons. In the spring of 1572, when the duke of Alba was menacingly close to the French frontier, Duplessis went to the Netherlands. After travelling about in the provinces, presumably not without danger, he went to England where he was received at court. He evidently made friends in the council, which later provided Navarre with valuable contacts. After some four years abroad, Duplessis returned to France in July 1572. He then went to Paris to see the admiral Coligny to whom he had been commended by his friend Hubert Languet.40 Duplessis wished Coligny to read a memoir containing his observations upon the Netherlands, and also a remonstrance in which he argued the need for France to make war against Spain in those provinces. This was timely support for Coligny’s controversial Netherlands policy, and he presented Duplessis’ remonstrance to the king – possibly with explosive results. Coligny intended to send Duplessis back to William of Orange, presumably to co-ordinate their respective plans. But this journey was averted by the defeat of Genlis at Mons on 17 July. Genlis had gone to the Netherlands in July 1572 with orders to take Cateau-Cambrésis. The purpose was to establish communications and to facilitate the passage of further forces. But, disobeying his orders,

39

Duplessis-Mornay was born at Buhy, now in the Seine-et-Oise, on 5 November 1549. On Coligny’s return to court on 6 June 1572 and the Netherlands crisis, see Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, chap. xv. Hubert Languet, 1518-81, celebrated protestant and humanist who settled at Antwerp. Like Duplessis, he narrowly escaped from the massacre in 1572. 40

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he went straight to Mons where he was overwhelmed with heavy losses. He and many others were captured.41 Thus the attack on Coligny, which preceded the notorious massacre, may well have been an expedient to keep him out of the Netherlands. However this may be, Duplessis escaped from Paris to the safety of England – emotionally scarred for life. He did not return to France until after the treaty of La Rochelle, July 1573. Duplessis was instrumental in obtaining the support of Louis of Nassau – architect of the huguenot policy of war in the Netherlands – for the Alençon coalition. He was also involved in the first rebellion against Charles IX in February 1574. Duplessis joined Thoré, who was defeated by Guise on 10 October 1575 as he invaded France. Duplessis was injured, captured and subsequently ransomed.42 As a deadly enemy of the Guises, Duplessis continued to support the Alençon rebellion up to the peace of Monsieur in May 1576. On behalf of Alençon, Duplessis was to have carried the news of the treaty to queen Elizabeth, but the journey was cancelled. Duplessis, however, was far too committed a Calvinist to be comfortable in the service of that restless, wayward prince. He also feared that Alençon would abandon the huguenots, whose religion he did not share. Furthermore, Duplessis regarded the estates-general, which Alençon desired, as premature. They would be useless before the peace was properly established; and he was right. The assembly was completely packed by the Guises and proved to be a disaster for the huguenots. Thus it was that Duplessis-Mornay joined Navarre at Agen, in or after August 1576, as the Guises began to form the first catholic league, or leagues. It is not surprising, given his experience, that Duplessis’ religious and political attitudes were now fully formed, and he saw in Navarre the one great hope for the future. He correctly perceived Navarre’s exceptional qualities of character, and always believed him to be destined for a glorious future. Navarre was to be the prince who must defend civil peace, tolerance and justice in France, uphold the authority of the crown, resist the Guises and, above all, oppose Spain – oppressor of the Netherlands – in every possible way. But Duplessis also realised that the boisterous young prince must be suitably guided, advised and restrained, for he did not always behave in a manner befitting his rank and calling. Duplessis’ influence on the youthful Navarre was evidently great. It is impossible to tell whether, when, and to what extent, Navarre’s own ideas went into the correspondence and remarkable policy documents penned by Duplessis in his name. Duplessis projected his own values, and practical proposals, which would depend upon Navarre for their execution. He also launched Navarre as a prince and statesman to be reckoned with. Navarre must be distanced from the regrettable connection with Anjou, who commanded no one’s respect. The first of Duplessis’ policy documents was a remonstrance in favour of peace, addressed to the estates-general. In this tract he emphasised an important distinction, 41 Jean de Hangest, seigneur de Genlis. Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, ii, 18-20; Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 289-91, and The Huguenot Struggle, 201-2. 42 Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 1-25, 31. Guillaume de Montmorency, seigneur de Thoré.


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adopted by Navarre, between heresy and error. It was written before the decision of the estates, on 26 December 1576, to demand only one religion.43 On this occasion Duplessis wrote anonymously, posing as a moderate catholic – a pretence which was rather thin in places since he defended the unrealistically liberal peace of 1576. If, ideally, it was preferable to have only one religion, this was not possible; Germany, after all, had settled for diversity. The huguenots, Duplessis argued, were also christians, seeking salvation in Jesus Christ; and, whether catholic or protestant, they were all Frenchmen. The whole difference between them, he claimed, lay in their attitude to the abuses in the Church. The existence of abuses was recognised by catholics, who remained within the fold while awaiting reforms. But the protestants had withdrawn, and the catholics claimed that they were in error; hence his distinction between error and heresy. It was not by war and violence that protestants could be reunited to the Church. Furthermore, the existence of diverse religions was a lesser affliction than the insolence of those determined to destroy this liberty – a statement which represented the moderate, or so-called ‘politique’ opinion. Granted the religious liberty they required, the protestants were loyal subjects. But if their liberty was to be contested, a resumption of war would lead to the dismemberment of the kingdom. In 1576, this was a prophetic observation. Dismemberment was to be feared because there were those among the nobility – he meant the Guises – who had every advantage to gain from divisions, and who would not hesitate to aim at sovereign power (‘ne manqueraient pas de se donner la main pour l’emporter sur le souverain’). This would lead to the ruin of the prince – namely Henry III – and, at the same time, of the people. The king had promised peace, upon which everything depended. Duplessis concluded that the estates-general should unite in demanding peace. Duplessis’ remonstrance is important because it exemplifies the religious position adopted by Navarre from 1576 until his abjuration in 1593. In particular, Navarre always claimed that he was equally a christian and not a heretic. But he did concede that he might be in error and would accept correction. He was also unfailingly tolerant, despite mountains of hostile and alarmist propaganda. Whether Navarre did, truly, believe in the ideal of one reunited church, is the crucial, unanswerable question. Perhaps it was not necessary to make such decisions, so long as an ideal was pursued; nor should we be too hastily dismissive of the unattainable, since the conception of reunification has survived into modern times.

VI: The Search for Religious Peace In the religious sphere, it had been clearly established, if not accepted, that the protestants could not be eradicated; one religion only was impossible. This did not prevent the Guises from resurrecting these issues in 1585; they were useful in ensnaring the king and they enabled the Guises to remain in arms. Above all Navarre, who in 1577 had only recently returned to Calvinism, had already been pressed to abjure. This was the first of many 43

Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 40-2; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 40-78, Duplessis’ ‘remonstrance aux états de Blois 1576’.

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similar demands and his response was therefore of vital significance. Navarre never said that he would not abjure, but rather that he was open to correction if proven to be in error. He also said that religious matters could only be determined by a council. Whenever he was pressed to abjure, Navarre repeated that he would submit to a free, general or national council. This raises a serious problem of interpretation. Duplessis-Mornay preached religious peace in the Netherlands as he had, and did, in France; to him the two causes were one. Late in July 1577, he returned to the Netherlands where he was employed by William of Orange to try to calm the extremists, whose propaganda was dangerous. While Duplessis was still in the Netherlands, Navarre sent to consult him about a demand by Henry III for the restoration of catholicism in Béarn. Duplessis replied advising Navarre to call a council in his own kingdom, inviting both catholics and protestant ministers. Clearly he saw in this royal demand a pretext and an opportunity to realise their policy; thus he proposed that ‘all Europe’ should be apprised of this assembly. If the pope forbade it, as seemed likely, it would be all the easier to persuade the people of Béarn that prelates recoiled from the truth. But if, despite Papal opposition, clerics attended, then there would be an opportunity to prove the righteousness of protestantism. Was he, one may wonder, testing Navarre, or merely attempting to seize an opportunity? Duplessis proceeded to draft a plan for the assembly. He refuted probable objections, recalled the example of Constantine, and referred to the Nicean council. According to his biographer, Duplessis was possessed by the idea of a free and holy council, seeing in this expedient the only way to solve and terminate current divisions; he feared no danger in a sincere confrontation.44 His immutable faith forbade him to doubt that the Truth, once demonstrated, must inevitably prevail. Consequently he spoke and wrote a great deal to enlighten his contemporaries and became internationally celebrated in learned circles. Since Duplessis was so anxious for a council, if necessary in remote Béarn, he presumably believed that, by establishing the Truth, it would liberate Navarre and justify him in his Calvinism. Others, however, must have supposed that it would facilitate his abjuration. Duplessis’ convictions, sincerely held and courageously pursued, raise questions which, in the twentieth century, are unlikely to be answered. Why should a council, in Béarn or anywhere else, achieve what had already eluded the protestant world for over half a century? Who could proclaim, with compelling authority, that the decrees of such a council had established that Truth? Nor could Duplessis have supposed that the whole Catholic Church, that colossal repository of vested interest, would bow down before this fresh dispensation. Furthermore, he need not have studied law to perceive that Navarre’s religion triumphant would still raise awkward juridical problems. The estates of Blois had established that, if nothing else. To what extent, one must also ponder, did Navarre share Duplessis’ convictions, not having shared his personal experience? Did he believe that a council, whose authority would certainly be challenged, could publicly validate Calvinism in some new, constructive way? Did he, perhaps rather vaguely, hope that a council would somehow let 44

Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 54.


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him off the religious hook, whatever its decisions; or did he suppose that he could safely undertake to embrace its decrees because, in view of the apparently insurmountable difficulties, no council would ever take place? It is possible – if rather unlikely – that Navarre may have seen in the call for a council a way of hinting, to those who demanded it, that in the fullness of time he would abjure. Alternatively, he could have seen it as a way of reassuring the Calvinists that they could trust him – or possibly both. The truth, however, may be more prosaic: perhaps Navarre looked to Duplessis for advice in this matter simply because there were times when he was obliged to utter – to say something – without necessarily seeking to peer deeply into a future which might, after all, not exist. Where obstinate problems admit of no solution old, discredited expedients have to be resumed. One thing at least, is reasonably certain: having promulgated this formula that Navarre was not obstinate, but open to instruction, correction, and the findings of a council, he could only adhere to, and reiterate it; and so he did. Considering that Navarre was ultimately obliged to abjure – amidst a raging controversy for and against – it follows that he cannot, at all times, have attached precisely the same significance as Duplessis to this religious formula. Duplessis was a visionary, and it is only on this level that his policy, in respect of religion, is comprehensible. Since Navarre did, repeatedly, advocate a council when harassed on the subject of religion, it is important to understand that this was not a perverse or extravagant notion, plucked from the air. It is therefore worth looking back over the civil war period to see how he had grown up with the idea that a council was the only proper means of resolving religious differences. This view was conventional and traditional. To catholics, the necessary decisions were made by the council of Trent; to Calvinists, they clearly were not. In the sixteenth century the call for a council arose, like protestantism itself, from demands for church reform. In France the proposal was rooted in the conflicts which preceded the civil wars. However, while protestants and some – mostly wavering – catholics wanted a new and free general council, others had desired a resumption of the council of Trent, begun in 1545. That, of course, is what happened and, in the eyes of protestants who were excluded, it had settled nothing. The first sign of armed conflict in France, the conspiracy of Amboise in March 1560, was followed by an outburst of pamphlet warfare. A protestant tract, known as the Remonstrance of Théophile, was presented to the government in May 1560.45 The remonstrance contained a warning, and a condemnation of the harsh regime of persecution conducted by the Guises, who controlled the young king Francis II.46 It also called for a council ‘saint et libre’, general or national, in which everything would be determined by the Word of God. In the meanwhile, the protestants requested freedom of conscience to live according to their confession of faith. That they ought to be suffered to live in peace – namely under an interim – pending a council, continued to be one strand of protestant thought. In 1577 Catherine de Medici still supported this contention. 45 Sutherland, ‘The Cardinal of Lorraine and the colloque of Poissy, 1561: a Reassessment’, in Princes, Politics and Religion, 119-20. 46 In 1558 Francis II married Mary queen of Scots, niece of François duc de Guise.

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An assembly of notables was called to Fontainebleau in August 1560 to consider the emergency arising from the conspiracy of Amboise. The assembly decided to recommend an estates-general, and also, in 1561, an assembly of the clergy to prepare the way for a council.47 The latter decision was supported by two leading prelates, Jean de Monluc, bishop of Valence, who was sympathetic to the new opinions, and Charles de Marillac, archbishop of Vienne. While they would have preferred a general council, they were prepared to settle, if necessary, for a national one; and their purpose was to reform the Church. The same theme was sustained in the electoral assemblies for the estatesgeneral of Orléans, 1560-61, and by the chancellor, Michel de l’Hôpital in his opening speech to the estates. Catherine de Medici, the queen mother, briefly regent for Charles IX, was forced by the strength of the protestants at that time to promise them a council.48 Charles, cardinal de Lorraine, Papal legate and inquisitor, planned to hold an exploratory assembly in France, prior to a new, general council, which the protestants were also to attend. But the pope refused a new council and, instead, reconvened that of Trent. The angry protestants were currently powerful enough to insist upon being heard by the clerical assembly of Fontainebleau. The effects of this ‘colloquy of Poissy’ were unfortunate, mainly serving to sharpen conflict by clarifying insoluble differences. In the face of doctrinal disputes, whether in 1560 or at any later date, there were only four possible alternative courses: to accept religious diversity, which was long held to be disastrous; compromise, which in matters of faith appeared unprincipled; reunion, or war. Diversity was indeed dangerous because, from the beginning, religious conflicts in Germany, where the Reformation began, had been used by France as exploitable elements in the Franco-Habsburg struggle. That was a disservice which Spain was delighted to repay in the same coin. As similar religious conflicts developed in France, they became catastrophically entangled in the rivalries of the nobility, and extended into the foreign sphere. A Gallican compromise, comparable to the emerging Anglican settlement, was attempted by the moderates at Poissy. Several commodious and subtle formulae were devised, which could have been acceptable to those content to eschew definitions. But most participants were not so content, each wishing to oblige the others to recognise their own conclusions. In other words, the preferred solution was reunion, but that equalled deadlock when neither could convert the other. Reunion, in any case, was not a straightforward option since neither side was homogeneous; besides, extraneous interests intruded. Agreement at Poissy would, at best, have been academic. Unlike England, France had no recognised legislature to pass indispensable acts of ‘supremacy’ and ‘uniformity’, and the problems of enforcement would have been insuperable; so, in fact, was the catholic opposition. The pope, Pius IV, was determined to destroy this threatening national council. His cardinal legate, François de Tournon, arrived on 24 October 1560, with offers of military help against the protestants, and the Papacy never departed from 47

Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 116-18. This rather complex promise is discussed in full in Sutherland, ‘The Cardinal of Lorraine and the colloque of Poissy’, in Princes, Politics and Religion, 113-37. 48


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that destructive attitude. Tournon was followed by the cardinal legate of Ferrara and Diego Lainez, general of the Jesuits.49 At Trent, shortly afterwards, the Papacy decisively rejected any chance of reconciliation with the protestant world. It is therefore not surprising that catholic leagues, when they arose, should have looked to the Papacy for support. The failure at Poissy was capped by the decrees of Trent, and the belligerently anti-protestant attitude of successive popes only exacerbated religious controversy. Despite the impossibility of finding a solution to the religious troubles, the idea of a council was never discarded. The deadlock situation was recognised in the preamble to the edict of Saint-Germain, 1561. In an enlightened attempt to secure law and order, the protestants won a grudging recognition by the edict of 17 January 1562 – before the civil wars began. The edict of Amboise, 19 March 1563 which ended the first civil war, expressed the hope that a good, holy and free, general or national council – together with time and the majority of the king, Charles IX – might bring religious peace.50 By the end of the third civil war it was obvious, if not always admitted, that the huguenots could neither be defeated nor destroyed; consequently they won acceptable terms in the seminal edict of Saint-Germain, 8 August 1570. It was in the chaos which followed the massacre of St. Bartholomew and the siege of La Rochelle that the demand for a council recurred. In his declaration of 13 November 1574, Damville-Montmorency called, among other things, for a general church council to resolve religious differences. This was perhaps because the events of the last two years, and the restricted peace of La Rochelle, 2 July 1574, had plunged the protestants back into a juridical limbo.51 In order to win protestant support, Alençon included their demand for a council in his declaration of 17 September 1575.52 Consequently, this item was resumed in article four of the peace of Monsieur, 6 May 1576. It clearly stated the king’s intention that his subjects should be reunited in one faith, religion and belief by the decisions of a free, holy and general council.53 Seeking to avert the renewal of war, Catherine de Medici argued – on 9 February 1577 – the need for some measure of toleration, pending a council. Navarre, as we have seen in his reply to the deputies of the estates, declared that only a council, and no other body, could act in matters of faith.54 But as the country was, nevertheless, dissolving into war, and as the Guises had packed the estates, no one can truly have believed that it was feasible to hold a council. Nevertheless, pronouncements on the subject were not mere rhetoric. If nothing more, Catherine 49

Baum and Cunitz, Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 553-4. On Poissy see also Nugent, The Colloquy of Poissy and Willis-Watkins, ‘The Second Commandment and Church Reform, The Colloquy of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 1562’, Studies in Reformed Theology and History, ii (1994); Wanegffelen, Ni Rome ni Genève, part ii, chap. iv. To Wanegffelen, the cardinal de Lorraine remains profoundly misunderstood by contemporaries and posterity alike. 50 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 352-7; Fontanon, Les Édits et ordonnances, iv, 267-9, text of the edict of Saint-Germain, 17 January 1562, pp. 272-4, text of the edict of Amboise, 19 March 1563. 51 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 47; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 360-1. 52 B.N., Mss. fr., 3342, ff. 4-5, Alençon’s declaration; Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 52-4; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 226. 53 Stegman, Édits des guerres de religion, 95-120. 54 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 265.

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evidently saw in the concept a way of playing for time – ‘faire couler le temps doucement’, as she was apt to say. When Alençon escaped from court, in September 1575, both he and the king had appealed to Rome. Henry III requested the despatch of a special nuncio, Fabio Mirto Frangipani, to intercede with his brother.55 The surprising choice of this Neapolitan tends to suggest Guise influence, for Frangipani was already their friend. But his mission achieved nothing. Upon his return to Bologna, of which he was governor, Frangipani sent his nephew to Rome to report on his embassy. He said that Catherine had defended the peace of Monsieur on the grounds of necessity.56 The persistence of politico-religious strife showed how right she had been in the first place. For a long time before the final session of the council of Trent, which opened on 18 January 1562, Catherine had striven to procure a new and free council which, with protestant participation, might restore religious unity and hence the tranquillity of the kingdom. But for Pius IV the reunion of dissidents was not the purpose of the council; so the co-operation of the Papacy was eternally unobtainable.57 Now, however, Catherine informed Frangipani of the king’s regrets that the pope had not called a council in France, in order to establish one good law, and clear form [of religion] to be inviolably observed and preserved, permitting everyone to be certain of the truth and free from deception.58 Catherine even sought to persuade the nuncio of the constructive results to be expected (‘il bon frutto’), not only in France but also in England, Flanders and Germany. To perpetuate the conception of reunion, it was Catherine who had inserted article four, the council clause, into the peace of Monsieur. So long as this traditional recourse had not been tried, the idea must persist; politicians, after all, may not admit inescapable problems to be insoluble. Frangipani, however, was predictably unimpressed. He rudely dismissed the plea as ‘feminine nonsense’; Catherine did not know what she was talking about (‘voi parlate di cosa che non è vostro mestiere’). Whoever had put her up to this had meant to deceive her, and to make her appear not only obtuse (‘di poco valore’) but also unscrupulous. There followed a crude and verbose tirade – suggestive of anxiety – about not calling into question and dispute things which were clear, certain, demonstrated, and confirmed in numerous ways – ultimately by the decrees of Trent. Such matters should not be 55

Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 42-3, instructions, 28 November 1575. Frangipani arrived in Paris on 31 December 1575 and departed in July 1576. He had already been in France from June to November 1574, when he bullied the king into promising never to make peace with the huguenots. In 1575 cardinal d’Este, French protector in Rome, tried to dissuade the pope from sending Frangipani, a client of cardinal Farnese, who was himself a client of the Spanish agents in Rome. Ibid., 27, 39-41. 56 Naples was, of course, a Spanish kingdom at this time. Martin believes that Frangipani co-operated with the Guises in the formation of the first catholic league of 1576. Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 26, 40, 45; Ibid., 44, 7 May 1576, Frangipani to Como, 279, 7 July 1576, Como to Frangipani, referring to negotiations with the Guises, 279-83, 14 July 1576, Frangipani to Como. 57 Victor Martin, Le Gallicanisme et la réforme catholique, chap. i. 58 ‘...una vera legga et certa forma da servarsi et custodirsi inviolabilmente, accio ogniuno fusse certo della verità et libero di inganno’, Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 279-83, 14 July 1576, Frangipani to Como.


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disinterred upon the demands of wicked persons. Frangipani insolently reminded Catherine of the colloquy of Poissy – about which she herself knew more than anyone alive – and how little credit that episode had reflected upon those who permitted the truth to be debated; he meant, of course, herself. Finally, he congratulated himself upon having abused the queen mother for entertaining proposals to which the pope would never listen, reminding her and the king of their duty to publish the decrees of Trent, and to ignore the wishes of wicked and licentious persons (‘et non ascoltarli nelle licenze et libertà della gola et del ventre et de l’altre lor dishoneste et sporche voglie!’).59 It would appear that Frangipani feared the schism that Poissy had seemed to threaten – the only effective restraint upon the Papacy. He was satisfied that he had left the queen in no doubt as to her error. If he did not have instructions to bully and humiliate the queen would he, one wonders, have dared to report his audience in such astonishingly unbecoming language? He rejoiced at least that he expected the estates to destroy the peace of Monsieur, and ventured to surmise that the huguenots could not survive for long. It is clear from Frangipani’s mission to France in 1576 that Henry III was already on poor terms with the Papacy, which had done nothing to help him to restrain Anjou. Thus despite the implacable opposition of Rome, the idea of appealing to a council – long supported by Duplessis-Mornay and Navarre – was arguably a matter of unfinished business; certainly it could not be dismissed as merely eccentric. The conception embraced the important principle of a religious interim, and tended to impede acceptance of the dreaded decrees of Trent. Furthermore, Navarre may possibly have hoped thereby to gain the invaluable support of Catherine de Medici.

VII: The Estates-General France, therefore, was in a state of grave political and religious turmoil when the estatesgeneral opened in December 1576. It was already clear that unless the king were to summon uncommon strength, authority and wisdom, another major and complicated struggle must ensue. By August 1576, the Guises were inciting opposition to the edict of Beaulieu in Picardy, Normandy, Champagne and Burgundy. Soon after the convocation of the estates on 6 August, they withdrew to Joinville to raise forces. The estates-general did not, as Duplessis had proposed in his remonstrance of December 1576, unite in demanding peace. Instead, they perversely demanded one religion only, while steadily refusing to finance a war. Great confusion arose as to how to proceed, revealing the extent to which the parties involved were at cross purposes. When the estates demanded war, Henry made the first of many efforts to detach Navarre from his party. A number of important factors and principles emerged from the negotiations which followed, all of which appeared to derive from the subversive proposals of the David memoir. Henry sent first Biron, and then the Bourbon duc de Montpensier, to threaten Navarre.60 Their 59

Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 279-83, 14 July 1576, Frangipani to Como. 60 Armand de Gontaut, baron de Biron, c. 1524-92, chevalier des Ordres du Roi, lieutenant-general in Guyenne, marshal 1577. Louis de Bourbon, prince de la Roche-sur-Yon, dauphin d’Auvergne, duc de

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instructions reveal the already hopeless position of the king. Montpensier advanced the argument that the king was bound by his coronation oath to impose one religion only – despite the fact that he had consented to the peace of Monsieur. In inviting Navarre to join the catholic association which he commanded – thereby implying Navarre’s conversion – Henry appears to hint that if he failed to satisfy the catholics (namely the Guises), he would risk deposition. The king also required the estates to send their own deputies to the princes, doubtless hoping to transfer to the assembly responsibility for whatever might ensue. The Guises, as well as the king, sought to shelter behind the authority of the estates. So the deputies’ instructions, over which there were sharp differences of opinion, were no less extreme.61 Their message to the princes is highly significant because of the issues which it raised. The estates opposed Navarre on grounds of religion, placing the royal succession in question. They had the audacity to threaten the princes with deprivation of their rights to the succession, unless they agreed to surrender everything they had gained by the peace in return for mere freedom of conscience for the huguenots. To broach the succession in this naked way was an outrage, especially in view of the youthfulness of the king – recently married on 15 February 1575 – and the fact Anjou might also marry. This move by the estates is also significant because the French succession, central to the Guise projects, was already under discussion in Rome. Cardinal Como, the Papal secretary of state, had considered sending a legate to the estates-general to declare the cardinal de Bourbon in line for the succession. This would have been to ignore the existence of Anjou, the hereditary nature of the French crown, and the independence of France in temporal matters.62 The deputies of the estates invited the princes to join the king in ordaining only one religion. Should Navarre object that the king was committed to the peace of Monsieur, they were to reply that Henry could make no pledge contrary to the interests of the state; nor could he contravene the fundamental laws, of which the catholicity of France was one. Thus they linked the succession to the catholicity of the crown. This was certainly a novel maxim, whatever they maintained, since the issue had never previously arisen. This, in one breath, was to assert the superiority of the estatesgeneral over the king, the right of the estates to determine the succession, and to declare and alter fundamental law. These revolutionary assertions, which no king or prince of the blood could willingly accept, were subsequently resumed by the Guises, in 1585, 1588 and 1593. Having thus threatened Navarre, the deputies invited him to place his head in the noose by attending the estates. Navarre’s reply was ‘serious, responsible and sad’, a desperate, reiterated plea for greater realism.63 Protestantism, he pointed out, was now established and could not be Montpensier, 1513-82, ‘gouverneur’ of Anjou, Maine, Touraine 1561. CSPF., 1575-7, p. 483, 6 January 1577, instructions for Biron; B.N., Mss. fr. 15534, ff. 302v-11, undated, instructions for Montpensier. 61 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 445-52, 4 January 1577, instructions for the deputies of the estates; Mayer, Des États généraux, xiii, 284. 62 Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 283-4, 3 October 1576, Frangipani to Como, from Bologna. 63 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 265.


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eradicated; a demand for one religion could only lead directly to worse trouble. Doubtless prompted by Duplessis-Mornay, Henry denounced the preposterous claims of the estates, in particular that they had any competence in spiritual matters; only a council could alter religion. If Navarre was in error, this should be demonstrated; and if his opponents convinced him that some other way was right, he would adopt it. This carefully ambiguous statement was erased by protestant ministers, but reinstated by Navarre. It represents the position Navarre adopted and maintained until his conversion in 1593. Condé, for his part, returned a violently worded protestation, denouncing the wicked counsellors of the king, destroyers of the crown, pensioners of Spain [which probably was not yet true] and authors of massacres.64 In these circumstances, the renewal of war was inevitable. Anjou now served the king against his recent allies, a switch of allegiance which was evidently due to duress. The subsequent peace of Bergerac and edict of Poitiers, 17 September 1577, spoke volumes for the moderation and common sense of Navarre. Deriving from the edict of Beaulieu, that of Poitiers represented a liberal compromise, thereafter regarded as a norm.65 For the first and only time, Henry III partially outwitted the Guises by himself assuming the leadership of the league, and by casting the onus of decision upon the assembly. What Henry wanted most in France was peace. But to obtain peace, he would have to subdue one or other faction. Thus peace could only be secured at the cost of vastly greater effort and resolve than he was either prepared to undertake or able to sustain. Wiser men than Henry III might well have failed in this predicament. Even his temporary advantage was more apparent than real, and it was already manifest that only the protestant Navarre could deliver the king from his catholic allies. Henry had promised peace – in two successive edicts. Now his authority was so gravely challenged that he could not enforce any treaty which the catholics resisted. If the king had already – as he seemed to believe – been threatened with deposition, the princes had also been threatened with deprivation, while the estates had advanced inordinate claims. All these explosive issues had been postulated some seven years before the death of the duc d’Anjou rendered Navarre heir presumptive to the throne. Had he not died, Anjou was scheduled for elimination.

VIII: The Netherlands Entanglement After the peace of Bergerac and edict of Poitiers, in July 1577, by which all leagues and associations were dissolved, the Guises experienced a temporary setback. The following years, however, began to offer new opportunities. The key to these developments, crucial for France and for Navarre, lay in the Netherlands. In revolt against Spain, the Netherlands became the focus of the European power struggle and, on account of the ambitions and exploits of the duc d’Anjou, France again became entangled in the 64

CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 488-9, 23 January 1577, ‘protestation’ of the prince de Condé. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 362-3, analysis of the edict; Haag, La France protestante, x, 142-56, text of the edict of Poitiers.

65

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conflict.66 But Anjou’s death, in June 1584, proved to be even more dangerous than his exploits. By his demise, Navarre was raised to the status of heir presumptive, and at a time of crisis in the Netherlands. This crisis arose from the alarming successes of the prince of Parma in reconquering the southern provinces.67 Fear was increasing that Spain would suppress the revolt and re-establish her authority throughout that strategic area. Then she could more easily have threatened France, England and Scandinavia, as well as increasing her influence in the Empire. In pursuit of his ambitions, as well as revenge for French interference in the Netherlands, it became advantageous for Philip II to support the Guise catholic faction. This co-operation enabled them both – at least initially – to pursue their interests in tandem by unleashing revolution in France and paralysing the monarchy. It was to be this intervention of Spain, simultaneously exercised in France and in Rome, which enabled the Guises to sustain their challenge to Navarre’s legitimate inheritance. It is therefore necessary to understand how this process developed. Following the edict of Poitiers, in July 1577, Anjou and Guise pursued their mutual enmity – as well as other interests – by entering the conflicts in the Netherlands. Guise had clearly emerged as the French catholic leader; foreign powers became aware of him, and alert to what he might do. Guise recruited forces released by the peace in France, and turned his attention to don John of Austria in the Netherlands.68 He supported don John’s fantastical scheme to conquer England and marry Mary queen of Scots – cousin of the duc de Guise – in which the Papacy was also involved.69 When the Spanish ambassador, Juan de Vargas Mexia arrived in Paris on 10 December 1577, he found the seigneur de Vaulx, an agent of don John, engaged in negotiations with the Guises. Vargas was among those who believed that the only way to save the Netherlands was to conquer England; and that is what – for his own reasons – Guise had in mind. Each, therefore, began to think that the other might be useful. Vargas shortly informed Philip II that he meant to approach the Guises; they had exhibited some desire for Spanish protection ‘puis qu’ils rêvent de se créer quelque part un royaume’. Philip II noted his approval: it would be most appropriate to work with the Guises.70 Vargas reported eagerly upon the state of France and proposed to exploit the bad relations between the Guises and the king; Henry III disliked them as ‘gente de pensamientos altos’, who cherished a grand perspective for the future. In other words, Vargas perceived that the discontent and roving ambition of the Guises might be harnessed to the interests of Spain. A meeting was arranged – albeit not until 13 April 1578 – by the Scottish ambassador, James Beaton, archbishop of Glasgow, to discuss 66

Sutherland, ‘The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of European Politics’, The English Historical Review, cvii (1992), 587-625, contains an analysis of the power struggle. 67 Alessandro (better known as Alexander) Farnese, prince of Parma, duke 1586. 68 Don John of Austria was the illegitimate half-brother of Philip II of Spain, governor-general of the Netherlands 1576-8. He served as the Papal commander at the battle of Lepanto, 7 October 1571, and died of plague on 1 October 1578; he was succeeded by the prince of Parma. 69 Sutherland, ‘William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands: A Missing Dimension’, in Princes, Politics and Religion, 224-36; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 235-7; Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 93. 70 Törne, Don Juan d’Autriche, 188, 27 December 1577, Vargas to Philip II, 188-9, 31 December 1577, Vargas to Philip II, ‘cierto si se pudiese tratar con ellos seria muy a proposito para todo’.


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‘affairs’, meaning an enterprise against England. While it was not at all in this respect that the Guises would be useful to Spain, Vargas felt, with some prescience, that they should, nevertheless, be kept on hold. Even before that meeting, he proposed that they should be subsidised, in order to sustain their status in France. Indeed, Spain should secretly seek to consolidate and increase their power, while leaving them free to pursue the chosen path on which they had already embarked.71 There is, therefore, a sense in which Vargas may be seen as the father of the future Catholic League, and his correspondence reveals the dual nature of the League’s origins. On the one hand, it was fomented by Spain for her own purposes; on the other hand, both the Guise faction and a potential catholic association already existed in France and should be encouraged to develop independently – as it did. Spain could then call upon, and exploit, a powerful faction if and when it became necessary. The English invasion plans of 1578 lapsed in October with the death of don John, but Guise soon came into contact with Bernadino de Mendoza. He had gone to England as Spanish ambassador in March 1578 and no Spaniard was more determined than he to overthrow queen Elizabeth.72 Further invasion plans were devised, which accelerated in 1582. Guise and Mendoza were both involved in the Throckmorton plot in 1583 which notoriously led to Mendoza’s expulsion from England in January 1584. This drastic measure severed English diplomatic relations with Spain and ensured Mendoza’s implacable hostility to England.73 It was possibly as an enemy of Anjou – who had first entered the Netherlands in July 1578 – that Guise is thought to have received Spanish money. By 1582 Anjou was receiving English help in respect of the Netherlands, and Guise had become a Spanish pensioner.74 Anjou blocked the path to Guise advancement; his ambitions in the Netherlands and England frustrated them, and their projects only began to prosper after his death in 1584. As early as the autumn of 1573, there had been rumours of an alliance between Alençon (as he then was) and William of Orange. Disappointed in his desire for the office of lieutenant-general, promised him in January 1574, Alençon had turned against the Guises.75 In May 1576 (at the time of the peace of Monsieur), Anjou was offered the sovereignty of the Netherlands in return for bringing military help – probably on account of his impressive coalition and alliance with the huguenots. He remained in touch with the Dutch rebels during the period of the estates of Blois. Before the end of the 71

Törne, ‘Philippe II et Henri de Guise’, Revue historique, clxvii (1931), 326-7, 27 March 1578, Vargas to Philip II. 72 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 438, claims that Guise made a secret treaty with Spain after the death of don John. 73 Martin, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians, 71-4. After the Throckmorton plot, queen Elizabeth sent William Waad, clerk of the council, to Spain but he was not received. CSPF., 1583-4, p. 391, 11/21 March 1584, Waad to Burghley, 391-9, statement by Waad of his negotiations; CSPVen., 1581-91, p. 83, 1 March 1584, Vincenzo Gradenigo to the doge and senate, from Madrid. 74 The first known order of Philip II to pay money to Guise is dated 24 September 1582. Törne, ‘Philippe II et Henri de Guise’, Revue historique, clxvii (1931), 333-4; Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 101. 75 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 35 and n.89, n.92. Anjou was promised the office of lieutenant-general on 25 January 1574.

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subsequent war, in which he opposed the huguenots, Anjou touted his services to the King of Spain; but Philip II did not require them.76 So the discontented prince decided, after all, to fish in the troubled waters of the Netherlands. After another theatrical exit from court, Anjou entered the Netherlands in February 1578.77 There, as in France, he was dangerous. William of Orange therefore thought it safer to draw him into an agreement with the States General. The consequent treaty of 13 August 1578 between Anjou and the States was vague. It was directed against Spain, and its purpose was to use Anjou in obtaining for the rebels the support of both England and France.78 While Anjou’s enterprise was pleasing to neither country, each was concerned and alerted. Queen Elizabeth had already tried to frustrate the agreement between Anjou and the rebels and, in the summer of 1578, Catherine de Medici resumed the marriage negotiations – suspended since 1573 – between Elizabeth and Anjou. Her immediate purpose was to remove her wayward son from the Netherlands.79 By January 1579 Anjou was back in France, his first escapade at an end. But the affairs of the Netherlands became more critical for both England and France following the death of don John in October 1578. His successor, the prince of Parma, was a soldier of distinction who later became a formidable opponent to Navarre. The advent of Parma caused Anjou and Elizabeth to look to each other for succour, while William of Orange became convinced that Anjou’s help must be secured. The discussions, however, were interminable. Thus, during the spring and summer of 1580 Anjou was in France, seeking to merit the status of lieutenant-general by helping to settle the conflicts arising from the edicts of pacification.80 The tenacious purpose of the Dutch was to trap both England and France into open war against Spain. This was not easily achieved; nevertheless, if Anjou could only be secured, neither queen Elizabeth nor Henry III could afford to remain entirely aloof. On 24 June 1580, the Dutch reached agreement upon a set of twenty-seven draft articles. In July queen Elizabeth sent over sir Edward Stafford, before the articles were put to the French, between 12-17 September. Stafford was to obtain information and to pursue the marriage negotiations. Of the Dutch articles, numbers fifteen and sixteen required the French king both to provide Anjou with open support, and to declare war upon Spain. While the actual agreement was not concluded in such dangerously precise terms Anjou was, nevertheless, thereby committed to obtaining his brother’s support. Consequently the Dutch lingered on in France in the expectation of some appropriate declaration.81 Henry III was now trapped in a perilous position in which he squirmed irresolutely for four and 76

This, in fact, was the second time that Anjou had offered his services to Philip II. He sent Claude du Bourg to Spain in April, and again in August 1576. Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 76-87. 77 Anjou’s exploits have been covered in detail by Holt, The Duke of Anjou. 78 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 96-104. 79 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 105-10; Jean de Simier went to England on 12 December 1578. 80 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 114, 126-30. The peace of Fleix was concluded on 26 November 1580. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 363-4, 26 November 1580, the treaty of Fleix. 81 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 128-40, with references to the texts of the documents; alliance 19 September 1580; Anjou’s acceptance 25 September 1580.


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a half years. Obliged to respond in some sort, on 26 December 1580 he made an ambiguous promise of assistance, only to take effect after Anjou had received the lordship of the provinces. Henry hoped that by then France would be restored to peace.82 If the Dutch were not more than half satisfied, the king was more than half committed. This dangerous situation necessarily affected French relations with England. Catherine de Medici was afraid, as she had been in 1572, of becoming involved in a war with Spain without having first secured an effective alliance with England.83 But, whereas Elizabeth sought only a closer offensive/defensive undertaking, France desired the marriage alliance. In this way she would be rid of Anjou by assuaging his ambitions. Until this matter was settled, Henry would make no plainer commitment to support his brother.84 England and France were really at cross purposes, each wanting the other to shoulder the inescapable burden of defending the Netherlands. France sent over a vast and imposing embassy in April 1581 in pursuit of the English marriage. The deadlock was partially dissembled by a completely vague marriage contract, ‘a somewhat farcical agreement’, on 11 June 1581. Anjou’s status was notably exalted when, on 26 July, the ‘States General of the United Netherlands’ repudiated the sovereignty of Philip II and required Anjou to return and replace him.85 By mid-August 1581, Anjou was therefore back in the Netherlands; but he was destitute and, without money, he could not proceed. So, in October, he went to England and presumably colluded with queen Elizabeth in trying to involve France. Henry III did, at least, vouchsafe some money, and Elizabeth was obliged to do the same. Thus furnished, Anjou returned to the Netherlands on 1 February 1582. Prominently flanked by the queen’s favourite, the earl of Leicester, the prince dauphin d’Auvergne, and other noblemen from both countries, Anjou took the oath at Antwerp on 19 February 1582 and received Philip II’s title, duke of Brabant. By this ceremony, Anjou recognised the deposition of Philip II; he also publicly committed both France and England to the defence of the Netherlands, despite the extreme reluctance of both monarchs.86 The further story of Anjou’s inevitable failure in the Netherlands is not relevant here. Effectively, his career was over by 17 January 1583 when his forces entered Antwerp and sacked the city. Thereafter, he was largely incapacitated by failing health. The Antwerp affair did not, however, mark the end of Dutch efforts to obtain a firm commitment from Henry III. This was what they had always sought, neighbouring France being their principal hope of arresting Parma’s conquests. Nor did Anjou abandon his efforts to involve the king: he declared the Netherlands enterprise to be the last alternative to civil war in France. This was because, if Philip II were not defeated in the Netherlands, 82

Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 141 and n.119. Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, chap. xv, ‘The Netherlands and the English Alliance’. 84 England and France were already allied by the treaty of Blois, 19 April 1572. Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 204 seq.; Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 147, 153-4. 85 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 158-60; Doran, Monarchy and Matrimony, 181-3; Kossmann and Mellink, Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands, 216-28, 26 July 1581, edict of the States General. 86 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 160-7; ibid., 196 sets out the total amount of money received by Anjou from England, France, the Dutch, and other sources from May 1581 to October 1583. 83

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he would sustain the tumult in France as a defensive measure. In this respect, Anjou was wholly correct; and therein lay Henry III’s predicament: he must either go to war in the Netherlands, or else endure civil war in France. Before his murder in July 1584, William of Orange offered Henry III Anjou’s title, duke of Brabant, acceptance of which must entail war with Spain. If Anjou was not the King of France, he was French, and Spain had been grossly offended by his audacity. Henceforth, not only must the Netherlands revolt be crushed, but France and England could also expect to experience the effects of Philip’s wrath.

IX: Navarre, Spain and the Papacy While the Netherlands saga unfolded in the north, Navarre struggled unsuccessfully, and for several years, to enforce the terms of the edict of Poitiers. The king, for his part, began to turn his back on public life, frequently withdrawing for long periods, to the extreme detriment of his affairs. In his absence, Catherine de Medici mostly strove to keep the peace, at home and abroad.87 She travelled extensively through the south of France from August 1578 to November 1579 and concluded the peace of Nérac, 28 February 1579. But she failed to avert renewed hostilities in 1580. When, before his second departure for the Netherlands, Anjou had sought to win approval and support by assisting with the treaty of Fleix, 26 November 1580, the idea was mooted that Navarre should also take part in the Netherlands enterprise.88 It was, however, held to be axiomatic that peace in France was essential before war in the Netherlands could be contemplated. So it was agreed that Navarre should first ensure the establishment of the treaty of Fleix – but that proved to be difficult.89 By the summer of 1582 Navarre claimed to have done everything possible to enforce the peace in France, and Anjou had been received in the Netherlands; that fulfilled the king’s pre-condition for helping him. Navarre therefore felt that the time for action had arrived. He sent his servant Ségur to court with bold proposals for making war on Spain, and others for raising the money. He offered his person, an army, and 500,000

87

In his book, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians, A. Lynn Martin says that the Jesuit, Edmond Auger, exercised a nefarious influence over the impressionable king. The provincial of Aquitaine in 1565, he went to court in 1568 at the bidding of the cardinal de Lorraine, and consistently supported the interests of the Guises. Henry III summoned him in 1583 to assist in the establishment of his congregation of penitents and, according to Martin, it was he who encouraged the king in his excessive, histrionic devotions, which exasperated even the Papacy. These activities ceased when Auger left in the summer of 1587, by which time it was already too late for Henry to govern effectively. It was, of course, in the Guise interest that the king should neglect affairs of state, appear ridiculous and become despised. See, especially, ibid., 30, 43, 59, 85, 91-3, 148, 206. It was not licit for Jesuits to engage in politics, but some did. 88 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 274-7, 363-4; Haag, La France protestante, x, 159-67, 171-8, texts of the treaties; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. x, 3-52, ‘déclaration et protestation du roi de Navarre, 1580’. 89 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 344-58 and Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 539-45, 6 July 1583, ‘Justification des actions de Navarre’. The document refers first to what happened in 1582.


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‘écus’ plus security to obviate any suspicions.90 The king refused Navarre permission to make war on Spain but expressed a wish to meet him. Sir Henry Cobham, the English ambassador, heard that a meeting might take place at Champigny, in Montpensier’s house. Ségur’s proposals were sufficiently well received for Clervant to follow him to court in support of his mission.91 Clervant explained that Navarre had various reasons for proposing war on Spain. One of these was the prevalence of turbulent elements right across the south of France, in Dauphiné, Languedoc and Guyenne, which it was desirable to employ elsewhere. Such men would not follow Anjou, far away in the Netherlands, but they would serve Navarre in the south. He also wished to recover his own lost kingdom of Navarre and believed that, in the attempt, he could divert Spanish forces away from other theatres of war. Furthermore, the campaign would furnish a just cause for being in arms, and that would discourage the catholics in France from attacking the huguenots.92 According to Cobham, Navarre was now under pressure to return to court or, at the least, to meet the king. This again raised the question of Navarre’s role in time of domestic peace which, in turn, led directly to the problem of his religion. Catherine de Medici had wished him to return to court at the end of 1580, after the treaty of Fleix. She asked him again in the spring of 1582 – both of which were critical moments in Anjou’s career. Then, on 23 November 1582, the king himself wrote to Navarre requesting his return.93 It appears to have been these weighty matters which prompted Navarre to send for Duplessis who had been living in the Netherlands.94 When Duplessis returned to Nérac, in December 1582, he became Navarre’s principal secretary, and left him no more.95 Navarre can have wasted little time in requesting Duplessis to draft a memoir on the burning issue: should he, or should he not, return to court? This subject is somewhat obscure since it is unclear what Henry III had in mind; was Navarre to visit the court, or to reside there, and what position would he occupy? 90 Jacques Ségur de Pardaillan. CSPF., 1582, pp. 178-9, 22 July 1582, Cobham, the English ambassador, [to Walsingham]; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 344-8, ‘Justification’. 91 Claude-Antoine de Vienne, seigneur de Clervant, councillor of state to Navarre. 92 The southern part of Navarre had been seized by Ferdinand of Aragon in 1515. CSPF., 1582, pp. 370-1, 4 October 1582, Clervant to Walsingham. Clervant said that the king was sending Sénégas to seek English help in the enterprise. This may have been because the Anjou marriage negotiations were over. It seems that Clervant was to go on to Germany, Switzerland and Savoy, to raise support. Ibid., 416-18, 27 October/6 November 1582, Cobham to Walsingham. 93 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 163-9, 21 December 1582, Navarre to the king. Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 64, says that this letter is wrongly dated; that, however, is questionable. 94 Duplessis’ movements are confusing. He appears to have been living in either Ghent or Bruges when, in April 1580 upon the outbreak of civil war, Navarre sent him to England to seek help and support. Elizabeth was not helpful, and Duplessis himself believed that war to be unjust and unnecessary. He appears to have returned to Béarn sometime in 158l, and then to have gone back again to the Netherlands to clear up his affairs. He was evidently detained by William of Orange, who wanted him to be there when Anjou arrived. He seems to have lived in Antwerp, studying and writing. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, i, Madame Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, 128; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 57-9. 95 According to Patry, Duplessis rejoined Navarre in the summer of 1582. Duplessis himself indicated that he arrived at Nérac in the first week of December, and letters of the next few weeks testify to his recent contact with friends in the Netherlands. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 157-60, 7 December 1582, Duplessis to Taffin; 162-3, 23 December 1582, Duplessis to Pibrac.

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Duplessis’ rather incoherent memoir was probably rushed; but its short answer was no: Navarre should not return to court.96 But if he were to go, a principal reason would be to seek the king’s assistance in the recovery of upper Navarre. If the king had, at first, been tempted by such a diversion, by December 1582 he was opposed to engaging France in that open war with Spain desired by the Netherlands and the huguenots alike. So far his assistance to Anjou had only been grudging and furtive. Duplessis did not mention religion but feared that, once at court, Navarre might be pressed to surrender his ‘gouvernement’ of Guyenne in favour of the king’s favourite, Épernon, together with the hand of his sister Catherine de Bourbon – unthinkable propositions which were best avoided.97 Furthermore, it was perfectly true, as Duplessis argued by way of apology, that by far the greatest service Navarre could render the king was that of keeping peace and order in the south.98 This task was becoming increasingly difficult as the catholics – who opposed each successive edict of peace – were beginning to reorganise their leagues. Besides, Duplessis was basically suspicious: he did not believe that the motive for recalling Navarre was only reconciliation. He was seared and haunted by the massacre of 1572, a frightful occurrence which – it should be remembered – had effectively excluded Coligny from the Netherlands; the analogy was too close for comfort. Duplessis went on to recall the treatment of Anjou after the peace of Monsieur, when he had been obliged to abandon his huguenot allies.99 So the pretext – which was true enough – for advising Navarre to remain in the south was that his services were needed there. But the underlying reason was the growing authority of the Guises in France and the danger Navarre would incur by returning to court. The Tuscan ambassador, Cavriana, had recently noted the magnitude of Guise discontent on account of the aggrandisement of the king’s new favourites, Joyeuse and Épernon. He also reported that, in mid-November 1582, Navarre had secretly sent three ministers to warn the king of the treachery of the Guises (per scoprire al Re il tradimento di questi Guisi).100 Deliberately to go to court in circumstances unpleasantly reminiscent of the past, would clearly be dangerous and ill-advised. Duplessis frankly feared that the 96

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 170-82, 26 December 1582, ‘discours si le roi de Navarre doit aller en cour’. 97 Jean-Louis de Nogaret, duc d’Épernon. Duplessis, about this time, had an idea that a marriage between Navarre’s sister, Catherine de Bourbon, and James VI of Scotland, could bring an advantageous alliance. This was an anti-Guise project, since they intrigued in favour of Mary queen of Scots and entertained hopes that James might be induced to convert to catholicism. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 21718, 31 January 1583, Duplessis to d’Angrogne. 98 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 163-9, 21 December 1582, Navarre to Henry III. 99 This may be why Anjou touted his services to Philip II. Anjou is not usually given credit for having been coerced at this time, but is rather blamed for his perfidy in supporting the king against the huguenots in 1577. It is interesting to note that, at the end of 1576, Anjou complained to the king of an attempt to murder him by the poisoning of his wine. He was desperately ill, but survived. CSPF., 1575-7, p. 453, 24 December 1576, Anjou to Henry III. 100 Anne d’Arques, duc de Joyeuse, admiral of France, ‘gouverneur’ of Normandy, died at the battle of Coutras in October 1587. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 443, Andrea Albertani to the grand duke of Tuscany, 15 July 1582, 449, 16 November 1582, Albertani to the grand duke of Tuscany. This was the first of several similar warnings.


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Guises might organise things as they wished them to be: he meant the removal of Navarre from their path, either ‘soubs ombre d’une sedition populaire’, or through the services of the assassins they retained (‘tel qu’ils en ont’). Navarre therefore excused himself and did not go to court, although the question of a meeting with the king remained open.101 When, in December 1582, Duplessis rejoined Navarre at Nérac, he perceived that a mighty storm was gathering in western Europe. He believed that France, like the Netherlands, was destined to be a major theatre of conflict. The Netherlands imbroglio had begun to attract that explicit and focused hostility of Spain which critically affected Navarre’s advancement and his eventual path to Rome. At the same time, events in the Empire gave cause for concern, as well as offering opportunities to diminish the influence of Spain. The Guises were showing signs of reorganising in France, apparently in order to oppose the succession – whether of Anjou or Navarre – while the Papacy was trying, through the nuncio Giovanni Batista Castelli, to disrupt the newly-established peace of Fleix, and to augment the influence of Rome. To Duplessis, brimming with constructive ideas, Navarre was the only possible saviour of the kingdom. It therefore followed that he must be called upon to play a leading role in the impending struggle. Duplessis seems always to have believed that Navarre would inherit the throne although, in 1582, that was less than obvious. Duplessis rightly perceived in his young master the makings of a great prince, and he began to exert over him a deliberate, vigorous and formative influence. If the crown was a future possibility, Navarre must behave accordingly. Duplessis was concerned that he should set an appropriate example and make a suitable impression, whereas his current lifestyle was not reliably decorous. Duplessis therefore offered some unsolicited advice, proposing a practical daily routine which placed work and duty above pleasure.102 Duplessis was ambitious for Navarre, wishing him to set his sights upon some worthy objective. When he stressed the importance of leadership, he was not only thinking that the king and Anjou were both childless, but also that the King of Spain was old and frail; he would leave either a very young prince or only daughters. Duplessis, who always took a global view of affairs, was looking beyond France to the Habsburg Empire. Beyond the borders of the Netherlands, there were also serious religious conflicts in the Empire, where Spanish influence and the Imperial succession were currently matters of grave public concern. The eccentric emperor, Rudolph II, was unmarried, and there was no king of the Romans (successor elect). If, as seemed likely, Rudolph were to marry the infanta Isabella, the entire Habsburg empire could be reunited, as it was under Charles V. That nightmare prospect was much discussed in diplomatic circles.103 Parts of protestant Germany feared the pervading influence of Spain in the Empire. These elements desired to break the Habsburg stranglehold on the elective Imperial crown while the Habsburgs, on the other hand, sought to render it hereditary. It was therefore a matter 101

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 163-9, 21 December 1582, Navarre to Henry III. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 189-93, 9 January 1583, ‘advis au roi de Navarre sur sa façon de vivre’; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 61-3. 103 Philip II was often in ill health; it was also considered quite likely that he would be succeeded by the infanta Isabella, rather than her sickly young brother, Philip. 102

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of critical concern when, in December 1582 – just as Duplessis had rejoined Navarre – the archbishop elector of Cologne announced his conversion to protestantism. That created a protestant majority in the Imperial electoral college. The ensuing war over the possession of Cologne hinged upon the disputed interpretation of the religious peace of Augsburg of 1555.104 This Imperial dispute had far-reaching implications for the protestant world, and Duplessis perceived a multiple opportunity. France had always cherished a residual claim to the Empire, and now there was no suitable, indigenous candidate willing to stand.105 The revival of the French claim, in the person of Navarre, would be a superb rejoinder to the upstart Guises who fabricated their descent from Charlemagne. But, more importantly, to place in the Empire a ‘prince de valeur’ would be a giant stride towards the ruin of the house of Austria; it would afford an opportunity to deliver the United Provinces and to counterbalance the power of Spain. As emperor, furthermore, Navarre might convene the council Duplessis so ardently desired, and impose religious peace. The idea of Navarre’s candidacy for the Imperial throne was to surface from time to time but, in the event, no Imperial election occurred in his lifetime.106 Duplessis was expanding upon a notionally ideal solution to interrelated problems and was, of course, aware of the obstacles. One good reason why the Empire might prefer to stick with the devil they knew was that Hungary, the buffer province against the Turks, was a Habsburg possession.107 Nevertheless, Duplessis’ aspiration is revealing. If it was possible to envisage a protestant holy roman emperor, then it was also possible to envisage a protestant king of France. Religious peace and toleration would be the key to both positions; but neither the one nor the other would be readily accepted. Besides his concern about the worsening international situation, Duplessis already knew that the Guises meant to challenge the French succession. While he was living in Antwerp, Duplessis acquired possession of a work by François de Rosières, archdeacon of Toul. This seditious tract advanced the pretentions of the house of Lorraine to have descended from Charlemagne, from which they derived their claim to the crown. Duplessis annotated it and sent it to the king. Henry III thanked him and requested a refutation.108 To Duplessis, this knowledge can only have increased his desire that 104

Holborn, A History of Modern Germany. The Reformation, 288-9; Sutherland, ‘The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of European Politics’, The English Historical Review, cvii (July 1992), 603 seq. The war over Cologne lasted until 1589, when the archbishopric remained in the hands of the catholic Ernest of Bavaria. 105 Zeller, ‘Les Rois de France candidats à l’Empire: essai sur l’idéologie impériale en France’, Revue historique, clxxiii (1934), 273-311, 497-534. 106 The emperor Rudolph II did not die until 20 January 1612. 107 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 213-17, 31 January 1583, Duplessis to Clervant. It is very doubtful if the Germans would have accepted a Frenchman as emperor, and Navarre did not hold a sufficiently wealthy power base to establish himself in Germany. Nevertheless, the election issue was a matter of serious discussion. 108 This work Stemmatum Lotharingiae ac Barri Ducum, tomi septem, appears to be dated 1580, but was probably read by Duplessis in 1582. It is not clear which document, if any extant, represents his refutation. It might be the ‘discours sur le droit pretendu par ceux de Guise sur la couronne’, which was sent to the king.


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Navarre should be well prepared. To his Flemish friend Van der Mylen, he expressed his high hopes of Navarre, declaring his belief that God reserved for him a great destiny and, in particular, that he should be the ruin of Spain. The war, as it was waged in the Netherlands, could last for twenty years, he said, but if mainland Spain were to be attacked [by Navarre in the south], the Netherlands could be quickly relieved.109 Had Navarre’s proposals for opposing Spain been implemented at this time, the history, not only of France but also of Europe, might have been substantially different. Philip II had been dangerously provoked by Anjou, ostensibly enjoying both English and French support, just when Spain’s military capacity was notably increased by the acquisition of Portugal, her fleet, and her overseas empire. Duplessis distrusted Anjou, who was neither competent nor commendably motivated. He was ambitious, victimised and bitter, and Duplessis rightly feared that he was heading for disaster. Yet it was essential for someone to oppose Spain in the Netherlands. Duplessis’ opinion that Navarre might succeed to the crown was shared by his uncle, the cardinal de Bourbon. When the question arose of Navarre’s return to court, Bourbon was among those who urged him to convert – or re-convert.110 Navarre’s conversion, Bourbon urged, would please the nobles and the people; but if he declined, there would be grave drawbacks. Duplessis, who drafted Navarre’s reply, objected to this unacceptable approach. The cynicism, of which Navarre has so often been accused, was liberally supplied by others. Navarre could not be seen to change his religion like his shirt (a favourite simile); religion was of the heart, and a matter of grace. While denying that Navarre sought to build his grandeur upon the death of those he was obliged to serve, Duplessis formulated a revealing analysis of Navarre’s religious dilemma. If God were, indeed, to call him to the throne, he would also prepare the way ahead. Kings reigned by the might of God, and it was God who possessed the heart of the people. The essential thing was to have faith in God, who would surely punish most severely those who abused the name of religion [for personal profit]. Navarre’s duty was to act rightly, without seeking to fiddle with fortune.111 Duplessis, it has been noted, was a visionary, and it is only as such that his policy, in respect of religion, can be understood. Amidst all these anxieties about religion and politics, Duplessis was extremely concerned about a more subtle, Papal offensive in France. This offensive was already underway when he returned to Nérac, and it tended to destroy the fragile domestic peace upon which all his projects depended. From this time on, until 1595, Papal intervention profoundly affected the affairs of France and, in particular, the fortunes of Navarre. The nuncio, Castelli, had arrived in France in May 1581. The triple purpose of his mission was to urge the king not to support Anjou in the Netherlands, but to pursue an aggressive B.N., Mss. fr. 3282. This, however, is dated 1 September 1580. According to de L’Estoile, Rosières was arrested and imprisoned in the Bastille in April 1583. Roelker, The Paris of Henry of Navarre, 94. 109 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 193-5, 9 January 1583, Duplessis to Van der Mylen. 110 The cardinal de Bourbon, who had presided over Navarre’s first abjuration in 1572, became the catholics’ puppet candidate for the succession at the end of 1584. 111 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 230-1, 6 March 1583, Navarre to cardinal de Bourbon, here addressed by his title archbishop of Rouen.

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policy against the huguenots and, above all, to obtain publication of the decrees of Trent. Papal pressure in respect of the decrees of Trent soon became part of an acute struggle between France and the Papacy over authority and jurisdiction.112 It appears that Castelli engaged the services of Charles Borromeo, cardinal archbishop of Milan, whom he had served as vicar-general. Borromeo, who had played a prominent part in the final sessions of Trent, arrived in France in December 1582. His prestigious presence alarmed Duplessis and further inclined him to dissuade Navarre from going back to court.113 Since, in December 1582, the king was persuaded to appoint a commission ‘for the introduction of the authority of the Council of Trent’, it is small wonder that Duplessis was concerned.114 He observed that the decrees of Trent had spelt the ruin of the Netherlands and could be similarly destructive in France. He described Borromeo as a subject of Spain and a creature of the pope. The cardinal would render each of them a notable service if he succeeded in reviving the religious strife in France.115 It was, Duplessis recalled, precisely in order to cause such strife that Pius V had dispatched the cardinal Alessandrino to France, early in 1572. Duplessis alleged that the massacre of St. Bartholomew was arranged and agreed upon during Alessandrino’s visit. This expedient was allegedly seen as an aspect of the execution of the decrees of Trent which called for the extermination of heretics.116 During eight miserable years, Duplessis averred, sufficient trouble had ensued. But now, just as [or perhaps because] there was some hope of better times, both in France and the Netherlands, the Papacy resumed its machinations. To Duplessis, both the mission of Borromeo and its timing were sinister. He came shortly before the huguenot ‘places de sûreté’ – or hostage towns – granted in 1577, were due to be surrendered in September 1583. That was a highly propitious moment for rekindling trouble in France. If the huguenots refused to comply, they would be condemned; if they 112

Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Castelli, 32-4, instructions, April 1581; Victor Martin, Le Gallicanisme et la réforme catholique, 172-209. 113 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 170-82, 26 December 1582, ‘discours’; CSPF., 1582, pp. 459-63, 25 November/5 December 1582, Cobham to Walsingham, announced the coming of Borromeo ‘upon the devote persuasions of the nuncio’. It is remarkable that there appears to be no mention of this visit in the correspondence of Castelli. Borromeo, nephew of Pius IV, canonised in 1610, was one of the great Counter Reformation figures. Nevertheless, his mission in France tended to promote civil war, which the catholics desired. Between his absolutes and those of Duplessis-Mornay, there was no common ground. 114 CSPF., 1582, pp. 483-6, 4/14 December 1582, Cobham to Walsingham. 115 Duplessis was correct; Borromeo was born in the state of Milan. 116 Michele Bonelli, cardinal Alessandrino, Papal secretary of state, came to France from Spain in February 1572 to avert both an Anglo-French alliance (the treaty of Blois), and the marriage of Navarre to Marguerite de Valois, as well as to induce the king to make war on the huguenots. Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 214-21; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 193-5, 9 January 1583, Duplessis to Van der Mylen; ibid., 211. In his tract, ‘avertissement sur la reception du concile de Trente’, Duplessis wrote: ‘avec lui [Alessandrino] feut conclu et basti le massacre, c’est à dire à proprement l’execution du concile, dont la France a esté longtemps sans repos et souspira sans doubte à jamais’. Ibid., 195-212, 31 January 1583. This is a remarkable assertion from a contemporary as honest and well informed as DuplessisMornay. He was in Paris at the time, and with difficulty escaped to England. Hurtubise, Correspondance du nonce en France, Antonio Maria Salviati, i, 33, says that Alessandrino was to induce France to join the pope’s Holy League (against the Turks) and to promote a marriage between Marguerite de Valois and the King of Portugal. Pius V’s successor, Gregory XIII, struck a medal to commemorate the massacre.


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agreed, they would be defenceless. This was another matter which would have to be grappled with. While the Guises endorsed the Papal programme as their own, thereby ingratiating themselves with Gregory XIII, in January 1583 Duplessis set to work on a tract against the decrees of Trent. These decrees filled the huguenots with dread because they called for an inquisition and the extermination of heretics.117 The tract, which purported to be from the pen of a moderate catholic, was taken to court, shown to the king, and published anonymously. In it Duplessis ventilated some of his ideas about a council – ideas which lay at the heart of his religious policy and that adopted by Navarre. Duplessis recalled that both Henry II and Charles IX had denounced the council of Trent as null; thus to the French [and especially to the huguenots] there had, effectively, been no council. To accept it now, would be to recognise the superiority of the pope over general councils (a maxim re-established at Trent). Worst of all horrors, acceptance of the decrees would preclude the further church reforms without which there could be no religious peace. Kings, in the past, Duplessis said, had summoned councils upon the advice of the royal council and the estates-general; in default of a general council, they could call a national one. Besides, by the terms of the edicts of pacification, exercise of the protestant cult was permitted until such time as, by God’s grace, the king might reunite his people in one faith. That was to be done by the means of a free and legitimate council. Acceptance of the decrees of Trent would violate that clause. This aspiration to religious unity was to be reasserted in the ultimate religious edict, that of Nantes in 1598; to Duplessis-Mornay it was no empty formula.118 The appearance of Duplessis’ tract coincided with the trial of Rosières for his subversive work on the genealogy of the Guises. Duplessis would certainly have been in danger if his authorship of the one, and denunciation of the other, were to become known.119 On 8 February 1583 the king wrote to assure Navarre that he would not accept the decrees except, perhaps, for certain articles concerning discipline.120 It is not clear whether the king’s decision should be attributed to Duplessis’ work; the timing is a little tight; nevertheless, he was right about the danger of this pressure from Rome.

117 Some elements of an inquisition always existed. See, Sutherland, ‘Was there an Inquisition in Reformation France?’, in Princes, Politics and Religion, 13-29. 118 The edict of Nantes, 13 April 1598, Haag, La France protestante, x, 226-57, text of the edict; Sutherland, ‘The Crown, the Huguenots and the Edict of Nantes’, in Golden, Ed., The Huguenot Connection, 28-48. 119 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 213-17, 31 January 1583, Duplessis to Clervant. 120 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 195-212, 31 January 1583, ‘avertissement sur la reception et publication du concile de Trente’, 212 n., 8 February 1583, Henry III to Navarre.

CHAPTER II: NAVARRE, THE SUCCESSION AND THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE I: Philip II Tempts Navarre The Papal pressure on Henry III to publish the decrees of Trent was profoundly disruptive in its implications coming, as it did, just when Anjou was exposing France to the hostility of Spain. Both factors were conducive to the renewal of civil war in France. Anjou’s enterprise in the Netherlands was not prospering; there was even talk of measures to destroy his alliance, although no one made any practical proposals. If Anjou was a liability to France, and a disaster for the Netherlands, his presence in those provinces was also an insufferable offence to the rejected king, Philip II. Anjou posed the threat of a major intervention by France, England or both. It was, therefore, primarily on account of the Netherlands, albeit upon the pretext of religion, that Spain began to subvert the state of France and undermine the monarchy. Duplessis-Mornay, it has been seen, was pondering what Navarre ought to do.1 Should he go to the Netherlands, or would that be too dangerous? Should he, perhaps, invade Spain from the south of France? Either way, he would need royal consent. It is possible that something of Navarre’s desire to assist the Netherlands – his life-long concern – was leaked to Spain; such concern could, in any case, be assumed.2 On the one hand, Navarre had inherited Condé’s alliance of 1568 with the Netherlands’ rebels and, on the other, he was bound to perceive an opportunity to reconquer Spanish Navarre. Nor was there any secret about the sentiments of Duplessis-Mornay or the milieu in which he had lived. But, if Navarre was a dangerous enemy, he might equally be a desirable ally. Consequently Philip II was prepared, if possible, to suborn him. This factor alone indicates that religion was not the immutable dynamic of Spanish policy. In respect of protestant enemies, the religious myth was plausible. France, however, was a great catholic country whose king was ostentatiously devout, while Navarre’s following notoriously contained many catholics. It might be undesirable but, if it happened to suit him, Philip II would stoop to enlisting heretics. The point requires emphasis because the religious pretext of Spain and the Catholic League became a diehard cliché which permeated the consciousness of contemporaries and posterity alike, surviving to this day. It was evidently late in 1582, or early in 1583, that two Spanish envoys, the comte de Chaux, a Navarrois, and his brother-in-law Undiano, came to Béarn.3 These gentlemen

1

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 218-19, l February 1583, Duplessis to Van der Mylen, 219-20, 1 February 1583, Duplessis to Buzanval from Nérac. 2 Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 64-5, says that Spain learnt of Anjou’s overtures to Navarre, which is possible but not established. 3 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, i, Madame Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, 139-42. She indicates that this mission preceded the sack of Antwerp by Anjou’s forces (17 January 1583), though she may have meant before the news of it arrived. It is not clear where the meeting took place; madame Duplessis-Mornay said that Navarre was at Nérac, which is not in Béarn.

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met Duplessis who later referred to the event as authentic; so did Navarre himself.4 The envoys’ message was blunt. Philip II offered Navarre 300,000 écus down, plus 100,000 per month to make war on the King of France. Their declared leverage was the huguenot dilemma of the hostage towns: the huguenots would court serious trouble if they refused to surrender them, and face great peril if they did. Was this Spanish assertion, one wonders, based upon inside knowledge of the nascent catholic rebellion? Secondly, Philip II proposed for Navarre the hand of the infanta, provided he would abjure. This, however, can hardly be taken seriously; besides, Navarre was married.5 Madame Duplessis-Mornay records that, after having been repulsed, the envoys returned. But it is not clear whether they returned after consultation or upon some later occasion. Finding that Navarre rejected their proposition out of hand, they resorted to threats: ‘vous ne scavez pas bien ce que vous faites car nos marchands sont tous pretz’. This could only mean that, in default of Navarre, a comparable arrangement could be had with the Guises. That, at least, is precisely what transpired. It was possibly at this stage that Navarre was offered [alternatively?] 30,000 écus to broker a peace in the Netherlands, with security to go to Spain to receive his orders in person! There was even mention of possible religious concessions in the Netherlands, if only Anjou could be removed from those provinces. That was the measure of Spain’s anxiety to end Anjou’s intervention.6 But, according to madame Duplessis-Mornay, events in the Netherlands supervened when Anjou’s forces tried to seize Antwerp, on 17 January 1583. This untoward event effectively ended both Anjou’s career and Navarre’s proposals for a simultaneous invasion of Spain.7 While the details and timing are uncertain, there can be no doubt that some such meeting did occur between Duplessis and obscure Spanish envoys, and that subversive offers were made and rejected. The particular, and irreversible, enmity between Navarre and Philip II was thereby augmented. Their hostile relations endured until 1598 when, shortly before his death, age and indigence forced upon the Spanish king the peace of Vervins.8 When Duplessis heard of Anjou’s fiasco at Antwerp, in January 1583, he was angry and appalled. He had never approved of the enterprise in the first place, and was disturbed by Anjou’s poor relations with William of Orange; but it would be dangerous to intervene. Duplessis had always foreseen some such catastrophe, and had actually voiced his anxiety while still in the Netherlands, before Anjou arrived. Now he feared that the 4

Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 560-9, 20 February 1584, Duplessis to Navarre; CSPF., 1585-6, pp. 65-7, 4/14 October 1585, advertisements from France, gives (in French) Navarre’s alleged reply to the Spanish envoys; but it is not clear whether it related to the first or second Spanish approach. 5 Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 64-5; a biography of Duplessis-Mornay of 1647 says that Spain would have obtained for Navarre the necessary divorce. It is unlikely that Philip II wished to marry the infanta outside the house of Habsburg, but he might have used such a proposal as a snare. 6 Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 65 n.34. 7 The Antwerp affair might not, necessarily, have ended Anjou’s career but, thenceforth, his health failed. 8 Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 66, says that Rosny (Maximilien de Béthune, baron de, better known as the duc de Sully) was sent to the king to report the Spanish offer to Navarre. However, his reference in the Œconomies royales, i, ch. xviii, refers to the year 1586. It is not certain that Navarre warned the king at the time. He may not have done so until some months later.

Chapter II: Navarre, the Succession and the Catholic League

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event spelt ‘malediction’ for France. To William of Orange, he came close to saying ‘I told you so’, recalling his former warnings which had been ill-received.9 The Antwerp affair caused a crisis in France, not only because Anjou’s campaign had collapsed but, even more, because it was feared that he would seek to save his skin by defecting to Spain. This was no mere fantasy. Only a few days before the events in Antwerp the nuncio, Giovanni Batista Castelli, had reported the likelihood of an agreement between Philip II and Anjou (called Alençon), who would then assist Spain to reconquer the Netherlands. Later in the year, Anjou was approached by Parma.10 Navarre and Duplessis could not be expected to stand idly by, observing Anjou’s defection. It is to be supposed that Duplessis remained in touch with William of Orange, and it may well have been William’s servant, Calvart, who brought the news of the Antwerp affair to France. Calvart was, at any rate, dispatched to the Netherlands by Navarre on 14 February 1583 with secret instructions drafted by Duplessis.11 Initially, Navarre sought to limit the damage by offering himself as regent and lieutenant-general in the Netherlands – an operative substitute for Anjou. This was in case the States were unable to break with Anjou on account of the towns which he held. If, however, Anjou promised to remain an enemy of Spain, and made certain military assurances, he should be allowed to retain his title. But if he defaulted, and the States were free to elect another prince, it would be reasonable to choose Navarre.12 The idea had its attractions. The Imperial crown was distinctly remote but, as sovereign of the Netherlands, Navarre could oppose Spain and defend the protestant world. Calvart was certainly meant to extract better conditions than Anjou had endured. Navarre could not involve the King of France – which Anjou had only done by the Dutch sleight of hand – but he could bring the alliance of protestant princes, sincere support for the true religion and [the necessary] community of interest. Duplessis, with sudden hyperbole, declared that Navarre would devote the rest of his life to the Netherlands. Calvart appears to have travelled about for some months between William of Orange, Navarre, and Anjou who evidently did not favour Navarre’s proposals.13 9

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 213-17, 31 January 1583, Duplessis to Clervant, 224-5, 13 February 1583, Duplessis to Sèvres, 225-6, 14 February 1583, Duplessis to William of Orange. 10 Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Castelli, 473, 11 January 1583, Castelli to Como. Castelli’s report was made in the context of an invasion project against England, in which the Papacy was involved and Spain likely to be. Anjou was also reported to have intelligence with Spanish servants in France, and to have appealed to the pope for help. CSPF., 1583, pp. 361-3, 24 May/3 June 1583, Cobham to Walsingham. Anjou offered to help the pope, through his knowledge of England and the Netherlands, in return for money. Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 168, 15 December 1583, Ragazzoni to Como, 190, 30 January 1584, Como to Ragazzoni. 11 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 227-9, 14 February 1583, secret instructions for Calvart going to William of Orange. 12 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 219-20, 1 February 1583, Duplessis to Buzanval. 13 CSPF., 1583, pp. 161-4, 27 February/9 March 1583, Cobham to Walsingham. Cobham said that Calvart returned to Paris from Navarre on 24 February/6 March 1583, and that he, Cobham, had sent him back to his master, William of Orange. In that case, Cobham seems to have had some intermediary role to play in the matter. Ibid., 342-3, 11/21 May 1583, Cobham to Walsingham. Calvart had reached Paris on his way from William of Orange to Navarre.

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The diplomatic confusion over these matters was incredible. Clearly Duplessis was seeking an arrangement which had some chance of being effective because, if not diverted, Parma would prevail in the Netherlands. Besides, from the end of 1582 Duplessis was becoming increasingly convinced that only an international alliance against the forces of Spain, the Papacy and the Guises could save France, their skins, and their souls. Spain, the Papacy and the Guises were, indeed, to be the elements against which, as Henry IV, Navarre had to struggle for nearly a decade. The difficulties were already great, not least because a bid for the Netherlands would depend upon the king’s consent, despite Navarre’s status as a sovereign prince; Henry III was always the impediment. Both before and after Anjou’s death, the United Provinces sought to recreate his shattered alliance because they were desperate to induce the King of France to commit himself to war with Spain. Spain was equally desperate to keep France – or French factions and Navarre – out of Parma’s victorious path. It was doubtless for these reasons that Philip II fulfilled his agents’ threat to transfer to the Guises the alliance and subsidies rejected by Navarre. Thus it was that the development of the Catholic League in France paralleled events in the Netherlands. The League effectively prevented both the kingdom and the huguenots from assisting either the Netherlands or England.14

II: Duplessis-Mornay Seeks a Protestant Coalition Unsuccessful in his bid for the Netherlands – which was certainly not, at that stage, for personal aggrandisement – Navarre did not idly await the domestic storm. It had become necessary and urgent for the protestants to prepare for their own defence by seeking international support, before the huguenots were exposed to fresh attacks on account of the hostage towns. While representing Navarre at the synod of Vitré (15-16 May 1583) – which discussed the problem of doctrinal disputes amongst protestants – Duplessis composed a long letter, or ‘discours’, addressed to Walsingham. This was accompanied by a paper on the status, valour and predicament of Navarre. Duplessis and Walsingham were in general agreement upon European affairs, though it is doubtful if Duplessis realised that his English friend was more radical in religion and foreign policy than the queen. Nor did Elizabeth share Duplessis’ conception of an international ‘protestant cause’, or display the altruism affordable to ministers but not to princes. Problems therefore abounded. Duplessis’ letter to Walsingham centred on the gravity of the situation caused by the failure of Anjou; an alternative strategy was now required.15 Elizabeth, Duplessis maintained, had seen in Anjou a means of evading an unsatisfactory foreign alliance. She had hoped that he might hold both Spain and France in check. Now Duplessis feared that Anjou might turn against the protestants [as he had in 1577], mentioning talk of 14

Duplessis referred to William of Orange having escaped assassins twice in one year; he did not escape much longer. Had Navarre gone to the Netherlands, he would almost certainly have perished likewise; not that he was safe in France. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 224-5, 13 February 1583, Duplessis to de Serres. 15 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 235-41, – May 1583, ‘discours’ sent to Walsingham.


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negotiations with Parma. Duplessis sought both to arouse English fears and to insinuate Navarre into the vacuum left by Anjou. When Anjou returned to France, he might be sucked by her enemies into some design against England, possibly via Scotland, whereby to deliver the King of France from uncertainty, and the King of Spain from trouble. Duplessis claimed to know, from intercepted letters, that some such proposal had been put to Anjou in 1582 by means of an Italian engineer. In these, and other ways, Duplessis depicted England’s need for a defensive coalition, of which Navarre was to be the commander. The time was propitious, he said, to ally with the German protestant princes because the principals were already united into a league in support of the archbishop of Cologne; they could therefore be approached collectively. They would welcome an alliance because they were oppressed. So Duplessis edged towards his aspiration that such an alliance might achieve the election of a non-Habsburg king of the Romans, thereby obviating the danger of a renewed Charles V situation – namely the unification of the Habsburg empires. England would reap positive benefits and safeguards. It was, however, necessary to sink a sizeable sum of money in Germany – something Duplessis was very anxious to achieve. Once leadership was manifest, others would join the alliance. Duplessis added a warning about the danger to England from Scotland [where the Guises were intriguing] and expressed his resentment that Elizabeth had abandoned Navarre and Condé. Thus his ‘discours’ was directed to the means of obtaining alliances for the huguenots and dissipating the efforts of England’s enemies.16 Duplessis was anxious, in the spring of 1583, to project Navarre as worthy to play a leading role in the proposed coalition. Navarre had, to some extent, heeded his exhortations to good conduct and was attracting the support of both protestants and catholics in France.17 Duplessis began his paper on Navarre by establishing his rank and leadership of the French reformed churches and hinting, via a reference to the reversionary interest, at his place in the succession.18 Navarre is described as vigorous, vivacious and of incomparable courage, fit to become one of the finest of princes, even the instrument of God for the performance of great deeds. Duplessis admitted Navarre’s isolation in the south and west. If he could only approach the centre of France, he would attract the allegiance of the nobility. It was true, in respect of the people, that his religion was an obstacle; but peace in France was no longer possible without the acceptance of both religions – a salient point. Duplessis believed that there was such discontent in France over the abuses of the church (the reforms of Trent not having been embraced) and the corruption of the state that, if Navarre were seen to be supported from abroad, many would rally to his religion and his party.

16

It is likely that this document was conveyed to England in May 1583 by La Fontaine, the French Calvinist pastor in London. CSPF., 1583, pp. 342-3, 11/21 May 1583, Cobham to Walsingham. 17 CSPF., 1583, pp. 392-5, 9/19 June 1583, Cobham to Walsingham. Cobham had reported on ll/21 May that d’Androgne was returning to England amply instructed in matters concerning Navarre. 18 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 241-57, – May 1583, ‘estat du roi de Navarre et de son parti en France’, sent to Walsingham. CSPF., 1583, pp. 684-94, addenda, gives an English version, dated ?April.

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Duplessis went on to list Navarre’s territories and to describe his administration, before stating his urgent need, which related to the problem of the hostage towns; and Duplessis explained why it was equally unsafe to keep or to surrender them. The edicts of pacification were disregarded, and the defiance of catholics was increasing. This was a reference to early manifestations of the renewed Catholic League, which welcomed the pretext that the hostage towns should be surrendered in September 1583. Catholic levies were being raised in Switzerland and Germany, munitions amassed in Lyon, and forces sent to Gascony. Navarre’s supreme problem had always been the lack of an army, which forced him to remain on the defensive. If only he were assured of a good German force, he could confine hostilities to the borders of France and retain the necessary hostage towns. But without such a force he would have to surrender them, committing the consequences to God. Despite the efforts of three successive envoys, Walsingham did not reply to Duplessis’ exhortations. Nevertheless, Navarre’s servant François Ségur-Pardaillan was dispatched, in July 1583, upon a long and arduous diplomatic mission to promote in Germany the religious peace and protestant alliance which Duplessis had proposed to Walsingham.19 Ségur’s instructions described the mounting catholic danger to the huguenots, to England and to protestants everywhere. He was to explain – in the first place to queen Elizabeth – the state of France and, above all, of the protestant churches. The pope was clearly aiming at the extermination of protestants [demonstrated by his strenuous efforts to obtain the publication of the decrees of Trent], and Duplessis believed in the existence of a great movement against them. Queen Elizabeth could be in no doubt as to the enmity of the pope, and Duplessis was especially on his guard against the widespread activities of the Jesuits.20 As he had said to Walsingham, the queen had sought in Anjou a buffer against her enemies and had been disappointed. Now Anjou was busy dismissing all the protestants in his service. Indeed he was even said to have been negotiating with the pope for the command of a catholic army, in order to devote his life to the extermination of protestants. Duplessis claimed, not only that he could prove this assertion, but also that the plan was already afoot before the Antwerp fiasco in January 1583. Whatever Anjou might conquer, he might keep, hinting that he would turn against

19

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 305-6, – July 1583, Duplessis to Walsingham, 272-94, – July 1583, instructions for François de Ségur-Pardaillan, ‘gentilhomme de la chambre’ to Navarre. De Thou discusses at some length the attitude of various German princes to the current theological problems, as well as Ségur’s mission to reconcile the Augsburg and Helvetic confessions, Histoire universelle, vi, 359 seq. 20 It is not clear that such a widespread movement was already afoot as early as 1583. However, certain Jesuits in the service of the Guises travelled indefatigably seeking such a catholic alliance. Some of these efforts were reported a little later by père La Rue, alias the Jesuit Henri Samier, to Mary queen of Scots. Teulet, Relations politiques, iii, 341-6, 18 May 1585, Samier to queen Mary, 348-51, 24 August 1585, Samier to queen Mary, both from Châlons, held by Guise. In May 1584 some German princes referred to ‘the league of the Council of Trent of late practised to be put in execution in a council at Rome between the pope and all the catholic princes’. CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 530-1 [May] 1584, memo of the answers from German princes to the King of Navarre’s letters.


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England – not least because he would never be suffered to serve a Papal league in France.21 As he had already made clear, Duplessis wanted queen Elizabeth to assume the leadership of a protestant counter-league. For this the time was particularly auspicious because the German princes were currently alarmed by the attitude of the emperor, Rudolph II – who was nurtured in Spain – and by the war over Cologne. Furthermore, in order to promote the safety of England, Ségur was to propose an idea, cherished by Duplessis, that Navarre’s sister, Catherine de Bourbon, would make a suitably safe marriage for James VI of Scotland. Philip II was actively concerned about the Scottish succession, hence the eventual marriage of her king. Duplessis therefore showed perception in his awareness of the critical Scottish flank, of which queen Elizabeth had never been unmindful. Navarre wanted queen Elizabeth to co-ordinate a religious reconciliation, as a preliminary to the proposed league of all protestant princes. It would be revealing to know the extent of his knowledge and understanding of the Anglican settlement. But, whether or not he and Duplessis had the English settlement in mind, Ségur’s instructions proceeded to the obstacles presented by German sacramental quarrels. Navarre and Duplessis were deeply concerned to resolve these differences by means of a general synod. Denmark and the French churches were co-operative; once the leading German princes were won, they could bring in the protestant Imperial cities and the Swiss. Duplessis presumed that the Netherlands churches would also join. He actually believed that such an alliance could be stronger than an opposing catholic league, whose members would not share the same objectives. Duplessis proposed various conditions to be followed, and repeated his desire for a German contingency fund. Navarre was setting the example by contributing money and jewels. Ségur was to proceed from England to the Netherlands to assure William of Orange of Navarre’s support. The huguenots, Duplessis wrote to William, were at the crisis of their malady, but they still hoped to preserve the peace in France.22 Finally, the instructions covered further missions to Denmark and Germany. Ségur was to seek religious reconciliation; also to forge an alliance to work on the election of a nonHabsburg king of the Romans while the conversion of Cologne assured a protestant majority in the electoral college. The most protracted efforts were made to achieve these remarkable objectives. However elusive, they were neither whims nor fancies but an essential part of Duplessis’ vision of peace. Without such a peace – though Duplessis did not say so – Navarre might never succeed to the throne of France. Like Walsingham, Ségur was provided with a ‘justification’ of Navarre’s career and actions, for the

21

What this project amounted to is unclear; it sounds exaggerated. Late in 1583, Anjou was already very ill but negotiations with the Netherlands continued. Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 200 seq. 22 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 312-13, 29 July 1583, Duplessis to William of Orange. William drew closer to the huguenots at this time on account of his marriage in 1583 to Louise de Coligny, daughter of the late admiral.

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enlightenment of any princes insufficiently informed, or who might doubt the urgency of these matters.23 Navarre was presented in this ‘justification’ as a principal victim of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, a horror familiar to every protestant.24 Thereafter, he had been held in captivity, threatened with imprisonment in the Bastille, and even with death. The memoir goes on to detail Navarre’s escape from court in 1576 when duke Casimir invaded France, his efforts to keep the peace, the estates of Blois – from which the huguenots were excluded – the revocation of the peace of Monsieur, and the formation of catholic leagues in all areas. Pressure had been placed on Navarre to conform to the king’s catholic will, otherwise he would risk exclusion from the succession, an issue which had been raised very early in the reign of Henry III. Moving on to the war of 1577, Duplessis came to the crucial point that the edict of Poitiers had granted the huguenots eight hostage towns for six years. These towns were due for surrender in September 1583, but the terms of the treaty of Poitiers had not yet been enforced. This, therefore, was the immediate reason why Navarre was seeking a protestant league. Navarre had conducted himself loyally. He had received no personal gain, either in 1576 or 1577; he had done his best to ensure peace, and he had surrendered Cahors and Millau as a gesture of good will. Furthermore, he had sought to win the king’s heart by his sincere proposals to assist Anjou’s Netherlands enterprise, and to divert nascent trouble in the south of France by invading Spain. If that exploit had proceeded, Navarre would have surrendered the towns. However, the proposal was made just when the king had begun to experience catholic pressures: Papal efforts were redoubled to obtain publication in France of the decrees of Trent, and to establish an inquisition; Jesuits were set to work on the persecution of protestants and the confiscation of huguenot property; ‘on commence de plus belle à brasser avec le pape une ligue générale à l’extermination de tous ceulx de la relligion’. Efforts were made to diminish the authority of Navarre, and to suborn him, while others were forbidden to serve him. Thus, unless Duplessis was being unusually casual about chronology, he was placing the beginnings of the new Catholic League in 1582 or, at the latest, early in 1583. Among the contributory causes were the rise to favour and power of the king’s favourites, Anne duc de Joyeuse and Jean-Louis de Nogaret, duc d’Épernon. In September 1581, Henry had spent some 100,000 écus on the marriage of Joyeuse to the queen’s sister, which was widely regarded as an outrage. By the spring of 1583 feeling against the two favourites was strong enough to arouse the fear of a rebellion on that account.25 Épernon became a particular and personal target of the duc de Guise.

23

Ségur’s mission derived in part from the results of the synod of Vitré. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 306-7, – July 1583, Duplessis to Danzay. It seems likely that Buzanval was sent to the Swiss cantons because Ségur had too far to travel. Ibid., ii, 472-5, instructions for Buzanval, no date. 24 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 539-45, 6 July 1583; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 295-303, ‘Justification des actions du roi de Navarre’. Duplessis also wrote at this time to sir Philip Sidney, seeking to enlist his influence with the queen, ibid., ii, 304-5, – July 1583. 25 Sutherland, The French Secretaries of State, 231, 240. Épernon was made ‘gouverneur’ of Metz, Toul and Verdun which greatly offended the Guises whose power base was in the east of France.


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III: The Huguenots Seek Royal Support If foreign alliances were essential, it was no less important for the huguenots to retain the confidence and support of the king. Thus, at the same time as working on European religious problems, Duplessis had gathered together into a general ‘cahier’ the churches’ complaints, contained in memoirs sent to Navarre. The ‘cahier’ – presumably deriving from the synod of Vitré in May 1583 – was taken to court by Navarre’s councillor, Clervant, in July. Its purpose was to seek the king’s co-operation in resolving their current problems before the catholics could make the return of the hostage towns a pretext for renewing civil war.26 They must convince the king that none of their endeavours, either at home or abroad, were in any sense, or to any degree, directed against him. They must therefore begin by pre-empting the dangers relating to the surrender of the hostage towns. Duplessis had a valuable opportunity to further the huguenots’ urgent affairs when he saw the king in Lyon in August 1583, evidently about quarrels relating to the queen of Navarre – Henry III’s sister Marguerite. Duplessis took this opportunity to submit a paper explaining why the king should grant an extension for the hostage towns, which would remove the wind from catholic sails.27 Duplessis is also reported by the English ambassador, sir Henry Cobham, to have tried to persuade the king to convene the church council which was so deeply desired; and Cobham recorded that Henry intended to do so.28 The king, however, displayed a perplexed and uncertain mood, wholly irresolute. He complained that Navarre never came to court, though he was perfectly aware of the reasons why. He declared that he now wanted peace; previously he had not wanted it, on account of the way in which the peace of Monsieur had been extorted. At one time he had expected to restore catholicism by force; now he knew that to be impossible. He was determined to allow his people to live in peace according to the edicts, provided that he suffered no hostile action. Duplessis assured him, in return, that Navarre wanted only peace and the enforcement of the edicts. Henry, however, was suspicious and in his answer, conveyed by Clervant in November 1583, he evidently expressed concern about Navarre’s foreign relations. As a sovereign prince, Navarre had a perfect right to conduct foreign relations. Through Chassincourt, his court representative, Navarre explained quite frankly the purpose of Ségur’s mission. He also pointed out that the Guises had similarly deposited money in Germany. Chassincourt was not to provide anything in writing, but to make careful note of the king’s replies.29 26

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 317-20, 3 July 1583, instructions for Clervant, 320-44, ‘cahier général’ [July 1583]. 27 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 358-62, 12 August 1583, ‘Raisons pour induire le roi à accorder la prolongation des places pour quelques années’. Duplessis did not leave Nérac until 17 August 1583. Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 75 n.53. 28 CSPF., 1583-4, p. 103, 6/16 September 1583, Cobham to Burghley. 29 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 364-76, – August 1583, 398-401, 25 December 1583, instructions for Chassincourt – Imbert de Biotière, seigneur de Chassincourt, ‘gentilhomme de la chambre’ to Navarre. The assembly of St. Jean-d’Angély, June 1582, had required Chassincourt to reside at court to represent Navarre.

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The confused king, who was primarily absorbed in manifestations of religious mania, held an assembly of notables at Saint-Germain, in November 1583, seeking to arrest the collapse of the state.30 In the assembly the cardinal de Bourbon called for one religion in France – as in 1577 – in which case, he said, the clergy would sell their shirts to support the king. Henry, however, angrily interrupted him, knowing the origin of that hostile demand; any attempt to impose one religion was unthinkable while Anjou remained attached to the Netherlands. Henry replied that he had already risked his life and his estate to establish one, single religion. But, since he had been obliged to make peace, he would keep it. One religion was a thing, Stafford reported, that [Henry] had found ‘unpossible, which they knew well enough’, and so the king departed, ‘in a choler’.31 The end of 1583 and the beginning of 1584 brought a closely-related crisis of conflict in France, the Netherlands and in England. At the end of 1583, Duplessis confided to Michel de Montaigne that the huguenots had received many reports of preparations against them; if that continued, it could not be thought strange if they reacted.32 Clervant had brought the king’s answers to the huguenot ‘cahier’, with assurances that Henry meant to observe the edicts, that he would dispatch commissioners to enforce them, and would restore Navarre and Condé to their ‘gouvernements’. Nevertheless, being misled by troublemakers, the king was annoyed with them. If the huguenots were attacked, they would have to respond, and Navarre was aware that prolonged patience would only be construed as weakness.

IV: Spain and the Catholic League Among the reports received by the huguenots at this time was news of what Duplessis called the ‘catholic conspiracy’, directed against both France and England – indeed he believed it to be aimed at each monarch personally. These movements were all aspects of the power struggle between Spain, her supporters and clients, on the one hand and, on the other, all who resisted her power. This alleged ‘catholic conspiracy’ was exemplified by a Guise project in Scotland, in conjunction with Spain and the Papacy, which had been blown apart by the notorious Ruthven raid in August 1582, and the capture of James VI by an Anglophile faction. Consequently the catholics’ designs were redirected against England. As part of the infamous Throckmorton plot in 1583, Guise was to command an invasion force provided by Parma.33 Spain, however, imposed a delay, during which the plot was discovered. But Guise did not immediately desist from his English projects, to which he was ardently committed. 30

See Sutherland, The French Secretaries of State, chap. xv. CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 214-18, 7/17 November 1583, Stafford to Walsingham. Guise went to the king and denied that he was behind Bourbon’s speech. Not believing this, Henry was short with him. 32 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, i, 608-13, 31 December 1583, Navarre to Henry III; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 401-2, 31 December 1583, Duplessis to Montaigne. 33 Francis Throckmorton, who was arrested on 4 November 1583, was the intermediary between Bernadino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, and Mary queen of Scots, Read, Walsingham, ii, 382 and n. 2. 31


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Late in 1583, Navarre and Duplessis received intimations of the dangers threatening both England and the King of France. Elizabeth, who was afraid of arousing suspicion, had made no positive answer to Ségur’s proposals. Consequently Navarre sent the seigneur d’Androgne back to England to flatter the queen that he longed to go over himself, were it not for so many adversities which detained him in France.34 D’Androgne was to warn the queen against Spanish-backed plots to trouble her state, and of designs against her person. His instructions referred to an enterprise by which Guise, with Spanish help, was to invade England through Wales in 1584. Foreign shipping was to be seized in western ports of France to transport 6,000-7,000 men. They were to be assembled in Saintonge and Poitou, under pretext of some Portuguese venture. All this was currently being arranged by the duc de Mayenne in Poitou. It is likely that the Throckmorton plot had already been discovered in England before the mission of d’Androgne, and that this was possibly some other, substitute, enterprise.35 Philip II was acutely concerned about the English succession and, during the lifetime of Mary queen of Scots, he resented the interference of her cousin, the duc de Guise, in this sensitive sphere of interest. The significance of these events, in respect of Navarre, was the termination of diplomatic relations between England and Spain. This derived from the expulsion of Bernadino de Mendoza from England in January 1584 for ‘irritating such as be mutable to commit horrible offences’. This severance brought open war between England and Spain a long step closer. Mendoza went first to the Netherlands, which enabled him to consult Parma, and possibly to establish essential lines of communication with France. He arrived in France on the last day of February 1584 and lodged in the house of Jean Baptiste de Tassis, the resident Spanish agent.36 Thus everything was now in place for Spain, through Mendoza and other agents, to organise and exploit the Guises – who were already astir – as the affairs of the Netherlands might require. Mendoza departed for Spain on 10 April 1584, when Anjou was already known to be dangerously ill.37 With an Anglo-Spanish war looming, Spain required the elimination of France as a possible participant. In these circumstances, it was desirable that Guise should abandon his English exploits and be fully occupied in France. He was therefore to be employed in the extermination of the huguenots, and in paralysing Henry III. This was both to protect the Netherlands from the French, and to obviate a closer Anglo-French alliance. This Spanish objective vindicated Anjou’s warning to his brother, in 1583, that he must choose 34

Navarre expressed his desire to meet queen Elizabeth on a number of different occasions. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 387-90, no date, believed to be of December 1583, instructions for the sieur d’Androgne returning to England. There is no mention of this mission in the Calendar of State Papers Foreign, presumably because it was secret. 36 CSPVen., 1581-91, pp. 81-2, 3 and 17 February 1583/4, Moro to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 491-4, 5 March 1584, Cavriana to Vinta; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 198-200, 20 February 1584, Ragazzoni to Como. 37 CSPVen., 1581-91, p. 91, 14 April 1584, Moro to the doge and senate. Mendoza tried to cover his tracks, being much afraid for his safety. Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 64. Guise and Mendoza were still, at this time, deeply involved in plans against England, until the death of Anjou altered Spanish priorities. See, Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, pp. 224 seq. 35

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between war in the Netherlands or civil war in France. To these ends, Spain exploited both the current religious issues in France and the older rivalry of the nobility, soon to be sharply revived by a factitious succession dispute. The huguenots, meanwhile, had wind of a rebellion already planned by the Guises. Towards the end of 1583, Navarre again sent Duplessis to court, this time with an urgent and secret message for the king.38 Duplessis’ arrival in Paris was delayed by floods. Then his crucial business was thrust aside by the eruption into court of Anjou, incognito (10 February 1584), as well as by the presence of deputies from the Netherlands. If Anjou had come about a crisis in the north, Duplessis had come about one in the south.39 He too had proceeded very secretly to reveal, as Stafford put it, the ‘discovery of a very evil intent of enterprises against France by the practice of the King of Spain’.40 Henry III, however, was surrounded by the Guises, and in no hurry to see Duplessis, despite the entreaties of Chassincourt. It was probably 16 February 1584 before Duplessis was able to speak to the king alone, and to tell him of the great enterprise – for it was certainly true – against his life, his honour and his state. The conspiracy in question had been revealed to François Châtillon by one, Beauregard, otherwise called La Roche. Châtillon had taken Beauregard to report to Navarre, and Duplessis took him to the king. Beauregard had been informed – presumably in confidence – by the duke of Savoy, Philip II’s principal arm in southern Europe. It was Stafford who sussed out the details. Spain and the Guises were involved in plans by which many towns in France were to be surprised; £60,000 of Spanish money had already been received (he did not say by whom), and more was expected. ‘It is certain,’ Stafford continued, ‘that there is as great a practice against France now as ever was, and the duke of Guise and his be doers in it’.41 The king had indeed received other, similar, reports; but he had never previously understood so clearly what was afoot. Stafford added, furthermore, that they ‘had a meaning’ upon the king’s life. It appears that something was to happen in each province, and especially in the Guisard ‘gouvernements’ of Champagne and Burgundy, when Savoy appeared on the frontier. Stafford and Duplessis believed that efforts were being made to involve Montmorency, while Navarre was trying to restrain him and to obtain a new alliance.42 The huguenots in Languedoc and Dauphiné were actively trying to frustrate these projects. Duplessis was concerned to erase from the king’s mind the evil impressions of Navarre which others were labouring to implant. Navarre was aware of the king’s natural inclination to love him, as they said, and he wished to merit the royal regard. Part of the problem of distrust arose from reports that Navarre had been in touch with the King of 38

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, i, 618-19, no date, Navarre to Henry III. Duplessis is said to have left for Paris in 1583, ibid., 619, n.1. He was, however, at Mont de Marsan on 31 December. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 401-2, 31 December 1583, Duplessis to Montaigne. 39 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 203, 10-21 February 1584; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 569-83, 9 March 1584, Duplessis to Navarre. 40 CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 350-1, 13/ 23 February 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. 41 CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 350-1, 13/23 February 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. 42 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, i, 615, [late 1583 or early 1584], Navarre to Montmorency.


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Spain. It was, therefore, at this point that Duplessis revealed the Spanish offers to bribe Navarre to make war on the king; indeed they had proposed to sustain this support until Navarre himself was on the throne. If this is hardly to be credited, one may certainly believe that Spain had sought to lure Navarre into her orbit. If, however, he refused to play, the Spanish declared that there were other takers. Since these proposals had been put to Duplessis personally, he could vouch for their authenticity.43 Seeing that the king was disturbed, Duplessis begged him to take appropriate action, and to accept the services of Navarre. It is unclear if, in that first audience, Duplessis also told the king of information received from François de La Noue, a prisoner in the Netherlands. La Noue reported that the King of Spain was determined to be revenged upon France by seizing the vital frontier provinces of Burgundy and Picardy, while Savoy invaded the marquisate of Saluzzo.44 Thus, by the end of 1583, trouble was welling up on all sides. An important part of Duplessis’ mission at court, early in 1584, was to win the king’s gratitude and confidence, and induce him to employ Navarre to avert these impending troubles; Navarre would, in any case, be driven to oppose their common enemy. The bewildered king did, in fact, promise, at that time, to employ Navarre; yet, somehow, the matter was never clinched. He sent Duplessis to see his mother, Catherine de Medici, possibly hoping, as he usually did, that she would devise some means of escape, or otherwise resolve his problems. Duplessis gave Catherine the additional information that the conspirators meant to seize Orléans, an important Loire crossing. She replied that these movements had been hatching for a long time and it was indeed essential to unite. If the ‘blood’ of France was of one accord, all these intrigues would fail.45 Both the king and Catherine gave assurances of their good will towards Navarre and that they would act upon his reports. Meanwhile Duplessis should remain at court while the matter was under consideration. In the event, he stayed for some months.46 Henry III held extensive discussions with Catherine after which Duplessis and Chassincourt saw him again, on 21 February 1584. But it was in the secretary of state, Nicolas de Neufville, seigneur de Villeroy, that Henry really confided. Villeroy frankly sought the huguenot envoys’ advice, and Duplessis responded by speaking his mind. He boldly proposed that the king should summon all the princes of the blood – had not Catherine herself suggested it – and Navarre would set the example by his obedience. This done, Duplessis proposed vigorous and far-reaching measures, involving the exploitation of protestant alliances. The authors of the troubles [the Guises] should not be allowed to leave court as they desired; indeed they should be vigilantly observed so that they could be arrested when manifestly incriminated. The king should beware of Spain’s 43

Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 560-9, 20 February 1584, Duplessis to Navarre. In making this statement, Duplessis said that the offer had occurred ‘depuis peu’. It is regrettably not clear whether the Spanish had made a further and more recent offer to Navarre. 44 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 522-36, 20 February 1584, Duplessis to Navarre; also in Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 560-9. 45 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 560-9, 20 February 1584, Duplessis to Navarre; ibid., 566. 46 According to Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 80, Duplessis remained at court until May. He appears, however, to have stayed until 10 June, the day of Anjou’s death.

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propensity for political assassination; he should divert Spanish forces by every possible means, such as assisting William of Orange and holding Cambrai. He should defend the threatened provinces – Picardy and Burgundy – and preferably invade Franche-Comté in order to disrupt the Spanish road.47 Existing alliances with England, Germany and Switzerland should be renewed, and converted to offensive agreements. Villeroy appeared to concur with these positive proposals. He agreed that it was essential for the king, Anjou and Navarre to work together, in which case ‘les autres seroient au bout de leur rôlet’. Naming Guise and Mayenne, Villeroy agreed that they must be observed, but cautioned against any precipitate action against them before the king was the stronger party. Villeroy is said to have noted detailed memoirs from Duplessis and Chassincourt as to how to achieve this position of strength. It appears that, for the moment, Duplessis’ advice was seriously heeded.48 The king treated with Stafford, held long discussions with Villeroy and, on the last day of February 1584, sent for the deputies of the United Provinces. They had come to seek the king’s help and had been waiting for some while. Anjou was pressing very hard for sufficient, and public, support for the Netherlands, while simultaneously intriguing with the Guises. Perhaps, in reality, the Guises were seeking to bully Anjou, as they had in 1576. However this may be, they became very nervous finding that Anjou reported everything to the king. Indeed, Guise is said to have feared that he was already ruined – which argues guilt.49 The catholic plan was, in fact, for a massive rebellion. Savoy would invade Dauphiné and Provence, while Guise opened up Burgundy to Spain; all the affected provinces, including Picardy, would rise. Measures were in place – as the huguenots had heard – to seize Orléans and, when the action began, Spanish support was expected.50 Duplessis hoped that these anxieties would at least impel the king closer to England. Henry had spoken to Stafford of a possible league, which may have seemed more auspicious since the expulsion of Mendoza. While the king was, for once, moved to take some precautionary measures, he offered different explanations to different people. Stafford distrusted him; he feared that, in ostensibly planning to overthrow Montmorency in Languedoc, Henry might really be preparing to turn against the huguenots.51 Expressing this anxiety to Duplessis, Stafford commented in his contorted way: ‘I find they cannot almost tell whereabouts they are, but be almost at a gaze, as all France is’.52 Duplessis believed that the acid test of the king’s resolution would be his reaction to Navarre’s offer of service.53 47

The so-called ‘Spanish road’ actually represented several possible routes from northern Italy to the Netherlands. See on this subject, Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659. 48 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 569-83, 9 March 1584, Duplessis to Navarre. 49 Claude de la Châtre, baron de la Maisonfort, ‘gouverneur’ of Orléans and Berry, marshal of France; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 569-83, 9 March 1584, Duplessis to Navarre. It is not clear who was using leverage against whom. 50 Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 80. 51 Stafford may have been wrong about this; the king wanted Navarre to deal with Montmorency and to recover his allegiance. 52 CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 370-1, 27 February/8 March (sic) 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. 53 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 560-9, 20 February 1584, Duplessis to Navarre.


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Doubtless influenced by Villeroy, the king’s response was initially promising. On 3 and 4 March 1584, Duplessis and Chassincourt heard in some detail from the king and Catherine what defensive measures they now proposed to take. Henry told them that he accepted Navarre’s warnings and good will; he had seldom acted so fast.54 Henry was raising forces and taking defensive measures in all the threatened areas – Picardy, Champagne, Beaujolais, Bresse and Provence. He was also planning to defend Paris and his own person. As a precaution, he excluded the princes and marshals from the council – which included the League leaders – a signal mark of royal disfavour.55 Henry was watching the Guises, and refused to lodge in the Louvre himself in order to exclude them. He was cross and anxious about Montmorency who, in Languedoc, appeared to be siding with Savoy. Henry wanted Navarre to make every effort to detach him.56 Acknowledging the king’s intimations, Duplessis expressed the fear that the churches might be alarmed by Henry’s defensive measures. Duplessis thereby elicited an inquiry as to how they might be reassured. Seizing the chance he had created, Duplessis requested a reissue of the edicts of pacification, with orders to everyone to observe and obey them. He also requested the dispatch of commissioners to the provinces, together with suitable protestant gentlemen to enforce the law. Finally, he asked the king to gratify the huguenots by extending the lease of the hostage towns. Without replying to this, Henry confirmed that all Duplessis’ reports appeared to be accurate; he wished to see him again after five or six days – about 10 March 1584.57 Speaking to Catherine next day, 4 March 1584, Duplessis and Chassincourt gave her the same information. They impressed on her that the churches were increasingly alarmed by the king’s preparations, lest his forces should turn against them if the enemy were to capitulate with the king. Catherine was sympathetic about the hostage towns, and Duplessis suggested two possible plans of action. One was for Navarre to go to Languedoc, to win over Montmorency and divert the rebels. Then he and Montmorency together could oppose Spain, or any other foreign force. Duplessis had not ventured to propose this to the king himself, fearing that he might not care to be so much beholden to Navarre.58 The second proposal related to Navarre’s willingness [still, and perhaps even more than ever] to attack Spain. News of Spanish movements near Saluzzo may have prompted Henry’s decision to send Beauregard back to Navarre with favourable letters from himself and Catherine. Presumably he sought Navarre’s intervention in Languedoc,

54

‘...que de plus en plus il cognoissoit vostre bonne volonté envers lui; qu’aussi y aviez-vous intérêt après lui et son frère, plus que personne’. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 569-83, 9 March 1584, Duplessis to Navarre; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 549-52, 3 March 1584, Duplessis to Navarre. 55 Duplessis indicated in his ‘discours’, discussed below, that the Guises had been expelled from the council. 56 On the extraordinarily complex intrigues and manoeuvres of Montmorency see, Joan M. Davies, ‘The duc de Montmorency and the House of Savoy’, The English Historical Review, cv (1990), 870-92 and ‘Neither Politique nor Patriot?’, The Historical Journal, xxxiv (1991), 539-66. 57 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 549-52, 3 March 1584, report on Duplessis’ audience; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 577-80, 3 March 1584. 58 We have already seen how, late in 1583, Navarre had sought to formalise an indissoluble friendship with Montmorency. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, i, 615 [late 1583], Navarre to Montmorency.

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or further east.59 Stafford, however, was sceptical. ‘If such things had not often deceived the world, they would make men think the king’s meaning is good... and that he would be revenged on the King of Spain and his favourers here... but things past make me doubt of any good meaning to come’. He feared that Henry ‘lacked sense and stomach’ and that the protestants were altogether too sanguine, thinking better of the king than he merited; Duplessis and Chassincourt did, however, admit to distrusting him. Henry was evidently showing disquieting signs of strain, having drawn his sword in anger during a council meeting – an embarrassment which was promptly hushed up.60 By the middle of March 1584, Parma was besieging Ypres and Anjou was gravely ill; factors welcome to the Guises. Their arrogance became insupportable as soon as it was realised that Anjou was dying. The court spun into a frenzy because the negotiations with the United Provinces – upon which everything else depended – were still incomplete. Furthermore, since Anjou was the heir presumptive, the looming succession issue would be a welcome gift both to Spain and to the Guises.61 In these circumstances, an anonymous ‘discours’, dated 18 March 1584, appeared, ‘sur les desseins de la maison de Guise’.62 This was in fact composed by Duplessis, doubtless at considerable risk. He probably acted upon the request of the king who needed some public justification if he were to employ Navarre. This ‘discours’ is a valuable summary of the first conspiracy of the nascent Catholic League. Duplessis exposed the accusations against the Guises which had previously been discussed only in exceptional secrecy. He began by dismissing the commonly held opinions that the king was arming either against the huguenots or Montmorency. Henry III was arming because he had discovered a Guise conspiracy, supported by Spain, against himself and the state. The Guises had long claimed that the throne was rightfully theirs, and they did so more forcefully as the obstacles diminished – whether by the death of princes or the decline of the state.63 Duplessis then detailed the Guise record of publicising their claims, fomenting civil war and seeking to eliminate members of the Bourbon family.64 When Henry III perceived what was happening, he had made peace with the protestants and resolved to observe it.65 Thereupon the Guises had fostered leagues in the provinces, especially in [the frontier provinces of] Picardy, Normandy, Burgundy, Dauphiné and Provence; they had amassed money, formed links with Spain and Savoy, and several times held meetings 59

No such letter from Catherine appears in her published correspondence. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 555-7, 6 and 8 March 1584; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 282. 60 CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 370-1, 27 February/8 March 1584, Stafford to Walsingham, 414-15, 17/27 March 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. 61 Desjardins, Négs.,Tosc., iv, 496-7, 20 March 1584, Cavriana to Vinta; Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 204-5. 62 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 496-7, 20 March 1584, Cavriana to Vinta; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 557-74, 18 March 1584, (first) ‘discours’; also in Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 58495; Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 205 and n.107. Referring to B.N., Mss. fr. 3902, ff. 267-75, Holt gives the date of the ‘discours’ as 15 March 1584. 63 Anjou was still alive, but this suggests that his death was imminently expected. 64 This was, presumably, a reference to the detention of Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre and the prince de Condé in October 1560. 65 Here Duplessis was repeating what the king had said to him at Lyon the previous summer.


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in Paris. Seeing the king to be childless and Anjou unmarried they had, for some two years past, begun to promote the cardinal de Bourbon as the next heir presumptive, thereby excluding Navarre. They had sought to establish this claim in Rome by sending the pope a Latin treatise. The king had now perceived that this movement was gathering pace. Since the religious peace in France (1577), Duplessis’ ‘discours’ continued, the Guises had sought fresh pretexts for arming. They had sounded out Anjou and even Navarre himself seeking, in each case, to exploit the authority of their rank.66 Failing these princes, they had turned to Spain for the necessary force, and to the cardinal de Bourbon as a figurehead of rank. Since the illness of Anjou, they had accelerated their intrigues, renegotiated their alliances, and flattered Bourbon so openly that everyone was aware of it.67 Realising that the king was abandoned to his devotions, that Anjou could not survive for more than three months [a pretty accurate guess], the Guises set to work on their own affairs. They spoke, of course, of the public good, the liberty of the people, the dignity of the nobles and the privileges of the clergy. No one, however, would see these men as reformers; they had entertained no such cares before their recent expulsion from the council. Duplessis claimed to have been observing them and their resentment, when all the thirteen princes of Lorraine – with their supporters – had come to court. [That was clearly intimidating.] In a strong attack upon the duc de Guise, Duplessis called him a corrupt hypocrite and a faithless dissembler; he could not operate without foreign support and had long been in league with Philip II. Thus Duplessis [rightly] predicted for France misery, chaos and a great struggle against Spain. Finally he expressed the hope, which he probably no longer felt, that the king would undertake the necessary measures. Henry III neither wanted to make war on the huguenots, nor against Montmorency, but he meant to make himself feared, obeyed and respected. If he were to do so, it could only be through the support of Navarre, and perhaps also of England. In this way the ground was prepared for Henry III to employ Navarre in his own service and that of France.

V: Navarre’s Proposed Solution, March 1584 It has been seen that, by mid-March 1584, nearly three months before Anjou’s death, the court was already in turmoil. Prompted by the Guises, the cardinal de Bourbon claimed the succession, while the king openly favoured Navarre, speaking of him as the second person in France.68 One evening, sitting by the fire, Henry had spoken of Anjou’s illness and, in the presence of Mayenne, declared that he recognised Navarre as his sole heir. He had always been inclined to love him and he believed they could co-operate. He also declared that he would not suffer Navarre to be superseded, finding it very curious that anyone should dispute the succession; it was no matter for debate. This plain declaration must have rejoiced the hearts of the huguenot agents, Clervant, Chassincourt, and 66

There is no other evidence that the Guises had approached Navarre since the peace of 1577. The ‘renegotiation of alliances’ may refer to the Guise relations with Mendoza since his expulsion from England in January 1584. 68 CSPF., 1583-4, p. 463, 20/30 April 1584, Clervant to Walsingham. 67

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Duplessis who reported it. They took the opportunity of urging Navarre to adopt an appropriate life style and to create a worthy impression. Above all, they deprecated his indiscreet and time-consuming amours.69 In mid-April 1584, the circumstances therefore appeared propitious for Duplessis to make a supreme effort to induce the king to take defensive action; otherwise the combined forces of Spain, Savoy and the catholics would shortly overwhelm not only himself, but also the state and the huguenots. The king’s interests, and those of the huguenots, coincided in every respect save that of religion. This was the predicament from which Henry III would find no escape. War in France was the policy of Spain and the policy of the Guises; they must, at all costs, prevent an active conjunction between the king and Navarre. This fatal dichotomy between the political and religious interests of the crown was not, of course, new; it dated from about 1560, but had never before been such a critical factor in decision-making. The far-reaching solutions envisaged by Duplessis in a second ‘discours’, could not be attempted without peace in France.70 Duplessis’ second ‘discours’, submitted on 24 April 1584, represents Navarre’s remarkable, constructive, and practical programme for averting the terrible trouble which had almost materialised in March and clearly threatened to engulf all France. Duplessis was not exaggerating: this trouble did engulf them, costing the king his life, and the kingdom more than a decade of civil war. Furthermore, it came close to costing Navarre his inheritance, and forced him – to Duplessis’s inexpressible grief – onto the path to Rome. In 1584 the wars, and the consequences of the Catholic League – shortly to be formally constituted – were not yet inescapable. In tendering his proposals to the king, Duplessis observed that Henry could no longer doubt the hostility of the King of Spain, although the state of France was such that open war should not suddenly be undertaken. The burden of his message was, once again, that Navarre should make war on Spain, thereby attacking the trouble at source and directing hostilities outwards. Discussing the relations of France and Spain, which closely affected all Christendom, Duplessis noted that the balance of power was dangerously tilted in favour of Spain. She had increased her power and wealth by the acquisition of Portugal and her overseas empire, while France had forfeited unity and discipline through civil war. Many unruly elements could beneficially be channelled abroad. While the kingdom was not immediately ready for war, certain protective measures could be taken forthwith: the first of these was to form a powerful league against the excessive power of Spain (‘contre cette grandeur d’Espagne qui se deborde’); the second was to repay Spain in her own coin by instigating domestic disorders. As for the proposed defensive league, Duplessis believed that England would join, since a conspiracy [Throckmorton] had been discovered against the queen which had led to the recent expulsion of Mendoza. When queen Elizabeth sent to Spain to explain the reasons for this, her envoy was given forty days in which to leave. Elizabeth was also aware of the Spanish [and Guisard] intrigues in 69

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 574-8, 14 April 1584, Clervant, Chassincourt and Duplessis to Navarre. 70 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 580-93, 24 April 1584, (second) ‘discours au Roi Henry III sur les moyens de diminuer l’Espagnol’; also in Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 596-605.


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Scotland.71 Duplessis resumed some of the arguments which he had previously put to Walsingham. The German princes, he continued, were a more complex proposition. But they were united in their desire to oust the Habsburgs from the Imperial throne, and were currently supporting the protestant archbishop elector of Cologne. France could prepare the way for a German league through the help of her old friend the landgrave of Hesse. Jealousy of Sweden, who was favoured by Spain, would render Denmark agreeable. Spain had done her utmost to win Danish friendship, hoping to persuade her king to close the Sound against Dutch shipping. If, on the contrary, Denmark could be induced to close the Sound against Spanish shipping, Spain would swiftly suffer from the lack of Baltic naval supplies. The Spanish/Danish alliance had been frustrated by those who did not want to see the Netherlands ruined, and France should take advantage of this. Once the existence of such an anti-Spanish league became known, it would be joined by others whom Spain had offended. The second proposal, namely the fomenting of domestic trouble in Spain, could be undertaken while the alliances necessary for open war were being forged. Duplessis went on to discuss the Holy Roman Empire (‘une grande grandeur de la maison d’Autriche’) and the Imperial succession. He advanced the point, already noted, that the Habsburgs normally intermarried. Owing to the frailty of Philip II’s only son, the entire inheritance might once again be united as it was under Charles V. The immediate, and perfectly feasible, action should be to support the archbishop of Cologne by attacking his Bavarian – and Habsburg – competitor in his archbishopric of Liège. Parma was using Spanish forces against Cologne, and Spain, ‘selon sa coustume’, had suborned a soldier to murder the archbishop. Quite a small French force would suffice to save Cologne; Navarre himself could execute the plan if given the necessary means. This, Duplessis added, dropping only a hint, would be a step towards recovering the Empire for France [and with the king’s consent]. This was indeed an ingenious proposal; it was practicable, and would serve a number of different purposes. It would be a means of employing Navarre in the king’s service – at a safe distance from the court – and therefore tend to frustrate the Guises’ designs in France. It would be a blow against the Habsburgs in Germany, calculated to win the gratitude, and hopefully the alliance, of the German princes. It would equally be a blow against Spain by diverting or incommoding Parma, and would assist the United Provinces. Coming in this way, to the Netherlands, Spain’s finest possession, Duplessis declared that they lived by France referring, presumably, to the southern provinces. If, by a blockade, France were to interrupt their supplies, there would be mutinies; the troops would have to disperse, and the enemy would be incapacitated. A similar blockade of both men and supplies could be achieved by breaching the Spanish communications through Franche-Comté, another matter which Navarre could arrange. The Swiss might be induced to co-operate, while England could obstruct Spanish access through the Channel. The United Provinces should also be directly assisted by secret monthly 71

There were, of course, other causes of Anglo-Spanish hostility – especially commercial and maritime; Duplessis mentioned only the most recent.

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payments, and by permitting French subjects to enter their service. Duplessis claimed to have information that the nobles and chief towns of Artois and Hainaut were insubordinate; they were jealous of Parma who dominated them instead of simply commanding their forces. Moving further afield, Duplessis advised the seizure of a port in Mallorca in order to seek control of the straits of Gibraltar, and to aim at rendering the Mediterranean perilous for Spanish shipping. He also proposed an effort to break into Spain’s East India trade, by bringing goods to Suez and thence overland to the Mediterranean. By these comprehensive means, Spain could be undermined and impoverished before the open war began. The first ‘discours’ of March 1584, was therefore a public justification for the coalition of the king, Navarre and various foreign powers against the combined threat of Spain, Savoy and the Guises. The second ‘discours’, of April 1584, proposed an impressive series of practical measures to be undertaken. But this deeply-desired alliance with the king, to avert and eradicate a Guise rebellion in the spring of 1584, entirely failed to materialise. It was already too late. Before any resolutions had been reached, events dramatically supervened; this vital partnership eluded them, leaving Navarre and the huguenots out in the wilderness.72

VI: Épernon’s Mission to Navarre, 1584 Shortly after presenting his second ‘discours’ in April 1584, when Anjou’s death was hourly expected, Duplessis wrote a revealing letter to Navarre.73 The Guises, he reported, had launched into action: after conferring in Nevers’ house they sent dispatches into Burgundy, Normandy, Picardy and Guyenne. Anjou was trying to transfer Cambrai to the king. Henry declined to take the risk; he suggested, instead, that Navarre should receive both Cambrai and the Netherlands. The king’s favourite, Épernon, was to be sent to Anjou at Château-Thierry to discuss the idea; possibly also to explore the huguenot proposal to invade Liège. But when the huguenot deputies at court proposed enterprises in Franche-Comté and Liège, they were told that such propositions would be belles if Navarre were at court. The king could not consider them before his domestic affairs were composed, and that depended upon an interview with Navarre. For this purpose Henry would go to Blois; but even this presented difficulties.74 Despite the king’s desire to see Navarre, Duplessis observed that the protestants received no better treatment; and the lease on their hostage towns – which was what they most urgently required – had not yet been extended. Possibly Henry was reserving that concession as leverage. He was annoyed that Navarre had not cheerfully accepted to go to Languedoc to tackle the

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It was presumably because the plans of the Guises had been betrayed that no rebellion materialised in the spring of 1584. The king did take some precautions, but the reprieve was only temporary. 73 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 594-8, 2 May 1584, Duplessis to Navarre. 74 This idea of an interview between the king and Navarre was on the tapis for several months, but no meeting took place.


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problem of Montmorency, but had imposed conditions.75 Then the idea was conceived that Épernon might visit Navarre.76 Both kings were undoubtedly in a crippling predicament over problems which, in fact, were never to be resolved. Navarre could not safely, wisely, or even honourably return to court. Yet he had, through Duplessis, pressed the king to accept his services, and had offered to attend an assembly of the princes of the blood. He had also proposed a series of audacious enterprises for the salvation of the kingdom which would necessitate co-operation and planning. Besides, there was the subversive matter of the succession which, if actually remote, was rendered critical by the League’s promotion of the cardinal de Bourbon. To Henry III, everything now depended upon Navarre’s religion. Navarre, however, saw things differently. Épernon went first to Château-Thierry to see Anjou, whose treaty with the Netherlands (to be discussed) was completed on 25 April 1584. He would then leave for Guyenne, ostensibly to take the waters – rather a curious pretext for so long a journey. Some mystery has always attached to Épernon’s mission to see Navarre in the summer of 1584. It is clear, however, that the events and circumstances which prompted Duplessis’ two ‘discours’ – of March and April 1584 – the proposals contained therein, and the reaction of the Guises to Anjou’s failing health, provided a very great deal to be discussed with Navarre; Épernon’s mission was evidently the answer. He would convey the king’s expression of good will, and propose the means whereby to establish Navarre’s preeminence. Stafford believed that Épernon held a special, separate commission, to be presented to Navarre if Anjou were to die while he was away.77 In this case, the ‘preeminence’ to which Duplessis cryptically referred was, presumably, the king’s public recognition of Navarre as heir presumptive; but for that Navarre would have to reconvert and return to court. Stafford’s explanation might account for the considerable uncertainty in court circles as to the real nature and purpose of Épernon’s mission, and why it was conducted on such an ostentatious scale.78 After visiting Anjou, Épernon departed for Guyenne on 15 or 16 May 1584.79 He may have met Navarre as early as 13 June at Saverdun and probably at Pamiers (Ariège) on, or about, 25 June. Épernon would, by then, have known of the death of Anjou on 10 June. The meetings are said to have been friendly, extending over three days. However, 75

Evidently Navarre had wisely refused to go to Languedoc without a commission which, presumably, the king dared not provide. CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 492-4, 11/21 May 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. 76 CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 492-4, 11/21 May 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. At the time of Épernon’s departure Stafford believed, without claiming to be sure, that he was first to visit Montmorency and ‘bring him by many promises to depend only on the King’s favour, and, for his own particular to make a league of amity with him...’ It appears, however, that Épernon went only to Guyenne, and then joined the king at Lyon. 77 CSPF., 1583-4, p. 535, 1/1l June 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. This letter, which refers to the death of Anjou (10 June), proves that Stafford was using the old-style dating, although one cannot necessarily assume that he invariably did so. 78 CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 492-4, 11/21 May 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. 79 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 506-8, 14 May 1584, Cavriana to Vinta, 508-10, 29 May 1584, Cavriana to Vinta; CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 492-4, 11/21 May 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. These two ambassadors agree upon the date of Épernon’s departure. Anjou’s new treaty with the Netherlands was signed on 25 April 1584.

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the number of meetings held between Épernon and Navarre is not known for certain, neither are the locations well established. All the talks were secret and no records were kept. Consequently we only know what can reasonably be deduced.80 According to de Thou, Épernon was ordered – presumably in his second commission – to make every effort to induce Navarre to convert and return to court. These changes were held to be essential for the peace of France, now that Navarre was heir presumptive. This was the burden of most accounts, but not all.81 In this way, the Guise plans would be destroyed, because they could not operate without an ostensible religious objective. The argument was, of course, entirely fallacious, since Navarre’s conversion would not have disposed of the huguenots; nor, as a catholic convert, would he himself have turned against them. Nevertheless, converted and at court, Navarre would, by his rank, have eclipsed the Guises and frustrated their assault upon the king and the state – unless he were to be swiftly dispatched. The king allegedly offered Navarre the most advantageous conditions, but nowhere do we learn what they were. Navarre is said to have listened to Épernon, smiled and questioned, but otherwise remained silent; that was his way. On the fourth day, after dinner, he is said to have retired with his chancellor, Armand du Ferrier, Antoine de Roquelaure (both catholics) and the protestant minister, Marmet. Roquelaure and Marmet hotly debated whether it was advantageous for Navarre to go to court and accept the king’s offers, in order to maintain the tranquillity of the kingdom. Roquelaure wanted him to go, to make his fortune and, if necessary, to feign catholicism. Marmet, on the contrary, began to formulate such stringent guarantees for Navarre’s safe return as would amount to a refusal.82 Navarre then appealed to the less partisan du Ferrier. He proposed just a brief visit to court – perhaps for the ‘interview’ – in order to dispel suspicion. But he advised Navarre not to linger. He maintained that Navarre’s conversion would do little to bring about either a reunion with the king or peace in France – an interesting opinion which is rarely considered.83 So the matter is said to have ended, and Épernon departed with nothing resolved. Stafford, however, reported other meetings in other places, and all sorts

80

Cazaux, ‘Les Entretiens d’Henri de Navarre avec le duc d’Épernon’, Bulletin de la société des amis du château de Pau, lxxii (1977), 43. Cazaux has made a number of calculations to show where and when the two men were close enough for a meeting between them to have been physically possible. The first meeting may have been between 12 and 15 June; the last possibility was on 6 August 1584 at Nérac. Ibid., 45, 46; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 516-20, 10 July 1584, Cavriana to Vinta; Mouton, Épernon, 125-33, 134; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 95, says that Navarre was at Pamiers from 19-26 June, received Épernon at Pau between 3-11 July, and that the negotiations took place at Nérac in August. This does not fit with other accounts or with the journey of La Rocque to court, where he arrived by 13 July 1584. 81 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 391-2. The longest account was written by Stafford, CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 581-5, 3/13 July 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. This, however, was before the meetings are believed to have ended. 82 The admiral Coligny, before returning to court in September 1571, had insisted upon written guarantees amounting to eleven articles. Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, chap. x; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iii, 694-701, 22 August 1571, Petrucci to François de Medici, 703-8, 19-20 September 1571, Petrucci to François de Medici. 83 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 391-2.


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of social events.84 The question of the ‘interview’ with the king had evidently not been entirely rejected; and there remained other, huguenot, business to transact. Épernon’s mission could, or may, have posed for Navarre a moment of temptation. Many would have argued with Roquelaure that Navarre should, if necessary, feign catholicism, and occupy his rightful place at court and in the kingdom. But the King of Navarre was a sovereign prince; he had more independence, and doubtless no less pleasure, away in the south. He believed that he could serve the king, oppose their domestic enemies, and resist the power of Spain without making personal changes. Nevertheless, Navarre greatly valued the king’s recognition of his status, which was not conditional upon his religion. When Henry wrote to inform him of the death of Anjou, Navarre quickly requested the privileges normally conferred upon the heir presumptive. Such privileges would formalise the king’s recognition, and augment Navarre’s authority by linking it directly to that of the crown.85 This may well have been before the arrival of Épernon. In July 1584, Navarre’s chamberlain, La Roque, went to court with a verbal answer to whatever Épernon had proposed, and with instructions on other matters.86 It was upon La Roque’s reports that Stafford based a long dispatch to Walsingham. Épernon, Stafford said, had conveyed his commission to Navarre: it declared that, since his brother’s death, Henry had looked upon Navarre as his son and heir, and that ‘using himself well to him [the king], he [Navarre] should find that the effects of his deeds should follow his words’. As one (friendly) correspondent put it, Épernon’s visit demonstrated that the eyes of all France were upon Navarre, as ‘Monsieur de la France,’ and that ‘God had disposed the king’s heart to acknowledge the sincere intention of the King of Navarre and to support his right’. But Henry III’s recognition of Navarre was never formally or publicly proclaimed.87 While everyone was speculating, according to their passions, upon the purpose of Épernon’s mission, it is clear that, from the death of Anjou and the time of Épernon’s mission, Navarre’s religion, together with his ‘protectorate’ of the huguenots, had become both a public and a private problem of supreme importance. Épernon’s mission is not, however, entirely mysterious. It has already been seen that there was a great deal to be discussed between the king and Navarre. We may safely assume, on account of Épernon’s two commissions, that they did discuss everything of current importance. While one commission related to Anjou’s death and the succession, the other was ‘a general commission to deal in those parts’.88 La Roque’s instructions related to such huguenot matters – under negotiation with Bellièvre – as Languedoc, the 84

CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 581-5, 3/13 July 1584, Stafford to Walsingham, ibid., 1584-5, p. 81, 29 September/9 October 1584, Stafford to Walsingham; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 95, says that Épernon remained in the south for some time, seeing Navarre at Pau between 3-11 July, and at Nérac in August. Mouton, Épernon, 137, says that Épernon left about 25 July to join the king at Lyon. 85 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, i, 666, – June 1584, Navarre to Henry III, 670 [late June] 1584, Navarre to Henry III. 86 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 601-5 [July 1584], instructions for La Roque. He had reached Paris by 13 July 1584. 87 CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 548-9, 9/19 June 1584, François Perrot de Mézières to Walsingham. 88 CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 493-4, 11/21 May 1584, Stafford to Walsingham.

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hostage towns, and the payment of garrisons. The king had consented to an assembly of the churches – doubtless thanks to Duplessis’ efforts – which was forthwith summoned for 15 August at Montauban. The king, we may recall, had wanted to settle his domestic affairs prior to further consideration of Navarre’s far-reaching proposals for action against Spain and the Guises.89 Based on the much later testimony of Épernon’s secretary, Girard, it has been said that the meetings between Épernon and Navarre in the summer of 1584 established a degree of complicity between Navarre and the king. Henry III, Girard recorded, could not openly favour Navarre, because of his religion, and was obliged to demand the return of the hostage towns. But, although they could not join forces against their common enemies [Spain and the Guises] Henry approved such defensive measures as Navarre might take.90 Before Épernon departed for Lyon, whether in July or early August 1584, he and Navarre must have learnt of the murder of William of Orange at Delft on 10 July. This most shocking event compounded the problems caused by the death of Anjou, and sharply focused the most crucial international problem: who would now undertake the defence of the Netherlands? Thereafter, Navarre’s return to court would have been sheer folly. Nevertheless, the gravity of the situation may have drawn the king and Navarre a little closer together.91 Duplessis, according to de Thou, wrote and published an elegant account of Navarre’s meetings with Épernon. Duplessis had remained in Paris for some weeks after presenting his second ‘discours’ of 24 April 1584. He departed on 10 June, wanting to join Navarre before the arrival of Épernon. He was, in any case, in a hurry to leave the city since one Johannes, an assassin employed by the Guises, had come to rest just opposite his lodgings. Duplessis’ report was to be distributed among the protestants in order to allay their fears and to strengthen their union.92 De Thou maintained, however, that it created a disastrous impression at court and among the catholics. They, and the Guises in particular, hated Épernon, and asserted that his journey had been undertaken in order to conclude a hostile treaty with Navarre. While no such treaty came to light, they now declared that Navarre persisted in his heresy, thereby endangering religion and the kingdom. Doubtless the Épernon mission was no more than an exacerbation. There 89

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 601-5 [July 1584], instructions for La Roque. Cazaux, ‘Les Entretiens d’Henri de Navarre avec le duc d’Épernon’, Bulletin de la société des amis du château de Pau, lxxii (1977), 48. Cazaux’s conclusion, that the public alliance between the king and Navarre [April 1587] was prepared at this time, is going too far. The so-called alliance was, after all, a truce following extensive hostilities. 91 According to de L’Estoile, Balthasar Gérard, William’s assassin, confessed to having been urged to the act by a Jesuit in Rome. He had, furthermore, also intended to murder Anjou [called Alençon], and had gone to Château-Thierry for the purpose – which was hardly necessary since the duke was mortally ill. Unable to execute that deed, Gérard proceeded to Delft, where William died. De L’Estoile also said that the Jesuits were behind the Parry plot which threatened the life of queen Elizabeth. Parry was executed on 2 March 1585. Roelker, The Paris of Henry of Navarre, 103-4. 92 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 594-8, 2 May 1584, Duplessis to Navarre, 598-600, 9 [June], (9 July in the text, is clearly an error for June) 1584, Duplessis to Navarre; CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 548-9, 9/19 June 1584, François Perrot de Mézières to Walsingham. It looks as if Duplessis’ departure was delayed; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 393. Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, makes no mention of this paper which is not available. 90


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already existed an ‘esprit de révolte’ and France was erupting into rebellion. The people complained and the Leaguer preachers fomented rebellion and fear; assemblies were held, troops raised, and clandestine leaders were appointed. Guise kept emissaries in all towns and fortified places; and he disbursed Spanish money to pay the preachers to attack the king, create panic, and to promote his party as the saviours of religion. Meanwhile Henry III had sought to deceive himself that the ‘stirs’ which followed the death of Anjou were nothing very serious. Nervously, he had begun to cultivate Navarre’s envoys, who were engaged in trying to settle the outstanding huguenot affairs. For this purpose he authorised the huguenot assembly at Montauban in August 1584, at which he was represented by Bellièvre. While recommending the avoidance of provocation, the deputies refused to surrender the hostage towns.93 They prepared a protestant petition which Duplessis, Laval and Constant were instructed to deliver to the king requesting, at the same time, an extension for the towns as an act of grace.94 Having so recently recognised Navarre as heir presumptive, could the king now refuse this first, reasonable request? The huguenot deputies did not reach court until 30 October 1584 having, it appears, hung about at Blois, where the king was awaited. Henry as usual, was unavailable, so their urgent business was deferred until 16 November.95 By then Henry had issued an edict, on 11 November, forbidding associations, confederations and levies of troops.96 By 10 December, Henry III had granted almost all the huguenot requests, which he had previously resisted. They now obtained an extension for the hostage towns, albeit only for two years rather than the three they desired. These concessions may have been influenced by Henry’s wish that Navarre should go to Castres to quell the trouble in Languedoc, of which there were reports. Montmorency and some protestant followers had taken the field in Languedoc, to Duplessis’ acute embarrassment, just when he was seeking to persuade the king of the huguenots’ loyalty. Besides, the plans which Duplessis still propounded depended upon the existence of internal peace. Duplessis regarded the rising in Languedoc as an act of folly and was very anxious, as a matter of extreme urgency, that Navarre should intervene to extinguish this fire; meanwhile his deputies would remain at Saint-Germain. In view of the pressure exerted by the longsuffering envoys from the Netherlands – some of whom had arrived even before the death

93

Anques, Histoire des assemblées, 36-7. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 667-80, 13 September 1584, instructions for the huguenot deputies; 606-67, September 1584, the protestant petition. 95 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 680-5, 14 November 1584, Duplessis to Navarre; CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 71-3, 23 September/3 October 1584, Stafford to Walsingham; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 305-6, 3 September 1584, Ragazzoni to Como, the king was shortly to leave Lyon and possibly to meet Navarre at Tours or Blois; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, i, 683, – October 1584, Navarre to Henry III; Roelker, The Paris of Henry of Navarre, 105. 96 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 393-4. The edict was registered on 12 December 1584 in gloomy silence because the wisest among the ‘parlementaires’ knew that it was already too late. The edict was a feeble attempt to induce the ‘parlement’ to prosecute the catholic leaders. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 6334. 94

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of Anjou – Duplessis favoured an attack upon Hainaut, Artois and Luxembourg; but he no longer wanted Navarre himself to assume the defence of the Netherlands. Duplessis returned south about the end of December 1584 to report to an assembly at Sainte-Foy on the king’s answers to the huguenots’ ‘cahiers’.97 Privately, Henry had recognised Navarre, made concessions and professed to desire peace and the enforcement of the edicts.98 If that was good news, Duplessis did not, however, bring his party a message of peace. Despite some concessions, the struggle to win the king’s confidence had failed. When, therefore, after several dreadful years of fear and humiliation, Henry III turned to Navarre in desperation, it was too late. Henry III had choked upon the issue of Navarre’s religion and was not going to employ his services against their common enemies. Navarre and Duplessis had striven, and continued to strive, to avert the consequent disasters. Duplessis now uttered a solemn warning that the Guises were about to take the field. This rebellion, scheduled for early in 1585, was closely related to the problems of the Netherlands, and the desperation of Spain to prevent either England or France from opposing Parma.

VII: The Problems of the Netherlands The Guise preparations, noted by Duplessis in April 1584, reflected their reaction to the illness and death of Anjou, as well as to Épernon’s mission to Navarre. Thereupon they dropped their plans to invade England, for which Spanish support had been cool.99 When discussions arose at court as to how Navarre, the new heir, should be styled, the Guises flew into action, preparing propaganda and holding assemblies. There was much talk of the cardinal de Bourbon, who frequently met the duc de Guise, and it began to be proclaimed that Navarre could never become king unless he abjured.100 Then, on 14 July 97

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 680-5, 14 November 1584, Duplessis to Navarre, 6879, 14 November 1584, Duplessis to Châtillon, 689-90, 23 December 1584, Duplessis to Sainte-Aldegonde; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 89-91. Stafford said that Duplessis departed very suddenly and secretly, ‘having had many warnings that mischief is intended against him’, CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 191-2, 17/27 December 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. There can be no doubt that Navarre would have been in great danger at court. 98 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 690-2, [late] 1584, Navarre to Henry III. 99 As soon as Philip II heard of the death of Anjou, he commissioned his foreign policy adviser, Juan de Zúñiga to prepare a policy for the exclusion of Navarre from the throne. Zúñiga advised either open intervention, an alliance with Henry III, or a secret alliance with the French catholics. He also recommended a marriage between one of Philip’s daughters and the duke of Savoy, because the League had no credible candidate for the throne. Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, 171-2. It is to be supposed that Mendoza, who was in Spain at the time, had been pressing for an alliance with the Guises. Savoy married the infanta Catalina in March 1585. 100 CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 537-8, 3/13 June 1584, Stafford to Walsingham, 563, 21 June/1 July 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. According to Stafford, the Guises sponsored two books supporting the claims of Bourbon to the crown and rejecting those of Navarre. Ibid., 581-5, 3/13 July 1584, Stafford to Walsingham; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 294, 6 August 1584, Ragazzoni to Como. He said that the Guises quit the court with a large following on 14 July 1584; Saulnier, Le Rôle politique du cardinal de Bourbon, 110 seq.


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1584, only four days after the murder of William of Orange, the Guises departed from court to assemble in Lorraine. They began surprising places in Brittany which, as a maritime province, was important to Spain, and there were rumours of an impending ‘stir’.101 This incipient rebellion coincided with a critical stage both in Parma’s reconquest of the southern Netherlands, and the affairs of the United Provinces. The Catholic League, organised by the Guises during 1583-4, served the purposes of Spain by arresting French intervention in the Netherlands, and by obviating an operative alliance between France and England. Such an alliance was Philip II’s lifelong nightmare.102 It was also hoped that the Guises might succeed in providing Spain with a couple of Channel ports. It is therefore essential to understand how their rebellion had developed during 1584. In the latter months of his life, Anjou had engaged in negotiating a new treaty with the Low Countries. His descent upon the French court in February 1584 – already mentioned – had been to extract money, and permission from the king to provide his allies with open and public support. Henry’s co-operation was indispensable in order to prevent supplies from reaching Parma via the northern ports of France. By the time the new draft treaty was submitted to the States General, Anjou was incapacitated. Consequently its terms provided for the French king to take his place.103 The treaty was signed on 25 April 1584; Anjou’s deathbed will, dictated on 8 June, requested the States General of the United Provinces to transfer all his rights and claims to his brother, Henry III. Two days later Anjou died. Thus, while Épernon was sounding Navarre, the States approached the king, offering him the title of defender and protector. This gesture assumed even graver significance upon the murder of William of Orange on 10 July 1584, just one month after the death of Anjou.104 Henry III was therefore thrust into a role that he was wholly reluctant to play. It brought him into sharp opposition to the Guises, who quit the court forthwith, in order to make their subversive preparations both in France and in Rome. It was in vain that Henry rejected all Anjou’s titles, rights, claims or debts. In the eyes of Spain and her supporters, the king was irrevocably compromised by his brother’s exploits. The desperate negotiations of the States to obtain French support were to continue until March 1585. During that time Parma progressed in his reconquest of the southern Netherlands. The murder of William of Orange created shock waves throughout protestant circles, an awareness of the ruthlessness of Spain, and a sense of imminent danger. ‘It ought,’ declared duke Casimir of the Palatinate, ‘to arouse all who are separated from the delusions of the Pope...[and] also all who have the seeds of troubles and seditions either 101 CSPF., 1583-4, pp. 581-5, 3/13 July 1584, Stafford to Walsingham; ibid., 1584-5, p. 35, 29 August/8 September 1584, Stafford to Walsingham; Martin, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians, 126 and n.3. 102 Philip II’s fear of an Anglo-French alliance was greatly exaggerated, the danger being more theoretical than real. Similarly, queen Elizabeth’s fear of France, and particularly French influence in the Netherlands, was instinctive, traditional, and also exaggerated. 103 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 203-7. 104 Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 207-12.

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in their entrails or upon their skirts’; that went for catholic France.105 While the Netherlands emergency was nothing new, their situation reached a nadir in the second half of 1584. Consequently someone – France, England, or a coalition – would have to act with greater clarity and constancy if a Spanish reconquest was to be averted. Unfortunately this was the moment when Henry III’s deficiencies of character and temperament began to manifest most strongly, and to have serious and irreversible consequences. Henry, it has been seen, failed to act upon Navarre’s intelligence and advice – or any part of it – which would have relieved the pressure on the Dutch. Unable, in his own estimation, to ally with the protestant Navarre, Henry III slowly turned away from the whole Netherlands issue. He also refused, despite the manifest evidence, to face the fact that a reconstituted Catholic League was forming all about him. The pace accelerated after the return from Spain of Bernadino de Mendoza in October 1584.106 The vacuum in the Netherlands caused by the death of William of Orange necessarily focused attention upon the relations between France and England. These relations were fraught, as each wanted the other to assume the financial and operational burden of defending the Netherlands – but without thereby acquiring a superior influence in the Provinces. This failure of England and France to co-operate sincerely, even while their interests coincided, was to be a key factor in European affairs over a long period of time.107 The Anjou episode had created an appearance, or veneer, of common involvement; on both sides there was a circumscribed recognition of the need for coordinated action and mutual support. Discussions as to who would assist the States, and upon what conditions, continued for many months. Then, in 1585, owing to the machinations of the Catholic League, France retreated into mildly benevolent neutrality. Nevertheless, the apparent Anglo-French ‘rapprochement’ – formally marked by queen Elizabeth’s bestowal upon Henry III of the Order of the Garter – alarmed Spain, her agents and supporters. They were all aware that a combined Anglo-French effort to relieve Antwerp and deliver the United Provinces could very well succeed.108 Henry III did not completely reject the proposals of the States General because, despite himself, he had been implicated by Anjou’s treaty of 25 April 1584. In August 1584 he sent des Pruneaux to the Netherlands, ignoring warnings from the nuncio that he

105

CSPF., 1584-5, p. 3, 3 August 1584, Casimir to Walsingham. Morel-Fatio, ‘Don Bernadino de Mendoza’, Annales de la faculté des lettres de Bordeaux. Bulletin hispanique, viii (1906), 31; CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 106-8, 16/26 October 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. Ostensibly, Mendoza came to condole upon the death of Anjou, since Spain already had an agent in Jean Baptiste de Tassis. In effect, Mendoza came to obviate the proposed treaty between France and the Netherlands, and to promote one between Spain and the Guises. 107 The failure of England and France to co-operate is analysed in Sutherland, ‘The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of European Politics’, The English Historical Review, cvii (1992), 587-625. 108 Guise sent the Jesuit, Claude Matthieu, to inform the nuncio that Elizabeth was sending a nobleman to confer upon the king the Order of the Garter; he feared that a treaty or closer intelligence would follow. Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 265, 12 June 1584, Ragazzoni to Como. Henry IV encountered a similar problem in 1595-6 when vigorous Anglo-French co-operation in the Netherlands could have been successful; but it was never achieved. 106


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was risking a rebellion in France.109 Des Pruneaux was to discover what conditions France might obtain from the States, although Henry’s offer to them was held to be ‘very pitiful’.110 In Stafford’s opinion, Henry would only involve himself for profit. Thus ‘if the Queen can have a good concurrency with the French King, she might easily hinder him from having so much and the King of Spain from having all’. On the other hand, the Netherlands themselves were no less confused and divided, and no more altruistic. The southern provinces, under immediate threat, naturally tended to look to neighbouring France. The maritime provinces of Holland and Zealand, which were protestantcontrolled, inevitably preferred England. Others were losing courage altogether. Thus a ‘good, ripe, fitting determination and assistance’ was said to be necessary. It seems that some elements in the Netherlands believed that they might get an easier bargain from France than from England, because the queen would [and did] insist upon the surrender of cautionary ports.111 Navarre was, of course, among those who wished that England would act. He wrote reproachfully to Burghley that queen Elizabeth did not take the trouble to consider the affairs of her neighbours. To Walsingham, he wrote more frankly believing that they, at least, ‘shared a like judgement’. He claimed to have been one of the first to predict ‘this storm which is at our doors’; nor would he be among the last to endeavour to divert the ruin and calamity. Stafford, for his part, wished that more trouble were taken to entertain Navarre ‘of whose friendship we may surelier hope than of any other’.112 Navarre was possibly alone in really desiring to intervene in the Netherlands – an issue which gave rise to heated debate. Henry III preferred to contemplate other matters and to do nothing; Elizabeth, who was never ambitious, wished only to remain secure, and to prevent the French king, as Stafford had suggested, from getting too much. In September 1584, she considered sending over William Waad, clerk of the privy council, to assist the ambassador. As of their own initiative, they were to discover whether Henry III meant to intervene; Elizabeth thought he ought to do so. She wished France to block supplies to the Netherlands, and her ambassadors were to seek an Anglo/French/Dutch conference at Boulogne to hammer out a joint policy. Elizabeth also envisaged their putting diplomatic pressure upon Spain to withdraw from the Netherlands the hated foreign forces – an original grievance of the rebels – and to restore their ancient privileges and form of government. But Elizabeth herself offered to pay less than a third of the 109

Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 289-93, 6 August 1584, Ragazzoni to Como. Roche de Sorbie, seigneur des Pruneaux, formerly a servant of Anjou. 110 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 26-7, 19/29 August 1584, Ortell (the Dutch agent sent to England) to Walsingham. 111 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 20-1, 11/21 August 1584, Stafford to Walsingham, 26-7, 19/29 August 1584, Ortell to Walsingham from Delft, 28-9, 21/31 August 1584, de Villiers to Walsingham from Middelburg, 37-8, 29 August/8 September 1584, Gilpin to Walsingham, 40-2, – August 1584, proposition of Ortell to the queen and Ortell’s remembrances; addenda, 699 [August] 1584, heads of the proposals made on behalf of the States General, 699-700 [4/14, September 1584], the [English] reply. 112 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 300-1, [20 August 1584], Ragazzoni to Como. Ragazzoni heard that Navarre wanted to undertake the protection of the Netherlands and would go in person. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 20-1, 11/21 August 1584, Stafford to Walsingham, 30-3, 24 August/3 September 1584, Stafford to Walsingham, 47-8, 13 September 1584, Navarre to Walsingham.

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proposed French contribution, while the issue of religion was evaded. If the king rejected these proposals, the English ambassadors should consider whether he did so from fear of Spain, or from a desire for sovereignty over the whole territory. Elizabeth had heard that this was what des Pruneaux was currently pursuing. It was evidently this anxiety which prompted her proposal for joint action.113 Indeed, Edmund Yorke shortly reported from Middelburg that sovereignty was precisely what the States General was about to offer Henry III, to be ‘their prince and absolute lord’. Their decision-making process was, however, protracted and tortuous; since the deputies had to report back to each province, there was no lack of ‘jars and diversities of opinions’. In fact the States General did not agree upon their formal offer to France until 23 October 1584. By that time, Mendoza had returned to France. Meanwhile, following the loss of Ghent on 17 September 1584, Parma was threatening Brussels and Mechlin. Antwerp was also endangered, navigation being seriously hampered; Antwerp became the crucial factor.114 Stafford, who was ill, had been staggering about France in pursuit of the elusive king. He believed that Henry would refuse the Dutch offer, namely ‘to establish his domination in such sort as the late Emperor Charles V received and took oath to them; upon the conditions, as to religion and other matters, which their deputies will present to his majesty...’ That statement concealed more than it clarified.115 Stafford reported the opinion of Barnabé Brisson, ‘président’ of the ‘parlement’ of Paris, who argued that it was now too late for a French intervention. Parma had already reconquered too much, while Antwerp and other places needed help from the sea; that was more fitting for England to provide.116 However, after talking to the secretary, Claude Pinart, a few weeks later, Stafford surmised that the French might yet accept the offer ‘if they may be absolutely received to order and dispose all things as they list...’ Yet he ‘dared scarcely assure it’, because those who governed the king would oppose it. Bellièvre, who had returned from the protestant assembly at Montauban, ‘sets forward the action of the Low Countries as much as he can’, and was probably representing Navarre’s point of view. The king himself ‘goeth running up and down’, settling nowhere. He was apparently still hoping for a discreet ‘interview’ with Navarre, which was evidently why Duplessis,

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This English approach to France was made with the knowledge of the States General, who were simultaneously in negotiation with queen Elizabeth. CSPF., 1584-5, p. 49, 4/14 September 1584, queen Elizabeth to Stafford, 222-4, [September 1584], instructions for William Waad. 114 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 62-4, 22 September/2 October 1584, Yorke to Walsingham, 92-3, 6/16 October 1584, Bizarri to Walsingham, 101, 23 October 1584, the States General to Henry III. In 1584 Parma concentrated on starving out the great towns on the Scheldt and its tributaries. Having taken all Flanders, except Ostend, he moved on to Brabant. After taking Vilvoorde, north of Brussels, he began to build his famous bridge below Antwerp to cut off the city from the sea. The bridge was completed on 25 February 1585. After lengthy negotiations, Antwerp surrendered on 17 August 1585, rendering English intervention inevitable. The treaty of Nonsuch, long under negotiation, was signed on 20 August 1585 (N.S.), Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 214-15. 115 This offer was made by Brabant, Flanders, Guelderland, Holland, Zealand, Friesland, Utrecht and Malines. Thomas Lovell reported to Walsingham which places refused to support France, CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 82-3, 30 September/10 October 1584. 116 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 77-9, 27 September/7 October 1584, Stafford to Walsingham.


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Laval, Bellièvre and others had been waiting about for him at Blois.117 Stafford feared for Navarre’s safety, recalling the fate of Coligny once he was lured back to court. Stafford ‘wished to God’ that Walsingham would assure Navarre of the queen’s concern for him. Although Navarre made preparations to go to Blois if necessary – and very well accompanied – the meeting with the king did not take place. The reason could have been circumstantial; everyone quit Blois to escape the plague. The proposed meeting between the king and Navarre would have preceded Henry’s consideration of the States’ offer – one which probably reflected their fear of Parma rather than their hopes of France. Holland, in fact, had favoured the English proposal for a conference at Boulogne.118 This debate, late in 1584, on the fate of the Netherlands was an important turning point for all concerned. Seeing that the States’ preference for France was by no means final, Walsingham wanted Stafford to promote the sensible English proposal for joint action.119 Heated discussion among her ministers led to the conclusion that queen Elizabeth must intervene. She could not ‘suffer the King of Spain to grow to the full height of his designs and conquests’; therefore the ‘Hollanders’ must be succoured. Given adequate security, the queen was now resolved to help, and also to ensure that France did not outstrip her. This momentous decision meant war between England and Spain.120 Consequently it was decided to send William Davison to Holland to ascertain if the States were really intending to turn to France; if not, what would their conditions be? Elizabeth was determined to obtain three hostage towns as a guarantee for the reimbursement of expenses; she also wished to enlist the services of Navarre in diverting Spain.121 Navarre’s voice was heard in England through his agent Ségur-Pardaillan. He tried to promote Navarre’s plans for religious peace as well as the formation of a coalition with the Germans to provide an effective union against the house of Austria.122 While England became increasingly desperate to know what the French king would do, and whether he would agree to joint action, Henry retired to Vincennes; he refused to see anyone before the return of des Pruneaux from the Netherlands. Declining to wait until the deputies were ready to depart for France, des Pruneaux reached Paris on 10 November 1584 bearing the States’ offer; this sounded substantial but was really quite vague. Des Pruneaux conferred with the king and Catherine for a whole afternoon. He 117

It is possible that La Roque had informed the king in July that Navarre had agreed to meet him, following the advice of du Ferrier. 118 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 89-90, 4/14 October 1584, Ortell to Walsingham, 92-3, 6/16 October 1584, Bizarri to Walsingham. 119 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 86-7, 2/12 October 1584, Walsingham to Stafford, 88-9, 4/14 October 1584, Gilpin to Walsingham. 120 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 119-20, 26 October/5 November 1584, Walsingham to Stafford, 129-32, [October] 1584, Discourse concerning the French King and the Low Countries. 121 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 95-8, 10/20 October 1584, proposed aid from Her Majesty to the Low Countries, 14951, 13/23 November 1584, instructions for Davison; HMC Hatfield, iii, 67-9, questions touching the Low Countries. It was decided to call parliament, always a sign of trouble. Ibid., 69-70. 122 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 113-14, 20/30 October 1584, memorandum of Ségur, 189-90, 15/?25 December 1584, Ségur to Walsingham, from Southampton on his return to France. Ibid., 1583-4, pp. 530-2 [May] 1584, answers of the German princes.

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then reported to the States General on 13 November 1584 that the king would defer his reply until he had received their deputies.123 Stafford elicited only a ‘sleeveless’ comment from the king and did not know what to expect. He perceived, however, that Henry was otherwise preoccupied, having ‘some great matter in his head [rebellion] and stands in fear of Spain both abroad and at home’.124 He was, in fact, paralysed by his half belief in the incipient Guise rebellion. The Dutch deputies were long delayed by adverse winds and even longer – at Boulogne, Dieppe, Abbeville and Senlis – by the ‘dallying entertainment’ of the king in January 1585.125 Henry was probably intimidated by Mendoza who rudely declared that he ought to surrender the deputies as Spanish rebels. This put the king into a ‘great chafe’ and a furious row ensued between them. Thus, it stood ‘in a staggering’ whether or not the king would hear the deputies at all. But then, he ‘is so diverse as not his mignons themselves know whether it be ebb or flood two days together’. Later, ‘coming home evil contented’ from his stormy audience, on 10 January 1585, Mendoza burst out ‘in a great choler’ that ‘he had a means to put such a dissension in the court that the King should be more busy to appease it than to look to other matters’.126 Mendoza was referring to the recent treaty of Joinville with the Guises.

VIII: The Netherlands and the Catholic League It is probable that during the critical summer of 1584, when the Guises were busy with their preparations, the Spanish agent, Tassis, was laying the foundations of their formal treaty with Spain. This would serve to focus their rebellion. The prospect of more precise Spanish support may account for their remarkable audacity at this time. While Philip’s counsellor, Juan de Zúñiga, advised such a treaty in June 1584, one may also deduce that, upon the advice of Parma, the project was nurtured in Spain by Mendoza. When he returned to France in October 1584, his principal purpose was probably to oversee the conclusion of the Guise alliance.127 Supplanting Tassis, Mendoza then remained in France as resident ambassador. Tassis left Paris about the middle of November, apparently to 123 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 138-9, 3/13 November 1584, Stafford to Walsingham, 140, 13 November 1584, des Pruneaux to the States General. 124 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 164-6, 22 November/2 December 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. 125 The deputies left Brill on 2 January 1585, arrived at Boulogne on 9th and Senlis on 24 January. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 202-3, 24 December 1584/3 January 1585, Davison to Walsingham, 228-30, 2/12 January 1585, Stafford to Walsingham, 233-4, 19 January 1585, the Dutch deputies to the States General from Abbeville, 237-9, 14/24 January 1585, Stafford to Walsingham; CSPVen., 1581-91, p. 105, 18 January 1585, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 126 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 228-30, 2/12 January 1585, Stafford to Walsingham, 230-1, 2/12 January 1585 (2), Stafford to Walsingham. 127 Jensen makes this statement categorically, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 57-9, and quotes Simancas K 1448, f. 14, 28 August 1584, Philip II to Mendoza. Mendoza returned to France in disguise, passing Blois on 16 October. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 106-8, 16/26 October 1584, Stafford to Walsingham; CSPVen., 1581-91, pp. 102-3, 12 October 1584, Moro to the doge and senate. Mendoza remained in France until January 1591, by which time he was virtually blind, Jensen, ibid., 212; Moret-Fatio, ‘Don Bernadino de Mendoza’, Annales de la faculté des lettres de Bordeaux. Bulletin hispanique, viii (1906), 20-70. He says that Mendoza returned from Spain in September 1584, which may have been the time when he actually entered France.


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join the Guises and finalise the treaty.128 Thus the dual origin of the Catholic League again becomes clear. The Guises naturally looked to Rome for justification and authority since Gregory XIII (May 1572-April 1585) was, like themselves, a sworn enemy of England. Besides, Papal authority was vital to those who adopted the mask of religion in order to subvert the succession. So, in 1584, the Guises made their approaches to Rome, partly through the unscrupulous Jesuit, Claude Matthieu. He had already assisted with negotiations in Scotland and, in 1583, became confessor to the duc de Guise. Indeed it appears that, for a while, Matthieu was simultaneously confessor to the king, which doubtless provided extraordinary opportunities for mischief. He did his best, for example, to discredit the king in the eyes of the nuncio, Girolamo Ragazzoni, declaring Henry to be insane.129 In September 1584 Matthieu and his colleague, Henri Samier, conveniently left for Rome on the business of their Order. They carried letters to the pope from Guise and the cardinal de Bourbon, as well as a paper upon the state of France.130 Matthieu made an undisguised and crudely secular presentation of their objectives. The Guises were making preparations to form a league with Spain and the disaffected elements in France, in order to defy royal authority, promote the claims [to the throne] of the cardinal de Bourbon and to renew the civil wars. Guise requested Papal sanction for the League, the excommunication of Navarre and Condé, and Papal advice upon what to do with the king! Would he have dared to voice such thoughts without encouragement from the nuncio, who was privy to their movements and purposes?131 Matthieu, however, went even further: he frankly inquired whether it would be advisable [not licit] to kill the king? Gregory XIII thought not. Nevertheless, the idea of regicide had been formulated and voiced; and it survived, because none other would serve. Gregory, however, thought it wiser to seize the king, and to use him [meaning, presumably, to exploit the authority of the crown] in the struggle against the heretics. This vague, but cynical and unrealistic advice of Gregory XIII may partly account for the curiously indeterminate conduct of the duc de Guise in his subsequent cat and

128 According to Jensen, Juan de Moreo came to France from Madrid with special power to work on the treaty, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 53, 275 n.64. Mendoza was not accredited as ambassador until November 1584 and Longlée, the French ambassador in Spain, warned Henry III to demand his recall. Mousset, Pierre de Ségusson, 72 n. 2, 73; Sutherland, ‘The Foreign Policy of Philip II and the French Catholic League’, History, li (1966), 323-31, review article. There is a lot of scattered material on the subject of the Catholic League which awaits correlation. 129 Claude Matthieu was superior of the Jesuits in Paris, 1582-4, and confessor to the king from August to November 1582. He was dismissed for being too political and pro-Spanish. Martin, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians, 83, 108-9, 121. 130 Henri Samier was also known by the pseudonyms Jacques La Rue and Hieronymo Martelli. Matthieu left Paris on 7 September and, together with Samier, arrived in Rome on 20 October – not November – 1584, just about the time that Mendoza reached Paris. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 655-7, 11 February 1585, Matthieu to Nevers. For further information on Matthieu’s report, see chap. III. 131 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 62, 31l-12, 17 September 1584, Ragazzoni to Como. Matthieu conveyed to Ragazzoni all the Guise secrets.

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mouse relations with Henry III.132 Nevertheless, Guise understandably felt that privately and morally the pope was behind him. Burgeoning in confidence, the duke began to canvas support in Burgundy and Champagne and to provide armour for men and horses, ‘speaking big and very contemptuously of the King’. When summoned to court by Henry III, Guise replied defiantly that they could serve him better where they were. Henry was already tossing about like a ship in a storm; no one could ‘settle any judgement’ upon his actions, and Stafford feared that he would shortly deliver himself into the hands of the Guises.133 The two Jesuits left Rome on 20 December 1584 when Guise was formalising his treaty with Spain. Matthieu travelled via Switzerland – where he arranged for a levy of 6,000 men – and thence to the borders of Lorraine. On 11 February 1585 he wrote at length to the duc de Guise, and sent his colleague Henri Samier to deliver a report to the duc de Nevers. By the end of February Matthieu was at Joinville, ‘aiding Guise in his efforts to secure the success of the League’.134

IX: The Treaty of Joinville, 31 December 1584 The treaty of Joinville between Spain and the French catholic leaders, signed on 31 December 1584, provided the foundation without which the later civil wars of the Catholic League could not have been fought. The treaty formalised the Spanish aspect of the Catholic League, and mobilised the domestic aspirations of the Guises to serve the evolving interests of Spain.135 For the Guises, the succession issue, provided by the death of Anjou, satisfactorily completed their revised pretexts for action. Tacitly, the treaty also marked the rival Spanish interest in the French succession. Thus, while Spain and the Guises had come to need each other, there was always that discordant element in their alliance. For Spain the immediate concern remained the looming inevitability of war with England, and the need to ensure the defence of the Netherlands.136 Joinville was not a startling new departure, but rather a timely consolidation of an old affinity. Nevertheless, it was an important turning point for everyone concerned – Spain, the Guises, Henry III, and Navarre for whom it decreed the long and arduous struggle which now lay ahead. 132

Martin, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians, 129-31. Guise was also constrained by the unreliability of Spanish subsidies. Philip II did not want him to be too powerful, but just to keep the cauldron bubbling. 133 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 124-6, 29 October/8 November 1584, Walsingham to Stafford, 164-6, 22 November/2 December 1584, Stafford to Walsingham. 134 Our knowledge of Matthieu’s mission derives from this report. Martin, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians, 128-31, 140-1. 135 B.N., Mss. fr. 3363, f. 19, 31 December 1584, original, text of the treaty of Joinville; Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 51-5. For the moment, at least, the treaty appears to have been kept secret, although preparations for the rebellion were widely apparent. De Thou insists that Joinville was a renewal of an original treaty with Spain, presumably updated, devised by Tassis and Moreo. The treaty was signed by Guise and his brother Mayenne and by François de Rocherolles, seigneur de Maineville for the cardinal de Bourbon. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 445-6. 136 The death of Anjou modified Philip II’s thinking, tilting his attention towards France, although England remained his priority project until the death of Henry III. Philip proceeded with his plan for the marriage of Charles Emmanuel, duke of Savoy, to the younger infanta Catalina (March 1585), and questioned his ministers on the subject of his claims to Brittany and the French crown. Mousset, Pierre de Ségusson, 66-7.


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The treaty was also a calculated precursor to the excommunication of Navarre, which Spain and the Guises actively promoted. By article one of the treaty, the cardinal de Bourbon was to be declared the heir presumptive; all heretical claimants were to be excluded and the protestant religion prohibited. This was as welcome to Spain as it was to the Catholic League since Navarre, who had not hesitated to reject Spanish propositions, was a potentially dangerous enemy. Bourbon, when he became Charles X, must renew the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis; he would be bound by an offensive/defensive alliance with Spain, and required to reimburse Spanish expenses in respect of the League. Philip II, no less than queen Elizabeth, was anxious about the costs of war. All this related to the future. For the present, Philip II would pay the Guises 50,000 écus per month, for so long as they sustained civil war in France. This was either to re-establish catholicism, to oppose the supporters of a heretic claimant [Navarre], or against those who upheld heretics in the Netherlands. Philip was to advance 600,000 écus in two instalments: the first on 31 March 1585 and the second on 30 June – both of which proved to be significant dates. The one coincided with the League’s declaration of Péronne, and the other – near enough – with the treaty of Nemours with the king. Together these transactions ensured the renewal of civil war in France. Other miscellaneous clauses were beneficial to Spain, such as the return of Cambrai, a strategic frontier fortress seized by Anjou; France was to desist [under Bourbon as Charles X] from her alliance with the Turks, from piracy, and from illicit trade in the Indies. Clearly Spain obtained the better bargain. But the treaty enabled the Guises to arm, and to rebel against the king who shrank from arresting them.137 It was, of course, absurd to propose that the sick and aged cardinal de Bourbon would outlive the youthful king. Nevertheless, the cardinal’s fragile candidacy was a useful expedient for the Guises who thereby purported to advance a Bourbon prince. Both the Guises and Spain were enabled to evade and postpone the deeper issue: namely that after the cardinal’s demise, there could be no further agreement upon the succession, either between Spain and the League or amongst the Leaguers themselves. This was, indeed, to be the rock upon which both the alliance and the League would founder.138 By affirming the Spanish interest in the French succession, the treaty of Joinville presaged her more direct and systematic intervention into the internal affairs of France. Indeed, it was to be this Spanish intermeddling which shattered Duplessis-Mornay’s dream of religious peace, and which forced Navarre, as Henry IV, onto the rocky path to Rome. This is not to claim that Duplessis’ dream would otherwise have materialised, but only that Spain became the instrument of its destruction. Had Navarre been able to conquer his

137

CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 339-42. 10/20 March 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. There did, however, exist a widespread and openly expressed belief that Henry III would not live much longer; René de Lucinge – Savoyard ambassador, 1585-8 – actually believed that this irrational conviction, or convenient fiction, underlay and explained the politics of the time. Dufour, Ed., Lucinge, Lettres sur les débuts de la Ligue, 271-3, 18 December 1585, 273 n.2. Ragazzoni described the king as ‘déjà assez décrépit et qui n’a pas bon teint’. Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 53, 268-72, 25 June 1584, Ragazzoni to Como. 138

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kingdom, free from the opposition – military, political and juridical – of Spain, the Papacy and the League, one can only surmise what more he might have achieved. With the treaty of Joinville safely accomplished Mendoza, it has been seen, clashed with the king in January 1585 over the presence in France of deputies from the Netherlands. The envoys had not yet gained access to the king and Mendoza intended to ensure the failure of their mission. Behind this anxiety lay his urgent concern to obviate the relief of Antwerp. Mendoza therefore launched into action: he called upon the Guises to strike at once [while the king was dithering]; Guise must now assume ‘the defence of religion’ which was threatened with ruin in France and the Netherlands. This was, of course, a manner of speaking: Mendoza meant that Antwerp was a key engagement for Parma; it was likely to fail if either France or England was permitted to intervene. Without succour, the United Provinces could not survive; that was Parma’s opinion. Mendoza told Guise that Swiss levies were waiting to march, and money for German forces was ready; it was now upon his resolution that the success or failure of the siege of Antwerp depended.139 Guise, for his part, realised that if Henry III decided upon war in the Netherlands, that would diminish the forces of the League in France. He was therefore already preparing to take the field as Mendoza required. That, it has been seen, was what Duplessis reported to the huguenots at Sainte-Foy late in December 1584. Mendoza was now confident that he could raise hell in France. That was Philip II’s wish, and that was precisely what happened. Henry III was apparently unwilling to resolve anything before the arrival of lord Derby from England. Thus, in Stafford’s disparaging words, he withdrew to his ‘monkery’ at Vincennes.140

X: The Bungled Rebellion It appears that the neglected deputies from the Netherlands saw the king privately only once, on 15 February 1585. That, contrary to what the king desired, was before the arrival of lord Derby. Consequently they were required to put everything in writing so that the whole matter could be referred to commissioners. Their articles were not disclosed, though Stafford tried to ‘stawk’ them. But, having ‘stawked’ in vain, Stafford hastened to obtain an audience, on 17 February. This was partly to seek enlightenment, but also to impress upon the king the danger to Antwerp, whose safety was of special concern to England. Henry merely replied that the deputies had not yet submitted their articles.141 139

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 448-51. CSPVen., 1581-91, pp. 105-6, 1 February 1585, Dolfin to the doge and senate. Henry was still hiding away on 4 February when the deputies were at Senlis, CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 257-9, 25 January/4 February 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. 141 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 273-6, 12/22 February 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. Stafford speculated at some length upon what the French might do. Ibid., 166, 3 December 1584, instructions for the deputies and articles of the proposed treaty. They had apparently come with full powers to beg for the king’s protection, as his subjects and friends, willing to accept reasonable terms. It was allegedly because these matters required careful deliberation that the king required them to be submitted in writing. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 450. 140


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Stafford claimed to have been credibly informed that Henry was procrastinating in order to see if the King of Spain would act – it is not clear in what respect. True to character, the King of France tarried until it was too late. This was arguably the most critical failure of his reign. Mendoza was ready, and determined, to avert the relief of Antwerp.142 He informed Parma, on 27 February 1585, that the Dutch deputies had delivered their articles in writing, adding ‘important news’: ‘the kinsmen of Guise are making themselves ready and it is doubted [i.e. expected] there may be a civil war’. The nuncio, Ragazzoni, also used his influence in the same sense. Stafford was well aware that the sands were running out. He believed the king to be frozen by the fear of ‘some great practice they [the Guises] have in hand, and that there is a meaning that they shall come shortly to this town [Paris] and by force constrain the king to take another course of life...’ That would include abandoning the Netherlands. Henry would not ‘enter into any action abroad for fear of danger at home’.143 The arrival of lord Derby, on 24 February 1585, was no doubt an additional vexation for Mendoza. In reality, however, the Spaniard’s triumph was already assured. After the – extravagant – Garter ceremony, on 28 February, the English ambassadors entered upon the business of the Low Countries. They sought the ‘speedy answer’ that queen Elizabeth demanded, now that French commissioners had treated with the Netherlands’ deputies. The Venetian, Dolfin, believed that Derby – who did not speak French – would leave the burden of the negotiation to Stafford, and that it would fail. The trouble was that both countries wanted to occupy the most valuable ports.144 In the event, Henry continued to hedge, implausibly claiming ignorance of the details of the deputies’ proposals. According to Bellièvre, he and the commissioners had ‘four times made the king acquainted [with their negotiation] and had always charge from him to dispatch them to their contentment’.145 It seems that, at this time, the sorely-tried deputies began to turn in desperation to the English ambassadors. Everyone had been hoping for a favourable resolution from the king on 9 March. That night, however, seized by a ‘sudden alteration,’ Henry summoned the deputies and made them an answer ‘quite contrary’. He would, he said, have accepted their offers, ‘if the case of his realm stood not as he is advertised from all places that it doth... but his own estate was so tickle and so unsound

142

CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 247-9, 18/28 January 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. Henry had ordered Longlée, his ambassador in Spain, to penetrate Philip II’s plans, Mousset, Pierre de Ségusson, 68, 11 January 1585. There seem to have been protracted negotiations over Cambrai where, perhaps, Henry feared that Spain might strike. Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 363-7, 12 February 1585, Ragazzoni to Como. 143 That he refused to act abroad for fear of danger at home is exactly what the king himself was to say, sixteen days later. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 173-6, 12/22 February 1585, Stafford to Walsingham, 285-7, 27 February 1585, Mendoza to Parma. Mendoza also reported that a levy of 10,000 men was being raised for Guise in Germany, and that the earl of Derby had arrived. 144 CSPVen., 1581-91, pp. 107-9, 28 February 1585, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 145 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 295-7, 23 February/5 March 1585, Derby and Stafford to Walsingham, 315-19, 3/13 March 1585, Derby and Stafford to Walsingham.

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within itself that he was to fear that in going about to get upon others he should put in venture to leese [lose] himself’; nevertheless, he would be a good neighbour to them.146 To Derby and Stafford, the king expressed his regrets, and the frustrated Bellièvre contributed a ‘very long and premeditate oration’, reported by Stafford. It appears that a treaty between France and the Netherlands had been ‘in good forwardness’, were it not for the ‘advertisements from so many places... come to him of evil affected subjects in his own realm, who, with practices and intelligences abroad and round about him he was greatly to fear, if he were entered into any action abroad, would greatly seek to trouble him at home... and therefore he had been fain to give them that answer’. Mendoza himself could hardly have improved upon that. Henry, however, proposed that England and France should ‘join in a more strait amity and league’. Together they could mediate with the King of Spain on behalf of the United Provinces. This was evidently the rhetoric of retreat, although Elizabeth had made a similar proposal in September 1584.147 To judge from expressions of astonishment and dismay, Henry had indeed made a sudden volteface. Presumably he had heard that ‘all the house of Guise and their adherents are armed and with the cardinal de Bourbon will be on horseback on 20th of this month’ [March]. Navarre told Walsingham, quite categorically, that it was the Guises who had caused the king to break with the Dutch deputies.148 In this altered situation, there was considerable debate as to how the king should proceed; and that was critical for Navarre. According to one opinion, Henry should accept the deputies’ offers and send Navarre to the Netherlands.149 But the council strongly opposed this view. The idea of engaging in foreign conflict as a means of averting civil war was derided as absurd temerity. Spain would not easily abandon the Netherlands, and the Catholic League must be dealt with first.150 This, no doubt, was pro-Spanish counsel since it was most unlikely that the king either could, or would, ‘deal’ with the Catholic League. Nevertheless, the council was right in that it was already too late to choose. The Netherlands crisis had provided the Guises with their great opportunity and the expectation of Spanish support. In mid-March 1585 there were reports that a barge, purchased by the cardinal de Guise, had been seized on the river Marne; it was laden with arms.151 On 14/24 March Stafford reported Guise to have seized Châlons. ‘We are at 146 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 342-4, 10/20 March 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. Davison reported from the Hague that those to whom he had been able to communicate the king’s refusal, were glad, most not wanting a French treaty. Ibid., 382-4, 26 March/5 April 1585, Davison to Walsingham, 394-7, 3/13 April 1585, Davison to Walsingham. Doubtless as a ‘good neighbour’, Henry placed an embargo on the export of food to the Netherlands, a measure which had been requested by the English. Henry was advised by the council that, of the two problems, the Catholic League should be attended to first. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 463 seq. 147 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 315-19, 3/13 March 1585, Derby and Stafford to Walsingham. Derby left the day after this speech on 14 March. CSPVen., 1581-91, pp. 110-11, 15 March 1585, Dolfin to the doge and senate; Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth, 311. 148 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 339-42, 10/20 March 1585, Stafford to Walsingham, 410-11, 20 April 1585, Navarre to Walsingham. 149 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 467. 150 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 474-5. 151 The date, and exact place of the arrest seem to vary. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 339-42, 10/20 March 1585, Stafford to Walsingham, gives 16 March; Desjardins, Négs.,Tosc., iv, 550-3, 29 March 1585, Cavriana to


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war’, he added bluntly.152 A few days later, Stafford observed that ‘these matters of war do grow very hot and great troubles like to ensue’.153 That day, 29 March 1585, the king issued a second preventative edict. It condemned the raising of levies, enjoined the disbanding of forces already assembled, and lowered certain taxes. Like its predecessor, of 11 November 1584, this measure was ignored.154 There is a good deal of material on exactly what happened at this time, but little on what the Guises had actually intended to do. According to one account, the first part of their plan was to obtain the revocation of the edicts of pacification and the surrender of the huguenots’ hostage towns – whose lease the king had just extended. These, however, were long-term objectives. It appears from Leaguer activity, and from the general level of fright, that Parma and Mendoza had engineered an emergency enterprise against the king in order to prevent the relief of Antwerp.155 La Rochette, ‘maître de camp’ to Guise, who was captured with the armaments ship, confessed to the revolutionary nature of the League. He provided valuable information about their forces and their intended demands.156 Villefallier – a finance officer from Orléans, and father-in-law to Péricart, secretary to Guise – made a full confession. He revealed that a rising had been scheduled for 6 April 1585.157 The League intention was to march on Paris. In Paris at least, the rebels’ purpose was always to seize the king. That, it has been seen, corresponded to Papal advice to Guise. But, through La Rochette and Villefallier, the king had discovered the League designs just ahead of their execution.158 Nevertheless, the League was in arms and the king was not; Henry therefore felt obliged to negotiate. Thus Catherine de Medici, albeit very ill, left for Épernay on 30 March 1585.159

Vinta, gives 14 March; p. 553, ‘il timore e grandissimo’; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 383-5, 18 March 1585, Ragazzoni to Como, says that the king had heard of the capture on 13 March. 152 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 354-5, 14/24 March 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. 153 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 359-62, 19/29 March 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. 154 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 451. 155 While there is no indication that Henry III intended to attempt the relief of Antwerp, that is what the Spanish feared. 156 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 359-62, 19/29 March 1585, Stafford to Walsingham; Dufour, Ed., Lucinge, Lettres sur les débuts de la ligue, 1585, pp. 32-5, 29 March 1585, Lucinge to the duke of Savoy. 157 Villefallier was a finance officer from Orléans and father-in-law to Péricart, secretary to Guise. The exact date of the intended rising varies in different accounts. Saulnier, Le Rôle politique du cardinal de Bourbon, 119, quoting Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, viii, 244 n.1; Dufour, Ed., Lucinge, Lettres sur les débuts de la ligue, 46-50, 8 April 1585, Lucinge to the duke of Savoy; Valois, Histoire de la ligue, 86-90; Sutherland, The French Secretaries of State, 255, n.2. 158 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, Poulain, Procès verbal, 289-323. Poulain was recruited to the League on 2 January 1585. One of those he then met was the sieur de Bray, the go-between for Guise and Mendoza. Poulain became an informer. 159 B.N., Mss. ital. 1734, f. 26, 2 April 1585.

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XI: The ‘Declaration of Péronne’, 31 March 1585 On the following day, 31 March 1585, the League issued their ‘declaration of Péronne’, prepared in the name of the cardinal de Bourbon.160 Historians have traditionally presented this declaration as the ‘manifesto’ of the Catholic League. It was nothing of the kind, and the timing alone should alert one to that. The Guises had been betrayed and exposed before they were ready to strike. Under any competent regime, they would have perished on the block. The relatively anodyne vacuity of the ‘declaration’ indicates an exercise in damage limitation. It was a feeble attempt to explain away the culpable preparations of the League, possibly in order to guide the course of Catherine’s negotiations, as well as to play for time. The assertion of loyalty in the ‘declaration’, and its mild protests against mignons, taxation, and religion did not reflect the aggressively subversive document of 1576, or the recent treaty of Joinville. Neither did the declaration of Péronne correspond to the wholly subversive treaty of Nemours which resulted from the negotiations at Épernay. Having – since late in 1583 – promoted the claims of the cardinal de Bourbon to the succession, it is significant that this was now denied. The aged cardinal, it was disingenuously declared, cared nothing for the kingdoms of this world. Nevertheless, the League was in arms, so who could be deceived? In a counter declaration of April 1585 the king observed, with the acidity he sometimes commanded, that the restoration of catholicism, the appropriate distribution of offices and dignities, and the well-being and relief of the clergy, nobles and people were not matters which necessitated assembling in arms, or the raising of foreign forces.161 This rejoinder is significant because it went on to state Henry’s real position in respect of the huguenots. His own religious zeal was not diminished, he declared, because he had pacified the troubles caused by religion. He had done so upon the advice of many councillors, including that of the cardinal de Bourbon himself. These troubles had [notoriously] become entrenched during the minority of Charles IX, and could not now be terminated in arms. Such a long war as would be necessary to destroy the protestants, was unsustainable. That simple fact of life was one that Henry soon ignored. As for the succession, there was no crisis. Henry and the queen were young and fit; the issue was being prematurely forced as a pretext for assuming arms. Finally, and for the third time, the king called upon the leaders of the League to disperse their forces, cancel their foreign levies, and to abandon all leagues and associations. Upon these conditions, he hinted at a pardon. Duplessis-Mornay also seized his pen to denounce the declaration of Péronne, condemn the Guises, and defend the rights of Navarre. Duplessis was not deceived for a

160

Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, 7-19; Goulart, Mémoires de la ligue, i, 56-63; Saulnier, Le Rôle politique du cardinal de Bourbon, 122, says that Guise prepared the manifesto and Claude Matthieu revised it. According to Salmon, Society in Crisis, 237, Matthieu [who had just returned from Rome] was ‘responsible’ for much of it. 161 Goulart, Mémoires de la ligue, i, 63-73, April 1585, ‘déclaration de la volonté du roi sur les nouveaux troubles du Royaume’.


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moment by demands for reforms, and he was determined that no one else should be.162 He referred, in particular, to the Guise propaganda over the last four or five years, and their need to find a pretext for war – namely religion – in order to pursue their own objectives. The king had done what he could to combat heresy but, pending a council, he had found it necessary to compose the troubles. Deprived of arms by the peace of 1577, the Guises had begun to foment rebellion in the provinces. Then the death of Anjou had fortuitously provided the opportunity to renew their ‘ancien desseins’. The Guises wanted only one religion; so did everyone else. But the emperor Charles V had discovered [once and for all] that force could not dictate to conscience. The Guises demanded that the succession be determined while the king was still young. But if the succession were a genuine problem, they would address themselves to the king – unless – Duplessis added pointedly – they were planning to curtail his life. Instead, they designated as his heir presumptive an old man under their control. It was really on account of the succession, Duplessis declared, that the Guises assumed arms, seized towns, distributed Spanish money and summoned Spanish forces, although Guise himself was known to be indebted to the hilt. Count Charles Mansfelt was expected with troops sent by Parma, with whom Guise and Mendoza were in touch.163 The Guises did these things knowing full well that Navarre was the rightful heir. He professed the religion in which he had been raised, and could not change it without instruction. He was ready, as he always would be, to receive such instruction from a free and legitimate council, and he could not be expected to do otherwise. According to canon law, not all error was heresy; Navarre subscribed to all the fundamentals of Christian doctrine. There follows a long passage designed to demonstrate that Navarre was not a heretic. The laws of inheritance [in respect of real estate] were not affected by religion, so why should the royal succession be any different? This observation must have suggested to contemporaries that Duplessis did not see the reign of a protestant as problematic. Guise claimed to fear that Navarre, as king, would overthrow [the catholic] religion, despite repeated assurances to the contrary. This, however, was no confessional quarrel; many catholics now supported the protestant Navarre, whether as legitimists or as enemies of the Guises. Duplessis went on to consider the Guises’ record, and the particular complaints contained in the declaration of Péronne. He frankly asserted, so that everyone should be clear about it, that the Guises were now resuming the designs contained in the David memoir in 1576. It was necessary for them to blacken Navarre, both because they feared him and because he was a natural enemy of Spain. For themselves and for Spain, the Guises were prepared to overthrow the establishment. Now that public issues were 162

Goulart, Mémoires de la ligue, i, 79-102 [probably April 1585], ‘réponse aux déclarations de Messieurs de Guise’; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, ii, 419-51, ‘advertissement sur l’intention et le but de la maison de Lorraine en prenant les armes’; ibid., iii, 49-81, ‘remonstrance à la France sur les protestations des chefs de la ligue’, 1585, are both, basically, the same document as the réponse. 163 A Spanish force of 2,000 foot plus 500 horse was said to be waiting at Ivoy. La Rochette confessed that Philip II had levied 4,000 reiters and 6,000 lansquenets. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 359-62, 19/29 March 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. Duplessis meant, of course, that by challenging the succession, the Guises intended to advance their own claims.

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polarised between the interests of France and those of Spain, Duplessis appealed to patriotism, calling upon all Frenchmen to rally to the support of the king and the rule of law, and to unite under the white cross against the red cross [of Spain]. These true patriots should form a counter-league with the king at its apex. This document is important because it stated, truthfully and without exaggeration, the crucial issues at stake. The Guises had made a blandly mendacious statement and now Duplessis exposed them as publicly as sixteenth-century facilities permitted. In effect, Duplessis declared the League rebellion to be a revolution – which it was. Whether or not the treaty of Joinville was still a secret, the fact of the Guise/Spanish connection was known. Although the king had abandoned the Netherlands, Spain remained the enemy; and without Spain Guise could not operate. Despite the League’s rhetorical facade, no one believed that the conflict was really about religion. Nevertheless, the royal and huguenot responses to the declaration of Péronne did raise serious religious issues. One of these was that the experience of thirty years proved that protestantism could not be exterminated in arms; some accommodation, in the form of an edict of pacification, had repeatedly been found to be necessary. For a long time past, the conflict had not been over the principle, but over the details of that accommodation, together with allied problems of security. This was the basis of Henry III’s attitude to the protestants; while he deplored their existence, he was reluctant to persecute and provoke them. Besides, Henry was not a warrior king; he preferred his own ease and self-indulgence. Another perennial religious issue was the definition of heresy. To this the official huguenot reaction was always to renew their demand for a council. But this, once respectable, refrain now tended to alienate the new pope, Sixtus V. He was elected on 24 April 1585, just as the troubles of the Catholic League erupted in France. Duplessis’ reply to the manifesto of Péronne also raises a major problem of interpretation: he stated that Navarre could not change his religion without instruction, which he was always ready to receive from a council. But, in proclaiming this so publicly, the problem again arises as to what Duplessis really meant? Was he simply stating a fact? Did he suppose that everyone knew what a committed Calvinist expected of a council? Was Duplessis facing the possibility that abjuration – the very worst eventuality – might become inevitable? Did he want others to deduce – as they surely did – that Navarre was prepared to abjure, albeit upon terms which remained undefined? If so, that crucial matter was certain to be pursued but, with hindsight, that is unlikely. Does the clue to Duplessis’ thinking lie in his significant observation upon the laws of inheritance, to which religion was irrelevant? This, in turn, raised the juridical difficulty that, hitherto, the succession had been regulated only by custom and precedent, not law. In normal times usage would not be challenged, but in times of trouble, ill-defined or imaginary ‘law’ invited controversy. Thus, in the first place, the Guise position had now been exposed, and the worst suspicions of them [potential regicides] had been propounded. Secondly, Navarre’s situation was also publicly stated: he denied that he was a heretic; he would not persecute the catholic religion – which his enemies chose never to believe – and he wished to defend the law, the king and the kingdom. But the third and vital factor, the disposition of the king himself, remained obscure. Henry had called upon


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the Guises to desist from warlike activities. But, beyond that, as Catherine de Medici departed for Épernay at the end of March 1585, Henry’s position became increasingly ambiguous.

CHAPTER III: THE REJECTION OF NAVARRE I: The King’s Hesitation Incontrovertible evidence of League activity had, in March 1585, finally led the king to dismiss the Netherlands deputies, voicing his alarm about the state of the kingdom. Yet, paradoxically, Henry still seemed not to take the existence of the League conspiracy entirely seriously. To Navarre’s court agents, Clervant and Chassincourt, Henry protested his hatred for the Guises and his love for Navarre; also his ‘assuredness’ to maintain the edicts of pacification and to sustain the huguenots. Henry warned Navarre to be on his guard, but not to appear to arm, and not to afford the League any pretexts for hostile action.1 The English ambassador, sir Edward Stafford, expressed the hope that the king would now be driven into the arms of Navarre. But, as the second League project had miscarried, Stafford also feared that the Guises would seek an agreement with the king at the expense of the huguenots. His colleague William Waad agreed, although he was still hoping that, together, they might persuade the king to make war on Spain.2 Walsingham had secret ‘advertisements’ that if Henry III did not yield to Guise demands, he would be threatened with excommunication. Duplessis ventured a fleeting hope that the Guises might, for the moment, be satisfied with having disrupted the Netherlands negotiations. In reality, he had long foreseen these events. To Bellièvre, who was much concerned with huguenot affairs, Duplessis recalled his journey to court early in 1584, and his warnings delivered to the king at Saint-Germain; and now, here they were, suffering these ‘mauvais humeurs’ which he had sought to divert elsewhere. Duplessis feared that the Guises would forge ahead with their designs now that Spain was behind them. What had occurred so far was merely ‘games’.3 Thus there was much musing and speculation about what was really going on, what might happen, and how the Guises would treat the king. After speaking to Clervant and Chassincourt, Henry wrote Navarre a personal letter. He had, he said, been unable to avert the exploits of the duc de Guise, because he was armed. Henry would send a gentleman to Navarre in order to convey his will – which meant that the message could not safely be committed to paper.4 This intimation raised Navarre’s hopes that Henry was at last about to relent, and to employ him against their common enemy. Consequently Navarre, who was at Castres conferring with Condé, Montmorency and Turenne, immediately sent Paul de Choart, seigneur de Buzanval to 1

CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 339-42, 10/20 March 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 362-3, 19/29 March 1585, Stafford to Walsingham, 358, 18/28 March 1585, Waad to Walsingham, 369-70, 22 March/3 April, 1585, Walsingham to Stafford; Dufour, Ed., Lucinge, Lettres sur les débuts de la Ligue, 37-40, 1 April 1585, Lucinge to the grand duke of Tuscany, 41-5, 2 April 1585 Lucinge to the grand duke of Tuscany. 3 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 5-6, 29 March 1585, Duplessis to Delbene, 6, 29 March 1585, Duplessis to Guadagny, 7-8, 29 March 1585, Duplessis to Bellièvre, 9-10, 29 March 1585, Duplessis to Cheverny. 4 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 38 n.1 [c. 17 March 1585], Henry III to Navarre, received on 23 March. 2

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offer the king his support against the League. Navarre proposed to join the king by the end of May 1585, bringing 25,000 foot plus 3,000 horse, to receive and obey his commands.5 The tormented king was at first inclined to accept this honest offer – had he only been favourably advised. Indeed, he even made some ‘show’ of accepting, and declared to his adverse council that ‘it is necessary for him and he will have it so’. But, during a six-hour meeting, they browbeat him, arguing that for the king to accept Navarre’s offer would bring all catholics out against him. Consequently no positive decisions were made. Just two days earlier, on 30 March 1585, Henry had sent his ailing mother, Catherine de Medici, to talk to the Guises at Épernay, as well as dispatching envoys to remonstrate with each of the League leaders personally; but he did so without having clarified what he hoped to achieve. Despite Navarre’s offer, which the council opposed, Catherine’s negotiation proceeded, and Henry III suffered the worst of both worlds. Henry III reacted in a similar way to unusually prompt – albeit unspecific – offers of help from queen Elizabeth, provided he would resolve ‘to take a princely course therein’. She expected, however, and rightly so, that ‘unsound persons’ would seek to dissuade him from employing protestants.6 Henry wished to go to Meaux to assemble his army. But he was so alarmed by the turbulent state of Paris, where the rebellion had so recently been averted, that he dared not leave the city. Thus, for lack of good counsel, he was likely to be overthrown. In Stafford’s opinion, ‘there was never king more betrayed’, all but Villeroy and Bellièvre being [pro-Spanish] ‘traitors’. Henry evidently muttered some general sort of acceptance of the English offers. Bellièvre, however, secretly confided to Clervant that the king was grateful but dared not accept for fear of alienating the catholics. In fact, swift action might well have succeeded. Stafford reported that Guise could easily have been disposed of at that time because so many catholics had offered to serve Navarre.7 Henry was, however, willing to accept money – which was not on offer – revealing his feeble vacillation. All the ‘traitors’ urged the king to make peace at any cost, while Bellièvre bravely defied them, declaring it dishonourable to abandon the edicts of pacification. Besides, it was well known that the king could not possibly defeat the huguenots; that had long since been established. But Bellièvre’s was a lone voice; the others urged the king to let the inevitable war fall upon Navarre and the huguenots.8 During Catherine de Medici’s negotiations at Épernay, which lasted for some three months, Navarre was fuming with frustration; he was convinced that if only the matter were properly handled, the League could be destroyed.9 He had been the first to warn the 5

Buzanval arrived on 1 April 1585. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 371-3, 23 March/2 April 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. 6 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 393-4, 1/11 April 1585, instructions for sir Thomas Layton, whom Elizabeth sent to France. 7 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 389-91, 1/11 April 1585, Stafford to Walsingham, 400-1, 4/14 April 1585, Stafford to Burghley, 408-10, 10/20 April 1585, Stafford to Walsingham, 411-12, 10/20 April 1585, Stafford to Walsingham (2). 8 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 408-10, 10/20 April 1585, Stafford to Walsingham. 9 Catherine’s protracted negotiations at Épernay are very fully documented, but they cannot be traced out here. See, Sutherland, The French Secretaries of State, 257-64 and notes, especially p. 258 n.3. On the

Chapter III: The Rejection of Navarre

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king of this danger, and he would not be the last to oppose it.10 The situation was untenable; the protestants were becoming nervous and restive, while Navarre himself was the butt of mendacious rumours damaging to his reputation.11 He proposed to approach the Dordogne, in order to be ready to serve the king; but Henry’s promised commands were still anxiously awaited. Twice in April 1585 Navarre wrote impatiently to the king to explain that he was straining to keep the cities, nobles and huguenots loyal. Optimism did not preclude doubt, and precautions had to be taken. To Duplessis, the issues had polarised; patriotism had entered into the equation and everyone was now either French or Spanish.12 Queen Elizabeth recognised the element of truth in this analysis, sending sir Arthur Champernowne to offer Navarre help and support (unspecific) if the king were to move against him. Champernowne sought full information as to Navarre’s situation because the queen was sending into Germany to move the protestant princes ‘to think upon some way to prevent the common peril’. Navarre’s survival had become necessary to Elizabeth, now that England was faced with having to defend the Netherlands. Indeed Navarre was a significant factor in the great European conflict, and the queen now tended to favour the protestant league for which he and Duplessis had long been pressing.13 Even before the arrival of Champernowne, Navarre had written to ensure that Elizabeth understood the issues at stake in France: the disputed succession, and the Spanish intervention which was now proven by the supply of men and money to the Guises.14 By exploiting religion, the Guises sought to divert the king’s anger away from themselves and to focus it upon Navarre, whose ruin would spell their success; that was the measure of his danger. A month later, as Navarre’s patience waned, he sent Ségur to England with a more urgent request for prompt assistance and with the bold proposal that he might become the queen’s captain general – meaning, presumably, commander of the League he hoped she would lead.15 Navarre had made it clear to Walsingham that if the king did not resist the Catholic League, he himself would have to do so; the Guises were attitude of Guise, see de Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, i, app. p. 347-8, 18 May 1585, Guise to Nevers. 10 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 38-40, 13 April 1585, Navarre to Henry III, 45-8, 26 April 1585, Navarre to Henry III. 11 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 24-6, [late March 1585], Navarre to Chassincourt. 12 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 16-18, 30 March 1585, Duplessis to Duranti. Things were not, of course, quite so clear cut. 13 CSPF., 1584-5, p. 394, ?1/11 April 1585, instructions for Champernowne, 415-16, 17/27 April 1585, instructions for sir Thomas Bodley, sent to Germany and Denmark, proposing an assembly in Germany in July. Elizabeth wished Navarre to be represented, in order to resolve upon common action. Ibid., 433-4, 27 April/7 May 1585 [further] instructions for Bodley. The negotiations of England and Navarre to obtain political and military support from Germany – which extended, initially, over some two years – is a big, separate subject. Elizabeth had every reason to fly into action, as she was receiving warnings at this time of Spanish preparations against her; they materialised as the Armada. 14 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 31-3, c. 5 April 1585, Navarre to queen Elizabeth; also in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 18-20. 15 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 51-3, 8 May 1585, Navarre to queen Elizabeth. Navarre also wrote an open letter to Leicester and the English nobility, to duke Casimir of the Palatinate, and to the rejected deputies of the Netherlands.

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seeking to displace him, and to exterminate the protestant religion. Navarre believed that he could frustrate the League and their projects with only a small amount of help. He was aware that Catherine was in negotiation with the Guises, but it still remained to be seen what the king was really trying to do.16 It is clear that a second Guise ‘coup’ had been averted in March-April 1585, that the Guises were in arms, and that the king wanted peace. But he failed, or refused, to face the dilemma defined by Anjou: namely that if he abandoned the Netherlands and made peace with the Guises, he would be committed to war against Navarre. Henry accepted Navarre as his legitimate heir and had himself declared the extermination of the huguenots to be impossible. To the Guises, however, that did not matter because a war of attrition provided a continuous pretext for remaining in arms. Villeroy was aware that the current disturbances could not be suppressed merely by talk – even by the arch negotiator Catherine de Medici. Preparations for defence had been initiated early in 1584, after Navarre had delivered his solemn warning. But when Villeroy fell ill, in August 1584, these vital precautions were neglected. Meanwhile Anjou had died, and the Catholic League was developing fast. When the king’s need arose, in 1585, Paris and the council were all against him, and he lacked money. It was therefore impossible for Henry to oppose the Guises in arms without accepting help from Navarre. In court circles it was considered essential for the king to reach some agreement with the Guises in order to avert a breach between himself and the catholics. This was a doubly fallacious argument as the breach between the king and the Guises had existed since his accession, while only a proportion of catholics were Leaguers. On the Guise side, the die was cast; they were irredeemably compromised; but they could perform only what Spain was prepared to finance. At first the king appeared to want to employ both huguenot and English help. Sometime early in May he is reported to have sent La Mothe-Fénelon to Navarre to ask him to prepare his forces and to be ready to march – but not yet. Henry may possibly have hoped to outface or to intimidate the Guises but, if so, he was betrayed by the court ‘traitors’. He may also have hoped that, by yielding lavishly to the Guises in other ways, he might preserve the edicts of pacification – as he had promised – and induce the Guises to disarm. But these were, precisely, the two fundamentals upon which the Guises were immovable.17 Indeed, ‘puffed up with the little order here to withstand them’, the Guises departed to assemble greater forces in order to negotiate – in the duke’s own words – ‘le bâton à la main’.18 So the Guises continued to increase their demands, some of which, relating to the Channel ports, favoured Spain and crucially affected England. Many people would oppose the Guises, Stafford believed, if only they could be certain of the king’s intentions. Stafford hoped that Henry was playing for time, to discover how far the 16

CSPF., 1584-5, p. 410-11, 20 April 1585, Navarre to Walsingham, 434-5, 8 May 1585, Navarre to Walsingham. 17 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 429-30, 6 May 1585, news from Paris; Dufour, Ed., Lucinge, Lettres sur les débuts de la Ligue, 81-3, 13 May 1585, 91-2, 20 May 1585, 94-6, 23 May 1585, Lucinge to the grand duke of Tuscany; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 18-21. 18 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, i, app. pp. 347-8, 18 May 1585, Guise to Nevers.


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Guises would go, in order to expose and ruin them. Stafford agreed with Navarre that a show of determination, with quite a small force, would suffice to disrupt the League. With Navarre impatient to act, this did indeed sound feasible; but Henry III unfailingly shrank from bold and decisive action.19 Elizabeth, evidently receptive to Stafford’s advice, expressed her astonishment – in astonishing French – at the treatment Henry III was prepared to stomach from his rebels, and her incredulity at the sorry spectacle of the king betrayed by his own council. If he would only accept her help, they [the League] could all be brought to shame. ‘Jesus,’ she exploded, ‘had such a thing ever been seen as a prince so enamoured of lackeys and traitors, and without the courage to reply’ [i.e., to act]. Elizabeth declared that Henry III had surrendered his own cause and endangered his own life – strong words from a fellow monarch not unacquainted with danger.20 Navarre was equally outraged by the king’s dithering prevarication. In a letter to Navarre of 8 May 1585, Henry was still requiring the huguenots to set a superior example by remaining inactive. Yet, at the same time, he also sought a cowardly, clandestine merging of royal and huguenot forces in which the huguenots were to adopt catholic names.21 This was an extraordinarily insensitive, not to say insulting request, derogatory to honour and to Navarre’s exalted rank. With his usual forbearance Navarre replied that, as a result of obeying the king’s commands, his position had become untenable. League forces were swarming everywhere and had attacked a château belonging to him. He had thought it best to occupy the protestants by permitting them to repair and fortify their towns. But the worst thing now was the insistent rumour that the king had yielded to the Guise demands for the revocation of the edicts of pacification. The huguenots feared that the negotiations at Épernay were virtually concluded, with themselves the victims. Navarre had been deprived of information; if he remained inactive any longer he would be unable to control events. Like many other documents this letter shows that, even in time of ‘peace’, Navarre was still perceived as a faction leader, in opposition; and he found this attitude wounding.22 In this emergency, Navarre called a meeting of some sixty huguenot leaders at Guistres, near Coutras, to consider what to do. He addressed the gathering on 30 May 1585 but, unfortunately, we have only the briefest account of his speech. Because all the churches were threatened, Navarre wished to consult them on the curious proposal in the king’s letter: should they remain inactive, should they send their forces in disguise to join those of the king, or should they simply support him, as best they could, seizing what opportunities arose to strengthen their own position.23 The outcome – of which there is no 19

CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 457-61, 4/14 May 1585, Stafford to Walsingham, 462-3, 4/14 May 1585, Stafford to Walsingham (2), 461-2, 4/14 May 1585, Stafford to Burghley. Stafford’s spies and informants revealed that the Guises were weaker than was generally supposed. 20 CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 513-15, – May 1585, queen Elizabeth to Henry III. 21 ‘...ce seroit un brave trait s’ils faisoient couler leurs gens de guerre dans les troupes du roi’, Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 66 n.1, 8 May 1585, Henry III to Navarre. 22 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 62-5, 17 May 1585, Navarre to Henry III; also in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 21-4. 23 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 66-8, 30 or 31 May to 4 June 1585, ‘discours du roi de Navarre’.

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account – was that Navarre could delay no longer. The national situation, and that of Navarre himself must now be clarified and proclaimed at home and abroad. This was the purpose of Navarre’s famous declaration of 10 June 1585.

II: Navarre’s Attempt to Save the Kingdom The declaration of 10 June 1585 represented Navarre’s final effort to avert the impending ‘peace’, between the king and the Guises, of which Navarre and the huguenots must expect to be the victims. Perceiving his Calvinist religion to be the basis of the Guise rationale, Navarre again declared that League policy was directed against himself, as a heretic. But whomsoever maintained that the Church required reform was branded a heretic. Navarre had been reared in a time when the two religions legally co-existed. If he had been a catholic, he would have been permitted to serve the king; he therefore again called upon Henry to convene a council, by which he was prepared to be instructed.24 The council of Trent [final session] had occurred at a time of civil war in France, and had not been free. Many people, Navarre said, had tried to destroy him, but no one had ever attempted to instruct him; he was condemned without a hearing. He went on to rehearse his own career, emphasising that he had made peace when he might [with advantage] have pursued the war; he had never sought any personal advancement, and his conduct demonstrated that he was not an enemy of the catholics. Given a ‘fond de bonne conscience’ there was no reason why a prince should not make use of the services of all his subjects, or why those subjects should not be permitted to perform their duty. In his own household, he employed both protestants and catholics.25 The declaration turned to the various accusations against Navarre: of seeking a league with England [which, as a sovereign prince, he was entitled to do], of plotting to abolish catholicism [as if that were possible], whereas the League was hatching plans for the moment when the king should die, in order to exclude Navarre and subvert the succession. Navarre here made the interesting claim that it was he who first sent the David memoir to the king in 1576, besides other, later, warnings. He defended his relations with the Germans [to which he was equally entitled], which were partly directed to resolving religious differences, and he defended having sought an extension for the hostage towns. He had done so precisely on account of the Guise conspiracy, which had first been expected to break in 1583. The Guises held as many ‘gouvernements’ as Navarre held towns and, together with their current demands, their possessions would amount to a substantial proportion of the kingdom. In this situation, Navarre now made the challenging offer to surrender his ‘gouvernement’ of Guyenne, as well as the hostage towns, if the Guises would simultaneously surrender their ‘gouvernements’, and the 24

Oddly enough, Guise had also proposed a council to settle religion, but a council or assembly of bishops and doctors [theologians] who would certainly have been hand-picked to serve his purpose. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 429-30, 6 May 1585, news from Paris. 25 The point of this section of the ‘declaration’ of 10 June 1585 was to refute a passage in the ‘manifesto’ of Péronne. It had asserted that subjects were not required to recognise, or support the domination of, a prince who deviated from the catholic faith.


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towns they had seized illegally. Navarre had been patient; he had been deprived of authority in Guyenne and his pension was unpaid; disturbances occurred all around him, yet still he sought peace and general obedience to the king. Navarre repeated, by way of conclusion, that he was willing to submit to a council, according to the edicts of pacification and, in political matters, he would accept the decisions of an estates-general. That, in view of past experience, was surely ill-advised. As further evidence that he wished only to live peacefully under the edicts and was ready to defend the king and the state, Navarre volunteered to fight Guise himself, either in single combat or with any declared number of participants. Authenticated copies of this declaration were to be prepared, and it was taken to court by Clervant and Chassincourt. Their instructions reveal that Navarre’s patience had expired; he could no longer endure the poison of defamation and sought permission to disseminate the declaration both to the ‘parlements’ and to French ambassadors abroad. Thereupon, rumours of the terms upon which the ‘peace’ was being concluded, were simply the last straw.26 Navarre’s deputies also conveyed a letter to the king requesting him to read and consider the declaration carefully [for the king would know that it was true]. By this time, Henry III had already come under pressure from the Guises. On 9 June 1585 they petitioned for an edict which decreed one religion only although, to judge from de Thou’s account, the petition was less extreme than the ultimate treaty. According to Stafford, the king was ‘marvellously startled’ when Navarre’s – autograph – ‘declaration’ was read aloud in council, probably on 28 June. Even the councillors thought it ‘the reasonablest thing that was ever set out’. Henry III immediately sent to order Catherine to suspend her negotiation until further notice.27 But the rest is silence; the articles of ‘peace’ had already been agreed on 22 June, and were followed by the treaty of Nemours, signed on 7 July. One may well wonder why the declaration of 10 June was not communicated to the council until it was too late – and then commended; presumably the ‘traitors’ had been at work. The conclusion of ‘peace’, Clervant wrote to Walsingham, ‘was rather by means of his [the king’s] councillors than of their own [League] forces’. Clervant complained most bitterly of the king’s treachery, striking [the huguenots] ‘in the very time when greatest safety was promised unto us’, when the edict [of pacification] was confirmed, and the League denounced as enemies. He expanded on Henry’s promises and assurances at the time when he willed the protestants not to stir. Henry had, apparently, written letter after letter to Navarre. Clervant pleaded for English money and help, lest their downfall should also overwhelm England; and he warned that the earl of Westmorland – a catholic exile – was even then consorting with the Guises. The Guises, he concluded, so threatened Henry with their forces, and those of other princes ‘that when the pope hath excommunicated him, he cannot but lose his kingdom...’

26 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 71-3, 10 June 1585, Navarre to Henry III; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 120-48, ‘declaration’ of 10 June 1585; also in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 89-126; ibid., 81-7 [10 June 1585], instructions for Clervant and Chassincourt. 27 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 483-4; CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 551-2, 22 June/2 July 1585 (2), Stafford to Walsingham.

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an almost accurate prognostication.28 Boasting of Papal support, the Guises probably did intimidate the king in this way. Henry, in these circumstances, had paraded his fatal infirmity of purpose, pleading helplessly with his mother and Villeroy to accomplish miracles, while revealing to the Guises the extent of his weakness.29 Although, during the following months, Henry continued to dither, backtrack, and evade the terms of the agreement, it was too late; his failure to stand firm at Épernay had placed himself, the kingdom, and Navarre on the slope to disaster.

III: The Hostile Peace of Nemours, 7 July 1585 The peace of Nemours, between the king and the Catholic League, marked a watershed in Navarre’s career and in the history of the huguenots.30 With the backing of Spain, the catholics had now redeemed their failure in 1576. Thus all the edicts of pacification (Poitiers, Nérac and Fleix) were revoked, and exercise of the religion was forbidden. Pastors were to be banished within one month and all protestants, upon pain of exile, were required to abjure within six months. Permission to sell property was the only concession – later revoked. The judicial safeguards were abolished, and the huguenots were declared ineligible for all offices (despite the exile clause). The newly-confirmed hostage towns were to be surrendered, and their garrisons withdrawn. The Guises were exonerated for their rebellion, and for conspiring with Spain – which they continued to do. Ostensibly, the text of this treaty is remarkable for what it omitted: it made no mention of the extraordinary gains and advantages extorted by the Guises, no mention of the king’s detested favourites, of the nobility, or any of the reforms demanded in the declaration of Péronne. Above all, it made no mention of Navarre, the succession, or of obliging the king to prosecute that war against the huguenots which their total deprivation was meant to entail. According to de Thou, however, all the Guise advantages were confirmed in a secret article. Since so much was omitted from the text, the full extent of the king’s capitulation and commitment was, and remains, unclear; but there existed an assumption of war.31 It may have been these significant omissions which led René de Lucinge, ambassador of Savoy, to hope that perhaps the king was planning some move against the Guises during the huguenots’ six months period of grace. Henry had, after all, written Navarre over twenty letters, one after another, to reassure him, and to beg him not to

28

CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 552-4, 2 July 1585, Clervant to Walsingham. The peace was known to exist some days before it was formally signed. 29 Sutherland, The French Secretaries of State, 262-4. 30 Haag, La France protestante, x, 184-7, 7 July 1585, text of the treaty of Nemours, registered as an edict on 18 July. This treaty bore a marked resemblance to the cardinal de Lorraine’s edict of Saint-Maur, 1568, which also banished the pastors, prohibited the religion, and precipitated war. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 280, 358, 364. 31 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 486-7.


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move – hence Clervant’s articulate indignation expressed to Walsingham (2 July).32 But, after suffering what might be deemed one of the most dastardly betrayals in the annals of French history, Navarre could no longer wait to see what the king would do. Henceforth, he must defend his life, property and rank, while the huguenots must begin, all over again, to establish their necessary concessions. This was not satisfactorily achieved until 1598, by the final edict of Nantes. The huguenots’ dangerous deprivation, after so much had been achieved, badly soured their attitude and very greatly complicated Navarre’s future life. Nevertheless, with that extraordinary magnanimity characteristic of his conduct, Navarre did not impute this disastrous betrayal to the king, but to his councillors – the court ‘traitors’ stigmatised by Stafford – who had deceived and misled their prince, and delivered him into the hand of the Guises.33 It was felt, if not precisely stated, that Navarre might hold some initial tactical advantage, since the king was not expected to inject much effort into the execution of Leaguer plans imposed under duress. Now, in any case, was the time for the huguenots to act. Navarre launched into immediate preparations to mobilise all potential support in France and, through foreign help, to obtain an army and ships without which he was doomed to remain for ever on the defensive. War was already erupting in the provinces. Even now, Navarre did not concede that all was lost – that the king and the kingdom were beyond redemption. Through his preparations, energetic propaganda, and concrete proposals, Navarre persisted in his efforts to avert calamity by obstructing the execution of the treaty. This had been couched in the form of an edict and registered by the ‘parlement’ on 18 July 1585. Navarre’s declaration of 10 June had created a notable impression. This encouraged him to hope that, if the unaligned catholics could be made to realise the mendacity of the League’s religious pretext, support for the Guises could be undermined. Then the genuine religious problem could, as Navarre had always proposed, be settled by a council. With these things in mind, in mid-July 1585, Navarre sent his servant Constant to Montmorency, whose perceived support for Navarre and the huguenots would dismay the Guises and greatly assist their enemies. Nor did Navarre cease to put pressure on the king, for whomsoever pressed him the hardest, would prevail.34 Navarre’s personal protest against the ‘peace’, registered as an edict on 18 July 1585, was contained in an important private letter to the king of 21 July. Navarre reminded the king of what he doubtless suspected was still Henry’s genuine opinion. When the rebels’ evil intentions against the king and the state had first emerged, Henry 32

Dufour, Ed., Lucinge, Lettres sur les débuts de la Ligue, 112-15, 22 June 1585, Lucinge to the grand duke of Tuscany, 116-17, 26 June 1585, Lucinge to the grand duke of Tuscany; CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 574-5, 1/11 July 1585, Stafford to Burghley. 33 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 148-50, 8 July 1585, Duplessis to Delbene. 34 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 151-6, [?11] July 1585, instructions for Constant going to Montmorency. Navarre’s secretary, Du Pin added, in secret ink, his own gloss on a letter of Navarre to Ségur: in expressing his master’s courage and absolute determination, he said that many catholics who saw through the Guises, would serve [Navarre’s] cause – and so they did. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 115-16, [11 August 1585].

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III informed Navarre of the proper judgements he then made of their intentions. Henry had understood that the Guise pretext of religion was intended to cover an attack on himself and the crown, aiming at the complete ruination of the state. This embraced Navarre, whose fortunes were indissolubly linked with those of the king, and Henry had ordered his officials to treat the Leaguers as rebels; all the ‘parlements’ had verified that edict.35 This measure notwithstanding, the king now wished to conciliate by ‘douceur’ those who had thus been branded as rebels [which was utterly contradictory]. Meanwhile Henry commanded Navarre to wait patiently while he sought to penetrate Leaguer intentions, and to demonstrate the discrepancy between their pretext and objectives.36 So far, Navarre continued, he had obeyed the king, passively watching their common enemies at work when he could have obstructed them. Navarre had risked his reputation, because the king repeatedly assured him that he had his interests at heart and would agree to nothing contrary to the irrevocable edicts. Navarre had preserved the many letters in which the king had written these things; and they had also been verbally expressed to Clervant and Chassincourt. Yet now the king had made a ‘peace’ (summarising the terms), by which he armed his enemies with his own forces and authority; ‘je laisse à juger à V.M. en quelle espérence me peut plus rester qu’au desespoir’. Navarre had made Henry the fairest possible offers. These had been ignored, landing the kingdom in a situation so calamitous that it would hardly be resolved but by Henry’s own death.37 The tragedy was that Navarre believed it all to be avoidable; and it was no fault of his that the king had not been saved from this shipwreck. Even now, in declaring his total opposition to such enemies, Navarre once again requested to serve this feckless and undependable king, whom he generously regarded as more sinned against than culpable.38 Navarre shortly published a second ‘declaration’, of 10 August 1585. This one was issued jointly with Condé, and the catholic Montmorency who had once again allied with Navarre after the ‘peace’ in July 1585. This new manifesto proclaimed their coalition which was dangerous to the catholic extremists.39 It reiterated many points made by Navarre in his letter of 21 July to the king. The declaration was intended to publicise the justice of the coalition, whose cause was neither narrow nor sectarian, to denounce the Guises who did not merit support on religious grounds, and publicly to offer the king a further chance to break out of his servitude. The quality of water appears at its source: so the Guise record was rehearsed, beginning with their arrest of the fathers of Navarre and Condé in 1560, before there were any protestant princes. The Guise conduct is traced through their first attempted rising in 1583 to the present situation in which all the reforming pretexts of the Péronne manifesto had been dropped. The princes now united, 35

One must query whether that was really the case. This corresponds to the report of Lucinge which said that the king hoped to expose and ruin them. 37 Navarre deplored ‘les calamitez aussi de ce Royaume auxquelles en vain pourra-t-on esperer fin qu’en sa [the king’s] propre fin’. This accurate opinion was later echoed by Lucinge, Dufour, Ed., Lucinge Lettres sur les débuts de la Ligue, 229-32, 7 November 1585. 38 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 93-7, 21 July 1585, Navarre to Henry III. 39 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 159-82, 10 August 1585, ‘declaration’ upon the peace [of Nemours]. 36


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solemnly protested that their purpose was to serve the king, to see him obeyed, and the kingdom at peace. Navarre repeated his offers already made to the king, but this time he added a warning. If these offers were again rejected, he could no longer remain inactive. The princes deplored the condition of the beleaguered monarch, whom they could have saved; they declared that their intention was in no way to harm catholics, all of whom were offered two months in which to quit the League before they were held to be enemies. Finally, the princes called upon everyone to support them in opposing the League which the king himself had originally condemned. Montmorency also issued his own, separate ‘declaration’. It appears to echo Navarre’s instructions to Constant who visited the duke in July 1585. Montmorency said that his father (the constable, Anne duc de Montmorency, who died in 1568) had cautioned religious peace, pending a council. Personally, Montmorency wanted to see the restoration of catholicism, but not by war; and he, too, called for a council. The current edict [of 18 July 1585] had been extorted by duress; thus Montmorency intended, wherever he had the power, to observe and enforce the edict of Poitiers, 1577. The conflict, he said, was not one of religion, therefore he joined Navarre in defending the king and the state.40 Montmorency, a lifelong enemy of the Guises, was believed by everyone – the king, Navarre, Guise and the pope – to hold the balance between the factions in France. His adherence to Navarre proclaimed, louder than words, that the war was one of power, politics and faction. This opinion was important because it swayed allegiance.

IV: The King Relies on Navarre’s Conversion The king’s extreme confusion of thought and purpose was betrayed by his bizarre conduct for some eighteen months after the peace of Nemours. Once again, he had committed himself to imposing one religion only, because the extorted ‘peace’ was not to be had on any other terms. Those who decreed the king’s policy still expected its execution, although the huguenot war was no more feasible in 1585 than it had been in 1577. Henry III may well have thought, or chosen to suppose, that Navarre’s ‘declaration’ of 10 June 1585 signalled his willingness to convert. It could, at least, be construed as affording that straw of hope. Thus Henry’s first line of evasion, and his policy for more than a year to come, was to press for Navarre’s conversion. Henry failed to perceive how little the desired conversion would actually have solved, but rather persisted in seeing it as an unique panacea. It would not, in the first place, have released the king from the obligation foisted upon him to wage war on heresy, an undertaking he feared and regretted knowing the insurmountable obstacles.41 Petulantly, Henry demanded the provision of three armies, angrily lashing out at the ‘parlement’, Paris and the clergy. He declared to their representatives, that he had made the decision against his will – an unwise admission – 40

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 488-9; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 186-95 [August 1585], ‘protestation’ of Montmorency. 41 It has been seen that there was no such obligation in the treaty of Nemours. It was, however, an assumption, and very likely featured in a secret clause.

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and now they must pay for it. He wished they had been content with the peace that he had procured – meaning the edicts of pacification.42 The subject of Navarre’s conversion was naturally discussed in court circles. When the punitive edict was registered (18 July), Vendôme – nephew of the cardinal de Bourbon – voiced the opinion that, within the six months period of grace, Navarrre would have taken instruction in a general or national council and converted. The king himself had told the nuncio Ragazzoni how much he desired Navarre’s conversion; also that he meant to send Philippe de Lenoncourt – for whom he wanted a red hat – to persuade Navarre thereto.43 It begins to look as if Henry believed – or hoped – that he could neutralise the peace of Nemours by persuading Navarre to convert and, furthermore, that he could obtain the co-operation of the pope. Ragazzoni, however, made a significant reply. He warned the king that because the matter was so important and dangerous [?], and because the Church held Navarre to be relapsed, the whole matter should be left to the infallible judgement of the pope. The king appeared to concur, while objecting that the Church only judged by appearances; he wished to consult his council. This caution from the nuncio is the first clear indication that Navarre’s conversion – even if he ardently desired it – would not be a straightforward procedure. On the contrary, it was susceptible to all manner of obstructions and legalistic ploys.44 Those most anxious to exclude Navarre from the succession, ostensibly on grounds of heresy, cherished no wish to see him converted and restored. Henry III, however, had no influence in Rome, and nothing more is heard of his approach to the nuncio. Relations with the Papacy were all but destroyed by an acrimonious row which erupted in Rome over the appointment of a legate or nuncio extraordinary, while Spanish and League influence was altogether too strong. The Papal co-operation in Navarre’s conversion, upon which the king may possibly have gambled in 1585, was not forthcoming. Soon after the edict of 18 July 1585 was registered, Henry sent Philippe de Lenoncourt, Nicolas Brulart, Jacques d’Angennes seigneur de Poigny, and two theologians of the Sorbonne to hold talks with Navarre; that could only be for one purpose. Catherine de Medici had, apparently, already sent the abbé Delbene.45 He had returned by 10 August and reported Navarre to be fortifying towns, to be closely united with Montmorency and not considering conversion.46 All this greatly displeased the king, who had deliberately proceeded very coldly in the execution of the edict. Henry’s intentions, Ragazzoni said, were not apparent. Lucinge tended to think that he had been induced to revoke the edicts of pacification and return to persecution in the hope of 42

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 489-91; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 199-201, 11 August 1585, ‘harangue du roi’. 43 Philippe de Lenoncourt, cardinal 1586, archbishop of Reims 1589. 44 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 436-8, 22 July 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. He enclosed a copy of the edict of July 1585. 45 Alfonso Delbene, abbé, agent for Navarre in Paris. 46 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 441-2, 16 August 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. The theologians were Jean Prévost, curé of Saint-Séverin and Jacques Cueilly, curé of Saint-Germain l’Auxerrois.


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forcing the Guises to disarm; meanwhile, it has been seen, he was constantly trying to reassure Navarre.47 The peace of Nemours may have forced the king to approach Navarre but, unfortunately, they differed fundamentally upon the appropriate solution to the problems which it raised. Lenoncourt and his colleagues reached Navarre at Nérac on 25 August 1585.48 He explained the king’s desire to afford Navarre personal satisfaction, but we do not know what enticements he offered. Henry’s principal reason for making ‘peace’, he said, was to restore unity among catholics. That, of course, was precisely what the treaty did not do; and the king must have known it. Now his solution [to the problems he had thereby created] was that Navarre, whom he regarded as a son [meaning his heir], should be reconciled to the Church. But can Henry seriously have believed that Navarre could be stampeded into conversion at such a time, and in such a way that no one would ever trust him again? There is no explaining self-deception. The reasoning was that, were Henry to die, Navarre’s religion would cause many difficulties in taking possession of the kingdom. This was correct; but, in the summer of 1585, everything still depended upon what would happen before Henry’s death, not after it. Henry asked Navarre to suspend the protestant cult during the six months period specified in the edict (although the pastors were to have departed after one month). That was something Navarre had no power to do. The suspension was to be ‘jusqu’à ce qu’on eut trouvé les moyens de rendre egalement justice aux deux parties’. This obfuscation probably related to a hint, dropped by Lenoncourt, that the council Navarre so much desired might be convened to appease the differences in religion. It may also explain the otherwise curious opinion voiced by Vendôme; but the envoys had no instructions to be specific. If this meant a council, Guise style, it could well be a trap. Besides, any hint of a council would alienate the pope from whom the king sought, either money for the war on heresy, or co-operation in obtaining the conversion of Navarre. Possibly Henry hoped that if the pope could be induced to cooperate, a council could be avoided. Such was Henry’s labyrinthine confusion of mind, which drove the ambassadors nearly demented. Finally, Lenoncourt demanded the restoration of the hostage towns (specified in the edict of July), despite the fact that, in December 1584, their lease had been extended for two years. At this point, a lesser man than Navarre might have failed to master his emotions; Navarre, however, expressed his gratitude for the king’s personal regard. He was mortified, nevertheless, that Henry had capitulated to their common enemies while rejecting his services. He could not, he protested, casually abandon the religion in which he had been nurtured and in which he perceived no error. Again, he repeated that he would not refuse instruction, nor even refuse to change [religion] if he were [shown to be] in error (‘dans le mauvais chemin’). Nor, as he had already frequently declared, would he refuse to submit to the decision of a free council. Indeed, Navarre had already said this 47

Dufour, Ed., Lucinge, Lettres sur les débuts de la Ligue, 187-91, 20 September 1585, Lucinge to the grand duke of Tuscany. It was evidently not yet generally apparent that the purpose of the ‘peace’ was to make war. 48 The account of this mission and Navarre’s reaction is provided by de Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 491-3; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 201-11, 25 August 1585, ‘propositions des députés du roi’.

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too often to change his tune; and he undoubtedly did desire religious reunion, never conceding its impossibility. One may safely assume, nonetheless, that Navarre had no imminent intention of converting in the late summer of 1585. The king had treated him unforgiveably, had disregarded his royal obligations to the huguenots, and was preparing war against them and their leader; the Catholic League was in arms and, in the Netherlands, Antwerp had fallen to Parma.49 As for the hostage towns, it was useless and quite unjust to demand their surrender when their lease had been extended and the huguenots were in mounting danger. While protected by the edicts, the protestant religion had struck deep roots and could not be eliminated by decree. Besides, to prohibit its practice would do nothing at all to promote public tranquillity. There was, however, a further purpose behind the mission of Lenoncourt to Navarre. He and his colleagues were also to propose a meeting between Navarre and Catherine de Medici. She had offered to go to Touraine if Navarre would halt the march of his German forces. In that case, the king would withdraw his armies located beyond the Loire. This is puzzling: although strenuous efforts were in progress to raise a German force for Navarre, they had not yet succeeded.50 One must therefore wonder whether the king was clutching at rumours in order to evade the agreement with Guise and return to peace with Navarre. The trouble was that, Germans or no Germans, the king had now lost all credibility. Again, Navarre replied with dignity that if the king withdrew his forces, he was willing to go to Bergerac, and to meet the queen mother. As for the Germans, he could not intervene without offending his friends. Besides, he added very pointedly, he was counting on the Germans to restore the royal authority and the peace of the kingdom! That, one should emphasise was, precisely, Navarre’s intention.51 Little information about Lenoncourt’s negotiation has survived. In mid-September 1585 Ragazzoni reported that Navarre had requested a meeting with Catherine. This, according to Navarre’s own account, was not true.52 To the king, Navarre merely expressed his regrets that he could not agree to the envoys’ proposals, leaving the rest to them. To Ségur, he expressly stated that it was they who had pressed him to enter into an agreement, and they who had proposed a meeting with Catherine. He was anxious that rumours of an accommodation might hamper current efforts to obtain an army. Far from there being any accommodation, France was rapidly drifting into civil war which was erupting on the local level. The proposed conference between Navarre and Catherine de 49

The Venetian ambassador in Spain reported that the fomentation of trouble in France had facilitated the fall of Antwerp, which Parma entered on 27 August 1585. This had been Spain’s principal objective. CSPVen., 1581-91, p. 123, 25 October 1585, Gradenigo to the doge and senate; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 12-13, 12 February 1585, Parma to Philip II. 50 See for example, Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 119-21, 19 August 1585, Navarre to Ségur. The complex negotiations were still at an initial stage. 51 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 491-3. Lenoncourt did not return until October. Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 460-4, 18 October 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. 52 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 125-6 [before 30 August 1585], Navarre to Henry III, 127, 30 August 1585, Navarre to Ségur. Cavriana also reported that Navarre had requested a meeting, Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 624-6, 17 September 1585, Cavriana to Vinta; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 449-50, 16 September 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci.


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Medici did not take place that year. Then, in the late summer of 1585, two major events occurred which seriously affected both domestic and foreign affairs. The first of these events was queen Elizabeth’s treaty of Nonsuch, 10/20 August 1585 with the United Provinces, and her subsequent invasion of the Netherlands. This open support for the Dutch was a direct result of the Guise conspiracy in March 1585, which had obliged the king to reject their appeals for help. After making these decisive moves, queen Elizabeth became anxious, and issued a declaration in four languages.53 She declared her purpose to be a general peace, the recognition of religious freedom in the Provinces, the restoration of ancient liberties, and the security of England. If this was an invitation to negotiate, Philip II had no such intention. He responded by ordering the seizure of all English and Netherlands ships, persons and property in Spanish ports.54 While the struggle against Spain was nothing new, an acceleration of the conflict was now inevitable. These were precisely the circumstances in which Spain, and especially Parma, would call upon the active co-operation of the Guises in France.55 Chronologically the second – and possibly related – event, was the excommunication by Sixtus V of Navarre and Condé on 20 September 1585. This dramatic move had been vigorously canvassed in Rome by Spain and the League. Henceforth, Navarre’s fortunes were to be the subject of constant, hostile manipulation in Rome where – in respect of France – Papal politics were largely dominated by his worst enemies. It is therefore necessary to understand the conflict which had been taking place in Rome for some time past and – so far as possible – how the excommunication came about.

V: The Papacy and the Catholic League The proposed excommunication of Navarre and Condé had been a burning issue in Rome since the election of Sixtus V on 24 April 1585. For the Catholic League, it was to be the natural and triumphant corollary to the treaty of Joinville – which demanded it – and of the so-called ‘peace’ of Nemours. It has already been seen how the Jesuit, Claude Matthieu, reached Rome on 20 October 1584 at the critical stage in the formation of the Catholic League. In November – it will be recalled – he had requested from Gregory XIII sanction for the League, the excommunication of the princes, and Papal advice upon what to do with the king. In bringing pressure to bear on the pope, Matthieu and the League agent, Pellevé, had the full support of Philip II and his hectoring ambassador, count 53 Read, Walsingham, iii, 121 and n.1, citing Somers Tracts, i, 410-19; Essen, Parma, v, 86. The date of the pamphlet is uncertain, probably October or November according to Read; see also Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 86. Elizabeth mentioned her intention to publish such a declaration which sir Thomas Smith, who was sent to the prince of Parma, was to give the prince ‘the first time of your access’. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 671-3, 22 August/3 September 1585, instructions for sir Thomas Smith. 54 Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 86. 55 The war between England and Spain, albeit open, was never declared. Essen, Parma, v, 157-8, 162, Philip II wanted revenge for the loss of Flushing and Brill to England, and his detailed plan for 1586 called for anarchy in France.

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Olivares.56 Indeed, Philip II must have acted as soon as he heard of the death of Anjou: on 29 June 1584 he wrote to inform Olivares that he wished the pope to publish an ‘act’ excluding Navarre from the succession. Philip avoided the word ‘excommunication’, neither did he name any alternative candidate for the French throne. For the moment, he would wait upon events.57 In his report (mentioned above) of 11 February 1585 addressed to the duc de Nevers, Claude Matthieu recalled that he found Gregory XIII well informed [about the League] and resolved to excommunicate Navarre. Some voices in Rome were quite as cynical as the Guises themselves, and the necessary preparations for the excommunication were already in hand. One can only suppose, therefore, that the pope had been influenced by Philip II’s request, as well as by his own hatred of heresy. Nevertheless, Gregory was restrained by certain – unnamed – cardinals, who regarded such a move as premature. The Catholic League must first be seen to be the stronger party, ready and armed to execute the Papal sentence – which hints at licensed war. The pope decided to reflect a while, and to seek advice upon Matthieu’s mission. But, as the matter was secret, he was restricted to consulting only cardinal Como, his secretary of state, and the League agent, Pellevé. They were later repeatedly accused by Sixtus V of having influenced his predecessor to encourage the Catholic League; and this appears to be true.58 Gregory XIII answered Matthieu on 16 November 1584 – some six weeks before the conclusion of the treaty of Joinville – applauding the League’s intention to make war on the heretics and relieving the catholics of any scruple of conscience in this respect. On 18 November Matthieu requested an indulgence, in the form of a jubilee, for everyone who assisted the League – a crafty way of angling for overt Papal approval. Gregory spotted the trap and gave only verbal approbation. Once the enterprise had begun – whatever that implied – he would not fail to favour it, and would if necessary send a legate. It has been seen that he refused to sanction the murder of the king, but advised seizing his person.59 By exploiting the royal authority, the League could assume control over the provinces and cities of France and establish ‘toutes choses bonnes’. That is precisely how, over the next three years, the duc de Guise sought to proceed. Gregory evidently feared that urgent action was necessary before the huguenots were fully alerted to their danger. He also wished to prevent the king – who still commanded the allegiance of a large proportion of the catholics – from joining forces with Navarre. Meanwhile,

56

Nicolas de Pellevé, archbishop of Sens 1562, cardinal 1570, archbishop of Reims 1592, protector in Rome of Scotland and Ireland, and Guise agent in Rome where he remained for twenty years. He died in 1594. Enrique de Guzmán, count of Olivares, father of the better known Gaspar de Guzmán, count-duke of Olivares. 57 Denying his title, king of Navarre, the Spanish always referred to him as the prince de Béarn. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 1-2, 215-16, 29 June 1584, Philip II to Olivares. 58 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 14. 59 This was notably crass advice since nothing could have been more of a liability than a royal prisoner.


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Gregory felt that he must be careful and avoid provocation.60 This may have been a reference to the affairs of the Netherlands, where France might still have intervened. This extraordinary report from Claude Matthieu to Nevers in February 1585, shows just how completely, and from the start, the Papacy was aware of the true nature of the Catholic League. It may also explain the objectives of the Guise ‘coup’, planned for 6 April 1585. Matthieu invited Nevers to consider carefully the pope’s advice – namely the arrest of the king – and then to send a trusted servant to accompany him [Matthieu] to decide with Guise upon the means, the day and the persons to execute that plan. Various questions, however, remain unanswered: did Nevers comply with Matthieu’s request; did Guise agree to the proposed plan, and did Matthieu’s report represent an accurate, or an embroidered, version of the pope’s reply? Nevers understood that the pope approved of war in support of catholicism. But he evidently had grave reservations about proceeding without a Papal indult, namely explicit and public Papal approval; but to do precisely what, is not clear. Nevers expressed these reservations to Pellevé, and also to the pope himself through the Jesuit Henri Samier who returned to Rome. It was Pellevé who replied to Nevers on 13 March 1585, just as the crisis was gathering in France. Pellevé declared the pope’s immutable commitment to catholicism and that his authority and means would not fail in any respect against heretics and their supporters. In other words, Gregory XIII shrank from authorising the rebellion he encouraged.61 To Samier himself, Gregory responded rather curiously. He could not, he said, agree to Nevers’ demands ‘sans trop grand préjudice’, because he could not be both party and judge in the same cause. Furthermore, he feared that his open participation would endanger all Europe, knowing the disposition of protestants in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands as well as France. Nevers, he said, should be satisfied with his word [by way of justification], and confirmed that he approved the war against everyone, of whatever quality, who favoured heretics. Implicitly, that included the king. Samier had brought back, for distribution among the catholic princes, a number of rosaries which the pope had blessed. This gesture could be construed as a tacit sign of approbation.62 The League certainly boasted of Papal approval, and Henry III was incensed against the Jesuits, especially Claude Matthieu, of whose intrigues in Rome he was

60

Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 655-7, 11 February 1585, Pont-à-Mousson, Matthieu to Nevers. According to his own account, Samier was sent by Guise to visit the cardinals de Bourbon and Guise, and the duc de Nevers. He then returned to Rome, significantly via Savoy. After only two days, Samier was dismissed by the pope. He returned, via Germany, to Châlons – a city the duc de Guise had just seized. Samier was immediately sent back to Germany to promote a much wider catholic league, for which he travelled continuously during much of 1585. Teulet, Relations politiques, iii, 341-6, 18 May 1585, père la Rue, alias Samier, to Mary queen of Scots, 348-50, 24 August 1585, la Rue to Mary queen of Scots; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 651-2, 30 March 1585, Jacques de la Rue – alias Martelli, alias Samier – to Nevers, 653, 13 March, 1585, Pellevé to Nevers. In the spring of 1586, Matthieu and Samier were excluded from politics, in which Jesuits were not supposed to indulge. Martin, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians, 166, 214, 218. 62 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 651-2, 30 March 1585, Châlons, La Rue to Nevers. 61

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aware.63 In April 1585, during the talks at Épernay, Henry complained bitterly that Gregory XIII favoured the League; also that there was talk of a Papal bull relating to the succession and the extermination of heretics. Henry was anxious that the nuncio should understand his situation. He protested that he was, himself, the heretics’ worst enemy, but it was impossible to exterminate them in arms; besides, the Papal encouragement of rebels was unacceptable. Henry hinted, obliquely, that if such a bull existed and was not revoked, he might be forced to do ‘that which would bring trouble to France and little honour to Rome’. This may be supposed to mean an alliance with Navarre, whose services were at his disposal. Such an alliance was exactly what the Papacy most earnestly wished to avert.64 Gregory XIII’s support for the Catholic League might be considered underhand rather than half-hearted – as has usually been alleged. This, at least, was the opinion of his successor, Sixtus V, whose inheritance was heavy with expectations.65 Gregory was evidently pressurised by extremists in Rome, and by Parma and Mendoza in the Netherlands and France. They were urging the Guises to rebel in order to prevent the king from assisting the Netherlands and relieving Antwerp. Consequently Gregory obliquely incited the rising projected for 6 April 1585. It was he who authorised the preparation of the canonical case against Navarre and Condé; presumably he intended to proceed to their excommunication when he supposed the time to be right. However, at the time of Gregory’s death Como, the Papal secretary of state, reported him to have expressed some displeasure at the rebellion, which promised no good to religion.66 This displeasure may have been because, by then, the rising had miscarried. Gregory could have begun to fear that he was backing losers and might be discredited. Nevertheless, Papal authorisation of the League, and the excommunication of the princes remained two highly critical issues which Gregory XIII bequeathed to his successor, Sixtus V.

VI: The Advent of Sixtus V Impenetrable intrigues and tactical manoeuvres, primarily relating to Italian politics, frustrated efforts to obtain an overtly pro-Spanish successor to Gregory XIII. An outsider, Felice Peretti, cardinal Montalto, who became Sixtus V, was elected by adoration on 24

63

Martin, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians, 137-42; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 394, 4 April 1585, Ragazzoni to Como, 394-5, 5 April 1585, Ragazzoni to Como. Claude Matthieu returned to Rome in March 1585 and remained at least until the autumn – after the excommunication of Navarre. 64 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 393-4, 3 April 1585, Ragazzoni to Como. The king almost certainly feared his own excommunication. 65 Hubner, Sixte-quint, i, 159, says that Guise exaggerated Papal support; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 55, says that Gregory refused to give the League unreserved support, which means that he refused the bull they required; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 14, says that Pisani later described Gregory XIII as having been ‘consentant’ which clearly he was, albeit as secretly as possible. 66 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 395-7, 8 April 1585, Como to Ragazzoni.


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April 1585.67 Montalto was the son of a gardener, and of Slav origin. He joined the Franciscans of Montalto as a child, and rose to be the general of his Order. He achieved renown as a preacher and theologian, served as a ‘consultor’ to the Inquisition, and was associated with leading Counter Reformation figures. He was appointed confessor to Pius V and a cardinal in 1570. This background in no way prepared the new pontiff for the political maelstrom into which he was instantly plunged; but he was not the pliable nonentity that the Spanish had been hoping for. At the time of Sixtus’ election, Matthieu, Pellevé and Olivares were making every effort in Rome to obtain the excommunication of Navarre and Condé. Cardinal d’Este, the French protector and Pisani, the newly arrived ambassador, strove equally hard to oppose so serious a measure.68 With the Papacy already embarrassingly committed to the Catholic League, Sixtus V was understandably confused; he found himself the object of importunate clamour and the focus of controversy. If Sixtus was not merely a Spanish chaplain he did, nevertheless, require Spanish co-operation in order to pursue various favoured projects – against England, Algiers or the Turks – for France, it must be remembered, was not his principal concern.69 He would have liked to see France a genuinely free, catholic country, liberated from the grip of Spain. But he quickly despised the decadent Valois court and was exasperated by Henry III’s paralytic inability to act. By instinct, Sixtus was inclined to support legitimate authority. But the Guises – about whom he was sufficiently informed from Ragazzoni’s dispatches to Como – appeared to be the only hope for catholicism in France. So what was the pope to do? He greatly desired to see the king make a serious stand against heresy; and to that end he expressed himself willing to help. In practice, however, Sixtus V became notorious for a miserly refusal to disburse the treasure he so assiduously amassed. Similarly, he wished to avoid division among the French catholics, and especially the detachment of the Guises from the king. But either he did not realise, or else he was disinclined to accept, that the Guises were already beyond the pale, while the committed catholics in France had long been seriously divided. It would be virtually impossible for the new pope not to flounder into a bog of contradictions.70 Sixtus V’s election in April 1585 coincided with Catherine de Medici’s negotiations at Épernay. Sixtus immediately learnt from Ragazzoni of Henry III’s painful dilemma. Henry desired the practice of only one religion as much as anyone else. But he was formally committed to observing the registered edicts of pacification, and he knew that he could not defeat the huguenots in arms. If the edicts were revoked, the huguenots 67

‘Adoration’ was one of several ways in which a pope could be elected. This entailed a low reverence before the same candidate by two-thirds of the voters present. In practice, it was a means of bouncing the issue. Hubner, Sixte-quint, book ii, gives an extensive account of the conclave. 68 Jean de Vivonne, seigneur de Saint-Gouard, marquis de Pisani April 1586, arrived in Rome on 18 April 1585. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 15. For the sake of clarity, he will be called Pisani from the start. Claude Matthieu returned to Rome in March 1585 and remained at least until the autumn, after the excommunication of Navarre. 69 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 4-5, 217-18, 4 June 1585, Olivares to Philip II. 70 Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 172-4; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, i, 163.

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ought only to be pursued according to canon, first by admonition and then with time to depart. Henry was, however, likely to have to accept whatever terms he could get.71 Thus, apart from the inherent complexities of the conflicts in France, the immediate outcome of the Épernay negotiation was unpredictable. According to Ragazzoni, everyone thought that Catherine’s mission tended to an accord. It might therefore be best for the pope to do nothing and see what transpired.72 Through cardinal Jeronimo Rusticucci, the new secretary of state, Sixtus V wasted no time in expressing to Ragazzoni his great displeasure at the state of turbulence in France. He approved Henry’s desire for only one religion and condemned his – entirely proper – anxiety to avoid contravening the edicts.73 Ragazzoni reported to Rome on the negotiations with the League, their exorbitant demands, the forces they could command, their political objectives, and the critical situation of the king. Like the League, Henry was also making preparations for war. Furthermore, there were already rumours that a national council was proposed. But, as the Guises became stronger, Ragazzoni observed an apparent shift in Henry’s attitude. He professed himself willing to take action against the huguenots [which could not be done without contravening the edicts], but only as the ‘chef’ and with the support of the rebels. Otherwise, Henry said, he would render all the heretics his enemies – a significant admission – without gaining catholic support.74 But to repeat the errors of 1576-7 was no solution; the Guises were immutably hostile to the king, whereas Navarre was ready and waiting to serve him. In this miserable dilemma, Henry sought the pope’s advice and Sixtus consulted Ragazzoni. It was therefore the nuncio who proposed the dispatch of an extraordinary legate to mediate harmony between the king and the catholics. Such an intervention just might have restrained the Guises, had Sixtus’ election occurred a few months earlier. It would certainly have shredded their propaganda – but it would not have been welcome to Spain. But, by the end of April 1585, the Guises were irredeemably compromised and, in the event, the proposal backfired. The special legate, Ragazzoni said, must be neutral and should come if the ‘peace’ negotiations were to fail. He expected, however, that lack of money on both sides would be conducive to an agreement. He also reported Guise to have claimed that the expenses of war could be met from the sale of church property – an assumption which was certain to annoy the pope.75 This was the state of conflict and confusion when Claude Matthieu and Pellevé were joined in Rome by the duc de Nevers and cardinal Vaudemont on 2 June 1585 – while the Épernay negotiations were still in progress.76 Nevers and Vaudemont came to press for the much desired bull of approbation in favour of the League, which the 71

Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 400-3, 18 April 1585, Ragazzoni to Como. Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 389-92, 1 April 1585, Ragazzoni to Como. 73 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 415-16, 7 May 1585, Rusticucci to Ragazzoni. This message was reported to the king, Ibid., 421-6, 1 June 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. 74 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 418-20, 23 May 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci, 421-6, 1 June 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. The rumour of a national council is interesting, since it came before Navarre’s ‘declaration’ of 10 June 1585. 75 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 421-6, 1 June 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. 76 Cardinal Charles de Vaudemont was a brother of the queen, Louise de Vaudemont. 72


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previous pope had withheld. In addition, they would support the demand for the excommunication of the princes.77 Nevers had evidently consulted Olivares about the chances of obtaining overt Papal approval for the League. Possibly unaware of Nevers’ impending arrival, Olivares replied on 30 May 1585. He offered advice on how to make it very difficult for Sixtus V to deny them a similar level of support to that already vouchsafed by Gregory XIII.78 The proposed procedure was complex. Nevers must ask the pope to elicit from Pellevé what – upon Gregory’s orders – he [Pellevé] had written to Nevers and other princes ‘pour les engager à prendre les armes’. Thereupon Nevers should demand from Sixtus V a similar declaration ‘en forme de confirmation’. If he agreed, Nevers would have succeeded [in obtaining the public approbation he desired]. Otherwise, Olivares continued rather obscurely, what had been said and done prior to the rebellion would serve to prove that the enterprise had been given a good beginning [by the pope] and would demonstrate the justice of the cause. That, in turn, would warrant the continuation [of Papal favour]. The League could not now lay down their arms without prejudice to religion and danger to themselves – an admission that they were compromised. Olivares’ circumlocutions appeared to mean that, since Gregory XIII had already supported the rebellion, Sixtus V would be obliged to do the same. Sixtus was very ardent in the defence of everything concerning catholicism in France, Olivares continued, and he desired to deprive the heretics of the succession to the throne. This matter [namely the excommunication] was already in the hands of the cardinals of the Inquisition, who thought that the exclusions should be quite widely cast. Anyway, it was all proceeding to Olivares’ satisfaction, at least in respect of Navarre. Nevers, however, believed the new pope to be a very different man from his predecessor. Evidence relating to the important, but ambivalent career, of the duc de Nevers can be difficult to interpret. It has been seen that in February 1585 he baulked at the extreme overtures of Claude Matthieu. Then, in June, after the failed rebellion, he joined the Jesuit in Rome. He endeavoured to persuade the new pope that the League meant only to defend religion and oppose the huguenots, for which the king wished to employ them.79 The probable explanation – given a degree of hindsight – is that Guise had deceived and misled Nevers, and kept him in the dark. Guise had a reputation for secrecy, and would certainly have exploited such influence as the Italian Nevers might be able to exert in Rome. Nevers, like the pope, wished to support the king – if the king were supportable – and to oppose heresy. But that hardly accords with the objectives of the League. Sixtus, for his part, appears to have exploited Nevers’ persistent demands for a bull in favour of the League, to try to divert their action into more acceptable channels. Thus he supplied Nevers with a brief, addressed to the cardinal de Bourbon, ordering him and his faction to join with the king against the huguenots. According to Olivares, this brief was cooler and

77

Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 175. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 2-3, 216-17, 30 May 1585, Olivares to Nevers. It is not clear where this letter was sent, or whether Nevers ever received it. 79 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 69-70; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 175; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 16. 78

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less specific than the formal approbation Nevers had desired. But it was probably sufficient for his purposes (para su intento). Nevers, he added, was satisfied.80 Pisani, who did his best to thwart Nevers, quickly perceived the apparent effects upon the pope of the Leaguer arguments. Pisani’s own position, however, was undermined by the king’s perverse conduct. What could he say when the pope inquired why, if the League was really so pernicious, did the king not proceed against it? Consequently Pisani, a soldier at heart, urged on the king that if he would only mount his horse, take command of his Swiss forces and display some resolution, the League could be outfaced and the pope would know whom to support.81 By this time, however, Pisani was already in difficulties in Rome. He and d’Este had, some weeks earlier, proposed the dispatch to France of an extraordinary nuncio – before the arrival of Ragazzoni’s advice to the same effect.82 The nuncio should assure the king of the pope’s good will, and deliver letters to Bourbon and the League leaders tending ‘to the good of the king’s affairs’. In other words, the special nuncio should seek to restrain the Guises and to heal the breach between them and the king. This could, however, be a high risk strategy, depending upon the disposition of the special nuncio. D’Este and Pisani favoured the bishop of Reggio. But their opponent, cardinal Farnese, obtained the appointment of Fabio Mirto Frangipani, bishop of Nazareth. Frangipani was a Neapolitan (hence a subject of Philip II) who had already been four times nuncio in France. He was known to be a Guise supporter and, in Rome, he consorted with Olivares and the League agents. What was worse, the pope had decided that Frangipani should remain in France and replace Ragazzoni.83 As a corollary to the brief accorded to Nevers, the pope proposed to order all catholics to join the king in exterminating the huguenots, and to declare excommunicate everyone who failed to comply. In this way, Sixtus fantasised, Henry would regain the adherence and obedience of the entire League and the restoration of the towns they had seized. Pisani, who was always sympathetic to Navarre, aborted this intemperate proposal. Instead, Sixtus agreed to exhort the king to persevere in his intention [?] to expel the heretics. In that case, the pope was prepared to assist the king, and to work on the princes [of the League] to end the current division among catholics. In actual fact, Sixtus knew perfectly well what the League was doing, and complained to Olivares that

80 Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 178; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 5-7, 218-20, 20 June 1585, Olivares to Philip II; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 17, said that Nevers left dissatisfied but that [failing the pope] the League succeeded in covering itself with the royal authority. Opinions vary as to whether Nevers left Rome on 16 or 18 June 1585. 81 Stafford made precisely the same observation as Pisani, CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 461-2, 4/14 May 1585, Stafford to Burghley; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 177-8, 16 June 1585, Pisani to Henry III; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 72. 82 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 421-6, 1 June 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. 83 Martin, ‘Fabio Mirto Frangipani and the Papal Policy in France’, Archivum Historiae Pontificae, xvii (1979), 197-240. According to Martin, the evidence relating to Frangipani presents difficulties; according to Mendoza, however, Frangipani served Philip II better than Sixtus V.


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Philip II was supporting and financing the rebels against the king.84 While Sixtus evidently sought to play off these tiresome opponents against each other, Olivares received the impression that the [authoritarian] pope really wished to gain control, and to settle the affairs of France himself. This may have been one reason for the dispatch of Frangipani. Hardly knowing whom to believe or what to do, this expedient would at least procure time, and enable the pope to postpone any more decisive action. Pisani and d’Este, however, staged a showdown on 11 June 1585 protesting against the choice of Frangipani; he was not the man to effect a reconciliation in France. The reason for his appointment was probably Spanish pressure, since he would be useful to promote their conspiracies against England.85 But Pisani and d’Este became so afraid that Sixtus might substitute an even more undesirable character – Filippo Sega, bishop of Piacenza (which the French called Plaisance) – that they gave in. Consequently Frangipani left Rome on 17 June 1585, about the same time as Nevers. But, rejected by Henry III, Frangipani was halted in Lyon. He was obliged to return to Rome, and a furious row led to the expulsion of Pisani on 25 July 1585. This amounted to a partial diplomatic breach between France and the Papacy – and at a very critical time – although Ragazzoni did not leave Paris until 15 August 1586.86 The expulsion of an ambassador was an abnormally severe measure which shook even Philip II. But Sixtus V was evidently sick of being pestered, and Olivares was also roughly treated. Pisani, always resilient, sought to turn this adversity to advantage and proposed a robust rejoinder. Through Villeroy, he advised the king not only to stand firm in his rejection of Frangipani, but also to retaliate by filing a demand for a general council. If the pope refused, Henry should declare his intention to assemble a national council – rumours of which had been reported by Ragazzoni. Pisani hoped thereby to alarm the pope – whom he disliked – and cause him to fear that the French church might begin to exert itself. This bold proposal may also have been an effort to abort the bull of excommunication against Navarre and Condé for which Spain and the League were pressing.87 Even if the extraordinary nuncio, Frangipani, had proceeded directly to Paris, he would not have arrived in time – before the conclusion of the peace of Nemours, signed 84 Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 178-9; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 5-7, 218-20, 20 June 1585, Olivares to Philip II; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 77-8. 85 CSPF., 1586-8, p. 94, 26 September/6 October 1586 (sic), Stafford to Walsingham. De Thou suggests that the appointment of Frangipani might have been to oversee the execution of an intended bull – it is not clear which, Histoire universelle, vi, 517-18. Mendoza, who worked with Frangipani after his eventual arrival in Paris in August 1586, declared him to be ‘harder than a diamond’ in respect of the exclusion of Navarre from the throne. That could have been another reason for choosing him. CSPSp. 1580-6, pp. 646-8, 8 November 1586, Mendoza to Philip II. 86 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 72 seq., 126. Henry III eventually agreed to accept Frangipani in return for the acceptance of Pisani in Rome. 87 Expelled from Rome, Pisani went to Lucca and, after an illness, returned to France late in 1585. Frangipani eventually went to France, arriving in Paris on 8 or 9 August 1586. Pisani similarly returned to Rome, on 10 August 1586. Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 185, 192, 188-9, 3 August 1585, Pisani to Villeroy; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 81-2, 84, 126, 188-9, 3 August 1585, Pisani to Villeroy; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 12-13, 225-6, 23 August 1585 Gradenigo to the doge and senate, from Spain.

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on 7 July 1585. Ragazzoni reported next day that three armies were now to be raised against the huguenots.88 The Florentine, Cavriana, believed that Catherine de Medici had agreed to the peace [under duress] as a sort of interim expedient. Thereafter she would travel to Guyenne to see Navarre and try to construct a general peace. René de Lucinge, the agent of Savoy, thought the peace was intended to trick the Guises into disarming; but they did nothing of the kind. Writing less than a week later, Lucinge said that Catherine would travel to see Navarre in order to seek his conversion.89 Frangipani, who was in Montélimar, also reported on the treaty of Nemours. His rather curious letter of 17 July 1585 laconically conveyed to Sixtus V the simmering hostility behind the ostensible reconciliation between the Guises and the king. The pope had moved too late, and the treaty was not at all what he had desired. Frangipani indicated that Henry III was already trying to evade the agreement and to escape from his tormentors. His initial arrangements were to send the duc de Guise to defend the eastern frontier – namely as far away as possible – to retain a hold on Mayenne [by sending him on an ill-prepared campaign against the huguenots], and to keep the cardinal de Bourbon under surveillance at court. In this way, the leaders were separated from each other. Frangipani added that within the next six months there would probably be another effort to convert Navarre.90 This ‘best solution’, in the king’s estimation, did not resonate with the new pope. The notorious peace of Nemours appears to have been a desperate expedient by which the king and Catherine hoped to disarm the Guises – at least for long enough to defuse the rebellion and broker a general peace. But, in their scheme of things, that general peace depended upon the conversion of Navarre, whose consistent response was to call for a council. To the League, therefore, the excommunication of Navarre had become more essential than ever. Frangipani provided just the sort of information that Sixtus V required. The alarming implication that the protestants were not Henry’s principal enemies may well have influenced the pope in the matter of the excommunication – which, it has been seen, was under preparation. The treaty of Nemours, which ended the catholics’ clamour for overt Papal support, also affected the pope. While Sixtus V had never been deceived by the Leaguers’ religious pretext, this flimsy veil had now been ripped aside, if only by Frangipani’s report. The destruction of France, which the League now threatened, could not benefit the Church. Sixtus V had always had his reservations; now the League was revealed as a flawed and twisted instrument, and the Guises were discredited in Rome. That created problems, and the pope was in a quandary. Disconcerted and angry, he 88

Frangipani left Rome on 17 June and the articles of peace were agreed on 22 June 1585. Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 430-1, 8 July 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. Ragazzoni reported that Guise had a large force located between Sens and Nemours which was doing great damage. 89 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 613-17, 9 July 1585, Cavriana to Vinta; Dufour, Ed., Lucinge, Lettres sur les débuts de la Ligue, 142-6, 13 July 1588, Lucinge to the grand duke of Tuscany, 187-91, 20 September 1585, Lucinge to the grand duke of Tuscany. 90 Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 310, 17 July 1585, Frangipani to the pope. Not everything reported by Frangipani was in the treaty. Cavriana believed that Navarre would now convert. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 613-17, 9 July 1585, Cavriana to Vinta.


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openly blamed Gregory XIII and cardinal Como for having encouraged a culpable movement.

VII: The Changed Situation in Rome The peace of Nemours in July 1585 therefore brought about a changed situation in Rome. This change is discussed in an interesting series of nine letters written by Nevers between July and September 1585 – the period between the ‘peace’ and Navarre’s excommunication. Nevers had left Rome by 18 June 1585 but returned late in July; it is not clear where he had been.91 Apparently ignorant of the peace of Nemours and the effects it had produced, Nevers resumed his previous efforts to obtain open Papal support for the League; but he was astonished and dismayed by his cold reception. Pellevé explained that it was too late; now talk in Rome was all of the obedience due to the prince. Indeed, Nevers reported to Bourbon that, during his audience on 29 July 1585, Sixtus rounded upon him angrily, declaring that Henry III had never consented to the League, but had been forced to dissimulate. Henry, the pope said, regarded the Leaguers as worse enemies than the huguenots; and Sixtus was now afraid that the king would be forced to call upon the protestants to deliver him from the tyranny of the catholics. This revealed the pope’s simplistic conception of the conflict in France. From time to time he continued to revile Gregory XIII and his secretary Como for having spread fire and blood in Christendom by their approbation of the League.92 Nevers’ second letter, of 4 August 1585, also addressed to Bourbon, suggests that the duke may have been deceived by the catholic leaders into thinking that, apart from defending religion, the League was mainly intended to dislodge the king’s detested favourites, Joyeuse and Épernon.93 Writing almost a month after the treaty of Nemours had been signed, Nevers declared that he was not against a true and sincere reconciliation with the king. It would be good to join with him in opposing the heretics and to bring the towns and country into line. This was exactly what Sixtus V desired; yet he and Nevers were apparently at odds. Nevers inferred that only expediency counted in Rome. If the catholics [of the League] were the strongest and could stand alone, they would be the holiest and most catholic, adding that the pope objected to frequent supplications [especially for money]. In Nevers’ audience that day, 4 August, the pope had observed sarcastically that the League had no further need of him [or of his approval], since the 91 Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 175, warns against reliance on Gomberville’s memoirs of Nevers, and dismissed these interesting letters as false. He did so, however, solely on the grounds that the duke had left Rome in mid-June 1585. Nevers did leave Rome at that time and, being Italian, probably made visits in Italy for the next few weeks. However that may be, he returned to Rome towards the end of July, specifying that he arrived at night and lodged with Pellevé. Documents are only forged for a purpose and there is no plausible reason for supposing these letters to be false. They are compatible with other evidence, and with the whole tenor of events. But, even if they were forged, there would still be reasons for studying them. 92 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 666-7, 31 July 1585, Nevers to Bourbon, Rome. The pope’s fears were shared by Philip II, Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 10-12, 223-5, 2 August 1585, Philip II to Olivares. 93 This point is interesting in view of the role eventually played by the duc de Guise in the conspiracy of 1588.

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king himself had absolved them all.94 Only then, when Nevers failed to understand the allusion to the amnesty contained in the treaty, did it transpire that he and Pellevé were still uninformed about the ‘peace’ of Nemours. Thenceforth, Nevers shared Sixtus’ surprise and indignation. That evening, Nevers discovered Pellevé with a letter from Guise, together with a copy of the treaty – presumably all of it.95 Looking on the bright side, Sixtus welcomed the ostensible reconciliation and, in the presence of Nevers, praised both the king’s clemency and his willingness to enter into a civil war contrary to his sentiments and interests – a rather ambiguous observation. Nevertheless, Sixtus V was not deceived. The treaty, he said, had delivered the League from an awkward situation; but he solemnly warned them of the dangers of abusing the king’s indulgence or, by renewed machinations, of making him regret his present forbearance. Nevers was appalled by the edict of 18 July 1585 which followed the treaty. On 15 August he complained to Bourbon that Guise had greatly overstepped the measures originally agreed. Doubtless Bourbon was another one whom Guise had abused and confined to the twilight. Nevers condemned them for treating the king as an enemy, imposing injurious conditions, and for behaving like sovereigns. When, in the edict, the king had consented to a whole list of felonious items, he was certainly not expressing his true mind. He would not forget; and he would make them repent. Like the pope, Nevers sensed danger. Whoever sought to intimidate a king would be the first to perish. He exhorted the leaders to return to court and to behave correctly. A king was jealous of his authority and would never consent to share it. By this time the League was denounced in Rome as seditious and pro-Spanish.96 Nevers’ hopes were shattered. The reunion of all catholics under one head had appeared as a divine remedy for the extirpation of heresy and the salvation of the Church. Guise, however, had not been quite as secretive as all that, for Nevers was aware of the treaty of Joinville. Had he, from emotional longing, so far deceived himself as to see the League as a divine remedy? Some problems of interpretation undoubtedly remain. Whatever the explanation, Nevers was rudely disabused, while the pope declared that there had never been a more pernicious conspiracy against religion and the state. Sixtus was distraught when he reflected that Henry III might be obliged to call in forces from England and Germany and make shameful agreements with Navarre and Condé. That, he groaned, would be the result of ‘votre belle levée de bouclier’ [insurrection]. ‘Le huguenot,’ he rightly foresaw, ‘ne sera jamais defait que le ligueur ne le soit’. Sixtus V and Nevers wept together at the thought of France being destroyed by those who should defend her. Sixtus gave Nevers the same advice that Nevers had already offered Bourbon: 94

Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 668-9, 4 August 1585, Nevers to Bourbon, 669-70, 5 August 1585, Nevers to Bourbon. 95 This is quite plausible since Nevers then quit the League. In future, he sought to promote the Papal policy of catholic reunion. It is, perhaps, a little strange that Pellevé should have remained in ignorance for so long after the nature of the treaty was known in Rome; but it was quite usual for letters from France to take a month or more. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 745-6, 15 September 1585, Nevers to Henry III. Nevers was reconciled with the king; early in 1586 he received the ‘gouvernement’ of Picardy, ibid., 747-9. 96 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 670-1, 15 August 1585, Nevers to Bourbon.


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it was dangerous to intimidate a king. France truly was in a desperate situation, and doleful prognostications were not at all exaggerated. In this same letter to Bourbon, of 20 August 1585, Nevers enclosed an extract from a letter of Pisani (probably to the king or Villeroy) in order to show that the pope supported the outraged king. Henry, Pisani advised, should inflict upon the rebel leaders some exemplary punishment, ensuring that the Guises could never again resume arms. Possibly Nevers really sent the extract because it also declared his own avowed intention to be loyal to the king and to oppose the huguenots. Pisani’s letter, furthermore, contained advice with which Nevers agreed: the king should secure the huguenots’ support by means of a treaty – albeit an agreement which was not disadvantageous either to religion or the state. That impossible task, was to be the object of Henry’s endeavours during the course of 1586. Furthermore, the advice continued, Henry should ruin the League by dividing and exposing the leaders, so that they lost all popular support. That is what Navarre endeavoured to do. Pisani believed that when the Spanish perceived the League to have lost their cities, forces and reputation, they would be abandoned. The pope, he said, did not believe that Spain supported the ulterior ambitions of the Guises, but rather sought to sustain the turbulence in order to keep France embroiled at home.97 This was true; Spanish support for the League was circumscribed because Philip II coveted the French crown for Spain, not for the Guises. Philip also had his designs against England, for which trouble in France was declared by Parma to be an essential precondition. Before leaving Rome, early in September 1585, Nevers twice wrote of his reconciliation with the king and advised Guise, as he had advised Bourbon, to return to court and to seek royal favour. Only if the king trusted him, could Guise be a true catholic leader. Every other route would fail; working with the king they could be strong but, in opposition to each other, they would both be lost. He informed Guise that he would never receive adequate support, either to overcome the huguenots or to dominate the court. The Spanish, he said, simply wanted French affairs to remain turbulent and unresolved, while the pope wanted France to be dependent upon himself, obliged to accept whatever might augment his own authority. Nevers’ warnings were accurate, and evidently based upon what he had learnt in Rome.98

VIII: The Excommunication of Navarre, September 1585 Nevers’ opinion of the Papal objectives would appear to be vindicated by the excommunication of Navarre and Condé in September 1585. This was a Papal act of assertion over a chaotic situation in which the pope purported to believe religion to be in danger. He could not, of course, have displayed paternal clemency towards Navarre without forfeiting Spanish support for projects against England and elsewhere. But in fact catholicism was not suddenly more endangered by the existence of heresy than it had 97

Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 672-3, 20 August 1585, Nevers to Bourbon, 675-6, 4 August 1585, Pisani [to Henry III?], extract. 98 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 677-8, 25 August 1585, Nevers to Guise, 678-9, 5 September 1585, Nevers to Guise.

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been for decades past. The only fundamental change, since the initial legalisation of protestantism in January 1560, was that the heir presumptive to the throne was now the protestants’ ‘protector’. Sixtus V inevitably shared the almost universal catholic assumption that Navarre, whether as king of France, or in any position of power, would seek to destroy the Catholic Church. Such an assumption was, of course, politically necessary.99 Neither Navarre’s conduct nor his many pronouncements could dent this conviction; heretics were regarded as an unacceptable, sub-human species. It is difficult now to take such nonsense seriously, imputing to Navarre, were he to reign, a degree of power – let alone malevolence – he could never have possessed. But tolerance was anathema to Rome; the religious example of Germany was unavailing; and there had never yet been a protestant holy roman emperor. Navarre’s conception of religious peace (among protestants and between the confessions) pending, or in default of, doctrinal reunion, made scant impact upon the emotional bigotry which then obtained; without that bigotry the power of Rome would have been diminished. Whatever his ambitions, however, Sixtus V was also concerned about developments in France. It has already been noted how Olivares reported, on 30 May 1585, that Sixtus wished to deprive the heretics of the succession. Whether or not he was influenced by the League supporters, Sixtus appeared to be strongly in favour of proceeding against Navarre. On 5 June, shortly after Nevers’ arrival in Rome, Sixtus asked cardinal Santori of the Inquisition, for a detailed account of the case against the princes. Olivares recorded on 20 June that the bull against Navarre and Condé – a matter which was handled very secretly – would soon be ready. Just a week later, on 27 June, Sixtus presided over a full meeting of the Inquisition and condemned Navarre as a relapsed heretic.100 The sentence, which remained a ‘secret’ of the Inquisition, and the ‘actes du procès’ were passed to cardinal Contarelli, who presided over the chancellery; he received orders to draft a bull.101 Thereafter nearly two months elapsed before the publication of the bull. The pope, who was under pressure, did not want it to be thought that he acted more from duress than of his own volition. This was a pattern of Papal conduct which would often be repeated. Olivares supposed at the time that the decree of deprivation would be published after the arrival in Paris of Frangipani; but then he had turned back from Lyon.102 Philip II and League supporters wanted the decree to be published immediately. This, Philip said, would encourage the catholics and intimidate the heretics. Philip wished the pope to be publicly committed, and precluded from changing his mind, because Navarre might be tempted to feign conversion. The inference was that an unpublished decree of the Inquisition would not necessarily be confirmed by a bull. Furthermore, it is not clear wherein the much amended bull differed from the decree. Olivares was therefore required, but with circumspection, to promote its 99

Hubner, Sixte-quint, ii, 163-4. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 5-7, 218-20, 20 June 1585, Olivares to Philip II; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 91-4. 101 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, i, 347-8, 18 May 1585, Guise to Nevers. This letter refers to the memoir sent by Guise. 102 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 7-10, 221-3, 13 July 1585, Olivares to Philip II. 100


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publication.103 Strictly speaking, Philip II was wrong: there was nothing to stop a pope from changing his mind, only it could not be easily done without loss of face. Nevertheless, it becomes apparent just how rough the path to Rome could be rendered, should Navarre ever wish to tread that way. Similarly, in the circumstances which followed the peace of Nemours, the League also wanted the publication of the Inquisition’s decree, and pressed all the harder for the bull of excommunication. Guise hoped that many of Navarre’s supporters would abandon him once he was thereby deprived of the reversionary interest; besides, his excommunication was considered essential to avert a general peace in France – which was always the king’s preference.104 In this respect, the discredited League and the Papacy were still in agreement. News of Lenoncourt’s mission to Navarre, if not his arrival at Nérac, had probably reached Rome by the time the case against Navarre was resumed, on 7 September 1585. Contarelli’s draft bull was perused and considered by the Inquisition; on 9 September an amended text was read to the consistory and disclosed in Rome.105 The revised draft was received by Ragazzoni in France on 28 September. Meanwhile the bull, in its final form, was published in Rome on 20 September 1585. On 6 October Ragazzoni informed the king, and presented copies of the bull eleven days later.106 The bull of 20 September 1585, excommunicating Navarre and Condé, was quite short. Its central point was that Navarre – designated only as Henri de Bourbon – and Condé, were relapsed catholics, both having publicly abjured, submitted to, and been absolved by, Gregory XIII. Consequently they and their posterity were totally destituted of rank, titles, offices, property, rights and claims and, explicitly, their claims to the French succession. Those who owed the princes loyalty and obedience were released from their obligation, and those who failed to abandon them were automatically embraced by the excommunication. Furthermore, the king himself was menaced by a solemn reminder of his coronation oath, which enjoined the extermination of heresy, and the clergy were admonished to publish the bull in their dioceses.107 Literally interpreted, the princes would have been unable to survive. But, despite its presumption – since it could never be fully executed – the bull was still a deadly serious instrument. Indeed, the excommunication of Navarre affected not only the rest of his life but also the history of western Europe. 103

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 10-12, 223-5, 2 August 1585, Philip II to Olivares. Philip may also have had in mind the likely effect of the excommunication upon queen Elizabeth. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 519 records that when Navarre’s mother, Jeanne d’Albret, was excommunicated, protest achieved its revocation. 104 Through Pellevé and Matthieu, Guise had also demanded immediate publication of the excommunication. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, i, 349-50, 25 August 1585, Guise to Mendoza. 105 Hubner, Sixte-quint, ii, 168. 106 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 92-4, 452-3, 30 September 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. This protracted procedure evidently gave rise to rumours, leaks and premature statements. For example, Samier wrote on 24 August that the pope had formally excommunicated Navarre. The letter, however, contained fabrications, so that might be one of them. Teulet, Relations politiques, iii, 348-51, 24 August 1585, Samier to Mary queen of Scots. 107 Haag, La France protestante, x, 187-91. The bull was signed by only twenty-five cardinals.

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IX: Explanations and Effects According to Pierre Blet, the juridical case against Navarre, begun by Gregory XIII, had never been interrupted. This may indicate that the Roman Inquisition, once at work, was stronger than a reigning pontiff.108 On the other hand, having served the Inquisition himself, it would not be surprising if Sixtus V was inclined to heed it. Thus it is possible that he always intended to proceed with the case against Navarre, regardless of what transpired in France during the first months of his reign. If so, the decree of the Inquisition, to be followed by a bull of excommunication, may have been complicated simply by the accident of its timing, only weeks after Sixtus V’s accession. Certainly, the causes and consequences of the excommunication are difficult to disentangle from the repercussions of the treaty of Nemours. In the first place, the excommunication was patently designed to produce a political effect, since there was no necessity to expel from the Church those who did not belong to it. The exclusion, by Papal decree, of the protestant princes from their rights of succession was the unique – if highly controversial – action that the pope could execute alone. It afforded him an early opportunity to make a striking claim to the superiority of the spiritual over the secular power, and to the Papal capacity to deprive princes. Besides, at this time of preparation for the ‘enterprise of England’ – namely the Spanish Armada – it was desirable for the pope to humour Spain.109 By the excommunication of Navarre, Sixtus V thrust the Papacy into the midst of French political conflicts by claiming to arbitrate the royal succession; that was something he could not afford to abandon to the sole discretion of Spain. It is therefore possible that Sixtus V always intended to issue the excommunication. Bald statements that Navarre was excommunicated on 20 September 1585 have often conveyed the impression that this was a direct reaction to the peace of Nemours. It has been seen, however, that the princes were condemned by the Inquisition on 27 June 1584. That was ten days before the peace of Nemours was signed on 7 July, and possibly a month before the news would have reached Rome. It remains uncertain whether the timing of the bull which followed the decree of the Inquisition was a matter of form, or of policy. News of the excommunication reached France precisely when Henry III and Navarre were grappling – in their separate ways – with the situation created by the ‘peace’, and when the Guises had most need of Papal support. Despite their disfavour in Rome, the excommunication played straight into their hands; it was exactly what the Guises desired, and required, in order to pursue their designs. For the League, therefore, which wanted Navarre’s exclusion and isolation, not his conversion, this dramatic blow was a triumph. It restored and formalised their religious pretext – in which the pope had expressed his disbelief – and enabled the Guises to retrench, and to raise their heads. It was the ultimate signal for the renewal of war, and not in France alone. The Guises 108

Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 91. Late in 1585, Philip II was forging ahead with his plans against England. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 70, 29 December 1585, Philip II to Parma. According to Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, 180, Philip had determined to proceed with the enterprise of England by 24 October; he then conspired with the pope and the grand duke of Tuscany, both of whom had approached him on the subject. 109


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pressed Mendoza for money, and once again conspired with him to murder queen Elizabeth in favour of Mary queen of Scots.110 Superficially, therefore, the excommunication might well be perceived as a gesture of support for the new ‘union’ of the League with the king – which is what the peace purported to be. But, it has been seen, Sixtus V was not so deceived.111 On the contrary, he strongly disapproved of the agreement which alienated the king, forced him to approach Navarre, and did nothing to reunite the catholics. Indeed, the pope was deeply concerned lest Henry III might be forced to make common cause with Navarre and the huguenots. The last thing Sixtus wanted was any settlement of the conflicts in France at the expense of Rome. In this respect, there was a danger in the mission of Lenoncourt, who was clearly looking for some sort of agreement between Navarre and the king. Henry, it has been seen, regarded the conversion of Navarre as the only escape from the bonds of the treaty. Navarre, for his part, tried to avert the execution of its terms, and the solution that he envisaged was, as always, a council. Accordingly he repeated, in his declaration of 10 August, his previous offer to submit to a council. Vendôme also spoke of a council; Montmorency, a leading catholic nobleman, publicly demanded one, and Lenoncourt hinted at the possibility. For the Papacy, however, a council would be an appalling eventuality; no pope could stomach such a demand, while a national council smacked of schism. Thus, despite his vexation with the League, Sixtus may still have seen the excommunication as the surest means of frustrating an agreement between the king and Navarre, and of silencing talk of a council. Even if Navarre had agreed to convert, he had no means of doing so without a council. The bull, however, rendered a second abjuration virtually impossible, and simultaneously disclosed an additional hurdle: namely that of absolution. Consequently it was even more difficult and hazardous for the threatened king to reach an accommodation with Navarre, or to accept salvation at his hands, while his need for both was greatly augmented.112 The bull also made it more explicitly problematical for nonaligned catholics to serve Navarre, thereby creating, not catholic unity, but a large, floating element. It was upon these rudderless catholics that the king – whether Henry III or Henry IV – must inevitably depend for support. So the excommunication, in the form in which it was promulgated, became a deadlock impediment to peace and order in France, and informed the long conflict between the Guises and Navarre. Furthermore, this outrageous interference with the royal succession generated a number of disputes in juridically grey areas; it aroused the hostility of the ‘parlements’, and enmeshed Navarre in the steady breakdown of relations between the crown and the Papacy. The excommunication of Henry of Navarre, heir to the throne, publicised in October 1585, necessarily created a sensation in France. It unleashed a dangerous, polemical debate about law and the succession; and it inflamed seditious Parisian preachers who began to fulminate against the princes and their supporters. The king, for 110

Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘La Politique de Philippe II’, Revue des questions historiques, xxv (1879), 33-5. Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 193 n.1, alleged that the bull was meant to cement the union and neutralise Spanish intervention. Clearly that is nonsense. 112 The bull complicated Navarre’s abjuration by upholding the validity of the 1572 conversions; this, therefore, condemned the princes as relapsed. 111

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his part, having been forced into war against the huguenots in France, could hardly turn about and support their cause in Rome. His council was dismayed, and prevaricated; it tried to stave off the effects of the bull, and obstructed its publication.113 For the Papacy to launch such a blatant assault upon Gallican liberties was to go altogether too far. The ‘parlement’, already angry at the king’s refusal to heed their advice in respect of the edict of 18 July, delivered a strong, anti-League, remonstrance. They shared the opinion of some councillors – expressed in response to Navarre’s remarkable declaration of 10 June 1585 – that he and the huguenots had offered to submit to reason. The protestants had been legally nurtured in their religion and should not now be condemned unheard. As for the excommunication, princes of France had never been subject to Papal jurisdiction. If the ‘parlement’ were to consider its registration, the pope must first demonstrate by what right he issued it, claiming thereby to interfere in the royal succession – and while the king was still young. Canon law, the remonstrance continued, required that no one should be condemned unheard, or without having been admonished and judged by a properly constituted council (sic). The court was outraged at this Papal attempt to deprive a man of his legitimate inheritance, and to overturn the bases of justice and politics. Instead of instruction, the new pope breathed only destruction. The ‘parlement’ proposed to burn the offensive bull and to seek the arrest of those in Rome who had promoted it, to the advancement of their own nefarious purposes. The remonstrance ended with a startling warning to the king: if this measure were to be admitted, Henry III could expect to be deposed.114 Here, therefore, were three important points of dispute: the pope had no jurisdiction over French princes, and none over the succession; furthermore, in issuing the bull, he had not proceeded according to form; consequently the instrument was invalid. Ultimately, the Papacy would have to be aligned with the victors in France, or else face disastrous consequences. It was therefore gravely ill-advised to presume, with such audacity, upon eventualities. For Sixtus V, the excommunication proved to be a serious political blunder; for Navarre it was a terrible catastrophe. It instantly redefined his position in the eyes of the world, and created divided loyalties. It precluded him from operating above confessional divisions, on a national level, which had always been the basis of his offers of service to the king. Now by forging a strong, but negative, link between Navarre’s religion and his claim to the succession, the Papacy was able to influence the circumstances in which he might be suffered to reign. In this respect, Navarre’s religion had been a novel complication, manipulated by the League. Now Sixtus countenanced the pretensions of the League by implicitly upholding the essential catholicity of the crown – even though the bull itself contained no such statement. This conception, propounded during the estates-general of 1576/7, was seized upon and disseminated by the League, who insisted that ‘catholicity’ was a fundamental law, superseding the Salic law. Since no comparable situation had ever previously arisen, this 113

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 517, 520. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 222-7, – September 1585, ‘Remonstrance au roi par la cour de parlement’; Shennan, The Parlement of Paris, 224; Roelker, Pierre de L’Estoile, 114-15. 114


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‘law’ of ‘catholicity’ was clearly an expedient fabrication.115 Theoretically, by Papal decree, and in the eyes of catholics, Navarre was now debarred from the throne as a heretic, and excluded from conversion as a relapsed catholic. On the other hand, few Frenchmen would have cared to admit that a king of France could only reign by Papal consent. Thus Sixtus V’s intervention ensured that, from henceforth, the conflict could only be settled by war. In the event, Navarre always lacked the material means with which to sever that specific and fatal link between his protestant religion and the succession. In the opinion of his enemies, and to those of tender conscience or confused mind, Navarre was now trapped, with no means of escape. This calamity destroyed the vision of DuplessisMornay in which, if reunion failed, Henry of Navarre would eventually reign in France as a protestant, while fully respecting the catholic faith and worship. While the bull was not, as Philip II liked to suppose, eternally irreversible, it would certainly be difficult and humiliating for the Papacy to revoke or circumvent it. In the event, that impediment was only overcome by the costly achievements of war, and by prolonged, patient and consummate diplomacy. Thus the ultimate consequence of the excommunication was a painful paradox: Navarre was eventually manoeuvred onto that very path to Rome which his enemies, including the Papacy itself, had carefully strewn with almost insurmountable obstacles. Therein lay the problems and dilemmas of the next decade.

X: The Reaction of Navarre There is no account of where, when, or how Navarre himself received the Papal bull that changed his life; indeed, there is no evidence that he ever received it at all. Navarre was evidently still working with Lenoncourt and his colleagues, early in October 1585, when he learnt of the excommunication, and also of a new, punitive edict.116 The Guises, together presumably with Stafford’s court ‘traitors’, were quick to exploit their victory. On 6 October 1585, the very day on which Henry III heard of the existence of the bull, he issued an edict even more detrimental to the huguenots than that of 18 July. It permitted (for men) only two more weeks in which the huguenots might abjure and retain their property – cancelling the remainder of the six months originally allowed. The pretext was that the long period of grace had been exploited to support risings in various provinces. Presumably the League was impatient to proceed with the huguenot war, now apparently

115 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 39, says that the ‘Law of Catholicity was more than a legal device... used to change the succession. At a deeper level, it reflected the League’s conviction that the French monarchy was a civil expression of divine order’. In other words, it was a conceit advanced by a few special pleaders. Ralph Giesey defined fundamental law as ‘the working axioms of government in any given age’, constantly in a process of growth and decay. At the most, he wrote, one can only establish trends in legal thought – which is hardly less subjective. Giesey, ‘The Juristic Basis of Dynastic Right to the French Throne’, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, li (1961), part 5, pp. 25-6. 116 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 228-9, – December 1585, Navarre to Catherine de Medici. Navarre referred to the presence of the king’s deputies when he heard of his excommunication.

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sanctioned by the pope, before the ensuing uproar weakened their case.117 Navarre’s reaction, to this devastating, double blow was typically robust. Vieilleville, who had apparently been sent by the king to support Lenoncourt, was swiftly sent back to the king.118 He conveyed a strenuous exhortation that Henry should revoke the new edict – presumably issued under further duress – and seek a solution to religious differences by calling a council; this had, after all, been recently mooted. A council, the instructions postulated, would oblige their common enemies to disarm. With the country erupting into civil war, it is difficult to imagine what, in respect of a council, anyone really had in mind. Perhaps it was somehow important to sustain the myth that some panacea did exist – albeit illusive; or perhaps it was supposed that failure to comply would expose the League’s religious pretext as a sham. Duplessis contributed a paper which also called for a national council, and tempted the king with the notional glory of having healed the doctrinal schism. In the meanwhile, the edicts of pacification must prevail; that was the huguenots’ immediate need, the demand for which was fuelled by the excommunication.119 Navarre also denounced the bull as invalid. He appealed to the outraged ‘parlement’ to oppose the League conspiracy, and referred to the solutions he had already proposed.120 It is worth emphasising that, in the controversies unleashed by the excommunication, Navarre originally enjoyed the support of the ‘parlement’. Later the court became divided, while the effective existence of the excommunication – albeit unregistered and illegal in France – somehow came to be regarded as a fait accompli. At the same time, on 11 October 1585, Navarre addressed a long letter to the Sorbonne – the faculty of theology – seeking to galvanise them into action, and hoping that they might see reason and come to his assistance. Navarre again declared that he professed the religion in which he had been nurtured. This had brought him many troubles and cost him the favour of the king. Demands that he should abjure were efforts to force his conscience. Were he to consent, he would be condemned. He had already freely and repeatedly offered all that could reasonably be expected. He was prepared to receive instruction from a free and legitimate council, by which all points of contention would be thoroughly examined and resolved according to traditional procedure. It was no fault of his that France did not remain at peace, nor that the Church was not reunited. Navarre appealed to the Sorbonne to publicise the important difference between heresy and error, 117

Haag, La France protestante, x, 191-4, text of the edict of 6 October 1585, described as the declaration of Henry III on the treaty of Nemours, 7 October 1585. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 364-5. Henry was doubtless alarmed by the threat to himself contained in the bull. 118 François de Scépeaux, comte de Durtal, maréchal de Vieilleville. Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 111. Vieuville or Vieilleville, appears to have been a servant of Catherine de Medici. It is not clear when he arrived. One might be tempted to suppose that it was he who had brought Navarre the news of his excommunication and the edict of 6 October. However, Navarre later complained that he was never formally notified of the new edict. Vieuville was probably sent back on or after 11 October 1585. 119 Duplessis-Mornay Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 195-8, [probably 11] October 1585, instructions for Vieuville, 199-208, – October 1585, Duplessis to Henry III. 120 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 136-8, 11 October 1585, Navarre to the ‘parlement’. Unfortunately it is not clear whether this letter preceded or followed the remonstrance of the ‘parlement’.


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which he claimed to have learnt from them. Heretics were motivated by ambition and obstinacy; he was moved by neither. It was not sufficient to refer everything to the decrees of Trent. Navarre asked to be heard and instructed; the Sorbonne must make the choice between civil war and a council. If they rejected his request, and the injustice against him persisted, then he would be obliged to defend himself.121 This choice was really academic: even with the full co-operation of the Sorbonne, the will, the means, and the objectivity to obtain a council were all lacking; so were the necessary conditions. Nonetheless, Navarre’s persistence in demanding a council could achieve a different sort of purpose: it sustained the point, appreciated in some quarters, that his religious stance was strictly reasonable. Besides, the theory had always obtained that an interim should prevail so long as a council was pending – and a genuine interim could have averted further war. Possibly encouraged by the vigorous reaction of the ‘parlement’ in denouncing the bull, Navarre caused a spirited and trenchant document to be billed in Rome. He stoutly rejected the Papal claim to jurisdiction over himself. He was subject only to that of the ‘parlement’, wherein he himself took precedence. He equally rejected the charge of heresy, hurling it back at the pope himself, an accusation to be proven in a free and legitimate council.122 If the pope refused to hold, and submit to, a council, then he was anti-Christ. Navarre demanded reparation; in times past, princes and kings had known how to punish the temerity of popes who surpassed the limits of their vocation [office]. Navarre was no whit inferior; he would avenge this injury to the king, to himself and to the ‘parlement’.123 Thus, having repeatedly urged the king to call a council – the only known mechanism for settling religious differences – Navarre now challenged the pope to do so. Navarre was particularly angry that he should have been declared inapt [to succeed to the throne] at a time when the king’s deputies were with him and before he had even answered them. He made this rather curious observation more than once, as if he supposed the pope to have acted upon an impulse. But Sixtus V, unlike the king, did not desire Navarre’s conversion. Duplessis, for his part, wrote to cardinal d’Este of the sense of outrage, expressed in various quarters, that the pope should seek the exclusion of Navarre. An extreme interference of this kind was likely to evoke an extreme response.124 The rift between France and the Papacy was widening.

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Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 138-42, 11 October 1585, Navarre to the Sorbonne; also in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 208-13. Ragazzoni, who did not wish the Sorbonne to reply, sent a copy of this letter to the pope. Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 481-5, 25 November 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. 122 This accusation was not mere abuse; it pertained to the Calvinist thesis that it was they who represented the true church, and that Rome was deviant. 123 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, i, 243-4. This document is said to have been displayed in Rome on 6 November 1585. 124 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 228-9, – December 1585, Navarre to Catherine de Medici, 230-2, 4 December 1585, Duplessis to cardinal d’Este.

CHAPTER IV: THE TRIPARTITE WAR, 1587 I: Navarre Prepares for Action Following the ‘double blow’ – his excommunication in September 1585 and the hostile edict of 6 October – Navarre formed the Association of Bergerac in November. This was in order to marshal every possible means of defending himself and the king. It was also another attempt to tackle the evils of France on a national and non-sectarian level. The Association was composed of both catholics and protestants, all of whom deplored the civil and religious divisions which threatened the state. The first article of association expressed their desire to terminate religious schism, by means of a general or national council; meanwhile, they undertook to live quietly together. In proclaiming their opposition to the League, the participants declared that the purpose of the conspirators was to seize the king and, when they were strong enough, to dispose of him. This was demonstrated by their demands, and by their choice of the aged cardinal de Bourbon as the king’s successor. The purpose of the Association was to liberate the king, and to recognise Navarre as his heir. It directly rejected the Papal claims, stating that the pope had no power or authority to determine the succession in France; and those who attempted to meddle therein were traitors. The members swore an oath to maintain this Union, under the command of Navarre. They agreed to succour each other in various ways, and made arrangements to provide for expenses. They also proposed an outline provincial organisation.1 Little is known about the potentially important Association of Bergerac. If, as such, it failed to prosper, its declared objectives were certainly pursued to the end. In terms of huguenot history, it is an interesting development: it would appear to distance Navarre, the huguenot ‘protector’, from the Calvinist ‘state’, with which he was never comfortable. This could be one reason why the churches increasingly distrusted him. The Association is typical of Navarre’s ecumenical approach and may, in part, have been an attempt to mobilise the Gallican sentiments displayed by the ‘parlement’. In the new situation created by his excommunication – which Navarre here attributed to his demands for a council – the Association confirmed his defiance of the Roman intervention. Consequently it prepared for the war which the pope had rendered inevitable, both by his moral incitement of the League and by disrupting Navarre’s attempts to neutralise the edict of 18 July 1585. While Henry III demanded Navarre’s abjuration, Navarre had asserted that by calling a council Henry could force the League to disarm. But now, if there really had to be another war, Navarre would impose upon it his own definition. It was not going to be a war between the king and the catholics against himself and the huguenots, when everyone knew that the League had conspired, and did conspire, against the king. No matter how badly Henry III might treat Navarre, he refused to blame the

1

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 215-24, – November 1585, the Association of Bergerac; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 115, claims this Association as a triumph for Duplessis.

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king or to regard him as an enemy; and there were many catholics, opposed to the Guises and their revolution, who recognised that the huguenots could not be destroyed by force. The formation of this national, non-sectarian Association of Bergerac, which called for a council, provided Navarre with a much broader platform from which, once again, to appeal to the king. In an important letter to Henry III, of 1 December 1585, Navarre echoed some of the points he had made for Roman consumption, because this Papal interference was distorting French affairs. In the first place, he proclaimed that he refused to regard the king as his enemy, although he complained that he had not been formally notified of the edict of 6 October.2 Nevertheless, he did not believe that it represented the king’s will. More important, however, was the Papal bull, which concerned the king no less than Navarre himself. In citing the struggle of Louis XII against the Papacy, and his excommunication when he had demanded a council, Navarre hoped to galvanise the king into action. By supporting Louis XII, the then king of Navarre was included in the proscription, thereby providing the King of Spain with a pretext for seizing part of his kingdom. But the people and the clergy, Navarre pointed out, had been unconcerned by the fate of Louis XII, because the kingdom of France did not depend upon Papal law; and a council was held at Pisa. It was not, therefore, the excommunication which mattered most – nor even Navarre’s personal exclusion – but the renewal of the Papal claim to dispose of the French crown. This was a claim that the clergy and ‘parlement’ had always resisted, and which was not to be tolerated. Such resistance to Papal infringements – although Navarre did not precisely say so – might now form the basis of a broad coalition in which he and the king could work together. The point Navarre wished to emphasise was that of Henry III’s own exposure. Navarre had been condemned, unheard, as a relapsed catholic, which effectively locked the gate to the fold. The Guises [and Spain] had solicited the measure in Rome, in order to eliminate [Navarre] who was the principal obstacle in their path. Thus it was to be feared that the same authority might next be invoked to depose the king himself; that was the League’s further objective. To clinch the point, Navarre added more bluntly that Henry III’s enemies sought his death. To Catherine de Medici, he declared that the pope had destroyed the possibility of a general peace which, he believed, she also desired.3 Resistance to offensive Papal claims – which were highly beneficial to their common enemies – presented the beleaguered king with a bridge between himself and Navarre. Furthermore, the Association of Bergerac could now offer Henry a far more acceptable alliance than that of Navarre and the Calvinist ‘state’. Together, Navarre, the Association and Henry III could certainly have destroyed the Catholic League and confined the pope to his proper sphere. But Henry III lacked the requisite capacity for action and the vision to perceive that there was no other means of escape from the deadly clutches of the Catholic League. A prisoner of his own confusion and negligence, Henry sauntered on like some deranged somnambulist approaching a ravine. There was not 2

Navarre issued a counter edict on 30 November 1585 ordering the seizure of property in towns in which the royal edict had been published. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 522-3, 30 November 1585, Bergerac. 3 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 147-50, 1 December 1585, Navarre to Henry III, 150-2, 1 December 1585, Navarre to Catherine.

Chapter IV: The Tripartite War, 1587

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much more that Navarre could do to avert the inexorable downfall of Henry III and, with him, the collapse of the French monarchy. The end, however, was not immediate. Navarre was now determined to defend himself. He therefore began the year 1586 by writing at length to the three estates of France in order to make his position both public and plain. Conscious of being deeply maligned, Navarre protested his astonishment that the clergy should hold an evil opinion of him, despite the moderation he had always extended towards them, even in time of war. He warned them that if they neglected his offers and failed to support his demands for a council, their money would be squandered and posterity would condemn them; their duty was to instruct, not to destroy. Appealing to their Gallican instincts, he complained that some members of the clergy had canvassed his excommunication in Rome although the pope had no authority over the succession in France. To the nobles, Navarre declared that the League had arisen in time of peace and had initially been condemned by the king. Subsequent developments reflected only the will of the rebels. The nobles appreciated that a prince of the blood [Navarre] was not accountable to these foreigners [the house of Lorraine]. Were the nobles prepared to watch them usurp the government and regulate the succession by means of the pope? He appealed to their latent patriotism to defend the king, while Navarre would welcome their support, even the support of those of whom he might have cause to complain. The ‘tiers’ – or third estate – were also to be impressed with the justice of Navarre’s cause. The rebellion had begun in time of peace; for eight months Navarre did not react, until the king’s forces united with those of the rebels against himself. Then Navarre perceived that passivity could only endanger the state. He reminded the ‘tiers’ of his constructive proposals, which had been wholly ignored, and warned them to beware of League propaganda about reforms. Their peace spelt war, and it was the ‘tiers’ who would suffer most. Navarre was a Christian prince who had proposed Christian solutions, both in religion and in affairs of state; he had done everything in his power to spare the ‘tiers’ the misery of civil war.4 These three statements were also intended for foreign consumption as Navarre prepared to launch appeals for external help. Without such help, he would be unable to do anything effective.5 Navarre, at this time, became somewhat over-optimistic that John Casimir of the Palatinate would soon be able to advance upon the frontier; but this was the start of a bitter and protracted disappointment.6 Navarre sent his servant, Constant, to 4

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 165-8, 1 January 1586, Navarre to the clergy, 168-71, 1 January 1586, Navarre to the nobles, 172-4, 1 January 1586, Navarre to the ‘tiers’, 175-7, 1 January 1586, Navarre to the city of Paris. 5 De Reau was sent to Switzerland, Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 304-14, – February 1586; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 177-8, – January 1586, Navarre to the estates general, said he was sending Buzanval to England, 182-4, 20 January 1586, Navarre to Fleury, 184-5, c. 20 January 1586, Navarre to Ségur. 6 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 323-5, c. February 1586, instructions for Montmartin going to Casimir, 326-7, [c. mid-February 1586], Navarre to queen Elizabeth. Unfortunately, evidence relating to the early months of 1586 is sketchy, and often unreliably dated. See end note on the raising of Navarre’s German army.

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Montmorency, with what he took to be good news of Casimir, perhaps because his envoy Guitry had finally obtained some success; and queen Elizabeth was sending Horatio Palavicino to Germany with the promise of money, albeit not enough.7 But delays arose for various reasons including the usual, timid attitude of the Germans. They were determined to send a peace embassy to France before considering any expenditure on troops.8 By the early summer of 1586, frustration had set in. Navarre still refused to regard the king as an enemy, although Henry sent three armies to oppose him in Guyenne – under Mayenne, Matignon and Biron respectively. Having done all he could, Navarre withdrew to La Rochelle where he endured an uneasy, waiting time, beset by rumours and fears.9 Navarre’s intention was that the prospective German army should enter France via Lorraine, seizing towns and introducing garrisons, in order to proclaim that the house of Lorraine was the enemy. This plan was possibly unwise, since the German force could have been defeated, delayed, or depleted in Lorraine before it entered France. Thereafter, the forces were to proceed via Burgundy to the Nivernais, where Navarre himself proposed to join them. Future variations on the rendez-vous were minor. But decisions as to how the united force would overwhelm the League and liberate the king, could only be made when the time came.10 The absence of any overall strategy may seem curious. But Navarre was surviving from hand to mouth, and facing many incalculable factors. No one knew, for example, what military opposition to expect. It is also possible that – as in 1576 – the mere appearance of a large foreign army, this time to converge with the forces of Navarre, might produce a desirable effect. All Navarre’s offers and proposals to assist the king against their common enemies had been rejected, although he had not requested anything for himself. Now, while awaiting his foreign army and seeking to defend Guyenne – his ‘gouvernement’ – Navarre evidently attempted to save the king and the kingdom in yet another way. He still hoped that a sufficiently broad, and catholic, alliance might be able to bridge the gap between himself and the king. In this, he might be much assisted by rallying the support of the Bourbon princes, Soissons, Conti, and Montpensier. Both to Casimir and to Montmorency, Navarre mentioned the valuable support and alliance of Montpensier; he had reached a ‘bonne resolution’, and prepared a protestation intended to rally catholic

7

Augustin de Constant, seigneur de Rebecque, ‘gentilhomme de la chambre’; Jean de Chaumont, seigneur de Guitry (Quitry), Navarre’s envoy to the Palatinate. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 32930, [February 1586], instructions for Constant. On the work and career of Palavicino see, Lawrence Stone, An Elizabethan: Sir Horatio Palavicino (New York, 1956). 8 CSPF., 1585-6, pp. 689-90, 30 May/?10 June 1586, Guitry to Burghley; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 210-11, 29 April 1586, Navarre to Ségur, in which he complained of having had no news for three months. The delay, he said, in sending an army was ruinous. 9 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 214-15, c. mid-May 1586, Navarre to Ségur, 220-2, 11 June 1586, Navarre to Ségur, Clervant and Guitry, from La Rochelle. 10 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 280-5 [c. February 1586], instructions for Montmartin going to Germany.


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support.11 This is puzzling since it does not otherwise appear that Navarre received the support of his Bourbon relatives before 1587.12 However, Soissons, Conti and Montpensier were evidently instructed to occupy all the places they could, especially river crossings, with the purpose of creating a route towards Paris.13 Previously, Navarre had always been isolated in the south and west. Now an apparent approach to Paris by allied princes might bring Navarre substantial catholic support; and that, in turn, could ease the way for the king to discuss an agreement. But, if the king were to arm against these princes, Navarre and Condé could go and join them – albeit taking care not to alienate their catholic followers. Their joint purpose must be to unite France by all possible means, to uphold the dignity of the king, and to work together, without making individual accords. In that way, everyone’s interests might be embraced in the general peace to which Navarre aspired. Montpensier, if successful, would enjoy both credit and renown. The remonstrance and petition of the Bourbon princes, referred to in the instructions for Constant who was sent to Montmorency, appears in the memoirs of Duplessis-Mornay, undated; perhaps it was never published. It contained some of Navarre’s now familiar arguments, and appealed to the king to suspend the war and consult non-League catholics upon the means of making peace. It reads like a product of the Association of Bergerac.14 Despite the poor evidence relating to the Bourbon princes, a general peace brought about by an impressive, mixed coalition, is certainly what Navarre desired to achieve.

II: The Desire for Peace Both the king and Navarre really wanted peace with each other and war on the League; but they were deadlocked over the means. Indeed, until the king was hounded, almost to death, the means no longer existed. After the peace of Nemours in July 1585, Henry III remained largely consistent in two important respects. In the first place, he was adamant about having only one religion in France. This was not so much from opposition to a degree of religious freedom – at least as a matter of necessity – as from fear. According to Stafford, Henry III had been made to fear ‘the general revolt of the chiefest and greatest towns’, subverted by the League. ‘If he should lean from [one religion] never so little, he 11 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 253-80, undated, remonstrance and petition of the Bourbon princes. 12 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 329-30 [?February 1586], instruction for Constant going to Montmorency. Navarre refers to Guitry who had gone from Germany to the Netherlands, which was in the first week of February 1586; the letter therefore cannot have been placed in the wrong year. Ibid., 323-5 [c. February 1586], instructions for Montmartin going to Casimir. 13 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 316-18, 11 February 1586, instructions for Lambert, who also carried minutes of letters from Montpensier to the king and Catherine de Medici, ibid., 318-19. This instruction is problematical. It contains a reference to the foreign army being ready, which it was not. However, it does not fit any better into 1587. 14 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 253-80, remonstrance and petition of the Bourbon princes; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 220-2, 11 June 1586, Navarre to Clervant, Guitry and Ségur, refers to the support of Soissons, Conti and Montpensier; yet their help is not apparent.

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did put himself in a hazard of losing [the towns] all in a day. So in that matter he never did waver’ – and that spelt war on Navarre.15 Secondly, Henry would continue to insist upon the conversion of Navarre, despite the bull of excommunication; and this insistence precluded an agreement. The bull had effectively divided opinion and given rise to a public quarrel between those who wanted it published and those who wanted it annulled.16 The pope was annoyed by its official suppression in France. Unofficially, it was readily available in translation until, as a proscribed document, its sale was prohibited.17 The fact that the excommunication of Navarre was not received and registered in France was naturally ignored by ultramontane catholics. Similarly, even those who rejected it still sought its revocation. It was not possible simultaneously to deny the validity of the bull and to seek Navarre’s reconversion because, ipso facto, that involved the Papacy. There may have been some agitation in Rome in 1585-6 to have the bull revoked. Obviously this was desired by Henry III, and would have put Navarre under some pressure to convert. But, if any such endeavour really occurred, it was very secretly conducted. Revocation was, however, referred to by Philip II in a letter to Olivares of 15 September 1586. Philip reminded the pope that leaders must be catholic, because he had heard from France of the greatest efforts being made to admit Navarre to conversion. But, he averred, whomsoever relapsed for the second or third time, could never be sincere.18 These observations probably related to Philip’s desire to obtain the pope’s collaboration in choosing an acceptable successor to the throne of France. Philip was also gravely disturbed by constant rumours of an impending general peace in France, whereas his evolving ‘enterprise of England’ depended upon the perpetuation of disorder. Mendoza had doubtless sent Philip II a report from Guise to the effect that Montmorency and Montpensier [?] offered Catherine de Medici some hope that Navarre could be persuaded to convert. Guise also reported – albeit somewhat later – a letter from Pellevé about Montmorency’s interventions. Montmorency is said to have assured the pope that Navarre would convert if Sixtus V agreed to absolve him.19 It is, however, unlikely that annulment of the excommunication became a serious issue at this time; the correspondence of the nuncio, Ragazzoni, mentions no such matter. The explanation of these rumours possibly lies in Montmorency’s own problems. He, also, desired Navarre’s conversion, and he evidently made an offer to Ragazzoni to persuade Navarre. Montmorency might, in that way, have deflected the pressure on himself to abandon the huguenot alliance, but he refused to participate in any peace 15 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 519-28, 25 February/6 March 1588 (sic), Stafford to queen Elizabeth, 580-4, 5/15 April 1588, Stafford to queen Elizabeth. 16 Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 227. 17 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 469-72, 8 November 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci, 481-5, 25 November 1585, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci, 497-8, 1 January 1586, Rusticucci to Ragazzoni, 583-4, 2 June 1586, Rusticucci to Ragazzoni, 590-8, 23 June 1586, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. 18 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 14, 227-9, 15 September 1586, Philip II to Olivares. 19 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, i, 376-7, 17 July 1586, Guise to Mendoza, 411-12, 24 January 1587, Guise to Mendoza.


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negotiations with Navarre. Montmorency later demanded to know why Navarre had been condemned without warning, when he had proclaimed his willingness to receive instruction; to prove it, Montmorency presented Ragazzoni with several copies of Navarre’s protestation [of 10 June 1585]. Montmorency also sustained his complaints of Navarre’s ill-treatment after the new nuncio, Fabio Mirto Frangipani, finally arrived in Paris on 8 or 9 August 1586. Montmorency repeated Navarre’s argument that his conversion in 1572 had been made under duress; therefore he was not relapsed. Furthermore, Montmorency ended his letter to Frangipani with a request for the pope to dispatch worthy and learned men to confer with Navarre [on the subject of his conversion].20 This may have been the first of many efforts to persuade successive popes to facilitate the conversion of Navarre. Frangipani sent the pope a copy of Montmorency’s letter. In reply, Sixtus is said to have claimed that his predecessor, Gregory XIII, had performed every office to bring Navarre back to the Catholic Church and to recognise the error of his ways, but in vain. It is unclear to what, if anything, this refers – unless it was the abjuration of 1572, to which the pope contributed only the absolution. Sixtus V denied all knowledge of Navarre’s declaration of 10 June 1585, or of his willingness to take instruction, despite the fact that the point was repeated in several well-publicised documents. Sixtus had, on the other hand, heard of Navarre’s obstinacy, and denied that the conversion of 1572 had been under duress – a matter he was certainly not competent to judge. It was not appropriate for the pope to send learned persons to Navarre, as Montmorency requested, because Navarre was contumacious. It behoved Navarre to confess, and to appeal to the pope personally, in which case Sixtus would hear him.21 That committed him to nothing, and the excommunication itself was evidence enough that the Papacy – while overshadowed by Spain – did not desire Navarre’s conversion and would not assist him to achieve it. If, indeed, Navarre had been considering conversion – a proposition which was constantly thrust upon him – he would surely not have done so in the summer of 1586. At the time he was hopeful of obtaining the support of a foreign army, subsidised by queen Elizabeth whose alliance he could not afford to jeopardise. Sixtus V had certainly driven a wedge between Navarre and the king but, far from reuniting the catholics, it vastly complicated the issues in France. Peace with Navarre and a general settlement in France was widely desired by all but the Catholic League, Spain and the Papacy. Throughout the year 1586, the idea of a settlement was fuelled by – premature – fears of a German army, and sustained by three successive foreign embassies to press the king to make peace. The first ambassadors to arrive were the Danes, on 24 April 1586. They are said to have been indiscreet and ill20

De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 29; J.M. Davies, ‘Languedoc and its “gouverneur”, Henri de Montmorency-Damville, 1563-1589’ (unpublished Ph.D., University of London, 1975), 335 seq. 21 According to Tempesti, Navarre is said to have written a humble letter to the pope retracting everything [which is unclear] and promising to live and die a catholic. This assertion is improbable enough to ignore, were it not that the existence of such a letter was referrred to at the time of Navarre’s absolution in 1595. Could there have been a forgery? Tempesti, however, gives neither dates nor references, Sisto-Quinto, i, 1703. Frangipani died on 16 March 1587, so these reports can hardly have referred to the next year.

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received, and shortly departed. The Danes were followed by the Swiss, towards the end of May. They urged the king to observe the edicts of pacification, pressed for peace on the grounds of famine in France, and offered to mediate.22 In reply, Henry said that he greatly desired peace, but ‘not such as some former ones have been’ – a reference to the peace of Monsieur in 1576. Henry invited Navarre to send an envoy to meet the Swiss, perhaps with ulterior motives. Navarre sent Rosny (better known as the duc de Sully, 1606) and his secretary La Marsillière, who was on his way to Germany. Rosny was taken by Villeroy to meet the king at Saint-Maur. Henry informed him that Navarre must accept his will – meaning that he must abjure. That was the only way to destroy the League’s claim that they made war on account of Navarre and his religion. According to Rosny, Henry III urged that a feigned conversion would do. If Navarre would merely attend mass, that would suffice. Ignoring the insulting implications, Rosny rightly replied that if Navarre converted alone, he would carry with him no force. That would not remove the religious pretext of the League [or the existence of the huguenots]. The League would denounce a feigned conversion and proceed as before. After meeting Catherine de Medici, Rosny went to Paris and briefed the Swiss, carefully explaining Navarre’s material needs. He then returned to the king with whom it was agreed that the Swiss should assist Navarre with 20,000 men, of which 4,000 would go to Dauphiné and 16,000 join Navarre. But, if the king should call upon them to serve him against the League, they would be obliged to obey. This reservation led to trouble, Rosny observed (many years later). That, it will be seen, was a reference to the campaign of 1587, when the presence of the king in the field caused some confusion as to what the Swiss troops were supposed to be doing. If Rosny’s report is correct, it is highly significant: it shows the king to have been in collusion with the huguenots, secretly exploiting the Swiss embassy to obtain help against the Guises.23 However, the size of the force envisaged is suspiciously large. According to Stafford, the king had hoped that Navarre’s envoys would be instructed to seek peace, and Henry had welcomed the Swiss embassy with that in mind.24 Henry himself wanted peace, but he wanted others to solicit it; and he told the huguenot envoys to encourage petitioning. When asked directly if they had no charge to treat for peace, Rosny and La Marsillière replied with dignity that the huguenots were not in arms against the king, and would not disarm until he was obeyed by the League.25 22 CSPF., 1585-6, pp. 566-7, 23 April/3 May 1586, Stafford to Walsingham, 640-1, 29 May 1586, deputies of the four cantons of Zurich, Berne, Basle and Schaffhausen to Henry III, 654, 2 June 1586, Henry III to the four Swiss cantons; Roelker, Pierre de L’Estoile, 119. 23 Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds. Sully, Œconomies royales, i, 151-3. Rosny, writing many years later, recorded that the king was sitting in his study dangling on his arm a basket, like that of a cheesemonger, containing two or three miniature dogs. In proposing outward conformity, the king may have been thinking of Navarre’s father Antoine de Bourbon who did, on account of his rank, prevaricate in religion. Navarre’s position was not, however, analogous. 24 Henry was doubtless influenced at this moment by the fact that the Guises had left the court on 24 May 1586 and were very threatening. 25 Ragazzoni, however, believed that Rosny and La Marsillière had come to discover the king’s conditions for peace. Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 577-81, 25 May 1586, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci, 584-8, 9 June 1586, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci; CSPF., 1585-6, pp. 690-3, 31 May/10 June 1586,


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The German ambassadors were the last to arrive, at the end of July 1586, just as both the king and Catherine were about to leave Paris. Did Henry know, perhaps, that the German princes had refused to help Navarre before hearing the outcome of their embassy? Following the failure of the Danes and the Swiss, it all seemed rather a hollow gesture. The ambassadors were already ‘marvellously stomached’ before the king eventually returned, only to dispatch them with scant courtesy on 9 or 10 October 1586.26 Nevertheless, Henry’s mind was, in fact, running on peace, and the current mission of Catherine de Medici to Navarre. The deadlock between them, if not resolved, would lead to the war for which Navarre was now preparing.

III: The Pressure to Convert The proposition that Catherine de Medici should seek a meeting with Navarre to press for his conversion and to make peace, was mooted at the time of his betrayal at Épernay in the summer of 1585.27 The idea was revived some time before Easter (6 April) 1586, when it was feared that his German army would materialise. But first of all, feelers were extended and efforts were made to put pressure on Navarre through his catholic supporters. This tended to undermine the ideals of the non-sectarian Association of Bergerac. Henry failed to appreciate these ideals because he persisted in his resolve – already noted – to have only one religion. Consequently fruitless attempts were made to detach Montmorency from the protestant alliance in order, it was hoped, to bring Navarre to his knees. But Montmorency – it has also been seen – knew well enough what the conflict was all about, and his family enmity for the house of Guise was immutable. Montmorency regretted that Navarre was not a catholic, but warned that he might soon be in a position to force a profitable peace. The king’s messenger, Vérac, went on from Montmorency to Navarre, evidently still hoping to elicit a request for peace. Navarre’s response was the same as that already made by Rosny in May 1586 at the time of the Swiss embassy: he was not at war with the king, but merely defending himself. Vérac confided that Catherine would employ herself in any possible way for Navarre’s good and that of the realm. Navarre replied, with unusual asperity, that it was about time for her to begin, as ‘she had long enough been adoing to ruin the realm of France and particularly to undo him’. So Vérac failed, and the king was ‘amazed at the stiff standing of the King of Navarre...’ who refused to ask for peace.28 When, about 21 July 1586, the nuncio heard of Catherine de Medici’s impending mission to Navarre, he protested that the pope would be very angry at such a blatant Stafford to Walsingham; ibid., 1586-8, pp. 2-3, 1/11 June 1586, Stafford to Walsingham. Stafford regretted that the ‘Swissers’ were turned away ‘so sleeveless’, ibid., 3-6, 1/11 June 1586, French Advertisements. 26 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 60-1, 29 July/8 August 1586, Stafford to Walsingham, 72-3, 20/30 August 1586, Stafford to Walsingham, 92-3, 25 September/5 October 1586, Stafford to Walsingham; Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 325-7, 13 October 1586, Frangipani to Rusticucci. 27 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, viii, 435-6, 2 May 1585, Bellièvre to Catherine. Bellièvre did not think that Navarre would agree to abjure. 28 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 36-8, 3/13 July 1586, Stafford to Walsingham.

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disregard for the excommunication. The king retorted that the pope would not think it strange if he understood the present state of France, and Henry’s own intentions. The huge expense of war was quite unsustainable and he wanted an honourable peace. He had news of the coming of 12,000 reiters for Navarre and had decided not to wait. Thereupon Ragazzoni begged the king not to conclude anything relating to Navarre, Condé or religion without consulting the pope. Henry remained non-committal and the pope later condemned Catherine’s peace mission as an ‘indignity’. Henry III, he declared, ought to make war properly, in which case Sixtus would help him.29 Catherine – like the king – left Paris on 25 July 1586, and went to her château of Chenonceaux on the Loire. Her mission, it will shortly be seen, was conducted against the background of renewed Guise hostilities and threats, which the disastrous peace of Nemours had failed to arrest. The pattern of this further activity reflected an acceleration of Spain’s Armada campaign against England; this placed the king under extreme pressure. Fearing that Navarre might refuse to see her, Catherine sent the abbé JeanBaptiste Guadagni on ahead.30 He returned directly, but with no clear message beyond Navarre’s desire for peace. Henry sounded the new nuncio, Fabio Mirto Frangipani, as to whether the pope would agree to his granting liberty of conscience; the nuncio pleaded no instructions. Guadagni’s journeyings continued throughout the late summer of 1586; 9 October found him reporting to the king in Paris when the German ambassadors were there.31 While Catherine lingered at Chenonceaux and Blois, other envoys to Navarre followed Guadagni – Chémerault, La Roche and Vérac. A great deal of time and effort was expended upon preliminary and practical arrangements, since Catherine was seeking a conference in a war zone. On 13 August 1586 she issued a declaration from Chenonceaux announcing that Navarre desired peace and that she was going to meet him. This statement may have been intended to undermine his credibility and alliances.32 In fact Navarre’s entourage – especially Condé and Turenne – were strongly opposed to peace since they awaited their foreign army; and there could be no question of detaching Navarre. But, not wanting to appear intransigent, on 23 November 1586 he agreed to a truce.33 The negotiations which followed between Catherine, Navarre, and a considerable number of intermediaries, are known collectively as the conference of Saint-Brice, after 29 Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Ragazzoni, 533-4, 9 March 1586, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci, 605-9, 21 July 1586, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci; Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 355-6, 11 February 1587, Rusticucci to Frangipani. 30 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 48-50, 14/24 July 1586, Stafford to Walsingham, 51-2, 15/25 July 1586, Stafford to Walsingham. 31 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 60-1, 29 July/7 August 1586, 72-3, 20/30 August 1586, 95, 29 September/9 October 1586, Stafford to Walsingham. About this time Cavriana described France as poor, exhausted, divided, plague-ridden and corrupt. He might also have added famine stricken. He also said that the king’s hair and beard had turned completely white. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 655-61, 30 September 1586, Cavriana to Vinta. 32 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, app. 402-3, 13 August 1586, ‘déclaration de la reine mère’. 33 Brémond d’Ars, ‘Les Conférences de Saint-Brice’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxvi (1884), 496-523.


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the name of a château near Cognac where the first two meetings occurred. The evidence relating to these exchanges is confused, and must be regarded as approximate; loose ends and inconsistencies abound.

IV: The Conference of Saint-Brice, 1586-7 The first conversation between Navarre and Catherine de Medici, on 13 December 1586, was bitter and elliptical. Catherine, in effect, asked Navarre to name his price, without specifying what she had in mind. Navarre replied that he requested nothing – he had never requested anything for himself, and he never did. Catherine indicated that the king had been obliged to make peace with the League in order to preserve the state. As religion was the League’s pretext, the destruction of that pretext was the only way to obtain peace. To Navarre, however, the king had rather been ill-advised than constrained to capitulate with the League; the treaty [of Nemours] was itself the cause of the present trouble. The preservation of the state depended upon the observation of the edicts of pacification which the treaty revoked. Navarre complained of his ill-treatment, including the dispatch of several royal armies against him. Catherine replied that the king had divided his forces deliberately, so that Navarre would not be overwhelmed by them. That much was probably true.34 Each waited for the other to make some overture, but Navarre merely said that he had no power to act alone.35 They met again the next day, 14 December 1586, together with Condé, and Navarre said that he required two months, a truce and passports in order to consult the protestant churches, England and the Germans.36 Next Catherine met Turenne, who went on ahead of Navarre. She told Turenne what she had not said to Navarre himself: that he must abjure, and prohibit the cult in the cities, if there was to be peace. When Turenne met Navarre by the way, he considered turning back. A third meeting between Catherine and Navarre did, however, take place but of which there are differing accounts. According to one, Navarre allegedly admitted certain advantages of an abjuration but said that it would primarily benefit the Guises. They did not want him at court, and his return would be to invite assassination. Catherine then proposed a truce for a year, during which the cult should be suspended and an estates-general called. Navarre, however, did not want a long truce, while an estates-general would be useless, given the 34

Stafford had said much the same thing to Walsingham, that the king gave the League the forces with which to perform what they desired of him but that ‘he handleth the matter so that they work no great effect’. In military terms, that was true. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 51-2, 15/25 July 1586, Stafford to Walsingham. 35 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 76 seq.; Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 111-15, 13 December 1586, Catherine to Henry III; CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 156-7, 13 December 1586, ‘discours de la Royne mere et du Roy de Navarre’ (wrongly dated 25 November in addition to 13 December). This document contains the short, sharp repartee between Catherine and Navarre, confirmed in a letter of Navarre to Scorbiac, ‘conseiller’ in the ‘parlement’ of Toulouse, Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 251-3, 27 December 1586. 36 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 115-16, 14 December 1586, Catherine to Henry III; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 80-5. After the first two meetings, Catherine sent Rambouillet to the king, and Navarre sent to England, Germany, Montmorency and various provinces. B.N., Mss. ital. 1735, ff. 255-6, 22 December 1586, Dolfin to the doge and senate.

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weakness of the king. Besides, religion could only be treated in a council. This had always been his demand, and he would agree to a truce for that purpose. After conferring with his colleagues, Navarre sent his ‘commissaire’ Montguyon with La Force to see Catherine on 17 December 1586. They inquired whether one religion only was the final word of Catherine and the king. The protestants had defended their religion for twentyfive years. To ask them to abandon it now was unreasonable, and they did not intend to do so. A temporary truce was agreed upon while Catherine sent Rambouillet to the king, and Navarre sent de Reau.37 Rambouillet arrived in Paris on 27 December 1586, evidently for the second time. According to the Venetian ambassador Giovanni Dolfin, he brought a substantially different report of the third meeting, before which Catherine had insisted that Navarre must abjure. Dolfin claimed that Navarre had bowed and departed in silence, followed by all his suite. Next day he sent word that he had terminated the truce because there were to be no more meetings. Catherine, who never took no for an answer, sent Nevers to Navarre who responded by submitting his [peace] terms in writing. These terms, as reported by Dolfin were: the revocation of the edict of 18 July 1585 against the protestants; the restoration of all places seized [by the League] since the last uprising; that Navarre should govern Guyenne alone, similarly Condé in Picardy and Montpensier in Normandy; that Navarre should have one ‘place de sûreté’ in each province, where he might appoint a governor and place a garrison and in which the religion could be exercised. Finally, he required the repayment of his expenses in Germany occasioned by the League.38 These alleged terms – it will be seen – were notably less than the objectives contained in the capitulation of 11 January 1587 with John Casimir of the Palatinate. Catherine’s final declaration, on 18 December 1586, was that the king was resolved to tolerate only one religion; and yet she still asked for time, until 6 January 1587, for further consultation; during that period there was a truce. Whatever the truth may be, it was all a pointless exercise to Navarre; he told the churches to be prepared for defence.39 Catherine was not hopeful either, and warned the king to be ready to oppose the foreign troops which the protestants claimed were coming. In an important letter – incompletely dated – Henry informed his mother that he had called an assembly of notables. He explained to them the pains she had taken to see Navarre in order to urge him and his followers to convert, and to discuss a durable peace.40 Henry claimed to have been moved in this matter by three considerations: to restore catholicism, to spare the people, and to avert a foreign invasion – of which only 37

François de la Rochefoucauld, seigneur de Mentende et de Montguyon; Jacques-Nompar de Caumont, duc de la Force. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 251-3, 27 December 1586, Navarre to Scorbiac, 254-5, 29 December 1586, Navarre to Villeroy; Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 119-21, 18 December 1586, Catherine to Villeroy, 122, 18 December 1586, Catherine to Pisani, in Rome, 123-5, 20 December 1586, Catherine to Villeroy. 38 B.N., Mss. ital. 1735, ff. 260-2, 1 January 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 39 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 254-5, 30 December 1586, Navarre to the churches of Armagnac. 40 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, app. 430-4, – January 1587, Henry III to Catherine.


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the third made sense. He told the assembly that Navarre offered little hope of conforming [to his will], as if the huguenots really wished to force him to pursue the war more rigorously. The peace [of Nemours] had, he said, been made in an effort to bring about one religion by ‘douceur’ [meaning legalistically]. In this same letter, Henry went on to make an apparently contradictory, if rather cryptic, statement to the effect that he had been willing to tolerate protestant practice to some degree (‘encores que l’on eust permis et tolleré par icelles quelque exercise de l’opinion contraire, de quoi le temps et nos actions et comportemens eussent de plus en plus rendu certain tesmoignage’). That intention was ‘interrupted’ and, recognising from experience that peace could only be made by the observation of a single religion, he would [now] have to act more rigorously. Did Henry mean that, if Navarre had converted he would have been tacitly, but increasingly, lenient towards the huguenots, or merely that the League had disrupted the edicts of pacification? Now, he said, he meant to seize huguenot property, according to the edict of July 1585. He had – presumably for that purpose – established a special council. By Rambouillet, Henry informed Catherine that he would issue a declaration. This was to warn the huguenots that he was serious about enforcing a single religion, and he intended to do so in arms. To Navarre’s envoy, de Reau, Henry said regretfully that Navarre had obliged him to take these measures. De Reau had informed the king of the coming of the reiters – but also, one must suppose, that they were not coming against himself. Henry III had no sooner signed this letter to his mother than Pontcarré arrived with a request for his final resolution upon certain additional points. These points may have been the terms allegedly submitted by Navarre in writing, but it is difficult to tell if the timing fits. In a further letter to his mother, Henry said that he had made it clear that he would not yield on religion; and he now repeated the point.41 But, more cautiously, he also said that he must study how to achieve one religion without loss of reputation, given that he desired to avoid the use of force (sic). But he did not know how to proceed. One can only suppose that Henry’s simultaneous sabre rattling – emphatically reported by Dolfin – was meant to impress the League, but did not represent his real intentions.42 If Catherine openly declared that the king persisted in wanting only one religion, Navarre would break with her entirely; but she was disinclined to give up. Something must therefore be contrived if the negotiation, about which the League was very sensitive, was not to be totally abandoned. As Navarre had said that he could not treat without consulting the huguenot deputies, Henry would permit them to assemble. Catherine could then explain herself, and the king’s will, to the deputies! She might propose a truce for one or two years, during which they could hold an estates-general or an assembly of notables to seek solutions – a suggestion already rejected. In that case, Henry proposed a kind of de facto interim: protestants who lived south of the Loire might go home and enjoy their property. In other provinces, where there was war, they should not be 41

Geoffroy Camus, seigneur de Pontcarré, ‘maître des requêtes’. Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, app. 434-7 [?10] January 1587, Henry III to Catherine. 42 B.N., Mss. ital. 1735, ff. 287-90, 16 January 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate.

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molested ‘en leur conscience et religion’, although the last edict [of July 1585] should be retained; that, of course, was a contradiction. Henry’s letter concluded, more precisely, that Navarre must now be addressed frankly, by persons of trust. Presumably he meant that, in order to avoid a breach, it was now time to reveal contingency offers not previously mentioned; and he referred to some private agreement made with Catherine at the time of her departure. The final message to Navarre was that Henry could neither save his kingdom nor do anything to help Navarre if he, in turn, did not co-operate in respect of his religion. This was a matter in which Navarre must support the king, if only on account of his own inheritance. If Henry knew that Navarre was ready and willing to abjure, he would open up the way for him, and provide the means by which this could be done with honour and dignity. In this case, Henry went on, he would protect Navarre’s rank and person (‘et ne soufriray qu’il luy en soit faict aucun tort’). Henry would pay Navarre a pension of 100,000 livres tournois per annum; but he would not allow him an appanage, nor permit him to divorce his wife, with whom he should seek to beget an heir.43 Henry would also provide for Condé, Turenne and Montmorency, if they were co-operative. Navarre must now decide, because all other courses spelt ruin. If the queen failed this time, Henry III would be quit. He could no longer continue in his present position.44 The deadlock therefore turned explicitly on the matter of Navarre’s conversion, and Henry plainly threatened him with open warfare. It is possible that this apparent persistence in the face of failure may have been calculated to alarm and put pressure on the Guises. The king’s virtual ultimatum makes no mention of the toleration which, in some considerable measure, must certainly feature in any agreement. Stafford, however, had previously reported that he believed the queen mother to hold a commission to offer exercise of the cult in all places held by the huguenots, and liberty of conscience elsewhere. That, presumably, would be part of the package, if Navarre agreed to abjure.45 It therefore appears that the peace of Nemours may have been concluded – under extreme duress – upon the desperate, tragically false assumption that Catherine de Medici could subsequently neutralise the consequences by bribing Navarre to convert. Yet Navarre had never been reticent; it has been seen that numerous communications had amply conveyed and publicised his personal and religious position, as well as the nature of the service he freely offered the king. Henry, in those final thoughts, made no reference to a council, the one expedient to which Navarre would have felt obliged to respond; yet this is hardly surprising. Henry III could neither have mounted nor promoted any sort of council. Neither could he arrange the conditions for an honourable conversion – which would, anyway, have been discounted as feigned. Already in 1585, before the excommunication, Ragazzoni had shown that door to be closed. Neither could the king have protected Navarre’s rank and person were he to venture back to court. Even if Navarre had truly wished to convert – for which there is no acceptable evidence – he could not possibly 43

Marguerite de Valois was the king’s sister. Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, app. 434-7 [?10] January 1587, Henry III to Catherine. 45 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 146-8, 17/27 November 1586, Stafford to Burghley. 44


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have done so in the domestic and international circumstances which pertained in 1586-7.46 So far as one can tell, what Navarre really desired was an army, money, and the necessary equipment with which to effect substantial and permanent changes. The king’s final observations were probably conveyed to Navarre on 27 January 1587. Navarre promptly refused any further meetings with Catherine. It was still to be some weeks, however, before she gave up. Messengers continued to ride to and fro between them, Navarre having withdrawn to La Rochelle. The substance of Navarre’s replies was that he still wished to serve in the cause of peace if only Catherine and the king would stop demanding things that were both impossible to implement and detrimental to conscience, honour and safety. Only on that completely different basis was Navarre willing to proceed. By that time, news of the huguenot agreement with Casimir, of 11 January 1587, had probably reached La Rochelle.47 Catherine no longer thought that the huguenots would agree to anything before their foreign help arrived; nor did she think [rightly] that the army would come before July or August 1587. Knowing the king to be unprepared, she was seriously anxious. But she also thought that the impending arrival of the Germans might possibly be exploited, and turned to good effect. This suggests that she was lowering the king’s sights. Navarre, however, could not and would not do anything either alone or in a hurry, and the difficulties proved to be insurmountable.48 He insisted upon receiving the royal payments due to protestant garrisons, money which Catherine was unable to raise. They were, furthermore, still in a war zone, and local truces were unreliable. The final rupture, early in 1587, occurred between Catherine and Turenne, at Fontenay-le-comte. Navarre still expressed himself willing to discuss peace, but on terms that he regarded as reasonable, and provided he had received passports enabling him to assemble the churches. Time, however, was running out: these discussions were effectively superseded by Leaguer rumblings which occurred in Paris early in 1587 – a precursor of worse to come – and the expectation of the German army.49 Navarre reported to the churches that he had, through 46

There was, furthermore, another obstacle which was not yet apparent. Even had Navarre contrived to convert and obtain absolution, he would not have been ‘rehabilitated’ – meaning that he would still have been debarred from the succession. This was a technical, but vital, problem to be fully discussed in later chapters. 47 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, app. 426-7, 6 February 1587, memoir sent by Navarre to Catherine, 146-8, 29 January 1587, Catherine to Henry III, 153-4, 2 February 1587, Catherine to Henry III, 155-7, 7 February 1587, Catherine to Henry III, 157-8, 7 February 1587, Catherine to Brulart, 160-4, 10 February 1587, Catherine to Henry III, 167-8, 14 February 1587, Catherine to Bellièvre; CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 179-80, 2/12 January 1587, Clervant to Walsingham, 186-7, 11 January 1587, capitulation between Ségur, Guitry, Clervant and Casimir, drastically abbreviated. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 64-9. 48 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 186-7, 25 February 1587, Catherine to Henry III. 49 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 168-70, 15 February 1587, Catherine to Henry III, 170, 15 February 1587, Catherine to Henry III (2), 172-3, 16 February 1587, Catherine to Biron, 179-81, 20 February 1587, Catherine to Henry III, 182-3, 22 February 1587, Catherine to Navarre, 183-6, 24 February 1587, Catherine to Henry III, 186-7, 25 February 1587, Catherine to Henry III, 189, 1 March 1587, Catherine to Bellièvre, 189-90, 7 March 1587, Catherine to Matignon, 190, 7 March 1587, Catherine to d’Entragues, 192, 13 March 1587, Catherine to Longlée.

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Turenne, offered to employ his person and all their means to save the king (‘d’employer ma personne et tous noz moyens pour establir l’auctorite du Roy, aneantie par ceulx de la Ligue, et acquerir un perdurable repos à ses subjects’). That is what the German army was for, and the difference it was intended to make. To the churches, Navarre also declared that Catherine de Medici had been recalled on account of troubles in Paris.50 Relations between himself and the king were therefore still completely deadlocked; and they were both in danger.

V: The Parallel Conflict in Rome The rumours of peace with Navarre which persisted throughout 1586, Catherine’s departure for the west late in July, and the winter conference at Saint-Brice all caused great agitation in ultra-catholic circles; speculation was rife as to what Navarre might do. Meanwhile a parallel conflict was played out in Rome. Someone, averse from peace, dispatched an extraordinary courier to Rome with a – premature – report of the failure of Catherine’s mission. By 9 February 1587 the Spanish ambassador, Olivares, had been informed of her failure by Pisani; also that the king was now resolved to make war on the heretics. Pellevé asserted that the king had been forced to desist from his peace negotiations both on account of the Guises, who would refuse to observe any agreement, and because of another simmering revolt in Paris. Pellevé assured Olivares that the League was all for war, with or without the king. He also claimed that the League had sought and obtained Papal benediction – which was less than frank.51 Olivares was not reassured that events in France would go as Spain required; and that was partly because of the instability he perceived in Rome. Without precisely supporting the League, Sixtus V had entered the conflict to exclude Navarre from the throne, and begun to exert a destructive influence on his fortunes. Olivares’ observations on the pope are worth noting. The Spaniard hated Sixtus V and, to Philip II, he launched into a candid condemnation of the pontiff’s small understanding of politics (‘lo poco que el papa entiende in cosas de estado’), and of his extraordinary inconsistency (‘le variedad tan extraordinaria con que procede in ellas’). These strictures may well have reflected the ambassador’s frustrated efforts to obtain financial support for the Spanish ‘enterprise of England’, and a favourable agreement upon the English succession. Olivares attributed this alleged inconsistency to Sixtus’ determination to surface on the winning side; this, with hindsight, appears to be correct. Olivares had, he said, discussed the French peace 50

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 274-5, 15 March 1587, Navarre to the churches. Catherine referred to this meeting with Turenne in a letter of 7 March 1587 to Matignon, Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 189-90; Roelker, Pierre de L’Estoile, 126-7. On this occasion, the trouble in Picardy was contained by the king. The nature of the conspiracy in Paris in March 1587 will be discussed in chapter v. 51 The king became very angry with Pellevé for his evil offices in Rome and proposed to seize his revenues. Martin and Toupin Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 345-7, 8 December 1586, Frangipani to Rusticucci; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 17-19, 231-3, 9 February 1587, Olivares to Philip II. This report probably arose from the assembly held by Henry III in Paris. Cavriana wrote on 20 January 1587 that the king had held an assembly and decided upon a single religion, and war with Navarre if he resisted. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 670-5, 20 January 1587, Cavriana to Vinta.


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negotiations in an audience with the pope, and eased the conversation round to what concerned him most, namely discussions which, he maintained, Navarre was holding about his conversion. Navarre’s conversion had already been the subject of a previous audience, on 23 January 1587. If the pope revealed anything in reply, Olivares did not say so; but the conversation confirmed his opinion that Sixtus V was unreliable. This opinion was sustained by the francophile Rusticucci. He voiced his belief that Sixtus V would not, any longer – a few months after the event – be disposed to destitute Navarre. The pope, Olivares protested, had said that, by requesting time to consult his allies, Navarre had behaved with greater prudence than Guise; for Guise had made peace [in 1585] without consultation in Rome. Olivares was embarrassed and defended Guise. The duke, he said, had obtained everything for religion and that, presumably, was pleasing to Rome.52 Probably Olivares’ report amounted to little of substance, except that Navarre’s religion, together with war or peace in France, were burning issues of general concern. The pope, who evidently reciprocated Olivares’ antipathy, was apt to needle him. Sixtus V was no more altruistic than any other politician, and no less confused by the affairs of France. When, upon occasion, it was necessary to utter, his response could be contrary and evanescent. Much of his attention, in respect of France, was focused on Montmorency, whose alliance – actually secured by Navarre – was pivotal. Montmorency had dealings with Rome and was involved with the duke of Savoy, which affected Italian politics.53 Pisani tried to guide the pope away from his crude and violent attitude to heresy by proclaiming his duty to pacify France. Personal quarrels, Pisani warned the pope, were being pursued in the name of religion. Pisani had almost persuaded the pope to issue a brief on the subject of peace – presumably its desirability – when the (premature) news arrived of the failure of the conference of Saint-Brice. What might that brief have contained? Probably Sixtus was only mollifying Pisani, since he thought it utopian to hope for Navarre’s sincere conversion. If Pisani discussed Navarre’s conversion in Rome, he did not say so. Nor is there any solid evidence either that Navarre himself engaged in such discussions or that the pope would, if requested, have rescinded so recent an excommunication. He was vexed by Henry III’s procrastination and prolonged negotiations, and he could not afford to alienate Spain.54 According to Rusticucci, Sixtus thought it beneath the king to dispatch his mother to sue for peace with his own subjects; he ought to exert himself properly and prosecute the war.55

52

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 17-19, 9 February 1587, Olivares to Philip II. Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 208-11. The pope thought that Henry III should pardon Montmorency, as he had Nevers. Pisani mentioned Montmorency’s negotiations in Rome between 17 November 1586 and 5 October 1587. If, indeed, there were any discussions of Navarre’s conversion, they were probably about this time. 54 Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 212 and n.1, 213, 21 October 1586, Pisani to Henry III, 214, 27 January 1587, Pisani to Henry III. 55 Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 355-6, 11 February 1587, Rusticucci to Frangipani. Sixtus V strongly disapproved of Henry’s ‘capucinades’ which kept him from his duties. Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 207, quoting Gondi to Henry III, 15 January 1586. 53

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VI: Spain Seeks the Renewal of Civil War Henry III, for his part, was well aware that the League was extremely disturbed by the persistent talk of peace during 1586, and by Catherine’s prolonged absence in pursuit of it. Indeed, upon her return on 21 March 1587, Stafford believed that Henry would send her on to the League, ‘who stir like princes and kings’. He referred especially to Aumale who was seizing towns in Picardy – according to the League schedule.56 This, though Stafford did not say so, was in anticipation of the Spanish Armada for which Philip II required the League to control the maritime, frontier province.57 Stafford envisaged the situation running out of control; he feared some attempt upon the king’s person, ‘whom they make a full account of to execute, and to make it the full conclusion of all their greatness’. The Tuscan, Cavriana, also feared a resort to unspecified assassinations as the probable means of breaking the deadlock.58 These ambassadors were not far wide of the mark. Early in 1585 the Guises had served Spain’s purposes well enough, albeit to their own disadvantage. But, after the peace of Nemours, they fell into disfavour with Philip II, until he needed them again. So he kept them too short of money to act effectively. After Parma’s capture of Antwerp in August 1585 – a watershed in international affairs – Philip II resumed his evolving enterprise of England, at one time scheduled for October 1586. Parma, who was favoured by the pope to command the campaign, had always insisted that civil war in France was an essential precondition.59 After extensive discussions in Spain, it was decided in October 1586 to strengthen the attachment with Guise. The explicit purpose was to sustain a state of alarm in France. This would render her incapable of annoying his Catholic Majesty, and preclude the conclusion of any peace with Navarre.60 Navarre was therefore more than wise and justified in evading an agreement which, it will be seen, could only have been worthless. Guise went to Paris in mid-February 1586 and became convinced that the king meant to seek peace with Navarre – despite the treaty of Nemours. This conviction can only have been confirmed by the arrival of the Danish ambassadors, followed by the 56

Charles de Lorraine, duc d’Aumale was a cousin of the duc de Guise. The duc d’Aumale first rebelled against the royal garrisons in Picardy in March 1587 in anticipation of the Armada which, in the event, was postponed. Dickerman, ‘A Neglected Phase of the Spanish Armada: the Catholic League’s Picard Offensive of 1587’, Canadian Journal of History, xi (1976), 19-23. 58 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 257-9, 24 March/3 April 1587, Stafford to Walsingham; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 667-70, 5 January 1587, Cavriana to Vinta; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 215. 59 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 70, 29 December 1585, Philip II to Parma, 70-1, 31 December 1585, Parma to Philip II, 105-7, 20 April 1586, Parma to Philip II, a very important letter on Armada plans; CSPSp., 1580-8, 560-2, 24 February 1586, Olivares to Philip II, who said that the pope’s ardour was cooled by the ‘money malady’ – Sixtus V’s notorious miserliness; CSPSp., 1587-1603, p. 49, 26 March 1586, Mendoza to Philip II. The Guises were involved in Scottish schemes, whereas Philip II wished to confine their activities to France. 60 CSPVen., 1581-91, pp. 211-14, 18 October 1586, Lippomano to the doge and senate. He also reported that the marquis of Almazon, viceroy on the Navarrese frontier, agreed to try to bribe Navarre, with 100,000 crowns in cash, to refuse to make peace. There was no need; nor is there any sign that Navarre snapped up the easy picking. Buzanval (in England) also mentioned that Spain had offered Navarre money to convert and ally with Spain, but he does not say when. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 47-8, 14/24 July 1586, Buzanval to Burghley. 57


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Swiss. When Guise departed for Châlons on 24 May 1586, it was ‘with a determination desperate to attempt something new if he can’. The king had pandered to him in all things but, ‘when it came to the performance of anything [namely the treaty and the war] then there is nothing to be had’. Guise was fuming and Stafford feared ‘some bad thing lurking’.61 The ‘determination’ perceived by Stafford was to avert Catherine de Medici’s mission to Navarre. While complaining bitterly about his lack of money, Guise assured the pope and the Spanish agents that he would not, in any case, accept or honour any peace agreement. Pellevé, in Rome, was right about that.62 The ‘bad thing’, suspected by Stafford, was evidently some sort of renewal, or extension, of their treaty of Joinville with Spain. From Châlons, Guise could more easily liaise with Parma who was authorised to work with Tassis in Paris and to forward to France part of the money he had recently received (and needed) for the Netherlands. This was, precisely, to ensure that the League was in a position to oppose the huguenots and therefore to disrupt the peace, if it were to be concluded.63 As much as anyone, or more than most, Parma was perturbed by the persistent talk of peace in France, and the expectation of a German army which could endanger the Netherlands’ frontier. He feared that, without renewed civil war, France would not tolerate a Spanish success – he meant of the Armada against England; and Olivares agreed. Parma hammered on this theme and it was he, together with the Spanish agents, Mendoza, Jean Baptiste de Tassis and Juan de Moreo, who went to work on preparing the disturbances they required in France.64 It was, presumably, to seek an appropriate agreement with the Spanish, that the Guises assembled at Ourcamp, near Soissons, late in September 1586, as Catherine strove to obtain a meeting with Navarre. We can deduce that the new Guise/Spanish agreement related to the steps required by Spain to facilitate the passage of the Armada against England, involving the League control of Picardy. Among other things, Aumale was to take Boulogne, a project doubtless proposed by Mendoza. It was not long before there was talk of Leaguer seizures in Picardy. Furthermore, the League was to attack Sedan and Jametz, where the duc de Bouillon sheltered protestants. Finally, one must suppose that 61

CSPF., 1585-6, pp. 638-40, 19/29 May 1586, Stafford to Walsingham; Blet, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 522-3, 17 February 1586, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci, 532-3, 7 March 1586, Ragazzoni to Rusticucci. 62 CSPSp., 1580-6, pp. 562-99 [February 1586], report of a discussion between Olivares and the pope; Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, iii, 225, lists Spanish payments made to Guise in May and June 1583, September 1584, May 1585, June and December 1586. In the last six years of his life, 1582-8, Guise received about 500,000 écus from Spain. The list is not necessarily complete; De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, i, 352-3, 14 September 1585, Guise to Mendoza, 366, 31 December 1585, Guise to Tassis, 367-8, 29 January 1586 and 372, 19 June 1586, Guise acknowledged the receipt of money, which he needed in order to make preparations lest peace was made with Navarre. Ibid., 384-5, 22 September 1586, Guise to Mendoza. 63 Essen, Parma, v, 174; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 120-1, 11 June 1586, Parma to Philip II, 123, 11 June 1586 (5) sic, Parma to Philip II, 133-4, 18 July 1586, Philip II to Parma, in which he mentions having sent Moreo to Paris with instructions about France. 64 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 88, 28 February 1586, and 89, (2), Parma to Philip II, 95-7, 30 March 1586, Parma to Philip II, 105-7, 20 April 1586, Parma to Philip II; CSPSp., 1580-6, pp. 562-9 [February 1586], report of a discussion between Olivares and the pope on the enterprise of England; Essen, Parma, v, 173.

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the convention with Spain included a revolution in Paris – partially orchestrated by Mendoza – which was intended to overwhelm the king. Henry III, if he failed to take effective action must, inevitably, face some sinister fate; and that is what the English and Tuscan ambassadors had perceived. By his confidant, François de Rocherolles, sieur de Maineville, Guise advised the nuncio, Frangipani, that they had decided ‘not to wait’. They would forestall an iniquitous peace which would result in a coalition of the king and Navarre against them. Consequently, they had decided to take up arms themselves, and again requested Papal authorisation. Frangipani had no commission in the matter. He tended to think that the pope would not oppose a legitimate prince, unless it were to defend religion or the Papal States; and Henry III was unequivocally catholic. As for the fear of an iniquitous peace, Frangipani advised that the League should await the outcome of Catherine’s negotiation. If the result was bad for religion, then they would have an honest pretext [he did not say Papal support] for taking up arms. But if they moved at once [early in November 1586] they might actually precipitate a peace and expose their war for what it was, a private cause. Furthermore, and above all, they should consider that they could not sustain a war alone – a curious observation since he must, like everyone else, have been aware of the Spanish alliance. Nor did Frangipani believe that the king would, in fact, turn against his catholic subjects at the behest of the heretics. Guise need only remain vigilant. Frangipani explicitly claimed to have dissuaded the Guises from launching into what he regarded as an unjust war for their personal profit. He refused to see Maineville alone, preferring to use an intermediary. Nevertheless, Frangipani did not think the Guises should be abandoned because they served as a brake on the heretics. It is not clear what he envisaged; one might reasonably deduce that the pope still wanted a religious war in France but without wishing to support a Guise rebellion. The problem was that the war and rebellion were inseparable and, without the League, Henry III would never seriously oppose the huguenots.65 In mid-February 1587, when there were rumours of a two-year truce with Navarre, Guise again asked the nuncio for authorisation to take the field if Catherine were to be successful.66 Frangipani returned the same reply as before. To Rusticucci the nuncio added that the risings in Lyon and Auvergne were part of the League movement; in other 65

Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 336-8, 9 November 1586, Frangipani to Rusticucci. The pope approved this answer to the Guises, ibid., 344-5, 2 December 1586, Rusticucci to Frangipani. When he finally reached Paris as resident nuncio, on 8 or 9 August 1586, Frangipani did not, after all, act as an agent of the Guises, or play into their hands. Yet the editors of his correspondence say that he favoured the League, p. 55, and Mendoza was well pleased with him and regretted his death, on 16 March 1587. In fact the pope deprecated the League tactics and Guise received no encouragement from Rome, even when the campaign began, de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 80. 66 Stafford reported this rumour of a truce, CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 194-5, c. 22 January/?3 February 1587, Stafford to Burghley. Guise pleaded with Mendoza for a first payment of the 300,000 écus promised in the treaty, because he had been forced to take up arms and wished to be independent of the king. The following Simancas references relate to the microfilm collection in the Bibliothèque nationale in Paris. Simancas K 1566, 21 MI 153, 14 February 1587, Guise to Mendoza, Simancas K 1565, 21 MI 152, 25 June 1587, Guise to Mendoza, no pagination.


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words, their rebellion had already begun.67 At the same time the king was warned of the development of a conspiracy in Paris. It has already been indicated that, despite Frangipani’s cautious advice to the League, this revolt was scheduled for March 1587, before the return to court of Catherine de Medici.68 It had evidently been brewing for some time, and may have derived from the recent agreement between the Guises and Parma. The Parisian League, which came to be known as the Seize, arose about the same time as the aristocratic Catholic League; but it operated independently, and the nature of their relations with the Guises is obscure.69 It appears that the Seize, the revolutionaries in Paris – for that they certainly were – required a noble leader, and that the duc de Guise who commended their praiseworthy intentions, meant both to support and to exploit them. After all, they might well achieve what he himself must hesitate to attempt. Besides, Paris was linked by intelligence with most of the ‘bonnes villes’ and could therefore, in theory, command a widespread rebellion. Guise wished to be ready, at any moment, with the necessary means to support ‘une si juste entreprise’, which he could not refuse.70 There is no doubt that, on behalf of Parma, both Mendoza and Moreo were engaged in fomenting the Parisians and their partisans in Rouen, Orléans, Lyon and Troyes. But they must also be restrained, in order to synchronise the timing of events with the departure of the Armada.71 Such was the alarm in Paris, in March 1587 that Henry III dared not leave the city to meet Catherine de Medici upon her return from the west. Instead, he sent Villeroy with whom she arrived on 21 March. The king was stunned. He was wholly reluctant to believe that Catherine had failed to work a miracle, and that nothing could be concluded with Navarre.72 The inference was that Henry was now completely exposed to the League in arms and to the hostility of Paris. But he would, nonetheless, be obliged to turn to Guise in order to oppose the German army – the army which Navarre declared was not 67

Martin and Toupin, Correspondance du nonce en France, Frangipani, 356-7, 14 February 1587, Frangipani to Rusticucci; De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 277-8, 14 February 1587, Guise to Mendoza, in which he claimed to have secured Auvergne. 68 Incessant changes in the Armada plans made synchronicity with events in France impossible; nevertheless the required paralysis prevailed. Saulnier, Le Cardinal de Bourbon, 169-70. The attacks on Sedan and Jametz were desired by Spain ‘because of the Meuse’, CSPF., 1586-8, p. 360, 18/28 August 1587, Buzanval to Burghley. Rocquain, La France et Rome, 309, gives 22 February 1587 as the date on which the king was warned. But Henry sent for Catherine in great haste a week or so before that. B.N., Mss. ital. 1735, f. 333, 16 February 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 69 Salmon, Society in Crisis, 242, says that the Parisians acted on their own initiative. On the Seize see app. ii. 70 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, i, 389-90, 10 November 1586, Guise to Mendoza. Mendoza could judge by ‘les bonnes et louables intentions qui ont conduict à la resolucion qu’ils demonstrent pour le service de Dieu combien il est necessayre d’establir nos moyens, de sorte qu’à toute heure nous puissions estre pretz pour soutenir une si just entreprise à laquelle la plus part des bonnes villes s’en sont unies d’inteligence’. 71 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 173, 16 January 1587, Juan de Moreo to Idiaques, from Brussels; Poulain, Procès verbal, in Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, 289 seq. He reveals in a general sense, how the towns were recruited. He also mentions the proposal to seize Boulogne. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, chap. v is on the origins of the Parisian League. 72 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, f. 19, 16 March 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate, ff. 22-3, 23 March 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate.

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coming to oppose the king. Yet Catherine’s ‘success’ could only have precipitated the rebellion and, most likely, an attempt upon the king’s person.73 In the event, her failure forced the king to make decisions – and even to act. After long consultations Henry sent an envoy to Navarre, ostensibly to inform him of the execution of Mary queen of Scots – which had occurred on 8/18 February 1587. Nevertheless, it was supposed that there must be some other, secret, purpose; this may have related to a proposal which was shortly put to Guise.74

VII: The Fear of Navarre’s Foreign Army If Henry III could not make peace with the one, then he must come to terms with the other; this was his alternating dilemma. Besides, if there was to be no peace with Navarre, little time remained in which to prepare against the Germans, or to divert them elsewhere. In March and April 1587 the matter of the foreign army was also exercising Guise. Indeed, it became the focus of his attention because, without assistance from one source or another, the Germans might overwhelm him. It is impossible to detect precisely when the king first began to hope that the Germans would do just that. Aware that he would have to take the field, Guise pestered Mendoza with his need for money, for the services of Moreo, and for Parma to send troops to the frontier. Guise also wanted Mendoza to write to Rome in support of his request to Sixtus V to declare the imminent war a crusade.75 After further consultations with Catherine, lasting for four whole days, Henry sent Bellièvre to remonstrate with Guise about the current state of affairs: their occupation of Sedan, the tumult in Paris, the seizure of Doullens in Picardy, followed by Montreuil and St. Valéry, the attempt on Boulogne, and quarrels over the governorships of Angers and Valence.76 Bellièvre departed on 13 April 1587 with this list of complaints against the League. If the Germans were coming Henry could not, simultaneously, cope with hostilities from the Guises. Bellièvre was to assure the duke of the king’s good will, and to seek ‘una vera unione’ as well as better relations between the Guises and Épernon. In effect, Henry was again proposing to assume the leadership of the League; he never learnt. Meanwhile, Schomberg was sent to obtain accurate news of the German force and, if it really was coming, to raise 8,000 men for the king.77 Bellièvre returned to court on 7 May 1587 with only evasive replies from Guise. So, as usual, it was decided to send Catherine herself to seek an undertaking from Guise 73

De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 282-3, 2 April 1587, Guise to Mendoza, repeated the point that he would not accept a peace. Once the foreign troops were defeated, Guise would never disarm. 74 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 26-9, 30 March 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 75 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 279-80, 1 March 1587, 282-3, 2 April 1587, 283-4, 9 April 1587, Guise to Mendoza. 76 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 22-3, 23 March 1587, ff. 33-5, 7 April 1587, f. 36, 10 April 1587, f. 40, 13 April 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 77 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, f. 46, 23 April 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate, ff. 55-7, 7 May 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate.


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to oppose the Germans. In return, she was evidently empowered to make notable concessions. Catherine met Guise and other leaders in Reims, on 24 May 1587. According to Villequier, they were working on how to live with the Guises, in order to be able to confront the Germans.78 Catherine was away for nearly a month, and her negotiation remained very secret. The outstanding issue was undoubtedly Picardy, because of the king’s plan to send forces to the province which might therefore clash with those of the League. Guise feigned ignorance of events in Picardy, which was not plausible. As Catherine and her advisers became desperate about the duke’s evasions, they tried a drastic new approach. Villequier put it plainly to Guise that he should take command of an army against the Netherlands, while an interim would be declared in France. It could have been on this proposal that the king had consulted Navarre in March 1587, before sending Catherine to Reims; but there were, of course, other possibilities.79 By mid-June 1587 Henry III had received estimates of Navarre’s forces which were to be ready by the end of July; Schomberg reported that there would be some 14,000 Germans and 12,000 Swiss.80 This alarming information cracked the deadlock between the king and Guise; since they were now both in danger, Guise tempered his attitude to the king. On 18 June 1587 Henry sent forces to Meaux and summoned the council and Catherine to join him there. Then he sent Bellièvre to fetch Guise, in order to conclude the negotiation begun at Reims. Clearly Henry did not want Guise to come alone; still less did he want him to enter Paris; neither would Henry confront him at all without the forces which had preceded him.81 Guise himself reported that the king wanted some assurance from him, of which his presence would form a part. Given this assurance, Henry would employ him against the heretics. While Henry III and Guise now needed each other, this was a situation that neither could handle; the immediate future alarmed them both. It was probably around 25 June 1587 that Guise sent one, Latreul, to warn Parma that the foreign army was certainly expected to enter Lorraine in about a month’s time. He feared that they were coming to offer themselves to the king, against the League; in that case, most of the French heretic forces would join them. Indeed, it might have happened that way, and many catholics would also have joined the royalists – possibly including the Bourbon princes, Soissons, Conti and Montpensier. Guise was perplexed by Henry’s attitude. All these matters were known to the king, and time was running out, but still he did not arm; clearly the League could not depend upon a king who remained 78 Villeroy, Lettres écrites à Matignon, 180-2, 24 May 1587; Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 205-8, 24 May 1587, Catherine to Henry III, 211-14, 29-30 May 1587, Catherine to Henry III. With Catherine went Bellièvre, Pinart, and René de Villequier, baron de Clairvaux – one of the ‘traitors’. Ibid., 211 n.1, Villeroy to Matignon; De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 284-6. 79 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 284-6, 25 May 1587, Guise’s report of his meeting with Catherine, sent by Mendoza to Philip II, 9 June 1587, 287-9, instructions for Latreul, – June 1587, 291-4, 25 June 1587, Guise to Mendoza. 80 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 81-3, 19 June 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate, ff. 88-90, 22 June 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 81 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 81-3, 19 June 1587, f. 93, 3 July 1587, ff. 94-5, 3 July 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate.

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inactive three weeks after learning that his enemy was on the Rhine. Guise had begun to fear that he and the League would be left to face this formidable challenge alone; that was, indeed, what the king had in mind. As Frangipani had pointed out, they could not manage alone and, if they were overthrown, the heretics would flourish in France.82 Guise made similar points in a letter to Mendoza. The king’s negligence was highly suspect. His purpose was to admit the foreigners so that, entering Paris, they could force the catholics to make a shameful peace. Thereafter, they would fall upon the Netherlands. That was what Villequier had openly proposed, albeit in a different context.83 Guise was nervous of the king’s forces; he also heard that the Germans would now march in August and might surprise them before they were ready. He therefore took the risk of going to Meaux, as Henry required, intending to force him to oppose the Germans. Yet, even at this eleventh hour, Henry still hoped to persuade Guise to lay down his arms and accept peace, promising him great – but unspecified – rewards.84 The king returned from Meaux to Paris on 8 July, followed by Catherine on 10 July. She had confirmed ‘the accommodation’ with Guise, as well as the circumstances permitted; but they had not agreed to restore the places seized in Picardy. In other words, the ‘accommodation’ was entirely unsatisfactory. Possibly for these reasons, Henry announced that he would take the field himself and called out the ‘ban’ and ‘arrière ban’. This move enabled him to retain the supreme command himself, and reduced the following available to Guise. The king refused to give Guise the forces he demanded but placed him in command of the vanguard, which was potentially dangerous.85 In retaliation, Guise tried to detach some of the forces serving the king. Here, indeed, was an inauspicious situation which destroyed any pretence to good relations between the king and Guise. While Catherine and Guise, albeit for different reasons, both sought to dissuade the king from taking the field, Henry was glad to escape from Paris where famine and soaring prices were causing unrest. To his mother, he admitted that he dared not place Guise in command of all his forces; that would amount to surrendering his crown and his life – a distinctly startling admission.86 Henry’s fears 82

De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 287-90, – June 1587, instruction for Latreul. In fact the foreigners were delayed by lack of money. Ibid., 291-4, 25 June 1587, Guise to Mendoza, 294-5, 4 July 1587, Guise to Mendoza. 83 Simancas K 1565, 21 MI 152, 25 June 1587, Guise to Mendoza. Guise was either imagining what might happen, or else seeking to alarm Mendoza; there was no question of the Germans marching on Paris. Guise had already warned Mendoza that the king might turn against Flanders, ibid., 1566, 21 MI 153, 24 March 1587, Guise to Mendoza; De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 291-4, 25 June 1587, Guise to Mendoza. He enclosed the instruction for Latreul and added that they would not abandon the towns in Picardy. 84 Simancas K 1565, 21 MI 152, 4 July 1587, Guise to Mendoza, from Meaux; B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, f. 95, 3 July 1587 (3), Dolfin to the doge and senate, f. 99, 6 July 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate; Villeroy, Lettres écrites à Matignon, 197-8, 5 July 1587. 85 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, f. 103, 16 July 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate, f. 105, 17 July 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. In fact the ‘ban’ and ‘arrière ban’ were later countermanded. 86 The Venetian, Dolfin, claimed to have heard of this advice to the king from one who was present. B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 103-4, 16 July 1587, ff. 109-10, 17 July 1587, ff. 112-14, 20 July 1587, ff. 117-18, 30 July 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate.


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were not diminished by Mendoza who announced that, out of concern for the Netherlands, Spain could not abandon the League. Guise, for his part, issued a ‘libretto’, containing the complaints delivered to the king at Meaux: he had failed to keep the promises made at Épernay in 1585, and had only feigned war on the huguenots. Henry retaliated by imprisoning the vendors and ordering the book to be burnt.87 If the foreign army – which prompted Henry’s military decisions – did not pose any threat to himself, why did he not arrest the duc de Guise when he took the risk of going to Meaux? With troops in the city, Henry would never have a better or a safer opportunity. Guise was aware of it, insisting to Mendoza that he was risking his life. Neither the king nor Guise could calculate what his opponent would do; each was aware that, in the field, the other posed a threat. Neither could they tell what Navarre would do, nor what the outcome might be. For the king, for Guise, and above all for Navarre himself, the approach of his Swiss and German forces marked an important watershed; indeed, the coming of this army overshadowed the year 1587.

VIII: Coutras and the Aftermath In their separate ways, the king and the duc de Guise both prepared for the German invasion. Meanwhile Navarre awaited news of the army’s progress, taking small places in Poitou with little opposition. As the talks with Catherine de Medici petered out, Navarre issued an edict in Poitou on 4 January 1587. He was concerned to ensure respect for the clergy and for mass, which brought him increased catholic support.88 Nevertheless, it was an uneasy time, and the future was very uncertain. Navarre had never yet commanded sufficient forces to abandon the defensive and assert his will. On the other hand, he still lacked the necessary money for offensive warfare, and his own power base was situated at a maximum distance from the frontiers of the Empire. The agreement of 11 January 1587 between duke Casimir and Navarre (together with his associated protestant and catholic supporters), affords us some idea of what Navarre really hoped to achieve.89 The purpose of the agreement with Casimir was to destroy the Catholic League, to re-establish Navarre and Condé in their rightful positions according to their rank, and to safeguard both religions. The contracting parties were not to lay down arms before obtaining a firm peace. The first article concerned the safeguards for ‘religious purity’ [?parity] in all provinces; payment for protestant pastors, and the restoration of the huguenot judicial arrangements, namely the ‘chambres mi-parties’ [established in 1576], with three ‘places de sûreté’ in each province. The second article related to Navarre and Condé, requiring the revocation of their excommunication and exclusion from the succession and, rather vaguely, the restoration of everyone. There was to be a nationwide declaration proclaiming Navarre as heir presumptive, endowed with the appanage 87

B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 119-22, 30 July 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, f. 40, 13 April 1587, ff. 72-4, 5 June 1587, ff. 77-9, 8 June 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate; CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 297-8, 17/27 May 1587, Stafford to Walsingham. 89 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 56-81, 11 January 1587, accord between Navarre and Casimir. 88

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enjoyed by Anjou after 1576. Condé, as next in line to Navarre, was also to receive an appanage and a ‘place de sûreté’ in Picardy. All leagues were to be dissolved. These items must be sworn by the king, royal officials, princes, officers and ‘parlements’ [categories which would include the Guises]. Casimir’s reward was to be the payment of his debts. A sinking fund was to be created in Germany; that was for the provision of a contingency force to be ready at short notice to support Navarre, the churches and associated catholics. The agreement included certain operating mechanisms by which three councils were to accompany the army, to oversee the conduct of the war, and to provide for the necessary finance. There is no indication that these measures were executed. Finally, it was agreed to call an estates-general before laying down arms, in order to ratify and impose the peace conditions. If Navarre died, the agreement was to stand in the name of Condé. The agreement with Casimir became, in the event, a secular response to the excommunication of the princes. This is an extraordinary document, drafted neither by Navarre nor, for once, by Duplessis-Mornay. Obviously its interest lies in its revelation of Navarre’s immediate objectives. It is characteristic in its remarkable moderation, freedom from greed or revenge, and the absence of contention. If religious ‘parity’ were really to exist in every province, why should there not, eventually, be a protestant king? The idea of a protestant emperor had already been entertained in the Empire. Nevertheless, the agreement was seriously unrealistic in several respects. Navarre might be declared heir presumptive and the excommunication might be condemned and rejected in France – indeed, it had never been officially received. But there was no likelihood that this would induce the pope to revoke it. Furthermore, no mercenary force could be kept in the field for long enough to obtain a complete victory, assemble a co-operative estates-general, and impose the conditions of peace. Nor is there any hint as to what might constitute a complete victory or how it might be achieved – and that was a ticklish point for a prince or a commander who did not mean to oppose the king. How to avoid opposing the king was indeed a problem, since theoretical distinctions rarely survive in the field. When Henry III began to understand that the Germans were really coming, he embarked on direct action against Navarre: he placed his favourite, the duc de Joyeuse, in command of an army and sent him to molest Navarre in Poitou. Joyeuse left Paris on 4 June 1587 and started taking small places to harass Navarre. At the end of November, Navarre complained of having had Joyeuse on his back for four months.90 This direct confrontation with royal forces placed Navarre in a false and unacceptable position; it was most unfortunate just when the German army was shortly expected. Whether on account of Joyeuse, or because he knew of the king’s recent confabulations at Meaux, Navarre issued another in his series of policy documents. This ‘protestation’, dated 14

90 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 72-5, 5 June 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 43-5, late November 1587, instructions for Monglas going to the German army; Buisseret, Henry IV, 22.


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July 1587, was a statement about his foreign forces. Before their arrival, Navarre wished to make the king an important and a public offer.91 The ‘protestation’ referred to Navarre’s declaration of 10 June 1585, in which he specified that he had taken up arms to defend the king, the house of Bourbon and the French against the rebels – the Catholic League. He had, however, remained on the defensive hoping, not only to spare the people, but also that Henry III would recognise the danger of usurpation. Now the king was enslaved by the League; their audacity was such that, for three or four months [past], they had repeatedly attacked him in Paris, seized places in Picardy, and resisted the royal forces there. They had also demanded the cession of Angers (Maine-et-Loire), strategically placed to oppose Navarre, and Valence (Drôme) on the Rhône. Navarre proclaimed that he and his allies now meant to take the field and to join their German and Swiss army. These forces [as Turenne had already informed Catherine de Medici], were not advancing in opposition to the crown. They were coming to deliver the king from their common enemies, the house of Lorraine, to restore the royal authority, and to call a free, general assembly. This would be to relieve the people, to eliminate foreign influence [meaning the house of Lorraine] and to establish a durable peace. Navarre begged the king to approve their efforts and offered to join him wherever he chose. Navarre further declared any catholics who opposed him – whether clerical or lay – to be enemies of the state. He promised to preserve their religion and property without change. Issued just weeks before Henry himself took the field in September 1587, this ‘protestation’ of 14 July offered the king a military opportunity to turn the tables on the League. Guise may well have feared that not even Henry III could be so feckless as to reject salvation. But, although the king was afraid of Guise, he was also afraid of Navarre triumphant; consequently he ignored the offer. There was, therefore, nothing more that Navarre could do to establish the fact that he did not wish to oppose either the king or the catholics; he had been wholly consistent in his modesty and lack of self-aggrandisement. After a few weeks of campaigning in the west, the royal army under Joyeuse began to break up. When, in August 1587, Turenne moved towards the Loire to effect a junction with Soissons, Joyeuse perceived the danger and returned to court to press the king for reinforcements.92 It was possibly this huguenot move towards the Loire which influenced the king both to grant the reinforcements and, rather suddenly, to take the field himself on 12 September 1587. Henry went to Romorantin (Loir-et-Cher) east of Tours, and for some three months his forces controlled the Loire crossings.93 Joyeuse, meanwhile, was 91

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 294-7, 14 July 1587, ‘protestation’ of Navarre upon the entry of his army into France; also in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 508-12. 92 Soissons crossed the Loire at les Rosiers on 25 August and Joyeuse reached court on 26th. Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Œconomies royales, i, 173-81; CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 350-1, 10/20 August 1587, Stafford to Walsingham, 355-7, [16/26] August 1587, William Lilley (Stafford’s secretary) to Waad, 355, 14/24 August 1587, Stafford to Walsingham, 373-4, 24 September/4 October 1587, Delbene to Walsingham; B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, f. 180, 11 September 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 93 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, f. 180, 11 September 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate, f. 199, 28 September 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 28.

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joined in Poitou by the forces of Mercoeur from Brittany. Together they moved south into Guyenne to intercept Navarre who planned to meet his foreign army in central southernFrance, somewhere near the source of the Loire; he would gather troops by the way.94 If Navarre had ever really intended to cross the Loire in the region of Saumur or Tours, by mid-September 1587 he had changed his mind. Thus, while Turenne joined up with Soissons, Navarre was preparing to move towards the Limousin.95 Then the first week of October found him back at La Rochelle. To queen Elizabeth, Navarre explained that he was about to leave to join the foreign army but that he faced two major difficulties: one was the king’s forces which now directly opposed him; the other was lack of money.96 When Soissons joined Navarre at La Rochelle, these predicaments were discussed. Navarre could not simply depart with his forces leaving Guyenne undefended; the provincial nobility would not have supported him. This, no doubt, was the real problem – and not upon that occasion only. Neither could Navarre risk being trapped between the forces of Joyeuse and those of Guise, each of whom – Navarre suspected – was more anxious to destroy him than to intercept the invading foreigners. It was also felt that Navarre lacked adequate forces with which to proceed, and that the enemy was now too well placed. It is probable that by the time this decision was reached, Joyeuse was already advancing into Guyenne. Navarre therefore assembled his forces at Saint-Jeand’Angély hoping to expel Joyeuse from the province.97 There was also another gnawing problem: Navarre still did not know what route the Germans were taking. He proposed to gather all the forces he could to meet them in Burgundy – presumably after the expulsion of Joyeuse from Guyenne. This decision was to be conveyed to the Germans by Monglas.98 It was not – as Joyeuse gleefully declared – the king’s appearance in the field which caused Navarre to change his plans. Nevertheless that development did introduce an unwelcome complication, and largely accounts for the impenetrable confusion of the military manoeuvres of 1587.99 Navarre was certainly perturbed. Early in October, he dispatched a gentleman to the king who was somewhere near Tours. Navarre wished to reiterate, and in a more personal way, that he would not fight against the king.100 Bouillon, whom Navarre had sought to place in command of the foreigners, is said by Duplessis to have been told of Navarre’s determination.101 The king himself was also in a quandary. Having informed both queens – his wife and mother – that he wanted Joyeuse 94

Philippe Emmanuel, duc de Mercoeur. Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully Œconomies royales, i, 184. Navarre is said to have gone to Loudun (Vienne). CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 273-4, 4 October 1587, Delbene to Walsingham. Sully, however, said that he went to La Haye-Descartes (Indre-et-Loire), Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Œconomies royales, i, 180. 96 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 305-6, 2 or 8 October 1587, Navarre to queen Elizabeth. 97 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 536-40, 40-49, 20 October 1587, ‘mémoire de ce qui s’est passé depuis le 24 août’. 98 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 515-20, 520-2, 15 September 1587, instruction for Morlas – actually Monglas. 99 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, f. 193, 25 September 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 100 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 210-11, 9 October 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 101 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iii, 542. 95


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to bring Navarre to battle, he lost his nerve. This was apparently because Guise had sought to detach the king’s Swiss troops from the royal forces and join them to his own.102 As the inevitable battle in Guyenne approached, Stafford declared the king to be ‘in a great manoeuvring of the King of Navarre’s fighting with Joyeuse. He sware yesternight [1/10 October 1587] that he would if it cost him a hundred thousand crowns that M. Joyeuse were [not th] ere and had no forces, for that if the King of Navarre were beaten, the state was lost’.103 The nuncio, now Giovanni Francesco Morosini, observed at this time that Henry both desired and feared the huguenots’ defeat. Equally, however, he both feared and desired the defeat of Guise, of whom he was more afraid than ever. Tossed and tormented in this way, Henry III pursued no outwardly consistent objective.104 It is well known how, on 20 October 1587, Navarre won a signal victory over Joyeuse, who perished in the battle of Coutras; so also did his brother, Claude de Joyeuse, seigneur de Saint-Sauveur. In Navarre’s so-called ‘allocution’ before the battle, we catch a rare glimpse of his contempt for the king he consistently sought to serve. To the princes, Condé and Soissons, Navarre is reported to have said ‘il ne seroit pas raisonnable que ce beau danceur et ces mignons de cour en emportassent les trois principales testes. Ceste querelle nous est commune’ – which suggests that Navarre distrusted his Bourbon relatives.105 Coutras, Navarre’s first great military victory, brought him neither satisfaction nor benefit, except that Joyeuse was removed from Guyenne. There was no triumphalism; indeed Navarre won the highest praise for his modesty, chivalry and magnanimity from catholic and protestant alike.106 Navarre has traditionally been criticised for not having ‘followed up’ or consolidated the victory of Coutras, although it is not clear what he could have done. According to the stricture of received opinion, he chose instead to hurry back to Béarn, to place his trophies at the feet of his mistress, the comtesse de Grammont, and there take his ease. Sully’s dictum that ‘all the advantage of so famous a victory floated away like smoke on the wind’, was no more than a statement of fact, not an accusation of irresponsibility.107 Coutras had been a big risk and doubtless also a big strain following a 102 Simancas K 1566, 21 MI 153, 24 March 1587, Guise to Mendoza. Guise sought Mendoza’s help in having catholic Swiss forces sent directly to himself. B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 204-6, 8 October 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate, ff. 222-4, 23 October 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. 103 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 383-5, 1/11 October 1587, Stafford to Walsingham. 104 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 81; he gives the date 3 September 1587. 105 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 308-9, 20 October 1587, ‘allocution du roi de Navarre avant la bataille de Coutras’. The battle is described by Sully, Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Œconomies royales, i, 182-90; Buisseret, Henry IV, 21-5. 106 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 309 n.1 quotes: ‘heureux...et véritablement favorisé du ciel [est] le prince qui peut voir sous ses pieds ses ennemies humiliés par la main de Dieu, sa table environnée des prisoniers...et sa chambre tapisée des étendards de ceux qu’il a vaincus, et qui, sans en devenir plus fier ou plus vain, sait garder au milieu des plus grands succès, la même fermté que dans les revers les plus inespérés de la fortune’. Navarre informed Matignon of what he had done with the bodies of Joyeuse and his brother, expressing regret for the bloodshed, of which he was innocent. Ibid., 309-11, 23 October 1587, Navarre to Matignon. 107 Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Œconomies royales, i, 196; Buisseret, Henry IV, 25, quotes this passage out of context, and further declared Navarre to be a poor strategist. Mattingly, The Defeat of the

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taxing summer. Deploring the loss of life, Navarre immediately sent to the king proposing peace. Peace would, indeed have been a commendable ‘follow up’. But, too much afraid of Guise, the king did not respond.108 Failing a general peace – in which he would not have needed the Germans – Navarre entertained the same intentions after the battle of Coutras as before it; only there was a lot to be attended to. So he gave his men leave until 15 November hoping by 25 November to be ready to proceed.109 The troops were burdened by their booty, and the weary nobles were in need of refurbishment. More precisely, Navarre was abandoned by the nobles of Saintonge and Poitou, which left him with no choice of action. He therefore sent Condé to La Rochelle to prepare for the march towards the Limousin, leaving the remaining forces with Turenne at Sainte-Foy. Navarre himself went to Béarn intending, as we have seen, to reassemble before the end of November.110 Sully was sent to join Conti, who was raising forces in Normandy, Maine and Anjou. Conti was ordered to link up with the foreign army and assume the supreme command; and he did succeed in joining them, if not in exercising the command. Unable to march himself, Navarre had at least sent the foreigners a prince of the blood; it was not his fault that the only available commanders were all incompetent.111 Sully’s advice, which he claimed was requested at this time, obliquely indicates some of Navarre’s problems. Sully said that, if the princes remained united and of one mind to pursue the same plan of action, Navarre might hold his army together for two more months. Sully emphasised – and may have exaggerated – the bad relations between Condé and Navarre. Navarre had supplanted Condé as the huguenot ‘protector’ in 1576, before becoming heir presumptive in 1584. Condé now desired a sovereign territory somewhere in the west for his own well-being. Turenne and La Tremoille also sought their own aggrandisement. It was Soissons, however, who persuaded Navarre to go to Béarn because he himself wished to see, and hoped to marry, Navarre’s sister, Catherine de Bourbon. Navarre would not hear of it, which cost him Soissons’ support.112 De Thou confirmed a difference of opinion between Navarre and Condé, who evidently wanted to seize Saumur. Condé felt himself to be slighted in respect of the glory of victory. That was probably a misunderstanding since Navarre’s generosity was legendary. Condé, however, indicated his intention to obey and co-operate. There is no evidence that he and Turenne behaved incorrectly at this time, though ambitions and tensions certainly existed. At no time could Navarre depend upon faithful service, and feudal armies were notoriously fickle.113 If, however, the army could somehow be held together, then Sully’s Spanish Armada, 146-7, makes a frivolous, womanising, assessment of Navarre’s conduct at this moment, giving less weight to the superior reasons of which he was aware. 108 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 141-53, memoir for the estates of Blois, 1588; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 130. 109 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 263-4, 20 November 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 126-33, – January 1588, instructions for du Fay. 110 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 15-16; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 40. 111 Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Œconomies royales, i, 193. 112 Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Œconomies royales, i, 193-6. 113 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 15; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 35-6, 3 November 1587, Condé to Navarre.


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advice was to march straight [north east] towards the upper Loire, in the direction of La Charité and Nevers (near the junction of the rivers Allier and Loire), and to meet the foreigners somewhere in that area. From opposite sides of the Loire, they might seize some small place and unite. Could Navarre have prevented the break-up of his army late in October 1587, after the victory of Coutras? To assert that he should have done so is to ignore reality. Apart from the problems already considered, Navarre did not then know where his foreign forces were.114 Conti, presumably, was expected to find out. But even more serious, and also time-consuming, Navarre still lacked the necessary money. Without money, it would not only be useless, but actually dangerous, to join a mercenary force which expected him to pay them upon arrival. Navarre and his envoys had been trying hard, and for a long time past, to raise enough money in time. Clervant had put this need to Walsingham as soon as the agreement with the Germans was signed in January 1587. In July, Navarre sent his ‘protestation’ to queen Elizabeth and repeated the request.115 On 1 September 1587 Navarre asked Elizabeth for 100,000 écus; on 8 October, he wrote that two things prevented him from joining his foreign forces, and this urgent need for money was one of them. He stressed the acute nature of this problem, and the trouble which would spring from the lack of provision. Buzanval, who was in England, pressed Walsingham for help, otherwise all would be ‘topsy turvy’.116 While Navarre was at Pau, where he did more than merely philander, he tried to raise 20,000 écus from the city and churches of Nîmes, with which to hold a muster when he joined his foreign forces.117 Sending Monglas to the German army some time in November 1587, Navarre informed them that he had risked everything to remove the obstruction posed by Joyeuse. The king was holding the Loire [in its central reaches] and Navarre was about to go towards the upper Loire [namely further south than the king] to join his troops. It is not, however, apparent that he had as yet raised the necessary money.118

114

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 126-33, – January 1588, instructions for du Fay. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 179-80, 2/12 January 1587, Clervant to Walsingham; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 298, 20 July 1587, Navarre to Buzanval. 116 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 305-6, 8 October 1587, Navarre to queen Elizabeth. It is said that nothing had been promised to the reiters until Navarre joined them [which might, presumably, be an incentive], but then they expected payment. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 361-3, 28 August 1587, anonymous letter from the camp at Blamont in Lorraine. Ibid., 351, 12/22 August 1587, Buzanval to Walsingham, 360, 18/28 August 1587, Buzanval to Burghley. 117 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 313-16, 12 November 1587, Navarre to the consuls and consistory of Nîmes. 118 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 43-5, late November 1587, instruction for Monglas; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 210-37. In this anonymous memoir, entitled ‘armée des allemands et orages en France’, actually written by Châtillon, he said that Navarre ordered them to march towards the source of the Loire where he would meet them. 115

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IX: The Tripartite Campaign, 1587 At this point, in November 1587, as Navarre was struggling with his preparations, the ultimate impediment arose: namely lack of time. It was not until mid-November that he heard of the victory by the duc de Guise, on 26 October 1587, over the reiters at Vimory. That was just six days after the battle of Coutras, while Navarre was unavoidably hors de combat. When Vimory was followed, on 24 November, by a second victory, at Auneau (near Chartres), all hope that Navarre could join the foreigners was at an end. Guise had triumphed to that extent. Thus, even if Navarre had been able to march straight away from the field of Coutras towards the approaching Germans, he would still have arrived too late to effect a profitable junction. As Navarre later wrote to the King of Denmark, no sooner had he seemed to be miraculously delivered [by his victory] than the Germans were defeated. His anguish was indescribable, and the consequences would be serious. If only, Navarre lamented, these forces had marched straight towards him, as he had expected [and several times commanded], all could have gone well; and the League conspiracy might have been destroyed by the end of 1587.119 There were, therefore, valid and comprehensible reasons why the victory of Coutras was apparently not ‘exploited’; and those reasons had nothing to do with Navarre’s personal propensities. Nor could he conceivably have chosen to go right back to where he began, in the miserable position of pleading all over again for expensive foreign help. The defeat and collapse of Navarre’s foreign army, without achievement and before he could even join it, was the gravest reverse and the worst disappointment he had yet endured. After such a costly and embarrassing fiasco, post-mortems abounded. What had gone wrong and who was to blame? As Stafford said, the matter must be analysed in order to avert repeat disasters; if contributions were to fail, the huguenots would be in a bad way.120 Problems had arisen with that army right from the outset. Casimir himself was to have been in command, but withdrew for personal reasons. Instead, he sent the baron von Dohna – said to have been incompetent – who joined the troops near Strasbourg on 22 August 1587. But, according to Stafford, Bouillon received ‘the whole conduction’, pending the presence of a prince which, it has been seen, Navarre did his best to provide. Stafford regarded Bouillon’s appointment as ominous, and feared that if the army was not employed in time, it would mutiny for lack of pay.121 Dohna evidently issued a manifesto in which he declared that the German army, which he commanded, came to defend the French crown and not to oppose the king.122 The Swiss clearly held the same belief, 119

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 323-7, 29 December 1587, Navarre to the King of Denmark; De Ruble, Ed., La Huguerye, Mémoires, iii, 162-3. De Ruble was the principal councillor of Casimir. 120 Stafford thought that Navarre should have advanced to the [upper] Loire after his victory; like so many others, then and later, he was evidently unaware of the impediments. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 478-83, 8/18 January 1588, Stafford to Burghley. 121 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 429-31, 2 December 1587, count Palatine to queen Elizabeth, 431-6, 2 December 1587, count Palatine to Navarre, 363-5, 19/29 August 1587, Stafford to Burghley, 383-5, 1/11 October 1587, Stafford to Walsingham; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 82-94, memoir of what occurred in Navarre’s army, 23 June to 13 December 1587. 122 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 18, seems to be alone in mentioning Dohna’s manifesto.


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which is also what Bouillon had been told by Navarre. Thus, when these forces found the king to be in the field and blocking their path (albeit disinclined to fight), there was understandable bewilderment as to what was happening, and what they were supposed to do. After the problems over the command, came differences of opinion about whether to remain in Lorraine or to proceed to France, and which route to take. They moved into Champagne and Burgundy and Monglas, sent by Navarre, joined them at Ars (south west of Metz) on 13 October 1587.123 After Coutras, Navarre sent one, Chevroche, to Bouillon to renew his orders to march to the upper Loire; Chevroche was followed by Monglas – again.124 Thus the commanders of the foreign forces knew perfectly well what Navarre wished them to do. They planned to cross the Loire at La Charité, which could have been all right except that, dawdling and disputing, they allowed the king enough time to block their path.125 From this point on there was little chance of ever joining Navarre; his foreign forces were virtually trapped, despite the fact that the king and Guise did nothing to assist each other. The French component had wanted to challenge Guise, who had harassed them all the way from Lorraine. Commanding the smaller force Guise, however, intended to join the king before facing battle, only to find that Henry rejected him.126 Had the foreigners not been averse from fighting, they might therefore have defeated Guise at an earlier stage. In that case, the king’s attitude to them would surely have been different. Now, however, they could not cross the Loire without encountering the king. They had definitely not come to fight the king, and his opposition was completely unexpected. Extraordinary confusion ensued as to who was opposing whom. One must allow that the hapless commanders faced a genuine dilemma, for Navarre would have been distraught if, in trying to cross the Loire, his forces had fired on the king. The Germans began to grumble about food and money. In order to keep the army together, it was decided to move – in the wrong direction – towards the verdant Beauce, there to wait until they had heard (again) from Navarre; but his orders were already known. Casimir later blamed this move on certain French councillors – which probably meant Bouillon – but that was to be expected.127 It is not surprising, in these circumstances, either that the king should have sought to defuse the situation, or that Guise should have tried to salvage some military coup. The 123

CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 385-6, 2/12 October 1587, discussion of the merits of making war in Lorraine; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 212-15, Châtillon’s account, which is probably the most reliable. De Ruble, Ed., La Huguerye, Mémoires, iii, 193. 124 De Ruble, Ed., La Huguerye, Mémoires, iii, 195 n.1; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 43-5, late November 1587, instruction for Monglas. 125 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 216-17; CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 491-3, 23 January 1588, Duplessis to Buzanval; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 134-41, – January 1588, Duplessis to Morlas. 126 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 219-21, 23 October 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate, ff. 222-4, 23 October 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. Only the Venetian records this rejection, which clearly was the case. Guise commanded the smaller force; but he may also have considered that if he could involve the king in fighting, his death might somehow be contrived. 127 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 616-23, 19/?29 May 1588, instruction for Casimir’s envoy to England.

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king crossed the Loire, to the south side, on 18 October 1587, and the reiters came to a halt at Briare (between Gien and Châtillon-sur-Loire) on the north side. It was on the very next day that the king contacted the Swiss, seeking to detach them from the Germans. The Swiss officers instructed deputies to treat because they were not prepared to oppose their confederates in the king’s service.128 It was while this negotiation was in progress, and hoping to avert a capitulation, that Guise brought off his first victory over the Germans. On 26 October, under cover of darkness, he attacked Dohna’s camp at Vimory, near Montargis, and seized their baggage.129 Four days later the reiters mutinied. It was then that this now deprived and ragged army sought the greater ease of the Beauce, where they were joined by Conti on 20 November.130 It was possibly due to Conti that the decision was taken to move as fast as possible towards the upper Loire – where they were supposed to be. But by then it was too late to retrieve the situation. The Swiss capitulation with the king was completed on 22 November 1587, and they received food and money. Then, on 24 November, just as the remainder of the army prepared to march, Guise struck a second time achieving his notorious victory at Auneau. Dohna is said to have been negligent in guarding the camp.131 Thereupon the remainder of the reiters mutinied again. After the French officers had exerted all their influence, and bandied largely illusory offers, an attempt was made to start marching south. But the now dishevelled army lacked order, discipline and resolution, as well as more material needs like arms, ammunition and guides; and by then it was winter. Consequently it was thought wiser to capitulate with the willing king and to save those who could be saved. Conti and Bouillon were parties to this surrender. Châtillon was not; he escaped and, with difficulty, returned to Navarre.132 The French scattered, with greater and lesser degrees of credit. The victory at Auneau enhanced the reputation of Guise who alone could boast of some achievement. But for Navarre’s foreign army, which was never going to reach the 128

De Ruble, Ed., La Huguerye, Mémoires, iii, 200 n.1, the editor explicitly states that the initiative came from the king. According to de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 87, this move was advised by Épernon and Bellièvre. 129 De Ruble, Ed., La Huguerye, Mémoires, iii, 200 n.2; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 95-111, a catholic account of what happened in the king’s army; B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 238-9, 5 November 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate; Simancas K 1565, 21 MI 152, 20 October 1587, Guise to Mendoza. Guise still complained of having received no help. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 247, 25 October 1587 (2), Philip II to Parma. Philip approved of support to the Guises, albeit urging Parma to spend as little money as possible. 130 Conti joined the foreigners at Prunay, empty-handed. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 225; DuplessisMornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 82-94, memoir; B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 241-2, 6 November 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. Dolfin says that Navarre warned them to wait in the Beauce. This seems very unlikely, unless it had been in order to permit Conti to join them. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 307-14, 8 February 1588, ‘discours de La Treul’ [Latreul] on the German army. 131 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 164-7, January 1588, Duplessis to La Marsillière. Different dates are given for the completion of the capitulation. Simancas K 1565, 21 MI 152, 5 December 1587, Guise to Mendoza. 132 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 227-37, 237-8, 8 December 1587, articles of capitulation; also in CSPF., 1586-8, p. 428; B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 279-82, 28 November 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. Guise said that Épernon had followed the foreigners in retreat to protect them from himself. Simancas K 1565, 21 MI 152, 11 December 1587, Guise to Mendoza.


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upper Loire, that defeat was little more than a coup de grâce. Such were the difficulties of combining a military operation in the sixteenth century. This was a disastrous tale of confusion and dereliction. Clearly, as Navarre lamented, the leadership had failed.133 There was no agreed procedure and no military objective, despite long distances to be covered and great privations to be endured. In such circumstances, an unpaid army was uncontrollable – and even the finest commanders knew it. Obviously Navarre wished and needed to be at the centre of events. Nevertheless, the idea of a junction, from more or less opposite ends of France, was hardly realistic. Separate, but simultaneous campaigns by Navarre and the foreigners might have been more effective; but Navarre lacked able and trustworthy commanders of sufficient rank. Once the foreigners had failed to cross the Loire, the king’s mobile army had always lain in their path, and with Guise not far away. At the time of Coutras (20 October 1587) the Germans were already in danger near Montargis; before Navarre could reassemble his forces, they were already in the Beauce where they were crippled by the king’s detachment of the Swiss and their second defeat at the hands of Guise.134 Navarre was helpless to assist: not only did he have his own military problems, but he could not, and would not, risk confronting the king in the field; he had specifically said so more than once. ‘Beau danceur’ the king might be, but his office remained sacred. The king effectively prevented the Germans from crossing the Loire but, without his confusing presence, Guise might well have defeated them, if only in a piecemeal fashion. Henry’s intention was that they should have defeated Guise for which, he later complained, he had afforded them ample opportunity; but they had shirked battle.135 This pitiful débâcle, late in 1587, did not augur well either for Navarre or for the realm. Guise was incurably angry; the king had scorned him and, more than ever, France was now dominated by a highly incensed Catholic League. Everyone emerged from the bizarre operation frustrated, fearful, damaged, and with unfinished business. The events of 1587 had worsened already contorted relationships without producing any substantive change. This was symptomatic of the deadlock confusion of French public life in which the king, the Guises, Navarre, the huguenot nobility and the protestant churches – not to mention the Spanish agents – were all striving after divergent aims. What might next transpire was still obscure, except that endemic revolt in Paris began to quicken, manifesting in scurrilous defamation of the king. If Henry III did not swiftly launch some decisive initiative, unpleasant things, merely postponed by the German invasion, would soon overtake him.

133

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 351-2, c. 20 March 1588, Navarre to La Roche-Chandieu. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 491-2, 23 January/?2 February 1588, Duplessis to Buzanval, endorsed 23 January by Walsingham’s clerk. 135 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 519-28, 25 February/7 March 1588, Stafford to queen Elizabeth. 134

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Note on the Raising of Navarre’s German Army, 1585-7 Conyers Read, Walsingham, iii, 195 seq., gives a summary of Elizabeth’s part in supplying money. Stone, Horatio Palavicino, chap. iv, and Anques, Henri IV et l’Allemagne, 8-18, both give a brief account of the raising of German forces for Navarre; neither is very clear. The whole issue arose in May 1585, as Catherine de Medici was negotiating with the League at Épernay. About the second week in May 1585, Elizabeth sent sir Thomas Bodley to Denmark and Germany to attempt the formation of a league against ‘the council of Trent’, CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 433-4, 27 April/7 May 1585, instructions for Bodley, and Navarre sent Ségur to England to seek a loan of 200,000 crowns. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 51-3, 8 May 1585, Navarre to queen Elizabeth. Bodley failed, and Ségur hung around for nearly two months. He finally left England with the promise of only 50,000 crowns and with crippling conditions attached. CSPF., 1584-5, pp. 577-8, 2 July 1585, Ségur to Walsingham, 584-5, 5 July 1585, Ségur to Walsingham. The money, however, was never sent; consequently Guitry went to England about November or December 1585, CSPF., 1585-6, p. 107, 21 October 1585, Casimir to Walsingham, 109-10, 22 October 1585, Ségur to Burghley. Like Ségur, Guitry also kicked his heels in England for nearly two months. He left at the end of January 1586 and awaited Palavicino in the Netherlands. Guitry obtained the dispatch of Palavicino with permission to spend 50,000 crowns, provided others also contributed. CSPF., 1585-6, pp. 377-8, 14/24 February 1586, instructions for Palavicino, together with severe conditions to be imposed. Palavicino joined Guitry at Harlem on 17 March 1586 and the negotiations began, but they proved to be long and arduous. CSPF., 1585-6, p. 427, 17 March 1586, Guitry to Walsingham. The envoys immediately ran into difficulties and delays which Guitry reported to Burghley. CSPF., 1585-6, pp. 689-90, 30 May/?10 June 1586. In June, Walsingham persuaded Elizabeth to authorise the loan of a second sum of 50,000 crowns, also upon conditions, apparently to restrain Navarre from any thoughts of a disadvantageous peace with the king. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 87-8, 11/21 September 1586, Palavicino to Walsingham, from Frankfurt. This money was offered to duke Casimir in October 1586 and the agreement to provide forces was finally signed on 11 January 1587. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 111-12, 11/21 October 1586, Palavicino to Casimir, 113, 16/26 October 1586, Palavicino to Walsingham, 187-8, 15/25 January 1587, Palavicino to Walsingham. The army was not, however, ready until July 1587; it crossed the Rhine in August after many difficulties, especially over the command which Casimir himself evaded.

CHAPTER V: THE FUGITIVE KING I: The Politics of Navarre’s Religion For Navarre, away in the south west, little had changed by November 1587 except that his position was even more difficult and dangerous. Whether he could, in any event, have joined up with his foreign army is doubtful; as it was, Guise had rendered that junction impossible. Officially the king, who claimed to have won an advantage over the huguenots, was raising money during the winter, with which to renew the war in Guyenne in the spring; and Guise was required to accompany him.1 Had Guise agreed, this would probably have been disastrous for Navarre. He was saved, however, by the hostility between the duke and the king.2 Some now wanted Navarre to travel to England to seek help in person; but Duplessis was determined that he must not leave France. Some wanted Elizabeth to declare war on France – which she would not consider – some wanted an Anglo-French-huguenot alliance against the League – which the king would not consider. Navarre’s secretary, Du Fay, was sent to England to renew the request for 100,000 écus; de Reau joined Ségur in Germany, all striving to obtain another foreign army, but with no signs of any clearer military objective. Turenne was sent to Montmorency, whose alliance was still crucial.3 In reality, Henry’s position was also virtually unchanged, although he supposed it to be somewhat improved. He now claimed to be at war with the huguenots, for which the pope had offered to help. The proposed campaign in Guyenne together, in principle, with the duc de Guise, should impress the pope that Henry was doing enough to merit his cooperation. But in fact Henry still wanted peace, and Navarre’s conversion. This, Henry persisted in believing, would resolve his core dilemma. The instructions for Turenne, on his mission to Montmorency, reveal that Catherine de Medici had proposed some sort of an assembly, in which everyone would be heard and arbitration imposed; but it was not, presumably, to be the council that Navarre repeatedly called for. In any case, it was too late for such expedients because the ‘traitors’ had deeply penetrated the king’s council and controlled the direction of his affairs. Navarre considered that he and Montmorency should play along with the proposal, but nothing came of it. If Henry thought that he had won an advantage over Navarre which might now bear fruit, he was deluded. The deadlock of Saint-Brice had yet to be broken and Navarre, after all, had completely routed a royal army. Navarre also remained anxious for peace, but on the sensible terms 1 ‘Négociations de Henri III avec la cour de Rome’, Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. viii (1836), 444-6, 7 January 1588, Henry III to Pisani. 2 The duc de Guise appears to have dominated the League completely, and to have kept his relatives and prominent followers ill-informed. 3 Michel Hurault de l’Hôpital, seigneur Du Fay, secretary to Navarre, pleaded desperately with Burghley for the queen to answer him, yes or no; would she, or would she not, help Navarre because they must know. That, alas, was to misconstrue the nature of queen Elizabeth’s foreign policy. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 119-26, – January 1588, instructions for Turenne, 126-33, – January 1588, instructions for Du Fay, who offered a complete explanation of the recent military fiasco.

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he had outlined. He sent his servant, Sainte-Colombe to the king, but with what message we can only surmise.4 Stafford records his having arrived, upon some secret negotiation, about the same time as Michel de Montaigne, a ‘very wise gentleman’ (of whom he had never previously heard). Navarre’s servants at court were not privy to whatever was going on, but Stafford was sure that the king ‘seeketh all he can to have the King of Navarre yield to him satisfaction in some point’, also by ‘the intermission’ of Montmorency to whom the king had sent his kinsman, Halot de Montmorency. Having skirted round the point of religion, Stafford assured Walsingham that ‘the cardinal of Lenoncourt hath dealt with the Pope to call in the excommunication of the King of Navarre and the Prince of Condé and that the Pope hath half promised to do it; that I can assure you’.5 Probably the pope had said only that if Navarre expressed penitence, he would listen; that would commit him to nothing. It was currently hoped – and feared – that Navarre might be shaken in his resolve not to abjure, on account of his acute vulnerability. The instructions for Du Fay on his mission to England emphasised his danger. Indeed Du Fay (just a little later) impressed upon Burghley that Navarre must either receive succour or be forced to ‘seek the means of bringing [the war] to a speedy end’. But then Du Fay had to argue his case.6 Stafford discussed with Navarre’s ‘own people’ at court whether he might not be constrained by his present necessity.7 It appears that Stafford was vexed by demands that queen Elizabeth should break with France when she was ‘out’ with Spain, and afraid that Navarre might be seduced into making peace in France, omitting the queen; Stafford did 4

François de Montesquieu, seigneur de Sainte-Colombe. Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 133, says, wrongly, that the king sent Sainte-Colombe to Navarre; in fact the king sent him back. 5 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 488-90, 22 January/1 February 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. Towards the end of 1587 Lenoncourt went to Rome to receive his red hat. He was reported to be on his way by 27 October/?6 November 1587. Once there he tried, secretly, to obtain the revocation of Navarre’s excommunication. Ibid., news from divers parts, 28 November/?8 December 1587, Rome, 531-5, 1/11 March 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. 6 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 573-7, 1/11 April 1588, Du Fay to Burghley. 7 Stafford was evidently embroiled with some of Navarre’s servants, seemingly on account of internal huguenot factions but also, perhaps, because they did not trust him. Conyers Read referred to Stafford’s hatred for Navarre, but it was apparently only Mendoza who made the allegation. Stafford’s letters reveal no sign of hatred for Navarre, quite the contrary. But his correspondence, at this time, is exceptionally difficult to interpret. The now aged controversy over the alleged treachery of sir Edward Stafford was contained in four articles: it was begun by A.W. Pollard in his stinging review of the Calendar of State Papers Spanish, 15871603, in The English Historical Review, xvi (1901), 572-7; Conyers Read, ‘The Fame of Sir Edward Stafford’, American Historical Review, xx (1915), 292-313; J.E. Neale, ‘The Fame of Sir Edward Stafford’, The English Historical Review, xliv (1929), 203-20; Conyers Read’s rejoinder to Neale under the same title, American Historical Review, xxxv (1930), 560-6. This controversy now appears to have been concluded by overwhelming evidence that Stafford did enter into a traitorous relationship with Mendoza from January 1587 for eighteen months. Leimon and Parker, ‘Treason and Plot in Elizabethan Diplomacy: The “Fame of Sir Edward Stafford” Reconsidered’, English Historical Review, cxi (1996), 1134-58. The reasons for his treachery were complicated, relating to Stafford’s own background and temperament, to court factions in England and to anxiety for the future which led him to speculate upon the English succession. While Stafford’s treason would now be hard to deny, it does not appear that it actually did much harm. Furthermore, it should be noted that the receipt of money from enemy agents was not, at the time, at all uncommon.

Chapter V: The Fugitive King

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not want her to be abandoned and exposed. If England was not prepared to commit herself to helping Navarre, neither did she want Navarre to commit himself to an agreement without her. Stafford insisted upon this point, which is why he was concerned to probe the opinions of Navarre’s supporters as to whether he might not be constrained to convert.8 Montmorency, he observed, had favour with the pope, and he knew about Lenoncourt’s presence in Rome. But, Stafford also admitted, ‘what to make of this mingle-mangle, I am not wise enough to judge’. According to Duplessis, Navarre and the churches were resolute, and Montmorency constant. Buzanval also praised Navarre’s ‘incomparable constancy’.9 Navarre’s reply to the message brought by Sainte-Colombe throws a little light on the matter. He welcomed the king’s desire for a pacification, but denied that there could be any stable peace without satisfying consciences – in other words, without toleration – an old lesson in France. The ‘satisfaction’ that Henry required of Navarre, was indeed his conversion, and Lenoncourt was seeking Papal help in that respect. Henry was doubtless afraid that if, upon the first signs of spring, he and Guise really marched into Guyenne, Navarre would be in great danger. But Navarre was accustomed to great danger; so he repeated, yet again, that he was willing to take instruction. No other way could bring peace or ensure a clear conscience. Given the means, however, he would gladly help the king to pacify France, and would work for religious peace and the reunification of all the churches, everywhere.10 Whether Sainte-Colombe informed Navarre of the efforts of Lenoncourt in Rome, we do not know. By 19 February 1588, Henry had received from Lenoncourt a report of a conversation with the pope about Navarre, together with Sixtus’ reply. From that it appears that the pope had offered no hope. To Henry’s great regret, he wrote to Pisani, Navarre had also offered no hope: he would not listen to reason or recognise his duty in this respect; on the contrary, he was closely united with those of his own opinion. Thus, for the moment, Lenoncourt should only seek to ensure that the pope understood the desirability of Navarre’s conversion, so that he might favour it if occasion arose.11 It therefore appears that what Henry had offered Navarre was mediation in Rome. In this respect, Henry III really had done his best, according to his lights. But the political problem of Navarre’s religion was something he had no power to resolve. Navarre, too, had done everything that he decently and reasonably could. But there was no way that any pope could consent either to a council or to the very liberal sort of general settlement that Navarre envisaged – of which his conversion might, theoretically, have formed a part. Nor is it clear how Navarre’s conversion in 1588 could have disposed of the 8

CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 478-83, 8/18 January 1588, Stafford to Burghley, 483-6, 8/18 January 1588, Stafford to Burghley (2), 487-8, 22 January/1 February 1588, Stafford to Burghley, 509-11, 10/20 February 1588, Stafford to Burghley. 9 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 488-90, 22 January/1 February 1588, Stafford to Walsingham, 491-3, 23 January 1588, Duplessis to Buzanval, 535-7, 4/14 March 1588, Buzanval to Burghley. 10 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 183-5, – February 1588, ‘response du Roi de Navarre aux propositions du sieur de Sainte-Colombe’. 11 ‘Négociations de Henri III avec la cour de Rome’, Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. viii (1836), 448-54, 19 February 1588, Henry III to Pisani; Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 266-7, – October 1587, Catherine to the duke of Savoy, 297, 21 November 1587, Catherine to cardinal de Joyeuse.

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Catholic League, backed by the hostile power of Philip II now poised to launch his great Armada; that, alone, would have inhibited the pope. Nevertheless the king had not totally abandoned hope of Navarre’s conversion, despite having said as much to Pisani. On 6 March 1588, Stafford was summoned to an extraordinary, secret, nocturnal audience with the king. Now Henry’s main purpose – opposed by Catherine and the council who thought it ‘unhonourable’ – was to invoke the help of queen Elizabeth. He wished her to ‘persuade the King of Navarre to have a care of his estate, and to accommodate himself with the French King in such sort as the League might have no more pretence to ruin France and him both’. Stafford told the king then, as upon other occasions, that queen Elizabeth could not intervene in the matter of religion. Henry made it clear that he would permit ‘liberty and exercise both, as he had done and would do again, with all his heart, but it was now out of his power to do it or to put France in peace’. He confessed that the German reiters had been his last hope which, ‘if they had [had] either valour or discretion might have made the League, upon their knees, ask that which they had broken in arms [namely peace] which was that he had expected and looked for’. It was on account of the foreigners’ ‘own evil government’ that Henry had been forced to capitulate – put ‘to that plunge’ – for which he was now stigmatised; otherwise Guise could have destroyed them. They might, Henry complained, at least have ravaged Leaguer territory. But now that that means [of salvation] had failed, ‘the colour of maintaining of arms’ [by the League] could not be removed ‘except the King of Navarre yield to him in religion’; then, in time of peace, the League would be beggared. In reply, Stafford objected that even if Navarre did yield, there was still Condé and, behind him, there were the huguenots.12 Navarre’s conversion (which, of course, Stafford did not desire) would make no difference; to the League, the ‘colour of religion’ would still remain. The king insisted, on the contrary, that if the [Bourbon] princes were to yield, others could more easily be worked upon. Besides, if the two next heirs [Navarre and Condé] were catholic, ‘the terror that they [the League] have put into men’s minds’ at the succession of a huguenot, would cease – an interesting admission that the ‘terror’ was purely factitious.13 The League would then be forced to draw in their horns, and could be ruined. Stafford tried to erase the idea from the king’s mind, advising him not to project Navarre as the rising sun. But Henry replied, in effect, that Navarre was less dangerous than the League, who threatened the ‘utter overthrow of himself and France’. He would never, he said, so abase the League that he could not raise them up again if Navarre became threatening – an observation which points to Henry’s fantasy world, since he neither moved to raise Navarre nor to abase the League. Nevertheless, Henry was so desperate that he persisted in grovelling before Stafford in the night, becoming ever more confidential. If only Navarre would comply, then they could help each other but, at the moment, the religious pretext was ‘so printed in men’s minds by art, that the least stir in the world cantoneth his towns and putteth all his estate in hazard’. Here, again, was 12

The prince de Condé died just three days later, on 9 March 1588. It is apparent that Henry III was unaware of the tensions and divisions within the ‘huguenot party’. It was neither homogeneous nor fully loyal to Navarre.

13


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Stafford’s perceptive explanation as to why Henry III never wavered in his current insistence upon one religion in France when, four times already, he had been obliged to concede toleration. There was, Henry said, no other way [than that of Navarre’s compliance] ‘to save himself whole’. Otherwise he would have to carry on with the same course and ‘swallow many things against his stomach to win time and do that way that which he can do no other way’; hence the king’s refusal to take no for an answer. That he might take action against the League, seems not to have been considered.14 Was the king really so completely crippled by the ‘traitors’ in his entourage that he could not choose to strike? Perhaps he was. This curious, nocturnal experience caused Stafford to ponder whether Navarre might be willing to convert if he thought he could do so without antagonising England; but that was only a fleeting spectre. Stafford’s confidence was further shaken by the death of Condé on 9 March 1588 – it was believed by poison. That, he considered, was the greatest blow which could have happened to religion; and he added, the king ‘holdeth himself very assured of the King of Navarre now’. As a means of reinsurance, Stafford wanted Elizabeth to encourage Turenne who was of a different faction within the party from Navarre’s confidants, Duplessis and Buzanval. The dangerous rifts in the huguenot ranks were manifest. Writing to Walsingham, Stafford declared that ‘you will find a marvellous broiled estate among them for even before the Prince’s death [Condé] they were all at inward jars, mistrust envy and picques one with another’. He believed that Soissons would be an instrument of great harm; and within that prince’s low capacity, Stafford was not mistaken. The religious men were said to be ‘in some suspicion of the King of Navarre’s slackness in zeal and of some about Navarre who ruled him most’. So they had resolved upon a council of sixteen zealots, both to supervise his actions and the disbursement of money levied by the churches. The fact that Navarre’s authority was challenged was, presumably, one reason why it was thought that he might be obliged to convert; he was not credited with conscience, conviction or loyalty. Special and ‘secret’ news, which came in haste from Rome, was thought by the Venetian ambassador, now Giovanni Mocenigo, to be about Navarre, knowing as he and Stafford did, of Lenoncourt’s not quite secret efforts. But it was only imagination.15 Stafford did not, as has been alleged, display hatred for Navarre, but considerable anxiety on his behalf. Indeed, he declared that ‘if the King of Navarre needed my life in a good cause, I would hazard it very far’, and feared that there were those about him who ‘might undo him’. Whether or not Stafford was hinting at assassination, an attempt upon Navarre’s life was quick to follow; henceforth he was never to be safe again.16 Furthermore, from that time

14

CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 519-28, 25 February/6 March (sic) 1588, Stafford to queen Elizabeth. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 530-1, 1/11 March 1588, Stafford to Burghley, 531-5, 1/11 March 1588, Stafford to Walsingham, 542-6, 17/27 March 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. Measures restricting Navarre’s freedom as ‘protector’ were imposed by the assembly of La Rochelle later that year. Sutherland, ‘The Edict of Nantes and the Protestant State’, Annali della Fondazione Italiana per la Storia Amministrativa, 2 (1965), 204. 16 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 546-8, 18/28 March 1588, Stafford to Walsingham; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 343-4, 10 March 1588, Navarre to madame de Grammont, 350-1, c. 20 March 1588, Navarre to Matignon; 15

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until 1598, he could never surely rely upon huguenot support. In particular, Turenne – better known as the duc de Bouillon by his marriage in 1592 – proved to be very treacherous.17 Over this general derangement in France, early in 1588, hung the menace of the Spanish Armada – the uncertainty, and the fear of its possible outcome. If Navarre was surrounded by manifold hazards and, like the king, by ‘traitors’, he was at least preserved from a major attack in Guyenne by the machinations of Guise and Mendoza in the north.

II: The Requirements of Spain The duc de Guise, the Parisian League – or Seize – and the Spanish agents were by no means dedicated to a single purpose when they forged the dramatic climax of Henry’s reign: namely the so-called day of the barricades in Paris, on 12 May 1588. This revolution entailed the downfall of the king, the loss of his capital, and the near destruction of the monarchy. Subsequent events stemmed from the miscarriage of the enterprise which, nevertheless, irreversibly altered the location of power. What remained of the reign of Henry III was little more than a coda, during which the conditions of his ruination were defined.18 Furthermore – and this was definitely unscheduled – the revolt established Paris as the radical centre of opposition by which, early in the reign of Henry IV, the remnants of the aristocratic Catholic League was to be notably impeded. From this time stemmed the beginnings of that divergence between the catholic nobility and the Parisian Seize, which conditioned the nature of the opposition to Henry IV early in his reign.19 Thus the events of 1588 began to shape the disastrous circumstances of Navarre’s accession as Henry IV, which was precipitated only fifteen months later. It is therefore essential to understand these circumstances: how they arose through the combined rebellion of the Catholic League and the Seize, and led on to the downfall of Henry III. In the event, it was to be the requirements of Parma – namely the convulsion of France and the League control of Picardy – which fired the events of January to May 1588. Guise, who had no other patron, once again applied himself to the destruction of France in the interests of Spain. He worked assiduously in liaison with his fitful paymasters, Mendoza and Moreo, trimming his own objectives to the achievement of theirs, and conjointly exploiting the treachery and sedition independently fermenting in Paris. But, since the Armada remained perpetually imminent, further efforts to ease and protect its passage through the Channel were fraught with incalculable problems of

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 194-200, May 1588, memoir sent to Ségur in Germany, referred to various attempts at Nérac on Navarre’s life. 17 Stafford believed it to be the Turenne faction which had tried to blacken him with Navarre. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 546-8, 18/28 March 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. 18 This opinion was precisely expressed by Cavriana, and that without the benefit of hindsight. Desjardins, Negs., Tosc., iv, 779-83, 13 May 1588, Cavriana to Serguidi. 19 The objectives of the aristocratic Catholic League and the radicals in Paris had never been aligned, but it was only in attempted action that the divergence became significant.


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synchronicity. Mendoza strove, with some success, to control the timing of events, efforts which help to account for the otherwise puzzling developments early in 1588. Together with the League, Guise now prepared to perform the will of Philip II and the duke of Parma. He also desired to be revenged upon Henry III who had eluded the terms of the treaty of Nemours and deliberately exposed him to disaster in the field. Mendoza reported France to be seething with discontent and disorder. If a well organised movement were launched against the weakened king, he believed it would succeed – especially if it were executed by the duc de Guise in the name of religion. This reveals something of what Mendoza had in mind, and he soon began to work with the council of sixteen – the Seize – in Paris, to which he referred as the ‘consejo’, never using names. The affiliated catholic towns formed a constituent part of the pro-Spanish rebellion he planned to foster. He was therefore working to keep them united with each other and at one with Guise. Meanwhile Mendoza awaited the information he had requested from the king in respect of the Armada and his relations with Guise.20 Guise, for his part, was working with Moreo, sent to him presumably by Parma, from the Netherlands; they too expected instructions from Philip II. Meanwhile Guise decided to attack the protestant cities of Sedan and Jametz – previously suggested by the Spanish – as a device for remaining in arms.21 Parma, at this time, was anxious about the reduction in League forces which followed the tripartite campaign of 1587. He was also desperate to frustrate the recurrent desire of Henry III to make peace with the huguenots; and they could no longer be relied upon to do nothing. Consequently it would be very serious for him if the King of France were not opposed and diverted by the Guises. Philip II was characteristically unsympathetic in respect of Parma’s preconditions for the safety of the Armada campaign, in which he was to be the co-commander. Philip did agree, however, that the Netherlands’ frontier must be protected, hence the League activity in Picardy in the early months of 1588. He therefore grudgingly allowed that the Guises should be entertained and encouraged, but as cheaply as possible.22 Neither then, nor later, did Philip II ever care about the fate of his French accomplices. Thus, despite the Spanish alliance, Guise was half crippled by lack of money; but he served the Spanish purpose nonetheless – and consequently perished. Early in 1588, however, he was looking for some recognition and reward on account of his recent achievements against Navarre’s foreign army. To this effect, he sent Mendoza his account of the campaign. In the memoir, conveyed by Latreul on 8 February 1588, Guise maintained that, shortly before the engagement at Auneau Épernon, Bellièvre and other ‘evil ministers’ of the king were treating with these forces in order to make a peace, 20

Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 131, quotes 25 January 1588, Philip II to Mendoza, 30 January 1588, Mendoza to Philip II; De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 305-6, 9 January 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. 21 Sedan and Jametz belonged to the protestant duc de Bouillon who died in January 1588. Simancas K 1565, 21 MI 152, 30 December 1587, Guise to Mendoza; K 1568, 21 MI 155, 8 January 1588, Guise to Mendoza. 22 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 260-1, 29 December 1587, Parma to Philip II, 270, 29 January 1588, Philip II to Parma; CSPSp. 1587-1603, pp. 199-201, 31 January 1588, Parma to Philip II. Parma reiterated his three conditions.

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detrimental to catholic interests. This long-standing plan [for peace] was to be accomplished – in the strength of those forces – at the gates of Paris. The army, Guise said, was only twelve leagues from the city.23 To him this nefarious intention was clear from the beginning, because he was commanded to meet the foreign force without being adequately provided. Guise went on to detail all the ways in which he was militarily deprived, so that he might be overthrown or disgraced. It was in order to frustrate the king’s design to make peace with the foreigners that Guise had attacked them at Auneau. This story, patently lacking in logic, was evidently what Guise wished the Spanish to believe. It was, however, quite true that the king had deprived him, with intent. The memoir ended with the information that Guise had now decided to attack Jametz. He had also sent forces to Picardy to prevent the towns from receiving Épernon’s forces into garrisons. In this way, the League was protecting the frontier which, presumably, Moreo had requested on behalf of Parma.24 At the same time as sending Mendoza an account of his achievements in 1587, Guise also informed him of the League’s subsequent deliberations at Nancy, in January 1588. This conference produced eleven, by no means unfamiliar, articles – well pleasing to Mendoza – which were presented to Henry III early in February. They were – once again – designed to strengthen the Guise position in France, and to oblige the king to declare his full support for the League and the war against heresy. Henry was to remove from the council and from office persons to be named. This was primarily aimed at the king’s favourite Épernon, who stood squarely between the Guises and the throne. Henry was to publish the decrees of Trent, and establish an inquisition in the capital city of every province. Several harsh items related to prisoners, and to the raising of money at huguenot expense. That was to defray the payment of Leaguer debts, and the expenses of further war. The League leaders were to retain the towns ceded in the treaty of Nemours with, in addition, permission to build fortifications, and to install garrisons at local expense. Henry had passed this way before; he did not reply, and the demands were overtaken by events.25 Henry III’s preoccupation, during March and April 1588, was the League activity to secure control of Picardy, including Boulogne. This was an endeavour which conformed to Mendoza’s advice and requirements. He was well pleased with the Guise resolution to oppose any accommodation with the king, and to prevent him from causing Philip II any ‘nuisance’ – a reference to the Armada. The ambassador was similarly pleased with the increased numbers of ‘villes catholiques unies’, which were expected to

23

Auneau is near Chartres, which is ninety-six kilometres from Paris. Guise, therefore, was stretching the point. 24 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 307, 8 February 1588, Guise to Mendoza, 307-14, 8 February 1588, Latreul’s ‘discours’. This information was for transmission to Philip II and Parma. The forces besieging Jametz were enrolled in the name of the duc de Lorraine and could, therefore, if necessary, be used by Spain. Simancas K 1568, 21 MI 155, 23 January 1588, Guise to Mendoza. 25 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 269-79, articles proposed by the League leaders, – January 1588, 27989, ‘conduite du roi à l’occasion de ses articles’.


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rise in a generalised rebellion, upon a signal from Paris and from Guise.26 From the beginning of 1588, Henry III was hoping for help and support from the pope, who might be expected to exert himself to control the Guises. Indeed, Sixtus V’s French policy was now quite contrary to that of the Spanish agents; his nuncio, Gian Francesco Morosini, was instructed to promote a reconciliation between the king and Guise.27 The secretary of state, Villeroy, made sure that Morosini was precisely informed: the Guises were threatening the king; he would gladly employ them if only they behaved like vassals. Morosini did, indeed, think that the League should proceed with the main task, which was war on the heretics, not the king.28 With Aumale in Picardy, provoking the people and obstructing the entry of royal garrisons, Henry was particularly anxious lest queen Elizabeth should seek safety in a peace with Spain.29 He therefore proposed to send envoys to Guise and the duc de Lorraine to require them to stop these usurpations in Picardy. Henry really had little alternative but to negotiate, as he had, unsuccessfully, in 1585 and 1587. Even as Guise awaited the arrival of Bellièvre and La Guiche, who reached Vitry on 8 March 1588, he was moving reinforcements into Picardy. According to Guise, the king’s envoys proposed three things – actually they proposed rather more. The first item was that Guise should return to court, and there apply himself to preparing the Guyenne campaign in which he was to participate. Secondly, Henry wished Aumale to be withdrawn from Picardy, and for royal garrisons to be received. Thirdly, he wished Guise to co-operate with Épernon – who had recently received the ‘gouvernement’ of Normandy and office of admiral, both vacated by the death of the duc de Joyeuse. Guise was also to be induced to sever his connections with Spain and Rome. In return he was offered blandishments so great that he brazenly likened his temptation to that of Christ on the mountain (sic).30 But, knowing the king, and being too deeply involved with Spain, Guise resisted. His immediate anxiety was that the king might act upon his threat to enter Picardy in person. In that case,

26

Simancas K 1568, 21 MI 155, 24 February 1588, Guise to Mendoza; De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 316-17, 25 February 1588, Mendoza to Philip II, 317, 28 February 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. 27 The pope’s French policy was not well tailored to his – conditional – support for the Armada. His nuncio, Giovanni Francesco Morosini, bishop of Brescia was a distinguished diplomat, moderate and conciliatory. No one tried harder than he to bring about peace in France, and at great personal cost. 28 De L’Épinois, ‘La Politique de Sixte-quint’, Revue des questions historiques, xv (1874), 408-9, 11 April 1588, Morosini to Montalto. 29 The Anglo-Spanish peace negotiations in the period preceding the Armada is a large, complex and separate subject. ‘Négociations de Henri III avec la cour de Rome’, Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. viii (1836), 4446, 7 January 1588, Henry III to Pisani, 448-54, 19 February 1588, Henry III to Pisani, 454-6, 14 March 1588, Henry III to Pisani; CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 552-5, 21/31 March 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. Stafford testified to the high level of anxiety in France lest England should accord with Spain. 30 It is not clear what Guise was offered. Simancas K 1568, 21 MI 155, 9 March 1588, Guise to Mendoza. Mendoza was not even to confide the king’s proposals to Parma, who had sent an express messenger, possibly about delays to the Armada occasioned by the death of the commander, Santa-Cruz, on 9 February. His reluctant successor, the duke of Medina Sidonia, was given just ten days in which to prepare, which was of course impossible. CSPSp., 1587-1603, pp. 208-9 ‘note’.

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Mendoza feared he might go one step further and turn upon the League. Guise therefore appealed for Spanish help to avert this danger.31 Before attempting to answer Bellièvre, Guise consulted Mendoza through his intermediary, Du Bray. According to his orders from Philip II, Mendoza advised that the essentials were not to lay down arms and not to make any agreement with the king. Guise should refuse to see the king but answer him with ‘bonnes paroles’ (which he did), in order to play for time and to avoid precipitating the Paris uprising too soon.32 Consequently Guise feigned displeasure about the events in Picardy and simulated preventive action. Later, when nothing had changed, he claimed that the matter pertained to Aumale and the Picard gentry.33 By the end of March, therefore, Bellièvre had achieved nothing and returned to court. According to Stafford, the League was by then strong in all places and terrorised the king with threats of Parma’s forces – although Parma was actually more than fully extended to hold his own in the Netherlands.34 Once Bellièvre was out of the way, Moreo ventured to meet Guise at Soissons in the first week of April 1588. He conveyed orders, presumably from Parma, to break with the king, promising in that event to provide 300,000 écus, 6,000 lansquenets and 1,200 lances. There was also to be an ambassador affiliated to the League.35 Guise is said to have met Mendoza at this time and agreed to engineer a general rebellion the moment he learnt of the Armada’s departure from Lisbon.36 The king, becoming increasingly anxious, appealed directly to Morosini. He pointed out that the movements in Normandy and Picardy were nothing to do with religion; by operating in this way, the Guises betrayed their secret designs. Henry had tried to negotiate in order not to divide the catholics – now a meaningless argument. He asked Morosini directly for a Papal brief ordering the Guises to cease from these exploits and to join with himself. In that case, they could expect to be well treated. But Henry would not prosecute the war in Guyenne unless Picardy was pacified. Morosini thought that mistaken. He was evidently in touch with the Guises, who were still angling for Papal approbation. But when Morosini sought to pacify them, Guise replied with a long report complaining how the king ill-treated them, and of his preference for Épernon. The duke had gone to Boulogne, had been in touch with England, and favoured the heretics. Knowing Aumale to be securely in control, Guise risked nothing by offering to submit to

31

De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 323-4, 31 March 1588, Guise to Mendoza. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois and Philippe II, ii, 320-2, 15 March 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. The exploits in Picardy were partly intended to protect the Parisians by creating a diversion. 33 ‘Négociations de Henri III avec la cour de Rome’, Revue rétrospective série ii, vol. viii (1836), 456-9, 22 March 1588, Henry III to Pisani, 459-63, 12 April 1588, Henry III to Pisani. 34 Mendoza did not think that Parma would send forces to help the League in Picardy for fear that the king might go in person. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 324-6, 5 April 1588, Mendoza to Philip II; CSPF., 1586-8, p. 550, 21/31 March 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. Bellièvre and La Guiche were expected back that night. Ibid., 552-5, 21/31 March 1588 (2), Stafford to Walsingham. 35 De L’Épinois, ‘La Politique de Sixte-quint’, Revue des questions historiques, xv (1874), 404-5. The proposal to send an ambassador affiliated to the League does seem very unlikely at that date. 36 Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, 199. 32


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the king if Épernon were recalled from Picardy.37 Pisani, in Rome, had actually sought the excommunication of Guise, which Sixtus agreed to consider – but was most unlikely to perform.38 He did, however, issue the desired brief, on 12 April 1588; it required the Guises to submit, and to serve the king. That was a notable and decisive step; but because it arrived too late, it has been overlooked.39 By the middle of April 1588, the rebellion was gathering momentum. The king was sufficiently alarmed by the state of Paris to threaten severe measures, and Guise was becoming ever more intransigent. Morosini therefore advised further negotiations. Much against his will, Bellièvre returned to Soissons about 19 April 1588 albeit, Guise contemptuously observed, with nothing to say. Henry sent one emissary after another to order Aumale out of Picardy and to urge him to join his envoys and Guise at Soissons. Aumale and Guise pretended to make appropriate moves, but were only hedging.40 According to Mendoza, the assembly at Soissons was simply a delaying tactic. Guise needed more time in which to prepare to go to Paris, where the projected revolt was simmering to the boil.41 Moreo also returned to Guise about the same time, conveying orders from Philip II who wanted Boulogne for the Armada. Within about ten days Bellièvre left Soissons, having received ‘but slight and jesting answers’. The reason, he explained, was that the news from Paris had superseded all else.42

III: Conspiracy in Paris The pivotal story of the so-called day of barricades in Paris, on 12 May 1588, can only be elucidated in the context of the Seize, and their previous exploits; these had all miscarried or been betrayed.43 That suggests that the king might have unravelled the whole skein by inflicting some exemplary punishments – which the Parisians greatly feared. Why he failed to do this, no one has ever understood – unless it was because of the crippling control of the ‘traitors’ at court.

37 De L’Épinois, ‘La Politique de Sixte-quint’ Revue des questions historiques, xv (1874), 408-11, 11 April 1588, Morosini to Montalto, 25 April 1588, Morosini to Montalto; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 2. 38 None of the League leaders was ever threatened with spiritual sanctions which would, of course, have infuriated Philip II. 39 De L’Épinois, ‘La Politique de Sixte-quint’, Revue des questions historiques, xv (1874), 408; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 329. If this information is correct, Pisani must have obtained the brief before Henry’s formal request to Morosini. 40 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 331, 16 March 1588, Catherine to Bellièvre and La Guiche, 332, 28 March 1588, Catherine to Bellièvre and La Guiche, 333-4, – April 1588, Catherine to Bellièvre and La Guiche, 335-6, 22 April 1588, Catherine to Bellièvre. 41 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 328-30, 14 April 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. 42 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, 332-3, 19 April 1588, Guise to Mendoza; Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, iii, 246; CSPF., 1586-8, p. 595, 20/30 April 1588, French advertisements; Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 335 n.1. 43 For a fuller account of the organisation of the Seize, see appendix ii.

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Paris had long been turbulent and the lowest classes (‘menu peuple’) seized upon the hope of pillage and became restless, discontented and impatient.44 From about January 1585, after the treaty of Joinville, the Parisians were plentifully fed by the Seize and their supporters with seditious and provocative lies. They were assured that religion was about to be ‘ruined’ by the huguenots. Some 10,000 of them were reported to be lurking in the faubourg Saint-Germain, poised to massacre the catholics and seize the crown for Navarre.45 Good catholics must therefore be armed and prepared to act. The whole house of Lorraine, so they were assured, was ready to support them. The pope, the cardinals, prelates, and the Sorbonne, not to mention Spain, Parma, and the duke of Savoy, were also ready to support them. The Parisians need not worry their heads about authorisation; others could shoulder the responsibility. The king was condemned for having favoured Navarre; Épernon was said to have taken him 200,000 écus [in 1584] with which to make war on the catholics. In January 1585 the Parisian League, or Seize, had recruited Nicolas Poulain, lieutenant of the ‘prévôté’ of the Ile-de-France. His role was to purchase arms and distribute them to designated houses in all parts of the city. Each of the leaders recruited supporters within his own specified area, always giving out that the huguenots planned to massacre the catholics in favour of Navarre; that, if anyone had ever given thought to it, made no possible sense. Some time later, which may have been in 1586, the leaders considered that it was necessary to obtain the support of the best towns of France. This work was undertaken by one, Ameline. Well supplied with information and sufficiently supplied with money, he is said to have recruited Chartres, Orléans, Blois, Tours and other places, all in the name of Guise, whose great efforts to raise forces and provisions was explained to them.46 Ameline’s correspondence was channelled by Poulain to the League council. The Parisians evidently became afraid that a protracted conspiracy would be discovered and pre-empted. Thus, without consulting their superiors, they began to make plans to rid themselves of the king. One day [possibly early in 1587] they proposed to seize him in the rue Saint-Anthoine, as he returned from Vincennes – a plan which was later revived. However, they were persuaded [by whom?] that they could not safely do such a thing of their own volition. Consequently they became increasingly impatient for the duc de Guise to come and support and guide them.47 It has already been seen how, in March 1587, elaborate plans were laid for a ‘coup’ in Paris. The Florentine, Cavriana, said the plot was intended to capture the king and the city, and to accomplish the ruin of the royal favourites, Joyeuse and Épernon. Their prominence had now become a serious issue.48 The plans also included the coveted opportunities for pillage – albeit not for 44

Barbara Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross (New York, 1991), has made a study of the endemic turbulence in Paris. The evidence relating to the conspiracies is confused and imprecise. 45 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, Poulain, Procès verbal, 289. 46 One must query the inclusion of Chartres, to which the king fled in May 1588, and Tours. 47 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, Poulain, Procès verbal, 297-8. 48 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 676-80, 3 March 1587, Cavriana to Vinta, 680-4, 31 March 1587, Cavriana to Vinta.


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everyone. Thus barricades were to be erected in the streets in order to control and exclude those not destined to share in the loot. These obstructions would also hamper any nobles and moderates who tried to support the king. They, and especially anyone suspected of heresy, were to be murdered. When Paris had, by these means, been made safe [for the rebels], the cry in the streets of ‘vive la messe’ would summon all good catholics to arms. But at this crucial point, the plan petered into incoherence. It included the employment of a Spanish army to defeat Navarre in Guyenne and, among the leaders, a deal of jockeying for power and place.49 Fearing for the king’s life, Stafford appears not to have distinguished between the Guises and the Parisian League.50 By this time, in 1587, Poulain had become disgusted and alienated from the Seize; so he turned informer. It was he who had reported a plan to seize Boulogne, originally promoted by Mendoza early in 1587. As a result, the duc d’Aumale was nearly captured. With the Parisians just awaiting the moment to rise, Poulain also informed on the third Parisian plot, of March 1587 – notoriously resumed in 1588.51 Poulain, however, experienced great difficulty in betraying to the king this bloody, if confused conspiracy, and got himself arrested in the effort. He did, however, succeed in seeing the king, the chancellor and Villeroy. The king, for once, took note of the various signs and warnings. He doubled the guard in the city, ordered a census of strangers, and deployed forces in the vicinity. The League was astonished and afraid. Their suspicions fell upon an uncooperative member, La Bruyière. So, upon this occasion, Henry III did take appropriate action, and frustrated the conspiracy.52 On account of the Parisians’ failure, some of the leaders addressed themselves to Mayenne when he returned from campaigning in Guyenne in 1587. They explained their plans to him, claiming that Guise had promised to help them. The delays were dangerous because the king might discover and surprise them. Mayenne therefore evolved a fourth project, which was to seize the king while he was at dinner in the abbey of Saint-Germain. Warned again by Poulain, the king stayed away. Cavriana confirmed the involvement of Mayenne, whose house was full of troops.53 The Guises, meanwhile, were performing the bidding of Parma, and kept their forces on a war footing at Sedan. Parma was adamant that the League must remain in 49

Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, Poulain, Procès verbal, 289 seq. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 229-30, 25 February/7 March 1587, Stafford to the two secretaries. 51 The first Parisian plot had occurred in July, and the second in October 1586, partly sparked by fear of a peace with Navarre. It is not clear what part, if any, Paris had played in the conspiracy intended for April 1585. In each [affiliated] town a council of six was to keep in touch with a council of the Parisian League, to raise money and to assemble men. If the king died childless, they had a contingency plan, to be executed within two weeks. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 71-2. 52 B.N., Mss. ital. 1736, ff. 1-2, 2 March 1587, ff. 26-8, 30 March 1587, ff. 47-51, 23 April 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate. Forces around Paris were being increased. Poulain clearly said that the king moved forces into Paris. Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série ii, vol. xi, Poulain, Procès verbal, 302-5. 53 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 676-80, 3 March 1587, Cavriana to Vinta, 680-4, 31 March 1587, Cavriana to Vinta. Mayenne was later said to have murdered one, Sacremore, who knew too much about his plot against the king’s person. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 332-3, 14 January 1588, Navarre to madame de Grammont. 50

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arms in order to avert a peace even though, as he wrote sarcastically to Philip II, that would cost him some money. Through Moreo, Parma was authorised in the case of a ‘rupture’ – meaning hostilities in France – to supply the League immediately with 300,000 écus.54 It appears that Guise was annoyed about the exploits of the Seize in Paris, which evidently queered his pitch; but he was never informed of the involvement of Mayenne. Doubtless Mayenne was amongst those kept in ignorance of his brother’s intentions. When the king took the field on the Loire, in September 1587, the League considered seizing Paris in his absence. But, as Guise was also in the field, he aborted the plan. The Parisians evidently contented themselves with the hope that, during the campaign, Guise himself would seize the king. But Henry, it has been seen, was careful to keep him at a safe distance, with the river Loire between them. Thus for the rest of 1587, the Parisians waited impatiently. On 16 December 1587, before the king’s return to Paris, the Sorbonne passed a secret resolution that government should be removed from princes who do not act correctly. At the end of December, the king summoned the nuncio, as well as Gondi, bishop of Paris, and the seditious preachers and gave them a trouncing. In particular Henry turned on Boucher – one of the Seize – castigating him for spreading lies; but he confined himself to a stern warning.55 It appears, therefore, that Henry III was independently threatened with deposition by the Seize and its nascent republican movement, apart from Spain and the Catholic League. Once the campaign of 1587 was over, the Parisians were anxious not to be frustrated yet again. By this time, however, both Mendoza and Guise, each for his own purpose, needed an enterprise in Paris. Guise therefore encouraged the Seize to gather the maximum possible number of forces, while leaving him to control the timing of events. This process began – probably about February or March 1588 – while the preachers denigrated the king with renewed vehemence. The idea, at one stage, was to provoke the king into making an arrest, which would be used as a pretext for rebellion. This shows how difficult a task it was for Mendoza and Guise, concerned as they were with synchronicity. There was indeed a critical incident of the kind (no date), in which the king proposed to arrest and hang Leclerc, a leading member of the Seize. Such vigorous action might well have defused the conspiracy, had the king not been subject to restraints. Here we have a clue to the understanding of these events. Henry was dissuaded by Villequier and others from taking action – and these were the ‘traitors’ identified by Stafford. Villequier issued a warning to Lerclerc and his colleagues who quickly went to ground.56 Thereafter, determined hotheads devised a fifth plan, to be executed at the end of carnival, when the king and 54

B.N., Mss. ital. 1735, f. 325, 13 February 1587, Dolfin to the doge and senate; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 170, 10 January 1587 (2), Parma to Philip II, 185, 28 February 1587, Philip II to Parma, 1923, 2 March 1587, Parma to Philip II, evidently a misprint for 22 March. 55 Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League 1585-1591’, unpublished Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley (1972), 132-3. 56 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, Poulain, Procès verbal, 308-9. According to de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 182, the king was possessed by René de Villequier, seigneur de Clairvaux, who assured him that there was no danger and discouraged him from taking corrective action.


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Épernon were expected to go cavorting about the streets, masked but ill-disguised. That would afford an opportunity to seize them both. Forewarned by Poulain, the king remained indoors.57 Tension was mounting in Paris; those in the know were afraid of what the king might do, since he was evidently apprised of their devices. In the week before Easter (17 April), the king summoned several known Leaguers to the Louvre and threatened to hang them. But since these threats were not carried out, they did more harm than good.58 The conspirators began to signal that they could not wait much longer for Guise to come. Pressed in this way, but presumably incommoded by the return of Bellièvre, Guise started to make specific plans with the Parisians, to be executed on 24 April. He appointed a colonel plus five captains in each of the five districts. They organised an illegal militia under the Seize. These officers had their instructions (unknown) and disposed of an arsenal. Leclerc estimated at 30,000 the number of men they could muster if required.59 On 15 April, Poulain heard from Leclerc that they would be fighting for catholicism by the time of Quasimodo [24 April]. Guise sent Aumale with a band of horse to lodge in the outskirts of Paris. They were ready to enter the city by the porte Saint-Denis – to which they held a key – on the night of 24 April. These horsemen would then seize Épernon – who did the rounds of the city between ten o’clock and four in the morning – and two of his own men were suborned to murder him. As previously, in 1587, Épernon was to be the first target. Leaguer forces, which it appears had been secretly assembling, would then approach the Louvre and overwhelm the guard, while the captains in the city set up the chains and barricades. These obstructions would render circulation impossible for all but a select 3,000. Led by Leclerc, this elite would loot and sack the ‘bonnes et fortes maisons’.60 What else was to happen, one can only surmise. It is interesting to note that although Mendoza and the Parisians – not to mention the king – expected Guise to go to Paris, he was not, apparently, scheduled to play any part in these proceedings; nor do we learn what he proposed to do. The inference is that the Parisians were to be encouraged to perform the unpardonable, and to spare Guise the odium of laying hands on the king. Whether or not Guise himself ever wanted and planned to go to Paris is difficult to determine, not least because Mendoza intended that he should. It was to these intentions that Mendoza referred when, on 14 April 1588, he wrote to inform Philip II that the bourgeois of Paris were now firmly resolved to execute their project [24 April]. He had, he said, first described it to the Spanish king in July 1587.61 That was about the time that Henry III had returned from taking counsel in Meaux before opposing the Germany army. Developments had now reached such a point, Mendoza continued that, with or without the consent of Henry III, it would be very difficult for Guise to defer coming to Paris. Mendoza sounded rather anxious about the imminent revolt: clearly the timing was tricky; furthermore, those involved did not all share the 57

This was the first week in March; 6 March was the first sunday in Lent. Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League’, 138. 59 Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League’, 139. 60 Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League’, 140. 61 This is surprising in view of the failed coup in March 1588. 58

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same objectives. These differences of objective were very real, and doubtless contributed to the overall confusion of events. However, if the revolt materialised, and Mendoza was assured of that, the French king would have his hands so well tied that he would be unable, even verbally (‘même en parolles’) to assist or support queen Elizabeth. If Henry III was to be incapable of dispatching even a verbal message, we may reasonably conclude that Mendoza expected him to be seized; and that was evidently what Philip II had in mind.62 That would take care of the Spanish interest in these events. It was, he said, to achieve the timely paralysis of France that Mendoza had used delaying tactics, in order to synchronise the rebellion with the departure of the Armada from Lisbon. But whether he meant that he had delayed the revolt, or that he was still trying to do so, is not clear.63 Once again, however, Poulain took action. On Friday 22 April Adrien de Petremol, a finance officer, smuggled Poulain unseen into the king’s chamber at five o’clock in the morning.64 Henry, with a callous disregard for Poulain’s safety, asked him to return after dinner, bringing his submission in writing – matters which should never be written down. Poulain was observed, but he managed for a little longer to extricate himself. He spun a story about presenting a petition – which he carried as a precaution – to François d’O.65 Either that day or the next, Henry introduced 120 breastplates into the Louvre, and summoned 4,000 Swiss troops from Lagny (Seine-et-Marne) into the Paris suburbs of Saint-Denis and Saint-Martin.66 According to Villeroy, these measures were taken by the king after receiving news [from Poulain] of a conspiracy against Épernon, which would also endanger Paris. Guise is said to have approached Paris at this time, coming as close as Gonesse (Seine-et-Oise). But, when he heard about the movement of the king’s Swiss troops, he returned to Soissons.67 It was doubtless on this account, and at this time, that Guise was constrained to change his plans. Poulain’s revelation seems, momentarily, to have galvanised the king, at least into contemplating action. To Bellièvre he wrote, on 24 April, ‘je suis resolu de faire tout ce qui est en moy jusques a y mettre tout... pour y remedier... j’ai deslibere de... me rendre le plus fort qu’il me sera possible et apres faire tout ce que je cognoistrai necessaire pour me deslivrer du danger et de la peine en laquelle je veis’. Henry III could no longer live as he had until then.68 62

Jensen, ‘Franco-Spanish Diplomacy and the Armada’, in Carter, Ed., Essays in Honour of Garrett Mattingly, 218. 63 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 328-30, 14 April 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. The Armada was successively expected to sail at the end of November 1587, 1 February 1588, 28 February 1588, 1 April 1588 and 24 April 1588. By 13 May 1588 it was momentarily expected. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, 246, 249, 269, 300; CSPSp. 1587-1603, pp. 207, 245, 249, 273. It finally sailed on 30 May 1588. Ibid., 306-7, 2 June 1588, Philip II to Mendoza. 64 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 183. Others call Petremol Pierre-Paul Tosinghi. 65 François d’O, surintendant des finances, was the son-in-law of Villequier and one of the hated favourites. 66 Mocenigo said that these forces arrived on 22 April 1588 when the king held a council upon the dangerous state of affairs. Everyone, he said, was in disagreement. The king could not act alone and did not know where to turn. B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 40-2, 22 April 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 67 Villeroy, Lettres écrites à Matignon, 218-20, 28 April 1588; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 183. 68 B.N., Mss. fr. 15909, f. 70, 24 April 1588, Henry to Bellièvre; Anonymous, Lettres de Villeroy écrites à Matignon, 218-20, 28 April 1588, Villeroy to Matignon.


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Poulain arranged to have Leclerc informed of the betrayal of the conspiracy scheduled for 24 April. On 23 April Leclerc, all unsuspecting, himself ‘enlightened’ Poulain of the disaster. The Seize leaders held a council meeting which lasted for four hours from eleven o’clock in the morning. At great risk to his own life, Poulain further alerted the king, thereby providing him with a supreme opportunity to arrest all the leaders together. No doubt Villequier again deflected him, since Henry merely sent to learn what had been resolved. All we know is that, frightened by the proximity of the Swiss troops, the Seize dispatched La Chapelle-Marteau to implore the duc de Guise not to abandon them. Thus the Parisian conspiracy, upon which the duc de Guise had based a wider uprising, was betrayed and aborted. They did not know what to do, and 24 April passed without incident. Consequently the historic revolution, which followed in May, was really a ‘pis aller’, an unpropitious exercise in damage limitation. From that point on, it would appear that Guise was obliged to improvise. That anything more should have happened at all, derived from the fear that the king would use his Swiss troops to inflict some exemplary punishment on the Parisian leaders, whose identities were known. Besides, they were too far embarked to withdraw, since the turbulent and expectant populace, unaware of the true situation, could not reliably be contained. Guise told La Chapelle-Marteau (on 24 or 25 April 1588) that, but for the betrayal, he would have fulfilled his promises. We do not know what they were. In the event, he sent two lieutenants, Chamois and Boisdauphin, to help in case the king attacked. He added, rather vaguely, that he would not be far away, and might arrive sooner than they expected. It is not clear what Guise meant to do, but it appears that his followers remained in arms.69 On 26 April Poulain and Leclerc went to see the two gentlemen sent by Guise, and the king sent for Poulain. He explained to the king the disrupted situation, caused in fact by Henry’s own failure to strike when he had the opportunity. As usual, Henry was afraid of worsening his relations with Guise; he seemed disinclined to believe Poulain, who must have told him that Guise would still be coming. There followed a rather curious lull during which, presumably, everyone was wondering what to do. While Bellièvre was sent – for the third time – to order Guise to keep away from Paris, Henry and Épernon seized the chance to escape. According to Villeroy, they went to d’O’s house at Fresne. Épernon would leave for Normandy on 29 April and the king return alone to Paris next day.70 Henry, however, went to Vincennes – where he liked to hide – and lingered there for several days. The precise chronology of events, during the heady first week of May, is impossible to establish. There was trouble and resentment in Paris over a new salt tax (gabelle) imposed, injudiciously, upon the king’s sole authority; followers of Guise remained in arms, and the king doubled the city guards. Bellièvre returned from seeing Guise on 5 May, saying that the duke proposed to 69

Urbain de Montmorency-Laval, seigneur de Boisdauphin; B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 48-51, 6 May 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 70 Villeroy, Lettres écrites à Matignon, 218-20, 28 April 1588; B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 48-51, 6 May 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate, ff. 57-60, 8 May 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. According to the Venetian ambassador Épernon left for Rouen on 3 May and arrived on 5 May while the king went to Vincennes.

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come to Paris to present a petition against Épernon. Clearly the departure of Épernon for Rouen had complicated the situation still further. The hapless Bellièvre was dispatched to Soissons – for a fourth time – to forbid Guise to enter Paris.71 In this first week of May madame de Montpensier, firebrand sister of the duc de Guise, evidently determined to seize the initiative and sustain the momentum of rebellion. She renewed the rumour of a conspiracy against the catholics, and was assisted by Mendoza. He put it about that, instigated by Épernon, the huguenots had planned to burn Paris on Easter Saturday [16 April] and massacre the catholics. This was doubtless part of various measures intended to ensure that Épernon should not escape by leaving for Rouen.72 At the same time, madame de Montpensier warned the Parisians to beware of the king’s anger. According to Poulain, she had spoken to the king, interceding for permission for Guise to come and clear his name. The king allegedly disregarded her, but foolishly disclosed that he meant to strike – meaning to arrest a bunch of ringleaders.73 That being the case, it was necessary for the Seize to act immediately, whatever the apparent risk. So, once again, they appealed to Guise. If he were to fail them now – in their moment of danger – they would attribute it to bad faith. Guise responded by secretly sending more captains who were to be lodged in various quarters; he himself would follow them. Madame de Montpensier did not, however, wait for her brother. On 5 May she organised a fifth attempt to seize the king. She arranged a dinner for five or six ‘cuirasses’ (armoured men) outside Paris. They were to ambush the king, who was apparently expected to return from Vincennes unescorted. His carriage would then be turned about and sent to Soissons – presumably to be ambushed by Leaguer forces. This done, the intrepid lady would raise the alarm in Paris and the affiliated cities, giving out that the huguenots had seized the king and taken him away to cut his throat. In the prevailing atmosphere, this absurdity was evidently sufficient cause for the people to fall upon the royalists and ‘politiques’. That the Parisians readily swallowed such theatrical nonsense, can only testify to their complete ignorance of public affairs, and to the ease with which they could be fomented. Fortunately Leclerc informed Poulain of this crude conspiracy; consequently Henry returned to Paris on the night of 5 May sufficiently well protected. Perceiving this, madame de Montpensier’s henchmen vanished into the darkness. Arrangements in Paris were now far advanced and many seigneurs had filtered stealthily into the city to take part. Maineville, servant to Guise, arrived on 7 May 1588 but was obliged to leave again without delay. This was on account of threats by the king against certain bourgeois Leaguers who were in charge of relations with the affiliated catholic towns. What exactly they envisaged at this stage is obscure; the inference is that they were liaison men between the Seize and the League. Without even seeing Mendoza, but evidently upon his advice, Maineville hurried back to tell Guise that he must go to 71

B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 55-6, 6 May 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. Bellièvre returned to Paris for the last time on 9 May, only a few hours ahead of Guise. 72 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 333-5, 7 May 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. The huguenots, of course, had done nothing because they were not there. 73 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, Poulain, Procès verbal, 318-19.


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Paris at once. Endangered by the king, the catholics could delay no longer; they must take up arms and declare themselves.74 Again, the inference might be that the liaison work was not yet complete. As before, Bellièvre returned from Guise ‘evil contented’. ‘Either,’ Stafford declared, ‘the king must give them that which was not fit for a king to grant, namely all that they asked, or else to show himself a king and make them to know him so’.75 At ever increasing risk, Poulain warned the king that Guise was definitely coming. Indeed, for several days there were rumours of his expected arrival. Henry tried to sustain the pretence that it was he who was in command; nevertheless, he was doubtful enough to increase the guards. Many people were stealing into the city, which was always a danger signal. An atmosphere of nervous irritation prevailed, and an increasing sense of impending doom.76

IV: The Barricades, 12-13 May 1588 It is well known how the duc de Guise, after leaving Soissons and riding all night, arrived in Paris about midday on 9 May 1588, with only a small following. Concealing his face, he passed the Swiss and French forces at Saint-Denis. Some say that they had orders to kill him if he ventured that way, contrary to the king’s commands. Is one to believe that he really passed unrecognised? Either way, the duc de Guise had serious problems. He was well aware that he gambled his life upon the king’s feckless desire to evade trouble; possibly also upon his own, covert support at court. But what alternative did he have? There was, precisely then, a rumour that the king proposed to hang a number of the Seize, including La Chapelle-Marteau.77 One must therefore suppose that Guise intended to save his associates, and the city, from Henry’s assembled forces. Guise was known to be deeply in debt. Hampered by lack of cash, he was unable to sustain a standing force and therefore incapable of instant action – circumstances forced him into pragmatism.78 Obviously he would try to salvage some advantage from the wreckage of what had, in any case, been an emergency plan, scheduled for 24 April. Épernon was then the duke’s first target. The failure to eliminate Épernon, of great consequence to Guise, is probably a clue to the understanding of his enigmatic conduct. Those who still suppose him to have come to Paris rearing to execute the rebellion concerted with Mendoza and the Seize, must surely be perplexed to find that he did nothing. The precarious ascendancy of his position four days later was, in the event, entirely conferred by the king. Accounts inevitably vary as to precisely what occurred in Paris between 9-13 May 1588, albeit not 74

De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 333-5, 7 May 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 604-6, 29 April/9 May 1588, Stafford to queen Elizabeth. 76 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 336, 8 May 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. Mendoza asserts that Henry had sent for the keys of Paris and taken measures to protect the Bastille as well as increasing the guards. If the king really possessed the keys – how many keys? – why did so many people, who were mostly League troops, enter Paris? 77 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, 3659; Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League’, 147. 78 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 63-6, 11 May 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. Mocenigo’s dispatches are an important source for these events. 75

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greatly in essentials. Nor are all the variations necessarily mutually exclusive. Historians, like contemporaries, must endeavour to extract what sense they can. There is not, and will not be, a definitive version; ifs, buts and loose ends have to be acknowledged.79 It is agreed that, upon arrival, Guise went straight to Catherine’s residence, the Filles-Repenties, and formally justified his presence as best he might, though some say that Catherine welcomed him.80 Stafford, on his way to the Louvre for a routine meeting about marine causes – suddenly insignificant – provided a graphic description of ‘the guards in [ar]ray, posting about to send for the Swissers’, and of the instant bustle, confusion and apprehension which arose, ‘all the world in a murmur’, as his meeting was cancelled. He discovered the reason, when he encountered Bellièvre, still booted, ‘coming in to the King from the Queen Mother’. Stafford expressed surprise that he was ‘so soon come home’ [from his last mission to Guise]. ‘He shook the head very soberly’ and replied that ‘he that he went to was come unlooked for, and so went by in haste to the King’.81 Bellièvre – who, like Guise, was in a parlous position – returned to the queen mother. Being ‘unable to go’, she was carried to the Louvre, with Guise walking beside her.82 Whether Guise ran the gauntlet of the Swiss guard, whose deployment was ostentatious, or whether he entered by a side door and back stair, he was doubtless protected by the presence of Catherine de Medici, and that of queen Louise in whose room they forgathered.83 The most likely account of this meeting is that the king was glacial and Guise pale and nervous. To the king he predictably dilated upon his reputation, which he vigorously defended against no specific accusation. De Thou says that he made a long speech of self-justification, even inviting an independent enquiry – which would, of course, have taken a long time.84 The significance, however, lies not in 79

Paul Robiquet’s three volume doctoral thesis, published as Histoire municipale de Paris, (1886), ii, contains a detailed account of the events of May 1588, drawing upon his exceptional knowledge of Parisian affairs. He offers a thoughtful comparative analysis and assessment of the often conflicting sources, which has yet to be improved upon. 80 It appears that the king may not have fully trusted Bellièvre, who returned from Soissons on 5 May. Henry sent him straight back, closely followed by La Guiche, presumably to ensure that Guise really was forbidden to come to Paris. Whether La Guiche was able to deliver his message does not emerge; nor is it likely that he was reliable in this respect. It is thought that Catherine may have encouraged Bellièvre to fudge the king’s message, desiring that Guise should come, in order to avert the likely effect of the king’s extreme anger, and so that everything could be smoothed over (‘... toutes choses rhabillent et que le roy oublie le passé’). She could not, however, control what happened – if or when he came. If this allegation is true – and one cannot be sure – one should probably seek an explanation in her shared aversion from Épernon as well as her habitual desire for peace. Some say that, in his first meeting with the king, Guise denied that Bellièvre had formally forbidden him to go to Paris. Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris ii, 311 and n.2-316. 81 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 606-7, [29 April/9 May] 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. Stafford said that 400 ‘Swissers’ had been sent for to guard the Louvre. 82 Some accounts say that Guise sent to Morosini to seek an audience for him, but that the nuncio was rejected by the king. De L’Épinois, ‘La Politique de Sixte-quint’, Revue des questions historiques, xv (1874), 427-9. 83 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 606-7, [29 April/9 May] 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. Stafford immediately had Bellièvre trailed. Poulain, who was waiting for him to leave, said that Guise was at the Louvre from 1-5 p.m. Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 314-16 and notes. 84 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 186.


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the strained conversation, but in the fact that Guise, alone and unarmed, remained free to walk away. This ultimate failure of Henry III to arrest the arch rebel completely floored the incredulous pope. He spluttered his indignation to more than one ambassador, that Henry had lacked the guts to execute an exemplary defenestration, or to lock the duke into a room apart with sufficient thugs to ensure his dispatch.85 According to the chancellor, Cheverny, the king did, in fact, contemplate summary execution (complete with the duke’s head upon the gate of the Louvre), as a grisly example to his confederates in Paris. L’Estoile also alleged that Henry, upon hearing of the arrival of Guise, turned to Alphonse Ornano in a towering rage and enquired how he would act in Henry’s place. Ornano offered to bring him the duke’s head, or to place it wheresoever Henry pleased; but he recoiled. Villequier, ‘gouverneur’ of Paris, and La Guiche, ‘chevalier du guet’ (the watch) – ‘traitors’ with a foot in each camp – frightened Henry by conjuring the likely reaction in Paris. They insisted that Guise must be going to make some proposition – a feeble argument after all Bellièvre’s missions to Soissons. Robiquet, quoting the king’s doctor, Miron, asserted that Henry considered having Guise felled next day by members of his guard of forty-five, and dumping the body out of the window.86 The fact that Henry actually contemplated violence at this time is important; the idea lingered like a poison in his mind, affecting his future attitude to Guise.87 One might, however, question the pope’s facile assurance of the wisdom and efficacy of dispatching Guise, in Paris, when the turbulent city was bulging with his supporters. On the other hand, not even to have arrested him (leaving murder aside) has been seen as the king’s fatal error. Such a choice of dangerous expedients should never have arisen in the first place. Free and unmolested, Guise must surely have deduced that he could now risk some emergency exploit, if he saw a chance. As soon as he had gone, Poulain hastened to warn the king that the Seize would certainly move, now that Guise was there. Partly for his own safety, he begged Henry first to ‘arrest’ him, and thereafter to send for four or five leaders he would name. But even then, Henry shrank from action. He doubled the guards at the Louvre, and issued orders to augment the city militia and to prohibit the carrying of arms at night. But in fact the king could no longer control the city in these traditional ways.88 What, over the next two days, was really happening? The Venetian, Mocenigo, believed that Guise intended to master the king and dictate his own will (‘il fino loro è di volersi impatronire di Re perche governi a modo suo’). Cavriana said exactly the same

85 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 29-30, 243-4, 30 May 1588, Olivares to Philip II, 31, 244-9, 4 June 1588, Giovanni Gritti to the doge and senate, from Rome. The arrival of Guise was not, of course, prepared for. Nevertheless, there were numerous occasions upon which he could have been seized. 86 Roelker, The Paris of Henry of Navarre, 145-6; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 314, 319. 87 That Henry did contemplate violence against Guise is not otherwise verifiable. But Cheverny was close to the king; and it makes sense. Cheverny, Mémoires (Edn. Petitot, xxxvi), 104; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 314-16 and notes. 88 Poulain does not appear to have known exactly what the Seize would now do. Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, Poulain, Procès verbal, 320-1. The narrative becomes confused at this point, shortly before Poulain was obliged to flee. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 185-7; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 320-3 and notes.

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thing (‘la somma è che costoro vogliono mutare governo e tenere in loro balia il Re’).89 But these were general observations, Cavriana’s made before the arrival of Guise. It appears likely that Henry was seeking some way of getting Guise out of Paris; or perhaps he still hoped Guise would come up with some proposal.90 It is difficult to establish whether any serious negotiations occurred, before or during the tumult in Paris, or whether Guise named a price. Henry later claimed to have negotiated about Picardy for several days, precisely – although Guise did not know it – as the Armada was at last under sail.91 But Guise could not possibly have accorded with the king, thereby openly abandoning the whole rebellion in return for his own skin. Vehemently, if incoherently, the Parisians wanted the king away – with power and profit somehow accruing to themselves. Both the king and Guise were evidently playing a waiting game. Doubtless Henry was right not to molest Guise, the popular hero, without having greater forces much nearer. Henry repeatedly sent for Épernon, then subsequently requested him only to send troops. But, as the city filled up with his supporters, Guise was rapidly becoming the stronger in Paris.92 Mocenigo reported Guise to have had meetings with the king on both 10 and 11 May, together with Catherine and various others including, on 11 May, Épinac, archbishop of Lyon. He was now a close Guise confederate and adviser. It is also possible that the nuncio, Morosini, accompanied Guise on at least one occasion, in which case, he would certainly have sought some peaceful outcome.93 With tension tangibly increasing, Henry determined upon an investigation in order to expel all strangers.94 In the evening of 11 May, he sent for some of the leading magistrates, known to be royalist, whom he had appointed as captains of the bourgeoisie. Several of their largest companies were ordered to keep guard all night, under the command of Augustin de Thou (uncle of the historian, Jacques-Auguste de Thou), in the cemetery of the Innocents. This was partly for security but also to facilitate the entry, through the porte Saint-Honoré, of the king’s Swiss and French forces which had been waiting at Saint-Denis. Some of these bourgeois companies were, however, suborned by the Seize; and this illustrates the king’s difficulty in imposing his will in Paris.95 The Swiss and French troops entered Paris in the small hours of 12 May, admitted by d’O, and were dispersed in order to occupy bridges and key points in the city. According to Henry III himself, he did this partly because there were rumours of some impending commotion, 89 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 66-7, 12 May 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs.,Tosc., iv, 776-8, 8 May 1588, Cavriana to Serguidi. 90 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 140. 91 B.N., Mss. fr. 3976, f. 84, 17 May 1588, Henry III to Nevers, from Chartres; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, 443-8, ‘lettre du roi sur l’esmotion advenue à Paris’. 92 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 63-6, 11 May 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League’, 148-9, says that most of the Guise men had arrived by 11 May, including Épinac, archbishop of Lyon, who arrived on 10 May. Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 282. 93 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 139-40. Robiquet says that on both 10 and 11 May the king and Guise exchanged recriminations, which does not sound much like serious discussion, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 320. 94 B.N., Mss. fr. 3976, f. 84, 17 May 1588, Henry III to Nevers. 95 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris , ii, 323-5; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 187.


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but also to ensure the smooth execution of the census.96 Notionally the census, backed by the presence of troops, could have exposed the Guisard forces and supporters, cleared the city of strangers and left the king in control. This perfectly normal procedure has always been condemned as an act of folly because it proved to be disastrous. Yet it differed only in degree from a similar measure which had successfully foiled the rebellion in 1587. Just a year later, however, it provided the Seize and other seditious elements with a welcome pretext for seizing their arms. However appropriate Henry’s precaution may appear – and it is difficult to see what else he could have done – such action was subject to misinterpretation. But were the king’s intentions really benign? Guise is said to have learnt of a decision, made in a ‘secret’ council on 11 May, to move against his partisans.97 Villeroy tells us – and there is no better source – that the king received conflicting advice, between the use of clemency or severity; he now inclined to the latter, having been too indulgent in the past. Swayed by those who claimed it would be easy, Henry decided upon the use of force. Villeroy believed force to be dangerous because a rising had been thoroughly prepared. However, on the morning of 12 May, just when his forces entered Paris, Henry lost his nerve. He informed Villeroy that he had slept on the matter, and was now afraid of the possible outcome. Writing some years later, Villeroy added a vitally important observation: at the time, he did not know that the king had meant to attack the duc de Guise (‘attenter contre la personne de M. de Guise’), and to arrest and punish some of the Seize.98 Obviously such arrests had become impossible without the presence of his forces. Although the king had changed his mind, it was promptly noised abroad – according to the secretary Pinart – that he meant to seize, or to kill, the duc de Guise; also that he would establish a foreign garrison in Paris.99 In fact the troops did nothing, because Villequier saw to it that they received orders to remain on the defensive. Did he, one may wonder, also cancel the census which was dropped? Subsequently the king maintained that he had only introduced the troops to facilitate the census, and that he warned Guise in order to avert alarm. But the people refused to tolerate these measures; the appearance of the troops all over the city caused great consternation, and that is what the rebel leaders were able to exploit.100 The historian, De Thou, who was there, tells us how the tumult began. We may, however, be sure that the Seize intended trouble in one way or another; it has been seen that a predetermined elite was hell-bent upon loot. The place Maubert, in an area 96

B.N., Mss. fr. 3976, f. 74, 12 May 1588, Paris, Pinart to Nevers, f. 76, 13 May 1588, Henry III to Nevers; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, 443-8, [May 1588], Henry III to the ‘gouverneurs’ of the chief cities. Henry ordered a very exact search of houses, with lists of people, arms and horses, to begin early on 12 May. He could not trust the militia, as we have seen, which might have impeded the operation. Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League’, 149-50. 97 Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 286. 98 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (Edn. Petitot, xliv), 53-4. In March or April 1588, Henry had written to Villeroy: ‘la passion à la fin blessée se tourne en fureur’, clearly suggestive of violence. B.N., nouvelles acquisitions françaises, 1246, no. 35, f. 27. 99 B.N., Mss. fr., 3976, f. 74, 12 May 1588, Pinart to Nevers. 100 B.N., Mss. fr., 3976, f. 84, 17 May 1588, Henry III to Nevers.

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described as ‘le fort des factieux’, remained unoccupied by the royal forces because those detached to guard the square were ordered not to resist opposition. That, said de Thou, was a capital error. It enabled Crucé, a Seize leader, to arouse the university quarter as soon as he heard of the arrival of the Swiss. He had it barricaded by nine o’clock, some three hours ahead of the rest of Paris. At eight o’clock Brisson and Séguier, ‘présidents’ of the ‘parlement’, went to the Louvre to warn the king that shops were closing [or were they failing to open?] and the situation was becoming critical. So far, however, it was not desperate. The king could either have concentrated forces around the Louvre, securing a retreat, or have sent them to destroy the first barricades (surely a sign of more to come) and mopped up those who were manning them; he did neither. This must have been about the time that Henry suffered his loss of nerve. Maybe he sensed that he could not win because, as Villeroy had said, the revolt was well prepared; maybe he perceived that he had been betrayed. What was there left for him to do? From the place Maubert the rebels spread out, encouraging everyone to meet force – actually the passive soldiers – with force. Crucé, and doubtless other confederates, sent men careering through the streets, calling people to arms and bellowing incendiary, albeit imaginary, fears of a huguenot danger; hatred and fanaticism will latch on to any rubbish noisily proclaimed.101 De Thou, walking about before midday, tells us that Guise at first remained indoors, with only friends and a few armed men. At [about] midday Guise and Épinac ventured into the next street, and walked about giving orders to those who were sent to him. Forthwith the chains were hung and the notorious barricades, composed of barrels and waggons, were erected all over the city, which hardly sounds like a coincidence. Henry claimed that the barricades began to appear just after midday, and everywhere at the same time. This, he said, was done upon the instigation of certain gentlemen or captains, sent by Guise, who very quickly penetrated each of the quartiers. It will be remembered that they had already been planted there about a month before. Guise recalled that some gentlemen among his friends came to find him, and that God miraculously excited the people to seize arms. He also referred, cryptically, to ‘quelque ordre que je mis soudain parmy eux, d’eux mesmes accommoder et barricader de tous costez’. Without consent or the password, circulation was paralysed; the royal troops were gradually hemmed in, with gunmen lurking in the windows above them.102 Various requests to withdraw the troops were conveyed to the king. He issued orders requiring the captains and gentlemen of the quartiers to ensure that the bourgeois remained at home. But Henry could not control the situation that way. Biron is said to have told the king (it is not clear when) that the 30,000 men of the militia, who were supposed to support him, in fact provided the backbone of the revolt. Since 1585, various efforts had been made to secure the appointments of suitable and loyal captains and other officials of the quartiers. Nevertheless, the trouble which occurred in Paris on 12 May 1588 was rendered possible by Henry’s loss of control over the bourgeois militia. 101

Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League’, 151-2. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 186-90; B.N., Mss. fr. 3976, f. 84, 17 May 1587, Henry III to Nevers; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, 443-8, ‘lettre du roi’, 452-56, [May 1588], extracts from letters of Guise.

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Probably he was unaware of the full extent of this defection. Then, when it was too late, their loyalty was put to the test and found wanting. There was nothing that Henry could have done about it, except to use the force he had paraded. Thus, although he had been aware of the importance of the militia, the expanding League had exploited endless opportunities for subversion. The king had no effective means of preventing this because the manner in which power was exercised was not fully institutionalised. Henry’s financial exactions and prodigality, the advancement of unacceptable favourites, inattention to affairs of state, and religious histrionics had ended by destroying his credit. He had become an object of hatred and ridicule, with no further hope of retaining sufficient loyalty among the municipality and the city guard. By the same token, municipal officials were deeply divided against each other. This facilitated subversion and opened the way to exploitation and anarchy. The effects of these things were apparent on 12 May. The census was halted, while the presence of troops did not enable the king to remain in control of Paris.103 In fact the troops were trapped and immobilised where they stood, with all avenues of retreat sealed off. Upon arrival, they could have mastered the city; now they were objects of contempt. The rebels and the troops began to jostle each other at close quarters and in stifling heat. Mutual threats and provocations aroused fears of a bloodbath. About three o’clock, a ‘conseiller’ of the ‘parlement’, and Saint-Yon, an ‘échevin’ of ambivalent loyalties, therefore went to the Louvre and begged the king to order his forces to leave the city. Seeing that nothing was to be gained, about four o’clock Henry sent d’Aumont and d’O to withdraw the troops – albeit in battle order; that was provocative demeanour which caused some violence. Swallowing his pride, Henry also dispatched Biron to the hôtel de Guise. Biron begged the duke to go out and help to extricate the Swiss and French troops who were now unable to move.104 The king’s predicament afforded Guise a godsent opportunity. Uncontrolled licence and bloodshed, while he was present in Paris, would neither enhance his reputation nor further his purpose. But, by consenting to rescue the royal forces, at the same time as claiming to save the city, he was able to project an image of his innocence and virtue, while actually delivering a fatal blow to the king’s authority.105 There are, of course, conflicting accounts as to who did what in the rapidly worsening circumstances, and the truth is uncertain. De Thou records that Catherine and Bellièvre came and went through the dangerous and congested streets continuing to seek an agreement, whether on 12 or 13 May. They are said to have made offers to Guise with 103

Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 323-35; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 187-9; Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League’, 150-1. 104 Accounts vary as to the movements of Guise: de Thou, as has been seen, said that he walked about at midday giving orders to those who came to him. L’Estoile said that he went out at four o’clock, and SaintYon that he went out at five o’clock. Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 335-41; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 189-91; Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League’, 155-6. 105 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 190-1. De Thou, who was hostile to Guise, depicts him as a man of considerable vanity, parading his generosity and credit. He was, however, still in danger himself. Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 340-3, tells how the troops were extricated.

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promises of immunity for his followers if he would depart. Guise is plausibly reported to have demanded guarantees. It is possible that, in return for big enough offers, he might have consented to leave; that would certainly have had some advantages.106 Morosini later recalled that Guise turned to him for help at the time of the barricades. Pinart had expected, before the tumult occurred, that Guise would meet the king on 13 May to work on matters of dispute between them. Thus, if it is true that Henry had intended to seize the duke on 12 May Pinart, like Villeroy, was unaware of it. In that case, Catherine de Medici may also not have known.107 Events, however, overtook diplomacy. The revolt, as it finally occurred, had been engineered out of the resistance to the introduction of the Swiss and French forces; technically, their presence in the city was illegal. Thereafter, the barricades remained in place; constructions in the quartiers close to the Louvre resembled preparations for a siege; and all the gates were closed except that of Saint-Honoré which, perhaps, the League was intending to use. The king himself disposed only of the porte Neuve on the Seine (‘qui faisait communiquer le Louvre avec les Tuileries’). The captains of the bourgeoisie, and others sent by Guise, moved about that night among the guards. They are said to have stolen from house to house, praising Guise and reviling the king – possibly combining secret arrangements which have never come to light. The comte de Brissac was especially active.108 Fears were fanned by reports of other troops approaching the city from Picardy. Exactly what did happen is far from clear; possibly no one individual ever knew. That night the Swiss and French troops, withdrawn from the streets of Paris, remained in the neighbourhood of the Louvre. Henry hoped their presence would contain the disorders until they departed next day. But this regrouping around the Louvre was perceived as menacing; Guise was annoyed, and is said to have taken every possible precaution (‘maggior provisioni’).109 Friday the 13 May was a day of utter confusion; all plans had been disrupted and fever was high. Henry tried to occupy four of the city gates (Saint-Jacques, SaintMarceau, Buci, and Saint-Antoine), it is not clear for what purpose, and the bourgeois prevented him. Brissac is said to have assembled and armed up to 10,000 students and monks (sic) in the university quarter, for whom the Louvre was the only possible target. They supposed themselves to be defending religion and the liberty of the city.110 106

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 189. Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 143-4, maintains that Catherine and Guise were discussing fundamental demands on the afternoon of 12 May, which hardly seems likely. 107 B.N., Mss. fr., 3976, f. 74, 12 May 1588, Pinart to Nevers; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 868-72, – January 1589, Morosini’s apology; De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 145. 108 Charles de Cossé, comte de Brissac, marshal 1594. Exactly which gates were held by whom, and at which moment, is not at all clear. Saint-Honoré was not open the next day. Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 344, 346. It was to be Brissac who, as the Leaguer governor of Paris, was instrumental in admitting Henry IV in 1594. 109 B.N., Mss. fr., 3976, f. 74, Pinart to Nevers; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 324-8, 17 May 1588, Henry III to Boisseguin; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, Histoire de la journée des barricades, 389; B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 69-70, 15, but clearly an error for 13 May 1588. 110 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 24, the king later mentioned this activity of Brissac to the nuncio, at Vernon, in June 1588. Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 346-7. An interesting detail is that arms, for such an occasion, had been stored in the lofts of the butcheries of the Marché-Neuf.


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Basically, the king wanted the barricades demolished and arms laid down, while the loyal members of the municipality and the ‘parlement’ wanted his forces dismissed. Discussions on these matters began early in the morning, between the king, Catherine, and various officials. At ten o’clock the king sent word to all the quartiers requiring them to calm down because he had halted the forces approaching from Picardy. They were seven or eight leagues away and meanwhile the Swiss and French would leave.111 Henry did, however, retain those Swiss who had already, previously, been summoned to guard the Louvre. The king could do no right: rumour immediately had it that his forces would all return, together with those from Picardy, and enter the city via the porte Neuve, between the Louvre and the Tuileries. There were, of course, those who wanted no solutions, and the king’s path was barred when he tried to visit the Sainte-Chapelle. In other words, he was a virtual prisoner; soon he received warnings of an imminent attack.112 Mocenigo declared that, had the king delayed any longer, it would have been too late for him to leave. Orders had already been issued (by whom?) to pre-empt the king’s departure. Cavriana gave him less than another hour (but we do not know from what time) before he would have been at the mercy of 55,000 people. Wherever that figure was plucked, Cavriana must surely have been alluding to the mob. Henry himself claimed to have believed that nothing could avert a major riot outside the Louvre, and that was why he left. But this was his retrospective version, doubtless suitably incomplete.113 Robiquet provided a more specific and more interesting account of the king’s departure. He said that a servant of Guise (‘un familier et domestique du duc de Guise et un gentilhomme bien qualifié’) went to inform the king that Guise and his followers were resolved upon a coup that night [13 May]. They would leave Paris by the porte Neuve or other gates, with 12,000-15,000 men and completely invest the Louvre.114 Precisely what was to follow, is not stated. This serious message, which came from the hôtel de Guise, was evidently corroborated by a royal emissary. In disguise, and together with a [loyal] captain of the city [guard], he had penetrated the ‘hôtel de ville’. It was on account of these messages that the council advised the king to leave. Catherine, who not unnaturally opposed the king’s departure, said that Guise had behaved reasonably the day before. She would therefore urge him to continue the work of pacification and ask him to come to the Louvre. But that was over-optimistic. Whereas the extrication of the king’s troops had been ostentatious and commendable, the demolition of the barricades was quite another 111

B.N., Mss. fr. 3976, f. 84, 17 May 1588, Henry III to Nevers; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 348, says that most of the Swiss had left by eleven o’clock; but they cannot have gone very far away. 112 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 195, says that the League would send 8,000 men out of Paris to surround the Louvre and keep the king inside – presumably as a hostage. Another report said that Guise and the League would invest the Louvre with 15,000 men and seize the occupants. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 318; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, Amplification des particularités qui se passèrent à Paris, mai 1588, 358; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 349. 113 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 71-3, 20 May 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 779-83, 13 May 1588, Cavriana to Serguidi; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, 443-8, ‘lettre du roi sur l’esmotion advenue à Paris’. 114 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 349-50.

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matter. Likening the people to ‘maddened bulls’, Guise denied – which was probably true – that he could control them. It would certainly be very dangerous to try, and equally dangerous to go to the Louvre; so he declined. In the meantime, other versions of the same warning had reached the king.115 He therefore quit the Louvre at four o’clock on 13 May 1588 and walked over to the Tuileries. There he was found, an hour later, by the secretary Pinart. He had been sent by Catherine to report what Guise had said – in other words the failure of her mission. Henry went to the stables and rode away, accompanied by some twelve councillors and noblemen who had had no time to dress or otherwise prepare themselves. Pinart returned to Catherine who was abandoned in Paris and expected to pacify the city. According to Villeroy, the flight was Henry’s own decision. Stafford observed that Catherine was ‘marvellously amazed’.116 Henry thought of going to Saint-Germain, but that was too close, or to Rouen, but Épernon was there. So Henry settled upon Chartres, of which the chancellor was ‘gouverneur’.117 This version of Robiquet does not essentially contradict other accounts but, being more complete, it makes better sense. Nevertheless, it still raises some interesting problems and queries, relating to the king and to Guise – problems which have an important bearing upon the events of the following six months.

V: The Fugitive King Why did the king flee from Paris in ignominious disarray when he could have made a dignified exit with an escort of some 4,000 Swiss and a contingent of French guards? This query evidently pertains to Henry’s helpless indecision: he left without preparations, or any idea of what he was going to do. Possibly he did not want to create the impression that, by approaching the Loire he intended to fight, with the overtones that he had moved towards the huguenots. On the other hand, this idea did arise, and his departure was followed by various troop movements and assemblies. Most likely he was too distraught to care. Robiquet threw some fascinating and authentic light upon the matter. He printed a letter from the colonel and captains of the Swiss, dated 14 May 1588 from Trappes. It was addressed to the duc de Guise who, they averred, had saved them in Paris two days before.118 They did not know what to do because the king, who owed them four payments, had left Paris saying only that they could withdraw. In fact they had tried to rejoin him, first at Saint-Cloud and then at Trappes; in both cases, they arrived too late. Deceived, betrayed and mutinous, they asked Guise for advice, and offered to return to 115

Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 350-2. Some accounts say that Catherine was consulted and some that she was not. Stafford at least explains why she should have been amazed. CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 609-10, 5/15 May 1588, Stafford to Walsingham; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (Edn. Petitot, xliv), 54; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 350-2. 117 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 354. Henry paused at Trappes to eat and slept at Rambouillet, reaching Chartres next day. 118 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 355 n.1. These troops were among the Swiss who had come to France in 1587. They had been expecting to fight the huguenots when they were summoned, instead, to Paris. We hear only that they did not enter Chartres, not what otherwise became of them. This letter establishes that Henry’s journey was via Trappes and Rambouillet, which is not the same in all accounts. 116


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Paris and enter his service. In the end, however, they proceeded to Chartres, partly hoping to be paid, and partly because the French guard and Picardy regiment – which cannot have been countermanded after all – threatened them if they defected. Ostensibly, the king’s flight took Guise entirely by surprise; or did he only feign surprise? That same day, 13 May – sometime before the king’s departure – Guise wrote urgently to d’Antragues, the ‘gouverneur’ of Orléans, demanding men, arms and horses, without baggage. He had, he asserted, defeated the Swiss, hacked down part of the king’s guard, and held the Louvre so closely invested that he would be accountable for what was within.119 This talk was defensive, arrogant and apparently mendacious. Did Guise really believe that the Louvre either was, or was about to be, sufficiently surrounded? Despite this request, on 14 or 15 May, d’Antragues cancelled the orders he had issued for League supporters to assemble at Beaugency, and sent them home. He explained that ‘notre grand’ [Guise] had been unable to execute his plan because the king had fled to Chartres. D’Antragues protested that he was so upset he scarcely knew what he was doing.120 Clearly, however, rebellion was no longer possible. What are we to make of these two letters which apparently indicate – as the king was informed – that Guise and his followers intended to storm the Louvre? This at any rate, was what Guise now wished the League to believe. Since he himself had not left Paris, could he, in fact, have avoided leading the long-deferred rebellion of the Seize? But if, as Mocenigo said, Henry was accompanied [or anyway followed] by some 5,000 troops, would it really have been possible for Guise, his supporters, or the mob to penetrate the Louvre and seize the occupants, or even to have sat out a siege? At the least, the duke’s darling reputation must have been drowned in blood. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that Guise could have surmounted such a deeply offensive incident. At best, he could only have achieved a degree of usurpation which was certain to trigger opposition. At the time of the barricades, Épernon was at Rouen, not far away. That he had gone there, with forces, at the beginning of May, was presumably not fortuitous. He had not been disgraced and he was suspected of being pro-protestant. To promote, or permit, an assault upon the king while the rich and powerful favourite was still at large, would surely have been foolhardy and unproductive. This proposition is borne out by the fact that, immediately after the barricades, Épernon’s disgrace and destitution remained the League’s priority demand. If, secondly, Guise did not mean to be personally implicated in an assault upon the king, Paris was an unpleasantly awkward place for him to be. On the day of the barricades, Guise kept a notably low profile. He only appeared in the city when requested to assist the king’s forces. By the next day, however, he was trapped in a position in which he could not easily distance himself from the ‘maddened bulls’, as he called the mob, since any determination to profit from their violence while avoiding

119

Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 312-13, 13 May 1588, Guise to the ‘gouverneur’ of Orléans. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 313, 14 or 15 May 1588, the ‘gouverneur’ of Orléans to the Leaguers of Orléans and Blois. 120

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implication in their deeds was not one to be openly avowed; the letter to d’Antragues shows that. In this desperate predicament, the only hope for Guise was to let the king go, if he could not quite precisely get him out. This could explain the visit to the Louvre of the gentleman from the hôtel de Guise – only we do not know whether he was a traitor to Guise or his envoy, or whether the king knew whence he came. Nor do we know why his warning should, specifically, have named the duc de Guise, unless because he represented the maximum peril from which the king must retreat. One might also wonder why the porte Neuve – between the Louvre and the Tuileries – was left open and undefended, when the king was not even permitted to visit the Sainte-Chapelle? This much is fact. It is also a fact that Henry was not molested on the way to Chartres. His fears on this account were evidently acute although, in his haste, he had carelessly left the Swiss forces behind. These considerations point to the conclusion that Guise had actually wanted the king to flee, and assisted him to do so; but, having saved the king, he would die for it himself.121 The most likely explanation for the conduct of the duc de Guise on 13 May 1588 may be found by recalling the conspiracy intended for 24 April, which was betrayed. It therefore failed to provide Guise with the initial impetus upon which his own plans for rebellion must have been constructed. When the king advanced his forces from Lagny to the suburbs of Paris, Guise was obliged to step into an emergency situation. The Parisians appear to have taken Guise for granted; obviously they desired the prestige and protection of noble leadership, and Mendoza may well have led them to expect it. But that was possibly not what Guise himself had in mind. It has already been seen that the priority objective for Guise was the destruction of Épernon, before proceeding to others – royalists and ‘politiques’ – and to the Louvre. But Guise did not cast himself for any part in these events, or the uprising which was to follow. His apparent reluctance to go to Paris, despite frequent references to his expected arrival, is worth pausing to consider. Guise needed the revolt in Paris in order, first of all, to destroy Épernon, and then to dispose of the king. But it appears that he did not mean to be personally tainted by laying rough hands upon the king. If, in the process, Henry were to perish, that would obviously be a bonus. But if, on the contrary, the rising were to fail, Guise would not have been certifiably involved. Since it is clear that Guise was not scheduled to conduct the Parisian revolt, it follows that his role must have lain elsewhere. We may therefore surmise that what he had intended was to lead and co-ordinate the more general rebellion – to which he was committed – together with the affiliated catholic cities.122 Once the king and his favourite had been overwhelmed in Paris, Guise could have stepped in, posing as a catholic saviour. If this scenario is anywhere near the truth, the pertinent question may well be one of timing: at what point, stage or time, had Guise meant to go to Paris – if at all? In the event, Paris was the worst and most incriminating place for him to be. Probably the plans and preparations were not complete by the time the emergency arose; 121

Robiquet came straight out with the opinion – which has been completely ignored – that Guise drew back ‘et laissa échapper la beste qu’il tenoit en ses filets’. Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 357. 122 Further research in some of the major catholic cities might possibly throw some light upon this aspect of the League rebellion.


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Mendoza, it will be remembered, was trying to delay the rebellion on account of the Armada, and Guise had problems over money. Then, with chaos in Paris, the king in Chartres, and Épernon in Rouen, rebellion was impossible. Where the movement was to have gone thereafter, it is impossible to imagine. Clearly Guise had very little control over the momentous events in which he was involved. One can only speculate upon some impenetrable anarchy, and marvel that such great risks were so carelessly undertaken. The certainty is that Guise had come under great pressure to go to Paris when the conspiracy miscarried; otherwise he risked being totally discredited in the eyes of his endangered supporters, and probably of crashing in their wake. Poulain had ensured that the enterprise of Paris was at least scotched; yet, because of the king, it had collapsed without being wholly averted. Henry, for once, had been the better prepared, but for action which he failed to take. Therefore Guise was not entirely outwitted; he remained entangled in Paris, where he surely had not intended to be; and therein consisted his precarious ascendancy over the king. Neither the king nor the duke was a victor although, but for the ‘traitors’, Henry could have been. Meanwhile the way ahead was dark; the persistence of deadlock between the king and Guise was very dangerous. Each of them had been humiliated and exposed as a failure; and neither of them relished that; each had gravely threatened the other yet, in the months which lay ahead, neither could escape the other. Henry III and the duc de Guise were imprisoned together in a hell of their own making. Henri duc de Guise, about whom we know so much and so little, has passed as an able man. But his soaring ambition and self-inflicted isolation had exposed him to exploitation and entangled him with men and forces beyond his control. Moving perilously towards that peak of usurpation from which he must tumble headlong down, Guise was now a very dangerous man. Certainly, he could never prevail in France – his precise goal, if he had one, remaining unconfessed – because he lacked both the rank and the means. Soon after the events of 12-13 May 1588 the nuncio, Morosini, subjected Guise to a devastating analysis of the necessary, but unattainable, circumstances in which he might seize and retain the crown.123 Nevertheless, his powers of destruction, if not of attainment, were still menacing. The king’s flight, and the loss of Paris soon proved both fatal to himself and of the direst consequence to Navarre.

123

Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 608.

CHAPTER VI: THE DENOUEMENT I: After the Barricades The failure of the tumult in Paris was a blow from which neither Guise himself nor the aristocratic Catholic League would ever recover. Thenceforth, the city of Paris became the centre, focus, and symbol of revolutionary, pro-Spanish, opposition, both to the execrated Henry III and to Navarre, his still protestant heir. As Henry IV, he failed to obtain general recognition, or to impose his royal authority, without first retaking the city in arms. Indeed the incident in Paris had left almost everyone concerned in a critical, and worsened situation; no one knew for certain what to do. Henry III had revealed, as queen Elizabeth instantly realised, that France was in acute danger of falling under the ascendancy of Spain. Now, in May 1588 – almost precisely as the Spanish Armada set sail from Lisbon – this hostile influence in France, and the astounding compliance of Henry III, was a source of considerable alarm to the queen. By extension, this alarm informed her attitude to Navarre for several years to come. The insidious Spanish penetration – sustained by Mendoza and Parma – was soon to be followed by open intervention in France. Spanish intervention proved to be the decisive factor in that resistance to Navarre – as Henry IV – which forced him onto the path to Rome. The collapse of French royal authority also opened the way to increased and sustained Papal interference in France, which similarly had a close and pernicious bearing on the problems of Henry IV. Immediately after the revolt in Paris, the confused situation was fluid and frightening. Stafford, reporting this ‘sudden horlyborlye of the King’s departure’, believed that he would go to Angers or Tours and marshal the forces which flocked towards him. Some even said that he had sent to Navarre, though Stafford did not believe it.1 Nevertheless, Guise had exceeded all limits, giving the king just cause to strike. Yet he still either failed, or refused, to accept that when religion was exploded as a political pretext, it need no longer be an obstacle to political action. No one could have blamed him in May 1588 had he responded to Navarre, first prince of the blood, and settled his affairs of state with a mixed catholic and protestant force.2 Many would have returned to the king’s allegiance; even the pope – so far as one can judge – would have accepted the exercise of legitimate authority. The duc de Guise was exposed and vulnerable, expecting imminent civil war. Guise could have been broken, executed, exiled, or dispatched to fight the Turks. But, instead, constantly misguided by the ‘traitors’, locked into his own defective character, and with all the obstinacy of weakness, Henry III acted out his own prophecy made to Stafford on 6 March. In the Englishman’s curious words, Henry ‘must

1

CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 609-10, 5/15 May 1588, Stafford to Walsingham; B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, f. 110-12, 3 June 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 2 The cardinal de Bourbon was declared first prince of the blood following the settlement of July 1588.

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needs keep the same course he doth... and... swallow many things against his stomach... and do that way that which he can do no other way’.3 Henry III did not, at first, care to see the situation as more complex than it had previously been. He quickly sent Schomberg to Catherine to ask her to remain and govern Paris, and to inform Guise that he meant to proceed with their scheduled campaign in Poitou. Indeed, the king seemed rather more anxious to extend reassurance than to express his anger or exert his authority.4 Nevertheless, the anger was there: to cardinal Joyeuse in Rome Henry announced his resolve to override any consideration in order to defend and preserve his authority and his state, no matter what happened.5 But, whistling in the wind, he was not actually prepared to fight the League. On the contrary, he asked Morosini to assure the pope that he would do his utmost to reunite the catholics – the theme he continually harped upon – and to appease the recent troubles.6 Henry’s first concern was to ensure that similar disorders should not spread. He dispatched a circular letter to various ‘gouverneurs’ in which he explained what had happened and pleaded for their loyalty. Henry also addressed the cities, urging them to reject the appeals of the League. More sensibly, towards the end of May, he sent out commissioners to the ‘doubtful’ provinces.7 If Henry did not send for Navarre after the barricades, he did inform him of what had happened in Paris. Navarre’s natural horror at these developments was tinged with momentary hope. Aware of the king’s just opportunity to retaliate, Navarre sent the sieur de Moulont to offer his services and to express his willingness to accept a tolerable peace. But Moulont was not even suffered to deliver his message.8 As Duplessis complained, they had constantly sought a settlement with the king, but the conditions had always been abjuration and the termination of protestant practices.9 Navarre observed that the events in Paris had been predictable and avoidable. Yet, even now, all was not inevitably lost if

3

CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 519-28, 25 February/6 March 1588, Stafford to queen Elizabeth. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 338, 16 May 1588, Mendoza to Philip II; B.N., Mss. cinq cents Colbert, 9, f. 159, c. 18 May 1588, Henry III to Catherine. 5 B.N., Mss. fr. 15574, f. 165, 16 May 1588, Henry III to cardinal Joyeuse, draft; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 31, 249-50, 17 June 1588, Lippomano to the doge and senate, said much the same, namely that Henry might be obliged to ‘prendre quelque résolution étrange...’ 6 De L’Épinois, ‘La Réconciliation de Henri III et du duc de Guise’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxix (1886), 53, 18 May 1588, probably the date of Morosini’s letter to Montalto. 7 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 377-9; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, 443-8, [ May] 1588, ‘lettre du roi sur l’emostion advenue à Paris’; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 324-8, 17 May 1588, Henry to Boisseguin. Jacques-Auguste de Thou went to Normandy and gives an account of his mission. Limousin, Champagne, Touraine and Picardy are also listed. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 223 seq. 8 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, f. 154, 4 July 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 150, in the memoir of Navarre for the estates general of Blois. Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 296, says – no doubt mistakenly – that the king conferred with an envoy from Navarre. 9 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 205-11, – May 1588, Duplessis to Buzanval. 4

Chapter VI: The Denouement

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only the king were well and loyally served – but he was not. Now it would be seen who were the genuine Frenchmen.10 About this time, late in May 1588, Navarre appealed to the comte de Soissons, a prince of the blood, both for his support and to influence and win over the king – secretly if necessary. It was true, as the king greatly feared, that the cities would then rebel; and that would certainly be serious. But, if the king were to ally with Navarre, he would receive help from England, Denmark and other princes. That they were protestant did not matter. Navarre himself was served by men of both persuasions; besides, Henry’s predecessors had allied with German protestant princes against the emperor Charles V (Charles I of Spain). Philip II was no less dangerous an opponent, thirsting for revenge for French intervention in the Netherlands.11 But Soissons did not consistently see his future in the service of his kinsman, Navarre. Navarre knew from experience that Henry was most likely to seek an accord with Guise, whether from his indolent propensity for taking the line of least resistance, or because he did not wish to divide the catholics against each other – a lost cause if ever there was one.12 As in the past, such an accord would entail war on the huguenots. Thus preparations for further war, which had been pending since the campaign of 1587, were necessary and urgent.13 For the duc de Guise, faced with a daunting choice of evils, his new situation was catastrophic; it cannot possibly have been what he had intended. Writing to the king on 16 or 17 May, he blustered: he protested that he had come to Paris in good faith to make himself agreeable. He blamed others for what had happened, since he himself had harboured no disobliging intentions. But his subsequent activity in Paris, as well as his correspondence, suggest otherwise.14 Now his position was ill-defined, insecure, and wholly dependent upon the Spanish agents. Either he would have to make open war, for which he lacked the means, or else he would have to negotiate a spurious accord and return to court. But after what had happened, Guise did not want to return to court; neither did he want to make another accord which the king would certainly evade. Both courses were fraught with difficulty, danger, and obscurity. One of the reasons why Guise was afraid of an imminent war – and with no religious pretext – was that Épernon had escaped from Paris and was hovering in Rouen. The favourite appears to have hoped that the king would now turn to Navarre, presumably as the most likely way of defeating their common enemy. But Épernon claimed that the king refused to listen to anything about the protestants, even though queen Elizabeth had 10

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 379-80, [June] 1588, Navarre to d’Aubeterre ‘gouverneur’ of Périgord. 11 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 200-5, – May 1588, ‘avis’ conveyed to Soissons. 12 Henry expressed this fear in his circular letter of – May 1588, addressed to the ‘gouverneurs’ of various cities. Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, 443-8, ‘lettre du roi sur l’esmotion advenue à Paris’. 13 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, l94-200, – May 1588, memoir for Ségur, 205-11, – May 1588, Duplessis to Buzanval. 14 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 368-9, 17 May 1588, Guise to Henry III; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xi, 449-52, extracts of letters from Guise; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 331-42, gives 16 May 1588.

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written to him more pressingly than ever before. As a result, the towns were going over to the League.15 Nevertheless, Épernon was in no immediate hurry to reveal his colours. He appears to have sought help for the king in Normandy, but was very ill-received. He sent forces to hold Boulogne – targeted by the League for Spain – and left others to defend Picardy.16 He then decided to depart, claiming that the king had sent for him. So it was that Épernon went to Chartres where he rejoined the king on 20 May 1588. That was exactly the situation that Guise had risked so much to alter. In these circumstances, the only possible course of action was for Guise to consolidate some hold over Paris, which would provide the most significant power base, and see what happened. It is traditionally said that, by his departure, Henry had left Guise in control of Paris, which is nonsense; the king himself had not been in control of Paris. In fact prompt and drastic action was necessary to establish a revolutionary government. Following the barricades, Guise sought to intimidate the ‘parlement’, with only partial success, and seized the Bastille, Arsenal, Temple and, on 18 May, Vincennes. At the same time, he arrested Hector de Perreuse, the loyalist ‘prévôt des marchands’ [mayor] and, on 18 May, by means of an irregular assembly, had both the ‘prévôt’ and all four ‘échevins’ replaced by members of the Seize.17 The Seize was then in a position to embark upon a purge of royal officials in the quartiers, and at the Châtelet. The process continued for some time until the League had destroyed all remaining royal support in the city. The newly constituted, revolutionary government then approached other cities, seeking to strengthen the urban confederation, because Paris could not sustain the resistance unaided. Other cities were invited to send representatives to Paris so that they might all remonstrate together. Paris envisaged satellite groups of cities, the smaller linked to the greater and all of them linked to Paris, which now claimed to lead the resistance. The problem for Guise was how to retain the overall control. To this end he constituted a 15

This remark is puzzling, made only five days after the tumult in Paris and when the king was at least two days’ ride away from Rouen. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 187-9, 18 May 1588, Épernon to Navarre. Elizabeth had made a previous offer in March, when she had hoped to persuade the king to make peace with Navarre and form an alliance against the League and Spain. Read, Walsingham, iii, 21315. Read’s observations about Guise are definitely wide of the mark. 16 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 187-9, 18 May 1588, Épernon to Navarre. Épernon claimed that Guise had been followed to Paris by 500 Spanish captains who had taken over his house. This is also mentioned in Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 312; CSPF., 1586-8, p. 611, 11/21 May 1588, queen Elizabeth to Henry III. Elizabeth sent sir Thomas Bodley to express her pain at this ‘inique accident’, and to upbraid the king for having ignored her admonitions, advice and offers. She urged Henry to come out into the open and stop fleeing from shadows! As Guise pursued his rebellious course, Elizabeth became ever more concerned and Bodley was followed by sir Thomas Leighton, with a robust lecture on Henry’s failures and misdemeanours. Ibid., 633-5, – May/June 1588, draft instructions for sir Thomas Leighton, 637, – May/June 1588, substance of Henry III’s answer to queen Elizabeth. 17 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 334-5 [16] May 1588, Guise to the cities; Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 337-9, 14 May 1588, Catherine to Henry III, 342-4, 20 May 1588, Catherine to Henry III; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 361-6. The new officials were Michel La Chapelle-Marteau, ‘prévôt’, and Nicolas Rolland, Jean de Campans, François Costeblanche and Robert Despres, ‘échevins’. De L’Épinois, ‘La Réconciliation de Henri III et du duc de Guise’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxix (1886), 56-7; B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 92-3, 1 June 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate.


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special council in which the municipal officers played only a consultative role.18 United in guilt, and their opposition to the king, the Seize and the Catholic League needed each other. But the association forged by the duc de Guise soon became a liability. The steady tension between the disparate movements became clearly apparent when leadership of the League fell to Mayenne in the following year. Besides securing Paris, Guise also took pains to gain control of the neighbouring towns, especially those situated on the river systems by which Paris was provisioned. He was preparing against a siege.19 Much concerned to raise money and men, Guise summoned forces from Picardy and raised levies in Paris. But, primarily, he turned to the Spanish agents. Moreo evidently appeared soon after the king’s departure; it is not clear where from.20 Presumably making a virtue of necessity, Guise bragged to Parma of his personal exploits in Paris. Alleging that the king was now resolved upon war, Guise begged for men and money urgently. He wanted Parma to send forces to Amiens, and claimed 300,000 écus, according to their agreement. The agreement, however, had been to subsidise war on the huguenots, not a war on the king, to which Guise had only vaguely referred. After Épernon’s return to court, on 20 May 1588, Guise was even more afraid that the king would turn on him. In fact monarch and rebel were both afraid of the future and of each other, certain of nothing.21 Mendoza, like everyone else, was also left in an awkward position, because the outcome of the Armada was still unknown. He was satisfied with the abortive explosion in Paris to the extent that France was crippled; England would not be receiving assistance against the Armada; indeed, the boot was rather on the other foot.22 Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted, in a much-quoted letter, that as ‘the abscess’ had not burst according to his expectations, the resulting situation was so serious that it would be difficult to redress.23 He evidently believed that Guise meant to swoop upon Chartres and force the 18

Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 367, 373-7, 395; the Leaguer members of the Guise council were Leclerc, Senault, Aimonnot, Louchard, Heuron and Crucé. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 339-41, 18 May 1588, Paris to the cities. 19 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 92-3, 1 June 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 346-8, 23 May 1588, Catherine to Henry III, 356-7, 27 May 1588, Catherine to Henry III, 361, 1 June 1588, Catherine to Villeroy, 362-4, 1 June 1588, Catherine to Henry III. The towns mentioned were Meaux, Château-Thierry, Meulan, Lagny, Corbeil, Estampes, Melun, SaintCloud, Mantes, Charenton and Montereau. 20 Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 287. 21 B.N., Simancas K 1568, 21 MI 155 (2), – May 1588, Guise to Parma; De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 339, 28 May 1588, Guise to Mendoza, 340-1, 29 or 30 May 1588, memoir of Guise for Parma. Guise is said to have seized 500,000 écus and to have arrested Zamet and Jérôme Gondi, two of the richest financiers in Paris. De L’Épinois, ‘La Réconciliation de Henri III et du duc de Guise’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxix (1886), 64, no date. 22 Mendoza had been disturbed by Anglo-French discussions which lasted throughout the first four months of 1588. Jensen, ‘Franco-Spanish Diplomacy and the Armada’ in Carter, Ed., Essays in Honour of Garrett Mattingly, 214-15. It remains doubtful whether Henry III would really have tried to help England and it is not clear in what way he might have done so. 23 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II , ii, 337, 15 May 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. This opinion was shared by Villeroy. B.N., Mss. fr. 3976, f. 80, 16 May 1588, Villeroy to Nevers.

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king to treat, or anyway get him out of the city – Chartres being a place of strategic importance. Mendoza claimed, however, to have discouraged any hostile initiative. He neither wanted Guise to embark upon a war that he would expect Spain to finance, nor did he favour too swift an agreement with the king. He shrewdly observed that, as the king could not triumph over the League cities – always a key factor – he would be obliged to treat with Guise; and that would place him in the hands of his enemy.24 Guise received 30,000 écus from Parma, brought by Juan Iñiguez the day before the barricades, for which he signed a receipt. It is also possible that Mendoza in some way renewed or strengthened the agreement with Guise. At the end of the year, when Mendoza was anxious about the security of his papers in Paris, he referred to the ratification of the League which he and Iñiguez... but the rest was never deciphered.25 Spanish and Papal policies, at this juncture, were not in step. The nuncio, Morosini, took a deeply serious view of what he called the ‘lacrimoso accidente’ in Paris. Morosini greatly feared the ruination of France because the Guises, in seeking to secure their safety, would seize authority from the king causing a situation which neither of them could handle.26 That was exactly right. Morosini wasted no time in calling on Catherine de Medici when, abandoned in Paris, she solicited his mediation. Catherine did her utmost to prevent Guise from seizing control of Paris, and repeatedly demanded the submission of the city. Henry wished to proceed at once with steps towards an accord and proposed to call an estates-general. Despite his previously disastrous experience, he perceived the estates as a means of obtaining reforms and erasing the widespread fear of a heretical succession. He was, he added, physically strong, and still hoped for children. Henry may also, as Guise objected, have seen the estates as a way of obtaining disarmament, because the deputies would not consent to pay for war; and Henry did not want to fight. So it was, as Mendoza surmised, the king and Catherine who pressed for negotiations to begin. While still opposing his efforts to gain control of Paris, Catherine therefore requested Guise to draft a memoir as a basis for the negotiation.27

24 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 342-4, 30 May 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. Mendoza claimed to have seen Guise twice – he was very careful and secretive about meetings. 25 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 381-4, 27 December 1588, Mendoza to Philip II; CSPSp., 1587-1603, p. 312, 14 June 1588, Iñiguez to Idiaquez, Paris. Iñiguez appears to have been Philip II’s agent, attached to Guise. He claimed, in this letter, to have brought about the present relations between the King of France and the League, which have usually been mainly attributed to Mendoza. Jensen, Dogmatism and Diplomacy, 172. 26 De L’Épinois, ‘La Réconciliation de Henri III et du duc de Guise’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxix (1886), 55. 27 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 339-40, 15 May 1588, Catherine to Henry III, 342-4, 20 May 1588, Catherine to Henry III; B.N., Mss. fr. 15574, f. 165, 17 May 1588, Henry III to Catherine (draft), 24 May 1588, Henry III to Catherine (draft); Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘Les Négociations de Catherine de Médicis après la journée des barricades’, Séances et travaux de l’Académie des sciences morales et politiques, lix (1903), 697-709, is the old standard account of this negotiation.


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II: The Demands of the duc de Guise Both Henry and Catherine were afraid that Guise might soon obtain forces from Parma, hence the urgency to negotiate.28 On 18 May 1588 Morosini hastened to bring heavy pressure to bear upon Guise and his close adviser Épinac, archbishop of Lyon, at the same time as seeking to penetrate their intentions. Morosini insisted that war against the huguenots was impossible without the king. Therefore Guise and Paris must submit and treat; then the duke could expect to receive honours and reward. The alternative was infamous, Morosini bluntly declared: Guise would become a tyrannical usurper. Any attempt to seize the royal authority would simply drive the king into alliance with Navarre and Montmorency.29 In reply, Guise was monosyllabic: being in the midst of the municipal changes in Paris he did not wish to commit himself. The officials who had to be displaced would not have collaborated in a joint petition to the king which Guise was preparing to deliver. Furthermore, Épernon had not yet gone to Chartres, and Guise did not know what he would do.30 Next day, 19 May 1588, Épinac handed Morosini a letter for the king which was evidently a partial draft of the proposed petition. The crux of it was that Catherine should be left with a [hostile] council in Paris, while Guise went to Guyenne. But that was conditional upon the disgrace and destitution of Épernon. Morosini was unreceptive; he pointed out that if the League wished to make war on the huguenots, they should not begin by driving Épernon into a protestant alliance. Morosini intended to call their bluff: he knew that Guise did not, in fact, wish to make war on the huguenots precisely because it would have to involve the king.31 Catherine became increasingly anxious about the activities of Guise in and around Paris, and pressed him to complete his memoir. But the memoir which she had requested was turning into the petition; and that, she made it clear to the king, was never submitted to her. She commented that Épinac demanded to know in advance what the king would do for their security. That was certainly, if not exclusively, a reference to the fate of Épernon. Catherine was being rudely marginalised; as Morosini observed, the Guises wanted her out of Paris because of her tiresome interventions.32 In other words, she was harder to manage than the king. The joint petition of the League and the Seize demonstrated that Guise had been successful in the reorganisation of Paris. It was presented to the king at Chartres on 24 May 1588, by Maineville, La Chapelle-Marteau and three ‘échevins’ who left Paris the day before. In a newsletter to Bassompierre, Guise declared the petition to be aimed directly at the ruination of Épernon who – though Guise did not yet know it – was by then 28

B.N., Mss. fr., 15574, 26 May 1588, Henry III to Catherine (draft). De L’Épinois, ‘La Réconciliation de Henri III et du duc de Guise’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxix (1886), 58-61. 30 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 376, 30 May 1588, Paris to various cities. The point about the petition was explicitly stated. 31 De L’Épinois, ‘La Réconciliation de Henri III et du duc de Guise’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxix (1886), 61-2. 32 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 342-4, 20 May 1588, Catherine to Henry III, 346-8, 23 May 1588, Catherine to Henry III, 348-9, 23 May 1588 (2), Catherine to Henry III. 29

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back at court.33 The petition alleged that Épernon and his brother, La Valette, were obstacles to the pursuit of the huguenot war, which was the sole objective of the League!34 Épernon was also blamed for recent events in Paris, despite his absence. So the brothers were both to be disgraced and relieved of their offices. The king was then required to go to Guyenne, while Mayenne made war in Dauphiné. There followed a whole list of requisite financial changes. The Parisians, for their part, denied having entertained any disobedient intentions, and declared the recent changes in government to have been necessary for the reassurance of the people. The king was therefore expected to approve them. He was also required to return to Paris, but without bringing any forces within twelve leagues of the city.35 Catherine quickly perceived that ‘ces princes’ as she called the Guises, had closely united with the Parisians from whom they were not now to be detached. Indeed, she declared them to be obstinate and immovable.36 While awaiting the king’s reply, Guise attended to raising forces and securing the towns in the Parisian area. Miron arrived on 28 May with, it appears, a draft response for Catherine and her councillors to approve.37 Henry’s swift reply to her, dated 29 May, was both bland and elliptical. He referred to his desire to unite all catholics. For that reason, he was willing to forget and forgive the recent events in Paris – for which Guise denied responsibility – and to preserve the liberties and privileges of the city. He pointed out the need for extraordinary sums of money to finance the war, which would preclude [financial] reforms. Nevertheless, Henry did agree to revoke various edicts and impositions. He proposed to defer the reform of abuses to the estates-general, which was to meet at Blois on 15 August [later deferred to October], and he undertook to observe their decisions. An estates-general was not a current League demand, so Henry evidently saw in this old expedient some hope of amelioration. He pointedly dodged the petition’s central demand for the removal of Épernon with an esoteric allusion to justice for everyone.38 Hatred of Épernon was Catherine’s principal point of agreement with the Guises. She sent back a courier to convey her opinion that the favourite would have to go. Presumably the joint petition and Catherine’s advice were instrumental in obtaining the partial downfall of Épernon. He was obliged to resign his new offices, the admiralty and the ‘gouvernement’ of Normandy, and he left Chartres after only two weeks. The king himself departed for Rouen – doubtless as a precautionary measure. Épernon went to Loches, armed with a commission of lieutenant-general of Anjou, Maine, Perche, Touraine, Angoumois, Aunis and Saintonge. This brought him to huguenot territory, 33

Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 313-4, 21 May 1588, Guise to Bassompierre, 380 n.1. The Guises were not, of course, alone in demanding the departure of Épernon. Montpensier, Longueville, d’Aumont and others also pressed for it. De L’Épinois, ‘La Réconciliation de Henri III et du duc de Guise’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxix (1886), 66; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 783-7, 23 May 1588 Cavriana to Serguidi. 34 Bernard de Nogaret, marquis de La Valette. 35 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 342-50, petition of Guise and the Catholic League, presented on 24 May 1588. 36 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 362-4, 1 June 1580, Catherine to Henry III. 37 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 14; Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 358, 28 May 1588, Catherine to Henry III. 38 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 350-3, 29 May 1588, Henry’s reply to the League petition.


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which must have aroused suspicions. At Loches, he was reportedly approached by Navarre and Montmorency.39 What, one wonders, did the king have in mind? Épernon’s departure was considerably less than the disgrace and destitution demanded by the League, but he was at least detached from the king and court. So, at the end of May 1588, Catherine was suffered to commence the peace negotiations. She began by lodging multiple complaints about the revolutionary changes in Paris – which it was now too late to avert. On 2 June Miron arrived with full powers for Catherine to negotiate, together with the king’s first offers.40 The king’s original offers show that he did not mean to make an issue of the revolt in Paris. Consequently he hoped that, after conceding some adjustments in favour of the League, Guise would join him in resuming the interrupted huguenot war. That, of course, was not what the king really wanted; it was a way of pretending that nothing had changed – and something respectable had to be put to Guise. Thus Henry offered an amnesty. Guise and the cardinal de Bourbon might both return to court as councillors. Guise might hold some degree of military authority, under the king, in addition to his existing office of ‘grand maître’. While Épernon could not be deprived of the office of colonel-general of the infantry, Guise might assume its functions.41 Guise, however, had more in mind than the exercise of another’s office, and he was scornful of the offers brought by Miron. If Épernon, in Loches, was less influential, he was still a force to be reckoned with; he might well have obstructed a huguenot war or devised a trap for the duc de Guise. Catherine, for her part, was aware that Mendoza was putting pressure on Guise, which rendered him increasingly exigent. She knew that she would never make progress until she openly broached the unmentionable point; otherwise, she wrote to Bellièvre, ‘nous sommes perdus’. Thus, if the king wished to be recognised, he would have to allow Guise the lieutenancy [of France], and cede half his kingdom. One must cede to survive, she wrote pragmatically; time would bring changes. Thus, if the removal of Épernon was fundamental, the formal status and powers of Guise were no less basic. This attitude probably reflected the headstrong and rapacious influence of Épinac, who drafted the catalogue of League complaints.42 Morosini pressed Guise to agree to take part in the Guyenne campaign. That would further the huguenot war and protect the king from the duke’s unwelcome presence. But, always ambivalent about harming Navarre, it is doubtful if Henry actually wanted Guise to go to Guyenne; calling an estates-general was one way of avoiding it. Nevertheless, Morosini still saw the Guyenne campaign as a useful device because Guise could not be suffered to remain where he was, lording it over 39

Mouton, Épernon, 206 seq. There is no text of Catherine’s ‘pouvoir’. Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 361, 1 June 1588, Catherine to Villeroy, 362-4, 1 June 1588, Catherine to Henry III, 365-7, 2 June 1588, Catherine to Henry III. 41 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 365-7, 2 June 1588, Catherine to Henry III. Catherine mentions these terms as having been discussed with her councillors, Guise and other League leaders. 42 It is not clear what Catherine meant by the lieutenancy. Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 368, 2 June 1588, Catherine to Bellièvre: ‘jamès je ne me vys en tel anuy, ny si peu de clarté pour en bien sortyr’. Ibid., 370 n. 40

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Paris. Morosini departed to see the king at Rouen, on 3 June 1588, presumably intending to discuss the war; but Henry III evaded the subject.43 Since no one, so far, had elicited any concrete response from Guise, Henry dispatched Villeroy to lay the foundations of peace.44 The difference was that Villeroy was now empowered to offer Guise the rank of lieutenant-general. But, as Catherine believed he might settle for less (presumably now that Épernon had gone), Villeroy proceeded with caution. First of all he tried to ascertain what Guise expected. It was therefore at this stage – probably on 9 or 10 June 1588 – that Guise produced an initial list of mainly familiar requirements. Thereafter, following each concession, he added further, and even major, demands.45 These articles affected a spurious loyalty and repeated the League desire, expressed in 1585, to commit the king to ‘religious’ war. As ever, it could be paid for by the sale of huguenot property – thereby eliminating the excuse that the estates would not provide the money. The king was to exclude from the succession any heretic or heretic supporter. The leaders’ anxiety for personal protection, as well as the acquisition of power, was revealed by a demand for hostage towns and various positions of command. They also specified the abandonment of all protestant alliances – which reflected the influence of the Spanish agents – and the publication of the decrees of Trent – which reflected the influence of Morosini.46 This was a bizarre situation in which both the king and Guise were trying to persuade the other to agree to a war which each intended to evade. Furthermore, having made the huguenots’ [legal] possession of hostage towns a pretext for war, the catholics were now demanding hostage towns for themselves. Villeroy had no sooner left Paris, on 12 June 1588, than Guise further demanded the ‘gouvernement’ of Normandy, vacated by Épernon, and the payment of the League’s debts. The possession of Normandy would have afforded the League extensive control over the north of France from the Netherlands frontier to the Atlantic. At the same time as raising his terms, Guise seized guns and ammunition from the Arsenal in Paris and placed them on the river, ready for use. Mocenigo blamed the interference of Mendoza for having disrupted the negotiation which, he thought, might otherwise have succeeded. The new demands, relating to Normandy and money, certainly smacked of Spanish influence.47 43

De L’Épinois, ‘La Réconciliation de Henri III et du duc de Guise’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxix (1886), 72-4. 44 Villeroy had originally sought to evade the dangerous and invidious task. Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 55; de L’Épinois, ‘La Réconciliation de Henri III et du duc de Guise’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxix (1886), 74. 45 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 55-9; Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 369-70, 9-11 June 1588, Catherine to Henry III. Catherine said that, on 11 June, they had discussed the articles submitted by the princes, and that Villeroy would return with them next day; which he did. 46 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 365-8. 47 CSPF., 1586-8, pp. 637-8, 2/12 June 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. Stafford observed that the Guises meant to hold on to Paris. Ibid., 640-1, 6/16 June 1588, Stafford to Walsingham; Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 370, 17 June 1588, Catherine to Villeroy. Catherine described the duke’s action as insupportable adding, ‘toutsfois vous cognoissez le duc de Guise qui ne croit que son oppinion’. B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 123-5, 17 June 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate.


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Villeroy joined the king in Rouen on 14 June 1588 to report on these matters. He also needed a decision upon what the official position of Guise was to be. The issue hinged upon the relative powers of a lieutenant-general and a constable; unfortunately, the appropriate commissions were not available in Rouen. Villeroy was therefore authorised to offer the military authority of a ‘grand maître’, with the details to be established later. That was an extraordinary obfuscation, not least because the office was already held by Guise. However, some assurance of worthy employment was all that Catherine was prepared to offer before Guise had even consented to making an accord; that small shred of dignity was salvaged.48 Villeroy returned to Paris within a few days bearing instructions based upon written answers to the League demands. These included considerable concessions, such as recognition of the cardinal de Bourbon as first prince – which meant, in effect, heir presumptive – and offices for other leaders. Thereupon Villeroy was greeted with a further barrage of additional demands, in particular for strategic towns – Orléans, Bourges, Montereau, Boulogne and Le Havre; also for the effective deprivation of Épernon. The king, however, wished this delicate and dangerous matter to be referred to the estates – though in fact it was not.49 The Parisians also produced a series of articles at this time, which the king was required to ratify. These items related to the recent changes in the city and to future procedures there. Their purpose was to tighten the control of the Seize over the machinery of government and the policing of the city. In conceding most of their demands, on 5 July 1588, Henry signed away the remnants of royal control in Paris. The king was now a permanent exile from his own capital. This was a desperate situation for a monarch, and one which Navarre unhappily inherited.50 Mocenigo commented that, in these conditions, Guise would more or less monopolise authority. Cavriana observed, a little later, that Guise had been obstinate and extortionate because some ‘grandissimo di corte’ had leaked the contents of Villeroy’s ‘pouvoir’. Guise therefore realised that he could safely press for special, personal powers. Villeroy himself was in despair because he knew that such a deplorable treaty would not solve anything.51 These were the circumstances in which Villeroy returned to Rouen, on 1 July 1588. He went to discuss the matter of the hostage towns, and Paris. This time he was armed with the necessary registers from which to compile a hybrid commission for Guise.52 Three times before he signed it, the king amended this commission; even then, he still wished to retract it. But although the commission was not conferred until Guise went to Chartres, it was, unofficially, the price of peace. Again, to that small extent, dignity and 48

Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 68-9. B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 132-4, 29 June 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 50 Gomberville, Mémoires du duc de Nevers, i, 733-41, 5 July 1588, twenty-two Parisian articles; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 404-7. 51 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 143-4, 3 July 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 790-4 [16 July] 1588, Cavriana to Serguidi; B.N., Mss. fr. 3976, f. 167, 22 June 1588, Villeroy to Nevers. Nevers was absent on account of a broken leg. 52 Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 375, 2 July 1588, Catherine to Bellièvre; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 71-4; B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, f. 141, 1 July 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 49

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honour were respected. When, for the third time, Villeroy returned to Paris, yet another set of demands awaited him. These related to Épernon, various towns, and the termination of foreign alliances. A suspicion arose that there would never be peace before there was certain news of the Armada. In other words, Spain still had an interest in the aftermath of the barricades, which explains the duke’s arrogant procedures.53 But not even Guise could hold out for ever; the secret articles, one may suppose, had already accorded most of his more audacious demands. The agreement was made on 12 July 1588, signed three days later, and carried by Villeroy to Rouen. It was registered on 19 July; thereafter, the king returned to Chartres.54

III: The Edict of Union, 15 July 1588. The edict of Union, as it was published in July (on different dates in different places), consisted of a preamble and eleven articles. Theoretically, it enabled the king and the duc de Guise to proceed together. In fact it defined the intolerable circumstances in which their now closely personal conflict would evolve. The edict’s stated purpose was the repose of religion. It bound all catholics into ‘the Union’ against heresy, explicitly embracing the ever important towns, upon pain of loss of privileges. The king renewed his coronation oath to extirpate heresy. After his death, furthermore, no one was to obey or to recognise as king, a heretic or favourer of heretics. This was, therefore, another attempt to manipulate the succession, but without publicly naming an alternative heir. Indeed, it was the interesting opinion of the wholly sagacious Arnaud d’Ossat that the purpose of this, otherwise sterile, alliance was to induce the king to will the throne to Guise – to extract ‘des dispositions testamentaires qui lui [Guise] ouvrissent la voie du trône ou lui permissent de le conquérir’. If this is true, it would help to explain the prickly and untenable relationship upon which Guise now embarked.55 Heretics were not only excluded from the succession but also from all military, financial and judicial offices. The clause outlawing all leagues and associations prejudicial to the Union, the king’s person, his issue and authority, had to be explained away to Mendoza. He, in turn, explained it away to Philip II, presumably claiming that the Spanish alliance was not prejudicial.56 Nevertheless, the treaty did expressly pay lip service to the defence of the king and his royal authority. The longest passage (articles ten and eleven) was devoted to details of the 53

CSPF., 1588, pp. 4-5, 3/13 July 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. These demands related to Sedan, Jametz and Valence. B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 162-5, 13 July 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 54 Villeroy went to Rouen on 17 July and Henry III returned to Chartres on 25 July. Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 377, 17 July 1588, Catherine to Villeroy; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 197. 55 Degert, Le cardinal d’Ossat, 64. Mendoza reported that the succession was one of the capital points, which Villeroy wanted to place on the secret list. It appears that this was done, and that the League stuck to the cardinal de Bourbon, at least for the moment. Mendoza also mentioned the English alliance and the decrees of Trent. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 347-8, 26 June 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. 56 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 349-51, 24 July 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. Mendoza said that the terms of this article had been agreed with him in advance. Evidently it was not to be taken at face value.


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amnesty accorded to the League. It explicitly included the events of 12 and 13 May in Paris (for which Guise had not otherwise admitted responsibility), as well as many events following and arising therefrom, up to the publication of the edict. These items included numerous illegal acts such as the seizures of money, goods and armaments, and the raising of troops.57 The negotiations leading to the edict of Union were very secretly conducted. Consequently there is considerable confusion in most sources between these public clauses and, presumably, secret clauses which were leaked. Villeroy, in his memoirs, makes no mention of secret clauses; according to Mendoza, they had not been communicated to anyone.58 No available version of the secret articles mentions the status of the duc de Guise. Mendoza reported that what Guise really wanted was to be ‘surintendant des armées’, which he took to mean constable in all but name. Only the Venetian, Mocenigo, indicated that Épernon and his brother were to retain just one ‘gouvernement’ each.59 The three secret articles most widely mentioned were the ratification of the treaty of Nemours and subsequent edicts, the publication – with reservations – of the decrees of Trent (a standard demand, pressed by the legate), and the raising of two armies, one for Dauphiné under Mayenne, and one for Guyenne. That Guise was permitted to remain at court instead of going to Guyenne, is not generally stated. Nevertheless, this proves the point that Guise did not mean to pursue the huguenot war with Épernon at large in the west.60 The sale of huguenot property to pay for the war was already in the treaty of Nemours; that would take time and was probably academic.61 Those cities already ceded by the peace of Nemours, plus Dourlans (on the Netherlands 57

Haag, La France protestante, x, 201-3, text of the edict of Union; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii, 36873, dated 21 July 1588; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 365-6. 58 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 725-9, in particular mixed the two sets of articles both describing them as secret and indicating that they were published in Paris on 21 July 1588. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 237-8 also lists the secret articles. None of these appear in the published edict, but the list is incomplete. Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, i, 176-83, prints ten published articles, plus thirty-two ‘particuliers’ also incorporating the other ten. 59 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 347-8, 26 June 1588, Mendoza to Philip II; Mouton, Épernon, 206 seq., is not very clear. Miron was sent to Loches to explain that Épernon and his brother were to keep only one ‘gouvernement’ each. Épernon was excluded from court and ordered to remain in his ‘gouvernement’, which was Provence. There is, however, no mention that his commission – of lieutenantgeneral in respect of the western provinces – was cancelled. It appears that the king was afraid of Épernon and doubtless did as little as possible. Stafford said that Miron was sent to obtain Épernon’s signature to the articles of Union and to induce him to resign the offices of chief gentleman of the bedchamber, the admiralty (which he was reported to have surrendered already) and the ‘gouvernements’ of Metz and Boulogne. But Stafford believed that Miron also carried instructions for Épernon upon how to refuse! CSPF., 1588, pp. 61-2, 20/30 July 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. 60 Épernon is always said to have been rich and powerful. In that part of France, he could doubtless have assembled a much larger force than Guise. 61 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 349-51, 24 July 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. Mendoza mentioned secret clauses to conceal the great advantages obtained by the League. He observed that the king still could not send help to England and that Guise would not allow this clause to be infringed. Stafford mentioned, very late in the negotiation, that Guise pressed hard for the breaking of alliances, which the king would not hear of [hence the secret clause]. CSPF., 1588, pp. 4-5, 3/13 July 1588, Stafford to Walsingham.

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frontier), were to be retained for a total of six years. Orléans, Bourges and Montreuil were similarly ceded for six years; and if, during that period, a captain or ‘gouverneur’ were to die, the king must appoint a replacement chosen by the League. In respect of Boulogne and Valence, Guise did not get his way. The edict did contain some face-saving items relating to Paris and other cities. The new ‘corps de ville’, elected in May 1588, was to resign, in order to be reinstated by the king, and to remain in office for a further period of two years; that did, at least, protect a principle. The Bastille was to be restored to the king, who was also to appoint the ‘chevalier du guet’; and this was done.62 Mocenigo mentioned other secret articles – previously referred to – in favour of various League leaders. Mayenne was to become ‘grand chambellan’, Aumale ‘grand veneur’ and Elboeuf ‘grand écuyer’. Guise was to receive 800,000 écus to clear his debts, and Brissac 100,000 écus. The cardinal de Bourbon was to be declared first prince and heir to the throne. By an edict of 17 August 1588, he was accorded certain privileges pertaining to the heir, but was described only as the king’s ‘plus proche parent’. The other appointments, conceivably referred to the estates-general, do not appear to have been made; nor is there any indication that the financial items were honoured.63 After the signing of the treaty, Catherine de Medici is alleged to have taken Guise by the hand and announced that the king conferred upon him the supreme command, with the title of constable or lieutenant-general. Catherine may well have wanted the concession to resemble an act of grace, but she would surely not have spoken of titles which Guise did not receive.64 The current state of French affairs – the case against the League, the king’s false position, and Navarre’s point of view – were perceptively analysed in a long ‘discours’ by Navarre’s secretary, Michel Hurault du Fay, evidently written just after the conclusion of the edict of Union in July 1588.65 This paper merits attention on account of its balanced good sense, its devastating candour, and a smattering of original points. It was prompted by the king’s own account of the events in Paris of 12 May 1588, plus two letters from Guise. The king, du Fay said, lacked the will to make himself obeyed. If he did not [now] exert himself, it would be apparent that he could be attacked with impunity. He could not even be sure of his own supporters when he was seen to tolerate their enemies. A king who permitted the succession to be disputed was ruined. Navarre’s defensive action was just, and he had always offered himself and his means to restore the king’s authority. He was the rightful heir and, even if everyone banded together to exclude him, they would 62

Baguenault de Puchesse, Ed., Catherine de Médicis, Lettres, ix, 377, 17 July 1588, Catherine to Villeroy. The officials were reinstated on 20 July. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 725-7, ‘secret’ articles of the edict of Union; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 237-8. 63 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 255-6, 17 August 1588, edict in favour of Bourbon; B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 184-7, 26 July 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate, ff. 222-4, 29 August 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. He notes that the Bourbon edict was registered in Paris. Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, i, 185-7, also mentions concessions in respect of Nemours, Épinac and La Châtre. 64 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 51; de L’Épinois, ‘La Réconciliation de Henri III et du duc de Guise’, Revue des questions historiques, xxxix (1886), 89. 65 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iii, 2-51, ‘excellent et libre discours sur l’estat présent de la France, – 1588’.


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not know who else to elect. Navarre had no manifest rival, and that would be a restraining factor. The Bourbon princes were important, and they blocked the Guise path. Du Fay then traced the Guise story, asserting that the young Henri, now duc de Guise, had been brainwashed by his uncle the cardinal de Lorraine. Guise, personally, was the League, in which he had no equal. His sole hope was to sustain trouble and to remain in arms in order to seize his opportunities whenever they arose. Above all [for Guise to succeed], the country must not be at peace when the king died. Guise must be in arms, under the late king’s authority, against his heir. He needed to control Paris, but he must be careful because he had embarked the king upon a war in which he could himself be ruined.66 Either Guise sought to arrange his affairs so that, after the king’s death, he could ruin and exclude Navarre, or so that Navarre would at least be forced to capitulate. Guise’s projects, the ‘discours’ continued, were not compatible with the prolonged life of the king. Had Henry remained in Paris, he would have perished. This fact created the fear and tension which now existed between them. The king, who was aware of the duke’s purpose, chose a bizarre and injudicious course to resist it; this was because of his persuasion that he must command one of the two parties. It was deplorable that the king had not dared to admit that he had been obliged to flee; he neither denounced his treatment as an injury, nor announced impending punishments; rebellion ought to be penalised. Instead, Henry meekly subjected himself to Guise and only requested prayers for the healing of the breach. Consequently he agreed to make war on Navarre, to whom a month before [?] he had by thirty letters, now in the possession of du Fay, shown what judgement he made of the intentions of the League. [This is interesting evidence of a far closer link between the king and Navarre than is otherwise apparent]. Yet still the king failed to act regally, and dared not turn to Navarre to overcome the League. Navarre had no designs in France, and his [ultimate] claim to the throne did not yet arise. Du Fay also criticised Catherine de Medici for the unjust treatment Navarre received. Having been unable to accord with Navarre she had [consequently] favoured Guise, albeit not as a rival to the king. Guise had now ventured so far that he must either be king himself or be ruined. In fact, his prospects were bleak; many of his friends resisted his ambition, and he would find it difficult to recompense his followers. In short, he was losing support and lacked patronage.67 Du Fay feared that, within two years, the duke’s audacity would make the recent events in Paris resemble a youthful indiscretion. He ended the memoir with a long address to the king.

IV: Guise Returns to Court The corollary to the mutually unsatisfactory edict of Union was that Guise must return to court. If Guise did not want to risk campaigning in the west, he had no alternative. The mortal rivals must now endure the constant exasperation of each other’s presence. Despite 66

It is noteworthy that Guise was never keen to fight the huguenots, for all his bluster about religious war. It is a valid point, and rarely made, that Guise was resented within his own party, and that this could bring him down.

67

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the ‘Union’, Stafford observed, ‘I never saw minds more disunited nor anything more laughed at’ – only it was no laughing matter. ‘We shall, ere long, see a great change, though for the time we see other appearances and preparations.’ ‘Assure yourself,’ he wrote to Walsingham, ‘that the king hath some marvellous design and that the duke of Guise’ good usage, that he showeth [him] and his, tendeth to a most great enterprise’. He went on to claim that Épernon’s reply to a visit from Miron ‘is certainly a pact between the king and him’.68 Stafford kept his secretary, William Lilley, at court; he was very well informed though it is difficult, on this occasion, to see what he referred to. Probably the estates-general superseded other matters and forestalled other events. Mocenigo also said that those familiar with the negotiation – meaning, presumably, the secret articles of the Union – were very much afraid of some untoward event (‘qualche strano accidente’), a fear aroused by the great distrust between Guise and the king who had so recently contemplated each other’s destruction. Even before Guise returned to court, both he and the king received warnings of danger. Cavriana similarly observed that the peace was called ‘union’, but tumult and war were bound to continue; and Mayenne was also to be feared.69 Guise himself was anxious to send Moreo to Spain, with explanations that he dared not commit to paper. Mendoza sent Philip II the articles of ‘Union’, together with the secret clauses, and his own considered advice for the future.70 Mendoza was satisfied that Guise, [under his instruction] had behaved imperiously (Guise ‘parle réelement en maître’), and had got his own way; but that referred only to the contents of the edict. Mendoza was not, in fact, sanguine about the precarious future; he foresaw not triumph but deadlock. The king, he said, would continue to obstruct the huguenot war in every imaginable way, if only to demonstrate that he was constrained to promise things beyond his power to perform. Mendoza envisaged a situation in which Guise must return to rebellion; he would therefore have to be supported by Spain. Consequently he and Iñiguez proposed that, after the enterprise of England, Philip II should consider the advantages of providing Guise with regular help. They had had difficulty in inducing him to accept only 70,000 écus, and he had been obliged to borrow 200,000 in Paris. Regularly assisted, however, Guise could either frustrate the king’s machinations or, if necessary, resist him with open force. In this way, Spain could make war on France without herself bearing the whole burden. The Spaniard’s assumption that this war against France was desirable (particularly if the Armada were to be successful), related in the first place to the defence of the Netherlands and, eventually, to the succession; for that the Guises were Spanish stalking-horses – 68

No such pact materialised, though it may have been under discussion. CSPF., 1588, pp. 61-2, 20/30 July 1588, Stafford to Walsingham, 89-90, 31 July/10 August 1588, Stafford to Walsingham, 98-9, 1/11 August 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. Épernon left Loches for Angoulême at this time. 69 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 187-91, 29 July 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, 189-99, deposition of Péricard; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 798-803, 26 July 1588, Cavriana to Serguidi. 70 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 349-51, 24 July 1588, Mendoza to Philip II, 352, 24 July 1588, Guise to Philip II. The peace in France was not displeasing to Spain, chiefly on account of the advantageous secret clauses but it was not thought that it could last. CSPVen., 1581-91, p. 375, 12 August 1588, Lippomano to the doge and senate, Madrid.


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ultimately expendable. Anyway, Mendoza concluded, the current state of France should assist Philip’s naval enterprises which had, after all, been Spain’s priority objective.71 It was not without misgiving that Guise left Paris for Chartres, on 30 July 1588, accompanied by Catherine de Medici, the cardinal de Bourbon, and a suite of eighty horses. Épinac and Claude de la Châtre had cautiously preceded him, apparently to test the king’s disposition.72 Before his departure, Guise requested an interview with Mendoza who, always discreet, agreed only to a secret, nocturnal meeting. Guise evidently expressed anxiety about his return to court, although he believed his suite to be stronger than the king’s. But he could not risk the accusation of cowardice. Mendoza thought Guise was now regretting having bridled the ‘maddened bulls’, in Paris, thereby frustrating their designs on the king.73 The only real danger to Guise, Mendoza confided to Philip II, was in the king’s cabinet, where everyone entered unattended. But an assassination of that nature would be difficult to organise secretly; Guise adopted the arrogant assumption that the king was too pusillanimous to consider it.74 Guise arrived at court on 1 August 1588. He was sufficiently well received, although the palpable distrust between himself and the king was apparent to everyone.75 Henry was now distressed about the ‘Union’ to which he had consented. Influenced by some who felt diminished by the duke’s advancement, Henry wished to withdraw the offending commission. But contrary advice prevailed because, according to Villeroy, Guise had already seen the commission, which was a part of the accord.76 So the curious commission, dated 4 August 1588, was duly conferred. Guise had not obtained any new office or title, but specified military powers to command the armies in the absence of the king. There followed a detailed list of other items.77 Thereafter he was variously described – but not styled – as lieutenant-general, constable and, most accurately by de Thou, ‘généralissime des armées’. The commission was an unique fudge, which Henry III called a ‘pouvoir sur les armes’.78 The king then arranged a kind of ceremonial reception. But Guise was unimpressed; he was also annoyed by the king’s refusal to return to Paris,

71

De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 349-52, 24 July 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. The problem of Guise’s debts and his urgent need for money was not resolved before his death. 72 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 349-51, 24 July 1588, Mendoza to Philip II; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 412-13. 73 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 349-51, 24 July 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. 74 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, 355-8, 9 August 1588, Mendoza to Philip II. 75 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, 355-8, 9 August, 1588, Mendoza to Philip II; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 412-13. 76 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 73-4. 77 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 251; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 729-30, letters patent for Guise, 4 August 1588; Isambert, Recueil général des anciennes lois, xiv, 621, (no text) misleadingly accords Guise the title of ‘lieutenant général du royaume’; Fontanon, Les Édits et ordonnances, iv, 729-30, 4 August 1588, ‘pouvoir octroyé à monseigneur le duc de Guise’; CSPF., 1588, pp. 107-8, 5/15 August 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. Stafford called Guise lieutenant-general of the army which, understood purely descriptively, was about right. Lieutenant-general of France, however, usually meant something like viceroy. 78 B.N., Mss. fr. 16110, f. 278, 6 August 1588, Henry III to Longlée.

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where he wanted the estates-general to be held.79 Nevertheless, there did seem to be a big change in the king’s attitude to the League. Either this was a marvellous mutation, Guise reflected uncertainly, or else extreme dissimulation.80 Stafford persisted in his belief that all was not what it appeared to be. Good usage of the duke, he wrote to Walsingham, ‘tendeth to a most great enterprise’ adding, only five days later, ‘I hope we shall see strange things ere long’.81 It has been seen that, after the tumult in Paris, Guise originally supposed a civil war to be inevitable. Only the departure of Épernon from Chartres had facilitated the accord with the king and the return of Guise to court. To Épinac, who now – unsuccessfully – orchestrated the duke’s procedures, the return to court was merely a change of tactics. In July 1588, he provided Guise with an ‘instruction’.82 The peace, it stated, would last only so long as Guise remained at court where, according to the secret articles, he was obliged to be. Thus Guise needed to acquire the favour of the king, and must obtain an appropriate office. He was already ‘grand maître’; but he should seek to enlarge the terms of his commission in every possible way; he should also aim at the office of constable by inducing the estates-general to demand his appointment. At court, he must insinuate his own followers into offices, and make everyone dependent upon his fear or favour. The king, balanced between regard and apprehension, must feel that Guise could not safely be disgraced.83 To these ends, Guise would have to cultivate the secretaries of state. This endeavour may have had something to do with the summary dismissal, on 8 September 1588, of the king’s oldest and most trusted servants – including the wholly indispensable Villeroy.84 Guise must also work on Catherine de Medici [now a dying woman] and gather all the principal offices of state into his own family. If so crude a programme was hardly a recipe for success, it was more likely to be a preparation for some new initiative. To Épinac, the return of Guise to court was no more than a pis aller. Cavriana observed that Guise and his followers were monopolising all the offices and councils and never quit the king’s side. Hatred, he added, generated deception, and Guise remained in close touch with Parma.85 It appears that Guise did try to follow Épinac’s nefarious advice. But for Guise to establish a sound relationship with the king was quite simply impossible; they had no personal affinity, no mutual trust, and no shared objectives.

79

B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 194-5, 6 August 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate, ff. 206-7, 12 August 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; CSPF., 1588, pp. 124-8, 8/18 August 1588, Lilley to Stafford. 80 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, 353-4, 6 August 1588, Guise to Mendoza. 81 It is not clear what Stafford meant, but he appeared to think that Navarre was about to launch some enterprise on the Loire, possibly at Saumur. CSPF., 1588, pp. 98-9, 1/11 August 1588, Stafford to Walsingham, 107-8, 5/15 August 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. 82 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, 14-21; Loutchitzky, Documents inédits, 225-6, ‘avis’ for Guise. 83 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 138-9, 29 June 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. Mocenigo reported that because of the mounting authority of Guise, many were seeking his favour; also that he was immediately informed of all discussions and decisions. 84 Sutherland, The French Secretaries of State, 294-7. 85 Desjardins. Négs., Tosc., iv, 808-18, 23 August 1588, Cavriana to Serguidi.


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V: The Affiliations of the Nobles The rise and emergence of Guise to a position of authority in the summer of 1588 immediately evoked opposition among the princes of the blood and other catholic noblemen.86 This is a further reminder that, since 1559, the whole long struggle represented – among other things – successive phases of the rivalry of the nobility. Such rivalry would naturally surface most dangerously when the crown was weakest. Nevers now told the king plainly that Guise would either perceive his favour as a sign of fear, or else as a screen for revenge; Guise himself was unsure which. Nevers had no doubt that, once in charge of the armies, Guise would exploit the king’s weakness to augment his own authority, or possibly to launch some major, pre-emptive strike. Nevers who, like the marshals, was angry that Guise was now ranked above them, added that he still aspired to the office of constable.87 Possibly prompted by Villeroy, Nevers tried again, on 20 August 1588, to influence the king, giving him substantially the same advice as du Fay in his ‘discours’. Nevers was in Picardy where, he said, the king’s enemies were far more dangerous than Navarre. He only defended himself, whereas these others planned usurpation and tyranny; and he warned the king never to believe them, whatever advice they gave. While Nevers thought that Navarre should obey the king, he also thought that the king should permit the huguenots to enjoy the edicts of pacification. He ought not to abandon them to the fury of these ‘faux zélés’ [the League]. Their wish to ruin the huguenots was merely to deprive the crown of a bulwark against themselves. A king who permitted the existence of treasonable associations exposed himself to the loss of authority, and even of his life; and that shows that the edict of Union, which banned all associations, was perceived to be a farce. Nevers pointed out – unlike anyone else – that no towns or provinces had declared for the huguenots. They were no longer a proselytising force and were not to be feared. It was against this ‘new party’ that the king should direct all his efforts. This was a big change from Nevers’ position of 1585.88 It was vital for the king to bring about the closest possible intelligence among the princes – not least with the estates-general in prospect. At the end of June 1588, Catherine therefore sent Soissons and Conti to the king because she now believed the Guises to be aiming at his destruction. Mocenigo twice referred to the displeasure of the ‘grandi’, at the advancement of Guise, and Nevers tried to refuse to serve in the Guyenne campaign while Guise held a superior command.89 Stafford hinted that the king was intriguing with 86

Stafford’s comment on the commission for Guise was that it would provoke a reaction and actually ruin him. The princes and nobles did, indeed begin to turn against him. CSPF., 1588, pp. 107-8, 5/15 August 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. 87 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 253; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 204-5; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 818-20, 28 August 1588, Cavriana to Serguidi. 88 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 854-5, 20 August 1580, Nevers to Henry III. 89 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 138-9, 29 June 1588, ff. 143-4, 3 July 1588, ff. 166-9, 15 July 1588, ff. 219-21, 23 August 1588, ff. 226-9, 8 September 1588, Mocenigo to Vinta; CSPF., 1588, pp. 4-5, 3/13 July 1588, Stafford to Walsingham, 124-8, 8/18 August 1588, Lilley to Stafford, Chartres. Stafford thought some officers of the crown might also be involved as well as Nevers and his son-in-law, Longueville. Cavriana believed that Nevers and Soissons could never get on together. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 803-7, 8 August 1588, Cavriana to Vinta; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 71.

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a ‘counter league’ at the time of the treaty of Union. However this may be, Soissons duly went to see the king at Rouen, early in July 1588, and suspicion was aroused when Henry pardoned him for having served Navarre in the Coutras campaign.90 Thereafter Soissons went to court, accompanied by many noblemen. Letters patent, comprising the pardon for Soissons, were presented to the ‘parlement’ on 30 August 1588 because the king was anxious that he should be eligible to attend the estates-general. The registration was, however, furiously opposed by Guise. The League intervened, causing such a tumult in Paris that Henry was obliged to withdraw. Soissons was advised to seek Papal absolution and, presumably, applied to Morosini.91 Soissons had evidently not responded to Navarre’s appeal of May 1588, after the barricades – which is mentioned above. Thus, while he awaited his absolution in uncertainty of mind, he received a second appeal to lend his support to Navarre. This was also an effort to avert another detrimental agreement between the king and Guise. The huguenot memoir of July 1588 is a surprising document to have come – it is said – from the pen of Duplessis-Mornay. It proposed – presumably through the influence of Soissons and the king – that Sixtus V should, of his own volition (sic), promulgate an universal cessation of arms, until he could compose all differences, especially bringing pressure to bear upon the authors of the League. This was, indeed, an exaggerated conception of the capacity and independence of the Papacy, just when Sixtus V was applauding the Guises as defenders of religion, (sic) and when the Spanish Armada was finally launched. The memoir recalled, for Papal consumption, Navarre’s repeated offers to submit to the findings of a council to which, so far, the only reply had been eight armies launched against him. The pope would be well advised, the memoir continued, to suspend the bull of excommunication so that France could be pacified. This was, of course, the king’s habitual argument in a new context: if the League pretext of religion were exploded, the Guises could be forced to lay down their arms. In that case, Navarre would do likewise. Navarre now appeared to be asserting that his basic problem was the excommunication and not, as the king repeatedly alleged, his adherence to protestantism. But would the king really have allied with Navarre had he abjured, but without obtaining complete absolution? That, it has been seen, would not have been granted. Did Navarre hope that the revocation of the excommunication would suffice to assuage the consciences of catholic royalists? Did he hope thereby, when no longer branded as inapt, to proclaim the legitimacy of a protestant succession? But catholic opposition to a hypothetical protestant succession had been largely responsible for the excommunication in the first place, and was therefore unlikely to cease with its revocation. Similarly, the objection that Navarre was relapsed, whether just or false, would still obtain. Probably he simply thought that the 90

B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 187-91, 29 July 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate, ff. 197-8, 7 August 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; CSPF., 1588, pp. 61-2, 20/30 July 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. 91 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 207; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 79-80; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 415-16; CSPF., 1588, pp. 152-4, 23 August/2 September 1588, Stafford to Walsingham. Soissons sent Jules Richi to Rome to seek his absolution which was traversed by the League representatives. The king thought this a curious procedure, in respect of a civil offence, and when Soissons had never been a protestant. Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, i, 199-200.


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removal of this infamous obstacle could only be beneficial. The memoir should probably be seen in the context of the estates-general, from which Navarre was hoping to elicit support.92

VI: The Papal Legate The complex situation in the summer of 1588, together with appeals from different quarters for Papal support or assistance, opened the way for a further increase in Papal activity in France. Indeed, this was a progressive development, and one which had serious consequences for Navarre. The core of Papal policy was the publication of the decrees of Trent, the extirpation of heresy (which Sixtus V must have known to be impossible), and clerical immunity [from secular jurisdictions], none of which was new. But Rome had, rather suddenly, become more than previously supportive of the League, whether because Sixtus now supposed the League to be in the ascendant, or perhaps because he hoped to influence them more successfully through the distinguished nuncio, Morosini. On 15 July 1588 – probably hoping to affect the outcome of the current negotiations, but for which he was too late – the pope had sent Guise and the cardinal de Bourbon an important brief. Sixtus thereby announced the dispatch of a legate to support their projects for the conservation of the state and religion.93 This legate was Morosini, who was already there. He became a cardinal on 3 August 1588, and was duly appointed legate a latere. He went to Chartres at the same time as Guise and received his red hat from the king. Henry III was, nonetheless, deeply shocked by the pope’s irregular and offensive procedure.94 Morosini was praised by the pope for his efforts to obtain reconciliation in France, and he received a fresh instruction at this time.95 His mission was now to embrace and favour the Guises, as the principal defenders of catholicism. They were not to be penalised [for past offences] although the king must be obeyed by all his subjects as their sovereign and monarch. At the same time, Sixtus menaced Henry III with both spiritual and temporal penalties if he did not cease to protect the heretics. He was required, without delay, to enact ‘strict laws’ that whomsoever had been a heretic, or suspected of heresy, could never succeed to the throne.96 Montmorency was to be brought back to his allegiance to the crown. Sixtus then decreed that if Navarre and all his followers wished to return to catholicism and obedience to the king, they could be received according to a procedure which he would dispatch. If they rejected this offer, they must be opposed in arms, and their property confiscated. Every effort was to be made to unite the princes – 92

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 228-34, – July 1588, memoir for Soissons. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 252-3. 94 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 70; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 201. 95 CSPF., 1588, pp. 144-5, 20/30 January 1588, Stafford to Walsingham; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 64-6. The instructions for Morosini are here dated 22 August 1588, though he appeared to have known their contents when he went to Chartres – perhaps because, in essence, there was nothing new. The detail, however, was trenchant and the tone urgent. 96 This prohibition was already a provision of the edict of Union. Nevertheless, the matter was resumed in the estates-general. 93

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possibly a reference to the Bourbons, Soissons and Conti, who had recently served Navarre. This extraordinary document shows the pope attempting to determine royal policy, backed by a thinly veiled threat of excommunication. Morosini informed the king that Sixtus did not want Navarre to be attacked before a further effort had been made to seek his reconciliation with Rome and the king – in which, it was hoped, Montmorency might assist. Curiously, however, Morosini later recorded that after fifty days this order was rescinded.97 Whatever the pope had in mind, Morosini’s instructions must on no account be interpreted as a genuine Papal approach to Navarre. In the first place, the proposition was totally vague. It is obvious that ‘all’ Navarre’s followers were not going to abjure; neither would they accept that they were not ‘in obedience to the king’. No proposals were made, either in the instructions or later by Morosini himself, to assist Navarre to convert. Furthermore, even if he had converted, it was categorically stated that he would still be excluded from the succession.98 Henry III earnestly desired Navarre’s conversion in order to alter, and escape from, the situation created by the ‘peace’ of Nemours in 1585, and subsequent events. This objective was purely political for which, it has been seen, the king himself did not shrink from proposing a feigned conversion. But a conversion which did not revoke Navarre’s exclusion from the succession (in the estimation of many catholics), would serve no political purpose at all. In reply to Morosini, Henry declared his ardent desire for the abjuration of Navarre which, as usual, he maintained would deprive the League of their ‘raison d’être’. Henry therefore wished the pope’s ‘paternal sentiments’ to be communicated to Navarre.99 Although there was no other overt approach to Navarre – possibly on account of preparations for the estates-general – Buzanval (the huguenot agent in England) informed Burghley that Navarre was under considerable pressure to convert. Perhaps we should relate this statement to the numerous letters which, according to du Fay, Henry had written to Navarre earlier in the summer of 1588. No doubt Henry hoped, as he had hoped in 1585, to neutralise the accord with Guise by means of Navarre’s conversion; all the same arguments applied. Buzanval, however, attributed this pressure to Navarre’s lack of foreign support; and that constituted his special pleading for help from England.100 This ill-conceived Papal policy makes little sense in terms of French affairs, and is not easy to interpret. Sixtus V was, however, committed to a Spanish alliance against England, and his reactions to news from Spain revealed his fear of Spanish aggrandisement.101 France must, somehow, be forced to become a sufficiently united catholic country in order to 97

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 868-72, – January 1589, Morosini’s apology; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 64-6; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 202-3. 98 A distinction was drawn between absolution, following conversion, and ‘rehabilitation’, which was necessary to rescind the exclusion from the succession incorporated into the excommunication. Since the French denied the Papal claim to determine the succession, ‘rehabilitation’ was to be the most problematic aspect of the abjuration and absolution of Henry IV. 99 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 70-1. 100 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iii, 19, ‘discours’ of du Fay; CSPF., 1588, pp. 53-4, 17/27 July 1588, Buzanval to Burghley. 101 According to Olivares, Sixtus V did not expect the Armada to materialise. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 39-42, 257-61, 26 September 1588, Olivares to Philip II.


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counterbalance the power of Spain. But in pursuing this objective, Papal judgements were simplistic and illusory. Morosini’s brief, to conjure peace and reconciliation in France, might be seen as unpardonably cynical; indeed it would be ridiculous were it not, in the end, so tragic. Sixtus V had, of course, to say something, but nothing obliged him to send the legate such crudely provocative instructions. While sharing the doleful prognostications of his fellow ambassadors, the cardinal legate must now endure the perils and opprobrium of the conciliator precariously placed with one foot in each camp.

VII: Expectations and Preparations Exhortations, whether to the princes or to the king, all fell upon deaf ears; Henry had cornered himself. Now the business in hand was the estates-general, which would reflect the conflict between himself and Guise. Lilley, Stafford’s agent, appeared to think the assembly in doubt. To Guise, however, the immediate task was to pack it; and of that he was soon quite confident. The Leaguer deputies were apprised of a whole programme designed to sap and destroy the royal authority, and to elevate that of the estates-general – which Guise then expected to control. Guise also wished them to ratify his advantages, gained under the edict of Union (‘l’on remet aux dits estats d’y doner la forme et de la prendre d’eux’). He told Mendoza, on the other hand, that under colour of tax reductions, the king hoped to elicit demands for a general peace. Henry was still faced with the basic problem that no one was prepared to pay for war.102 The king moved to Blois early in September 1588 in preparation for the assembly. Everything now depended upon who would attend and what would happen. The nascent hostility of the princes and nobles boded ill for Guise in his efforts to dominate the court; it also emphasised the importance of the support of the nobility for whomsoever attempted to exercise power. Guise was dismayed when Soissons, Conti, and Montpensier all came to Blois strongly accompanied by a mainly huguenot following of veterans from Coutras. Indeed, Guise referred to the appearance of ‘armies’, and heard that ‘they’ had designs on his life. Other Bourbons wanted the return of Soissons and Conti to full catholicism [?] so that they could present a united front against the Guises. They knew the succession would be raised in the estates and feared an edict against their house, despite their superior claim to the succession over the house of Lorraine. Guise, for his part, wished to neutralise the pardon obtained by Soissons, lest it might herald the restoration of Navarre.103 Morosini received, in late or mid-September, precise instructions for ‘the conversion’ (sic) of Soissons and Conti. The document is important since, potentially, it

102

De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 353-4, 6 August 1588, Guise to Mendoza, 358-60, 6 August 1588, Guise to Mendoza, in which he said that the king was pressing ahead with the estates. Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, i, 192-6. 103 B.N., Simancas K 1568, 21 MI 155 (2), 5 September 1588, Guise to Mendoza, 8 September 1588, Guise to Mendoza, 23 September 1588, Guise to Mendoza; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 71; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 217.

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might also apply to Navarre.104 Some confusion evidently existed as to the religion of these princes, and that went for the Papal Curia. Thus Morosini was to discover whether or not they had previously abjured. If so, they would be declared relapsed; then a different form of abjuration would be necessary. They were also to be interrogated as to their – supposed – protestant religion, practice and experience. In fact neither Soissons nor Conti had reverted to Calvinism after their abjuration in 1572. Their sole offence appears to have been that they had briefly served their cousin, Navarre, in 1587. Theoretically, however, that brought them within the terms of Navarre’s excommunication; the legate, anyway, presumed them to be excommunicated. If Morosini was not convinced of the princes’ true repentance, he might, at discretion, refuse or delay the absolution.105 After much difficulty, Soissons was privately absolved by the legate, on 13 October 1588. But it should be noted that Soissons was only received as a penitent and granted a simple absolution. He was not to be ‘rehabilitated’, namely restored to all those things of which the excommunication deprived him, including his rank. The salient point is that Soissons was deemed to have incurred the specified secular penalties, and that these still obtained. Thus, had Soissons been closer to the throne he would, like Navarre, have been deprived of his claims to the succession. Conti was not absolved until later because he had failed to submit a request.106 These procedures are of the utmost significance in respect of Navarre, his current position, and what he might expect or fear in the future. While, of late, Sixtus had seemed to incline to favour Navarre’s conversion, this evidently related to his confused conception of a united, catholic France – bearing in mind that Spain was his principal anxiety.107 It was obvious from Morosini’s instructions, and Soissons’ experience that, in the eyes of those catholics who wished to exclude Navarre, he would still be debarred from the succession. Furthermore, he would still be condemned as relapsed – even though his first abjuration was performed under duress, and not conducted according to form. Indeed, Navarre could not even be sure of the simple absolution accorded to Soissons. These were vital technicalities, not widely understood, but which rendered Navarre’s abjuration politically pointless. In August 1588, while the League stage-managed the elections for the estatesgeneral, Navarre made every effort to organise some support in the assembly. For this purpose he dispatched a memoir to several of the provinces. It contained both an appeal and a warning. The latest troubles, it declared, had annihilated the name of the king, whose authority was undermined. Peace was essential, and Navarre was therefore anxious that the estates should demand it; that was the appeal. The warning was against the 104

Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 71-3, 19 September 1588. Soissons and Conti definitely abjured in August 1572, and were absolved on 27 October. Hurtubise, Correspondance du nonce en France, Salviati, i, 296-8, 30 October 1572, Galli to Salviati. Unlike Navarre, they appear to have remained catholic. Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 71-3, 19 September 1588, Montalto to Morosini; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 787-94 [October 1588], Pisani to Henry III. 106 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 71-3, 79, 80, 84. The pope was very angry because the form of Soissons’ absolution accorded Navarre the title of ‘king’ which, according to Morosini was introduced by a notary. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 207; De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 369-71, 13 October 1588, Guise to Mendoza. 107 Sixtus V knew that Navarre had no means of converting; therefore the pope ran no risk. 105


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danger of reaching conclusions in the assembly prejudicial to the interests of Navarre [precisely what the League intended] because they would find that he was capable of defending his rights. If anyone in the assembly raised the accusation of heresy, they should remember that Navarre had offered, and still offered, to accept the decisions of a general or national council. He should not be driven to despair by the use of such terms as ‘relapsed’ and by attempts to slam the door against him – points which prove Navarre’s awareness of the nature of the path to Rome. A council could, and should, be held; reason and precedent supported that. Finally, the memoir claimed that the pope was now vexed at having been induced by the ‘violence, importunity and imposture’ of certain persons, to take action against the King of Navarre.108 Perhaps it was thought that, with a little facesaving assistance or, maybe, upon the failure of the Armada, the pope might be induced to change his mind about the excommunication. On the other hand, he could not be expected to welcome the demand for any sort of council. While Soissons was pardoned by the king and absolved by the cardinal legate, Conti hesitated, and remained in touch with the huguenots. Indeed, Conti was the huguenots’ principal hope of representation in the estates. The huguenots wanted him to steer clear of Rome, and use his rank to draw attention to their [honourable] declarations and submissions. Consequently, like Soissons, he was also sent an ‘avis’, in September 1588.109 Whereas, it declared, Conti was uncertain about how to write to the pope, Navarre wished him to abandon the idea. According to the form supplied to Morosini, for Conti to appeal to Rome would be to condemn his own past and to block his own path. Furthermore, to seek absolution for having helped Navarre, was offensive and prejudicial.110 On the other hand, since Navarre had no ordinary means of access to the pope, it was perceived that Conti could be of assistance as an intermediary. Consequently the ‘avis’ explained how he might be able to help. Conti’s recommended message to the pope was based upon three premises. Firstly, the pope had made clear his awareness of the evil intentions of the League which was not, and could not be, on good terms with the king. Secondly, Sixtus had acknowledged that he had been deceived, and regretted having acted so hastily against Navarre.111 Thirdly, the Guises had based their hopes for the future upon the success of the Armada, which was now known to have foundered. Conti, therefore, should say that he had always considered the troubles in France to be political and not religious; the League attacked a catholic king, seized catholic cities, and made war in [strategic] areas where there were no protestants. Conti therefore thought it right, the ‘avis’ proposed, to defend the state and his house [of Bourbon], without prejudice to his conscience. He had followed the example of the best catholics who had armed against the League when the king declared them to be enemies of the state. Since then, they had attacked the king in Paris, and his subsequent accord with them had been a matter of necessity. Conti had never wavered in his religion but, being of the highest rank, he could 108

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 241-3, – August 1588, memoir for the provinces. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 267-8, 13 October 1588, Duplessis to Fresne-Canaye, 259-63, – September 1588, ‘avis’, by Duplessis, for Conti, conveyed by the seigneur de Lagny. 110 To judge from this ‘avis’, Navarre was in no doubt that Conti did not profess to be a Calvinist. 111 Unfortunately it is not clear why Navarre believed this. 109

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not stand aside and watch while the state and the monarchy were destroyed. The pope, he was to point out, had not moved against the catholic Montmorency, who opposed the League. Conti therefore had done nothing to deserve the deprivation of his rank [which would have precluded him from attending the estates]. If, the ‘avis’ concluded, the king agreed to his sending such a letter, that would be a hopeful sign. If not, then nothing good for the house of Bourbon was to be hoped for. But if, having taken this step, Conti appeared in the assembly, then he could propose what was good for France [presumably peace] and frustrate the measures to be taken against Navarre.112 Navarre was behaving consistently, and one might think that he was doing all he could to propitiate the catholics and Rome. Conti, however, opted for absolution, which he obtained on 31 December 1588. Nevertheless, it was evidently still expected that he would attend the assembly and expound the huguenot position and proposals.113 For this purpose Navarre prepared a further memoir, for delivery to the assembly. It rehearsed the Guise record and stated how, after his victory at Coutras, Navarre had returned his prisoners without bargaining, and proposed peace. But the war had continued because the king was too much afraid of the League. Then the Guises caused the incident in Paris, obliging the king to flee. Royal forces, prepared against the huguenots were recalled; Navarre sent the sieur de Moulont to offer the king his services, and to express his willingness to accept a reasonable peace; but these untoward events prevented him from being heard. Instead, the king again offered peace to the Guises, just when Paris might have become their tomb. However, the principal purpose of this memoir was to induce the estates to demand a council to settle the affairs of religion. Though Navarre could not possibly say so, it was desperately important and increasingly urgent that the religious issue should be settled during the lifetime of Henry III. Navarre wished to publicise the fact that he had made this proposal for a council before the war, and had always sought civil and religious peace. Having chosen to seek absolution, however, Conti declined to help his kinsman. Thus Navarre’s case went by default.114 In mid-November 1588, Navarre opened a synod at La Rochelle at which to discuss huguenot affairs and prepare for the major war which seemed unavoidable.115 At 112 The measures to be taken against Navarre referred to the proposed ratification of the edict of Union, the exclusion of Navarre from the succession, and war on the huguenots. Navarre also hoped to forge an agreement with the discarded Épernon, who was additionally offended by an assault upon his person at Angoulême. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 248-51, – August 1588, Duplessis to de Reau. Rocquelaure had already twice been sent to Épernon, who was hedging his bets and awaiting the outcome of the estates-general. Ibid., 251-3, – September 1588, instruction for Rocquelaure going to Épernon, 268-71, 18 October 1588, Duplessis to Buzanval. 113 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 167-8, 13 October 1588, Duplessis to Fresne-Canaye. 114 Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x (1895), 319, quoting the Venetian, Mocenigo, 2 January 1589. Sixtus V referred Conti’s case to Morosini who acted forthwith, Aubery, L’Histoire du cardinal de Joyeuse, 235, 12 December 1588, Joyeuse to Henry III. DuplessisMornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 141-53, – 1588, memoir of Navarre for the estates-general of Blois. 115 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 268-71, 18 October 1588, Duplessis to Buzanval, 272-5, – December 1588, ‘proposition du roy de Navarre’, La Rochelle; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, ii,


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this time of crisis the protestant party, which should have united in self-defence, was threatening to disintegrate. This was mainly on account of the greed and ambition of its leading nobles, La Trémoille, and Turenne – better known as the duc de Bouillon. When Navarre attempted to remedy this serious situation, he was faced with a barrage of opposition. While the nobles entertained their own ambitions, Navarre was accused of being more heir to the throne than protector of the churches. This mainly shallow distinction did reflect the fact that, religion apart, Navarre had more in common with the king than with the turbulent nobility by whom they were both threatened. In addition to factions among the leadership, there were the churches and ‘consistoriaux’, the genuine, devoted Calvinists, who supplied the money to leaders of whom they were unsure. The ‘consistoriaux’, furthermore, expressed disapproval of Navarre’s licentious lifestyle, against which Duplessis had cautioned him long ago. The aftermath of Coutras had also been a bitter disappointment to the churches although, it has been seen, Navarre did not fail in anything he could have accomplished. Honest and fair himself, he did not expect his actions to be maliciously misinterpreted; possibly he paid too little attention to explaining himself to his own rank and file. Now, at La Rochelle, Navarre was obliged to endure the imposition of a ten-member ‘conseil de surveillance’. The churches did not trust Navarre; and he became utterly disgusted with the huguenot system of assemblies. Navarre’s instinctive ecumenicity was no more acceptable to most Calvinists than it was to ultramontane catholics. Thenceforth there existed a permanent breach, on the leadership level, between the supporters of Navarre and Duplessis-Mornay on the one hand and, on the other, the Turenne faction – something upon which sir Edward Stafford had already commented. Turenne – like the pope – would probably try to back the winner, and Navarre could never rely upon loyal huguenot support. On the contrary, he would have much to fear from treacherous harassment at critical times which very nearly proved to be fatal.116 There was, therefore, no refuge for Navarre since, to judge from the example of Soissons and Conti, an attempted abjuration would bring him no advantages. Despite his ill-treatment by different sections of the party, Navarre did not ever betray the churches – the zealous Calvinists – who were now obliged, all over again, to strive for a sufficient edict of toleration. Like Navarre, Henry III also hoped to put his case to ‘the nation’, and thereby restore his shattered authority. But that was a flawed and desperate conception – curious in a king – since it was not in the estates that authority resided.117 The assembly might, as in 1576-7, provide a way of establishing that Henry lacked the money for the huguenot war to which, when pressed, he would pay lip service. There were some who thought that the money could be found by curtailing abuses and extravagance. It is, however, inconceivable that Henry III desired the escalation of a fitful war in which the duc de Guise would now be the supreme commander, unless Henry himself remained in the 529-32; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 306-7. The synod of La Rochelle lasted from 14 November to 17 December 1588. 116 Sutherland, ‘The Edict of Nantes and the Protestant State’, Annali della Fondazione Italiana per la Storia Amministrativa, 2 (1965), 206 seq.; Anquez, Histoire des assemblées, 39-45. 117 De Thou, Histoire universelle, 317, 322.

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field. Either situation would have been equally dangerous. In the event, no measures resulted from the estates-general of 1588-9; they simply provided the stage for the last and most public clash between the king and the duc de Guise.

VIII: The Estates-General, 1588-9 Guise, for his part, had not wanted an estates-general. But, since there was to be one, he would certainly exploit it to establish and augment his standing – with what ulterior intention one can only surmise. What quickly transpired – as many had long foreseen, said, and reported – was the ultimate certitude that Henry III and the duc de Guise could never work together. Guise had quite simply gone too far to submit, serve or obey; indeed, it is doubtful if he had ever rendered due obedience to Henry III. Guided – or misguided – by Épinac, the duke’s unavoidable return to court was no more than a change of route towards the same mirage.118 Guise had his apprehensions about the outcome of the estates. Early in September, he drew Mendoza’s attention to certain efforts to obtain the election of deputies favourable to the ‘suspect princes’. Guise supposed the purpose to be a general peace with the huguenots through the pretext of cuts in taxation. However, he believed that he would succeed in obtaining a majority, and so he did. But, if anything went wrong, Guise declared to Mendoza, he was resolved to behave more violently than he had in Paris. From that one may conclude that he now intended to prevail by fair means or foul.119 Before the estates were formally opened, the Guise plans were nearly wrecked by the news, on 7 October 1588, of Savoy’s invasion of the marquisate of Saluzzo. Henry blamed Guise for this untoward event and the estates accused him of treason. Some members even advocated a general peace in France in favour of war on Savoy. Nevertheless, Guise still hoped that he could force through the assembly the edict of Union, which was to be erected into fundamental law, together with a declaration of open war on the huguenots. They were to be condemned as traitors, so that no further treaty could be made with them.120 During the next six days, Guise evidently worked on this endeavour and, by 13 October, he had induced the estates to agree. So the bishop of 118

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 323, explicitly makes the point that Guise had gone too far to be brought to obedience by peaceful means. 119 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 358-60, 5 September 1588, Guise to Mendoza, 361, 21 September 1588, Guise to Mendoza. In the assembly all 134 clergy were Leaguers, 96 out of 180 nobles and, in the ‘tiers’, 151 out of 191; overall, 380 out of 505. Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 163. The first, second and third estates were presided over by the cardinal de Guise, the comte de Brissac and La ChapelleMarteau respectively, all confirmed Leaguers. The cardinal, however, had wished to remain in Paris as a precaution, lest any harm should befall his brother. 120 Joyeuse later reported from Rome that Savoy admitted to having intelligence with Guise over the invasion of Saluzzo. La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 208-32, 9 January 1589, Joyeuse to Henry III, 23351, 10 January 1589, Joyeuse to Henry III; Quazza, Storia Politica Italiana, 389. The invasion of Saluzzo was completed between 28-30 September 1588; Bergadini, Carlo Emanuele I, 37 seq.; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 228-9; Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 163-5; de Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 366, 9 October 1588, Guise to Mendoza, 369-71, 13 October 1588, Guise to Mendoza.


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Embrun, in the name of all three Orders, requested the king to renew the oath of Union at the opening of the estates. The king was plainly annoyed and he refused, speaking harshly to those who made the request. For Guise, this refusal confirmed his belief that Henry really wanted peace. The deputies persisted in their demand for the renewal of the oath, threatening to depart. As usual, the king gave way; he agreed to swear to the edict of Union, and to require everyone else to do the same, before proceeding to other business. All this Guise reported to Mendoza in a postscript to his letter of 13 October 1588. This intimidating pressure on the king was reflected in the contents of his opening harangue to the assembly, on 16 October 1588. With more courage than discretion, Henry III attempted to use the estates against the League and pointedly lashed out at Guise. Henry declared the purpose of the estates to be the restoration of the monarchy and confirmation of his legitimate, sovereign authority which, contrary to the opinions of some, was indivisible. He appealed for the co-operation of the estates in destroying the evil designs of the princes (‘qui ont l’ame aussi traversée et peu desireuse du bien’), and in setting things to rights. He commended his own, catholic record, while the excessive ambition of some of his subjects had impeded the suppression of heresy. Nevertheless, he shared the deputies’ fears of a heretic succession; that was why he proposed to render the edict of Union fundamental law, to which they would all swear on 18 October. By this holy Union, all leagues, associations and related activities were outlawed and belonged to the past; henceforth anyone who indulged in them would be guilty of treason. Henry then specified a list of matters requiring reform. But the principal burdens of his speech were a warning to the League, and a demand for money from the estates; without money he could not execute the said Union.121 Flabbergasted by this unexpected candour the leaders stormed out of the assembly. Next day, prompted by his brother the cardinal de Guise, the duke dispatched Épinac to the king. They impounded copies of his speech, which had already been printed, and bullied the king into publishing an amended version. If he refused to satisfy them, they threatened that the majority of the deputies would depart forthwith, with civil war to follow.122 Accordingly, at the next royal session, on 18 October, the secretary Ruzé read out a declaration which conferred upon the edict of Union the status of fundamental law; the king took the oath [again] and received those of the deputies.123 This was not reported by Guise to Mendoza until 24 October, when he referred to the achievement as having been a big struggle. Several times he had been ‘aux termes de rompre’, whatever that implied – possibly to act more violently than he had in Paris if his principal purpose were to miscarry. Guise admitted to having constrained the

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Mayer, Des États généraux, xiv, 350-63, the king’s harangue, 16 October 1588. Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 449-56, gives the passage expunged: ‘aucuns grands de mon royaume ont faict des ligues et associations mais, temoignant ma bonté accoutumée je veux bien mettre pour ce regard tout le passé sous le pied’. This passage, however, does not feature in Mayer’s version of the speech. 123 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 456-8. It should be recalled that the edict of Union also outlawed leagues, accorded an amnesty, and excluded Navarre from the succession. 122

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king: ‘nous avons quasi forcé (s’il faut ainsi parler) d’entrer en ceste resolution’.124 If this was an ostensible triumph for Guise, it was also something of a farce: pushed to the limit, the king had publicly sworn to undertake a war he could not wage, while Guise had sworn to an accord which outlawed the League and its activities. In other words, the deadlock persisted, and nothing was going to break it. Besides, there were other, additional quarrels; in particular, Henry clashed with the estates over Navarre, money, and the decrees of Trent. On 4 November 1588 the three Orders drew up a declaration against Navarre, proposing to proclaim him a rebel and a traitor (as Guise desired) and – yet again – to exclude him from the throne.125 Despite the king’s harangue to the estates, and the solemnisation of the edict of Union as fundamental law, it appears that Henry still aspired to the destruction of heresy by ‘douceur’. Consequently, he wished to send an embassy to Navarre, in which he may have been influenced by Morosini. Pisani reported the pope to have ordered Morosini to attempt every sort of means to withdraw the King of Navarre from his error and bring him back to the Catholic Church.126 The matter had been mooted earlier, at Chartres, but shelved in order not to facilitate Navarre’s attendance at the estates. Then the pope had written to the king a second time about approaching Navarre, before reopening the war. At the risk of repetition, it must be emphasised that the pope did not mean what his statement appears to mean, and what he intended the world to understand. He was well aware that Navarre had his own conditions to impose; Sixtus risked nothing by appearing to sound conciliatory. In other words, it was all a charade in which the means of conversion were never broached. In fact Nevers departed about midOctober in command of a royal army to renew the huguenot war in Poitou.127 Revealing the depth of his servility and his desperation for peace, Henry III nevertheless asked Morosini for permission to negotiate with Navarre, if he would convert. Others, Henry maintained, would follow his example. To Pisani, Henry mentioned a truce between the pope and the protestants of the comtat Venaissin, which might both offer a precedent and serve as a model for a truce in France, ‘selon la necessité’.128 Apparently far out of his depth, Sixtus V veered from one extreme to another. First, he encouraged the Guises as defenders of catholicism, and even considered declaring their war a crusade. Then he ordered the king and Morosini to approach Navarre, 124 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 373, 24 October 1588, Guise to Mendoza, 374, 26 October 1588, Guise to Mendoza. 125 According to de L’Épinois, the estates also called upon Navarre to convert, which makes little sense since they would not have acknowledged him anyway, La Ligue et les papes, 244. Robiquet, furthermore, says that they also demanded the exclusion of Soissons, an eligible, catholic Bourbon, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 459; Picot, Histoire des états généraux, iii, 107. 126 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 795-805, 31 October 1588, Pisani to Henry III. 127 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 80, gives no date for the pope’s second command to the king. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 856, 20 September 1588, Nevers to Henry III, 795-804, 31 October 1588, Pisani to Henry III. Pisani referred to a letter from the king, of 10 October (not available) in which he had said that Nevers was leaving. B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, f. 257, 20 October 1588; Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 167. 128 The comtat Venaissin was part of the Papal, Avignon territories. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 805-6, 27 November 1588, Henry III to Pisani.


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apparently seeking universal reconciliation in France. That was another simplistic encroachment into the temporal sphere.129 Paradoxically, the pope was actually afraid that Navarre might send to the estates proposing to abjure. Sixtus therefore declared that the estates should never have been called.130 But the conflict over Navarre continued, and the assembly persisted in demanding his denunciation. It is to his credit that Henry III never, at any time, agreed to a specific condemnation of Navarre; neither did he ever, publicly and explicitly, name a successor; at least, in that respect, he avoided attracting Papal censure. These Papal contortions, apparently aimed at reunion in France, coincided with the failure of the Spanish Armada. Sixtus V probably feared that the King of Spain might now turn more of his attention to France.

IX: Gallican Liberties and the Quarrel with Rome Franco-Papal relations were already bad, despite the heroic efforts of Morosini, and they were about to worsen. Sixtus V, like everyone else, was also seeking to exploit the estates-general to further his interests in France. The legate was permitted to address the assembly and he seized the opportunity to exhort all three Orders to demand the publication of the decrees of Trent – for which previous nuncios had already striven.131 While the ‘tiers’ was in favour, the clergy and nobles were not. Morosini then attempted a short-circuit, urging the king to go ahead and simply publish the decrees himself. Henry replied, quite rightly, that he would not be obeyed.132 Instead, he appointed a commission, under Épinac, to examine the matter. That was quite a skilful move. By now it was clear that Gallican liberties were under threat from an overbearing and authoritarian pope. Sixtus V had been afforded opportunities to intermeddle in France when the League appealed for his sanction to rebel, and the king appealed for money. A commission to consider the decrees of Trent provided Jacques Faye, sieur d’Espesse, ‘avocat général’, with a welcome opportunity to stand up and defend the Gallican principles which, he said, no council had ever disputed. The Papacy, he declared, had no authority in temporal matters and need not be obeyed. Such a dispute, in a royal commission, was a deeply serious matter: by implication, it denied the validity of Navarre’s excommunication – the content of which was purely secular. His exclusion from the succession was the supreme, outrageous interference in temporal affairs; consequently the act had already been rejected by the ‘parlement’. Secondly, d’Espesse declared that, although Papal authority was recognised in the religious sphere, it had never been absolute or unlimited. When he proceeded to examine what other matters flowed from Gallican principles, he was angrily interrupted; Épinac roundly dismissed

129

The pope had sought the reconciliation of both Épernon and Montmorency with the king. Tempesti, SistoQuinto, ii, 83; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 795-805, 31 October 1588, Pisani to Henry III, 805-6, 27 November 1588, Henry III to Pisani. 130 Aubéry, L’Histoire du cardinal de Joyeuse, 201-4, 4 October 1588, Joyeuse to Henry III. 131 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 83. 132 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 250-3.

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such principles as imaginary.133 The commission broke up in confusion; the pope was furious, and the fundamental issues of authority and independence had been publicly ventilated. Yet again, Sixtus V threatened the king, declaring that if he would not recognise the decrees of Trent, God would not recognise his sovereignty.134 This smacked of deposition, and played into the hands of moderates of all persuasions. Gallican principles and liberties, if ill-defined, were certainly not imaginary. This burgeoning quarrel proved to be of the utmost importance to Navarre, as Henry IV; the subsequent alienation from Rome of a group of royalist prelates provided him with indispensable leverage and support. Besides the decrees of Trent, the invasion of Saluzzo, already noted, contributed to the increasing breakdown of Franco-Papal relations. Exactly what lay behind the affair is uncertain. According to Cavriana, the invasion had been planned some six months previously – in March or April 1588 – but Mendoza declared to Philip II that Savoy had moved too fast.135 To judge from the correspondence of Pisani, the pope was either partly behind the move or at least consented to it. Furthermore, Pisani indicated that Mayenne was also involved. Some evidence suggests that Spain was principally to blame. The rather dubious idea appears to have been that, while Guise was alive and active, the French could safely be expelled from Italy. That would, to some extent, compensate Philip II for the loss of prestige incurred by the failure of the Armada.136 What Sixtus hoped to achieve is unclear. He was evidently concerned about developments in Dauphiné. The loss of that frontier province to the huguenots allegedly posed a threat to Italy, and Sixtus wanted war in Dauphiné to take precedence over Poitou.137 He may have been concerned to distract attention from Spanish preparations for a second Armada together with further, unsuccessful, attempts to control the Channel ports.138 Sixtus 133

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 319-22. Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 91-2. 135 When the king sent an agent to Savoy Guise, according to Joyeuse, also sent someone who got there first. He also reported that Savoy admitted intelligence with Guise over Saluzzo. La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 208-32, 9 January 1589, Joyeuse to Henry III; ibid., 250 n.14, 12 December 1588, Joyeuse to Henry III. 136 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 834-49, 15 November 1588, Cavriana to Serguidi; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 528, 18 January 1589, Lippomano to the doge and senate, Madrid; CSPVen., 1581-91, p. 433, 13 May 1589, Contarini to the doge and senate, Madrid. The headstrong duke of Savoy was, of course, also acting in his own interests, doubtless knowing that Philip II wanted him to secure an ample state for himself. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 367-9, 13 October 1588, Mendoza to Philip II; Bergadini, Carlo Emanuele I, 37-42; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 787-94, 17 October 1588, Pisani to Henry III, 80815, 13 November 1588, Pisani to Henry III. It was cardinal Montalto who told Pisani that Mayenne was also involved. Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 288-96. 137 Aubéry, L’Histoire du cardinal de Joyeuse, 201-4, 4 October 1588, Joyeuse to Henry III, Rome. Joyeuse was certain that Savoy had conceived this plan long ago and that Spain and the pope both knew about it. The pope, he said, concealed a great deal from him. Spain insisted that she was not involved, which Joyeuse did not believe, while Savoy boasted of enjoying Papal approval. Ibid., 207-12, 27 October 1588, Joyeuse to Henry III, 231-4, 12 December 1588, Joyeuse to Henry III. Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 289, 296, agreed that the pope secretly authorised the invasion of Saluzzo; also that the pope was deceived by Savoy. 138 Philip II’s reaction to the loss of the Armada, was to plan to have another powerful fleet ready by March 1589. That, however, was not practicable. On the other hand, he was not entirely averse from peace, provided 134


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proposed to Pisani that Henry should appoint Savoy as his ‘gouverneur’ of Saluzzo and join with him and Mayenne against the huguenots in Dauphiné. That idea, according to cardinal Montalto, originated in Spain. The pope was playing some complex game, and saying different things to Pisani and Olivares.139 Whatever the truth of the matter, Sixtus’ proposal was insolent, providing further evidence of interference – albeit in a temporal matter by which he was himself affected. Undoubtedly Sixtus V wished to be the arbiter of the Saluzzo affair, and to become the depositary of the marquisate – an expedient to be adopted later under Clement VIII.140

X: The Limit of Endurance If Henry’s relations with Rome were steadily worsening, so were his relations with Guise. The frail facade of cordiality between them was shattered by the hostile estates which heaped humiliations upon the hapless king. Additional quarrels arose over finance which, in view of the huguenot war, were inevitable and bitter. Guise did use his influence to obtain a small sum of money for the war, but he coveted the credit for tax reductions, and sought to obtain the dismissal of a number of – royalist – finance officers. While this, in itself, might have been beneficial, Guise control of the finances could only further undermine the king’s authority.141 The new Guise tactic, masterminded by Épinac, was not working. Guise complained naively of Henry’s distrust, and that he was slow to implement decisions. Guise confided to Morosini that he contemplated leaving court, at the same time becoming increasingly exigent.142 As in Paris, he imposed a special council of his own followers, in order to constrain the king’s freedom of action; and he forced the king to dismiss and to prosecute his chief advisers; only d’O remained.143 Furthermore, Guise sought to control nearby Orléans, which he claimed was granted to him by the [secret articles of the] edict of Union. Perhaps most disturbing of all, he allegedly wished the estates to declare him constable – which was not in their gift; and there were secret reports about his [hostile] intentions.144 he could get his own way. CSPVen., 1581-91, p. 394, 29 September 1588, Madrid, 400-1, 15 October 1588, 408-9, 24 October 1588, Lippomano to the doge and senate. 139 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 808-15, 13 November 1588, Pisani to Henry III, 817-21, 28 November 1588, Pisani to Henry III. 140 The issue of Saluzzo did not go away. It bedevilled the treaty of Vervins, 1598, and was not finally settled until 1601. That was after Henry IV had gone to war with Savoy. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 795805, 31 October 1588, Pisani to Henry III. 141 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 318; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 255-7; Tempesti, SistoQuinto, ii, 104-5; Picot, Histoire des états généraux, iii, 120-1, 132. The estates called for a ‘chambre de justice’ to enquire into the finances. 142 Cooper, ‘The Blois Assassinations’, in Cameron, Ed., From Bourbon to Valois, 54, quoting Morosini, 19 December 1588; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, l05, 19 December 1588, Morosini to Montalto. 143 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, f. 279-80, 16 November 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Tempesti, SistoQuinto, ii, 104-5; Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x (1895), 31214, 24 December 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 144 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 470; Picot, Histoire des états généraux, iii, 137, 138. Péricard, secretary to Guise, later claimed, in his deposition, that Orléans had been granted to Guise by a separate

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As the tension mounted, Guise himself received a multiplicity of warnings to the effect that he was in danger; but he could not, without disrepute, leave Blois before the closure of the estates.145 In general, Guise was the stronger except, as Mendoza had observed, in the king’s closet. But, if he wanted to dominate the king, he could not refuse to attend; therein lay the risk. No doubt he had a clearer view than the king of the likely consequences of his own demise – except that Morosini had spelt it out – and convinced himself that Henry would not dare to molest him.146 Arrogantly assured of his own impunity, Guise misjudged the king’s temperament. One of the warnings received by Guise came indirectly from the pope, conveyed by an agent of Guise, Nicolas (also called Jean) de Pilles, abbé d’Orbais.147 Guise showed the letter to Morosini. The legate bravely confronted the king with this serious allegation, attributing his anxiety to ‘the common voice’. Morosini addressed the king with ‘fervour and liberty’: if Henry were to procure the death of Guise within the castle, it would be infamous for his reputation, and entail the destruction of the state. Guise, he pointed out, had two brothers (the cardinal de Guise and the duc de Mayenne), who would never lay down their arms until they had avenged him. Furthermore, Guise had many notable relatives and friends, and the best and most important cities would revolt. That is what the king had rightly feared for some time past. Although the king, in arms, might eventually prevail, he would not succeed either quickly or easily. Nothing, Morosini concluded, could be gained by the death of Guise. Henry would simply have to face both the catholics and the huguenots simultaneously. If that was not quite how things transpired, there was much truth in the legate’s candid warning; certainly nothing constructive could be gained.148 That such a conversation was even possible, testifies to the sinister atmosphere in Blois. Henry replied, with cryptic truth, that he had as much care for the duke’s life as for his own. Morosini hammered home the point that, if ‘the common voice’ proved to be true, Henry would be embarking upon a long, difficult and expensive path; the friends of Guise were legion, and would be immutable, even after his death. Yet the only advice Morosini could offer was for the king to bind Guise to himself by favours and kindness. If the one was a counsel of despair, the other was an impossibility. Guise was no longer susceptible to royal blandishments; they did not suit his book. Morosini did his best, fearing that Guise and his followers might suddenly depart. Upon another occasion, ‘brevet’ signed by the king and Pinart, while d’Antragues had promised the king that he could hold the city for him, which he tried to do but ultimately failed. Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, 190-1. It appears that Guise got his way over Orléans and d’Antragues was ordered to hold the city for the duke. Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x (1895), 311-12, 20 December 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 145 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, 215-16. 146 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 361, 21 September 1588, Guise to Mendoza, 363-5, 24 September 1588, Mendoza to Philip II, 367-9, 13 October 1588, Mendoza to Philip II; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 823-6, 24 September 1588, Cavriana to Serguidi. 147 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 80, no date. 148 In this, and in his efforts to obtain the reconciliation of Montmorency and Épernon with the king, Morosini was acting upon Papal orders. Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 80. Unfortunately there is no date for Morosini’s important audience.


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Morosini suggested to the king that money might be an answer, because the duke was known to be heavily in debt. Provided with the means to sustain himself, Guise should be kept continuously occupied. Allegedly Guise was offered 200,000 écus, which he refused. Near the end of October 1588, a Florentine banker, Rucellai, dined with the duc de Guise, and reflected upon the incompatibility between the duke’s consuming ambition and the king’s compulsion to control him. Later Rucellai maintained that Guise wanted to retake Saluzzo. That might have kept him occupied, at a desirable distance. But Henry dared not entrust Guise with an army; as Rucellai observed, the great apprehension between them extended ‘sino alle proprie vite’.149 As Guise acquired an ever stronger hold on the direction of affairs, Henry began to receive ever more urgent warnings of danger. It was probably on 18 December that the royalist, Alfonso Corso, also called Ornano, arrived in Blois, sent by Mayenne from Lyon. Mayenne, ‘gouverneur’ of Burgundy, was to take the field in Dauphiné. Ostensibly, Ornano came to discover how Mayenne should act in respect of Savoy. But that was not all; he conveyed a warning to the king, of which there are differing versions. Henry should beware of Guise who, for certain, had a wicked design against him, to be executed sometime soon. The strongest version of the message is that Guise was conspiring to kill the king and seize the throne. De Thou gives a more cautious account of Ornano’s warning: namely that Mayenne had only sent to offer his services, if his kinsmen [at court] were to plot against the king. Mayenne later vilified the king for having distorted the message.150 Mayenne kept a secretary, Rossieux, at Blois supposedly to follow the proceedings of the estates-general. Rossieux was in touch with Péricard, secretary to Guise, and doubtless also with Mendoza. Thus we may suppose that Mayenne was well informed about the ominous developments at court. His notorious ‘warning’ may have been a precautionary measure, intended to distance himself from his brothers.151 As the king understood it, Mayenne’s message was corroborated by another, which came from the duc d’Aumale in Paris. Aumale was present when a decision was taken [?by the Seize] to send a force to Blois to abduct the king and carry him back to Paris. Aumale sent his wife to warn the king of this conspiracy.152 In Henry’s own account, incorporated into a later document, he gave most prominence to Aumale’s warning, which was quite specific. He was also warned by one, Provenchères, a servant of Guise, and received similar information from the baron de Luz, a nephew of Épinac. There was therefore nothing crucial about the exact version of Mayenne’s message. In Rome the cardinal de Joyeuse heard, upon good authority, that the cardinal de Guise had dispatched Pierre Frizon (Frisson, Frison), the dean of Reims, 149

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 877, 7 November 1588, Rucellai to Usimbardi, 877-9, 19 December 1588, Rucellai to Usimbardi. We should not, necessarily, believe the rhetoric about Saluzzo, though it may well be true that Guise desired an army. Cavriana’s fears were already extreme by 24 September 1588, ibid., 823-6, Cavriana to Serguidi. 150 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 324. 151 Drouot, ‘Le Duc de Mayenne au lendemain des assassinats de Blois’, Mémoires de l’Académie de Dijon, 1927-33 (no volume number), 3. 152 It is not clear why Aumale should have been concerned to warn the king. There appear to have been serious differences among the leaders of the League who were not necessarily loyal to Guise.

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to seek express Papal authorisation to seize the king. This was a matter in which the abbé d’Orbais was involved. Allegedly, this authorisation was granted.153 Henry could hardly afford to wait upon subtleties; what he understood, as he informed Nevers, was that Guise intended to seize him. Writing later, Joyeuse was quite clear that, with or without permission, the Guise brothers had been about to lay hands upon the king and hold him captive in Paris – for a start. True or false it was, in the end, the fear of abduction or arrest which ended the king’s hesitation and impelled him to act.154 With these fears preying on his mind, on 22 December 1588 Henry had a two-hour walk in the garden with the duc de Guise. While no one overheard the conversation, their gesticulations conveyed disagreement. Miron, however, claimed to have been present, some days later, when Henry explained to his half-sister, madame d’Angoulême, what had happened. Henry wanted to discuss the huguenot war. But Guise interrupted him with a stream of complaints. He had decided, he finally declared, to be revenged for his illtreatment at court. Thereupon he resigned his military ‘charge’ and sought licence to depart to his ‘gouvernement’ of Champagne – at the same time demanding the ‘survivance’ for his son. Provoked in this way, Henry disclosed his knowledge of the ‘petits conseils’ which Guise had been holding, day and night and in a variety of places. Ignoring the accusation, Guise stuck to the subject of his resignation, which the king rejected. Step by step, the king was cornered. Finding no way to escape, Henry seized the reality that he and the duc de Guise could no longer survive together; one or other of them would have to die. Henry had lived with this nightmare contingency for long enough. Believing in the pre-emptive need to save his own life, and to preserve the crown, Henry determined to command the deed which had long been expected.155 Finally acting with precipitous haste – following the acrimonious exchange in the garden – Henry neglected 153

‘Aussi tient-on ici qu’ils [the Guises] ont fait instance secrete et precise au Pape de trouver bon qu’ils se saisissent de votre personne... et plusieurs gens d’entendement, et qui savent les affaires de Rome, ont opinion que le doyen de Rheims, sous couleur de la légation d’Avignon, était venu quérir ladite permission, et qu’il l’a emportée’. Jean de Piles (called Nicolas by de Thou), canon of Notre Dame, abbé d’Orbais was described by Pisani as a ‘très pernicieux instrument’. He left Rome at the end of 1588, his mission complete because he was confident that the king would be seized. La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 208-32, 9 January 1589, Joyeuse to Henry III; Cooper, ‘The Blois Assassinations’, 55-6, says there is no clear evidence that Mayenne warned the king. Nor is there any clear evidence that Corso did not warn him. Tempesti, Sistoquinto, ii, l09; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, ‘discours’, 141-2; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 470, 520; De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 260-1; de Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 385-6, 27 December 1588, Mendoza to Philip II; Revue rétrospective, iii (1834), 4401, 23 December 1588, Henry III to Nevers; Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 333. 154 La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 208-32, 9 January 1589, Joyeuse to Henry III; B.N., Mss. ital. 1735, ?f. 343, 24 December 1588 (there are errors at this point in the folio numbers), says that men were being raised in Paris to send to Blois to seize the king, and Guise held the keys to the château; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iii, 203-11, 13 February 1589, declaration of Henry III against Aumale and Mayenne; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 471. The plot is indicated in the ‘relation de Miron’, Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, 124. 155 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, ‘relation de Miron’, 111-38. The questions Henry put to Péricard on 24 December show clearly what his accusations were against the duc de Guise. Ibid., 197.


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all the preliminary measures that caution and security required. That was foolhardy; except that Henry did not command the necessary means to secure Paris and Orléans, to surround Blois, to arrest Aumale, or to seize Mayenne in distant Burgundy; neither could such measures have been undertaken with sufficient secrecy and speed. Nevertheless, Henry did pause to take counsel and to search his conscience. Was there any other way out, and was it legitimate to kill? To the first question, the answer was definitely no; to the second, technically it was yes. Summary justice was neither new nor unlawful; but it could be ill-advised, and was certain to be exploited.156 The duc de Guise was murdered in the king’s ante-chamber – just as Mendoza had predicted – early in the morning of 23 December 1588. This was not, however, a calculated political ‘coup’, but a sudden, desperate act of self-defence. Henry is alleged to have exclaimed, with ephemeral relief, ‘now I am king’. The ‘success’ he desired was the restoration of his authority. But Henry III had not, in that instant, become ‘the king’, and his authority was not thereby restored. As Morosini had rightly perceived, the tentacles of the League spread too far and too wide, not only throughout France but also to Madrid, to Brussels and to Rome. At the same time a number of other Leaguers were arrested in Blois. Besides their puppet, the cardinal de Bourbon, the detainees included the duke’s son, the prince de Joinville, his brother, Louis cardinal de Guise, his half-brother the duc de Nemours and their mother, madame de Nemours; also Épinac, archbishop of Lyon, the duc d’Elboeuf, Péricard secretary to Guise, and the Parisian deputies to the estates.157 These were persons of rank and influence whose detention was certain to provoke an uproar. Thus, what to do with these captives very soon became a serious embarrassment. The removal of Guise was, for Henry III, a personal and destructive necessity. But his shocked elation quickly curdled as he realised that the cardinal de Guise was too dangerous to spare. Accordingly, the cardinal perished next day, thereby opening an entirely fresh chapter of troubles. To have murdered the duc de Guise, a rebellious subject, was one thing. But the murder of a cardinal – rebellious or not – and the imprisonment of another, gravely embroiled the king with the legate and the Papacy; that was something that Henry had not foreseen. The king’s enemies received a notable advantage; the League rebelled in many places and the aggressive Parisian curés began to bellow for his excommunication. In the ensuing row about the cardinals, the arguments were specious and even absurd. Nevertheless, the pope seized upon that opportunity to tighten his grip upon the hapless king. Henry III could muddle and temporise no longer; he was facing total disaster – excommunication, deposition, and probably death. Only then did the last Valois turn to his still unconverted heir, Henry of Navarre. Grudgingly, Henry III was forced to accept the service that Navarre had been offering since 1583. 156

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 328-32, Henry’s long and sometimes moving confession, or apology, to three intimates, whose counsel he sought on 22 December 1588. He referred to his fear of foreigners in France disputing the just succession – which is what transpired. 157 Mendoza was evidently afraid that Péricart would betray the complete projects of the League and the full extent of Mendoza’s involvement. Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 171-2, quoting Simancas K 1567, f. 191, 27 December 1588, Mendoza to Philip II.

CHAPTER VII: THE ‘TRAITÉ DE LA TRÈVE’, APRIL 1589 I: Revolution in Paris The elimination of the duc de Guise had been, for the king, a personal necessity. But it was not, otherwise, of much avail so long as Paris was controlled by the Seize and other extremists; the monarchy could never be restored until they were destroyed and the city returned to allegiance. This was Navarre’s advice to the king, following their agreement, the ‘traité de la trève’, in April 1589; and that was also to be his own, bitter experience as Henry IV. News of the death of Guise reached Paris on Christmas eve 1588; the reaction was immediate and violent. If it is true that the Parisians had been planning to abduct the king from Blois, they had been frustrated. When they learnt of the death of their hero, and the arrest of their deputies to the estates, their anger exploded into frenetic activity.1 Indeed the League launched into action before anyone else was even aware of the news. They sent for Aumale, cousin to the late duke, with whom they held a council that night, and elected him as their governor. Aumale wasted no time in disseminating the news. He called for forces, and sent his brother, Claude de Lorraine, known as the chevalier d’Aumale, to support Orléans which had risen in revolt.2 Claiming, as usual, that religion was in danger, they sent to inform the affiliated League cities, and also replaced the absent officials imprisoned at Blois. It was assumed that civil war was inevitable. Thus, on 1 January 1589, they wrote to congratulate Mayenne upon his survival and asked him to come to Paris; they needed a commander. Preparations began at once: taxes were raised and arrests were made, often in order to obtain money.3 Meanwhile the preachers mounted their pulpits to vilify the king, incite revolt, and to foment hatred and fanaticism. The new, provisional government consisted of Aumale, with a council, namely the ‘bureau de la ville’, plus sixteen councillors. These were chosen from among the revolutionary committees of nine established in each quartier, and changed every week. The quartier committees, according to de Thou, were composed of the dregs of society and constituted the new driving force in revolutionary Paris.4 The city was in a state of anarchy; all the signs and symbols of royalty were execrated and destroyed, and terrorism went unchecked. Having failed, yet again, to seize the king, the Parisians still meant to be rid of him – by whatever means. If it was the murder of the duc de Guise which most enraged 1

Saulnier, Ed., Journal de François Bourgeois de Paris, 12, lists the ‘prévôt des marchands’, La ChapelleMarteau, three ‘échevins’ Campans, Cotteblanche and Le Roy and the ‘président’ Neuilly; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 472 n.2, omits Cotteblanche. 2 Saulnier, Ed., Journal de François Bourgeois de Paris, 12-14; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 356. 3 Some time before this revolt, the Parisians had tried to organise a network of secret provincial councils. See Drouot, ‘Les Conseils provinciaux de la Sainte-Union 1589-95’, Annales du Midi, lxv (1953), 415-333; Félibien, Histoire de la ville de Paris, v, 450, 26 December 1588, ‘ordre pour la sûreté de Paris’, 451, 29 December 1588, ‘ordre pour les levées de milice et d’argent’, 451, 31 December 1588, Paris to Mayenne. 4 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 487-93. He lists the names of the sixteen ‘quartiniers’ many of whom were long-term Leaguers.

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revolutionary Paris, it was the death of his brother, the cardinal de Guise, that they exploited to further their designs. On this account the ‘curés’ were not backward in declaring the king to be excommunicated. That was no business of theirs but it was, or would be, an essential step towards the king’s destruction, since they could not then be required to obey him. On 7 January 1589, a memoir was presented to the Sorbonne, itself deeply permeated by the Seize and the Jesuits. The Leaguers wished to know whether they were released from their allegiance and free to bear arms against a king who had ‘violated public faith’ at the estates of Blois – whatever that inferred. Notwithstanding some opposition, the radicals prevailed, and the answers were affirmative.5 The Sorbonne decree of the same date was published and dispatched to Rome with Lazare Coqueley and the abbé d’Orbais who had been, until recently, a League representative in Rome. They may have gone together with Mayenne’s envoy, Jacques de Diou. Diou, however, travelled via Turin where, according to Joyeuse, he negotiated with the duke of Savoy. The Sorbonne reputedly required the king to be excommunicated and asked the pope to act accordingly. Aumale, for his part, had already appealed to the pope to avenge the house of Lorraine, defenders of the Church, though he did not specify by what means.6 The violence of the League reaction in Paris, specifically against the king, alienated the moderates and, in particular, members of the ‘parlement’. The revolutionary government therefore proceeded, on 16 January 1589, to intimidate and purge the ‘parlement’, leaving a rump which, for the time being, was compliant. The magistrates swore a new oath, entirely hostile to the king and contrary to their duty as royal servants.7 The king’s rejoinder was to order Aumale out of Paris, and the courts to cease from their functions. But his messenger was rejected, and all his feeble efforts to conciliate Paris were drowned in derision. Shortly after this Henry ordered the ‘parlement’ into exile at Tours; henceforth it remained divided until after the recapture of Paris by Henry IV in 1594. According to the usually reliable Venetian, Mocenigo, a price of 10,000 écus was placed on the king’s head.8 It was doubtless because Paris was preparing for a siege that 5

Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iii, 181-3, 7 January 1589, ‘déclaration’ of the Sorbonne. This amounted to a declaration of deposition. According to one source, they had already, on 4 January 1589, declared the king excommunicated. Saulnier, Ed., Journal de François Bourgeois de Paris, 22; CSPF., 1589, pp. 32-3, [between 7-12/17-22 January 1589], occurrents out of France, said it was resolved that the king was ‘excommunicate’ and no obedience was due to him. 6 Jacques de Diou, commandeur de l’Ordre de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem, seigneur de Montcenis. La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 252-63, [probably February 1589], Joyeuse to Henry III; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 501; Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x (1895), 322-4, 12 January 1589, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Cooper, ‘The Aftermath of the Blois Assassinations’, French History, iii (1989), 409, 31 December 1588, Aumale to the pope. 7 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 502-6; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iii, 178-9, ‘déclaration en forme de serment’. 8 Félibien, Histoire de la ville de Paris, v, 304-6, – February 1589, translation of the ‘parlement’ of Paris to Tours, registered 23 March 1589; Saulnier, Ed., Journal de François Bourgeois de Paris, 42-3. The king released two of the ‘échevins’ to act as intermediaries – which they did not – and sent them to Paris with an offer of pardon. Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x (1895), 322-4, 12 January 1589, Mocenigo to the doge and senate, 324-5, 26 January 1589, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 496, 507.

Chapter VII: The ‘Traité de la Trève’, April 1589

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they sent letter upon letter to hasten the arrival of Mayenne. They also sought to cloak their cause with Papal authority, asking the pope for men and money for a war of revenge, tactlessly referring to the king as ‘ce mauldict et excommunié tirand’. Furthermore, they wrote to the cardinal de Joyeuse – who later joined the League – seeking his support in Rome and emphasising Henry’s ‘crime’ in having murdered a cardinal.9 Thus Paris, as Robiquet remarked, had totally departed from the forms of respect and submission which Guise, who aspired to the crown himself, had been constrained to observe. The king’s name was deleted from the mass; henceforth he was called at best Henri de Valois, if not by some derisory epithet. The ‘parlement’ in Paris ceased to act in his name, while Aumale claimed to act for all France.10 The rebels were grasping their greatest opportunity to date, but what they really hoped to gain, beyond short-term power and profit, was never clear. Aumale had his own provincial programme – with or without a monarchy – but, with Guise deceased, Paris was obliged to call upon Mayenne for leadership. His aspirations, however, like those of his deceased brother, equally required him to preserve the monarchical forms and framework of government. Consequently there was always to be a more or less crippling divergence of purpose between the Seize and the remains of the aristocratic Catholic League under Mayenne. He was supported by the moderates and the ‘parlementaires’.

II: The Emergence of Mayenne The uproar and anarchy in Paris were quickly apparent, and a grave sign of danger for the king; meanwhile, for several anxious weeks, Mayenne kept Henry guessing.11 If he were to remain loyal, Cavriana observed, Spain would have lost her hold on France; doubtless that accounts for the despondency of Mendoza. Thus, for a while, everything continued to be uncertain. Mayenne, like the rest of the clan – except for the cardinal de Guise – had been jealous of his eldest brother, who led them all into disrepute, and for little or no reward. The king, for his part, did not wholly distrust Mayenne, as he had the duc de Guise, and had twice given him a command in the huguenot wars. But, without playing a central role, Mayenne had certainly been involved in the League. He was represented at Joinville in 1584; he had conspired with the Parisians to destroy the king in 1587, and he had assisted, in 1588, to draft the articles against Épernon.12 He was no less avid than the others for profit, power, and personal aggrandisement but his best prospects, so far, had 9

Félibien, Histoire de la ville de Paris, v, 453-4, 11 January 1589, Paris to Joyeuse; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 517; Saulnier, Ed., Journal de François Bourgeois de Paris, 30; Revue rétrospective, iii (1834), 194-6, 11 January 1589, Paris to Joyeuse. 10 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 507-8. 11 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 842-6, 24 December 1588, 846-53, 31 December 1588, 855-8, 16 January 1589, Cavriana to Serguidi. Cavriana – who thought that Mayenne should be arrested – reported that there was still no sign as to what he would do. CSPF., 1589, pp. 47-50, 18/28 January 1589 (last date), news from divers places, gives some interesting details about the current situation in France. 12 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, i, 208.

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been in his ‘gouvernement’ of Burgundy. The death of his brothers now offered him a role on the national stage. Paris pleaded for his services as commander – that is to say in a military capacity – while his sister, madame de Montpensier, clamoured at him to revenge them all. Thus it was specifically against Henry III that Mayenne took up arms in January 1589. When the king was destroyed – whether incarcerated, deposed or deceased – the supreme prize just might lie within his grasp, since the League had rejected Navarre long ago; it was the crown that dazzled Mayenne. From this time until 1595, Mayenne was to be Navarre’s principal domestic enemy, vigorously opposing his succession not only in France but also in Rome. It is therefore important to consider Mayenne’s début as leader of the Catholic Union. After the murders at Blois, the king’s attitude to Mayenne was hazy and ambiguous. Accounts differ as to what, initially, Henry really sought to do. It does, however, seem clear that reconciliation was open to Mayenne, and at a handsome profit to himself. On the other hand, reconciliation with the king might have generated more problems than it solved, and lost him the catholic support; besides, his ambition soared with his prospects.13 It appears that Mayenne first learnt of the death of Guise via his secretary, Rossieux, who fled from Blois with celerity and dispatched an express messenger from Orléans. Stafford reported Mayenne to have been at dinner in Lyon when he first heard ‘of these news’ on 26 December. Inevitably Mayenne experienced an element of shock and naturally had to consider what to do. But, if he hesitated, as some sources allege, it was not for long.14 Having considered his position Mayenne left Lyon next day, bound for safer places; he was advised not to return. He travelled to Mâcon, Tournus and Chalon-surSaône. There he was joined by his councillor, Pierre Jeannin who, like Villeroy, consistently worked for peace. Together Mayenne and Jeannin proceeded to Beaune, and thence reached Dijon, the provincial capital, on 4 January 1589. There Mayenne took measures to ensure his own authority, and League supremacy in the province. It was doubtless in anticipation of some communication from the king – the nature of which was problematical – that Mayenne had departed without delay. Consequently he had already gone when Alfonso Corso returned from Blois. According to the king’s own account, Henry did not believe Mayenne to have been involved in the latest machinations of his brother but, obviously, he could be alienated. Henry therefore sent orders that Mayenne should return to his ‘gouvernement’ – which he had freely done – and leave the command in Dauphiné to Corso.15 The contents of the king’s letters to Mayenne, and the exact nature of his orders to Corso, are not satisfactorily attested. Cavriana reported that Corso 13

Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, i, 247. Drouot, ‘Le duc de Mayenne au lendemain des assassinats de Blois’, Mémoires de l’Académie de Dijon, (no volume number) 1927-33, pp. 6-7. This account, written by Pierre Jeannin, ‘président’ of the ‘parlement’ of Dijon and trusted councillor of Mayenne, says that Rossieux fled to Orléans and advised Mayenne from there. Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, i, 226. By the middle of January 1589, Mayenne was reported to be seeking forces in Milan, which shows that he did not hesitate for long. CSPF., 1589, pp. 14-17, 4/14 January 1589 (last date), news from divers places, 17, 5/15 January 1589, Stafford to Walsingham. 15 B.N., Mss. ital. 1737, ff. 343-7, 24 December 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Revue rétrospective, iii (1834), 447-50, 24 December 1588, Henry III to Pisani; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 110. 14


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went to induce Mayenne to remain loyal. But Drouot said that he had orders to seize Mayenne if he showed any signs of rebellion. Cayet clearly states that the king sent to arrest Mayenne. It was not, however, until he had reached the relative safety of Dijon that he received the king’s letters (which are not extant). Henry evidently appealed to him not to react adversely, claiming that his necessary actions had been prompted by Mayenne’s own warning. Whatever enticements were also proposed, this accusation was obviously a tactical error and provoked indignant denials.16 A few weeks later, Mayenne sent Corso what now seems rather a cryptic letter. Mayenne declared that the explanation made by Corso in Lyon to one Tranges, about the death of his brothers, was not acceptable. Mayenne would never believe that anything could excuse such an unjust vendetta. Furthermore, he claimed to have learnt that he too was destined to perish, and appears to indicate (in Italian) that it was Corso himself who had been deputed to perform that deed. But this Mayenne could hardly credit, since he took Corso to be a gentleman of honour. Now Mayenne would perform his duty and seek revenge. It is also reported that Henry sent the baron de Luz to Dijon with orders to the ‘parlement’ to seize Mayenne if he disobeyed the royal commands. But Mayenne swiftly purged the ‘parlement’ and imprisoned fifteen members, and the baron de Luz found that Dijon had rallied to Mayenne.17 Thus, whatever Henry had intended in respect of Mayenne, he had not moved fast enough. Before deciding how to proceed, Mayenne naturally had to consider what support he might attract. He was immediately assured of Paris, without which he could not have operated, although the alliance was never to be close or comfortable. Could he also expect Papal support, and continued help from Spain such as Guise had received? These would be the deciding factors. If Mayenne affected to deplore the death of Guise, that of the cardinal strengthened his hand in respect of Rome – to which Paris had appealed without delay. It was the death of the cardinal de Guise which assisted Mayenne to complete the downfall of Henry III which he was otherwise unlikely, at that time, to have achieved in the field. Indeed, it was probably the second murder that clinched Mayenne’s decision. On 5 January 1589, the day after he arrived in Dijon, Mayenne sent Diou to Rome. He was to inform the pope of the death of the cardinal and to ask for the support of Sixtus’ authority, counsel and forces. Exploiting his advantage to the full, Mayenne now claimed that the king could no longer be useful; there was nothing more to be expected from him. The pope should therefore assume the protection of the French catholics and 16 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 842-6, 24 December 1589, Cavriana to Serguidi; Drouot, ‘Le Duc de Mayenne au lendemain des assassinats de Blois’, Mémoires de l’Académie de Dijon, 1927-33, pp. 4-5; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, i, 244; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, ‘discours de ce qui est arrivé à Blois’, 148 indicates, in a garbled way, that Corso had secret orders to kill Mayenne, La Châtre and Saint-Paul. Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 174, referred to Corso as a hired assassin; he was one of the king’s commanders. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 354; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, i, 297-8. 17 Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x (1895), 326-7, 30 January 1589, Mayenne to Corso. Whether or not Henry ever tried to have Mayenne murdered, is not clear. So to accuse him was the obvious propaganda line and such rumours were inevitable. Ibid., 326, 26 January 1589, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Drouot, ‘Le Duc de Mayenne au lendemain des assassinats de Blois’, Mémoires de l’Académie de Dijon, 1927-33, pp. 8-10.

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unite with them to avenge this outrage against the Church. At the same time, Mayenne sent La Mothe-Réal to the catholic cantons of Switzerland, and Pélissier to Spain to seek assistance from Philip II.18

III: The Spanish Reaction Mendoza, shocked and frightened by the events he had long foreseen, was uncharacteristically subdued. He confided to Parma his fear that the League would now be overthrown and the Union of the towns destroyed. Without seeking to penetrate the future, he reported to Philip II the unco-ordinated movements of rebellion, the anarchy and disorders in Paris, the events in Orléans, and the progress of Mayenne; and he asked for instructions without proffering advice.19 When, on 14 January 1589, Philip II heard of the death of the duc de Guise, he stood staring at the floor; eventually he said, ‘this is a matter for the pope’. One might rather suppose that Philip was referring to the death of the cardinal, perceiving the leverage that event would afford. Indeed, Olivares was instructed to insist upon the gravity of the murder of a cardinal, and to incite the pope’s anger against Henry III. Far away in Spain, Philip II cautiously pondered the new situation; the duc de Lorraine and Mayenne were likely to seek his help but, first of all, he wanted more information. He advised encouragement, and physical help if Mayenne were to enter Paris; but, so soon after the Armada, the League had precious little to offer Spain. Philip’s support was not gratuitous; what he most desired was the return of Cambrai, occupied by Anjou in 1581; he also had an increasing interest in the Brittany coast. For the moment, Parma’s formal instructions were to keep the peace with France despite, as the duke observed, all the contrary reasons.20 But, up until the death of Henry III, Philip II’s attention remained primarily focused upon England; and 1589 was the year of England’s revenge attack on Portugal. Of all the servants of Philip II Parma, in the Netherlands, was the most closely affected by the death of Guise. Aumale and Mendoza immediately informed him of this, with further letters about the cardinal. Doubtless echoing Mendoza, Parma feared the 18

De Thou says that Coqueley and the abbé d’Orbais followed Diou to Rome. Histoire universelle, vii, 3912; Drouot, ‘Le Duc de Mayenne au lendemain des assassinats de Blois’, Mémoires de l’Académie de Dijon, 1927-33, pp. 11-12. The League agents were reported to have arrived by 21 January. CSPF., 1589, pp. 23-6, 21 January 1589, news from Rome. Mayenne wrote to Philip II again on 28 January, seeking protection and support and insinuating that Henry III and Navarre were already acting together, which was not yet true. Capefigue, Histoire de la Réforme, v, 304-6, 28 January 1589, Mayenne to Philippe II. 19 CSPVen., 1581-91, pp. 424-5, 15 January 1589, Lippomano to the doge and senate, Madrid; Hubner, Sixtequint, iii, 52-8, 276-82, 18 January 1589, Lippomano to the doge and senate. From Venice John Wroth (Wrothe) confided to Walsingham that the spirits of the Italian princes were revived by the death of the Guises. They hoped that France might now overcome the Spanish faction and then liberate them. CSPF., 1588, pp. 393-4, 26 December 1588/5 January 1589; de Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 385-7, 27 December 1588, 388-9, 31 December 1588, 390-2, 5 January 1589, 392-5, 21 January 1589, Mendoza to Philip II; CSPF., 1588, pp. 391-3, 25 December 1588/4 January 1589, Parma to Philip II. 20 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 384, 19 January 1589, Philip II to Parma, 403, 12 April 1589, Philip II to Parma, 391-2, 17 February 1589, Parma to Philip II. Mendoza was, of course, pressing for increased help as the civil war gathered pace.


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ruination of the League, and the liberation of Henry III who might then seek to profit from the Anglo-Spanish war. Parma was inundated with French requests for help, which he was in no position to afford and had no instructions to extend. He did, however, dispense the required encouragement, sweetened with a little money for Aumale and, to some extent, he misled Mayenne. Parma’s opinion was that Aumale and Mayenne should receive substantial help, and he suggested that Philip II might even grant Mayenne some sort of commission. Parma sent Gabriel de Alegria (secretary to Tassis) to discover Mayenne’s intentions. Bassompierre and Maineville, ‘two very friends of Guise’, had both escaped from Blois to Paris and hastened to send La Planche to the Spanish commander count Charles Mansfelt. They proposed, in return for assistance, to facilitate the Spanish occupation of many important towns in the north – an injudicious offer.21 Late in April 1589, Mayenne told Mendoza that Spanish assurances were the reason why he proceeded with his plan, and he hoped to obtain a revised agreement, tailored to the new situation.22 Thus Mayenne already knew that Parma’s support could be relied upon, together with his influence in Madrid, although their relationship actually proved to be anything but cordial. Parma, however, fell seriously ill at this time and withdrew to Spa. Indeed, he never fully recovered before his death in December 1592. Nevertheless, intermediaries on both sides sought to combine a revised treaty between Spain and Mayenne as the new leader of the Catholic Union. Philip was offered the title and ‘pouvoir’ (whatever that implied) of protector to the League and Union of Catholics, and Mayenne would act as his lieutenant-general in France; the cardinal de Bourbon, still a prisoner, was expendable. Philip II was not, however, to be ceded Cambrai, nor any towns in Picardy. He might keep such huguenot towns as his forces occupied – which would appear to be largely hypothetical. He was also offered Navarre’s property in France and the Netherlands, which was hardly more realistic. Such terms, coming from the supplicant, were unacceptable to Spain. Nevertheless, the proposal shows that, even before the death of Henry III, the Spanish invasion of France had been envisaged. Parma’s response was necessarily non-committal. The matter was still under consideration when Henry III was murdered in August 1589; indeed, it was never to be satisfactorily settled. It was therefore Navarre who suffered, if not from a revised alliance, at least from a renewed affinity; it is well known that, in 1590, it was Parma who forced him to raise the siege of Paris.23 21

Christophe, baron de Bassompierre, seigneur d’Harouel et de Baudricourt, colonel of the reiters. CSPF., 1588, pp. 391-3, 25 December 1588/4 January 1589, Parma to Philip II. This, presumably, was intercepted. On the other hand, a similar letter of the same date appears in Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 379, Parma to Philip II. It was quite usual to send copies of letters by different routes. Ibid., 379, 4 January 1589 (2), Parma to Philip II, 382-3, 13 January 1589, Parma to Philip II. The duc de Lorraine also asked for help and madame de Montpensier went to Flanders for the same purpose. CSPF., 1589, pp. 23-6, 11/21 January 1589, news from divers places, 135-6, – February 1589, report by Gabriel de Alegria said that Parma had offered help to Lorraine on 8 January and to Mayenne on 13 January 1589. 22 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 409, 28 April 1589, Parma to Philip II. 23 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 423-4, 10 July 1589, memoir, 426-7, 14 July 1589, Parma’s answer to Mayenne’s proposals, 427, 14 July 1589, Parma to Philip II, 430, 3 August 1589, Parma to Philip II, 430-1, 3 August 1589 (2) Parma to Philip II.

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IV: Mayenne Assumes the Leadership Sustained by the hope of adequate support, Mayenne left Dijon on 18 January 1589 and went to Troyes. Some thought he would head for Paris, others said Orléans. It seems that the king released his mother, madame de Nemours, who was one of the prisoners, to plead with Mayenne not to attack.24 When Mayenne was at Châtillon-sur-Loire, his military rendez-vous, Henry sent the seigneur de Bissy with letters for Mayenne and also for Pierre Jeannin, upon whose restraining advice he counted. The king had wanted Mayenne to remain in Burgundy but, since he was now advancing, Henry hastened to make him various – unspecified – offers. Mayenne rejected the letters, sending only a rough, verbal message about avenging his brothers and dying for religion. According to Jeannin, who pressed Mayenne to make peace, he was already intoxicated by receiving widespread acclaim.25 Learning that Orléans had fallen to the League (31 January 1589), Mayenne first occupied Chartres; then he entered Paris on 12 February 1589 to formalise his position as the new leader of the Catholic Union.26 In Paris, Mayenne’s first task was to counterbalance the demagogic control of the Seize, and to curb their reign of terror. He held a large assembly on 16 February 1589, and established a general council of fifty-four, ‘le conseil général de l’Union’. This was to manage all public affairs – both of Paris and the state – pending an estates-general.27 In effect, Mayenne had added fourteen of his own followers to the existing council of forty. But it was so arranged that he could, if necessary, co-opt others and, for the moment, he imposed a precarious control. On 4 March 1589 he assumed the factitious title of ‘lieutenant-général de l’estat et couronne de France’. This, if nonsensical, deliberately preserved the concept of monarchy, and was conveniently transferable.28 On 13 March 24

Madame de Nemours was to say that all the house of Guise would be declared rebels if they did not submit within six days; and the declaration against them was already prepared. It was not however thought that she would achieve anything because Mayenne was ‘in a fury’. CSPF., 1589, pp. 69-71, 27 January/6 February 1589, Lilley to Stafford, 72-4, 28 January/7 February 1589, Lilley to Stafford. Isambert, Recueil général des anciennes lois, xiv, 635-42, [13] February 1589, ‘declaration contre les ducs de Mayenne et d’Aumale’ which gave them until 1 March in which to submit. Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 540. 25 Ballarde, Le Président Jeannin, 47; Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x (1895), 326, 26 January 1589, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, i, 251; Drouot, ‘Le Duc de Mayenne au lendemain des assassinats de Blois’, Mémoires de l’Académie de Dijon, 1927-33, p. 12; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 135; CSPF., 1589, pp. 23-6, 11/21 January 1589, news from divers places, said that the king threatened to attack Mayenne and to kill the prisoners taken at Blois if he did not desist from ‘these courses’, at the same time as offering pardon and office. 26 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 858-64, 9 February 1589, Cavriana to Serguidi; Mayenne spent two days at Troyes and was at Montargis by the end of January 1589 when Orléans fell to the League. Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, Mémoires secrettes, 257-8; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 521. 27 Félibien, Histoire de la ville de Paris, v, 457, ‘déliberation pour former le conseil général de la ville’, gives 18 February 1589. 28 The title is said to have been devised by Barnabé Brisson. On 21 February 1589 Mayenne went to Rouen to break the resistance of the ‘parlement’ of Rouen, the city having declared for the Union on 9 February. Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 529-30. Besides establishing himself in Paris, Mayenne established twelve provincial councils of the League, mainly for military purposes; each provincial council was linked with Paris. Roberts, Troyes During the French Wars of Religion, 175-7.


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Mayenne swore a curious oath of office before the rump ‘parlement’, publicly aligning himself with that body whose support he needed. He promised to fight for religion, to maintain the authority of the ‘parlements’, the privileges of the clergy and nobles, and to lower taxes. Taxes apart, that does not sound much like a programme devised by the Seize. Mayenne then issued a long ‘règlement’ to govern the combined action of the Union, and to prevent pillage. The ‘règlement’ included the convocation of an estatesgeneral for 15 July 1589; this event was difficult to achieve and repeatedly deferred. Parma was instructed to persuade Mayenne that Henry III could not be trusted – words which Mayenne shortly repeated to Morosini. Mayenne must also pursue his personal revenge and sustain a state of ferment in France. In return, Philip II would support him.29 Thus Mayenne exchanged war against the huguenots in Dauphiné for war against the king further north.

V: The Question of the Cardinals Open war on the king was a trickier proposition than nominal war on the huguenots; and for this some new veil of decency was required. It has been seen that before taking any definitive action, Mayenne made a bid for Papal support, using as his pretext the murder of the cardinal de Guise; this proved to be a potent weapon against the king. Henry III was quickly made aware that his act of summary justice against the cardinal had canonical implications; but he was not prepared for the fatal furore which ensued, both in Paris and in Rome. This controversy over the cardinals – one murdered and one imprisoned – was exploited as a means of destroying the king and augmenting the Papal grip on France. The manner in which the conflict developed, and the consequent breach of normal relations with Rome, does much to illuminate the grave difficulties to be encountered by Navarre as Henry IV. It is therefore necessary to understand what happened. Henry’s first brush with Rome was through the cardinal legate, Morosini. On 23 December 1588, the day on which Guise was murdered, Henry refused to see Morosini. But he sent Pierre Gondi, the Florentine bishop of Paris, to inform him of what had taken place. Next day Henry wrote to Morosini, recalling the pope’s reiterated injunctions to make himself obeyed. After hearing of the death of the cardinal on 24 December, Morosini immediately wrote to Montalto in Rome. The unfortunate legate was in such an agony of indecision that it reduced him to tears; in this predicament, whatever he might do could attract the condemnation of an offended pope. In particular, he was afraid that Henry might be driven by despair to the arms of Navarre. Morosini decided to seek instructions. To Henry, however, he replied severely that he was forthwith excommunicated. This was a personal admonishment, distinct from formal Papal censures; he was forbidden to enter a church, and ordered to apply to the pope for

29

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 52-8, 276-82, 18 January 1589, Lippomano to the doge and senate, Madrid.

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absolution.30 Henry also hastened to explain himself in Rome by sending Pisani a full memoir (missing). Pisani was to inform the pope [of the murder of Guise], in the manner contained in the memoir, and to say [unwisely] that Sixtus V’s ‘holy and personal admonitions’ had relieved him therein of any sense of scruple. Henry was sure the pope would approve his deed. It was casually added, in a postscript, that Henry had further disposed of the cardinal de Guise, and the pope should also be informed of that. This disingenuous procedure points to acute anxiety.31 It was not until 27 December 1588 that Henry granted Morosini an audience. The legate, however, had contrived an unscheduled meeting on the previous day by waylaying the king in a garden. Henry was already uneasy about the death of the cardinal and, if he still hoped for comfort from the fair-minded legate, he was disappointed. Henry explained in some detail the necessity for the murders, saying that the cardinal de Guise had threatened him with incarceration in a monastery. Morosini declared the murders a ‘gravissimo errore’ and repeated his notice of excommunication. He imposed penitence, and again told the king to seek Papal absolution. Not only the king himself, but also the executants, had incurred the penalties contained in a bull In Coena Domini.32 Henry was required to abstain from holy offices and the sacraments, and to prosecute the huguenot war. This was thunder and lightning. Henry had not anticipated incurring such censure because the Kings of France were privileged, and exempt from excommunication. Morosini denied all knowledge of that. Henry asserted that any prince must proceed against treason, even in a cleric, and especially to save his own life. The legate denied the legality of laying hands upon a churchman in any circumstances.33

30

Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 109-12, 24 December 1588, Morosini to Montalto, ibid., 112-13; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 868-72, – January 1589, Morosini’s apology, in which he records, clearly and in detail, his conduct and motivation in this crisis. This was probably addressed to Montalto. Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, ‘discours de ce qui est arrivé à Blois, 152-3. 31 Indeed, Henry himself made this observation to the pope. Cooper, ‘The Aftermath of the Blois Assassinations of 1588’, French History, iii (1989), 417, c. 24 December 1589, Henri III to Sixtus V; Revue rétrospective, iii (1834), 447-50, 24 December 1588, Henry III to Pisani; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 298. If this postscript was a crude device to play down the more serious event, it was not only futile, but also unnecessary in respect of the king’s own ambassador. It seems likely that this letter was conveyed to Rome by Gondi. 32 In Coena Domini was a famous bull, albeit of uncertain origin which, by tradition, the pope proclaimed from the loggia of Saint-Peter’s on the Thursday of Holy Week. Among other things, the bull contained a series of excommunications against representatives of the secular authority who encroached upon ecclesiastical jurisdiction. One of its provisions was that the murder of a cardinal automatically entailed excommunication. Efforts to have this bull observed in France formed part of the ongoing conflict between the two authorities, which principally centred on the decrees of the council of Trent. Victor Martin, Le Gallicanisme et la réforme catholique, 173-8, 248. The need for Papal absolution on the grounds that others – besides the king – were involved, was not a point taken up in Rome. 33 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 113-15. This was probably reported by Morosini to Montalto on 31 December 1588. The pope, furious at being implicated by Henry III, turned upon the long-suffering Morosini, brutally castigating him for the failure of his legation. Ibid., 115-18. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 868-72, – January 1589, Morosini’s apology in which he gave a full account and justification of his actions at the time of the murders at Blois. Thereafter, the pope abandoned him vouchsafing no further instructions, and thus evaded


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Anxious and disturbed, it was on account of Morosini’s strictures that Henry committed the fatal error of requesting a pardon in Rome. Thereafter he discovered what he hoped would provide a solution. He had, he wrote to Joyeuse on 4 January 1589, previously asked Pisani and Joyeuse to consider whether he needed to seek a Papal absolution. He had not been keen to do so because he did not wish the pope to assume new and greater powers over the King of France.34 However, Henry had since taken advice and discovered that any need for absolution was already covered by a Papal brief [of 20 July 1587] conferred by Sixtus V himself. This permitted the king, in all circumstances, to receive absolution from a confessor of his choice. He had, accordingly, confessed to the ‘theologal’ of Blois, on 31 December; he had been absolved, and received communion on 1 January 1589.35 Despite the undoubted validity of the Papal brief in question, this was not the end of the matter. Morosini, for one, was evidently not satisfied, since he rebuked the king for having taken communion before receiving absolution.36 It is not clear when Henry’s important letter of 4 January 1589 reached Rome, but it was well after news of the murders; that had arrived, exceptionally fast, on 5 January. At first the pope appeared inscrutable and unconcerned, observing that Guise did not live like a cardinal, and had never been to Rome.37 Then Olivares intervened. After the Spaniard had had two long audiences, on 6 and 7 January 1589, Sixtus was thoroughly agitated. It was, presumably, at this time that he lambasted Morosini for not having declared an interdict.38 Had he done so, however, Morosini might have been in even greater trouble, since an interdict would have suited the Spanish admirably. Sixtus required a scapegoat for the mess in France and he blamed the unfortunate legate. When Joyeuse received an audience on 7 January, following that of Olivares, the interview ‘n’eut rien d’ordonné ny modéré; tout fus confus et aigre’; the French king was now in serious trouble. The pro-Spanish cardinals had begun to create such a fuss that one might have supposed Mendoza to have perished at Blois. Joyeuse sought to explain the true situation, but the pope declined to listen. Indeed, he lost his – notoriously short – temper. committing himself. Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x (1895), 31718, 29 December 1588, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 34 It is not clear in what document Henry had enquired about Papal absolution. There must have been another letter that is missing. 35 Oroux, Histoire ecclésiastique de la cour de France, i, 203-4. The confessor was Jacques Coulomb, ‘chanoine théologal de Saint-Sauveur de Blois’. According to Cooper, ‘The Aftermath of the Blois Assassinations’, French History, iii (1989), 406-7, the text of the brief did indeed empower a confessor to pardon the king and prescribe penance – which was a weekly fast for one year. However, Cooper also says that the theologal of Blois had refused this absolution, contrary to Henry’s own statement to Joyeuse. A possible explanation is that Henry had consulted the ‘theologal’ who only consented to absolve him after he had submitted the brief. Aubéry, Histoire du cardinal de Joyeuse, 237-8, 4 January 1589, Henry III to Joyeuse. Henry had sent Pisani a copy of the brief. 36 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 134. This may have occurred a little later. 37 The cardinal de Guise was reportedly a womaniser and a gambler. Aubéry, Histoire du cardinal de Joyeuse, 239; La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 205-32, 9 January 1589, Joyeuse to Henry III, 233-51, 10 January 1589, Joyeuse to Henry III. 38 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 115.

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Guise, he declared unreasonably, should have been arrested, and the cardinal sent to Rome. Joyeuse stood up to him, retorting that the king had done no more than follow Papal advice. Sixtus was forced to acknowledge his own expostulation – before the barricades in Paris – that Guise was ripe for defenestration. Joyeuse insisted that, in respect of Guise, the king was answerable only to God. As for the cardinal, Henry had wished, not only to inform the pope but also to request his absolution – despite the assurance of leading theologians that he was not required to do so.39 Joyeuse may have thought that since the king’s enemies were making capital from the death of the cardinal, nothing less than a Papal absolution could neutralise the damage in France. However, the king’s humble and tentative attitude was ill-advised. It enabled the pope to compile a canonical case against him when it was, of course, unthinkable for a king of France to be tried in Rome. Sixtus said that he would consult the cardinals, and Joyeuse that the king had already done more than was required; furthermore, he had asked the pope to keep the matter private. Sixtus made difficulties: in a matter of conscience, the king must write himself. Fearing what the pope might say to the consistory two days later (9 January), Pisani tried again next day to reason with him. He was supported by the cardinal Santa Croce who declared that a king might kill a cardinal who was guilty of treason, so Henry had no need of absolution. Joyeuse was not permitted to address the consistory and the cardinals evidently advised the pope to appoint a special congregation to conduct what he now saw as ‘the case’. The tribunal was composed of pro-Spanish cardinals and led by the Neapolitan, Santa Severina.40 This was a serious development. Joyeuse feared that the congregation would raise obstacles to the absolution by demanding politically awkward penances. He wondered whether the pope’s anger might not be partially feigned in order to humour the Spanish; or, possibly, Sixtus had previously been hoping to dominate and control Henry III by manipulation of the Guises. Joyeuse now considered that, as the king had already requested absolution, he might as well write the letter the pope demanded.41 Before the special congregation assembled, on 10 January 1589, Joyeuse and Pisani again sought Henry’s absolution. But, having delegated the matter to others, the pope declined to discuss it. This rejection of the French ambassadors was a gift to Olivares. As early as 11 January he was proposing to Sixtus that nothing in France could be settled under Henry III who ought, therefore, to be deposed. From the beginning, his purpose was to induce the pope to accept Philip II’s preferred successor to the throne – 39

This statement raises problems. Joyeuse had not received Henry’s letter of 4 January 1589, and did not mention the brief. One must suppose that Henry had received conflicting advice but had been told that he was within his rights in a case of treason or personal danger. 40 Cugnoni, Ed., ‘Autobiografia di Santa Severina, Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria, xiii (1890), 184. 41 La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 233-51, 10 January 1589, Joyeuse to Henry III. Ibid., 243 n.9, suggests that Sixtus V had hoped to marry a niece to the prince de Joinville, heir to the deceased duc de Guise, and depose the king in favour of Guise; this need not necessarily be believed. Cimber et Danjou Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, 159-184, Joyeuse to Henry III. The above passage relates to 10 January 1589. This important document is not, however, one letter, but rather appears to be a memoir covering about a month. Its editorial deficiencies make it extremely difficult to use this valuable material correctly.


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albeit not yet named. On 15 January 1589 Olivares reported Morosini to have written that Henry III did not regard himself as excommunicated – presumably by the legate himself. Olivares also appeared to be distorting Morosini’s report in order to spread the rumour that Henry III was consulting Navarre.42 Olivares was somewhat obsessed by the fear – shared by Mendoza – that Henry III would now turn to Navarre; that could spell the end of Spanish influence in France. Olivares therefore shared Parma’s opinion that Mayenne must be swiftly and sufficiently supported. So the ambassador took it upon himself to send instructions to that effect to the duke of Terranova, governor of Milan.43 It was probably late in January 1589 that Diou and the Parisian representatives arrived in Rome to plead for help and support. By this time Olivares had manoeuvred the pope into speaking of Henry III as if he were both excommunicated and deposed; and so they freely discussed the French succession.44 The way was therefore neatly prepared for the League envoys. They talked the usual nonsense about religion in danger, accusing the king of heresy. They wanted the pope to be their protector, to supply aid, and to exhort all catholics to support the League. By ratifying the Sorbonne decree, Sixtus could release them from the duty of allegiance. Furthermore, they wished him to recognise Mayenne as protector of the catholic religion (not, apparently, as lieutenant-general), and more than strongly hinted that Mayenne was the appropriate candidate for the throne. This was to hand the pope a kind of surrogate sovereignty. The envoys were assisted in their efforts to overthrow the king by a letter to the pope from the ever active madame de Nemours, mother of Mayenne. Desperate for revenge, she argued that if a king neglected his duty, power reverted to the estates, which might revoke that of the king and even have him murdered. That quasi-juridical submission apparently indicated the direction of the wind.45 It is therefore important to realise that the overthrow of Henry III was plotted in Rome. If the pope did not precisely sanction it, he did encourage it, but carefully, without openly committing himself. For the moment, Sixtus meant to hide behind the congregation which was preparing the case against the king. The case might be used, or not, according to eventualities. Both Olivares and Joyeuse realised this.46 Similarly, the succession struggle which emerged between Spain and Mayenne in 1590 – both of them in opposition to Navarre – began in Rome early in 1589, some seven months before the 42

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 47-9, 270-2, 11 January 1589, 50-2, 272-6, 15 January 1589, 58-9, 282-3, 21 January 1589, Olivares to Philip II. 43 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 47-9, 270-2 11 January 1589, Olivares to Philip II. Philip was much more concerned that, without the restraint imposed by Guise, France would spare no effort to recover the marquisate of Saluzzo, which suggests that he had little understanding of French affairs. He was desperate to purge the shame – the loss of reputation – entailed by his failure to launch a second Armada. Ibid., 52-8, 27682, 18 January 1589, Lippomano to the doge and senate. 44 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 59-65, 284-91, 23 January 1589, Olivares to Philip II. The League envoys may have arrived by about 23 January, or soon after. Joyeuse referred to their arrival, and that they lodged with Pellevé, but without names or a date. Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, 177. 45 Cooper, ‘The Aftermath of the Blois Assassinations’, French History, iii (1989), 411-13, 17 January 1589, madame de Nemours to the pope. She wrote a further letter on 14 April 1589. Idem. 46 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 50-2, 272-6, 15 January 1589, Olivares to Philip II.

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death of Henry III. This fundamental rivalry between Mayenne and Spain precluded any sincere co-operation, even though neither party could operate without the other; in the end, their conflicting ambitions assisted Henry IV. It was in response to the uneasy reports of Pisani and Joyeuse that, at the end of January 1589, Henry III sent Claude d’Angennes de Rambouillet, bishop of Mans, to support them in Rome.47 D’Angennes would restate the king’s case in the strongest terms; at the same time, he might diplomatically allow some guarded concession in respect of the decrees of Trent.48 Meanwhile Henry’s situation in Rome had become more serious. It was probably early in February 1589 when Joyeuse informed the king that the death of the cardinal de Guise was currently his biggest problem in Rome. The pope’s anger, diligently stoked by Olivares, was unreasonably increased by the fact that Henry’s absolution really was covered by the wording of his brief of July 1587. Sixtus was therefore reduced to making silly rejoinders: that the brief referred only to the past and that, as he had made it, only he could interpret it. The pope, in fact, had become anxious that Henry might simply let the matter drop. Joyeuse, however, was seriously concerned to protect the royal authority from the work of the special congregation. This body was meeting frequently and secretly, preparing a case which the king would then be required to answer. If they meant to examine the reasons for the murder of the cardinal then, by the same token, they would also be examining those for the death of Guise. That was none of their business; besides, French causes could not be cited in Rome. Joyeuse learnt that the congregation was, in fact, discussing extreme and far-reaching penances, designed to impose on the king unpalatable items of Papal policy. These were, as ever, the publication of the decrees of Trent, without caveat; the extermination of heresy; the establishment of an inquisition; the renunciation of protestant alliances and matters concerning preferment to benefices – all of which had already been pressed by the legate in 1588. In addition, it was now adduced that Henry could not seek absolution for the death of the cardinal while he continued to detain Bourbon and Épinac in prison. For Henry III, these were serious matters to arise just as Mayenne appeared in arms on the Loire poised, apparently, to march upon the almost defenceless king. They are also important matters in the sense that Henry of Navarre would also be faced with similar intransigence, and most of the same unthinkable demands – some sooner, some later. If Henry III could not release the cardinal de Bourbon, the League’s princely figurehead, still less would Henry IV be able to release his rival claimant to the throne.49 There were those, therefore, who thought that Henry III should do nothing, and Joyeuse proposed an 47

It appears that the Florentine, Jérôme (Hieronimo, Geronimo) de Gondi, accompanied d’Angennes to Rome, which points to the concern of the grand duke of Tuscany. Under Henry IV, Gondi was to play an arcane but significant role. 48 Cooper, ‘The Aftermath of the Blois Assassinations’, French History, iii (1989), 407, 417-18, 28 January 1589, Henry III to Sixtus V; CSPF., 1589, pp. 69-71, 27 January/6 February 1589, Lilley to Stafford, said that the bishop had gone. Ibid., 77-9, 29 January/8 February 1589, Lilley to Stafford. It was still hoped that ‘a little praying’ would procure a pardon. Victor Martin, Le Gallicanisme et la réforme catholique, 249-50. 49 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, 178-82, Joyeuse to Henry III, probably relating to 5 or 6 February 1589.


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ingenious formula to extricate both king and pope.50 Realising that Henry’s fate in Rome depended upon his fate in France, Joyeuse favoured procrastination, which would hamper the congregation. Unfortunately, however, the king’s fate in France equally depended upon his fate in Rome, and time was running out. Before the Joyeuse proposal could be considered in France, d’Angennes had arrived in Rome, on 23 February 1589.51 Aware of the crossing of communications, Henry replied to Joyeuse – inevitably too late – that the ambassadors would simply have to decide together what to do. He added that he had never intended to enter into any justification of his actions – but without condemning Morosini who had cornered him. Henry did, however, wish the pope to know that if he proposed to use procedures contrary to the royal dignity, he would not stomach it. King and pope were on a collision course.52 D’Angennes, bishop of Mans, had four audiences with the pope before sending the king an unfavourable report on 15 March 1589. In the first meeting, on 25 February, d’Angennes stated the king’s case, clearly and trenchantly. He had commission only to seek the pope’s benediction upon the absolution already received. Sixtus V would not hear of it; he said silly things again, for example that the cardinal should have been confided to Morosini to be sent for trial in Rome. Sixtus required d’Angennes to make his demand in writing, to be submitted to the congregation, while insisting that the king was extending his original fault by holding Bourbon a prisoner. To the cardinals, d’Angennes became more legalistic. He argued that the king could not incur censures known as ‘latae sententiae’. Regulations made by popes in favour of cardinals did not bind kings of France – and other comparable arguments. In an acrimonious audience, on 3 March 1589, the pope required Henry to seek absolution personally, and to release the prisoners, knowing perfectly well that he could not do either. D’Angennes pleaded that at least the pope might annul the Sorbonne’s decree. That damaging measure of 7 January 1589, which amounted to a declaration of deposition, was probably at the root of Henry’s desire for the Papal absolution he maintained he did not need. On 6 March 1589, d’Angennes confronted the pope with the juridical arguments he had used to the cardinals. That was dynamite; at the mention of Gallican liberties, Sixtus became incandescent with rage. If Henry did not care to comply, he exploded, then he would excommunicate him, and arrest d’Angennes as well. Before the next audience, on 13 March, the ambassadors had received Henry’s letters of 24 February ordering them to demand absolution in his name. By this time Henry had become aware that he could not safely remain in Blois and vainly hoped that Papal absolution might help to stem the rising tide of revolt in France. D’Angennes explained that Henry had heard from them that the pope regarded his absolution as insufficient. He therefore made the request for Papal absolution, and again asked for condemnation of the Sorbonne decree. Upon this occasion, the ambassador actually knelt, and begged the pope to favour them. Sixtus, 50

There is no date for the face-saving formula. Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, 182-4. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 392; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 303. 52 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, ‘discours de ce qui est arrivé à Blois’, 185-7, [February 1589], Henry III to Joyeuse. 51

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already aware of their new instructions, savoured his advantage and refused the requests. He now demanded that the [clerical] prisoners be sent to Rome. When d’Angennes reported to the king on 15 March 1589, he rehearsed all the weighty arguments he had deployed in Rome. But the pope had remained unimpressed; indeed, he became increasingly angry and exigent. The king’s request for absolution was now inadmissible without full and proper confession and repentance. It was also impossible while ecclesiastics, and members of the Guise family [which had nothing to do with Rome], were held prisoner. D’Angennes was now required to submit a memoir to the congregation. The pope, therefore, was engaged in multiplying conditions which he knew could never be met. He was on the verge of excommunicating the king, and threatening to arrest his ambassador extraordinary.53 This situation could only be worsened by rumours of a negotiation between Henry III and Navarre, which revived the spectre of Navarre’s conversion. Claiming to have received news of a report that Henry had sent the cardinal de Rambouillet to propose an entente with Navarre, Olivares immediately sought an audience with the pope.54 With the succession in mind, he dilated, as he had before, upon the undesirability of Navarre’s conversion. It could only be false and feigned, and Philip II would help the catholics to avert it. In this respect, Sixtus V shared Olivares’ concern. He did not want the king to ally with Navarre; uncertainty on that account was probably one reason why he was playing for time.

VI: Henry III and Navarre It was not immediately clear to Henry III, following the murders at Blois, that he would be obliged to turn to Navarre, whether he liked it or not. Initially, he was in a confused state of shocked elation. Deprived of material means and reliable support, Henry did very little more than prepare dispatches. He tried, for a while, to carry on as before, hoping to obviate the impression that he had formerly been controlled by Guise. Thus he completed the business of the estates-general, which mainly afforded the catholics valuable time in which to prepare for war. Henry did not instantly recall Nevers from Poitou, where he was engaged in the siege of La Ganache.55 He sent the ‘gouverneur’, d’Antragues to Orléans hoping to dispose the people to obedience. But Mayenne’s secretary, Rossieux, a native of the city, disposed them otherwise. Henry foolishly ignored the reasonable offers 53

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 392-402; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 303-5. Charles d’Angennes, cardinal de Rambouillet, died on 23 March 1587. This might have been an error for his brother, Claude d’Angennes de Rambouillet, bishop of Mans, except that he would have been about to leave for Rome. This allegation looks like a malicious invention. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 59-64, 23 January 1589, Olivares to Philip II. 55 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 365-6. The remains of Nevers’ army, dispatched against the huguenots, returned to the region of Blois. According to Lilley, who was at Blois, Nevers himself had returned by 22 January 1589. However, he and the king were evidently on uneasy terms and had still not met by 11 February. CSPF., 1589, pp. 27-8, between 6/16 and 12/22 January 1589, Lilley to Stafford, 84-5, 1/11 February 1589, Lilley to Stafford, 85-6, 28 January/7 February 1589, extracts from a letter of Stafford, not known to whom; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 855-8, 16 January 1589, Cavriana to Serguidi, provides an interesting survey of the king’s situation. 54


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made by their envoys, who only demanded another ‘gouverneur’ and the destruction of the citadel. Thus, by the end of January, the city was lost.56 Had Henry held Orléans, it was said, things just might have turned out differently. In the event, Mayenne, who was by then in the region of Montargis, was free to range along the Loire and to endanger the king. In Nevers’ opinion, Mayenne ought to have been speedily destroyed, before he had time to act. But Henry had deceived himself on two important counts: he estimated that Paris would soon be bleating for mercy, and that Mayenne would have a struggle to survive in Burgundy; so the requisite precautions were neglected. Cities which had waited, observed the triumph of the Union in Paris, Chartres, Orléans and Rouen. Henry escorted the prisoners to Amboise, and some of them back again to Blois. He had no place of refuge, and many began to abandon his service. By early February 1589 Henry was exhausted, confined to bed with piles and helpless with pain.57 Some of Henry’s initial hesitation may have derived from his unrealistic hopes of an accord with Mayenne. At the end of December 1588 he had offered a pardon to all catholics who submitted. But, on 13 February 1589 – when Mayenne had reached Paris – Henry launched a declaration against him and his cousin, Aumale. This curious document referred to their respective warnings to the king, before the murder of Guise, and to his own subsequent offers, if they would submit. Now they were declared rebels and deprived, unless they yielded by 1 March 1589. Mayenne, desperate to consolidate his hold on Paris, did not respond. This meant, in effect, that the king was at war, and therefore endangered in Blois.58 But Henry could not make war on the League except in conjunction with Navarre; and it was precisely to avoid seeking the help of Navarre that he had been prepared to grovel to Mayenne. The reaction of Navarre and the huguenots to the events at Blois in December 1588 was muted and cautious. Duplessis described the death of Guise as vengeance with clean hands; but Navarre forbade the release of fireworks at La Rochelle. He hoped that the obstacles to peace were now removed, but the huguenots agreed to continue as before to gather forces and await developments. In Duplessis’ words, the death of Guise ‘tire un grand queue de changement après soi’.59 There is no sign in the huguenot correspondence of any early move towards the king. Nevertheless, the king’s enemies fully expected him 56 Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, i, 275-6; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 345; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, Mémoires secrettes, 265. 57 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 352, 365-6, 371-2; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 855-8, 16 January 1589, Cavriana to Serguidi, 858-64, 9 February 1589, Cavriana to Serguidi; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, Mémoires secrettes, 246; Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x, (1895), 327-9, 2 February 1589, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 58 Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x (1895), 318-19, 2 January 1589, Mocenigo to the doge and senate, 331, 18 February 1589, Mocenigo to the doge and senate; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iii, 203-11, 13 February 1589, declaration of the king against Mayenne and Aumale. 59 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 277-9, 26 December 1588, Duplessis to Navarre, 2812, 27 December 1588, Duplessis to Navarre, 283-4, 29 December 1588, Duplessis to Pujols, 284, 30 December 1588, Duplessis to de Bèze, 287-91, – December 1588, Duplessis to Buzanval; ibid, vol. i, madame Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, 170; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 416-18, 1 January 1589, Navarre to madame de Grammont, 421-2, 1 January 1589, Navarre to La Noue, 425-6, 1 January 1589, Navarre to de Reau, 429-30, 28 January 1589, Navarre to Épernon.

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to turn to Navarre, and they soon began to mutter about it. Navarre was, however, alleged to have sent an envoy to the king upon receipt of the news from Blois; and that is highly probable. But as soon as Morosini heard that rumour, he forbade the king to negotiate. Indeed, he backed the estates in requiring the king to denounce Navarre. Henry replied wearily, as he always had, that it was unnecessary to denounce Navarre; Morosini threatened to depart if Henry came to terms with him.60 Henry had therefore to choose between Navarre and the legate; and he made the wrong choice. Navarre no longer really expected the king to seek his help. On 11 February 1589, Duplessis wrote to Morlas, who was evidently at court. He commented on the turmoil caused by the murder of Guise, and how badly the king had been served at Orléans. He asked Morlas to make soundings, and to gauge whether Henry was inclined to treat, either publicly or privately.61 Duplessis reported the king to be undecided whether to summon Navarre or merely to allow him a Loire crossing and let him loose against the League. Navarre, however, was not to be content with admission by the back door. He would either have a proper agreement or none at all. It was probably in order to facilitate a negotiation with the king that, on 4 March 1589 – just as Mayenne, in Paris, assumed his pretentious title – Navarre issued one of his major declarations; he was at Châtellerault not far from Tours. The declaration, which was addressed to the three estates – presumably meaning everyone – should doubtless be associated with Navarre’s initial observation that the death of Guise removed the obstacle to peace. He also sought to neutralise catholic propaganda, which cast Navarre as a destructive villain. For four years, the statement began, Navarre had been the object of strife, because of a vain and imaginary fear of his succession. While he had not been permitted to defend France, he had been obliged to defend himself. He had always shown how much he regretted the miseries of France and, had he been admitted to the estatesgeneral, he could have contributed some constructive proposals. Consequently he now wished to explain the manner in which he perceived his duty, as well as to assert his innocence. God had spared him, despite severe disadvantages and, so far, there had been only one great battle. But all those armies sent to oppose him had caused untold suffering. Now Navarre was ready to ask the king for peace. He was aware of the demand in the estates for one religion but, while many people complained of diversity, few sought its remedy. Navarre then reverted to his former offers. Let the ordinary, or any extraordinary, means be followed, and he and the huguenots [which was very doubtful] would accept the decisions of a free council. This was the true, traditional procedure; the protestants would not be moved in any other way, least of all by war. 60

Brown, ‘The Assassination of the Guises’, The English Historical Review, x (1895), 321-2, 12 January 1589, Mocenigo to the doge and senate, Vendôme; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, Mémoires secrettes, 242-3. Navarre was also reported to have sent Rocquelaure to the king, which was probably the same rumour. 61 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 313-16, 11 February 1589, Duplessis to Morlas. Lilley several times referred in his letters to ‘Navarre’s man’, who assured Lilley that there was a treaty between Navarre and the king – meaning discussions. That may well have been about a Loire crossing. CSPF., 1589, pp. 95-6, 5/15 February 1589, Lilley to Stafford.


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While Navarre’s reiterated demands for a council may be regarded with reserve, it should be noted, in parenthesis, that on 15 February 1589 he had written to the duke of Saxony, pressing on the Germans the urgent need for a council of pious men, not moved by ambition but acting in a christian spirit; he had always included the German protestants in his religious sights.62 Navarre, the declaration continued, had often been called upon to abjure. But how, he asked rhetorically, could he do so with a dagger at his throat, and when honour if not conscience must preclude it? No one had ever made any effort to convert him. How would the firmest catholics react if, after living for some thirty years as a protestant, he were to switch religions upon the prospect of a kingdom? What also would the huguenots think? He was not prepared to do it; but he was prepared to listen to instruction – to be persuaded. If, he said, the estates desired his conversion from a fear that he would seek to constrain them [in their consciences], they were wrong. It was not only untrue, it was out of the question. He did not regard it as reasonable that a handful of protestants should constrain the majority of catholics; nor was there, indeed, any present question of his ever being king. Reverting to the miseries of France, Navarre deplored the fact that no one in the whole assembly at Blois had ever uttered the sacred word ‘peace’; yet only peace could bring order and regeneration to France. If the French failed to grasp this, they would be submerged by foreigners because, divided between three parties, the kingdom could not survive. It was essential, either for the king to ally with the more obedient party, or else to make peace with them both. Navarre enlarged upon the likely outcome if current conditions continued. Addressing the clergy, who wronged him, Navarre denied that he was their enemy. Indeed, he was very much in agreement with them in desiring the preservation of Gallican liberties against Papal usurpations – an opportune and significant thrust. What did the clergy hope to gain from war, which could only ruin the Church? To bring about peace, all [grievances] must be set aside and pardoned. Navarre himself was in arms, but not against the king. If he failed to galvanise the king into action against the League, he feared yet another accord with the League at his expense. Alternatively, the League could become so strong that, when they had ruined the king, Navarre could not stand against them. Nearly all the deputies [to the estates] had been hostile to the king. Now he and Navarre were both in peril, and everything [in the state] was in danger of collapse. Those who supported the king should advise peace and urge him to employ Navarre. Navarre then made a similar appeal to the League. Like him, they should cut their losses and serve the king and country. If not, he trusted that God would not abandon the king, and that he would rally his servants of whom Navarre was the first; in that case the League would be annihilated. As first prince – which of course implied his claim to the succession – he would seek to prevent the destruction of the king and the kingdom. Wherever Navarre wielded power, he would restore the king’s authority; and he extended his protection to everyone who shared his objectives. This was an eloquent appeal to his countrymen to rise above factionalism and doctrinal strife. He sincerely hoped for a remedy for the differences in religion, but this could never be achieved in 62

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 432-6, 15 February 1589, Navarre to the duke of Saxony.

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arms. Navarre ended this last great manifesto before his untimely accession with a solemn declaration before God. Just as he himself had, so far, and by the grace of God, refused to be constrained in his conscience, so he swore that he would never constrain catholics in theirs, nor interfere with the exercise of their religion. At the time of his accession, Navarre reverted to this point and remained true to his pledge; but he never received the quid pro quo that he desired and must have hoped to elicit. He offered peace and ecumenism, either toleration or reunion of the churches, properly arrived at. Embedded in this, one might discern an implication that, failing the ideal of reunion, the King of France could as well be a protestant as a catholic. At any rate, catholics had nothing to fear from the eventuality of his succession. But for the moment, the essential thing to emphasise was the feasibility of peace.63 It is impossible to say whether this declaration of 4 March 1589 represented any extension in Navarre’s thinking on the problem of religion. Thinking, in any case, is neither simple, nor of only one kind, since the mind can ramble and fantasise as well as reason. Navarre pointed out several times that, being close to the king in age, he might never succeed to the crown. Consequently, whatever he might have to do as king still pertained to the realm of speculation, fluid and indeterminate; and, if that time ever came, much would depend upon immediate circumstances. For the moment, he wished it to be understood that he could safely be allowed to rescue the kingdom; and he was not fantasising about that. Who, one wonders, saw this virile statement, and did it penetrate to Rome? Unlike the League, which controlled many centres of population, Navarre had no direct means of influencing public opinion, which was mainly done from the pulpit. In this respect, he was always at a disadvantage compared with the League. Their stale old lies about religion in danger were still trumpeted out ad nauseam. Emotion and fear had been exploited for much too long for any sudden change to occur; and too many people were scrambling for the ephemeral spoils of anarchy. The court dispersed at this time, early in March 1589, and effectively ceased to exist. When Cavriana left for Moulins, he described France as decrepit, decadent and – precisely – in the throes of anarchy. From Paris to the frontier of Savoy rebellion was rife. The strongest were dominating and the king was disregarded; there was widespread talk of terminating his life, and there were those who were poised to do it. Mayenne’s army was assembling nearby, and would march directly against the king. The League now had 10,000 Swiss (perhaps through the influence of Olivares?), plus some forces from Parma. But Mayenne’s real strength was said to lie in the general rejection of the king, the disobedience of the people, the disdain of the nobles and the hostility of the clergy. Cavriana believed that Henry was averse from employing the forces of the huguenots for fear of the catholics [and the pope], but that necessity would supersede all other considerations. Henry would be so hard pressed that he must accept help from anyone – exactly what Henry himself would shortly say to Morosini. It was publicly declared that

63

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 443-58, 4 March 1589, ‘declaration’ of Navarre from Châtellerault; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iii, 230-45.


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either the king or Mayenne must die and, if God did not save the king, Cavriana could envisage no temporal salvation.64

VII: The ‘Traité de la Trève’, April 1589 The origins of the negotiation between the king and Navarre are obscure, and the discussions, when they occurred, were secret. The beginning of serious negotiation can reasonably be narrowed to early March 1589, after the expiration of the king’s ultimatum to Mayenne; he did not submit. For greater safety, the king moved to Tours where he arrived on 7 March. It therefore seems likely that negotiations began either shortly before or after his arrival. Madame Duplessis-Mornay observed laconically, and without a date, that Pierre de Mornay, seigneur de Buhy (Philippe Duplessis-Mornay’s brother) went to see the king, but the whole negotiation remains shrouded in secrecy. Buhy, it seems, was travelling back and forth, initially discussing the king’s proposal that Navarre should be permitted to cross the Loire in order to oppose the League. But Navarre was not content merely to be loosed against the League when an opportunity existed to obtain some, minimal, relief for the huguenots.65 Hopeful that the king would now turn to him, Navarre sent the trusty Duplessis after his brother. Duplessis reached Tours on 21 March 1589 and saw the king next day. Articles sent by Navarre were read and discussed. Navarre proposed a truce for only five months, doubtless so that he could bargain over its extension. Other issues were the Loire crossing and money to pay the garrison of the crossing town. Navarre became irritated because the king was clearly playing for time and, it was rightly thought, simultaneously holding discussions with Mayenne; ‘on ne veuille de nous qu’en default des aultres’. Nevertheless, while Navarre consented to a truce for a year, the king still cavilled over the Loire crossing. ‘For God’s sake,’ Navarre groaned to Duplessis on 24 March, ‘let me not be deprived of the means of service’.66 Far from turning gratefully to Navarre, who requested nothing, Henry was making abject and ultimate efforts, through Morosini, to obtain an accord with Mayenne. The details, and especially the timing, of these parallel negotiations are equally obscure. The legate had repeatedly warned the king against employing the huguenots. But Henry was now desperate; he wanted Morosini to persuade the pope to intervene, or to exercise the Papal authority himself, in order to divert Mayenne from an attack he could not withstand. Morosini, deprived of instructions, was prepared to help – if he could – on a 64

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., iv, 864-7, 11 March 1589, Cavriana to Serguidi, Moulins, ‘...io non veggo modo di salvazione alla sua persona’. Henry fled from Blois when the suburbs were attacked but he was scarcely more secure elsewhere. Similar reports of anarchy and regicide were made by Rucellai, ibid., 879, 31 January 1589, Rucellai to Usimbardi, 880-1, – February 1589, Rucellai to Usimbardi. 65 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, i, Madame Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, 171-2, ibid., iv, 341-2, 12 March 1589, Duplessis to Buzanval. Duplessis wanted Navarre to get on with it, and lay siege to Saumur. 66 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 459-60, 8 March 1589, Navarre to madame de Grammont, Montbazon, 464-6, 23 March 1589, Navarre to Duplessis, 466-8, 24 March 1589, Navarre to Duplessis; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 343-5, [22] March 1589, Duplessis to Navarre, 347-9, 23 March 1589, Duplessis to Navarre.

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personal basis; but he required a written request, with which the king complied. Henry formally requested the pope [Morosini in fact] to broker a peace, undertaking to observe whatever was agreed. If the matter were to stall on the problem of the succession, then he would accept the League nominee! This final humiliation of the king was signalled in Rome precisely when his enemies were gaining ground and his ambassadors were struggling to uphold his authority. Morosini sent Rinuccini, his ‘maestro di casa’, to Mayenne, probably about 20 March 1589. He was to ask if Mayenne would accept Papal arbitration, and to convey the king’s huge offers to the League leaders.67 Mayenne suspected a trap, and elected to take his time. On 22 March, he wrote to Philip II reminding him that he had already requested Spanish help upon first hearing of the murders. Now, he said, their ‘former king’ had assumed the cause of the heretics. Henry’s union with Navarre, Mayenne alleged mendaciously, was all too notorious, and it was in Spain that Mayenne placed his hopes.68 If the death of the cardinal had been one notable advantage, a reprobate alliance between the king and Navarre would be even better. Mayenne also consulted Mendoza, visiting him at dead of night. He pressed the ambassador for men and money, and conveyed his intention to send Pierre Brisson to Rome. Mendoza (who referred to Mayenne as Jacopo de Arbelais), dismissed Rinuccini’s message as ‘a cunning of the King’ to gain time, and commended Mayenne’s requests to Philip II. He was very clear that there must be no accord, and advised Mayenne to refuse the legate cautiously.69 So it was not until 6 April 1589 that Mayenne replied to Morosini claiming, in effect, that the pope would not expect them to submit – avoiding the king’s name and style – but would rather protect them against him. A truce, he maintained, was only an artifice to gain time – which sounds like an echo of Mendoza. Furthermore, the king had been deprived of his power and could not be named in a treaty. Mayenne took this opportunity to complain that he was in constant danger from assassins.70 Next day Mayenne wrote to the pope, sending Pierre Brisson, dean of Reims. Brisson was to describe the state of affairs in France, to declare that the League and the towns would not submit to ‘the encourager of heresy’; he was also to counteract the mission of Henry’s envoy, the bishop of Mans. Mayenne was anxious that the pope should not be misled by talk of an accommodation with the king. He begged Sixtus neither to oblige them to submit – again mentioning assassins – nor to grant the king’s absolution [which would undermine their resistance]. In any case, time for negotiation had expired because next 67

The terms offered by the king are printed by Cooper, ‘The Aftermath of the Blois Assassinations of 1588’, French History, iii, (1989), 418-19, undated, memorandum of Henry III to Morosini. This, however, appears to be incomplete, making no mention of Mayenne himself. Morosini said later that Mayenne, whose answer was dated 6 April, had not replied for thirteen days. 68 Capefigue, Histoire de la Réforme, v, 306-9, 22 March 1589, Mayenne to Philip II. 69 CSPF., 1589, pp. 196-7, 1/11 April 1589, Mendoza to Philip II, presumably intercepted, 208-9, 15-17 April 1589, letters from Mendoza to Parma. Mendoza departed from court, without licence to depart. He went to Paris, claiming to have done so upon an inspiration from God. Ibid., 209, 8/18 April 1589, Stafford to Walsingham from Dartmouth, 212, 11/21 April 1589, Mendoza to Philip II. 70 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 157; Saulnier, Ed., Journal de François Bourgeois de Paris, 82, records that on 3 April Jean and Anthoine Magnac or Maignon were arrested and accused of plotting to kill Mayenne.


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day, 8 April, Mayenne took the field; he marched to Châteaudun and Châteaurenaud, apparently closing in on Tours.71 Waiting for Mayenne’s answer to Morosini, Henry III lost his nerve. When the legate had secret advice that Mayenne meant to attack Tours, Henry thought it necessary to give Navarre the Loire crossing. Then he could advance upon Paris and divert Mayenne. When this expedient was opposed by Morosini, an anonymous councillor objected that the king had already sent madame de Nemours to seek an accord with Mayenne, which had been flatly rejected. Henry had tried again through the duc de Lorraine to obtain an accord but, after five weeks, he had received no reply. Finally he had [most recently] offered to submit to Papal arbitration, but still Mayenne did not reply. On the contrary, he was about to take the field and come to cut the king’s throat. Therefore the legate should not complain if Henry merely permitted Navarre to oppose Mayenne. Initially, therefore, Henry seems only to have sought a permissive agreement with Navarre, which he hoped Morosini could be induced to accept. If the legate did not like it, he should propose some other means to save the king’s life. Effectively, the legate did not like it, and requested a passport to depart. Henry objected that the longer he waited, the more he would have to concede to Navarre. It therefore appears that, when Duplessis assumed the huguenot negotiation at Tours, on 22 March 1589, Henry was awaiting his answer from Mayenne, as well as that from d’Angennes in Rome, written on 15 March.72 By 3 April Henry dared not wait any longer. He therefore concluded with Navarre the arrangement known as the ‘traité de la trève’. This was no more than a rushed and temporary working agreement. It provided for a one-year truce, enabling Navarre to march directly against Mayenne, and to employ all his (modest) forces against the king’s enemies. That was all that Henry had sought, hoping to leave other options open. But he had to agree to deliver the Pont-de-Cé, on the Loire by 10 April – for which Saumur was substituted.73 During the truce the status quo was to be observed; all catholics were to be protected [as Navarre had already repeatedly promised]; and it was secretly agreed that the protestants should not be molested. This otherwise useless clause was doubtless included as an important point of principle, since no one could expect its execution. Navarre might hold one place in each ‘bailliage’ or ‘sénéchaussée’ (from among those conquered), an echo of the terms of the peace of Bergerac of 1577. The cult was to be permitted in Saumur, in the army, wherever Navarre was present, and in the cities which he held.74 For the moment, that was sufficient, because everything would depend upon the outcome of war. Henry sent Schomberg and the secretary Revol to break this news to the angry and exhausted legate. Even beyond the eleventh hour, however, Henry was still prepared to 71 CSPF., 1589, pp. 179-80, 7 April 1589, N.S., instruction for Brisson and letter from Mayenne to the pope; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 548, 7 April 1589, Mayenne to the pope. 72 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 154 seq. One must stress again that the timing is uncertain. Morosini received a passport from Mayenne dated 19 March 1589. 73 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 430-2. 74 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 351-5, the ‘traité de la trève’, 3 April 1589, registered at Tours on 26 April 1589; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 292-3, 366.

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betray Navarre, who made no demands upon him. If, in the meanwhile, Mayenne had shown willing to conclude either a truce or peace, Henry would still withhold from Navarre the Loire crossing. Morosini offered to risk his life by going in person to Mayenne to propose, in effect, the same offers as before. Meanwhile, ratification of the treaty with Navarre was postponed for the ten days or so required by Morosini. He is said to have departed on 10 April in search of Mayenne. At the same time, Morosini sent his secretary, Francesco Sini, to Rome, hoping to justify his unauthorised endeavours; these were intended to avert the union of the king with Navarre. To the pope, Morosini recounted the king’s case, exactly as Schomberg and Revol had put it to him. He said that the agreement with Navarre was involuntary, to save the king’s life. He begged leave to retire to Rome if his current mission failed – as it was sure to do. Morosini therefore made one more, hopeless, heroic effort to induce Mayenne not to attack the king. Relying on the Papal wish for peace, and supported by Jeannin, Morosini again rehearsed every argument he had ever employed. He pointed out that the king’s offers to the League were enormous, while to make war on the king would be long, arduous and unpredictable.75 Mayenne replied that he had always wanted peace in France, until the recent events. He would even have opposed his own blood, if his kinsmen had plotted against the king. This, he now claimed, was the true message he had sent to the king in December 1588, and he reviled ‘quel miserabile’, as he styled the king, for having distorted it. Mayenne had never considered the king capable of such deeds [as those of Blois] and would never deal with him again. They must either break free from this tyranny or die. It was in vain that Morosini sought to exert Papal authority. Mayenne again denied that the pope would require them to submit. He would embrace their cause, not least since the king had now approached the heretics. Mayenne would therefore proceed with his ‘impresa’; in other words, he would attack the king in Tours.76 Morosini went to Orléans, whence he reported to Montalto in Rome and sent Rinuccini to the king. In Orléans Morosini met Ercole Rondinelli (from Ferrara), who had just arrived from Paris. While Morosini urged the king to make even greater concessions [which must surely have referred to the succession], Rondinelli undertook to put pressure on Mayenne. He would do so on the grounds of his mother’s strong desire for peace, his own lack of money, and the ominous cracks in Union solidarity. Certainly Mayenne’s position was parlous, but it was simply too late to change course. While still at Orléans, Morosini received a letter from the king, dated 23 April. This gave more emphasis to Henry’s continued desire for Papal good will and adjudication than to his accord with Navarre; it was, he claimed, advantageous to catholicism. Henry was very anxious not to be visibly abandoned by the legate, which could only bring comfort and advantage to the League. At the worst, Henry hoped that Morosini would go no further away than Moulins, until his envoy Sini had returned from Rome. Morosini complied, not having been recalled; but he never again returned to court, and departed after the death of the 75

According to Tempesti, Mayenne was offered Burgundy as an independent dukedom, with control over appointments, plus a pension of 40,000 écus per annum; that was more than he was ever to be offered again. Sisto-Quinto, ii, 155. 76 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 167-9.


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king. In his own, perverse, way Henry was grateful to Morosini; he continued to hope that the legate might somehow restore his standing in Rome. There was, however, no more that Morosini could do, either in France or in Rome.77 Before the king’s last letter to Morosini, the huguenots had occupied Saumur, on 21 April; Duplessis-Mornay became and remained the ‘gouverneur’. Navarre therefore crossed the Loire which, for the first time, opened up a route to Paris. This was the objective which had failed in the summer of 1587. Crossing the Loire was a significant watershed in Navarre’s arduous progress, and one which would be widely noted. Upon this occasion, therefore, he issued another manifesto: it comprised an open declaration of war upon the king’s enemies – who were his enemies – and called for support, now upon the authority of the king. This declaration reveals how shocked Navarre had been by the Sorbonne decree virtually deposing the king, and the desecration of the ‘parlement’ – events which struck at the very foundations of the monarchy. Presuming others to be equally shaken, he sought to facilitate defections from the League, promising immunity and protection. He also emphasised how little support Mayenne – a mere cadet – could hope to command, once they had dragged the king from his throne. To destroy the king could only damage the honour and rank of the nobles, whose prosperity derived from that of the crown. Navarre declared that he was moved neither by vengeance nor ambition; he would therefore pardon anyone who would pursue the cause of peace.78 Navarre also issued a second, brief statement on 24 April 1589, addressed to the huguenots. He explained that, in these circumstances, it was his duty to serve the king. He hoped that the outcome would be ‘une bonne paix’ which, for the protestants, could mean no less than the restoration of the edicts of pacification. Meanwhile they were required to respect the catholics.79 The king felt similarly compelled to make his apology for joining Navarre in opposing those who had ‘practised a League’ to usurp the kingdom, rebelled against the king, publicly threatening his life, and conspired with foreign princes to partition France. Now the king, who reaffirmed his personal catholicism, could not oppose both parties simultaneously.80 The ‘traité de la trève’ was confirmed only just in time.81 Navarre quit Saumur to seek out and confront Mayenne. But, when the king heard that his enemy was close to Amboise, he finally summoned Navarre to save him.82 There were many who feared that Navarre was entering a trap, and he himself was apprehensive. Nevertheless, on 29 April 1589, the two kings met at Plessis-les-Tours amidst public rejoicing. Despite having 77

Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 169-71. Ibid., 178, says that Morosini was recalled about 20 July 1589. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iii, 252-60, Navarre’s declaration, 21 April 1589; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 433, gives 18 April, probably the date on which the declaration was drafted. It is also printed in Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 476-80, footnote. 79 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 433; Haag, La France protestante, x, 203-5, 24 April 1589; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 367. 80 Haag, La France protestante, x, 205-8, 26 April 1589; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 367. 81 It is not clear exactly when the truce was confirmed, presumably before 21 April 1589. 82 Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, i, 257-8, says that Mayenne deliberately acted in such a way as to force the king to turn to Navarre. They hoped this would precipitate his excommunication, and secure the pope’s support for the League. 78

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summoned Navarre, Henry’s attitude to his legitimate heir remained ungenerous and deceitful until the moment – as he believed – that death was staring him in the face. Navarre, by contrast, expressed his joy that he was finally able to be of service. God had restored him to his rightful place and now, at last, he was the principal pillar of that crown from which, five months before, the estates had sought to exclude him. Within the week Navarre had come to grips with Mayenne, almost at the king’s gate and, nearer Paris, Longueville and La Noue were successful against League forces. Navarre even began to feel optimistic that before long, and if the king were diligent, they might see the towers of Notre-Dame. Henry III, in his opinion, could only recover his kingdom by going straight to Paris; that was their joint objective and the thrust of their campaign.83

VIII: The Monitorium Mayenne was left in a dangerous position by the ‘traité de la trève’, which he had declined to circumvent. In view of the superior military power of the two kings, he had to ensure that Paris did not suddenly undergo a change of heart. He therefore paid the notorious preachers to ignite and sustain an irreconcilable hatred against the king. Day by day they spewed out impious libels and falsified scripture in order to destroy the king and keep the people in revolt. Jean Boucher, one of the most notorious clerics, embarked upon a tract to establish that the king must be deposed; clearly there was some confusion of thought between deposition and the desire for it.84 Mayenne himself thought it wiser, towards the end of May 1589, to evade Navarre in the field and return to the Parisian region; this enabled him to attend to other matters. In particular, he made a massive appeal to Rome, exploiting his third advantage, the reprehensible ‘traité de la trève’. Mayenne learnt from Diou that the pope was willing to entertain their complaints; that could only assist the congregation to gather material for the case against the king. Consequently, Mayenne appointed the League agents, already in Rome, to present these complaints. Now, on account of the treaty, he requested the pope to pronounce the king’s excommunication, and to provide the League with money and men for the war. They wanted the pope to forge a holy league which, presumably, Mayenne expected to command; and they begged him to send them – a strange procedure indeed – a dedicated legate. That would be a lively sign that they were acting under Papal authority. This audacious demand is important because, after the League had disposed of the king, that is exactly what Sixtus did, thereby causing untold difficulties for Henry IV.85 83

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 450-6; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 477-81, 30 April 1589, Navarre to Duplessis from the ‘faubourgs’ of Tours, 486, 17 May 1589, Navarre to the mayor and ‘jurats’ of Bordeaux, 487-8, 18 May 1589, Navarre to madame de Grammont, 488, 21 May 1589, Navarre to madame de Grammont; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 171-2, Navarre reached Plessis-les-Tours on 28 April, saw the king next day and, on 30 April discussed their campaign. 84 De Thou Histoire universelle, vii, 434-5, lists fourteen of these foul-mouthed clerics, most of whom were notorious members of the Seize. Boucher’s incomplete work was rendered superfluous by the king’s assassination. 85 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iii, 309-10, 25 May 1589, letter of the League to the pope. This item is marked ‘intercepted’.


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The instructions for the Leaguer envoys, dated 25 May 1589, were carried to Rome by Guillaume Rose, bishop of Senlis, categorised by de Thou as the worst of the gang of villainous preachers. The instructions were probably drafted by Rose himself, since they consisted of a nasty tissue of lies designed to blackguard the king, exonerate Mayenne and his deceased brother, Guise; also to justify their assumption of arms – allegedly – under the banners and authority of the pope. They maintained, of course, that France was now in danger of a change of religion; and they declared that they would never again submit to Henry III. By the assassination [of a cardinal] Henry was notoriously excommunicated, according to the canons of Boniface VIII and the decree of the Sorbonne! Furthermore, they also required the excommunication of everyone who assisted the enemy.86 The pope was therefore requested to pronounce this sentence, to exclude Joyeuse from the consistory, to expel Pisani from Rome, and to arrest d’Angennes.87 Mayenne was pushing at a door already ajar; unbeknown to him, the pope had already struck at Henry III on 5 May 1589. Mayenne’s previous letters, of 7 April, arrived about the end of that month and were submitted to the special congregation. About the same time, d’Angennes had heard from the king. Henry protested the futility of demanding the release of Bourbon into the hands of Morosini; that would be madness. Morosini, in any case, had no facilities for handling prisoners. Over Épinac, archbishop of Lyon, Henry had no control. Besides, Henry did not receive d’Angennes’ report of 15 March, which conveyed these Papal demands, until after the legate had departed (on 10 April) to find Mayenne. This dates the king’s letter to d’Angennes to about 10 April.88 In times of crisis, diplomacy at such a distance was impossible. Thus, just as Henry explained that he could not comply with the pope’s conditions, the League representatives were renewing their clamour for his excommunication. So the pope had either to grant their request or else to lose all credit with the League. Consequently he adopted what appears to have been a cynical and unworthy expedient. Morosini’s secretary, Sini, must also have arrived in Rome at about the end of April 1589. He brought Morosini’s letter to Montalto, written as the legate set off, on 10 April, to plead with Mayenne. Morosini informed the pope of the king’s agreement with Navarre adding, in his fair-minded way, that Henry had acted from necessity. The pope still hoped that severity would reduce the king to compliant penitence, meanwhile reserving his own options. While the case in point had been the murder of a cardinal, Sixtus was ultimately swayed by Henry’s treaty with Navarre – a less obscurely legalistic matter, and one which instantly threatened the League. The treaty was notified to the cardinals by the secretary to the consistory. He also mentioned a regrettable truce in Dauphiné, between Corso and the huguenot Lesdiguières, as well as the fact that the king 86

Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iii, 314-15, 24 May 1589, instructions for the League envoys to request the excommunication of the king, 315-25, memoir and instructions for the catholic envoys, drafted by Guillaume Rose, bishop of Senlis, 25 May 1589. 87 Cugnoni, ‘Autobiografia di Santa Severina’, Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria, xiii (1890), 184. 88 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 442.

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had attended divine office and received the sacraments, contrary to Morosini’s injunctions.89 After receiving Sini’s detailed reports, Sixtus V called a consistory on 5 May 1589 and issued a monitorium against Henry III. It related, in the first instance, to the clerical prisoners and, secondly, to the death of the cardinal; but it was actually the king’s alliance with Navarre that had clinched the matter. Henry III was required, within ten days of publication – notionally 3 June – to release the imprisoned prelates. Within thirty days of their release he must so inform the pope, upon pain of excommunication, including his supporters. Furthermore, within three months, either the king or a procurator must appear in Rome to account for the murders (both) and imprisonments.90 In other words, a king of France was to be tried in Rome, to determine whether he had incurred ecclesiastical censures. The same requirement applied to anyone else involved [in the murders]. Neither they nor the king might receive absolution, save from the pope in person, notwithstanding any privileges obtained from Rome. That qualification belatedly annulled Henry’s covering brief of July 1587. Doubtless Sixtus meant to bring the king to heel, and apparently without any care for the possible consequences if the king and his legitimate heir were both under sentence of excommunication. If Sixtus V was really concerned to curb the power of Spain, that was no way to set about it. The monitorium of 5 May 1589 was to remain secret until its simultaneous publication, in Rome and in France, on 24 May. According to de Thou, it was to be proclaimed and displayed on the doors of several French cathedrals, which seems curiously vague. Precisely what became of the monitorium is confused, obscure and deeply suspicious. According to Niccolini, the Tuscan ambassador in Rome, it was to be sent to Morosini with orders that, if the king preferred, the legate might present it secretly in the presence of a notary and witnesses. If, however, the king rejected it, Morosini should publicise it widely.91 This interesting report, from a reputable source, presents considerable difficulties. Morosini was no longer at court, and had no intention of returning, precisely on account of the king’s truce with Navarre. These were facts which Sini must have made known in Rome. Nor did Morosini receive the two copies allegedly sent to him on 12 May 1589. There was, in any case, no likelihood that they could have arrived before the designated publication date, 24 May, let alone in time for the matter to have been confidentially handled before that date. Furthermore, if the king was to be privately notified, why did Mayenne’s agent, Diou, leave Rome on 13 May bearing two copies of the monitorium, which is said to have been published in Lyon sometime in June? Niccolini confirmed the departure of Diou on 13 May, adding that Pisani would send a courier that evening in the hope of reaching France ahead of him; one must suppose that Diou was to be intercepted. Furthermore, Niccolini wrote on the same day 89

Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 176. One might wonder whether Papal severity was also prompted by Henry III’s persistent refusal to publish the decrees of Trent without caveat. 90 Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxi, 318-20. 91 ‘...il quale monitorio si manda al legato Morosini con ordine di fare intendere al Re che volendo S.M. gli sia intimato segretamente e solo coram notario e testibus, che il legato ne lo compiaccia’. Desjardins, Négs. Tosc., v, 35-6, 5 May 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany.


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that the pope had ordered three copies (sic) of the monitorium to be sent to Morosini, to be published in three provinces, plus three more to be sent to ‘another’ [person] because Sixtus distrusted the legate. According to Tempesti the French made every effort to prevent the monitorium from reaching France.92 Sini returned to Morosini on 11 June – with what message we do not know – and without the elusive monitorium; presumably because it had already been sent to Morosini.93 Sini went back again to Rome at the end of June to report the loss of the packet, and to request duplicates. If they were ever sent, they also failed to arrive. Despite the reported efforts of the French, it is difficult to stifle the suspicion that Morosini was not intended either to receive or, therefore, to deliver the monitorium. Sixtus V knew that Morosini was no longer in a position to function as legate; the court had ceased to exist, and Henry III was in the field. However, by 23 June, some copies of the monitorium had reached the League, and it was publicly read in Chartres and Meaux. It probably also reached Paris, since the Sorbonne noted and complained that it accorded the king his correct style, and failed to provide for his immediate excommunication.94 But it was never served upon the king either within, or beyond, the period of its validity. None of this explains what was really happening, except that a monitorium was launched without allowing anything like sufficient time for the king’s compliance. Mayenne’s agent, Diou, had obtained it in Rome and taken it to France, and the League publicised it in several places; yet it reached neither the legate, nor the king to whom it applied. This extraordinary procedure has apparently never been questioned; it appears to have been meekly accepted, by posterity and historians alike, that the pope was within his rights to censure the king. Thus, whether the king was excommunicated or not, has remained in the air; and that was pretty much what the pope intended. Leaving aside the matter of Gallican liberties, and other objections inherent in the dispute, it looks as if the monitorium was actually an audacious and unscrupulous expedient, designed to achieve certain political purposes without the risk of embarrassing the pope. While the situation in France was fluid and unpredictable, outright excommunication could have been risky. The monitorium enabled Sixtus V to appear to have gratified the demands of the League, and the League to derive strength and prestige from irresponsibly proclaiming the excommunication of the king – never mind the all-important technicalities, of which most men were ignorant. Albeit legally null, this scurrilous procedure was effectively

92

Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 177; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 35-6, 5 May 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany, 39-41, 13 May 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 389; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 329. Palma Cayet said that the pope named six places in which the monitorium was to be published and mentioned Poitiers and Agen. Chronologie novenaire, i, 459-60; ibid., ii, 21-2. Cugnoni, Ed., ‘Autobiografia di Santa Severina’, Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria, xiii (1890), 187, claims that the monitorium was billed in many rebel cities. 93 De L’Épinois concluded that the courier sent to Morosini must have been murdered. La Ligue et les papes, 330. Rocquain simply said that he was unable to get through. La France et Rome, 389. 94 The pope was reported to be very offended with ‘those of Paris’ for their slackness in publishing his monitorium. CSPF., 1589, pp. 350-1, 29 June/9 July 1589, Wroth to Walsingham.

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damaging, not least by lending force and credibility to the current theories of regicide.95 But if the combined efforts of Henry III and Navarre were to overwhelm the League – which would certainly have happened, but for the regicides – the pope could deftly evade the embarrassing consequences of an obsolete document which had gone astray; for it was not advisable to have excommunicated a restored and triumphant king. That would resemble a crass invitation to Henry III to summon the council so frequently advocated by his saviour and heir. It is said to have been at Estampes, on the march towards Paris, and sometime in July, that Henry III learnt of the Papal censure. Navarre is reported to have cheered the king by declaring that if he were the conqueror, his absolution would follow. If not, they would all die condemned as heretics.96 True or false, that surely was the measure of it. The pope had certainly been in an awkward situation, from which he emerged with discredit. According to John Wroth, the English agent in Venice, Sixtus V hoped that his monitorium would damage the French king in the estimation of the ‘ignorant and common sort’, while fearing that neither the king nor the nobility would heed it. These misgivings caused the turbulent pontiff to fret inwardly and to withdraw for long periods; at other times he went about muttering and mumbling to himself.97 Both Niccolini and the Venetian ambassador had sought to restrain him from sending the monitorium out. Sixtus even tried to deny having done so, but the envoys knew that Diou had carried two copies to France. Then, on 24 May 1589, it was published in Rome.98 The mystery and confusion do not end there. On 12 June 1589 Niccolini wrote of the pope’s anxiety about the affairs of France and what response the monitorium would elicit although, as the ambassador observed, the pope was not represented in France. It appears that Sixtus contrived to imply that he who went via Lyon – namely Diou – would somehow deliver it. In that case, Niccolini calculated, there could be no reply before 2025 June, which made a nonsense of the time factor inherent in the document.99 Sixtus V was perfectly capable of such complex dissimulation in order to mislead and perplex, and that was evidently his intention. Whether or not the king was deemed to have been excommunicated – and there is no indication that he thought so himself – the monitorium was still a very serious matter. In the first place, Joyeuse, Pisani and d’Angennes, bishop of Mans, all departed from Rome on that account, causing a total severance of FrancoPapal relations.100 As the quarrel between France and the Papacy was not resolved in the 95

The Parisians expressly stated how very helpful the censure had been in respect of the death of Henry III. Félibien, Histoire de la ville de Paris, v, 463-4, 7 August 1589, Paris to the pope. On the subject of regicide see Salmon, ‘Nationalism and King-Killing’, Majestas, i (1993), 89-95. 96 Rocquain, La France et Rome, 389; Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 188, quoting Davila. 97 CSPF., 1589, pp. 325-7, 14/24 June 1589, Wroth to Walsingham. Lilley was unable to obtain a copy of the monitorium, ‘it is here [Pontoise] kept so secret, but at Paris contrary’. Ibid., 375-6, 12/22 July 1589, Lilley to Walsingham. 98 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 42, 19 May 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany, 42-3, 28 May 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 99 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 45-9, 12 June 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 100 CSPF., 1589, pp. 302-3, 6/16 June 1589, Wroth to Walsingham, 325-7, 14/24 June 1589, Wroth to Walsingham, 357-9, 2/12 July 1589, Lilley to Walsingham. Joyeuse arrived in Venice near the middle of


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king’s lifetime, it inevitably extended into the reign of Henry IV. These matters, and especially the breach between Rome and France were also of critical concern elsewhere in Italy.

IX: The Involvement of Italy The reaction in Italy to the monitorium against Henry III probably came as something of a surprise both in Rome and in France. The conduct of the Papacy had begun to worry Venice, Tuscany and Mantua, each of whom received a copy of that monitorium which failed to reach Henry III.101 They feared that the convulsions in France would open the way for Philip II to augment his power in Italy. This growing anxiety in the peninsula was shortly to have a marked influence upon the affairs of Henry IV. When the grand duke of Tuscany heard of the monitorium, he sent the French envoy, La Clielle, back to France with some robust advice. Henry III, he proposed, should dispatch La Clielle to Rome to present the following message: Henry had heard from his allies of a monitorium against him. This was a novel procedure which he found unjust after so many French services to the Papacy. It was ungracious of the pope to feign ignorance of the just reasons [so often explained] for the punishments and arrests [at Blois] since all Europe knew of them. Therefore an enquiry [held in Rome] was useless. To be convinced, one need only observe the present conduct of Mayenne and the League who persisted in their rebellion. The King of France was neither accountable to Rome nor susceptible to Church censures, any more than his predecessors had been. If these things had already been said by the French ambassadors – now departed – the next item had not. The grand duke advised the king to go to Rome in person with an imposing suite – namely an army – where he expected to have the sentence revoked and the absolution granted – if absolution was needed. Venice, Tuscany and Mantua would concert orders to their ambassadors in Rome to inform the pope that they knew of the monitorium; that this procedure could not fail to be judged as unjust, imprudent, audacious and emotional, when it was known that the king had reason and right on his side. Every prince felt disposed to support him. They would ask the pope to revoke the sentence forthwith, thereby preventing the harm which could come of it. Otherwise, if Henry III marched on Italy [as they advised], they would do nothing to defend the pope. They would also advise the king to seize Avignon and the comtat Venaissin until Sixtus V behaved wisely and peace was restored.102 A show of strength might, indeed, have been effective. June; Pisani apparently arrived a little later. Ibid., 375-6, 12/22 July 1589, Lilley to Walsingham said that both ambassadors were in Florence – which could be significant – taking ‘some resolution for their return’. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 444, thought that d’Angennes and Pisani had gone to Leghorn and embarked for France. 101 CSPF., 1589, pp. 201-2, 5/15 April 1589, Wroth to Walsingham; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 67-8, 295-7, 13 May 1589, the doge to Badoer, his ambassador in Rome, 69-72, 297-301, 26 May 1589, Olivares to Philip II; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 444. 102 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 444-7. The comtat Venaissin was a Papal possession, now in the Vaucluse.

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With Franco-Papal relations already severed, here was a major row in the making, and no one can tell what might have happened had Henry III survived much longer. These Italian states were profoundly alarmed, and with good reason, by the creeping Spanish control over France. The collapse of the monarchy could open the flood gates and this early move in defence of the king, is very significant. Venice was to be the first catholic state to recognise Henry IV; without fail Tuscany and Mantua would also support him. For if Henry IV had been an absolved catholic, it would not have been possible for the League and Spain to resist his accession. This, of course, was the argument constantly used by Henry III; but he lacked the power to obtain the absolution. Furthermore, no one knew that Navarre would succeed to the throne both shortly and in time of war. In Rome, the ambassadors of the Italian princes would sustain an incessant pressure upon successive popes, to counteract the efforts of the Leaguer and Spanish envoys, first to prevent the abjuration of Henry IV and, thereafter, to block his absolution. It has already been seen, in the case of his hapless predecessor, just how tortuous Rome could be, and how ruthless and tenacious in seeking to extend the powers of the Papacy into the temporal sphere.

X: Regicide Following their hurried truce, in April 1589, Henry III entrusted Navarre with the conduct of the war. He promptly required military changes in order to assemble one large army. Soissons was sent to Brittany, where he was captured by the duc de Mercoeur, and Schomberg went to Germany to seek further forces.103 Henry III sent Fresne Forget to Spain in a vain attempt to frighten Philip II and curtail his help to the League. Several years too late, Henry also demanded the recall of Mendoza. Mayenne, however, was receiving Spanish money and, for the moment, Philip II needed him. It was at this time, it has been seen, that Mayenne was engaged with Parma in seeking a closer accord with Spain.104 It is needless to follow every step by which Henry III and Navarre advanced upon Paris in the summer of 1589.105 Châtillon and La Noue – protestants to the fore – crossed the Seine at Poissy. Pontoise was taken on 26 July, as Navarre joined forces with a levy of Swiss. They were successfully conducted to France by Sancy, and at exactly the 103

Philippe-Emmanuel de Lorraine, duc de Mercoeur, ‘gouverneur’ of Brittany 1582, son of Nicolas de Lorraine, comte de Vaudemont. Mercoeur was the brother of Henry III’s queen, Louise. 104 Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘La Politique de Philippe II’, Revue des questions historiques, xxv (1879), 5-66. At first, Philip II was willing to recall Mendoza but, after the death of the king, he was asked to stay and, on 7 September 1589, Philip sent instructions for him and Moreo. Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 193-7; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 457-9; CSPVen., 1581-91, pp. 463-4, 10 July 1589, Contarini to the doge and senate, Madrid. The secretary Idiaquez was in charge of Mayenne’s affairs. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 497, 6 June 1589, Navarre to Henry III. Épernon rejoined the court at this time and was present in the army when Henry III died. 105 Lilley followed the two kings and the army and commented that everywhere was being ‘pilled’, although the king (he probably meant Navarre) tried to prevent it. However, churches, clergy and women were protected. CSPF., 1589, pp. 334-6, 22 June/2 July 1589, Lilley to Walsingham.


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moment of need.106 From 18 July, Paris was closed and the trenches were manned. Houses were searched, requisitions made, and known royalists arrested. After the fall of Pontoise, the royalists took l’Ile-Adam, Beaumont and Creil; on 30 July, Henry III entered Saint-Cloud. On 1 August Navarre appeared in battle order, somewhere near the ‘faubourg’ Saint-Germain. He was in position to attack the capital next day. No one could doubt that the city was in imminent danger and, after all that had happened, it was deeply feared that Paris would now be sacked.107 The assassination of Henry III of France, on 1 August 1589, was finally timed to perfection, to prevent the recapture of Paris and the restoration of the monarchy.108 Otherwise the reconquest of the capital must have entailed the ruination or death of Mayenne, the destruction of the Catholic League and the Parisian Seize, as well as the end of Spanish influence in France. Everything, in fact, was at stake. Navarre himself observed on that very day, 1 August, that the League had been left with no other escape but to execute [if they could] their former project against the king.109 It is evident, if not proven, that those who desired the king’s death, contrived the deed. It is not to be supposed that a youthful monk, described by de Thou as an illiterate libertine, could have obtained access to the king, armed with the requisite papers to command attention, without sponsorship or accomplices.110 Jacques Clément was raised in the Dominican house at Sens. Imbued by his superiors with the theories of regicide current in clerical circles, he perceived a means of attaining to the salvation from which he believed himself to be excluded; and he was encouraged therein by père Bourgoing, prior of the Dominicans in Paris.111 Brash and indiscreet, Clément boasted of his project and appeared sufficiently fanatical to take the necessary risk. It is uncertain whether Clément himself applied to a so-called ‘honest bourgeois’ of Paris, or whether some questing member of the Seize appealed to him; for it was known that the king would probably not refuse to see a monk. Clément is said to have conferred with La Chapelle-Marteau, a founder member of the Seize, who was previously involved in abortive assaults upon the king in Paris. Thereafter – or possibly together with La Chapelle-Marteau – Clément met and conferred with Mayenne. Then he set off, in the company of La Guesle, ‘procureur général du parlement’, carrying forged letters purporting to be from the imprisoned first ‘président’, 106

Poirson, Ed., Mémoires de Villeroy et de Sancy, 162-4, Sancy left for Switzerland and Germany on 3 February and joined the king at Poissy, with foreign forces, on 26 July 1589. 107 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 501-2, 14 July 1589, Navarre to madame de Grammont, Pontoise, 502, 25 July 1589, Navarre to Souvré; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 564-9; Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 188. 108 According to Navarre, Henry III died at 2 a.m., on 2 August 1589. Halphen, Harangues et lettres inédites du roi Henri IV, 21-4, 18 August 1589, Henry IV to Maisse. 109 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 503-4, 1 August 1589, Navarre to Duplessis, Saint-Cloud, footnote. Lilley also commented that as the king was ‘prospering in all his enterprises...the enemy ran to the practices of Spain’. CSPF., 1589, p. 394, 22 July/1 August 1589, Lilley to queen Elizabeth. 110 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 486. 111 Bourgoing was arrested on 1 November 1589 and executed in Tours on 26 January 1590 for having encouraged the murder. Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 72; de Ruble, Ed., d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, viii, 73 n.4.

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Achille de Harlay. According to Navarre, Clément was actually arrested the day before by royalist troops but was rescued by the ‘procureur’.112 So the assault was executed on 1 August; but, while Clément perished on the spot – thereby saving the League from more explicit exposure – the king survived a little longer. He sent for Navarre and ordered him to summon the council. Afterwards Navarre went to Meudon in the belief that all would be well. Then the surgeons summoned him back again; but, making haste, he came too late. Navarre made no reference to a death-bed speech – which, in any case, he would not have heard; neither did he claim that the king had named him as his successor, or mention whether Henry had been absolved.113 According to one anonymous editor, the facts tend to establish that the design of Jacques Clément was known to the Seize, announced [?commended] in advance by the Leaguer preachers, encouraged by madame de Montpensier, and authorised by Mayenne. Mayenne thereafter solemnised the event as a festival, admired Clément’s effigy, commanded his eulogy, compensated his family, arrested opponents, and ignited fireworks in Paris.114 If that was not complicity, it was something very like it. Years later, in all the negotiations for his submission to Henry IV, Mayenne invariably insisted upon exoneration for the regicide; the stigma always adhered to him, presumably not without cause. It is impossible to believe that Mayenne did not earnestly desire the king’s death which was, at that moment, the only apparent alternative to his own. Subsequently the general council of the Union, established by Mayenne, addressed to the Parisian preachers a circular letter inviting them to dilate upon three propositions: firstly that Jacques Clément was a hero and a martyr; secondly that Navarre could not succeed to the throne and, thirdly, that those who supported him were excommunicated – a form of Papal censure with which the League made remarkably free. Amidst the unseemly public rejoicing, Guincestre, one of the fourteen preachers named by de Thou, pronounced the assassin’s apotheosis; thus Jacques Clément was enthusiastically accorded upon earth the treasure he desired in heaven.115 Such news as the death of Henry III might have been expected to travel fast; in fact it did not reach Rome until 11 September 1589. The reaction of the compromised pope was unedifying. According to Santa Severina, head of the French congregation, Sixtus V 112

These last facts were precisely stated by Navarre on the day of the crime. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 503-4, 1 August 1589, Navarre to Souvré, 503-4, 1 August 1589, Navarre to Duplessis, footnote; Halphen, Harangues et lettres inédites du Roi Henri IV, 21-4, 18 August 1589, Henry IV to Maisse. 113 According to Santa Severina, queen Louise later declared to the pope that Henry III was penitent and requested confession but had died too soon. His posthumous absolution was sought by Arnaud d’Ossat. Cugnoni, Ed., ‘Autobiografia di Santa Severina’, Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria, xiii (1890), 190; Victor Martin, Le Gallicanisme et la réforme catholique, 280; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ii, 503-4, and n.1; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 571-5; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 486-91. 114 Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xii, Mémoires secrettes, 358-9; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 1-10, ‘discours’ on the death of Henry III. Navarre regretted that Clément had not been spared for questioning, although the matter was not a mystery. They had ‘assez de preuves’. Halphen, Harangues et lettres inédites du Roi Henri IV, 21-4, 18 August 1589, Henry IV to Maisse. 115 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, ii, 576-7.


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felt relieved of a great burden. He was apparently unaware that worse trouble would ensue if French affairs were not swiftly and carefully handled.116 He called a consistory to which he praised the action of Clément in hyperbolical terms, something he might not have risked had the French ambassadors not previously departed. Sixtus denied the late king the customary Roman funeral rites, on the grounds that he had died impenitent.117 Probably most ultramontane catholics had really desired the king’s death – monk ‘manqué’ that he was – and persuaded themselves and each other that it was meritorious to kill him. In this sense, the responsibility was collective, beginning at the top with Sixtus V who might have used his influence to restrain the incendiary propaganda of the regular and secular clergy. Thus the pope who unscrupulously extorted capital from the summary execution of a traitorous cardinal, openly applauded the assassination of an anointed king. Ten days later Sixtus V appointed the legate already requested by Mayenne, thereby appearing to afford him public support in the absence of a catholic king. Thus it was that the still-protestant Henry of Navarre succeeded to the throne as Henry IV suddenly, in time of war, and just when the exultant League was openly condoned by the Papacy. With nothing behind him but anarchy, and the power of Spain against him, Henry IV was unable to impose his own solutions through outright victory in the field. Consequently he was also unable to escape from this Roman mesh and, above all, the intolerable claim of pontiffs – encouraged by Spain for her own reasons – to adjudicate a contested succession.

116

Cugnoni, Ed., ‘Autobiografia di Santa Severina’, Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria, xiii (1890), 188; La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg à Rome’, Revue des questions historiques, lxxix (1886), 11, says that the news of Henry’s death reached Rome from Lyon on 12 September 1589. 117 Queen Louise, widow of Henry III, was desperate that the pope should perform the customary funeral rites in his chapel for the sake of Henry’s soul and his memory. She appointed Arnaud d’Ossat to plead for her in Rome. He argued trenchantly that, at the time of his death, Henry III was neither excommunicated nor impenitent. La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 61 seq.; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 495; Analecta Juris Pontificii, série ii (no volume number), 867.

HENRY IV OF FRANCE AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION 1572-1596 Volume II

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CHAPTER VIII: THE ACCESSION OF HENRY IV, AUGUST 1589 I: First Steps Following the death of Henry III, on 2 August 1589, turmoil and perturbation seized the royal camp; these emotions were mixed with anger and outrage. Who but Henry of Navarre could hope to avenge the blasphemy of regicide? Without him, furthermore, the outlook would be grim for the late king’s officials and supporters. But for many, however, this was a situation to be exploited. When a meeting was held by the late king’s principal servants, discordant opinions were heard. Nicolas de Harlay, seigneur de Sancy urged upon the assembled company that France was a monarchy and must have a king. The transition from one king to the next was instantaneous, and depended upon God. Unless they, who were the royalists, recognised Navarre as Henry IV, no one else would do so. Anyone who could not support Navarre should withdraw forthwith; and some did, notably the ducs de Nevers and Épernon. Among those who remained, agreement to recognise Navarre as Henry IV was only tentative and conditional. Marshal Biron (Armand de Gontaut, baron de Biron), who could have been a tower of strength, was more concerned to defend his personal interests than those of the monarchy. The comté de Périgord purchased his service but not his loyalty.1 From the outset, Henry was illserved, and grudgingly, and that restricted his freedom of action. With the timely support of Sancy, however, Henry’s own vigorous action may have helped to sway opinion in his favour. The next day, 3 August 1589, Henry summoned an army council. His first – possibly primitive – instinct was to retreat beyond the Loire. The gentry in his own forces had already extended the term of their commitment in order to partake in the assault upon Paris. Deprived of that gratification, many would quit and attend to the harvest. Henry IV was to be repeatedly beset by this problem – namely that he disposed of no reliable or standing force.2 Jean de Chaumont, seigneur de Guitry, Navarre’s envoy to Casimir in 1586, persuaded Henry of the unwisdom of abandoning recently occupied small towns in the Parisian region; and Sancy, who had just conducted the king’s Swiss troops to Paris, prevailed upon them to serve his successor for three months.3 Henry would remain in the north, and that was a beginning. Henry of Navarre therefore had no realistic alternative but to accept the conditions of the princes and nobles. He did not, however, permit any conditions directly harmful to the huguenots; nor is it clear who drafted the declaration of 4 August 1589. While the promulgation of this document is very well known, its significance has often been 1 Thompson, Ed., Ehrman, The Letters and Documents of Biron, pp. xxiii, xli, xlii. The editor was convinced of Biron’s selfish disloyalty and that he was in no hurry to see the king victorious. Sancy was quite explicit about Biron’s desire to exploit the king’s predicament and to put the interests of the nobility first. Poirson, Villeroy et Sancy, 166. 2 CSPF., January to July 1589, pp. 357-9, 2/12 July 1589, Lilley to Walsingham. From Pontoise, before the death of Henry III, Lilley warned of these impending defections. 3 Poirson, Villeroy et Sancy, 164-5.

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misconstrued. Some contemporaries alleged, and historians have repeated, that Henry thereby promised to abjure; he did not.4 Henry promised – quite explicitly – what he had already offered several times before. In the first place, the declaration recognised his accession by the use of his proper title, king of France and Navarre; his enemies persisted in styling him only ‘prince de Béarn’. Henry undertook to preserve the catholic religion unchanged in all respects. Furthermore, and ‘according to his previous declaration’ [of 21 April 1589, when he crossed the Loire], he expressed himself ready and desirous to be instructed by a legitimate and free, general or national council, and willing to accept its conclusions. For that purpose, he would assemble [a council] within six months. Meanwhile, the religious status quo, as established by the ‘traité de la trève’, should obtain, until it was otherwise determined by a general peace, or by an estates-general, also to be convoked within six months. The clause relating to the convocation of some sort of council was unavoidably vague, since the nature of so problematic an assembly could not be determined. There followed undertakings about the command of cities yet to be captured, and the confirmation of state and court offices in recognition of services rendered to the late king. Finally, Henry agreed to pursue the regicides.5 Reciprocally, and on the same date, the princes and nobles agreed to recognise Navarre as Henry IV, upon the terms of his declaration, and according to the fundamental laws of the kingdom. That suggests an admission that Navarre’s claim to the throne was hereditary; separate and distinct from his religion, it was therefore indestructible. The League, however, had asserted the catholicity of the crown as fundamental law, and also advanced the convenient principle of election. The nobles then inserted two additional conditions: firstly that Navarre should hold an assembly of the servants of the late king, within two months, to deliberate upon, and resolve, the affairs of the kingdom. This probably related to their second condition: namely permission to send notable persons to Rome. These persons were to explain and justify the nobles’ adherence to Navarre, and also to obtain from the pope that which they knew to be necessary for the good of Christendom and the service of the king and the state. Finally the nobles required that the regicides be brought to justice. Did they know that the pope had, at the least, applauded the regicide? According to Sancy, who was present, these convolutions meant that the nobles proposed to seek Papal assistance to achieve the abjuration of the king, and his blessing upon it – the word absolution was eschewed.6 The duc de Luxembourg was chosen to represent them in Rome; but this was not announced until 6 September 1589. He did not, apparently, leave in any great hurry. Thus, from the first days of his reign, Henry IV had agreed to representations in Rome with a view to his abjuration; that much is fact. It is impossible to say whether the king welcomed this move towards Rome, which he was in no position to make himself; neither was he in any position to prohibit it. By the time the outcome was known, his circumstances might be notably different. 4

This error in interpretation arises, precisely, from taking the document out of the context of the previous reign. 5 Isambert, Recueil général des anciennes lois, xv, 2-5, 4 August 1589, declaration of Henry IV. As an integral part of the same document, Henry’s declaration is followed by that of the princes and nobles. 6 Poirson, Villeroy et Sancy, 165-6.

Chapter VIII: The Accession of Henry IV, August 1589

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If this, unique, account of Henry’s accession is true, it reflects an extraordinary naivety on the part of the royalist catholics – two of whom were cardinals – and an apparent ignorance of Franco-Papal relations since the excommunication of Navarre and Condé. Perhaps the princes and nobles originally supposed that, within the two months allowed in their statement, they would receive some answer from Rome, clarifying the way ahead. Luxembourg, however, did not reach Rome until 8 January 1590. This delay, which is hard to explain, afforded the Leaguer and Spanish agents an initial advantage of time in which to advance their own cause. Perhaps on account of this delay, the demand for an assembly of notables was heard of no more; or, perhaps, it was superseded by the king’s announcement, on 27 August 1589, of his intention to hold an assembly at Tours, scheduled for 31 October.7 Henry had, meanwhile, clarified his position in a significant speech to the seigneurs, delivered on 8 August 1589. He referred, on this occasion, to otherwise unknown ‘oaths and recommendations’ imposed and expressed by the dying Henry III, in the presence of the said seigneurs and for the peace of the kingdom. The principal requirement had been to maintain the liberty and freedom of exercise for the two religions, until the problems between them had been resolved by a holy, general or national council. That was how Henry III had intended to proceed – presumably after the expected recovery of Paris and defeat of the League. In other words, Navarre was reminding the nobles that the dying king had called for an interim. It was therefore not unnatural that Navarre should have claimed, and expected for himself, the same religious assurance extended to everyone else. Consequently, he now declared that he had assembled the seigneurs to affirm that he would not waver in his religion before he had been instructed by such a council as had been, and was, proposed.8 If this evidence is true, it may indicate an attempt by Henry III to remove the problem of Navarre’s religion out of the immediate, crisis situation following his death. The same evidence could also throw light upon the contents of the two declarations of 4 August 1589. These reciprocal undertakings, together with Henry’s speech of 8 August, might be seen as a provisional contract between himself and the nobles to defer the issue of his religion. That was well and good, so far as it went; indeed, it was unavoidable. But while Navarre perceived the problem in terms of a council, the instinct of the nobles was to look to Rome; in fact neither the one nor the other could provide a solution. Thus, from a position of alarming weakness, and in fluid circumstances, Henry had to struggle on, trying to sustain the religious position which he had already, repeatedly, defined. Henry’s declaration of 4 August 1589 can only be properly understood in the context of his former pronouncements made since 1583. At the risk of repetition, it is essential to realise that the declaration did not constitute an undertaking to abjure. 7

The evidence for the king’s announcement of 27 August 1589 is contained in his declaration of 28 November 1589, deferring the proposed assembly to 15 March 1590. Henry had summoned the princes, officers of the crown, seigneurs, captains, gentlemen and other principal ministers and officials from the provinces. The exact nature of the assembly remains uncertain; contemporaries were not concerned with such definitions. Isambert, Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, xv, 11-15, 28 November 1589, ‘déclaration du roi’. 8 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 34-7, 8 August 1589, speech and declaration of Navarre to the seigneurs.

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Henry’s well-publicised religious position remained unchanged, together with the specifications in the ‘traité de la trève’. The only, slight, shift – albeit far more theoretical than real – might be detected in his consent to the forthcoming mission of Luxembourg to Rome. One must not suppose that, in August 1589, Henry IV could see far enough ahead to embrace the hope of Papal assistance in place of a council that was never going to happen. The future was wholly obscure; his need at that moment was to survive, and to impose his authority, from which everything else would stem. That must begin with the early recovery of Paris. Henry later complained to Duplessis about his initial difficulties. He had had to tame so many ‘personnes farouches’, everyone being convinced that he was out to establish his own power in order to destroy their religion. Apparently no one believed his protestations and denials. A little later he assured Duplessis and the huguenots – as he was bound to do – of his constancy in religion.9

II: The Protestant King The exceptional difficulties faced by Henry IV in August 1589 arose from the fact – already noted – that he succeeded to the throne unexpectedly, and in time of war. The murder of Henry III, at the crucial moment in his advance upon Paris, delivered the Catholic League and the Seize from destruction; it also opened up, in their own estimation and that of Spain and the Papacy, a disputed succession. Although Henry III had taken the field and was therefore at risk, the contingency of his death had not been provided for. As the crown of France was hereditary no special arrangements were necessary. Acknowledgement of the heir presumptive would, however, have been normal but, on account of the unresolved contention over Navarre’s religion, this had never been done. Everyone knew that Henry III had recognised no other heir, but that was no longer the point. It has been seen in Part I that Navarre’s religion was always a matter of public concern. While he was heir presumptive, it became an exploitable factor in public life. But, being close to the king in age, he had always regarded his eventual succession as unlikely. He freely acknowledged that France was overwhelmingly catholic, and he was no missionary. He surely must have reflected – it is impossible to suppose otherwise – that he might be forced into abjuration. That could be one reason why he had so frequently called for a council. A council would provide a structure and framework by which the transition could either be avoided or else rendered proper, formal and acceptable. Meanwhile, frank declarations, and repeated demands for a council had provided a means of resisting the pressure to convert. As the protestants’ ‘protector’, Navarre recognised particular obligations. It was all a very different matter, however, when Henry succeeded to the throne, without any warning or preparation beyond a normal perception of danger. Now, despite the royalists’ acceptance of his hereditary right, Navarre’s religion was suddenly the 9

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 69-70, 6 November 1589, Henry IV to Duplessis, 70-3, 7 November 1589, Henry IV to Duplessis. Henry wished Duplessis to rejoin him.


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burning issue which defined the allegiance of many catholics and relaxed the loyalty of others. But the conversion of a prince was not – as some have supposed – either a straightforward or a private matter, to do or not to do. Conversion was a process, which could neither be undertaken alone, nor without Papal participation. Henry knew what had befallen Soissons and Conti when they sought absolution. He was also aware of the fate of Henry III; and that had led to a total breach with Rome. This profoundly unhelpful severance exacerbated Henry’s problems by worsening the rift between the already divided catholics; for it was not the huguenots who were tearing France apart. Inevitably, Henry’s immediate concern was for survival; and that precluded impulsive decisions in adverse circumstances. Besides, his principal hope of foreign assistance – without which he could not possibly confront the hostility of Spain – lay with queen Elizabeth and other protestant princes. Ample evidence soon emerged that Henry IV expected recognition as the legitimate sovereign that he was, before he would consider acts of grace – of which his dignified abjuration might, conceivably, be one. Henry, anyway, had no option but to proceed pragmatically. His principal objective had to be the recovery of Paris. Paris – whence Henry III had been expelled, never to return – was the stronghold of the Catholic Union and a city of strategic and symbolic importance. Given greater loyalty and better fortune than Henry in fact enjoyed, Paris might have fallen fairly quickly. The swift recovery of Paris would have altered everything, both in domestic and foreign affairs including, above all, the attitude of Sixtus V. It has already been seen how Henry’s domestic and foreign enemies combined to work against him in Rome. In the event, the recovery of Paris proved to be an immensely difficult task, and one for which the indigent king was not equipped. Obliged, therefore, to temporise as best he could, soothing fears and sustaining utterly disparate hopes, Henry necessarily sought to defer the resolution of all major issues to the conclusion of a general peace. The huguenots were temporarily provided for by the ‘traité de la trève’ in April 1589 – which was all that could be done in time of war. But the vexed question of a better, and permanent, protestant settlement was looming. Clearly the king would like a satisfactory dispensation to be included in a comprehensive peace, before the truce expired in April 1590. That would have relieved him of his uneasy and divisive role as huguenot ‘protector’. It would also have pre-empted the huguenots’ bitter and subversive opposition to the king’s eventual abjuration. While events did not work out that way, Henry IV still cherished his intense aspiration – albeit increasingly remote – to accomplish a religious reunion. The conception was ultimately enshrined, as a forlorn hope, in the preamble to the edict of Nantes in 1598. Now his inescapable shift towards the late king’s catholic supporters – exposing him to their deliberate catholic influence – strained his close relationship with Duplessis-Mornay. For Duplessis, who was ill at the time, his strictly Calvinist aspiration to religious reunion was enhanced, however unrealistically, by the accession of their protestant ‘protector’. He hastened to

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offer his advice to the new king, as he always had to Navarre as huguenot leader and heir presumptive.10 The catholics, Duplessis said, were alarmed. Therefore a[nother] declaration was necessary to assure them that there would be no innovations in religion; efforts would be made, by legitimate means and the advice of those best qualified, to achieve the reunion of all the king’s subjects. The terms under which the protestants were to live should also be specified, and those who were dissatisfied could proceed by petition. Henry should write to all the churches and protestant towns exhorting them to behave with moderation. He should also express the desire to relieve the people [of their burden of taxation] and to call an estates-general. He should publicly deplore the outrage of regicide which brought him to the throne, and pardon within a stated time those willing to submit. Duplessis appeared in this memoir to be unaware of the breach with Rome, caused by the monitorium against Henry III; ignorance of the matter may therefore have been widespread. Consequently he proposed that the cardinal de Joyeuse and Pisani – who were no longer in Rome – should warn the pope, with thinly veiled threats, of the danger he incurred by his ‘foudres et bulles’ [against Navarre and Condé], recalling the [schismatic] example of England. In particular, Duplessis saw vengeance for the murder of the late king as a possible unifying factor, and in that he was not, at the time, entirely mistaken. It was probably also about this time that Duplessis drafted a further document intended to propose to the emperor, Rudolph II, that it would become his rank and calling to summon a council; that, Duplessis alleged, would transcend the Papacy. The king was made to complain of the abusive use of the term ‘heretic’, and of the irregular way in which he had been excommunicated, without either warning or admonition. He would be willing – as indeed he had often declared – to be instructed in the truth by such a council, which Duplessis assuredly did not see as culminating in Henry’s abjuration. It is doubtful if this idea, coming from a leading Calvinist, would have commended itself to the royalists; probably the document was never sent. Duplessis was afraid, not only of the strong catholic influences to which the king was now subjected, but also that he could easily lose the huguenot support which he so desperately needed.11 This was to be the last of Duplessis’ policy documents. His dreams had, implicitly, depended upon the peaceful accession of his master; Duplessis was unable to adjust to the demands of Henry’s accession and the prolonged struggle which ensued. As the ‘gouverneur’ of Saumur, an important Loire crossing, Duplessis remained the king’s principal link with the huguenots in the west, although altered circumstances destroyed their previously close relationship. By the time Duplessis’ memoir was received, Henry had already taken his first, pressing steps; and these were entirely consistent with his previous conduct.

10

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 393-8 [10] August 1589, memoir of DuplessisMornay for Henry IV. 11 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 434-42, ‘projet de la depesche pour l’empereur’; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 178-9.


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III: The Need to Prevail In the days which followed the declarations of 4 August 1589, Henry IV wrote numerous letters announcing his accession and distributing the declaration. But he was ill at ease, and complained of finding himself among ‘des peuples bizarres’, far away from his native Gascony and the places he was used to. He appealed for help from Saxony, and to the King of Denmark he openly declared that the League had killed the king. His servants, Sancy, and Jacques de Bongars, seigneur de Bauldry et de la Chesnaye returned to Germany to seek help there; Beauvoir la Nocle went to England with letters for the queen and her ministers, Burghley, and Walsingham. Henry even briefly entertained the romantic notion of crossing the water to meet Elizabeth in Rye – from which a clearer understanding might have sprung than they were ever to enjoy.12 While awaiting the results of these appeals, Henry was left with only about half the strength of the original, combined royal army, which he divided into three contingents. He soon moved away from the Parisian area going first towards Compiègne with the body of Henry III. Thereafter he approached the rich, maritime province of Normandy, taking a few small places by the way. The province was convenient for communications with England, and Henry was seeking an offensive/defensive alliance for which negotiations had already begun by 23 August 1589. It was somewhat easier, and more natural, for queen Elizabeth to deal with the still-protestant Henry IV, whom she had already favoured for many years, than with previous French monarchs. Furthermore, the interests of England and France were temporarily closer than in the past. With exceptional celerity, Elizabeth undertook to help with money and munitions, albeit because she herself felt threatened. She sent a small contingent to secure Dieppe followed, in October, by 4000 men commanded by Peregrine Bertie, baron Willoughby.13 Elizabeth’s initially favourable response was not, however, the beginning of a constructive partnership which, notionally, might have spelt the defeat of Spain. This significant failure of England and France to co-operate successfully partly arose from a lack of communication and mutual confidence. Each monarch was ignorant of the priority needs of the other, and of the manner in which money was raised; each had pressing requirements which did not seem reasonable to the other. Elizabeth was adamant, then and later, that her forces should be employed to secure the northern sea coasts, while Henry wanted them wherever reinforcements were most urgently needed; this important disagreement led to bitter recriminations. Part of Henry’s immediate purpose was to lure Mayenne and his forces away from the Parisian area so that he did not re-establish control 12

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 10-11, 8 August 1589, Henry IV to the duke of Saxony, 11-12, 11 August 1589, Henry IV to Genies, 25-6, 19 August 1589, Henry IV to Burghley and to Walsingham, 27, 23 August 1589, Henry IV to queen Elizabeth, 29-31, 27 August 1589, Henry IV to Buzanval, in England, 31-3, 27 August 1589, Henry IV to the King of Denmark; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 290, 13/23, August 1589, commission for Beauvoir la Nocle, Buhy and Buzanval to request money and munitions in England. 13 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 290, 2/12 August 1589, Lilley to Walsingham. He said that if Henry IV were not assisted, there would soon be a dozen kings in France which would become ‘a highway for Spain to tyrannise the whole world’. Ibid., 294-5, 20/30 September 1589, commission for Willoughby.

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over places already taken by Henry III. With the substantial force that he raised in August 1589 Mayenne was, indeed, tempted to seek an early victory over the king. Their respective manoeuvres in the region of Dieppe notoriously led to the first pitched battle of Henry’s reign; Mayenne was defeated at Arques on 21 September 1589.14 The battle of Arques was an auspicious beginning; nevertheless Henry’s situation was still critical. He returned to Dieppe and, on 18 October 1589, met the 4000 English troops. Thus reinforced, he departed on 21 October and, contrary to the queen’s intention, marched her force inland. In fact they all made a dash for Paris where, it was supposed from his ‘talking on the way’, Henry had established intelligence. This was a first opportunity to retake the city; La Noue believed that Paris might then have fallen had Mayenne arrived only two days later. But Henry was betrayed: Mayenne’s return from Picardy was not obstructed according to plan, and so he entered Paris on 2 November. There appears at this time to have been some serious tension in the royal camp between the catholic Biron and the protestant La Noue.15 Henry still wished to draw Mayenne away from Paris and to seek battle in open country. He therefore went to besiege Estampes, a town that Mayenne had promised to protect.16 This ploy was also unsuccessful and, by then, the season was far advanced. Henry moved towards the Loire, the seat of his provisional government, and entered Tours on 21 November. There his accession was recognised by the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Mocenigo, on behalf of the doge and senate.17 These events show how the needs of war superseded all other matters. At this time, late in November 1589, Henry wrote an important letter to the lieutenant-general in Guyenne, Jacques de Goyon, comte de Matignon, ostensibly to explain the postponement of the assembly scheduled to meet at Tours on 31 October 1589. Some such assembly, it will be recalled, was demanded of the king within six months of his accession.18 This letter contains the most explicit statement we have of Henry’s own attitude to religion at the beginning of his reign. Henry recognised that Matignon, and others, conceived of the settlement of national affairs in terms of [his] change of religion (‘le changement de religion’) – he avoided using the words conversion or abjuration. If that item were to be disposed of, Henry conceded, so also would other, related matters. Matignon should understand that no one was more concerned than Henry himself to establish his [royal] 14 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 54-5, c 3 October 1589, Henry IV to queen Elizabeth. Henry thanked the queen for her prompt help of money, munitions, food and clothes. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1580-90, pp. 251-3, 253, 26 September/6 October 1589, Stafford to Willoughby, reported Mayenne’s withdrawal that day. 15 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, pp. 254-5, 11/21 October 1589. Lilley was critical of Biron’s ‘conduction’ of the English. Had they assisted the king to recover Paris, Elizabeth would doubtless have overlooked their employment inland and claimed a regal share of the credit. Ibid., 321-4. 16 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 63-4, 2 November 1589, Navarre to Duplessis; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, pp. 322-4, 326. The English forces were retained until the end of December 1589, ibid., 330. 17 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 81. 18 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 315-19 [late November 1589], Henry IV to Matignon, wrongly placed under 1590, and incomplete.


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authority and to relieve the country; and no one was more concerned to find the means. Nevertheless, what they proposed [conversion] could not be done as promptly as they desired (‘ne peut estre sy prompt que l’on le desire’). It required appropriate circumstances. Henry did not wish to take this step until he could do so with reason, for his own welfare and that of the state, and with the firm intention never [again] to depart therefrom. (‘...car devant faire ceste resolution je ne veux poinct faire que par raison, et par ce qu’il faut pour mon salut et le bien de mon estat, que je le fasse en ferme intention de ne m’en despartir jamais’). Following this tantalising statement Henry proceeded, somewhat elliptically, to indicate the practical impediments. To convert required leisure in which to confer and consider, and no such opportunity had arisen. The affairs of his enemies were such that, if he abandoned them [i.e. if he quit the field], they would complete their usurpation. But if he sustained the pressure now, he could destroy them. It was clear which alternative was the more urgent. By delaying the one [conversion], it would become easier. But to delay the other would be to lose everything; and the situation would become ‘irreversible’. Henry had had to employ the [English] forces that joined him in Normandy, and that had prevented him from going to Tours in October; now his first levy of foreigners was already in France. Furthermore, very few of those he had convoked had been able to reach Tours; it was therefore impossible to hold the assembly. Consequently Henry would stay no longer than three weeks, and postponed the assembly to 15 March 1590. If that date overstepped the limit of six months, it still preceded the expiry of the ‘traité de la trève’. Henry hoped, by then, to be in a strong enough position to open up the routes [to Tours] and enable the deputies to assemble. If he himself were then to ‘take some other resolution’ [to convert], it could not be imputed either to duress or to fear – which is what would be alleged at the moment. That was a theme to which Henry would often revert; he was the king, and he would not be constrained. If Matignon were to attend the assembly, he would perceive that the king’s intentions were honourable, that he was tractable and reasonable, desiring peace and the public good, besides his own ‘salut’. Henry added that he resented being suspected on grounds of his religious promises – which he had honoured – when the war was not about religion. It was, he said, about political ambition and had begun, not against himself but against Henry III, the greatest catholic of the century. Henry hoped that Matignon would disseminate these truths especially to the ‘parlement’. What Henry wished Matignon – and those of like mind – to understand was that his abjuration would simply be ignored and discounted, unless he had previously defeated his enemies and obtained recognition; this did, indeed prove to be correct. In other words, religion was the pretext, power the reason. The supreme significance of the letter to Matignon lies in the statement that if and when Henry abjured, it must be definitive and final. In other words, it could only be undertaken if and when his throne was secure. This was surely an oblique indication of a grave anxiety that could not be openly avowed: what if Henry were to be defeated? Had he not said that if he now neglected the war in order to attempt a premature settlement, the situation would become irreversible? It was well known that Henry had been raised as a protestant, forced to abjure, and then reverted to Calvinism. He could not possibly – with any shred of credibility – change his religion,

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and change again. Henry disposed of no regular army, no reliable revenue, and no truly supportive allies. While he hoped for an early triumph, success was wholly uncertain; failure was actually much more likely. If, after yielding to instant pressure to abjure, Henry were to be overthrown, what would become of him then; and what would he be able to do for France? As a nominal catholic convert, defeated and discredited, he could neither safely retire to Béarn nor flee abroad to a protestant country; neither would he be welcome to catholics anywhere. They would (and later did) condemn his conversion as feigned, and obstruct his absolution. This possibility, and its practical implications, is another matter overlooked by all those who have maintained that the king ought to have converted without more ado. But for Henry to abjure in 1589, would be to risk total destitution, without refuge or succour.19 This was the first good reason why it could not be done as ‘promptly’ as some desired. Nor is it surprising that Henry not only strove to impose his authority but, as the legitimate king, expected to receive recognition before making concessions. These arguments about Henry’s conversion were actually sterile, there being no possible means by which he could have accomplished it. It is difficult to understand how those who desired this change either failed to grasp, or refused to recognise, so simple a fact. Henry himself referred to the problem only obliquely, when he said that such a change required a degree of leisure, tranquillity and consultation; but he said this more than once. Consequently direct consideration of the pervasive problem of the king’s religion was actually deferred for much longer than had at first been envisaged. The same reservations continued to apply, until Henry’s original hopes of an early triumph had been totally destroyed. This skilful letter to Matignon, both reserved and revealing, should not be taken as a statement of any ultimate intention to convert, nor yet of any contrary determination not to do so. Henry’s wise prevarication was strictly consistent with all his previous public pronouncements, and protected his enduring aspiration to preside at least over religious peace, if not reunion. This is as much as we can know. One might, however, hazard a guess that Henry would not choose to convert if he could otherwise succeed in imposing authority, order, and peace. From Le Mans, on 28 November 1589, Henry issued a declaration which complemented his private letter to Matignon. The declaration explained his conduct to date, the battle of Arques, and his descent upon Paris. Henry now expected to meet a foreign force, which must be employed at once and by himself in person. Consequently he was obliged to defer the estates-general to 15 March 1590. Meanwhile, Henry offered a pardon to all who submitted within six weeks. This confirmation of Henry’s intention to hold an estates-general in March 1590 was, in a sense, an act of faith. At this stage, Henry still felt that the struggle might soon be over. We know from other correspondence that he hoped – with the troops he then expected – to be in Paris by the end of January 1590.20 If 19

It will be seen that there were numerous other problems relating to the king’s conversion; it was no straightforward matter. 20 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 41-4, 23 September 1589, Henry IV to Vivaris, 70-3, 7 November 1589, Henry IV to Duplessis, an important letter concerning the huguenots, whose attitude he found importunate. Ibid., 82, c. 20 November 1589, Henry IV to madame de Grammont; Isambert, Recueil général des anciennes lois, xv, 11-15, 28 November 1589, ‘déclaration de Henri IV’.


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Paris were to be retaken, the Seize could be destroyed, the seditious preachers silenced, and Mayenne isolated. The purpose of the estates-general would then be to ‘establish the state’. That meant, presumably, the recognition of Henry IV as king; to punish the rebels, and to prosecute the regicides as the nobles demanded. Had events so transpired, a religious settlement, if not the desired reunion, would have followed, as it always had, at the end of each civil war. Henry would then have been in a more appropriate position to address himself, without constraint of arms, to the problems of his own religion. But, instead, by the autumn of 1590 the intervention of Spain had utterly destroyed the king’s early hopes and optimism. This intervention was the great problem and burden with which Henry IV had to struggle for so long; this was what repeatedly presented him with almost insoluble problems; this is what surely would have broken a lesser man. Things had gone disastrously wrong: Parma had invaded France from the Netherlands and relieved Paris at the last moment; Henry’s army had largely dissolved; the new pope, Gregory XIV (1590-1), was a Spanish subject and a Spanish puppet; and Spanish forces had invaded several frontier provinces. This military intervention not only protracted the wars, it also ensured that Henry’s religion remained a matter of constant, critical concern to everyone involved in the European struggle against the power of Spain. Henry was balanced on a razor’s edge: by continuing to maintain that he was willing to take instruction, he sustained the hope – or expectation – that he would abjure; at the same time he protected his own position by remaining uncommitted; for he had not promised to convert. But, after the failure of the Rouen campaign in 1591-2, this indeterminate position would become increasingly difficult to sustain. The remainder of 1589 was consumed in mopping up operations in Touraine, Anjou and Maine; Henry took le Mans, Alençon, and finally places to the north of Normandy. The conquest of Normandy, excluding Rouen and Le Havre – towns which mattered most to queen Elizabeth – took longer than Henry had envisaged. While still occupied at Falaise and Lisieux, he became concerned that Mayenne had regrouped his forces to besiege first Pontoise and then Meulan, to the north and west of Paris. In order to protect his prospects of retaking Paris, Navarre interrupted his Normandy campaign and went to lay siege to Dreux. Mayenne, who had received reinforcements from the Netherlands, was now confident that he could defeat the king. However, on 14 March 1590, at Ivry on the Eure (south west of Mantes), Henry IV won a second, pitched battle. This further victory was invaluable for the king’s prestige and reputation, and may have rendered the nobility less disinclined to serve him. It was at this momentarily high point that critics are wont to say that Henry ought to have abjured and had himself crowned; the reasons why he could not, remain the same. But in fact, Henry’s real position had become still more dangerous and insecure than ever before; it was this victory at Ivry which convinced Philip II of the need to sustain the Spanish intervention in France. The new legate, cardinal Enrico Caetani – it will be seen – was similarly convinced of the need to defend and save Paris for the League. Both the Spanish king and the legate were equally determined that in no circumstances could the ‘prince de Béarn’ be recognised as the King of France. That is what the war was about.

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This formidable opposition to the legitimate protestant king not only shattered Henry’s early hopes of imposing authority and peace, it also frustrated the expectations, and strained the loyalty of the royalist catholics. To understand how this sorry situation came about, it will be necessary to examine the position and policy of Mayenne and the Catholic Union following Henry’s accession, the attitude to French affairs of Philip II and Parma and – in the next chapter – the perplexingly controversial legation of cardinal Caetani. For about a year after Henry’s accession the political conflict mainly occurred in Rome. The attitude of Sixtus V (1585-90), to the French king, and the mission to Rome of the duc de Luxembourg, became the cause of an exceptionally violent quarrel between the pope and Henry’s worst enemy, Spain. Both before and during their vitriolic row, Henry’s cause was perseveringly supported by the Venetian ambassador and, to a lesser extent, by the envoys of Tuscany and Mantua. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say that by 1590 the religion of Henry of Navarre divided Europe; and behind that division lurked the perennial fear of Spanish domination.

IV: The Plight of Mayenne In the critical aftermath of the death of Henry III, Mayenne had hastily to redefine his own position. The murder of Henry III, in which Mayenne was incontrovertibly implicated, successfully averted impending military defeat for himself, the League, the Seize, and Paris. But it was not until the day after Henry IV had won provisional recognition from the royalist catholics, that Mayenne issued a statement styling himself, as previously, ‘lieutenant-général de l’estat et couronne de France’. He wished to retain that ingenious title, together with as much power as possible, while privately entertaining hopes of the crown itself. His declaration of 5 August 1589 was an appeal for the support of all those catholics who had felt obliged to serve the king but who were now freed, by his death, to serve religion and the state. Awaiting the liberation and presence of their new king [the cardinal de Bourbon, Charles X], Mayenne called upon all catholics to serve the League; he evidently perceived in this no contradiction; in any case, he actually meant himself. Catholics must either come and fight the heretics or, at the least, withdraw.21 Mayenne, however, made an initial and serious miscalculation in supposing that he might inherit the support of the late king’s servants – who had already been serving with Navarre – and so presented the further conflict in simplistic, confessional terms.22 His declaration was also anachronistic in that his rebellion against Henry III, following the murders in Blois, had superseded the fitful and abortive war on heresy begun in 1585. Then, by the murder of the king, Mayenne had again changed the nature of the rebellion, this time into a succession conflict. It was unfortunate that Henry IV should have come to the throne as a protestant without the resources to win a decisive victory, recover Paris, 21

Isambert, Recueil général des anciennes lois, xv, 5-8, 5 August 1589; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 29-31, 5 August 1589, ‘édit et déclaration de Mayenne et du conseil général de la Sainte-Union’. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 542-3. 22 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 125-6.


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and impose his royal authority. But, for all that, Mayenne was only a potential usurper, without the rank, charisma, means, or the patronage to win a substantial following among the nobility. The nobles wanted their legitimate king, upon whom their own fortunes depended; but they wanted him to be catholic like themselves, within the tradition they understood. The huguenots, albeit nervous and disappointed, could place no hope at all in any other sovereign. If the French were not to tolerate a foreign domination, Henry of Navarre was the only plausible candidate. Nevertheless, the corollary to Mayenne’s declaration was an edict of 7 August 1589 proclaiming Charles X, the imprisoned cardinal de Bourbon; loyalty to him became mandatory. As a temporary fiction, which afforded time for the evolution of some permanent solution, the recognition of Charles X was also acceptable to Spain and the pope.23 After the League had disposed of Henry III, the political situation was completely changed, and not for themselves alone; and their military situation remained critical. Again, and with renewed urgency, Mayenne had to ascertain what support he could expect from Spain – or Parma – and from the pope. What would their objectives be now? Mayenne promptly dispatched a secretary to Rome, bearing the news of the death of Henry III. His envoy, Nivelle, was followed on 5 August 1589 by Diou – who had returned from Rome with the monitorium against Henry III in June 1589. Diou reached Rome on 1 September; that was over four months before the arrival of the duc de Luxembourg who represented the nobles and, in some sense, the king. Diou’s mission was to seek the excommunication of all who supported Navarre. This intemperate demand was to become a dominant issue in Rome for nearly a year, despite the terms of Navarre’s excommunication which already embraced his supporters.24 Diou was also to seek the Papal protection and authorisation for which the League had always hankered. Papal sponsorship would afford the League a degree of independence, and would certainly be essential in respect of the succession. Finally, Diou was to request money, which the pope was known to possess but did not care to disburse. Nevertheless, Mayenne who was frenetically active at this time, encouraged the Leaguer cities with assurances that Spain would protect them.25 On 22 August 1589, shortly before leaving Paris, Mayenne wrote Philip II a letter which was partly intended to deflect from himself the odium of the regicide. Henry III, he said, had been the victim of a Jacobin monk, acting of his own volition and unaided – which was patently impossible. Consequently, Mayenne had had the cardinal de Bourbon proclaimed king, and would do everything possible to get him released from prison; that was another lie. 23 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 4; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 180; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 543. Duplessis-Mornay supervised the removal of Bourbon from Chinon to Fontenay-leComte, where he died in May 1590. On 22 August 1589 the ‘parlement’ of Toulouse declared support for Bourbon and forbade the recognition of Navarre. 24 It is unclear whether Navarre’s followers were aware of the contents of his excommunication. La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg à Rome’, Revue des questions historiques, lxxix (1886), 11. Despite La Ferrière’s known scholarship, this article is disappointing. 25 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 542; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, i, 367; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 7-8.

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‘Béarn’, Mayenne continued, now called himself king and, with foreign help, sought to prevail. Surely that must elicit the Spanish support for which Mayenne now pleaded more urgently than ever, declaring Philip II to be the greatest protector of catholics. Mayenne would confer with Moreo as soon as he arrived [in Paris], and then send an envoy to Spain. This letter to Philip II was intercepted by marshal Matignon in Bordeaux and may never have arrived unless – as was common practice – another copy went by a different route.26

V: Reluctant Allies It has already been seen that, before the threat to Paris and the murder of the king, Mayenne had been engaged in negotiations with the Spanish agents for an updated alliance, recognising his leadership of the Catholic Union; so far this endeavour had proved sticky. During the year between the failure of the Armada and the death of Henry III, Philip II had no special need to fan the conflict in France by sustaining Mayenne’s rebellion; nor would the Spanish king offer his support for nothing. But the death of Henry III altered Philip’s attitude to France. He had long been contemplating his own claim to the French crown, and his war with England produced new strategic requirements in France. Now the time had come to act openly, swiftly, and on his own account. Spain must step in before the French succession might be otherwise determined, either by the Papacy or by the contending parties in France. In 1590, both Henry IV and Mayenne were hoping to clinch a speedy victory over the other, and neither eventuality would really have suited Spain. Yet Philip II could not hope to succeed in France without the co-operation of a catholic faction. That faction could only be Mayenne – for whom Philip II cared nothing at all – the remnants of the old Guisard League and the Seize. While it was only the Parisian Seize and their raucous adherents who were really proSpanish, Mayenne unfortunately had no other recourse. While there could be no easy partnership between himself and Spain, the convenient fiction that Charles X was king enabled them to obfuscate and evade the point: the war was about the succession and, spuriously, it was made to hinge upon the question of Henry’s religion. Meanwhile Mayenne was able to agree with both Spain and the Papal legate, Caetani, in opposing the royalists and obstructing Henry’s path to Rome, should he think of moving that way. Henry’s conversion, which was vaguely, but widely, expected was the crucial factor for Mayenne. Resistance to Henry’s succession could not survive his conversion – or not if the pope concurred. Spanish opposition to Henry IV was not, of course, confined to the succession, but that is what came first. The negotiations between Mayenne and Spain for a revised alliance suggest that he was seeking to revive the Guisard Catholic League and distance himself from the radical and disorderly rabble who dominated Paris. However this may be, negotiations were being conducted in the name of Mayenne and the catholics of Picardy. Picardy had been the original centre of the non-Parisian League, and was the frontier province which most 26

Goulart, Les Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 267-8 n., 22 August 1589, Mayenne to Philip II.


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closely concerned Parma. Montélimar, (Jacques Colas, vice-sénéchal of Montélimar, the name he used), Mayenne’s principal agent, arranged conferences at Hal and Brussels, to which Parma appointed Tassis and Froissart as his deputies. It has already been seen how the proposals made by Mayenne in July 1589 were unacceptable to Spain. Consequently the negotiation was deadlocked at the time when Paris was cut off by Henry III and Navarre, and the crisis situation arose. Montélimar then requested that Moreo and Tassis should go to Arras to confer with the bishop of Amiens – presumably representing the catholics of Picardy; Parma, languishing at Spa, also sent Froissart. By means of his secretary Rossieux, Mayenne hinted at the possible cession of Cambrai, in return for the help for which he was desperate. But Parma referred Rossieux to the deputies already assembled at Arras.27 Mayenne’s position was very insecure. While Parma was concerned that Paris should not fall to Henry III and Navarre, he did not yet have orders to intervene in France. Before making any further commitment, Spain wanted not only Cambrai, but also the Somme towns of Abbeville, Amiens and Corbie. These were to be turned into fortified bases, and held both for use in war and as hostage towns for the ultimate reimbursement of expenses. While the municipal affairs involved in these negotiations are a complex, specialist study, it appears that the towns themselves resisted Spanish occupation. Mayenne was therefore unable to agree to the Spanish terms; whether he otherwise would have done so is, in any case, uncertain. The deputies were probably still at Arras at the time of the murder of Henry III; and the negotiations were profoundly affected. Mayenne sent Montélimar to secure the Somme towns, doubtless against Henry IV – who dispatched one third of his forces to Picardy under the duc de Longueville. A Leaguer meeting was convened at Amiens on 26 August, the day before Mayenne left Paris to take the field. Moreo must have been delayed in the Netherlands by emergency talks on the implications of the death of Henry III. Then – according to Villeroy – Moreo rejoined Mayenne at Gournay-en-Bray (between Beauvais and Rouen), captured by the League some time before the end of August.28 It is difficult to ascertain how much help Parma sent Mayenne – financial or military – in August or September 1589, once Paris was out of immediate danger. Parma had, however, definitely received money destined for France, albeit not enough altogether. He moved forces to the 27

It appears that Juan de Moreo was sent to Paris in May 1589, probably via the Netherlands, and possibly on account of the ‘traité de la trève’ concluded in April. He was instructed to remain with Mayenne and to liaise with Parma and Tassis in the Netherlands, while Mendoza remained in Paris as chief adviser to the Seize. Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 184, 194. 28 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 423-4, 10 July 1589, memoir of what Montélimar declared at Hal and Brussels. He claimed to be mandated by Mayenne and the catholics of Picardy and believed that Mayenne would obtain the ratification of catholics in other provinces. Ibid., 426-7, 14 July 1589, Parma’s answer to Montélimar, 427, 14 July 1589, Parma to Philip II, 430, 3 August 1589, Parma to Philip II. In this letter Parma said that Moreo had conveyed the king’s letter of 5 May (sic), possibly referring to an earlier occasion, from which Parma could deduce what he ought to do in the current crisis. Ibid., 430-1, 3 August 1589 (2), Parma to Philip II. Philip proceeded to indulge in one of his protracted ruminations on the matter of the alliance, and appears not to have learnt of the death of the king before 30 August 1589. Ibid, 437, 7 September 1589, Philip II to Parma, 432, 14 August 1589, Tassis to Philip II, from Arras, in which Tassis reflects upon the consequences of Henry’s death – not calendared; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 138; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 146; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 9-10.

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frontier and gave Montélimar 20,000 écus, in line with his previous policy of sweetened encouragement. Gourdain (Girault de Mauléon), ‘gouverneur’ of Calais, believed the Spanish were more likely to attack Calais and Boulogne than to send help to the League, unless they ceded Amiens and Abbeville. Mayenne was not, therefore, at all sure of the degree of support he required.29 Nevertheless, in the three weeks following the death of Henry III Mayenne did succeed in assembling some 30,000 men, with the help of the dukes of Nemours and Lorraine; and some reported the presence of a small force from Parma. Thus, when he left Paris on 27 August 1589, Mayenne disposed of an army about twice the size of Henry’s. During the march to Mantes and Vernon, Mayenne left the army and went to the Netherlands. He spoke to Parma himself at Bins in Hainault and obtained a promise of forces to be sent without delay. Mayenne’s intention was to relieve Rouen which was threatened by the king precisely in order to draw his opponent away from Paris. Mayenne, for his part, was so over-confident of crushing the ‘Béarnais’ that lodgings were prepared in the Bastille to receive the fallen king.30 But, on the contrary, after several days of hostilities between 16 and 21 September, Mayenne – it has been seen – was defeated at the battle of Arques. For both contenders this first pitched battle was of vital significance – aside from the fact that either or both of them might have perished. Some have said that were Mayenne to be victorious, he would have claimed or seized the crown, though it seems more likely that the beneficiary would have been Philip II. For Henry, with his small and doubtfully loyal army, defeat would probably have left him a discredited heretic facing exile – if not incarceration in the Bastille. Victory, on the other hand, did much to raise his credibility and reputation; it also alerted the pope to the possibility that the protestant king might prevail in France; and that was a sobering consideration. Utter defeat exposed Mayenne’s weakness and dependence on Spain, an ally whose terms he was neither willing to accept nor able to deliver. Early in October 1589 Mayenne moved away from Dieppe towards the Somme; he renewed his appeals for help and the negotiations for a firm agreement with the Spanish. From somewhere near Amiens, Mayenne sent Moreo to Parma to request money, and men under La Motte (Valentin Pardieu), the governor of Gravelines. Otherwise, he threatened, peace would be made in France within two weeks – a ridiculous assertion.31 Parma may have played for time by resuming the discussions begun before the battle of Arques. Sir Thomas Morgan (governor of Bergen-op-Zoom) sent home a report on 7/17 November 1589 of an assembly of French nobles, together with Tassis, La Motte and various of Parma’s councillors at Papam on the frontier. The Spanish were, apparently, 29

Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 425, 14 July 1589, Philip II to Parma, 426, same (2), 426-7, 14 July 1589, Parma’s answer to Montélimar from Spa, which expressed extreme caution about intervening. Ibid., 430-1, 3 August 1589, Parma to Philip II, 447, 6 November 1589, Philip II to Parma. Philip expressed his desire to acquire Calais and Boulogne as well as Cambrai. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 333. 30 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 9-10. 31 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 443, 17 October 1589, Parma to Philip II, from Binche. Moreo arrived on 15 October. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 253, 26 September/6 October 1589, Stafford to Willoughby.


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still insisting upon the cession of Cambrai and the three Somme towns; there were also said to have been discussions about the succession. Morgan heard that La Motte was to go to France with 9,000 foot and horse, and other forces for which, no doubt, Mayenne was pressing. Other letters, however, indicated things ‘at a stay’; rumours and counter rumours were numerous.32 After successfully relieving Paris at the beginning of November, Mayenne tried to end the violence and disorder prevalent in the city. He could not hope to prevail in France without enforcing his will on Paris. In this endeavour, he clashed with the ‘corps de ville’. On 21 November 1589 he inspired an ‘arrêt’ of the ‘parlement’ requiring the recognition of Charles X and, on 28 November – like the king – he too summoned an estates-general. It was to meet at Melun in February 1590. Mayenne was supported in these efforts by Pierre d’Épinac, archbishop of Lyon, who had been arrested at Blois but released on 24 October 1589. He now acted as ‘garde des sceaux’ for the lieutenant-general. Mayenne abolished the general council of the Union and created his own council of ten. Of these, eight members were to remain in Paris under Épinac, strengthening those who opposed the encroachments of Spain. In these ways Mayenne evidently tried to preserve the monarchical structure of government and to ensure the means – an estates-general – by which he himself might be elected king.33 Conflict reigned in Paris between the pro and anti-Spanish factions. While Mayenne never favoured Spanish domination, he was in serious need of help, and sustained his appeals for it. Moreo, who was still in the Netherlands, was then dispatched to Antwerp to raise money. Upon his return, he asked for the assistance in France of Tassis. Some time in November or early December Moreo, Tassis and the comte de Grammont, sent to the Netherlands by Mayenne, all returned to France, reputedly bringing a harvest of 300,000 écus.34 Tassis, Moreo and Mendoza – who were not harmonious colleagues – were instructed to define the nature of the help expected by the League. Another high-level conference was therefore held in Paris, probably in December 1589. Mayenne, Villeroy, Jeannin, Mendoza, Tassis and Moreo were all present. But the nature of this tortuous negotiation had changed. Spain would not undertake to intervene without first obtaining some substantial advantage, and that now hinged upon the succession, as well as the cession of strategic towns. It was proposed, if not for the first time, that Philip II should be declared the protector of the kingdom and the crown, while Bourbon remained the titular king. This proposal, which was initially supported by Mayenne, might have given Philip II undefined powers to promote his own succession. It caused an uproar of 32 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 336, 7/17 November 1589, Morgan to Walsingham. By 23 December La Motte had gone to Binche in the Netherlands to see Parma who objected that his forces were far too small to send – dishonourably – to France; besides, and this was the point, it would endanger the Netherlands. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 443, 17 October 1589, Parma to Philip II, from Spa. 33 Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 347, 360-3. Épinac’s loyalties were uncertain; he aspired to a cardinal’s hat and would support whomsoever supported that. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 566; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 405-6; Anquetil, L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, 102-3. 34 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 445, 6 November 1589, Parma to Philip II; Nouaillac, Villeroy, 169, said the Spanish agents arrived in December.

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disagreement, with echoes in other parts of Europe. The Seize, and the Jesuits in particular, desired the Spanish protectorate which would gradually oust Mayenne. Villeroy and Jeannin were strongly opposed to it and claimed that the ‘parlement’ would never agree.35 Early in 1590 there were reports of a treaty between the League and Spain, and Lilley – a faithful follower of Navarre’s camp – promised to send home a copy of the twelve articles. But in fact there was no treaty, and a glance at the draft articles explains why. Apart from the Spanish protectorate, it was also proposed that the infanta Isabella, Philip’s preferred candidate, should marry a French prince and succeed Charles X, bringing as her dowry Flanders and Burgundy. It is impossible to believe that Philip II would honour such an agreement; nor does it appear from his correspondence, that he entertained any such thing at this stage. There were also tough items relating to the exclusion of the Spanish from certain categories of offices; a clause to prevent the financial milking of France, and a stipulation that Spain should pay for the war herself. That was not at all what Philip II had in mind. Furthermore, the French demanded free trade with Peru and other Spanish possessions, an item which was to cause incredible difficulties in 1598. While it is not clear that all these clauses had really been discussed at this time, they could hardly have been plucked from the air. However desperately Mayenne may have needed help, it is clear that the two sides were poles apart; it seems possible that some of the French negotiators intended to ensure that the treaty would fail.36 Nevertheless, the Spanish agents on the spot were concerned about Mayenne’s pressing need for help. It was therefore agreed, before 30 December 1589, to send Tassis to Spain.37 Despite his low regard for Mayenne, Parma had decided that he would have to send forces to France, so he was anxious to hear the outcome of the conference in Paris. Moreo, and Tassis – on his way to Spain – both went to Brussels, together with Montélimar who was to solicit the help promised in August or September by Parma himself. Parma announced at this time that he was sending forces to France, under Egmont; in fact they did not enter France until near the end of February 1590. Without these forces, it is doubtful if Mayenne would have ventured to give battle at Ivry, where Egmont was killed.38 That was Mayenne’s second, and last, chance to overwhelm the king.

35

Nouaillac, Villeroy, 169-71. After his dismissal by Henry III in September 1589, Villeroy joined the League. This may have been largely a matter of survival, but also of genuine catholic scruples. Villeroy had nothing but religion in common with the League; he struggled without ceasing to bring about peace in France. 36 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 337, 25 December 1589/4 January 1590, Lilley to Walsingham; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 213-17. It appears that Philip II hoped his agents might broker some reconciliation between Mayenne and the Seize, which was impossible. Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 198, 6 November 1589, Philip II to Tassis. Philip evidently did not realise that Tassis was already in France. 37 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 458, 30 December 1589, Tassis to Philip II, from Paris. Mayenne also sent his own envoy with Tassis, described as the seigneur de Reyffrins. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 399-400, 12 January 1590, Mayenne to Philip II. 38 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 457, 23 December 1589 (2), Parma to Philip II, 464, 18 January 1590, Parma to Mayenne, 465, 29 January 1590, Parma to Philip II.


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The significance of these Franco-Spanish talks in Paris, late in 1589, was the bid by Spain for a protectorate, and the open discussion of the succession.39 The latent threat of Spanish domination was becoming apparent. Villeroy was appalled by the abyss which now yawned before them. He was therefore instrumental in frustrating the threatened protectorate by proposing to refer it to the estates-general – an assembly which might never meet. Villeroy also prepared for Mayenne a long ‘avis’ intended to win his support for a peace project. Villeroy pointed out the utter weakness and disunion of the League and, appealing to Mayenne’s vanity, dangled before him the glory of having made peace in France. Peace with Navarre, Villeroy urged, would bring Mayenne greater and more certain personal gains than any other outcome; clearly Villeroy discounted Mayenne as a possible claimant to the throne. Mayenne could not, of course, accord with Navarre unless he were to convert. Villeroy’s purpose at this point was therefore to enlist the assistance of Mayenne in obtaining Navarre’s conversion. Mayenne’s role would be to inform the pope of his desire for peace, and to obtain Papal permission to treat with Navarre. That, by implication, would entail the pope’s willingness to receive him back into the Church. Here Villeroy telescoped the two stages of conversion and absolution. Secondly, Mayenne must inform Philip II of this intention, offer to settle his quarrel with Navarre, promise to keep France out of the Netherlands, and to end the English alliance. Thirdly, Mayenne should inform Bourbon [Charles X] whose interests could easily be provided for. If Mayenne sent someone of rank to Navarre, he would be constrained to show his hand. Since he maintained that Mayenne was the obstacle because he refused to make peace, the catholics would abandon him if he rejected this initiative. Owing, however, to the hostile intervention of Spain and the Papacy, the recovery of Paris proved to be an immensely difficult task. This point is doubtful; presumably someone had said as much to Villeroy during one of his various negotiations. If, however, Navarre agreed, they could conclude a long truce and hold an estates-general. Navarre, Mayenne and Bourbon were to be bound by the decisions of the estates – a dangerous precedent indeed – provided the resolutions were not prejudicial to catholicism or the laws of France. The huguenots should be excluded from offices and decisions relating to garrisons, benefices, the succession, and [cryptically] the royal marriage. Villeroy evidently conceived of a comprehensive settlement, since the United Provinces and England were both to be included. Did Villeroy, with all his experience, really suppose that any general settlement could thus exclude the huguenots? The likely answer is no; but, first of all, Mayenne must be embarked on this endeavour.40 Mayenne would have to act quickly, otherwise it would be too late. If Navarre refused this approach, then Mayenne would be in a stronger position to unite all the catholics under a regent, with the consent of the pope and Spain; then a successor could be declared when Bourbon died. The purpose was to obviate the existing fear of a change in the state, or the dismemberment of France; such fears served to increase the support for Navarre. Clearly Villeroy was concerned that Navarre held the patriotic advantage; he 39 40

Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 198, 30 October 1589, Mendoza to Philip II. Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 384-415 [January 1590].

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knew that people were disturbed by Spanish propaganda and the presence in Paris of scheming Spanish agents. Reliance on Spain could not immediately be avoided; but it should only be temporary, until the League had conquered some provinces whose resources they could tap. But, as Spain would impose conditions, like the marriage of the infanta to the next king of France – a proposal which had shaken Villeroy – Papal support was preferable. Villeroy was really saying that Mayenne’s position was untenable and he was drifting dangerously. As he had no money or means of raising an army he would be better advised to follow a French prince. Villeroy implored him to formulate and adopt such a policy, and to act upon it swiftly. Villeroy was right about Mayenne because, so long as he still aspired to the throne himself, he would continue to be slippery about any definitive arrangements. Unfortunately Villeroy and Mayenne did not share the same objectives. Villeroy’s steady purpose, for which he laboured unremittingly, was the recognition of Navarre, converted to catholicism; no other solution offered any prospect of peace in France; and hindsight shows that Mayenne would indeed have been better off had he accorded at this stage. The weakness of the analysis lay in the assumption that anyone – other than Navarre – actually desired a solution beneficial to France. Mayenne was not remotely concerned about the prospects of peace in France; on the contrary, he was grabbing at all the power and profit he might get – either the crown itself, or at least the reality of power – and Villeroy failed to convince him that he could not win. Meanwhile Villeroy had disclosed his own position and his alienation from Mayenne.41

VI: The Disputed Succession Villeroy’s ‘avis’ was prompted by his fear of Mayenne’s weakness in face of the threatened domination of Spain; and he was not mistaken about the intentions of Philip II. Philip evidently pondered for about a week over the death of Henry III. Then he sent Parma a spate of letters on 7 and 8 September 1589. Departing from his attitude of cautious reserve to the current negotiations with the Catholic Union, Philip declared that they could now abandon their previous ‘prudence’ – meaning secrecy. Thenceforth, France explicitly displaced England as Philip’s principal enterprise. Parma was authorised to assume the defensive in the Netherlands, and to intervene openly in France. Philip’s preference was for Parma to go in person, in order to assure the execution of ‘the affair’ – naturally without either overspending, or neglecting the security of the Netherlands.42 This ill-defined exhortation spelt danger for Parma. He had enemies at court and was already in awful trouble following the failure of the Armada, for which he was maliciously blamed. That military expeditions must be properly prepared, sufficiently provided for, and pursue defined objectives, was something that Philip II preferred to ignore. Parma was to invade France and obtain results gratifying to the king. But Parma knew that Spain could not simultaneously hold the Netherlands and impose her will on 41

The proof that Mayenne aspired to the throne himself does not emerge until later. It was, however, universally believed, and there can be no doubt about it. 42 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 437-8, 7 September 1589, three letters of this date from Philip II to Parma, 438, 8 September 1589, Philip II to Parma.


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France; and, unfortunately for Philip II, his only distinguished general was already pronounced a dying man. About this time Parma sent his trusted minister, Jean Richardot, to Spain with four principal papers. Since Richardot was reported to be in Spain by 3 October 1589, he had probably departed before the arrival of the king’s letters of 7 and 8 September. Parma’s principal preoccupations were his disculpation in respect of the Armada, the question of his recall, and a project for peace in the Netherlands. Now Richardot was also to explain Parma’s opposition to open intervention in France – which Philip II had, in fact, already recommended.43 Parma did not want to be blamed for another reckless and abortive campaign. It was not, apparently, until 6 November 1589 that Parma commented on Philip’s letters of 7 and 8 September. Spain, he asserted, had not so far benefited from all the money spent on France – which was not, perhaps, entirely true. The catholics, he said, only made offers when they were in danger, and later eluded them. Parma approved of crowning Bourbon, which would facilitate the cession of various cities as well as the reimbursement of Spanish expenses. But, if he himself was to invade France, he would need substantial reinforcements.44 Later in November, possibly after having received this letter, Philip sharply reminded Parma that he had called ‘Béarn’ an avowed enemy whose domination would be harmful. Was not that reason enough for invading France? France, Philip stressed, was now more important than any other matter, all of which would be covered in documents to be brought by Richardot.45 But Richardot did not return to the Netherlands until June 1590. By January 1590 Parma was not merely authorised to invade France, he was explicitly commanded to do so. While complaining bitterly of poverty, hunger, desertions, mutiny, and every kind of calamity, Parma had in fact accepted that he would have to do something. It has been seen that he was planning to send Mayenne a small force under the command of Egmont; about 20 February 1590 they were ready to cross the frontier.46 Philip II was now in deadly earnest about the French affair. On 8 March 1590 he issued a declaration from Madrid calling upon all catholic princes to assist him in extirpating heresy in France and in delivering the king, Charles X, who was unjustly held prisoner by the heretics. This summons was then extended to other heretics and infidels. He mendaciously declared before God and his angels that the preparations he was making 43

Richardot’s journey to Spain had been mooted as early as March 1589. His departure was first delayed by illness, and then by the negotiations with the Catholic League, of which he was fully cognisant. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 400, 24 March 1589 (2), Parma to Philip II, 404, 13 April 1589, Philip II to Parma, 418, 10 June 1589, Parma to Philip II, 427, 14 July 1589, Parma to Philip II; CSPVen., 1581-91, p. 470, 3 October 1589, Contarini to the doge and senate; Essen, Parma, 278-9; Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 2223, 306 n.19; Parker, The Army of Flanders, 245 n.2. 44 Essen, Parma, 279; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, 445, 6 November 1589, Parma to Philip II. 45 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philip II, iii, 452, 26 November 1589, Philip II to Parma. 46 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, 471, 20 February 1590, Parma to Philip II, 474-5, 14 March 1589, Parma to Philip II. Parma was angry about the catholics’ defeat at Ivry, which he regarded as an unnecessary battle. Parma himself always evaded direct confrontation. Ibid., 476-7, 24 March 1589, Parma to Philip II. Parma’s gathering problems in the Netherlands were exacerbated by the successful exploits of Maurice of Nassau, who took Breda on 4 March 1590.

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were for no other purpose. This suggests that the brazen declaration was primarily intended to justify raising money from ecclesiastical sources. Nevertheless, Philip’s intention to intervene in France had thereby been publicly proclaimed; and that was as near as he could get to declaring war on a king he did not recognise.47 Philip’s shocked response to the news of Mayenne’s defeat at Ivry on 14 March 1590 was to detain Richardot in Spain, and to dismiss any question of Parma’s retirement. Never mind that Parma was dying, he was peremptorily ordered into France.48 Philip’s orders to invade France were reiterated in letters of 29 April, 20 May, 20 June, and 24 June 1590 during the siege of Paris. But it was not until late in August that Parma finally entered France.

47

Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 206-8, 8 March 1590, ‘déclaration du roi d’Espagne’, 209-10, 9 March 1590, Philip II to the grand inquisitor. The king pretended that he needed money to prevent heretic forces from Germany from ‘descending’ to establish heresy in France! 48 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 482, 4 April 1590, Philip II to Parma; CSPVen., 1581-91, pp. 485-6, 12 April 1590, Contarini to the doge and senate, 486-7, 26 April 1590, Contarini to the doge and senate, in which he said that Richardot had gone. Ibid., 491-2, 10 June 1590, Contarini to the doge and senate (no text) enclosing the [draft] terms of the treaty between Spain and the Catholic League.

CHAPTER IX: HENRY IV AND POPE SIXTUS V I: The Disposition of Sixtus V Sixtus V, it has been seen, appeared in August 1589 to be aligned with Mayenne in opposition to Navarre. But once Henry IV had claimed his rightful throne, Sixtus became more sensitive to the need for circumspection. Less than two weeks later, on 24 September, he appointed a new legate for France. The coming of a legate was initially welcome to the royalist catholics, to Villeroy on account of his ‘avis’ in favour of peace, and especially to Mayenne who had requested a legate the previous May. At the same time as negotiating for a revised agreement with Spain, in the last months of 1589, Mayenne was trying equally hard to obtain both Papal sponsorship and authorisation of his irregular position. His special agent, Diou, who was dispatched to Rome on 5 August 1589, arrived on 1 September. According to the confidential sources of Giovanni Niccolini, the Tuscan ambassador in Rome, Diou came with five demands. He requested 1,200,000 écus – which was unlikely to elicit Papal sympathy – the appointment of a legate, together with four prelates to administer the money; Papal confirmation of Mayenne’s rank and title; orders to the custodians of Bourbon [who had been swiftly moved to a safer place] to surrender the cardinal to the League, and permission to pursue the murderers of the Guises – possibly to deflect attention from the murderers of the king. Diou also wanted the pope to require the royalist catholics to abandon Navarre and unite with the League, with excommunication as the penalty.1 Sixtus V was no less disturbed and confused than everyone else by the aftermath of the death of Henry III, and the now disputed succession. From Grimaldi, archbishop of Avignon, Sixtus received a garbled version of Henry’s declaration of 4 August 1589, thereby obtaining a similarly garbled impression that he wished to live as a catholic, according to the decisions of a council which should settle the matter.2 It appears that Sixtus was nervous about the assemblies promised in Navarre’s declaration, which threatened his authority and smacked of schism. But did Sixtus really believe that Navarre was contemplating conversion? If so, what did he think of it, and what was he to do? It did not require the arrival of Diou to provoke a heated debate in Rome upon the proper objectives of Papal policy. Sixtus V wanted France to be an unequivocally catholic country, under a catholic king; that much was clear. He hated heretics and, in the excommunication, he had himself declared Navarre relapsed and inapt. If Sixtus should now wish to favour him, that ill-considered move against the heir presumptive would be an awkward obstacle. Spain, furthermore, was implacably opposed to Navarre, an hereditary enemy, and would not recognise him in any circumstances – short of the 1 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 197-8; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 58-9, 16 September 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; the pope evidently wrote to Mayenne, who answered on 25 September 1589, which was after the battle of Arques (no text). De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 348. L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, 110-11; Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 325-6. 2 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 54-5, 1 September 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany.

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outcome of war. Spain, whose territories sandwiched the Papal states, had a solid grip on the college of cardinals, and was well placed to intimidate and manipulate the pope. Contemporaries and historians have all experienced difficulty in defining the French policy of Sixtus V. Accounts, both of Papal policy and of the legation of cardinal Caetani, are confused and conflicting. This is largely because Sixtus V only lived for one year after the accession of Henry IV. During that time he was mainly awaiting reliable information, and temporising while attending upon events in France. Owing to the war conditions, communications were seriously disrupted and exceptionally slow; many packets were intercepted or lost altogether, and the co-ordination of policy and action was virtually impossible. Consequently Sixtus V never held the initiative or formulated longterm objectives. Besides, he was by no means a free agent. To some extent he played along with the opinions of those who sought to influence him in disparate ways, creating a degree of confusion and frustration which became increasingly hard to handle. Capable of praising queen Elizabeth’s ability, Sixtus V could equally well perceive that Henry of Navarre was the only suitable candidate for the throne of France; furthermore, his legitimate claim was a superior advantage. That being the case, Henry IV converted – sincerely or otherwise, relapsed or not relapsed – must be preferable to an avowed Calvinist, and would probably be accepted in France. While Spain’s attitude to such unpalatable facts was bellicose and uncompromising, the pope must reserve judgement and evade commitment. That could only be possible for just so long but, for Sixtus V, death supervened. The assumption must be that Sixtus was opposed to Navarre and, like everyone else, discounted his reiterated assurances in respect of catholics and catholicism. Sixtus did not – in the circumstances that obtained in his lifetime – mean to recognise Henry IV as the King of France. To do so would have incurred the furious hostility of Spain and even serious reprisals. One must therefore be extremely wary of accepting, at face value, Sixtus’ variable pronouncements about Navarre or the (more or less) received opinion that he favoured Navarre; he did not. Despite his desire for a peaceful, catholic solution in France, which was obviously not imminent, Sixtus V became increasingly aware that Henry IV might prevail; he was therefore affected by Henry’s initial successes which drove an uncomfortable wedge between himself and Spain. Sixtus V was inescapably hampered by uncertainty as to what information to believe. Diou, first in the field, sought to persuade him that almost all France recognised the cardinal de Bourbon as Charles X, while Navarre was virtually abandoned. Thus Sixtus felt obliged to accept the initial choice of Bourbon as king, and to provide later for the ultimate succession. This, in the circumstances, was reasonably anodyne and not definitive.3 Nevertheless, Sixtus delayed his answer to Diou until 19 September, and then it was largely unfavourable. He refused to recognise Mayenne’s assumed position, and denied Diou the coveted status of ambassador. In other words Sixtus would not publicly approve or underpin Mayenne and the Catholic Union. He also refused the money requested but agreed, reluctantly, to send a legate. He hoped thereby to obtain the 3

L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, 110-11.

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information he needed. In this way, Sixtus appeared to be taking a major step, agreeable to Spain, while avoiding any commitment. There were, however, to be serious implications and repercussions because this decision was too hasty and not thought through.4 While a Papal presence in France was normal, current conditions were not. An ambassador is usually accredited to a legally constituted authority or, at the least, one that has been recognised. It was therefore bizarre to send a cardinal legate, contrary to the forms of protocol and custom, with a very imposing but cumbersome and expensive suite, into a country ravaged and disrupted by war. It was even more misguided to send the legation to Paris, nerve centre of the Catholic League, the Seize – and of Spanish influence – at the same time as refusing to recognise Mayenne’s assumed position, or to grant his requests. It is possible that Sixtus entertained some vague idea of outfacing Spain and her agents in France and establishing the Papal right – which he claimed when it suited him – to determine a disputed succession. The aged cardinal Santa Croce, a former nuncio in France, advised the pope to send a nuncio only, and not to Paris; that would offend Navarre – and so it did. Santa Croce also warned the pope not to underestimate Navarre, with whom he might yet have to treat, (‘convenire seco’); but other counsels prevailed.5 Various names were proposed and canvassed for the legation; it did not prove easy to find a candidate suitable in all the desired respects. Only Rusticucci was held to be fitting, but he did not speak Latin. There was also pressure from Diou, and Olivares with whom he consorted, to send a ‘confidente di Spagna’. The appointment of cardinal Enrico Caetani, announced on 24 September 1589, indicated their succcess. He had several relatives in useful places, and was entirely acceptable to the Spanish.6 Sixtus took the view that he had to choose someone agreeable to Spain since it was only with Spanish help that Navarre could be excluded. Caetani owed his promotion and prosperity to the pope, who regarded him as his own ‘creature’. He believed, in other words that, Spanish affiliations notwithstanding, Caetani’s loyalty would be to himself. But, once in Paris, he could hardly avoid relations with the Spanish and Mayenne which, to others, would appear suspicious or disloyal. Caetani departed with abnormal haste, on 2 October 1589. Thus his legation occurred at the very beginning of Henry’s reign when the nobles were expecting his conversion; a sympathetic legate was exactly what they needed, and might even have altered the course of history. Unfortunately accounts of the legation – which ended in 4

Cugnoni, Ed., ‘Autobiografia di Santa Severina’, Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria, xiii (1890), 189, for this legation the pope ‘non senti gusto alcuno’; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 55-6, 2 September 1589, 57 n.1, 58-9, 16 September 1589, 60-3, 20 September 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 5 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 60-3, 18 September 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. Santa Croce had served as nuncio in France from 1552-4; he died on 8 November 1589. 6 Cugnoni, Ed., ‘Autobiografia di Santa Severina’, Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria, xiii (1890), 189; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 60-3, 20 September 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany, 63-4, 25-30 September 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxi, 326-7.

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September 1590 after the death of Sixtus V – are unreliable and very confusing. Unresolved problems and loose ends necessarily remain. Caetani was not only far away and cut off, but also subjected in Paris to strong pressures. It was therefore hardly to be expected that he should have performed the pope’s will – in substance and in timing – to his complete satisfaction. Caetani is usually portrayed as having been devoted, even sold, to Spain, while neglecting or disobeying his instructions. That he was, or at least became, pro-Spanish would be difficult to deny, and he may well have taken advantage of instructions which were vague and conditional, aimed at unpredictable circumstances; certainly they raise a host of problems. For Sixtus V the appointment of Caetani was an error of judgement. Sixtus denounced him repeatedly, after the beginning of a major quarrel with Olivares, and made him a scapegoat to ease his own difficulties in Rome. Sixtus had not hesitated to disgrace and persecute the admirable Morosini, who would now have served him much more subtly; such ill-treatment was apparently an occupational hazard.

II: The Legate’s Instructions The French policy of Sixtus V was fluid, and to some extent deliberately dissimulated. What Caetani ought to do in France, and how, was the subject of much debate and heated disagreement. This alone suggests that the pope would not receive solid and consistent support from his legate in the months ahead. Sixtus required each member of the French congregation to produce a draft instruction for his consideration, which is why there are several such documents. However, not all of them have survived, and it is important to emphasise that no definitive instruction for the legation now exists. Attempts to provide a programme of action were vitiated by uncertainties, and indicate the pope’s priority need for better information. Presumably the preparation of instructions began as soon as the appointment was announced on 24 September 1590; a document in the Vatican secret archives, dated 30 September 1589, has generally been accepted as the ‘original’ instruction.7 This was, however, only a minute, explicitly submitted to the pope for his approval, though it may be assumed to indicate the general principles to be followed. The minute opened with an exhortation to keep in mind the purpose of the legation, described as the preservation of catholicism in all France, and the reunion of catholics under a catholic king. Upon this – total impossibility – Caetani must ponder and meditate, seeking the ways and means. There follows a reference to Papal orders and advice, evidently to be verbal, about the legate’s itinerary – Tuscany, Bologna, Modena, Ferrara, Turin and Lyon – and what he must do during the course of the journey. At Lyon, he would have to consider whether to travel via the Bourbonnais or Burgundy (League territory) and, if possible, to obtain an escort to Paris. There is no mention of any other, more suitable, destination. Caetani should either try to see the duc de Nevers – a pro-Bourbon catholic, 7

Cugnoni, Ed., ‘Autobiografia di Santa Severina’, Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria, xiii (1890), 188; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 74-7, 303-21, text of the minute dated very precisely, Saturday 30 September 1589, 16 hours.


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not currently supporting Navarre – or anyway to contact him. His mediation with royalist catholics could be valuable in the attempt to obtain a catholic king. The draft proceeds to the legate’s arrival and solemn entry into Paris, and to instructions for his first audience, if he found Bourbon installed as Charles X (‘il re liberato’). Then, among many other people, as well as cities, the legate must contact Mayenne. Caetani was to take with him 100,000 écus, about the use of which his instructions were verbal. Finally, he was to report to the pope continually and in detail. This part of the document, probably composed by Montalto, nephew of the pope, was followed by further, complementary pages, written by Santi Quattro, but from which certain passages had been deleted which related to Vendôme, nephew of the cardinal de Bourbon. Vendôme was under consideration as a Papal candidate for the throne if his uncle were either dead or still in prison. In the latter case, Caetani was to urge Mayenne and the council of the Union to rescue Bourbon by force.8 If, however, in his absence, all the ‘parlements’ (sic) desired an estates-general to elect a new king, the legate must inform the pope immediately, so that he could take appropriate action. If Navarre attempted to summon the council promised in his declaration, the legate should also report that, meanwhile doing everything – together with the use of censures and penalties – to avert or disrupt it, if necessary by force of arms; and the same went for Navarre’s projected estates-general. At this juncture, however, news of events in France is said to have arrived so that, before Caetani’s departure on 2 October, he received fresh, oral instructions. These were then formalised by Lomellini, the Genoese and pro-French clerk of the apostolic chamber; they were dated 5 October 1589, and sent after the departed legate. This is where the confusion arises. In the first place, the ‘original’ instruction was only a set of draft proposals – though it may have been approved. Secondly, Pastor’s version of the fresh, oral instructions corresponds to an analysis by Tempesti, which Pastor himself, Hubner and Manfroni all dismissed as apocryphal; but it does not correspond to Lomellini’s draft ‘discorso’ of 5 October 1589 allegedly sent after Caetani.9 What then was the news from France which apparently caused, not only an alteration to the legate’s instructions, but also his precipitate departure? To deduce from the contents of further ‘discussion’ documents, of 3 and 5 October, the news was twofold: in the first place, it had become known that Bourbon was still a prisoner, a matter of doubt in the minute of 30 September 1589. That being the case, the throne was deemed to be vacant, and the succession open and disputed.10 Secondly, news of the mission to Rome of the duc de 8

It appears to have been thought that Bourbon might have been sent to La Rochelle, or even to England. Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 328-32; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 197-9; Hubner, Sixte-quint, ii, 249-54, ibid., iii, 74-7, 303-21, instruction for Caetani, 30 September 1589. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 3524, gives a version similar to that of 30 September 1589. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xvii (1867), 449-53 favours a memoir of 3 October 1589 attributed to Montalto. Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 203-4, believed Lomellini’s ‘discorso’ to be the authentic instruction. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 641-9, [5] October 1589, Lomellini’s ‘discorso’, 64954, 3 October 1589, memoir attributed to Montalto, 654-8, October 1589, observations upon the memoir. 10 The Papal view that the throne was vacant differed from that of Spain and Mayenne; to them the fiction that it was occupied by Charles X was useful. 9

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Luxembourg, on behalf of the royalist catholics, was announced on 6 September 1589 and evidently reached Rome about the end of the month. This view is supported by Santa Severina who said that when the news about Luxembourg arrived (no date), the Spanish were vexed and the pope ordered the legate to leave ‘quanto prima’.11 Luxembourg was mentioned in the memoir of 3 October 1589, but not previously. Taken together with Navarre’s declaration of 4 August, the coming of Luxembourg aroused the prospect – the hope and the fear – that Navarre was planning to abjure, and that had a bearing on the matter of the vacant throne.12 The memoir for Caetani, of 3 October 1589 (namely one of the discussion documents), was attributed by Caringi to Montalto.13 It described Caetani’s legation as the greatest in the memory of man, doubtless because he was now to seek to obtain for France a new catholic king. If this were to be done by war, the participation of Spain was inevitable. But, if the process were to be protracted, the differences in objectives between the Papacy and Spain would become apparent. The principal interest of this document is that it reveals the existence in Rome of a body of opinion which welcomed the possibility of Navarre’s abjuration from which, the memoir alleged, the pope was not averse. It was therefore to be hoped that he would absolve Navarre because it could be argued that he was not relapsed. This controversial assertion – which begged various technical questions – provoked adverse ‘observations’, appended to the document, designed to show that Navarre could never be absolved, let alone ‘rehabilitated’; and this was the Spanish view. The critic denied the assumption that Navarre was not relapsed because he had abjured under duress (in 1572) and in fear for his life. Navarre, the argument went, had been at liberty in 1572; in any case, the relapse consisted not in the abjuration but in the subsequent return to protestantism. The pope’s sentence was therefore sound but if, or when, Papal errors were committed, they must be defended. Finally, being relapsed, Navarre could never be ‘rehabilitated’ – namely restored to his rights and his kingdom – because, in such cases, pardon entailed the confiscation of property. In fact the condemnation had already decreed the confiscation of property, while the kingdom – a sacred trust – was not real estate. There were, indeed, valid grounds for arguing that Navarre was not relapsed, but this technical and recurrent dispute would never be settled by words. The document dated 3 October cannot have been an instruction. The draft ‘discorso’ of Lomellini, dated 5 October 1589, was by far the most detailed of the documents generated by a legate’s need for instructions. Discussing the current state of French affairs, Lomellini asserted that if the succession was disputed, the estates-general disposed of authority and created law.14 The important factor was that no movement ever succeeded in France without a princely leader – even the Guises had adopted a Bourbon. Now, therefore, everything depended upon who enjoyed the support 11

Cugnoni, Ed., ‘Autobiografia di Santa Severina’, Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria, xiii (1890), 190; De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 383. 12 Manfroni proposed other explanations which are, however, chronologically impossible. This work is very confused. 13 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xvii (1867), 449, seq. 14 In fact an estates-general could only legally be called by the king.


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of the nobility. Currently the catholic princes, dukes, and nobles (‘il corpo della nobilità’), who had followed the late king, were supporting Navarre, and would enable him to gain control of the kingdom. Thus, in order to expel Navarre, it would be necessary to work with foreign forces. It was not to be expected that the nobles could be drawn to support the League, either by negotiation or by the fear of excommunication. They would simply ignore and reject ecclesiastical censures. Their attitude could be perceived from their oath to support Navarre – with reservations. First of all – and despite the foregoing observations – Caetani must try to win the confidence of the royalist catholics without being too precise about the canons against the favourers of heretics. The nobles must be deemed to be good catholics and be assured that the legate did not seek to subvert the order of succession but – cryptically – only to ensure that the holder was catholic. The nobles, Lomellini continued, would be attracted when they saw that a catholic king of the blood royal was proposed. Of these, the first was Navarre, a heretic, and the second Bourbon, who presented difficulties. There was, however, no mention, at this stage, of anyone else; everything would depend upon the exact state of affairs in France. Such an approach might have provided a small ray of hope to the royalists who wanted help in obtaining the conversion of Navarre. Perhaps it was to render the conversion impossible that the legate was sent to Paris? Lomellini was uncertain of the intentions of the League. The nobles, he wrote, would never accept a Guise or other foreigner. But, if the Guises [namely Mayenne] only sought to obtain a catholic king, recognised by the pope, then much might be achieved by negotiation. Nothing, of course, could have been further from the reality. If the League appeared to be supreme, the legate would have to support it. If, on the contrary, Navarre appeared to be winning with the support of the nobility upon the expectation that he would convert, then the legate should not proclaim that he wished to exclude him. It would be preferable to indicate that Rome wished to procure a catholic king and that, if Navarre gave adequate assurance of being catholic, an accommodation could be found. This, Lomellini alleged, could lead to a truce, which would arrest Navarre’s progress and enable the legate to enter into negotiations [and frustrate them]. But of course, if Navarre was impatient to abjure, and all Mayenne wanted was a [?any] catholic king, the French would have arranged their own differences with the assistance of Villeroy. No clear directive could be derived from this flawed analysis. If, however, Caetani found a confused situation, it would be better to negotiate secretly [with the royalists] for a catholic king, favouring Bourbon, with his nephews [Vendôme, Conti and Soissons] as regents and lieutenants. This, Lomellini [wrongly] supposed, the nobles would support, evidently ignoring their concern for the legitimate succession. He rather played down the obvious difficulty of Guise opposition, suggesting that Mayenne could be intimidated and cajoled into relinquishing unreasonable aspirations and accepting second place in the realm. Upon arrival, Caetani should seek to open talks with Vendôme and other noblemen, as well as with the League, but to avoid giving the impression that he was too closely linked with it. As a cardinal, Vendôme had a proper reason for seeing the legate, and cardinals Gondi (bishop of Paris) and

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Lenoncourt might accompany him.15 If these talks were promising, the negotiation for a catholic king could proceed, together with the participation of other catholics. But if it proved impossible to meet Vendôme, Caetani should still cultivate him assiduously, consult him, and display confidence in him. We know from a statement of Montalto that Caetani definitely received both written and verbal instructions, plus additional directives at a later date.16 The written instruction should be distinguished from the first instruction, of 30 September 1589. With hindsight, the likelihood is that the written instruction was based on Lomellini’s ‘discorso’, which mainly accords with subsequent Papal attitudes, but without necessarily containing the whole of it, and possibly with other additions. But it is wrong to allege that the ‘discorso’, in that form, was itself the instruction because we simply do not know.17 By the same token, it is also wrong to suggest that we know what the legate’s instructions contained; we do not. The weakness of Lomellini’s ‘discorso’ as the substance of an instruction exposes the almost insuperable difficulties of the Papacy, despite some pertinent points like the pivotal importance of the nobility; there were too many swiftly changing imponderables. All drafts and accounts agree that the purpose of the legation was to save catholicism in France – an emotive but largely meaningless statement – and to seek to establish a catholic king. But that was in the absence of any suitable candidate or, indeed, any candidate at all, apart from the imprisoned cardinal. In view of these vacuous objectives, one must wonder whether the arcane Papal purpose was not to ensure, in some entirely nebulous way, that Spain did not make all the running; possibly also to resist the usurpation of Papal authority by secular institutions or the Gallican clergy. That would be comprehensible, but it was crippling folly to appoint Enrico Caetani and send him to Paris, whence to conduct diplomacy. Besides, Papal arbitration of the French succession was no more acceptable in France than Spanish domination except, perhaps, to Mayenne; but Sixtus V did not support Mayenne. Nor was it to be expected that the legate could support the Leaguer catholics without helping Mayenne, and consorting with the Spanish agents upon whom the League depended. In fact the conflict in France was not ripe for solution; that had to evolve from within.

15

Charles de Bourbon, cardinal de Vendôme 1583, fourth son of Louis, prince de Condé, coadjutor of the old cardinal de Bourbon, archbishop of Rouen 1582, cardinal de Bourbon 1590, died 1594. Philippe de Lenoncourt, archbishop of Reims 1588, died 1592. Pierre de Gondi, bishop of Paris 1569, cardinal 1587, died 1598. 16 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xvii (1867), 455, 17 October 1589, Montalto to the legate. Ibid., xviii (1867), 70-1, 10 February 1590, Montalto to the legate, in which he was exhorted to read his instructions frequently. 17 Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 205, said that the ‘discorso’ was Caetani’s final instructions, superseding all others.


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III: Caetani’s Legation in France Caetani left Rome on 2 October 1589 and entered Lyon on 8 November; there he remained for the rest of the month on account of the danger of the routes. From Lyon Caetani embarked upon his tangled negotiations, allegedly writing to Mayenne, the royalist catholics, and to Nevers whom he tried, in vain, to lure to Lyon. Mayenne sent his secretary, and a small escort, with which Caetani departed on 1 December travelling through the duke’s ‘gouvernement’ of Burgundy, via Mâcon, Chalon, Beaune, and Dijon. He remained in Dijon from 11 December 1589 to 3 January 1590. He then proceeded to Paris with another escort, for which he was obliged to pay. Caetani reached Paris on 20 January 1590, made his solemn entry next day, and presented his credentials to the ‘parlement’ on 26 January.18 All of this was a serious disappointment for the royalist catholics. The legate’s brother, Camillo Caetani, patriarch of Alexandria, informed their uncle Peranda (secretary to the late cardinal Sermoneta), that the ‘enemy’ – a revealing expression – had tried to intercept the legate and his suite in Burgundy; but they failed on account of the escort. He also claimed that one, Fugaccia, who came from Tours, said that it had been put to Navarre that he should not permit a legate to enter France without his permission.19 The royalists had naturally been anxious to keep the legate away from Paris. An edict of the ‘parlement’ of Tours, issued on 5 January 1590 when Caetani was already on his way, offered him a passport and an honourable reception if he meant to proceed to court; otherwise he would be deemed to be an enemy. Another edict from Tours, of 27 January 1590, condemned anyone who had dealings with the legate without the king’s permission. This was presumably aimed at the rival ‘parlement’ in Paris, to which Caetani presented his credentials. Already he appeared to be the legate of the League, while the attitude of the ‘parlement’ at Tours was unhelpfully intransigent.20 Although the legate’s arrival raised the people’s spirits, he found Paris in a state of terror and desolation, in urgent need of outside help; negotiations, it will be recalled, between the League and Spain had recently been suspended. Mayenne arrived from his camp about 26 January to hold a council with the legate; they discussed the proposed Spanish protectorate, which Caetani opposed. Mayenne departed again on 30 January 1589 having persuaded the legate to part with 50,000 écus to pay his mutinous army. That was an undeniably partisan gesture, and

18

Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xvii (1867), 459; Drouot, ‘La Mission du légat Caetano’, Revue d’histoire moderne, iii (1928), 373-80. Caetani wrote to Nevers on 10, 23 November and 7 December 1589. 19 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xvii (1867), 469-71, 27 January 1590, Camillo Caetani to Peranda. 20 Isambert, Recueil général des anciennes lois, xv, p. 17, 5 January 1590, ‘déclaration de Henri IV sur l’arrivé du légat’, no text; Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xvii (1867), 462; ibid, xviii (1867), 82; Drouot, ‘La Mission du légat Caetano’, Revue d’histoire moderne, iii (1928), 388 n.5; Tempesti, Sisto Quinto, ii, 226; Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 230-1; Anquetil, L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, 114.

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a principal act of disobedience for which he was never forgiven.21 Sixtus’ intention, at that stage, was not to help Mayenne but to obtain the release of the cardinal de Bourbon – a catholic king. In practice, the distinction might not be sustainable. More than two months before Caetani’s arrival in Paris the Spanish agents had received detailed instructions for his reception – and manipulation. Mendoza held a letter for him from Philip II. In other words, the legate was to be hijacked by the Spanish, and used to further a proposed Spanish/Papal alliance. This was mooted in Rome in December 1589, after Caetani’s departure, and intended to induce the pope to supply money and an army for the League. Mendoza was to urge the need for the liberation of Bourbon – behind whom they all tried to shelter. In this respect the Papacy and Spain were in agreement, but not with Mayenne. Above all, ‘Béarn’s’ pretensions [to the throne] must be emphatically disavowed. Olivares made similar representations in Rome but it was not Papal policy to say anything more about the exclusion of Navarre. The Spanish also wanted the legate to work on winning over the non-League cities, and to obtain the support of all the ‘parlements’ [with the election of a king in mind]. Mendoza had personal instructions relating to the succession, and must manoeuvre Caetani into sending the pope a report supportive of Spanish policies.22 In this he appears to have been successful. From the start, therefore, Caetani came under intense Spanish pressure. But it is not clear whether he was dominated and overwhelmed, or whether his opinions upon the affairs of France were his own. It is possible that the appointment of Caetani was mistakenly interpreted to mean that the pope was adopting a policy favourable to Spain. Alternatively, it may have been thought that exploitation of the legate in Paris was another way of obliging the pope to agree to an offensive alliance with Spain. That, it will be seen, is what Olivares was working on in Rome. Parma was also poised to exploit the arrival of the legate, whose brother, Pietro Caetani, was the duke’s agent in Paris. Parma shortly sent an envoy, Camillio Capizucchi, described as a relative and family friend. Capizucchi was to penetrate the legate’s intentions, and to make sure that he understood what was required for Philip’s service. Thus it does appear that the Spanish presumed Caetani to be at their service. After a few weeks, Capizucchi returned the curious report that he thought the legate’s instructions required him to persuade Philip II to regard the cause of the catholics as his own. Only by assisting them could Philip obtain, and profit from, a footing in France.23 Whether this indicates that Caetani was, indeed, pro-Spanish, or merely reflected his desire to see the League preserved from collapse, is uncertain. It does, however, appear that he was not 21

Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xvii (1867), 468-9, 25 January 1590, the legate to Peranda, 469-71, 28 January 1590, the patriarch to Peranda; Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 203. 22 Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 199-202, 6 November 1589, Philip II to Mendoza, 6 November 1589, Philip II to Caetani; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, pp. 338-9, 25 January 1590, two letters, Philip II to Mendoza and to Moreo and Tassis. These letters were intercepted and therefore may not have been received unless they were sent in duplicate. Philip II hoped to use the ‘parlements’ to elect the infanta and therefore wished for the help of the legate. 23 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 471, 20 February 1590 (1), Parma to Philip II, after Capizucchi’s return, 476, 24 March 1590, Parma to Philip II.


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well placed to make fruitful contacts with the royalist catholics – about which the evidence is poor. Vendôme had evidently been in touch with the legate, probably at Dijon during his journey, and had warned him against going to Paris. Then he wrote again, after Caetani’s arrival in Paris, exhorting calm and moderation for the good of the Church. The legate is said to have replied ‘gravement’, rebuking the cardinal in respect of certain peace negotiations. The outlook was inauspicious. Caetani carried a brief from the pope to the royalists which he sent – evidently from Paris – together with a letter from himself.24 In this letter, of 30 January 1590, Caetani said that he was writing to convey the pope’s will, because the war conditions had prevented their meeting. It is not, however, certain that he had actually tried to meet Vendôme. Sixtus V’s purpose, he said, was to preserve catholicism, and to keep the kingdom intact for its legitimate inheritors and those ‘able’ to succeed. This sounds like an echo of Lomellini’s ‘discorso’; it could also have been a hint to Vendôme himself, since Bourbon was a prisoner and Navarre, Soissons and Conti were not ‘able’. The pope, he said, was greatly afflicted that the nobles had so far forgotten themselves as to follow and support one who was excommunicated and debarred from the throne. Doubtless they were beguiled by the vain and diminishing prospect that he would abjure. Even if this were to be hoped for, it was not licit to serve this prince while he remained excluded. Thus he required them to quit Navarre’s service, notwithstanding any pretext or promise, and to obey the pope’s will. This condemnation could only antagonise the nobles; they had not forgotten themselves; their envoy, Luxembourg was, even then, presenting their case and their problem in Rome. While the pope did hope to detach the nobles from Navarre, he had yet to answer their request for permission to serve him; in the event, he evaded the point. Catholics, said Caetani disingenuously, all had the same objective, but were divided by disharmony. He therefore invited the royalists to reflect upon the means of conciliation [despite having condemned their peace negotiations] and conjured their likely sufferings if they did not unite to agree upon a catholic king. But if they did so agree, no prince would dare to invade France. If the nobles failed to obey these injunctions, they could expect to incur spiritual penalties. Nevertheless, he invited Vendôme to turn to him upon all occasions. Was this a crude and tactless attempt to detach the nobles, or was it calculated disobedience – since they could not be expected to comply with orders delivered under threat? Either way, nobles and legate were at cross purposes. While the nobles wanted assistance in obtaining Navarre’s conversion, Caetani wanted their co-operation in obtaining some other, catholic, king. Caetani was uncertain of the pope’s intentions in respect of Navarre; he did not, himself, favour Navarre’s conversion, and had no intention of promoting it. It was probably in response to this communication of 30 January 1590 that Caetani was condemned, for a third time, on 5 February, by the ‘parlement’ of Tours; he was now reviled as a Spanish pawn sent by Olivares; that may have been true, but it was not 24

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 269, 20/30 January 1590, the legate to Vendôme; Caringi, ‘Sixtequint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xvii (1867), 462-5, no details, 469-71, 28 January 1590, the patriarch to Peranda; Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 232. There is no text of the Papal brief addressed to the royalists.

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diplomatic. He had a brother [Pietro] in the service of Parma; he entered France without permission; he had not submitted his instructions [to the ‘parlement’ of Tours] and he resided in Leaguer cities. This ‘arrêt’, which again forbade any communication with the legate, was in turn annulled by the ‘parlement’ of Paris on 20 February 1590.25 Before that, however, the Sorbonne joined the fray. On 10 February 1590 they condemned Henri de Bourbon as a relapsed heretic, debarred from the throne. While this might have been seen as an usurpation of Papal authority, the decree was actually signed by the legate and all the [extremist] ‘curés’ of Paris. It was published, together with letters from the pope and Montalto of 2 October and 30 December 1589 addressed to the doctors of the Sorbonne, praising their zeal in maintaining the catholics in the Union.26 It would have been sufficient for the legate to pass no comment on the decree. Most likely, he welcomed this condemnation by the Sorbonne that he did not quite dare to issue himself. But to sign, and thereby to authorise the decree, and to misuse in support of it a formal, anodyne Papal brief, was outrageously partisan. It was, in short, to adopt an intransigent position from which, when Navarre was again victorious – at Ivry on 14 March 1589 – Caetani could no longer retreat. So, within a couple of months of his arrival, he fell foul of the pope who wished to remain uncommitted. Vendôme would not yet have been aware of the Sorbonne decree when, on the same date, 10 February 1590, he replied to Caetani’s graceless threats of 30 January 1590. Vendôme complained of having received no reply when he approached the legate upon his arrival in France. Now he was deeply disappointed; they [the catholic royalists] had hoped that he was coming as ‘an angel of peace’; but instead he was ‘sequestered’ by the enemy in Paris. They had urged him to go to a neutral place – such as Nevers – whence he could have negotiated a good peace. He could have come to see the king and been received with exceptional honour according to Henry’s declaration of 5 January 1590 which was sent to him.27 From that he could judge Henry’s purpose. Vendôme now begged Caetani not to permit the Church and state to be ruined by a faction, men who were burdened with debts and who needed war. He praised the qualities of Henry IV and the valour of the catholics who served him. Everyone who desired the good of the Church and state believed in Henry’s God-given mission to pacify France and preserve religion. He had promised these things, and had demonstrated his fear of God. Everything pointed to his conversion, if only he were suitably led. It was inappropriate to use rigour against him when he sought instruction and guidance. Indeed, he would ask the legate himself, if only Caetani would invite him. Instead, the legate sided with the rebels who had 25

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 602-3; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 25. The brief of 2 October 1589 was doubtless one of many carried by the cardinal when he left Rome. There was another, addressed to the council of the League, in which the purpose of the legation was stated to be to co-ordinate efforts to achieve the election of a catholic king. Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 329-30, 394; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 25-6, wrote that the clerical government of Épinac, ‘garde des sceaux’, and Caetani operated in Paris, while Mayenne attended to the war. On 8 February 1590 the city of Paris wrote to thank the pope for having sent the legate. Ibid., 23-4. 27 This, however, was hardly realistic; the legate could not go to see a king whom the pope did not recognise; but there were other possible devices. 26


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murdered their king. The nobility was well aware that it could only survive by adherence to a valiant king. Vendôme declared their attachment to religion and to Rome as well as to the state, and awaited the legate’s reply and advice.28 Sadly, Caetani was not their man; it was already too late, and it was Mayenne who had shrewdly sent an escort to conduct him to Paris. Vendôme’s letter to the legate, of 10 February 1590, bore the same date as a circular, signed by himself and Lenoncourt, convoking the bishops to Tours on 15 March for the council that Henry had announced. Evidently he intended to hold a secular and ecclesiastical assembly simultaneously. A copy of this circular, in Italian, was sent to the legate via Épinac, archbishop of Lyon, Mayenne’s right-hand man in Paris. They put it to Épinac that, as a senior prelate, he should be concerned to achieve what all catholics desired, namely the conversion of their legitimate prince; only, alas, that was not what all catholics desired. The royalists were confident of achieving the conversion, and looked to the legate to recover the lost sheep; otherwise his legation would achieve no good. The two cardinals stated clearly that the royalists would not be detached from their king, but his conversion would dissipate all pretexts for war. It was more honourable for them to serve the king than to further the ambitions of foreigners. They were assured of the support of the prelates in Tours, and of others who would shortly join them.29 It was, on the face of it, a proper function for these princes of the Church to enable and assist the conversion of the king. Caetani might have been well advised to seek further instructions at that stage, which would not have corresponded to the procedures he adopted. But, whereas Vendôme wished to reunite the catholics – especially the clergy – to obtain Henry’s abjuration, conversely Caetani sought the reunion in order to establish either Bourbon or some other catholic king. Thus, despite the assertion (according to his instructions, or advice), that he did not seek to subvert the succession, the succession clearly was the core and substance of their difference. Épinac did not reply to the cardinals until 24 February 1590, following the conferences held by the legate with Gondi, bishop of Paris, and other prelates. Épinac was more or less emollient in tone, and hedged his bets by conceding that the true conversion of Navarre would be advantageous. Nevertheless, with the usual formulas about defending religion and the state, he toed the Papal line. He would only act under the pope’s authority and by permission of the legate. According to their agreement, Caetani sent the royalist cardinals a hostile letter rebuking them for usurping his authority in calling an assembly. No assembly was necessary, and he forbade it; if it had already been convoked, it must be cancelled – again upon threat of punishment.30 A week later Caetani took action: writing to all archbishops and bishops, he forbade them to attend an assembly 28

Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xviii (1867), 67-9, 10 February 1590, Vendôme to the legate, from Tours. 29 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xviii (1867), 10 February 1590, Vendôme and Lenoncourt to Épinac. 30 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique xviii (1867), 72-3, 24 February 1590, Épinac to Vendôme and Lenoncourt. The bishop of Fréjus also replied that day, saying that the legate forbade him to attend. Ibid., 73-4, 24 February 1590, Fréjus to Vendôme and Lenoncourt.

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to consider the abjuration of Henri de Bourbon ‘soi-disant roi de France’, an excommunicated prince. They were summoned by persons who had no right to convoke them when a legate was present in France, and to a city he could not enter. If Henry desired instruction, theologians and preachers would suffice; but was he really ignorant of a faith he had formerly professed? If it was a matter of controversy between catholics and Calvinists – the legate revealed his real concern – that had been settled by the council of Trent. The assembly was forbidden, upon pain of demotion and excommunication; if it met in defiance of him, its transactions were annulled in advance.31 To the legate’s Latin missive was joined a letter in French addressed to the nobles, presumably from the leaders of the League, defending themselves against accusations of conduct detrimental to the state. They obtained an ‘arrêt’ of 5 March 1590 from the ‘parlement’ ordering everyone to recognise Charles X and to work for his liberation, meanwhile recognising Mayenne as his lieutenant-general. Further to this, on 11 March – as Mayenne marched to the relief of Dreux – the Sainte-Union was formally reconfirmed in the church of the Augustins, and in the presence of the legate who received the oaths. The participants swore to defend Paris, never to make a truce or peace with a heretic king, to liberate Bourbon and, meanwhile, to support Mayenne. It could not be clearer, therefore, that it was the legate who obstructed a nascent opportunity for Henry IV to convert, and one which he could not easily have resisted. For this, there were principally two reasons: firstly that Spain would not recognise Navarre in any circumstances, and the Papacy was largely in thrall to Spain. Secondly, the Papacy feared and opposed any assembly that might be called a council and debate articles of faith. Not only did Caetani make no effort to adopt a neutral stance, he rather appeared to be co-ordinating the resistance to Navarre. He need not have aligned himself with the League by receiving the renewed oath, any more than he need have signed the Sorbonne decree against Navarre. Similarly, he could have used Vendôme’s advances to promote a closer relationship with the royalists, if necessary frustrating the assembly in subtler ways.32 It is reasonably clear, however, that Caetani was instructed to seek the liberation of Bourbon, which could only be done by the League. So, to the royalists, he appeared entirely hostile and partisan. On the other hand, Caetani had been reviled by them, as well as invited to court, and condemned by the royalist ‘parlement’ as a Spanish pawn. Thus it is somewhat perverse to argue that Henry ought to have converted forthwith, after having won the battle of Ivry on 14 March 1590. On the other hand, the situation was complex and one could, perhaps, attach too much importance to the legate. In the flurry of hopes and fears aroused by the impending siege of Paris, the king did come under renewed pressure to convert.33

31

Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xviii (1867), 74-5, l March 1590, the legate to the archbishops and bishops; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 605-6. 32 Caetani claimed to have instructions to avert the council. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xviii (1867), 76-84, 3 March 1590, instructions for Camillo Caetani. This injunction featured in the minute of 30 September 1589. 33 All this will be discussed in chapter x.


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Caetani had evidently reported to Rome on 24 and 27 January 1590, after his arrival in Paris.34 These letters are only briefly summarised and not well attested. Caetani was concerned about the adverse circumstances he observed, and his conduct could be interpreted in the light of his fear that Paris, if not supplied and assisted, could not be contained. Everything [including the liberation of Bourbon] depended upon Mayenne; his situation was so serious that Caetani had felt impelled to give him the 50,000 écus – half the money he had brought with him. Mayenne had expressed his desire for an alliance between Rome and Madrid, and Caetani urged the pope to send an army. By the time these letters reached Rome (very fast) on 10 February 1590, Sixtus V was embroiled with Olivares, and had heard and responded to the message of Luxembourg on behalf of the royalists. Sixtus had been impressed by the news of the battle of Arques, in September 1589, and may have recalled the advice of Santa Croce not to underestimate Navarre. Certainly, during the last few months of Sixtus’ life, a feeling developed that Navarre might win the war. Already on 8 February 1590, Montalto had written to instruct Caetani that, if the royalist catholics sought to speak with him about the tranquillity of the kingdom, the restoration of catholicism and other matters concerning God and the peace of France – how much should one read between the lines – then the legate should welcome this and listen to them civilly, in a safe place. Montalto renewed this injunction on 10 February, before he had seen Caetani’s first letters from Paris, which were still in the hands of the pope. Whatever could be done gently, he cautioned, should not be done harshly, not least because it was reported that all Germany [!] was taking up arms to assist Navarre. If the legate could find a safe place, he should not refuse to see Vendôme and Lenoncourt, but rather do everything possible to win and detach the royalist catholics, as he had already several times been instructed to do. The letter ended cryptically, about rereading his instructions and recalling the pope’s recommendations.35 So, according to this advice, he should have responded positively to Vendôme’s approach of 10 February. But, as Vendôme was writing to the legate, and Montalto preparing this exhortation, Caetani signed the Sorbonne decree condemning Navarre – all on 10 February 1590. Caetani would not have received Montalto’s letters by 23 February, when he rebuked Vendôme for calling a council, and it would be interesting to know what he would otherwise have done. But, as things were, he had shot his bolt. In circumstances as contorted as those in France, diplomacy at a distance was quite impossible. Caetani had departed too soon, and he was not in tune with the pope’s thinking. The disharmony between the pope and his legate was irreversible. In response to Montalto’s two letters, containing instructions he could no longer execute, Caetani hastened to prepare a comprehensive report, dated 3 March 1590. The legate sent his brother, Camillo Caetani, patriarch of Alexandria, to Rome, to deliver his report and to put his views to the pope. On his journey to Rome, Camillo called on 34

Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xviii (1867), 70-1, 10 February 1590, Montalto to the legate. 35 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xviii (1867), 70, 8 February 1590, Montalto to the legate, 70-1, 10 February 1590, Montalto to the legate.

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Nevers and explained that the purpose of his mission was to persuade the pope to declare himself ‘chef de la Ligue’, and to clarify his wishes in respect of Navarre. Montalto had aroused Caetani’s fears that the pope was planning to negotiate with Navarre. Nevers, like the pope, desired negotiations with the royalists, and the two discussed whether Nevers could mediate Navarre’s conversion. Camillo agreed that he might try, so long as he did not imply that the legate desired it. But if Navarre refused, then perhaps the royalists might be detached. Nevers decided to write to Vendôme, while awaiting instructions from Rome, and he had a confidential agent in Paris who was sent to see the legate, secretly.36 It is, however, impossible to trace these intrigues. The first part of the report of 3 March 1590 was an instruction for Camillo Caetani prepared by the legate’s secretary, Riccardi. That was followed by a long postscript by the legate himself. If he was aware of having fallen foul of the pope, he showed no signs of contrition and sustained the opinions already expressed in his letter of 27 January. Indeed, the injunctions to his brother sounded very much as if the Spanish had put him up to entreating the pope to accept Olivares’ policy, about which a row (to be discussed) was currently raging in Rome. Sixtus, Caetani said, must ally with the King of Spain and other catholic powers against the heretics [knowing full well that Navarre was supported by catholics] and send money in advance of forces. Otherwise the French would make peace. If, however, Sixtus refused, then Caetani wished to be recalled rather than become a prisoner of Navarre. Like the Spanish, Caetani also asked the pope to denounce Navarre [as the Sorbonne had done] debarring him from the throne and, above all, to excommunicate all ecclesiastics who supported him. It was essential to declare himself clearly, using both temporal and spiritual weapons, because nothing could be gained by negotiation. But, seeing [?if Camillo saw] that, in the important matters, the pope did not wholly share their views, Camillo should proceed circumspectly because Sixtus would not tolerate hectoring. It would be best to inquire with whom he might work, and to obey the pope’s orders. Camillo need not refer to the money given to Mayenne but, if the pope mentioned it, he should merely explain. The conclusion should be the prompt dispatch of men and money to France. The report was arranged in eleven sections beginning with the convocation of the French bishops. Caetani claimed to have forbidden the assembly because it had been summoned without reference to himself. Such a meeting required Papal permission, and it might entail a national council, which he had orders to prevent. It was feared that the assembly would result in peace and, furthermore, the pope could have been forced to ‘rehabilitate’ Navarre as king, in order to avert a schism. The second section, however, condemned Navarre as an obstinate huguenot who had no intention of converting. If the fear of abandonment ever caused him to seek absolution, he should be rejected, at least until he had released Bourbon, expelled the heretics in his entourage, and broken with England – suicidal conditions. The essential point was that – whether catholic or not – Navarre must never be recognised as the King of France. The Union and Paris, as well as 36

Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xix (1867), 509-10, 20 March 1590, the patriarch to the legate.


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the legate, wished the pope to endorse this undisguised Spanish policy. Sixtus V, however, was becoming concerned to prepare for the contingency that Navarre might triumph, while Spain was more concerned to ensure that he did not. Caetani wanted a declaration against recognising Navarre to precede any negotiations about his religion, thereby laying a cynical trap: if, being thus explicitly excluded from the throne, he reneged on conversion, then his ulterior motives would be manifest. But if he still wished to proceed, he could be heard, provided he conformed to the – impossible – conditions prescribed. Sixtus must understand [the danger] that if Navarre were declared catholic, the clergy would submit and he would be the King of France; that would be disastrous for religion. What Caetani most wanted to know, and the answer Camillo must insist upon receiving, was whether or not the pope meant to ‘rehabilitate’ Navarre – a ticklish point. Indeed, the difference between a simple absolution, such as that accorded to Soissons and Conti, and absolution plus ‘rehabilitation’, was a juridical subtlety which enabled the pope, when it suited him, to appear to favour Navarre while retaining the proviso that he would not recognise him as the king. But if Navarre were to conquer the kingdom, the pope might have carefully avoided further offending a victorious prince who could provide a welcome bulwark against Spain. The next section of Camillo’s instruction related to the Spanish. They were detested in France, and suspected of trying to seize the kingdom since Philip II had sought the title of protector. Caetani claimed to have induced the Spanish to behave more discreetly. Camillo must stress the absolute necessity of paying Mayenne’s army, for which the legate had parted with the 50,000 écus. In fact, Caetani wished the pope to send an army of 18,000 foot and 2,000 horse, as well as 50,000 écus a month to save France from Navarre. This extravagant demand was guaranteed to enrage the pope who was currently struggling to evade similar pressures from Spain. To soften these requests, Caetani claimed to be importuned by the Parisians, who called for the pope as their ‘chef’. The Spanish, for their part, were so afraid of Navarre that Sixtus would be able to extract from them excellent conditions – which was not his experience. Mayenne was said to be isolated, unsupported, and distracted by the requirements of government. His French forces were disinclined to fight, because they had relatives in the opposing camp, while his foreigners would not fight without pay. The nobles hated Mayenne and followed Navarre in the hope of rewards. They feared excommunication but, at the moment, believed that the pope would accept Navarre. If the pope were to turn against them, that would be a severe blow. Vendôme was a feeble nullity; he might be acceptable to the nobles, but not to the people, who were almost out of control; it was also doubtful if Vendôme would expel the heretics. The legate was reproached [by the League] because he had not declared openly against Navarre [although he did sign the Sorbonne decree], nor had he replied to the measures levelled against himself. He was suspect to the royalists because he had gone to Paris, helped the League, forbidden the assembly at Tours and was pro-Spanish.37 Caetani appeared to be convinced that Navarre had no 37

The text simply lists these items, ‘il est partisan des Espagnols’, leaving it unclear whether this was a statement or an allegation.

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intention of abjuring; he was obstinate and showed no such inclination. But he knew no more than anyone else, and this is what he chose to believe. Whether or not Caetani had disobeyed instructions, he evidently made no attempt to deceive the pope. The pope is said to have ordered Montalto to write Caetani a very severe (‘durissima’) response.38

IV: The Pope’s Dilemma The pope’s dilemma, in respect of his French policy, was not resolved by sending Caetani to France, a decision he regretted forthwith; thereafter, he faced a difficult time.39 Torn by conflicting sentiments and desires, Sixtus was disinclined to make any decisions before receiving what he hoped would be accurate information from Caetani; he had not expected the journey to take so long.40 Meanwhile, Sixtus’ relations with Olivares and Diou were tense and disagreeable. They constantly pressed him to declare openly for the League, and to spend his money on raising an army. Diou demanded 500,000 écus. Sixtus retaliated by demanding Marseille; he also required support for the duc de Lorraine as the catholic candidate. Diou became cross and impatient.41 A few weeks later, he told Villeroy that the pope was open to all sorts of impressions, and had no good meaning towards Mayenne. Sixtus suspected Mayenne of seeking the throne for himself, and complained that he made no effort to liberate Bourbon. There was, Diou concluded, nothing to be expected of the pope; he was disinclined to sink his money on their account.42 Sixtus’ attitude to France, and to Navarre in particular, was interlinked with Italian affairs. This was especially so in the case of Venice, which feared Spanish/Papal cooperation in France. Venice refused to join an Italian league against Henry IV, and Sixtus quarrelled with the Republic over her favourable attitude to the king.43 On 12 September 1589, Venice accepted Henry’s ambassador Hurault de Maisse and – it has been seen – formally recognised the king at Tours on 22 November. Maisse, who became an important source of information, encouraged the Venetians to believe that Caetani rather intended to establish the power of Spain than to restore catholicism in France. If that was not really what Sixtus intended, he did confide to the Tuscan, Niccolini, that it was necessary to be rid of the ‘Navarrais’, and to depend upon Spain.44 Yet the Venetian ambassador, Alberto Badoer, reported on 30 September 1589, when Caetani’s 38

Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 234, no date or text, ibid., 234 n.2. Manfroni refers to letters of Caetani to Montalto of 22 February and 6 March regretting the pope’s dissatisfaction. 39 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 66-7, – October 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 40 Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 225, 29 November 1589, Peranda to the legate. 41 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 67-8, 11 October 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany, 71, 29 November 1589, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 42 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 384, 19/29 October 1589, Lilley to Walsingham. 43 La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg’, Revue des questions historiques, lxxix (1886), 13. 44 Raulich, ‘La Contesa fra Sisto V e Venezia’, Nuovo Archivo Veneto iv (2) (1892), 245 n.1. This report was written before the news from France, which allegedly changed Caetani’s instructions.


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instructions were first under discussion, that the legate was to proceed indifferently with both sides; he was not to express opinions about Navarre but to receive any envoy sent to him.45 Sixtus attacked Badoer over the Venetian respect for Navarre, pointing out that even the royalist catholics only recognised him conditionally. Sixtus claimed to have no quarrel with Navarre apart from his religion – which neatly distanced himself from Spain. Furthermore, he also claimed not to have wanted Navarre’s excommunication; he would sooner have retained the means of access to him through prelates and religious; that was now impossible, unless Navarre desired it; the pope, of course, had never tried. Sixtus was persuaded against his better judgement that the excommunication, already prepared by Gregory XIII, was the right way to pacify France, and to keep the late king and Navarre apart. Sixtus appeared ambivalent on the subject of Navarre and the row with Venice continued. But that was as much as anything because the recognition of Henry IV was an offence to Papal authority.46 Sixtus could not, however, afford a breach with Venice; so he received their extraordinary ambassador, Leonardo Donato, who arrived on 18 November 1589.47 Sixtus stuck to his point, that he could not consider Navarre to be the legitimate French king; he was under Papal exclusion and had only been tumultuously acclaimed.48 Venice took the view that Navarre was a valuable counterpoise to Spain. They also feared that, if provoked, he might activate the Turks in the Mediterranean. The two Venetians felt that Maisse could be usefully employed to mediate between the pope and the king.49 They inquired why Sixtus should wish to bar Henry from reconciliation to the Church, and desired the pope to use all gentle means to bring him back to obedience. As it would be almost impossible to deprive him of the crown, without destroying France, it was dangerous to alienate him; but his nature was tractable and he was open to instruction.50 The dispute with Venice reached its climax over the duc de Luxembourg. He arrived in Venice on 4 December 1589 on his way to Rome, and asked the doge and

45

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 74-7, 321-4, notes of cardinal Cornaro attached to Badoer’s report of 24 October 1589 to the doge and senate. The pope was quarrelling over matters of protocol and authority. When the nuncio in Venice, Matteuzzi, departed incognito, the pope sent him back to his post. On this affair, see Raulich, ‘La Contesa fra Sisto V e Venezia, Nuovo Archivo Veneto, iv (2) (1892), 243-318. 46 Venice and the Papacy were the only Italian states which remained independent of Spain. Levin, ‘A Spanish Eye on Italy’. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Yale University, 1997), 6. The struggle to retain their independence was constant, and they could not afford to fall out with each other. 47 Raulich, ‘La Contesa fra Sisto V e Venezia’, Nuovo Archivo Veneto, iv (2) (1892), 276-84. Philip II was annoyed by the pope’s intermeddling in temporal affairs. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 77-81, 324-7, 13 December 1589, Contarini to the doge and senate, from Madrid. 48 Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 334-6. 49 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 385, 14/24 November 1589, Wroth to Burghley, said that to ‘ruinate’ France would enslave the pope, 385, 20/30 November 1589, Wroth to Burghley, from Venice. 50 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 388, 28 November/8 December 1589, Wroth to Burghley. Luxembourg had a commission from Henry IV to treat of French affairs in Venice but, for Rome, his commission was from the three estates of France – rather oddly since there was no such body.

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senate to facilitate his mission.51 The ambassadors reported to the pope that the senate had declined this request, doing so in a way that effectively performed the good office required. The Venetians had congratulated Luxembourg on Navarre’s successes and his inclination to become a good catholic. But, while the ambassadors sought to assuage the quarrel, Sixtus erupted into one of his notorious tempers. Luxembourg had no business in Venice; the Venetians were favouring heresy, and both ambassadors could go. But, when the storm abated, they stood their ground and reason prevailed. For all his ranting, Sixtus intended to receive Luxembourg, and sour relations with Venice were unhelpful. He so far relented as to agree to the presence of Maisse in Venice – which he could not prevent – but with some face-saving provisos.52 When Donato left, Badoer faithfully sustained the good work, constantly seeking to influence the pope in favour of Navarre. The crucial question, in Rome as in France, was whether or not Navarre meant to abjure and, if so, whether he could be absolved. Philip II, upon hearing of the death of Henry III, had warned the pope not to be deceived by Navarre; he might simulate conversion. Philip reported heretics in England and Germany to have agreed that Navarre might legitimately dissemble.53 Sixtus raised this question in the French congregation, on 6 November 1589. He even discussed appointing a commission of French bishops and prelates to instruct Navarre, with permission to absolve – possibly as part of the search for some means of uniting the French catholics against Spain. But Spanish influence in Rome was strong, and Sixtus could not avoid discussing the succession with Spain if he wished to retain a voice in the matter. Besides, he could not risk a breach with Spain while he was still at odds with Venice.54 In fact his reconciliation with Venice, and concessions made to Olivares, appear to have coincided, in mid-December 1589. Spain, for her part, was also concerned about the Venetian recognition of Navarre, and was anxious to make the Papacy bear the greater part of the cost of intervention against him. Sixtus was still awaiting the information he required from Caetani, but Olivares so successfully nagged him for a decision that he agreed to allow Santori to prepare a draft agreement for joint action in France.55 On 16 December 1589 Olivares sent a courier to Madrid to report that the pope was prepared to consider an alliance with Spain in order to save religion in France, if a heretic became king – which was doubtless a calculated ambiguity. While this matter was handled verbally by the old Spanish cardinal Gesualdo, two so-called ‘verbal notes’ were drafted. The first of these proposed that the pope should equal the forces of Spain, or even exceed them, while Spain should prepare the campaign for the spring of 1590. If Bourbon died, Sixtus would support the 51

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 81-90, 327-37, 16 December 1589, Donato and Badoer to the doge and senate. Before climbing down, Sixtus had threatened sanctions against Venice, and the interruption of corn supplies. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, pp. 385-6, 20/30 November 1589, Wroth to Burghley. 52 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 341-2, 30 August 1589, Philip II to Olivares. 53 Hubner, Sixte-quint, ii, 286-7, 294; Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 225. 54 Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 225. 55 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 93, 339-2, 93, 342-4, [mid] December 1589, first and second ‘verbal notes’, given to Olivares by Gesualdo. Ibid., ii, 290-5. The Spanish courier arrived on 17 January 1590. Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 341-2.


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Spanish candidate for the throne. The second ‘note’ expressed the hope of raising 40,00050,000 men in order, with overwhelming force, to secure an early victory [in France], which would bring everyone over to their side.56 Thus, as the pope awaited the arrival of Luxembourg, he was already half committed to an offensive alliance with Spain; and that was a tricky situation in several respects. Sixtus had allowed himself to be pressurised, and the draft agreement with Spain, albeit informal, was to cause him a great deal of unforeseen trouble. Probably unbeknown to the pope, this news was swiftly carried to the legate by Mayenne’s servant Nivelle. He is said to have reached Caetani at Troyes, where the legate arrived on 9 January 1590.57 If this is true, then the legate may have been substantially misled as to the pope’s real intentions. Indeed this could have been why Caetani failed to respond favourably to Vendôme – only it is unclear if the timing fits. Furthermore, Caetani would not expect to offend the pope, less than three weeks later, by strongly recommending a Spanish alliance, and intervention in France with men and money. Having begun his legation with that in mind, it would have been difficult to back away from the Spanish thereafter. It is therefore possible that pope and legate were at cross purposes before his legation had begun. The proposed alliance was, of course, exactly what Philip II desired, and he responded, on 28 January 1590, with unusual alacrity. He accepted the Papal offer to bear the greater burden of expenses – which was not actually stipulated in either ‘note’ – and felt that they could easily agree upon a successor. Philip proposed that Sixtus should appoint the commander [thereby shouldering more responsibility] and, later, issue spiritual sanctions against Italian princes who refused to join.58 This reply was received on 22 February 1590, by which time Sixtus seriously regretted the whole proposition. He is alleged to have told Luxembourg that he had sought to quieten (‘addormentare’) Olivares, but reflected that such an alliance would be harmful to France.59 Very likely Sixtus did need to divert Olivares, while he awaited information from France and the arrival of Luxembourg; nor was it possible, in any case, to mount a vast campaign by the spring of 1590. Diou, who was not impressed, informed Villeroy that Sixtus had spoken of sending 25,000 men, under the duke of Urbino, and had inquired how Mayenne might react. However, Sixtus had always shown that he wished to hear from the legate before making decisions, and his intentions were very fickle. There was no sign of military preparations, and Urbino had not even been consulted, though Diou claimed to know that he had his own conditions to impose. Diou did not, in fact, believe in Papal help for 56

The message, carried by Nivelle, who had rushed to Rome upon the death of Henry III, was that the pope would send 20,000 foot, plus 6,000 horse, at his own expense, under a general to command all the League forces. Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 225-8; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 375. 57 Hubner, Sixte-quint, ii, 296. 58 Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 228. 59 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, pp. 390-1, 1/11 January 1590, Diou to Villeroy, 390, 3/13 January 1590, Wroth to Burghley. Wroth reported much talk about the help the pope was sending the League but those who knew his humours ‘thought it would dissolve in fume’. Ibid., 392, 3/13 January 1590, Wroth to Burghley.

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Mayenne, and claimed to have heard that Caetani carried a secret [commission to declare] in favour of Henry IV if the League’s affairs were hopeless. Furthermore, Sixtus had already betrayed surprise that Henry had not yet sent to request his absolution. Whatever the veracity of these things, Diou reported what he heard in Rome, thereby contributing to a climate of opinion – or perhaps a fear – that the pope had begun to favour Navarre.60 Certainly Sixtus did not regard himself as bound by a putative, unsigned agreement with Spain, which seemed increasingly undesirable. On the other hand, although Philip’s favourable response did not reach Rome until 22 February 1590, the Spanish elected to regard the alliance as already concluded. Olivares may have feared for his reputation if the treaty collapsed, so his opposition to the mission of Luxembourg was carried to extremes. It is small wonder that, in the final eight months of his life, Sixtus V should have juggled with men and with policies. But it is doubtful if he could have continued to balance on the fence any longer, had he not died in August 1590.

V: The Mission of Luxembourg to Rome The duc de Piney Luxembourg was chosen in September 1589 by the royalist catholic nobility to represent them in Rome, and to explain why they were impelled to recognise and serve the protestant Henry IV. Presumably they also wished to ascertain the attitude of the pope to the changed and problematic situation in France. It was well understood by Henry IV, Mayenne, the pope and the legate that everything depended upon the support of the nobility; without their support, the League could only prevail in the might of Spain. None but the Seize and other extremists welcomed the implications of that – a dilemma with which Mayenne had constantly to juggle. The royalists, however, were almost alone in desiring the conversion of Henry IV, the legitimate prince that France so badly needed. At least his conversion was not desired by the League, the Spanish, or the legate. But the attitude of Henry himself, and of Sixtus V, was more subtle and less apparent. It has been seen that Henry was initially concerned with survival, while deferring important decisions. He had no representation in Rome, although Pisani (whose family lived in Rome) is said to have been sent by the king and the nobles in October 1589 to prepare the way for Luxembourg. Pisani was apparently accompanied and assisted by Antoine Lefèvre de la Boderie, who then corresponded with Navarre and his secretary Revol.61 No decisions could be expected of the king before it was known how Luxembourg had fared in Rome – at least since the legate was not the requisite ‘angel of peace’. But we do not 60

Little appears to be known about the early career of La Boderie who went as ambassador to England in 1607. Ambassades de M. de la Boderie en Angleterre, i, pp. vii-viii. There is no apparent evidence for the rather important statement that it was the king and the nobles who sent Pisani, the former ambassador, back to Rome, Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 317-18; La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg’, Revue des questions historiques, lxxix (1886), 17; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 78-9, 23 February 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 61 Unfortunately there is no text of the nobles’ letter to the pope. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 568 said that Luxembourg left on 16 August 1589 and went to Switzerland; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 394; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 383; L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, p. 111; La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg’, Revue des questions historiques, lxxix (1886), 18.


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know what, if anything, Henry said to Luxembourg, or what result, if any, he was hoping for. His remarkable reticence on this central issue concerning himself was almost complete. Luxembourg’s departure from France was delayed, probably because he had applied to Rome for a passport. His journey to Rome was also slow; he was travelling in the winter, and possibly trying to win support in the places he visited on the way; that was the case in Venice. He announced his mission to the pope on 6 September 1589, and asked him not to send a legate until after his arrival. Probably Caetani had been appointed before that letter arrived; indeed it may be why he departed in such a hurry. Since Luxembourg bore letters to the pope, dated 17 September 1589, it is unlikely that he left before then. He arrived in Venice on 4 December 1589 where, it has been seen, he was well received. Eight days later he left for Mantua, Ferrara and Florence, and was greeted everywhere with cautious cordiality. Luxembourg reached Rome on 8 January 1590, a little before the legate had begun to queer his pitch in France.62 Contrary to the wishes of Olivares, Luxembourg obtained a private audience late on 10 January. Before he could return with an interpreter, on 14 January, Olivares and certain pro-Spanish cardinals had launched a movement to obtain his dismissal. But Sixtus, who did not care to be instructed in his calling, declared himself willing to see anyone, including queen Elizabeth! While admitting to Badoer that the situation was ticklish, Sixtus had to know what the duke would say.63 It is essential to be ultra cautious in interpreting Luxembourg’s mission to Rome, and the pope’s alleged shift of policy in favour of Navarre. Sixtus was pestered to declare for the League, to supply large sums of money, and to ally with Spain. So far he had received only a surfeit of Spanish and Leaguer importunity and propaganda, but no information about Navarre. What was the pope to believe, and what was he to do? Luxembourg’s coming at least enabled him to play for time; and, if he hoped to exploit the duke, he must first accord him some civility. Caetani’s early reports, sent from Lyon and Dijon, had emphasised the serious decadence of France and the distress of the League. If this was true, then the Venetians – and doubtless also Pisani, whom the pope knew well – might be right in thinking that Henry IV could prevail. Luxembourg represented the royalist catholics, whose position was parlous. They earnestly wished their support of Navarre to be approved, and for their prince to be catholic also. If, by Papal acceptance, their allegiance was condoned, they and Navarre would be signally strengthened. Consequently Luxembourg’s arrival gave rise to fresh and repeated demands for the renewal of the exclusion of the ‘Béarnais’, and for the excommunication of all who supported him. Then, the argument went, the catholics would desert him and Navarre could not become the effective king of France. Philip II was particularly concerned because Sixtus had published a jubilee which, he feared, might facilitate feigned conversions and pave the way for ‘Béarn’ to make a false abjuration. Like 62 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 93-7, 349-50, 13 January 1589/90, Badoer to the doge and senate. Badoer said that Luxembourg went to the Vatican for his first audience with twenty-two carriages; only three were admitted. 63 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 104-6, 355-7, 14 January 1590, Philip II to Olivares.

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Mendoza, Olivares was commanded, above all, to ensure Navarre’s exclusion.64 Sixtus, however, was more realistic and not prepared to dance to that Spanish tune. Despite the clamour against him, Luxembourg remained in Rome, with only one short break, until Sixtus died in August 1590. Some queries hang over his mission; reports of his audiences are imprecise and we do not know exactly what he said to the pope. To judge from Tempesti’s account, Luxembourg gave Sixtus the impression that Navarre was penitent, and sincerely desired to be catholic.65 But was this the nobles’ interpretation of his ‘declaration’ of 4 August 1589, wishful thinking, or simply what they wanted the pope to believe? Rumours of Navarre’s alleged desire to convert, together with the pope’s ostensible favour toward Luxembourg, combined to spread the misleading impression that Sixtus V was about to accord with Navarre – provided he abjured. Consequently Diou tried harder to curry favour, promising to make no more demands for money; Philip II would provide for the ordinary costs of war. Even Olivares pleaded that Philip II only wanted the election of a catholic king. By these blandishments, Badoer said, they flattered themselves that they could persuade the pope to abandon his supposed plan to treat with Navarre.66 The only acceptable account of Luxembourg’s audiences comes from the dispatches of Badoer. He reported what the pope told him, and Sixtus wanted Venice to believe that he was more favourable to Navarre than was necessarily the case. Sixtus informed Badoer that he meant to load Luxembourg with favours because his presence augmented the Papal reputation, demonstrating the respect of the royalists for the Holy See. If it pleased God to work the good of France by this means, he would not oppose it. Sixtus was quite skilful at tossing out this type of comment, creating a desired impression without committing himself to anything in particular. In a strictly similar way, he gave Badoer the idea that he had no intention of yielding to Spain and that, if he could do so suitably – therein lay the escape route – he would seize his first chance to accord with Navarre. He said that on account of his annoyance at the Spanish rumour that Philip II had become the French protector – without Papal participation.67 It was not, apparently, until his audience of 19 January 1590 that Luxembourg conveyed any message from Navarre. This repeated his claim that he was not a heretic; he had always held the same beliefs, and he acknowledged the Real Presence. When accused of error, he had invariably replied that he was open to persuasion. Sixtus admitted it, saying that Montmorency had written as much some time ago. Only then did Luxembourg come to the crucial points of his mission. He asked the pope to authorise the royalist catholics to continue to serve the king, without incurring censure, and to send Navarre suitable persons to instruct him. Indeed, he reminded Sixtus that Navarre had

64

Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 237 seq. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 98-104, 350-5, 20 January 1589/90, Badoer to the doge and senate. 66 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 98-104, 350-5, 20 January 1589/90, Badoer to the doge and senate. 67 It is not clear when Navarre had made that request. Hubner, Sixte-quint, ii, 283-4. 65


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requested him to expound the truth, which he would then embrace (‘de me faire connaitre la verité, et je l’embrasserai’).68 In considering what such messages really meant, one might reflect that Navarre and the pope appeared to be playing a similar game. Reports that he was favouring Luxembourg, and might be about to accord with Navarre, could only augment Henry’s tenuous authority over the royalist catholics, and help to undermine the confidence of the League. Ignoring Luxembourg’s first request, on behalf of the nobles, Sixtus evidently replied that sending envoys to Navarre was a grave matter, requiring lengthy consideration. Did Luxembourg have any suitable person in mind? If so, Sixtus would send him to treat with Navarre and to prepare a report. In this way, they could arrive at a good agreement, and he would do everything possible without dereliction of his duty as pope. Encouraged by the pope’s ‘buoni paroli’, Luxembourg entered into discussions about a suitable envoy. Sixtus himself proposed Séraphin (also called Serafino) for the mission, a Frenchman and auditor of the rota. Luxembourg concurred, and optimistically envisaged no difficulty about the king’s submission; in fact, the difficulties were immense.69 Among the cardinals there were rumours that Sixtus might send another legate – or possibly two – and recall Caetani, whose arrival in Paris was not yet known. It is doubtful, however, if the pope was serious about anything more than increasing Luxembourg’s confidence that he favoured an accommodation with Navarre. It should be observed that Sixtus’ carefully worded answer to Luxembourg, ignoring the central request of the royalists, committed him to nothing. The dispatch of a cardinal, or other envoy to produce a report, was only a time-spinning suggestion; meanwhile Sixtus could do nothing. Luxembourg’s presence and these exchanges created a frenzy of activity in proSpanish circles. At least five cardinals (Deza, Mendoza, Como, Rusticucci and Madruccio) daily met together with Olivares, concocting means to frustrate Luxembourg’s mission and obtain his dismissal.70 This was the origin of Olivares’ notorious ‘protestation’. In an audience, probably of 21 January 1590, Olivares presented a paper which Sixtus rejected; eventually he agreed to read it later. In this obviously spurious document, Philip II purported to criticise the pope for favouring Luxembourg, and threatened reprisals if he did not desist. The ambassador could not suffer such a challenge to Spanish supremacy to pass unpunished.71 Olivares, still awaiting the king’s reply to the proposed Spanish/Papal alliance, was certainly exceeding his instructions by fomenting a row of theatrical proportions between himself and the pope – both of them obdurate and irascible men; this could do nothing to foster the alliance. Sixtus confided 68

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 98-104, 350-5, 20 January 1589/90, Badoer to the doge and senate. It was possibly remarks like this that led Matteo Brumano to observe that Luxembourg was not very highly thought of (not ‘tenuto di gran valore’); Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 343-4. 69 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 98-104, 350-5, 20 January 1589/90, Badoer to the doge and senate. 70 This point is made, in a general sense by Levin, ‘A Spanish Eye on Italy’. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Yale University, 1997), 16. 71 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 72-5, [late] January 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Pastor, History of the popes, xxi, 345-6.

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his anger to the Tuscan Niccolini. He saw no cause to expel Luxembourg who was there for good reason (‘buon effeto’); and he complained [of what Diou had told him] about Spanish largesse to the League which was only serving personal interests upon the pretext of religion. Sixtus also mentioned the proposal to send another legate to France, thereby confirming the impression that Papal policy was tilting.72 Naturally Sixtus rejected the Spanish demand for the immediate dismissal of Luxembourg and, on 29 January 1590, he delivered a report to the consistory. He had, he said, willingly admitted Luxembourg to discuss the conversion of Henry of Navarre, which was the purpose of his mission. Somewhere along the way the vital distinction became blurred between the nobles’ promotion of Navarre’s conversion, discussed by Luxembourg, and any desire of Navarre himself to convert. While there is no full report of Sixtus’ speech, he is alleged to have defended himself by saying that ‘to negotiate is not to make an agreement’.73 This could be a clue to the interpretation of his French policy; certainly it precisely defined his attitude to the Spanish alliance. It was also a high risk strategy. It was not until 7 February 1590 – seven months after the accession of Henry IV – that Sixtus actually replied to the royalist catholics. He praised their defence of catholicism, but begged them to unite their efforts [unspecified] with those of the other catholics. A similar brief was sent to Vendôme. Luxembourg, however, is said to have assured the nobles that the pope allowed their service to Navarre upon the hope of his conversion – which was not at all the same message.74 It was at this point, it should be recalled, on 8 and 10 February 1590, that Montalto wrote to instruct Caetani to receive and listen to the royalist catholics if they approached him, which contrasted with the unfavourable tenor of Caetani’s early reports from Paris, received in the evening of 10 February. Luxembourg’s mission had made at least a tactical difference. We do not know how Luxembourg reacted to Sixtus’ disappointing answer to the royalists, but he did inquire whether, if Henry sought to submit – meaning to abjure – his letters would be accepted. The pope replied yes; but he could not consider absolution unless or until the cardinal de Bourbon was released – the condition he had imposed on Henry III. It may have been upon the basis of this reply that Luxembourg wrote his report to the king (no date or text). La Boderie, who must have been following events, apparently referred to certain possible expedients, such as Bourbon being induced to stand down.75 But the pope knew perfectly well that Henry IV could not think of releasing the League’s puppet king; therefore his answer was void. There is said to have been talk in Rome of Pisani returning [so he must have come in October 1589 and departed again] with Navarre’s ‘submission’, but that was certainly 72

Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 344. Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 344-5 La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg’, lxxix (1886), 201, no texts. 74 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 75-6, 16 February 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 237; La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg’, Revue des questions historiques, lxxix (1886), 24-5, quotes an important letter from La Boderie who informed the king of the same condition; no date or reference. 75 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 76-8, 16, 17 February 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 73


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utter nonsense. Nevertheless, following the pope’s answer of 7 February and, presumably Luxembourg’s report, some response from Navarre was expected and awaited; and it was thought in high quarters that he would submit.76 This delusion probably derived from a false interpretation of Henry’s declaration of 4 August 1589, presented by Luxembourg, and his purely hypothetical inquiry. There was nothing in Sixtus’ replies, either to the royalists or to Luxembourg, to warrant such an expectation. One might deduce that Sixtus’ preference was to detach the royalists and re-unite all catholics behind Bourbon, as an interim expedient – but that required his liberation. Notionally, Sixtus could thereby support catholicism without appearing to favour Mayenne. The same [impossible] device would make Henry look more like an isolated heretic and less like a national leader; otherwise the Papacy might be obliged to reckon with him. Whether or not Sixtus actually desired Navarre’s conversion probably depended upon a fluctuating estimation of his chances of success.

VI: Olivares’ Protestation It was in the last week of February 1590 that the tensions over the pope’s French policy erupted into an ugly and protracted quarrel with Olivares. The dispute which began over the presence of Luxembourg, was fuelled by the arrival, on 22 February 1590, of Philip II’s answer, dated 28 January, to the alliance proposals of the previous December.77 Gesualdo informed the pope that Philip welcomed his proposals and agreed that 50,000 men should enter France under a Papal commander. He also welcomed Sixtus’ offer to accept the Spanish candidate for the French succession. Olivares was evidently empowered to proceed with the treaty.78 At his routine Saturday audience, on 24 February 1590, Olivares read the pope a letter, purporting to be from Philip II, demanding a formal ratification of the projected alliance. The king, it said, had done his duty, and the pope must now do likewise. Papal duty consisted in executing three Spanish demands: to dismiss Luxembourg; to issue a declaration perpetually debarring Navarre from the throne, and to excommunicate the royalist catholics. This virtual ultimatum was evidently accompanied by the threat of action against the Papal States, to be launched from Naples. Olivares required an answer within three days.79

76

Hubner, Sixte-quint, ii, 295-6. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 110, 363-7, 28 January 1590, ‘note verbale Espagnole’ delivered to Gesualdo on 22 February 1590, 110, 367-72, 28 February 1590, ‘note verbale pontificale’ for Olivares. 78 Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 348; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 80-4, 2 March 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. Niccolini said that this letter had been procured from Spain – he did not say from the king – by Olivares, Pellevé and the pro-Spanish cardinals, and the demands were made because the pope did not mean to help the League as they considered he should. 79 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 111-15, 372-6, 28 February 1590, Olivares to Philip II. Olivares had sent for dr. Martos because he himself did not speak Latin. Possibly, also, it was more suitable that the ‘protestation’ should be delivered by another. Furthermore, the arrangement may have underlined the proximity of Naples where troops were, indeed, being massed on the frontier. Martos arrived on 28 February in the evening. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 80-4, 2 March 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 77

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Olivares was granted an extraordinary audience on Tuesday 27 February 1590, precisely three days later. Sixtus then resorted to his gagging device: that was to speak continuously for an hour in order to confuse and tire his adversary. The gist of what he said was contained in an answer to Philip II, about the alliance, which was delivered to Olivares next day. Olivares, when finally suffered to speak, insisted upon the extreme importance of speed in executing the Spanish demands. He undertook to hold his courier, for the pope’s further answer in that respect, until Saturday 3 March; secretly, he was dispatched at once. Olivares was preparing to exert greater pressure upon the pope through a humiliating ‘protestation’. This was to be delivered to the consistory by a certain doctor Martos, a lawyer from Naples. The document, however, was not ready, Martos was not expected for two more days, and there would be no consistory before 12 March. Olivares could therefore afford to allow the pope a few more days.80 Olivares’ three demands were now entangled with the question of the military alliance, and greatly complicated the pope’s position. This explains why Sixtus’ answer to Philip II, delivered to Olivares by Gesualdo on 28 February 1590, was surprisingly emollient, dissimulating his simmering anger. The ‘note verbale’ claimed that Sixtus welcomed Philip’s reply, and that he was still of the opinion, held for some time past, that it was necessary to be united with Spain to remedy the affairs of France. Nevertheless, the answer proceeded to a skilful refusal to mount a French campaign. The difficulty was blamed on Mayenne who, informed by Caetani of the proposal, had not been pleased.81 Secondly, there were earnest peace negotiations in France, so that any pressure on Mayenne might serve to precipitate an agreement.82 Nevertheless, the pope had begun preparations [for war] – which was untrue. The ‘note’ then turned to Olivares’ three demands, which purported to come from the king. Sixtus claimed that he had twice ordered the legate to try to detach the royalist catholics from Navarre – once before, and once after his arrival in Paris. If they failed to respond, Caetani was to proceed with a monitorium and excommunication against them. The instructions for Caetani of 8 and 10 February 1590 might bear that interpretation, on the grounds of arcane references to verbal instructions which covered penalties; once again, we do not know the precise commands, and cannot tell whether Sixtus was speaking the truth. The dismissal of Luxembourg was demanded upon the grounds that his presence was pernicious, and encouraged the royalists to hope that he might achieve their wishes [in respect of Navarre]. Sixtus replied that, far from affording them hope, he had raised great difficulties (‘difficoltà grandi’), one of which was the release of Bourbon; that was certainly true. Luxembourg had not indicated that Navarre meant to abandon the heretics, nor did he request pardon, but only that Navarre should be instructed. The third demand, for the perpetual exclusion of Navarre was obliquely deflected. Mindful of his reputation, 80

While Mayenne wanted money rather than forces, it was only to the Papal commander that he had objected. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 107-10, 357-62, 24 February 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate. 81 Peace negotiations began in the last week of March 1590; it is not clear to what negotiations the pope referred late in February. 82 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 110, 367-72, 28 February 1590, ‘note verbale pontificale’ for Olivares, 107-10, 357-62, 24 February 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate.


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Sixtus did not wish it to be said that Navarre failed to convert because the pope refused to hear him. Nevertheless, it was being said in France that the legate had rendered his conversion impossible. Sixtus further indicated that he could do nothing before he had heard from France – meaning the expected answer from Navarre. In the absence of information, he could not change course without dishonour.83 This letter circumvented Olivares’ deadline but without preventing an ugly scene. To both Luxembourg and Séraphin, Sixtus decried Caetani’s conduct, as he had already done to the French congregation. He was, he said, particularly embarrassed by the payment of 50,000 écus to Mayenne. He played down the recent uproar created by the Spanish; he would not be ordered about. Thus, when Navarre’s letter arrived, he would still be favourably inclined to absolve him [upon his own terms].84 To Badoer, Sixtus was less guarded. He did not believe that the letter produced by Olivares supposedly containing the Spanish demands was genuine; but he swore, nonetheless, to punish Philip II. Sixtus also confirmed – as he had to Luxembourg – that, despite Spanish threats of war, he hoped Navarre would send authorised envoys to ask for pardon; in which case everything could easily be arranged. No doubt Sixtus fully intended to mislead those who supported Navarre; but he need not mislead us. Sixtus’ various statements about his willingness to accommodate Navarre never meant that he was prepared to recognise Henry IV as the King of France; nor did Sixtus ever suggest that he would. To Philip II, Sixtus had already stated candidly that he was raising great difficulties. All the same, he was shaken by Olivares’ ongoing threats which taxed his ingenuity. Thus, to Badoer, Sixtus now proposed an Italian league.85 The impending crisis came on 3 March 1590, during Olivares’ Saturday audience. It began badly for the ambassador, when the pope reasserted his right to neutrality in respect of France. Olivares concluded that all Sixtus’ promises were as solid as vapour; he simply wished for time to see what transpired. Indeed, he had even let slip that he was anxious not to vex ‘Béarn’ any further, in case it was he who triumphed. Olivares now concluded that the only way to control the pope was to frighten him, very thoroughly. He therefore proceeded to renew the threats of his ‘protestation’ ( containing the demands), even though he could not address the consistory without permission. Thus provoked, Sixtus began to bellow with rage (‘chirriar con gran coraje’) threatening Olivares with ruin – expulsion – execution – swearing that he would see him no more, and slammed out of the room.86 Sixtus V’s noisy temper was almost a match for the uncouth procedures of Olivares, although this degree of hypertension may well have shortened his life. Nevertheless, the fate of a pope who dared to display independence of mind was observed and noted by the cardinals, several of whom would shortly succeed to the Papal throne. In 83

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 80-4, 2 March 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Hubner, Sixtequint, iii, 107-10, 357-62, 24 February 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate, 115-18, 376-8, 3 March 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate. 84 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 107-10, 357-62, 24 February 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate, 115-18, 376-8, 3 March 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate. 85 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 118-22, 378-82, 3 March 1590, Olivares to Philip II. 86 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, pp. iii-vi.

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particular, Ippolito Aldobrandini, later Clement VIII, was marked for life by the fear and dread of another such intolerable row.87 In this overheated atmosphere, it was subtly contrived that Luxembourg – who still awaited Navarre’s answer to his report of early February 1590 – should absent himself upon a Lenten pilgrimage. His departure gave rise to a clutch of rumours, and it was still feared, if he returned, that Olivares would proceed with his ‘protestation’. Honour and dignity apart, that could cause a damaging polarisation among the Italian princes.88 While Gesualdo tried to calm both parties and persuade the pope to receive Olivares as usual, Sixtus complained directly to Philip II. Badoer’s account of this protest to the Spanish king, derived from the pope himself, revealed further pressure exerted by Olivares. He had even ventured to threaten the pope with a council, and a Spanish schism. At his routine audience, on 10 March 1590, a slightly chastened Olivares was obliged to kneel and apologise. Next day Sixtus reported the whole stormy affair to the French congregation.89 In discussing these events with the Italian ambassadors – as he was wont to do – Sixtus made certain observations which seem to indicate his real intentions. Speaking to Niccolini about Luxembourg, Sixtus said that it was necessary for Navarre to send an ‘express’ [messenger], requesting his absolution because Luxembourg had no commission to do so; he had no commission from Navarre at all. Then, provided Bourbon had been released, Navarre might be absolved. Bourbon, however, would remain the legitimate king.90 To Matteo Brumano, the Mantuan ambassador, Sixtus was even more explicit. He complained that, with France ruined, Spain was trying to isolate the Papacy. He hoped that the Italian princes would not tolerate this, and that Spain might better understand his worthy intentions towards France. He then confided that he had favoured Luxembourg in the hope that Navarre would release Bourbon. He had therefore conveyed to Navarre that if he desisted from his sin [holding a cardinal in prison], Sixtus would absolve him and grant him benediction; otherwise he could not. If Bourbon were to be released, then there was a catholic king. This remark clearly illustrates the pope’s essential distinction between absolution and recognition. But if, despite the pope’s known good will, Navarre and his adherents refused his offer, then Sixtus could not be accused of severity and the royalists would be to blame. In that case, he could proceed against them, or at least against the ecclesiastics among them; and that was his intention. But he could not, and would not, appear to take such measures at the dictation of Spain. Sixtus then expressed his anger that Caetani consorted with Mendoza, and had alienated Vendôme when his detachment from Navarre might have started a landslide. To seduce

87

Hubner Sixte-quint, iii, 122-5, 382-6, 10 March 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate; Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 395-8, 17 March 1590 (wrongly dated 12 March), Brumano to the duke of Mantua. 88 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 122-5, 382-6, 10 March 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate, 126, 386, 17 March 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate. 89 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 87-93, 9, 10 March 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 90 It may be recalled that Vendôme informed the legate that he would not abandon Navarre.


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Vendôme had been the ‘first thing’ [to achieve] and it had been bungled.91 If this evidence is true – and it is by far the best we have – then the pope’s supposed shift of policy in favour of Navarre is revealed as a sly expedient. He offered Navarre a simple absolution – which would have been more damaging than beneficial – upon terms he could not possibly consider, while seeking to detach his principal supporters under threat of excommunication. If, however, Navarre were suddenly to triumph – by making peace or retaking Paris – then Sixtus, who had not ostensibly refused him absolution, would be subtly better placed to restore relations with the King of France. For ecclesiastical, as well as political reasons, that would be essential. With Luxembourg away, Sixtus ventured to inquire of Olivares, probably on 17 March 1590, what more he wanted. Olivares promptly repeated his other two demands: another declaration perpetually debarring Navarre from the throne, and the excommunication of the royalist catholics; otherwise Philip II would renounce obedience to Rome. Seeing that the pope was again incandescent with anger, Gesualdo and Como intervened – apparently on behalf of Olivares. They persuaded Sixtus to call an extraordinary congregation, hand picked by themselves, on 19 March. Members would discuss whether they should allow the ‘protestation’, now called an admonition, and whether they should proceed, as the Spaniard wished, against the royalist catholics. The pope was now in a tight corner, and regretfully obliged to explain himself.92 He harangued the meeting on the state of France; he explained what Gesualdo had [originally] negotiated with Spain, how Philip II replied and, misleadingly, his own orders of 10 February 1590 to Caetani which, he claimed, were to upbraid the royalist catholics for following Navarre.93 Sixtus also gave an account of Luxembourg’s mission, and his own undertaking to await Navarre’s reply to Luxembourg’s report. Then Sixtus put two questions to the meeting: should he wait for Olivares to make his ‘protestation’, and should he keep his word to Luxembourg? If, after fifteen days, and despite his alleged orders to Caetani, there was no answer from Navarre, nor any report from the legate, should the pope proceed to a monitorium [against the catholic royalists?]. If Navarre’s reply arrived, and indicated as Sixtus expected that he would not release Bourbon, then the pope would dismiss Luxembourg and issue the monitorium – but not, therefore, to Spanish dictation. Thereafter, the Papacy and Philip II would act together.94 Badoer, 91

Terminology is loosely used and it is difficult to know, on each occasion, what type of a meeting one is really dealing with. Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 241, says that this was a secret consistory at which only twenty cardinals were present. That was why the pope also wanted a general congregation, presumably the meeting held on 22 March 1590. Meetings of the consistory could be public, private or secret. Congregations were usually specialist committees, of which Sixtus instituted fourteen. The word congregation was also applied to some meetings of the consistory. 92 That is not the tenor of Montalto’s letter to the legate of 10 February 1590, which emphasised the gentle, receptive approach to Vendôme. There were, however, also references to unavailable instructions which may have contained a threat. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xviii (1867), 70-1. 93 Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 398-402, 24 March 1590, Brumano to the duke of Mantua. 94 Montalto’s letter to the legate of 6 December 1589 ordered him to summon the erring prelates and, if they refused, to execute his verbal instructions. Montalto’s letters of 8 and 10 February 1590 ordered him to meet and listen to the royalists, and admonished him to reread his instructions and to remember the pope’s

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however, reported a rather different version, namely that the pope claimed to have commanded the legate to treat with the royalists, and to excommunicate them if they refused to abandon Navarre. So he wished to wait for two more weeks to see what had transpired. It is therefore not clear whether the pope was really waiting for a reply from Navarre, or to learn what, if anything, Caetani had done – or both. Alternatively, he could, as usual, have been dissipating time. Similarly it is also unclear whether the pope really had ordered Caetani to excommunicate the royalists if they refused to abandon Navarre.95 Pressure was accordingly brought to bear on Olivares to hold his ‘protestation’ for fifteen days from 19 March 1590. But, because of Luxembourg’s return to Rome next day, Olivares refused to wait for more than one day. Thus, in theory, at least, he might be about to publicise his ‘protestation’ at any moment – if not in the consistory. Once again, the pope became apoplectically angry, uttering every conceivable threat; his patience had snapped. To another consistory, on 21 March, he denounced the ambassador’s villainy. Upon pain of excommunication, the cardinals were forbidden to have any contact with Olivares, directly or indirectly. Next day, 22 March, Sixtus summoned a full congregation to report the proceedings of the previous, ad hoc committee of 19 March; and all but nine cardinals attended. Sixtus harangued them at length, defending all his actions with vehemence. This was, presumably, his official version of recent events. He claimed that after the death of the cardinal de Guise [in December 1588] he had written to the King of Spain, confided in him, and offered to do whatever he wished. Similarly, after the death of Henry III, Sixtus had again contacted Philip II, but received no answer. Sixtus now declared that he had never backed Navarre, and he had sent Caetani to France in order to please Spain. The legate had disobeyed his orders, made no secret of his intelligence with Spain, and had failed to lure Vendôme from his loyalty to Navarre. Sixtus had been ready to send forces and a general – Urbino – to command over Mayenne. In his negotiation with Luxembourg, Sixtus claimed some success. After his accession, Navarre had declared his intention to abjure. This, it has been seen, was not the case, but it may have been what Luxembourg had said. So he [Navarre] had applied to Rome for instruction. So far as we know, it was actually the nobles, through Luxembourg, who applied for Navarre’s instruction. Sixtus had replied that Henry must send a ‘uomo da posta’ requesting pardon, remission, and the lifting of his excommunication; and he must also liberate Bourbon. Thus it was concluded by the Tuscan Baldovino Delmonte, that the

recommendations. In the ‘note verbale’ to Olivares of 28 February 1590, Sixtus said that he had twice ordered Caetani to seek to detach the royalists and to proceed against them – by monitorium and excommunication – if they refused to abandon Navarre. Sixtus also told Brumano that it was his intention to proceed against the royalists if Navarre did not release Bourbon not, actually, if they refused to abandon Navarre. Not much later, Sixtus denied to Delmonte ever having given Caetani such orders, and criticised him for the [alleged] monitorium of 7 March 1590. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xvii (1867), 457-8; ibid., xviii (1867), 70-1; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 110, 367-72; Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 395-8; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 112-16, 30 March 1590, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. 95 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 107-12, 22 March 1590, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany.


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purpose of receiving Luxembourg had been to obtain the release of Bourbon who was to be the catholic king.96 Everyone else was now in a position to reach the same conclusions. Sixtus further declared on 21 March that he wished to enlist the cardinals’ help against Olivares. He began by showing the meeting a letter from Philip II addressed to Gesualdo, in which the king lavishly praised the Papal zeal. Then Sixtus complained bitterly of Olivares’ intolerable insolence, bursting out with his complaints against the Spaniard’s unreasonable demands. He had required the excommunication of princes of the blood, nobles, and all the royalist catholics. Furthermore, the pope was expected to annul every agreement made between the royalists and Navarre; Sixtus had refused. He had, he said, already ordered his legate to try to detach the catholics, and to threaten those who refused with ecclesiastical censures. Doubtless this element of prevarication and confusion was intentional; it enabled the pope to hedge his bets and, if necessary, to transfer blame to the legate.97 Delmonte, Niccolini and Badoer each gave their account of the ensuing discussion in which only Gesualdo, plus three others, defended Olivares. The most interesting advice was tendered by the Spaniard, Aragon, which Sixtus subsequently adopted. Aragon warned that if, upon the demand of Spain, mass excommunications were issued, it could lead to a schism. If the royalists refused to obey the legate, the pope could proceed gradually with excommunications. Sixtus also inquired whether he should excommunicate and expel Olivares, and whether he should arm against Spanish forces assembling in the Abruzzi – measures which sounded very like war. The shaken cardinals voted against admitting the ‘protestation’. They resolved to put pressure on Olivares, which was actually a way of saving him from expulsion, and worse. Very late that night, 22-3 March 1590, it took two cardinals two and a half hours to persuade Olivares to desist, presumably with grave warnings of the likely consequences if he refused. Olivares now agreed to the proposed interval of fifteen days and, thereafter, to take no action without previously informing the pope. Furthermore, Olivares was induced to order the withdrawal of Spanish forces from the frontier of Naples. At two o’clock in the morning, the exhausted cardinals calmed the still-fuming pope with the news of their relative success. Olivares remained in isolation, under threat of expulsion, and deprived of access to the pope. But he was not quite yet at the end of his hostile resources.98 This alarming crisis, in March 1590, had arisen over Olivares’ three-point ultimatum. Luxembourg had departed and then returned. The row had centred on the excommunication of the royalists, which remained unresolved; the third and salient point, the permanent exclusion from the throne of Henry of Navarre had been quietly eluded, and the fifteen days were tacitly forgotten. Olivares had very nearly cornered the pope and had inflicted upon him a serious humiliation. Consequently, Sixtus had been obliged 96

Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 241. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 126, 387-94, 22 March 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 97-101, ?19 March 1590 (wrongly dated 17 March), Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany, 107-16, 22-30 March 1590, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany; Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 398-402, 24 March 1590, Brumano to the duke of Mantua. 98 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 127-8, 394-5, 23 March 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate. 97

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to disclose his formerly arcane thinking on the subject of France and Navarre. Thus, to a degree, his duplicity was also disclosed, and his policy shown to have been closer to that of Spain than had previously been supposed; it was not, at any rate, substantively more favourable to Navarre. Whether the Venetians were dismayed is another uncertainty. Badoer was astonished when Sixtus informed him that he had assured both Olivares and Philip II (he did not say when) that he would never permit any prince to become king of France against their wishes; indeed, he would actively prevent it.99 In fact Sixtus was irremediably angry that Olivares’ hostile conduct had forced him to account for himself, publicly, in the congregation. This had blown his purpose (‘orditura’) and all his designs were frustrated. He felt released, by such ill-treatment, from any previous obligation towards Spain, and he would do nothing for the League. Besides, the proposal to place Urbino in command of the Papal forces was ridiculed in Rome. In seizing upon these events as a pretext for relegating any material obligation, Sixtus was influenced by dispatches from Caetani of 13-21 February 1590, which arrived during that wakeful night of 22-3 March. Sixtus now learnt that Navarre was daily gaining in power and reputation (‘ogni dì più piglia potere et opinione’); also that for all their insolence in Rome, and bluster in France, the Spanish were slack and tardy in assisting Mayenne. In that case, they had no right to level accusations at the pope.100

VII: After the Battle of Ivry It was barely a week later that further letters from Caetani arrived on 29 March 1590 – uncommonly fast – bringing the startling news of Navarre’s second victory over Mayenne at Ivry, on 14 March. This was a major development with serious implications which forced everyone to think again.101 Next day, 30 March, the pope held a general congregation, as well as a consistory which was probably small and private. To the congregation he reported not only the defeat of Mayenne but also what Delmonte termed the ‘strange procedures’ of the legate: on 7 March 1590 he was said by the pope to have issued a monitorium against the royalists; also that he had done so before the required time because Paris was dangerous and he wished to leave.102 This is frankly inexplicable. The question then arose in the congregation as to whether Caetani should be recalled as he requested. While the pope desired his recall, the cardinals opposed it lest the catholics 99

Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 398-402, 24 March 1590, Brumano to the duke of Mantua; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 102-3, 24-31 March 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 100 The legate’s letter was probably of 16 March 1590 (no text), sent on to Rome by Camillo Caetani from Autun, where he learnt of the battle. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xix (1867), 511-13, 4 April 1590, Camillo Caetani to the legate. This date is clearly an error, since he did not arrive in Rome until 5 April. It should probably be 24 April since Camillo referred to having had four audiences before holy week, which was 15-22 April. 101 The need to leave Paris would be a bizarre reason for issuing a monitorium, which could be done anywhere. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 103-4, 29 March 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. Both Niccolini and Delmonte mention this matter, of which there is no other sign. Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 2435. 102 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 112-16, 30 March 1590, Delmonte to the grand duke.


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– the League – should feel abandoned at this critical time. Far from wanting to abandon the League, some of the cardinals agreed with the Spanish that it was high time to intervene; they did not believe in Navarre’s intention to convert. The discussion continued in the consistory about what was to be done. Delmonte was one of the few to draw attention to the practical difficulties (so far entirely ignored) of making war on Navarre – with what forces, what officers, what objectives and in what place, he inquired?103 Finally the meeting agreed to co-opt five more cardinals into the French congregation; together with the pope, they would decide what to do.104 While the announcement of the monitorium should placate Olivares, it was commensurately distressing to Luxembourg. He protested, through Séraphin, that to proceed in the matter of a monitorium [namely to excommunication] would alienate the royalist catholics, and he proposed to complain to the pope. Such action, he said, belied the pope’s good will towards Navarre and could [?would] alter his resolution to abjure. Luxembourg demanded a concrete sign that the legate had exceeded his orders, and wished his transgression to be made clear to Navarre.105 To those in Rome who supported Navarre, Sixtus complained that the legate had performed the will of Mendoza. Montalto increased the confusion by telling Niccolini that the legate had only issued a warning, not a monitorium, while Delmonte used the word admonition.106 It appears from Caetani’s instructions for his brother, Camillo, dated 3 March 1590, that he had sent letters of ‘exhortation’, of which Camillo had a copy; that, however, was before the alleged date, 7 March. Two months later, there was no reference to any monitorium in a private account by the legate of Navarre’s complaints against him.107 The monitorium, and its timing, remain a complete mystery; no other references to it have come to light. Possibly Sixtus invented it or, perhaps, upgraded a warning to suit his own purposes. Just possibly, on account of the battle a week later, it was ignored and overlooked. Sixtus may have wished to show that Rome was not supporting the victorious royalists, or merely to quieten Olivares; but why 7 March? Deception would be risky, since a wholesale monitorium was hardly a private matter. The clamour for a monitorium against the royalist catholics was renewed early in 1591, after the election of Gregory XIV; so, either it had never existed or else it had been quietly dropped.

103

Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 359, 402-3, 7 April 1590, Brumano to the duke of Mantua. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 103-4, 29 March 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 105 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 112-17, 30 March 1590, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany; Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 359-60. 106 There is no mention of a monitorium in Caringi’s account of Caetani’s legation; it just might have been issued in preparation for the renewed oath of Union on 11 March. ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xix (1867), 497-8, 516-20, 4 May 1590, the legate to Camillo Caetani. 107 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xix (1867), 511-13, ?24 April 1590, Camillo Caetani to the legate. Camillo mentioned that many letters had been intercepted. Communications with France were very difficult, slow and unreliable. Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 248-9, 31 March 1590, Diou to Mayenne. Diou accused the pope of vanity and obstinacy. This letter was intercepted by the royalists, so Navarre must have been aware that the pope would not help the League. Diou did not, in fact, leave Rome at this time. 104

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Thus the implications of the battle of Ivry, the report of Caetani’s alleged monitorium, Olivares’ ‘protestation’, and the question of intervention in France – which Sixtus meant to evade – all became entangled together. Nothing had been decided before the arrival, on 5 April 1590, of the legate’s brother Camillo Caetani – sometimes called the patriarch – with his instruction of 3 March. It has already been seen that Camillo was primarily sent to try to persuade the pope to declare himself ‘chef’ of the League, as well as to clarify his wishes in respect of Navarre. Evidently the legate did not know whether or not the pope desired Navarre’s conversion, in which he himself did not believe. Indeed, there is no sign that Caetani was aware of Sixtus’ purpose in apparently favouring Luxembourg in Rome – namely to obtain the release of Bourbon. In Pisa, the grand duke of Tuscany had warned Camillo that his mission – to win support for the League – would be difficult, on account of Sixtus’ quarrel with Olivares. Camillo had four audiences in quick succession. He declared the pope to be illinformed and angry on several counts: about the money given to Mayenne, Caetani’s harsh treatment of Vendôme, his failure to summon the bishops to Paris [in time of war], and about Mayenne’s pretensions to dispose of benefices. Camillo disputed nothing, but required either help for the League or the recall of the legate. The cardinals had opposed Caetani’s recall, and Sixtus refused to provide money; as for sending forces to France, he awaited ‘nouveau avis’, meaning Navarre’s reply to Luxembourg. Camillo advised his brother to collect every detail he could about Navarre’s religion, and warned him that Luxembourg informed Navarre of everything Sixtus said against him. Camillo concluded that there was no hope either of men or money. Indeed the pope had already said as much to Diou who, seeing his cause to be hopeless, had threatened to leave for Malta.108 Caetani was also informed by another brother, Onorato (called Honoré by the French) that the pope would not spend money. Nevertheless, Caetani should not be discouraged as most of the cardinals supported him and disregarded his intercepted letters requesting Spanish favours for his secretary, Fabio Riccardi. But Luxembourg, who handed the compromising letters to the pope, pressed for the legate’s recall. Sixtus, however, remained silent for he, too, obstructed Navarre’s return to Rome. The Roman court, Onorato asserted, was completely divided; everyone spoke, wrote or simply invented things according to his fancy.109 The disarray caused by the battle of Ivry naturally affected Mayenne more closely than anyone. Reports that Sixtus did not mean to help him added to his acute distress. Allegedly writing to the pope on 20 March 1590, Mayenne recalled that he had authorised their resistance against Henry III; now there was more reason than ever to support them against the debarred heretic who claimed to be king. Indeed, Mayenne could not understand why the pope withheld help; it was not to be believed that Navarre would abjure and, if he did, it would only be feigned. Instead, he sought to stabilise his position 108

Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 783-4, 4, May 1590, 784-5, 28 May 1590, 785-6, undated, Caetani the legate, 786-7, 31 May [not 28 May] 1590, Onorato Caetani to the legate. 109 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 250-3, 20 March 1590, Mayenne to the pope. This appears to be an incomplete summary.


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in arms.110 On 25 April 1590 Sixtus held meetings of the French congregation to consider Mayenne’s appeal – which Pinelli believed to have been forged in Rome – together with other letters from the legate and Vendôme.111 Sixtus hotly denied ever having authorised the League rebellion; neither had his predecessor done so. He was even more annoyed by allusions to his treasure. Indeed, he was so bitter against Mayenne that he was tempted not to reply. But, instead, he sent for Aragon, president of the French congregation, and proposed to answer point by point. He wished to disabuse Mayenne and the League because he would offer them nothing. If, upon receiving his answer, they failed to make peace, Sixtus would wash his hands of the war. To Aragon’s expostulations Sixtus replied that no one fought for religion; it was all a matter of state. Mayenne, who wished to be king himself, had done nothing to liberate Bourbon. Sixtus, however, had heard from Vendôme, and he was optimistic about Navarre’s conversion. Olivares, who reported the exchange, accused the pope of ‘eating at two mangers’.112 The news of Ivry rendered Olivares’ third demand – for Navarre’s permanent exclusion – more urgent and pertinent than ever. But, in order to avoid expulsion from Rome, Olivares was obliged to modify his tactics, so he sent doctor Martos back to Naples. Nevertheless, Olivares complained of the pope all over the city and was said to have stamped his feet and ground his teeth with exasperation.113 Claiming to report the advice of an anonymous confidant, Olivares – one must suppose – now sought to save his skin and reputation by proposing to Philip II that the ‘protestation’, or parts of it, might still be delivered in the form of a letter. Even harsher measures were now called for, because Sixtus refused to defend religion in France. Thus Philip should require the pope to submit Olivares’ disputed demands to a general council, to be held in some safe place. More modestly ‘the confidant’ thought the archbishop of Toledo, primate of all Spain, might summon a national council. Olivares had plenty to say about the pope’s violent, abusive and cantankerous behaviour, possibly to cover his own misconduct. He also observed that Sixtus was ill, and drinking more than usual. The dislike was entirely mutual; Sixtus called Olivares a sorry scoundrel and a traitor (‘tristo ribaldo e traditore’).114 Philip II’s reaction to the disaster at Ivry was uncharacteristically decisive. Previously he had wished to wait for news of what action the pope would take. Now Philip immediately informed Tassis, Mendoza and Moreo that he had ordered Parma personally into France; not, it has been seen, for the first time. Thus his victory at Ivry 110

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 117-19, 27 April 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. Pinelli reproved Diou for having presented such a [tactless] letter. 111 It is not clear to what letter (if any) from Vendôme, the pope referred. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 136-8, 4036, 27 April 1590, Olivares to Philip II, 138-9, 406-8, 29 April 1590, Olivares to Philip II. 112 Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 361; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 246-7; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 132-3, 400, 28 April 1590, Contarini to the doge and senate said that Philip II did not approve of Olivares’ conduct and that he had exceeded his instructions. 113 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 130-2, 397-400, 14 April 1590, Olivares to Philip II, 136-8, 403-6, 27 April 1590, Olivares to Philip II; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 117, 22 April 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 114 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 132-3, 400, 28 April 1590, Contarini to the doge and senate, 144, 414-21, 3 May 1590, Philip II to Tassis, Moreo and Mendoza. Sessa did not reach Rome until 21 June 1590.

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was, for Navarre, also his undoing. Meanwhile, Parma was to send Mayenne all the forces he needed. These agents in France were to liaise between Mayenne and Parma, and to try to obtain the northern bases which Parma would need. Peace with ‘Béarn’ must be forbidden; above all, they must prevent the pope from according his ‘rehabilitation’ – which, assuredly, Sixtus never meant to do. To obviate this, ‘Béarn’ must, once again, be formally excluded – as Olivares had been demanding. Philip now appointed the duke of Sessa to go to Rome to press for the Papal co-operation, now more urgent than ever, which the discredited Olivares was unlikely to obtain.115 Nevertheless, he did not give up. In his Saturday audience on 19 May 1590, Olivares presented a letter from Philip II expressing his displeasure at the news of Ivry. But the misfortune need not be irremediable, and Philip was resolved to support the catholics. He had ordered Parma to send them all the help he could, leaving only essential garrisons in the Netherlands. Consequently Philip now pressed the pope to add his contribution to the holy task, as he had formerly agreed to do.116 The pope was again in a quandary; only the arrival of various messengers provided a brief diversion. On 20 May, according to Badoer, Sixtus summoned the French congregation and read them extracts from Caetani’s letters of 26 and 29 April 1590. The legate was concerned to reject the pope’s criticisms. Sixtus had blamed him for refusing to talk to Vendôme, Lenoncourt and the royalists. Caetani retorted that it was inappropriate to talk to the supporters of heretics – although he had, in fact, subsequently talked to marshal Biron.117 The notorious 50,000 écus had been spent on the League because it was necessary; and Mayenne’s claim to nominate to benefices was in accordance with the concordat. This extraordinary claim confirmed the pope’s conviction that Mayenne, with his usurped title, saw himself as king – or king in all but name. Sixtus also conveyed to the congregation parts of a letter from Vendôme who was positively hopeful that Navarre would convert. Much seemed to turn, at this time of waiting and confusion, upon whether or not Navarre could be expected to convert, despite the hostility of Caetani. Clinging to apparent intimations of Navarre’s good will in this respect, was the only way for Sixtus to preserve an escape route. It is very doubtful if Sixtus ever really desired Navarre’s conversion, which entailed so many hazards, at least until it briefly appeared that he might retake Paris. If Navarre was actually about to triumph, Sixtus must not be caught in the Spanish camp. Next day, 21 May 1590, Navarre’s long-awaited courier finally arrived. He carried letters dated up to 30 April from Navarre himself, and 2 May from the nobles. It was only on 14 March, the day of the battle of Ivry, that Luxembourg’s messenger had, with difficulty, reached the king. Henry replied from Mantes, on 26 March, but without any mention of Luxembourg’s proposal, of the imprisonment of Bourbon, or of any recent monitorium against his followers. Neither were these matters mentioned by Vendôme. He 115

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 124-9, 25 May 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. In an effort to avert a siege of Paris, Caetani met Biron at Noisy on 26 March 1590, sought to detach the marshal and proposed a truce and an estates-general. About a month later Caetani also sent the bishop of Ceneda to try again. This is discussed in context in chapter x. 117 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 183-4, 25 March 1590, Henry IV to Luxembourg; Hubner, Sixtequint, iii, 129-30, 396-7, 6 April 1590, Vendôme to Luxembourg. 116


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simply told Luxembourg that the legate had compromised his mission by publicising his partiality [for the League].118 Luxembourg saw the pope next day, on 22 May, and expressed Navarre’s satisfaction at Sixtus’ good will towards him and his intention to abjure. Indeed, according to Niccolini, Navarre averred that he might already have done so, were it not for his vexation at the legate’s disobliging conduct; that had raised doubts about the true nature of the pope’s instructions. These were circumstances in which Henry risked nothing by protesting his good intentions; and this is all we hear of his longawaited response to Luxembourg. La Boderie, however, showed Niccolini part of a more revealing letter addressed to himself. That referred to the pope’s demand for the release of Bourbon, which was something Henry could not do.119 In other words, Sixtus had not made a genuine offer; pope and king were still playing a similar game. A rare and tantalising glimpse into Henry’s thinking on the subject of religion is afforded by a brilliantly cryptic letter addressed to queen Elizabeth on 15 March 1590.120 It suggests that, like the pope, he wished to keep his options open. The day after his victory over Mayenne at Ivry, Navarre wrote cheerfully to inform queen Elizabeth, whose good will he must retain at all costs. He had, he said, excused himself several times for being unable to follow her advice and adopt the Roman religion in order to establish himself more easily on the throne. He was waiting to tread the path she had taken, because he sensed that God had called him to perform, throughout Christendom, what she had done in England. Henry had not so much followed his own devices as the judgement of the theologians and ministers about him. Otherwise the evident force of the queen’s reasons, and his own desire to please her, might have induced him to accept her advice. These statements are far from self-explanatory. Queen Elizabeth had established in England a protestant, but episcopal, national church. It is, however, more likely that Henry wished to be ingratiating than that he really regarded the Anglican settlement as an universal model. However, he went on to say that he had often regretted not having taken Elizabeth’s counsel at the outset. But, having been advised to await the outcome of war [which was then expected to be brief], basing himself upon freedom of religion [proclaimed on 4 August 1589], and his claim to the throne, the good results demonstrated that it had been right not to abandon Jesus Christ. The victory [Ivry] was a miracle and demonstrated the might of God, especially to the catholics who were numerous in his army and had served him loyally. He now hoped to proceed to victory over Paris and Rouen, not least by the fear that his success had aroused. For the moment, he need only satisfy the duc de Longueville. He pressed the king harder than ever to convert, failing to consider that, after all that had happened, it was too late. Henry would be patient, awaiting the right moment to reveal his definitive purpose (‘mon parti definitif’) and make [Longueville] understand that he ought not to probe the conscience 118

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 124-9, 25 May 1590, Niccolini to the doge and senate. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xix (1867), 505-7, 15 March 1590, Henry IV to queen Elizabeth. The letter was found among the legate’s papers. 120 It appears, obscurely, that Longueville was dallying with the other side. Cugnoni, Ed., ‘Autobiografia di Santa Severina’, Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria, xiii (1890), 194; Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xix (1867), 505-7, 15 March 1590, Henry IV to queen Elizabeth. 119

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of him who gave everyone religious freedom [meaning himself]. Meanwhile, Henry was answerable only to God. He thanked the queen for her help, which was doubtless the real point, and expressed his wish to establish the reign of Jesus Christ in France. History did not reveal what Henry meant by the ‘parti definitif’, something which was never to materialise. Nor do we know what queen Elizabeth would have understood by this ‘explanation’ since the letter was intercepted. If it means anything, it would appear to be that Henry might have abjured upon his accession but that, not having done so then, he could not do so now, in the midst of the war – and especially not since the arrival of Caetani.121 Henry, therefore, was not going to convert and the clergy were not able to assemble – as much on account of the war as the attitude of the legate; the next, urgent step was the siege of Paris. Caetani and the Spanish maintained that Navarre had no intention of converting – anyway, he must on no account be received by the pope. The intercepted letter to queen Elizabeth therefore provided just the ammunition they required. Caetani had written that he would never consent to Navarre’s absolution; sooner than that, he would never again set foot in Rome so long as Sixtus lived.122 Luxembourg pressed for the legate’s recall. He demonstrated, also with intercepted letters, how Mendoza had praised Caetani to Philip II, whose orders he would observe minutely. Since the legate offered no hope, Luxembourg renewed his original request for a Papal envoy to be sent to the royalists, if not to Navarre himself, with whom negotiations could be conducted. Sixtus was noncommittal, at the same time exploiting Vendôme’s assurances in standing up to Olivares. Sixtus was acutely aware that Ivry had changed everything, and was probably embarrassed by Henry’s intercepted letter to queen Elizabeth. To Badoer, he condemned Caetani’s efforts to detach the royalists as untimely; he knew that Henry could not be expected to convert when, after a signal victory, his mind was on Paris [and Rouen] – though Sixtus did not quite put it that way. The legate, he said, had shown a lack of tact, as well as good will. Some of his arguments – for example that Philip II would never permit Navarre to reign – were certain to offend. Sixtus renewed his complaints against the legate who had disrupted all his plans; in fact, Olivares was every bit as much to blame for that. Now, Sixtus told Badoer, he would attend upon the march of events and make no decisions – which is what Olivares had already surmised. Nevertheless, Navarre still exhibited good intentions, and he must not be despaired of. In this way Sixtus encouraged the Venetians to believe in his continued support for Navarre, while Badoer, in turn, encouraged him to persevere therein.123

121

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 124-9, 25 May 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Hubner, Sixtequint, iii, 147-9, 426-8, 26 May 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate; Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 786-7 [31] May 1590, Onorato Caetani to the legate. 122 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 142-4, 412-14, [5 May] 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate. This must be an error for 25 May, since the letter referred to others from the legate of 26 and 29 April 1590, which could not have arrived by 5 May. 123 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 129-31, 2 June 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany, 138-9, 15-29 June 1590, analysis, Niccolini.


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VIII: The Death of ‘Charles X’ By the early summer of 1590, Sixtus V’s French policy had been both exposed and frustrated. No decisions had yet been taken when, on 2 June 1590, further news arrived which undermined the basis of all his endeavours so far: Bourbon, the puppet king, had died on 9 May. Now the fudged succession issue lay wide open; for Mayenne, the League, the pope and Spain, the death of Bourbon drastically changed their considerations, and greatly increased the pressure on Henry IV. The outcome of the siege of Paris – which lasted from May to September 1590 – became more critical than ever. The dispirited pope imagined that Bourbon might have survived, if only Caetani had used his money properly and secured his release. But, money or no money, Caetani could not have released Bourbon, because Mayenne had no interest in his liberation. Opinions varied as to what was likely to happen now. Niccolini and Badoer began to feel that Sixtus was cooling towards Navarre, no longer believing in his conversion.124 In other words, the prospect of Navarre’s conversion was no longer a useful card – according to Papal artifice – in seeking the release of Bourbon, the compromise catholic king. The pope had been playing a potentially dangerous game – only he knew that Navarre could not, and Mayenne would not, release the cardinal. Sixtus V had been running, to the point of exhaustion, in order to remain in the same place. Unnerved by the Spaniards’ threatening talk of a council, he was now at a loss, uncertain what to do. He could not trust the college of cardinals, and began to fear that he might, after all, be obliged to intervene in France. On 5 June 1590 Sixtus firmly refused Luxembourg’s entreaties to recall Caetani; he might, he said, have been able to do it a few weeks ago, but not any longer. Luxembourg inquired how the pope would react if Navarre sought absolution now that Bourbon was dead? Sixtus replied only vaguely that he did not think Navarre was so inclined.125 The news of the death of Bourbon coincided, on 2 June 1590, with Olivares’ Saturday audience. Consequently Sixtus discussed with him the now necessary choice of a catholic king. He proposed – not for the first time – that Olivares should write to Philip suggesting either Savoy or Lorraine. However, the Venetian, Antonio Giustiniano, who reported to Niccolini, thought this another example of the pope’s habitual deceit. Olivares also observed to Badoer that, by the time any answer arrived, the pope could say that it was too late to take action before the following year. Olivares could get little out of the pope; even to Badoer, he was opaque. Sixtus was plunged into perplexity. He was afraid to spend money, and he was nervous about the impending arrival of Sessa, asking everyone if they knew what [message] he was bringing. Suspecting that he was cornered, Sixtus’ anxiety was well founded.126 Philip II and Sessa certainly meant to hammer on Sixtus’ obligation to intervene in France. On 12 June 1590, Philip II replied to a duplicate of Sixtus’ letter of 8 or 9 March 1590, about the alliance mooted in December 1589, the original of which was lost in France. Philip was angry that Sixtus had queried the 124

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 132-7, 8-9 June 1590, analysis, Niccolini. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 132-7, 8-9 June 1590, analysis, Niccolini; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 150, 428-9, 9 June 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate, 165-8, 453-7, 19 June 1590, Olivares to Philip II. 126 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 162-4, 450-2, 12 June 1590, Philip II to Olivares. 125

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authenticity of his letter of 28 January 1590 on this matter. Philip claimed to have met the pope more than half way in respect of the proposed French campaign. He unwisely criticised the pontiff for dereliction of duty and for failing to order the royalist catholics to quit ‘Béarn’s’ service. The purpose of Olivares’ ‘protestation’, and of this letter, was the defence of the Church. For the rest, he referred the pope to Sessa. If this hectoring letter was ever received, it would assuredly not have relieved the ailing pontiff’s gnawing anxiety.127 To Sessa, on 15 July 1590, Philip II made some of the same points. He had good cause to be vexed when, having accepted the pope’s offer, it was then evaded. Sixtus had claimed (on 28 February 1590) to have sent the legate the monitorium desired by the Spanish against the royalist catholics. Yet the long sojourn of Luxembourg in Rome appeared to belie this, while ‘Béarn’ and the royalists boasted of his cordial reception. Sixtus’ conduct substantiated the rumour that he had given the legate secret instructions unfavourable to the catholics, since the delay [following the alleged monitorium of 7 March] in acting against the royalists was long, despite the urgency of the situation; and still the pope procrastinated.128 These were sharp points, tending to suggest that the monitorium was apocryphal. About the same time as sending Sessa to Rome to extort a Papal alliance, Philip II dispatched the duke of Feria to France to supervise the choice of a catholic king. His first exhortation to Feria was to ensure the exclusion of Navarre and – for the sake of form – the extirpation of heresy. Mayenne must be conciliated and induced to accept second place. For the election of the king, Philip preferred the ‘parlement’ to an estates-general. The claims of the infanta should be discreetly introduced but, as he had indicated all along, Philip also wanted other things. In particular, he wanted Cambrai, as well as hostage cities and ports, and he required reimbursement for his expenditure in France. These matters would be facilitated by the presence of Parma, whose forces would secure Paris. Feria was required to work with and through the legate, as well as Mendoza and Tassis.129 Sixtus’ reaction to the news of Bourbon’s death, and Luxembourg’s request for a Papal envoy to the royalists, was still to keep his options open. About the middle of June 1590, before the arrival of Sessa, he proposed in consistory to send a legate to Avignon – 127

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 155-62, 444-9, 15 July 1590, Philip II to Sessa. This indicates that Philip II believed in the report of Caetani’s monitorium of 7 March 1590 against the royalists, which the pope had failed to follow up with their excommunication. 128 Hubner, Sixte-quint. iii, 434-43, – June 1590, instructions in respect of France. Philip II was aware of the difficulty of stopping Navarre in arms and [failing Papal action] he instructed the legate and Mendoza to seek to bribe the royalists, for which he sent money. Ibid., 154-5, 443, 4 July 1590, Contarini to the doge and senate, from Spain. 129 At the time Bourbon was known to be ill, so the Sorbonne decree was a precaution against his death. L’Estoile, Journal du règne de Henri IV, i, 39; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 138-9, 15-29 June, analysis, Niccolini; Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 165-8, 453-7, 19 June 1590, Olivares to Philip II; Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 796-8, ?August 1590, Camillo Caetani to the legate; Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 403-5, 21 or 25 June 1590, Sixtus V to the dean of the Sorbonne. Pastor believed the Spanish to have been behind the Sorbonne action, presumably because Olivares’ third demand had still not been met.


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which might have been a more judicious arrangement in the first place – with whom Navarre and the royalists could treat. Sixtus also declared his intention of proceeding against the dean of the Sorbonne for issuing a comprehensive decree on 7 May 1590 debarring Navarre from the throne, even if he were to be absolved. This was an extremist precaution, multiplying the obstacles for Navarre on account of Bourbon’s frailty. Pellevé was excluded from the consistory for defending the Sorbonne, and Camillo Caetani was placed under house arrest.130 These assertive measures by the pope were doubtless intended to signal his aversion from the League, and perhaps as a warning to Sessa who arrived on 21 June.131 In his first audience, on 23 June 1590, Sessa may have been surprised to find the pope apparently well disposed towards Spain. Sessa and Olivares assessed the situation together and decided to ignore the continued presence of Luxembourg. He was now thought unlikely to achieve anything, and no longer posed a threat. That disposed of Olivares’ first demand. Warning the pope of the danger if Navarre were to triumph before Paris, Sessa told him, on 26 June, that he had come on account of the delays in implementing the agreement of December 1589. He was careful not to mention money, but urged the pope to use spiritual as well as temporal arms to detach the royalists from Navarre – Olivares’ second demand. Sixtus reaffirmed his resolve to fulfil the offer made by Gesualdo, pointing out that it had never been signed; and there was some disagreement over its extent. He complained to Sessa of Olivares’ ‘protestation’ and accused the Spanish of having neglected Mayenne. Although the pope could raise his contingent within two weeks – so he said – Sixtus began to temporise. He flatly refused to subsidise Mayenne, against whom he levelled a whole list of complaints; sooner than that, he would hurl his money into the Tiber. The legate, he claimed, had been instructed to warn Mayenne not to expect help from Rome, instead of which he had given him money. He had also been instructed to detach the royalists, but had failed to do so. Sixtus now invented the conceit that the royalists might, however, be moved [to shift their allegiance] by the appearance of a Spanish/Papal force under a neutral, foreign commander. Papal forces, therefore, would not go to support Mayenne or the League, but only to assist in establishing a catholic king – extraordinary sophistry. Sixtus would not, however, raise any forces without concluding and ratifying the capitulation – another device for ensuring that nothing could be done that year. Furthermore, he objected to Philip’s proposed strategy and suggested, instead, one great joint effort; but the objective was not defined. As for censures against the catholics, Sixtus was now firmly opposed to it, and for the same reason as before: he would not excommunicate the royalists under overt Spanish pressure.132 At other times Sixtus had said that the legate had orders to censure them. Now he said that it would be dangerous to push them to despair; they would sooner turn against the Papacy – meaning schism – than join Mayenne. If there were a force in France 130 Sixtus’ measure against the Sorbonne either coincided exactly with the arrival of Sessa on 21 June or came just a few days later. 131 Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 405-6, [27 June] 1590, Brumano to the duke of Mantua. 132 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 168-77, 457-66, 30 June 1590, Sessa to Philip II, 181-2, 473-4, 7 July 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate.

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to which they could safely rally, but refused to do so, that would be the time to issue censures. So, monitorium or no monitorium – the matter was, and remains, unclear – Sixtus would not proceed to excommunications. When Sessa persisted, he was silenced for his ignorant intrusion into the religious sphere. Having carefully specified unattainable conditions, Sixtus appointed two cardinals – Aragon and Santa Severina – to draft a capitulation together with the two ambassadors. He proposed that a king of France should be ‘nominated’ as soon as the army entered France, in which case he would accept the Spanish candidate. This point had already been conceded, in December 1589, but should not be taken at face value. Did he, for instance, by saying ‘king’, tacitly reserve the right to reject the infanta? Sixtus was now thought to be weakening, despite having devised quite sufficient obstacles to wreck the negotiation. Among other things, it had not been determined where the army would enter France, or for what purpose, who would ‘nominate’ a king, or how he could be imposed on the contending parties and the country.133 The negotiations began next day, 1 July 1590, amidst fears that the pope would find some pretext to break them off; the Spanish, on the other hand, hoped to have an army in the field by September. The same day Sixtus called a [?French] congregation to consider letters from the legate (no date or text). Caetani submitted that there was no [Bourbon] prince whose choice as king would satisfy public opinion. He rejected, each in turn, the relapsed king of Navarre, Vendôme (who favoured Navarre and was no soldier), Conti, Condé, Montpensier and his son, with no mention of Soissons. Savoy had offended by invading Saluzzo and, to the nobles, the house of Lorraine was foreign. Caetani stopped short of concluding that a Spanish candidate was the only remaining option. But assuredly the pope would not send an army to France in order to enthrone the infanta, and the only alternative to the infanta would appear to be Navarre. The congregation dispersed without any decision, and the pope was said to be exhausted.134 It was, Sessa believed, on account of their negotiation that, on 2 July 1590 Luxembourg sent a courier to France advising Navarre, so he claimed, to pre-empt the Spanish/Papal alliance by making a feigned conversion – never mind the fact that he was deeply preoccupied by the siege of Paris. But this was only an unconfirmed suspicion; Sessa, anyway, did not think Navarre was willing. According to Niccolini – who was probably mistaken – Sixtus had, by the same messenger, invited Navarre to send to Rome requesting absolution. This would be granted because the pope, hard pressed by Sessa and Olivares, would be obliged to make some decision; and he needed to know what to do. There were also those who thought that he would not do anything. Nevertheless, a gesture towards Navarre could make sense if, indeed, Sixtus had come to see him as the only 133

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 177-81, 466-73, 8 July 1590, Sessa to Philip II, 181-2, 473-4, 7 July 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate. 134 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 141-3, 7, 10 July 1590, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Hubner, Sixtequint, iii, 177-81, 466-73, 8 July 1590, Sessa to Philip II. It was the opinion of Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 365 that the pope now saw Navarre as the only possible king; in that case, he must be catholic and therefore encouraged to convert; this is too precise and too simplistic. Sixtus left paths open, he did not make decisions.


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plausible alternative to the infanta – and if he might be about to recover Paris. To the Spanish, however, Sixtus affirmed that he would not ‘rehabilitate’ Navarre, and would proceed very cautiously in respect of a simple absolution, ‘in foro conscientiae’; so they must have discussed the matter.135 The reservation that Sixtus would not ‘rehabilitate’ Navarre, was consistent with what he had always maintained, when under sufficient pressure, and may be accepted as true. If Henry of Navarre were to succeed before Paris, and then converted, he would obtain absolution. But recognition, which required ‘rehabilitation’, was quite another matter; that could only be the outcome of steely bargaining; the pope would definitely seek to impose all the old conditions of Papal policy. There was, however, a missing link in this equation: those in France who wanted Henry of Navarre to be their catholic king would know that he had been absolved, and might not understand or care about the ‘rehabilitation’. In the event, it all transpired a little differently.

IX: Sixtus V, Evasive to the End By mid-July 1590, talk in Rome was all about the Spanish/Papal capitulation; Badoer became anxious that Sixtus would finally be trapped. The now sick and dying pope tried to allay the Venetian’s fears – and perhaps also his own. The Spanish, he said dismissively, talked much but did little. He placed no faith in what they said, and believed their proposals to be impossible. He agreed with Badoer that if, by intervention, he were once to abandon his ‘neutrality’, he could never again recover it – a trenchant point. Despite well-informed opinion to the contrary, Badoer still had confidence that the pope would not easily accept the Spanish convention.136 The negotiations were troubled, and Sixtus insisted that the articles should not mention support for the League, to which many catholics were opposed. The purpose was declared to be the ‘liberation’ of the [royalist] catholics in order to choose a king, and to exterminate heresy. To these ends, the committee of ambassadors and cardinals had agreed upon articles which were to be binding upon the pope’s successors – did they perceive that Sixtus was dying? The agreement was for specified forces, under the duke of Urbino. He was to march within two months, and to remain in France either until a catholic king was crowned, or for up to one year. An article on the succession – about which the Spanish had no instructions – was relegated to a secret annex. The articles included provision for the execution of the Papal programme which Rome had long been trying to impose on France, in particular the decrees of Trent and an inquisition. The new king was always to include in his inner council prelates to a proportion of one third. It was specified that the choice of king must be made by election. Presumably that was to accommodate a tacit Papal reservation that –

135

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 182-5, 474-6, 14 July 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 185, 477-86, 19 July 1590, ‘projet de capitulation entre Sixte-quint et Philippe II’. It was not sent until 1 August 1590, ibid., 193-4, 498-9, 4 August 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate.

136

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if necessary and unavoidable – Navarre, converted, could be chosen. That he did not require election and would not admit the principle, was a stage too far.137 This curious document omitted a host of immediate, practical issues. Clearly it is useless to dispatch an army into a large country with only political objectives; nor is there any sign of logistical arrangements, despite the unrealistic length of time the forces were scheduled to remain in France. These things could be allowed to pass, thereby ensuring failure. It is certain that, following rumours of the increasing size of Navarre’s army, and even that Paris had surrendered, Sixtus once again awaited credible news from France; meanwhile he did not mean to commit himself.138 Consequently he presented the congregation with a fresh expedient, namely that, in the absence of a prince of the blood, it pertained to the Papacy to choose a new king. He gained a little more time, while awaiting the cardinals’ decision, but remained on a collision course with the Spanish. To Badoer, Sixtus spoke plainly: he did not want a league with Spain, but was pondering how to do something for France while avoiding leagues and huge expense. Badoer ventured to suggest that it would be difficult to expel the now powerful and victorious Navarre – deceptive appearances. Edging towards what he really wished to ascertain, Badoer inquired: and what if Navarre were now to abjure? Sixtus replied that he did not intend to exclude him, or anyone else. If Navarre abjured, the French would ‘elect’ him as their king and no one could do anything about it.139 In other words, if Navarre abjured, he would be absolved, and the rest would come later. Thus Sixtus, the politician, had evidently come to terms with what might be about to happen; and that, after all, might not be so bad for the Papacy. The cardinals, on the whole, supported the claim that it pertained to the Papacy to fill the throne of France. Consequently, Sixtus’ final device, as he wriggled on the Spanish hook, was a proposal to dispatch two cardinals to France. The Frenchman Séraphin, would go to the royalists – as Luxembourg had desired – and Borghese to the League and catholic cities. They should then seek to co-ordinate a [representative?] meeting of catholics from both sides, in order to elect a king; the pope agreed to support their decision. If, therefore, they were to elect Navarre, the pope could not be held responsible for that. While, on the face of it, this idea was less dotty than some, it overlooked the fact that both sides were immersed in the very terrible siege of Paris; a truce would be necessary in the first place, which neither Navarre nor Mayenne would consider. Furthermore, the outcome of the siege of Paris – one way or another – would cause an important shift of power. Possibly the proposal was not seriously intended, other than to consume more time. Nevertheless, the divided cardinals agreed to draft a memoir 137

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 143-5, 21, 24, 27, July 1590, analysis, Niccolini; Pastor, History of the Popes, xxi, 406, 28 July 1590, Brumano to the duke of Mantua. Olivares wrote to Mendoza on the same day, reporting the departure of Pellevé. He had ardently supported Mayenne as a candidate for the crown, insinuating that he might surrender to Spain all the more recently acquired provinces of France. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 191-2, 496-7, 28 July 1590, Olivares to Mendoza. 138 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 491-3, 28 July 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate. 139 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 193-4, 498-9, 4 August 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 145-6, 3-22 August 1590, analysis, Niccolini.


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expressing the pope’s desire to provide France with a catholic king, by alternative means [to war] and according to precedent – of which none was cited. In Rome, the heat was unbearable, tempers were rising, and Spanish troops had entered the Papal States – ostensibly on their way to Provence. The Spanish ambassadors finally dispatched their courier on 1 August 1590, bearing the still unsigned, draft capitulation. Clearly there could be no French campaign in 1590; to that extent, Sixtus V had succeeded.140 When, on 4 August 1590, the Spanish had their routine audience, Sixtus again employed his gagging tactics, of which Sessa bitterly complained. Sixtus launched into a long spiel about the harm Caetani had caused by ignoring his instructions. Sixtus declared those instructions to have emphasised the four main points. They were, the release of Bourbon, for which money had been provided; to obtain a meeting with the cardinals Vendôme and Lenoncourt, to detach them from Navarre upon pain of loss of rank; to summon the bishops and prelates, upon pain of demotion and, finally, to send for the royalists – ignoring the fact that they were neither an institution nor of one mind. If they refused, the legate could pronounce those censures permitted by his commission of legate a latere. If he could not execute these orders, he was to leave France. All this amounted to little more than detaching Navarre’s supporters and establishing Bourbon as king, certainly not to assisting the League, on an heroic scale, in the defence of Paris. Indeed, it is clear that Caetani should never have been sent to Paris in the first place. Mayenne, the pope continued, had done nothing to seek the liberation of Bourbon, but had extracted money from the legate, and demanded the right to present to benefices. The royalists could have no confidence in the legate, seeing that he favoured Mayenne; otherwise, Sixtus asserted unconvincingly, they would by now have abandoned Navarre. He then raked over the past, blaming the Guises for his own inability to settle the affairs of France under Henry III. Now it was necessary to act with more prudence. Before sending an army into France, they must ascertain how it would be received, and obtain a safe base for Urbino – which was sound common sense. So now, Sixtus ventured cautiously, revealing only part of his current plan, he meant to send an envoy to Mayenne and the ‘parlement’ of Paris, and to take ‘other’ necessary steps. But Sessa, already aware of Sixtus’ device, disconcertingly inquired what he hoped to gain by sending Séraphin to Navarre’s camp. That would be scandalous, and an insult to Philip II; neither would it detach Navarre’s followers. Thus circumvented, the moribund pope became dangerously angry, and another exchange of abuse ensued. The frustrated pope bellowed at the ambassadors that he was not a Spanish slave, not obliged to perform the king’s will, and not accountable to him. He charged Sessa, the military man, with intimidation, with meddling in religious matters of which he was ignorant, and of giving credence to street gossip... More calmly, Sixtus conceded that he would always be Philip’s ally, but he wished the ambassadors would leave him alone, and more or less told them to get out. The pope, Sessa concluded, would do nothing before receiving news from Paris.

140

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 194-202, 499-506, 7 August 1590, Sessa to Philip II.

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Nevertheless, they suspected that he was serious about sending two cardinals to France because their instructions were being prepared.141 Three days later, on 7 August 1590, Sixtus informed the congregation of the ambassadors’ opposition to his latest proposal. He made their opposition a pretext to send two cardinals – Santa Severina and Santi Quattro – to inform the Spaniards that if they refused to allow the pope to proceed in his own way, he would not send any forces to France. The cardinals admitted that this was an enabling device, whereby to blame the Spanish for the rupture of the negotiation. They also said it was absurd to expect Sixtus to spend money when he saw the world crumbling; but if he had not been pressed so hard, he might have sustained the catholic cause with spiritual measures.142 Most of August 1590 passed in nervous suspense and the exchange of invective. Overstressed, Sixtus became increasingly volatile and indiscreet, holding forth at table upon confidential matters, which were promptly retailed to Sessa. Sixtus found it understandable, for example, that Navarre declined to convert before he was [effectively] king of France; otherwise the Queen of England and the German protestants would abandon him, and the King of Spain would suck him like an egg (sic).143 Sixtus now disliked Sessa as much as Olivares and their final, disagreeable, audience on 19 August may well have hastened his death. The ambassadors required the pope to abandon his plan to send prelates to France and demanded that he fulfil his promises. They wanted a clear decision. Furious at this renewed dictation, Sixtus used such language that the ambassadors, who were ordered out, had no further desire to return; Spain and the Papacy were on the brink of rupture. Possibly mindful of the pope’s failing health, several cardinals complained of Sessa’s outrageous conduct. Not yet entirely beyond retaliation, Sixtus ridiculed ‘that lout’ (‘quel zotico’) Sessa, who insistently repeated ‘resoluzione padre santo, resoluzione padre santo’. He ended by commanding Pinelli to draft a bull condemning Spain for making religion a pretext for intervention in France, when their real purpose was to safeguard the Netherlands and to enmesh the pope for other reasons of state. All pretences having been scraped away, they were now down to basics. When he showed himself to be disinclined [to perform their will], they accused him of favouring heretics, and incited preachers to revile him. Furthermore, Philip II would be declared schismatic. If more temperate counsels might actually have prevailed, this order expressed the fact that Sixtus was ‘disgustatissimo’ with the Spanish, and likely to sever relations. The ambassadors, for their part, had sent two couriers to inform the king that the pope was resolved to do nothing, and requested instructions. Niccolini, however, had not yet despaired of a happy issue from so many afflictions. There must, he wrote, soon be news from Paris and, if Navarre entered the city and sent to Rome to request absolution (‘come si crede’), it was thought the Spaniards would leave; they could not be

141

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 194-202, 499-506, 7 August 1590, Sessa to Philip II. Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 203-5, 507-9, 22 August 1590, Sessa to Philip II. 143 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 205-6, 513, 25 August 1590 (1), Badoer to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 147-9, 22 August 1590, analysis, Niccolini. 142


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present when the absolution was pronounced. But, alas, Niccolini was still unaware of Parma’s invasion of France to raise the siege of Paris.144 Seething with anger and indignation, on 21 August 1590 Sixtus held his last congregation. He sent for the gouty and indisposed Aragon, knowing that he would oppose the mission to France of Séraphin, which Sixtus now wished to defer. Aragon obliged, on the grounds that Séraphin was a confidant of Navarre and would do nothing to detach the royalists. Sixtus, who no longer had detachment in mind, retorted that those who deplored the conversion of others, were very ill-disposed. If, Sixtus declared with dying abandon, Séraphin were to obtain the conversion of Navarre, he would receive a red hat. But, in Aragon’s opinion, Sixtus believed that Navarre delayed for fear of losing huguenot support. Besides, Spain, Mayenne and ‘the rest’ would not cease to be his enemies – which was absolutely to the point. In order to defer the dispatch of envoys to France, Aragon proposed waiting until after the siege of Paris – which could not be very long; Sixtus agreed with alacrity. Having elicited the response he required, Sixtus declared that he would not ‘rehabilitate’ the ‘prince of Béarn’, nor permit him to be king, as he had already said many times. What he had actually said was that he would not recognise Navarre. The observation, made for agreeable Spanish consumption, featured in Aragon’s report of the meeting, which Sessa sent to Spain. This reassurance would cost him nothing because the point was now academic; Sixtus had just heard of Parma’s entry into France. Before the congregation dispersed, Sixtus informed the cardinals of this development; he now hoped that the Spanish would no longer require Urbino to go to France. Two days later, Sixtus V was dangerously ill. The Spanish held their courier until, on 27 August 1590 they could report, with not one conventional syllable of regret, that Sixtus V had been ‘swept away’ – and without confessing; that was a duty he had long neglected. Now all their concern was fixed on obtaining a more compliant successor. While, in Rome and Madrid, the Spanish openly rejoiced, Badoer lamented that Sixtus’ death left ‘tous les bons’ [the opponents of Spain] in a state of great anxiety; despite his severity, he had been a friend to Venice. Sixtus V – who died on the very day that Parma’s army entered Meaux – never had to hear of the Spanish relief of Paris; that could have rendered the odious Spanish alliance inescapable.145

144

Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 203-5, 507-9, 22 August 1590, Sessa to Philip II, 205, 509-12, Aragon’s report on the congregation of 21 August 1590, 206-8, 514-16, 25 August 1590 (2), Badoer to the doge and senate. 145 Hubner, Sixte-quint, iii, 209, 516, 27 August 1590, Olivares to Philip II, 209, 516-17, 27 August 1590, Sessa to Idiaquez, 210, 517-18, 27 August 1590, Badoer to the doge and senate, 211, 518, 22 September 1590, Contarini to the doge and senate.

CHAPTER X: THE IMPORTANCE OF PARIS I: Caetani and the Royalists While the frantic struggle evolved in Rome, Henry IV proceeded from the field of Ivry, in March 1590, to prepare the siege of Paris. The battle of Ivry had been a signal victory for the king, which left Mayenne wholly dependent upon Spanish help; without it, he was already defeated. But help, which had to come from Parma and the Netherlands, was precarious and unpredictable. Parma himself was painfully conscious of the folly of Philip II’s new enterprise of France; it overstretched the capacities of Spain and drove the duke to near despair. Besides, prince Maurice of Nassau had recently assumed the offensive in the Netherlands, challenging Parma’s successful advance. Parma was distressed by the fall of Breda on 4 March 1590, and countermanded forces that were destined for France.1 If support for the League was precarious, support for the king was equally uncertain. While Henry’s victory averted his overthrow and enhanced his prestige, not least in Rome, it did not otherwise bring him much concrete advantage; rather it confirmed the active opposition of the King of Spain. Some contemporaries imagined that Henry could have taken Paris forthwith. But he was left with only a small force of about 11,000 men; the weather was bad; he lacked money, munitions and the artillery necessary for a siege, and his Swiss contingent mutinied. Biron, head of the king’s council, is said to have opposed proceeding to Paris, but whether this was good sense or betrayal is unclear. Some royalists – and Biron was probably one of them – were reluctant to see the king victorious because they wanted him to convert before he entered Paris. But, as Henry had explained to queen Elizabeth, he was neither prepared to do so then, nor to the dictation of others.2 So Henry went to Rosny and Mantes on the Seine; during the following weeks, he seized a substantial number of small towns on the river systems around Paris. By May, the city was under blockade, her essential supplies cut off. Lilley, who faithfully followed the king, believed that this strategy would work, and that Paris could not hold out; the enemy also feared as much. So the legate imposed a new oath to resist the king, and known moderates in Paris were persecuted.3 1

Breda, the Orange family seat, captured by Maurice on 4 March 1590, was the first major town to be seized by the rebels since 1580. Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 228; Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 115-16; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 474-5, 14 March 1590, Parma to Philip II, 491, 20 May 1590, Philip II to Parma. Philip II stressed, on this and other occasions, that France was now his principal concern. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, pp. 341-2. 2 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 235-6, blamed François d’O, Biron and the ‘intendants’ of the army for the king’s inability to besiege Paris. While he is not the only one to accuse Biron of treachery, then and at Rouen in 1592, it is far from sure that Navarre really wished to attack Paris; to describe him as ‘paralysed’ in March 1590 sounds like an exaggeration. Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 255; Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 99, says it was thought that armed victory over Paris might reduce the likelihood of Navarre’s conversion. Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 28. 3 Upon the fall of Corbeil, there was a protest assembly in Paris, whereupon the ‘prévôt des marchands’ and ecclesiastics threatened to burn the demonstrators’ houses. This was how Paris was obliged to resist. Lists and

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Vanquished by the royalists, Mayenne was battered in his prestige and largely bereft of forces. After the battle he slunk away to Mantes – which shortly fell to the king – and on to Saint-Denis. There, on 18 March 1590, he held a council at which Mendoza, Moreo, Épinac, Nemours and the legate were all present, in order to determine future policy.4 Although Mayenne was not naturally pro-Spanish – since his interests and those of Spain never coincided – it was only from Spain that help could come; and that would have its price. Together, the councillors produced an emergency plan. Mayenne would remain in the field and reassemble forces for the League; Nemours and Épinac were to organise the defence and supply of Paris and assure the fidelity of the people, while the legate was to undertake negotiations with the enemy, in the hope of arresting their advance and unsettling the royalist catholics. Mayenne himself moved on to Soissons on 20 March, henceforth avoiding any part in the defence of Paris. Moreo, Pietro Caetani and Carondelet went to the Netherlands to report to Parma on the calamity of Ivry, and to plead for his help. They were followed by a succession of increasingly pressing supplicants.5 From Soissons, on 20 March 1590, Mayenne wrote the pope a pleading letter which, it has already been seen, infuriated Sixtus V.6 Mayenne also wrote to Philip II, on 22 March, and sent his secretary, Rossieux, to join Tassis in Spain. Anxious about how Philip II might react to his defeat, and the death of Egmont, Mayenne pleaded that he had fought under his authority, and by his means. He claimed to have been under pressure either to fight or to make peace; the Swiss, who were unpaid, otherwise threatened to quit. They had, Mayenne said, been paid by the legate, contrary to his instructions, while the reiters were also about to mutiny. Had he succeeded at Ivry, it would have been a decisive coup. Instead, the enemy was about to converge upon Paris, while Mayenne was paralysed by lack of money; their only hope lay in Spain.7 Tassis and Rossieux evidently left Madrid on 5 May 1590, bringing with them 800,000 écus and credit for one million in

Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, pp. 285, 286, 5 April 1590, Mendoza to Philip II, intercepted, gave Paris only a month; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 327 seq. 4 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 275, 27 February/9 March 1590, Lilley to Walsingham, 477, 20/30 March 1590, Lilley to Walsingham; Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 385; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 27-8. 5 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 476-7, 24 March 1590, Parma to Philip II, 482, 4 April 1590, Parma to Philip II. Parma thought the disastrous battle ought to have been avoided. Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 346-7; Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 233-4; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 31; Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 384-5. 6 Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 250-1; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 621. After the conference at SaintDenis, Caetani informed Montalto that Paris was supplied for six weeks, but he gave different figures to different people according to what he wished them to believe. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xix (1867), 516-20, 4 May 1590, the legate to Camillo Caetani. 7 Rossieux evidently joined Tassis, whose movements are difficult to track. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 342; CSPVen., 1581-91, p. 485, 11 April 1590, Contarini to the doge and senate; de Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 401-5, 22 March 1590, Mayenne to Philip II.

Chapter X: The Importance of Paris

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gold; and Tassis carried further orders for Parma to enter France forthwith.8 Alarmed by royalist successes around Paris, Mayenne renewed his pleas to Parma, on 12 April. From Soissons, he protested that he was gathering all the forces he could, constantly sending men to Paris, and sustaining their morale.9 The legate added his entreaties, fearing that Paris could not hold out; the Parisians themselves bluntly demanded a force of 20,00025,000 men. Some time in May, Moreo conducted a small contingent to Paris from the Netherlands, while Mayenne went to Cambrai to urge the governor, Balagny, to yield the town to Spain; that was the measure of his desperation. Parma, it seems, was still demanding the cession of hostage and refuge towns which Mayenne was largely powerless to deliver. Balagny refused, and Mayenne returned to Péronne in Picardy. It was at this point that he received the news of the death, on 9 May 1590, of the cardinal de Bourbon. This highly significant development threw everything into confusion.10 The danger to Paris, after the battle of Ivry, had led to the decision – at Saint-Denis on 18 or 19 March – to send the legate to seek a meeting with Biron. This encounter took place at Noisy, on 26 March 1590, in the house of Albert de Gondi, brother of Pierre, the cardinal bishop of Paris; he was already involved in a peace initiative, together with Jeannin and Villeroy. The meeting with Biron had some advantage for Caetani who was meant to be trying to detach the royalists from the king. Now, fearing that Navarre would shortly control the Seine and reduce Paris to extremity, he told Biron that he ought not to be serving Navarre in the hope of his conversion. He proposed both a truce, to arrest the progress of the king, and an estates-general, presumably for all the catholics to elect a catholic king. After long discussions, it was therefore decided by the royalists to make one more effort to induce Henry to convert, which is what Villeroy was simultaneously urging. Biron said that if the king refused, he would inform the nobles of the legate’s desire for an estates-general – which was something approaching blackmail. But, after a month of silence, during which Henry tightened his grip on Paris, Caetani sent the bishop of Ceneda (Marc-Antonio Mocenigo) to meet Biron. This was a choice Caetani quickly regretted since Ceneda was a Venetian, and did not share the legate’s assumptions.11 Caetani’s main purpose was to avert disaster in Paris, fearing that Spain would send the League only minimal forces. To Camillo, he suggested 3,000 foot plus 600 horse, without any mention of Parma.12 Up until then, Caetani declared (in Ceneda’s instructions), he 8 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 343, 25 May/4 June 1590, Châteaumartin, an agent in Bayonne, to Walsingham. The money, if this was true, was presumably for Parma, not Mayenne. Money sent to Parma is said to have been embezzled by Moreo, who died in August 1590. Essen, Parma, 296. 9 De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 407-8, 12 April 1590, Mayenne to Parma. Early in April 1590, Mendoza did not give Paris more than a month. The legate was roughly in agreement, and this was known from intercepted letters. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 286, 5/15 April 1590, Lilley to Walsingham, 286, 2/12 April 1590, Buzanval to Walsingham. 10 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 289. Moreo was said to have brought 3,000 foot plus 800-900 horse. 11 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xix (1867), 514-16, 23 April 1590, instructions for Ceneda; Nouaillac, ‘La Fin de la Ligue’, Revue Henri IV, i (1905), 54-7. 12 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xix (1867), 516-20, 4 May 1590, the legate to Camillo Caetani.

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had prevented the principal fortresses from accepting Spanish garrisons, but he would do so no longer. It is not clear to what, if anything, that referred. Through Ceneda the legate again called upon Biron either to abandon the king, or to obtain a truce, requiring an answer within a week. Ceneda was neither to accord Navarre his regal titles nor to discuss the matter of conversion, for which the legate had no commission. For that Navarre must apply to the pope and, since it would be a lengthy procedure, there was all the more need for a truce. Failing that, Caetani proposed to do everything he could to seek foreign help, hinting that the pope could employ both spiritual and temporal arms. These negotiations and the warning in Ceneda’s instructions suggest that Caetani had not – as was declared in Rome – already launched a monitorium against the nobles on 7 March 1590. If Biron could not be induced to propose a truce, Ceneda must do so himself, in the name of the legate, in order to summon an estates-general, but making it clear that he was not seeking peace. Ceneda embarrassed the legate by agreeing to go from Provins to Bray, without reflecting that Henry was there, with whom Caetani had been careful to avoid any contact. Ceneda, it appears, did desire Henry’s conversion, which would be very welcome in Venice; carried away by the attentions of the nobles, he declared that if Henry abjured, he would immediately be king of France – which was quite outside the legate’s competence. Ceneda also said mass for all the nobles at court, extending the first comfort they had received. Why, then, was there such an uproar in Rome about a fresh monitorium and excommunication? If one such solemn declaration [1585] was so ineffective, would a repetition be any different? Perhaps Sixtus V had indeed reflected that the politicisation of spiritual sanctions had only brought them into disrepute. When Ceneda twice declined to see the king, an ‘accidental’ meeting was contrived. Henry voiced his complaints against the legate who had mistreated him, contrary to the wishes of the pope. Henry allegedly showed the bishop over a hundred intercepted letters written by the legate which revealed his partiality for Spain.13 Caetani was embarrassed by Ceneda’s indiscretions, both in respect of Rome, and of Mayenne who became suspicious. However, Caetani persuaded himself that no one would hold him responsible for an appeal to the king delivered in the hunting field. Ceneda returned, after about a week, with neither decision nor reply; and that was the end of Caetani’s brief relations with the royalists. The pope, he said, had so completely tied his hands that the royalists remained undisturbed by his threats; they believed that his efforts to detach them were contrary to his instructions. Discouraged, abandoned, and anxious, Caetani wished to withdraw to Amiens or, better still, to be recalled. Instead, he stayed on in Paris to assist Mendoza, the Seize and the preachers to bludgeon and deceive the Parisians into resisting the king’s blockade from May to the end of August, until the arrival of Parma; that was at the last possible moment.14 13

Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 266. The legate did complain that his dispatches were intercepted, though the number seems rather high. In one letter to Philip II Caetani is said to have promised to stay [in Paris] and do everything possible to increase Philip’s power in France. Mendoza is said to have praised the legate to the king and requested a pension for him and his secretary; certainly the legation had been financially ruinous. 14 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xix (1867), 516-20, 4 May 1590, the legate to Camillo Caetani; Tempesti, Sisto-Quinto, ii, 254-5, offers a different version of the meeting with Biron. He


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II: The Peacemakers Unlike the legate, cardinal de Gondi genuinely desired peace. He was in constant touch with Villeroy, and Mayenne’s servant Pierre Jeannin, both of whom wanted peace. Villeroy, semi-detached from the League, and semi-independent, had already made two bids for peace: firstly in August 1589, and again after the battle of Arques, in September. He possibly hoped to prepare and establish a working set of articles which some reverse of fortune might suddenly render acceptable. The more he worked at it, the more able he would be to seize an opportunity, if one arose, and the more likely he would be to extract commitments. Like the royalists – which, at heart, he was – Villeroy had placed hopes in the legate. He had shown Caetani his ‘avis’ of January 1590, addressed to Mayenne. Then he realised with deep disappointment that the legate would neither assist them to make peace, nor to obtain the conversion of the king. Villeroy refused the renewed oath of Union, administered by the legate on 11 March 1590. He left for home on 15 March, and almost immediately learnt of the battle of Ivry. That, maybe, would offer a fresh opportunity. Mayenne had taken Villeroy’s ‘avis’ in good part. It supported other advice that he should call upon Navarre to abjure, and then to recognise him. That was what the good, patriotic, catholic moderates really desired. Villeroy was afraid that Mayenne would now become formally committed to Spain; he and Jeannin made strenuous efforts, at this time and later, to frustrate such a disaster which might be irreversible.15 It was Jeannin who begged Villeroy to launch a peace initiative; he believed that Mayenne was not entirely unamenable, after having heard the Spanish terms for an extended alliance. Thinking the time auspicious, as he did at every major turning point, Villeroy joined Mayenne’s conference at Saint-Denis on 18-20 March 1590. But, whereas Mayenne had previously appeared well disposed, the battle had changed his attitude. Now he breathed only revenge, and that was dangerous; Spain could exploit his vulnerability by stiffening her terms even more. Gondi, Villeroy and Jeannin had been planning to see the king. Upon Gondi’s insistence, Villeroy agreed to meet Duplessis-Mornay at Soindres, near Mantes. That meeting took place on 26 March while, in a contrary sense, the legate worked on Biron at Noisy. Villeroy was convinced, then and always, that Henry could only master France if he converted. To do so now, Villeroy argued, could consolidate his victory and win general catholic support; otherwise the League must become doubly dependent upon Spain. To Villeroy, Navarre’s various pronouncements amounted – constructively – to an undertaking to convert, when the time was right; and Villeroy thought that time had come.16 Probably Sixtus V would not then have refused a simple maintained that Biron had a commission from Vendôme, with the king’s consent, to invite the legate to a meeting, in order to get him out of Paris before the siege began. While this appears to be consistent with a letter of Vendôme to Luxembourg, Navarre said that Biron received a brief from the legate. Hubner, Sixtequint, iii, 129-30, 396-7, 6 April 1590, Vendôme to Luxembourg. Vendôme said that when they had taken Paris, it might prove easier to work with the legate. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 183-4, 25 March 1590, Henry IV to Luxembourg, Mantes. 15 It was, of course, impossible to obviate negotiations with the Spanish but Jeannin tried to ensure that Mayenne’s terms were unacceptable. 16 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 151-65.

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absolution, sufficient to satisfy those not versed in canonical technicalities. Navarre, however, steadily demanded recognition and submission first of all; he had to avoid the stigma of opportunism, as well as the danger of falling between two stools. There can be no doubt that the legate – and the pope – were right in supposing that Navarre had no intention of abjuring just then, not least since he actually underestimated the difficulty of taking Paris. Had Henry succeeded before Paris, his position would have been entirely different: then, acclaimed rather than condemned, he might think of abjuring as an act of grace – although Villeroy never pushed his arguments to the point of considering the difficulties involved. Meanwhile Mayenne would not recognise the unconverted king because, so long as he remained a protestant, Mayenne would continue to cherish his own regal ambitions. This was a deadlock situation. If Mayenne now refused to consider peace, then the king would blockade Paris; and, if Paris fell, other cities would submit; that would be even worse for Mayenne than his defeat in the field. The stakes could not have been higher. Nothing daunted, Villeroy went to see Mayenne at Soissons, assured of his welcome back at court if he returned with a ‘pouvoir’ to negotiate. Anxious, ill, and discouraged, Mayenne allowed Villeroy to return, albeit without instructions. On 13 April 1591 at Melun, Villeroy told the king that if he abjured, Mayenne and his followers would recognise him, and treat for peace. This was just the type of parlous situation that Villeroy always hoped might suddenly be turned to advantage. But Mayenne, of course, meant nothing of the kind, and had already reassured Mendoza. The apparent concession was a useful ploy for putting pressure on both the king and the Spanish simultaneously.17 Henry, no less familiar with the rules of the game, repeated that he would take instruction ‘avec le temps’, but not under duress. He would yield to the truth and the desire of his subjects, Villeroy later recalled, but he must be instructed in a proper way. Villeroy proposed that Henry should, forthwith, summon prelates and theologians; Henry replied that he would consult his advisers. In fact he called Mayenne’s bluff by requesting authorized deputies, since Villeroy had no ‘pouvoir’. Villeroy replied that Mayenne could not send deputies on his sole authority; and a truce and passports would be necessary if he was to consult his party. Villeroy warned Biron against supposing that Paris could easily be taken. The ‘zélés’, he said, had put pressure on Mayenne who had decided to call an estates-general; he had also won over the seigneurs of Picardy in his efforts to qualify for Parma’s help. Henry sent Villeroy back to Mayenne to say that he would gladly embrace all his subjects, and would treat Mayenne well if he co-operated in making peace. That was what Henry IV always said, and that was what he finally did. Villeroy, who rejoined Mayenne in Picardy, felt that the king had lost a great opportunity because once Parma entered France – as Villeroy expected, albeit with regret – the situation would have changed to one of open war with Spain. Circumstances were drastically changed, in any case, by the death of the cardinal de Bourbon on 9 May 1590.18 Henceforth, the 17

Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 162, 165-6; de Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 406-7, 3 April 1590, Mayenne to Mendoza. 18 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat, (edn. Petitot, xliv), 173-85; Nouaillac, ‘La Fin de la Ligue’, Revue Henri IV, i (1905), 57-8.


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succession became the unavoidable, central issue, upon which the Spanish and Mayenne were essentially at odds, yet both in opposition to Henry IV. The future depended, in the first place, upon the outcome of the siege of Paris.

III: Parma and Mayenne By this time, early in May 1590, Henry had recovered places and bridges on the Seine from Troyes to Rouen, and on the Yonne from Sens to Montereau; he was briefly optimistic that he might soon be truly king despite – it has been seen – a new decree from the Sorbonne of 7 May 1590, excluding him whether he abjured or not.19 Now the death of Bourbon raised the spectre of a genuine rival for the throne. At the same time it opened the way for Mayenne while, paradoxically, increasing his dependence upon Spain.20 Mayenne renewed his requests to Philip II and the secretary Idiaquez for speedy help, and sent for Moreo; he dispatched Jeannin and Roland (an ‘échevin’ of Paris) to the Netherlands to request a meeting with Parma, and to beg him to come to France.21 Mayenne himself then made a dash for the frontier in a bid to see Parma personally. Their previous efforts to reach an agreement had failed, and Parma was awaiting the return from Spain of Richardot and Tassis; besides, he was seriously ill, and about to withdraw to Spa. He earnestly desired to keep out of the French entanglement, for which he had neither the strength nor the means. Parma believed his forces to be inadequate to face Navarre, and there was considerable pressure on him in the Netherlands to disregard the king’s unreasonable demands. At this point Parma received a batch of letters from Philip II by which he was again ordered into France, albeit with no instructions on the succession which Richardot and Tassis were to bring.22 Parma therefore consented to meet Mayenne in Hainault (between 20 and 24 May). They discussed the plight of Paris and how best to save the city, the means of providing overall help (‘secours d’ensemble’) and the election of a new king, a sensitive item for them both.23 While there is no sign that Parma had yet made any personal commitment, it 19 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 462-70; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 193-4, 14 May 1590, Henry IV to madame de Grammont. Navarre added, to his mistress, that he was ageing rapidly and was dogged by would-be assassins. The Sorbonne decree was a reaction to the moderates’ desire for peace and, according to Wolfe, was meant to prepare the League for the possible surrender of Paris without ending the war. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 269; Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 98. 20 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, pp. 342-3. It appears that there was no available commander prepared to serve in France. Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, iv, 29, 10 May 1590, Mayenne to Philip II; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 492-3, 20 May 1590, Parma to Philip II. 21 Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, iv, 29, 10 May 1590, Mayenne to Philip II; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 492-3, 20 May 1590, Parma to Philip II. 22 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 490, 12 May 1590, Parma to Renty, governor of Hainault, 491, 20 May 1590, Philip II to Parma, 492-3, 20 May 1590, Parma to Philip II. Parma had received letters from the king of 30 March, 4 and 16 April 1590. That of 4 April, and others of 29 April and 20 May 1590 also ordered Parma to France. Ibid., 498, 1 June 1590, Parma to Philip II, Spa; Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, iv, 47, 3 May 1590, instructions for Tassis; Essen, Parma, 284-6. 23 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 496, 24 May 1590, Parma to Philip II, 497-8, 1 June 1590, Parma to Philip II, 498, 1 June 1597 (2), Parma to Philip II.

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was the coincidence of the death of Bourbon with the beginning of the siege of Paris, far more than the battle of Ivry, which eventually took Parma into France. Yet, on account of the immense difficulties he experienced and the damage to other Spanish interests, it was actually touch and go until late in July 1590 whether Parma himself would invade France. If Ivry had been sufficient to convince Philip II that Parma must forsake the Netherlands, now his presence and his army were even more urgently required in France to ensure the promotion of an acceptable catholic king, dependent upon Spain. Richardot had returned – and, presumably Tassis – by 22 June while Parma was ill at Spa.24 He was so dismayed by their instructions that he again desired his recall, thereby to escape the risk of disaster in France. But his recall had already been discussed and rejected. Thereafter Philip II would receive neither facts nor advice; he had made up his mind. So Parma was faced with a terrible choice. Would he obey, against the dictates of reason, experience and judgement, or would he defy the king?25 His case was undermined by Moreo, who irresponsibly assured the king that Parma could have mastered France. So, with foreboding and a leaden heart, Parma realised what he must do; he returned from Spa to Brussels on 9 July 1590 to prepare for France.26

IV: The Siege of Paris While Mayenne pleaded, and Parma hedged, Henry sustained the blockade of Paris. In mid-June 1590, he hoped to intercept Mayenne on his way to Paris but, anxious to avoid a battle, Mayenne took refuge in Laon.27 Sometime late in May, and upon pretext of seeking peace, passports were requested from the royalists for Épinac, Vitry, Brigard and others to visit Mayenne, ostensibly to declare that unless he now made peace, they would look to their own interests. But, from intercepted letters, Henry discovered their real purpose; they meant to assure Mayenne that they would resist unto death, provided he discussed ways of raising the siege and promised to bring help; they may also have intended to bring jewels and plate. For this reason, and because Mayenne had gone to the Netherlands to seek Spanish help, Henry cancelled the passports and launched a direct appeal to Paris. He expressed his good will towards the inhabitants, and denounced the help they were promised as purely imaginary. If Mayenne succeeded in anything, it 24

Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 502, 22 June 1590, Moreo to Philip II. Essen, Parma, 289. 26 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 502, 22 June 1590, Moreo to Philip II. Moreo asserted that Parma had refused to execute his orders and that the help destined for France would arrive too late, if at all. Already on 24 June 1590, pp. 503-4, Philip II peremptorily demanded of Parma action, not words. Some forces were sent to Mayenne under Camillo Capizucchi. Ibid., 503, 24 June 1590, Parma to Philip II, Spa, 504, 24 June 1590, Parma to Philip II, 505-6, 26 June 1590, Parma to Philip II, 510, 21 July 1590 (3), Parma to Philip II. In this letter Parma said that he had sent Antonio de Zuñiga with forces to Mayenne, to join others already there; Colalto with 4,000 had already gone. 27 Dufour, Ed., Histoire du siège de Paris, 204, places this excursion between 14 and 16 June. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 408-9, 24 June 1590, Mayenne to Moreo, said that Paris would be lost if not relieved within a week. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 208, 22 June 1590, Henry IV to Canisy; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 638-9. 25


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would be to deliver them into the hands of Spain. They need not fear the king’s vengeance, or that he would interfere with their religion. But, if they refused to heed him, they must suffer the consequences. These letters are said to have been suppressed by Nemours, the ‘prévôt’, and a few others, while the ‘parlement’ forbade any negotiation with Navarre.28 His appeal, therefore, was never heard. As famine began to grip the city and living conditions became atrocious, the legate made a further effort to gain time. Épinac and Caetani met the legate’s kinsman, Pisani, in a Gondi house in the ‘faubourg’ Saint-Germain on 7 July 1590. Caetani is said to have called for the king’s conversion and proposed a truce, during which the pope should be the arbiter of the succession. This absurdity can only have been a ploy by which to demonstrate that Henry did not mean to convert. Indeed, Pisani replied that, first of all, Henry wished to master Paris.29 On 9 July he took the northern suburb of Saint-Denis, granting honourable terms which were doubtless intended to reassure the Parisians. Lilley described the people there as ‘very lean and imbecile of body’ for want of food. Little, however, was made of the king’s recent, disastrous loss of Meaux, a city of critical importance on the Marne to the east of Paris.30 By this time the Parisians had only bread, made from oats, and a kind of gruel dispensed to the poorest by Mendoza. Tension was mounting between those who were inclined to treat with the king and those – who were better fed – who meant to hold out. Lilley reported, on 16 July 1590, that the ‘whole body of the populace’ had protested that they would kill the chiefs of the League – some 140 men – and yield to the king unless they were promptly relieved.31 Henry became increasingly hopeful that he might detach Paris from the League and force a separate surrender of the city. That would isolate Mayenne, and leave the Spanish exposed and uncertain. By mid-July Henry was aware that Mayenne’s forces, which he estimated at 18,000 plus 3,000 horse, were nearly ready.32 So, on 16 July, Henry again wrote to the Parisians. Although he had already assured them of his good will (only the letter was suppressed), he disposed of all the necessary means to seize Paris by force. But, mindful of their plight and their sufferings, he extended this further opportunity to accept his offers. He knew that they had constantly been made to fear for their religion which, in fact, he had carefully protected. He invited 28 Franklin, Journal du siège de Paris, 167; Dufour, Ed., Histoire du siège de Paris, 205. At this time a council of ten was established in each quartier to attend to the problems of food, alms and public order caused by the siege. Ibid., 206. Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 394; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 203-5, 15 June 1590, Henry IV to the people of Paris; de Thou, Histoire Universelle, vii, 645-6. 29 Pisani had married Caetani’s niece. Franklin, Ed., Journal du siège de Paris, 169, said that Caetani hoped Pisani might have news from Rome. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 232, 3/13 July 1590, Henry IV to Beauvoir; Nouaillac, ‘La Fin de la Ligue’, Revue Henri IV, i (1905), 70; Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 260-1; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 652. 30 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 233-4, 4/14 July 1590, Lilley to Stafford, 234, 18/28 June [?July] 1590, news from Brussels. Meaux was taken by Saint-Paul sometime late in June. 31 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 282-8, c. end October 1590, Henry IV to Beauvoir; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 232-3, 6/16 July 1590, Lilley to Stafford. Lilley said that ‘all manner of vile provisions’ were extremely dear. 32 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 216, 15 July 1590, Henry IV to madame de Grammont. He said that the Spanish – namely forces sent by Parma – would join ‘the fat duke’ on 17 July.

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them to send him deputies and he would reassure them; wiser counsels might then prevail. Otherwise, Henry hinted, Paris was likely to be sacked. To Nemours, Navarre was quite explicit. He begged the governor not to resist any longer, in the vain hope of non-existent succour because, if he had to proceed by force, he would be unable to control his army. In any case, the help Nemours expected could not reach Paris without interception and battle; before risking that again, he cautioned Mayenne to remember Ivry. Mayenne had lost when he was the stronger, and now he was the weaker. But, if the king were in fact to lose, Paris would fall under the domination of Spain.33 In anticipation of the battle he earnestly desired, Henry had assembled what he claimed to be a finer company of nobility than had been seen in thirty years, plus upwards of 3,000 gentlemen. Clearly Henry was reckoning entirely without Parma, whose advent had not been confirmed. Lilley also reported that Mayenne was thought to be too weak to give battle and would have to wait for Parma; but he had no knowledge of that. Parma’s movements and intentions were the subject of widely differing reports and rumours.34 Between the utter desperation of the city, and his expectation of a battle, Navarre did not expect to lose Paris. It was probably not until Mayenne received Parma’s letter of 21 July 1590 that he knew, for anything like certain, that Parma would really come. Parma claimed to have done everything possible to help the League since receiving Mayenne’s letters of 13 and 18 May, after the death of Bourbon. Nevertheless, he authorized Mayenne to notify the Parisians of his coming. Mayenne could expect him on 15 August; meanwhile he should avoid battle. Nevertheless, Parma still required the cession of certain towns – Montreuil, Abbeville, Amiens and Péronne – to guarantee his passage, and he inquired what itinerary he should follow.35 It was very late in time to be disputing the terms of their agreement; but, despite his now clear commitment, Parma still had grave reservations. He confirmed his submission and obedience to Philip, while pointing out that the forces he had sent to France were sufficient to oppose Navarre – provided Mayenne avoided a battle. Parma had evidently been hoping that he had done enough, and need not go in person. He resented being forced to hazard his reputation by entering France without any prospect of success, and dependent upon men of uncertain loyalty; nor could he hold the Netherlands 33

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 216-18, 16 July 1590, Henry IV to Paris, 226, c. 20 July 1590, Henry IV to Nemours. It is uncertain whether Navarre wrote this letter to Nemours late in July or early in August; the former seems more likely but de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 656, placed it in early August. Dufour identified this undated letter with one of 26 August 1590, mentioned by the anonymous author of the Histoire du siège de Paris, 253. Dufour is clearly mistaken since the letter states that there was no sign of the help Nemours expected whereas, by 26 August, Parma was at Meaux. Nor is it plausible that Navarre would write to urge Nemours to surrender when Parma and his army were only a few miles away. 34 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 227-9, 22 July 1590, Henry IV to Montmorency, Saint-Denis; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 234, 22 July/1 August 1590, Lovell to Killigrew, from Bergen-op-Zoom. Lovell said that Mayenne was at Soissons awaiting forces from the Netherlands. Ibid., 234, 4/14 July 1590, Lilley to Stafford, 234, 24 July/3 August 1590, Lilley to Stafford, Saint-Denis. 35 It is not clear what answer Parma received, but the French assurances in respect of the towns were not satisfactory. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 511, 21 July 1590, Parma to Mayenne, 512-14, 22 July 1590, Parma to Philip II; Essen, Parma, 289.


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on the defensive – as Philip II required – when the enemy commanded the sea and the rivers. Those were the sort of facts that Philip II elected not to contemplate. Parma sought to explain the requisite circumstances if he were to confront ‘Béarn’ in France, hinting that Paris might well have fallen before that encounter. As things were, he would be exposing his army to unjustifiable risk. He was blamed for proposing to leave the Netherlands; he was blamed for not being in France, and he was blamed for the likely fall of Paris – for which he was probably hoping. Clearly Parma did not think it should be his concern to raise the siege of Paris. He roundly criticised Philip II for expecting miracles and demanding the impossible. In effect, Parma was rejecting the responsibility for a campaign of which he could not approve. Despite his written assurances to the king and to Mayenne, he was still hesitating when, on 23 July 1590, he received four successive envoys from Mayenne; they all warned Parma of tumults in Paris and the imminence of surrender. Parma yielded; that same day he wrote, as requested, to steel the Parisians with an assurance that he would join Mayenne by 15 August – a date that was less than firm in his own mind. Even then, he doubted if he could act within the stated time, or before the king had taken Paris.36 Henry’s second letter to Paris, of 16 July 1590, had little effect upon the leaders to whom it was addressed; nevertheless tempers were volatile and the city was running out of control. Events which occurred in late July and early August illustrate the manner in which the Parisians were constantly deceived by false information, and diverted by opportune expedients in order to prolong their agonising resistance. On the morning of 23 July a crowd of people from all classes gathered outside the ‘palais’ as the ‘parlement’ was about to assemble, shouting bread or peace – ‘pain ou paix’. This may have been the first indication of a conspiracy to admit the royalists under cover of civil commotion.37 The ‘parlement’ summoned Nemours, and it was decided to appoint a special committee, composed of members of the ‘parlement’ itself and the ‘corps de ville’, to examine the matter of supplies – which hardly sounds like emergency action. Next day, 24 July, the ‘parlement’ assembled again, together with representatives from the other courts, the city, Nemours, Épinac and Gondi. This was probably to announce the news from Mayenne – received the day before – that help was imminent.38 However, seditious papers had been found in the ‘palais’ demanding food, so it was agreed that the special committee, already constituted, should meet on 26 July in the [inhibiting] presence of Nemours and any counsellors he wished to bring.39 36

Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 509-10, three letters of 21 July 1590, Parma to Philip II, 511, 21 July 1590, Parma to Mayenne, 514, 23 July 1590, Parma to Philip II. Parma’s letter of 23 July 1590 to the ‘prévôt’ and ‘échevins’ of Paris arrived on 1 August 1590. He said that he would join Mayenne on 15 August. Franklin, Ed., Journal du siège de Paris, 192-3. 37 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 246, mentions two conspiracies, in July and August, to cede Paris to Navarre. Anquetil, L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, 144, also mentions something similar. 38 If Mayenne referred to Parma’s letter to himself of 21 July, it had come very quickly. 39 Dufour, Ed., Histoire du siège de Paris, 226-7, gives the exact composition of the committee of twenty, plus Nemours, Épinac, Gondi and possibly a few others brought in by Nemours. Apparently 25 August was a holiday; even so, the procedure was dilatory.

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That same evening, 24 July 1590, Henry’s forces suddenly occupied all the ‘faubourgs’, possibly to appease his restless nobles, or in the hope of drawing Mayenne into battle. At the same time, he permitted an exodus of traumatised women, children and religious, whether from compassion or to encourage the moderates who were anxious to treat.40 The occupation of the ‘faubourgs’ greatly increased the pressure on the city by obstructing the intrepid foraging sorties, without which mere survival was impossible. When the special committee met on 26 July, nothing was decided because Mayenne had already announced the arrival of help by 30 or 31 July.41 That, it transpired, was pure deception. On 28 July news – apparently genuine – was received that Mayenne was at La Ferté-Milon; this was confirmed by others who said that he would soon reach Meaux. The help promised by Mayenne before the end of July inevitably failed to materialize. On 1 August, the city received Parma’s devastating letter of 23 July; he could offer no hope of relief before 15 August. Furthermore, Mayenne now had to admit, after months of deception, that he could neither move, nor help Paris in any way, before the arrival of Parma.42 Consequently the special committee immediately reconvened, sitting both morning and afternoon, and discussed sending envoys to Navarre – with whom, however, negotiations were forbidden. On 2 August, death was again decreed for anyone who dared to speak of peace. Time was therefore spent on seeking the legate’s permission to negotiate; and Caetani wobbled, returning no precise answer. After renewed disorders on 3 August, it was decided to seek passports to send Gondi, Épinac and Brisson to Navarre.43 They would beg him to incline to some good means of restoring peace to the kingdom, to the honour of God and the preservation of the catholic religion (‘se voulloir disposer à quelques bons moiens pour le [royaume] remettre en quelque repos, à la conservation de l’honneur de Dieu, à la seureté de la religion catholique’), before proceeding to make a similar request to Mayenne. That was not quite precisely to speak of peace. It is difficult to see just what this elliptical commission really intended – probably to mislead the king and delay further action. This notorious meeting began in the morning of 6 August at the abbey of SaintAntoine-des-Champs, with the king, several princes, Biron and Cheverny (who had been recalled as chancellor). Gondi spoke for the ‘parlement’ and the city, begging Navarre to end their misery. They requested a passport to visit Mayenne, in order to induce him to 40

Accounts vary as to whether the occupation of the ‘faubourgs’ occurred on 24 or 27 August but Dufour, Ed., Histoire du siège de Paris, 227, is specific that it happened at 7 p.m. on 24 August, and this is the best account we have. Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Les Œconomies royales, i, 255. Sully lists ten ‘faubourgs’. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 241; Nouaillac, ‘La Fin de la Ligue’, Revue Henri IV, i (1905), 70; Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 262-4. Navarre later claimed, in the face of queen Elizabeth’s wrath, that the exodus had not affected the outcome of the siege. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 282-8, late October 1590, Henry IV to Beauvoir; Franklin, Ed., Journal du siège de Paris, 190. 41 Dufour, Ed., Histoire du siège de Paris, 228-30. 42 Franklin, Ed., Journal du siège de Paris, 192-3. 43 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 236. It is not clear who issued the declaration, presumably the Sorbonne. Manfroni, ‘La Legazione del cardinale Caetani’, Rivista Storica Italiana, x (1893), 262-6. The prohibition was taken very seriously by the legation which did not want to risk negotiations.


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seek a general peace. Henry refused; Mayenne, he said, was already treating with him through Brissac. It is not clear what Mayenne conveyed through Brissac, who had been captured by the royalists, but he evidently came [back?] to the king late in July or early in August, ahead of the envoys from Paris. Mayenne was annoyed about the Spanish delays which placed him in an invidious position. He was therefore not above negotiating while awaiting Parma; also because he was seriously alarmed that Paris might accord without him.44 While the envoys pressed Henry to convert, he insisted that his religion in no way precluded the recognition he demanded, and he refused to discuss the matter. He spoke to each envoy separately, urging them to induce Paris to surrender. Only in that way might peace be seen to proceed from himself and not from Mayenne or the King of Spain.45 Henry consulted his council, and sent the secretary Revol to request their ‘pouvoir’, which was found to be defective. Henry angrily upbraided the prelates for permitting the people to suffer so terribly for the sake of the legate, Mendoza, or that ‘rotten plank’, the sick and aged king of Spain. Paris was neither a republic nor a free city and could not be the arbiter of peace. He advised them to submit while there was still time; he would not ruin Paris and would expel only the Seize. There were long discussions and Navarre showed them intercepted letters from which he learnt the real intention of Mendoza and Spain; and that was not peace. Hoping to detach Paris and to deal with Mayenne later, Navarre made the envoys a proposal. They were to prepare the articles of a capitulation and provide hostages. If, within a week, from 6 August, Mayenne had not forced Navarre to raise the siege, the agreement would take effect and Paris would surrender. Failing that, and in his own words, Navarre would exercise a victor’s rights against the leaders of the rebellion. Not until after that capitulation, might the envoys visit Mayenne in order to seek a general peace, and not otherwise.46 The prelates therefore returned to Paris the same evening – without having first seen Mayenne – to make known the king’s proposals which offered them honourable terms. The king himself had a detailed report of this meeting prepared in the form of a declaration to the people of Paris, dated 7 August 1590. This was to ensure that his offers were recorded and publicised. But it did not work out as he had hoped; somehow the League leaders managed to evade the envoys, and frustrate their efforts, evidently using intimidation.47 Next day Nemours excused himself from attending a meeting to hear the envoys’ report. When, on 8 August the prelates went to the ‘palais’ – just as Mayenne reached Meaux – they met with a crowd of people, again demanding bread or peace; disorders ensued which were suppressed by Nemours, and no meeting was held. News of 44

Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 184, 187; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 424; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 317-20. 45 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 235-6, 9 August 1590, Henry IV to the ‘parlement’ of Normandy. 46 It was customary to treat separately with cities under siege. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 235-6, 9 August 1590, Henry IV to the ‘parlement’ of Normandy; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 239; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 320; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 415-22. 47 Dufour, Ed., Histoire du siège de Paris, 237-41. Dufour claimed that no other source mentioned this declaration, signed by Revol. However, de Thou indicated that Navarre’s proposal was delivered in writing, Histoire universelle, vii, 651-8; Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 397-400, 640-1 app. xix; Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 793-5, 26 August 1590, the legate to Montalto.

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the approach of Parma allegedly arrived from Mayenne, on 8 or 9 August.48 Not having received any response from the envoys, Navarre is said to have issued another proclamation, from Saint-Denis on 11 August; again, he declared his intention to preserve the catholic religion and to accept the findings of a council. He also repeated his intention to protect the people of Paris, and offered an amnesty to all who helped to restore the city to his obedience.49 This state of deadlock was sustained for three more days until, on 15 August, news came ‘from various parts’ that Parma was approaching Meaux with an estimated 20,000 men. How this news was conveyed, and to whom, is unclear; and there were those who doubted it. According to the diarist Pigafetta, Henry was greatly astonished and exasperated when he heard it; now there was no way that he could take Paris.50 Brissac is reported to have told Henry that Parma would enter France by 5 August. Others, however, had thought he might be detained, and some that he might stage a demonstration on the frontier, or even lay siege to Calais or Cambrai. As late as 3 August, Parma protested that the Netherlands’ high command opposed his departure as inappropriate. Indeed, Parma later disclosed that both Tassis and Richardot considered it impossible to execute the king’s orders and that the French campaign would be disastrous.51 Brissac meanwhile rejoined Mayenne; on 15 August he returned once more to the king with the message, which was not true, that Mayenne would submit if Henry converted. Thus one may reasonably suppose that it was Brissac who supplied the news that Parma was then in Picardy, not far from Saint-Quentin. However that may be, Navarre did know of Parma’s advance by 15 August, since he wrote to Saint-Quentin that day. He told the city that Parma would pass them by, going straight to join Mayenne on account of the serious state of Paris.52 This extraordinary evidence gives credence to a report that several of the king’s officers had suppressed and concealed some communication from the frontier warning him of Parma’s approach. Parma crossed the frontier probably on 11 August – 48

The so-called bread riot on 8 August is said to have been a conspiracy to seize the ‘palais’ and admit the royalists. Franklin, Ed., Journal du siège de Paris, 209-10; Dufour, Ed., Histoire du siège de Paris, 234-6; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 350, says that some of Parma’s forces had passed Amiens by 8 August 1590; Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 401-2, says that Mayenne announced on 12 or 15 August that he would go to meet Parma, though it appears that he did not leave Meaux. It is also said, rather vaguely, that the enemy was ‘promptly’ informed that an army approached. Navarre knew of this by 15 August but not, apparently, before. 49 Dufour, Ed., Histoire du siège de Paris, 243; Franklin, Ed., Journal du siège de Paris, 214, dated this 12 August; Dufour, Ed., Pigafetta, Relation du siège de Paris, 76, says that the declaration was derided. 50 Dufour, Ed., Pigafetta, Relation du siège de Paris, 84; Dufour, Ed., Histoire du siège de Paris, 245. 51 It will be recalled that it was only on 21 July that Parma wrote to inform Mayenne that he would come by 15 August. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 349, 26 July/5 August 1590, Sackville to Burghley, SaintDenis, 348, 27 July/6 August 1590, Mouy to Killigrew; ibid., 350. Parma’s forces were demanding eighteen months’ pay. It was feared in the Netherlands that, if Parma went to France, the eastern provinces would be lost. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 515-17, 3 August 1590, Parma to Philip II, 531-2, 20 October 1590, Parma to Philip II. 52 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 240, 6/16 August 1590, Lilley to Stafford, Saint-Denis, 240, 10/20 August 1590, Stafford to Burghley, 349, 26 July/5 August 1590, Sackville to Burghley; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 238-9, 15 August 1590, Henry IV to Saint-Quentin.


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the timing is not precisely clear – so the news may have been suppressed for about four days. During that time Henry might, presumably, have taken some definitive action, either to intercept Parma or else to force the surrender of Paris.53 In other words, the king had been betrayed, and with inestimably serious consequences. The legate provides further corroboration that it was only on 15 August that Henry learnt of the coming of Parma. That was the day, Caetani wrote, on which Henry changed his mind, agreed to negotiations with Mayenne, and recalled Gondi and Épinac to SaintDenis. It was only then, on 16 August, that Nemours permitted a meeting to hear the prelates’ report of their talks with Navarre on 6 August. They revealed the existence of a passport, brought that day by d’Andelot, with permission for the prelates and others to visit Mayenne and seek the means of a general peace – which is what they had originally requested.54 This permission was accepted because Parma’s deadline, 15 August, had come and gone; he had not arrived. That Paris was teetering on the brink of collapse, is clear from an extraordinary proposal made to Épinac by the legate, who now faced the spectre of defeat. If a capitulation proved to be unavoidable, Épinac was to suggest to Mayenne that Paris might be sequestered into the hands of the royalist catholics, to hold in trust for whomsoever the pope and an estates-general might approve as a catholic king.55 The need for provisions was paramount and that is what Henry offered, together with a truce. The prelates returned to Saint-Denis on 17 August and asked Henry for a limited quantity of supplies to be allowed into Paris during the negotiation. Navarre refused, sending them on to Meaux where they joined Mayenne next day. They brought offers of a truce and good terms if Mayenne refused to receive the foreigners – namely Parma’s army. Manoeuvres to obtain provisions for Paris having failed, it appears that Mayenne detained the envoys until he knew for certain, by about 20 August, that Parma was close. Then they returned to Navarre with the news that Parma had reached Soissons by 17 August. Mayenne agreed to reject the foreigners if communications with Paris were freed; and he would meet Navarre when he had abjured.56 That reply was altogether too crude, and neither point need be believed. Indeed, it hardly seems possible that Mayenne could have rejected the foreign forces at that stage; Parma himself, after so many entreaties, was finally approaching. Nor was there the remotest chance that Mayenne would recognise Henry IV before the matter of the succession had been more fully explored. Henry, however, now appears to have been seriously anxious for negotiations. He sent Épinac back to Mayenne to propose a truce, and the appointment of deputies; Gondi went to 53

Parma left Valenciennes on 11 August. Essen, Parma, 291-3; Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 246-7; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 41. There is no echo of the king’s anger about this betrayal, nor of any repercussions. 54 Brissac and d’Andelot had been taken prisoner by the royalists and the League respectively. It was not unusual for prisoners of rank, who would be ransomed, to move about fairly freely and to serve as emissaries. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 793-5, 26 August 1590, the legate to Montalto; Dufour, Ed., Histoire du siège de Paris, 246. 55 Dufour, Histoire du siège de Paris, 246. There were, apparently, other secret instructions. 56 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 793-5, 26 August 1590, the legate to Montalto; Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 401-2.

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Paris to offer a four-day truce if the city would also send deputies. Presumably Henry’s desperate hope was to get the matter of Paris settled before Parma actually arrived; otherwise he would have to cope with the two problems at once: the siege and the Spanish army. Henry’s offer was considered next day and rejected, unless the city was to be provisioned during the truce; food was the priority. Leaving Paris at six in the evening, probably on 22 August, Gondi once more trekked back to Saint-Denis to deliver his answer. He rejoined Épinac at Meaux on 23 August, the day that Parma arrived. Their brief discussion with Parma was largely a matter of form. He had come at what was probably the very last possible moment at which the capitulation could be averted, and he had not come to treat. Gondi called on Mayenne at Mareuil, near Meaux, before visiting the king once more.57 Then he retired, doubtless exhausted, to Noisy. He remained there, in the house of his brother Albert, while Épinac stayed with Mayenne.58 When Henry learnt – it seems on 15 August 1590 – that Parma was on his way, he faced a serious dilemma: should he continue the siege of Paris or prepare to face the foreign army; he lacked sufficient forces to do both. Thus, still uncertain of the exact timing of Parma’s arrival, it was in the hope of terminating the siege, which was so very nearly over, that Henry had opted for negotiations. But he also began to prepare for a battle with Parma, without which nothing definitive could be achieved; and his restive army might otherwise dissolve. Parma remained at Meaux, until all his forces and artillery arrived with La Motte on 27 August 1590. Next day he moved, seeking to keep the king’s forces occupied while Paris was provisioned.59 Henry learnt that Parma had arrived at Claye, meaning to approach Paris via Chelles, on the Marne, and Vincennes. Consequently Henry raised the siege on 30 August and placed his whole army in battle order on the plain of Bondy, between Parma and Chelles. Thus relieved, the starving Parisians attended to their own problem of provisions while Henry repeatedly challenged Parma to battle.60 On 31 August, brave and optimistic, Henry expected either to triumph or to die; but he had not yet understood that Parma was determined on no account to hazard a battle; that was not his style. Consequently Navarre managed only to harass Parma’s forces for several days, and to occupy Chelles. Taking advantage of boggy 57

It seems curious that Mayenne should not have been in the same place as Parma or at his meeting with Épinac and Gondi. 58 This account largely follows Dufour, Histoire du siège de Paris, 249-51, which is the most lucid, precise and convincing. Other accounts of the negotiation between Henry, Gondi and Épinac vary considerably in length and detail. Some have garbled chronology and some just vaguely fizzle out. This, composite, version seeks to make the best sense one can, without necessarily being accurate in every respect. Richard, Pierre d’Épinac, 397-404; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 235-6, 9 August 1590, Henry IV to the ‘parlement’ of Normandy; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 240, 13/23 August 1590, Revol to Beauvoir. Revol said that Parma arrived on 12/22 August 1590. Ibid., 242; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 521, 28 August 1590, Parma to Philip II. Parma said that he had arrived three days ago; doubtless the letter was prepared one day and dated and signed on another. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 799-802, 31 August 1590, the legate to Montalto; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 651-8; le Gentil, L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, 146-9; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 415-25. 59 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 240-1, 10/20 August 1590, Stafford to Burghley. Ibid., 242. 60 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 803-4, 2 September 1590, the legate to Onorato Caetani. Paris, the legate said, received food within two days.


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terrain, Parma had dug in to protect his men, and Navarre accused him of hiding behind a marsh. Still evading the enemy, a tactic alien to Henry’s nature, Parma extricated himself by building a bridge of boats across the river. That enabled him to attack Lagny, on 6 September; fog and contrary winds prevented the royalists, nearby, from perceiving what was happening until it was too late. When Lagny fell, the garrison was massacred.61 So it was that Paris was provisioned from the south. On the night of 9-10 September, Henry made an attempt upon Paris by escalade, either to have the city or else to lure Parma into the open. Although the decision, known to few, had only been taken that day, the exploit was betrayed and the ladders were found to be five feet too short. Neither was Parma to be lured into danger, despite the risky division of the royal army. Henry was forced to accept both that Paris had been relieved, and that there would be no battle.62

V: The Failure of the Siege The historic siege of Paris by Henry IV, in the summer of 1590, was an event of epic proportions and international significance. No one, of whatever persuasion, had imagined that the capital could possibly resist for so long; hence the frantic efforts of the League to reassemble forces after the battle of Ivry in March. The four months’ travail of the Parisians was an amazing feat of dogged endurance, tyrannously extorted in the interests of Spain. Cheverny attributed the achievement to the spirit and valour of the young governor, Nemours (half-brother to Mayenne), the presence of the legate, the alms and food distributed by Mendoza, the sinister outpourings and exhortations of the priesthood, and the false information supplied at intervals by Mayenne.63 If the tyranny and violence of the Seize and the mendacity of Mayenne were predictable, the combined efforts of Nemours, Caetani and Mendoza were not. Henry had been looking forward to peace and the relative enjoyment of his crown by about the end of May, not so long after the blockade was in place. But it was only late in July that the resistance began to crumble; by then the people were desperate. The city’s prosperity was destroyed and normal life had ceased to exist; unspeakable things were being eaten, while starvation brought sickness and mortality. Paris, Henry wrote to Montmorency on 22 July, could hold out no longer. He was amazed by their ‘abstinence’ and long endurance, admitting that he, and everyone else, had miscalculated. In the end, however, the Parisians would also have been 61

Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 805-6, 8 September 1590, the legate to Montalto. Parma’s troops committed incredible disorders and pillaged churches that Navarre had protected. Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot xliv), 190. A property belonging to Villeroy was not spared. 62 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 244, 31 August 1590, Henry IV to madame de la Roche-Guyon, 245-8, 5 September 1590, Henry IV to Montpensier, 248-50, 7 September 1590, Henry IV to Bordeaux; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 245, 6/16 September 1590, Stafford to Burghley; Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 805-6, 8 September 1590, the legate to Montalto; le Gentil, L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, 154-5; Cheverny, Mémoires (edn., Michaud et Poujoulat, x), 507. 63 Cheverny, Mémoires (edn., Michaud et Poujoulat, x), 507. The duchess of Montpensier also sustained the Parisians with lies and false hopes while the priesthood and the prelates of the legation used services, prayers, sermons, ceremonies and processions in order to exercise a kind of emotional blackmail.

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mistaken, and would regret having escaped from the king.64 But these are reasons why the siege should have taken so long, not why it should have failed altogether. The king has been variously blamed for his weakness and misjudgement in respect of Paris, without much attempt to consider what else he could have done. The failure of the siege has scarcely been accounted for, except simplistically: Parma was the better tactician, so Parma won. What Parma did, despite great adversity, was remarkable. But it was not definitive, and it was not what Philip II required of him. In the beginning, it has been seen, Mayenne lacked adequate forces and Paris was considered too weak to hold out. Henry, for his part, lacked the necessary equipment for a bombardment, but successfully imposed a blockade by controlling the river systems. He hoped that degree of pressure would bring about internal collapse and surrender. This was, arguably, a safer and a wiser method, especially as Henry was not loyally served, and could not trust his catholic supporters. The recovery of Paris could have been definitive: some royalists therefore feared that if the League was forced to recognise the king before he abjured, the chances of his doing so would be diminished.65 This was a very serious, ongoing problem. As a result, Henry was never fully operational; nor could he tell at what critical moment his efforts might be undermined. One cannot recall too often that Henry of Navarre had no money, and lacked the facilities – such as intelligence services – that money could have bought. Henry was, however, clear that his claim to the throne was legitimate and unconditional; first and foremost, he wished to be recognised. Furthermore, he was deeply anxious neither to destroy Paris nor to tarnish his reputation for the sake of a smoking ruin; he knew, if he took the city by force, that he could not prevent a sack. Lilley was of the opinion that to force Paris might result in ‘more danger than commodity’, while a sack would be disastrous. Henry was blamed for his compassion in permitting a considerable exodus towards the end of July; later he claimed that it had not affected the outcome.66 But, after having occupied the ‘faubourgs’ on 24 July, when all the gates were held by the royalists, certain captains and ‘gens d’autorité’ profiteered from permitting food to enter the city; and that did make a difference.67 In all those months, Mayenne made no attempt to relieve Paris which, by early August, was close to breaking point. If a variety of factors had combined to prolong the ordeal, it was still not going to last for ever. Henry at least threatened to use force, if necessary, and to exert a victor’s rights. But in fact it was unnecessary to tighten the screws while a capitulation was on offer and a little more patience could have sufficed. That is why Henry was simply waiting when he learnt of Parma’s tardy approach to break 64 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 193-4, 14 May 1590, Henry IV to madame de Grammont, 216, 15 July 1590, Henry IV to madame de Grammont, 227-9, 22 July 1590, Henry IV to Montmorency. 65 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 235-6. According to Poirson, it was Sully who said: ‘Paris vaut bien une messe’. In his mouth this now infamous aphorism makes good sense but, in that of the king, it makes no sense at all. Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 99, quoting a letter of 2 August 1590, Revol to Bellièvre. 66 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, 226, late July or early August 1590, Henry IV to Nemours, 282-8, c. end of October 1590, Henry IV to Beauvoir; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 236-7, 24 July/3 August 1590, Lilley to Stafford. 67 Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Œconomies royales, i, 255. Sully listed ten ‘faubourgs’.


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the blockade.68 There is no indication that Parma had any great care for the fate of Paris, still less for Mayenne; the dramatic timing of his arrival was apparently fortuitous. The ultimate reason why Henry IV failed to take Paris, in the circumstances which obtained, is because he did not know, until 15 August 1590, that Parma was definitely expected. What Henry would otherwise have done is a matter for speculation: he must either have squeezed Paris harder and faster, possibly blasted Mayenne out of Meaux, or gathered his forces to intercept Parma somewhere further off; but he could not simply have done nothing. Henry is likely to have been aware of intense speculation as to what Parma would do; but he could not have expected Parma to indulge in such breathtaking brinkmanship if his intention was to relieve Paris. Caetani reported that Henry had not believed that Parma would come, or thought, at the least, that he would be too late.69 That, after all, was not wildly inaccurate. Henry’s letter to Nemours of 20 July 1590 warned him not to resist any longer in the vain hope of imaginary succour. Besides, no relieving forces could expect to escape interception and battle. Henry was not referring to Parma, but cautioned Mayenne to recall their last encounter. After the siege was over, Caetani observed that Henry had been confident of entering Paris on St. Bartholomew’s day, 24 August – to savour the poetic justice thereof.70 Palma Cayet also observed that Henry had not been expecting Parma; Mayenne himself had serious misgivings.71 Henry informed Montmorency on 22 July that Mayenne had been gathering his forces at Soissons for about three weeks; now he was ready to approach Paris.72 Knowing that Mayenne had sought help, and that Parma had sent him forces, Henry may well have supposed that that was all Parma would do; indeed, it was all that Parma wanted to do. By that time, Henry’s own army had so increased, with the arrival of nobles and gentry from the provinces, that he was cheerfully confident Mayenne would evade a battle. In that case, the struggle of attrition in Paris could be allowed to play itself out. Henry would not have known that Mayenne awaited Parma’s decision and would not, could not, act without him; and it was not until 21 July that Parma announced his departure. One important factor in the survival of Paris was the loss of Meaux to the League. Mayenne is known to have entered Meaux by 8 August 1590 as some Spanish forces passed Amiens on their way to join him.73 The question therefore arises: why was Mayenne left in peace at Meaux, enabling Parma to join him there on 23 August? Henry evidently went to investigate the area – if not Meaux itself – on 9 August, with 1,000 68

This was the opinion of the legate. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 803-4, 2 September 1590, the legate to Onorato Caetani. 69 The Venetian ambassador reported 4,000 English troops to have gone to Flanders to join with German levies raised by the queen in order to prevent Parma from invading France. Later, however, he said that Elizabeth did not impede the invasion. CSPVen. 1581-91, p. 494, 3 July 1590, Mocenigo to the doge and senate, Tours, 506, 10 October 1590, Mocenigo to the doge and senate, Tours. 70 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, xx (1867), 793-6, 26 August 1590, the legate to Montalto, 799-802, 31 August 1590, the legate to Montalto. 71 Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 423; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 216, 15 July 1590, Henry IV to madame de Grammont. 72 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 227-9, 22 July 1590, Henry IV to Montmorency. 73 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 350, 29 July/8 August 1590, Lilley to Stafford.

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horse. Despite some ambiguity, it appears that had Henry disposed of 800 ‘shot’ and two cannons, he might have destroyed ‘the bridge’ and seized Mayenne in his nearby lodging. Next day the company returned to Saint-Denis. The problem was that Mayenne was protected by rivers which made him inaccessible, otherwise Henry would have attacked. He did consider besieging Meaux and, with hindsight, he probably should have done so. But he was allegedly advised against dividing his forces, and assured that it would be easier to take Paris itself.74 It is hard to judge whether that was sound advice; but, if Paris had accepted the capitulation, a siege of Meaux would not have been necessary. On 11 August, when Henry wrote of these matters to Tavannes, he was optimistic about an agreement with Paris but, in case of failure, he hoped that force would oblige the city to yield.75 It is inconceivable that Henry could have acted as he did, had he known that Parma was already approaching, or that he could have written to Tavannes and not mentioned the fact. The extraordinary apparition of Parma, just in time to raise the siege of Paris, has excited no comment among historians; but it surely calls for explanation. Parma marched from the frontier to Meaux, virtually without equipment yet entirely unopposed, while the king waited passively for the dissidents in Paris to prevail, and the city to surrender. Queen Elizabeth was certainly astonished enough to demand an explanation; later, in 1591, she told the king sharply that he should do more to prevent the return of Parma and not just wait for him to arrive.76 Nothing but ignorance of Parma’s movements can explain Henry’s otherwise bewildering behaviour; and he must have suffered a pretty frightful shock when he learnt the truth – although no one mentioned that. How else can one interpret Henry’s volte-face, on 15 August, in respect of peace negotiations with Mayenne? Caetani observed that when Henry learnt of the entry of Parma, he changed his mind and sent a passport for Gondi and Épinac. By then, however, it was too late for Mayenne to do other than prevaricate and wait for Parma.77 Once informed, Henry could hardly ignore the approach of Parma; besides, the nobles and gentry were rearing for action; if disappointed, they might well depart. So, with the Parisians once more defiant, Henry opted for battle with Parma and devoted his efforts to seeking it. This meant dividing his forces which was dangerous, and may have been an error; but it was not foolish. Again, Henry would certainly have acted differently had he known – before it was too late – that Parma was immutably determined to avoid a battle; and he was too skilled and experienced to be outwitted. Whether Henry may also be blamed for failing to take Paris at this ultimate stage, is a matter of opinion, not of fact. 74

De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 659-60. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 241-2; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 237-8, 11 August 1590, Henry IV to Tavannes. 76 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 306-8. It was feared at the time that Parma might return in March 1591, before the arrival of Navarre’s German forces; queen Elizabeth was afraid that he might cross France and assist the Spanish to conquer Brittany. Her wounding rebuke shows just how little Elizabeth understood Navarre’s situation and his almost total lack of resources. 77 Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 793-5, 26 August 1590, the legate to Montalto. 75


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Stafford blamed him bitterly for not seizing Paris from under Parma’s very nose; indeed, Stafford blamed Henry for committing such errors as might have been avoided by children, in his desire to force a battle that the enemy never intended. But this easy condemnation was coloured by extreme disappointment. Finally, in considering Henry’s failure to take Paris in 1590, one must allow an element of fearfully bad luck. The diarist, Pigafetta, who was there, clearly stated that, had the siege endured just one more week, the Parisians must have opened their gates.78

VI: Stalemate After the Siege Henry really required his army to operate for another month; Parma was still near Paris, plagued by the usual difficulties over pay, supplies, sickness, and the threat of mutiny. Yet even before the fall of Lagny, Henry had been advised to disband, and send home everyone [of note] to pursue the wars in the provinces. The nobles, who had rushed to join the siege in the hope of glory and profit, were now equally pressing to leave. Soissons departed on 7 September 1590 and others followed his example. Henry lacked the means to keep his army intact but hoped that, if he licensed the nobles and gentry to leave, they would be better inclined to return when the need next arose; an army dispersed was at least not destroyed. After the failure of the escalade, Navarre held a council at Gonesse on 10 or 11 September. Having no choice, he accepted the advice to dispatch small contingents into the northern provinces, as he had upon his accession, and to place garrisons in the towns around Paris, upon which the blockade depended. He himself would retain a small force with which to trail and harass Parma. Nothing could be attempted, in any case, while Parma remained in France, and until Henry disposed of other forces. Meanwhile, as Mayenne entered Paris on 18 September, Navarre was anxious that his decisions should not be misconstrued; so he had an explanatory memoir prepared for general distribution.79 Henry was now in a critical situation. Had he succeeded in recapturing Paris in the summer of 1590, the civil wars would probably have petered out, and the problem of his religion would, at the least, have assumed a different complexion. What Spain and the Papacy might have done, one can only imagine, but it is very unlikely that Philip II could have sustained his bid for the crown. Now, by an audacious swoop, Parma had snatched 78

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 246, 14/24 September 1590, Stafford to Burghley; Dufour, Ed., Pigafetta, Relation du siège de Paris, 92; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 191. Villeroy said that the king had banked on a battle. 79 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 249. Parma allegedly entered Paris only in disguise, Essen, Parma, 300; Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 804-6, 8 September 1590, the legate to Montalto. Caetani said that over 400 nobles had quit Navarre’s army. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 664; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 250-2, 11 September 1590, Henry IV to Montmorency, Gonesse, 252-3, 11 September 1590, Henry IV to Bordeaux, 256-8, 22 September 1590, Henry IV to Montmorency, 263-8, 8 October 1590, Henry IV to Montmorency; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 324-35, late September 1590, ‘discours’ prepared for the king; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 244-5, 28 August/7 September 1590, Stafford to Burghley, Chelles, ibid., 246; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 46.

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the jewel almost from the king’s very hands. For Henry this was a serious reverse; indeed, it was probably the greatest disappointment of his life, albeit borne with outward equanimity.80 The worst repercussion was the subsequent pursuit, by the Spanish and Mayenne, of conflicting endeavours to obtain a catholic king. At the same time, the frustrated royalists would increase their pressure on Henry IV and render his survival even harder. To resolve the succession in the interests of Spain was Parma’s real business in France, which was not a military objective; to Philip II, the relief of Paris was a tiresome eventuality. But it is only with hindsight that Henry’s failure before Paris in 1590 looks like a definitive watershed, marking the end of his initial period of progress. At the time, it seemed more like a stalemate, and the relief of Paris was incomplete. Parma still had to escape, and Henry’s calculations, as he mounted a holding operation around Paris, were apparently based upon his expectation of the arrival of foreign forces. Then he would recall the French and renew the pressure upon Paris, which Mayenne did not regard as safe.81 Henry had originally expected English and German help in September 1590. Then he hoped for the arrival of forces by the end of November, and that could still have been in time to obstruct Parma’s retreat. So long as there was any hope of bringing Parma down – one way or another – Paris was a secondary consideration; the resistance would then collapse in any case. But November passed, and Parma returned to the Netherlands, safely if not unopposed. Indeed, the failure to dispose of Parma – gravely exposed, with no bases, and far inside France – was possibly more serious and tantalising than his breach of the blockade. Finally, Henry hoped for foreign forces in January 1591.82 Then Paris, gravely weakened, seriously divided, and without any early hope of external help, must surely have surrendered; but no forces came. Henry had hoped, by taking Paris, to reduce his dependence upon protestant England. This was psychologically damaging, and could be exploited by his enemies. But now the extent of that dependence became embarrassingly public; it was also a source of aggravation to those who clamoured for his abjuration.83 Foreign help on any significant scale was, past belief, slow and difficult to 80

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 282-8, – October 1590, Henry IV to Beauvoir. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 245-8, 5 September 1590, Henry IV to Montpensier, 250-2, 11 September 1590, Henry IV to Montmorency, 256-8, 22 September 1590, Henry IV to Montmorency, 263-8, 8 October 1590, Henry IV to Montmorency; CSPVen., 1581-91, p. 505, 30 September 1590, Mocenigo to the doge and senate, Tours, 506, 10 October 1590, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. Mocenigo indicates queen Elizabeth’s reservations about helping Henry IV [partly] on account of the arrival in France of deputies from the United Provinces. She was pathologically anxious to obviate any increase of French influence in the Netherlands. Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 174-7, 18 December 1590 Mayenne to Rondinelli, ambassador of Ferrara, 300-2, 23 January 1591, Mayenne to Épinac. There is very little material available on Mayenne. This invaluable collection of his correspondence runs only from November 1590 to 1 June 1591. 82 It is not obvious upon what grounds Navarre expected the arrival of foreign forces late in 1590, but he referred to the matter several times. Although, late in 1589, the German princes were willing in principle, to provide forces, the problem of finance had not been resolved. This immensely complex subject is examined in detail by Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, chap. ii. 83 Navarre’s dependence, from henceforth, upon England was noted both by the legate and by Lilley, and doubtless contributed to Stafford’s anguish. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 236, 22 July/1 August 81


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obtain, to organise, and to employ to good military purpose. It was not to be until August and September 1591 that this help materialised; and then it raised, if anything, more problems than it solved.

VII: Parma’s Task The disbanding of Henry’s army brought relief to Parma; he proceeded to besiege Corbeil in order to unblock the Seine south of Paris. Before this, he received a three-day visit from the legate, Caetani. Welcome news had reached Paris on 14 September 1590 of the death of Sixtus V on 27 August, just as Parma’s troops were assembling at Meaux. Both Parma and Caetani now hoped for a more favourable pontiff, and the legate departed for Rome with minimum delay, on 24 September.84 From Corbeil, Parma wrote a long, rambling letter to Philip II about what he had learnt in France. There is regrettably little information about Parma’s relations with Mayenne, which were cool, and their discussions of political matters. The picture, however, was one of confusion and uncertainty. In effect, the League leaders were not sympathetic to Spain, although Parma claimed that Mayenne supported the candidacy of Philip II; that was assuredly not correct. Parma himself tended to support Mayenne, who would not pose any threat to Spain. Parma’s audacious preference for Mayenne reflected his belief that Philip’s designs on France were not feasible; but, for the sake of form, he allowed that they might be – provided Philip supplied enough money. The amount, however, would be more than he could hope to raise.85 As Parma prepared to retreat, on 11 November 1590 Philip II ordered him to stay in France – regardless of the state of his army, and without any place of refuge. Philip’s military inexperience was constantly apparent. Naturally these orders came too late, but Philip worked on the assumption that Parma would remain in France as he required.86 His mind was exercised by what Parma was to undertake, in conjunction with Mendoza, Tassis and Mayenne, about which he had written on 1 October 1590. The conditions to be achieved were, naturally, similar to those already discussed earlier in the year, only the succession was now the principal item. Ideally, Philip wanted the ‘parlement’ of Paris (sic) to elect the infanta although, at other times, he referred to an estates-general. If this proved to be difficult, the young duc de Guise might be acceptable, provided he married suitably, meaning the infanta.87 Further to the succession, the treaty of Joinville was to be 1590, Lilley to Stafford; Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 805-6, 8 September 1590, the legate to Montalto. 84 Poirson, Histoire de Henri IV, i, 269-70; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 669. Caetani left Filippo Sega in France, and arrived in Rome on 29 October. Caringi, ‘Sixte-quint et la Ligue’, Revue du monde catholique, xx (1867), 806-7. 85 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 528, 3 October 1590, Parma to Philip II, 534-5, 21 October 1590 (3), Parma to Philip II. 86 Essen, Parma, 306-8; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 539, 11 November 1590, Philip II to Parma. 87 The infanta and Guise were born in 1566 and 1571 respectively. It may be doubted whether Philip II seriously envisaged marrying the infanta, who could have succeeded him, outside the house of Habsburg.

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ratified, Cambrai returned to Spain, and her expenses in respect of the League reimbursed. Philip wanted strongholds on the Picardy frontier, and bases from which to invade England. The presence of Parma’s army – with, again, no place of retreat, and no military objective – was to extort the right decision. Philip also hoped to extract from a new pope money known to have been hoarded by Sixtus V. If Parma did not stay and use his troops and exert his authority, Paris would soon be under blockade again; Philip therefore warned Parma not to neglect his orders. Philip II seems not to have appreciated that, even in easier circumstances, Parma and his army would have no power to mobilise and direct political mechanisms; and he had no authority at all.88 Parma’s retreat to the Netherlands was delayed at Faremoutier, near Meaux. There he awaited Mayenne, who joined him sometime between 11 and 19 November 1590. Parma referred to having received Philip’s orders of 21 October (so he may also have received the memoir of 1 October). Consequently he had summoned Mendoza, Tassis and Richardot. They had all agreed that the state of affairs in France was very different from what Philip II supposed it to be. The legate had gone, and the army, which had suffered acutely, must be withdrawn. Together they discussed two proposals made by Mayenne. One was to conclude an agreement with ‘Béarn’, to permit the proper provisioning of Paris, and the other was to seek passports to facilitate an assembly of deputies from the catholic cities. This was not, overtly, to be in order to elect a king, but on the pretext of matters of government and administration. Parma and the Spanish ministers had agreed only to the first point – although Philip’s letter of 11 November, not yet received, opposed any kind of armistice. They did not accept the second proposal with which, nevertheless, Mayenne proceeded on his own. Parma still tended to favour Mayenne unless, by chance, Philip wished to spend in one year what he normally spent in three or four. Parma left Mayenne some of his forces, agreed to provide him with 65,000 écus a month, and promised to return in the spring of 1591. Whether he believed it or not, Mayenne gave out that Parma had only withdrawn for the winter, and would return with a powerful army. Thereupon Parma withdrew to the Netherlands marching in battle order, harassed and hampered by the king but undefeated. Philip II sent Diego de Ibarra to assist Parma – supposing him to be in France. In fact Ibarra replaced Mendoza who retired early in January 1591.89 Possibly Philip was anxious that Parma, sick and weary, really might give up. Grudgingly Philip II had to accept Parma’s retreat. He and Mayenne sent Jeannin and Alonso de Idiaquez to Spain.90 88 Essen, Parma, 301-2 gives an analysis of the memoir of 1 October 1590. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 527, 1 October 1590, Philip II to Parma, 539, 11 November 1590, Philip II to Parma. At the same time as ordering Parma to remain in France, Philip II wrote to him at length about the problems of the Netherlands. Ibid., 539-40, 12 November 1590, Philip II to Parma. 89 Mendoza left for the Netherlands on 3 January 1591. Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 112. 90 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 543-4, 19 November 1590 (2), Parma to Philip II, 544, 19 November 1590, Mayenne to Philip II. Mayenne proposed to send an envoy to Spain to explain his intentions. Ibid., 545, 5 December 1590, Philip II to Parma, 546, 5 December 1590 (3), Philip II to Parma, 548, 13 December 1590, Tassis to Philip II. Tassis believed that Parma would return to France if given the means, which had not been the case in August 1590. Ibid., 555-6, 25 January 1591, Parma to Philip II. Idiaquez fell ill on the way to Spain. Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 211 n.1, 18 November 1590, instructions for


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VIII: Proposals for Peace After Parma’s breach of the blockade of Paris, both Henry and Mayenne were at something of a loss: Henry was waiting for foreign troops which did not come, and Mayenne was waiting for Parma, once again, and for Jeannin to return from Spain. The royalists concentrated, as before, on the small places around Paris; Corbeil and Lagny were both retaken.91 Meanwhile Biron went to Normandy, where the League still held Rouen and Le Havre at the mouth of the Seine. The royalists’ prospects were not auspicious since, by the end of 1590, Spain had forces in Languedoc, where Montmorency opposed the Union, in Provence, and in Brittany. These invasions were doubtless partly intended to support Parma’s projected efforts to procure a catholic king. The invasion of Brittany was particularly serious because it complicated, and ultimately soured, Henry’s relations with queen Elizabeth.92 The procurement of another German army largely depended upon her money and mediation.93 In January 1591, Henry made one more attempt to seize Paris by stratagem and intelligence, partly perhaps in the hope of impressing queen Elizabeth. This further attempt, albeit a failure, prompted a request for a Spanish garrison which arrived in February 1591. Henry therefore laid siege to the strategic city of Chartres between February and April 1591.94 If Mayenne did what he could to maintain essential communications, he was still not popular in Paris where the triumphant Seize had been indoctrinated by Mendoza. They enjoyed something of a free hand after the departure of Nemours, Caetani, Épinac and Mendoza. The Seize sent to Mayenne at Corbeil in September 1590 – perhaps really hoping to see Parma – and presented radical demands. They wanted a purge of moderates from Mayenne’s council and the restoration of their former council of Union which he had destroyed. Their purpose was to oust Mayenne from his lieutenancy or even, as he thought, to destroy the monarchy. These demands were repeated in February 1591. On 24 February the Seize wrote, independently, to pope Gregory XIV, seeking his help to obtain a catholic king, by which they meant the infanta. In Paris they persecuted opponents, seeking to win control over all authorities in the city. They also obtained a Spanish

Ibarra. Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 2-7, 11 November 1590, Mayenne to Épinac, 13-14, 16 November 1590, Mayenne to Sega, 43-5, 19 November 1590, Mayenne to Diou, 138-9, 8 December 1590, Mayenne to de Ligny, representative of Savoy; ibid., ii, 179-80, 28 April 1591, Mayenne to Saint-Paul. 91 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 254-5. 92 A Spanish force landed at Saint-Nazaire on 8 October 1590. Tenace, ‘The Spanish Intervention in Brittany and the Failure of Philip II’s Bid for European Hegemony, 1589-1598’. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Illinois, 1997), 147. 93 In November 1590 the ‘parlement’ of Aix accorded the duke of Savoy the title of protector of Provence. The duke of Lorraine also aspired to control Champagne. Rocquain, La France et Rome, 430-1; Le Gentil, L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, 160-3; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 297, 15/25 November 1590, Dombes to Beauvoir. Dombes said that the Spanish had landed a month ago. Poirson, Histoire de Henri IV, i, 252, 259-61; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 670-1. 94 It was after this further attempt upon Paris that the Seize asked Mendoza for a Spanish garrison. On 12 February 1591, 4,000 men detached from Mayenne’s force, entered Paris. Rocquain, La France et Rome, 433. Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 311-15, 29 January 1591, Mayenne to Diou.

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garrison, which further strengthened them against Mayenne and the moderates.95 Unless or until Parma returned, there was not much that Mayenne could do; and Parma’s return would entail some hard bargaining over the cession of cities and the claims of the infanta. It appears that, privately, Parma was not averse from ‘entertaining’ the king with negotiations for a peace or a truce because he could more easily be ruined by delay and temporisation than by force.96 Besides, he needed time himself; so Mayenne made quite a clever bid to improve his lot by diplomacy and political means. He sought to explore, once again, whether he could obtain independent support from the Papacy, following the death of Sixtus V. Like Philip II, Mayenne also coveted the Papal treasure, stored in the Castel Saint-Angelo. Those on both sides who desired peace and a political solution thought the time propitious, late in 1590, to reopen negotiations. For both Henry and Mayenne, victory had proved elusive; each was now dependent upon incalculable foreign help, while the onset of winter brought a military lull. Villeroy, who spent two horrific days in Paris, where his wife had been trapped, went home to Villeroy late in September at the time of the siege of Corbeil. He believed, though he was not necessarily right, that peace could have been had before Parma arrived, if only Paris had been sufficiently reassured. But what did he mean by ‘Paris’, which was not a single entity, or by reassurance? Mayenne, he claimed – and this was certainly true – would not have permitted Paris to accord without him.97 It is difficult to see what other reassurance Henry could have given, short of conversion; but, even so, he was still declared excluded from the throne by the Sorbonne and the League, not to mention the Papacy. The revived peace initiative evidently originated with the royalists, who were putting pressure on the king. Both Henry and Mayenne endured a struggle to retain their supporters. At least two moves seem to have been made, more or less simultaneously: one was to obtain the help of Villeroy, and another to engage Mayenne. Shortly after going home, Villeroy was visited by his brother-in-law, Fleury, a ‘politique’ of the ‘parlement’ of Paris. He brought letters from Gondi and others (unnamed), seeking his advice, and asking him to resume his peace negotiations. They maintained that Henry was willing, so Mayenne must be approached. Villeroy, who did not want to go on bearing the whole burden alone and secretly, advised that each side should appoint five or six commissioners to conduct a proper negotiation. Secondly, he said that a suspension of arms was necessary in order to hold a League assembly, because Mayenne could not act alone. It must have been early in October 1590 that Villeroy went to see Mayenne, during the siege of Corbeil. He found that Mayenne had already consented to his going to join Gondi at Noisy, to negotiate with Navarre’s servants. While Villeroy did not at all want to go alone, Mayenne would not affront the Spanish by agreeing to a formal conference; he did, however, favour a truce, and freedom of commerce for the relief of Paris. Villeroy 95

Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 439-55, ibid., iii, 7-16; L’Estoile, Journal du règne de Henri IV, i, 107-9. L’Estoile refers to the devotion of the Seize to Mendoza and the legate in March 1591, long after they had both departed. 96 Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, ii, 455. 97 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 189.


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was authorised – but without a commission – to treat for these things. At the time, Henry wanted peace sufficiently badly to offer a truce so that Mayenne could hold the assembly he needed. So a meeting was arranged for this purpose at Buhy, on 15 October 1590, attended by Villeroy (still alone), Biron, Duplessis-Mornay and Turenne. The need for a cessation was agreed at Buhy, and its conditions were discussed. But, when Henry learnt that Parma was about to retreat, he abruptly changed his mind. Clearly, he could not permit Parma to walk calmly away under cover of a truce, allowing the enemy much needed time in which to reorganise. Nevertheless, Henry was still willing to make peace, and offered Mayenne the passports he would need to gather an assembly. But Mayenne also had second thoughts about a truce because Parma, Filippo Sega, the Seize, the Sorbonne and the ‘curés’ all opposed it.98 To Épinac, he wrote on 11 November 1590 that he would work only for freedom of commerce until he could see his way more clearly. In fact his thoughts were mainly of driving Henry away beyond the Loire in the spring of 1591.99 So the idea of a truce was dropped. Villeroy was now sent to discuss commerce and cultivation, and to obtain the passports necessary for the assembly. These were granted for two months (no date). The nature of the assembly to be called by Mayenne was never specified, or even discussed. It seems extraordinary that the experienced Villeroy should have been deceived by Mayenne, while Navarre’s servants were made to look naive. Villeroy envisaged an assembly of League representatives to authorise peace negotiations. Mayenne, however, perceived the assembly as an ‘estates-general’ – or something like it. The idea was to make a quick bid for a decision in favour of himself. Parma knew that Philip could never raise the forces and money necessary to impose a Spanish candidate. He therefore tended to support Mayenne, who would still be dependent upon Spain. Mayenne had offered to cede Brittany and Burgundy, provinces which would be vastly beneficial to Spain. Philip II, however, rejected Parma’s opinion and refused to support Mayenne.100 It is not clear whether Mayenne was aware of Parma’s initial support. Anyway he continued to pursue the matter of an assembly while he waited for Parma to return.101 Mayenne, when he received the passports, expressly assured Villeroy that he would not use them to dispatch anything offensive to Navarre. But those who issued the summonses on behalf of Mayenne, referred to an estates-general of the kingdom – which Villeroy had naturally never mentioned. He recorded, furthermore, that Mayenne wanted the assembly in order to elect a king – another matter that Villeroy had never mentioned. Villeroy discovered the awful, embarrassing truth quite by chance, and complained of it to all and sundry. Jeannin alleged that the wording was an error, which would be rectified – but for that the passports must be prolonged. He was probably right, in the sense that it had not been intended to reveal Mayenne’s purpose. Mayenne called the assembly to 98

Filippo Sega, bishop of Piacenza (Plaisance), cardinal 1591, came to France with Caetani. He remained behind when the legate departed and replaced him in 1591. 99 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 2-7, 11 November 1590, Mayenne to Épinac, 54-5, [20 November 1590], Mayenne to Caetani. 100 11 November 1590, Philip II to Parma. Tenace, ‘The Spanish Intervention in Brittany’ (Ph.D. thesis), 162. 101 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 202-9, 11 May 1591, Mayenne to Diou.

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Orléans for 20 January 1591, but the offending summonses to which Villeroy referred do not appear; perhaps they were pre-empted. Addressing the ‘baillis’ and ‘sénéchaux’, Mayenne wished the deputies to be empowered to advise, resolve and conclude everything necessary to restore religion, extirpate heresy and to preserve the kingdom under the command of a catholic king.102 Mayenne sometimes referred to an assembly, and sometimes to an estates-general. He did not, until much later, refer either to himself or to the election of a king. Nevertheless, this instruction is not suggestive of a peace conference, and there could be no catholic king if none was chosen. Error, or no error, Mayenne’s real intentions are not in doubt. He wanted Caetani to return to France to attend the assembly. In an important letter of 27 December 1590 to Diou, Mayenne offered to delay the meeting for four to six weeks in order to allow the new pope, Gregory XIV, to send representatives for the election of a catholic king above suspicion. Although Mayenne wanted to know, quickly and secretly, who the pope favoured, he had only himself in mind.103 It is possible that Villeroy failed to realise what was afoot because not more than twenty-five passports were issued, insufficient for an estatesgeneral. However, there were probably areas for which none were necessary, and Mayenne may well have preferred a small assembly which he could more easily manipulate. Like Jeannin, he denied deception, only to be inescapably exposed by intercepted letters. One such missive of 2 February 1591 to the bishop of Amiens, confided that all his negotiations had been in order to achieve the assembly/estates, through which to ‘provide for their affairs’. It was not peace that he envisaged.104 By then, however, the assembly had been deferred because the passports were revoked. Even so, in order to facilitate peace, Henry did not rule out Mayenne’s assembly. New summonses were drafted, which Henry amended himself, and Fleury was charged with the matter of the passports; in fact, they were not renewed. Fleury went to Soissons near the end of March 1591 – during the siege of Chartres – and interrogated Mayenne about his motives and the intercepted letters. Mayenne declared the repose of the kingdom to be his greatest desire – and so forth. He no longer pressed for the passports; he would seek, by using escorts, to manage without them. Nor would he be responsible for the counsels, opinions, letters or writings of others. He denied the authenticity of the letter to the bishop of Amiens, and would treat only for the freedom of commerce. There the negotiation stuck; the League assembly was again postponed, to May 1591; and by then many things had changed.

IX: The King’s Isolation Henry is said to have agreed to the peace negotiations because some of the royalists were threatening to abandon him unless he abjured. While the evidence is poor, it does appear 102 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 55-7, 21 November 1590, Mayenne to ‘baillis’ and ‘sénéchaux’. 103 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 225-31, 27 December 1590, Mayenne to Diou. 104 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 216-17.


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that Henry came under increasing but disparate pressures at this time of dislocation and loss. Pressure came from the huguenots, who had not yet been provided for, from the royalist catholics, and from an inchoate so-called ‘tiers parti’. This seems to have been more of an idea than an organisation, and the idea was to supplant the king by the cardinal de Vendôme. Luck had deserted the king, who was neither victorious nor catholic, and support for him was seeping away. In October 1590, when Henry was about the confines of Normandy, the protestants there petitioned him. They recalled his undertaking, on 4 August 1589, to call an assembly to order public affairs, which must include a huguenot settlement. In his answer of 8 October 1590, to the ‘parlement’ of Caen, Henry assured the protestants that he had an assembly at heart. But restraint was still necessary, and the ‘traité de la trève’, albeit expired, must continue to serve as their guideline.105 The petition, however, was a warning. It is also reported that Henry had found a certain paper in his room at Chelles – which must have been early in September 1590 – warning him that the nobles were threatening to quit because he had not honoured his promise to abjure. Although Henry had never promised to abjure, he could not manage to break free from this elliptical assumption; and his position was becoming dangerous.106 Sometime in November 1590, Henry held a council at Pont Saint-Pierre, which resulted in a so-called ‘formulaire’ for the revocation of the edict of July [1585]. It appears in the memoirs of Duplessis-Mornay and shows some signs of his influence calling, as he did, for religious reunion. This rambling policy document is easier to follow from a ‘discours’, sent to Navarre in March 1591, to remonstrate against his delay in publishing the ‘formulaire’, now described as the declaration of November 1590. After the ‘formulaire’ or declaration had been drafted and approved at Pont Saint-Pierre, the king had resolved to send the chancellor to Tours to dispose the ‘parlement’ and the rest of the council who were there, to sanction it. The document consisted principally in three articles: the revocation of the Leaguer edicts [of 1585], restoration of the [former] edicts of pacification, and the reintegration of catholics in all places held by Henry at the time of the ‘traité de la trève’ [April 1587]; the huguenots were equally to remain and enjoy their religion. This recalled the principle of religious parity. All this, however, was provisional, until such time as his majesty, by the grace of God, had reunited all his subjects in one faith and religion. For this purpose, the declaration proclaimed the holding of a general or national council, or of an ecclesiastical assembly of the most holy and learned christians in his kingdom (which would appear to mean of both religions), to whose findings the king would submit. However, the chancellor’s journey to Tours was cancelled, hence the complaint or ‘discours’ of March 1591.107 105

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 268-70, 8 October 1590, Henry IV to the ‘parlement’ of Caen. L’Estoile, Journal du règne de Henri IV, i, 87 n.85. The report is attributed to Panigarole. 107 ‘... [sa majesté] faisoit ouverture par la mesme [déclaration]...’ is curious phraseology which, without date or place did not, of course, announce the holding of an assembly. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, iv, 492-504, – November 1590; ibid., v, 36-41, – March 1591, ‘discours envoyé au roi’. The wording of the conditional clause about reunion under one religion was to be repeated almost verbatim in the preamble to the edict of Nantes in 1598. 106

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Henry was soon subjected to another sort of pressure, namely from the so-called ‘tiers parti’ which proposed to support an alternative, catholic candidate. This idea was not, of course, new. It has been seen that Sixtus V considered supporting Vendôme – now called the cardinal de Bourbon – and it may have been from the pope that Philip II heard of the idea. Writing to Parma on 16 August 1590, Philip II rejected a project to detach Vendôme, as he called him, from ‘Béarn’ and offer him the crown. They should choose whoever would be best for religion, by which he meant the infanta.108 Mayenne, who did not believe – and did not care to believe – that Henry would convert, is said to have favoured the idea [in October 1590] of negotiating with Bourbon in order to detach him and other royalists from Navarre. Then the League would not need the support of foreigners to preserve religion. With that in mind, Mayenne may have nodded assent, but without seriously adopting the proposal. Bourbon did not lead or command the royalists; but he was superior to Mayenne in rank; so there was no guarantee that the, notionally, reunited catholics would elect Mayenne as their catholic king. The same source maintains that Villeroy proposed a truce in order to confer with the royalists, during which time the new pope could be consulted about Henry’s conversion. Jeannin is said to have objected that applying to Rome would take far too long because, at the time, there was no pope. The next pontiff, he said, was unlikely to favour Navarre; besides, even if he did abjure, Spain would not thereby be halted. Jeannin preferred a negotiation with Bourbon in order to frustrate Spain, without mentioning a ‘tiers parti’.109 Vendôme has been accused of an actual ‘conspiracy’ against the king. He had, however, neither wealth nor following nor anything but his rank to commend him. It therefore seems more likely that he was exploited and put up to his ephemeral pretensions. The danger of the so-called ‘plot’ consisted in the force of the idea of reuniting the catholics to obtain a resolution which excluded Henry IV.110 The expression, ‘tiers parti’ was, however, frequently heard. According to de Thou, it referred to a secret league among the royal house. But it appears to have amounted to little more than a feeble bid by Bourbon to placate the Papacy, in a new reign, and simultaneously advance his own claims. These claims were effectively frustrated and brushed aside by Mayenne’s agents in Rome. This, however, cannot have been before 1591. Mayenne himself wrote to Diou, on 17 February 1591, about rumours that Bourbon and Soissons were conspiring against Navarre; but he could perceive no signs of it. Bourbon was serving with Navarre’s forces, and Soissons in his council at Tours. Later, in April 1591, Mayenne referred explicitly to the ‘tiers parti’; he hoped it was not a Roman device to settle French affairs cheaply by reconciling the catholics.111 However this may be everyone, of whatever persuasion, was anxious to ascertain the attitude of the Papacy. Mayenne had heard by 18 December 1590 (in just under two weeks), of the 108

Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 519, 16 August 1590 (2), Philip II to Parma. Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 487-9. Villeroy himself made no mention in his memoirs of this proposal. 110 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 104-6. 111 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 64-7, 17 February 1591, Mayenne to Diou and Épinac, 154-64, 16 April 1591, Mayenne to Diou. 109


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election of Gregory XIV, whom he described as one of seven cardinals nominated by Spain. Now, Mayenne added, they might hope for the support that they had so long desired. If Mayenne was to be disappointed in this essentially Spanish pope, Gregory XIV was entirely hostile to Henry IV, the royalists, and to the ‘tiers parti’. A dissident movement to replace the king could hardly survive Papal hostility; but that did not quell the disaffection from which it had sprung.112 Henry IV had now to face such an intensely difficult time, in every sphere of his existence, that he might well not have survived it.

112

Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 174-7, 18 December 1590, Mayenne to Rondinelli, the envoy of Ferrara.

CHAPTER XI: THE HOSTILE PAPACY, GREGORY XIV I: The Spanish Prevail in Rome The failure of the siege of Paris and the retreat of Parma led to an indeterminate period in which, it has been seen, both Henry and Mayenne lost their momentum. Neither possessed the capacity to do anything effective. The following year, 1591, was a time of great uncertainty dominated at first by the competition, which neither leader could accelerate, to be first in the field with substantial foreign forces. While Mayenne hoped to drive Henry back across the Loire, Henry hoped to obstruct and to confront Parma. He was also thinking about Rouen, the last great stronghold in Normandy, which was of great commercial importance to France and England alike.1 With the uncertainty over Parma’s return, and the arrival early in April 1591 of more Spanish forces in Brittany, Henry was desperate for English help on the two northern fronts. Queen Elizabeth was less than co-operative over the threat posed by Parma, although Henry could not challenge him unaided.2 While the king was almost entirely engrossed in this sterile military struggle, the overtly hostile policy of the new pope, Gregory XIV, incited serious troubles on the domestic front. Gregory carelessly dissipated the treasure so assiduously hoarded by Sixtus V, and meekly endorsed the spiritual and material interventions his predecessor had so stubbornly resisted. Following the death of Sixtus V on 27 August 1590 there was, in effect, a Papal vacuum for over three months, until the election of Gregory XIV on 5 December. Urban VII, Giambattista Castagna elected on 14 September 1591, was a lawyer and experienced diplomat from Genoa of whom much was expected; but he died directly, on 27 September, of a fever carried by mosquitoes. His policies were not yet apparent, though Stafford observed that whatever a pope’s previous colours, they all of them changed after election; indeed, the pressures on them were not easily resisted.3 The length of the ensuing conclave indicates the intensity of the battle of wits and influence before the election, on 5 December 1590, of Gregory XIV. Niccolo Sfondrato, the son of a Milanese senator, was a Spanish subject. In stark contrast to Sixtus V, he was by nature mild, temperate and complaisant. With no experience of affairs of state, and suffering from poor health, Gregory was wholly unsuited for the rigours of a demanding office. Albeit cautious and slow, he was ultimately incapable of independent action. Nothing could have been better pleasing to Sessa, who finally got his own way without further obstruction. As the affairs of France remained the most important foreign issue Gregory XIV, like his predecessor, was instantly the object of clamour and importunity on the part of Sessa and the League agents, Diou and Mayenne’s secretary, Desportes. The League 1

Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 54-5, [20 November 1590], Mayenne to Caetani, 311-15, 29 January 1591, Mayenne to Diou. 2 Lists and Analyses, 1590-1, pp. 297 seq.; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 372-5, 12 April 1591, Henry IV to Montmorency. It had been said that Parma would come by the end of March; he had not, and Henry thought the end of the summer more likely. 3 Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxii, 313-29; Lists and Analyses, 1590-1, p. 397.

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envoys wasted no time in delivering their exhortations: if only the pope would wholeheartedly support the League, the royalist catholics would desert Navarre and France could be given a catholic king.4 The League, however, had lost its original identity and become, more or less, a euphemism for Spanish interests; neither Spain nor any pope was much concerned for the interests of Mayenne, the only prominent League leader. News of Gregory’s election had reached Mayenne at Saint-Denis by 18 December 1590, and filled him with hope that he would now receive the support and help he had always solicited in Rome. Writing to the new pope on Christmas day, Mayenne claimed that France was now at the crisis of her ‘maladie de l’église’, and begged for his protection and intervention.5 Mayenne’s hopes and fears were expressed in a long letter to Diou of 27 December 1590. His most immediate fear was of a coalition of protestant powers, and his first hope was for support against it. Everyone would perceive the pope’s [good] intentions if he were to begin by renewing the excommunication against Navarre as a relapsed heretic, and similarly threatened all his supporters, specifying a time limit; that meant a monitorium. Mayenne detailed the League’s need for substantial help in men, money, equipment and food. They really required three armies with which to make a supreme military effort, though he did not say how they should be deployed. Diou was to press for the return of Caetani to attend an assembly to discuss the election of an acceptable catholic king – which may have been a veiled reference to the unacceptable Spanish pretensions. He hoped the pope would assist in forging a catholic coalition [which Mayenne himself wanted to command]. It was, he said, for this purpose that he was sending Jeannin to Spain, Épinac to Rome, and Mandreville to Germany. Mayenne was evidently unaware that Gregory XIV was Spanish in all respects; he believed he was offering the Papacy a chance to wrest from Spain the credit for catholic action. Finally Diou was commanded to be vigilant in traversing the efforts of anyone sent by Navarre. Diou and Desportes had had their first audience on 16 December 1590; they presented the League’s usual demands, including permission for Mayenne to appoint to benefices, and a request for a red hat for Épinac.6 It was several months before Mayenne’s initial hopes turned to disillusionment. His position in France was almost untenably weak. Indeed, he could hardly have survived at all, were he not the only individual with whom the Spanish could deal – albeit simultaneously intriguing with the extremists in Paris. If the crown of France were to elude Philip II, these destructive revolutionaries might at least assist in the dismemberment of France, which was the next best thing. The siege of Paris had 4

Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxii, 336-68. Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 217-21, 25 December 1590, Mayenne to Gregory XIV. 6 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 225-31, 27 December 1590, Mayenne to Diou. If Caetani could not be induced to return, Mayenne proposed that Sega should receive a red hat and be appointed legate. Ibid., 235-8, 28 December 1590, Mayenne to Épinac. Mayenne ordered Épinac to leave [Lyon] for Rome and sent instructions dated 28 January 1591. Jeannin passed through Lyon on his way to Spain to finalise their proposals. Épinac was to visit Savoy, Venice, Florence, Modena and Ferrara on his way to Rome – only he never went. Richard, Épinac, 413-17. 5

Chapter XI: The Hostile Papacy, Gregory XIV

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strengthened them and, on 12 February 1591, they rejoiced in the arrival of a Spanish garrison.7 The deputy legate, Filippo Sega, bishop of Piacenza was the only person of standing left in the city and he was, or became, hostile to Mayenne. Sega, writing on 9 January 1591, also solicited the monitorium against the royalists, together with money for Paris and an appeal to the leaders of the Union meaning, no doubt, the Seize. In his opinion the catholics, on both sides, were lazy and myopic. The fact was that Leaguers and royalists all wanted catholic reunion at the other’s expense. Sega was eager to place Paris and the Ile-de-France under Papal protection pending the election of a catholic king. He did not trust Mayenne.8 Mayenne received Diou’s first report, which was quite encouraging, on 22 January 1591. Writing again next day Mayenne continued to stress the importance of the monitorium claiming that many of the royalist catholics had only persevered because of the indifference (‘froideur’) of Sixtus V. Conversely, Mayenne believed there would be royalist defections if the pope openly supported the League. A few weeks later he was seeking money with which to bribe the nobles and forces serving the king.9 With no representation in Rome, the royalists had little chance of persuading the pope of the ambition and wickedness of the League. Luxembourg strove, from a distance, to prevent the cause of the royalist catholics from being obliterated. Upon the death of Sixtus V, he had joined Albert de Gondi and the duc de Retz in Tuscany. Gallant if ineffectual, he did his best for the royalists and for the king, whose abjuration he still desired. Luxembourg was returning to Rome when he heard of the death of Urban VII. Consequently, on 26 October 1590 he sent a letter, to be handled by La Boderie, in an effort to influence the conclave. He hoped for a new pope who would promote the abjuration of Henry IV. He also put the case for the nobles and magistrates, who were loyal to Henry IV in order to obtain his conversion. Sixtus V had perceived the king’s good disposition, and had proposed to use his authority to further this purpose. [If Luxembourg believed that, he was deceived]. He therefore begged the cardinals to work for a consummation of Sixtus’ worthy intentions. Proceeding from entreaties to warnings and threats, he cited the perennial examples of Germany and England. The unworthy persons who had claimed to defend Paris, upon pretext of religion, should be ignored. France needed help to save the faith, the king and the kingdom; but, if a false zeal for discipline were to lead to the [renewed] excommunication of the [royalist] nobles, the Gallican church would secede. So Luxembourg begged for the choice of an impartial pope. To these matters the cardinals were quite indifferent, and the secession of France would suit the Spanish well enough, leaving them supreme in Rome. In any case, Caetani 7

Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 56, gives 11 February; Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 274. 8 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 448-52. 9 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 292-7, 23 January 1591, Mayenne to Diou, 311-15, 29 January 1591, Mayenne to Diou, 315-17, 29 January 1591, Mayenne to Caetani, seeking his assistance in speeding up Papal help and obtaining the monitoria. Ibid., 319-22, 29 January 1591, Mayenne to Diou. According to de Thou, Mayenne sought to suborn Souvré, ‘gouverneur’ of Tours, but failed. Histoire universelle, vii, 781.

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is said to have obstructed the distribution of this letter and one does not know which, if any, other cardinals may have seen it.10 Luxembourg departed from Venice on 30 November 1590, taking Henry some money from that supportive state. But he left another letter with the French ambassador, Maisse. It was to be forwarded to the future pope, together with a copy of that addressed to the cardinals.11 This time Luxembourg indulged in more detail: he recalled how the League, protected by Philip II, had ill-treated Henry III and, for a long time past, had coveted the French throne. Luxembourg begged the pope not to be seduced by the royalists’ enemies, but to suspend judgement until the nobles and magistrates had been able to enlighten him; an embassy would soon be sent from France. It may have been for this purpose that he returned home. La Boderie had this letter translated and delivered to all the cardinals, as well as to the pope. Sessa, however, obtained its suppression – it is not clear how – and the appeal was disregarded.12 Luxembourg may not yet have known the fate of his letter when the royalists dispatched the secretary (unnamed) who had served with him in Rome. Their envoy evidently arrived some time in March 1591, on an exploratory mission. The nobles proposed to send an ambassador to render obedience to the pope and to request him to pardon the king who would soon convert. Perhaps they should first have gained access before mentioning conversion. Again, the pope was prepared to respond reasonably until he was constrained by the cardinals of the French congregation; then, with none of the devious subtlety of Sixtus V, Gregory XIV ordered the royalists to abandon Navarre. The Tuscan, Delmonte, boldly warned the cardinals that they would drive the nobles to despair, and France to schism, and that would ruin everything. The Church, after all – though he did not say so – was also divided. Delmonte observed a tendency among the cardinals to criticise and blame each other. In his view, they were falling over each other to impress the Spanish, each with his eye on the succession.13 Presumably they were aware of the pope’s poor health. Proceeding cautiously, Gregory XIV appointed a canonist to consider the rectitude of expending the notorious Papal treasure on the ‘catholic cause’.14 Gregory, who desired to make a careful examination of French affairs, was induced by the pro-Spanish to reconstitute the French congregation, overruling his own wishes in the matter. Thus the original five pro-Spanish cardinals were reappointed, with the addition of Caetani, and the cardinal nephew, secretary of state Sfondrato; he was even more pro-Spanish than the pope.15 That was the first step. Secondly, cardinal Mendoza, who was evidently a prime 10 La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg à Rome’, Revue des questions historiques, lxxix (1886), 45; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 731-3. 11 Luxembourg was back in France by 23 January 1591. Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 292-7, 23 January 1591, Mayenne to Diou; La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg à Rome’, Revue des questions historiques, lxxix (1886), 46. 12 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 733-4; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iii, 31. 13 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 155-6, 31 March 1591, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. 14 Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxii, 369. 15 The cardinals of the French congregation were Santa Severina, Santo Ignatio, Lancelloti, Pinelli, Mattei, Caetani and Sfondrato. La Boderie informed the French secretary of state, Revol, that they had restored the committee formed by Sixtus V when he wished to trouble French affairs, removing those co-opted when he


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mover in French affairs, presented the sympathetic congregation with plans for a revised Spanish/Papal alliance for the invasion of France. The pope was to declare himself ‘chef’, or leader of the League, and to promise to provide 100,000 écus per month; in that case Spain would do the same. Italian princes, other than Venice, were also to be induced to contribute. An army of 50,000 was to be raised, plus 12,000 more to join Mayenne and other French commanders, in order to destroy Navarre. So strong was the Spanish hold on the pope, who would only perform their will, that La Boderie now saw his – unofficial – position as untenable. He left Rome early in February 1591, before the arrival of the royalists’ envoy, and conferred with various princes on his journey back to France.16 In the second half of January 1591 decisions began to be taken, and Gregory undertook most of the things required of him.17 On 19 January 1591, he informed Philip II that he would provide Paris with 15,000 écus per month and issued apostolic letters to leaders of the League and others (unspecified). To Sega, on 27 January 1591, he announced his heartfelt desire to destroy religious innovations in France, to consolidate the catholic religion, and to restore peace through the appointment of a catholic king.18 On 26 January 1591 Marsilio Landriano, a fellow Milanese, was appointed nuncio; he was, especially, to deliver the censures against the royalists for which Spain and the League had long been pressing. This decision was evidently put to the French congregation; Sfondrato read them a long screed from a servant of Mayenne begging the pope for help. This was agreed in principle, but wrangling over the details and the size of the Spanish contribution occupied most of February 1591.19 On 20 February Sega published a brief promising the Parisians money and men. To this he added a letter of his own, assuring them that Paris had nothing more to fear – the Spanish garrison had recently arrived – and that royal authority would go to a prince capable of defending catholicism. It was the Seize, not Mayenne, who responded to this message; on 24 February 1591 they thanked the pope and praised Caetani whom they regarded as their ally in Rome. Mayenne had also been assured that the pope would embrace their cause and not spare his means. But, while paying some lip service to the League, Paris and the Seize were really the beneficiaries. Mayenne’s anxiety was mounting as the spring approached, fearing that he might not be first in the field with foreign forces. So he bombarded the Papacy and the cardinals with requests to act quickly, and he expected Desportes to return with a full report.20 had wished to restore them. La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg à Rome’, Revue des questions historiques, lxxix (1886), 47-8. 16 La Ferrière, ‘La Mission du duc de Luxembourg à Rome’, Revue des questions historiques, lxxix (1886), 48. 17 The material available on these matters is vague and unsatisfactory. 18 These letters evidently arrived at the same time as the Spanish garrison in Paris, on 12 February 1591. Rocquain, La France et Rome, 435; Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxii, 370. 19 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 471; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 151-2 (no dates). Dates relating to the appointment, departure and activities of Landriano are utterly confused. 20 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 57; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iii, 15-16; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 775; Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 56-61, 17 February 1591, Mayenne to Diou. Mayenne had sent one Duvaille with memoirs for several cardinals including Pellevé and

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Towards the end of March 1591, Mayenne’s impatience was turning to anger. He was sick of being blamed for the adverse effects of the irresolution of others, and deprived of the recognition and appreciation he felt he deserved. One pope [Sixtus V], he said, had done all he could to ruin him, and he was not prepared to permit another to push him over the precipice. Nor was Parma any more helpful, declining to offer assurance of support. Meanwhile Chartres was about to fall to Navarre, and that would be a serious blow. Mayenne confided these complaints to Jeannin, who had not yet arrived in Spain. He was authorised to be short with Philip II, and to signify that peace with Navarre had long been an option. Mayenne wondered whether the apparent cooling in Rome was caused by someone advancing the interests of the ‘tiers parti’.21 It appears that Bourbon had sent one, Scipion Balboni, to Rome, probably in January 1591. As early as 9 February Delmonte mentioned him, but reports conflict as to what he was doing. According to de Thou, Bourbon offered his submission and appeared anxious to justify his support for Henry IV. But because he continued to delay his conversion, Bourbon proposed himself as an alternative candidate; he guaranteed that the royalist catholics would then abandon the king.22 The story goes that the pope simply acknowledged Bourbon’s submission, required him to support the Union and referred him to the nuncio. Delmonte’s version of Bourbon’s message was that Navarre would very soon abjure. But he also reported Bourbon’s ‘man’ to have informed him personally that the message was that Navarre would never, ever, abjure. Thus the only solution was to select Bourbon, to which the whole League would agree. Later in the month, Delmonte reported that a letter from Bourbon was read to the French congregation, requesting the appointment of a neutral legate to assist in Navarre’s conversion. The answer, Delmonte said, would be non-committal, again referring him to the newly-appointed nuncio – who was anything but neutral.23 It appears to be established that Bourbon’s claim to the crown was made in Rome and brushed aside. It is doubtful if he, personally, ever posed a serious threat as an alternative candidate; he lacked the support, the means and the capacities. The explanation might be that the Spanish were trying to bribe Bourbon, as John Wroth reported from Venice later in the summer; but they would hardly have wanted him as a Caetani. Ibid., 82-8, 7 March 1591, Mayenne to Diou and Épinac, 113-14, 30 March 1591, Mayenne to Sessa. Desportes had returned to France by 30 March 1591. 21 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 107-9, 28 March 1591, Mayenne to Jeannin, 154-64, 16 April 1591, Mayenne to Diou. 22 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 779-81. This letter is not consistent with other evidence and Bourbon’s role remains ill-defined. De Thou recounts that Desportes fell in with Balboni on the way to Rome, extracted his secrets, obtained a copy of his instructions and warned the pope accordingly. This must be regarded as suspect; so far as one can ascertain, Desportes was already in Rome. De Thou also says that Desportes sent these instructions to Mayenne, but that they were intercepted and reached the king. 23 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 153, 20 February 1591, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany, 155, 25 February 1591, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. Mayenne wrote to Balboni as to one with whom he was quite familiar. On the other hand, he told Épinac, who was not there, to watch out for what Balboni was doing in Rome. Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 112-13, 30 March 1591, Mayenne to Balboni, 164-5, 18 April 1591, Mayenne to Épinac.


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genuine candidate.24 The real threat to the king lay in the growing impatience and dissatisfaction of his catholic supporters. It was not, however, the ‘tiers parti’ – if such a thing truly existed – so much as Épinac which was causing Mayenne’s frustration. Épinac had been supposed to go to Rome in January 1591, when Jeannin set off for Spain. Épinac was to extract the level of help that Mayenne believed was at last within his grasp, and which might be an effective counterpoise to the necessary support of Spain. For three months (February to April 1591), while Henry laid siege to Chartres, Mayenne sent his most important and secret dispatches in Épinac’s cypher, only to discover that he had stopped in Lyon. As late as 13 March 1591, Mayenne informed the pope and several cardinals that Épinac would come, and provide them with full information. He would, however, already have been too late.25 This failure was a grave humiliation and embarrassment, and damaging as well. Mayenne’s honour was involved in being the first to offer obedience to the new pope. Months later, it transpired that Mayenne had been making imperious demands without that formality having first been observed; and he believed it was resented. Épinac had received the necessary dispatches and funds to treat with the Italian princes on his way to Rome. Mayenne had relied upon his presence, not only to offer obedience but also to inspire a sound resolution for their appropriate assistance, and to deflect the difficulties raised by opponents. Instead, important decisions about France had been made in the absence of any member of the League although Mayenne – in his own estimation – represented the dignity of the French state. He was right in fearing and feeling that he was being sidelined; meanwhile he struggled on, trying to hold Paris and Picardy, endlessly waiting for Parma, who failed to honour his promises. On 19 April 1591, Épinac finally informed Sfondrato that he could not go to Rome; twice he had made the attempt, but was unable to proceed. He pleaded ill health, which may have been true, but it hardly explains his conduct. He had evidently sustained the fiction that he was coming, and his arrival was impatiently awaited to defend the discredited French. Diou and Desportes evidently lacked influence, and Mayenne was wounded in his authority and dignity.26 Intercepted letters testified to his poor standing in Rome where he was esteemed to be without courage or experience, and to be negligent in affairs. Even ostensible allies were unable to agree amongst themselves, and Pellevé was at odds with the French congregation.27 Épinac’s failure, it was believed, had frustrated the desired coalition which, in theory, Mayenne might have commanded. Instead of this, Papal and Spanish ‘help’ would simply be conferred where it suited others, without consultation. 24

Lists and Analyses, 1591-2, pp. 430-1, 10/20 July 1591, Wroth to Burghley. Richard, Épinac, 417; Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 95-7, 13 March 1591, Mayenne to Caetani. 26 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 164-5, 18 April 1591, Mayenne to Épinac, 179-80, 28 April 1591, Mayenne to Saint-Paul, 183-5, 28 April 1591, Mayenne to Épinac; Richard, Épinac, 417 seq. Mayenne seems to have expressed dismay rather than anger. Épinac was a slippery, independent character who wanted, most of all, to be a cardinal. He may have feared that supporting Mayenne in Rome would be no help. 27 Richard, Épinac, 421-3; Lists and Analyses, 1591-2, p. 430, 10/20 June 1591, Wroth to Burghley. 25

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As early as 6 March 1591, Mayenne had heard of the appointment of Landriano and of the ‘general monitorium’ he was to bring. By 3 April he had received a copy of the draft document from Diou, plus news of the men and money to be sent.28 In making these decisions, Gregory XIV was seen to be openly siding, not with the League but with the Spanish; and this was a matter of great concern to Venice. Alberto Badoer, the departing ambassador, charged the pope with imprudence, and with the folly of squandering his treasure on Spanish quarrels. Such provocative and ‘inconsiderate irritating’ of Henry IV could, he warned, have serious repercussions. To this the pope replied indifferently that he ‘did not think upon so many worldly considerations’.29 Clearly his failing health was the only hope. The several monitoria, in which Henry’s renewed excommunication was included, were dated 1 March 1591, and published in Rome on or before 31 March. It was unfortunate that this decisive step should have coincided, more or less, with the arrival of the royalists’ envoy, previously announced by Luxembourg. He was too late.30 Furthermore, on 28 March 1591, cardinals Bourbon, Lenoncourt and Gondi were individually ordered to abandon Navarre under pain of demotion. They must provide satisfactory proof of obedience within forty days of receipt of the brief; otherwise they would be cited as abettors of heresy. Then, on 5 April 1591, the pope announced the mission of Landriano, and addressed the royalists whose adherence to Navarre obstructed the establishment of a catholic king. Next day the pope appointed his kinsman, Ercole Sfondrato to prepare the Papal expeditionary force and, on 9 May, he was created duke of Montemarciano. Early in June, the duke departed for Milan with a small Papal force and shortly addressed himself, not to Mayenne, but to Parma. That was the sort of move that Épinac’s presence in Rome had been intended to avert. At the same time Gregory announced these measures to the Seize.31

II: The Plight of the Royalists The plight of the royalists was that they were right back where they had started in August 1589, when they had first decided to send an envoy to Rome. With no one on the spot, they had failed once again to obtain a hearing before serious decisions were taken; not that they could have made any difference. Luxembourg had done his best, but the new pope was too well fenced by the adversaries. Luxembourg had heard of the fate of his letter addressed to the new pope; he had also heard that the pope sent money to Paris, promised to help the League, and was sending a nuncio – he said to gather information. 28

Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 80-1, 6 March 1591, Mayenne to the ‘parlement’ of Rouen, 149-52, 8 April 1591, Mayenne to Hureau, 154-64, 16 April 1591, Mayenne to Diou. 29 Lists and Analyses, 1591-2, p. 429, 10/20 June 1591, Wroth to Burghley. 30 The data on the monitoria is vague. It appears that the threats and penalties included in these documents were added upon Spanish insistence. Lutz, Ed., Das Papsttum, anonymous instructions (probably for Caetani in Spain), summer 1593, 220-1; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 155-6, 31 March 1591, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany; Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxii, 371. 31 Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxii, 373-4. Landriano was unable to deliver the brief. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 468-9; Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 202-9, 11 May 1591, Mayenne to Diou.


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Luxembourg had not, however, heard of the new monitoria when he wrote to the pope yet again, in the name of the royalist nobles, on 8 April 1591. He expressed astonishment that the pope could act so hastily, condemning them unheard. The enemies who desired their ruin, he wrote, were desperate for Papal support in order to demonstrate that they were fighting for religion. In fact they [the Spanish] cared little for the Papacy, but sought to embark the pope on a war that would exhaust the notorious treasure – which he had inherited. If the French [royalists] were not merely abandoned, but actively opposed by the pope, they would have to seek [protestant] help; they could only submit to their legitimate king. Luxembourg would welcome the dispatch of a prelate, provided he was not like Caetani who had joined the rebels. If only Gregory would send someone suitable, then Rome would not, as previously, be deceived about France. While Luxembourg heard on all sides that the pope favoured the League, he recalled a conversation which took place in Tuscany before the election. Gregory had declared that it was necessary for the King of France to be the King of France, and for the King of Spain to be the King of Spain, so that they balanced each other. Luxembourg reaffirmed the royalists’ catholicism, and their hope that Henry would convert; but, during the war, the means of instructing him were lacking.32 The nobles are also said to have written to the pope, on 7 April 1591, expressing their confidence that he would end their troubles; and they announced the coming of an envoy, to be sent with the king’s permission, to offer their submission and service. Everyone agreed upon the need to reunite catholics, but the Leaguers only inflamed the trouble. They wanted the pope to order the nobles to abandon their king and join the League. This they could not do. They went on to explain important matters which were in danger of being ignored: it was God who gave them kings; they were not selected; the succession was not negotiable, but determined by law. Thus, the way to reconciliation in France was for everyone to pray for the king’s conversion; it was the pope’s privilege to open that door for him; but he would not be coerced.33 Hostile decisions had, however, already been taken and, before this letter could have arrived, Landriano must have departed, bearing the monitoria. Wishing to send an ambassador to Rome the nobles, or one among them, addressed an ‘avis’ to the king, urging him to satisfy the pope, not yet knowing that Gregory XIV was on no account to be satisfied. This would facilitate the king’s relations with Italian princes [a precious source of support and money]. If the king himself could not approach the pope, the cardinals, prelates and seigneurs could do so. They wished to complain of the exploits of Caetani, and to warn against the dangers of precipitate Papal action. They could apprise the pope of the king’s fine qualities and assure him that Henry was still prepared to receive instruction provided he was not approached with threats and condemnations. This ‘avis’ appears to have been a way of putting pressure on the king to 32 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 529-32, 8 April 1591, Luxembourg to the pope; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 349-53, 8 April 1591, Luxembourg to the pope, Chartres; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iii, 32-7. 33 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 473-4, says that the nobles answered the pope. They cannot have answered on 7 April a brief of 5 April, but they evidently did send a letter.

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convert, and of seeking his permission to assure the pope of his good will in this respect. But it does not appear that the king’s permission was obtained before the arrival of Landriano in France.34

III: The Spiritual Censures Landriano’s mission and the presence of a Papal army were intended to complement each other – had their activities only been synchronised. Once again, the nuncio was to seek to detach the royalists and restore religion by means of a catholic king. He was therefore to declare that the pope would never recognise Henry IV and never condone his followers. They were to be confronted with the conflict of loyalties between king and Church. That was precisely what they had sought to circumvent and to resolve, only Sixtus V had deftly evaded the issue. Gregory would not permit the kingdom to fall into the hands of a heretic whose conversion, if it occurred, would be feigned. Lest some might be deceived by such a conversion, the pope was sending an army, to be assisted by Parma [the boot was actually on the other foot] so that everyone would be obliged to serve under the Papal banner. Nevertheless, it was also emphasised that Landriano was to be neutral, and independent of the factions, precisely in order to reunite the catholics against Navarre. The pope preferred to sustain legitimacy, upon condition that the candidate was qualified; and Landriano should go no further. The exclusion of Navarre was the nuncio’s principal objective. He should also try to seduce Nevers, humour Mayenne, encourage the Sorbonne and the catholic cities, and join the Papal army when it arrived. Landriano was to see the cardinals Gondi, Bourbon and Lenoncourt [to deliver the special Papal orders]; and it was suggested that he might reside at Orléans. These futile instructions are said to have been prepared by Caetani which, given his recent experience, beggars belief; perhaps he considered that the army and the denunciations were all that really mattered.35 There are conflicting accounts as to when Landriano left Rome and arrived in France. However, since this ‘neutral’ nuncio went straight to Reims, we may believe Mayenne who said that he arrived on 13 May 1591, bringing money for Mayenne’s forces, albeit less than he expected. The two Papal monitoria, one addressed to the clergy and one to the laity, were dated 1 March 1591.36 By these documents, Gregory XIV renewed all former decrees and exclusions against Navarre. The monitoria were published by Landriano in Reims on Sunday 19 May; they were pinned to the door of Notre-Dame in Paris on 3 June, allegedly sent to all the major cities, and published by

34

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 42-8, ‘avis au roi’, said to have been sent to the king after the siege of Chartres which ended on 9 April 1591. 35 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 480-4; Victor Martin, ‘La Reprise des relations diplomatiques’, Revue des sciences religieuses, i (1921), 343. 36 The renewed excommunication does not appear to have formed a separate document but, according to Rocquain, it was expressed in each monitorium. La France et Rome, 438.


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Épinac in Lyon on 24 June.37 Addressing the clergy, the pope dwelt on his anxiety for France, and blamed them for forgetting their duty by supporting, or failing to oppose, the adversaries of the catholic religion. Those prelates who ignored the excommunication issued by Sixtus V against Navarre had led their flocks into error. France required a suitable catholic king and the clergy must gather together all their forces [?strength] behind the pope’s spiritual and material measures. Ecclesiastics who now failed to abandon Navarre within fifteen days [?from] incurred excommunication; two further weeks would bring loss of benefice – which the pope had no power to enforce. The second monitorium was addressed – in short – to the royalist catholics. They were commanded to abandon the service of Navarre and threatened with penalties if they refused. But it is not clear who was to be included, and this sort of toothless snarling invited contempt.38 Following the advice of Desportes and Diou, Landriano went to Orléans, with an escort provided by Mayenne, probably to deliver to the cardinals the Papal brief of 28 March 1591. Mayenne may have been right in thinking he would risk his life if he shouldered the task.39 These spiritual censures, which could not be executed, were extraordinarily inept. Without effectively altering anyone’s actual position, they nevertheless provoked anger and hostility. If anything, they demonstrated that Sixtus V had been right in thinking that the Papacy should be wary, although it is doubtful if he could have sustained his caution much longer. Similarly, it is difficult to see how another pope could avoid nudging France towards schism, since that was the effect of relentless Spanish pressure. But if schism would have left the Spanish content in Rome, the censures so much desired by them did nothing to unite the catholics and further the Spanish cause in France. Mayenne, who had canvassed the denunciations as strongly as anyone, bar Olivares, now feared an adverse reaction. This was because he very quickly heard that the prelates were preparing to denounce the legality of the instruments.40 Mayenne was right. Effectively the pope had declared war on the King of France, at the same time as more stridently denying his claim to the throne, and tampering with his servants. This raised a number of controversial issues and was not to be tolerated. There were limits to submission and obedience; resistance and defiance were creeping in. It has been seen that the king was already under contrary pressure to satisfy the huguenots, pending a council. This was not opposed by the catholics, who feared that the king’s – necessary – protestant allies might demand greater liberties than the former edicts had allowed. Henry still found it impossible to summon the long projected 37 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 271; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 439; Richard, Épinac, 428; Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 202-9, 11 May 1591, Mayenne to Diou. Mayenne sent Montélimar to meet Landriano, ibid., 249-59, 22 May 1591, Mayenne to Diou. 38 Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxii, 371-3; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iii, 59; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 438. 39 Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxii, 373, 377, app. 448-9, text of Latin brief, 28 March 1591, addressed to Gondi, Bourbon and Lenoncourt; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 483-4, 490; Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 249-59, 22 May 1591, Mayenne to Diou. 40 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 249-59, 22 May 1591, Mayenne to Diou.

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assembly (of whatever nature) on account of the enemy, the peril of the routes, and the need for the nobles to remain in the provinces – in other words, the war. Meanwhile, and although he was needed in the field, Henry decided to summon Bourbon and the council from Tours to Mantes. They assembled in the last week of June 1591, and the king was present for the first half of July. According to de Thou, Henry wished to investigate and destroy the ‘tiers parti’ and successfully extracted their secrets from Jacques Davy du Perron.41 By this time, however, king, clergy and nobles were all confronted by Landriano and the actions of the hostile Papacy.

IV: The Gallican Reaction The dispatch of Landriano to France and his publication of the much debated monitoria was definitively counter-productive; the hostility of the Papacy provoked strong and angry reactions. The ‘parlement’ at Châlons – in exile from Paris – was the first to proclaim its outrage. On 10 June 1591, they issued an ‘arrêt’ declaring the bulls against Henry III and Henry IV, the ordinances of Caetani, and the monitoria of 1 March 1591, as abusive [i.e. illegal]. Like his predecessor, Landriano was condemned for having entered France without permission; a warrant was issued for his arrest, the price of 10,000 écus placed on his head; it also became a criminal offence to protect him. The bulls, together with any executive orders deriving therefrom, were declared null, and they were publicly burnt. Those who had counselled them in Rome were deprived of benefices in France. The magistrates inserted into this ‘arrêt’ a clause condemning anyone who approved the murder of Henry III. No one was to apply to Rome for bulls (presumably provisions of appointment), or to send money to Rome. This was verging on schism. This ‘arrêt’ was annulled by the Leaguer ‘parlement’ of Paris.42 If the Châlons ‘parlement’ had acted of its own volition, the king effectively endorsed their decree. While the council was assembled at Mantes, Henry issued a declaration in the form of letters patent on 4 July 1591. He had hoped that the new pope would behave with restraint and that they might refrain from mutual provocations. But the fulminations of his nuncio were so violent and unreasonable that Henry could not fail to defend the authority of the crown and the liberties of the Gallican church. The principal purpose of the declaration, Henry said himself, was to proclaim that the Papal onslaught against him was unjustified; he had always performed, and intended to perform, what he had promised [in August 1589]; and he referred the matter to the attention of the

41

Lists and Analyses, Foreign,1591-2, p. 299, 26 June/6 July 1592, Williams to queen Elizabeth. Williams said that outwardly relations at court were good. Privately, they were not. Some ‘spoke lewdly of the king and his party, especially of his foreign friends and succours’. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 247-8, 27 June 1591, Henry IV to Nevers, 249-52, 13 July 1591, Henry IV to Nevers; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 421-4, 8 July 1591, Henry IV to Montmorency; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 789-91. 42 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 790-1; Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxii, 376; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 440.


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‘parlements’.43 The letters patent of 4 July 1591 declared Henry IV to be the legitimate successor of Henry III and reiterated, with elaborations, his declaration of 4 August 1589. Consequently Henry repeated his desire for a council to heal the religious divisions, and his willingness to receive instruction. The statement went on to recount how the League had conspired with Spain, Savoy and Lorraine, thereby emphasising that the Guises were foreigners. Now they had obtained a compliant pope, whose partiality was demonstrated by his violent and precipitate action against those he had not heard. Gregory XIV had been convinced by the rebels [or Spain] that Henry had conspired against catholicism and rejected instruction. By a nuncio ‘express’ the pope had launched monitoria against all the king’s catholic supporters. The nuncio had entered the kingdom without permission, and addressed himself to the king’s enemies who had been detaining him at war. Otherwise he would have taken instruction long since. This further explicit emphasis on the king’s desire for a council and for instruction could well have been inserted under pressure. That would enhance the general belief that Henry had promised to convert – which was not the case – and was still waiting to do so. Manifestly the Papacy, as well as the League, had made this impossible. Finally the declaration also annulled the monitoria; they contravened Gallican liberties, which the king had promised to protect, and he expected the ‘parlement’ to prosecute the nuncio. He called upon the clergy to assemble promptly to proceed, according to law, against the monitoria and censures, so that the people should not be deprived of their priests and services. It is not clear what the clergy were expected to do. It is possible, however, that Henry simply chose to authorise an assembly he could not prevent; Mayenne had heard as early as 22 May 1591 that the clergy were calling an assembly to Chartres to oppose the Papal decrees.44 On 7 July 1591 instructions were drafted, allegedly in the presence of the king, for Luxembourg to go back to Rome as the nobles’ representative. These instructions might be seen as the nobles’ counterpart to the king’s letters patent of 4 July. They were sending Luxembourg to seek the pope’s good graces. There was, necessarily, nothing new in their justification, why they served Henry IV, and their condemnation of their enemies and Spain who sought to usurp the crown. Their letters of 7 April had not averted the pope’s ill offices, and the arrival and actions of Landriano had been a bitter disappointment. The nobles demanded his recall and the revocation of the bulls he had published. Meanwhile they sought suspension of all judgements deriving from the monitoria, and asked the pope to send an envoy by whom he might be correctly informed. If the pope were to mention the king’s conversion, Luxembourg should say that there was good hope of it; if the pope showed any inclination to change his attitude to the affairs of France, Luxembourg should remain in Rome for as long as might be necessary. The pope was to be informed that the nobles supported the restoration of the huguenot edicts of pacification because the war was political; not to do that would be very dangerous. If, after all his efforts, Luxembourg 43

A copy of the declaration of 4 July 1591 was sent to Beauvoir in England. Lists and Analyses, Foreign 1591-2, pp. 299-301, 10/20 July 1591, Henry IV to Beauvoir, 300-1; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 418-19, 8 July 1591, Henry IV to the ‘parlement’ at Caen; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 441. 44 The clergy must have known about the monitoria in advance of their publication in France; otherwise the timing would be impossibly tight.

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perceived that the pope would not send them a suitable prelate, but insisted upon his orders to abandon the king upon pain of excommunication, then Luxembourg could only plead with the pope not to reject so many good and faithful catholics. Their condemnation violated the customary form and judicial procedure, as well as their expectations of a pope. If he persisted, they would conclude that he concurred with the Spanish in the ruination of France; in that case, they hinted that schism would follow. Luxembourg was to travel via Venice and Florence, seeking help and support.45 The nobles may have reflected that Sixtus V – if never as favourable to the king as they imagined – had been induced to change his tone. The timing of these events (the monitoria, the condemnation of the ‘parlement’, the letters patent, and the instructions for Luxembourg) was unfortunate for the king. He had already summoned the council to Mantes, in default of an assembly, in order to consider what was called the first cause of the renewed troubles. This was the revocation of the edicts of pacification, about which he constantly received complaints and remonstrances; and it was desired by catholics and huguenots alike.46 The interim terms of the ‘traité de la trève’ had expired in April 1590, over a year ago; since then the huguenots’ legal position had been obscure. This agitation served as a reminder that the huguenots were not so much supporting the king, whom they distrusted, as fighting to recover their lost status and guarantees. Consequently, on 24 July 1591, Henry reinstated the edicts of pacification, regretfully aware that his enemies were sure to make capital out of that.47 On 5 August 1591, presumably after the return of the council to Tours, the ‘parlement’ annulled the bulls and monitoria of the so-called pope, which were to be lacerated and burnt. He was declared a heretic, schismatic and an enemy of peace and the Catholic Church. The nuncio observed that the pope was held to be illegitimate because he was elected under Spanish pressure and coercion. These condemnations had their effect. Landriano found himself unpleasantly isolated, and his bidding ignored. Caetani could have told him before he ever left Rome that there was nothing he could do in France.48 Thus the monitoria that Spain and the League had been requesting for so long precipitated a fresh conflict of authority and jurisdiction. After Henry’s letters patent of 4 July 1591, and the two condemnations of the ‘parlements’, which effectively outlawed Landriano, it is difficult to see how a further appeal from the nobles for understanding and help could possibly elicit a favourable response. Besides, the Papal forces could have entered France before Luxembourg 45 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 512-24, 7 July 1591, instructions for Luxembourg; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 326-7, says that Pisani was to accompany Luxembourg. 46 Halphen, Harangues et lettres inédites du Roi Henri IV, 39-41, 15 July 1591, Henry IV to Maisse. 47 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 421-4, 8 July 1591, Henry IV to Montmorency, in which he explained his intentions; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 442; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 790-1, 796-7; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iii, 113-16. 48 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 301-2; Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 249-59, 22 May 1591, Mayenne to Diou; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, iv, 361-7, 4 July 1591, letters patent, registered at Châlons on 24 July 1591, 367-9, 5 August 1591, ‘arrêt’ of the ‘parlement’ at Tours. De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 796-7; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 487-8. Landriano appears to have remained in France until after the death of Gregory XIV on 15 October 1591.


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reached Rome. In the event, the second mission of Luxembourg did not take place; and perhaps these are the reasons why. Probably the ‘parlement’ objected, and possibly also the king. The restoration of the edicts of pacification and a reactivated alliance with England may also have had something to do with it. Maybe it gradually dawned on the royalist catholics that the conversion of their king, which they so desperately needed, was not the concern of successive popes. By extension, the holy father did not care about the nobles either; they were expected to join the rebels against the kingdom of France simply because they were all catholics. The abandonment of the proposed mission to Rome, in the summer of 1591, ended the hopes and efforts of the royalist catholics to obtain the king’s conversion through the help and support of a Papal envoy. Whether or not the king had actually desired such an envoy remains quite unclear; only later did he pursue the same endeavour himself. The alternative was a Gallican solution, at least as an interim measure. This might be advantageous for the royalist prelates – cast off by Rome, yet never formally excommunicated – for whom the Church was a career structure; and a Gallican solution would be much harder for the king to elude. The Spanish had miscalculated badly; Papal severity had signally undermined traditional respect and support for the Papacy.

V: The Prelates and the ‘Parlement’ After these events at Mantes, the king departed on 16 July 1591 and returned to his forces on the borders of Champagne and Picardy. The clergy were left to hold the assembly required – or permitted – by the letters patent of 4 July to annul the monitoria. Late in August the clergy transferred to Chartres. There is little information about this important assembly except that, on 21 September 1591, they issued a statement – also called a ‘mandement’ – signed by some nine or ten prelates against the Papal measures. The offending bulls were declared null in form and unjust in content; they were launched upon the instigation of enemies, and they were impossible to execute. Nevertheless, they might still have dangerous repercussions. They were therefore not to be permitted to affect either the prelates or the royalist catholics; the king wished no one to be disturbed by them. The prelates, like the nobles, also wished to send an embassy to Rome. Indeed they declared that the king undertook to send an embassy in order to reassure the anxious; that surely was wishful thinking. They also called upon everyone to obtain, through prayer, the enlightenment of the king’s spirit, and his restoration to the Church. This desire of the clergy for the king’s abjuration, and for peace, was to be widely disseminated.49 Bourbon, who had agents in Rome, is said to have adopted an independent line, explaining that he could not obey the monitorium because of the king’s 49

According to Edward Grimeston, the prelates meant to ask the king to send to the pope before they either chose a patriarch or proceeded against him. Their attitude was menacing. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 15912, p. 302; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 72-5, 21 September 1591, ‘déclaration du clergé’; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 508; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 799-802; Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 275-6. The leading royalist prelates were the archbishops of Bourges and Reims and the bishops of Mans, Angers, Chartres, Nantes, Beauvais and Bayeux.

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forces, and because of his dependence on the king. To abandon him would imperil Bourbon’s person and property – which does not suggest that he posed any great threat.50 Angry reactions to the mindless Papal censures rekindled old tensions in France. Duplessis-Mornay, writing at length to the king on 3 October 1591, revealed that he was deeply disturbed by the pronouncement of the clergy. Naturally he had never favoured that sort of assembly, and he derided the clergy for objecting to the excommunication only now that they themselves were affected by it. They wished to send an embassy to Rome, in the king’s name, and rejected the prohibition of the ‘parlement’ in respect of provisions to benefices, all of which was derogatory to the king’s authority. Worst of all, they asked the king to take instruction and to abjure, and it was really in order to carry this article that the rest were devised. Some went further, so Duplessis said, declaring that if the king did not comply, they could not in conscience continue to serve him. This, he declared to be the real basis of the ‘tiers parti’ which he called ‘ceste chimerie pretendue’. Duplessis feared that the clergy sought to become the arbiters of a peace settlement, in order to reunite all catholics, and then to put pressure on the king [to convert]. This presupposed an inadmissible level of intelligence with the enemy. Now the clergy challenged the jurisdiction of the ‘parlement’, which had never before been contested in this way. It is doubtful if the clergy had any such confrontation in mind. They desired an embassy to Rome in the belief, or hope, that if the pope were better informed, he would act differently; he would cease to uphold the League, and would assist in finding the means of reconciling the king and the Church. That was what really disturbed Duplessis: he feared that he saw abjuration approaching. He put his objections to the ‘parlement’; they advised him to gain the king’s ear before the arrival of clerical deputies to be sent to the king.51 Nicolas Fumée, bishop of Beauvais, and two colleagues joined the king at Noyons, about 9 November 1591. With his mind on the problems of war, the coming of Parma and the imminent siege of Rouen, clamour about the Papacy and conversion was the last thing that Henry needed.52 Unton reported the king to be under heavy pressure to receive instruction, and the king greatly disliked these proceedings.53 The prelates put three questions to the king: they related to his abjuration, a clerical bid for peace, and their proposed embassy to Rome. For the moment, during the siege of Rouen, it was not too difficult for the king to evade these matters, particularly since Gregory XIV had died on 15 October. Henry vaguely reassured them in respect of his abjuration, while no one desired peace more than himself; indeed he had often embraced the shadow, hoping to grasp the substance. As for their contacting the pope, their message to Rome was not 50

Lists and Analyses, 1591-2, p. 430, 9/19 July 1591, Wroth to Burghley. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 85-97, 3 October 1591, Duplessis to Henry IV. 52 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 77; De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 508-9. Bourbon, the chancellor and three bishops went to the camp to persuade the king to accept instruction and to conclude peace. Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of Unton, 169-72, 29 November/9 December 1591, Unton to Burghley. 53 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 304, 28 October/7 November 1591, Unton to Burghley, 304, 6/16 November 1591, Unton to Burghley. 51


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simply an ecclesiastical issue, but an important matter of state. The deceased pope had behaved like a hostile foreign prince and Henry was aware, from intercepted letters, that the new pope, Innocent IX (elected on 29 October), had begun by confirming his predecessor’s policy in respect of money and the Papal army. It was therefore not the moment to appeal to Rome – something the ‘parlement’ expressly forbade. Henry had sent for deputies from the ‘parlements’ of Paris and Rouen to discuss the matter; furthermore, the coming of Parma would draw important persons to the king. Meanwhile, the bishops could go home.54 Doubtless moved by Duplessis, the king sent for Achille de Harlay, ‘premier président’, Jean Thuméry, Jacques Guillot, and Jean Villemereau who naturally opposed an embassy to Rome. The clergy were concerned about the dereliction of the church, which was no longer properly administered; it is said that discussions took place, in the presence of Renaud de Beaune, archbishop of Bourges, about the establishment of a patriarchate, which he favoured. Such blatant schism would, however, have created an uproar and was rejected by Bourbon and the council. Instead, certain measures were taken to deal with outstanding administrative problems.55 Evidence is almost entirely lacking about the crucial role of the royalist clergy, several of whom served in the royal chapel. One can only suppose, however, that they tended to sustain the pressure on the king to abjure; and it became an increasingly intimate issue. If this is correct, then mounting pressure on the king to abjure coincided with growing Spanish pressure on Mayenne and the League to elect a catholic king.

VI: Mayenne under Threat It has been seen that, for Mayenne, the early months of 1591 were a time of great anxiety and successive disappointments. Ambitious plans, based on a coalition which might, notionally, have afforded him greater independence, never got off the ground. He was disgracefully betrayed by Épinac, creating the impression in Rome that he had defaulted in his duty of obedience, just when he hoped to obtain Papal support for himself and the League. Parma had promised to return in the early spring, both to open up the rivers and crossings and to assemble a powerful army and enable Mayenne to form another. Mayenne sent Saint-Paul to the Netherlands to induce Parma to move; but to no avail. Mayenne complained bitterly that it was he who received all the blame and declared his inability to be patient any longer, threatening, as he often did, to negotiate a settlement with the king.56 Mayenne’s position was worsened, at this time, by Henry’s successful siege of Chartres. Mayenne was anxious that his efforts to relieve the city should be widely understood. This adversity increased his difficulties in Paris where there was 54

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 122-4, 18 December 1591, ‘ce qui se passa en la poursuite du résultat de l’assemblée du clergé’; Oroux, Histoire ecclésiastique de la cour de France, ii, 228-9. Fumée died in March 1592. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 508-9. 55 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 77-9. 56 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 179-80, 28 April 1591, Mayenne to SaintPaul.

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anger at the loss of what they called their ‘grenier’ – an important, overland source of food. Furthermore, it was feared that the loss of Chartres could destabilise the League strongholds of Orléans and Rouen, which might be tempted to surrender to the king. Besides, no longer held down by Chartres, Henry might again threaten Paris, or Mayenne himself in Champagne or Picardy.57 To some extent Mayenne balanced the loss of Chartres by taking La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Château-Thierry on the Marne before going to Reims for his projected assembly. It was there, on 13 May, that he was joined by Landriano who created a sensation by publishing the Papal monitoria. But the Papacy of Gregory XIV, which was so hostile to Henry IV, proved to be of little comfort to Mayenne; the Spanish saw to that. The projected assembly at Reims was another disappointment for Mayenne.58 Although it never opened, articles and memoirs, dated 22 May 1591, were prepared for the inauguration. This – single – document declared that it had not been possible to call the assembly in the form of an estates-general; nevertheless, it was hoped that it would be no less effective. The memoir reveals Mayenne’s discouragement and deeply wounded vanity which craved recognition and appreciation. The principal purpose of the assembly appears to have been to confirm his authority and leadership. The League is said to have departed from its true course [which was conservative in all things bar the succession] with the result that God had favoured their adversary. What Mayenne really meant was that support for himself, the ‘chef’ and lieutenant-general, representing the very person of ‘a’ legitimate king, had diminished. Having to combat a prince who usurped the title, they could not prevail, or even survive, unless under the banner of a leader of equal authority and pre-eminence – a sovereign in the kingdom being as necessary as the head to a human body. Nevertheless, the League had gone far towards forgetting the reverence and obedience due to him. Thus Mayenne equated himself with the sovereign while claiming only the lieutenancy. The memoir goes on to claim that unity had been lacking, and negligence, fraud and disorders had crept in, faults which caused divisions. The first principle was to recognise their leader, revere his sovereign authority, to trust his prudence and to rely wholly upon him. There follows a declaration to this effect, to recognise and obey Mayenne, pending the selection of a catholic king by an estates-general, upon pain of expulsion from the Union for rebellion. Mayenne was to be humbly entreated by the assembly to continue his care and efforts and to accept the attendant vexations and 57

Mayenne referred to Chartres as one of the most important towns. Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 179-80, 28 April 1591, Mayenne to Saint-Paul, 181-3, 28 April 1591, Mayenne to Diou, 198-9, 4 May 1591, Mayenne to La Fayette; Cheverny, Mémoires (edn. Michaud et Poujoulat, x), 511, noted the Parisians’ anger; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 573-4, 17 May 1591, Parma to Philip II, mentioned Mayenne’s concern about the loss of Chartres; Buisseret, Henry IV, 37, takes his habitual line that Chartres was central to Henry’s ‘amorous campaign’, dismissing the city as of only ‘modest strategic importance’. Clearly contemporaries did not think so. 58 Rocquain, La France et Rome, 437, maintains that there was a conference at Reims – no date – attended by Mayenne, Lorraine, and the ambassadors of Spain and Savoy, at which it was agreed that, before holding an estates-general, it must be possible to execute their decisions. Consequently Jeannin was sent to Spain at the end of April to request massive help. In fact, Jeannin arrived in April.


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fatigues, recognising their obligation to him and submitting with reverence. Furthermore, the assembly was to request him to invite the royalist catholics to quit Navarre’s service within a given time, offering them either security of office or compensation. [In that way Mayenne might obtain control of the machinery of government]. He was to be asked to expand the council of state with suitable, experienced men and to be constantly attended by a standing committee of one deputy for each province; this would reinforce his control of the wider League. Other items related to order and discipline. Finally, but most important, the assembly was to provide a notable sum of money in order to curtail Mayenne’s dependence upon foreigners.59 If Mayenne did not, at least formally, assert his own aspiration to the crown, such measures, publicly subscribed, would have enhanced his image and prestige and presented him to the Spanish as the League candidate – king already in all but name. When this memoir was prepared, Mayenne wrote to Diou that he was pressing for the estates as hard as he could, in order to take a firm decision for France; to Épinac he declared that his hopes rested in the assembly. He also wrote to the emperor Rudolph II, apparently seeking support for himself. The likely explanation is that Mayenne had meant to broach the succession in an estates-general but dared not do so in the circumstances.60 There was no further mention of Papal authority or sanction, or of fighting under the Papal banner. With no sign of Parma and his forces, Mayenne still awaited the return of Jeannin from his arduous journey to Spain. The decision to send Mayenne’s most able councillor to Madrid – it has been seen – was taken soon after the siege of Paris. Upon Mayenne’s request, Parma agreed to send Alonso de Idiaquez with him. Jeannin landed near Barcelona, on 14 April 1591, reached Madrid on 22 April, and had an audience with Philip II on 24 April.61 Unfortunately there are no instructions for Jeannin and accounts of his mission, which lasted for two months, are sketchy. He evidently went to ascertain what Philip II intended to do, and to persuade him of the insuperable difficulties of instating the infanta. Mayenne is said to have believed that, if well informed, Philip II would support him. Philip II was not, of course, to be persuaded. Jeannin therefore deftly deferred the succession to an estates-general and proceeded to discuss the need for men and money. Philip agreed to send two armies, provided an estates-general was called to

59 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 274-87, 22 May 1591, ‘articles et mémoires pour l’assemblée’. 60 Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, ii, 246-7, 22 May 1591, Mayenne to Épinac, 249-59, 22 May 1591, Mayenne to Diou, 287-90, 1 June 1591, Mayenne to the emperor, Rudolph II. From this point on, material on Mayenne is sparse. Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 20, says that he wished to postpone the choice of a king; the assembly did not meet, but Mayenne’s programme survived. 61 Many sources are mistaken about the origin and dates of Jeannin’s mission to Spain. He left in January 1591 and travelled via the Netherlands, Lorraine, Franche-Comté, Dijon, Lyon, Savoy, Genoa (3 February) and Marseille (2 March). Henry and Loriquet, Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, i, 138-9, 8 December 1590, Mayenne to de Ligny, representative of Savoy; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 555-6, 25 January 1591, Parma to Philip II; Ballande, Rebelle et conseiller de trois souverains: le président Jeannin, 53-7; Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 481-4.

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sanction his demands.62 This undertaking would be largely meaningless unless the timing of the military and political measures were synchronised, which was beyond Philip’s powers. A story is recorded that, working with Jeannin, Philip II unrolled a map of France. In referring to various locations of importance, he spoke always of ‘my’ city, province, subjects etc., without ever mentioning Mayenne.63 If this is true, then Philip II hardly bothered to deceive Jeannin. He, at least, perceived that Mayenne had nothing to hope for, if not that the Spanish were out to destroy him. Thereafter Jeannin adopted Villeroy’s policy of working for peace with Navarre – provided he could only be induced to convert. Otherwise no one could devise any viable solution and, in the meanwhile, they had somehow to survive. Jeannin and Idiaquez departed on 25 June 1591 and travelled via Genoa and Switzerland arriving in the Netherlands by 28 July. Together they conferred with Parma. Jeannin rejoined Mayenne at Ham, in Picardy, on or about 15 August. By this time don Diego de Ibarra had arrived from Spain, to replace Mendoza and to undermine Mayenne.64 Jeannin’s return to Picardy, bringing Mayenne neither hope nor consolation, coincided with the escape from prison (where he had been held since the murders at Blois) of the young duc de Guise. This was a further blow for Mayenne who was instantly eclipsed in popular esteem; it was also a bonus for Philip II. In his instructions of 6 November 1591 to the duke of Feria, who was sent to dominate the proposed estatesgeneral, Guise was the only Frenchman Feria was authorised to support, if necessary – partly perhaps because he was unmarried.65 There was, however, some confusion in Spanish policy, and this concession may only have been to humour the Seize and protract the negotiations. It is difficult to believe that Philip II would really have permitted the infanta to marry Guise, who was lacking in rank, and everything else. Since it was thought possible that the infanta might succeed her father, Philip II really wanted her to marry the archduke Ernest of Austria, or one of his brothers, which could not be quickly arranged. This proposal also featured in Feria’s instructions. Towards the end of 1591, Philip II decided to recall Parma – certainly for multiple and complex reasons – and replace him as governor-general by the archduke Ernest. However, his availability might beneficially have been ascertained in advance. A Habsburg marriage, in conjunction with the infanta’s election to the throne of France, could be expected to arouse anguished opposition from all who feared the power of Spain.66 62

It appears, if not explicitly, that the French saw the estates-general as the electoral body, whereas the Spanish only wanted them to ratify a decision. 63 Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 485. 64 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat, (edn. Petitot, xliv), 234-6. Ibarra had arrived in the Netherlands. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 561, 17 February 1591, Parma to Philip II, 579, 2 June 1591, Philip II to Parma; 590, 28 July 1591, Parma to Philip II. Philip sent a declaration on the negotiations with Jeannin, which pressed Parma to act promptly; no other details. 65 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 502; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 443. Both the Seize and the Sorbonne welcomed Guise and wanted him to marry the infanta. Essen, Parma, 329-30. 66 Lists and Analyses, 1591-2, p. 430-1, 1/11 August 1591, Villars to Mayenne; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 618, 30 December 1591, Philip II to Cerralvo, a cryptic letter which related to the fate of


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Jeannin must surely have known that Idiaquez delivered orders for Parma to return to France forthwith, and not to withdraw for any reason until he had restored order – meaning until he had terrorised the French into electing the infanta as queen.67 Prince Maurice, at this time, was threatening to retake all Parma’s conquests beyond the Waal and the Rhine. Five times, Philip II repeated his orders for Parma to return to France immediately. But, by the end of August, Parma was again languishing at Spa, whence he informed the king that he feared a general rebellion in the Netherlands; and that would be worse than a disaster in France.68 Philip II feared that Henry might take Rouen and turn again upon Paris; Henry, in fact, was too much concerned to ensure that Parma should never again penetrate France unopposed. While he was awaiting the arrival of Parma, as in 1590, and this time also the Papal forces, Mayenne’s summer campaigns, ranging between Champagne and Rouen, had been indecisive. The Papal forces had tarried in Dauphiné to serve with Savoy, which must have been at Spain’s behest. Accompanied by Landriano, Mayenne met them in the duchy of Bar, on 10 September 1591; together they proceeded to Verdun in Lorraine. By then this army was much depleted and suffering from sickness and shortages. Montemarciano returned to Italy after the death of Gregory XIV on 15 October; some of his forces disbanded, and the remainder entered France with Parma.69 It appears that in October 1591 further negotiations took place at Verdun between Mayenne and the Spanish. These talks turned upon the same points as before, and in accordance with the instructions for Feria. Relations were strained over the nomination of the infanta, her proposed marriage to the archduke Ernest, and compensation for Mayenne. Furthermore, Parma demanded the cession of La Fère before entering France; so no agreement was reached.70 If this information is correct, then Parma’s arrival must have been more problematical and uncertain than ever. With these matters, and the safety of Champagne and Picardy on his mind – not to mention Rouen – Mayenne was distracted by an urgent summons from Belin, governor of Paris. Mayenne had already been appalled by the violence of the Parisian deputies who had gone to Reims for the intended assembly. As soon as the Spanish garrison had arrived in February 1591, the Seize had begun to harass Mayenne and became extremely exigent. Parma. Ibid., 619-22, December 1591, anonymous denunciation of Parma. Ibid., iv, 22-3, 20 February 1592, Philip II to Parma, not delivered, 34-8, c. March 1592, instructions for Cerralvo. Philip’s machinations against Parma, of whom he was afraid, were despicable in the extreme and deeply suspicious. Fortunately for Parma death supervened on 3 December 1592. The archduke Ernest did serve, briefly, as governor of the Netherlands, but did not arrive until 30 January 1594. Ibid., 224, 4 February 1594, Ibarra to the secretaries. 67 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 579, 2 June 1591, Philip II to Parma; Essen, Parma, 313, 3201. 68 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 594-5, 31 August 1591, Parma to Philip II, 598-9, 4 October 1591, Philip II to Parma, 603, 12 November 1591, Parma to Philip II, in which he repeated his fear of an impending general rebellion. Parma was also expecting Imperial envoys to try to make peace in the Netherlands. 69 Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxii, 378; Lists and Analyses, 1591-2, pp. 432 seq.; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 502; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 443; Le Gentil, L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, 183. 70 Lists and Analyses, 1591-2, p. 228, 4/14 December 1591, Unton to Burghley; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 535-6.

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They demanded the restoration of the ‘conseil d’Union’ and they wished to establish a ‘chambre ardente’, a special tribunal – and something very like an inquisition – to eliminate the supporters of heretics; these were magistrates, moderates and the antiSpanish, whose property they coveted. Severe class struggles were rending the city which was still suffering from shortages. Now the situation had almost run out of control. Probably the Seize were prompted by Ibarra when, on 2 September 1591, they wrote to Philip II offering the crown either to himself or to the infanta. Ibarra was already preparing for the arrival of Parma by obtaining an estates-general at which the election would take place.71 While it is doubtful if Philip II supposed that the Seize could really deliver the crown, they could be useful; and it appears that their messenger had secret instructions.72 It is therefore possible that the Seize, having adopted Guise as their leader, offered to eliminate Mayenne. He had rejected their proposals in February (and was to do so again in September), while his adherence to monarchical forms precluded their brand of popular tyranny; and he was certainly a problem and an obstacle to Spain. However this may be, the Seize fabricated the discovery of a plot among the ‘parlement’ and the bourgeoisie to surrender Paris to Navarre. Thereupon they devised an elaborate conspiracy in which Sega was implicated. Intercepted letters from Parma are said to have revealed their objective, which was to depose Mayenne and his governor Belin, and to replace the old magistrates with adherents willing to support the infanta.73 According to Villeroy, these changes were to coincide with the arrival of Parma. On 6 November 1591 the Seize established an inner executive committee of twelve – presumably the twelve who had signed the letter to Philip II – and held frequent, secret meetings in a variety of locations. They drew up a list of proscribed persons in each quartier and plotted to purge the ‘parlement’ of opponents. The rump would then oblige by revoking Mayenne’s commission. Then, in their own authority, they would elect a Spanish monarch as Parma entered France. This project looks very much like a Spanish device, to dispose of Mayenne and circumvent an estates-general which the Spanish could not control. Philip II had always preferred to make use of the ‘parlement’, if he could. On 15 November 1591 the Seize moved into action with the arrest and murder of Barnabé Brisson, ‘premier président’ and two ‘conseillers’, Tardiff and Larcher. Two days later they sent to Mayenne demanding their ‘chambre ardente’ by which to dispose of many others.74 This would have instituted a reign of terror. The ‘garde bourgeoise’ 71

Ibarra went to Reims on 5 September 1591 to prepare for an estates-general, met Landriano and discussed Philip’s will with some delegates. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 387-8, 7 September 1591, Ibarra to Philip II. In fact, the estates-general was repeatedly deferred. 72 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 40-2, has an interesting account of this matter but he wrongly dates the letter of the Seize 20 November 1591 which, from other material, is clearly wrong. The messenger is named as Claude Matthieu but was not, according to de Thou, the same individual who had previously served the duc de Guise. He had, apparently, died in Italy three years before. 73 There is, unfortunately, no precise evidence for these intercepted letters. Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 241; Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xiii, 309-18, ‘assemblée secrette de plusieurs bourgeois de la ville de Paris’. 74 It is not clear why they sent to Mayenne, unless to exploit his authority before they destroyed it or, perhaps, to lure him to Paris where he might be disposed of. Some loose ends remain.


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began to organise their opposition and Belin begged Mayenne to intervene. It was not until 28 November that he entered Paris with a sufficient escort of 2,200 men, followed by Diego de Ibarra.75 Mayenne was concerned, not only about the threat to himself – which he may, or may not, have fully appreciated – but also that these revolutionaries might destroy the remnants of the monarchical regime in Paris; then other cities might follow their example and turn on their magistrates and officials. Mayenne temporised for a few days, while making sure of the officers of the quartiers and identifying opponents. Then he arrested Bussy Le Clerc, who surrendered the Bastille in return for immunity in respect of the murder of Brisson. Vitry (Louis de l’Hospital) who assisted Mayenne, arrested four ringleaders (Louchard, Auroux, Emonot and Ameline) who were hanged in the Louvre on 4 December 1591. Others were imprisoned, and some escaped to the Netherlands; the Seize as a group and an organisation was destroyed. Mayenne restored the ‘parlement’ and appointed four new ‘présidents’. He dissolved the council of twelve (?what remained of it) and forbade meetings. Then, on 10 December he published an amnesty, and distributed a circular letter explaining how he had curtailed a revolt against the magistrates which would have ruined the city.76 Mayenne and Ibarra left Paris on 11 (some say 13) December 1591 and went to Soissons. They learnt that Parma had been waiting at Landrecies to hear that Mayenne was back in camp and had rejoined his forces. Parma’s men had already preceded him into France, ‘quietly and piecemeal’. During Mayenne’s absence, and contrary to his wishes, Guise and Rosne had ceded La Fère to Parma; he took his chance and sent in artillery, ammunition and a garrison of 400. But Mayenne is said to have insisted upon a signed promise that Parma would quit La Fère when requested to do so, or when his artillery was moved.77 In view of the impending relief of Rouen, that might have been quite soon. If the Seize had succeeded in overthrowing Mayenne, it is likely that Parma would have obtained the other towns he demanded, Guise, Soissons, Coucy and Laon. In that case, his work in France would have been greatly facilitated. With Spanish forces in Dauphiné, Languedoc and Brittany, and Parma holding four or five fortresses near the Netherlands frontier, the infanta might well have been proclaimed in Paris, dispensing with the hazardous nuisance of an estates-general. In this sense, Spain had come 75

Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 613, 19 December 1591, Parma to Philip II. One may wonder why the Spanish garrison apparently took no part in these exploits. Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 282-300; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 73-83; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 38-44, says that the Spanish limited the extent of the punishments in Paris; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 613, 19 December 1591, Parma to Philip II, Landrecies; Lists and Analyses, 1591-2, p. 226, 25 November/5 December 1591, Unton to Burghley. 77 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 613, 19 December 1591, Parma to Philip II, Landrecies. Parma moved about between Brussels and the French frontier. Henry IV told Unton that Parma had reached Guise by 16 December, Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 198-200, 9/19 December 1591, Unton to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, 1591-2, p. 228, 4/14 December 1591, Unton to Burghley, 228-9, 10/20 December 1591, Unton to Burghley, 389, 16/26 October 1591, Bodley to Burghley. The Leaguer ‘gouverneur’ of La Fère is said to have been murdered some months before in order to prepare the way for Spain. Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 279; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 44-7, 20 December 1591, Ibarra to Philip II; Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 494. 76

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alarmingly close to success, by sleight of hand and conspiracy as well as war. While the advent of the infanta must have been furiously opposed, Spain would still have been in a much stronger position than before. Thus the showdown in Paris between Mayenne and the Seize, in which he took courageous and effective action, was a seminal incident. With the destruction of the irresponsible, extremist elements, Spain was deprived of her only real support in France.78 Mayenne, however, reaped only a little time. The eclipse of the Seize did not bring support for him; instead it revived the bourgeois League and the moderates who now tended to seek peace with Navarre, if only he would abjure. It is ironic that Mayenne’s undeniable achievement was mainly beneficial to the king, clearing the way for the submission of Paris without a second siege. Whether these changes had any effect upon his ultimate decision to convert, it is impossible to say; nor can one be sure how much he knew about the organisation of revolutionary Paris. For the moment the king, Mayenne and Parma had all to concentrate on Rouen.

78

It would be interesting to know whether these events in Paris had any effect upon the composition and disposition of the deputies to the estates-general of the League in 1593.

CHAPTER XII: THE ROUEN CAMPAIGN, 1591-2 I: The Normandy Agreement, July 1591 The Rouen campaign of 1591-2 illustrates the nature and weight of Henry’s military burden and the mounting domestic pressures to which he was also subjected. This, as it transpired, was the last campaign in which Henry might have established himself in arms, with the help of German and English forces. That he was unable to do so was due not only to Spain, in the person of the duke of Parma, but also to the disloyalty of his own ‘supporters’. Crushing difficulties reduced the king – by nature an extrovert optimist – to near despair. These events, and the circumstances in which the campaign ended, provide important evidence relating to his abjuration about a year later.1 The Rouen campaign also reveals an astonishing diplomatic confusion in the vital relations between Henry IV and queen Elizabeth, upon whose support Henry was largely dependent. Misapprehensions, carrying serious consequences, were permitted to occur between the two monarchs. Each was exposed to a degree of embarrassment and fiasco which should never have arisen. Thereafter, no one could doubt the near impossibility of synchronised military operations. Furthermore, it was doubtful if queen Elizabeth either could, or would, ever again provide the king with help on a comparable scale. This was an anxiety which inevitably influenced future policy.2 Rouen commanded the lower reaches of the Seine in Normandy, the rich, northern, maritime province, relatively close to Paris. Soon after his accession, it has been seen, Henry IV withdrew to Normandy, creating the impression that he was about to besiege Rouen. Lacking the men, means and equipment, it is likely that he only meant to lure Mayenne away from Paris. Nevertheless, the idea of besieging Rouen arose at this time from intrinsic circumstances, and it appealed especially to England. Stafford reported in September 1589 that Henry desired 5,000 men for two months in order to besiege Rouen. His servant, William Lilley, regretted the king’s departure, fearing the loss of Normandy.3 If the king took Rouen, he could also take Le Havre (which the English called Newhaven), clear the sea coasts and so become self-supporting. The idea was also discussed with an enterprising English merchant, Otwell Smith. Recently expelled from Rouen, he had moved to Dieppe. Smith supplied Burghley with valuable information and became instrumental in promoting the Rouen project, then and in 1591. He encouraged Navarre to believe that he could raise money from English merchants, all of whom would 1

The Rouen campaign is a big subject upon which there is copious evidence; it can only be selectively covered here. See especially Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, and Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, passim. Wernham, ‘Queen Elizabeth and the Siege of Rouen’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series, vol. xv (1932), 163-79; MacCaffrey, Elizabeth I. War and Politics, 1588-1603, chaps. viii and ix. English works say little about the French point of view. 2 Greengrass, ‘Henri IV et Elisabeth: les dettes d’une amitié’, in Avènement d’Henri IV, colloque III, PauNérac, 1989, 353-70, provides an interesting brief account of the relations between Henry IV and queen Elizabeth. Ibid., 369-70 lists the sums lent by the queen to Henry of Navarre between 1589 and 1596. 3 Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, 37.

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be substantial beneficiaries if the project succeeded. In other words, there was commercial pressure for the siege of Rouen.4 Henry proposed to repay such a loan from the Rouen customs receipts within eight months of taking the town. This was the idea which Smith successfully propounded in 1591. Queen Elizabeth might demand the revenues of Rouen as security for Henry’s already sizeable debts.5 The queen sent Henry some prompt help in the autumn of 1589.6 A series of difficulties arose at that time which should have alerted the French to Elizabeth’s rigid, almost legalistic, attitude to their relations. In a matter as incalculable as civil war, precision was impossible. The queen was reluctant to be committed, unless upon ‘very apparent and urgent necessity’, and then only briefly, within specified limits of time and place. She also wanted security and profit. With the sole exception of Paris and Rouen, Elizabeth expected the king to operate along the sea coasts. Astonishingly, it is reported that Henry’s representatives in England conveyed the impression that he would consent to that.7 About a month later, in a discourse upon the need to support Navarre, the envoys unwisely asserted that he should be encouraged to undertake ‘some great enterprise’ such as Paris or some other town – meaning Rouen. Although Henry always asserted that he was not equipped to undertake a great enterprise, the queen was mistakenly given to believe that he was prepared to do what she required.8 In the autumn of 1589, following the battle of Arques, the focus of attention shifted from Rouen to Paris. Then, in the autumn of 1590, after the king’s failure before Paris, the Rouen project was revived. The impetus was provided by queen Elizabeth following the Spanish invasion of Brittany in October 1590. This occupation now threatened England and the Channel ports. The English feared that if the Spanish were to seize Le Havre, only Calais could resist. Then communications and trade between France and England would be gravely endangered. But whereas, in 1591, Rouen was of primary importance to England, to Henry it remained desirable, but of secondary significance. Two principal difficulties arose: the project overlapped with the arrival in France of Henry’s German army – in which Elizabeth herself was deeply involved – and it was delayed by the unpredictability of Parma, whose invasion was constantly imminent. To Parma’s return, Elizabeth’s attitude was cavalier, even though she feared his [very

4

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 296, 11/21 October 1589, Smith to Burghley. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 328, 17/27 April 1591, Smith to Burghley, 328, 24 April/4 May 1591, Williams to the privy council, 328, 29 May/8 June 1591, Smith to Burghley. 6 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, p. 298, 30 October/9 November 1589, bond for the repayment of £15,000 upon conditions. 7 These envoys appear to have been the ambassador, Jean de la Fin, seigneur de Beauvoir La Nocle, who went to England in August 1589, Pierre de Mornay, seigneur de Buhy, brother of Duplessis-Mornay, Paul de Choart, seigneur de Buzanval and possibly also Philippe Canaye, seigneur de Fresnes. 8 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1589-90, pp. 299-301, 28 November/8 December 1589, discourse for Walsingham. Whether the ambassadors were culpably incompetent or merely desperate to get English forces into France, is not clear at any stage. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 54-5, c. 3 October 1589, Henry IV to queen Elizabeth. 5

Chapter XII: The Rouen Campaign, 1591-2

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unlikely] appearance in Brittany.9 During the siege of Chartres (February to April 1590) which, like most sieges, was not expected to last so long, Henry was looking ahead.10 In mid-February 1591, he sent La Tour to England, while Elizabeth sent Edmund Yorke to France. La Tour was to press for help against the Spanish in Brittany, and to urge the queen to do what she could to hasten the German levy. French anxiety was centred on Parma whose return to France was currently expected towards the end of March. Henry could not confront Parma unaided; from the start, he always made that clear to queen Elizabeth.11 Yorke’s mission to France was mainly about Brittany, and to gather information. He was also instructed to require the king ‘to take better order’ [than in 1590] against Parma’s return. Henry should prevent Parma from entering France instead of just waiting for him to appear. Henry’s response to this rebuke was a request, on 8 March 1591, for 4,000 men for two or three months until the Germans arrived. This requirement reflected Henry’s fear that Parma might precede the Germans. Henry proposed to meet the English at Dieppe – though he never said when – with 11,000 foot and 4,000 horse, and to use the combined force to clear the Normandy coast, while awaiting Parma. It was this proposal that miscarried. If Parma came, Henry hoped that the queen would send some veteran bands from Flanders, as part of her 4,000, because everything would depend upon the quality of his army. He evidently envisaged a flexible force, and he explained how he proposed to employ it to block Parma’s path. Basically he intended to put strategic garrisons in place and to hold the Somme.12 Whereas Henry’s priority was to oppose Parma, Elizabeth latched on to the suggestion that their forces could meet at Dieppe and clear Normandy before the arrival of Parma. That Henry himself would have to go to meet the Germans seems not to have been considered. While pulling in different directions, Henry and Elizabeth were moving towards an imperfectly defined agreement. It proved to be unworkable because the time factors inherent in their endeavours were incalculable. It is tempting, and sad, to ponder what Henry might have achieved against Parma and the League with a paid German army and no Rouen distraction. Elizabeth did her best in respect of the Germans. She appears to have thought that they would enable the king to undertake the siege of Rouen, although she later said that they were meant to oppose Parma. She told the king that he must not be careless of his sea ports, especially Dieppe. She also reproved him for wasting time on places ‘of small importance’ when he ought to expel the Spanish from Brittany. He would conquer his enemies, she scolded, if only he 9

This fear of queen Elizabeth appears to have been entirely imaginary. Parma did not even come on account of Rouen. 10 Henry invested Chartres on 13 February 1591 and hoped to succeed in only a week. He entered the city on 19 April. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 232, 14 February 1591, Henry IV to Nevers. 11 Rymer, Foedera, xvi, 89-92, 30 January/9 February 1590/1, instructions for Edmund Yorke; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 310-16. Henri de la Tour d’Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, went to England about 14 February 1591. Yorke sailed for France on 17 February, landed at Dieppe and went to Caen. Ibid., 306-8, 27 January/6 February 1591, instructions for Yorke. 12 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 315-17, 26 February/8 March 1591. Yorke had returned to England by 9/19 March and reported to Burghley and Beauvoir.

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followed her advice. This advice, it has been seen, also included taking ‘better order’ against Parma, which must be in the east of France, far away from Normandy. This unreserved letter from Elizabeth, of 7/17 March 1591 (while Yorke was still in France), shows that she perceived French affairs only in terms of her own needs, with small understanding of Navarre’s predicaments. No contemporary, for instance, considered Chartres – to which the queen’s letter referred – a place ‘of small importance’.13 Ignorance of foreign circumstances rendered Elizabeth both suspicious and vulnerable. It transpired that she possessed no appropriate maps, without which strategy could not be appreciated.14 While Henry prepared to send de Reau to England – hard on the heels of Yorke – Elizabeth decided, without consultation, to send sir John Norris to Brittany, and sir Roger Williams, with a detachment of 600, to secure Dieppe. De Reau was to inform the English of the arrival of 3,000 more Spanish in Brittany, but to ensure that Elizabeth did not therefore neglect the ‘other’ help that Henry required and requested. Otherwise, he would be unable to keep the field, fortify Picardy, or oppose Parma. Elizabeth seems not to have understood, although she had certainly been told, that fortifying Picardy was an intrinsic aspect of resisting Parma.15 When Henry emerged from the siege of Chartres, on 19 April 1591, he was faced with a dual crisis: one in Brittany because of the Spanish, and the other in Champagne where Mayenne was besieging Château-Thierry. While Elizabeth’s attention was on the sea coasts and Brittany, it is clear from Henry’s correspondence that his mind was on Picardy and Champagne. Unaware of the commissions to Norris and Williams, and impatient to know what Elizabeth would offer, Henry wrote Beauvoir what proved to be a seminal letter. He had, Henry wrote on 19 April 1591, asked queen Elizabeth for help by three successive envoys, in order to enable him to oppose Parma. If, however, Parma delayed, they could attempt some other enterprise [meanwhile]. Henry had an opportunity that he was sure would be agreeable to the queen – he did not name Rouen, possibly for reasons of security. Beauvoir was to keep pressing his requests and to urge speed.16 This letter was surely not intended to deceive the queen because, at the time, the king did not

13

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 316-17, 7/17 March 1591, queen Elizabeth to Henry IV, 317, 17/27 March 1591, Grimeston to Burghley, explaining why Henry could not abandon the heart of France to his enemies. 14 Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, 27 and n.50. Burghley complained of the inadequacy of his map and Unton sent him another one. Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 280-2, 25 January/4 February 1592, Burghley to Unton, 306-11, 8/18 February 1592, Unton to Burghley. 15 Yorke had returned to England by 19 March 1591. Rymer, Foedera, xvi, 94-5, instructions for sir Roger Williams. He had a commission, dated 6/16 April 1591 and was not to leave Dieppe or at least the immediate area. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 317-25, 6 April 1591, Henry IV to Beauvoir. A contract for aid to Brittany was signed on 3/13 April and the English landed on 2/12 May 1591. Ibid., 337. On 6/16 April 1591, Williams was instructed to take 600 men to Dieppe, where he arrived on 10/20 April. Ibid., 330. Antoine de Moret, seigneur de Reau (or des Réaux) reached Portsmouth on 9 April and was back in France by 20 May 1591, ibid., 326, 10/20 May 1591, Grimeston to Burghley. 16 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 325, 19 April 1591, Henry IV to Beauvoir, also in Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 379-83. Henry proposed to undertake ‘quelque bonne entreprise comme j’en ay en ma main une occasion, qui je m’asseure seroit très agréable à la dicte dame’.


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expect Parma before the end of the summer.17 It did, however, obscure the problems of Picardy and Champagne, and the fact that he would have to meet the German army himself. These were all things which could, and should, have been clarified during the ensuing discussions. The Rouen project was strongly encouraged by Williams and Otwell Smith, both of whom favoured English support for Navarre.18 Williams was perfectly aware of the need to oppose Parma; but he extolled the financial advantages of taking Rouen. With 4,000 English foot, he said, the king could beat Parma and, if Parma dared not fight, the king would take Rouen ‘if he came before it’. These observations confused the issue even further. Once the king held one of his best towns, Williams continued, he could ‘make all Spain shake’ by his own means; her Majesty’s wars [in France] would then be ended. This was a seductive argument. If, however, England neglected this advice, she would be forced to fight alone, ‘for the state of France cannot stand this,’ Williams assured the privy council, ‘but in time must needs fall with wants at the mercy of the Spanish’. Williams and Smith therefore urged that Henry should be persuaded to besiege Rouen – which indicates that he was not yet committed. It would be better to ‘succour him once roundly’ to win some of his chief towns than to keep on giving ‘small helps’; that only prolonged the struggle. In this way – the telling argument – Elizabeth might recover the money already spent on France.19 The queen was evidently persuaded, since she promised de Reau 3,000-4,000 men for Rouen. Then, hearing of increased Spanish activity in Brittany, she changed her mind about Normandy. If she granted the men, Henry must, after all, bear the whole cost.20 Beauvoir protested vigorously. He and de Reau had already led the king to expect 4,000 men for two or three months, either if Parma entered France before the Germans arrived, or if the king besieged Rouen. They expected the king, upon de Reau’s report, to undertake the siege. This was doubtless the point, since it would clearly be too late to send a force from England to oppose Parma once he had arrived. Three days later, Beauvoir protested again: the king, he said, might already be approaching Rouen on the strength of their assurance.21 Henry’s council was divided. He conferred with Biron, who favoured the siege, and inquired of Edward Grimeston (Stafford’s servant) whether the merchants would lend 50,000 crowns for the campaign.22 The decision in favour of 17

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 372-5, 12 April 1591, Henry IV to Montmorency. Williams and Smith were both in Dieppe. After the fall of Chartres, Navarre went to relieve ChâteauThierry on the Marne, but was too late. In May, he went to Senlis and Saint-Denis, and in June to places on the Seine. Then, as it has been seen, he joined his council at Mantes. 19 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 327, 11/21 April 1591, Williams to the privy council, 327, 24 April/4 May 1591, Smith to Burghley. 20 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 328-9, 22 April/2 May 1591, Burghley and Hatton to Williams, 339, 2/12 May 1591, the queen’s answer to the French; Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, 69-70. 21 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, pp. 339-40, 3/13 May 1591, Beauvoir to Burghley, 340, 6/16 May 1591, Beauvoir to Burghley. Before the return to France of de Reau, Smith reported that the king was coming to besiege Rouen if the queen would aid him with 4,000 men and ten cannons. This was not, of course, an English commitment, and Smith was making mischief. Ibid., 340, 4/14 May 1591, Smith to Burghley. 22 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 328, 29 May/8 June 1591, Grimeston to Burghley. 18

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Rouen may have been clinched in England by Smith, who was supported by Burghley and the privy council. In addition to the arguments already advanced, Smith proposed that if Henry were induced to grant the queen the Rouen customs receipts she could, within two years, recoup all the money she had ever expended on Henry of Navarre.23 After assisting Biron to take Louviers – one necessary preliminary to the siege of Rouen – Williams went to see the king at Vernon on the Seine, probably about 11 June 1591. It was thought that Henry would soon go to Dieppe and send de Reau back with an answer, presumably to the English offer of unpaid troops.24 Henry, however, was detained because his Swiss troops were mutinous, which demonstrated sufficiently that he could not raise money. He spoke of besieging Pontoise or Sens, and wanted Williams to accompany him. Williams necessarily declined, dutifully insisting upon the importance of the sea coasts.25 It is not clear whether Smith’s proposal to grant Elizabeth the revenues of Rouen was put to the king, some variant of which could have been potentially acceptable. But it does appear that both monarchs were, to a degree, coerced into undertaking the Rouen campaign by interested parties and the process of bargaining.26 As late as the middle of June 1591, therefore, the siege of Rouen was not yet determined. The king’s mind was on Picardy and Champagne; he also urgently needed to join his council at Mantes – it has already been seen – to attend to various political and religious problems. The stark facts were that Henry had no money and desperately needed the queen’s help; he had no other recourse. De Reau’s instructions, dated 13 June 1591, were emollient, grateful and complaisant in tone. They also summarised the state of the AngloFrench negotiation, as Navarre understood it. For the queen’s enlightenment, Henry detailed the tactics he had employed ever since the death of Henry III. Furthermore, he explained that he lacked the artillery and munitions necessary for any great enterprise [Paris or Rouen]. He realised that the queen did not share his priorities referring, no doubt, to her ignorant gibe about places of ‘small importance’. But, he said, he had constantly to supervise the captured towns [in the Parisian area] for fear of losing them again; this was limiting. Henry welcomed the queen’s advice and would follow it so far as he could – a singularly amiable response to her lofty patronising. He acknowledged the importance of the maritime places; nevertheless, de Reau was to explain that Henry could not yet concentrate on them. Did de Reau, one wonders, ever convey that important caveat? Before de Reau’s first mission [about 6 April 1591], the instruction continued, Henry had twice already requested 4,000 men (besides the aid for Brittany). This aid was required in order to oppose Parma, who was reported to be ready to enter France. Henry 23

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 328, 29 May/8 June 1591, Smith to Burghley; Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, 76, n.72, says that Smith anticipated a highly lucrative post for himself in Rouen. 24 This arrangement would not, in fact, have suited the queen who did care whether her forces were paid and what became of them. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 187, 4/14 June 1591, Williams to queen Elizabeth; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 243-4. 25 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers ii, 245, 11 June 1591, Henry IV to Nevers, Vernon. He said that he still intended to come to Champagne which Nevers had been expecting ever since the siege of Chartres. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 188-9, 4/14, 9/19 June 1591, Williams to the queen. 26 Wernham, ‘Queen Elizabeth and the Siege of Rouen’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series, xv (1932), 167, says – without evidence – that Henry offered Elizabeth the Rouen customs.


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had offered, if there was time to spare before Parma arrived, to use the force where the queen thought best. He had, he said, hoped to make the attempt easier by means of certain practices [?such as taking Louviers]. He was ‘comforted’ in this ‘design’ by Elizabeth’s reply and offers to de Reau which, though limited, were of great consequence.27 So, being assured of her help, he readily resolved upon ‘it’ [the siege of Rouen] and again dispatched de Reau to inform the queen of that resolution. Meanwhile he was beginning to prepare his forces. Henry hoped that the queen, having heard his needs, would not deny them. Though he really wanted 5,000-6,000 men, he only asked for 4,000, paid for two months, plus a substantial list of auxiliary requests for specialised services and equipment, as well as ships to guard the mouth of the Seine.28 Furthermore, Henry wanted money for his Swiss, and permission to raise 200,000 crowns in London. He declared that he had various things to be done in Picardy, exploits which might serve to mislead the enemy as to his real intentions. A Papal force was on its way to support the League and, Henry added, the enemy was about to make a great effort to overthrow him. He expressed the hope that the earl of Essex might be appointed as the queen’s commander.29 This important instruction raises problems. It appears that Henry had been undecided about the siege of Rouen before seeing Williams at Vernon about 11 June 1592. Now – only a day or two later – he was sending de Reau to inform the queen that he was resolved upon it; but he would need substantial help. Nevertheless, he still put Parma first; he explicitly stated that he could not yet concentrate on the maritime areas; also that there were tasks to be accomplished in Picardy. He did not mention either the Germans or any tentative timetable. In other words, execution of the Rouen campaign was conditional upon unpredictable circumstances. Henry’s resolution was not meant to be construed as a promise – though the difference between a resolution and a promise might be subtle. While such ambivalence was doubtless ill-advised, this instruction for de Reau was either careless or clever. Williams and Smith sustained their pressure on the queen at precisely this time, stressing the importance of Rouen. Williams’ view was broader than that of the queen. He saw how easily Henry could be overthrown and feared that the Spanish might enter Normandy. Then all the burden of the [anti-Spanish] wars would be on the queen. To Williams, Normandy was the area in which Navarre must be assisted to make a stand, and this meant taking Rouen.30 Thus, by some blend of desire and wishful thinking, the queen was apparently encouraged to ignore the reality that Henry’s movements depended upon factors beyond his control and, in the first place, Parma. While Henry was at Mantes during the first half of July 1592 attending to the problems caused by the hostile Papacy, the Normandy negotiation was concluded in England. Elizabeth and Burghley are said to have been acting upon ‘an important 27

It is not clear whether Henry was referring to the queen’s original offer of paid forces, or her revised offer on 2/12 May 1591 of unpaid forces. 28 Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, 74. 29 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 314-17, 13 June 1591, instructions for de Reau. Mayenne met the Papal forces in Bar on 13 September 1591, de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 502. 30 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 317, 4/14 June 1591, Williams and Smith to Burghley.

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strategic principle,’ namely that of ‘offensive action to attain a limited object within a defensive war against a superior enemy’.31 This is explained by the queen’s supreme anxiety to recoup her escalating expenses, for which Rouen offered the best hope. This ‘strategic principle’ indicates, however, that the problem of Parma had been disregarded. A comprehensive and properly drafted treaty was required. But the agreement, which related only to Rouen, was a botched and incomplete affair, run up in a hurry. A preliminary contract was signed on 25 June/5 July 1591, by which the queen agreed to send 3,400 men to join the 600 already in France with sir Roger Williams. Elizabeth undertook to advance the forces’ pay for two months. In return, she would receive the total profits of all tolls, taxes and duties levied in and around Rouen and Le Havre, until Henry’s entire debt was cancelled; an extraordinary undertaking in time of war. After two months, the English force could be recalled unless the French guaranteed their further payment. Whether the troops might, or might not, remain any longer was left ambiguous because of the queen’s uncertainty.32 In these circumstances, the capture of Rouen would not – as Williams had suggested – have enabled the king to sustain the wars from his own resources. A further contract for the Rouen customs was signed on 29 June/9 July 1591, and Beauvoir delivered a personal bond for the ratification of the agreement.33 But why, one must query, was the contract only for Rouen when Henry had always said, and continued to say, that he wanted help against Parma? The French envoys obtained agreement that the force should not await the French ratification, which would take too long. Henry replied to letters from Beauvoir on 10 July 1592 when he was with his council at Mantes.34 Henry expressed his satisfaction that matters were so well advanced for the new help which he had requested [about which de Reau was currently in England], and that it was assured. Can one deduce from this one observation that Henry was aware of the terms of the impending agreement, and knew that Beauvoir was about to sign away the Rouen customs? This would be a surprisingly brief allusion to so important a matter, and in so long a letter. Henry referred at greater length to troops and equipment agreed for sir John Norris [who was to go to Brittany]. In this connection it was reasonable, Henry wrote, that the queen should be assured of the reimbursement of her expenses. Indeed he noted that Beauvoir had already agreed to this by virtue of a general authorisation which he held, to be used if necessary (‘en virtu du pouvoir que avez de moy qui est general pour toutes semblables occasions ou il y aura lieu de l’employer’). Presumably it was also by virtue of this general ‘pouvoir’ that Beauvoir signed the bond consigning the Rouen customs to the queen, of which on 10 July, Henry was not yet aware; nor is there any apparent sign that the contract was ever ratified; indeed, there is no further mention of the

31

Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, 78. Rymer, Foedera, xvi, 102-3, articles accorded by Beauvoir and de Reau for Normandy, 25 June/5 July 1591. Also in Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 320-1. 33 Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, 76 n.72. The contract for the Rouen customs was signed the same day. 34 PRO SP 78/24/309, 10 July 1591, Henry IV to Beauvoir from Mantes; Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, 76-7. I am grateful to Professor Howell Lloyd for his advice and an interesting discussion about the Normandy agreement. 32


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matter. Did it, one must wonder, affect Henry’s attitude to the whole, burdensome Rouen enterprise? There is much about this curious transaction that remains unclear.

II: The Arrival of Essex, August 1591 Some three weeks after the contract for Normandy – namely Rouen – was agreed, there were rumours from France that Henry’s intentions lay elsewhere. Thereupon, Elizabeth hesitated and ‘stayed’ the levy of forces (15/25 July 1591). Beauvoir immediately protested; he denied the rumours; and he urged that in any case several small, strategic, places would have to be taken before the siege could begin. He insisted that the enterprise must be carried out in August 1591. By the end of August, he said, the German army would doubtless be in France, and those at Rouen would see that there was no hope of relief.35 Was Beauvoir really authorised to say such things, or did he panic, fearing that the queen had again changed her mind? The agreements made in England on 5 and 9 July 1591 did not conform to de Reau’s instructions of 13 June which, however imprecise, had not concealed Henry’s priorities. Indeed, he had expressly observed that his priorities differed from those of the queen – and yet it appears that his agents had completely disregarded them. The role of the French envoys in England is bewildering. One would be tempted to suppose that they were desperate to get an English force into France and gambled on the consequences, were it not for the king’s own candour. It was timing and money about which he had been vague, not his objectives. While the levy for France went ahead after all, and with abnormal celerity, queen Elizabeth seems to have known in her heart that this incomplete and shambolic arrangement would not work. She had feared from the outset that her efforts and forces would be wasted; and she was so annoyed about problems over Brittany that she threatened to recall sir John Norris.36 The instructions for her noble commander, the earl of Essex, were neither helpful nor fair, containing no hint of the restrictions she intended to impose on him. Conscious of the queen’s great condescension towards France, Essex was to impress upon the king how necessary it was to use the force profitably, during the two months for which it was granted.37 Essex was explicitly sent to help the king suppress his rebels and to expel foreign enemies. The troops should be joined with the king’s ‘great force’ [which sounds like the Germans] so as not to be unprofitably wasted. Essex was speedily to learn the king’s purposes and how he meant to employ the English – matters which might well have been arranged in advance.38 This instruction, which shows no sign of forbidding Essex to assist the king against Parma – on the contrary – does not tally with the Normandy contract. That had related exclusively to Rouen – albeit without any explicit obligation to besiege the city. If Henry’s instructions to de Reau had been imprecise and ambivalent, the English were no less so. Beauvoir had said that the siege 35

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 324, 15/25 July 1591, Beauvoir to Burghley. Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 12-14, 27 July/6 August 1591, Burghley to Unton, 1718, 3/13 August 1591, Burghley to Unton. 37 The dates are not given, but the eight weeks ran from 12 August 1591. 38 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 327-8, 21/31 July 1591, instructions for Essex. 36

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must take place in August. But, when de Reau returned from England, probably joining the king at Noyon late in July, Normandy did not feature in Henry’s immediate plans. After leaving his council at Mantes, on 16 July 1591, Henry took Conflans and five other places near Paris, between Saint-Denis and Pontoise. Then, thinking that he could take Noyon in a few days, he decided to attack; he did so partly in order to raise money to pay his Swiss troops. Noyon, however, received help before the king got there on 27 July. Then he deliberately prolonged the siege a little in the hope of luring Mayenne to battle; his overthrow, before the arrival of Parma, could have altered Henry’s prospects entirely. Furthermore, Henry had been promising, since before the siege of Chartres, that he would join Nevers, the ‘gouverneur’ of Champagne; and he still entertained that general intention. While at Noyon he learnt that his Germans were expected in Lorraine by 10 August; he hoped to be on the frontier to meet them and to give battle against Mayenne.39 By this time Nevers was angry and restless, threatening to quit his frontier province; Henry was obliged to send de Reau to reassure him.40 Henry is therefore unlikely to have told Beauvoir, or anyone else, that he would be in Normandy in August. These were the king’s circumstances when the earl of Essex landed at Dieppe on 10 August 1591, followed by his forces on 12 August – the date from which the queen’s payment for two months (eight weeks) was to run. Elizabeth was expecting the joint forces to go straight into action against Rouen. But there was nobody at Dieppe to meet, greet or direct the earl and his men.41 This egregious error, insulting to the queen, is difficult to explain. Elizabeth explicitly claimed that when the French envoys insistently required her to hasten her forces, she was assured that the king and his army would be ready in Normandy. With Essex came sir Henry Unton, who served as ambassador in France until June 1592. But he remained for some time at Dieppe, badly stricken with the ‘yellowe janders’. Sympathetic to the king, his invaluable reports throw much light upon Henry’s miserable condition, and reveal some of the pressures he became unable to resist. Unton’s instructions, dated 24 July/3 August 1591, were no more helpful than those of Essex, and contained no strict injunctions.42 The arrival of the queen’s volatile favourite, the earl of Essex, was an anti-climax. It was almost inevitable that the English would come either too late or too soon. An 39

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 433-5, 14 July 1591, Henry IV to Montmorency. Henry said he was going to Picardy and Champagne; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 232, 14 February 1591, 245, 11 June 1591, 247-8, 27 June 1591, 252, 15 July 1591, 255-7, 26 July 1591, Henry IV to Nevers; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 194-5, 11/21 August 1591, Grimeston to Burghley, 332-3, 14 August 1591, instructions for de Reau. 40 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 259-60, 1 August 1591, Henry IV to Nevers. De Reau left on 3 August 1591 to see Nevers. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 465-6, 19 August 1591, Henry IV to Nevers, said he was coming in three or four days; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 332-3, 14 August 1591, instructions for de Reau. 41 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 339-40, 13/23 September 1591, the privy council to Essex. 42 Rymer, Foedera, xvi, 103-5, no date, instructions for Unton; Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 1-4, 24 July/3 August 1591, instructions for Unton, 21-2, 3/13 August 1591, Unton to Hatton, 32-4, 15/25 August 1591, Unton to Burghley, 43-4, 22 August/1 September 1591, queen Elizabeth to Unton; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 329-30; ibid., 193, 27 July/6 August 1591, Burghley to Norris.


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expeditionary force could neither be raised and shipped overnight nor, once raised, be held in idleness consuming money and supplies. Furthermore, they were restricted to an impossibly rigid timetable – namely eight weeks from 12 August 1591. In these circumstances, both monarchs were confronted with the effects of their own negligence – or that of their servants. Henry wanted the reassurance of English troops in France in case Parma preceded the Germans but, for queen Elizabeth, Normandy was a dangerous gap in her defences. In the most unfortunate event, the arrival of the English coincided with news of coming of the Germans. Besides, Henry could not safely ignore Nevers in Champagne, while Parma’s unpredictability caused unavoidable changes of plan. Having lived for so long from hand to mouth, and from one day to the next, Henry was used to doing what he could as and when he could. This made him undeniably casual about time and money; queen Elizabeth, on the contrary, was punctilious and exigent. Now, in the late summer of 1591, the clash had come. Elizabeth, who had never been confident about this expensive and risky venture, soon wrote to Unton that such was the importunity of the king and his ambassadors, besides the inclination of the privy council, ‘as we were in a manner led thereunto against our owne opinion’.43 The pressure on the queen was evidently strong, and there was no easy alternative. Elizabeth was not prepared – and not able – simply to subsidise the King of France for no more palpable reward than his continued opposition to Spain; neither could she carelessly await his overthrow. Now she was trapped by an evolving problem, and escalating expenses that she had done her utmost to avoid. She neither trusted her appointed servants, nor could she control them from a distance; her anger extended to everyone concerned. Thoroughly upset and anxious, Elizabeth adopted an unhelpful attitude of wounded dignity; she became querulous and irresolute, thereby adding to Henry’s burdens. Henry had heard of the arrival of Essex and the English forces by 14 August 1591. He wrote the queen two letters of gratitude and obligation and apologised for not having been in Normandy. He sent de Reau to Essex with a memoir for the queen.44 His message was that the timing had miscarried. Whereas Rouen could once have taken priority [roughly from April to July 1591], circumstances had completely changed. Parma, with larger forces than previously expected, might invade at any moment – the League claimed within ten days – and a Papal force was shortly to join Mayenne. One could argue that Henry was at fault because the period during which the siege might have taken priority had mainly preceded the Normandy agreement. He did not, however, blame anyone, nor did he try to back out. Indeed, he was determined to proceed, and the best way to ensure success was to meet and bring up his Germans. He could not, in fact do anything else. The memoir described the arrangements he had made to secure Champagne and Burgundy and to intercept the Papal forces. Henry’s hope was to scatter the enemy, leaving fewer of them to go to the relief of Rouen. He explained that he must go in person 43

Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 43-4, 22 August/1 September 1591, queen Elizabeth to Unton. 44 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 459-60, c. 14 August 1591, Henry IV to queen Elizabeth, 461-2, 15 August 1591, Henry IV to queen Elizabeth; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 332-3, 14 August 1591, instructions for de Reau, which was the memoir.

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to meet the Germans, who had to be deployed in different places. But, on account of Essex, Henry proposed to retain only a minimal force himself. The rest, under Biron, were to prepare the Rouen enterprise together with the English. Henry then reverted to his original, auxiliary requests, which his envoys ought surely to have settled before Elizabeth believed him to be committed to the siege.45 It was inevitable, in these circumstances, that the king needed to confer with Essex, who was forbidden to leave the area close to Dieppe. Nevertheless they did meet at Pierrefonds, at the end of August 1591, and made appropriate arrangements. Biron, Montpensier and Essex would begin by taking Gournay and Caudebec which were, precisely, necessary preparations for the siege of Rouen. Henry promised to observe the queen’s injunctions as exactly as he could, and to use her forces with consideration.46 A week after having made these arrangements, Henry suddenly heard that Parma would come in ten or twelve days’ time; he might either intercept the Germans or fall upon the royal forces. That Parma might move just as the siege of Rouen was about to begin was the disastrous possibility that both parties had steadily ignored. Until Henry saw what Parma would do, it was impossible for him to divide his forces as he, Essex and Biron had agreed. He must now try to meet Parma and to seek battle, although he knew, by now, that Parma evaded battles. To one of his servants Henry expressed the wish to expel Parma before he had had time to dine. Consequently de Reau was ordered to England with an instruction of 14 August 1591, followed by another of 22 August. De Reau was to convey this fresh information, and to remind the queen of Henry’s original request. Accordingly, Henry now sought permission – if necessary – to employ Essex and his men against Parma. He hoped that Essex himself would help to persuade the queen, and that she would issue prompt orders for him ‘to conform himself’ to the king’s judgement. This was precisely what queen Elizabeth did not intend to allow. The problem is, however, difficult to explain since Essex’s instructions authorised him to help the king to suppress rebels and expel foreign enemies. By 12 September, Henry had heard that Parma might again be delayed for three months or more; two days later came contrary news that he meant to invade at the end of September.47 Henry himself was delayed at Noyon by various things, including illness. He left on 13 or 14 September for the frontier 45

Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 46-7, 23 August/2 September 1591, Unton to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 334, 23 August/2 September 1591, Unton to Burghley. De Reau was leaving and he landed at Portsmouth on 4 September 1591. 46 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 200, 2/12 September 1591, Essex to the privy council. Gournay fell on 26 September and Caudebec on 23 October 1591, ibid., 208, 213; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 475-7, – September 1591, Henry IV to queen Elizabeth. 47 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 333-4, 22 August 1591, fresh instructions for de Reau. There were various confusing reports about Parma; he was said to be the most discontented man in the world because he could not escape going to France, except by open insubordination. Burghley thought that he delayed, hoping that the Germans would disband for lack of pay. Parma told Jeannin that he would be in France by 8 or 10 September. Ibid., 385-9, 7 September 1591, Ibarra to Philip II. There were, however, very good domestic reasons for his delays, including his illness. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 480-1, 6 September 1591, Henry IV to Boisguerin, 482-3, 12 September 1591, Henry IV to Nevers, 483-4, 14 September 1591, Henry IV to Nevers.


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areas, as Mayenne joined up with the Papal forces. It was not until 20 October 1591 that Henry returned to Noyon. Thereafter he addressed himself to the siege of Rouen.48

III: The Queen’s Misapprehension These enforced changes of plan were Henry’s misfortune. He was also unfortunate in that queen Elizabeth had already begun to vent her ‘high discontentation’ on 28 August 1591. That was some two weeks before the arrival of de Reau with Henry’s explanatory memoirs of 14 and 22 August.49 Confusion and misunderstanding became worse confounded when their respective communications crossed, deepening their misapprehension of each other’s problems. Elizabeth wrote Henry two very pained letters, blaming his ‘long tarrying’ at Noyon for there not being time to take Rouen before Parma came, though she was not, as yet, properly informed. Rouen could not possibly have been taken between the arrival of Essex, on 10 August, and the king’s departure from Noyon in mid-September – and the queen was writing on 28 August. She had, she repeated, been promised that the king would be ready in Normandy awaiting the arrival of the English. She hoped that, by God’s grace, the king’s eyes might be opened, enabling him to distinguish between important and trivial matters. She instructed Unton to protest at the king’s ‘preposterous delays’, besieging a town ‘far off’ when her forces were ‘inutile’ (which her servants denied); she herself had been made to look foolish.50 Anxious, alienated and ill-informed, the queen waxed even more censorious after de Reau arrived with Henry’s two instructions. She complained that he had failed to deliver his letters until a week after his arrival, despite having passed within two miles of the court. Burghley lamented that de Reau could have done much to ease the tension, had he not deliberately shunned the court. De Reau had unwisely elected to deal with the privy council. This discourtesy worsened a bad situation, particularly as it coincided with the news of an escapade by Essex in which his brother had perished. Furthermore, Henry’s ‘tickle’ request – as Burghley would say – for permission for Essex and the English to serve against Parma, should have been persuasively pleaded with the queen herself. Instead it was improperly conveyed, on 11 September 1591, by means of a copy of a letter from the king to de Reau himself. It is therefore small wonder that he received

48

Biron had gout, which was one cause for delay; Henry was raising money in Noyon and selling land for the same purpose. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 475-6, 29 August 1591, Henry IV to Montmorency, 482-3, 12 September 1591, Henry IV to Nevers; Nouaillac, ‘La Fin de la Ligue’, Revue Henri IV, i (1905), 124 n.1. 49 De Reau’s communications of 14 and 22 August 1591 were not received in England until 11 September 1591. 50 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 35-9, 18/28 August 1591, Burghley to Unton, 39-40, 18/28 August 1591, queen Elizabeth to Henry IV, 41, 18/28 August 1591 (2), queen Elizabeth to Henry IV, 43-4, 22 August/1 September 1591, queen Elizabeth to Unton, 48-9, 28 August/7 September 1591, Unton to Grimeston, 52-5, 31 August/10 September 1591, Unton to Burghley.

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a swift and curt reply: if the king did not promptly assemble all his forces to besiege Rouen, the queen would instantly withdraw hers.51 Neither the agreement of 5 July 1591 nor the instructions for Essex had precluded English assistance against Parma; nor had the queen ever overtly rejected this priority. Yet now, when a crisis loomed and Henry sought her express permission, Elizabeth was furiously indignant. She condemned the request as being one ‘to employ our forces to some other purpose, as the French kinge should find it goode for himselfe’. To refer in this way to an invasion of France by the duke of Parma, reinforced by a Papal army, was obtuse; it was also unbecoming after her own insulting observations to the king on the subject of Parma’s return. As recently as the time of Essex’s departure in August, Elizabeth wrote that, when their forces were joined, Henry must ‘stop up every route’ by which Parma might come.52 Now she feared the effects on her men of campaigning so far afield; it would ‘greatly pluck them down’. She also feared the ‘inestimable charges to which these motions might drive her’. Sir Thomas Leighton and sir Henry Killigrew, appointed to supervise Essex, must insist that he ‘observe the purpose for which we sent him’.53 A disastrous failure in communication had occurred, and essential issues had been neglected and obscured. As neither monarch had deliberately sought to deceive the other, one might reasonably deduce that de Reau and Beauvoir were among those at fault; surely a higher standard of diplomacy could have averted the very serious imbroglio which now existed? The basic trouble was, of course, financial; one of the queen’s two, precious months had already expired. No one dared to guarantee that the king would pay the English after the second month, though everyone knew how badly he needed them. The full blast of this furore had fortunately not yet hit the king when he next heard that Parma meant to invade on 28 September. Henry began to assemble all the forces he could – even from distant provinces – preparatory to seeking battle.54 What is more, he informed Beauvoir on 14 September 1591 that his German army was smaller than expected; he was trying to intercept the Papal force, and he really did need help. Henry did not then know that Parma had actually been detained once again; but his unpredictability exposed the king to misrepresentation. Wars, Henry said, were subject to accidents and changes.55 He wished Beauvoir to make the queen understand this, and to understand the sort of enemy he had to contend with. Nevertheless, he had not changed his mind about Rouen, and referred to the useful arrangements he and Biron had made 51

Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 86-7, 24 September/4 October 1591, Burghley to Unton, received only at the end of November. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 334-5, 1/11 September 1591, the queen’s reply to the French. 52 Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, 107, citing PRO SP 78/25/94. 53 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 55-7, 2/12 September 1591, queen Elizabeth to Leighton and Killigrew, 59-61, 6/16 September 1591, Burghley to Unton. Burghley was in trouble as the ‘principal furtherer’ but advised perseverance. Ibid., 68-70, 13/23 September 1591, Unton to Burghley. 54 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 480-1, 6 September 1591, Henry IV to Boisguerin, 483-4, 14 September 1591, Henry IV to Nevers. 55 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 336, 14 September 1591, Henry IV to Beauvoir, ‘les affaires de la guerre...sont subjectes à tant de divers accidents que, selon qu’ils arrivent, il faut changer d’avis et faire nouvelle resolution’.


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with Essex. If he first overcame Parma, Rouen would be theirs. Furthermore, Henry was burdened with other acute anxieties. He had heard that the pope was sending a cardinal legate to proceed to the election of a pro-Spanish king. Not having received the queen’s angry letter of 28 August 1591, Henry still hoped that she would allow Essex to join him. He went so far as to say that Beauvoir might seek the queen’s advice on Parma versus Rouen; but, if he had a chance to fight before her answer came, ‘comme chose nécessaire’, he must take it. On the other hand, he did not wish to risk forfeiting the queen’s forces, which is precisely what was already mooted. Both monarchs were now locked into a quandary of their own making, while their servants writhed in an agony of apprehension bordering on despair.56 Furthermore, relations were again confounded by the crossing of correspondence. The queen was still unaware of Henry’s two letters to Beauvoir of 14 and 17 September 1591 when she issued her declaration of 4 October recalling Essex and her forces. The queen’s declaration was unpalatably self-righteous; she stressed her own generosity towards the king, and complained of the indignities to which she and her people had been subjected. She asserted that because the German forces could not be speedily raised, and Parma was not expected early in the year, there had been time for the Rouen campaign. This conviction that the king had negligently failed to execute the siege of Rouen in the summer of 1591, already expressed in her letter of 28 August, was apparently based upon a misapprehension that Rouen could be taken in three weeks. Some mischievous special pleader had evidently offered this assurance – indeed Elizabeth called it a promise.57 Her agreement to send 4,000 men, the declaration continued, was for this purpose [namely Rouen]. The king was going into Picardy in order ‘to conceal the plan’, but he would be ready with all his forces to besiege Rouen.58 Yet, after her speedy effort [to raise forces], which was ‘worthy to be remembered’, the king was ‘far off in the furthest part of Picardy’. The plan, Elizabeth claimed, was agreed on 25 June/5 July 1591, and de Reau returned to the king with the contract.59 Clearly these things should never have been agreed by his envoys and, if the king was duly informed, he should not have let them pass. He did not, however, know when either the Germans or Parma would come; nor did he know, until somewhat later, of the queen’s grave misconception as to how long the siege might take. Possibly Henry was careless; possibly he took a calculated risk; possibly he imagined that queen Elizabeth knew things that she did not know; probably the envoys committed him too far. Part of the queen’s annoyance arose from the fact that sir Roger Williams had been called from Dieppe to the siege of Noyon, and a great 56

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 336, 17 September 1591, Henry IV to Beauvoir. This important explanation of the queen’s otherwise inexplicable attitude emerged only later, in the instructions for sir Thomas Wilkes of 12/22 March 1592. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 373-6. There must, nevertheless, have been men at court who knew better. 58 Henry had actually said that his going into Picardy might have the effect of concealing the plan, not that he was going for that purpose. Here, perhaps was a semantic problem, or maybe one of translation, although the queen did speak French. 59 Nothing emerges about de Reau’s return or the king’s reaction to the contract. It rather looks as if he was presented with a fait accompli. 57

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number of his men had perished. War might be war, but the queen entertained an unfamiliar distinction between national service and that of an auxiliary force; the latter ought not to be endangered. Williams, her own servant, the declaration continued, had been sent to bring Essex to confer with the king, which was also to carry him away from his charge. Instead of coming to Rouen the king went further away, while Biron besieged Pierrefonds (Oise) instead of going to Normandy. When Biron finally sent for Essex, only thirteen days of the Normandy contract remained, and so forth. Then, through a bare message (from de Reau), Elizabeth had been asked to ‘engage her people so far [against Parma] that they would hardly or never return to their country’. This was a matter ‘unreasonable to be demanded and absurd to be granted’. The world, she felt, would condemn her for ‘yielding such great succours...without any fruit thereof’. She taxed the king with carelessness, contempt and mockery. To avoid further ill-treatment, she meant to revoke her general and her forces. An addendum stated the additional reason that no order had been issued for the payment of her men after 6 October; hope only had been expressed. The king, when he asked for Essex to help him against Parma had said never a word about money. Thereafter the queen would be ‘more circumspect in trusting to these kinde of promises’. Beauvoir protested strongly, restating the king’s case. He made it clear that, at the time of writing (14 and 22 August), Henry had not known that Parma would withdraw again from the frontier. Furthermore, if Henry had dropped everything to go to Rouen when the English arrived, he would have been obliged thereafter to raise the siege. There was, therefore, no way in which Henry could have given satisfaction; but now the queen’s declaration of 4 October 1591, and her sensational recall of Essex, made it difficult for her to back down.60 De Reau returned to the king on 5 October 1591 with the message, whether or not in writing, that the queen meant to revoke her forces if their payment was not forthcoming after the end of the second month. But Henry had not yet seen her angry declaration of 4 October when he wrote his long apology of 9 October 1591; this was addressed to Beauvoir from Attigny (Ardennes) near the frontier.61 Henry had, he said, explained to Beauvoir the reasons for his journey to the north east, where he found that his presence was necessary to retain the loyalty of his forces. Otherwise, those who had joined him would either not have come, or not have stayed, just when Parma had appeared likely to enter France at the end of September. When the English arrived Henry had, unfortunately, been needed simultaneously in two provinces distant from each other. After deliberation, his presence in the east had been considered indispensable. But it was said that he would not be failing in his obligation if he sent Biron, with the bulk of his army, to join with the English in conducting preliminary operations in Normandy. Henry deeply regretted that – as de Reau said – the queen accused him of breaking his promises. 60

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 342, 23 September/3 October 1591, queen Elizabeth to Essex, 3434, 24 September/4 October 1591, the queen’s declaration and 28 September/8 October 1591 addendum thereto, 345, 24 September/4 October 1591, Beauvoir’s protest. 61 Halphen, Lettres inédites du Roi Henri IV, 43-8, 5 October 1591, Henry IV ?to Nevers. Henry said that he had left Attigny on 30 September on a reconnaissance, and had sought battle with the Papal forces near Verdun. He had twice been out of the country, once to Lorraine and once to Luxembourg.


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He denied having betrayed her. Deliberations upon affairs which depended for their execution upon other people must not be interpreted as absolute promises; and the chances of war required changes. This element of uncertainty was obvious to the king, but not to queen Elizabeth. He had not, he said, departed from the Rouen plan; the only alteration lay in the timing. But, to Elizabeth, that was precisely the point. It was generally agreed that he must try to prevent Parma and the Papal forces from invading France together [which they did]. When he asked to be allowed to summon Essex, he had expected this to be gladly agreed because success at Rouen would be very unlikely if current obstacles were not first removed. Besides, Henry claimed, the agreement had been for help either against Parma or for the siege of Rouen (‘ce fut pour l’une ou l’aultre fin que je luy demanday: ou du siège de Rouen, ou de combattre le duc de Parme si l’occasion s’en offrait la première’). Elizabeth naturally stood upon the contract of 5 July 1591, whereas the agreement that Henry had in mind was one that his envoys had failed to formalise. Furthermore, Henry continued, the queen herself had most expressly exhorted him to obstruct Parma’s entry, which showed that she understood the importance of doing so. Having seen the queen’s reply, [brought by de Reau on 5 October] Henry had decided to abandon various advantageous opportunities and to leave these (north eastern) areas in some danger. Unwisely naming a date, he now aimed to reach Normandy by the end of October. He hoped Beauvoir could placate the queen and induce her to leave her forces in France for the (unspecified) time he would need. Beauvoir was also to ask her to continue to pay them, if he could not manage it himself. This would, after all, facilitate her complete reimbursement from Rouen. The request was not placatory, but it defined the queen’s dilemma. Alas, she ‘found no satisfaction by any reason therein used’, and doubted the king’s intentions all the more. She remained convinced that he spent his time ‘in private journeys upp and downe before the coming of the allmagnes’.62 The queen’s discomfiture was comprehensible; nevertheless, with a little more imagination she could have appreciated that the king’s most intractable problem was, like her own, financial. Not only the French, but the queen’s own servants were utterly distraught. Unton, whose relations with the king were excellent, was placed in an excruciating position. More clearly than anyone else, he perceived the gravity of the situation in France. But he was constrained to behave correctly as the queen’s ambassador. To Burghley, he said that the siege would last longer than the forty days’ extension the queen was prepared to contemplate if Henry undertook to pay her men. But, without the English, it would not proceed at all, ‘the kinge in his estate being only holden upp by her Majesty’s gracious favour’.63 Any ‘untimely revocation’ of her forces would ‘quail the reiters...and so animate the enemie as he will grow insolent and victorious’. Besides, manifestation of the queen’s favour was an important psychological factor, without which the king would lose support. Unton also feared that Parma might overwhelm the king, because the Germans, 62

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 832-7 (sic), 9 October 1591, Henry IV to Beauvoir; Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 110-12, 15/25 October 1591, Burghley to Unton. 63 Elizabeth did care about the welfare of her troops; and she needed to care because manpower was limited, and recruiting was difficult and unpopular.

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if unpaid, would break at once.64 Unton’s anxiety was shared by his compatriots. Yorke declared that to revoke the forces would be the ‘dangerousest policy in the world’; and Smith wrote that although the king would not come for a month, he would not come at all if the English were recalled. Essex agreed that, without help, the king’s forces would disband, in which case Parma could please himself.65 Clearly the King of France was balanced on a knife edge.

IV: The King’s Distress Henry finally met what proved to be a recalcitrant German army on 29 September 1591.66 He was still worried about Parma, and Nevers continued to give trouble in Champagne. It was therefore against his better judgement that Henry returned to Noyon in Picardy by 20 October. But he had said he would be at Rouen by 21 October and, later on, by the end of the month. These were deadlines he was unable to meet on account of military problems beyond his control; the long-awaited Germans were almost more trouble than help. Unton, also in disfavour with the queen, was deeply concerned. The king, he told Burghley, was now on his way. ‘I finde by his words greate affection, and in his discourse a good and sharpe judgement, great memory, quick concept and readie answears’. He was not annoyed by Unton’s ‘plain manner of dealing’ but he remained evasive about money. ‘At length [Henry] discovered his wants to me, promisinge hereafter he would deale more plainelye with her Majesty, and acknowledged his errors’.67 Unton went on to describe just how close Henry came to failure and collapse, for lack of sufficient support at home and abroad; it is the most graphic account that we have. Many, he wrote, feared that the Germans would mutiny for want of pay; then the king would be lost. Unless he changed his religion, ‘which they nowe urge verie greatly’, the [royalist] catholics were ready to rebel and the towns to revolt. Intercepted letters disclosed such a conspiracy between the cardinal de Bourbon and Épernon. Catholics began to persecute protestants, sought to exclude them from offices, and were jealous when the king conferred with them. ‘I assure your lordship,’ Unton continued to Burghley, ‘the state of the kinge is most miserable and himselfe, as it were, forcible governed by the Catholickes; the people malitiously bente againste him through all of France’. The garrisons in the [conquered] towns consumed all his money. ‘His poverty is great and [he] hath no assurance of any [of] his subjectes but them of the relligion, who are fewe in number and of smale power, yett doth he pollitickly temporise with them; all which best shewes his discretion’. Henry was 64

Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 68-70, 13/23 September 1591, Unton to Burghley, 7881, 18/28 September 1591, Leighton and Killigrew to the privy council. The queen was now so angry that she disliked all her servants in France. Ibid., 85, 20/30 September 1591, Burghley to Unton, 102-3, 1/11 October 1591, Unton to Burghley. 65 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 339, 13/23 September 1591, Yorke to Burghley, 339, 14/24 September 1591, Smith to Burghley, 340, 18/28 September 1591, Essex to the privy council. 66 Cloulas, ‘L’Armée pontificale’, Bulletin de la commission royale d’histoire, cxxvi (1960), 86. 67 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 110-12, 15/25 October 1591, Burghley to Unton, 11418, 18/28 October 1591, Unton to Burghley, 119-25, 18/28 October 1591, Unton to queen Elizabeth.


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supported by most of the nobility; but, being unpaid, they pleased themselves. The king was ‘loathe to discover his poore estate’ and equally loath to abuse the queen. ‘I must need confesse,’ he had said to Unton, ‘I am not able to pay [the English] and my wantes are so greate as I have not 500 crownes in my purse, nor where with all to pay my armye but the money which Normandy hath promised for the siege’. This, he said, ‘is my estate; and if the queen...revoke her forces, then will the German armye departe; and then everyone can judge of my successe’. In short, he would be forced ‘to leave the field and lose his crowne’. Rouen, Henry said a little later, was an exploit he undertook to please the queen, ‘against the will of most of his catholikes and divers provinces’. Unlike the queen, Unton truly believed that Henry’s wants were great; otherwise he would hardly suffer his army to mutiny.68 Unton’s predictions were confirmed directly. Henry had no sooner reached Noyon, late in October 1591, than a great mutiny among his Germans and defections to the enemy obliged him to depart again. He feared that the new duke of Saxony would cause others to quit and then the royalist catholics would also abandon him; the princes of the blood would ‘execute their malice’ and the towns would yield to the enemy. Henry could only trust in God, who had preserved him ‘more by miracles than means’ and was ‘able from stones to raise men’. If the siege of Rouen was to proceed, Henry still needed much more help from the queen, including his original, auxiliary requests; nor was he too chastened to plead for more. But, as Unton explained, Henry did not understand how little money the queen disposed of, ‘conceiving her treasure to be infinite’. Here, also, a higher standard of diplomacy might have helped.69 Unton shared the king’s privations in the field, traversing enemy territory together; and he found it a shattering experience.70 ‘The state of France,’ he reported, ‘is most miserable and lamentable and the necessities of the poor kinge such as he is forced to give over his tables in cost and in a manner himselfe wanteth breadd to eate. If I were not an ey[e] wittnesse hereof I could not beleave it.’ The foreigners had only been induced to march upon the promise of pay in two weeks’ time; and that was bluff. But he is, Unton said, ‘a most noble brave king of great patience and magnanymitie, not ceremonious, affable, famillier and only followed for his trewe valour; but very much hated for his relligion, and threatened by the catholiques to forsake him if he converte not’. This last observation reflected the pressure exerted by the bishops and

68

Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 114-18, 18/28 October 1591, Unton to Burghley, 12933, 6/16 November 1591, Unton to Burghley, 140-2, 9/19 November 1591, queen Elizabeth to Unton, 145-6, 11/21 November 1591, Burghley to Unton. Henry also said, on another occasion, that the siege of Rouen had been the will of his council, not his own. It is possible that, with changing fortunes, opinions also changed. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 379-80, 11 April 1592, the king’s answers to Wilkes. 69 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 119-25, 18/28 October 1591, Unton to queen Elizabeth, 133-8, 6/16 November 1591 (2), Unton to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 359, 29 November/9 December 1591, Unton to Burghley. 70 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 133-8, 6/16 November 1591 (2), Unton to Burghley. Unton felt his service to be ‘unpleasing to the king, unprofitable to the queen and not pleasing to himself’.

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chancellor who chose this ‘very unfit time’ [31 October] – it has been seen – to come and lobby for peace and Henry’s conversion.71 This was the king’s terrible plight as he finally approached Rouen; he was not even supported by his own followers. The siege began on 11 November 1591, after the necessary capture of Gournay and Caudebec, and the king arrived twelve days later. On 1 December Henry summoned Rouen to capitulate. He warned them not to rely on Parma because he would have to give battle before he could reach them. Unton had been careful to assure Burghley that the king would begin and continue the siege, whether Parma came or not.72 Somehow Unton’s moving dispatches affected the queen. She acknowledged the extremity of the king’s estate, and feared the dissolution of his army. Partially mollified, she did in fact, take action to help, despite all her protestations that she would not. Possibly she was alarmed by Unton’s report that both sides in the French civil war now wanted peace.73 Soon after the siege began, and just as things had improved a little, news was received of Parma’s arrival. This was critical; only about 400 of the English force now survived, and Unton believed that Parma meant to remain in France, abandoning the Low Countries. The king, he declared, ‘without her Majesty’s better assistance cannot encounter him [Parma] nor longe dwell in his owne kingdome’. These things would be clearly conveyed to the queen by Essex, who left for England on 30 November 1591.74 Learning of Parma’s arrival, and that he meant to take various places to secure his route, Henry turned to Unton. Accompanied by Revol and de Reau, he called upon the ambassador at eleven o’clock at night, ‘greatly troubled in mind’. With less than 10,000 men, and those not to be trusted, he could not conduct either a siege or a battle; yet Parma and Mayenne could be there – close to Rouen – in less than fifteen days. But, reduced to selling land and borrowing great sums of money, queen Elizabeth was determined to waste no more on France. She suspected that the king’s forces were treble what he 71

Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 128-9, 6/16 November 1591, Unton to Hatton, 12933, 6/16 November 1591, Unton to Burghley. The French bishops did not desist, but were either still there or else returned to badger the king on 9 December 1591. Ibid., 169-72, 29 November/9 December 1591, Unton to Burghley. 72 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 96-8, 27 September/7 October 1591, Unton to Burghley, 114-18, 18/28 October 1591, Unton to Burghley; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 507, 21 November 1591, Henry IV to Nevers, 509, 30 November 1591, Henry IV to Nevers, 510-11, 1 December 1591, Henry IV to Rouen. 73 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 125-8, 29 October/8 November 1591, Burghley to Unton, 129-33, 6/16 November 1591, Unton to Burghley, 133-8, 6/16 November 1591 (2), Unton to Burghley, 140-2, 9/19 November 1591, queen Elizabeth to Unton; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 347, 29 September/9 October 1591, secret letter, Burghley to Killigrew, 355-6, 8/18 November 1591, queen Elizabeth to Henry IV. 74 It has been seen that Alonso de Idiaquez returned to the Netherlands on 28 July 1591, from his mission to Spain, with formal orders for Parma to abandon his projects in the Netherlands, return to France and not to leave until Philip’s purpose was accomplished; nor was this the first time that Parma had been ordered back to France; Essen, Parma, 321. On 14 November 1591, Philip II issued a patent and instructions for Pierre-Ernest Mansfelt as temporary governor in the absence of Parma, Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iii, 604; Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 148-9, 19/29 November 1591, Unton to Burghley, 1501, 19/29 November 1591, Unton to queen Elizabeth, 151-2, 19/29 November 1591, Unton to Hatton, 155-9, 25 November/5 December 1591, Unton to queen Elizabeth.


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claimed; nor could she quickly raise and ship forces abroad in the winter. She did nothing to ease the king’s troubled mind by dispatching another of her haughty admonitions because he had dared to request a further 5,000 men. While Unton stuck to his low assessment of the king’s forces, it remained his dismal duty to discourage the king from seeking more help, ‘wherewith hee was very much appallede, saying he was weary of himselfe now her Majesty did abandon him, and wishede his death might fynishe his miseryes. At the last he demandede whether I could geve him noe better hope...’ Unton truly regretted that the queen was ‘so could (cold) towards the Kinge. He hath neede of more heate’ and without further aid ‘the cause will fainte’; but he dared not write as much to the queen herself. It was at this point that Henry decided to send Duplessis-Mornay to England, ‘to plead his broken estate’ – a move which unhappily displeased the queen even more.75 It was known for certain by 17 December 1591 that Parma had finally entered France. Henry was then in the wrong place and lacked everything he needed. Since he could not simultaneously command two operations, these were precisely the circumstances he had always tried to avert. This predicament, which first arose at the siege of Paris in 1590, and again at Rouen in 1591-2, reveals the king’s hopeless lack of resources, commanders and loyal support. Had the German forces defected at that moment, they might well have been enlisted by Parma. The queen, with Unton as intermediary, was at least instrumental in dissuading Anhalt, the German commander, from departing; they agreed to serve until the end of January 1592.76

V: Parma’s Negotiation It was Parma’s misfortune that he became involved, first in the relief of Paris and then in the relief of Rouen, when his principal purpose in returning to France was to obtain the election of the infanta. Philip II, now completely obsessed with France, was acting in cooperation with the Papacy. The complaisant Gregory XIV vouchsafed all the support that Sixtus V had withheld. Shortly after his election, in December 1590, Gregory had sent an extraordinary nuncio, Pietro Millino, to press Philip II for the election of a catholic king in France. Millino was followed by Dario Buccarino, whose mission probably coincided with those of Jeannin and Idiaquez.77 The dispatch of Marsilio Landriano to France, 75

Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 188-9, 4/14 December 1591, Unton to Essex, 190-2, 4/14 December 1591, Unton to Burghley, 193-4, 6/16 December 1591, Burghley to Unton, 195-6, 6/16 December 1591, queen Elizabeth to Unton, 198-200, 9/19 December 1591, Unton to Burghley, 203, 12/22 December 1591, Burghley to Unton, 205-6, 12/22 December 1591, queen Elizabeth to Henry IV, 212-15, 19/29 December 1591, Unton to Burghley, 217-19, 19/29 December 1591, Unton to Cecil, 230-1, 23 December 1591/2 January 1592, three privy councillors to Unton. 76 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et Correspondance, v, 129; Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 155-9, 25 November/5 December 1591, Unton to queen Elizabeth, 169-72, 29 November/9 December 1591, Unton to Burghley, 169-71, 29 November/9 December 1591, Unton to Burghley, 179-81, 3/13 December 1591, Unton to Burghley; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 283-4, 17 December 1591, Henry IV to Nevers. 77 Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Ponteficia en España, i, 337-43.

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armed with ‘spiritual’ weapons, and of the newly created duke of Montemarciano with a Papal army, were further aspects of the same endeavour to subvert the French succession.78 Despite this exceptional co-operation between Rome and Madrid, there appeared to be some degree of confusion in Philip II’s policy. It was not until after the death of this frail pontiff (15 October 1591), that Philip sent the duke of Feria to France with instructions dated 6 November 1591. Feria, and the legate Sega, were to dominate an estates-general and obtain the election of an appropriate king – which meant the infanta as queen.79 Ibarra went to report to Parma, at Landrecies on 17 December 1591, after leaving Paris with Mayenne on 11 – some say 13 – December. No revised agreement with Spain had yet been achieved since the death of Henry III. Anxious for help to save Rouen, Mayenne wished to know what the Spanish would do although, since the return of Jeannin from Spain in July, he could have been in little doubt.80 While Mayenne’s expectations were low, the Spanish were frustrated by his success in Paris against the Seize. If only they had overthrown Mayenne and mastered Paris just as Parma entered France, Spain would have controlled the north and Parma might have been able to force the election of the infanta. Now Parma would have to exploit the fact that Mayenne could not relieve Rouen unaided. If Rouen were lost, everything else could unravel; Mayenne and Spain would both be losers.81 Parma was therefore left to deal with Mayenne, without whom he could not operate in France, and to obtain the necessary treaty, which only a few extremists desired. Parma and Mayenne met at Guise (Aisne), probably on 22 December 1591, and again at La Fère.82 They agreed that Ibarra and Richardot should meet Jeannin to discuss the Spanish king’s proposals. Their first session probably took place about 10 January 1592; but it is impossible to ascertain precisely what occurred on which occasion. However, the upshot of various discussions between about 10-18 January 1592 is sufficiently clear. Parma sought a declaration in favour of the infanta before he would agree to the relief of Rouen; Mayenne, however, put Rouen first. Richardot explained the infanta’s claim, with which Jeannin was quite familiar. It was proposed that, after her proclamation, Philip II would employ all his forces to sustain both the queen and catholicism. That was, of course, totally vague. Jeannin replied that the infanta’s claim was possible, if the Salic law were to be waived. However, she would be required to come to France within six months and, within another six, to marry according to the wishes of the princes and crown officials. That also was rather vague. It would be necessary to capitulate with many princes and noblemen, in order to preserve the catholic party, and to attract royalist support. But, first of all, they must know precisely what support Philip II would provide, because some 78

On the Papal intervention in France see, Cloulas, ‘L’Armée pontificale de Grégoire XIV, Innocent IX et Clément VIII, pendant la seconde campagne en France d’Alexandre Farnèse’ (1591-1593), Bulletin de la commission royale d’histoire, cxxvi (1960), 83-102. 79 Essen, Parma, 329-30. 80 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 44-7, 20 December 1591, Ibarra to Philip II, Landrecies. 81 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 298, 304. 82 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 50-8, 12 January 1592, Ibarra to Philip II.


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eight to ten million ‘écus’ – in coin – would be required over two years. Richardot replied that Spanish support would be sufficient, and called for an estates-general as soon as possible. The function of the estates, Jeannin indicated, would only be to endorse decisions already made – fully intending that they should fail to do so. At a further meeting, attended by both leaders, Mayenne proposed deferring a decision because success could only be obtained by the provision of immense sums of money. Mayenne’s own support would not come cheap. He and Parma appear to have met a number of times at a secret lodging between La Fère and Nesle. Mayenne pressed for 100,000 ‘écus’ per month, to use as he saw fit, something Jeannin had already requested in Spain.83 The control and disbursement of the Spanish money was a major point of contention between Parma and the League, each wishing to control it. A further meeting of the deputies, probably on 13 January 1592, proved equally difficult. The French now required an additional undertaking that the infanta would maintain the laws, customs and integrity of the kingdom; nor was she to employ foreign captains, ‘gouverneurs’ or garrisons. Not only would huge sums of money be necessary to purchase the approval of the estates, but also to pay for a much larger army with which to oppose Navarre. This was essential because an accord between the League and the royalists would no longer be a background option. The French were not content with the current means of payment, nor did they want an estates-general before agreement had been reached with the nobility. Finally, Rouen must be relieved. Richardot and Ibarra made a ‘suitable’ reply, seeking to attenuate the financial demands. Everything was reported to Parma, in the presence of Tassis, on 16 January 1592. Although Mayenne is said to have been hard pressed by the Spanish, there was actually great pressure on Parma also. His awful predicament was that he had no commission to conclude an agreement – such was the extraordinary way in which Philip II conducted his affairs and treated his ablest servants. If this quandary were to be revealed, it would be extremely damaging. So the Spanish concocted an answer and played for time. At a further meeting of the deputies, held on 17 January 1592, the Spanish neither promised nor refused the sum of 8,000,000 ‘écus’. They rather sought to move the negotiation on to the tricky matter of individual claims and to hasten the estatesgeneral. It could be decided later what money would be required, and whether it could not be better spent in other ways. They hoped, in the meanwhile, to obtain instructions and a commission from Philip II. The French, however, who had no need to play for time, rejected Parma’s answer on the grounds that the proposed procedure was too protracted. The principal matter, which was money, must be settled first of all. Thus, without instructions, the Spanish were now obliged to fashion a counter proposal which, they rather anxiously assured each other, Philip could always repudiate. Parma’s second answer was that Philip II should pay for a foreign army, together with artillery, food and equipment, for one year, plus 1,200,000 ‘écus’ for the infanta to pay for French forces. If this was agreeable, they would strive to have the arrangement extended for a second year.

83

Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 50-8, 12 January 1592, Ibarra to Philip II.

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Negotiations were also to proceed for the reimbursement of all the money spent by Philip II on France – which was hardly a winner.84 Parma was in limbo. He urgently needed a firm reply from the king and was uncomfortably aware that there would be other, extraordinary, expenses. There must be no delay or failure in promises made to Mayenne and his followers, as that would damage the principal project [to elect a catholic king] past hope of revival. Parma would certainly be asked to show his commission, thus speed was essential. Furthermore, Papal support [which was necessary for the election of the infanta] was no longer a certainty. Not only Gregory XIV, but also his successor the pro-Spanish Innocent IX, had died. The next pope, Parma feared, might not understand these matters as well as his predecessors. As usual, Parma tempered his real opinion. After the expenditure of so much money on France (which he would have liked for the Netherlands), he declared these further amounts for the infanta to be worth while. Such were the myriads of difficulties, nevertheless, that only God could overcome them. Parma had little expectation of success, while Ibarra accurately assessed the French efforts to destroy the negotiation. He found Mayenne and Jeannin slow, tepid, and anxious to defer the estates-general – and hence to defer a decision. Ibarra believed that Mayenne, who put his personal interest first, was seeking to cling to such power and position as he possessed; he was also jealous of Guise, who negotiated with Spain.85 Mayenne feared that Guise might supersede him by accommodating the Spanish demands. If, Ibarra argued, Mayenne was really resolved to perform the [Spanish] king’s will, he would not resist the cession of French towns. Spain would have to spend her way out of these difficulties because the French were insatiable. Their current rapacity was, of course, expressly designed to avert an agreement. Ibarra’s candid observations were contained in two letters of 12 and 14 January 1592 to Philip II which, together with Parma’s important report of 17 or 18 January 1592, were all intercepted by the royalists.86 They gleefully sent copies to Mayenne who thereby learnt the truth; Philip II – presumably – did not. But did Parma know what had happened? Since nothing more could be done, in the absence of further instructions, it was agreed to relieve Rouen. Mayenne was anxious to get there before Henry’s forces were fully assembled. Parma later referred, on 10 March 1592, to further negotiations, during a lull in the Rouen campaign. French offers made in respect of the infanta were, he said, a mere formality because they awaited the outcome of the siege. Relations between Parma and Mayenne remained tense and sterile, which did nothing to ease the misery of joint campaigning in the winter.87 84

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 390-2. Guise sent the bishop of Avranches to Spain. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1590-1, p. 393, 23 March/2 April 1591, Unton to Burghley. 86 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 390-2, 17 [or 18] January 1592, Parma to Philip II. This letter was summarised, dated 10/20 April 1592, by Wilkes for submission to queen Elizabeth and the privy council. The same letter is also in Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 63-70, dated 17 January 1592. Ibid., 50-8, 12 January 1592, Ibarra to Philip II, 58-61, 14 January 1592, Ibarra to Philip II; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iii, 34255. 87 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 201-2, 10/20 December 1591, Unton to Burghley; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iv, 27, 10 March 1592, Parma to Philip II. 85


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VI: The Relief of Rouen Henry IV had hoped to take Rouen before Parma advanced across Picardy. Henry’s lansquenets, however, would not budge without pay and caused almost as much trouble as the siege itself. Then Henry learnt from intercepted letters that Parma and Mayenne would drop everything to relieve the city; even while the negotiations proceeded, Parma’s forces were on the move; he assured the governor, André de Brancas, seigneur de Villars, that he would soon be there.88 Henry immediately sought to assemble all his forces. Not having sufficient men both to sustain the siege and to face the enemy, it was at this stage that Henry sent Duplessis-Mornay to England; he was to further a request already delivered. The approach of Parma was, after all, a serious matter. But Duplessis’ unwelcome mission created an uproar in England and provoked another regal outburst of anger and indignation. While the queen’s complaints were necessarily the same, the burden of her argument now was that the Germans had been supposed to oppose Parma and the Papal forces. Beauvoir and Duplessis mounted a spirited protest, declaring the queen’s condemnation to be excessive. The French had not failed through carelessness, nor could she abandon them now without herself incurring blame. After a long delay at Dover, Duplessis returned about 2 or 3 February 1592 ‘with an answer not to his contentment’. A few days later he was appalled to hear that the king was wounded.89 While Unton had opposed Duplessis’ mission, he continued to plead Henry’s case with Burghley, who needed no convincing. The king’s estate, Unton wrote, ‘was most miserable and lamentable. He is a Kinge without a crowne and maketh warrs without money...He cannot long subsist if his auxilliaries forsake him and if God doe not hold his holly hande over him’. Unton had dutifully delivered his disobliging messages to the king who ‘saieth sometimes his necessities have no lawe and that he shall perishe if her Majesty foresake him’.90 While Duplessis was in England, Henry moved to Gisors (Eure) on 10 January 1592, to intercept Parma. He intended ‘to amaze the duke and his forces and to enterteine 88

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 521-3, 14 December 1591, Henry IV to Montmorency, 527-8, 18 December 1591, Henry IV to Nevers, 529, 19 December 1591, Henry IV to Nevers, 539-40, 3 January 1592, Henry IV to Montmorency, 542-5, 3 and 6 January 1592, Henry IV to Duplessis-Mornay. 89 Duplessis-Mornay left Rouen on 31 December 1591, and had audiences with queen Elizabeth on 6, 10 and 12 January 1592. Henry had already sent to ask for 5,000 more men when he knew that Parma was on the move, and had received a reproachful refusal. The situation was complicated by the queen’s highly charged relations with Essex, whose return to England she demanded. Duplessis left for France about 18 January 1592 but was delayed at Dover for two weeks. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 152-88, January 1592, Duplessis’ negotiation in England; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 363-4, 365-6, 27 December 1591/6 January 1592, memorials for Duplessis, 366-7, 4/14, January 1592, queen Elizabeth to Henry IV, via Duplessis, 367-8, 2/12 January 1592, the queen’s declaration, 368, 3/13 January 1592, protest by Beauvoir and Duplessis, 368-9, ‘unwelcome remarks’ by the queen; Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 223-5, 20/30 December 1591, Unton to queen Elizabeth, 261-3, 10/20 January 1592, Unton to Burghley, 280-2, 25 January/4 February 1592, Burghley to Unton. The queen was selling lands and borrowing great sums at this time and was tormented with doubt about the French expedition. Ibid., 237-41, 26 December 1591/5 January 1592, Unton to Burghley. 90 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 237-41, 26 December 1591/5 January 1592, Unton to Burghley.

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tyme’, until all his own forces had assembled. This entailed constant harassment, the obstruction of supplies to the enemy and the blocking of alternative routes. Parma was also impeded by non co-operation from Mayenne who, paradoxically, wanted the relief of Rouen but not that it should fall to Spain.91 By early February, the struggle intensified. The king, Unton reported, went every day to war skirmishing all the time. On 5 February 1592, he was not only wounded but also narrowly escaped capture near Aumale while seeking to redress a surprise move by Parma.92 Everyone was distraught, while the implications did not bear thinking of. The king was in great pain, unable to ride or to walk; but he returned to action just two weeks later, before he had really recovered. Unton and Burghley believed that Parma’s tactic was to weary the king rather than permit a battle. In this way, his nobles would quit and his army would crumble.93 While Henry was disabled, the Spanish landed at Le Havre and Parma captured Neufchatel; the enemy held the passage to Dieppe and communications with England became very difficult.94 Pressure on Rouen hastened Parma’s advance and caused a major skirmish as the king tried to hold him back. Both camps were constantly harried and alarmed; sir William Sackville was killed; Unton’s servants and horses were dying from starvation, and he himself was ill.95 By the last week in February 1592, Unton had abandoned all hope of success at Rouen, partly because the Spanish were moving eastwards from Brittany. He expected the royalists to starve first. The queen’s refusal to succour the king any more ‘doth daunte him and all his counsell’.96 In fact the queen had changed her mind, apparently alarmed by the king’s injury. She agreed to send a force of pikemen, then wavered again, supposing that they would come too late. Henry was stunned by a vigorous sortie from Rouen, in which Biron was injured. Speechless at first, Henry then burst out to Unton that his honour and kingdom were now at stake and everything was against him; ‘whereupon he concluded passionately requiring me to send [to England] my secretary Thomas Edmondes’, to whom the king ‘imparted all his mind’.97 Unton found Parma’s 91

Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 249-50, 31 December 1591/10 January 1592, Unton to Burghley. Unton followed the king in the field, witnessed his sufferings and suffered himself. Ibid., 256-8, 6/16 January 1592, Unton to Hunsdon, 294-8, 1/11 February 1592, Unton to Burghley. On 20 January 1592, Rouen implored Mayenne to come to their aid. Benedict, Rouen During the French Wars of Religion, 220-1. 92 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 283-6, 26 January/5 February 1592, Unton to Burghley, 288-9, 27 January/6 February 1592, Unton to Essex. 93 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 278-80, 19/29 January 1592, Unton to Essex, 292-3, 31 January/10 February 1592, Burghley to Unton. 94 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 294-8, 1/11 February 1592, Unton to Burghley, 304, 3/13 February 1592, Unton to Burghley, 306-11, 8/18 February 1592, Unton to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 371, 10/20 February 1592, Beauvoir to Burghley; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iv, 17-18, 12 February 1592, Parma to Philip II from Neufchatel, about the affairs of the Netherlands! 95 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 306-11, 8/18 February 1592, Unton to Burghley, 31113, 8/18 February 1592, Unton to Essex, 318-21, 12/22 February 1592, Unton to Burghley. 96 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 322-7, 13/23 February 1592, Unton to Burghley. 97 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 305, 5/15 February 1592, Burghley to Unton, 316-17, c. 12/22 February 1592, Essex to Unton, 318-21, 12/22 February 1592, Burghley to Unton, 322-7, 13/23 February 1592, Unton to Burghley, 333-4, 16/26 February 1592, Unton to Burghley, 334-6, 16/26 February


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movements bewildering. Having, apparently, got some help into Rouen, he believed the siege would now be raised. Parma then withdrew eastwards, back across the Somme, possibly while the going was good, possibly to resume his interrupted negotiation with Mayenne. Experiencing great difficulties, Parma rested his army while hoping for reinforcements, and failed to make any progress in his negotiation with Mayenne. Indeed, as the Spanish pressure on Mayenne increased, peace negotiations with the king were quite intensive – if not on the part of Mayenne himself.98 Henry was not deceived by these tactics. He referred to Parma’s feigned retreat and knew, from intercepted letters, that the enemy would soon regroup when Rouen pleaded for swift relief. As soon as Parma approached again, Henry planned to raise the siege and march against him.99 Meanwhile, his hopes were briefly revived. He returned to the siege and agreed to batter the city, only to find that his army began to melt away.100 As he sought to increase the pressure on Rouen, Henry learnt – again from intercepted letters – that Parma’s forces would be ready by 18 April, fearing that Rouen could now be lost. Henry’s only remaining hope was to outstrip Parma; but he failed, for lack of foot, horse and food.101

VII: The Mission of Sir Thomas Wilkes During this period of hesitations, between December 1591 and April 1592, queen Elizabeth had been disturbed by a series of worrying reports. She heard that Henry lacked sincere support among his own followers, that his council was not loyally behind him, that Bourbon, Soissons, Épernon and Auvergne, among others, proposed to form a third party (which was nothing new), while other catholics threatened to desert him if he did not abjure. Again, on 9 March 1592, Unton reported that the catholics in the council left nothing undone to hinder the king’s wishes, thinking him ‘too close with [protestant] England’; so they frustrated his resolution to take Rouen. They created difficulties, tormented the king, and betrayed his every decision.102 But, at the heart of the queen’s 1592, Unton to queen Elizabeth by Edmondes, 336-7, 19/29 February 1592 (sic), queen Elizabeth to Unton, 338, 19/29 February 1592, Burghley to Unton, 340, 19/29 February 1592, Essex to Unton. 98 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 341-3, 20 February/1 March 1592, Unton to Burghley, 351-3, 28 February/9 March 1592, Unton to queen Elizabeth, 353-8, 28 February/9 March 1592, Unton to Burghley, 358-9, 28 February/9 March 1592, Unton to Cecil, 360-3, 3/13 March 1592, Unton to Burghley, 367-9, 9/19 March 1592, Unton to Burghley; Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iv, 27, 10 March 1592, Parma to Philip II, 27, 11 March 1592, Parma to Philip II. 99 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 591-4, 26 March 1592, Henry IV to Montmorency, 597-8, 28 March 1592, Henry IV to the States General of the United Provinces, 598-9, 28 March 1592, Henry IV to Goville. 100 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 351-3, 28 February/9 March 1592, Unton to queen Elizabeth, 353-8, 28 February/9 March 1592, Unton to Burghley, 379-83, 15/25 March 1592, Unton to Burghley, 390-2, 19/29 March 1592, Unton to Burghley, 402-4, 23 March/2 April 1592, Unton to Burghley; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 591-4, 26 March 1592, Henry IV to Montmorency. 101 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 395-6, 20/30 March 1592, Unton to Burghley, 402-4, 23 March/2 April 1592, Unton to Burghley. Rouen was, indeed, close to collapse; there were riots on 16 April 1592. Benedict, Rouen During the French Wars of Religion, 221. 102 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 186-8, 4/14 December 1591, Burghley to Unton, 221-3, 20/30 December 1591, Unton to Burghley, 223-5, 20/30 December 1591, Unton to the queen, 237-41,

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displeasure lay her unshakable conviction that Henry could have taken Rouen in the summer of 1591 when he had elected to go to Noyon. But Henry had always said that he would have to go to Picardy, and with serious problems on his mind.103 These were the reasons why Elizabeth sent over sir Thomas Wilkes, clerk of the privy council, when Edmondes returned to France. Edmondes had evidently at least made some impression on the queen. Wilkes was to establish precisely, and report upon, the true state of affairs in France because Elizabeth did not wish to be fed with any more promises the king could not perform.104 Wilkes and Unton reached the king’s camp at Darnétal (near Rouen) on 6 April 1592. It had taken them four days to travel from Dieppe and then they had to wait until 12 April to see the king. Wilkes was instructed to speak to him privately, ‘considering how untowardly his afairs have proceeded by reason that divers catholics that, favouring not his greatness, have given impeachment to his designs’. First of all, Wilkes should ask the king to take in good part the queen’s ‘hard conceits and sundry mislikings of his unfortunate proceedings’. To counterbalance her strictures she evidently sent him a miniature of herself. The instruction then surveyed de Reau’s missions to England, the promises he is alleged to have made, and the arrival of English forces at Dieppe in the absence of the king. Thus [on account of the king’s delays] Rouen was manned and fortified and Parma was permitted to enter France with too mighty an army for the king to fight – the logic of which is puzzling. Elizabeth now claimed to have been assured – promised indeed – that Rouen could be taken in twenty days. Here is the fresh revelation which explains so much; but was Elizabeth really so credulous? Now, however, sorties had been made and troops had entered. So Elizabeth demanded to know, ‘inwardly without colour’, what success she could expect at Rouen in view of the common opinion that Parma’s withdrawal was temporary and the city would not be taken. Elizabeth feared that this opinion was correct; also that Henry had ‘those about him who cunningly hindered his purposes’ and did not mean Rouen to fall. As she thus dealt with the king frankly and secretly, so she desired to be sincerely answered.105 While they were unable to see the king, Wilkes and Unton delivered six written articles on 11 April 1592. Derived from the instructions, these articles related to the chances of taking Rouen, the disloyalty of the king’s council, and his opinion on the current negotiations for peace. It was a matter of some anxiety in England that Spain might be included. The other three articles concerned forces in Brittany, and the queen’s

26 December 1591/5 January 1592, Unton to Burghley, 353-8, 28 February/9 March 1592, Unton to Burghley, 379-83, 15/25 March 1592, Unton to Burghley, 402-3-4, 23 March/2 April 1592, Unton to Burghley. 103 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 292-3, 31 January/10 February 1592, Burghley to Unton, 318-21, 12/22 February 1592, Burghley to Unton. 104 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 375, 24 March/3 April 1592, Essex to Unton, 376-7, 14/24 March 1592, Burghley to Unton; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 373-6, 12/22 March 1592, Wilkes’ credentials, 377, 16/26 March 1592, instructions for Wilkes from the privy council. 105 Other points in Wilkes’ instruction dealt with matters relating to Brittany. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 373-6, 12/22 March 1592.


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demand for a cautionary town, naming Brest or Saint-Malo. She did not wish the French to imagine that she would save Brittany if they did not.106 From these deliberations, two sets of answers emerged: those from the king himself, and those from the king and council. Henry’s personal reply comprised an account of his conduct since July 1591. He began with the contentious siege of Noyon, which had been necessary to preserve Picardy; otherwise other places would have fallen and assisted Parma’s advance towards Rouen. Noyon, Henry said, was taken within a few days [seven] of the arrival of the English; this was not entirely to the point, since he was still unable to go to Normandy. Leaping ahead a month or so, Henry declared that the chief reason for his delay [in coming to Rouen] was the mutiny of his reiters when they entered Champagne. They refused to march unless they were paid and accompanied by the king in person. Then Henry had to attend to the division of his army, placing a great part of it under Nevers to hold the frontier against Parma. This shows that the Germans were, in part, used for that purpose. It was the queen, Henry said, who forced him to hasten to Rouen and undertake the siege despite all his difficulties, his lack of infantry and Parma’s invasion. He did so only to please her. By the time the siege began, the English and his lansquenets were disbanding. As fast as he acquired new forces others quit because he had no money. Then [from 10 January 1592] Henry had to take all his horse and much of his foot to face Parma. The errors with which the queen now charged him derived from ‘these particularities’. Henry himself had never had any liking to attempt the siege of Rouen, but the majority of experienced councillors had carried the vote and overruled him.107 It was, he said, his custom to accept and execute such decisions – he did not add because he had no choice. His councillors, Henry admitted [and despite the majority vote] were ‘backward in the matter of Rouen, and in all other things tending to advance his service’. They daily urged him to convert, promising in that case to assure his kingdom. Otherwise, one must infer, there would be no such assurance. This is important evidence, privately confided to Wilkes. Turning to his plans, prospects and to the question of peace, Henry said he could not decide what to do until he saw if Parma would return; this must be known in about two weeks’ time. If he came within a distance of six leagues, Henry would [seek to] give battle; victory over Parma would also secure Rouen. If Parma did not come, Henry would take Rouen by assault, explaining how he proposed to do it. He was confident the city could not be victualled because there were no supplies to be had – a matter to which Unton frequently referred. As for the peace talks, the French always discussed peace as soon as they went to war. He assured the queen that nothing would be concluded without her knowledge and advice and that Spain was not included. There was, in any case, no hope of peace because the Leaguers ‘had no good meaning but entertained the Infanta of Spain’. Henry permitted what he called ‘a kind of treaty’ [negotiation] in order to obviate 106

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 378, articles delivered to the king on 1/11 April 1592. Of these items, only Rouen and Brittany were to be discussed by Wilkes in the presence of the council. It appears, however, that he also discussed with them the peace proposals. 107 This suggests that members of Henry’s council could have been responsible for the mischievous promises made in England.

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any agreement between Parma and Mayenne. Currently the pressure on Mayenne to accord with Spain was considerable. About Brittany, Henry said that his catholic councillors would not permit him to cede Brest or Saint-Malo, but he agreed that the first port to be taken should be given to the queen for the retreat of her people; he did not say as a cautionary town, which would mean for the reimbursement of expenses. His necessity knowing no law, as Unton had put it, Henry was not too cowed to request another 2,000 men with which to fight Parma; and he needled the queen a little for staring out of the window while he fought her Spanish war. This mild reproach was understandable, in view of her censorious attitude, but it was not quite true.108 Wilkes met the council on 12 and 13 April 1592 and obtained a further, and similar, set of answers dated 15 April. They asserted that any serious discussion of peace was always curtailed on the pretext of the king’s religion.109 When Wilkes returned to England on 18 April 1592, Henry and Unton accompanied him to Dieppe. Henry knew Wilkes and liked him well and had welcomed his confidential mission. At his leave-taking Henry made an extraordinary speech, which must long have occupied his mind; the report is stated to be in Wilkes’ own handwriting. Henry thanked the queen for her ‘succours’ and also for her picture, which he would wear during his life, and for her scarf which he would wear in battle. He had, he said, refused an offer of the infanta in marriage, provided he abjured. [This was mentioned in his answer about the peace negotiations]. His affections, he said, were for the queen, and he longed to signify his love in person. If he was victorious in the coming battle – to which the alternative was death – he meant to cross the Channel with twenty horse to see the queen, and wished her to send Wilkes back to accompany him. The love which, in this secret manner, he presented to her, would have been signified long ago had he met anyone he could trust as well as he trusted Wilkes. He desired this to be a secret between her, himself and Wilkes [Unton was also privy] until he could come in person. Wilkes noted that, upon his arrival in France, Unton ‘did discover to me the king’s affection and love to her Majesty’. He had ‘carried [Unton] about with him to the wars to feed [his] humour in talking and expressing his love to her Majesty’ and to learn how this might be received. In all ‘charges and fights’ Henry had told Unton, ‘you shall see me adventure for the honour of my mistress, the Queen of England’ as if he meant Unton to report his valour [which Unton did] ‘to draw on her liking’. But he had never dared to write of this to the queen because he heard that she passed his letters to others to read.110

108

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 379-80, 11 April 1592, the king’s answers to Wilkes. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, pp. 381-2, 15 April 1592, answers of the king and council. On Brittany, the council claimed that the means assigned for the payment of forces had been destroyed by war, but explained what efforts the king had made. Henry appointed Bouillon and the secretary Revol to deal with matters not fit for the knowledge of the catholic councillors, which included an order for the baptism of the infant prince de Condé, heir presumptive to Henry IV, as a protestant. Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 407-8, 1/11 April 1591, Unton and Wilkes to Burghley, 410-11, 8/18 April 1592, Unton to Burghley. 110 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1591-2, p. 383, 8/18 April 1592, the king’s speeches at Wilkes’ departure. 109


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This apparently genuine report can only mean that, during the Rouen campaign when Elizabeth showered the king with recriminations, his thoughts were of seeking her hand. Certainly he had much regretted a missed opportunity of slipping over to England – which could never have been secret – when the queen was at Portsmouth. Marriage between queen Elizabeth and Henry of Navarre was not a new idea; it had been desired by the admiral Coligny in 1570, after the peace of Saint-Germain. Nevertheless, it was a startling proposition in 1592, not least because Henry was married – and with an ex post facto Papal dispensation. Unton once reported that the king was seeking a divorce, with no comment upon who might accord it. The general opinion appears to have been that only the pope could release him. An English marriage could certainly have cost the king all but his small huguenot following. But probably he only envisaged it in the context of a general settlement – civil peace and religious peace. France and England together could certainly have outfaced Spain, and peace in the Netherlands would have followed; of this Philip II had always been anxiously aware. Unlike Alençon or Henry of Anjou, Henry IV was a protestant, and the very proposition tends to suggest a disinclination to change his religion. But queen Elizabeth was no longer young, and she had succeeded in remaining single. For her to marry a destitute king without a crown, as Unton lamented, was neither advantageous to herself nor likely to appeal to parliament. Since this matrimonial matter was deeply secret, it is not surprising that little information has survived. A damaged and fragmented letter of 11/21 May 1592, from Unton to Wilkes, revealed Henry’s persistent desire to go to England, and his request for two ships under cover of Unton’s return home. He reiterated that the king spoke of nothing but his intended journey. Unton, however, found this altogether too hot to handle. He did not even know how Wilkes’ report had been received, so he deferred to Wilkes’ advice. Weeks later, on 6/16 June 1592, Burghley confided that the queen ‘received in secrete sorte’ Unton’s letters to Wilkes. Relations, if anything, had become increasingly strained – always for the same, familiar reasons – and Henry IV of France did not journey to England.111 This episode is incomprehensible: Henry cannot really have thought his destiny lay in that direction. If his protestations were merely flattery, they were excessive and if, in despair, he was preparing for the eventuality of exile, he would surely not have chosen England.

VIII: The End of the Rouen Campaign Two days after Henry’s declaration to sir Thomas Wilkes, Parma swept back into Normandy. He tried, on 20 April 1592, to surprise the king and his forces. Next day Henry was obliged to raise the siege and decamp with all speed and with ‘hott skirmishes’. Parma, meanwhile, succeeded in getting men and food into Rouen.112 Henry’s supreme and only hope of success now lay in battle, although neither army was 111

Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 448-50, 11/21 May 1592, Unton to Wilkes, fragments, 467-8, 6/16 June 1592, Burghley to Unton. 112 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 413-16, 12/22 April 1592, Unton to Burghley, from Pont de l’Arche.

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fit to fight.113 Henry’s recent declaration to Wilkes casts a new light upon his reiterated desire, and strenuous efforts, to force a battle. Queen Elizabeth had only less to fear than the king himself from the proposed election of the Spanish infanta. But the defeat of Philip II’s finest general could have altered the European balance of power; while the fall of Rouen, it was always believed, would entail the fall of Paris. With victory over Parma and the prospect of settling his crippling debts from the Rouen customs, Henry would have something substantial to offer the ‘mistress’ whose scarf he would wear in the battle. Surely all ‘hard conceits and sundry mislikings’ must then be forgotten. Everything seemed to be at stake, including the king’s life. Dieppe was endangered, and all Normandy. Even the sober Burghley allowed that, upon the outcome of this crisis ‘depended the fate of Christendom’. Yet, in reality, very little was changed.114 Parma similarly experienced every problem and privation a general could face. He complained of the tyranny of Mayenne, a lack of forces, food (although he is said to have supplied Rouen) and the means to retreat; he also claimed that the French had betrayed him.115 It was Mayenne who insisted upon the siege of Caudebec (further downstream), to keep the Spanish out of Rouen. On 22 April 1592 Parma was wounded in the right arm at Caudebec, while his forces were trapped by the king pursuing in battle order. Parma, Unton said, would have to hazard the loss of his army because, without fighting, he could not retreat.116 If he continued to evade a battle, the king would seek to fight him in his trenches. The only thing we fear, Unton declared, is that Parma might steal away at night; even so, he might be overtaken. By 6 May, Parma had begun to dislodge, moving back towards Rouen. But he was obliged to fight a rearguard action and return again to Caudebec; then he achieved what Unton had feared. On 13 May, Parma crossed the tidal river, 300 yards wide, using flat-bottomed boats. He moved undetected, under cover of night, and reassembled at Rouen.117 Unton believed that Parma could still have been overthrown, had Henry not paused to retake Caudebec. But Parma escaped to Evreux, having abandoned his transport and impedimenta – including the sick and wounded. Moving very fast, he recrossed the Seine at Saint-Cloud heading for the Marne valley.118 Deeply distressed, Unton derided this ignominious flight. But, saving what could be 113

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 616-17, 20 April 1592, Henry IV to Nevers, Gouy, 625-7, 2 May 1592, Henry IV to Nevers, 629-33, 7 May 1592, Henry IV to Montmorency. Unton also referred several times to Henry’s hope for a battle. 114 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 431-2, 25 April/5 May 1592, Burghley to Unton. It appears, in fact, that Rouen was ruined. Famine, disease and high mortality, plus the destruction of trade caused a severe and prolonged crisis. Benedict, Rouen During the French Wars of Religion, 221-3. 115 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 424-8, 21 April/1 May 1592, Unton to Burghley. This information was derived from an intercepted letter. 116 Halphen, Lettres inédites du Roi Henri IV, 51-5, 28 April 1592, Henry IV to Beauvoir, Yvetot; Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 417-18, 16/26 April 1592, Unton to Burghley, 418-20, 16/26 April 1592 (2), Unton to Burghley; Essen, Parma, 349-55. 117 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 428-30, 24 April/4 May 1592, Unton to Burghley, 440-2, 5/15 May 1592, Unton to Burghley, from Langtot. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 155, 8/18 May 1592, Williams to the privy council; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 638-41, 19 June 1592, Henry IV to Montmorency. 118 It is alleged that Parma entered Paris in disguise without his army.


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saved, it was also a brilliant manoeuvre. If Parma had failed in his political purpose, he had saved the city of Rouen and deprived the king of what he most desired – victory and peace. Both armies were near to collapse from lack of food, fodder and money, as well as from sickness and exhaustion. Parma himself was ill and unable to ride. Unbeknown to him he was already disgraced and recalled. This was, more or less, the pitiful end to his distinguished career. Henry IV was also sick, not for the first time that year, and Mayenne who was too ill to move, remained behind in Rouen. He alone had gained some advantage: the city was saved for the League and Parma had gone, without a marriage treaty or any other agreement; in the event, Parma and Mayenne would never meet again. On the other hand, Mayenne was nonetheless dependent upon Spanish help.119 So ended the Rouen campaign, in unspeakable human wretchedness, dereliction and dismay. The military stalemate led, in some degree, to the recurrence of former situations, while the political consequences for Henry IV were climacteric.

IX: The King’s ‘Misserable Estate’ During the rest of 1592, there was no more significant campaigning. Neither side could field sufficient forces, and both waited to see what Parma would do. After pursuing Parma for about three weeks, Henry returned to the Parisian area to attend to other matters. Thereafter, he resumed his perennial struggle to retain the towns on, and between, the river systems around Paris. Thus he moved about between Gisors, Senlis, Compiègne, La Fère, Saint-Denis, Provins and Chartres, seldom remaining anywhere for long. In this way, he sustained the pressure on Paris, which had always remained partially blockaded. Early in July 1592, Henry left Saint-Denis to retake Épernay (on the Marne) which had fallen to Parma’s forces. There, on 9 July, marshal Biron, Henry’s principal commander, was killed.120 These military activities were the active background to important political matters: the failure of the peace negotiations – to be discussed – the future of Henry’s relations with England – which closely affected his ability to keep the field – and his attempts to renew relations with the Papacy under pope Clement VIII. All these matters will be seen to have a bearing upon Henry’s eventual abjuration in July 1593.

119

Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 434-7, 1/11 May 1592, Unton to Burghley, Yvetot, 440-2, 5/15 May 1592, Unton to Burghley, 446-7, 9/19 May 1592, Unton to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 155, 3/13 May 1592, Williams to the privy council, 155, 4/14 May 1592, Yorke to Burghley, 155, 9/19 May 1592, Unton to Burghley. Sega believed that Parma had done all he could; without enough money or food he was bound to withdraw. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 558. 120 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, pp. 164, 172-4, Épernay surrendered to Parma on 18 June and to the king on 19 August 1592. To Beauvoir Henry praised Biron and claimed that his loss was one of the worst blows he could have sustained. In view of Biron’s notorious disloyalty, this is surprising. Edmondes declared that ‘there were few who, upon cold blood, did not esteem it a very happy blow in respect of his declining weakness [drink] and being insupportable in his humours’. Smith added that all men were glad of his death. Ibid., 167, 2/12 July 1592, Edmondes to Burghley, 168-9, 8/18 July 1592, Smith to Burghley; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 645-6, 10 July 1592, Henry IV to Beauvoir.

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Leaving Rouen, Henry assembled his council at Buhy on 20 May 1592 to consider what to do with his disbanding army. It was decided that, with cavalry only, he should harass Parma’s retreat, cut off his supplies and intercept him at Soissons. The rest of the army would remain with Biron in Normandy.121 The king’s designs for Normandy were frustrated by disasters in Brittany, while his presence was equally required in Champagne. Furthermore he needed, as always, to defend the areas around Paris and to block the invasion routes from the north and east. This was the old story. Henry sent for Unton to Compiègne and ‘discoursed att large of his misserable estate, of the factions of his servants and of their ill dispositions’; inevitably he asked the ambassador what further aid he could expect for Brittany. Henry said that he was assailed [by Spain] in Brittany and Languedoc, from the Netherlands, Savoy and Lorraine and he could not resist unaided. Yet the most immediate problem was still Parma. Having harassed Parma as far as Compiègne, Henry was obliged to abandon the chase. By 13 June he had returned to Gisors and summoned his council to discuss the affairs of Brittany as well as the peace negotiation which – it will be seen – had raised profoundly serious considerations.122 Queen Elizabeth had promised to decide by 6 June what help she would send to Brittany; but, after Burghley had read her letters from the king, ‘all became overcast’. She decided to await further news which, doubtless, referred to the possibility of peace. She was, furthermore, strongly influenced by Roger Williams’ passionate complaint of the type of warfare to which the English were subjected in France; they had lacked transport, commissariat, medical support or any place of retreat.123 After taking counsel at Gisors, Henry decided to send Nicolas de Harlay, seigneur de Sancy to England, together with Unton who was leaving France. The king’s intentions, Unton informed Burghley, depended upon the outcome of Sancy’s mission. He too was probably referring to the question of peace, then about to be discussed with Villeroy.124 It was generally considered that, without English help, Brittany would be lost. But it was not only in respect of Brittany that Sancy went to England; he made large demands for men and supplies for several different areas. This the queen thought ‘very strange’, considering the numbers of her people already wasted; she was offered no recompense and no retreat town. Besides, if the king’s resolution depended upon the queen’s reply, the queen’s reply also depended upon the king’s resolution. To her mind, if the civil war was to end, the king could 121

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 157, 7/17 May 1592, Unton to Burghley, 157, 9/19 May 1592, Unton to Burghley, 11/21 May 1592, Unton to Burghley, Buhy. 122 Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 460-4, 24 May/3 June 1592, Unton to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, 158, 3/13 June 1592, Unton to Burghley, 158, 6/16 June 1592, Smith to Burghley, 159, 3/13 June 1592, Williams to the privy council. From Gisors the king went to Saint-Denis about 20 June 1592 trying, as usual to hold the places around Paris and the invasion routes. 123 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, pp. 299-300, 27 May/6 June 1592, Williams to Burghley, 159, 31 May/10 June 1592, Williams to Burghley. 124 Unton and Sancy parted from the king at Saint-Denis on 20 June 1592 and reached Dieppe next day. Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 467-8, 6/16 June 1592, Burghley to Unton, 469-71, 12/22 June 1592, Unton to Burghley, Dieppe; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, pp. 304, 19 June 1592, Henry IV to Cecil, 164, 10/20 June 1592, Smith to Burghley. The king went to Saint-Denis with his council and army. Unton left his secretary, sir Thomas Edmondes with the king.


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provide for himself. For this reason, Elizabeth did not object to the peace proposals, provided they excluded Spain.125 The queen was deeply suspicious. Sancy was asked to show his ‘pouvoir’, and a tough and irascible negotiation ensued. Deprived of the profits of Rouen, Elizabeth looked for a similar arrangement in respect of Brittany, namely troops in return for a retreat town from which she could hope to derive revenue. While the outcome was unsatisfactory to both parties, a conditional contract for Brittany was agreed on 30 June/10 July 1592. Henry could only offer to cede the first walled town or seaport to be taken. Once the peace negotiations had broken up, Sancy pressed the queen to name a date for the dispatch of the Brittany force. He also pursued the other requests, including help for the Ile de France, but they were all refused. The ratification of the contract, so hastily agreed, was long delayed; Sancy was unable to reach the king until 3 September 1592, at Provins. The contract was ratified next day and taken to England by du Maurier, secretary to Bouillon.126 Thus the vital matter of further English help was still unresolved by the autumn of 1592. Various reports arrived that Parma would return in October and threaten the north of France from the Somme to the Seine. In these circumstances, Roger Williams supported the king, urging the uselessness of help for Brittany if Henry was unable to remain in the field. If the queen was so unwise as to ‘despair the poor king too much’, the threat was now that he would be forced to abjure. Williams’ plea probably crossed with letters from Burghley who found the queen ‘in some sort scrupulous to yield any further expenses’. A similar situation now existed as in the summer of 1591. Elizabeth sent the king another long, rambling reproof, in obscure French, blaming him for failing to take Paris and Rouen, and for the loss of Blavet in Brittany. Again, she threatened to withdraw her forces.127 Henry seems never to have accepted that queen Elizabeth was genuinely unable to continue pouring men and money into France. The uncertainty of future English help left him increasingly exposed. If he could not carry on, Henry would, indeed, as Williams had explained, be forced to abjure. From queen Elizabeth’s point of view, that was much less serious than an end to the war with Spain. The king’s conversion did, indeed become the salient issue in the peace negotiations, between March and June 1592, during the crisis of the Rouen campaign. But, as the king stated in his answer to Thomas Wilkes, they were unlikely to succeed. Nevertheless, these protracted negotiations, entangled with the Rouen campaign, were more candid and far reaching than any previous discussions. Indeed, the manner in which the king was to move, inexorably, towards his abjuration in July 1593, was largely defined by the peace negotiations of March-June 1592.

125 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 305, 22 June/2 July 1592, the queen’s answer to Sancy, 305-6, 23 June/3 July 1592, the reply of Beauvoir and Sancy. 126 Sancy fell ill and the king was campaigning. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, pp. 308-10, 30 June/10 July 1592, contract for Brittany, 316, 15/25 September 1592, Beauvoir to Burghley. Sancy left Dover on 19 July 1592. It is not clear how soon du Maurier went to England. 127 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, pp. 318, 29 September/9 October 1592, Williams to Burghley, 319, 3/13 October 1592, Burghley to Bouillon, 318-19, 3/13 October 1592, queen Elizabeth to Henry IV.

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X: Villeroy’s ‘Expedient’ The peace negotiations of 1592 were loosely connected to those of 1590-1, principally conducted by Villeroy. He never entirely abandoned the endeavour, making use of his relatives and connections with the court. Mayenne had refused to proceed before holding the proposed estates at Reims. That assembly never materialised, and Mayenne was to employ the same tactic over again. Then, in May 1591, the nuncio Landriano had arrived with Gregory XIV’s ‘spiritual’ weapons against the king and the royalists. During the following summer, Villeroy trailed about after Mayenne. As the seige of Rouen began, in December 1591, Villeroy went home, assured by Mayenne that he did want peace; in fact he sent Antoine de Grammont to court to ‘purchase’ it. This was Mayenne hedging his bets. The king, Unton said, was greatly inclined to peace, provided Spain was excluded; Villeroy was expected soon. The king’s inclination to peace naturally increased with his difficulties. By March 1592, when the negotiation gathered pace, Unton thought him resolved to conclude upon any reasonable terms. The first item, however, was the king’s conversion which, to him, was not reasonable.128 Villeroy’s deep desire for peace was fuelled by his knowledge of Parma’s negotiation with Mayenne. He feared that Parma might oblige Mayenne to sign an agreement supporting the election of the infanta as queen of France, possibly with her marriage to the archduke Ernest of Austria. Villeroy may also have felt that, between the pressure from Spain and the king’s own extreme difficulties, Henry was approaching a situation in which he might be induced or obliged to convert; and this, to Villeroy, was the only viable solution for France. For this he laboured with skill, ingenuity and perseverance, bringing the desired event significantly closer. First of all, Villeroy sought to ensure that the royalists fully understood just what Spain was aiming at.129 For this he worked through various prelates, including the cardinal de Bourbon, and kept in touch with Mayenne’s councillor, Jeannin. Unfortunately, the two ministers were not in agreement. While Villeroy was almost a free agent, having remained in the League purely in order to pursue peace, Jeannin was still a moderate Leaguer; and he did not believe in the king’s conversion. He favoured trying to detach the cardinal de Bourbon and the royalist catholics, even proposing to choose an alternative Bourbon prince. Indeed, Jeannin desired a negotiation with Bourbon rather than the king, and without waiting for Mayenne’s permission. That was because Mayenne favoured the detachment of the royalists only to obtain support for himself.130 Villeroy desired a truce to facilitate consultation with the royalists. He also wished them to send to Rome – in a new reign – to seek Papal assistance in obtaining the king’s conversion. This significant proposal was calculated to appeal to the royalist nobles and clergy who had 128 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 230-44; Parma learnt of this move when Grammont returned, and was angry. Stevenson, Ed., Correspondence of sir Henry Unton, 201-2, 10/20 December 1591, Unton to Burghley, 246-8, 29 December/8 January 1592, Unton to Burghley, 351-3, 28 February/9 March 1592, Unton to queen Elizabeth, 360-3, 3/13 March 1592, Unton to Burghley. 129 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 244-7. 130 The Spanish, in their negotiations with the League, favoured demoting and excluding all the Bourbon princes.


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both raised the point. So the idea of the ‘voyages de Rome’ survived the rupture of the peace negotiations; the adverse disposition of Clement VIII, however, was still unknown; indeed, the French had not yet heard of his election.131 But neither side would consider a truce – impossible during the Rouen campaign – while Jeannin thought any referral to Rome too lengthy a procedure. Nor was there any reason to suppose that the next pope would prove helpful, even if the king did abjure. In that Jeannin was correct. Mayenne, he said, would not treat before the king’s conversion, nor without consulting the party. Such stipulations enabled him to sustain a spurious negotiation. Spain was now openly bidding for the throne of France and Parma would not promise to relieve Rouen unless Mayenne agreed to the election of the infanta. That negotiation, it has been seen, became deadlocked, while the peace negotiation helped Mayenne to outface Parma.132 According to Jeannin, Mayenne might make a commitment to a third party, such as Nevers, to recognise the king after he had both converted and provided for catholicism, as well as Mayenne himself, and his family. Villeroy, who deplored intransigence, knew the king could make no such commitment during the Rouen campaign. Villeroy decided to sound Bourbon, bearing in mind Jeannin’s proposal. These tentative, and more or less clandestine moves, were disapproved in royalist circles, probably because they must tend to encourage the ‘tiers parti’ which was already undermining the king’s position. A proper negotiation would, however, be welcome and was quietly promoted.133 Early in March 1592, Villeroy’s brother-in-law, Henri de Clausse, seigneur de Fleury, came to him, asking him to seek permission from Mayenne to treat with Duplessis-Mornay.134 The choice of the huguenot Duplessis is surprising. But the negotiation was most discreetly conducted, almost as a family affair, among friends and relatives within easy reach of each other’s houses.135 Villeroy attributed this royalist initiative to the skill with which Parma had succoured Rouen in February 1592. Villeroy, who had no commission, immediately sent an express messenger, a ‘trompette’ to Mayenne, but he did not answer for several weeks. Villeroy’s letter crossed with one of 2 March 1592 from Jeannin.136 There was, therefore, a more or less simultaneous initiative on each side, arising from the current state of the war. Jeannin repeated points already made in respect of the king’s conversion. The negotiation must be secret until after the conversion, otherwise the Spanish might proceed to seize cities in which they had

131 Innocent IX died on 30 December 1591 and Clement VIII was elected on 30 January 1592. Clement VIII sent the legate a brief, dated 15 April 1592, denying the claim of Henry IV to the throne. For some reason this was not registered by the Leaguer ‘parlement’ of Paris until 27 October 1592. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 176. 132 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 247-8. 133 The force of the ‘tiers parti’ is said to have lain mainly in its threat. Wolfe, ‘Piety and Political Allegiance’, French History, ii (1988), 20. 134 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 249-50. 135 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 110, maintains that the king used Duplessis to control the agenda of the moderate catholics. 136 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 250-5.

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intelligence.137 Jeannin now proposed a long truce, of five or six months, presumably to save Rouen. By this time Parma’s negotiations with the League were resumed when, late in February or early in March 1592, he withdrew from Rouen and recrossed the Somme.138 Parma was joined by Sega, newly created cardinal of Piacenza. The legate and the Papal commander were ordered to support the League.139 The fact that Rouen had now been succoured enabled Parma to press Mayenne really hard to agree to his demands before the departure of those who had assembled for the negotiation. Thus, in his letter of 2 March 1592 Jeannin sent Villeroy various articles, currently under discussion with the Spanish, by which Mayenne would agree to have the infanta elected upon ‘certain dishonourable conditions’.140 This was intended to alarm Villeroy, and it did; he feared that the sands were running out. The League wanted him to join their meeting, but Villeroy was still waiting to hear if Mayenne would permit him to meet DuplessisMornay; so he refused. Villeroy did not want to be faced with Jeannin’s scepticism, in respect of the king, before attempting some subtler proposals than had yet been made. This was necessary since the king would not promise to abjure, and Mayenne would not otherwise treat.141 In other words there was deadlock on the point of religion. For the king to yield, would be to alienate the huguenots – especially Duplessis-Mornay – while to refuse would tax the tenuous loyalty of the royalist catholics. Nevertheless, Villeroy was certain that Jeannin’s line, the adoption of some alternative prince, was not an acceptable solution. Villeroy’s kinsman, Fleury, provided liaison between himself and the brothers Buhy and Duplessis. On 10 March 1592, Fleury passed on to Duplessis the news that Parma was expecting the Spanish general, count Charles Mansfelt, with 5,000-6,000 men to enter right into France, believing Rouen to be safe.142 No treaty had yet been concluded between Parma and the League, though Mayenne might still be coerced before the end of the month. Most of those in the French army feared such a treaty. On 18 March 1592 Duplessis duly received permission to meet Villeroy; Villeroy, however, had still not received any answer from Mayenne about meeting Duplessis. Clarification was necessary because Duplessis insisted that the matter of religion must not be pressed. The door, Duplessis wrote, opened or closed on that premier point. The king, he told Fleury, hoped 137 According to a report composed by Matteucci for pope Clement VIII, Spain worked on the cities which were sick of war, wanted a king and were inclined to turn to Spain; seventeen cities had joined in an address to Philip II. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 539. 138 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iv, 27, 10 March 1592, Parma to Philip II, Pontrémy. 139 Sega was made a cardinal on 18 December 1591 by pope Innocent IX. On 15 February 1592, Clement VIII appointed Sega legate a latere. Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 61-2. 140 These conditions were probably the proposals contained in Parma’s second reply to Mayenne of 17 or 18 January 1592. It will be recalled that Parma’s report to Philip II had been intercepted and there is no sign that he had received any new instructions. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 208-11, 2 March 1592, Jeannin to Villeroy; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 254-5. Jeannin informed Villeroy of the election of Clement VIII. 141 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 236-8, 22 March 1592, Villeroy to Fleury, 282-3, 13 April 1592, Villeroy to Fleury; Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 495-7; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 255-6. 142 There is no indication that Mansfelt did, in fact, come to France at this time.


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that Villeroy would be allowed to proceed, and Henry believed that Villeroy sincerely wanted peace.143 Fearing, however, that Mayenne’s permission might not be forthcoming, Villeroy meanwhile employed a League prisoner, de Lomenie, to ensure that the king understood the danger of a League treaty with Spain, which would be an agreement to elect the infanta. Such an agreement would preclude any reconciliation between the king and the League, and would guarantee a long war.144 Villeroy offered to visit Nevers and cardinal Gondi, believing that they also desired peace and might be influential with the sympathetic grand duke of Tuscany. This was, presumably a reference to the Florentine origins of the new pope, Clement VIII. The king responded to Villeroy by sending Fleury’s brother, Philippe de Senneton, seigneur de La Verrière. Together, Villeroy and La Verrière met Gondi at Noisy, while still awaiting the return of Villeroy’s ‘trompette’.145 The arrival of La Verrière permitted Villeroy to hope that the king might now be susceptible to the advice he constantly received to satisfy the catholics – in other words to convert – with the help and intervention of the pope. The very discussion of such a proposal was significant and influential; it helped to create a climate of opinion and edged the king in that direction.146 The meeting between Villeroy and Gondi, in March 1592 at the height of the Rouen campaign, was seminal. To Villeroy, hope consisted in circumnavigating the rocks. Tricky matters should be subtly, not crudely, formulated; movement had to be facilitated. Thus, in order to enable the negotiation to proceed – despite the fundamental difference between himself and Duplessis – Villeroy devised a formula which he called ‘the expedient’.147 The ‘expedient’ provided for the king to announce his intention to abjure, within a given time, in order to end the suspicion that he did not mean to do so. He was to state that he meant to rejoin the Catholic Church by means of instruction, and should permit the royalists to send to the pope to seek his help, advice and authority. In other words, they were to ask the new pope to assist in the king’s conversion. This was, in effect, to call Henry’s bluff; and to propose one long step beyond saying that he would abide by the decisions of a council. Meanwhile, the League should be secretly assured as to the safety of religion, in order to obtain a truce either before, or at the time of, the conversion. The ‘expedient’, therefore, derived from the urgent need to obviate an apparently imminent treaty between the League and Spain in favour of the infanta; clearly Villeroy did not know that Parma had no commission to treat. The four specific factors of the ‘expedient’, enunciated by Villeroy in March 1592, 143

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 216-17, – March 1592, memoir for the king, 222-3, 10 March 1592, Fleury to Duplessis, 223-5, 13 March 1592, Duplessis to Revol, 231, 16 March 1592, Duplessis to Fleury, 232, 18 March 1592, Henry IV to Duplessis, 232-3, 19 March 1592, Duplessis to Fleury; 233-4, 21 March 1592, Duplessis to Fleury, 238-9, 23 March 1592, Duplessis to Fleury. 144 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 244, 25 March 1592, Henry IV to Duplessis. 145 This visit to Gondi probably occurred about 20 March 1592. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 264-5, 1 April 1592, Fleury to Duplessis. 146 It was not yet known in France that the pope was about to launch a further bull condemning and excluding Henry IV. Hopes were initially placed in Clement VIII because of his Florentine origin. 147 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 236-8, 22 March 1592, Villeroy to Fleury.

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were all to be reflected in the king’s progress along the path to Rome. Mayenne and the king were both informed of this proposal.148 When Villeroy returned to Pontoise after visiting Gondi, his ‘trompette’ had at last brought Mayenne’s reply. Mayenne – who was not yet aware of ‘the expedient’ – offered to recognise Navarre as king, provided he undertook to convert after taking instruction. In that case, Mayenne would empower Villeroy to negotiate the conditions of an agreement. Mayenne’s bad faith is demonstrated by his introduction, at this stage, of a new hurdle and major stumbling block. He proposed to allow the king two months in which, not only to convert, but also to be reconciled with the pope – which Mayenne would secretly support.149 That was, of course, pure falsehood; Mayenne intended to oppose the king in Rome as strenuously as he always had; and that is what he did. The treaty, which Villeroy was authorised to negotiate, would only take effect after the conversion and the absolution, although that sensitive word was avoided. Duplessis saw no point in proceeding on such terms, but Villeroy and Fleury begged him not to give up.150 Villeroy and Duplessis met again on 3 April 1592, just as Thomas Wilkes arrived in France. All the proposals mooted so far were discussed again, and Duplessis protested that the king could not be made to do ‘unworthy things’. Duplessis rejected any question of a declaration of intent to abjure, as distinct from the receipt of instruction. Whereas to catholics, instruction was intended to facilitate conversion, to Duplessis it should presage a Calvinist outcome.151 He was, however, aware of the urgent need to avert a treaty between Mayenne and Parma. For this reason, Duplessis and Villeroy skilfully attenuated the ‘expedient’ in order to avoid a breach. According to the revised version, the king would promise to receive instruction, within a time limit to be specified, ‘avec désir et intention de s’unir et joindre à l’église catholique [‘Roman’ was omitted] moyennant ladicte instruction, faite comme il convient à sa dignité’. This was a clever formula which, for Duplessis, incorporated the possibility of failure. Those concerned should seek Papal authority and advice. That would allow Villeroy to proceed, if he could, with the ‘voyages de Rome’. If this revised ‘expedient’ was accepted, Duplessis and Villeroy proposed to draft two sets of articles, one to take effect before the conversion, and the other after it. Duplessis cherished the rather forlorn hope that if the League leaders were accorded sufficiently lavish personal inducements, they would find that the point of religion was not so important, and might be willing to agree to a long truce. A truce, so the reasoning went, would bring about an end to the war, and that would detach the League from Spain. With Spain removed from the equation, the League probably could 148

Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 257-8; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 245-8, 28 March 1592, Duplessis to Henry IV, informing him of the ‘expedient’. 149 That, of course, was totally untrue; Mayenne strenuously opposed the king in Rome. 150 Fleury had sent to Pontoise to retrieve a copy of Mayenne’s reply – no text. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 260-1, 24 March 1592, Fleury to Duplessis, 245-8, 28 March 1592, memoir from Duplessis for the king, 257, – March 1592, Duplessis to Fleury, 266-7, 2 April 1592, Fleury to Duplessis; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 258-61. 151 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 245-8, 28 March 1592, memoir from Duplessis for the king, 267-8, 3 April 1592, Duplessis to Bouillon.


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be bought. Then there might still be a chance that the king would be recognised without having first converted; and that was what Henry earnestly desired. In this Duplessis miscalculated; Mayenne would not voluntarily relinquish such power and position as he already held.152 Before Duplessis and Villeroy could proceed upon the basis of the amended ‘expedient’, it was again necessary to report back. Villeroy, however, first went to see Nevers, Bellièvre and Gondi, all of whom could be influential. The king, Villeroy stated in his memoirs, had agreed to the [original] ‘expedient’, and to sending an embassy to Rome. Villeroy therefore sought, and obtained, Gondi’s agreement to undertake the ‘voyage de Rome’ himself, provided Mayenne agreed.153 About 10 April 1592, Villeroy sent the aged Michel de Castelnau to Mayenne with the revised ‘expedient’, namely that the king would submit to instruction upon the authority of the pope. This was a clever move since Mayenne could hardly be blamed for referring the religious problem to Rome. Once the good work was begun, Villeroy prayed, surely God must complete it. If Mayenne agreed, then Villeroy could get on with drafting the terms of the treaty and ending the war. Villeroy tried, in these ways, to narrow the gulf between the two sides; unfortunately his efforts were based on ill-founded assumptions about the disposition of Clement VIII. Castelnau returned on 13 April, speedily but answerless; Mayenne was occupied in gathering all the forces he could for Rouen. However, Jeannin had obtained that the treaty with Spain should at least be deferred to the estates-general, then scheduled for 15 May. That, at least, reduced the tension.154 Nothing to which Mayenne consented should be taken at face value. The negotiation with Spain was not to his liking, and the outcome of war was uncertain. He was therefore glad to be able to provide for the worst and, at the same time, to embarrass Parma. Furthermore, if the matter of Henry’s conversion was referred to Rome, Mayenne could more discreetly frustrate it there. Villeroy reflected angrily, while he awaited a reply, that Mayenne was only trying to advance his own affairs by a victory over the king, despite having been offered a means of escape from the negotiation with Spain. Mayenne did reply, on 14 April 1592, but communications were dangerous; caught in some tight corner, the messenger destroyed his dispatch. Consequently, the answer had not been received by 20 April when the siege of Rouen was raised. Nevertheless, desperate for peace and willing to make big concessions, Henry commanded Duplessis to remain at

152

Nouaillac, Villeroy, 218; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 268-70, 4 April 1592, Duplessis to Henry IV; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 260-2. Oddly enough, Villeroy says nothing about the revised ‘expedient’. 153 The king probably assented to the ‘expedient’ about the end of March 1592. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 286-7, 15 April 1592, Duplessis to Henry IV, in which Duplessis referred to the king’s consent. Ibid., 310-12, 20 April 1592, Duplessis to Henry IV, said that the king had approved the ‘expedient’ three weeks ago; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 263-4. 154 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 264-5; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 281, 13 April 1592, Jeannin to Villeroy, 282-3, 13 April 1592, Villeroy to Fleury, 286-7, 15 April 1592, Duplessis to Henry IV.

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Mantes until he received the reply from Villeroy.155 The long delay caused consternation, doubts and fears. Duplessis, rearing to join the king in the field, blamed Villeroy; Villeroy suspected Mayenne’s intentions and sought a passport to go home. A copy of the lost letter finally arrived on 25 April, by which time circumstances had changed.156 Mayenne’s reply rejected the formula in the modified ‘expedient’ relating to the king’s conversion. Nor would he declare in favour of peace, but only a truce. The royalists, he said, should approach the pope, under pretext of explaining the truce, and obtain his authority and consent to the king’s abjuration. Mayenne also wished the pope to exert his influence on Spain and the proposed estates-general – presumably, since the point is vague – to induce Philip II to relinquish the claims of the infanta. It was evidently not yet known in France that Clement VIII’s pro-Spanish policy had already been announced. Mayenne wished Villeroy to seek assurances for religion and the party, which meant enormous gains for the League leaders. If Gondi went to Rome, Mayenne would send Desportes, followed by someone of greater standing. Mayenne’s answer to Villeroy had nothing to do with negotiating peace; it was based on a design to frustrate the royalists in Rome and to promote his own election to the throne.

XI: Complex Negotiations Jeannin wrote to Villeroy on 22 April 1592, after the relief of Rouen, when sensible resolutions could be envisaged. He hoped to sway the forthcoming estates (scheduled for May) against the infanta, and still appeared to favour the choice of an alternative Bourbon prince. Mayenne and Jeannin were not working in unison, which complicated Villeroy’s task. Villeroy, authorised by Mayenne only to confer with the royalists on the means of assuring religion and the League, met Duplessis at Buhy on 26 April. Duplessis was not too displeased by Mayenne’s reply because he hoped to divert the League from the point of religion by means of sufficient material concessions. He declared that Henry sought to satisfy the pope, and would advance his instruction in a manner to become apparent. What Duplessis meant by these ostensibly curious statements, will also become apparent from his proposals for the king’s instruction, and the nature of Gondi’s mission to Rome. Both Duplessis and Villeroy were therefore now ready to discuss the contents of an agreement, for which Villeroy had prepared by drafting a list of articles. He did not, however, go so far as to deliver them in writing; nor did he commit Mayenne to anything. By article one of Villeroy’s proposals, the king would promise to take instruction and make a declaration of intent [to abjure], thereby enabling everyone to hope for satisfaction. Several articles covered the necessary security of catholicism and the clergy. Provision was made for the huguenots, the privileges of the cities, for an amnesty, 155

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 293-4, 16 April 1592, Villeroy to Fleury, 294-5, 16 April 1592, Bouillon to Duplessis, 295-7, 16 April 1592, Duplessis to La Fontaine, in England, 298-9, 18 April 1592, Fleury to Duplessis, 300-1, 18 April 1592, Villeroy to Fleury, 302-7, 18 April 1592, Duplessis to Buzanval, in the Netherlands, 310, 20 April 1592, Duplessis to Fleury, 322-3, 25 April 1592, Duplessis to Bouillon. 156 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 268-72, no text, but Villeroy discussed the letter.


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financial and military matters, and for an estates-general every six years. Villeroy also broached the subject of individual compensation. For Mayenne, he claimed the ‘gouvernements’ of Burgundy and the Lyonnais, plus their ‘survivance’ (the right to appoint his successors), and the settlement of his debts. There were also to be ‘gouvernements’ for his principal followers.157 Villeroy reported the discussions on his articles to Jeannin on 30 April 1592. That happened to be just at the most critical moment of the Rouen campaign. Jeannin’s reply to Villeroy’s report, dated 8 May 1592, was received two days later. Jeannin was under close surveillance because he was suspect to the Spanish and the opponents of peace; and he had not yet had an opportunity to consult Mayenne. However, he saw so little advantage in Villeroy’s proposals that he proposed to suppress them. Mayenne, he said, wanted peace as much as anyone else, but people tried to divert him with grandiose notions which would have to be satisfied; in other words Mayenne would exact a higher personal price. He wanted sovereign powers in an hereditary ‘gouvernement’ [or two], terms he had already demanded without success from Philip II. He emphatically did not want an amnesty; the League was not vanquished and would endure no hint of condescension.158 If Villeroy had skirted around his basic disagreement with Duplessis, that with his fellow catholic, Jeannin, was undisguised. Jeannin did not believe in the king’s conversion or that the pope would ever sanction it. By pursuing this tack, Jeannin claimed that they would lose both religion and the state. Jeannin still favoured an alternative prince of the blood, despite the unsuitability of each and every one of them. Villeroy was distressed by this setback after working in good faith as Mayenne had directed. The crown belonged to Henry of Navarre and Villeroy knew that negotiation with anyone else would neither end the war nor save the kingdom; he would have no part in it. Villeroy’s honest negotiations were paralleled by various dangerous intrigues, since both the League and the royalists were divided amongst themselves. Mayenne’s apparent determination to obtain, first of all, the king’s conversion, found an echo among the disaffected royalists; only they were still unaware of Mayenne’s utter duplicity, ostensibly promoting what he fully intended to oppose. Villeroy recorded that the duc de Longueville and marshal d’Aumont, in the name of the royalist catholics [presumably not all of them], declared that if the League would recognise the king, on condition that he abjured within a given time, they would undertake to abandon him if he reneged. The proSpanish, for their part, were also seeking to detach the royalist catholics in the interests of Spain. The permutations and confusion were considerable.159 After receiving Jeannin’s reply of 8 May 1592, Villeroy prepared a memoir for Duplessis. He tried to present the bad news in the best light, stressing the need for peace. Instead of keeping the whole matter secret, Duplessis imparted everything to the king and various councillors. This 157

Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 278-81, Nouaillac, Villeroy, 218-20. Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 281-92; Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 499-500; Nouaillac, ‘La Fin de la Ligue’, Revue Henri IV, i (1905), 202; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 229. 159 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 286. 158

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created an uproar, and greatly embarrassed Villeroy. He had pushed quite far ahead without a commission, and such revelations were certain to infuriate Mayenne. Faced with Mayenne’s intransigence on the one hand and, on the other, the royalists’ threats to abandon the king, Duplessis changed his mind and ceased to support a truce. He always wanted peace in France, in order to get to grips with Spain; and he still favoured the ‘voyage de Rome’, which he hoped might help to end the civil war. But, obviously, he had never meant to facilitate the king’s abjuration. Now, if Henry refused to convert, his catholic supporters would abandon him. Duplessis evidently still believed that the king’s instruction could have a Calvinist outcome, thereby averting his conversion. In these circumstances, Duplessis obtained royal permission to organise a huguenot assembly, apparently with the intention of staging a theological disputation. Within two months, he proposed to assemble seven or eight of the most notable Calvinist ministers, at Saumur where he was ‘gouverneur’. These ministers were to prepare for an assembly in six or seven months’ time. He invited the pastor La Fontaine to participate, and sought his advice in this serious situation. Duplessis expressed his sense of doom; they were – all of them – on the edge of a precipice, uncertain who would be toppled by whom; even the pushers could fall in themselves. La Fontaine approved the proposal in principle; the difficulties, however, were immense. Many books would have to be assembled and much time would be needed.160 There, for a while, the matter rested. When, in June 1592, the court was at Gisors the councillors Biron, Bouillon, and d’O summoned Villeroy; he asked Duplessis to go with him. Duplessis had misgivings because the councillors were not of one mind. However, they agreed to further the ‘voyage de Rome’, and to use their influence with the king to gratify Mayenne. Supported by both Duplessis and the catholics, the ‘voyage de Rome’ evidently did not mean the same thing to all men. Having conferred with the councillors, Villeroy was summoned by Jeannin to Rouen. He wished Villeroy to calm Mayenne who was furious at the breach of secrecy. This had vexed the deputies to his assembly who complained of pre-emptive actions.161 Villeroy, who had not seen Mayenne for some time, took the opportunity to present his case. He pointed out that the Spanish already preferred Guise to Mayenne, and Parma had abandoned him in Rouen. It was now time for Mayenne to break with Spain and to serve religion and the kingdom. If Villeroy truly thought that Mayenne would bite, then he did not know his man. On the other hand, Mayenne had been ill, and Parma’s retreat did leave him great difficulties and uncertainty. The king, Villeroy recorded in his memoirs, had promised and was resolute to send to Rome in an effort to satisfy the pope. If this initiative did not result in his conversion, the catholics would desert him and he would be ruined. The inference must be that this is what the councillors had told Villeroy during their recent meetings at Gisors. But, if Henry did convert, then some glory would

160

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 339-45, 19 June 1592, La Fontaine to Duplessis, from London, 346-8, 24 June 1592, Duplessis to Henry IV, 351-2, 2 July 1592, Duplessis to the ‘premier président’ of Rouen; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, throws no light on Duplessis’ complex role. 161 The whole question of Mayenne’s assembly is obscure. It had been deferred to May 1592. Although it did not then take place, it appears that some deputies did turn up; again, it is not clear where.


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reflect upon Mayenne, particularly if he had promoted the matter in Rome. As for Mayenne personally, the king would certainly satisfy all reasonable requests.162 Villeroy’s efforts failed: as before, Mayenne refused to co-operate before he had held his assembly. This time, however, Mayenne also refused to co-operate until the pope had pronounced upon the king’s conversion. Each time that Villeroy succeeded in making a degree of progress, Mayenne shifted his ground. For the first time, he was anxious that the king really would convert, for fear of losing the catholics’ support. Consequently Mayenne demanded not simply an undertaking by the king, nor even his actual conversion, but also reconciliation with the Church, before he would treat for peace. In other words, Mayenne completely obstructed a peace negotiation. He approved the ‘voyage de Rome’ and proposed to send someone himself ‘to do what he could’. Thus, pretending to co-operate in this respect, Mayenne would traverse the royalists’ negotiation in Rome; he had no intention of recognising Henry of Navarre. Mayenne required an answer from the pope before the estates-general, which was now rescheduled for July 1592.163 He asked Villeroy for Henry’s final word on the subject of conversion. Mayenne was juggling, and playing for time. Not having concluded any agreement with Parma, Mayenne did not yet know what Philip II was prepared to concede in return for his support; furthermore, Mayenne was now hoping to elicit Papal support for himself.164 Thus the throne was vigorously disputed in four different ways: apart from Henry IV himself, there was the Spanish bid to elect the infanta, with problems over her marriage and other things; there was the old proposal of Jeannin to choose an alternative Bourbon prince, and Mayenne’s aspiration to seize the prize himself with Papal support. Peace was out of the question. Villeroy was doubtless angry and discouraged when he saw the king at Gisors about 16 June. The visit was meant to be secret and Villeroy delivered Mayenne’s final message. Mayenne claimed that he would have to capitulate with Spain if Henry failed to satisfy the pope and become reconciled with the Church – which begged many complex questions. This condition was actually an insolent non sequitur, there being no comparability between the time scale within which the two propositions could take effect. Villeroy emphasised that Mayenne was never going to make peace before the king’s conversion – contrary to what Duplessis had hoped. Consequently, Villeroy advised, the king must hasten what had become the ‘voyages de Rome’, since it was now proposed that Pisani should accompany Gondi. To this Henry agreed; he would also do all he could to satisfy those who desired his instruction. Villeroy believed the king to be sincere, for the sake of his subjects and from a desire for peace. Nevertheless, the wording of Henry’s 162

Villeroy met the king at Gisors on 14 June 1592. Nouaillac, Villeroy, secrétaire d’état, 223-4; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 301-5; Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 501. It is not clear when, or to whom, the king promised to send to Rome to satisfy the pope. 163 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 305-7. 164 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 229-30. Philip II is said to have decided what he would do for Mayenne on 6 December 1592, after a mission to Spain of Pélissier. But, whatever Philip II said, for the moment, it appears that he did not mean to let Mayenne keep the frontier province of Burgundy.

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reply could be taken to mean that he had Duplessis’ conference in mind. Henry made Villeroy promise to tell him if, the point of religion conceded, Mayenne would [still] refuse to negotiate. But all this sparring had become over-complex. The point of religion was now two points: not only abjuration but also Papal absolution; and Henry had no power to guarantee his reconciliation with the Church; that depended upon the pope.165 Mayenne would do nothing without the authority of the pope, the advice of sovereign princes who supported the party [Spain], and the forthcoming estates; nor did he wish it to be thought that he had ever contemplated acting alone. Since the king meant to send Gondi and Pisani to Rome, Villeroy supposed that he meant to satisfy the other catholics. Henry would allow time for the Rome mission and for the League assembly. Villeroy therefore hoped that this would be enough to restrain Mayenne from clinching any agreement with Spain. As Henry had told queen Elizabeth, the will to make peace did not exist. However the negotiations, brilliantly pursued by Villeroy, had crystallised the issues. The royalists’ threat to abandon the king was deadly serious. Although Henry still expressed himself in ambiguous phraseology, he had consented to the ‘voyages de Rome’. The whole transaction had swept him substantially closer to conversion, and that was Villeroy’s patriotic objective. In this respect, the ever-patient Villeroy had not failed, although the peace negotiation was suspended in June 1592. Everyone now looked to Rome; and the so-called estates-general of the League would have to take place. Duplessis left court to help with problems at Quilleboeuf in Normandy and, thenceforth, his influence diminished. Villeroy went home to evade interrogations. On his way he informed Gondi that Mayenne proposed to send Desportes and the bishop of Lisieux (Anne de Pérusse seigneur Descars) to Rome. A prolonged struggle in Rome was about to begin, and Villeroy was anxious that Gondi and Pisani should get there first.166

165

Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 308-12; Nouaillac, Villeroy, 221-4; Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 502-3. 166 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 314-15; Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henry IV, i, 339. Quilleboeuf was fortified as part of a move to put pressure on Rouen. Edmondes reported that members of the ‘tiers parti’ were seizing control of certain towns in Normandy. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, pp. 2823, 4/14, 8/18, September 1592, Edmondes to Burghley.

CHAPTER XIII: THE PROBLEM OF CONVERSION I: The King’s Dilemma After the harrowing Rouen campaign, Henry’s conversion had begun to look like a sine qua non. His prospects of definitive victory had steadily deteriorated since the triumph of Ivry, in March 1590. By the summer of 1592, his position was critical. Indeed, there was even a sense in which Henry was facing defeat – except that he never gave up. His inability to establish himself in arms exposed him to the disloyalty and importunity of his own supporters, to the duplicity of Mayenne, and the subversion of Spain. In some three years, he had failed to overpower his enemies, retake Paris and obtain peace on his own terms. Now it was apparent that he would never command the necessary means to impose his legitimate authority that way. The crucial factors had been insufficient foreign aid coupled, from 1590, with the open intervention of Spain. Now the Spanish had a foothold in several frontier provinces, and Parma was expected to return in October 1592; his mission was to intimidate Mayenne’s long-deferred ‘estates-general’ into electing a catholic king – namely the infanta.1 That would be a recipe for prolonged war and the disintegration of France. The nobility and clergy, it has been seen, had increased their pressure on the king to convert, while Spain, the League and successive Papal envoys repeatedly sought to detach them from Henry’s service. Henry’s conversion would probably inhibit the election of a rival king; it also appeared to be the only alternative route towards his general recognition, followed by peace. The tenor of the recent negotiations in the summer of 1592 had been that Henry’s religion was the principal obstacle to peace – although, paradoxically, Mayenne actually desired neither peace nor the king’s conversion. The problem of religion frustrated Henry at every turn; yet he was painfully aware that, apart from appeasing the royalist catholics, his abjuration would be no guarantee of anything. Nevertheless, he was being steadily impelled towards it, despite the adverse circumstances in which the desired results would not be obtained. Conversion, it has already been seen, was not a straightforward option – to do or not to do; it posed enormous difficulties. The conversion of a king was not a private act; nor even a public one which could suddenly or simply be decreed. It required support, participation, and an acceptable procedure to be employed in unprecedented circumstances. It was one thing to adopt the catholic faith, but Henry was burdened with a Papal excommunication; he was branded by the Church as a relapsed catholic, and barred from the succession both by the Papacy and by repeated decrees – albeit of doubtful validity. These matters were juridically controversial and could be endlessly manipulated; and so they were.

1 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 318, 29 September/9 October 1592, Williams to Burghley and others; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 22-5, 22 August/1 September 1592, Edmondes to Burghley, 2831, 20/30 September 1592, Edmondes to Burghley.

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There is little indication that those who persistently clamoured for Henry’s conversion had ever considered its practical difficulties, the technicalities of absolution, or the Spanish domination of Rome. Nor did they heed the dangers – always apparent to Henry himself – of attempting to apply a religious solution to a political problem.2 They persisted in thinking it sufficient to send to Rome, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. Placing vain hopes in a new pope, the royalists did not reflect upon the recent past: the embassy of Luxembourg in 1590, repeated Papal censures, the enmity of three Papal envoys, and the employment of Papal forces against them. Not one of four successive popes had wished to promote the king’s conversion, or even displayed a proper concern for the decay of the Church in France. Yet, given the excommunication, Papal authority clearly was necessary for Henry’s conversion to be accepted. Mayenne could insist upon the prior need to obtain Papal authorisation, while assiduously obstructing it in Rome. Thus, if Henry resorted to some domestic procedure – yet to be devised – his enemies would not fail to denounce the conversion as feigned and invalid. If he called their bluff – for they did not think he meant to convert – they had only to shift the grounds of their opposition from the king’s heresy to the means of his conversion, and thereafter to his absolution. At the very least, that would take a long time during which anything might happen. The struggle would continue unabated. It was not from obstinacy – with which Henry is charged to this day – that he delayed and prevaricated.3 Apart from personal problems, which there is no good reason to disparage, Henry perceived the dangers of converting from a position of weakness; that would bring neither recognition nor peace but would, on the contrary, weaken him still further. Consequently he took infinite pains to avoid making either a formal, or a public, commitment, because he hoped to achieve first of all what he later called a ‘firm foundation’. There were three conceivable ways of establishing that foundation – namely the requisite circumstances in which to convert: the first was triumph in arms, which had so far proved impossible and appeared increasingly unlikely; the second was the imposition of peace which just might be possible if the League were to collapse from internal divisions, lack of means, or the loss of Spanish support; and this could be fostered through intelligence in Paris. But, thirdly, if Henry could somehow obtain prior Papal authorisation for his conversion, his position would be unassailable. All three possibilities could at least be pursued simultaneously. By the summer of 1592, Henry realised that his abjuration was being now forced on him, whether he was ready or not. It is impossible to say when he first acknowledged this to himself, but it was evidently not later than mid-September 1592, when he alerted queen Elizabeth. It may even have been by March 1592, when he accepted Villeroy’s ‘expedient’, or possibly in June when, more explicitly, he agreed to the ‘voyages de Rome’. This agreement to approach the Papacy, and from a position of weakness in France, certainly testified to Henry’s desperation. Once already, he had 2

In a report to Clement VIII Matteucci, his military commissioner in France, told the pope in no uncertain terms that the cause of the war was ambition and its nature political. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 531-9. 3 It has already been seen that Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, insists on this point of obstinacy, pp. 92, 100, 188.

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placed hopes in the coming of a legate; and that legate had been Caetani, who went to Paris and served the League and the Spanish. Sega (known in France as the cardinal de Plaisance), had come with Caetani and remained behind, after the death of Sixtus V. Clement VIII wasted no time in appointing him legate a latere, which was not auspicious.4 As Henry’s chances of obtaining Papal support were slim, it was necessary to proceed with extreme caution. In the current circumstances, another failure and explicit rejection by Rome could be fatal to his survival in France. Time was also short as some response from Rome was required, both by the king and the League, before the so-called estates-general proceeded to the election of a king.5 The hopes and fears of all concerned in the struggle for the throne of France were now largely focused on pope Clement VIII.

II: Pope Clement VIII Ippolito Aldobrandini had been elected pope, as Clement VIII, on 30 January 1592. Not on the Spanish list of approved candidates, he was a compromise choice after the failure of five others. He finally received the support of cardinal Montalto, who is said to have extorted a promise that Clement, as pope, would not contravene the wishes of Spain. According to the Venetian ambassador, Paolo Paruta, Clement actually promised the Spanish, in writing, never to absolve Navarre – in any circumstances. There are a number of references to some such injudicious undertaking, which suggests that it was probably true; it would certainly help to explain quite a lot.6 The Aldobrandini family originally came from Florence but had moved away. Clement studied law in Rome, Bologna and Ferrara. His nature was kindly and affable but he was timid, slow and pernickety. Wracked by anxieties and legalistic doubts, he retreated into negativity and inaction. ‘Irresolute’ and ‘pusillanimous’ are the adjectives most commonly used to describe him by the ambassadors whose patience he sorely tried. His do-nothing policy, which Clement absorbed from Sixtus V, was dementing to everyone but himself, but it was not necessarily unwise. Clement thereby succeeded in surviving unscathed until, with the passage of time, circumstances had substantially changed. Clement VIII’s tortuous procedures are largely explicable in the light of his previous experience. He was a creature of Sixtus V. Auditor of the Roman rota (Rota Sacra Romana), Sixtus V made him a cardinal in 1585 – the year of Navarre’s excommunication. As a prominent servant of Sixtus V, Clement had witnessed his harrowing conflict with the Spanish ambassador, Olivares. It is therefore not surprising 4

Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 61-2. Sega was made a cardinal by Innocent IX on 18 December 1591, and legate a latere by Clement VIII on 17 February 1592. 5 The assembly was then expected at Reims or Soissons by the end of October 1592. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 28-31, 20/30 September 1592, Edmondes to Burghley. 6 In January 1594, during his mission to Rome, Nevers is said to have informed the king that he would bring him a copy of the promise made by Clement VIII to Spain ‘pour parvenir au Pontificat’ that, in respect of the affairs of France, he would never act contrary to their wishes. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, i, Mémoires de madame Duplessis-Mornay, 271; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, p. iv; ibid ii, 223-4, 26 February 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 84-5; Innocent IX, who preceded Clement VIII, reigned from 29 October to 31 December 1591.

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that Clement’s attitude to Henry IV and the affairs of France should have closely resembled that of his mentor. Consequently Clement VIII was insuperably afraid of the duke of Sessa, who had joined Olivares in Rome before the death of Sixtus V. Determined, and at all costs, to avoid another such conflict over the same issues, Clement would not be cajoled into any action he could not justify to the Spanish. Time was no object; everything could wait. Clement was, in fact, in an awkward position. To some extent, he was dependent upon Spain for the defence of Italy; and the Turks created an alarm in 1593 by invading Croatia. More immediately, Rome was dependent upon Spain for corn from Sicily. Clement worried about the scarcity and the high price of bread which threatened social unrest in Rome. Unlike Sixtus V, Clement did not enjoy the advantage of wealth. Sixtus’ notorious treasure had all been squandered by Gregory XIV upon intervention in France. This costly policy was inherited by Clement VIII, who was elected near the beginning of the Rouen campaign. Such intervention was ineffective and unsustainable. Clement diminished it, but did not finally withdraw his forces from France until May 1593. In appointing Sega cardinal legate in France, Clement had emphasised the need to elect a catholic king opting, unhelpfully, for some imaginary paragon.7 There were those who began to insist that only Navarre could fill the vacuum in France.8 But he could not do so unaided, and Clement VIII was clearly hostile. Indeed, Clement confirmed the Papal condemnations against Navarre, thereby compounding the error of the excommunication and, with it, his own future difficulties.9 Clement’s attitude to Henry IV and the affairs of France was not only hostile, it was also legalistic. To him, the terms of the excommunication presented a serious problem, although a bold exercise of Papal authority could simply have negated it. But Clement chose not to believe in the possibility of an acceptable conversion, or in the sincerity of Navarre’s declared intentions to preserve the Church in France. Behind Clement’s negative and unpaternal attitude lay a basic principle inherited from Sixtus V: he would not be held responsible for having assisted Henry IV to become the effective king of France. Thus, until circumstances changed, Clement would neither facilitate Henry’s abjuration nor grant him absolution. In this way he would conciliate Spain, whose consuming preoccupation was to deprive Henry IV of his throne. Late in 1592, the surest way for Spain to do this was to obstruct his conversion and absolution; and Rome

7

Isacker, ‘Notes sur l’intervention militaire de Clément VIII en France’, Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, xii (1911), 702-13; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 157, 15 April 1592, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany; Leva, Ed., Paola Paruta, i, 162-5, 10 April 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate, 209-12, 22 May 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 561. Gregory XIV had spent 700,000 écus on France and Clement VIII 200,000. 8 Nevers wrote to the pope to this effect on 27 August 1592. Navarre, he said, could not be expelled and his conversion was the only solution; otherwise there would be a schism. De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 570. This opinion was contradicted by a memoir of Diou submitted to the pope in September 1592. Ibid., 570-2. 9 The evidence relating to Clement’s condemnations of Navarre is unclear. He is said to have issued briefs against Navarre in June and July 1592. Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 64. The Venetian, Paruta, referred on 30 January 1593 to monitoria against Navarre. Leva, Ed., Paola Paruta, i, 90-3.


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was the place in which to do it. The projected ‘voyages de Rome’ of Gondi and Pisani were therefore foredoomed to failure.

III: The ‘Voyages de Rome’ Cardinal Gondi is said to have begun his journey on 4 October 1592. Pisani followed later, which was clearly a matter of policy.10 For an Italian cardinal to go to Italy and to Rome was one thing; Pisani was an ambassador designate. It is probable that the principal purpose in sending the Florentine Pierre de Gondi, was to liaise privately with the wealthy grand duke of Tuscany, Ferdinando I. There were rumours, reported by sir Roger Williams, that Henry might marry a relative of the grand duke, gaining a large dowry. The support of Ferdinando was soon to be crucial to Henry IV; but it was conditional upon his conversion.11 Bouillon, Revol, Schomberg and Pisani – all among the king’s closest advisers – conferred with Gondi at Noyon before his departure. Efforts were made to obviate the impression that he went ‘charmed and instructed hence’; in fact he had no formal instructions at all; as a cardinal, Gondi could maintain a degree of independence.12 Nevertheless, Henry’s explanation to queen Elizabeth throws some light on the nature of Gondi’s mission. A memoir relating to Gondi’s mission was taken to England by Aubéry du Maurier (secretary to Bouillon), probably in October 1592.13 Henry was evidently concerned both to prepare the queen for his conversion and to reassure her that it was not imminent. This was not deception because, although Henry surely knew that his conversion had become inescapable, he remained determined to delay it for as long as possible, or at least until he was ready. Henry explained in the memoir – as he already had to sir Thomas Wilkes – that he was increasingly pressed by his enemies, whose hopes for the future depended upon his ruin. His friends were tepid, and his supporters disaffected, especially the clergy. Tacitly, they seemed to approve of the impending election of a catholic king. Henry had been obliged to break off the peace negotiations and to undertake instruction in the 10 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 368, 13/23 August 1592, Edmondes to Burghley, 368, 22 August/1 September 1592, Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes said that Pisani was to follow Gondi, with a message for the pope. 11 The Gondi were a wealthy Florentine family. Pierre de Gondi, however, belonged to a branch which settled in France and he was born in Lyon. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 369, 23 August/2 September 1592, Williams to Burghley and others. Williams said that the grand duke was sending [Girolamo] Gondi to France. It is not clear when he first came, or for how long the grand duke had been helping, or seeking to influence, the king. On 9/19 January 1593, Edmondes reported to Burghley that the grand duke continued his offers to the king, provided he would abjure. Ibid., 369 (sic). 12 There is some indication that Pisani’s departure was delayed by lack of money. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 691, 23 October 1592, Henry IV to Nevers; De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 85, says that Gondi and Pisani travelled together, separating in northern Italy. There is, however, no mention of his being in Italy until late in December 1592. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 54-6, 26 December 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 368, 13/23 August 1592, Edmondes to Burghley, 368, 30 September/10 October 1592, Edmondes to Burghley; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 39-41; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 329. 13 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, pp. 318-19, 3/13 October 1592, queen Elizabeth to Henry IV.

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catholic religion.14 This was partly because Tuscany, Venice and other friends had warned him that they could not [they dared not] support him as they would like to do unless he converted. These were the reasons, he said, why he was sending Gondi to Rome. The cardinal was informed of Henry’s intention and desire to do everything in his power to end the war, and to be instructed in the catholic religion – although that did not constitute a clear undertaking. He had sent his servants to discuss with Gondi how to proceed because he could not, abruptly, just change his religion. He was advised that Gondi, in his capacity as a cardinal, should mediate with the pope. Gondi would say that he believed the king meant to take instruction, provided he was given time, and not coerced by force. Here, again, the emphasis was on timing, and the habitual ambiguity remained as to whether or not instruction comprised conversion. Gondi, the memoir continued, would then beg the ‘universal father’ to take the matter in hand (‘de bien volloyr embrasser ceste affaire’). Thus, Henry did not conceal that he did have conversion in mind. At the same time he assured the queen that his intention was not to depart from his religion [yet] but to prolong the matter. For this purpose Pisani would follow Gondi, and go in the name of the nobility. Meanwhile [having issued the right signals] Henry could attend to his ‘conservation’. In other words, he would get on with the war. He had also resolved to call an assembly of the more loyal and moderate clergy (‘les moins passionnés’) to inform them that he had decided to take instruction. He did not mention a time-scale but repeated that he could spin things out. He hoped these measures would be sufficient to satisfy the Italian princes, and others who badgered him. At the same time, Henry was also summoning the wisest [protestant] ministers. It is doubtful, however, if a colloquy between catholics and protestants was envisaged, but possibly an assembly to regulate the future of the protestants. Henry was trying to avoid ruffling feathers and this is a rather grey area.15 It remained to be seen for how long Henry could sustain this balancing act. Meanwhile he clearly hoped that further material help might be forthcoming from England. The manner in which the pope might take the king’s conversion in hand was to be the subject of Pisani’s mission; it was twofold and specific. Pisani bore instructions from the royalist catholics dated 2 October 1592, plus others from the king, dated 7 October, and a personal letter from Henry IV to Clement VIII, dated 8 October 1592. Like Luxembourg before him, Pisani was to justify the nobles’ conduct [in supporting Navarre] and to demand the recall of Sega, the detested legate. Henry’s, allegedly secret, instructions centred on the problem of his conversion, which presented grave difficulties. In guarded language, Henry explained that he was willing to take instruction – that much 14

There is scattered evidence which indicates that Henry’s ‘instruction’ took place through various discussions over quite a long period. The clergy of the chapel royal had easy access to the king. He is said to have spent several long evenings in ‘close consultation’ with Claude d’Angennes, bishop of Le Mans and Jacques Davy Du Perron. Du Perron is also said to have held debates with prominent protestant ministers. Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 125. 15 Ouvré, Aubéry du Maurier, 323-5, memoir to the sieur du Maurier going to England. He was ready to leave on 13 October 1592. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, pp. 309, 316-19; Patry, Philippe DuplessisMornay, 240-1.


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he had declared many times; furthermore, he was not set against whatever could be shown to be his duty in matters of conscience. But, during the peace negotiations, conversion was also put to him as a matter of state, as the true means of obtaining obedience [namely recognition]. He had, however, no reason to believe that all his subjects would offer obedience if, for his part, he did what was required of him. On the contrary, he risked being mocked by some and abandoned by others. There, in a nutshell, is Henry’s own explanation as to why, in the eyes of some contemporaries, and some historians, he had ‘obstinately refused’ to abjure. This was why Pisani was to request the appointment of a different, and suitable legate, sent to intercede with the League on behalf of the king. Henry wanted this legate to obtain an undertaking that the League would recognise and obey him if he converted. In return, Henry offered to guarantee the retention of offices previously held under Henry III. Given this help and assurance, Henry promised to receive instruction; and he believed that he could, in conscience, consent to what was required of him. If the League refused such a request, their insincerity would be exposed. In that case, Henry hoped the new legate would unleash against them the measures they had sought against himself.16 This was a skilful approach. If a friendly legate were to perform this office of mediation, he might also be expected to conduct the king’s conversion – with full Papal authority – thereby disposing of the knotty problem of absolution. In those circumstances, absolution could hardly be withheld. Ferdinando I, grand duke of Tuscany, was central to all these French endeavours. Thus Pisani, like Gondi, was to travel via Florence to seek his advice and support. The ‘voyages de Rome’ were equally ‘voyages de Florence’, to pursue substantial offers of help which were, however, conditional.17 Thus, both envoys were to convey to the grand duke some declaration relating to Henry’s conversion. This was intended to reassure him, while avoiding outright commitment.18 In Rome, Pisani should note which cardinals were well-disposed towards the king, in order to clinch their support with various inducements. Henry’s own letter to the pope expressed his desire to restore normal diplomatic relations with Rome [broken off in 1589 before his accession] and for obedience to be expressed in his name. In this way Henry also showed concern for the Catholic Church in France. Pisani, a familiar figure in Rome, was appointed to remain as Henry’s ambassador, and the pope was requested to receive him. Furthermore, since obedience was to be expressed 16

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 368, 22 August/1 September 1592, Edmondes to Burghley; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 674-5, 8 October 1592, Henry IV to Clement VIII; Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 13-17, 7 October 1592, instructions for Pisani; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 330. 17 The position of Tuscany was insecure. Philip II bought the allegiance of duke Cosimo I in 1557 by ceding him Siena. Ten years later the pope conferred on him the title of grand duke. Cosimo’s successor, Francesco I was loyal to Spain. But Ferdinando I, who succeeded in 1587, changed course. The Spanish intervention in France in 1590 represented a turning point for the ‘pax Hispanica’ in Italy. Ferdinando began to support Henry IV, in the hope that France would redress the balance of power in Italy. The relations between Ferdinando and France were, however, more or less clandestine and remain very shadowy. If sufficient material exists, the subject would repay a detailed study. 18 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 676-7, 8 October 1592, Henry IV to the grand duke of Tuscany. It appears that Henry also sent La Clielle to Florence and Rome – not for the first time – but nothing is heard of his mission.

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by Pisani, before the king’s conversion, Henry thereby made a remarkably generous gesture in the face of sustained Papal hostility; in the event, it was not one that the pope would have welcomed.

IV: Conflict in Rome and the Concerns of Italy Gondi’s mission was sabotaged by the cardinal legate, Sega, who forbade him to go to Rome – curious treatment by one cardinal of another. The mission was also traversed by Mayenne’s agents, his secretary Desportes and Anne de Pérusse d’Escars, bishop of Lisieux, who raced to Rome ahead of Gondi – which is what Villeroy had feared.19 There they opposed every effort in favour of the king. They also strove to avert any unwelcome Papal decision upon the affairs of France before the League estates could elect a catholic king. Desportes and d’Escars are reported to have informed the pope that there were four possible alternatives for France, deducing therefrom that Mayenne was the only viable candidate for the throne. Mayenne hoped that, by obtaining the support of the new pope, he might also acquire that of Spain. While Clement VIII was publicly committed to the election of a catholic king, he never named a candidate; and he was not impressed by Mayenne’s entreaties.20 He instructed his nuncio to Spain, Camillo Caetani, to try to persuade Philip II to withdraw the proposals made in favour of the infanta, at least unless she were to be elected together with a French king. This was to become Philip’s fall back policy. Clement also wanted Spain to support an estates-general in France and to send in Parma with sufficient forces to protect the estates and to overwhelm Navarre. Furthermore, Clement proposed that Spain should attack Béarn. Clement VIII was therefore determined not to receive Gondi.21 From Florence Gondi sent his secretary on to Rome to dispel the damaging rumours already spread about by his enemies. The pope sent a monk, Alessandro Franceschi (or Franceschini) to intercept Gondi, bearing fabricated charges against him. Accused of temporising, and of having supported Navarre, Gondi was forbidden to enter the Papal States. Clement did not wish to hear anything about Navarre; and he would do everything in his power to keep him off the throne. These strictures were delivered to Gondi in writing. Gondi naturally denied the charges, which were made by those who wished to conceal the truth from the pope. Gondi’s reply was long and detailed. He came, he said, without orders from anyone; he was concerned about the decay of the Church in France. He declared that his enemies wished to make an example of him. Then a 19 They joined Diou, probably in October 1592. De L’Estoile, Journal du règne de Henry IV, i, 257, says that Gondi reached Florence by 22 October 1592, which is plausible; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 2-5, 31 October 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate, 10-13, 7 November 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 314-15, 318; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 329 and n.5; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 574, 577; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 461-2. 20 De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 583; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 46-8, 19/29 January 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Mayenne is said to have proposed ceding Burgundy and Brittany to Spain, which sounds unlikely. 21 Jaitner, Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens’ VIII, 93-101, 27 October 1592, second instruction for Caetani.


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perpetual silence would be imposed upon the subject of Navarre’s conversion, and no one else would dare to speak of the state of the French Church. Gondi claimed to possess a passport from Mayenne, who wanted Papal permission to make peace. Such permission would have provided him with powerful leverage against the Spanish.22 The efforts, direct and indirect, of Henry IV to obtain a hearing in Rome prompted intense and prolonged diplomatic activity. Maisse worked on the Venetians to exert their influence to obtain the admission of Gondi. Their new ambassador, Paolo Paruta, whose legation began on 31 October 1592, was to work with patience and perseverance for three whole years to sustain the cause of Henry IV.23 Reporting on the exclusion of Gondi, Paruta’s dispatches reveal Clement’s rooted aversion from Henry IV, which persisted until long after his act of conversion. Nevertheless Clement’s attitude to French affairs was more complex and duplicitous than, at first sight, appeared. When, in his very first audience, Paruta urged the pope to receive Gondi, Clement replied that he was ‘di mala natura’ and of ill report, repeating the accusations previously made to exclude him from Rome. It is possible that Gondi’s secretary had managed to convey to the pope something of Gondi’s mission. Clement, at any rate, was determined to evade the problems inherent in Navarre’s conversion. He therefore chose to claim that it was impossible to have confidence in Navarre if he feigned conversion; such an act would be to gain time; to forestall Papal action; to retain the royalist catholics, and to divide the League. These were the arguments carefully fed to him by Mayenne’s agents, producing deadlock at the outset.24 Henry was required to convert but, on the grounds that he was insincere and untrustworthy, he was not suffered to comply. There were also canonical difficulties which, as a lawyer, Clement might present as insuperable although, as a wise pope, he might equally well have disposed of them. Papal ill-will could not alter the fact that Henry IV was the legitimate king of France. The consequences of frustrating him could be very grave, not only for France but also for the Church; nor would the Italian princes meekly accept it. Paruta urged the pope to think more in terms of the possible, and warned him against driving Navarre to despair. But Clement was perplexed, doubtful, and ill-disposed, and he resented unsolicited advice.25 In this respect, he was almost a clone of Sixtus V. When Paruta had gone, Clement was immediately perplexed by contrary counsel from Desportes and d’Escars. They evidently feared that Henry’s absolution might be 22

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 371, – December 1592, Franceschi to cardinal Gondi, together with his reply which was long and detailed. This correspondence was evidently sent to England by Edmondes. Ibid., 372. De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 85-7, says that Gondi was permitted to go to Rome, provided he did not favour heretics. This was not, however, until January 1593. 23 Paolo Paruta went to Rome as part of an extraordinary embassy to congratulate the pope on his election, and remained behind as permanent ambassador. His commission was dated 13 September 1592 and he served until October 1595. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 1, 2 October 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate. The abjuration and absolution of Henry IV was the burning issue of Paruta’s legation affecting, as it did, the whole of Italy. His well-written and well-edited dispatches provide an invaluable source. 24 Precisely the same points were later to be made by Épinac in the conference of Suresnes, after Navarre’s declaration of 16 May 1593. 25 Leva, Ed., Paola Paruta, i, 2-5, 31 October 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate.

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imminent and, with it, his immediate recognition in France. Then there could be no election of a catholic king. Thus they raised all the points that could trouble the lawyer pope. Henry should not be released from the excommunication before he had shown clear signs [unspecified] of penitence and [true] conversion; before having expelled heretical ministers; before having restored catholicism to all places which he commanded. Every week they plagued the pope about the election, and Paruta believed that he was swayed by these entreaties. Nevertheless, he knew the underlying reason to be Clement’s fear of precipitating a second series of Spanish protests, comparable to those endured by Sixtus V at the hands of Olivares. The pressures on Clement VIII were, indeed, considerable. The League envoys and Spain were supported by most of the cardinals, who were bribed by Sessa. They maintained that the pope should not risk losing the favour of Spain for the sake of uncertain French support. Sessa himself threatened to leave Rome the instant Gondi arrived; so Clement dismissed any thought of admitting him. To Paruta the outlook was bleak.26 In mid-November 1592, Gondi tried a fresh approach. He sent his secretary back to see if he could extract some support from the French congregation. The Spanish, however, prevented any meeting. The secretary did succeed in gaining access to various cardinals, and was even observed in the pope’s ante-chamber; but he proved inadequate to the task. Instead of delivering his letter of credence, he mistakenly confided Gondi’s purpose. Early in December, the secretary sought a written assurance that Gondi would not be arrested if he came to Rome. This endeavour also failed. Nevertheless, the Spanish intransigence had begun to arouse a degree of opposition. Some held that Gondi should be privately admitted, presumably as a cardinal. It began to be whispered that, given patience, he would end by coming.27 That is the first, faint, sign that there could be another dimension to Papal policy. Meanwhile the clamour and conflict merely increased Clement’s natural irresolution; he would do nothing. This hint of a change is probably attributable to the influence of the grand duke, to whom the exclusion of Gondi from Rome was a matter of great concern. As early as 14 November 1592, it was reported that Ferdinando was sending Belissario Vinta, a secretary of state; then he waited to see what, if anything, Gondi’s secretary might achieve. Relations between Florence and Rome were tense, whether or not because the grand duke was already helping Henry IV; the matter is unclear. Paruta worried that any disagreement with Florence would only increase Papal dependence upon Spain. The grand duke’s strained relations with Spain – the reason for his cultivation of France – rendered his task more delicate. He kept as low a profile as possible and avoided openly entertaining French agents in Florence.28 Vinta appears to have come to Rome – ostensibly on Medici family business – soon after Gondi’s

26

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 6-7, 7 November 1592, 10-13, 7 November 1592 (2), 14-18, 14 November 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate. 27 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 14-18, 14 November 1592, 20-2, 21 November 1592, 24-8, 28 November 1592, 40-2, 12 December 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate. 28 Gondi, a native of Florence, was staying at Ambrogiana, a villa belonging to the grand duke near Florence, while Pisani waited on Venetian territory.


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secretary departed. Vinta told Paruta that he had spoken to the pope about France, acting without any commission, and had found his mind closed.29 In these circumstances, Pisani would fare no better than Gondi. It was only at this time, near the end of December 1592, that there was news from Venice of his arrival in Italy. Pisani went from Brescia to Mantua to confer with the cardinal, and it was thought that he might go no further.30 Indeed, Pisani was also refused permission to enter Rome. Clement VIII claimed to know who had sent him, and why. Nevertheless, it was accounted a great novelty to refuse to hear those who came upon matters of such great moment as peace in France. Pisani evidently intended to convey his instructions from the royalists and then, from the safety of Venetian territory, to canvass support among the Italian princes. Their affairs were critical at this time. The Spanish and their supporters had begun to promote the view that the division of France was necessary for the protection of Italy – meaning Spanish domination. Consequently the Spanish sought to revive the idea of an Italian league, by which the Papacy would be bound.31 The princes felt threatened while the pope, beset by multiple dangers was troubled, melancholy and fearful. He worried about the war between the huguenots and Savoy, which had spread into Piedmont. Savoy, claiming extreme need, was clamouring for support, which the Papacy could no longer afford. Furthermore, there seemed to be a new Turkish threat looming for the spring of 1593. Unnecessarily worried about French designs upon Italy, Clement felt the need for a strong Spanish presence in Milan. But this was anathema to Venice and Tuscany.32 Burdened by these problems, Vinta called on Paruta on 21 January 1593. The grand duke desired the peace and security of Italy, but he had to be cautious because, in respect of Siena, he was a Spanish vassal. It was feared that, in order to force the pope into an Italian league, Spain might threaten the Papal States.33 Thus it was essential for the more independent states, both to avert this oppressive league and to prevent the election of a catholic [Spanish] king in France. If Henry’s conversion was the only viable solution for France, it was also believed to be the only possible bulwark for independent Italy. If they co-operated in helping Henry IV, there was hope that he might, in future, protect them against Spain with whom he was effectively at war. Such support for Henry 29 Leva, Ed., Paola Paruta, i, 10-13, 7 November 1592 (2), 14-18, 14 November 1592, 54-6, 26 December 1592 (2), 81-3, 23 January 1593 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 30 Evidence relating to Pisani’s mission is scarce, doubtless because it consisted in waiting; its value was symbolic. Arnaud d’Ossat took a long-term view of Pisani’s waiting. It did credit to the nobility, who sent him. Furthermore, if peace were to be made in France, what they demanded would have to be granted. Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 375-92, 3 April 1593, d’Ossat to Pisani. Pisani evidently took refuge at Desenzano, on Venetian territory. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, p. xv. 31 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 54-6, 26 December 1592 (2), 56-8, 2 January 1593, 67-9, 9 January 1593, 6974, 16 January 1593, 74-6, 16 January 1593 (2), 78-81, 23 January 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate. 32 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 6-9, 7 November 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate. Paruta warned the pope that he might well drive Navarre to seek help from the Turk. Ibid., 78-81, 23 January 1593, 83-6, 23 January 1593 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. The pope was actively engaged in helping to transport Spanish forces to Italy. Henry was in regular touch with M. de Brèves (François Savary de) his agent in Constantinople. 33 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 69-74, 16 January 1593, 83-6, 23 January 1593 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate.

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was part of Pisani’s business in Italy. On 12 March 1593, in the presence of the pope, the French congregation discussed the coming of Pisani. By this time events in France had begun to gather momentum. If Clement VIII’s attitude to France was infuriatingly obtuse, he was manifestly not a free agent, and he continued to dither. Clement was reported to have resolved to receive both Pisani and Gondi, but not yet; until he could see more clearly, Clement would certainly do nothing.34

V: Prelude to the Estates-General In the second half of 1592, affairs in France were in a state of confusion and suspense. Amidst a mounting public demand for peace, some wanted the conversion of Navarre and others the election of a catholic king. The proposed election, versus peace with Navarre, was the basic conflict. It was thrashed out – albeit not to a conclusion – in the so-called estates-general of 1593, in many smaller committee meetings, and at the conference between League and royalists at Suresnes. Paris, in particular, was divided and turbulent. Public meetings and resolutions brought Mayenne back to the city on 24 October 1592, where he was barely in control of events.35 It is not clear who was responsible for the registration by the ‘parlement’, on 27 October, of a Papal brief of 15 April 1592. This excluded Navarre from the throne and authorised the legate, Sega, to obtain the election of a catholic king.36 This, no doubt, was why the committee meetings tended to be held in his house. Amidst considerable turmoil, Mayenne attended an assembly of the ‘corps de ville’ on 4 November 1592. He promised to hold an estates-general to choose a king, tossing out the observation that he [or she] could actually do no more than he did.37 These events provoked the royalist ‘parlement’ of Châlons to issue an ‘arrêt’, on 18 November 1592, calling for the legate’s arrest. They ordered all princes, prelates and seigneurs to remain loyal to Henry IV, even threatening to destroy the city in which the estates met to elect a king.38 This was a warning which should have been taken more seriously. Parma wanted the estates to be held in Reims or Soissons, where force and money might be more effective. Mayenne, on the advice of Jeannin, preferred Paris, where intimidation would be more difficult. Parma assembled an army and, on 16 November 1592, went to Arras preparing to invade for the third time. His arrival in France was imminently

34

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 158, March to June 1593, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 314-15, 24 October 1592, Henry IV to Nevers. Mayenne was followed by the garrisons of Dreux and Verneuil. 36 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 100; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 573-8; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 87-8. 37 On 4 November 1592 Mayenne promised an estates-general which was summoned on 27 November for 20 December; it was then postponed until 17 January 1593 and finally opened on 26 January. Bernard, Procès verbaux, pp. xlviii-l; De L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 579-81. The Sorbonne condemned those who advocated peace with Navarre. 38 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 176-8; De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 88-9; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 100; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 463-4. This ‘arrêt’ was annulled by the ‘parlement’ of Paris on 22 December 1592 and publicly burnt next day. 35


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expected when, on 3 December, he died.39 The loss of Parma was a massive blow to the Spanish cause in France. It was also a commensurate relief to Mayenne; so far he had evaded holding an estates while Parma was in France. Now Mayenne entertained inflated hopes of manipulating the assembly to his own advantage. He even dreamt that the Spanish might relent, and desist from their intentions to have the infanta elected.40 Faced with the dual danger of a third invasion by Parma and the election of a catholic king, Henry IV had two principal concerns. One was to sustain the blockade of Paris which, in turn, sustained and increased the demand for peace. Secondly, he was desperately seeking further English help to enable him to take the field again. ‘In God’s name,’ Beauvoir pleaded with Burghley, ‘let her Majesty apprehend the dangers’. But, angry as usual that the king was not campaigning in Brittany, Elizabeth did not wish to be at any ‘further charge’; nor did she wish to see the French ambassador. Beauvoir continued for several months to press for help, warning the queen that Henry would otherwise have to abjure.41 When Parma entered Arras, Henry called out the garrisons of Picardy, hoping to intercept him. This time Parma might not have found it so easy to evade a battle because Henry was ready and waiting at Compiègne when he received the news of Parma’s death.42 Henry then withdrew to Senlis, Saint-Denis and Chartres. The so-called estates-general of 1593, summoned to elect a catholic king, were preceded by significant manifestos on the part of Mayenne, the royalist catholics, and Henry IV himself. Mayenne’s declaration of 24 December 1592 was verbose, confused, contradictory, and mendacious. Its principal purpose was to lure the royalist catholics into abandoning Navarre, promising honours for those who complied. Mayenne defended his own record, proclaimed the catholicity of the French crown as a fundamental law – which was necessary to him – and denied complicity in the murder of Henry III, of which the royalists accused him. He asserted that Navarre could have converted during the [phoney] reign of Charles X. While that was obtuse, Mayenne correctly stated that Navarre would 39

Philip II rapidly designated the archduke Ernest as governor-general of the Netherlands, which he had had in mind in any case. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iv, 138, 6 February 1593, Philip II to San Clemente; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 106; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 316-18. Parma’s death was experienced as a severe blow to the Spanish; in fact he was about to be recalled. The cardinal de Bourbon is said to have been with Mayenne in Paris at this time ‘busy about the assembly’. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, 283, 27 November/7 December 1592, Edmondes to Burghley. 40 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 327. The new Spanish commander, dom Pedro Henriques d’Azevelo, count Fuentes, awaited the arrival from Italy of Laurent Suarez Figueroa, duke of Feria, ambassador to the estates. It was not until February 1593 that count Charles Mansfelt invaded France, but without approaching Paris. He and Mayenne besieged Noyon before returning to the Netherlands. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 190-1. Mayenne created the sieur de Rosne marshal of France and sent him to the Netherlands; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 709-11, 21 December 1592, Henry IV to de Brèves; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 186-8. 41 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 326, 11/21 November 1592, Beauvoir to Burghley, 327, 13/23 November 1592, Beauvoir to Burghley, 328. 42 Henry declared that the news would be even better if followed by that of the death of Philip II. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 708-9, 7 December 1592, Henry IV to Nevers, 709-11, 21 December 1592, Henry IV to M. de Brèves in Constantinople; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 189-93, ‘discours’ on the death of Parma.

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not be coerced, but wished first to be recognised, and to take Paris. Mayenne announced the estates for 17 January 1593 [deferred to 26 January] and invited the royalists to send representatives. Euphemistically, they were to seek the best solution for religion and the state. This was a fairly bizarre situation since, legally, only the king could summon an estates-general. More outspoken than Mayenne, Sega issued an exhortation to the royalists – couched in hysterical terms – to join in electing a catholic king.43 Although the assembly was an illegal farce, it was there. It could not be permitted to proceed unimpeded and unchallenged; the royalists were constrained to take note of it, and to foster disunity. Otherwise even an illegal ‘election’ of a catholic king would create a serious and dangerous situation, before the abjuration of Henry IV. It would destroy all hope of reconciliation between royalist and Leaguer catholics, and also of the elimination of Spanish influence in France. Furthermore, the pope would have supported an election in which the legate had taken part, probably rendering Henry’s conversion and absolution impossible. It was therefore essential for the royalists to disrupt the estates and obviate an election.44 Mayenne’s manifesto and Sega’s exhortation, furthermore, raised juridical issues which could hardly be ignored. Now that the ‘voyages de Rome’ had complied with the League’s previous stipulation to seek Papal authority for Henry’s conversion, royalist counsellors perceived in Mayenne’s invitation an opportunity to resume the peace negotiations. Schomberg, de Thou and Revol were all loyal counsellors, but they earnestly desired the king to make peace, and to pay the necessary price of peace. Mayenne’s overture could be exploited by them to promote a public peace conference. Schomberg therefore sought a secret audience with the king; he argued that it was useless to rely on a military solution against an enemy backed by foreign forces. Henry’s situation was dangerous; fortune was fickle, and the heir presumptive [Condé] was a mere infant. The nobles and cities were weary of war; the court was divided, and domestic differences were more dangerous than external threats. The king’s endeavours were obstructed, and his opportunities frustrated. Schomberg was a Saxon who did not shrink from stating bluntly that Henry was rapidly losing support. Schomberg did not mention religion; he did not need to. Henry knew that there could be no peace without conversion and absolution. He interrupted Schomberg saying that he had always wanted peace, but his religion was held against him. Let those who thought him in error persuade him of it; it was known that he was not obstinate. But he was anxious not to appear to sue for peace

43

De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 200-7; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 266-77, December 1592, Mayenne’s declaration, 296-306, 15 January 1593, Sega’s exhortation. Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 116-17, appears to believe in the sincerity of Mayenne’s declaration. 44 This was Henry’s own opinion. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, 768-71, 10 May 1593, Henry IV to Conti. After his abjuration, Henry explained to de Brèves, his ambassador in Constantinople, that by his abjuration, the King of Spain had been thwarted in his efforts to have the infanta and the archduke Ernest elected. Ibid., iv, 6-9, 8 August 1593. The king also strongly emphasised the importance of this point in his instructions for the bishop of Mans (going to Rome), Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 33-42, 9 September 1593. Ronald S. Love, ‘The Religion of Henry IV’ (Ph.D. thesis), epilogue, is therefore mistaken to play down the importance of the threatened election; to Henry, it was no less dangerous than the ‘tiers parti’.


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but rather to confer it – which was normal procedure – and his authority must not be compromised. When the estates-general opened on 26 January 1592, the council decided to proceed by means of two public declarations (‘écrits’): one in the name of the nobles, calling Mayenne’s bluff, and one stating the king’s own case. The first was issued on 27 January 1593, by the royalists. They justified their own position and, adopting Mayenne’s phraseology, declared the need for peace to save religion and the state. They therefore challenged Mayenne and his associates to send distinguished persons to a place to be agreed, to discuss these affairs of church and state. This invitation, signed by Revol, was dispatched by means of a ‘trompette’. Villeroy was present, on 28 January 1593, when the royalists’ challenge to a conference was received in Paris; it was, he claimed, his own idea.45 The proposal was considered in the secrecy of a committee. Sega angrily declared it to be full of heresy, which was nonsense. But the proposal was sure to trouble the estates, and peace was the last thing Sega desired. He wanted the messenger to be punished in order to suppress the message. The document, however, was also addressed to the estates, and the ‘trompette’ had divulged its contents at the city gate; so it could not be suppressed. While Mayenne obtained a decision to consult the estates, Sega tried to impose an oath against ever treating with Navarre or the royalists.46 Henry’s own declaration, of 29 January 1593, clearly ventilated the real issues; and it marked an important stage on his path to Rome. He presented a vigorous defence of his royal authority, which the League attacked in the name of religion. The real reasons for the war were the desire to usurp or divide the crown, the wickedness of enemies who supported the Seize ‘cabal’, and profit seekers. Henry declared Mayenne guilty of usurping sovereign powers, in particular by calling an estates-general, which was a royal prerogative. The estates were therefore declared illegal and their transactions null. Most of the declaration was devoted to the king’s religious position vis-à-vis the League. He pointedly charged them with obstructing – by every means in their power – the abjuration they demanded as a condition of treating for peace. Henry had declared, and did declare, his willingness to take instruction. Indeed, he would do everything to win the love of his subjects and resolve their scruples. He had often said that he would submit to a council; neither would he reject some simpler method.47 He could not, however, just quit his religion. He had made his position clear when he permitted the nobles to send an embassy to Rome [did he mean Luxembourg, or only Pisani?]. He had more than once exhorted his enemies to profit from a truce to seek some suitable means for his instruction. Not precisely rejecting his proposals, the enemy had used them as leverage against Spain. 45

Villeroy claimed to have fathered the royalist proposal to approach the League assembly and seek a peace conference. He confided the idea to Fleury to convey to someone at court. He saw the peace negotiations as having been suspended and wished them to be resumed. Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 31920. 46 Cheverny, Mémoires (edn. Michaud et Poujoulat), x, 521; Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 118; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 218; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 248; Bernard, Procès verbaux, p. liii; Richard, Épinac, 483; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 320-3. 47 The long-standing proposal to submit to a council was now dropped.

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They did not, in fact, wish to accept the king’s offers, and they feared a peace conference. Whenever the subject of Henry’s return to the Church arose, the League claimed to be subject to Papal authority; they could only do what the pope decreed. Yet as soon as Pisani had left for Rome, they sent a contrary embassy, doing everything possible to ensure his exclusion. Henry now hoped that the pope would penetrate their artifice and act with equity. Finally, he offered an amnesty to all who submitted within two weeks.48 This declaration of 29 January 1593 was both remarkably candid on the part of the king, and destructive of Mayenne’s persistent sophistry. Henry proclaimed to the world that the League demanded his abjuration and absolution as a condition of peace and recognition. In other words, religious conversion was the precondition of a political settlement. At the same time they hid behind religious scruples, trumpeting the need for Papal authority for the conversion which they continually obstructed. That is what Henry had said in his letter of 8 October 1592 to the pope himself, though presumably Pisani, marooned in northern Italy, had been obliged to retain it. Thus, while appearing suitably correct, Mayenne believed that the League and Spain together could avert Papal intervention and render the king’s conversion impossible. Their concern, in fact, was not with the king’s religion at all, but solely with his exclusion from the throne. It might be said that the declaration of 29 January 1593 committed Henry IV to conversion, provided the necessary means could be found.49 While this commitment was naturally not explicit, Henry did state that it would not be his fault if he failed to do what was required of him. He knew by then that Pisani’s mission had been obstructed. But, as he had not been in Italy for very long, Henry had not yet despaired of the outcome. He still hoped that if only the pope could be made aware of the truth, he would have to consider French affairs with greater impartiality. Then he would take the true measures necessary to solve the current evils. Frank and open himself, Henry was slow to believe in the villainy of others. He hoped that his own manifest patience would argue his good intention to do all that could reasonably be expected of him.50 With no ambassador in Rome, news was sparse, slow 48

De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 213-18, 29 January 1592; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 278-87, 29 January 1593, letters patent in the form of a declaration. The fact that the king’s statement was issued as letters patent is important because they were registered by the ‘parlement’ at Tours. This was regarded as an assertion of the king’s authority by judicial means which the council had advised. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 719-22, 29 January 1593, Henry IV to Maisse. 49 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 119-20, says that after the declaration of 29 January 1593, Henry’s attitude to conversion began to change; developments forced him to consider its ‘possible merits’; and he repeated the point, p. 123. Henry’s attitude did not change because he was forced to temporise. The possible merits of abjuration was simply not the point. 50 Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 22-4, 27 April 1593, Henry IV to Pisani. Arnaud d’Ossat made the point to Pisani that the king’s patience would demonstrate his sincerity. Pisani sent a copy of this important letter to the king. Henceforth, Henry was guided by the advice of d’Ossat, whose services he employed in Rome. Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 275-92, 3 April 1593, d’Ossat to Pisani. Duplessis was glad that the pope had refused to see Gondi and Pisani because, if the matter were well handled, this opened the way to break entirely with Rome and facilitate that religious peace and reconciliation of which he and Navarre had dreamed – before Navarre became the King of France. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 405-7, 29 April 1593, Duplessis to Bouillon. Patry, Philippe DuplessisMornay, 234-5.


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and indirect. Henry had not yet absorbed the disagreeable truth that other matters concerned the pope far more closely, and that he was still supporting the League.51 When, shortly after the declaration of 29 January 1593, Henry moved away towards the Loire, he was probably glad to escape from the pressures of the court.52 His position was weak, critical and ambiguous. He did not know what would happen in Paris, or what to expect of the Spanish after the death of Parma. It was not only from putative traitors that the pressure to convert was becoming increasingly urgent; it was also coming from his most loyal servants.

VI: Mayenne and Feria Mayenne’s much heralded estates-general formally opened in Paris on 26 January 1593, three days before Henry’s declaration.53 The assembly was, however, only sparsely attended, and little was done before the beginning of April.54 It remained a small and doubtless bewildered gathering, subjected to bribery, propaganda and cajolery. Mayenne is said to have intended to pack the estates, which represented his only chance of seizing the crown, provided he could obtain Papal support for himself. He hoped the pope would broker a deal with Spain, and he made known in Rome the concessions he would offer. Without independent resources, these ambitions were never realistic, even following the death of Parma. Nevertheless, Mayenne did manoeuvre with considerable skill in seeking to extract his own, maximum advantage.55 To Philip II and his agents, the estates offered the only plausible means of imposing the infanta on France. But, in the absence of Parma, their act had fallen apart. Sabre rattling continued, albeit without an army. Despite the presence of the estates, Mayenne left Paris on 8 February 1593 both to join with Spanish forces from the Netherlands and also to meet the duke of Feria, Spanish 51

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 719-22, 29 January 1593, Henry IV to Maisse, 768-71, 10 May 1593, Henry IV to Conti. These events in France were to be made known in Venice, although Paruta was already doing everything that Venice could to help the king in Rome. Henry believed that Mayenne was encouraged in his hopes and designs by Pellevé, archbishop of Sens, who had returned from Rome to attend the estates. Mayenne’s agents in Rome were certainly pressing his claims to the crown, but unsuccessfully. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 46-8, 19/29 January 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. 52 Henry left Chartres on 8 February 1593 and went first to Châteaudun. He went to Saumur on 28 February to arrest an intrigue between his sister, Catherine de Bourbon, and the disloyal Soissons who tried to marry her by fair means or foul. Duplessis was trying to raise money for Henry’s Swiss troops. He was also involved in negotiations relating to a divorce for the king. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 396-8, 19 April 1593, Duplessis to Henry IV, 407-8, 5 May 1593, Duplessis to Henry IV. Henry returned to Chartres on 26 March, probably for two days, before taking the field again in Picardy. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, ix, 444, itinerary; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 326-7. 53 Bernard, Procès verbaux, is the only reliable source on the estates of the League. But it is incomplete, and arranged in such a way as to be all but impossible to use. Other accounts are garbled chronologically and incomprehensible. Most of the serious deliberation appears to have been conducted in a committee of League leaders, the Spanish agents, the legate and four representatives from each of the three estates. The whole episode is extremely hard to follow. 54 Capefigue, Histoire de la Réforme, vi, 225-8, 28 January 1593, Ibarra to Philip II. Ibarra was confident of a successful outcome. 55 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 245-7.

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ambassador to the estates.56 Mayenne was annoyed with the Spanish and the legate who preferred Guise to himself; and he feared that Guise might try to seize control of the army. Mayenne did not want the estates to proceed to any serious business in his absence, but he assured Villeroy that the proposed peace conference would take place. Wanting several strings to his bow ‘pour se faire respecter’, Mayenne favoured the conference. He believed he could neutralise any untoward developments which might occur, presumably by appealing as usual to Papal authority. He shared the royalists’ desire to frustrate the Spanish intentions, and the threat posed by a conference would be useful in resisting Feria. It was necessary for Mayenne to see Feria, before proceeding to the election of a king, because he had never finalised any agreement with Parma. If the Spanish would not support Mayenne, his only option was to feign support for the infanta, at an extortionate price. The final decision respecting the election would pertain to the estates, which Mayenne hoped to manipulate. Thus it was that Mayenne actually undertook to support the election of the infanta, when he and Feria met at Soissons about 20 February 1593. In return, Mayenne would obtain Burgundy in perpetuity, with all but sovereign powers; the ‘gouvernement’ of Normandy [?], the payment of his debts, and 200,000 écus. Other benefits would accrue after the election of the infanta, for whom Mayenne would serve as lieutenant-general until her arrival. Thereafter, he could expect a principal office.57 Ostensibly, both men had gained a great deal. On each side, however, their intentions were dishonourable; and, on the Spanish side, the agreement would have to be ratified. Besides, the major question of the infanta’s marriage had still to be settled. Nevertheless, Mayenne had staked his claim in a Spanish future, should that transpire, having already taken what steps he could to ensure opposition to Spanish proposals in the assembly. He would, as usual, delay, defer, and juggle.58 After meeting Feria, Mayenne joined count Charles Mansfelt at the siege of Noyon in Picardy. With Pontoise occupied by the League, the possession of Noyon – which fell on 29 March 1593 – would facilitate the provisioning of Paris.59 The Parisians expected Mansfelt and Mayenne to take the new royalist fortress at Gournay on the Marne, and Saint-Denis; in other words, they were to render the capital safe. But Mansfelt’s army broke up, and he returned to the Netherlands.

56

Feria’s instructions were dated 24 October 1592 and permitted him to treat with the estates as he thought best. Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘La Politique de Philippe II’, Revue des questions historiques, xxv (1879), 512. With Feria came Tassis, and a theologian, Iñigo de Mendoza, especially versed in the Salic law. 57 Philip II would not have sanctioned the cession of Normandy to Mayenne. Either this item is an error or else Feria deceived Mayenne. Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vi, 211, 6 December 1592, Philip II to Ibarra. Mayenne’s undertaking was signed on 25 February 1593 and two documents were signed by Feria on 28 February 1593 (not various other dates which appear). Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 231-2; de Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 410-16, agreement between Feria and Mayenne; Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, iv, 194-7; Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘La Politique de Philippe II’, Revue des questions historiques, xxv (1879), 52-3. 58 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 245-8. Mayenne had tried to organise a kind of fourth chamber, with the attendance of moderate officials and ‘parlementaires’. 59 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 374.


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This led to Leaguer disillusionment with the Spanish who failed, in the end, to provide any military support during the estates; and Paris was not safe.60 In Paris, the royalists’ counter-proposal of 27 January 1593 had been hotly debated. Sega’s opposition was finally overruled; to reject it would anger the nobles and the ‘tiers’, both estates being sick of war and hostile to Spain. Thanks to the efforts of Jeannin and Épinac, the royalists’ proposal to hold a peace conference was therefore accepted on 26 February. But the acceptance, issued on 4 March in the name of Mayenne, was conditional. They would only confer with catholics, on religion, the state and the reintegration of heretics. There was to be no negotiation with Navarre; and they would continue to maintain that only a catholic could be king of France. The whole tenor of the reply reflected the desire to use the conference as a means of detaching the royalists – which is what the Papacy and the League had long been seeking. Thus the letter proposed a union against the heretics.61 The reply was received at Chartres on 8 March 1593, while the king was still away in Touraine. It was not until after his return that the royalists sent a provisional reply, on 29 March, requesting a postponement until 16 April. This request was doubtless because the king had returned to the field in the hope of engaging Mansfelt in battle.62 The acceptance by the estates of the royalists’ proposal made a bad and vexatious beginning for Feria, who arrived in Paris on 9 March 1593. Consequently he sought to profit from the absence of Mayenne by rushing the election of the infanta and thereby averting the peace conference.63 It was not, however, until 2 April that he was able to address the estates. He patronised them in Latin by dilating upon the benefits conferred by Spain, and the need to save religion by electing a powerful catholic king; he stopped just short of naming the infanta. He then presented a letter from Philip II, dated 2 January 1593. Philip exhorted the assembly not to disperse without electing a catholic king who would restore religion. Philip also requested the satisfaction he claimed to merit, without actually naming his daughter. Pellevé replied to Feria’s speech and invited the assembly to demonstrate their attachment to Spain. While that might be construed as an invitation to applaud, he was of course pro-Spanish and supported the infanta.64 Feria had earnestly hoped to obtain a swift and favourable vote without more ado. In fact he had made a bad impression; the assembly agreed only to consider his proposal, and await the return of Mayenne. As soon as Feria had gone they turned to the royalists’ interim answer of 29 March and proceeded, in the following days, to make arrangements for the conference. To counter this, Feria began to muster his supporters among the extremists in Paris. The 60

Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 118. Bernard, Procès verbaux, 73-6, 4 March 1593, Mayenne to the royalists; also in de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 218-22; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 324. 62 Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 135-46. 63 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 116-19. Feria was hampered by lack of ready money, his principal weapon. CSPVen., 1592-1603, p. 62, 18 March 1593, Mocenigo to the doge and senate. 64 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 225-31; Bernard, Procès verbaux, p. lviii, 124-31, Feria’s harangue; also in Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 323-7. Ibid., 327-8, 2 January 1593, Philip II to the estates-general. Pellevé had returned from Rome for the estates. He had departed before the end of November 1592. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta i, 20-2, 21 November 1592, Paruta to the doge and senate. 61

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Seize and the preachers launched a violent campaign against Navarre declaring, once again, that he could not be recognised even if he did convert. Undeterred, the estates began to name their deputies to the conference (on 21, 23, and 24 April) which was to meet at Suresnes on 29 April. The peace conference had therefore begun before Mayenne returned to the turbulent city on 6 May 1593.65

VII: The King’s Perilous Position When Henry returned to Chartres on 26 March 1593, he only paused for a few days to attend to business. Then he hurried away to Compiègne to try to save Noyon from Mansfelt and Mayenne. Unfortunately, he was just too late. As soon as Henry approached, seeking battle, Mansfelt crossed the Somme and withdrew. Having waited to see what the enemy would do, Henry returned to his council at Mantes on 17 April.66 The failure to save Noyon and engage the combined enemy forces was a bitter disappointment to the king. Victory in the field, there and then, would have excised Henry’s most urgent problems; but he did not give up. There were still two things which could end the war and save the king. One was to starve Paris into submission during the summer of 1593 and before the estates elected a rival king. His ‘design’, Edmondes reported, was now wholly upon Paris.67 There was some chance of obtaining more military assistance, and queen Elizabeth sent the king another small force under sir Roger Williams.68 Henry’s hope was that Elizabeth might be induced to grant him a fixed loan, to obviate endless diplomatic difficulties and further misunderstandings. On 29 March he had sent the vidame de Chartres to England, both to thank and to beg. Henry accounted to the queen for his actions since the siege of Rouen, emphasising his need to sustain the pressure on Paris. The vidame was to explain his ‘infinity of difficulties’. This probably meant that one of Henry’s reservations about conversion was his fear of losing the English alliance before the fall of Paris.69 The other possible way of ending the war was to abjure under Papal auspices; and there were reports awaiting his attention upon the state of French affairs in Rome. Neither solution was totally forlorn, but both would take time. Conversion was certain to be a core demand at the forthcoming peace conference. But, so long as the means and the time remained unsettled, no one could be too precise about it. 65 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 379-82, 402; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 146-79; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 121-3. 66 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 744-6, 29 March 1593, Henry IV to Pisani, 746-7, 3 April 1593, Henry IV to Nevers, 747-9, 4 April 1593, Henry IV to Nevers, 751-4, 12 April 1593, Henry IV to Nevers. 67 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 59-61, 26 March/5 April 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Henry blamed the failure to save Noyon on his having been detained in the west. 68 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 744-6, 29 March 1593, Henry IV to Pisani; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 61-4, 9/19 April 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. The English force was mustered before the king on 19 April. In June 1593, Elizabeth authorised another levy of 1500 to strengthen Williams’ force. MacCaffrey, Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 176. 69 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, pp. 334-5, 29 March 1593, instructions for the vidame de Chartres, 336, 7 May 1593, Bouillon to Beauvoir. Bouillon, a protestant, warned Beauvoir that, for lack of means, Henry would be forced to abjure.


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It was probably at this critical point, in the spring of 1593, that the so-called ‘tiers parti’ was at its most dangerous. These dissidents were also concerned about the impending election of a catholic king. Soissons and the cardinal de Bourbon were assembling forces in Normandy. Montpensier, the ‘gouverneur’ of Normandy, and Conti, now turned against the king because they feared he was losing the war. They were all of them Bourbon princes and, ostensibly, they wanted to secure a Bourbon succession. They were joined by some former servants of Henry III, including Épernon. The proposal was to pacify Spain by a marriage between the cardinal de Bourbon and the infanta, and there were some who urged Mayenne to turn to Bourbon.70 The idea was fatuous and their motives base, but they were still a danger to the king. It was therefore necessary to conciliate them in some way before the League tried once more, through the peace conference, to detach them.71 Thus a few days before the conference began, Henry evidently engaged in policy discussions, probably with Cheverny, Schomberg and Rosny [Sully]. Privately, Henry undertook to assemble a number of prelates for his instruction, and also to convert – allegedly within three months; and that meant before the end of July.72 The end of July, it will be seen, was not an arbitrary date. Already in October 1592, when Gondi had left for Italy, Henry had mentioned such an assembly in his memoir for queen Elizabeth. These decisions were conveyed to the leaders of the ‘tiers parti’ for their satisfaction, and to Renaud de Beaune, archbishop of Bourges, before he departed for the peace conference where he led the royalist delegation.73

70

Villeroy recalled that the flirtation between Mayenne and Bourbon went quite far. He referred to articles for Bourbon signed by Mayenne. The messenger departed (no date) but was stopped by Mayenne, who changed his mind. Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn. Petitot, xliv), 334. 71 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 386-91. Poirson asserts that some extremists among the disaffected were plotting to murder the king. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 289; Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 116, says the real threat was that the estates would precipitate a ‘tiers parti’ strong enough to demand Henry’s abjuration or abdication. 72 Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Les Œconomies royales de Sully, i, 335-7. Sully’s chronology is completely jumbled. Wolfe referred at this time, April 1593, to the king’s ‘steady drift towards conversion’, The Conversion of Henry IV, 125. Babelon, Henri IV, 556, said that Henry waited for the waves to carry him, which also sounds very much like ‘drift’. The word is ill chosen; there was nothing remotely haphazard about his successive steps towards conversion. 73 While this account is compiled from various bits of questionable evidence, it makes good sense; something of the kind, if not each detail, is certainly true. De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 237. The discussions are said to have taken place when the royalist deputies were chosen, which was on 23 April 1593. Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 392-4; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 179-82. Cayet is alone in recording an alleged conversation of the king with François d’O on the subject of his conversion. While this is not necessarily true, the points he is said to have made were valid and significant. Henry remained uncertain about three things: the invocation of the saints; auricular confession, and Papal authority – which was not an article of faith. Since Pisani had been rejected by the pope, Henry said that he would call an assembly of prelates from which to receive instruction. He had always wanted peace, but to have declared himself catholic at his accession would not have brought peace. Now, however, things had changed. He had made sure of the huguenots, and was determined to confound the ‘tiers parti’ by his instruction and conversion; and he hoped that would bring peace.

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VIII: The King’s Misgivings It would be difficult to argue that Henry was not committed to converting by the end of April 1593; and, it will be seen, his religious perceptions at this time were moving closer to catholicism. He had agreed to the ‘voyages de Rome’, albeit without burning his boats. One could even argue that, since his accession, he had always been committed; but one might be wrong. At least he had mainly conveyed that impression, and had needed to. But there were still no obvious means by which he could achieve conversion, and any domestic procedure was bound to be profoundly controversial. Indeed it could split the catholics even more completely between the ultramontanes, Gallicans and schismatics.74 Abjuration without Papal participation was hazardous, and not for the king alone, although he stood to lose everything. The declaration of 29 January was a short step in that direction, actually conceding very little. It was more a complaint, and a public accusation against the League than a statement of intent. For his own justification, Henry had wished to publicise the machinations of the Spanish and the League which deliberately deprived him of the means of conversion. By referring to ‘the most direct means’, which he agreed to embrace, Henry accorded sufficient hope to enable the royalists to promote the peace conference. That would inhibit the work of the estates and the election of a catholic king. Again, this prevarication was not obstinacy; it was discretion, and a reluctance born of profound misgiving. Henry was still waiting upon events, but he could not do so indefinitely. Henry’s private commitment to his counsellors, made about 23 April 1593, went one step further. So far as one can ascertain, conversion was now coupled with instruction. On the other hand, there was still no public declaration of intent; the procedure to be followed was not in place, and the timing was unspecified. With no Spanish army in France, a public discussion of peace at the forthcoming conference might well destabilise Paris and the estates. Paris might yet be recovered and Henry – it has been seen – was not without hope of help from Tuscany. Indeed, the manner and the timing of Henry’s eventual abjuration – on 25 July 1593 – can be explained by the intervention of the grand duke of Tuscany, combined with events in the estates and the conference at Suresnes.

IX: The Intervention of the Grand Duke of Tuscany It has been seen that the grand duke of Tuscany, among other Italian princes, saw the conversion of Navarre as the only solution for France and, by extension, for the security 74

Renaud de Beaune, archbishop of Bourges, is said to have proposed in September 1591 that he should be declared patriarch, in order to establish a church discipline independent of Rome. Certainly the matter was discussed. Baumgartner, Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate, 174-5; Baumgartner, ‘Renaud de Beaune’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, ix (1978), 104-5; Oroux, Histoire ecclésiastique de la cour de France, ii, 228-9. Duplessis-Mornay had favoured the ‘voyages de Rome’ hoping that the rejection of Gondi and Pisani would open the way for a schism and the appointment of a patriarch in France. Duplessis had proposed that the king should go to Tours and, in the ‘parlement’ proclaim a schism and a patriarch and have himself crowned at Poitiers, like Charles VII. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 388-9, 20 December 1592, Duplessis to Henry IV, 389-91, 20 December 1592, memoir for Henry IV; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 234-5.


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of Italy. Furthermore, Ferdinando professed to believe that, at heart, the pope also desired Henry’s conversion. Of this there is no clear evidence, though Clement may have been attracted by the prospect of an anti-Spanish intrigue.75 The grand duke, disposing of wealth, was in a position both to assist the king and to put pressure on him to convert. Ferdinando was, however, afraid of the likely repercussions of appearing to support a heretic and an enemy of Spain. Consequently, he tried to proceed as secretively as possible – especially in Rome. Early in 1593 his envoy, Girolamo Gondi, came to France from Florence and met the king at Blois – evidently on 25 or 26 February 1593 – during Henry’s absence in Touraine.76 This important mission was doubtless the fruit of cardinal Gondi’s visit to Florence on his way to Rome late in 1592. Girolamo Gondi had travelled to France via Lorraine, seeking to detach the duc de Lorraine, Ferdinando’s father-in-law, from the League. This was a bargaining point.77 Gondi’s mission was to persuade the king that his long delay in converting was causing harm. Gondi also imparted what the grand duke claimed to be the secret desire of the pope for Henry’s conversion. In view of the rejection of Pisani, as well as cardinal Gondi, the smallest hint of favour from Rome must have come as a big surprise. If the news did not exactly offer Henry a lifeline, it did provide a small ray of hope. Besides, the grand duke did not stop at exhortation: Florence, Venice and other states offered Henry 6,000 Swiss troops, plus one million [écus?] in gold for himself, and 20,000 écus per month for the duc de Lesdiguières who opposed Savoy in Piedmont. But this alluring offer was conditional: Henry must abjure before the end of July 1593; the grand duke would wait no longer. Thus, if Henry did indeed promise, late in April 1593, to abjure within three months, that corresponded to the grand duke’s deadline. Ferdinando was taking risks for Henry’s sake, and this was his price. Otherwise he would be obliged to come to some agreement with Spain, which he would much prefer to avoid. He also feared that the pope might be going to do something irreversible – referring presumably to the formation of a Spanish league in Italy. Duke

75

The pope was hampered at this time because he was pressing the Spanish for help against Turkey. CSPVen., 1592-1603, p. 63, 27 March 1593, Vendramin to the doge and senate, from Spain. 76 The Gondi were a large Florentine family with various branches some of which settled elsewhere. Girolamo or Jérôme was born in Spain in 1550, the son of Francesco Gondi and Anne Velez de Guevara and the nephew of Jean-Baptiste (so-called) Gondi who came to France with Catherine de Medici. Girolamo came to make his way at the French court, was naturalised French, and inherited his uncle’s considerable fortune. Little, however, appears to be known about him and it is not clear why he was in Florence in 1593. Dictionnaire de Biographie française, 560-1; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, pp. 372-3, 14/24, 16/26 February 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes said that Gondi was expected within a few days of 24 February and reported the meeting in his letter of 26 February 1593. Gondi is said to have tried, on behalf of the grand duke, to persuade the king to convert at the beginning of the siege of Paris and to have assisted his kinsmen to raise money for the Rouen campaign. The grand duke is also said to have provided the king with money and to have helped with the defence of Provence. Zeller, Henri IV et Marie de Médicis, 4-5; Jullien de Pommerol, Albert de Gondi, 248. 77 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 372, 16/26 February 1592, Edmondes reported to Burghley that Gondi was expected within a few days. Henry met Gondi at Blois, which suggests an effort to keep the meeting private. Zeller, Henri IV et Marie de Médicis, 4.

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Ferdinando’s ultimate hope was to obtain a coalition and open war against Spain. His projected alliance was to include England, as well as Venice, Mantua and Ferrara.78 Henry spoke frankly to Girolamo Gondi. It was known that he had wanted either to defeat the League or to obtain peace before converting, so that he could not be accused of acting out of self-interest. Now he was, in effect, invited to make a blind commitment to convert, whatever the circumstances in France. Despite his doubts and misgivings (‘molti reflessi’), Henry is reported to have been convinced by Gondi.79 In fact his attention was always primarily on the war; what really convinced him was the need to secure the Tuscan help while deferring the quid pro quo. English aid would always be grudging and unpredictable, so Henry’s principal hope now lay in Tuscany. The reports from Italy, which awaited Henry’s consideration at the end of March 1593, after the meeting with Girolamo Gondi, were not totally discouraging. A few weeks later Henry learnt from Pisani (letters of 24 March 1593) that the pope was wavering.80 Thus, on 26 April 1593, approximately three days after making his private commitment to take instruction and to convert, Henry wrote an important letter to the grand duke. While Ferdinando demanded Henry’s abjuration, unequivocally and within a time limit, he might possibly be induced to provide speedy help in return for a clearer commitment – but, again, made only in private.81 Cardinal Gondi, when he went to Italy in October 1592, had evidently conveyed to Ferdinando the king’s general intention to convert. Now something more was needed. In his letter of 26 April 1593, Henry promised to make a public profession of catholicism within two months from the submission of Lorraine, which the grand duke had, so far, failed to obtain. This might be a way both of making a clearer commitment to abjure, and of avoiding the July deadline. This illustrates Henry’s grave predicament: he made the point that if he was going to convert, it must be upon a ‘firm foundation’, in order to reap obedience and recognition.82 Henry hoped that this expression of good will – for that is all it was – would suffice to obtain delivery of the offers made in France by Girolamo Gondi.83 Thus Henry asked the grand duke for 4,000 Swiss, paid for one year, plus money for 1,000 of the troops he already had. In addition, 78

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 372, 14/24 February 1593, Edmondes to Burghley, 372, 16/26 February 1593, Edmondes to Burghley, 372, 16/26 March 1593, Edmondes to Burghley, Blois. Sir Roger Williams thought the proposed alliance a good idea and that the Italians might assist the king with ‘great treasure’. Ibid., 292, 9/19 May 1593, Williams to Burghley and Essex. Besides a coalition, the grand duke also wanted to marry his niece, Marie de Medici to Henry IV – an ambitious plan which succeeded in 1600. Galluzzi, Istoria del Granducato di Toscana, iii, 80-1; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 73-5, 9/19 May 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. 79 Galluzzi, Istoria del Granducato di Toscana, iii, 81. 80 Revue rétrospective, série ii, xi (1837), 22-4, 27 April 1593, Henry IV to Pisani. 81 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 140-5, 20 March 1593 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate, reported that Navarre was raising 6,000 Swiss troops with the help of the grand duke. 82 After the fall of Noyon on 29 March, Mayenne went to Reims to meet the duc de Lorraine and, presumably, frustrated the accord the grand duke was trying to obtain. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 763-4, 26 April 1593, Henry IV to the grand duke, 776-7, 24 May 1593, Henry IV to Nevers. Lorraine did not submit until 9 October 1595. Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 457. 83 Henry stated this explicitly to Pisani. Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 22-4, 27 April 1593, Henry IV to Pisani.


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he asked for 200,000 écus immediately. That sum would enable him to reduce Paris, and so deliver him from subjection to those who claimed to be his servants; he referred to the ‘tiers parti’. Henry’s objectives were therefore made perfectly clear.84 The grand duke, meanwhile, did his best to further the ‘voyages de Rome’. While cardinal Gondi and Pisani were still excluded from Rome, the burden of their missions had been conveyed to the pope by less conspicuous men. Towards the end of February 1593, Clement had begun to waver in his opposition to the envoys. Pisani himself made repeated efforts to influence the pope. Late in March he sent letters from Nevers explaining in more detail the mission committed to himself. Montmorency also tried, by sending a gentleman to Rome. He assured the pope of Henry’s genuine wish to convert, and pressed him to see Pisani. By early May, Pisani had written to the pope six or seven times explaining his mission to receive and obey Clement’s commands. But it does not appear that Pisani made known his mission to request a special legate to facilitate the king’s conversion. All he had received in reply was one incomprehensible letter from Aldobrandini; it appeared to excuse the pope on grounds of health, despite the lengthy audiences he accorded to the Spanish ambassador. Clement hoped that events would provide an opportunity for him to avoid provoking the Spanish. What he wanted, Paruta reflected, was to be able to receive Navarre without fear of condemnation. Doubtless he said so from time to time, but his fluctuating sentiments were never definitive; they depended upon the latest news. Clement never expressed any concern for Navarre, and had no clear conception of what he hoped would happen in France. He vaguely favoured a French catholic king, but he awaited the outcome of the estates, and then of the conference at Suresnes. The ambassadors of the League pressed the pope for money, and the Spanish ensured that he did not make any decision to admit the French envoys. After Pisani threatened to depart, Clement gave out that he did not want either envoy to leave Italy. By early April 1593, Paruta felt that he was making a little headway. He learnt from a Papal confidant that, if Pisani remained in Italy, he would certainly be admitted to Rome.85 Henry was anxious that his designated ambassador should remain in the country, and praised his patience and prudence. The presence of the envoys, Henry said, would testify to his continuing desire to renew relations with Rome, and might exercise a restraining influence on the pope. Meanwhile the conduct of the Spanish in Rome would amply justify his seeking a domestic remedy in France, in lieu of that desired from Rome – namely the co-operation of a legate. This observation strongly suggests that Henry’s Gallican conversion had been discussed with Girolamo Gondi in Touraine in February 1593, and that it was the solution favoured by the grand duke.86 The grand duke was at least sufficiently reassured as to Henry’s intentions to risk working on the manner and the timing of his conversion. He therefore decided – though it is not clear exactly when – upon a secret approach to the pope to elicit his co-operation in 84

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 763-4, 26 April 1593, Henry IV to the grand duke. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 109-11, 20 February 1593, 116-18, 27 February 1593, 140-5, 20 March 1593, 145-7, 27 March 1593, 149-52, 27 March 1593 (2), 160-2, 3 April 1593, 162-5, 10 April 1593, 193-7, 8 May 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. 86 Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 22-4, 27 April 1593, Henry IV to Pisani. 85

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preparing the form of the act of Henry’s conversion.87 It could therefore be said that duke Ferdinando stepped into the breach caused by the exclusion from Rome of cardinal Gondi and Pisani. If, by authorising a form of procedure, Clement VIII could be committed to the king, this would meet Henry’s requirement of a ‘firm foundation’, from which to obtain recognition, obedience and peace. Ferdinando enlisted the services in Rome of his pensioner, cardinal Toledo. Toledo was a confidant of the pope and, as a Spanish Jesuit, he was not suspect to Sessa. From Toledo, the grand duke learnt of the pope’s ardent desire to receive Navarre back into the Church. The ardour – if it really existed – was tempered by fear. Consequently Clement did not wish the act of conversion to be prepared in Rome, where so many obstacles existed. It should rather be arranged [and executed] in France, and followed up by a request for Papal approval. According to Toledo, the king should not be too discouraged by the pope’s severity in rejecting every gesture from the royalists; all this was attributable to the influence of Spain. Such severity was also necessary in order to avert a rebellion of the cardinals. When, however, Navarre had been declared catholic, religious considerations, and the good of Christendom, could be evoked both to justify the pope and to induce various resolutions – here, however, Toledo became totally vague. The pope needed to be able to claim that he could not reject one who had indeed converted. The grand duke had had an ingenious idea for engaging the pope in Henry’s conversion and thereby constructing his ‘firm foundation’. But the pope, for his part, had equally cleverly evaded any reliable commitment while giving the impression that he had offered a genuine reassurance. This ‘reassurance’ was therefore imparted to Henry, not later than the middle of May 1593. At the same time, the grand duke increased his pressure on the king to make a firm decision. Ferdinando was not prepared to be kept in doubt one day beyond the end of July. If Henry defaulted, the Tuscan must look to his own affairs. In other words, Italian support was at stake.88

X: Stages of Commitment Henry was therefore awaiting further developments when the peace conference of Suresnes assembled on 29 April 1593; it began in earnest on 3 May – but apparently without an agenda.89 The opening speeches were delivered by Renaud de Beaune, archbishop of Bourges and Pierre Épinac, archbishop of Lyon, for the royalists and the League respectively. Both speeches were long, rambling exhibitions of erudition, but 87

This action by the grand duke must, presumably, have been prompted by some report from Girolamo Gondi. It can hardly be attributed to Henry’s letter of 26 April 1593 which would not have been received in Florence much before his declaration of 16 May; the timing would not fit. 88 Galluzzi, Istoria del Granducato di Toscana, iii, 83-5. The grand duke was alarmed because there would soon be 20,000 Spanish – foot and horse – in Milan, and no one was doing a thing about it. He was counting on Henry’s conversion to restrain the Spanish. Toledo had personal reasons for his aversion from Spanish policy, and had shown himself favourable to Henry under Sixtus V. 89 It seems unlikely that Henry’s letter to the grand duke of 26 April 1593 could have been answered before the declaration of 16 May. So his proposal to link a firm commitment to abjure to the submission of the duc de Lorraine was probably overtaken by other events and disregarded. The proposal was not, in any case, remotely acceptable.


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short on substance. Each side was concerned with self-justification and the seduction of the other. Beaune stressed the need for peace, which could only come by recognising the authority of the rightful prince. But, to Épinac, religion came first, before the prince. The purpose of the conference was to obtain the union of catholics against sectarians. Therefore they must agree upon a catholic sovereign. They could not, and would not, obey Navarre. While they all agreed upon the necessity of saving religion, Beaune retorted that the crown was not elective. But his hands were tied by Henry’s ambiguous and incomplete commitment. Beaune could only assert the expectation and the hope that Henry was going to convert. He had agreed to do so; he was making every effort to discover the truth, and he should not be regarded as a sectarian. Beaune desired the reunion of all catholics so that they might together induce the king to return to the Church. Indeed, he wished that the League, which had credit in Rome, would cease from its obstruction and assist the mission of Pisani. In the second session, on 4 May, this obstruction was denied by Épinac, but unconvincingly since he still declined to support Pisani. Beaune then shifted his ground. He declared that the popes, whose authority the League invoked, were all dominated by Spain; hence their hostility to Henry. But Spain, whose king was old and ill, could only disappoint them, whereas Henry possessed the qualities of a great prince. A disputation then arose as to whether kings were immune from Papal excommunication. Schomberg made an impassioned plea against the election of a rival king, which could only lead to endless war. The discussion was aimless and sterile.90 The conference was suspended while the League deputies went to Paris to see Mayenne who returned on 6 May. During the recess, Schomberg reported to the king that the Leaguers were ‘peremptory on the point of religion’; peace was only possible if the king converted.91 This Henry sought ‘to put off with his accustomed answeare of his willingness to be instructed’.92 Besides reporting to the king, the Saxon Schomberg also went to Paris. He urged on Mayenne the temerity and danger of electing a king – which everyone knew could only be Spanish. But Mayenne had clinched his bargain with Feria and the drama must continue; so he made no reply. On the basis of Mayenne’s support, and in his absence, Feria had proceeded with his Spanish business. But Mayenne would undermine all proposals which excluded himself. He called a committee of the estates which met in the legate’s house on 13 May 1593. Much of the business of the estates, it appears, was conducted in this way apart from most of the deputies. It was then that Feria formally demanded the crown for the infanta. Presumably on account of his pact with Mayenne – of which Mayenne was reminded – her candidacy was officially declared in Paris next day; and a spectacular and vociferous procession provided maximum publicity.

90

The conference speeches are given at length by de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 237 seq. Beaune is said to have manoeuvred Épinac into declaring that religion was the only objection to Navarre – which was certainly not the case. Baumgartner, Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate, 177. 92 Butler, Ed., Edmondes Papers, 66-8, 26 April/6 May 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes warned Burghley that the king would not get away with his ‘accustomed answeare’ much longer. 91

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Thereupon a considerable clamour arose in Paris between those who favoured the election and those who saw the Suresnes conference as a chance for peace.93 Schomberg knew already, when he returned from Paris, that Mayenne was committed to the Spanish, and the election would therefore proceed. When the conference resumed, briefly, on 10 May, Beaune challenged the Leaguers to declare their conditions for peace. Épinac replied that he had already answered everything; the rest depended upon the pope. That was what Henry had foreseen. During a further recess, Schomberg and Revol again reported to the king. They insisted that it was now time for him to execute the decisions which had already been taken [in April]; he must make a clear declaration on religion in order to disrupt the plans of the rebels and oblige them to make peace.94 There was, however, little enough reason to believe that, if the king were to declare his intentions, peace would follow. The League still refused to endorse Pisani’s mission, while denying that they obstructed it. That was a clear enough sign of non cooperation. Nevertheless, Henry could not ignore the movement of events in Paris, the deadlock at Suresnes, and the threat of his own supporters to abandon him. Even so, the nervous urgency of his councillors had not entirely overcome Henry’s prudent reluctance, and their success was only partial. They shifted the king one more step beyond his declaration of 29 January 1593 and the recent, but private, agreement made in April. As early as 10 May, Henry wrote to Conti, a disaffected prince, to announce his forthcoming instruction. He also expressed his desire for a maximum number of princes and nobles to assemble at Mantes by 10 July 1593. Similar letters were sent to Pisani, Nevers and Maisse and many other summonses were issued soon after.95 These advance preparations were doubtless intended to increase the impact of Henry’s declaration of 16 May 1593. According to conventional wisdom, this declaration was a well-publicised announcement of Henry’s intention to abjure. The truth of the matter is more complex and more subtle. The declaration was actually consistent with Henry’s determination to resist the pressure to convert until he had obtained his ‘firm foundation’. Omitting the rhetoric, the declaration said as little as possible. It announced the king’s intention to take instruction from bishops and theologians who were summoned to Mantes for 15 July. It proposed a three months’ truce, during which the conference could negotiate the conditions of peace. Publication of the peace agreement could be delayed – meaning until the time of, or after, the conversion. Such a delay had featured in the ‘expedient’ proposed by Villeroy in March 1592.96 The declaration of 16 May 1593 was, however, a notable advance on that of 29 January because it announced both the means and the timing of Henry’s instruction. Publicly, however, instruction was still detached from conversion. Conversion was, of course, implicit; but the implication 93 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 402-5; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 127-30; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 250. 94 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 257-9. 95 Different dates, 10, 15, 20 July appear in different documents. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 76871, 10 May 1593, Henry IV to Conti. Some sixty letters of summons were issued on 18 May. Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 135. 96 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 406-7; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 259-60.


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was slurred and allusive, which did not pass unnoticed at Suresnes.97 Similarly, the letter to Conti of 10 May had centred on Henry’s conversion, but without naming it; yet nothing less would satisfy the nobles, and that was the significance of calling a lay assembly. But the lay assembly was not mentioned in the declaration of 16 May.98 This slurring of Henry’s commitment to abjure, and the reasons for it, are clearly illustrated by his interesting relations with Thomas Edmondes who remained in France when Unton returned home. Edmondes reported that Mayenne had ‘no direct meaning to come to peace’ even if the king did convert. Henry, of course, was well aware of this; hence the proposal to delay publication of the terms of a peace agreement. That was intended to ensure that conversion and peace should, at the least, be simultaneous. In other words, it was one more effort to establish the ‘firm foundation’. The royalists, Edmondes continued, claimed that conversion would deprive Mayenne of his credit with the people. So the king would assemble his bishops and the principal catholics of his party ‘to advise on the forme and course to be used for his conversion’. This indicates that these controversial difficulties were still to be overcome. Furthermore, Edmondes wrote, Henry also sent for the leaders of the [protestant] religion, for their reassurance. This was another problem.99 On the morning of 16 May 1593, Edmondes obtained an audience. Not shrinking from the dread word, he begged the king not to convert – at least not without queen Elizabeth’s advice. Henry replied that ‘he had not taken the resolution’. Later that day, however, when the declaration was complete, Henry recalled the ambassador. He now admitted that he would convert ‘but wished it rather understood than to declare it himself’. That is precisely what Henry had been doing, emitting signals, not making statements – a subtlety which became increasingly difficult to sustain.100

XI: The Dual Problem of Religion Henry’s interesting revelation to Edmondes reveals just how uncomfortable he was with the implications of the declaration of 16 May 1593. Various reasons relating to his need for a ‘firm foundation’ are already clear. The terms of the declaration itself demonstrate Henry’s anxiety to obtain peace before – or, to break a vicious circle – at least at the time 97

Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 286. Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 239-40, gives this declaration as a provisional undertaking, pending ‘une assemblée politique mixte’, at Mantes on 16 July. This doubtless reflected the original intention that any religious changes would be part of an overall settlement. The protestants desired a theological disputation – ‘une conférence contradictoire’. 99 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 70-3, 6/16 May 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 779-80, 25 May 1593, Henry IV to the reformed churches. Henry told the churches that he had resolved to call an assembly of both religions ‘to assist with necessary measures’. He kept very quiet about having sent for protestant ministers. 100 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 338; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 73-5, 9/19 May 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Henry would shortly send a gentleman to the queen. Edmondes, of course, did not want either Henry’s conversion or peace in case it included Spain. He hoped the king would accept the ‘very great’ offers from Italy and form a powerful coalition against Spain. Elizabeth, however, might not be so easily caught. 98

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of, his conversion. The same need for peace applied to the demands of the protestants, who represented another dimension to the multiple problem of the king’s religion. As a result of the ‘traité de la trève’ between Navarre and Henry III, the old catholic/protestant conflict had been subsumed – at least on the national level – into the war between the crown and the Spanish/Catholic League. As that war devolved upon Henry IV, the confessional conflict had been precariously contained in, and by, the person of the protestant king. As the pressure increased for Henry to abjure, he was constantly reminded of his original promise, of 4 August 1589, to receive instruction. But to the king, if not to the captious catholics, that undertaking was conceived in the context of a general settlement of the – carefully undefined – affairs of church and state. A general settlement naturally embraced the protestants, to whom Henry had a special commitment and responsibility. For the king to change religion in any other circumstances must threaten to reactivate the old confessional quarrel, which now centred largely on the terms and degree of toleration. Similarly, a contingent loss of confidence in the person of the king must tax the huguenots’ loyalty to the crown, thereby increasing the danger of Henry’s overthrow. If, on the basis of his original commitment, the catholics obliged him to summon an assembly of prelates, then he was equally obliged to summon protestants; but for this the catholics made no allowance. To summon both catholics and protestants in time of war, and when the king’s conversion was in prospect, was a likely recipe for combustion. By pressing the king, as the royalists did, forcing him to choose prematurely between different aspects of duty, they destroyed the fragile balance, the partially suspended hostility, which currently existed between the two religions.101 Consequently Henry was placed in a dangerous, embarrassing and distressing predicament, from which no happy issue was possible. One could, however, also assert that this situation was inherent in the disastrous, but inescapable, declaration of 4 August 1589. With a general settlement still far off, Henry was now obliged to address himself both to his own conversion and to the position of the huguenots in a piecemeal fashion, and in time of war. He had long since begun to think seriously of his own, personal religious hurdle: could he in good conscience become a catholic? Indeed, he is reported – whether or not reliably – to have been conferring with learned theologians, ever since his accession.102 In this exploration, Henry was greatly assisted by Jacques Davy Du Perron. He was himself a convert to catholicism who became a theologian as well as a poet, author and orator.103 Du Perron had been prominent at the court of Henry III, serving the king as ‘lecteur’ for a small stipend. After the king’s death he served the cardinal de Vendôme (cardinal de Bourbon 1590). Du Perron became close to Henry IV during the Rouen campaign when the pressure to convert began to build up. From this time, Henry had pursued constructive theological discussions with Du Perron who, from his own 101

Greengrass, ‘The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henry IV’, in Cameron, Ed., From Bourbon to Valois, 123, rightly referred to the ‘uneasy coalition’ which might fragment at any moment. 102 Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 182-6. 103 Wanegffelen, Ni Rome ni Genève, 407. It is uncertain when Du Perron converted, probably not later than 1578. It is also uncertain when he took holy orders, which is thought to have been when Henry IV made him bishop of Évreux about May or June 1593. Féret, Le Cardinal Du Perron, 7, 49.


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experience, as well as by his ability and powers of persuasion, was well placed to mediate Henry’s necessary transition. It could well have been with this in mind that Henry appointed him to the bishopric of Évreux in 1591. At the height of his affairs, Du Perron recorded, the king did him the honour of conferring with him secretly to prepare his conversion. Sometimes their discussions would last all night.104 Henry could not afford to be less than open-minded, and he had repeatedly declared that he was susceptible to persuasion. To change religion was something perfectly possible, and frequently done; Henry himself had already been forced to do so several times. One should recollect, in this context, that to be a Calvinist or to be a catholic did not represent just two rigid moulds from which one must be chosen. Between the extreme Calvinists, on the one hand, and the ultramontane catholics on the other, there lay a whole gamut of opinions. For Henry it was not so much a stark ‘either or’, as a question of finding some place on the catholic end of the scale at which he could feel easy in his mind. It was therefore a matter of identifying appropriate and acceptable interpretations, and of avoiding provocative definitions. It was pointed out to the king, before he summoned the prelates, that his errors were more of usage than of doctrine. Du Perron could therefore be said to have assisted the king to move up – or along – the confessional scale.105 This gradual shift in Henry’s religious perception, evidently in progress late in 1591, could well have been what enabled him to consent to the ‘voyages de Rome’. At precisely that time Henry expressed his personal problem of conscience as being twofold. He was not, he said in the instructions for Pisani, averse from whatever could be shown to be his duty in matters of conscience, which was another way of viewing the problem. This could only mean that, to be the King of France – which, of course, was decreed by God – it could actually be his duty to convert. Yet – and therein lay his lonely predicament – it was not his duty to lie about his religious beliefs, or to live that lie. In the same instruction, however, Henry also said that he believed he could ‘in conscience’ consent to what was required of him.106 When, therefore, Henry referred to divine inspiration in respect of his conversion – which was, ostensibly a political act – he could well have meant that God had guided and enabled him to accomplish with integrity what he was otherwise constrained to do.107 If that is correct, such ease of mind was indeed a blessing for which to be grateful. Henry’s impulsion towards catholicism strained his relations with the huguenots. Duplessis’ dream, it is now well-known, had always been that the king’s instruction would have a Calvinist outcome. The truth would be demonstrated in disputation, and the truth must necessarily prevail. But, since the king’s accession, the conception of instruction had changed; it had now become the preliminary to conversion. Thus, it has been seen that, in the face of the ‘voyages de Rome’, Duplessis swiftly sought permission

104

La Brière, La Conversion de Henri IV, 25; Du Perron, Les Diverses oeuvres. 638. Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 33-42, 9 September 1593, instructions for the bishop of Mans and others going to Rome. 106 Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 13-17, 7 October 1592, instructions for Pisani. 107 For example: Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 6-9, 8 August 1593, Henry IV to de Brèves. 105

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to organise a protestant assembly at Saumur.108 It could, therefore, have been due to his exertions that, in April 1593 – before the king’s private commitment on the eve of the conference at Suresnes – Du Perron took part in a disputation. The participants met in a house belonging to Rosny, the ‘gouverneur’ of Mantes. Du Perron and four Calvinist ministers (with ten more to advise) held discussions over seven days, with the king’s consent but in his absence. The debate was reportedly led by the pastors Jean-Baptiste Rotan, from La Rochelle, and Michel Béraud, from Montauban. The principal topic was whether the whole of Christian doctrine was contained in the scriptures, and whether or not the teaching of the Church was necessary. Du Perron successfully countered the Calvinist arguments with grammatical and philological points, which are said to have convinced Bertrand de Salignac, and Palma Cayet who converted in 1595.109 Clearly this was helpful to the king emphasising, as it did, that few if any articles of faith were incontrovertible. Furthermore Rosny, who favoured the king’s conversion as a necessity, is alleged to have propounded an astonishingly liberal point of view. It was nonsense to allege that either protestants or catholics were damned for their beliefs if they loved God, lived a Christian life and believed in salvation through Jesus Christ. The essence of Christianity could exist in either church.110 These interior matters are inevitably rather nebulously attested. It does, however, appear that Henry’s thinking gradually came to accept that salvation was also possible in the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the process was disquieting, and the way ahead was neither clear nor smooth. Henry’s perplexity may be deduced from Duplessis’ answer to a missing letter from the king. Writing from Saumur on 15 May 1593, when it was already too late, Duplessis assured the king that he was mindful of his suffering which, however, he had long foreseen. Duplessis strongly urged the king to resist; no human conspiracy could prevail against God; God would not fail to sustain him if he held firm. It testifies to the power of the contemporary Calvinist ethic that the experienced Duplessis could, in terms of realpolitik, be so apparently naive. Duplessis, if not surprised, was stunned by the declaration of 16 May 1593. To him, it was preferable to die rather than to abandon God. Yet can Duplessis, in his heart, really have thought it the king’s duty to lie down and die – passively to allow himself to be overwhelmed? Probably not, because to Duplessis, God could not allow that to happen. To Henry, however, God all too nearly had allowed that to happen. To the king Duplessis wrote that if he wished the truth to be known, he must summon those capable of establishing it; otherwise the forthcoming assembly would be a formality, the issue predetermined.111 In that, there was an element of truth. What to do about the protestants had been the subject of violent discussions in the council on 15 and 16 May 1593, before the all-important declaration; and Bouillon sent 108

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 339-45, 19 June 1592, Duplessis to La Fontaine. Accounts of this disputation come from the ‘discours sommaire’ at the beginning of Du Perron, Les Diverses Oeuvres, 1-36. No date is given but the event is always placed in April 1593. Féret, Henri IV et l’église, 40-2; La Brière, La Conversion de Henri IV, 26-8. 110 La Brière, La Conversion de Henri IV, 28-30. 111 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 415-16, 15 May 1593, Duplessis to Henry IV, 424-5, 25 May 1593, Duplessis to Marmet, pastor at Nérac, 426-7, 25 May 1593, Duplessis to Henry IV. 109


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Duplessis a report. Previously, in his memoir to queen Elizabeth in October 1592, Henry had envisaged calling the most learned ministers to discuss with the catholics – albeit ‘aimablement’ – difficulties which might arise.112 Now, Bouillon said, the king had been forced to concede that only the bishops would conduct his instruction. Henry extracted a declaration protecting huguenot interests for the next two months, but only because he had otherwise refused to proceed with the declaration in respect of his instruction. Bouillon had, however, obtained that protestant deputies should also be summoned from all the provinces.113 Building on this, Henry decided to attempt to compensate the protestants for his conversion by procuring for them the comprehensive edict of pacification they desired and needed. For this purpose, they were to be allowed to assemble. But the conception of instruction by disputation was already considerably attenuated. It is not surprising, in these fraught circumstances, if Henry’s conduct was, at times, hesitant or ambiguous. To Edmondes, Henry had said vaguely that the protestants were also summoned – for their reassurance. Neither the letters to the princes and catholic supporters, nor the declaration of 16 May itself, made any mention of summoning the protestants; indeed, the king kept very quiet about it. Obviously such an announcement would have killed, stone dead, the conference at Suresnes, from which he still cherished a small hope of obtaining a peace agreement. All that the king could now do was to extend reassurance to his protestant subjects, and to forestall trouble. Writing to the protestant churches, on 25 May 1593, Henry said that he had resolved to call an assembly of both religions ‘to assist with necessary measures’. He was sending Raymond de Viçose to assure them of his continued good will; and he made no mention of conversion.114 Viçose went first to Saumur. He found Duplessis agonising between despair and flickering hope. In one and the same letter Duplessis expressed his fear that the king was too far committed to withdraw, but also the hope that he could still be saved.115 Duplessis understood that there was to be no disputation with the prelates; nevertheless he went to work on obtaining a distinguished assembly. Thus, if peace were to be made, it could be general, with security and satisfaction for everyone.116 Those who attended must be well prepared, both to defend the truth – should they get a chance to do so – and with suitable instructions to obtain the maximum possible advantages. In a memoir for Viçose, Duplessis discussed what demands they should be prepared to defend. This endeavour might be seen as the beginning of the history of the edict of Nantes which, in the event, took another five years to secure. Duplessis cherished a forlorn hope that if the ministers were present, the bishops might not dare to act for fear of excommunication. They had, 112

Ouvré, Aubéry du Maurier, 323-5; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 241. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 416-17, 16 May, declaration in favour of the huguenots, 418, 18 May 1593, Cheverny to the ‘procureur général’, said that the king was calling an assembly of prelates and notable pastors. Ibid., 427-9, 25 May 1593, Duplessis to Bouillon. 114 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 779-80, 25 May 1593, Henry IV to the reformed churches; also in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 431-2. Viçose was sent to the churches of Poitou, Saintonge, Aunis, Guyenne and Gascony. Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 241. 115 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 461-4, 19 June 1593, Duplessis to La Fontaine, 116 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 430, 25 May 1593, Duplessis to Lomenie. 113

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however, been excommunicated several times already; the procedure was debased and meaningless. Duplessis also hoped to add to the weight of authority in the assembly, and to intimidate the catholics and the League by obtaining an impressive foreign representation from England, the United Provinces, Switzerland and Germany.117 The king’s intentions in respect of the protestants are most clearly illustrated by his instructions for Beauchamp, who was sent to the constable Lesdiguières, and places in Languedoc and Dauphiné.118 The constable was to be invited to come and play a principal part ‘in restoring the state’. Nothing would be more supportive than his presence at court in July 1593. Beauchamp was commanded to explain the situation, the king’s difficulties and, in particular, that he was rapidly losing catholic support. For the reasons to be explained, and according to his promise of 4 August 1589, Henry was calling a number of prelates to conduct his instruction. Furthermore, by means of a general assembly of persons of both religions, Henry hoped to determine the means of keeping the protestants in peace and safety. Meanwhile, he had obtained an undertaking that nothing would be decided at Suresnes contrary to huguenot interests. For the sake of speed, Henry had already chosen the deputies [from Dauphiné?] and wished the constable to pay them. Thereafter, Beauchamp was to visit various unspecified places to ensure that the churches understood the king’s danger. Above all, he was to explain the reasons for the assembly of 20 July, in which ‘les plus grandes affaires’ would be thrashed out. That would be the opportunity to lay the foundations for the conservation of the state and the security of the protestants – in other words to present their case for a sufficient and acceptable edict of pacification. With a touch of his old idealism Henry also expressed the wish that reconciliation might be achieved between those of the two religions. But that was not what most of the huguenots desired, and it was not to be.

XII: The King’s Proposal for Peace Henry had been unable to evade the declaration of 16 May 1593 because there were too many threatening circumstances, and the pressure was too great; indeed, it amounted to duress; Henry did not like the degree of commitment into which he had now entered because he was not ready.119 But, so long as he remained formally uncommitted, there was still some hope of first attaining to the necessary ‘firm foundation’. In yielding to this 117

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 427-9, 25 May 1593, Duplessis to Bouillon, 440-1, 31 May 1593, Duplessis to Servin, 448, 9 June 1593, Duplessis to various ministers, 450-3, 9 June 1593, memoir for Viçose, 458-61, 18 June 1593, Duplessis to Buzanval, in the United Provinces, 461-4, 19 June 1593, Duplessis to La Fontaine, 455-6, – June 1593, Duplessis to La Motte. 118 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 432-7, 26 May 1593, instructions for Beauchamp. Henri duc de Montmorency is said to have been made constable on 12 December 1593. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 71-3, 22 December 1593, Henry IV to Pisani. The office had been vacant and it is not clear to whom this message was addressed if not to Montmorency. 119 If Henry was not pleased at being pushed into the declaration of 16 May 1593, his commissioners to the conference ‘verrie earnestlie’ pressed him to abjure forthwith because of ‘the enemy’s great practising to precipatt the ellection of a newe Kinge which some of them will come to declare on Frydaie [21 May]. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 73-5, 9/19 May 1593, Edmondes to Burghley.


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pressure, Henry was sustained by ‘intimations’ from Rome about the secret attitude of Clement VIII to his conversion. Henry explicitly stated that the declaration of 16 May was made in the light of the advice received from Rome. It appeared to offer, with only a short delay, the coveted Papal approval which would have brought in its wake recognition and peace.120 The pope – it will be recalled – had allegedly expressed a desire to receive the king without thereby incurring blame. He had indicated to cardinal Toledo that he would prefer Henry’s conversion to be undertaken in France, followed by a request for his approval. With no available alternative, that is exactly what Henry IV proceeded to do – but with how much faith in the outcome, we do not know. It now appears likely that, somewhere along the line, the positive ‘intimations’ from Rome were exaggerated or, maybe, blown out of context. But to the grand duke – who was more helpful than anyone else – if Henry were to be declared catholic, by whatever means, that would at least be a good beginning. On 30 May 1593 Henry informed Ferdinando of the declaration of 16 May. He described it as a decision ‘to satisfy some and to expose others’ – even though the difficulties which had caused the delays were greater than ever; and he mentioned 20 July, which was within the prescribed time limit. Henry sent Girolamo Gondi back to Florence, presumably to convey what he dared not write, and doubtless to press for the help he now expected.121 Having successfully extorted the declaration of 16 May 1593, Schomberg returned to the peace conference. Beaune announced this startling news to the assembly on 17 May 1593.122 In fact his speech went a good deal further than the declaration itself, committing the king more precisely than the declaration had done. Beaune made a veiled reference to the clandestine Papal encouragement. The king and the royalists, he said, had wished his reconciliation with the Church to be upon the authority of the pope. However, factions in Rome aroused fears and long delays, whereas the matter was pressing. Consequently Henry had sought for solutions at home. This was without any lack of respect for the pope, and without prejudice to the rights of the Holy See. He would now adopt ‘the means which were advised’, with the intention of submitting to Rome thereafter. Beaune announced the forthcoming clerical and lay assemblies, without mention of the Calvinists. He therefore hoped that, with no further difficulties, the League would treat for peace during the truce which the declaration proposed.123 Beaune’s announcement had the

120 While the provenance of the message about Clement VIII’s attitude is unknown, there is no doubt as to the truth of its existence. Henry himself referred to it a number of times, to Pisani, to Gondi and to the pope himself. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 788-92, 9 June 1593, Henry IV to Pisani. Ibid., iv, 25-6, late August 1593, Henry IV to cardinal Gondi; Gomberville, Les Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 492-505, 31 August 1593, instructions for Nevers going to Rome. 121 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 782-3, 30 May 1593, Henry IV to the grand duke of Tuscany. Girolamo Gondi was to meet Pisani at Desenzano (Garda) and perhaps go together to Venice. 122 Bernard, Procès verbaux, p. lxvii, 202-5; Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 407-8; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 247-52. 123 Bernard, Procès verbaux, 202-5; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 260-1; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 485-97.

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impact of a thunderbolt, because the king’s decision had been kept entirely secret.124 Henry’s proposals would have satisfied anyone with a genuine desire for peace. Now – as he wrote to the grand duke – his adversaries were exposed. Plunged into confusion, Épinac began to bluster. He dismissed the proposal as insincere; it was made to retain catholic support; it arose from external pressure; it was a coup d’état, and he sought a recess. Back in Paris, Épinac reported this development to an extraordinary committee, in the presence of the legate, on 19 May 1593.125 The League was faced, on the one hand, with Feria’s proposal to elect the infanta, who would marry the archduke Ernest of Austria and, on the other, with the offer of a truce leading, supposedly, to Navarre’s conversion and to peace. Feria’s task was rendered much more difficult. Next day, 20 May, at a meeting in the legate’s house, he called for an end to the conference. He demanded the immediate election of the infanta – waving aside the Salic law – making large, instant, offers of men and money to support the election. It was not, however, until 28 May that Mayenne put Feria’s proposal to the estates. On the following day they were addressed by Tassis, and subjected to a long, Latin lecture on the Salic law by Iñigo de Mendoza.126 His performance was not appreciated; it aroused considerable opposition among those who were now hoping for peace. Members of the ‘parlement’ in particular, were outraged; they would never tolerate a Spanish monarch. This conflict with Feria, over the election and marriage of the infanta and the terms of Spanish support, was set to continue until 24 July 1593. That was the eve of Henry’s conversion.127 Meanwhile Mayenne induced the estates to reject the offer contained in the declaration of 16 May – if not quite definitively. The temperate reply of 3 June 1593 was drafted by Jeannin. It declared that they welcomed Navarre’s intended conversion – while perceiving no sign of it – but rejected his chosen means. Only the pope had the power and authority to approve the conversion and accord absolution; otherwise they would not recognise its validity. Navarre should therefore address himself to the pope and not to the League. Until all this was achieved, they would not treat for peace; that would be to approve Navarre’s [Gallican] conversion. Once they were clear on these matters, they would reply about the truce. In this specious way, the possibility of a truce was not

124

This secrecy may have been partly because it was necessary, if possible, to conceal the discussions about the protestants who were also to be summoned. The matter was never referred to in the peace conference. 125 Bernard, Procès verbaux, pp. lxvii, 202-5, 275-6. Mayenne was astonished by the king’s resolution, and dismayed, because he awaited answers from Spain and Rome. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 75-7, 18/28 May 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. 126 Bernard, Procès verbaux, pp. lxviii, 211-14, 28 May 1593, Mayenne’s speech to the assembly, 242-3, Tassis’ speech; 704-25, Mendoza’s speech. 127 There is a separate subject in the role of the ‘parlement’ in the estates, the disputed authority between them, and their relations with Mayenne. Their opposition on this occasion led to a counter move to exclude them from the estates. Bernard, Procès verbaux, p. lxviii; ‘Journal de la Ligue’, Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 51-2; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 263-6; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 254; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 128-32.


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entirely eliminated.128 Now that Henry had conceded conversion, and proceeded in the only way he could, the opposition was shifted onto the means of conversion and the absolution. This was exactly the situation that Henry had anticipated and wished to avert; hence the need for a ‘firm foundation’. His abjuration was to be rejected if it had not first been approved by the pope; therefore it would not bring peace. The conference resumed for further discussions between 5 and 10 June 1593. Beaune sought to show that the League objections were spurious by expanding upon the king’s intentions. These intentions, he pointed out, did embrace Papal authority. It appears that, since receiving the message from Rome, if not before, the bishops had considered how they might proceed. Now Beaune proposed that the king should seek absolution from them, in a form known as ‘ad cautelam’, and attend mass. Then he would send ‘ambassadeurs d’obédience’ to Rome. Beaune defended these intentions. Neither the king nor the council felt that, in a matter of such importance, he should be exposed to the judgement of foreigners [the Spanish] who would link absolution to the excommunication.129 In saying this, Beaune tried to avert a dispute over Henry’s claim to the throne. The excommunication, he asserted, was a simple declaration of irregularity, against which the French prelates already disposed of all the necessary means. This was a way of asserting that a simple absolution [in conscientiae] would be sufficient, thereby discounting the need for ‘rehabilitation’ to remove the penalties contained in the excommunication.130 There was, Beaune said, precedent and proof to establish that French bishops could absolve the king; Gallican liberties incontestably conferred that right. They would never permit the ultramontanes to determine the condition of the king, or his right to the throne. This was, in effect, to claim the independence of the temporal power. Once again, Beaune asked the Leaguers to join with them in seeking Papal intervention, thereby admitting that Papal co-operation would really be preferable.131 After this unproductive meeting on 5 June, Beaune reported to the king and prepared a lucid résumé of the proceedings of the conference. In this paper he blamed the pope’s hostility squarely on the League and the Spanish. The royalists still sought Papal favour despite the fact that past ill-treatment of the king would fully justify him in turning elsewhere – namely to the bishops. Nevertheless, Henry had summoned princes and prelates, seeking a wise solution to his conversion and absolution, with which the pope and all catholic princes could be satisfied. It was their conviction that no one who desired the preservation of religion and the prosperity of the state could or would impugn the act. The state of France required immediate redress, which was why the king proposed a truce. Beaune also left that proposal open. The only shred of progress was that the Leaguers did consent to receive Beaune’s paper. This may have been because the king was, by then, besieging Dreux; it might therefore be advisable not to have rejected the 128

Bernard, Procès verbaux, 237-40, 3 June 1593, Mayenne’s reply to the royalists; Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 362-5; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 251-2; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 267. 129 That is, of course, exactly what the League was doing. 130 To admit the need for ‘rehabilitation’ would be to make the pope the arbiter of the French succession. This inadmissible proposition proved to be a major difficulty. 131 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 268-71; Richard, Épinac, 499-500.

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possibility of a truce. Beaune’s paper was read out in Paris on 13 June 1593. This coincided with the second proposal of the Spanish, namely to elect the infanta together with the archduke Ernest of Austria. The nobles and ‘tiers’ preferred the option of a truce. The matter continued to be hotly debated in Paris while the conference was repeatedly adjourned. Thereafter, the deputies communicated with each other only in writing.132

XIII: The Final Quest for a ‘Firm Foundation’ The adversaries were now locked into a dangerous impasse. Henry had been compelled to agree to convert. He had made his current arrangements in the light of ‘intimations’ from Rome that they would be agreeable to the pope; and it has been seen that he stated that precisely. Now the League had rejected these arrangements, calling for advance Papal approval. This was the situation that Henry had always feared.133 Everything that had happened to date is stated and explained in a long and important letter from the king to Pisani, dated 9 June 1593. Henry candidly admitted that he could no longer defer his conversion beyond July, when the prelates would convene; otherwise his enemies would make too much of it. Consequently Henry attempted a final expedient, still based upon those ‘intimations’ from Rome on which he had had to pin his faith. Henry had now abandoned the hope of receiving the services of a special legate – which it had been Pisani’s mission to obtain. Instead, he now requested a specific, advance authorisation for the Gallican conversion he believed the pope to have commended. He wished Pisani to request a brief, addressed to the archbishop of Bourges (or a group of French prelates), enabling him to receive the king’s conversion. In this endeavour Pisani would seek the help of the grand duke, or even confide the matter entirely to him.134 The arrival of a Papal brief authorising the king’s conversion in France would, indeed, have been a dramatic coup, devastating to both Feria and Mayenne. If, as it then appeared to Henry, Clement VIII actually desired his conversion, it would be natural to suppose that, one way or another, absolution would follow. That was, after all, in the pope’s own long-term interests. But such reasoning was to suppose that the exercise of Papal authority would cut through the tangled controversies relating to the excommunication; underhand encouragement of the conversion incautiously ignored all that. 132 Bernard, Procès verbaux, p. lxviii, 255-9, 11 June 1593, proposition of the royalist catholics; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 268-75; Butler, The Edmondes Papers, 84-5, 20/30 June 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 465-6, 25 June 1593, Henry IV to Duplessis. Henry said that the conference had ended. 133 Mayenne’s reply of 3 June 1593 stated that it was for the pope ‘d’y mettre la première et la dernière main’. 134 It was evidently decided to send the king’s letter to Serafino Olivario, a confidant of the pope and an enemy of Spain, and the pope is said to have seen it. Galluzzi, Istoria del Granducato di Toscana, iii, 86-7; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 788-92, 9 June 1593, Henry IV to Pisani; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1592-3, p. 372, 2 July 1593, Henry IV to Beauvoir. Henry said that Pisani meant to return at the end of July. Arnaud d’Ossat was especially anxious to dissuade Pisani from leaving Italy for fear that the nobles would never send to Rome again; in other words he was afraid that reconciliation might never take place. If, however, the estates-general failed, the pope could more easily be justified in seeing Pisani. Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 275-92, 3 April 1593, d’Ossat to Pisani.


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The only thing that Henry could do in the meanwhile was to increase his pressure on Paris. The proposal for a truce and peace negotiations made in his declaration of 16 May, coincided with the demands of Feria, and created a great ‘combustion’ in Paris; people were beginning to declare for the king, if he converted. That much, at least, was positive. Three days after the declaration, Edmondes reported that the League was beginning to break up. The nobles backed a popular demand for peace, which the clergy, the Spanish and the legate all opposed. Realising that he would get nowhere with Mayenne, who had slammed the door on his conversion, Henry began to ‘plaie on the stringe of the people to stirre them against him’ [Mayenne]. So the struggle for Paris continued, while an answer was awaited from Rome.135 It is doubtful if Henry really expected to receive the Papal brief he so badly needed. To begin with, time was very short and, as he himself observed, Clement cared little for the French crown.136 Had Henry been more precisely aware of the pontifical anguish of indecision, he would certainly not have cherished that last, slender hope. History does not relate how Clement VIII reacted to Henry’s request. Advance sanction of his conversion would, however, be seen as tantamount to recognition of the king, whereas Clement had vowed that he would never be responsible for making Navarre the King of France. Clement VIII, Paruta reported on 29 May 1593, perceived multiple difficulties in any move over France; he did not wish to lead the way; he must continue to wait and see. If the conference at Suresnes ended in peace, he would have to accept Navarre. That is why he wanted Pisani to remain in Italy – even to send someone to Rome. It is probably also why Clement sometimes let drop an apparently obliging observation about wanting to receive Navarre, if only he could. Meanwhile Mayenne continued to demand support for the League, and the Spanish to keep the pope in a fever of confusion and perplexity. News of Henry’s declaration of 16 May 1593 created an uproar in Rome. By early July, as the date for the assembly of princes and prelates approached, the Papal court was in a turmoil.137 The Spanish would reject Navarre with all their force; and that meant war, as well as diplomacy in Rome. To Paruta, Clement declared that Navarre had been born a heretic [which was untrue] and would never be any good. The whole subject made the pontiff irritable; he was thoroughly convinced that Navarre could never be accepted, and that left him at a complete loss.138 Only through disappointment and intolerable humiliation would Henry IV discover just how disingenuous Clement VIII had been – cynical and cruel. He must bear a heavy responsibility for the five more years of civil war in France which, with a modicum of 135 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 75-7, 18/28 May 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; 78-9, 30 May/10 June 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. The grand duke was reported to be seeking, with money, to frustrate a levy of Swiss troops for Spain. 136 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 799-803, 10 June 1593, Henry IV to Épernon. 137 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 214-17, 29 May 1593, 220-2, 5 June 1593, 248-50, 26 June 1593 (3), 254-6, 3 July 1593 (2), 257-60, 10 July 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. Pisani was advised by supporters in Rome on no account to depart because that was exactly what the Spanish wanted. 138 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 279-84, 31 July 1593, 286-8, 31 July 1593 (2), 289-91, 7 August 1593, 315-18, 21 August 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate.

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vision and courage, he could have ended in the summer of 1593. But that was not his preoccupation. Clement VIII was a canonist while Henry IV was a heretic and a relapsed catholic. Clement would not incur the wrath of Spain and the opposition of the cardinals in order to help him; he might, however, be glad of Henry’s powerful support were he somehow to prevail in his own strength. A lesser prince than Henry IV might well have succumbed to the righteousness of his own anger and led his catholic country into schism.

XIV: The Intervention of the ‘Parlement’ After writing to Clement VIII on 9 June 1593, Henry left Mantes next day and laid siege to Dreux. This would help to restrict supplies for Paris and to facilitate communications between Mantes and Chartres. As Henry intended, the siege precipitated a crisis in Paris. On 14 June the estates assembled – in some alarm – to discuss the truce he had proposed. At the same time the Spanish demanded an answer to their second proposal, namely the election of the infanta and her marriage to the archduke Ernest. Next day a crowd gathered outside the ‘hôtel de ville’ demanding peace. Mayenne was now in trouble. On 18 June the nobles and ‘tiers’ voted for a truce and rejected the (second) Spanish proposal.139 This gave Mayenne an opportunity. Instead of returning the Spanish a flat rejection, he advanced an alternative. Mayenne proposed to tell Feria that the laws of France would only permit the election of a French prince – taken to include his house of Lorraine. Having anticipated this move, the Spanish agreed. They stipulated, however, that the choice of prince must be reserved to Philip II. Meanwhile, they sought to obtain, first of all, the election of the infanta. Supposing that the marriage would then be abrogated, the French wished her election to be conditional upon the marriage.140 Mayenne’s proposal to elect a French prince did not provide a solution because the Spanish always intended that the infanta should reign jointly with her husband. This was the nearest Mayenne ever came to advancing his own cause while, apparently, fulfilling his agreement with Feria to support the infanta. But Mayenne could not marry the infanta himself, while his eldest son, born in 1578, was barely old enough. The duc de Guise was the only available candidate, and favoured by Spain. But Mayenne was too jealous to support his nephew. During this complex struggle in Paris Henry took the town (not the citadel) of Dreux on 25 June 1593. Then he began to approach Paris.141 Mayenne had been doing his best either to raise the siege or else to fight. But Feria accused him of allowing Dreux to fall in order to intimidate the estates and obtain a truce. Mayenne protested that he had frequently requested the return of Mansfelt who had now crossed the Somme and was 139

Bernard, Procès verbaux, p. lxviii; ‘Journal de la Ligue’, Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 56-9. Mayenne’s proposal was made on 20 June and the Spanish accepted it on 21 June 1593. On 22 June the estates assembled to hear and consider the new proposal. The deputies were greased with Spanish money. Bernard, Procès verbaux, p. lxix. 141 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 848-52, 2 July 1593, Henry IV to Beauvoir. Queen Elizabeth was sending 1,500 men at this time, to make 3,000 altogether under sir Roger Williams. Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 437. 140


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believed to be approaching Paris.142 Henry swiftly sent for all his forces and prepared for battle, whether against Mayenne, the Spanish or both. Thus, with the last remaining month to go before he abjured, there was one more chance that Henry might obtain a decisive victory by which to establish his ‘firm foundation’.143 For everyone concerned there ensued a frantic race against time – whether to obtain a victory, an election, or a truce. The outcome of this desperate conflict was affected by the dramatic intervention of the Paris ‘parlement’, outraged by Mayenne’s proposal which the Spanish had accepted. Prompted by Villeroy’s friend, Guillaume du Vair, the ‘parlement’ issued an ‘arrêt’ on 28 June 1593; next day they also presented Mayenne with a powerful remonstrance.144 The ‘arrêt’ of 28 June 1593 bluntly forbade the transference of the crown to a foreigner. It commanded Mayenne to exercise the authority vested in him to prevent such a transference on grounds of religion. It required the fundamental laws to be observed, as well as previous ‘arrêts’ relating to the declaration of a French catholic king. This apparently referred to a measure of 22 December 1592 by which the ‘parlement’ forbade the choice of a foreigner and recognised Henry IV – provided he abjured. At the same time Mayenne himself had confirmed the Salic law by letters patent. Furthermore, the ‘parlement’ annulled in advance any contrary treaty, and required Mayenne to provide, forthwith, for the peace of the people. To pursue his policy, the remonstrance stated, he would have to destroy the laws of the state, overturn the Salic law and violate his own letters patent as well as the ‘arrêt’ of the ‘parlement’. The Leaguer gentry and cities would revolt, and the pope would also disapprove. What hope could be placed in Spain when the nobility was firmly behind Navarre? Any agreement to accept the infanta was to be regarded as null. The ‘arrêt’ had the effect of excluding the house of Lorraine because they were not of the blood royal and did not qualify under the Salic law.145 Thus Mayenne received a magisterial reprimand, promising stiff opposition if he ignored it. The ‘arrêt’ and remonstrance were complemented by a long and cogent ‘discours’ on the need for peace, unequivocally supporting Henry IV as the legitimate French prince. In view of Henry’s declaration of 16 May, they told Mayenne that he should now make peace without waiting upon Rome (‘attendu le changement qui est advenu en la 142

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 803, 14 June 1593, Henry IV to M. de Saint-Denis, 810-11, 25 June 1593, Henry IV to Duplessis-Mornay. Henry said in this letter that the League was tempted by huge Spanish offers. Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 320; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 290-1; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 82-3, 18/28 June 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. 143 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 799-803, 10 June 1593, Henry IV to Épernon, 803, 14 June 1593, Henry IV to M. de Saint-Denis, 810-11, 25 June 1593, Henry IV to Duplessis-Mornay, 848-52, 2 July 1593, Henry IV to Beauvoir. 144 Of the sixty or seventy members of the ‘parlement’ still meeting, not more than ten were obstinate opponents of the king. Guillaume du Vair later became keeper of the seals. 145 ‘In an ambiguous decree of December 1592, the magistrates defined the role of the forthcoming assembly as that of declaring and establishing a Most Christian king, a Catholic and a Frenchman, in accordance with the laws of the kingdom.’ Shennan, The Parlement of Paris, 229. The annulment by the ‘parlement’ of any unlawful agreement with Spain might be seen as a ratification of Henry’s declaration of 29 January 1593. Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henry IV, i, 352, 444. De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 281-3; Bernard, Procès verbaux, 546-9, 28 June 1593, ‘arrêt’ of the ‘parlement’, 736-40. Spain was aware of the authority of the ‘parlement’ which Philip II had at first proposed as the electoral body.

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personne du prince français qui a droit à la couronne’). The pope would only drag things out in order to mollify the Spanish. Indeed, it was likely that in order to avoid the importunity he might otherwise suffer, Clement VIII would actually prefer to be faced with a good and solid peace in France. Then, for fear of a schism, he could not refuse the obedience to be offered by ambassadors.146 The wording of this ‘discours’ strongly suggests that someone in the ‘parlement’ was aware of the ‘intimations’ from Rome – the likely informant being Villeroy. The intervention of the ‘parlement’ precipitated a crisis within the League. A violent dispute ensued and Mayenne considered making arrests. It appears, however, that three quarters of the colonels of the ‘quartier’ militias supported the ‘parlement’. The use of violence could therefore have been fatal. The nobles, furthermore, were anxious to grasp this pretext to escape from the agreement to elect the infanta. Mayenne protested that he had not yet reached a decision about the truce and undertook to do everything reasonable in respect of the ‘parlement’s principal points.147 Mayenne is represented as having been shaken and angry but, in view of the existence of previous ‘arrêts’, the intervention of the ‘parlement’ was surely predictable.

XV: The Election is Abandoned On the same day as the ‘arrêt’ of 28 June 1593, the Spanish demanded an answer to their requirement that Philip II must choose the infanta’s French husband, and they called for her immediate election. Whether or not on account of the ‘parlement’, their demands were rejected on 2 July and Mayenne devised a way out. He told the Spanish, on 4 July, that the French could not proceed to the election in the absence of any Spanish forces to sustain it. When a Spanish army was ready, the matter could be reviewed.148 Next day, in an effort to break the deadlock, Feria offered to accept the duc de Guise as the infanta’s French husband. In return, he required Mayenne to annul the ‘arrêt’ of 28 June and to desist from negotiations with the royalists.149 This unexpected move was extremely awkward for Mayenne. He was committed to supporting the infanta, and it was he who had proposed the election of a French prince. Rumours began to circulate that the pope favoured Guise and that Mayenne had consented. Jeannin advised him to delay.150 It is unclear whether the pope really favoured Guise, but he did become anxious about this time that the estates would fail; then nothing would be changed so far as obtaining a king was concerned. That would increase the chances that Navarre might survive and cause problems in Rome. Clement was annoyed about the constant demand for Papal censures 146

Bernard, Procès verbaux, 751-4 [29 June 1593] the ‘parlement’s’ ‘discours’ on peace. Bernard, Procès verbaux, 546-9, 742-8; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 283-4, Shennan, The Parlement of Paris, 230-2; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 136-8. The ‘parlement’ claimed the right to verify acts of an estates-general; their ‘arrêt’ was envisaged as a veto on the agreement with Feria. 148 Bernard, Procès verbaux, pp. lxix, 301-2, 552. Feria asked for this statement in writing. Ibid., 553. 149 Bernard, Procès verbaux, pp. lxix, 304-6. Mayenne is said, about this time to have approached the cardinal de Bourbon, offering to have him proclaimed king if he and his confederates would abandon Navarre. Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, 449, 467-8. This might have been a ploy to get Bourbon to oppose Navarre’s conversion – which he did. 150 ‘Journal de la Ligue’, Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 76-7. 147


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which had not been supported and enforced by the presence of adequate Spanish forces. He also felt that the negotiation in favour of the infanta had been badly mismanaged by the Spanish and inopportunely promoted. Consequently they had lost the good will of the Catholic Union.151 A meeting in the legate’s house, on 10 July, Mayenne manoeuvred with some skill. He expressed his desire for a ‘bon fin’ upon the Spanish proposal to accept Guise for the infanta. But, resourceful as ever, he asked to see Feria’s commission and stipulated that, before concluding, they must first agree upon the conditions of the treaty. Feria produced a Latin commission, dated 24 October 1592, which he handed to the abbé d’Orbais. This was a general authorisation for the Spanish envoys to negotiate in France. Pressed harder, Feria produced another paper permitting him to accept Guise upon the conditions contained in the instruction.152 Mayenne was now trapped. It was therefore decided, on 10 July, to proceed with negotiating the treaty conditions to be submitted to Philip II, and to agree upon the declaration [of the infanta and the duc de Guise as joint monarchs].153 From 10 to 24 July the conditions of the treaty were under discussion, the election being agreed in principle. Mayenne, of course, made huge personal demands. Edmondes believed that this negotiation was secret, pending the arrival of Mansfelt’s army.154 If

151 Lutz, Ed., Das Papsttum, 220-6, summer 1593, anonymous instructions (probably for Caetani in Spain). The pope intended there to be a Papal force of 1,000 men to guard Paris during the estates and to augment the prestige of the cardinal legate; but it is very doubtful if the force materialised. Jaitner, Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens’ VIII, 131-4, 30 May 1593, instructions for Rodolfo Baglione, who was to recruit and command the force. 152 Feria was apparently ordered not to fulfil Spanish promises unless Mayenne had fulfilled his. Furthermore, Spanish help would not be renewed until fresh instructions were received. Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 48-9. 153 Bernard, Procès verbaux, 553-6; Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 451-2. Poirson says that Mayenne signed an undertaking to accept the infanta and Guise upon condition of receiving satisfaction for himself. He is most unlikely to have signed anything. It has been widely supposed that Philip II would not allow the infanta to marry outside the house of Habsburg. It is possible that the emperor cared more about this than Philip II himself, who had no other way of gaining France. However this may be, Feria had executed his instructions precisely. Philip required a declaration by the estates recognising the infanta and leaving the rest to himself. But if they insisted on the choice of a Frenchman, it could only be Guise. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iv, 10, 25 January 1593, points concerning the education of a king in France; Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vi, 237-9. 154 Bernard, Procès verbaux, 556, 12-13 July 1593. At this crucial point, the documentation ceases. ‘Journal de la Ligue’, Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 77. Mayenne is said to have demanded the ‘gouvernements’ of Burgundy and Champagne-Brie hereditarily (Edmondes said in sovereignty); the principalities of Joinville, Vitry and Saint-Dizier, which belonged to Guise; 200,000 écus (in gold) down; 600,000 in various payments, presumably debts, and 50,000 écus per annum. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 86-8, 5/15 July 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes thought that Mayenne was driven to accept the final proposal of the Spanish because of the king’s imminent conversion. In fact Mayenne was outmanoeuvred. He really wanted Normandy, a key province, which Philip II had already refused when Jeannin was in Spain in 1592. Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vi, 210-11, 6 December 1592, Philip II to Ibarra. De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 293; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 138-9.

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Mansfelt had succeeded in approaching Paris at this time, Mayenne would have been caught, and his duplicity exposed.155 Mansfelt, however, was obstructed by the king. Having taken the citadel of Dreux on 9 July 1593, Henry prepared to go to Beauvais. He was ready to intercept Mansfelt, or else to exploit any favourable development in Paris.156 Edmondes observed that Henry ‘put them in payne how to publishe their ellection’. Indeed, it may well have been the king’s timely manoeuvre that finally frustrated it.157 When Mansfelt heard of the proximity of Henry’s forces, situated between his own and Paris, he withdrew. But if Henry’s prompt action in the field sent Mansfelt racing for cover, it also destroyed the last chance of obtaining a ‘firm foundation’ through victory in the field. There remained only Paris: Henry spent some ten days between 12-22 July moving about between Mantes and Saint-Denis, sustaining the anxiety that he intended to march upon Paris.158 During this time the conditions of the treaty with Spain were discussed, with Sega acting as intermediary.159 Desperate to obtain the election before the king’s conversion, the Spanish tightened their grip on Mayenne by agreeing to most of his demands. Everything was therefore in place for the election of the infanta, apart from the requisite Spanish forces. The crisis came on 20 July 1593: Mayenne had to agree to discuss in council whether to put the draft treaty to the estates, together with a request to determine the rights of the infanta and Guise. It was implausibly maintained that Spanish forces would soon arrive, and there were many who wished to clinch the agreement. In the council Mayenne was adamant that he would not be responsible for an election unless the results could be guaranteed by adequate military support. It is unclear whether, had he wished to do so, Mayenne could have forced the agreement through the estates. It does, however, appear that if he ran out of decent pretexts, he was prepared to resort to a blunt refusal. Over dinner, however, he got his own way. That being the case, a truce with Navarre would be necessary.160 Mayenne summoned a meeting at the Louvre, on 22 July, 155 Mansfelt did not, of course, command a huge force such as the French had always demanded to support the election of the infanta. 156 According to Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 484, Henry ordered a new blockade of Paris, 12-14 July 1593; it is not, however, clear what that means. 157 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 85-6, 1/11 July 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Henry was warned at this time to be especially vigilant because ‘sundrie were sent out of Paris to kill him’. That must have been chillingly reminiscent of the situation in August 1589 when Henry III had perished. It is not clear that Henry actually went to Beauvais at this time. According to de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 291, he crossed the Seine but then turned back. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 814-16, 8 July 1593, Henry IV to the archbishop of Bourges. 158 There is no indication that Henry meant to attack Paris directly. It would hardly have been convenient just as the clergy and laymen assembled for his conversion. It is also unclear whether Paris was protected by a series of temporary truces covering the peace conference. One truce expired on 18 July but was extended to 23 and again to 27 July. This enabled people to escape from Paris to Saint-Denis at the time of the conversion, although it was forbidden to leave Paris. Bernard, Procès verbaux, 316 n.1; ‘Journal de la Ligue’, Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 82-8. According to Wolfe, The Conversion of Henry IV, 142, the truce was extended to the end of the month. 159 There is no reliable account of events in Paris between 10-24 July 1593. 160 Richard, Épinac, 519-21; Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, 325.


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attended by the Spanish and deputies from the three estates. He handed Feria a declaration which stated that no election could take place in the absence of Spanish forces. It is, however, recorded that the resolution in favour of the infanta and Guise was passed – the circumstances are unclear – but it was to be withheld until the arrival of the Spanish forces. Next day, 23 July, Mayenne renewed the oath of union before the legate; he promised not to treat with Navarre, however catholic he might become, and undertook to proceed to the election once the conditions were right.161 So the declaration to Feria was represented as only a postponement of the election; consequently the whole charade had to continue. Mayenne’s flimsy case was strengthened by the departure of Mansfelt, the perception of imminent danger from royalist forces, and the fretfulness of the unfortunate deputies who demanded licence to depart.162 Mayenne had won a reprieve. On 24 July, the eve of Henry’s abjuration, Mayenne called another meeting in the Louvre. He presumed to express his wish that a decision could have been reached; but, as no election was currently possible, it had been decided to accept a truce with Navarre. In order to support the fiction that the election was only deferred, the deputies were commanded to remain in Paris.163 It should not, however, be too difficult to ensure that the conditions were never right. Mayenne had escaped after all; but this was just how close the League had come to the election – albeit illegal – of a foreign catholic monarch. That, however, is not to say that the infanta would ever have come to France and imposed her authority as queen Isabella, still less that she would ever have been married to the duc de Guise. There was, therefore, no election of a catholic king; there was no opportune victory for Henry IV, and no redeeming Papal brief to authorise his conversion. Despite all his persevering efforts, Henry IV had failed to obtain the ‘firm foundation’ that he knew to be necessary before his now imminent conversion. The race against time had been lost; only the unconfirmed hints from Rome permitted the king to hope that all might soon be well, once his conversion had been announced.

161 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 90-1, 22 July/1 August 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Bernard, Procès verbaux, 317; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 139; Richard, Épinac. 521; ‘Journal de la Ligue’, Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. ix (1837), 88-90; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 303. 162 Bernard, Procès verbaux, 311. 163 Bernard, Procès verbaux, 317-19.

CHAPTER XIV: THE CONVERSION OF HENRY IV, JULY 1593 I: The Ceremony at Saint-Denis Henry IV notoriously referred to his imminent conversion as a leap in the dark – ‘un sault périlleux’.1 It is not surprising that he should have been apprehensive about his hurried abjuration, for which he had to leave the field. What Henry was obliged to do in July 1593 is not what he intended to do; there was a real sense in which – there and then – his abjuration represented a serious defeat. The proceedings themselves were potentially vulnerable to disruption, by the protestants at Saint-Denis, by the hostile cardinal de Bourbon, abbot of Saint-Denis, and by the cardinal legate in Paris; Bourbon and the legate both tried to halt the proceedings. Although the accomplishment of the act was fully determined, Henry was still not prepared to sign anything unacceptable. But, had the conversion been frustrated, or had Henry failed to proceed at this time, he could hardly have done so later. Thus, if the abjuration was perilous, a fiasco would be disastrous. Furthermore, the densely crowded ceremony exposed the king to exceptional danger, while the outcome was unpredictable. In the short term, Henry’s abjuration was certain to be vociferously condemned by the ‘curés’, the League, the Spanish, and the huguenots alike. Whether Henry’s protestant allies would be more concerned about his religion or their fear of Spain remained to be seen. Evidence relating to Henry’s decision to convert is scanty; he was necessarily secretive about it. It has been seen that his instruction began some time before, probably with the clergy who staffed the chapel royal.2 These crown appointees, were the catholic clergy most closely connected with the king.3 Little is known about the chapel royal. Possibly Henry appointed staff with his conversion and subsequent support in mind.4 It was directed by Renaud de Beaune, archbishop of Bourges, who became ‘grand aumônier’ in January 1591. When Nicolas Fumée, bishop of Beauvais, died in 1592, he was succeeded as ‘premier aumônier’ by Du Perron. Henry’s petition to the pope, taken to Rome by Du Perron in July 1595, stated – whether or not correctly – that he had 1

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 821, 23 July 1593, Henry IV to Gabrielle d’Estrées; DuplessisMornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 469-75, 22 or 29 June 1593, Du Maurier to Duplessis, in which this expression, ‘saut périlleux’ was already used. It cannot be interpreted in purely religious terms. Wanegfellen, Ni Rome ni Genève, 386. 2 Henry categorically stated that his personal instruction began in this way. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 492-503, 31 August 1593, instructions for Nevers, going to Rome. 3 The chapel was staffed by eight ‘aumôniers’, eight chaplains and eight clerics serving quarterly, two of each at a time. Oroux, Histoire ecclésiastique de la cour de France, ii, 247. The king is said to have received secret instruction, especially from Du Perron. Ibid., 240. 4 Oroux, Histoire ecclésiastique de la cour de France, i, p. lxvi. This work is very sketchy. Beaune was a ‘parlementaire’ who had risen to be a ‘maître des requêtes’ as early as 1563. He served as chancellor to Alençon and became archbishop of Bourges in 1581. It is not clear when he entered holy orders. Beaune might be described as a legitimist, with an eagle eye for the main chance. He is said to have desired the position of French patriarch. At Saint-Denis he was the principal of eleven prelates. Baumgartner, ‘Renaud de Beaune’, The Sixteenth-Century Journal, ix (i) (1978), 99-114.

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undertaken serious instruction (‘instruit à fond’) for eighteen months before the ‘voyages de Rome’ of Gondi and Pisani; that would be roughly from April 1591, after the siege of Chartres.5 The clergy summoned by the king began to assemble at Mantes in mid-July 1593, eventually numbering about forty. Among them were a few of the more moderate ‘curés’ of Paris, notably René Benoît of Saint-Eustache, who was to become the king’s confessor.6 Benoît, it is suggested, was more apt than Du Perron to perceive the doctrinal compatibilities which could enable the king to convert in good conscience. The inference is that Henry was not too profoundly Calvinist to be converted by a ‘curé’ who was not too dogmatically catholic.7 Besides the catholic clergy who assembled at Mantes, there were also a number of protestant divines.8 It is alleged that a further disputation occurred between the pastors Rotan and Morlas with Du Perron, and that Du Perron won the argument. The catholics, however, refused to allow the protestants to participate in their discussions. Consequently the pastors withdrew and, fearing the worst, they submitted a bitter memorandum.9 Thus the kind of religious assembly that had always been envisaged never took place, but that was not the fault of the king. Henry is alleged to have addressed the clergy at the opening of their assembly on 15 July 1593.10 Whether or not this speech was really delivered on that occasion, it is a precise and important statement of the king’s position. Henry is said to have related his decision to convert directly to his initial promise to receive instruction; and that promise was made upon his accession because he was pressed to do so. Since then, wars and difficulties had intervened. Now he was more acutely aware of the extreme desire of his subjects, and was moved to compassion by the misery of his people. He realised that many excellent persons rejected the opinions which separated him from the Church. 5

This petition also states that Henry had seriously thought of returning to the Church for three years past. He had sought to do it with Papal approbation, and that was why he had sent Luxembourg to Rome. The timing does not correspond. De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 636-7. 6 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 139-40; Greengrass, ‘The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henri IV’, in Cameron, Ed., From Valois to Bourbon, 108. Claude Morenne, Jean Chavigny, Jean Lincestre and Louis Séguier were also called. 7 Wanegffelen, Ni Rome ni Genève, 419-27. These pages show how Benoît could have influenced the king, but not that he did, unless that is deduced from his favour with the king. 8 There was considerable confusion about why the protestants had been summoned. Some thought it was to oppose the king’s conversion. Most, however, were not notified in time to come. 9 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 140; Greengrass, ‘The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henri IV’, in Cameron, Ed., From Valois to Bourbon, 116. The subject of the disputation is said to have been the Church and salvation. The conclusion was that salvation could also be found in the Catholic Church. La Brière, La Conversion de Henri IV, 30-1. If this is true, then clearly it was very important for Henry IV. Féret, Henri IV et l’église, 51-4, says that the catholic case prevailed. These reports do not appear to be reliable. Rotan wrote to Duplessis from La Rochelle on 24 July 1593 and described the king’s condition as contemptible. He was rushing into certain ruin for an uncertain hope. This does not sound as if Rotan had been convinced by any catholic arguments. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 496. 10 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 471-2. Others maintain that this speech was made to the four prelates with whom Henry conferred on 23 July – which hardly makes sense. The evidence is very confused. Cimber et Danjou, ‘Procès verbal de la cérémonie de l’abjuration de Henri IV’, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xiii (1837), 345-6; La Brière, La Conversion de Henri IV, 33.

Chapter XIV: The Conversion of Henry IV, July 1593

491

Thus, touched and inspired by the spirit of God, he wished to be able, in good conscience, to satisfy his subjects. Consequently he had entered into discussions with various learned catholics. They had assured him that the Catholic Church was the real Church, to which belonged the interpretation of scripture. They had taught him to see that it was on account of abuses that he was severed from the Church. The actual differences were more a matter of usage and custom than of doctrine. Having, therefore, resolved to reunite himself to the Church, he had called an assembly to expound the doctrine and constitution [canons], during which [time] certain learned, catholic persons would instruct him upon particular, principal points which were still unclear. All this was for the assurance of his conscience without which he would not, for four kingdoms, depart from the doctrine in which he had been nurtured. This speech clearly indicates that Henry had decided to convert, that he had pursued preliminary instruction, and that certain things remained to be resolved. But he also appeared to issue a warning that there were things – not necessarily doctrinal – that he would not accept. Henry showed that he had studied how he could accomplish, with integrity of conscience, that which had become his duty as the King of France. How to do that had been his personal dilemma. His statement bears out the proposition that, over a period of time, he had been enabled to move onto the catholic end of the confessional scale. If Henry had solved his dilemma, the clergy had also to resolve theirs: how to proceed with the conversion defensibly and canonically. Whether at Mantes, or later at Saint-Denis, they conducted lengthy debates. These discussions centred on the nature of the king’s conversion because they were required to prepare the form of his abjuration and confession of faith. This provided the hostile cardinal de Bourbon with an opportunity to be obstructive by demanding the inclusion of items the king was bound to reject: for example, a formal condemnation of the heretics. Furthermore, echoing the League, Bourbon questioned the validity of a conversion without Papal intervention. These were serious matters since Henry could not have proceeded if the clerical assembly lost its collective nerve.11 A ‘lively’ debate therefore ensued over how to justify their procedures to Rome. Probably the discussions were strongly guided by Beaune, who knew of the ‘intimations’ from Rome received before Henry’s declaration of 16 May 1593. Indeed he had alluded to them in the conference at Suresnes, but no one appears to have asked him what he meant. Knowledge of this factor was clearly not general, and it radically alters all previous interpretations of Henry’s Gallican conversion. The solution adopted by the clergy was that already proposed by Beaune to the conference – namely absolution ad cautelam. This emergency procedure, recognised by the council of Trent, was used in cases of mortal danger. It was perfectly correct, provided Papal confirmation was sought forthwith.12 That was precisely what Henry fully intended to do, again according to the ‘intimations’ from Rome. It was doubtless hoped that this solution might circumvent the critical problem of the excommunication and 11

Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 141; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 486-7. Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 141; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 487; Féret, Henri IV et l’église, 67-8. 12

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Henry’s legitimate claim to the throne which, to the royalists, did not pertain to Rome.13 Upon that matter everything depended. If his case was one of simple heresy, episcopal absolution was wholly sufficient. But, as the decision to absolve ad cautelam, demonstrated deference to Rome, it was less easily challenged than the former; it also recalled the fact that Henry had always wished to act under Papal auspices.14 On the other hand, this procedure, which did require Papal benediction, could be taken to imply that more than simple heresy was involved. Such absolution was essentially provisional and incomplete. But if, according to the ‘intimations’ from Rome, the pope would approve the Gallican conversion, then the incomplete absolution would only be temporary. In the unfortunate event, Henry remained in suspense, absolved yet not absolved, while the excommunication issue fuelled extensive controversy. It became necessary to assume or assert the validity of the episcopal absolution although it had, undeniably, been conditional. The clergy removed to Saint-Denis on 20 July 1593 and the king arrived late on 22 July. A deputation of the clergy waited upon him to know his will. Henry wished to confer next morning with four of them: Beaune, Du Perron, Claude d’Angennes, bishop of Mans, and Philippe du Bec, bishop of Nantes – a decision which must have been prearranged. During their five or six hours of discussion on 23 July drafts of the king’s abjuration and profession of faith were carefully examined.15 According to Greengrass, the prelates pressed the king to accept binding and comprehensive oaths, rehearsing all the major catholic doctrines, as opposed to a summary renunciation and a short declaration of faith.16 The remaining points upon which the king had doubts are said to have been the invocation of saints, auricular confession, and Papal authority – which was not an article of faith. Henry had always maintained that he believed in the Real Presence which could, otherwise, have been the insuperable obstacle. It is, however, far from clear whether these points were really discussed with the bishops on 23 July.17 The four prelates returned to the assembly that afternoon, requesting the clergy to produce the final version of the king’s abjuration and confession for that evening. It was important that it should be seen to be the work of the assembly. At this critical point the king’s conversion could still have failed. Further conflict arose because his amendments had weakened the provision against heresy.18 Bourbon, who presided, seized another opportunity to be obstructive. He proposed to refer the whole matter to Rome, presumably knowing that that would put an end to it. Whether or not the cardinal legate was aware of these discussions, he chose that day to issue a monitorium annulling the 13

Arguments relating to the validity or nullity of the king’s excommunication were all controversial and not susceptible to definitive conclusion. 14 Féret, Henri IV et l’église, 68-77. 15 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 142. 16 Greengrass, ‘The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henri IV’, in Cameron, Ed., From Valois to Bourbon, 114. 17 Hubner, Sixte-quint, i, 283. Luxembourg had actually made that point about the Real Presence to Sixtus V in January 1590. Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 180-2, relates the discussion of these points to Henry’s private undertaking in April 1593, before the conference of Suresnes. 18 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 143-4.


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proceedings of the assembly and forbidding anyone to attend it, upon pain of deprivation and excommunication. Furthermore, he declared that Navarre could only be absolved by the pope, and that was unlikely to happen.19 Whether or not the legate’s disruptive intervention was actually known to the assembly, some sort of showdown evidently ensued between them and the king. Accounts vary as to how the king dealt with this threat – he appealed to a council of notables, or he called upon certain judges, or Du Perron persuaded the assembly to accept a modified formula of the pontifical; the truth remains unclear. By whatever means, the disagreement was overcome next day, and the king signed the two amended documents. Next morning he bade a tearful farewell to his protestant ministers.20 Despite the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, it is clear that difficulties and dangers existed right up to the last moment. There was a limit to how far the supplicant king could be humiliated. His conversion was an unique occasion, requiring special dispensations. But, again, the whole affair assumes a different complexion in the light of the ‘intimations’ from Rome, of which doubtless only a few individuals were aware. In contrast to the private preliminaries, the king’s abjuration on the morning of 25 July 1593 was as public as possible. It was preceded by long processions and attended by great crowds. Henry arrived at the steps of the basilica at 10 o’clock, dressed only in white and black, stripped of the trappings of royalty.21 Kneeling on the steps outside the church, the king was interrogated by Beaune, who conducted the ceremony. Firstly Henry was asked, ‘who are you?’. To this he replied, ‘I am the king’, thereby declaring that his claim to the throne depended neither upon his religion nor the Papacy.22 Next his desire to be received into the Church was proclaimed. Then he handed Beaune the signed texts of his abjuration and confession of faith together, it is said, with an act of submission to the pope. The confession of faith proclaimed the orthodox doctrine on all points contested by the protestants. It would therefore appear that Henry was not permitted to blur the articles of faith, but only to avoid condemnation of the protestants and overt acceptance of the decrees of Trent.23 Still outside the church, Henry turned to the people to recite a shorter, amalgamated version of the two documents: 19 Segretain, Sixte-quint et Henri IV, 338-40, 23 July 1593, text, ‘monitoire du cardinal de Plaisance; Greengrass, ‘The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henri IV’, in Cameron, Ed., From Valois to Bourbon, 110-11; Féret, Henri IV et l’église, 67-73; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 309; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 489; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 263-5, 10 July 1593 (2), says that Sega was put up to this condemnation by the Spanish, in order to obstruct the king’s conversion. That same day the oath of Union was renewed despite negotiations for a truce. 20 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 144-5; Greengrass, ‘The Public Context of the Conversion of Henri IV’, in Cameron, Ed., From Valois to Bourbon, 113-14; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 140; La Brière, La Conversion de Henri IV, 34. 21 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 146 seq., describes the processions and ceremonies. He maintains that there was symbolic importance in the seventh Sunday after Trinity. If so, it was probably fortuitous, since Henry had undertaken to convert before the end of July. 22 Rocquain, La France et Rome, 489. The cardinal de Bourbon was abbot of Saint-Denis but was not a priest. Despite previous opposition, he did participate in the ceremony. 23 Féret, Henri IV et l’église, 84; La Brière, La Conversion de Henri IV, 34.

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The Path to Rome I, Henri, king of France and Navarre by the grace of God, do hereby recognise the Roman Catholic Church to be the true Church of God, holder of all truth and without error. I promise before God to observe and uphold all decrees established by its saintly Councils and all canons of the Church, following the advice given to me by prelates and doctors as contained in statements earlier agreed to by me wherein I swear to obey the ordinances and commands of the Church. I also hereby disavow all opinions and errors contrary to the holy doctrines of the Church. I promise as well to obey the Apostolic See of Rome and our Holy Father, the Pope, as have all my predecessors. I will never again depart from Catholicism, but instead persevere in its profession with the grace of God until I die. For this I implore His assistance.24

Once inside the packed church, Henry was conducted to the altar – not without difficulty. Kneeling again, and with his hands on a Bible, the oath already made was sanctified. The king’s confession and his absolution, pronounced by Beaune, occurred beyond the altar during the singing of the Te Deum. After the confession, high mass was celebrated by Philippe du Bec. According to Wolfe, who commented upon the sacerdotal nature of kingship, Henry – and only he – received communion in both kinds. Furthermore, the consecrated host was reserved for use in subsequent masses to be attended by the king in the near future.25 Henry, however, later clearly stated that he had deferred receiving communion until he could do so under Papal authority. For this reason he postponed his coronation which was to have followed his conversion.26 That was one more obvious reference to the ‘intimations’ from Rome which afforded hope of a speedy Papal benediction. Before the conversion ceremony ended, Bourbon offered the king the kiss of peace; that was the end of the ‘tiers parti’.27 Henry’s re-emergence from the church was greeted with tumultuous and noisy rejoicing. After dinner, and further religious observances, Henry later rode over to Montmartre so that the Parisians could see his bonfires and fireworks up on the hill.28 Henry had done all that he could, in the only possible way, and within the deadline set by the grand duke of Tuscany. Henry later declared that he had wanted to wait for another two months, but up to what point he had entertained that hope is not clear; probably not beyond the declaration of 16 May 1593. While it has been seen that Henry had not despaired of obtaining his ‘firm foundation’, and he also required more time for an answer from Rome, the ultimate pressure was the 24

Some inconsistencies were simply unavoidable. The implication of this statement would surely be acceptance of the decrees of Trent. Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 151. According to the ‘Procès verbal de la cérémonie de l’abjuration de Henri IV’, Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, série i, vol. xiii (1837), 349, Henry, still kneeling on the steps of the church, requested absolution from his excommunication. See also Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Les Œconomies royales, i, 366-8. 25 Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 153. 26 Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 45-7, 22 December 1593, Henry IV to Pisani; also in Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 71-3. The wording is identical in both texts. Ibid., iii, 819, 16 July 1593, Henry IV to Rambouillet, refers to Henry’s intention to be crowned immediately after his abjuration. Butler, The Edmondes Papers, 90-1, 22 July/1 August 1593, Edmondes to Burghley, 91-2, 7/17 August 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. 27 Bourbon died a year later, on 30 July 1594. 28 This fact was mentioned by Edmondes, who reported that the king’s conversion had been performed with solemnity and magnificence. Butler, The Edmondes Papers, 89-90, 15/25 July 1593, Edmondes to Burghley.


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need to avert the election of a catholic king, and the mounting disaffection of his own followers which could no longer be contained. Henry himself told Duplessis-Mornay that they had pushed him to the brink of a precipice.29 Henry had been accorded, or arrogated to himself, an unusual degree of privacy in the matter of his abjuration; without it, the whole act might have foundered. He behaved with humility, which is not demeaning, but made no public demonstration of penitence or contrition; his catholicism would never be of the kind indulged by Henry III. Having performed a profoundly solemn act of duty, Henry had no cause for penitence or contrition. Necessarily improvised, his conversion was fraught with difficulty and controversy which did not end with the fireworks. Claims and counter claims competed in a juridically grey area. Because the prelates were constrained to adopt an ambivalent position, a disturbing query hung over the king’s episcopal absolution. Henry’s heresy might be simple, but his relationship to the Church was not. There remained the question of royal exemption from Papal sentences, and he still had no representative in Rome. Despite the deliberate deference accorded to the Papacy, the whole event was, paradoxically, a major episode in the perennial struggle for supremacy between church and state. The Leaguer claim that only the pope could absolve the king contravened Gallican liberties. The bishops refrained from the provocation of appealing to Gallican liberties, but they carefully evaded the excommunication issue, through which the Papacy claimed to alter the succession.30 With the cardinal legate thundering malediction, a bold appeal to Gallican privilege might possibly have been better and safer. It would not necessarily have precluded subsequent Papal benediction, though it might have led to schism. That, in any case, remained a possibility for some time to come. However these things may be, the king’s conversion left him as intensely vulnerable as before, albeit in different ways. Without alternatives, Henry could only cherish his little – and more or less private – hope that this unstable interval would be brief.31 It is certain that Henry did not wish to convert in July 1593, and probable that he did not wish to do so at all; it was bound to inflame opinions all round. Since the war centred on the succession, Henry’s conversion was manifestly a political act; but it was conducted with sensitivity, and the maximum possible integrity. The political point was apparent, while the enlightenment was not. It is therefore easy to condemn if one desires to condemn; and it is easy to cry cynic, without pondering the nature of sincerity. Henry’s conversion was not simply the adoption of alternative doctrines, a movement along the confessional scale, or an attitude of mind which existed at the moment of the act. Nor was his sincerity a static, finite, quantity to be measured or denied on 25 July 1593. It was a process, consisting also in the determination to live, and reign, and succeed in that way, performing the duty of the King of France for the benefit of the kingdom and his traumatised people. An inescapable clash of duty may pertain to the essence of tragedy. 29

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, i, madame Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, 261. Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 156-8; Greengrass, ‘The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henri IV’, in Cameron, Ed., From Valois to Bourbon, 111. 31 As recently as 2 July 1593, Henry had heard that the pope begged Pisani, underhand, to have patience and not to leave Italy. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 848-52, 2 July 1593, Henry IV to Beauvoir. 30

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But Henry IV of France was too vigorously positive to be a tragic figure; he knew what he had to do, and he knew where to draw the line and risk the consequences.

II: After the Abjuration In so far as the king’s abjuration in July 1593 was inescapable, it must be deemed to have been beneficial – certainly in the longer term. It did much to clarify the issues and, since they did not evaporate, it established their essentially political nature. It also cleared the way for the bloodless recovery of Paris. It is, however, utterly mistaken to regard the king’s conversion as a long-overdue panacea, or to perceive its outcome in terms of living – more or less – happily ever after. Nothing could be further from the truth. The conversion should not, because it was climacteric, be considered out of context. Indeed it came rather close to anti-climax, so tangled were the immediate problems, and so great was the ensuing conflict. Above all, it demonstrated the wisdom of Henry’s persistent effort to obtain, first of all, a ‘firm foundation’. On the positive side, Henry’s conversion ended the threat of the ‘tiers parti’, and enabled moderate catholics to support him. Similarly, it acted as a catalyst in dividing and destroying the moribund League. Henry received the indispensable support of the ‘parlements’. Their relations, however, were soured by his imperative need to raise extraordinary sums of money, which could not be achieved too scrupulously. His conversion enabled Henry to clinch the invaluable support of the grand duke of Tuscany and his allies; the various Italian ambassadors in Rome valiantly upheld his cause, day in day out, for the next two years. On the negative side, conversion did not bring the peace that had always proved impossible without it. On the contrary, it rendered inevitable a major war with Spain, for which Henry was still as ill-equipped as he had been against Parma. With England, his relations became increasingly strained, if not principally on account of religion. Condemned by the legate, Henry was furiously and scurrilously attacked in Paris. His conversion was derided as a ‘stinking farce’; it was blasphemy even to think that the pope might accept the Béarnais – and so forth.32 But Henry III had fared no better. Jean Boucher delivered a series of blistering sermons. He attacked the episcopal absolution and ruthlessly exposed the flaws in the conversion process.33 Once again, regicide reared its hideous head and some of the foul-mouthed ‘curés’ were quick to advocate it. Just a month after Henry’s conversion, a group of them – doubtless amongst others – enlisted Pierre Barrière to emulate the action of Jacques Clément. Barrière was arrested at Melun on 29 August 1593 and confessed to his intended regicide; he died a very nasty death just two days later. Feria and the legate had been awaiting Henry’s death; and they were not alone.34 Even more sinister, Ambroise Mouy reported to Burghley on 4 October 1593 that 32

Roelker, The Paris of Henry of Navarre, 239-42. Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 159-63; Greengrass, ‘The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henri IV’, in Cameron, Ed., From Valois to Bourbon, 117-19. Boucher’s sermons were published in March 1594. After the fall of Paris, however, he fled to the Spanish Netherlands. 34 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 141; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 491. 33


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the emperor was waiting to hear of the king’s assassination – which points to Spanish complicity in a persistent intention. Once the way was clear – which meant once the king was dead – the archduke Ernest would go to the Netherlands, invade France and seize the kingdom. That was Spain’s alternative to the failed election. There were other ways of imposing a Spanish king on France, and there is nothing fantastical about the conception; that was how the Spanish proceeded.35 Catholics who still wished to oppose the king continued to do so. Spain, after all, continued to tyrannise over the Roman court, so the pope would not recognise the king. Thus Henry IV was still to be burdened for some time to come by Mayenne’s inextinguishable ambition and perfidy, even as he became increasingly isolated. The Spanish had little regard for Mayenne, but he might be of some residual use in the defence of Burgundy. Nor could Henry rely on the vital support of the nobles, most of whom preferred their personal advancement.36 Finally, Henry’s conversion rekindled the old sectarian conflict which his accession to the throne had partially assuaged. Following the king’s conversion, a three months’ truce was agreed on 31 July 1593 and published next day. According to Villeroy, if the king had not agreed to a truce, the assembly would not have dispersed without electing a king, presumably because they would need the urgent protection of Spanish forces.37 Henry’s conversion was therefore not enough. In the event, the truce was twice renewed and expired at the end of the year. These last five months of 1593 were, for the king, a time of uncertainty, frustration and delay. The issues immediately facing him were confusingly interdependent. His first, but short-lived hope, was for peace with Mayenne. Alternatively, Papal benediction just might come fairly swiftly. Either event could be expected to entail the other, and to bring the king recognition. Then his new catholic position would be underpinned – ex post facto but maybe just in time – with the necessary ‘firm foundation’ upon which to proceed to a general settlement; and that would, of course, include the outraged huguenots. The mission of Nevers, who was soon to go to Rome, and the peace negotiations in France constantly interacted with, and influenced, each other. During the weeks following his abjuration and the truce, Henry was concerned to publicise his conversion both at home and abroad. In doing this he tried to diminish controversy by saying as little as possible. His circular letter of 25 July 1593, to the ‘parlements’ and various officials, must have been prepared in advance. Henry claimed to have acted in accordance with the promise made upon his accession. Its fulfilment had been constantly deferred by the artifice of his enemies. Considering that he had first 35

Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 413, 23 and 27 September, 4 October 1593 (NS), from Frankfurt, Mouy to Burghley; Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV, 165, recorded seven or eight murder plots against the king between 1593-5. Buisseret, Henri IV, 56, recorded two attempts in 1593, three in 1594, two in 1595, two in 1596 and some nine thereafter. Greengrass, France in the Age of Henri IV, 201-2, noted at least twenty-three assassination plots, besides the one that succeeded, ‘clustered about the times of greatest uncertainty’, 1593-4, 1597-8, 1602, 1604. Astrologers ‘regularly predicted that [Henry] would die a violent death’. For the rest of his life, therefore, Henry’s enemies, who were the Spanish and the catholic extremists, were trying to murder him. 36 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 91-2, 7/17 August 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. 37 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn., Petitot, xliv), 340.

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wanted peace, which Mayenne had never been prepared to make, that assertion was strictly true. Henry called for thanksgiving, and expressed the hope of confounding those who held his promise to have been an abuse.38 To ‘certain protestant gentlemen’ Henry sent a categorical reassurance that his abjuration was personal; they had nothing to fear. He had been convinced, he assured them, that salvation was possible within the Catholic Church, and he hoped thereby to end rebellion. He appealed to them to believe what he said, and that he intended no change in the edicts. That there would be no changes was not, however, what the huguenots wanted to hear. They became increasingly importunate in their demands for a new and comprehensive religious dispensation.39 Henry also wrote to the Leaguer cities inviting them to submit without fear of retribution. He could understand and excuse those who had refused to recognise him for reasons of religion; but now those reasons existed no longer. This offer was typical of Henry’s generosity of spirit, without which the pacification of France would have been even more difficult and protracted.40 The most important notifications were, of course, to the grand duke – a principal ‘furtherer’ of his conversion, as Henry said, and to the pope himself. Similarly, Henry wrote to Pisani on 8 August 1593, before sending his servant Brochard de la Clielle to Rome. Henry expressed his hopes that the truce would soon be converted to peace, and that the attitude in Rome would now have changed. The inference was that he was waiting to see if he could strengthen his position by achieving peace in France before sending Nevers to Rome. Henry wanted Pisani to accompany or to follow Nevers, and to remain in Rome as the resident ambassador. In other words, Henry sought to restore diplomatic relations with the Holy See.41 He wanted Nevers to meet and confer with his servants currently in Italy – Pisani, cardinal Gondi, de Retz, and Maisse – to consider together how he should proceed. The mission of La Clielle was intended to prepare the pope for the ceremonial embassy of Nevers, which was certain to provoke opposition. But the embassy was delayed, pending further peace negotiations and, probably, Henry’s coronation which was then scheduled for mid-September. It was therefore necessary for the king to utter, and to express his intended submission without further delay. Time had already been afforded, once again, for Mayenne’s envoys to reach Rome first, and to create trouble for those sent by the king. La Clielle went ahead to visit Florence on his way to Rome, bearing letters from the king, Nevers and the royalist clergy. La Clielle’s instructions, dated 18 August 1593, related primarily to his visit to Florence where the grand duke’s advice was to be 38

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 822-3, 25 July 1593, circular letter on the king’s abjuration. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 823-4, 25 July 1593, Henry IV to certain protestant gentlemen. 40 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iii, 825-6, 25 July 1593, Henry IV to the League cities; CSPVen., 15921603, p. 118, 10 January 1594, Mocenigo observed to the doge and senate that Henry’s clemency did much to win him support. 41 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 506-11 [August 1593], instructions for Pisani, to be conveyed by Nevers; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 15-17, [8 August] 1593, Henry IV to Pisani; also in Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 30-2. Pisani, knowing the situation in Rome, was determined not to go there. He therefore organised a ‘misunderstanding’ and failed to meet Nevers. Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 342, 11 November 1593, Pisani to Nevers. 39


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sought and followed.42 La Clielle was to inform the grand duke – as he well knew – that Henry had proceeded with his conversion despite having drawn a blank in Rome. Here Henry sounded less sanguine than elsewhere, referring to the degree of opposition to be expected from his enemies. If his conversion failed to bring the desired benefits, that meant war. La Clielle was therefore to solicit the promised 200,000 écus [which had been requested for the reduction of Paris] and for the payment of Swiss troops opposing Savoy.43 Some two weeks after the departure of La Clielle, Henry wrote an unusually revealing letter to cardinal Gondi, who was still in Italy. In this letter Henry expressed, in effect, what he hoped Nevers would achieve in Rome. Henry explicitly referred to the hope he still placed in the ‘intimations’ from Rome, upon which he had founded his Gallican conversion. He had, he said, been given to believe that the pope would be well disposed to support him, once his conversion was accomplished; now he had done precisely what had been required of him. There could be no further [religious] pretext for bearing arms against him, or for opposing him on grounds of Papal authority. Henry clearly expected that the exclusion of Gondi and Pisani from Rome would now be rescinded; and they were both instructed to go to Rome either together with, or soon after, Nevers.44 In these circumstances, known only to a few, Henry necessarily had to exhibit confidence in his episcopal absolution and its acceptability in Rome. It transpired, however, that by acting as if he were already back within the Church, he was taking too much for granted. On the other hand, there was absolutely nothing else that he could have done. Henry anticipated opposition; indeed, he expected his enemies to seek by intimidation what they could not win by argument. But he still believed the pope, if assisted, to be favourably inclined towards him. Through Nevers, Henry intended to offer the pope a means of escape from the Spanish tyranny, not knowing that Clement was too utterly pusillanimous to take any sort of risk. Henry was therefore unprepared for the hostile, legalistic, and prolonged objections sustained against him by Clement himself. Clement’s incapacity to formulate and pursue a positive policy eventually aroused contempt in Rome, even among those who were fully aware of his genuine difficulties. This negativity also dissipated wavering loyalty and rendered the cardinals more susceptible to corruption.45

III: The Instructions for the King’s Envoys Nevers was originally to have gone to Rome after the king’s ‘sacring’, as Edmondes said. The coronation had been going to take place at Chartres, on 15 September 1593; but it was probably deferred when Nevers’ instructions were prepared at the end of August. 42

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 12-13, 9 August 1593, Henry IV to the grand duke of Tuscany. La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 303-4, 8 August 1593, royalist prelates to the pope, signed by twenty-one of them, 305-8, no date, instructions for La Clielle. He is said to have departed on 18 August 1593 and to have arrived in Rome on 11 September. La Brière, La Conversion de Henri IV, 40. 44 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 25-6, [?31] August 1593, Henry IV to Gondi. 45 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 177-8, 17 December 1593, Delbene to the grand duke of Tuscany. 43

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Henry later explained to Pisani that with reason on his side, and his belief in the pope’s sincerity, he was hopeful of a successful outcome. Thus it was as a particular sign of respect for the pope that he had refrained from taking communion; for that reason he had postponed his coronation. In other words, Henry IV hoped both to flatter the pope and to combine his coronation with the celebration of his absolution.46 His authority would then have been unassailable. Since Nevers was not required to ask the pope for anything, Henry evidently expected to receive a blanket approval of his conversion and sufficient absolution, following an appropriate act of submission. Nevers was to perform that solemn act, hence his impressive suite.47 After his benediction, Henry looked forward to Papal co-operation in pacifying France – an objective with which Clement VIII was not yet much concerned. He was still thinking in terms of the election of another, catholic, king. The instructions for Nevers, dated 31 August 1593, are highly informative.48 They credit Clement VIII with vastly greater qualities of goodwill, rectitude and vision than he actually possessed. The instructions, which fall into four parts, indicate Henry’s hopes for order and peace in the near future. They began with a brief statement of the king’s position in respect of his abjuration which, purely factually, placed the pope clearly in the wrong. Henry stated that he had intended to abjure for a long time. But he could not do so while faced with enemy forces as it would have been said that he was moved by fear. He had made these assertions before, and there is no reason to disbelieve them. But, the instructions continued, the enemy armies were not the only problem. Because Henry had wished to abjure under Papal auspices, he sent Pisani to Rome in 1592. He went upon the king’s command, albeit in the name of the royalist catholics, to request a legate to supervise his conversion. To Henry’s great regret, this felicity had been denied him. His enemies had traversed his intentions with every possible obstruction. They employed the interval – while awaiting a reply – to promote the usurpation of the crown, and they alleged that the king had no wish to convert. Consequently Henry had been unable to wait any longer for the desired intervention of the pope.49 Instead, he followed the advice – namely the ‘intimations’ from Rome – that it could not but be agreeable to the pope as just and legitimate that the prelates had received him; they did so with the accustomed and requisite forms and ceremonies. That this was all subject to the reservation of submission to the pope, would be explained by the bishop of Mans. Once the reconciliation was established, Henry hoped the pope would exert his unique authority and influence in constructive ways. The second part of the instruction 46 Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 458; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 90-1, 22 July/1 August 1593, Edmondes to Burghley, 91-2, 7/17 August 1593 Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes says, wrongly, that Nevers and others had already gone to Rome. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 71-3, 22 December 1593, Henry IV to Pisani; also in Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 45-7; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 303 n.1. 47 Luxembourg is said to have been vexed at the choice of Nevers, which suggests that he anticipated success. De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 314. 48 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 492-503, 31 August 1593, instructions for Nevers. 49 Henry had originally intended to wait for two more months. Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 363.


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provided guidance for Nevers in this sphere. Henry was anxious that the pope should believe his good intentions and be made to understand the evils inherent in the civil war. The people, who longed for peace, were controlled by leaders who spoke of religion but pursued their own advancement. Only the pope could help, by requiring those leaders to submit, and by condemning their use of arms. Similarly, Henry wished the pope to end the Spanish exploitation of religion as a means of opposing the king. If Spain still persisted in making war, then everyone would understand why. Clement could proclaim his will by controlling the preachers in Paris; paid by warmongers, they fomented evil. He could also recall Sega, his unacceptable cardinal legate, a servant of Spain. These were simple things, easily performed – except that Henry was calling upon the dithering pontiff to behave like a world leader. Clement failed to perceive how much this could enhance his own reputation. Thirdly, the instruction for Nevers pre-empted the possibility that Clement might try to make general peace a stipulation. Much as he wanted peace, Spanish preparations for war were such that Henry could not consider it. If, however, the pope exhibited fear of Spain, Nevers might adumbrate the formation of a League with France and the Italian states – presumably what the grand duke desired. In effect, therefore, Henry offered the timorous pope the possibility of escape from Spain into a French-led alliance. Doubtless such an alliance would, initially, have been secret, to avoid provoking an attack upon the Papal States. Finally, Nevers must make the pope understand the complexities inherent in the king’s unique case. Peace in France could not be achieved without flexibility and some willingness to temporise. These observations were prompted by the obstructive attitude of Mayenne to the peace talks – to be discussed. His tactics were to demand the fulfilment of unacceptable conditions before he would advise the pope to recognise the conversion and favour peace. In the same way, Mayenne also justified continuing the rebellion. Ostensibly these conditions, such as war on heretics, affected the security of religion. Henry rightly foresaw that the same conditions would be advanced by his adversaries in Rome. He did not, however, authorise Nevers to bargain. Henry had expressed his optimism, and the hope he derived from the ‘intimations’ from Rome. He acted in such a way as to enable the pope to fulfil his role in that scenario. But the instructions for Nevers reveal that Henry did also fear the worst. In the first place, there would be efforts to exclude Nevers from Rome. He must do everything conceivable to circumvent that difficulty and to proclaim the dangers of the consequences. Finally, the instruction contained a warning: there was now a limit to what the king’s honour could stand. With or without the pope, Nevers should work for an Italian league. The grand duke was to be reminded that Henry had fulfilled all the conditions upon which his support depended. Nevers’ task was one aspect of the mission to Rome. With him went Claude d’Angennes, bishop of Mans, who assisted at Henry’s conversion, Louis Séguier of SaintDenis, and Jean Gobelin. Their function was to represent the royalist clergy and to report on what – in the absence of Papal help such as Pisani had been sent to request – the king had been obliged to do. It is apparent that Henry intended to capitalise on that point of Papal negligence. He also wished the pope to understand the special circumstances of his

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rank and calling, and the danger of any further delay in confirming his absolution. The legate was hostile, and he himself could not send a third ambassador to Rome. The instruction explains in some detail how the Spanish frustrated proposals at Suresnes for a combined catholic approach to the pope, pressing instead for the election of a king. The swift action of the prelates, in the face of great danger, was in no way a defiance of Rome. Consequently these prelates were to implore the pope to sanction what had been done, and to silence the king’s detractors. The envoys were required to visit and inform the cardinals.50

IV: Nevers and the Reaction in Rome Certain reports of Henry’s conversion in France reached Rome on 15, 16 and 17 August 1593.51 Initially, this news was greeted with rejoicing. The pope’s attitude was, not surprisingly, ambivalent. One precious sliver of evidence indicates, from the Roman end, the veracity of the king’s ‘intimations’ from Rome. To ‘an old cardinal’ – unnamed – Clement is reliably reported to have expressed his satisfaction at the manner of the king’s conversion, without his intervention. The old cardinal advised the pope that he must not miss this opportunity to recognise the conversion, even if [the French] had gone rather too far in the procedure. It appears, from a comment to Paruta, that Clement had not expected the French prelates to absolve the king – as if anything else would have been of the smallest use. Toledo was also glad. He had long considered that only Navarre could be the King of France – a position far in advance of the pope’s.52 The opinion did exist that Henry’s reception was now both possible and necessary. Thus it was not regarded as inevitable that Clement’s known fear of Spain must preclude independent Papal action. Indeed, it was thought that if the pope now clung to his former resolution never to accept Navarre, he would ruin the Church and bring confusion to Christendom. He would also forfeit considerable French revenues which might otherwise be recovered.53 Henry, who had desired to convert only upon a firm foundation, had finally done so from sheer necessity, and with no foundation at all. But the pope, who had encouraged him to act in this way, would now default because the circumstances did not suit him. Clement VIII was not confident of being publicly justified in receiving Henry IV and restoring peace to France. If Clement was partly pleased to hear of the conversion, as some observed, it was because Henry might yet prevail in France, despite the odds stacked against him. Henry of Navarre as a catholic would then be preferable to Henry of Navarre as a Calvinist; his conversion would become subtly less inadequate after all. For the moment, however, the 50

Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 33-42, 9 September 1593, instructions for the bishop of Mans and others. The word ‘absolution’ is occasionally employed in these documents but only as a synonym for benediction. 51 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 303-10, 21 August 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate, 315-18, 21 August 1593 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 52 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 159-62, 20 August 1593, anon. to Vinta [in Florence]; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 303-10, 21 August 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. 53 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 303-10, 21 August 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate.


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situation in France was as unclear and as unpredictable as it could well be. Furthermore, the League and the Spanish had by no means abandoned their project to elect another king. The further pursuit of this fantasy was intended to influence the pope in their favour, and against receiving the king. So they would seek to destroy his case in Rome and to sustain the strife in France.54 The news of Henry’s conversion and the proposition that he might receive Papal benediction was the greatest issue to have convulsed Rome for a long time. Nearly a month elapsed between the news of the conversion and certain knowledge of Nevers’ embassy. While there were good reasons for the delay, it afforded Henry’s enemies ample time in which to damage him.55 Their first objective was the exclusion of Nevers from Rome, like Luxembourg, Gondi and Pisani before him. Upon this issue there arose a prolonged and unedifying conflict, at the centre of which cowered the trembling and irresolute pope. His elusive conduct invited the importunity of all parties. The storm of controversy in Rome preceding the arrival of Nevers was a very serious matter. The issues at stake were held to be of vital concern to all Christendom. If that was hyperbolical, they were certainly of the greatest importance to all western Europe. They related, fundamentally, to the power and aspirations of Spain, currently focused on France, and to the corresponding fear of her domination; in other words, the balance of power. This fear of Spain was acutely experienced by the smaller states of Italy, trying to defend a fragile independence. The specific issue raised by Henry’s ‘great matter’ was the continuation of the war or the restoration of peace in France. The war was essential to the interests of Spain, and peace commensurately vital to her enemies. Peace in France would gradually redress the balance of power – which had long been tilted in favour of Spain – and discourage the advance of the Turks in Europe. Clement feared that to receive the king’s ambassador, coming to offer his master’s obedience, would be seen as tantamount to acknowledging the king himself. In either case, he was afraid of incurring blame, condemnation, and even penalties. That is how much he cared about peace in France. If peace were achieved in spite of him, he might accept what he could not change; that would be no fault of his. This cringing attitude placed the pope in the illogical position of desiring the same thing as Spain and his adversary, Sessa – an absurdity that did not pass unnoticed in Papal circles.56 But, so long as the war in France continued, Clement VIII would do nothing; he need neither accept, nor too specifically reject, the king’s conversion. Thus the length of the truce in France was a matter of acute concern in Rome. How, in the meanwhile, to deal with Henry’s ambassador, presented other difficulties. After receiving the news of Navarre’s conversion, the pope held a consistory. While the Spanish actually denied the report, some cardinals defended the royalist prelates on account of the king’s peril.57 At the same time, the Spanish called for censures against them, and loudly proclaimed that on no account should Navarre be received. Soon 54

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 304 n., 13 August 1593, resolution of the doge and senate. Paruta had heard from Venice, by 21 August 1593, that Henry was sending an ambassador. His first mention of the duc de Nevers was on 4 September 1593 (2). Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 331-2. 56 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 177-8, 17 December 1593, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. 57 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 159-62, 20 August 1593, anon. to Vinta. 55

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they were supported by the arrival of an envoy from Mayenne, some two weeks before La Clielle. Sega, who was still in Paris, strongly supported the Spanish opposition in Rome. Writing to the former nuncio, Caetani, on 3 August 1593, he said that with Navarre at the gates of Paris, the truce had been necessary. Furthermore, peace might follow while he sought his absolution in Rome. They could be sure that once he was thus fully catholic, he would be generally acclaimed. This development must therefore be frustrated, and the war in France must continue. Sega made no attempt to conceal the political nature of further war.58 This report will have strongly influenced the pope to resist any pressure to act. In these circumstances Paruta received information from Venice, and instructions to discover what the pope had in mind. His audience, on 20 August 1593, exemplified the essence of Henry’s matter. To Paruta, Clement displayed not gladness, but irritation. He condemned the royalist bishops as schismatics for absolving the king (despite their deference) and admitting him to mass. Nevertheless, Paruta strongly urged that the impediment to Henry’s succession had been removed, and the pope could not delay his acceptance. To persist in seeking to elect another king would indeed provoke schism. Clement, however, saw only difficulties. He alleged canonical objections to avoid absolving Navarre; that would be to declare him king. Rome was awash with legalistic obstacles, yet their employment now would certainly complicate any future change of mind. Paruta constantly stressed that the pope could operate on a higher level. Henry’s case was exceptional; great princes were above the law, which never covered all cases. Clement’s third line of argument was that Henry could not be trusted. He was a heretic born [untrue]; he would relapse and harm the Church. Considering all that Henry had recently endured, Paruta thought that most unlikely. He knew that, behind all the pretexts, Clement was simply afraid of Spain; so he still wished to wait, to see what happened in France and whether peace would be made. Armed with information from Venice, Paruta ventured to say that when the king sent an envoy, Clement would be obliged to make a decision. Clement then let slip that he did not, on any account, wish to incur the blame for having made Navarre the King of France. To this Paruta boldly retorted that it was impossible to exclude him. Any efforts to do so would fail; Clement was heading for the complete loss of France.59 Paruta did not yet believe that the pope was terminally closed to persuasion. Initially, many of the cardinals and other clergy would have supported the reception of Navarre; that was the only way to end the civil wars in France. Paruta ensured that the pope was apprised of these opinions, from which he was otherwise isolated. The Spanish, however, continually railed against Navarre. They informed the pope of the new Leaguer oath [of 23 July] never to admit Navarre, and promised that Spain would send another army to France to pursue the deferred election of a king. Paruta observed that Mayenne’s envoy rendered the pope markedly less inclined to receive 58 Desjardins. Négs., Tosc., v, 162-3, 3-12 August 1593, Sega to Caetani. Not all Sega’s letters got through to Rome. However, Paruta referred to the contents of this one on 11 September 1593. 59 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 303-10, 21 August 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate.


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anyone sent by the king or the bishops. This pressure on the pope was sustained by the arrival of another envoy from Mayenne. He warned that without speedy help, Mayenne would have to make peace. At the same time – by 11 September 1593 – the news of Nevers’ embassy was confirmed. Now the burning issue was whether or not he would be received. A current Spanish ploy was to press the pope to confirm the legate’s condemnation of the conversion, and of the royalist prelates before anyone had sought his approval. That, however, was a shade too crude. No one had previously seen the pope in such a state about anything. Furthermore, he was simultaneously ‘crucified’ by anxiety over a new Turkish threat, which would require co-operation with Spain. In October 1593 Clement VIII sent Camillo Borghese to seek Spanish help against the Turks, at the same time as sending a legate to the emperor. To the pope, it was more important to oppose the Turks than for Spain to sustain the war in France. Therefore, if necessary, the French war should be suspended by a long truce.60 Rome was therefore in a state of some turmoil when La Clielle arrived on 11 September 1593, secretly and incognito. Probably the grand duke had prepared his way by notifying the Florentine agent, Olivier Séraphin (auditor of the rota) who had already been involved in Henry’s affairs. Séraphin and Arnaud d’Ossat contrived a secret, nocturnal audience for La Clielle on 13 September, but they were warned that his reception would be harsh (‘assez dur’), to avoid alarming Spain and the League.61 La Clielle informed the pope of the king’s conversion, delivered his letters, and announced the embassy of Nevers to offer obedience. To the pope, Henry wrote that he had freely submitted to such forms and ceremonies as the prelates considered appropriate. He meant to remain catholic for evermore, and would offer his submission. Consequently he was sending a solemn embassy – he said in a few days’ time. This declaration was taken to indicate an ‘ambassade d’obédience’ such as was customary from all catholic princes. In other words, Henry now appeared to place himself back within the pale, and that proved to be a bad mistake.62 Clement read the letters and declared that he had supposed La Clielle to be an envoy of Montmorency. Such nonsense suggests that the letters displeased him, and he referred La Clielle to cardinal Toledo.63 Next day, Clement called the French congregation to consider what to do about Nevers, how to answer Mayenne, 60 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, i, 318-22, 28 August 1593, 325-8, 28 August 1593 (2), 329-30, 4 September 1593, 331-2, 4 September 1593 (2), 332-4, 4 September 1593 (3); ibid., ii, 1-5, 11 September 1593, 7-11, 11 September 1593 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. Borghese did not arrive in Madrid until 17 January 1594. This matter was therefore pending throughout the period that Nevers was to be in Rome, 21 November 1593 to 14 January 1594. Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Ponteficia en España, 360-3. 61 Degert, Le Cardinal d’Ossat, 80. D’Ossat had a link with the pope through one Sannèze, a servant of the Aldobrandini. Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 339-40, says that La Clielle remained in hiding for two days while his secret audience was contrived. 62 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 10-11, 9 August 1593, Henry IV to the pope. La Clielle also bore a letter from Nevers to the pope, asking to be received, and a letter of credence to be presented together with Arnaud d’Ossat. Ibid., 11-12, 9 August 1593, Henry IV to the pope; Brémond d’Ars, Jean de Vivonne, 33940. 63 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 20-3, 18 September 1593 (4), Paruta to the doge and senate; La Brière, La Conversion de Henri IV, 40-1; Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 79-83; Féret, Henri IV et l’église, 1206; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 494.

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and how to instruct Sega. Gondi, furthermore, had renewed his demands for admission to Rome. Clement opposed the admission of Nevers. Those in his favour therefore tried to avert any decision, while some ‘persons of authority’ surreptitiously sent to advise Nevers to hasten straight to Rome. Accordingly, no decision was made. The French congregation then conferred with the inquisition, which was a sinister development.64 While La Clielle waited, Mayenne’s third envoy arrived. He brought the same message, namely that his need would force Mayenne to make peace. There was no shortage of voices to persuade the pope that Henry’s conversion was feigned and unreliable. An unseemly tussle ensued – with journeys, messages and advice to Nevers – as to whether he should or would come to Rome. Venice, in particular, was acutely concerned about Clement’s perceived change of attitude to the embassy, and sent Paruta urgent instructions. The doge and senate were adamant that Clement must now receive Nevers and procure peace and unity in France.65 Paruta, who was unaware of the presence in Rome of La Clielle, hastened to comply with his instructions. In an audience on 17 September 1593, he chose to stress points which indicated Henry’s good will and good faith. Clement, he said, should not now dwell on what might be desirable but, accepting the arguments of necessity, grasp what was possible. Clement’s reply was different from usual. He declared that he could not admit Nevers to Rome because he had written to say that he came to perform the office of obedience. That, apparently, was what he had objected to in the letters delivered by La Clielle. This office, he told Paruta, was premature; many things were necessary before he could accept such an act. He must consider the terms for receiving and blessing Navarre. Clement was saying, in effect, that the French had presumed too far, and supposed that the king would get off too lightly. As it transpired, this was the key to Clement’s otherwise baffling conduct in respect of Nevers. Thenceforth, it appears, he intended to drive a really hard bargain. That, in any case, was a certain way of consuming time and concluding nothing. Clement, secondly, was concerned that the League was manoeuvring to hide behind him and his authority in case of peace in France. He declared to Paruta that when Navarre had been made king in France – whatever that implied – and he himself was secure from blame, he would incline to the necessity. This was his bottom line. It had not yet occurred to Clement that the boot might then be on the other foot.66 By further instructions, of 16 September 1593, Paruta learnt of the mission of La Clielle and that Nevers had orders to go straight to Rome. Paruta was required to express the Republic’s approval of the conduct of Henry IV – a bold assignment – and to uphold La Clielle in every way. It was believed in Venice that Nevers, like Gondi and Pisani, was going to be excluded from Rome. Consequently, on 24 September 1593, Paruta told the 64

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 20-3, 18 September 1593 (4), Paruta to the doge and senate. Paruta received instructions, dated 11 September 1593, and a copy of a declaration of 9 September 1593 made by Maisse to the senate. This related to the king’s conversion, the truce in France, and the embassy of Nevers. On 18 September 1593, Paruta received a further statement by Maisse who, on 16 September, conveyed to the senate Henry’s letter of 29 August 1593. This letter requested Venetian support for La Clielle. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 11-13, 18 September 1593, 13-17, 18 September 1593 (2), 20-3, 18 September 1593 (3), 23-8, 25 September 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. 66 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 13-17, 18 September 1593 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 65


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pope that the rejection of Nevers would be the first step towards a great precipice and the ruination of Christendom; it would destroy the possibility of agreement between Navarre and the Church, together with any hope of peace in France. That was, indeed, a very terrible prospect for the states of Italy. The pope himself would be engulfed in further war, while the Turks would be greatly encouraged to attack Italy. This was intended to shake the pope, but he made only his usual answers. He did not wish to be blamed, and Navarre could not be trusted.67 That same day, Toledo summoned La Clielle. He was informed that the pope would not receive Nevers until Henry displayed signs of penitence and obtained absolution. Horrified, La Clielle protested that the absolution was precisely the purpose of Nevers’ embassy. To the pope, however, it was the wrong kind of embassy, and La Clielle received no other recorded answer. He left Rome on 26 September to find and to warn Nevers.68 No doubt La Clielle made it known among the friendly courts in Italy that Nevers was not to be received, news which evidently provoked an outcry. Clement was awaiting the expiry of the truce in France at the end of October 1593, and was determined to dally and delay. He had already dispatched a Jesuit monk, Antonio Possevino, to find Nevers and, ostensibly, to induce him to desist from his journey to Rome and return to France. But Paruta knew that someone else had also been sent to intercept Nevers – but by whom? It was evidently hoped that, by changing his route, he might reach Rome unmolested.69 Presumably, therefore, Nevers received conflicting communications. Knowledge of what happened between 19 September 1593 and his arrival in Rome on 21 November 1593 is sketchy. The first message that Nevers is known to have received – probably from Venice – was, precisely, that he might not enter Rome.70 But it would be instructive to know more about the shadowy role of Possevino. He was a Mantuan like Nevers, an uncle of the reigning duke. This might be significant, since Possevino was not hostile either to Nevers or to Henry IV. According to Nevers’ own account, Possevino met him in the Grisons on 14 October 1593, bearing only a simple letter of credence. Possevino was sent to intercept Nevers, at the earliest possible stage, even if that meant entering France. His formal instructions, dated 19 September 1593, provide a clear statement of Clement’s official policy in respect of Henry IV and his ambassador. The purpose of Possevino’s mission was to induce Nevers and his company to turn back. This was because, things in France being as they were at that time, the pope could not receive Nevers as the ambassador of the King of France. He came to offer obedience on behalf of the king and to treat of other matters (‘... per prestare l’obedienza e trattare altre cose seco’). This, the pope had learnt from Henry’s letters delivered by La Clielle. But, as Clement did not recognise the king, such a mission was inopportune and premature. Clement argued that Henry had been 67

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 31-4, 25 September 1593 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. Féret, Henri IV et l’église, 125; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 494. 69 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 31-4, 25 September 1593 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 70 Letters from Nevers to this effect were received in France by 19 October 1593. Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 462. What La Clielle did is obscure; he might have gone to Tuscany where he had served before. He did not return to France until 7 December 1593. 68

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excommunicated by Sixtus V, and had not been absolved. This is the first that we hear of his rejection of the episcopal absolution. The [French] bishops, Clement said, had no jurisdiction in the matter which was reserved to the pope. He had not, of course, yet heard their explanations and canonical arguments, but he went on to make a point which appears nowhere else. These prelates were themselves both excommunicated and suspended from office by the terms of the monitoria of Gregory XIV [taken to France by Landriano in May 1591]. Therefore they should not have acted as they did. They had again incurred the penalties of a major excommunication, so their absolution of Navarre was in no sense legitimate or canonical. The so-called king had not requested any dispensation, rehabilitation or restitution by which he might be relieved of his sentence and succeed to the throne. Therefore the pope could not, without great scandal, receive his ambassador. That was, of course, simply to revolve within a vicious circle, since he rejected each successive envoy. But the trouble was that Nevers’ mission had been unwisely, or incorrectly, categorised. The pope went on to object that Henry was not generally recognised in France, neither had he been crowned, but catholic leaders had called an estates-general to elect a catholic king; Navarre was therefore not the legitimate king. As for his spiritual well-being, Clement rejoiced at his conversion, provided it was genuine. [Sega assured him that it was not]. Clement would be even better pleased if Navarre were to restore catholicism in places obedient to him, and to prohibit Calvinist practices. The rest of the instruction is rather strange. If Nevers refused to turn back forthwith, Possevino should say that the pope would not receive him as ambassador, alone or accompanied. Furthermore, Nevers was to be reminded that, as the servants of a heretic, he and his suite were excommunicated. Finally, Possevino might say that the pope revered Nevers personally, and would have been glad to see him in any other cause or at any other time.71 Did these formal instructions, which Nevers was not to see, tell the whole story? They did not, as some accounts allege, forbid Nevers to enter either Rome or the Papal States. Did the pope really mean Nevers to turn back, or was he merely temporising, waiting as usual for news from France? He emphatically did not mean to accept from Nevers the king’s obedience; but to reject out of hand a ceremonial embassy, would surely be a startling outrage, almost a causus belli. According to Pastor, Nevers then asked Possevino if he could be received in a personal capacity. About this there was nothing in his instructions – only a few words of vague civility – and probably not in his verbal instructions either; by the end of the month the matter was duly under consideration. Nevers later recorded that he sent Possevino back to insist upon the importance of his mission. Meanwhile he continued his journey, in accordance with his instructions.72 During this time, Rome was kept in the dark, and so are we. What did Possevino say about Nevers in Rome? His mission had been secret; no decision concerning Nevers was announced, and there was no news of him. Clement appeared to 71

Jaitner, Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens’ VIII, 150-5, 19 September 1593, instructions for Antonio Possevino. 72 Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 85; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 405-15, Nevers’ ‘discours’, – 1593; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 75-81, 30 October 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate.


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be strongly inclined to exclude him, but without quite precisely saying so. The likelihood is that this information came from Venice, since Maisse made such a statement to the senate on 2 October 1593.73 Shortly before Possevino could have returned to Rome, the pope heard from Sega that the League was obstructing peace in France by deliberately making unacceptable demands. Sega believed that the peace would fail, but that the truce would be prolonged – which was true. This meant that Clement would have to sustain his prevarication – and he could not tell for how long.74 It was probably also about this time, certainly before the arrival of Nevers, that Sessa presented the pope with a threatening paper, reminiscent of the conduct of his predecessor, Olivares. If Nevers was gratified in Rome, Spain would starve the city by blocking food supplies from the kingdom of Naples. Philip II would create a schism in Spain and elsewhere, and sow division among the cardinals. He would induce the emperor to call a general council, and to demand the return [to the Empire] of Rome and other cities. The Spanish would be the eternal enemy of anyone who favoured French [the king’s] affairs. France should remain divided; her institutions would then lack authority and she would be less nuisance. Apart from the matter of food supplies, this was, of course, theatrical nonsense; but it was the sort of intimidation that Clement had greatly feared.75 It is not clear how many journeys were made by Possevino between Rome and the duc de Nevers as he travelled across Italy. A report from Venice indicated that Nevers threatened to return to France – which is what the pope had ostensibly commanded. Possevino, however, dissuaded him, at least until he had had time to report again to Rome.76 Something, therefore, must have changed, which may have been on account of Italian pressures. A decision could not be delayed much longer. A courier from Mantua arrived in Rome on 22 October with letters from the duke, from Nevers, and from Possevino. Next day, a secretary, Cipriano Saracinelli, arrived from the grand duke to press for the admission of Nevers. He received a negative reply. When Paruta added the voice of Venice, Clement said that he neither wished to absolve the king nor to receive an envoy until peace had been made in France and Henry ‘declared’ king; or else until some other ‘great accident’ forced him to change his mind.77 Under conflicting pressures from Spain and the Italian states, Clement called the French congregation and the inquisition on 24 October 1593 and sheltered behind them. All thirteen cardinals agreed that Nevers could not be admitted as Henry’s ambassador. Three opposed admitting him at all, while seven advised admitting him as an Italian prince. The remainder proposed first finding out more about Nevers’ negotiation. It looks as if Clement hesitated, evidently fearing that the mere news of Nevers’ admission to

73

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 41 n.1, 2 October 1593, statement by Maisse to the senate. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 41-7, 9 October 1593, 49-51, 9 October 1593 (3), 51-3, 9 October 1593 (4), Paruta to the doge and senate. 75 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 716-17 [October 1593], ‘les intimidations de Sessa’. 76 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 75-81, 30 October 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. 77 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 64-71, 23 October 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. 74

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Rome might prompt support for Navarre in France.78 Next day, however, the cardinal nephew, San Giorgio, evidently wrote to inform Nevers that the pope would not receive him as ambassador. But he would receive him, formally, as the duc de Nevers, sent to treat of the absolution or conversion of Navarre (‘mandato per trattare dell’assoluzione o conversione del Navarra’), or any other matter – which sounds pretty much like a semantic quibble. This letter, which is hard to explain, was shown to the duke of Mantua, and also came to the notice of the Tuscan Delbene. He reported to the Tuscan secretary, Vinta, that Possevino was ordered to treat Nevers agreeably, and explain the reasons for these conditions. Possevino begged Nevers to proceed, promising that he would be well received and able to treat confidentially of anything pertaining to the kingdom or religion. He evidently overcame the stiff resistance on the part of Nevers. He demanded official letters requesting him to accept the proposed arrangements, for the good of the negotiation and the satisfaction of the pope, who desired him to conduct his business in that manner. It is not clear why the letter of 25 October did not suffice in this respect. There appears, at this stage, to be some missing link, since the letter of 25 October evidently did not mean what it said; perhaps it was intended to quieten the Italian princes. Possevino undertook to obtain the clarification that Nevers required, and to bring it to Loretto, near Rome. He also promised to provide an escort and to promote the negotiation. Delbene, who reported all this, had his reservations, especially about the pope’s good will towards the clergy who accompanied Nevers – and he was right.79 Possevino left Mantua for Rome on 4 November 1593 and Nevers left for Bologna next day.80 From Bologna, Nevers went to Rimini, whence we learn a little more of what was happening. The pope, he is reported to have written from Rimini, had sent for him and resolved to use the king with favour; the Church did not exclude supplicants. But, at the solicitation of the Spanish, it had been resolved to impose penances on the king. These were to be war on the huguenots, one religion only, and the retention by the League for four years of the towns held by them.81 These items, which originated in France, were intentionally unacceptable. This report from Nevers hardly corresponds to the ostensible assurances made by the cardinal nephew in his letter of 25 October; some difficulty remains in this respect. Awaiting the return to Rome of Possevino, Paruta delivered another impassioned plea in favour of Navarre. Clement’s reply – which reveals that his attitude to the negotiation had hardened, at least by 30 October – was that he had referred the case to theologians. They declared that he could not receive Navarre or admit him to any dignities. It was not sufficient, Clement now declared, for Henry to make the sign of the cross (‘farsi la croce’).82 One can only suppose that, faced with intense Spanish opposition, Clement had decided to demand conditions the French could not

78

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 81-5, 30 October 1593 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 173-6, 4 November 1593, Delbene to Vinta. 80 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 173-6, 4 November 1593, Delbene to Vinta, Mantua. 81 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 123-6, 6/16 December 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes reported on the receipt in France of Nevers’ letter from Rimini. 82 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 75-81, 30 October 1593 (1), Paruta to the doge and senate. 79


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possibly accept. This would take time during which nothing need be concluded. Nevers, in any case, had no commission to bargain. Possevino, who was harassed by the Spanish, returned to Rome late on 5 November 1593. The French congregation and the Inquisition were hastily summoned and sat far into the night. Their deliberations were influenced by news from Paris of the prolongation of the truce [on 13 October]. Either the king was too weak to fight, or else there was some chance of an accord. It was concluded that Nevers should be admitted in a private capacity, with a small [personal] suite, and for ten days only. He was neither to visit nor to receive visits from the cardinals, to speak of Navarre or to treat of French affairs. Presumably they supposed that he would not come. That, however, was probably not what the pope really wanted, in view of pressure from the Italian states.83 Possevino was sent to convey the decision to Nevers. We do not know what he said but, clearly, Nevers did not receive the letter of guarantee he had demanded; he was not, however, deterred from going to Rome.84 It appears from the later evidence of Nevers’ own ‘discours’, that Possevino had attenuated the message. He mentioned the time limit and the exclusion from the cardinals, but he did not tell Nevers that he was forbidden to speak of Navarre or to treat of French affairs. That enabled the pope to suffer Nevers to speak, in so far as it suited him to hear what he had to say, and to silence him when it did not. Shortly before Nevers arrived, there was news from Lyon that cardinal Joyeuse and Jeannin [actually Joyeuse and Senecy] were on their way to Rome, in the name of Mayenne and the estates-general. Mayenne, playing his usual game, had undertaken to promote the king’s absolution in Rome; but that was, of course the last thing he meant to do. Clement would certainly do nothing definitive before he knew what Mayenne’s envoys would say. Thus, Paruta observed, the negotiation was likely to be very confused.85

V: The Embassy of Nevers Nevers arrived in Rome late on 21 November 1593. He went straight to the pope, presumably in high dudgeon. He immediately asked for the two restrictions on his visit to be lifted – the ten day limit, and exclusion from the cardinals. He sent the Mantuan ambassador, Giulio Caretta, to Paruta who briefed Nevers upon the attitude and reasoning of the pope.86 On 23 November, Nevers registered his point by waiting upon the pope with a following of seventy gentlemen – no mere personal suite – a demonstration which was ill received. He seized the opportunity to make a long speech in which he sought to dispel prevalent misconceptions about the king. No doubt he was guided by Paruta who 83

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 75-81, 30 October 1593, 89-92, 6 November 1593, 92-8, 13 November 1593, 99-101, 13 November 1593 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 84 We do not know where Nevers was at this stage; it took him about two more weeks to reach Rome. 85 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 109-11, 20 November 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. Jeannin went only as far as Lyon. Senecy accompagnied Joyeuse to Rome. Ibid., 111-18, 26 November 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. 86 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 111-18, 26 November 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate.

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knew that Clement would be shaken if he were convinced that Henry might be about to prevail in France. Thus Nevers insisted that the king’s authority was not as slight as the pope imagined; and he could not be expelled from France. Nevers proved, from intercepted letters from Mayenne, that the League could not survive alone. It was deeply divided, and the leaders were seeking to salvage personal advantages. Mayenne’s authority was usurped, and the estates-general, which proposed to elect a king, was illegal. Nevers was supposedly forbidden to speak of such things, and Clement either was, or pretended to be, taken aback. He expostulated that he would not be told that Navarre was a catholic; not even an angel from heaven could convince him of it. The royalist catholics he held in contempt as bastards, and he continued to help the League. This was uncouth, to say the least. Nevers had wished for a public audience in full consistory. Instead, he presented Clement with an autograph letter from the king in which he requested the authorisation of his abjuration by the pope’s benediction. Nevers asked leave to present the three priests, to whom the king’s letter referred, and permission to remain for more than ten days. The pope would consider. Evidently he was playing a double game.87 If the pope neither hastened to get rid of Nevers nor afforded any incentive for him to remain, it was evidently because he wished to see whether concessions could be wrung from him. In their third audience (probably on 27 November 1593), Clement explained the problems involved in absolution, expressed his distrust of Navarre, and asked what Nevers proposed.88 Nevers proposed nothing. But he offered to promise, on behalf of the princes, ‘parlements’ and ‘gouverneurs’ that they would abandon Navarre if he relapsed. Clement was evidently convinced that there was nothing to be gained. He wished to prevent Nevers from seeing the cardinals, whose advice he flouted, and himself refused to see the three priests who accompanied Nevers, unless they first submitted to the inquisition. This was an ugly ploy to avoid discussing the validity of the Gallican conversion which these clerics were to expound. On 29 November, Clement sent to inform Nevers that he must leave. Nevers now realised that his scurvy reception in Rome had been a put up job. In France, both Feria and Sega had heard that his visit would be short, constrained and fruitless; and, while he was silenced, the priests would be trapped by the inquisition. Now he had directly experienced the influence of the Spanish, who had manifestly fulfilled their predictions. The priests, however, were under Nevers’ personal control. Although their baggage and pack horses were seized, Nevers preserved them from the inquisition; but they never saw the pope, and he never heard the reasoning behind the episcopal absolution.89 In this situation, Nevers aimed at obtaining a written reply; he would not take the responsibility of returning only a verbal reply to an autograph letter. On account of the decision of the two congregations, which Possevino was presumed to have conveyed to 87

Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 405-15, Nevers’ ‘discours’. On 29 November, as a calculated insult, Sessa aped Nevers by himself going to the Papal court with seventy coaches. Ibid., 417. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 111-18, 26 November 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. 88 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 176-7, 3 December 1593, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. 89 L’Estoile, Journal du règne de Henri IV, i, 449.


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Nevers, Clement actually could not give Nevers a written reply; consequently he wished to silence him. Clement now sent to enquire whether Possevino had not told him that if he came to Rome the pope did not wish to discuss the affairs of Navarre. Nevers believed that Possevino had told the pope and cardinals how to reconcile the king to Rome and restore peace in France. Only then did Possevino’s deception come to light. Nevers had been conned and Possevino, whether culprit or, more likely, scapegoat, was obliged to flee.90 The disclosure created an uproar. Toledo tried to persuade Nevers to leave; there could be no written reply because there had been no embassy.91 The pope had had, if not the best of both worlds, at least a little of each. When Paruta resumed his pressure on behalf of Navarre, the pope demanded to know what he had done to merit absolution. He was freely in control of [his kingdom] of Navarre but had not [re]introduced catholicism there, or made any other sign of penitence. He called Navarre an usurper, and declared that all the theologians were against him. To allege usurpation was, of course, a reference to the excommunication, and a signal that it was not going to be swept aside. Paruta then tried to induce the pope to state what Navarre was expected to do. The answer was nebulous: ‘che faccia prima alcuna cosa perchè ben sa ciò che si gli convenga di fare’.92 If Nevers and Paruta wanted a statement of what the pope expected Navarre to do, Clement wanted to know what he would offer, and whether he was prepared to do what was required of him.93 Clement, however, was now in no hurry for Nevers to leave before Joyeuse and Senecy arrived. In lieu of an answer, he therefore gave Nevers another audience, on 5 December 1593. This proved to be a stormy occasion which ended in tears. Frustrated and miserable, Nevers begged and pleaded for an answer, and again demanded to know what Navarre was expected to do. Clement responded with a stream of abuse about the French king who was no catholic. He declined to specify in what circumstances he would absolve the king, and waffled about discipline and penitents. Evidently he had still hoped that Nevers might make proposals. While that was impossible, Nevers had, nevertheless, come prepared for the worst. He handed the pope a written declaration which was designed to confound his defective reasoning. In a separate statement, Nevers again asked the pope for a written answer.94 This disgraceful and undiplomatic affair created a ferment in Rome, and provoked a flood of propaganda.95 It was hotly disputed whether the pope was obliged to state how Navarre might obtain absolution; everyone took sides. Technical arguments about relapsed penitents were propounded by pro-Spanish cardinals, disseminating the opinion 90

Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 504-5. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 129-32, 4 December 1593 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 92 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 123-6, 4 December 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. 93 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 176-7, 3 December 1593, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. 94 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 132-5, 11 December 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 423-5, 5 December 1593, memoir of Nevers for the pope. 95 This propaganda conflict was described by Niccolo Mellini as a great Spanish plot, contrived by certain cardinals to convince the regular clergy in Rome that the pope had no power to absolve Navarre. The purpose was to generate an irresistible pressure of public opinion. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 178-80, 10 December 1593, Mellini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 91

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that the pope had no power to absolve Navarre. Nevers, for his part, did his best to obstruct the publication of damaging material.96 Joyeuse and Senecy were shortly expected in Rome and, in France, the truce would expire at the end of the year. Sessa continued to insist that Spain would have powerful forces with which to renew the war. Even in Rome, however, it began to be realised that the purpose of this war had nothing to do with religion; the purpose was the destruction of France.97 On 20 December 1593 the pope made a statement to the consistory. He declared that he would not consent to absolve Navarre, or to rehabilitate him. This was to state publicly that the whole question of the excommunication would have to be cleared; it was not, as Paruta had often urged, simply to be superseded.98 Montorio, a prelate in the service of Sega, appears to have been sent by Sega and Mayenne. His arrival (no date) apparently confirmed the pope in his negative decision. Montorio spoke strongly against Navarre and supported the election of Mayenne – despite the unpublished agreement with the Spanish. He also advised the pope to keep Nevers hanging about in Rome, and not to let him leave discontented because the future in France was quite uncertain. As reports arrived about the renewal of war in France at the end of the year, nothing could shift the pope. To Paruta, he took his stand upon canonical points about relapsed penitents, lecturing him from various texts.99 The truth of the matter was that Camillo Borghese, Clement’s envoy to Spain, had not yet arrived. Clement was waiting to hear from him what Philip II would say now about Navarre and the French succession. In the event, Borghese did not receive any answer at all.100 There were those who strove immensely hard behind the scenes to obviate a complete break between France and Rome. The Italian ambassadors certainly did not want Nevers to leave too abruptly, slamming the door behind him. Nevers’ instructions required him to be insistent and importunate. Consequently, he braved one more disagreeable audience, on 2 January 1594. Inevitably he and the pope traipsed over the same old ground. Nevers’ persistent demand to know what the pope expected the king to do only elicited abusive and frivolous answers, for example: the opposite to what he had done so far (‘qu’il fasse le contraire de ce qu’il a fait jusques icy’); there were plenty of theologians in France; Navarre already knew perfectly well what he must do, and the pope was not obliged to tell him. Presumably such nonsense was intended to conceal the truth because that truth was purely political: Henry IV must definitively conquer his 96

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 139-41, 18 December 1593, Paruta to the grand duke of Tuscany; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 177-8, 17 December 1593, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany, 178-80, 10 December 1593, Mellini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 97 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta ii, 144-6, 18 December 1593 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 98 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 180-3, 20 December 1593, Clement VIII’s speech. 99 L’Estoile, Journal du règne de Henri IV, i, 426; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 183-4, 24 December 1593, Delbene to Vinta; 243-8, 3 August 1595, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. Delmonte reported a speech made by the pope to the consistory on 31 July 1595. Clement was wrong in his assertion that Nevers had left Rome before Montorio arrived. Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 423, ‘discours’; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 150-2, 25 December 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate, 154-9, 1 January 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate. 100 Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Ponteficia en España, 377.


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kingdom himself, without the aid of Papal authority. Nevers then posed a clever and a leading question: did the pope wish Navarre to attend mass? Receiving no reply, Nevers finally issued a warning. These were matters which might never be raised again, in which case it was the pope who would be the loser. On 10 January 1594, Nevers took his leave. He expressed the depth of his despair that Clement had refused to accept as assurance of Henry’s true conversion the act [of obedience] that he had offered. Now that Nevers was leaving, Clement perversely softened his tone. He said that he hoped for an opportunity to do more than he could at present, and to bring peace to France. However, there was nothing in Nevers’ supplication which entitled him to act. Nevers, on the contrary, claimed to have said quite enough. He departed on 14 January 1594, intending to visit Florence, Ferrara, Mantua and Venice. In accordance with his instructions, this was doubtless to pursue the basis of an Italian coalition; then the pope might be liberated and enabled to perform his paternal duties.101 In case of exclusion or failure, Nevers was instructed to publish an account of his mission denouncing the Spanish tyranny which constrained the actions of the pope. In doing this he described the uncharitable conduct of Clement VIII – who was grossly discourteous – and the extraordinary influence of the Spanish ambassador. Nevers also sought to refute a recent publication which maintained that the pope had no power to grant absolution. What Nevers said about Rome when he returned to France was later described as unrepeatable.102 He and d’Ossat apparently corresponded almost until the time of the absolution, working in France and Rome respectively to avert any definitive and disastrous action. It was important to dismiss any thoughts of revenge. The king should do what was necessary, stand by his claim to be sufficiently absolved, proceed to his coronation, appoint to benefices, and use the ‘parlements’ to defend himself against the pope. The king’s conduct must be impeccably catholic; he should not appoint a patriarch or act as if France were detached from Rome. If he failed in France, he would never be recognised in Rome. That was the blunt and brutal truth conveyed by d’Ossat – and the king followed his advice. This advice included refusing to treat with the League as an entity. By treating with the cities and seigneurs separately, the League would effectively be broken up.103 It is difficult to judge how, in other circumstances, Clement would have dealt with the theological arguments against Navarre, which were both controversial and derogatory to Papal authority. It is also difficult to envisage how the Spanish would have reacted had 101 Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 431-3, 505; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 181-2, 15 January 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate. On his way to Florence, Nevers passed Joyeuse and Senecy who arrived in Rome that same evening, 14 January 1594. They all ignored each other. 102 The grand duke was believed to have assisted in the compilation of this declaration; it was partly intended to prepare the way for future efforts. Degert, Le Cardinal d’Ossat, 91-3 quotes B.N., Mss. fr. 3989, f. 108. Nevers asked the pope to reconsider and to receive the king, imposing some conditions. The memoir printed by Gomberville was addressed to France. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 184 n., 305-8, 17 January-8 February 1595, Bonciano to the grand duke of Tuscany. 103 Degert, Le Cardinal d’Ossat, 95-7; ibid., 97-103, 5 February 1594, d’Ossat to Nevers.

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he simply exerted his superior authority and validated the episcopal absolution; sufficient voices urged that this was both feasible and necessary. Sound and fury there would certainly have been; but Philip II was old and ill, and Spain was badly overstretched by her wars with England, the United Provinces and France. One might query whether it was wise to have sent a formal embassy somewhat into the blue. But Henry had had no choice: as he later specified to Clement VIII, he had sent Nevers to satisfy the requirements of the French prelates who had received him into the Church.104 On balance, Nevers’ punishing experience probably did more good than harm. He did much to dispel misinformation, and he augmented the support of the Italian states. The deception perpetrated on Nevers, and his unpardonable humiliation in Rome were known to derive from Spanish influence; it was therefore concluded that Clement VIII had yielded to pressure.

VI: Spain, Mayenne and the Peace Negotiations So far, Henry’s conversion had solved very little. While Nevers was unable to obtain benediction in Rome, Henry had been unable to obtain peace in France. That, in turn, magnified all his other problems, especially with England and the huguenots. So long as Henry’s catholic status remained ambiguous and, until he knew whether the truce could be turned into peace, he was in an exposed, and perplexing position. Within about a month, however, Henry knew more or less what to expect; much as he wanted peace, he was preparing for war because the Spanish and the legate were doing all they could to frustrate the negotiations; so there was no further point in delaying the mission to Rome.105 As early as 8 August 1593, Henry observed that Philip II meant to fight for what his ministers had failed to obtain [the crown]. The treasure fleet had arrived, and Philip was assembling forces in Spain, Italy and Germany in order to enter France by the end of October.106 Spanish hostility was palpable; Philip II had been wounded in his reputation by the failure of the election, so his reaction to the news of Henry’s conversion was a belligerent determination to subvert his succession in France. Philip was now preparing ‘to thunder’ upon the king and to ‘geive him a monster blowe’.107 Plans for a renewed attack on France centred on the coming of the archduke Ernest as governor of the Netherlands.108 It had long been intended that the infanta should marry the archduke. Now Henry heard that she was expected to receive the Netherlands and Franche-Comté as her dowry. Henry having been murdered – it will be recalled – Ernest was to gather a

104

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 359-61, 5 May 1595, Henry IV to Clement VIII. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 23 n., 29 August 1593, Henry IV to Maisse. 106 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 6-9, 8 August 1593, Henry IV to Brèves in Constantinople. 107 Butler, The Edmondes Papers, 111-14, 1/11 November 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 71-4, 23 October 1593 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 108 The archduke Ernest arrived in Brussels on 30 January 1594 and died on 20 February 1595. 105


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great army, make peace with the United Provinces, and conquer France.109 Like all Philip II’s aspirations, this was implausible; Henry IV was, nevertheless, in danger – from Spain and from Mayenne. Mayenne treated the king’s conversion as a non-event. Except that the truce had become essential in the absence of any Spanish forces, he carried on much as before. In Paris he arranged his affairs so as to plaster over his breach with Feria. On 8 August 1593, Mayenne renewed the oath of Union, promising to reject anything contrary to religion. He induced the estates to vote for the publication of the decrees of Trent. Apart from a standing committee, they were prorogued until the end of the truce (originally the end of October). Then they were to reassemble to conclude the affairs of the kingdom – namely the deferred election. By then, the Spanish might have provided the necessary forces. In this way, Mayenne sustained the myth that the election would still take place.110 Consequently, he wanted to know what the Spanish preparations would hold for him. After these arrangements, Tassis left Paris for the Netherlands on 13 August 1593. He went to work on amassing Spanish help despite his concern about the current peace negotiations. Sega, however, understood that Mayenne would only make peace if the Spanish failed him. Even then, he would not act without the pope.111 Mayenne was free to embark upon another time-wasting enterprise, playing off Spain against the king. A peace conference took place at Andresy between 11-14 August 1593. Now that the king had converted, efforts were made to induce Mayenne to submit. Villeroy hoped that he would have the sense not to reject this opportunity, while the king was still willing to offer amazingly generous terms. In war, Mayenne would lose support, unable to hold the party together. But in peace he would enjoy authority and security. Mayenne, however, did not have the good sense. Purporting to provide for security of religion, he was immediately obstructive, demanding war on the huguenots and their exclusion from offices.112 It appears, from such timing as one can ascertain, that Henry was trying to obtain peace with Mayenne before sending anyone to Rome. But at Andresy the Union decided, as ever, that they must await the will of the pope; and Mayenne had his own agenda in Rome. Further discussions took place at Milly on 10 September 1593.113 At one or both of these conferences, Mayenne had demanded the destitution of the heretics and one religion only. Navarre must now be accepted by the pope but, if he relapsed, their duty of allegiance would cease. With peace satisfactorily out of the way, Mayenne sent Villeroy to the king at Fontainebleau (or Fleury) about 14 September to seek an extension 109 Philip II had repudiated the promise made by Feria to accept Guise for the infanta. Butler, The Edmondes Papers, 91-2, 7/17 August 1593, Edmondes to Burghley, 105-7, 18/28 October 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, pp. 415, 416-17. 110 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, v, 409-12; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 144; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 490-1; Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, iv, 382-3. 111 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 164-6, 13 August 1593, Sega to the nuncio in Spain. 112 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 166-7, 16 August 1593, Sega to the nuncio in Spain. 113 Nouaillac, Villeroy, 247-8; Nouaillac, ‘La Fin de la Ligue’, Revue Henri IV, i (1905), 213-14; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn., Petitot, xliv), 342, 349; Butler, The Edmondes Papers, 93-4, 5/15 September 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. The instructions for the bishop of Mans were dated 9 September 1593 and Nevers is said to have left Fontainebleau on 11 September 1593.

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of the truce to the end of the year. Henry, who had little option, agreed to one more month.114 If the League required a lead from Rome the pope, it has been seen, was equally waiting upon news from France. By 9 October 1593, Clement had heard from Sega that a prolongation of the truce, not peace, was to be expected.115 Villeroy and Jeannin had, so far, been unaware of the extent of Mayenne’s duplicity. But, when Villeroy came to discuss the prolongation of the truce, Henry showed him an intercepted letter. It revealed Mayenne’s oath of 23 July 1593 which amounted to a treaty with Spain. Once the Spanish had assembled an army, the election would proceed. Henry hoped that if the horrified Villeroy were to face Mayenne with this disclosure, he might yet be jolted into genuine negotiations. Villeroy harangued Mayenne with sensible arguments. Mayenne, he said, needed peace and the king was still prepared to ‘honour’ and ‘gratify’ him. Caught out, Mayenne defended himself, but rather feebly; nevertheless, he proceeded to play his old game. The king’s absolution, he declared, was now the most necessary thing. He would therefore send Joyeuse, Senecy and Jeannin to Rome to promote it. If the pope absolved the king, then Mayenne would consider the oath of 23 July to be invalid. Absolution was not, of course, what Mayenne was after, but rather a long interval, during which he himself might send to Rome and to Spain, just as he had done in the past. He therefore ended by arguing how very necessary it was to extend the truce. The negotiations are unclear but again, lacking means and money, the king had no option. He agreed to an extension, to be announced in two stages, on 13 October to the end of November, and on 10 November to the end of the year.116 For Henry IV, so much depended upon the news from Rome, which was perplexing and uncertain. Nevertheless Henry could, in a sense, be said to have known the answer by the end of October 1593, before Nevers had even entered Rome. The first recorded news came in a letter from Nevers (no date) on 19 October. He wrote about Possevino who, Nevers said, was dispatched to forbid him to enter Rome in any capacity – which was actually not quite the case.117 Two weeks later, the pope was said to have told ‘the king’s servants’ – which might have been La Boderie or Arnaud d’Ossat – that he dared not favour the king until he had some better advantage over his enemies to bear him out against the greatness of Spain.118 Furthermore, Clement had heard that Mayenne was sending Joyeuse and Senecy, but they had only just departed. The inference was that he wished to await their arrival before deciding anything. So, Edmondes reported, the pope showed ‘a soure countenance to Nevers’ but with secret assurances. The assurances, 114 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 558-9, 14 September 1593, Montigny to Duplessis; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 95-7, 18/28 September 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. 115 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 51-3, 9 October 1593 (4), Paruta to the doge and senate, 60, 16 October 1593, Paruta to the doge and senate. 116 Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn., Petitot, xliv), 351-67; Nouaillac, Villeroy, 249; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 102-4, 9/19 October 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 43-4, 22 October 1593, Henry IV to Pisani. 117 Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 462, 10/20 October 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. 118 This report probably came from La Boderie. He is said to have been one of the first to intimate that the king should not be alarmed by the conduct of Clement VIII. He sought to divert the Spanish who moved heaven and earth to prevent the king’s reconciliation with Rome. La Boderie, Ambassades, i, p. xi.


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if true, point to the nature of Possevino’s verbal instructions.119 This information, Henry commented, did not suggest any great change in Rome; the Spanish exercised too much power. Nevertheless, Henry did not mean to alter his resolution to do all he could to satisfy the pope. Clement, after all, was aware of the likely consequences of rejecting him. Nevertheless, the hopes that Henry had placed in the ‘intimations’ from Rome must have flickered out by the end of October 1593. He knew, if not precisely, that the pope would not sanction his conversion forthwith, and provide him – late, but not quite too late – with his ‘firm foundation’. Henry’s advice from Italy was not to prolong the truce, because Spain was preparing great forces. But, for lack of means and money, he was obliged to do so.120 It became clear that the pope was playing a double game, which would therefore be protracted and of uncertain outcome; nor did the deceitful Mayenne have the smallest intention of making peace. It was in Mayenne’s power to end the civil war. Instead, he spurned the king’s generosity and launched into his most ambitious attempt yet to establish himself in power in France. Montorio was to oppose Henry’s absolution in Rome, and Joyeuse and Senecy went after him to promote Mayenne’s own claim to the crown. Furthermore, on 29 October 1593, he sent his stepson, Montpézat, and Pélissier to Spain. He needed the longer truce in which to await the answers. Montpézat and Pélissier were to explain and justify the events in Paris, which had tarnished Philip’s reputation. Secondly, they were to press Mayenne’s ambitious demands.121 Mayenne expressed compliance with the king’s wishes in respect of the throne and the marriage of the infanta; he would now accept her marriage to the archduke Ernest. At the same time, he made enormous military, financial and personal demands, such as he had already put to Parma and Feria in France. In effect, Mayenne wished to be viceroy, with the supreme command of Spanish forces in France. However, these instructions were really designed to show that, of all the possibilities, Mayenne’s own candidacy was the only practicable solution. In return, he was prepared to offer Spain the dismemberment of France. Philip II, however, did not need Mayenne’s permission to marry his daughter to the archduke Ernest, or to challenge in arms the succession of Henry IV. Surely not even Philip deluded himself any longer that the infanta might still be elected, whatever appearances Mayenne had fabricated in Paris. Neither did Mayenne have the smallest hope of delivering what he offered. That he could make such pretentious proposals at so late a stage shows that reality entirely escaped him. To Spain, the duc de Mayenne was almost irrelevant.122 Tassis was well aware of these things. ‘Les actions de Mayenne tendent ou à être roi ou du moins si grand que tout autre 119

Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 105-7, 18/28 October 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 43-4, 22 October 1593, Henry IV to Pisani. 121 Jeannin went to Lyon with instructions for Joyeuse. Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 571-2. He and Senecy did not arrive in Rome until 14 January 1594, just after the departure of Nevers. Mayenne had already sent Sisoyne to Spain, on 6 September 1593, to explain and excuse the truce which angered Philip II’s ministers. Mayenne complained that they treated him badly and he could not carry on. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, ii, 416, 6 September 1593, instructions for Sisoyne. 122 Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 574-7. 120

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qui sera eslevé à la royauté dépende de lui’. Tassis was concerned that competition would detract from the real issue. The struggle was now directly between Spain and Henry of Navarre. If the Spanish were diverted, Navarre might win the throne and seize the Netherlands. Nevertheless, Tassis considered open war on behalf of the infanta – and reimbursement – to be dangerous. The enemy might foment enough trouble to destroy Spanish domination in the Netherlands. Tassis even envisaged the possibility of recognising Henry IV, in return for Saluzzo, Cambrai, and renewal of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559).123 Having sent his envoys to Spain and to Rome, Mayenne set about trying to obtain a third extension of the truce. He wanted this time in order to receive his answers, and also for Spain to assemble her forces.124 Early in November 1593 Mayenne sent Belin, governor of Paris, to the king with a proposal for a general peace – an idea which may have come from Rome. Meanwhile, and for the rest of the year, he sustained his pressure for a long truce, to which Henry was strongly disinclined.125 On the other hand, the Swiss he was expecting (paid by the grand duke) had not arrived, nor did he yet know what England or the United Provinces would do to help him. Henry was apprehensive that the enemy might invade before he was ready to resist. According to Edmondes, his situation was now desperate.126 In the first week of December 1593, La Clielle and La Boderie returned from Italy, shortly followed by Ferret.127 La Clielle said, rather surprisingly, that he had found the pope well disposed towards the king, but fearful of Spain. Spain was making vast preparations for war, and persuaded the pope not to favour the king until the outcome was clearer – which meant indefinitely. The pope’s idea was ‘to extend this occasion of receiving the king, to make a peace generall througheout Christendome’. In the mean time, he favoured ‘a like common truce’.128 By 16 December 1593, Henry had heard from Nevers that the pope had sent for him – he did not say in a personal capacity only – and would favour the king; this, presumably, was a reference to the letter from San Giorgio of 25 October 1593. If Henry was encouraged by that deceptive information, he was 123 Garnier, ‘Le Président Jeannin’, Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de géographie et d’histoire, xxviii (1913), 578, 26 October 1593, Tassis – probably to a Spanish secretary. 124 It does not appear that Montpézat received any answer from Philip II. He required time to consider, and to consult the pope and the archduke Ernest. Montpézat was still in Spain in the middle of March 1594 by which time his proposals were largely obsolete. Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Ponteficia en España, 365, 9, 14 March 1594, Borghese to Aldobrandini; De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 362-3. 125 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 123-6, 6/16 December 1593, Edmondes to Burghley, 126-8, 16/26 December 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. 126 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 119-21, 16/26, November 1593, Edmondes to Burghley, from Dieppe. 127 Ferret, a ‘valet de chambre’, was sent chasing after Nevers to warn him of reports of the death of Philip II. Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘Lettres inédites de Henry IV’, Annuaire bulletin de la société d’histoire de France, xxxvii (1900), 199, 25 September 1593, Henry IV to Nevers. 128 This report is the first we hear of the pope’s desire, which rapidly increased, for a general peace; it arose mainly from his anxiety over the activity of the Turks. In October 1593 he sent Camillo Borghese to Spain to press Philip II to provide more help against the Turks. Lutz, Das Papsttum, 130, 6 October 1593, instructions for Borghese. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 121-3, 27 November/7 December 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. La Clielle and La Boderie arrived back on 7 December 1593, shortly followed by Ferret.


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certainly forewarned by the caveat; the Spanish were now pressing for the imposition of unacceptable penances – in other words political conditions. These conditions apparently echoed Mayenne’s obstructive peace proposals, namely war on the protestants, one religion only, and the retention for four years of Leaguer cities.129 Despite the worsening news from Rome, Henry was disinclined to renew the war until he had heard what happened when Nevers and, as he supposed, Gondi, reached Rome.130 Reason, Henry wrote to Pisani on 22 December 1593, was on his side, and his good opinion of the pope’s sincerity afforded hope. Mayenne sought a renewal of the truce until the end of March 1594, by which time he hoped the Spanish forces would be ready. Henry knew that, meanwhile, Mayenne would do all he could to obstruct his case in Rome. But Henry also needed time; so he attempted one last expedient, which afforded Mayenne one last chance. When Belin returned (no date), still pressing for a longer truce, Henry agreed to one more month, providing Mayenne then made peace. Negotiations were to begin within ten days, and to be concluded before the end of January 1594. The king’s Swiss troops were to be suffered to enter France, and no more taxes were to be raised. Mayenne did not respond, and the truce expired with the year. Disgusted with Mayenne’s refusal to treat, Villeroy quit his service for good.131

VII: Relations with England Henry had known, certainly within weeks of his abjuration, that the truce was unlikely to end in peace. Without that ‘firm foundation’, he feared that his abjuration would lose him the support of the huguenots and his protestant allies. Henry sent the protestant minister Morlas to England, in mid-July 1593, before his abjuration. Morlas was to explain the absolute necessity of what Henry was about to do. After the event, Henry sent Ambroise de Mouy to explain about the truce. But Mouy also carried a fresh and substantial list of financial and military demands.132 Henry desperately needed the public assurance of English support during the truce and the peace negotiations. He also needed to be prepared to attack the Netherlands; and that was part of the trouble with England. His relations with queen Elizabeth continued to be strained, for all the reasons which had emerged during the Rouen campaign. These difficulties were to be exacerbated by the rebellion in Ireland in March 1594, which darkened the remaining years of Elizabeth’s reign. She was acutely afraid of being abandoned to the full force of Spanish power; and Spain, of course, would exploit the rebellion. But Elizabeth was also becoming wary of 129

Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 123-6, 6/16 December 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes referred to Nevers’ letter from Rimini (no date). 130 In the event, Gondi was not admitted to Rome until mid-January 1594. 131 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 126-8, 16/26 December 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Villeroy, Mémoires d’estat (edn., Petitot, xliv), 372, 23 December 1593. Villeroy had only served Mayenne in order to be able to broker peace. In February 1594, he accorded with the king for himself and his son, Allincourt, and was promised the first vacant office of secretary of state. He succeeded Revol who died on 24 September 1594. Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 349; Nouaillac, Villeroy, 251. 132 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 90-1, 22 July/1 August 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 352.

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Henry IV as a potentially great king of France. Indirectly, Henry’s abjuration was unhelpful to their relations in that it altered the nature of his conflict with Spain. From being an extension of the French civil wars, it moved into a new chapter of the historic Franco-Habsburg struggle, which would be prosecuted in the traditional theatres of war. This rekindled an ineradicable English neurosis. Queen Elizabeth became increasingly anxious about the possible extension of French influence in the Netherlands. This fear, and Henry’s debts, would always come between them, despite their common interest and fitful co-operation in opposing Spain. Elizabeth had long been prepared for Henry’s abjuration which did not greatly affect her, provided she was reassured on certain points. Now it afforded her an opportunity to stage a demonstration, and to try to obtain more of her own way. Like the huguenots, she feared what Henry might be constrained to do – such as terminating his protestant alliances. In fact that was the last thing he wanted. Elizabeth did not await the news of Henry’s abjuration to send sir Thomas Wilkes back to France. For the record, Wilkes delivered a ritual shriek of indignation.133 The queen ‘misliked’ the abjuration, but ‘wished the king’s estate may be rather hereafterwards amended than impaired’. Her doubt was fair enough; Henry himself must often have wondered to what extent his estate had been ‘amended’. Elizabeth wished to know what assurance Henry had of the princes [‘tiers parti’] of whom she had heard so much during the Rouen campaign. She also wished to know, as usual, what Henry meant to do about Brittany. Furthermore, she still required a port town [having, as she felt, been cheated of Rouen]. Above all, Elizabeth required to know how the king would ‘continue jointly with us against the King of Spain’. Indeed, she required a formal, autograph letter, sealed with the great seal. In June 1593, in response to the vidame’s appeals, she had granted Henry 1,500 men to bring the force under sir Roger Williams up to 3,000. The dispatch of these troops now depended upon the answers made to Wilkes. Referring to a ‘correspondency’ on the king’s part to join in offence against Spain, Elizabeth appeared to be angling for an alliance.134 Henry fully shared Elizabeth’s anxiety about Spain. Shortly before the arrival of Wilkes on 16 August 1593, he had dragged Edmondes out of bed to discuss the proposed marriage of the infanta to the archduke Ernest, and the war he was to wage in France.135 Henry’s relations with Wilkes were always good. But his mission was soured by Elizabeth’s furious reaction to the requests for help delivered by Mouy.136 She would make no reply until Wilkes returned. It is not clear whether Henry had already received this letter before talking to Wilkes, for three hours, at Melun on 25 August 1593. In their 133

Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, pp. 359-60. Wilkes was much delayed. He did not reach Caen until 12 August 1593, or see the king until 20 August. He had found the highways to be full of ‘lewd people’. HMC Hatfield, iv, 343, – July 1593, OS., queen Elizabeth to Henry IV. This notorious letter began, ‘Ah que douleurs, oh quel regrets...’ 134 Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, pp. 358-9, 14/24 July 1593, instructions for Wilkes. 135 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 91-2, 7/17 August 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 362. 136 Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 362, 23 August/2 September 1593, queen Elizabeth to Henry IV, contains the demands made by Mouy.


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inevitable discussion of his abjuration, Henry made some interesting points. He confessed that he had intended to abjure two months later, but events had been ‘precipitated’ when the dangers surged more suddenly than he expected.137 His conversion had, however, ‘stayed the falling away’ of the princes, his whole catholic council, catholic ‘gouverneurs’ of royalist towns and the nobility generally. So Henry revealed the extent of the threatened defections, which he could not have survived. Since his abjuration, a number of Leaguer gentlemen and towns had recognised him – to take effect when the truce ended. Furthermore, his abjuration had ‘engaged the duke of Florence to perform his great promises’. Henry strongly protested to Wilkes his continued ‘amity’ towards the queen and their ‘conjunction’ against Spain. Wilkes, who was taken ill at Dover on his return journey, dispatched his report to the queen about 1 September 1593. Henry provided a set of written answers. He took the opportunity of informing the queen of the great Spanish levies being raised in Italy and Germany as well as Spain. He declared that he was assured of a further 3,000 Swiss (which he obliquely indicated were to be paid by the grand duke). But he begged the queen not to refuse him 20,000 crowns per month, beginning in September, for his English troops, and other things. He explained, rather vaguely, what he hoped to do in Brittany, and promised not to make any separate peace with Spain. He asked the queen to make a reciprocal guarantee. These answers were accompanied by a ‘bond of amity’, which amounted to an offensive/defensive alliance.138 If Henry had expected his replies and bond of amity to be pleasing to the queen, he was disappointed; she found many causes ‘to mislike’ them. On 24 August/3 September 1593, Elizabeth announced her intention to recall all her forces in France on the pretext that they were unemployed during the truce.139 Elizabeth intended to exploit Henry’s distress in order to bargain for a port at the mouth of the Somme. Henry objected that her choice was totally unsuitable, and belonged to Nevers; besides, he could not break the truce. If the queen really meant to abandon him, he would be obliged to extend the truce which would permit the enemy to assemble great forces.140 The queen remained adamant. By 9 November 1593, ships had arrived at Dieppe to embark her Normandy contingent. Henry was appalled that Elizabeth should ‘so expose him in loss to the world’. Nor did he know how to subsist ‘against so mightie a power as the enemie is preparing to thunder uppon him’. Seeking to delay the departure of the English, Henry offered Harfleur in Normandy, and the Ile de Brihac in Brittany as retreat towns. But the English dared not

137

Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 363. There is no other indication that Henry had intended to abjure – roughly – at the end of September 1593. That would not have met the grand duke’s deadline. 138 Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, pp. 363-4, 29 August 1593, the king’s written answers and bond of amity. Elizabeth’s reciprocal bond – which her conduct belied – was dated 18/28 October 1593. 139 Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, pp. 227, 365-6. Henry had a proposal by which the English and other forces could be profitably employed to help the United Provinces to besiege Dunkirk. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 95-7, 18/28 September 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. 140 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 95-7, 18/28 September 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 367, 17 September 1593, Henry IV to Beauvoir.

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disobey their orders to leave.141 Accustomed to the queen’s tantrums and caprices, Henry persisted in his pleading, as the enemy gathered strength against him. Nevertheless, the English withdrawal was accomplished, and Henry was deprived of auxiliary forces.142 This loss of support accounts for Henry’s anxiety towards the end of 1593; he had no good news from Rome, yet he could not wisely extend the truce. His Swiss troops, at least, were approaching Picardy.143

VIII: Trouble with the Huguenots At the same time as striving to retain the support of England, Henry was also struggling to reassure the huguenots. During the months of uncertainty following his abjuration, Henry was faced with pressing demands for a new and comprehensive religious edict defining the protestants’ status and rights. Henry had always intended – it has been seen – that a new edict should form part of a general settlement which might, or might not, comprise his own conversion. That, of course, was never specified. The huguenots, however, could not, or would not, accept that to promulgate such an edict was impossible in time of war. Now Henry’s premature abjuration gave them good reason to fear that he might be constrained to impose prejudicial measures of a kind the catholics had always demanded. Some such conditions were advanced by Mayenne during the peace negotiations, and threatened to renew sectarian strife. On the leadership level, the huguenot nobility were no more altruistic than their catholic counterparts, while the socalled ‘consistoriaux’ – the genuine Calvinists – had never fully trusted the king. The sudden destruction of Henry’s old, confidential friendship with DuplessisMornay was probably symptomatic of many other personal griefs. Duplessis remained loyal, but his career was over and his aspirations in ruins. He had so much wanted Henry to be king, yet his sudden accession had been disastrous; now Duplessis would never be at his side in time of peace; nothing would ever be the same again. There would never be a council, and the reunion of the churches was wholly remote, although the idea survived. Even as late as that very year, 1593, Duplessis had bravely entertained far-reaching plans 141

Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 107-8, 24 October/3 November 1593, the privy council to Edmondes, 109-11, 26 October/5 November 1593, Edmondes to Burghley, 111-14, 1/11 November 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Henry had not yet received any acknowledgement of his bond of amity, or the queen’s reciprocal bond. Elizabeth may have been disturbed by Henry’s dispatch to Spain of one, La Varenne. The royalists had intercepted an ‘agent de confiance’ with dispatches for Philip II. La Varenne was employed to assume his identity and to deliver his dispatches together with verbal messages extracted from the captured agent. La Varenne therefore went to Spain and saw the king. He was about to receive a second audience when news arrived of the arrest of the League courier. La Varenne fled and managed to escape. It appears that Philip II was angry with Mayenne for frustrating the election of a king. Philip II is alleged to have told Varenne that there was no fear that the pope would approve Henry’s conversion, unless he went to Rome in person. In that case, Philip would see to it that Henry did not return. Ibid., 126-8, 16/26 December 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, p. 368; Anquetil, L’Esprit de la Ligue, iii, 291-2; L’Estoile, Journal du règne de Henri IV, i, 430-1. 142 MacCaffrey, Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 173-83. 143 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 126-8, 16/26 December 1593, Edmondes to Burghley.


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for the resettlement of religion and the state.144 On the personal level, Henry was no less distraught than his old friend. He had, he wrote, loved Duplessis more than any gentleman in the kingdom. But he was hurt by Duplessis’ inability to understand his royal responsibilities.145 Like the royalist prelates, the huguenots had been summoned to Mantes in July 1593, but precisely why, was not made clear. Duplessis complained that the summons had barely been received by 1 August; and that is not easily explained, except by villainy. It was not the fault of the king, that the assembly was cancelled at the time of his abjuration. He had done his best to include and to consider the huguenots, but he had always been circumvented and overruled. Duplessis and Viçose, however, summoned the deputies all the same. Indeed, Duplessis distributed memoirs to all the churches upon which to base their articles and the instructions for their deputies. Thus, if madame Duplessis-Mornay is correct, the king’s will was crossed in the matter of a protestant assembly. It is easy to imagine that an assembly was the last thing Henry desired shortly after his abjuration. Nevertheless, deputies from at least six provinces assembled at Saumur with their articles ready drafted.146 Bouillon, who was campaigning in Lorraine, tended to think that they should be countermanded. He feared that a group might not display the necessary acumen. But he did not press the point, and Duplessis had the matter in hand. Duplessis had many cogent reasons for wishing the assembly to proceed.147 Consequently, about 6 September 1593, he wrote the king a comprehensive account of the huguenot point of view, their mounting fears and their expectations of the king. Henry, he said, had changed his religion in an instant; he had done – and was doing – everything to the exclusion of the huguenots. They perceived him as becoming the new French catholic leader, set against themselves. Those who had forced his conscience might now constrain his will. This situation was all the worse because the edicts of pacification, albeit renewed, were still ignored by the catholics. The huguenots did not see that the king was consequently in no position to grant them even greater liberties. Duplessis really feared that, once absolved, Henry would be forced on to the path of persecution. With hindsight, this is preposterous but, to those in danger, it was realistic. Duplessis therefore implored the king to pre-empt huguenot militancy by consenting to

144 These plans included the king’s divorce from Marguerite de Valois, upon which Duplessis was employed. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, i, madame Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, 239-40. 145 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 505, 7 August 1593, Henry IV to Duplessis. 146 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 560-5, 18 September 1593, Bouillon to Duplessis. Duplessis, at least, was perfectly clear that the assembly had been correctly summoned to restrain the king from converting. Ibid., 500-1, 29 July 1593, Duplessis to La Burthe, 522-3, 21 August 1593, Duplessis to Bouillon, 535-44, – September 1593, Duplessis to Henry IV; ibid., i, madame Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, 259-60. 147 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 513-14, 12 August 1593, Bouillon to Duplessis.

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all that was necessary – in other words, a liberal new edict. It was for this purpose that Duplessis intended the huguenot assembly to proceed.148 If it is true that the king’s will had been crossed in respect of the assembly, Henry dissembled his vexation. He was, however, adamant that he must first talk to Bouillon and Duplessis, repeatedly begging, pleading and commanding Duplessis to come to him. Duplessis was willing to go, albeit against the advice of his friends, if Bouillon went too.149 Together, they would prepare the ground at court, while the deputies synthesised their ‘cahiers’ at Saumur. In mid-September Duplessis heard a report that the assembly was to be deferred until Nevers returned from Rome. That could be for ever, since Nevers had only recently departed.150 Following the more palatable advice of Bouillon, the king had, indeed, decided to cancel the assembly, which was gravely inopportune.151 Duplessis strove to convince Bouillon that it was too late to cancel the assembly because the deputies were already arriving. Besides, the hope of obtaining a settlement was holding the huguenots in check. Duplessis, who had seen some of their articles, judged them to be good and appropriate. He was convinced of the essential and urgent need to intervene and secure a protestant edict, ‘certain et asseuré’ before the end of the peace negotiations. He was disturbed by the Leaguer publication, on 18 August 1593, of the decrees of Trent, after the truce and while the peace was pending. This would either render peace impossible or [as in 1585] turn the war against the huguenots. If the negotiations failed, the king would need their services. But, if Trent was accepted, persecution and an inquisition would follow. Duplessis appreciated that the king wished to wait until he had heard from Rome. But he believed that a huguenot settlement was more likely to be accepted as necessary before the absolution than after it. While that was untrue, Duplessis had good cause to fear the nature of the penance which might be imposed on the king.152 It was Duplessis’ passionate entreaty that induced the king to authorise the assembly after all. Nevertheless, Henry required the deputies to wait for him at Tours; and he would determine the time and the place of their assembly. Duplessis finally left Saumur on 18 September and joined the king, without Bouillon who did not return from Lorraine until after the coronation. Duplessis and the king remained together for three days.153 Glad to see him at last, Henry greeted Duplessis 148 Duplessis was warning the king of a genuine danger. He himself had been offered money to revolt. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 535-44, [c. 6 September] 1593, Duplessis to Henry IV, 547-9, 6 September 1593, Duplessis to Bouillon. 149 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 505, 5 August 1593, Henry IV to Duplessis, 505-6, 7 August 1593, Henry IV to Duplessis, 513-14, 12 August 1593, Bouillon to Duplessis, 514-15, 15 August 1593, Henry IV to Duplessis, 519, 16 August 1593, Duplessis to du Maurier, secretary to Bouillon, 522-3, 21 August 1593, Duplessis to Bouillon, 527-8, 28 August 1593, Henry IV to Duplessis, 553-8, 12 September 1593, Duplessis to Buzanval, 560, 18 September 1593, Duplessis to du Maurier. 150 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 547-9, 6 September 1593, Duplessis to Bouillon, 5589, 14 September 1593, Montigny to Duplessis. 151 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 558, 14 September 1593, Montigny to Duplessis. 152 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 547-9, 6 September 1593, Duplessis to Bouillon, 5605, 18 September 1593, Duplessis to Bouillon. At this stage there is a gap in Duplessis’ correspondence. 153 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, i, madame Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, 261-2; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 252-3; Ouvré, Aubéry du Maurier, 36.


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as he always had. For several hours Henry tried to explain to his friend exactly what had happened. He sought to convince Duplessis that he had had no choice but to abjure. His own supporters had pushed him to the brink of a precipice from which there was no other escape. Although Henry felt he had not been well supported by the huguenots, he had not changed in any way towards the religion or those who professed it. Then, as so often in the past, they discussed the problems of religion. Duplessis found that the king believed the differences between the two faiths to have been exaggerated by animosity. Thereupon they fell to discussing that religious reunion which was still dear to both their hearts. Before making any religious changes, Duplessis said, the king must first be firmly established in France. He did not, however, see that Henry must equally be firmly established before he could grant the huguenots a comprehensive edict; otherwise it would cause more trouble than joy. But once the king was established, Duplessis called for the destruction of Papal power in France. Popes were opposed to general councils and would never tolerate a national one. Nevertheless, a national council would still be the best way of resolving differences. Evidently Duplessis still clung to the hope that the king’s abjuration was not inexorable, and that religious reunion, at least in France, was not yet unattainable. In other words, he placed his residual hopes in a schism. Beyond the importance of imposing royal authority, their conception of the future was now profoundly divergent. Unfortunately there is no account of what the king and Duplessis said about the proposed assembly before Duplessis returned to the deputies gathering at Saumur.154 The fact remained that, for the king to allow a huguenot assembly, while still awaiting an answer from Rome, was a gift to his enemies; that he was powerless to prevent it, was of no account to them. The protestant deputies assembled at Mantes on 8 November 1593. The king had gone away to Dieppe, whence the English were about to depart. While awaiting his return, the deputies prepared a ‘cahier’ of ninety-eight articles, plus a second confidential one – ‘particulier’. They also appealed to queen Elizabeth to send an ambassador to their assembly and to help them obtain hostage towns.155 The king finally attended the assembly on 18 December 1593. He had managed to evade it until, by the arrival of La Clielle and La Boderie on 7 December, he was informed about the reception of Nevers in Rome. Now he knew absolutely that there was to be no ‘firm foundation’; so he had no alternative but to make the huguenots wait for their new edict. By establishing a commission of deputies and councillors, to which Duplessis and Bouillon were co-opted, Henry outwardly distanced himself from the deputies.156 154

Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, i, Madame Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, 261-2. Queen Elizabeth sent sir Robert Sidney, mainly for other reasons. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 1002, 4/14 October 1593, 109-11, 26 October/5 November 1593, 111-14, 1/11 November 1593, Edmondes to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, 1593-4, pp. 372-3, 26 October/5 November 1593, and 20/30 November 1593, instructions for sir Robert Sidney. Both Sidney’s departure and his journey were delayed. He did not reach Dieppe until 9/19 January 1594. Ibid., 377, 379-80. 156 Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 253-4. On 15 November 1593, the deputies sent Maravat and La Vallière to the king at Dieppe and, on 25 November they sent him their ‘cahier’. Henry sent Sancy to reassure them of his good will, promising to come in person. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, v, 5747, 19 December 1593, Duplessis to Buzanval. 155

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No one in all France understood the huguenots’ problems better than Henry IV; but he was caught in a cleft stick. He wanted to help them and, indeed, his own future might yet depend upon their loyalty. But to issue a comprehensive religious edict in the circumstances of December 1593 would have been fatal lunacy; Henry simply could not do it. While Bouillon had his own fish to fry, Duplessis was too blinded by apprehension, and too conscious of grass roots pressure, to recognise the impediments as absolute. Henry granted them everything he possibly could, lavishing reassurances confidentially. The commissioners informed the deputies that their requests were reasonable, but inopportune. Until such time as the king was obeyed, they would have to be patient with the old edicts of pacification. Nevertheless, as an earnest of better things to come, the commissioners, guided by Duplessis, Bouillon and Calignon prepared a series of secret articles which actually amounted to a draft edict of considerable liberality. Recognising the huguenot fears of possible constraints upon him, Henry promised that neither his coronation [oath] nor anything else [absolution] could oblige him to make war on them. The draft edict, retained by the chancellor and secretaries, was communicated verbally to three of the deputies. They saw the king again on 21 January 1594 but, for the moment, the king took his public stand on the edict of Poitiers, 1577. The huguenots refused to recognise how much the king had done for them. At considerable risk to himself, he had shown them absolute good will, but they were neither grateful nor satisfied and their mood remained menacing.157 Now, therefore, Henry faced an incipient but very serious huguenot problem. At Sainte-Foye, in June 1594, they expressed their disaffection by reconstituting their ‘state within the state’. Bouillon and La Tremoille in particular, began to oppose their now catholic king. At the siege of Amiens, in 1597, Henry was to come within an ace of overthrow by Spain, precisely on account of huguenot hostility and blackmail. In the absence of a recognised, adult, catholic heir, the possible consequences of Henry’s downfall in 1597 defy speculation, yet the huguenots had been prepared to risk even that.158

157 Sutherland, ‘The Edict of Nantes and the Protestant State’, Annali della Fondazione Italiana per la Storia Amministrativa (2) (1965), 212-14 et seq.; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, vii, 281, ‘discours’; Patry, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 254-5. Duplessis returned to Saumur in mid-February, before the coronation. 158 Sutherland, ‘The Edict of Nantes and the Protestant State’, Annali della Fondazione Italiana per la Storia Amministrativa (2) (1965), 214-5, 228-31; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 93-4, 5/15 September 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes heard that it was secretly resolved to declare the young prince de Condé (b. 1 September 1588) first prince of the blood. He was, indeed, groomed as heir presumptive until the birth of the future Louis XIII.

CHAPTER XV: HENRY IV AND ROME I: The Coronation Five months after Henry’s abjuration, he was still as far as ever from having obtained his ‘firm foundation’ and, thereafter, a general settlement in church and state. As war was the only way ahead, its development in France would continue to influence affairs in Rome. The main events of 1594, Henry’s coronation, the recovery of Paris, and the successful siege of Laon, were important steps towards his reconquest of the kingdom. There was, however, nothing inevitable about Henry’s ultimate repossession of France, or his Papal absolution. In these related endeavours, Spain continued to be his powerful and remorseless enemy. Furthermore the ever present danger of assassination cast a persistent shadow over the king’s life. As the truce drew to a close with the year 1593, Henry had to decide what to do. Although there was still no definitive information from Rome, the likely outcome of Nevers’ embassy was fairly clear. The delay was harmful, and the coronation was also deferred.1 On 27 December 1593, Henry therefore issued a declaration which enabled him to end the truce without immediately resuming the war. This bluntly worded document was intended to ensure that his true position was generally understood. He explained that the manner of his abjuration derived from the refusal of Clement VIII to receive Pisani and to direct the conversion himself. This refusal was, however, blamed on the artifice of Spain. The reasons for Nevers’ embassy were also explained, but without reference to his ill-treatment. Proceeding to the truce, Henry exposed Mayenne’s bad faith and duplicity, purporting to make peace after promising Spain that he would not. Now, after five months, they were no closer to peace, yet the League was pressing for a further five months’ truce. Henry had offered one month, during which peace was to be made. Meanwhile, the League had been assembling foreign forces on the frontier. Now the renewal of war would at least distinguish those who had truly been concerned for religion from those who had not. So the declaration summoned all good Frenchmen to support the king, without fear of recrimination. Those who submitted within a month might be restored to property, offices and dignities. The first to submit was Louis de l’Hospital, seigneur de Vitry, and the city of Meaux (11 January 1594), where Parma’s artillery had been stored.2 The surrender of Meaux was particularly helpful, control of the Marne valley being as important as ever in order to put pressure on Paris. Ignoring Henry’s declaration, Mayenne sustained his demands for a prolongation of the truce, mendaciously promising to make peace; but, once again, intercepted letters gave him away. What he actually wanted was enough time in which to send an impassioned appeal 1

Revue rétrospective, série ii, vol. xi (1837), 45-7, 22 December 1593, Henry IV to Pisani. Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, vi, 1-13, 27 December 1593, declaration of Henry IV, ibid., 14, 25 n.1. Orléans, Bourges and Lyon soon followed, as well as many towns in Picardy. Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 105-7; Buisseret, Henry IV, 47, gives a map indicating the towns which submitted in 1594 and their price. The majority were in the sensitive north east of France. 2

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to his kinsman Montpezat, who was still in Spain.3 The ‘parlement’, however, responded to the declaration on 3 January 1594 by recognising the king. They proclaimed his absolution to be delayed by the practices of a foreign prince. Nevertheless, they petitioned Mayenne to provide for peace; it was sufficient to recognise Henry IV.4 This support of the ‘parlement’ was auspicious for Henry, who wished to accomplish his coronation before resuming hostilities. The decision to hold the ‘sacre’ at Chartres was taken early in 1593, Reims being in the hands of the League. By 20 August, preparations were already in the hands of contractors. Then, towards the end of the month, as Nevers’ instructions were being prepared, the ceremony was postponed out of deference to the pope. It is not clear precisely when the Papal rejection of Nevers was known for certain in France. De L’Estoile recorded, on 5 January 1594, the receipt of letters from Nevers expressing his realisation that the pope would not accept Henry’s conversion.5 The outrageous treatment of Nevers was a shocking scandal which provoked a powerfully adverse reaction in France. It was also a public humiliation for the king who had sought to abjure under Papal auspices, and to express his obedience to Rome. The apparent hostility of the pope was strongly reciprocated in France by anti-Papal sentiment in certain influential quarters. Henry now supposed the rejection of Nevers to be the end to his quest for absolution and reconciliation – of which he must have grown weary.6 But this was not at all a desirable situation. France without Rome left many things uncertain, and an immense potential for conflict. With Nevers rejected, the king was now in an even more awkward and dangerous position. It was therefore imperative that his catholic kingship and authority should be swiftly sanctified by his coronation. Upon that solemn occasion he would consummate his conversion by receiving communion. Thereafter, it would be harder for adversaries to deny his catholicism, or to challenge the sacred authority of a legitimate, crowned king. By 19 January 1594, the coronation was again under consideration; by 24 January Edmondes knew that it was rescheduled.7

3

Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 131-3, 12/24 January 1594, Edmondes to Burghley; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 83-5, 5 January 1594, Henry IV to Maisse; Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 122 n.1, 15 January 1594, Mayenne to Montpezat. Mayenne said that the affairs of France were worsening and he was struggling to retain the loyalty of the towns. Montpezat must persuade Philip II that he needed Mayenne and obtain a resolution to send forces and large sums of money. Navarre, Mayenne said, would soon have 20,000 men, and there were factions in Paris who favoured him. Mayenne complained bitterly of Philip’s ministers, especially Feria who almost drove him to submit to the king. 4 Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 28-31, 3 January 1594, ‘arrêt’ of the ‘parlement’. 5 De L’Estoile, Journal du règne de Henri IV, i, 460, 470, 12 February 1594. Nevers had an audience on 2 January1594. There was no further news of his final audiences or of his departure from Rome. 6 Martin, ‘La Reprise des relations diplomatiques’, Revue des sciences religieuses, i (1921), 378-84, 21 August 1594, cardinal Gondi to Clement VIII. 7 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 129-31, 9/19 January 1594, Edmondes to Burghley, 131-3, 12/22 January 1594, Edmondes to Burghley; Gomberville, Mémoires de Nevers, i, 693 [20 January 1594], Sega to La Châtre. Sega said that the pope had refused Nevers because Navarre was not penitent. La Châtre retorted that greater moderation would have been more helpful. Ibid., 694-5, 27 January 1594; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 100-3, 28 February 1594, Henry IV to Beauvoir. Henry said that he had had reasons to defer his coronation; now he had reasons to proceed and it had taken place the day before.

Chapter XV: Henry IV and Rome

531

Henry went to Chartres on 15 February 1594 and was crowned on 27 February. The necessary accoutrements and regalia, normally kept at Saint-Denis, had been destroyed by the League. Replacements had therefore to be specially commissioned. The ceremony was conducted by Nicolas de Thou, bishop of Chartres who, for the occasion, was symbolically addressed as ‘monsieur de Reims’. The congregation was restricted, and the ubiquity of armed guards testified to acute anxiety for the king’s safety. The critical aspect of the coronation was, of course, the oath that Henry must swear: Je vous promets et octroye que je vous conserveray en vos privilèges canoniques, comme aussi vos Eglises, et que je vous donneray de bonnes loix, et feray justice, et vous defendray, aydant Dieu par sa grace, selon mon pouvoir, ainsi qu’un Roy en son royaume doit faire par droict et raison à l’endroit des Evesques et de leurs Eglises. Je promets au nom de Jésus-Christ ces choses aux Chrestiens à moy sujets. Premièrement, je mettray peine que le peuple chrestien vive paisiblement avec l’Eglise de Dieu. Outre je tascheray faire qu’en toutes vacations cessent rapines et toutes iniquitez. Outre je commanderay qu’en tous jugements l’équité et miséricorde ayent lieu; à cette fin que Dieu clément et miséricordieux fasse miséricorde à moi et à vous. Outre je tascheray à mon pouvoir en bonne foy de chasser de ma jurisdiction, et terre de ma sujétion, tous hérétiques dénoncez par l’Eglise, promettant par serment de garder tout ce qui a été dit. Ainsi Dieu m’ayde, et ses saincts Evangiles de Dieu.

The coronation oath was a major focus of huguenot anxiety, despite the king’s promise that nothing could oblige him to persecute them. Nevertheless, the very plain requirement to expel heretics from his jurisdiction was unfortunate to say the least. His predecessors had also been constrained to compromise in this respect; there was simply no way to escape from mental reservations and subtle definitions.8

II: The Recovery of Paris News of the king’s coronation reached Paris on 1 March 1594. Thereafter, the recovery of Paris was his priority. Paradoxically, this was assisted by the replacement of the governor Belin, who wanted peace, by Charles de Cossé Brissac, who was thought to be more zealous. But Brissac had his own ambitions, and his price; there was nothing to be gained by supporting Mayenne. It appears that the intrigue to deliver Paris by intelligence had begun at Chartres. Schomberg, Bellièvre and J.-A. de Thou, who had all assisted in engineering Henry’s conversion, now plotted the bloodless recovery of Paris. They worked through Brissac’s kinsman, Antoine de Silly, seigneur de Rochepot, and Brissac concluded an agreement with the king (no date). His price was a marshal’s baton, 300,000 ‘livres’, and an annual pension of 30,000 ‘écus’.9 During the next few weeks a serious internal contest arose over the control of the city. This occurred between the remains of the Seize and the preachers – the pro-Spanish 8

Couturier, ‘Chartres 1594: Le Sacre du roi Henry IV’, Bulletin de la société archéologique d’Eure-et-Loire, xl (1944), 1-24, gives a full account of the ‘sacre’, based on a contract of 20 August 1593, and the report by the bishop of Chartres in Godefroy, Le Cérémonial de France (edn., 1949), i, 306-42. 9 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 383; Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 120, 122.

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extremists – on the one hand and, on the other, the ‘parlement’ and bourgeois who were increasingly anxious for peace. In this conflict, the key factor appears to have been – as in 1588 – the control of the civic guards in each quartier. The majority of these guards now favoured peace. Mayenne, who had never been popular in Paris, was virtually squeezed out. His sister, madame de Nemours, had wind of the conspiracy and denounced Brissac. She warned Mayenne that he must capitulate with the king before departing, or lose the city; and that would not endear him to the Spanish. Seriously at odds with Feria, but without wanting peace, Mayenne was searching for a way out. On 5 March 1594, he summoned the captains of the quartiers and L’Huillier, the ‘prévôt des marchands’, but without apparent results. Next day, 6 March, Mayenne left Paris for Soissons, preparatory to meeting Mansfelt. Mayenne was evidently followed, or accompanied, by Tassis, and shortly went to Brussels to importune the archduke Ernest for help.10 A few days after Mayenne’s departure, about 10 March 1594, Henry moved from Chartres to Saint-Denis and, on 17 March, to Senlis. Meanwhile, during the internal conflict, Brissac pursued the conspiracy. He received overtures from his brother-in-law, François d’Épinay de Saint-Luc, in the name of the king. Ostensibly on family business, the kinsmen met at the abbey of Saint-Antoine. There they made their decisions and drafted plans to admit the king into Paris. On 18 March 1594, Mayenne had all his possessions removed from the city; he evidently knew that his authority was eclipsed. Brissac then accorded with the ‘parlement’, ‘corps de ville’, and officers of the quartiers. They were informed, on the eve of the event, that peace had been made, to which any resistance must be rigorously opposed. In the small hours of 22 March 1594, royalist forces, many of them withdrawn from neighbouring garrisons, were admitted into Paris. Six separate corps converged on the city, entering by different gates, one approaching by river to the Arsenal. Henry himself entered by the porte Neuve through which Henry III had fled, never to return. At that highly symbolic moment, Brissac duly received his marshal’s baton. The king’s men occupied key positions, while Brissac and others distributed a declaration, prepared at Saint-Denis. It promised that the king would live as a catholic, and it accorded an amnesty. This effectively neutralised potential resistance so that, by midday, all but the Bastille was controlled by the king; the fortress held out until 27 March. Henry dined in the Louvre – where he had not set foot since 1576 – and attended a Te Deum in Notre-Dame. He sent for the legate, possibly hoping that Sega might now see fit to recognise him. But Sega refused to greet the king; Du Perron escorted him to Montargis where he remained until, early in June, he was recalled. In Paris a number of prominent undesirables were expelled, but there were no dramatic reprisals and few recriminations.11

10

Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 161-2. By 4 February 1594, Mayenne’s secretary was already in Brussels insisting that, without aid, Paris would be lost. Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1593-4, p. 419. 11 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1593-4, p. 470, Sega arrived in Rome on 13 November 1594; Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 106; Rocquain, La France et Rome, 507-10; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 162-76; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 383-92, 398; de L’Estoile, Journal du règne de Henri IV, i, 478-98, includes a list of those expelled from Paris; Buisseret, Henry IV, 51-4; Berger de Xivrey,


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Repossession of Paris was the political counterpart to Henry’s conversion. It was achieved without bloodshed, sack or pillage – as Henry had always desired. It probably did more than any other single event to destroy the League, which had long been centred in Paris. Henry began at once to restore the royal authority and to impose order. On 28 March the ‘parlement’ was reinstated. The magistrates from Tours returned on 14 April. All detrimental edicts and ‘arrêts’ passed since 29 December 1588 were annulled; so were all the acts of the so-called estates-general. The privileges and liberties of the city and university were restored, and the religious edict of Poitiers, 1577, remained in force. Offices and benefices conferred by Mayenne were to be surrendered, but they could be re-applied for. On 30 March 1594, the authority and powers of Mayenne as lieutenantgeneral were revoked. It became treason to serve him, and the whole house of Lorraine was called upon to submit. Printers and booksellers were ordered to destroy seditious works, some of which were publicly burnt. On 2 April 1594, the Sorbonne submitted and was pardoned. On 22 April they recognised the king and enjoined obedience to him; those who obstructed his absolution were condemned as enemies of the state.12 All this did much to establish Henry IV as the recognised, catholic king, despite the success of his enemies in Rome. Henry, for his part, was punctilious in his catholic observances, and especially over Easter (10 April 1594). The archbishop of Bourges strove to silence the seditious preaching which still poisoned Parisian life. However, on Mayenne’s favourite pretext of awaiting Papal authority, the Jesuit and Capuchin orders persisted in their rebellion. They refused either to recognise or to pray for the king. Freed by the pope (in 1584) from episcopal jurisdiction, and devoted to the service of Spain and the Papacy, the Jesuits had long been a dangerously seditious element in the body politic. They had notoriously contributed to the destruction of Henry III; they abused the confessional for political ends; they interfered in the parishes, expelling moderate curés; they meddled in the affairs of the League, and served as liaison between the Seize and the Spanish. Mendoza had often chaired the council of the Seize in the Jesuit college, rue Saint-Jacques. They were the invaluable agents of Spain for whom, notoriously, murder was a normal weapon. Thus they had openly advocated regicide in respect of Henry III, and they did so again, against Henry IV. Allain, principal of the Jesuit seminary at Reims, wrote a book-length apology of regicide in the case of excommunicated kings, and his brethren had recently been implicated in Barrière’s attempt on Henry’s life. So long as they refused to submit, the Jesuits represented a serious danger. Thus in April 1594 the Sorbonne requested the ‘parlement’ to banish them. The consequent case against the Jesuits was still pending when, at the end of 1594, a major row erupted on account of another assault in which Henry was injured. The now inevitable expulsion of the Jesuits had serious repercussions in Rome just when discussions about the king’s absolution had secretly been resumed.13 Lettres missives, iv, 120-1, 22 March 1594, circular letter on Paris, 122-4, 22 March 1594, Henry IV to Pisani. 12 Goulart, Mémoires de la Ligue, vi, 88; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 180-93; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 393-8. 13 Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 186-7, 204-23; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 398.

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III: The Return to War Following his arrival in Paris, Henry enjoyed the pleasure of watching from the Louvre as the Spanish garrison departed, unmolested. The troops were accompanied by Feria and Ibarra. Totally amazed at such unexpected forbearance, the Spaniards were moved to comment on Henry’s generosity.14 Nevertheless, their expulsion from Paris was a serious blow to reputation, and rendered the imposition of a Spanish monarch utterly remote. The salient factor was the absence of a Spanish field army in France. But, not completely dislodged, Feria now proposed to make La Fère in Picardy (ceded to Parma) the principal Spanish base. Henceforth, the war would mainly centre in the north east, and on the Netherlands’ frontier.15 After leaving Paris, on 6 March 1594, Mayenne made his way to Brussels. His notorious opposition to the infanta assured him a cool reception. Ironically it was from the lips of the archduke himself, on 27 March 1594, that Mayenne learnt of the loss of Paris. Thereupon he threw a fit of rage, swearing to continue the war; that, however, depended upon receiving help from the archduke. The loss of Paris was a turning point; the Spanish wondered whether the war was over, or whether Philip II would now pursue what Tassis called a ‘real’ war.16 Feria, who hated Mayenne and was more single minded than Tassis, thought that Paris might be recovered. Meanwhile he proposed to occupy some fortified position and try to reconstruct the government of the League. But for that, he still needed Mayenne. In June 1594 Feria reached agreements with the ‘gouverneurs’ of La Fère and Ham.17 It is uncertain what he achieved, and there is little evidence relating to Mayenne at this time. His role was no longer clearly defined. To the Spanish, he was mainly a demanding nuisance. They did not, however, want Mayenne to accord with the king, and that was his trump card. He and the Spanish therefore continued their abrasive relationship a little longer. Faced with the possibility of a ‘real’ war, it was essential for Henry to take the field again without delay. He had been preparing for this resumption of war for several months. But, as usual, he was desperate for 3,000 men from England, although the grand duke had provided a Swiss contingent.18 At Chartres, shortly before the coronation, sir Robert Sidney had delivered queen Elizabeth’s reciprocal bond of amity, but no answer about troops. This request for troops had been pending since the mission to England of the vidame de Chartres in March 1593. Since then, Henry had repeated his request no less than five times. Now, in mid-March 1594, he informed Sidney that the Spanish had reached the last frontier village in the Netherlands, and were about to march towards 14

Safe conduct for the Spanish had been part of Henry’s agreement with Brissac. All the king wanted was to be rid of them. Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 152-6, 28 March 1594, Feria to Philip II, Laon, 161-5, 30 March 1594, Tassis to Philip II, Brussels. 15 Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 150, 152-6, 28 March 1594, Feria to Philip II; ibid., 160. 16 Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 164. 17 Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 236-7. 18 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 126-8, 16/26 December 1593, Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes went to England on 2 March and returned to France on 23 May 1594. He joined the king at Laon on 13 June. Ibid., 133-4, 20/30 January 1594, Edmondes to Burghley, 138-40, 4/14 June 1594, Edmondes and Williams to Burghley.


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Guise and Chauny. The queen remained adamant believing that, with so many towns submitting to the king (including Rouen on 30 March 1594), Henry could provide for himself. She did not appreciate the cost of Leaguer submissions, almost all of which had to be purchased.19 Mansfelt had, indeed, been sent to guard the frontier, and he assembled his forces at Valenciennes. Campaigning recommenced when he took La Capelle on 9 May 1594. Hearing of this attack, Henry summoned his dispersed forces and ordered Charles de Biron to meet him at Compiègne.20 But, at Chauny on 9 May 1594, he learnt of the fall of La Capelle. Once again, a major victory in the field could have ended the war. Together with Nevers, Henry therefore sought battle with Mansfelt somewhere near Crécy; but again he declined. Since Henry’s presence in the area was essential, he decided to recover Laon, the Leaguer stronghold.21 When Henry arrived, on 26 May, Mayenne fled to Brussels to beg for help. According to de Thou, Feria pressed for his arrest, because he served no one but himself. The archduke, however, thought that too risky, and decided to help in the defence of Laon. Mayenne and Mansfelt, together with Feria, therefore entered Laon on 9 June 1594.22 As the siege got under way, Henry heard that 12,000 men in Italy were preparing to attack Lyon. From that moment on he was torn by the need to go to Lyon. But the siege of Laon lasted until 2 August 1594; after that, other matters still detained the king.23 Henry’s progress, however, now appeared impressive: he was catholic, he was crowned, and he had recovered first Paris and then Laon; no one could doubt that he was indeed the King of France. This outstanding success in 1594, albeit shortlived, profoundly affected his fortunes in Rome.

IV: The Pope’s Anxiety Deeply preoccupied by the war, upon which his survival depended, Henry IV had come to regard the question of his absolution as closed.24 Since Clement VIII had created that impression in France, there was nothing more that Henry could do. Clement VIII, for his part, had long since begun to fear that his scurrilous treatment of Nevers had irretrievably alienated the French. If the matter of Henry’s absolution were ever to be resumed, the 19

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1593-4, pp. 380, 382-4, 386, 391. Charles de Gontaut de Biron, son of Armand de Gontaut, baron de Biron, ‘maréchal’ 1594, duc de Biron, 1598, executed 31 July 1602. 21 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 581-2; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 495-502. 22 Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 579; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 495-6; Capefigue, Histoire de la réforme, vii, 240-2, 20 June 1594, Feria to Philip II. 23 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 157-61, 26 May 1594, Henry IV to Beauvoir, 200-2, 4 August 1594, Henry IV to Épernon; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 142-4, 20/30 June 1594, Edmondes to Burghley. After the successful siege of Laon, Amiens (14 August 1594) and Beauvais submitted. The duc de Lorraine submitted on 16 November, and Guise on 29 November 1594. The cities of Burgundy began to abandon Mayenne. Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 588-9; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 510. 24 From intercepted letters (no date) the king learnt of Sessa’s assurance to Feria that the pope was quite firm in his decision not to absolve Navarre. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 231-3, 4 March 1594 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 20

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difficulties would now be formidable. Indeed, the matter remained in suspense for most of the year 1594, after Nevers’ departure in January; the debate, however, continued. Clement’s principal foreign concern was the need for defence against the Turks, which involved collaboration with Spain. But, because of Spain’s heavy commitments in western Europe, the Turkish problem became inseparable from that of Henry IV and France. This increased the pope’s difficulties. For a while, Clement partly hoped that the arrival in the Netherlands of the archduke Ernest (30 January 1594) might relieve him of the French problem altogether. Ernest, however, had little but his rank to commend him; his poor health and incapacity were quickly apparent, and he died on 20 February 1595. As Ernest offered no solution, Clement wished, increasingly, to be able to absolve the king with the security of Spanish assent. For upwards of eighteen months, this hope informed his thinking and conduct in respect of the absolution.25 While still pursuing Spanish assent, Clement tentatively embarked upon secret and unofficial negotiations with cardinal Gondi in Rome. Nevertheless, his personal doubts and reservations, as well as his legalistic approach, had always to be reckoned with. Consequently the process of obtaining Henry’s absolution would still be protracted, tortuous, and uncertain; at no point could a successful outcome be regarded as a foregone conclusion. Clement VIII was in a state of maximum indecision when, on the day of Nevers’ departure, 14 January 1594, Joyeuse, Senecy, and the abbé d’Orbais arrived in Rome on behalf of Mayenne and the League. Like Montpezat in Spain, they came to propound Mayenne’s cause. They tried to sustain the fiction that the election of a catholic king was only deferred, and they sought material help. Clement recounted Nevers’ mission, and reassured the envoys that he could not absolve Navarre. But he also excused himself from helping them, citing the cost of the Turkish war.26 During a long wait for letters from Mayenne, news from France of multiple submissions (in particular, Meaux and Lyon) produced a marked effect in Rome. Sega even reported that Paris itself was in danger.27 Over the following weeks, Joyeuse and Senecy came to the conclusion that Navarre could not now be dislodged; consequently they altered their tactics. They began to think that it might be best for Clement to confer the benediction after all, but together with a general peace in France upholding Mayenne in the defence of religion. In other words, the Leaguers began to think about saving their skins. Very doubtful of the outcome in France, Sega advised Clement not to destroy all contact with the French; it was important to sustain some thread of negotiation.28 25

The calculation of eighteen months is based on the appointment, in October 1593, of Camillo Borghese as extraordinary nuncio to Spain and the return in mid-May 1595 of another special envoy, Gian-Francesco Aldobrandini. Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Ponteficia en España, i, 360, 363; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 509-26, 20 May 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 26 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 181-3, 15 January 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate, 196-8, 29 January 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 185-7, 29 January 1594, anon. 27 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 187-8, – March 1594, Delbene to Vinta; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 201-2, 5 February 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate, 223-4, 26 February 1594 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1593-4, pp. 467-8. 28 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 243-8, 3 August 1595, (sic) Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. These points were later made by the pope himself.


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In view of this advice, and the disturbing reports from France, Clement sent for cardinal Gondi who was finally preparing to leave for France. Instead, he came to Rome some time between 5 and 19 February 1594.29 With the confirmation (by 22 February 1594) of the submission of Lyon, opinion in Rome began to tilt in favour of the king. In the growing belief that Henry would establish control of the kingdom, cardinals and ambassadors advised the pope to recognise reality. Paruta added to this pressure; but he observed that Clement was believed to have promised the Spanish that he would never – at any time or in any event – absolve Navarre.30 That would explain the need for Spanish assent, which was otherwise contrary to Papal dignity. Early in March 1594, further letters from Sega produced something of a crisis in Rome. He reported that Paris would shortly be lost; also that Henry intended to be crowned. By virtue of the episcopal absolution, he would receive the sacraments and proceed to fill ecclesiastical benefices.31 Both Sessa and the League envoys were now convinced that Navarre could not be removed from France. Sessa reacted by sending a courier to Spain with an urgent demand for provisions in order to sustain the war. He claimed to have induced the pope to defer making any decision until the end of May.32 The subject of the election was now replaced by damage limitation tactics. League and Spanish policies, however, were not identical. Sessa, henceforth, was concerned to obstruct and delay the absolution so effectively as to frustrate it altogether; and that could have been possible. Joyeuse came round to the opinion that Navarre should be absolved, but not without first extracting substantial advantages for the League.33 Following an important audience on 13 or 14 March 1594, d’Orbais prepared a memoir for Joyeuse and Senecy, reformulating their policy. The envoys’ revised purpose was to stop the spate of separate, individual treaties with the king, which were causing the League to disintegrate. The people, they said, were now determined to recognise the king. The only way to halt their alienation from Rome was to change their conviction that peace would never come from the pope. So the envoys requested the pope to declare his intention to promote peace, beginning with a truce for one year. During that time, Clement could treat for the security of religion and the people. Whether that would include the king’s absolution, they did not say; but they concurred with the Spanish policy of raising obstructions. Presumably that was for leverage with which to obtain better terms. While vigorously hedging their bets, the envoys were not so much seeking peace as the preservation of the League as a corporate entity. Since it was known that the king would reject a long truce, he could then be accused of refusing to obey the pope; and the League would have fresh pretexts for rearming against him. Above all, they wanted 29

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 201-2, 5 February 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate, 217-19, 19 February 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate. 30 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 219-21, 26 February 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate, 223-4, 26 February 1594 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 31 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 231-3, 4 March 1594 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 32 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 240-1, 12 March 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 33 According to one source, they hoped to wring concessions out of Gondi. But Gondi had no commission and could only advise. Degert, Le Cardinal d’Ossat, 105.

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the pope to obtain Spanish support for a quick Papal declaration condemning the opportunist agreements with Leaguer members and cities. Delbene observed that their purpose was to keep a strong fire burning under the cinders. The memoir is muddled because of its ambivalence between war and peace. But the proposals would have the advantage of protecting the leaders, and obtaining Papal sanction in the case of an accommodation which might soon be necessary.34 By the time the memoir was presented, on 19 March 1594, there were rumours from Brussels that Henry’s coronation had taken place.35 Joyeuse and Senecy received no proper answer to the memoir. It was, however, twice put to the French congregation, very secretly.36 Unable to obtain help, either for war or for peace, the envoys gave up and prepared to leave Rome after Easter. Gondi intended to follow them, and Delbene would go too.37 Clement had little enough concern for the fate of the League; and he could not broker a peace in France without recognising the king. Sessa’s proposal was altogether simpler: he wanted the pope to repeat, in consistory, Navarre’s exclusion from the throne, and to censure the leaders of the cities which submitted.38 This proposal was out of the question; nor was Clement prepared to be jostled by Henry’s supporters into ‘recognising reality’ – not even after the confirmation (21 April) of the fall of Paris.39 Clement’s mind was rather disturbed than changed by these developments. He was really waiting to hear more about the mission of Borghese, his special nuncio to Spain.40 If only Clement could induce the Spanish to endorse Navarre’s absolution, everything would be different. Borghese, in fact, was having no success. In the spring of 1594 (no other date), Clement asked him to ensure that Philip II appreciated the dangers involved in continuing to reject Navarre. Philip, however, was also influenced by the news from France, and he attributed Henry’s successes to the receipt of Italian money. He now feared that if Navarre were permitted to prosper, he might revive the ancient French claims to Milan and Naples. He therefore wished Navarre to be definitively overthrown in battle. That was, of course, intended to clear the way for the infanta and the archduke Ernest. So Philip listened to Borghese without conceding anything.41 Borghese had no better success with Philip’s ministers. They declared Navarre’s conversion to be feigned, and talk of schism to be alarmist. Borghese perceived a split in the council over the wisdom of an open war against Navarre. Doubtless this accounts for some apparent confusion in Spanish policy as to whether they wanted a dynastic war, or desired the pope to mediate peace. Borghese did, however, intimate that Spain was less hostile than 34

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 188-92, 25 March 1594, Delbene to Vinta. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 246-8, 19 March 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate. 36 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 188-92, 25 March 1594, Delbene to Vinta. 37 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 192-3, 1 April 1594, Delbene to Vinta. 38 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 261-4, 2 April 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 39 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 192-3, 1 April 1594 (3), Delbene to Vinta; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 261-4, 2 April 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate. 40 Borghese’s instructions were dated 6 October 1593 and he reached Madrid on 17 January 1594. Jaitner, Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens’ VIII, 155-69. 41 Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Pontificia en España, i, 374-5. 35


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Sessa’s performance led the pope to suppose; that was something. Borghese believed that if the pope remained firm against absolving Navarre, Spain would make war on France from the Netherlands. But, if it appeared that the pope was proceeding otherwise, Spain would concentrate on delaying tactics. She would propose a general peace and aim at securing Brittany and Saluzzo. In six months, Borghese obtained only a promise of some money for the Turkish war, when the American treasure fleet arrived. About France specifically, he received no answer at all; he was simply referred back to the hostile Sessa in Rome.42 In practice, the contrary Spanish policies could run concurrently. Well before Borghese left Spain, Sessa had come up with ‘new arguments’ – as Paruta said – for paralysing Papal action. Fearing the effects on the pope of the fall of Paris, Sessa proposed that Clement should seek a general peace as the price of Henry’s absolution. Henry would then reject the peace, Spain would continue to obstruct the absolution, and nothing would be done. Obstruction is what it was all about.43 In the spring and early summer of 1594, Clement VIII was in a complex and volatile situation. He was now being pressed to absolve Navarre; he was also under pressure to negotiate two different sorts of agreement by opponents who feared Navarre’s progress. On the one hand, Sessa proposed a general peace – which Philip II had not endorsed – while opposing the absolution which peace would require; this was obstruction. The League, on the other hand, really wanted war, but saw that capitulation could not long be postponed. In that case, it would be preferable to have their king absolved, provided they secured sufficient personal advantages. They hoped thereby to save the League as an entity, while the leaders retained their offices.44 There was also no lack of pressure on the pope ‘to provide’ for the kingdom of France; Paruta, as well as the friendly cardinals, Morosini and Verona, had all been trying. Gondi was anxious to return to his diocese, now that Paris had been retaken. But, as he prepared – once again – to leave Italy, letters were received from Nevers who nobly offered to assist in any negotiation the pope might initiate.45 Gondi’s departure was arranged for 10 May 1594. Yet he was reluctant to leave, so long as he perceived the smallest hope that Clement might allow him to seek some solution in France. Then the Spanish, fearing what Gondi might achieve, began to object to his departure. They sought the revocation of his licence, asserting that to let a cardinal go to Paris was tantamount to recognising the king.46 Since Gondi was the bishop of Paris, the argument was transparent. Gondi did leave Rome, on 25 May 1594, with licence to depart. It was widely believed, Paruta said, that the pope was beginning ‘to bend’, and would consent to ‘hear’ 42

Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Pontificia en España, i, 375-7, quoting letters of 8, 11, 18 May, 11 and c. 14 June 1594 from Borghese to Aldobrandi, secretary of state. Clement instructed Borghese to prepare a report on the Spanish king and kingdom. The report is interesting but unlikely to have affected policy. Borghese left Madrid on 15 June and sailed for Italy on 27 June 1594. Ibid., 378-83. 43 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 283-5, 23 April 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate. 44 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 300-3, 7 May 1594 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 45 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 291-3, 30 April 1594, 298-300, 7 May 1594, 300-3, 7 May 1594 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 46 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 306-9, 14 May 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate, 314-16, 21 May 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate.

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what was proposed in respect of an agreement with the king. But first he must send another envoy and lodge a formal request. By that, Paruta meant something substantially different from seeking confirmation of the events at Saint-Denis.47 Unfortunately there is no report of Gondi’s last audience with Clement VIII. Allowing him to go could be seen as a shrewd, face-saving attempt to crack the deadlock which was becoming dangerous. As a man who would put his foot in the door and keep it ajar, and also as an opponent of schism, Gondi could now be more useful in France than in Italy. Unable to make any direct gesture himself, Clement needed Gondi if he was ever to restore communications with France. A door ajar is not a door wide open; definitive statements about Gondi’s instructions and Papal undertakings are misleading and wide of the mark. If the King of France resented his ill-treatment by the pope, Clement was not anxious to be rebuffed in his turn. Gondi was not dispatched to France; he was licensed to return to his diocese.48 Expectations were certainly attached to his return, because of his own constructive approach; he would do everything possible to further the king’s absolution. Without Gondi’s efforts at this time, it would never have been conferred. Gondi’s departure from Rome in May 1594 possibly marked the start of a new stage, or development, in Papal thinking, albeit not definitive. Clement was beginning to persuade himself that he would have to decide to accept Navarre.49 Apart from his own mutability, and the pressure from Navarre’s supporters, Clement once again came under the influence of external circumstances. In the first place, he received a report from Sega’s nephew on the exact state of affairs in France; this confirmed that Henry did, indeed, possess the crown. Other information testified to the weakness of Spain in the Netherlands where the archduke Ernest was neither respected nor obeyed. Feria had been recalled from France; Mayenne had difficulty in finding any place of refuge, while Sega expected a general pacification.50 Even more disturbing, letters from Nevers, received in Rome by 4 June 1594, delivered a serious warning. Since his return to France, Nevers had not yet ventured to go to court, waiting until the pope reached some more favourable resolution. Nevers had feared that his appearance might provoke a violent anti-Papal reaction; the results might be serious for Rome, and possibly irreversible. Now, however, he must attend an assembly of prelates and notables to work on ecclesiastical business. Schism, he said, was the most likely outcome. Nevers proposed that if Clement could not openly declare his will, he might at least make it known secretly.51 On 13 June 1594, the cardinal secretary of state informed Nevers, somewhat obliquely, that if Henry now

47

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 331-4, 4 June 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. See, for example: Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 101-5; Féret, Henri IV et l’église, 161, says that the pope was won over to the royal cause; Martin, ‘La Reprise des relations diplomatiques’, Revue des sciences religieuses, i (1921), 378-84, 21 August 1594, Gondi to Clement VIII. 49 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 336-9, 11 June 1594 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 50 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 321-5, 28 May 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate, 331-4, 4 June 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 51 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 331-4, 4 June 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 48


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showed signs of repentance, the pope was not bent on his perpetual exclusion.52 If that was not a generous offer, the door was at least ajar. Clement now ventured to employ the theologians on demolishing their former arguments against absolution, and on resolving technicalities. They must enable him to perform a volte-face without loss of reputation. This reversal, however, was only to be without restoring Henry’s aptitude to reign. Paruta observed that the king was already reigning, and would never admit to holding his throne from the pope. Supporters now agreed that Henry must be induced to send another envoy and request absolution; and the pope must be persuaded to grant it.53 Clement had freely admitted, when the eventuality was remote, that if Navarre were to prevail, he would have to be recognised. Clement was now impelled in this direction by the collapse of the League. Fearing a straight war between France and Spain, he was patently dismayed by Mansfelt’s capture of La Capelle (9 May 1594) without French participation.54 Everything would now be more difficult because a dynastic war between France and Spain would burden the pope with obtaining peace. But that, it has been seen, required the absolution and recognition opposed by Sessa with inexhaustible ingenuity. The only conceivable solution was to deliver peace and absolution simultaneously.55 But Henry IV would never consider peace before the rebels had submitted; Nevers and Gondi had made that clear. Nor would Henry contemplate Papal mediation with Spain before his absolution. So far as Rome was concerned, Henry was now in a strong position. But Clement would have to justify his absolution by obtaining impressive concessions – in other words, a hard bargain. That would not be easy.56 In these circumstances, news from Gondi was anxiously awaited.

V: Gondi Restores Communication On his way to Paris, Gondi visited Sega at Montargis. No longer hostile, the legate offered his advice, which was to send Du Perron to Rome. Gondi arrived in Paris on 2 July 1594. On 12 July, he joined the king at the siege of La Fère; his business naturally aroused keen curiosity.57 Edmondes reported that the pope had now agreed to Henry’s absolution, provided he would send an envoy to request it. That was not true, but was probably what Edmondes feared.58 Gondi quickly became aware of the anger aroused in France by the rejection of Nevers; and he swiftly reported heavy pressure on the king to 52

Rocquain, La France et Rome, 514; Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 106-7. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 339-41, 11 June 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. It was not known in Rome whether Gondi had any instructions; Paruta, rightly, believed not. 54 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 341-4, 18 June 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate. 55 Gondi did not, in fact, raise the point in France. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 159-61, 21/31 August 1594, Edmondes to Burghley. 56 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 372-4, 16 July 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate, 396-8, 6 August 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 57 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 144-7, 30 June/10 July 1594, Edmondes to Burghley. News of Gondi’s arrival reached Rome by 30 July 1594. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 384-8, 30 July 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 58 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 148-51, 23 July/2 August 1594, Edmondes to Burghley. 53

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permit the chapters to fill clerical vacancies, now and for ever. This, Paruta said, was the key item, upon which depended schism or obedience.59 Anger against the pope fuelled the ambition and cupidity of those who would profit from schism. The whole council appeared to believe that Henry was hated by the pope; and they wanted nothing more to do with Rome. That was understandable, but not wise. Bonciani, agent of the grand duke of Tuscany, was very anxious that the imminence of a schism should be made clear in Rome.60 The king was now caught between the pressure from those who wanted him to send to Rome, and those who favoured schism. While Henry himself wisely deprecated schism, he had more or less dismissed the matter of absolution from his mind. Gondi’s own account of his negotiation with the king is cautious and reticent. He claimed to have gone to tell the king how ‘everyone’ regretted the lack of communication with Rome. From this it was deduced that Henry no longer sought Papal benediction – which was true.61 The king now believed (‘a quasi ferma impressione’) that Papal grace was unobtainable. Gondi had had to make the most strenuous efforts (‘ho durato gran fatica’) to persuade him otherwise. Henry protested that he had asked the pope many times, and had sent an ambassador of rank. Gondi replied that Clement’s severity did not indicate a resolution to reject him; but he did expect the king to show greater signs of penitence. Henry protested that he had done everything required of him by the French prelates; he did not know what else he was supposed to do. To this Gondi suggested several of the things which had long been voiced in Rome: the prince de Condé should be brought up as a catholic; and the decrees of Trent could be published, to which the pope might admit some qualifications. There were also points relating to the exercise of protestantism and, remarkably, an admonition to desist from flirting with nuns. Gondi and the king had a long dispute about whether or not he should send another envoy to Rome. In effect, Henry was now accepted as a catholic, and his subjects had begun to submit. But that process might cease if, by sending to Rome, Henry appeared to undermine, or to question, the validity of his episcopal absolution; that was a new difficulty. Henry himself did desire reconciliation, perceiving the greater wisdom of ending the breach with Rome; for one thing, he needed a divorce. But another fiasco would be altogether too damaging. Gondi said that the pope had deferred, but had never refused absolution; that was how things worked. It was the king’s duty to restore the church in France; and if he sent to the pope again, he would be received. That affirmation was the voice of faith, and quite a risk; Clement had made no actual commitment. But what Henry and the pope had in common was a desire to avert a schism. Both the clergy and the laity, however, were trying to persuade the king that schism was necessary; the huguenots also desired it, albeit 59

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 403-6, 13 August 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 289-93, 13 August 1594, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany. Bonciani was the grand duke’s secret agent in France where he dared not openly accredit an ambassador. He was known as Baccio Strozzi, and pretended to be a clerk in cardinal Gondi’s household. 61 Gondi evidently saw the king at sufficient length sometime between 2 and 13 August 1594, after the fall of Laon. Martin, ‘La Reprise des relations diplomatiques’, Revue des sciences religieuses, i (1921), 378-84, 21 August 1594, Gondi to Clement VIII; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 289-93, 13 August 1594, Bonciani to the grand duke. 60


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for different reasons. On Sega’s advice, Gondi suggested sending Jacques Davy Du Perron to Rome. By 13 August 1594, Henry had agreed to do so. His first intention then, in mid-August, was to send Du Perron at once, but with express orders to leave again if he saw that the absolution was either to be refused or delayed. Clearly Henry was under a misapprehension; great difficulties had still to be overcome, and great patience would still be required. Together Gondi, Nevers and Du Perron must have contrived to enlighten him. Having defended the pope to the king, Gondi proceeded to defend the king to the pope. In a long letter of 21 August 1594, he explained to Clement VIII that Henry was already trying to obtain custody of the young prince de Condé, and would co-operate over the decrees of Trent. Gondi denied an allegation that Henry still attended protestant services; he heard mass every morning and performed catholic observances. He was also doing his best to restore catholicism.62 That was difficult because once again, though Gondi did not say so, Henry was faced with a serious huguenot problem, for which few made any allowance. Gondi was aware that Clement had not yet committed himself to absolving the king, and suffered his own misgivings. Consequently, Gondi expressed faith in God that the pope would now use clemency, and implored him to have compassion on France. If he were to refuse the king again, there would be no further chance.63 To the secretary, Aldobrandini, Gondi wrote a rather different letter. The king, he said, had agreed to send another envoy for the same purpose for which Nevers had gone [namely to offer obedience and receive benediction, without prejudice to what had gone before]. But he would only do so provided there were to be no impossible conditions liable to provoke trouble in France. Nor were any third party interests to be embraced; that excluded clauses relating to Spain, Savoy or the League.64 The pope remained generally silent about Gondi’s work in France, speaking only to Toledo and the cardinal nephews. Paruta learnt simply that Du Perron was expected and would be received. The Venetian, however, was not very optimistic on this account. He believed that many difficulties would be raised, and that Clement would seek to enhance his reputation by delaying the absolution. Since, from the outset, Du Perron was commanded not to linger in Rome, the situation was inauspicious. Communication alone was not enough. The pope’s thinking was coloured by his extreme anxiety over Turkey. Any perceptible move towards Henry IV would increase the Spanish disinclination to co-

62

The treaties with a number of Leaguer towns excluded the cult. Where the religious edicts were contravened, Henry had a problem with the huguenots. It was this type of difficulty that later gave rise to the second group of fifty-six articles in the edict of Nantes in 1598. Similarly, major offices were going to Leaguers who submitted, and the religious edicts were not registered by the ‘parlements’. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, vi, 30-2, 20 March 1594, Duplessis to Montigny, 39, 25 March 1594, Duplessis to Esmery, 44-5, 4 April 1594, Duplessis to Lomenie, 66-72, 11 June 1594, paper for de Chouppes for the huguenot assembly at Sainte-Foy. 63 Martin, ‘La Reprise des relations diplomatiques’, Revue des sciences religieuses, i (1921), 378-84, 21 August 1594, cardinal Gondi to Clement VIII; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 289-93, 13 August 1594, Bonciani reported the gist of Gondi’s letter to the grand duke of Tuscany. 64 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 429-31, 8 September 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate.

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operate in the Turkish wars.65 Clement therefore wanted Henry to agree to peace with Spain as much as he wanted Spain to accept the absolution and recognise Henry IV; but neither king was going to comply. Edmondes reported the pope to have proposed a year’s truce, in preparation for peace – which is what the League envoys had sought.66 News of the pope’s willingness to admit Du Perron was received in France by 4 October 1594. Clement also agreed not to demand impossible conditions – which was fairly subjective. It was feared, however, that he might dally over the negotiation, hoping first for a Franco-Spanish peace. The idea of peace was in the air, but prosecution of the war was always Henry’s priority. He would not consider political deals in return for absolution; he was more concerned to obtain an effective English alliance.67 Although Du Perron’s mission was now agreed in principle, he did not leave France for about eight months. Probably Henry wanted, first of all, to see if negotiations with Mayenne (to be discussed) would lead to his submission, just as he had hoped to make peace in France before sending Nevers to Rome in 1593. Henry also intended Du Perron’s mission to coincide with his own appearance in Lyon, scheduled for early October 1594. While these were matters of timing, which concerned the king, the mission itself aroused considerable controversy. There was strong opposition to be overcome from Henry’s own supporters, an aversion which was doubtless increased by the machinations of his enemies. They undermined the king’s deliberations by giving out that the pope had no intention of gratifying him. If Clement had suffered Gondi to raise the king’s hopes – the argument went – he did so only from a fear of schism. He wished to obtain time for Spain to succour the remnants of the League and bring about changes in France. Du Perron would be no better treated than Nevers; he could expect only empty words and offensive conditions – and so forth. Rumours of this kind, which were largely propaganda, arose from various different quarters.68 The appointment of Du Perron had been accepted in Rome with abnormal alacrity – which was some sign of hope. Domestic opposition to his departure therefore placed the king in a difficult position. Reminded also of the power of his enemies in Rome, Henry recoiled a little, pausing for further deliberation. If, in the long term, his absolution was still essential, it was no longer immediately urgent. A more cautious approach might be beneficial, and convey to Clement VIII that it was he who had most to lose; he no longer had for ever in which to torment the King of France. Henry took two decisions: Du Perron would be accompanied by a councillor and a member of the ‘parlement’, presumably both to lessen his burden and to assuage the opposition of Henry’s own supporters. Secondly, Henry decided to approach Arnaud d’Ossat – whose impressive ability was already apparent – and request him to prepare the negotiation in secret. Henry 65

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 429-31, 8 September 1594, 431-3, 10 September 1594, 436-8, 12 September 1594 – in which Paruta said that the pope was sending Gondi an answer next day – 445-8, 17 September 1594, 451-3, 25 September 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate. 66 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 159-61, 21/31 August 1594, Edmondes to Burghley. 67 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 170-4, 26 September/6 October 1594, Edmondes to Burghley, 194-7, 30 November/10 December 1594, Edmondes to Burghley. 68 Ligny, Les Ambassades, du Perron, 135-49, 9 May 1595, instructions for Du Perron and d’Ossat.


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would not risk sending another envoy into the blue, to be insulted by his enemies and bullied by the pope. Accordingly, Henry wrote to the pope, on 8 November 1594, and welcomed his acceptance of Du Perron. He explained the delay in sending his envoy by the burden of his affairs, and an apprehension of his detractors in Rome. He therefore asked the pope to accept the mediation of d’Ossat. Next day, 9 November 1594, Henry wrote d’Ossat a crucial letter (missing); it formed the basis of his preliminary negotiation at the end of 1594 and early in 1595. The king’s purpose is revealed in a comment made by Villeroy to Bonciani: before Du Perron arrived, the pope must first be resolved to grant the absolution.69

VI: The Intrigues of Mayenne As d’Ossat prepared the way in Rome, the imposition of Henry’s authority in France was making impressive progress. After the coronation and the recovery of Paris, the successful siege of Laon was just the sort of exploit Henry needed to sustain his soaring reputation. The fall of Laon was shortly followed by the submission of Amiens; all of Picardy – bar Soissons and La Fère – was soon to be held by the king. An accord with the duc de Guise brought Reims and other places in Champagne under control. Elboeuf and Lorraine also abandoned Mayenne. These successes had a signal effect in Rome, where the timing of the negotiation proved to be crucial. Appearances, however, were deceptive. It had always been the case with Henry of Navarre that everything depended on the war, but now the nature of the war was changing.70 In reality, Henry was in great danger and his position was weak. When, by the summer of 1595, it became apparent that fortune had turned against him in the north east, the negotiation in Rome – albeit nearing completion – again appeared in jeopardy. It is therefore necessary to consider the events in France which so closely affected those in Rome. When cardinal Gondi returned from Rome in July 1594, the matter of Henry’s absolution was only one of many pressing items of business; finance and the huguenots were among the more serious and intractable; there was also the question of whether or not to declare war on Spain. Henry remained at Laon until nearly the end of August 1594. The most acute danger was still there in the north east, although the king’s presence was simultaneously required in many different places. Then, in September, everything was postponed when Henry became seriously ill.71 At least since the beginning of August, Henry had planned to go to Lyon, which was threatened by Savoy and Nemours. But lack of money, as well as pressure of business, obliged him to defer the journey. Brittany also remained a long-term anxiety, and soured his relations with England. Besides all his other difficulties, Henry was in constant danger of assassination. Having no heir, his demise would leave the succession wide open; the Spanish were well aware of this, and ready to 69

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 243-4, 8 November 1594, Henry IV to Clement VIII; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 295-9, 28 December 1594, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany. 70 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 503, 510; Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, i, 582-3, 588-99. 71 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, vi, 90-3, 28 September 1594, Duplessis to Buzanval.

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pounce. Henry’s path through this thicket of trouble was closely affected by Mayenne’s reaction to the fall of Laon. The loss of Laon was a serious blow to Mayenne and the crumbling League whose leaders were defecting. After the siege, Mayenne returned to Brussels in the first week of September 1594. At the same time he sent commissioners to the king proposing to treat for peace.72 Although Mayenne no longer aspired to the throne, he had not otherwise shed his grand illusions. He was still not prepared to recognise the king, and therefore had no intention of making peace. Nevertheless, he sent commissioners because he hoped to stem the disastrous tide of Leaguer submissions. Henry, however, was only willing to negotiate with Mayenne personally, not with the whole League; he made the duke an offer, and required an answer within two weeks. No answer came, so trouble was to be expected.73 Mayenne’s affairs now centred on Burgundy, his only possible retreat. It was not yet apparent that he had already forfeited support in the ‘gouvernement’ he had neglected for so long. Had Mayenne been genuinely willing to accord with the king, he could have retained Burgundy – albeit without the sovereign powers he longed to wield – and with 100,000 écus for his debts. It would greatly have assisted the king to have Mayenne, transmuted and loyal, holding the frontier province for the crown. Henry could then have been free to defend the vulnerable north east, whence disaster would strike. This need was even greater than Henry necessarily realised, as the Spanish intention was to take Picardy, Cambrai, Champagne and the Ile de France. After that, Paris must have been their objective. It was Jeannin and Desportes who pursued a negotiation with the king in August 1594. They claimed lavish advantages for Mayenne and his followers.74 At the same time, Mayenne himself returned to Brussels to seek a new treaty with the Spanish. In an effort to rally the League, he proposed that Philip II should be declared protector of the religion and the catholics of France, pending the election of a king. He also claimed, on behalf of the League, the help that he had been promised. As a guarantee of compensation for expenses, he suggested that Philip should hold certain hostage towns, later to be returned in exchange for money. For himself, Mayenne wished to remain lieutenant-general [of which the ‘parlement’ had already divested him] until the election; he wished to be the Spanish commander in France; he demanded money for war in Burgundy; and he expected to retain the ‘gouvernement’ of Burgundy under the new king. But, needing help to secure the province, he offered thereafter to cede Soissons. Failing all this, Mayenne wished to be provided with foreign lands and a title. Not least, he required huge sums of money and an annual pension. That all this was quite disproportionate to his services

72

Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 148-51, 23 July/2 August 1594, Edmondes to Burghley. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 148-51, 23 July/2 August 1594, Edmondes to Burghley. The long negotiation leading to the submission of Mayenne is a complex subject awaiting clarification. Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 360-1; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 293, 2 October 1594, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany. 74 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 360-3. 73


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seems not to have struck him. If his terms were rejected, he would consider himself to be free.75 Then he would see what he could extort from the king. Feria and Jeannin arrived in Brussels on 22 August 1594. Next day the archduke called a meeting to consider points made by Mayenne.76 Feria was bitter against Mayenne, condemning his egotism and unhelpfulness; he considered nothing but his own profit. Feria blamed Mayenne for the loss of a number of places, including Amiens, hinting at complicity. He proposed to demand Soissons forthwith, and to introduce a Spanish garrison. Nevertheless, he thought it dangerous to abandon Mayenne and the League altogether; he wanted to be sure of Mayenne’s support in Burgundy during the [renewed] war with France which was now expected. Mayenne should be regarded as the prince of Burgundy; his pay should continue, and some garrisons should be subsidised.77 The archduke made Mayenne a proposal, but it offered very little help and would keep him firmly in his place.78 Furious, Mayenne appealed directly to Philip II, which illustrates his divorce from reality. While the archduke awaited answers from Spain, Jeannin and Bassompierre proposed a peace conference with the king. Mayenne was obliged to consent, in order not to be abandoned by the remnants of the party. He wrote to Philip II and to Montpezat, desperate to be believed that he had done his best to save Laon; and he demanded major concessions as reparation for his ill-treatment. To Joyeuse, Mayenne confessed that he was in a hurry to get to Burgundy. He had been in Brussels for a month, without avail.79 Henry is said to have invited Mayenne to submit, possibly at a conference at Poissy in October 1594.80 Sometime in November, Mayenne complained to Rome that he had not obtained all he wanted from the French king. He sent his secretary, Vincent, to Rome in an effort to block the absolution until all sorts of concessions had been extracted from the king. But Mayenne was much mistaken if he really thought that Henry would barter in this way for his absolution. Henry knew that the arch rebel had got to be reduced to submission.81 Mayenne was slow to accept that neither side trusted him, and to appreciate where his best interests lay. It is not clear when he went to Burgundy, allegedly with a sweetener of 20,000 écus from the archduke. One may deduce that Mayenne had been aiming to get Spanish help to subdue Burgundy, in order to put pressure on the king to grant him the ‘gouvernement’ with sovereign powers. 75

De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 507-9. Feria, Fuentes, Tassis, Ibarra and Richardot were all present. 77 Gomberville, Les Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 710, 31 August 1594, Feria to Philip II, 711-15, 27 August 1594, ‘avis’ by Feria. 78 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 509-10. 79 HMC Hatfield, iv, 588-90, 6 September 1594, Mayenne to Philip II, 590-3, 6 September 1594, Mayenne to Joyeuse, 593-5, 6 September 1594, Mayenne to Montpezat. These letters were intercepted and, presumably, of no effect unless dispatched in duplicate by different routes. 80 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 366. Drouot says vaguely that Mayenne continued to negotiate with the king after he had gone to Burgundy. Ibid., 385. 81 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 332-43, 6 December 1594, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 194, 10 December 1594, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. Vincent arrived in Rome on 4 December 1594. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 507-9, 10 December 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 76

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Failing that absurdity, Mayenne would at least have obtained a secure, and strategic, retreat from which to resume his bargaining with Spain.

VII: The Declaration of War, January 1595 As Mayenne began to pose a threat in Burgundy, the huguenots were also on the verge of rebellion. Henry’s fateful decision to declare war on Spain had much to do with their disaffection. Outraged by the generous terms necessarily awarded to individuals and catholic cities, rebellion rather than loyalty was seen by them to be rewarded. After the arrival of Gondi in July 1594, the expectation of a fresh Papal negotiation caused the protestants acute anxiety. Early in November, Henry again met huguenot deputies at Saint-Germain. On 15 November he reissued the edict of Poitiers, 1577, hoping to avert revolt.82 While the ‘parlements’ tended to ignore the edict, its reaffirmation was prejudicial to Henry’s cause in Rome. The suspect huguenot leader, Bouillon, had withheld his services and forces from the siege of Laon, but he pressed for open war with Spain.83 In July 1594, towards the end of the siege, Rosny was sent to Bouillon at Sedan. Inquiring what the king would do next, Bouillon argued strongly in favour of a declaration of war. Big opportunities existed in and around the Netherlands, and war on Spain would please the resentful huguenots. Bouillon put to Rosny the whole huguenot case, hinting that they were preparing for resistance. Bouillon declined to rejoin the king, and Rosny trusted neither his judgement nor his rectitude, perceiving before him an incipient rebel. Naturally Henry had also pondered a declaration of war, and the controversial matter was debated in council. To declare war on Spain before the end of the civil war was risky; and Rosny strongly opposed it. He believed that Spain had so far regarded the French war as merely auxiliary, but would cease to do so if attacked by the king. While a sustained bid for the throne of France was hardly a sideshow, it was perfectly true that the war would escalate. The king, Rosny said, remained in doubt for several months.84 An offensive war would help to define the conflict as foreign, and transfer hostilities to enemy territory. It had always been the aim of the States General of the United Provinces to involve the King of France in open war with Spain. If Henry now attacked Hainault and Artois, as the Estates desired, he was likely to obtain greater support; and the frontier would have to be defended in any case. If not altruistic, Bouillon’s proposal to join forces with the Dutch was not necessarily unwise; and he would be less dangerous if occupied outside France. It appeared from intercepted letters of Mayenne (no date) that a major invasion from the Netherlands was in preparation. Thus, having first done his best to mollify the huguenots, Henry sent Bouillon to defend the frontier and attack the Netherlands. It is therefore most likely that the decision to declare war had been taken by 82

Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 307-8; Fontanon, Les Édits et ordonnances, iv, 360. Duplessis had considered Bouillon’s loyalty doubtful well before the siege of Laon. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, vi, 43-4, 4 April 1594, Duplessis to Vergues. 84 Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Les Œconomies royales, i, 492-3, 502-4, 512-24. Bouillon evidently envisaged impressive successes in Luxembourg or Liège and a welcome pretext for remaining in arms. 83


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the end of October, certainly by early November 1594.85 Henry could then address himself to the matters raised by Gondi. So, on 9 November 1594, Henry wrote his important letter to d’Ossat authorising his secret negotiation in Rome. A declaration of war – well before the mission of Du Perron – was certainly calculated to be of assistance. For example, it would clearly exclude the abrogation of protestant alliances, and war on heretics; such items would obviously be impossible; so also would peace before absolution, which the pope had begun to desire. Besides, a king who declared war on Philip II was not one to be bullied. Henry, however, was not quite ready; he did not want to issue a declaration of war when he knew he would have to go south to Lyon or Burgundy. With the Netherlands and Picardy on his mind, Henry came under mounting pressure to hurry away to the relief of Lyon, threatened by the forces of Savoy. At the same time, it was increasingly obvious that Mayenne, if supported by Spain, could become dangerous.86 Henry had serious misgivings about going so far away while the situation in the north was perilous. Thus from Amiens, on 17 December 1594, he attempted an expedient which might have averted the northern threat and deferred the declaration of war. Henry dispatched a ‘trompette’ to the estates of Hainaut and Artois to announce his intention to take the offensive, indicating that the brunt of the attack would fall upon them. He offered to refrain from declaring war in return for certain guarantees. They must induce the Spanish to withdraw their forces assembling on the frontier, prevent any offensive against Cambrai or France, and cease to protect French rebels. Henry required clear proof of their intentions by 1 January 1595.87 This initiative was immediately disclosed, and doubtless bothered the archduke Ernest. While Henry awaited the reply, a sinister and untoward event occurred which greatly inflamed French hostility to Spain. On 27 December 1594, Jean Chastel attempted to knife the king. Henry’s wound in the lower jaw, albeit slight, was an alarmingly near miss. Friends and foes alike were acutely conscious that he had no heir. This frightening event was more of a shock than a surprise. In the autumn of 1594, when Henry’s progress appeared impressive, the Spanish were more than usually anxious to be rid of him. Now they wished to avert his declaration of war and offensive in the Netherlands. Assassination was the only remaining way by which Spain might seize the throne of France. From Rome, Delmonte informed the grand duke on 26 November 1594 of precisely that: murder was what the Spanish intended, as they could not otherwise arrest the king’s progress. Delmonte repeated this 85

Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1593-4, p. 405, 22 October 1594, Henry IV to Beauvoir; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 162-4, 31 August/10 September 1594, Edmondes to Burghley, 170-4, 26 September/4 October 1594, Edmondes to Burghley; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, vi, 94-5, 4 October 1594, Duplessis to La Fontaine, 95-7, 16 October 1594, Duplessis to La Fontaine; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 306-7. Henry undertook a tour of inspection in Picardy from about 2-26 December 1594. 86 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 187-90, 13/23 November 1594, Edmondes to Burghley, 194-7, 30 November/10 December 1594, Edmondes to Burghley; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1593-4, p. 405, 22 October 1594, Henry IV to Beauvoir. 87 Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1593-4, p. 405.

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prognostication on 17 December 1594, adding that Sessa no longer spoke to anyone of Navarre. Villeroy also received warnings from various quarters that the Spanish meant to murder the king. On 26 December he wrote to tell Duplessis; next day the assault occurred.88 It might well be noted that such incidents were always impeccably timed for the maximum benefit of Spain. Jean Chastel, aged nineteen, had spent three years with the Jesuits, from whom he learnt that it was meritorious to kill a ‘tyrant’. Jean Guignard, regent of the Collège de Clermont, was found to possess papers commending the murder of Henry III and advocating that of Henry IV. He was condemned to death on 7 January 1595. It was never denied that Spain worked through the Jesuits, whose general was always a Spaniard. It was easy enough for them to incite some deluded youth, happy to die in the pursuit of glory and salvation. This serious incident entailed a major row, which damaged the king’s cause in Rome at a critical time. On 29 December 1594, the ‘parlement’ expelled the Jesuits from France. This was not, as has generally been supposed, solely on account of the assault, but also because the Order had refused to submit. So the case for their expulsion, which had been pending since the fall of Paris, was rapidly completed. They were condemned as corrupters of youth, disturbers of public peace, and enemies of the state.89 In Rome the assault was attributed to the belief that Navarre would be absolved [when Du Perron arrived]. Niccolini later observed that when Mayenne’s secretary, Vincent, left Rome (no date), he and Spanish adherents spoke of the assault as if something was imminently expected. Niccolini strongly suspected that Mayenne was [again] implicated, and observed that Sessa passed long hours with the Jesuits. Niccolini thought that the pope regretted Chastel’s failure; his success would have disposed of the whole absolution problem.90 Instead, sensibilities were inflamed by the ‘arrêt’ against Chastel, because it categorically rejected the proposition that the king could not be recognised before his absolution.91 Recognition of the king lay at the sensitive heart of the whole absolution affair. While the decision to declare war had definitely preceded the assault, the two things were evidently related. After the assault, it became impossible to delay the declaration much beyond the king’s recovery. To the duc de Lorraine, now reconciled,

88

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 194, 26 November 1594, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany, 194-5, 17 December 1594, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, vi, 126-8, 26 December 1594, Villeroy to Duplessis. 89 Goulart, Les Mémoires de la Ligue, vi, 231-40; Robiquet, Histoire municipale de Paris, iii, 204-22; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 532-7. 90 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 194, 10 December 1594, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany, 194-5, 17 December 1594, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany, 197-9, 20 January 1595, Niccolini to Vinta, 199201, 21 January 1595, Niccolini to Vinta. 91 Isambert, Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, xv, 91-3, 28 December 1594, ‘arrêt’ against Jean Chastel; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 450-62, 31 January 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. It was true, in theory, that the king was vulnerable so long as he was not absolved. In fact the motive for assassination was political and the attempts continued until one succeeded.


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Henry later wrote that he had left it as late as he could.92 The earlier declaration of 17 December 1594, addressed to the estates of Hainaut and Artois, had been forwarded unopened to the archduke Ernest. He returned the ‘trompette’ with no reply.93 Henry therefore issued a formal declaration of war on 16 January 1595; it was delivered to Brussels by a herald. The declaration, which is not revealing, expressly condemned the ‘barbarous methods’ employed by the King of Spain. It rehearsed the offences of Spain against France since the death of Francis II, specifying 1585 as the critical year. Despite Spain’s religious pretensions, she had not been moved by the king’s conversion. Cambrai was identified as a point of conflict. Finally, Artois and Hainaut had rejected Henry’s offers to divert the war away from their provinces. Now commerce and intelligence with the enemy were forbidden, while the frontier garrisons gained ‘liberty of invasion’.94 The use of ‘barbarous methods’ did not cease: the following February, 1595, Henry was warned against ‘persons’ suborned to kill him. Again, in April 1595, Duplessis informed Villeroy of the nasty details of a Spanish conspiracy. The intention was to place explosives (‘une double grenade’) under the king’s bed.95 Besides the ‘barbarous methods’ of the Spanish, and the incipient negotiation in Rome, there were various other reasons why Henry IV might declare war on Spain. Rosny, who opposed it, maintained that the king had been persuaded thereto against his better judgement. But Rosny, who flattered his own opinion, was writing many years later when the upshot was history. The king may possibly have lived to regret his decision; but in 1595 it had certain advantages. Firstly, the declaration – a sort of manifesto – was a sovereign act of kingship. Philip II was still trying to usurp the crown, preferably by means of regicide; the declaration proclaimed a national war against this traditional enemy.96 Henceforth, everyone was either a loyal subject or a rebel. Henry also had some fear of the possible conclusion of peace in the Netherlands, which his open intervention might help to avert. This was especially important while it was still supposed that the 92 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 392; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 333-6, 7 April 1595, Henry IV to Lorraine; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 342-70, 22 December 1594, d’Ossat to Henry IV. Henry evidently referred to his intended declaration of war in his letter of 9 November 1594 to d’Ossat (missing). 93 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 531-2, 541-2; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 343-70, 22 December 1594, d’Ossat to Henry IV. This letter shows that Henry had decided to declare war on Spain by the time he wrote to d’Ossat on 9 November 1594. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 194-7, 30 November/10 December 1594, Edmondes to Burghley, reported that a declaration of war had been determined. 94 Isambert, Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, xv, 94-7, 16 January 1595, Henry’s declaration of war. Spain replied two months later, listing Spanish services to France, 7 March 1595, Brussels; De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 541-2; Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Les Œconomies royales, i, 558-9. 95 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, vi, 248-9, 9 April 1595, Duplessis to Villeroy. Presumably the timely warning averted the insinuation of an assassin into a post which afforded access to the king. It would also have enabled searches to be carried out. 96 This was the opinion of Villeroy, who knew as much about public affairs as any man alive. DuplessisMornay, Mémoires et correspondance, vi, 126-8, 26 December 1594, Villeroy to Duplessis. That Spain still sought to usurp the crown is proven by Feria’s ‘avis’. Gomberville, Les Mémoires de Nevers, ii, 711-15, 27 August 1594.

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infanta would marry the archduke Ernest. As well as encouraging the United Provinces, Henry must have expected the declaration to gratify queen Elizabeth, with whom he urgently desired a league of ‘straight union and concurrence’. Elizabeth, though doubtless pleased, declined to be impressed. She coolly wished the king good success, adding unkindly that she had been at war with Spain for many years past. That was a snide remark since the war between England and Spain remained undeclared.97 Possibly even more important than England, and certainly more reliable, was the grand duke of Tuscany. War on Spain must have been what he most desired, since he aspired to an antiSpanish coalition. He was also prepared to help with money – though just how much remains unclear. The process of the war and the king’s absolution were now more closely linked than ever; and both were related in Clement’s mind to the wider issue of a general peace. Peace in Europe was desperately needed by everyone, albeit for different reasons. By the end of September 1594, Clement VIII was deeply disturbed by the Turkish wars. To him, everything – the Turkish war, the absolution, and peace in western Europe – now depended upon what Spain might be persuaded to do. Considerable pressure for peace was coming from Venice, on account of the renewed Turkish threat. Paruta talked to the pope about peace, but could not envisage it without a prior accommodation with France; and that meant the absolution and recognition of the king. Clement agreed that the Turks could not properly be opposed while minds and forces were occupied elsewhere.98 But the time had not come, and the French war with Spain would prove extremely difficult to end; there would be no happy issue and no triumph. But that, as the king intended, belonged to another story. With these things in mind, and because he was resolved to receive Du Perron, Clement had decided by 22 October 1594 to send another extraordinary nuncio to Spain; he chose his own nephew, Gian-Francesco Aldobrandini.99 Venice pressed for the nuncio to be charged with seeking peace between Spain and France, and Clement wanted Sessa to be suitably instructed. The nuncio carried two commissions. One was a reasoned, but emotional, demand for the organisation of a new crusade, for large forces by land and sea, and for the payment of money previously promised to Camillo Borghese. The other commission, relating to France, must have come as a shock to Philip II, whose ministers were accustomed to intimidating the Papacy. In effect, Clement told Philip II that he had failed. Success in the Turkish wars, Clement declared, depended upon the achievement of peace in France. Only then could sufficient resources be marshalled against Turkey. The situation in France and the dangers to religion [schism] demanded a legitimate, French, catholic king. There were only two possible ways of achieving this: one was to expel Navarre as suspect of heresy – interesting wording which refrained from denying his 97

On 25 February 1595, Elizabeth withdrew her forces from Brittany. Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, ii, 16-18; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 194-7, 30 November/10 December 1594, Edmondes to Burghley, 207-11, 23 January/2 February 1595, Burghley to Edmondes, 215-19, 17/27 February 1595, Edmondes to Burghley. 98 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 445-8, 17 September 1594 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 99 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 463-6, 22 October 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate.


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catholicism. The other way was to restore him to the right path by means of peace and diplomacy. Once he had returned to the bosom of the Church, he could become a friend of Spain. In other words, the pope would mediate peace. Philip II, so far, had only sustained the French civil wars, instead of undertaking the ‘real’, dynastic war necessary to obtain a new king. Now it was too late. The League was destroyed, and Mayenne was abandoned. Therefore Aldobrandini would exhort the King of Spain, in the name of the pope, to recognise Henry IV as the legitimate King of France.100 Clement now wished to be able to absolve the king safely, with Spanish assent, and not much more ado. Awaiting Du Perron, who was expected at any moment, Aldobrandini did not leave Rome until 1 December 1594. Had Philip II consented to Clement’s request, the way ahead might have been almost smooth. Upon his arrival in Spain, late in January 1595, Aldobrandini was warned by the nuncio Caetani that, in respect of French affairs, Philip II and his ministers were ‘obstinatisimos’.101 Aldobrandini emphasised the connection between Turkey and the affairs of France. Philip II was cool. He alluded to new evidence of Navarre’s evil disposition, recently received from Rome. This, no doubt, meant the expulsion of the Jesuits, which played into Spanish hands. Philip was sure the pope would do nothing inappropriate for the cause of religion. Thereupon he referred Aldobrandini to the secretary Idiaquez.102 Aldobrandini obtained no other answer until the end of March – probably on account of the death of the archduke Ernest (21 February 1595), governor of the Netherlands. Philip II had been occupied with the decision to send the cardinal archduke Albert of Austria to replace him; and Albert was now to marry the infanta Isabella.103 The pope might believe that opposition to Navarre was a lost cause, but to Philip II it was clearly not the moment to close his French options by recognising Henry IV. Philip was willing to send a fleet to the Levant, and a small force to the emperor. As for France, Philip disapproved of any measure which tended to strengthen Navarre’s position as king.104 In other words, Philip II and his ambassador would obstruct Henry’s absolution in every possible way because they now perceived a fresh hope of enthroning the infanta in France. Consequently the absolution did not proceed without more ado.

100 This exhortation is not actually explicit in the instruction, but is implicit throughout. Aldobrandini reached Madrid, via Genoa and Palamos, on 26 January 1595. Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Ponteficia en España, i, 388-9; Jaitner, Die Hauptinstrukionen Clemens’ VIII, 304-20, November 1594, second instruction for Aldobrandini. 101 Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Ponteficia en España, i, 388-9, 28 January 1595, Aldobrandini to cardinal Aldobrandini. The first audience with Philip II was on 3 February 1595. 102 Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Ponteficia en España, i, 390, 5 February 1595, Aldobrandini to cardinal Aldobrandini. 103 The archduke Albert and the infanta Isabella were eventually married, but not until May 1599. That was after the peace of Vervins (2 May 1598) and the death of Philip II (13 September 1598). 104 Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Ponteficia en España, i, 390. Aldobrandini left Spain on 1 April and reached Rome on 16 May 1595. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 509-26, 20 May 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy.

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VIII: D’Ossat’s Negotiation in Rome D’Ossat did not know that Clement VIII was urging the King of Spain to recognise Henry IV. He thought that Aldobrandini had gone to ascertain Philip’s conditions for peace. But, since Henry’s entry into Paris, Villeroy had made it clear that they would on no account consider peace before absolution. France still needed the war and was not yet capable of peace.105 In Villeroy’s opinion, absolution should be quickly accorded; after that the pope could embark upon mediating peace; that is what eventually happened, but not quickly. While talking about peace, Sessa continued his evil offices with the pope and the cardinals. He employed arguments used by Jean Boucher in Paris which purported to invalidate Henry’s conversion, and proposed the stipulation of conditions designed to wreck any negotiation. Meanwhile Sessa, and everyone else, speculated as to why Du Perron did not come. This was the situation in Rome when, on 7 December 1594, d’Ossat received Henry’s letter of 9 November. Now he knew why Du Perron did not come, but the secret was very well kept. Mayenne’s secretary, Vincent, also arrived. D’Ossat rightly supposed that he would try to persuade the pope not to absolve the king without including an advantageous settlement for Mayenne and the League.106 Despite the incessant efforts of Henry’s opponents, the grounds of conflict with the pope had gradually shifted. The King of France was now deemed to be irremovable – except, of course, by regicide. Consequently discussion centred not on whether Henry could be absolved, but on the form and conditions of absolution. But there was not, for that reason, anything inevitable about it, and no one in Rome was under that illusion. So long as the Turks continued to cause anxiety, and Philip II opposed the absolution, Clement VIII would be mutable, and susceptible to intimidation. He had no distinct or benevolent concern to grant the absolution provided he could evade, avert, or postpone the dangers of withholding it.107 Between 15 December 1594 and 13 January 1595, d’Ossat very secretly established the bases upon which the absolution could finally be negotiated. He proved to be a diplomat of consummate skill, shrewd, methodical, and eternally patient. Without him, as well as Gondi, the absolution would definitely not have been granted. D’Ossat was not then known to be serving Henry IV; he represented the dowager queen Louise, who still pursued the posthumous absolution of Henry III. D’Ossat had a private audience on 15 December 1594 – precisely, in the name of queen Louise – and soon wrote the king two fundamentally important letters on 22 and 23 December. From the first letter, which reported on the audience, we begin to learn the contents of Henry’s letter of 9 November 1594. D’Ossat’s second letter expressed his 105

La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 294-301, [early December 1594], 308-32, 5 December 1594, 426-40, 8 January 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 106 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 507-9, 10 December 1594. Paruta said that Vincent arrived on 7 December, d’Ossat said 4 December 1594. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 332-43, 6 December 1594, d’Ossat to Villeroy, 343-70, 22 December 1594, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 107 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, ii, 436-8, 12 September 1594, Paruta to the doge and senate. Paruta observed that Clement’s acceptance of Du Perron did not mean that the negotiation would be simple; all sorts of problems would be raised in Rome to delay a resolution.


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own opinions; both reports had been requested by the king.108 In his audience, d’Ossat delivered Henry’s letter of 8 November 1594 to the pope, and requested an answer. Unable to address Navarre as king, Clement said he would make his reply to Gondi. Then they discussed some of the points that Henry had made to d’Ossat. Clement accepted the delay in sending Du Perron, and agreed to the appointment of two additional envoys. The second point referred to Henry’s protestant allies, which were essential for the defence of France against Spain; no comment. Next, the king wished to explain that hitherto he had always remained on the defensive, although Spain had waged open war against him. Now, albeit not without regret, he was obliged to return the same treatment to Spain. This, therefore, was an indication of the intended declaration. Clement observed that he was suspected of wishing to join the two issues of absolution and peace. But he claimed to have told Sessa that if he could not do the two things together, he would do them separately; he would not make an issue of it. What d’Ossat called the king’s fourth point, related to Guise, Mayenne and submissions. Clement referred to another belief, namely that he wished to link a prior settlement with the League to Henry’s absolution. He said he would have to sustain the League; however, d’Ossat understood that he would not make too much of that either. Vincent, presumably, had not made any great impression. As d’Ossat was taking his leave, intending to go and see the cardinal secretary, Clement called him back. He told d’Ossat that Nevers had declared that no other envoy would come after him. Clement had [therefore] summoned Gondi in order not to sever the last thread of communication. It was untrue that he had told Nevers he would never admit Navarre; he had said that he must show signs of penitence. Clement’s account of Nevers’ mission corresponded exactly to that of Nevers himself. If the pope had then conceded absolution, he would have been blamed for Henry’s subsequent successes. Now, however, that God had made him king, Clement could not be reproached for condoning the works of the Lord! Next day, d’Ossat had a private meeting with Aldobrandini, to whom the pope had already reported the audience. He asked d’Ossat to repeat what he had said to the pope, apparently because he was charged with expanding on certain aspects. It may also have been a test of d’Ossat’s reliability, since Aldobrandini accepted that his account was correct. He said that the pope had so far been severe, both to sustain his authority and to elicit a greater show of humility and sincerity from the king. Henry, of course, had done precisely, and only, what the French prelates had required of him. Each side, Aldobrandini said, was now ready to approach the other. The French, however, would have to help by offering signs of true conversion, and guarantees for the security of religion. This was followed by some critical comments. It would have been better not to have sent a prince [Nevers]; and whoever came next, could not be received as an ambassador. He deplored Henry’s use of forces from the United Provinces, and war against Spain [meaning the expected declaration] was unwelcome; it would increase the difficulties of making peace. The pope, he said, must support the Leaguers [although 108

La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 343-70, 22 December 1594, d’Ossat to Henry IV, 37095, 23 December 1594, d’Ossat to Henry IV.

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there is no obvious sign that he did]. Aldobrandini told d’Ossat to return in four days, 20 December, to receive the pope’s answer, to be addressed to Gondi – in fact it was much delayed. D’Ossat ended his long letter of 22 December 1594 to Henry IV by saying that he was following the instructions of the grand duke. He was commanded to act alone and secretly, and not to deliver anything else contained in the king’s dispatch. Only the bearer, who had come at night, the pope himself, and Aldobrandini knew that d’Ossat had received the packet.109 This plan for complete secrecy miscarried in an embarrassing way, but the skilful d’Ossat was able to turn an awkward situation to notable advantage. So far, neither the pope nor his secretary had actually done more than sound agreeable, by which d’Ossat was not deceived. The most encouraging thing that he could say – when expounding his own opinions – was that Henry could, and should, send his envoys to Rome. Nevertheless, the king was right to fear the negotiation because the matter was difficult and delicate (‘scabreux’). The pope was not actually hostile, but he would not act without support and favourable advice at court. This, it will be seen, had to be laboriously contrived. D’Ossat characterised the Papal court as highly formalistic, and very slow in its deliberations, especially on religious issues. Such an important matter would be fully exploited in order to maximise Papal authority; and there would be profiteering. There were persons in Rome, transported with hatred, who would oppose the absolution upon any conditions whatsoever, and despite the direst consequences. They would traverse and obstruct the negotiation in every possible way, and right up to the very end. Consequently, when he heard that the pope was seeking to solicit an envoy from France, d’Ossat had thought it essential, first of all, to establish the foundations secretly. One must therefore suppose that d’Ossat had expressed this opinion to Gondi before he left Rome, that his advice had been communicated to the king, and that Henry had eventually accepted it. Every possible aspect of the negotiation, d’Ossat continued, must be thoroughly examined and prepared in advance. Those who came must have ready answers to everything that might arise, and predetermined expedients to overcome every conceivable obstacle. It would be useless to rely on the equity of the case. The advantage, however, was that no one could oblige the king to do anything contrary to his dignity, profit or will. Despite Papal censures, the king was now in possession of his kingdom and could claim to hold it from God, by the sword. The king was catholic – d’Ossat boldly and firmly declared it – admitted to communion and the ‘sacre’; and he conferred benefices. The pope was now excluded from France and could only return by the king’s grace and his absolution. So the real issue was no longer the king’s survival, but the pope’s dwindling authority in France. In other words, the king was not without leverage, and the pope could be the greater loser; and this was generally understood. At the outset, d’Ossat continued, there would be big and unreasonable demands. But once the king’s ambassadors had stated all that he could concede, and provided good, sound reasons for what was impossible, the pope would have no recourse. The Papacy had already shot all its bolts and employed all its weapons. D’Ossat advised that the ambassadors would have to endure the dilatory pace – the ‘longueurs’ – inherent in the 109

La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 343-70, 22 December 1594, d’Ossat to Henry IV.


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matter, as well as the malignant hostility of Spain. Given all this, the king could win, provided he was reasonable. D’Ossat believed that he would not be obliged to do anything which could disrupt the kingdom. The pope would have liked to include peace with Spain [though it was far from clear that Spain wanted peace] and an accord with the League; but he would stop at exhortation. If the king conceded the points relating to Béarn, Trent and Condé, he would gain credit for having made the offers, and that would help to arm the pope against detractors. The most difficult point of all was that of ‘rehabilitation’ which comprised the Papal claim to interfere in the succession. If the negotiation were to collapse, d’Ossat said, it would be on that account.110 It was the pope’s intention to grant rehabilitation before recognition, separately and apart from any absolution. That decision reflected the distinction latterly drawn by Sixtus V. Sixtus had hinted that he might conceive of granting a simple absolution; but he had also declared that he would never rehabilitate and recognise Henry IV as the King of France. To circumvent this awkward problem d’Ossat proposed a clever contingency plan. The king, he said, could simply request absolution; that was all he needed. If the pope refused, the ambassadors could plead no commission to request rehabilitation, which the council and ‘parlement’ would reject. Failing that – and this is where the skill came in – they must induce the pope to conceive of rehabilitation in an acceptable form. For this d’Ossat devised a formula: the absolution clause could be followed by a statement that the bull of Sixtus V – the excommunication – might not affect or prejudice the king any more than if it had never existed. This could be regarded by the Papacy as an abolition clause, tacitly comprising rehabilitation, yet without necessarily being interpreted that way by the French. D’Ossat did not, however, think that the negotiation should be allowed to founder on this rock. If the pope rejected the expedient, d’Ossat thought the ambassadors should yield. As the ‘parlement’ would never accept rehabilitation it could, if necessary, be repudiated later, and upon that pretext.111 D’Ossat repeated that the pope had never said that he would not grant absolution. He had said to Nevers, Gondi, Delbene and Lomellini that the king should have requested it. It might be useful, d’Ossat added, if the envoys were to carry letters of credence from the ‘parlement’ and council; perhaps also the nobles and prelates. It was necessary to consider just how the absolution should be requested. The precise wording was highly critical because the episcopal absolution must be preserved unchallenged, and without prejudice. So the king should request absolution pure and simple, not to supersede, but to complement, that of Saint-Denis. This intention might helpfully be embodied in a secret act, before the envoys departed. That would provide a degree of protection and certainty. Rather surprisingly, d’Ossat said that there was no need to hasten the dispatch of the envoys, except for the risk that the pope could die; the consequences of having to start all over again could be disastrous. In saying that 110

It will be recalled that ‘rehabilitation’ comprised lifting the king’s excommunication of 1585 which annulled his claim to the throne. It was denied by the king, the ‘parlement’, gallicans and others that the pope could excommunicate a king – though Henry of Navarre was not the king in 1585. It was also hotly denied that the pope could dispose of the French succession. Consequently Henry would, on no account, accept ‘rehabilitation’. 111 Fortunately that contingency was avoided because the ‘parlement’ was hostile to the whole agreement.

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there was no hurry, d’Ossat may have reflected that Clement would never get on with the matter before the return from Spain of Gian-Francesco Aldobrandini. Nevertheless, he did not expect Du Perron to be delayed for anything like as long as he was.112 While he awaited Clement’s answer, to be addressed to Gondi, d’Ossat ran into difficulties. Unknown to him, cardinal Gondi had apprised Delbene, Lomellini, and Séraphin that d’Ossat would receive and deliver letters for them. It has been seen, however, that the grand duke had imposed on d’Ossat silence and secrecy, forbidding the delivery of anything contained in the king’s dispatch.113 It would be fatal if the grand duke and the cardinal secretary found d’Ossat to be unreliable. He therefore felt obliged to deny having received the letters he was forbidden to deliver. This imbroglio was complex, but d’Ossat turned it to his advantage. Nervous about what might be said to Aldobrandini, d’Ossat swiftly got his word in first; Aldobrandini agreed to sustain the denial. In this conspiratorial atmosphere, d’Ossat perceived an opportunity to confide in Aldobrandini, who was more sympathetic than the pope, and more straightforward about the affairs of France. D’Ossat saw in this situation an opportunity to initiate a negotiation on the terms of the absolution, which his audience with the pope had not afforded. On 30 December 1594, d’Ossat and Aldobrandini had a secret, nocturnal meeting. D’Ossat put five points to the secretary, in the hope of extracting some specific commitments. In the first place, he wished to elicit a much more precise undertaking that the pope genuinely intended to pursue and conclude the king’s absolution – which was in his own interests. D’Ossat therefore told Aldobrandini that there were opponents in France who did not believe the pope to be sincere. They thought he had only wanted Gondi to prevent the king from taking decisions about ecclesiastical affairs. Aldobrandini denied the accusation, thereby providing just the assurance that d’Ossat desired.114 Secondly, d’Ossat raised the non-negotiable points relating to the protestants. The pope had given some assurance that Henry would not be expected to accept conditions liable to disturb the kingdom. Nevertheless, anxiety persisted that he would be required to make war on the huguenots and renounce his protestant alliances. These alliances existed for temporal reasons, and had been inherited. Aldobrandini replied that, in these respects, the pope would not insist upon the impossible. Thirdly, d’Ossat came to the three points to which the king was amenable, Béarn, Trent, and Condé. These items were, he said, more difficult than might be supposed. They would require preparation and could not be performed overnight. The absolution, however, was urgent, in order to redress the disorders of the church and restore Papal authority. Aldobrandini allowed that these items might have to be performed later, after the absolution. That was an important point of principle. The fourth point had already been disposed of but was raised by d’Ossat because it featured in the king’s letter. Henry had heard that the pope would require peace 112

These two letters of 22 and 23 December 1594 were to be sent to France via Girolamo Gondi in Florence. They were delayed until 13 January 1595 when d’Ossat received the pope’s reply to the king, addressed to cardinal Gondi. 113 Du Perron was later instructed to thank the grand duke for his successful handling of Henry’s important dispatch to d’Ossat. Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 135-49, 9 May 1595, instructions for Du Perron. 114 D’Ossat actually put all his points to the cardinal before receiving any answers.


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with Spain and the League, together with concessions demanded by the League leaders. The cardinal agreed that these items had already been excluded. Mayenne, therefore, would receive no help. Finally, d’Ossat braved the core question of rehabilitation. He did so in order that it could later be said that the pope had been warned. The king, d’Ossat told Aldobrandini, was informed that the pope would insist upon rehabilitation. This was contrary to the dignity of a king of France, whose office devolved upon him according to the Salic law. In temporal matters, the king was answerable only to God. D’Ossat added a variety of other reasons why rehabilitation was unacceptable, such as declarations made to estatesgeneral and ‘arrêts’ of the ‘parlements’. Aldobrandini replied that he could not speak so freely upon this matter which concerned the Papal authority. The king would appear to be denying the [Papal] authority he purported to recognise. The matter would be pursued when the envoys came. The cardinal thought the king should not raise such objections; but he also allowed that there were ways of temporising. That reply offered the hope that d’Ossat’s expedient might be accepted. Reversing a little, Aldobrandini objected that it was not for a penitent to dictate his terms, adding some homilies about humility and what the king ought do. In the first place, he should send Du Perron forthwith. The cardinal raised the subject of Gian-Francesco Aldobrandini’s mission to Spain, saying that it was about Hungary. The existence of a second commission, about France, remained secret. If the Spanish answer was positive, the absolution could proceed upon the bases now agreed. If not, it might still proceed, but there were rocks on the path upon which it could founder. What this actually meant was that the pope now wished to grant the absolution, but with Spanish assent. Then there would be no schism in France and, in theory, they could all concentrate on opposing the Turks. Clement seems not to have reflected that Spain was also at war with the United Provinces and England. All the French ever knew, at least officially, was that the Spanish opposition persisted.115 It will shortly be seen how closely Du Perron’s instructions reflected the advice tendered by d’Ossat in his reports. D’Ossat thought the pope and his advisers had grown anxious that the French envoys might never come.116 The timing of Aldobrandini’s mission to Spain had been geared to the expectation of Du Perron’s arrival; it had apparently been supposed that he was on his way to Rome when Aldobrandini left for Madrid in December 1594.117 The Papal intention had been to regulate the nuncio’s instructions according to what Du Perron said and how he reacted to Papal proposals. It was not yet necessarily too late to attempt this difficult exercise until it was known, by 12 March 1595, that Philip II was 115 By means of an intercepted letter from Gian-Francesco Aldobrandini to the pope, it was known in France by mid-April 1595 that Philip II had declared his opposition to the reception of the French king. It might therefore be deduced that the nuncio had pressed him on the point. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 230-3, 4/14 April 1595, Edmondes to Burghley. 116 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 396-426, 4 January 1595, d’Ossat to Henry IV; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 42-4, 4 February 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 117 It will be recalled that Clement’s agreement of 13 September 1594 to hear Du Perron was received in France on 4 October. Aldobrandini was appointed extraordinary nuncio to Spain by 22 October but did not leave until 1 December 1594.

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obstinately determined to pursue the French war.118 Given the distances involved, and Philip II’s dilatory attitude to decision-making and correspondence, such fine tuning could never have worked. Nevertheless, the conception illustrates how closely Clement was governed by the attitude of Spain, and how he would have liked the French negotiation to evolve. D’Ossat awaited the pope’s letter to Gondi, in order to send his whole packet to Florence. Meanwhile, he turned to Villeroy to resolve the difficulties arising from the undelivered letters to his colleagues in Rome. He asked Villeroy to write again, and to explain the situation to cardinal Gondi and Nevers.119 The pope wanted d’Ossat to speak secretly for the king, while Delbene spoke for Nevers, and Lomellini for cardinal Gondi; Séraphin served the grand duke. By comparing the answers made to them with those received by d’Ossat himself, the pope’s real intentions might be clarified. D’Ossat believed success to be possible, provided the king prospered in France, and if he played his part. That meant conceding every demand in the spiritual sphere. Even so, Clement would not grant the absolution willingly; indeed, he would not grant it at all if he could safely evade it.120 If the pope’s letter for Gondi continued to be withheld – possibly awaiting news from Spain – d’Ossat considered ways of exerting pressure by exhibiting his knowledge derived from intercepted letters. This would make them understand in Rome that the king had good intelligence. The League’s supporters, for example, were giving out that the pope was never going to absolve Navarre. This elicited a further reassurance from cardinal Aldobrandini that the pope did mean to grant the absolution. Aldobrandini, who still did not deliver Clement’s letter for Gondi, advised d’Ossat to go and see the pope.121 From this opportunity, d’Ossat extracted another notable advantage. His long and important meeting with Aldobrandini had been strictly off the record; neither of them had instructions. Now d’Ossat seized his chance to get that interview validated. He declared to the pope that he deemed everything said to Aldobrandini to have been said to Clement himself. Similarly, he deemed all the cardinal’s replies to have come from the pope himself. Probably taken by surprise, Clement could hardly impugn or disavow his secretary of state, so he agreed; that was correct. In this way Aldobrandini’s replies, which disposed of most of the king’s reservations, were at least verbally ratified by the pope.122 118 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 426-40, 8 January 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy, 477-93, 21 March 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 119 D’Ossat had a rather special relationship with Villeroy who had been responsible for his going to Rome in 1584, in the service of the ambassador, Paul de Foix. It was also Villeroy who had led the king to employ d’Ossat on his absolution. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 426-40, 8 January 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 120 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 25-8, 21 January 1595 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. Paruta said the pope was not wholly resolved to grant the absolution in the manner in which it was desired. Neither did he want to break with France. 121 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 426-40, 8 January 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 122 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 440-3, 12 January 1595, d’Ossat to Henry IV. It appears that d’Ossat’s whole packet, together with the letter to Gondi, was dispatched next day, 13 January 1595, to Florence.


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This promising situation in Rome was rudely shattered when, on 19 January 1595, news arrived from Venice and Florence of Jean Chastel’s assault on the king and the expulsion of the Jesuits.123 D’Ossat swiftly pointed out that potential assassins would be less easily corrupted if only the king had been absolved; alas, that was never the case. The pope and Aldobrandini were scandalised by the expulsion of the Jesuits, the pillars of religion, while the king’s absolution was under discussion. They chose to ignore the fact that it was the ‘parlement’, not the king, who had acted. As the Jesuits had held the king to be outside the Church, the assault unfortunately focused attention on the validity – or otherwise – of the episcopal absolution. D’Ossat grasped the nettle firmly: he declared that, for four years, Henry had sought Papal help with his instruction and conversion, during which the popes had failed to respond – a calculation that dates right back to the king’s accession. Now Henry had come to be generally recognised in France; he was absolved before God, and should be deemed to be catholic.124 That was bold talk, tending, as it did, to marginalise the pope. It has been seen that Clement was especially vexed by the ‘arrêt’ of the ‘parlement’ against the Jesuits because it denied that the king could not be recognised before his absolution. It has also been seen that Clement was not as shocked by the assault as, decently, he should have been. This confirmed d’Ossat’s opinion that he would like to escape from the whole affair. The Jesuit row was also disturbing because it handed Spain a useful weapon. Sessa gave out that the king might have escaped this time, but he would not survive for long. This sinister observation may have been intended to augment the pope’s irresolution – and it probably did. It also revealed that Sessa saw nothing untoward in the idea of murdering the King of France – a blatant use of assassination as an instrument of policy.125 The Jesuit row now precluded any improvement in Franco-Spanish relations. While this crisis was held to have traversed the French negotiation, a corresponding anxiety arose in Rome that Du Perron might never come. Clement needed help in that respect, because he must not appear to take the initiative himself.126 Du Perron had been constantly expected in Rome from about October 1594, after the pope had agreed, in principle, to accept another envoy. From 7 December 1594, d’Ossat, the pope and Aldobrandini all knew the reasons for the delay; everyone else was in the dark. D’Ossat’s initial reports and the pope’s reply, addressed to Gondi, (missing) were received in France about the middle of February 1595. Henry was sufficiently reassured by Clement’s ‘bonnes responses’ and d’Ossat’s considered advice to proceed with the negotiation.127 Consequently Du Perron was supposed to leave forthwith. The 123

La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 443-50, 28 January 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. On 20 January 1595, at night, d’Ossat received Villeroy’s letter of 27 December 1594, with a memoir for the pope. D’Ossat delivered it, in Italian, to Aldobrandini on 22 January 1595. 124 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 450-62, 31 January 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 125 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 202, 27 January 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 126 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 42-4, 4 February 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. Paruta was asked, indirectly, to induce Venice to press the king to send an envoy. Paruta observed that from mid-November 1594 to mid-March 1595, there had been little news from France. Ibid., 95-7, 18 March 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 127 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 494-504, 14 April 1595, d’Ossat to Henry IV.

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final two months’ delay were unscheduled, and remained unexplained in Rome; even d’Ossat became edgy and impatient. He could see the good effects of his careful diplomacy being steadily eroded. The problem, however, related only to the king’s perplexities in France, not to his intentions in respect of Rome. Thus, to judge from letters received by d’Ossat, Du Perron was expected in Rome by the end of April 1595, at the latest.128 The news was welcomed and helped to assuage the vexation caused by the Jesuit affair. The Spanish, however, were greatly displeased. Furthermore, it was known in Rome by 12 March 1595, that Philip II was determined to continue the French war. The unfortunate set-back to the negotiation in Rome, combined with the non-arrival of Du Perron meant that much could depend upon Henry’s own progress in 1595.

IX: The Spanish War By the end of February 1595, French campaigning had begun in the Netherlands, Franche-Comté and Burgundy. For his offensive Henry formed seven military divisions: they were commanded by Bouillon – who got his own way – Longueville, and Nevers in the north, Montmorency in Dauphiné, and Charles de Biron; he was sent to Burgundy where the catholics were defecting from Mayenne. One division consisted of Lorrainers (now loyal) who invaded Franche-Comté; the seventh was commanded by the king himself.129 Bouillon entered Luxembourg late in January, while in March and April Longueville ravaged Artois.130 The purpose of invading Franche-Comté was to try to disrupt the Spanish road and prevent the passage of money to the Netherlands.131 In retrospect, this initiative might be thought unwise because the Spanish province appealed for help to the governor of Milan, Juan Fernandez de Velasco, duke of Frias, constable of Castile. This was an unwelcome complication for Henry. In January 1595, Biron went straight to Beaune, Mayenne’s stronghold in Burgundy. The city conspired against Mayenne and fell to Biron on 6 February. It was soon apparent that Mayenne had little

128 On 21 March 1595, d’Ossat acknowledged letters of 13, 14, 15 and 16 February 1595 from Paris, and 26 February 1595 from Lyon, one or more of which contained the information that Du Perron would shortly depart. On 8 March 1595, Henry himself informed d’Ossat – received on 30 March 1595 – that he was sending Du Perron, alone, later that month. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 477-93, 21 March 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy, 494-504, 14 April 1595, d’Ossat to Henry IV; Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 11-12, 8 March 1595, Du Perron to d’Ossat and Delbene to say that he looked forward to working with them. 129 It appears (no reference) that Henry received a loan of 100,000 écus from the grand duke. Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, ii, 10-12; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 205-7, 21/31 January 1595, Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes said that Bouillon had attacked Luxembourg. 130 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 205-7, 21/31 January 1595, Edmondes to Burghley. 131 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, vi, 259-61, 25 May 1595, Duplessis to Buzanval; Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Les Œconomies royales, ii, 3-6. Forces disbanded in Lorraine attacked Franche-Comté in February 1595 under Louis de Beauvoir seigneur de Trembleville and Jean Aussonville, seigneur de Saint-Georges.


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support in the province. Biron was before Dijon by the end of May, where he awaited the king.132 During the preceding months, Henry had still been intending to go to Lyon; but he lacked the money to pay his forces. He was struggling with this problem when, sometime in February 1595, d’Ossat’s packet arrived from Rome. It appears that Henry was also awaiting the return of La Clielle from Tuscany with a message from the grand duke. Ferdinando was, presumably, expected to have welcomed the declaration of war; but the war had to be paid for. La Clielle was said to have left Paris on 10 December 1594. Early in January 1595 there were rumours in Rome of his impending arrival, supposedly to determine the pope’s intentions. The rumour is worth noting as evidence that d’Ossat’s negotiation remained secret.133 La Clielle did not go to Rome, but had returned from Florence by the end of March 1595. Edmondes made the interesting comment that the grand duke would now disregard other marriage proposals [for his niece] and would provide money in Lyon for the king’s Swiss troops. While Edmondes thought the king had ‘little meaning’ to perform the marriage, the grand duke had a powerful motive for obtaining the king’s absolution. Du Perron would now go to Rome when Henry went to Lyon. It appears that Henry did not mean to let Du Perron proceed before he himself was in the field, and appreciably closer to Italy. That, Villeroy informed d’Ossat on 30 March 1595, would be in a week; Villeroy was about to prepare the instructions. Then Henry again fell seriously ill.134 Biron and Montmorency had informed the king (no date) that Velasco was assembling large forces in Lombardy to attack the Lyonnais and Burgundy. Scenting battle, they pressed the king to join them. By the time Henry was well enough to go to Fontainebleau, on 18 April 1595, Velasco had entered Franche-Comté.135 Montmorency, however, succeeded in rendering the Lyonnais safe by taking Vienne (Isère) on 24 April 1595. So it was probably towards the end of April that Henry altered his plans and decided to go to Burgundy. This was now the critical area; Henry was bound to fear that Velasco would assist Mayenne to subdue the province. In this respect Mayenne was useful to the Spanish; by creating a diversion he facilitated their success in Picardy. Henry, however, was still in difficulties over money, partly because the submission of cities and

132 The citadel of Beaune held out until 19 March. Autun fell on 16 May and Nuits-Saint-Georges on 23 May 1595. Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 387-8, 392 seq., 411. 133 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 5-7, 7 January 1595 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate, 25-8, 21 January 1595 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 426-40, 8 January 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 202, 4 February 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 134 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 225-9, 21/31 March 1595, Edmondes to Burghley, reported La Clielle’s return from Florence. Ibid., 230-3, 4/14 April 1595; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, 509-26, 20 May 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. D’Ossat received Villeroy’s letter of 30 March on 17 April 1595 and became vexed by the further delay before the arrival of Du Perron. 135 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 373-5, 12 June 1595, Henry IV to Rosny.

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individuals was costing enormous sums.136 As the king’s departure was constantly imminent, so also was that of Du Perron. But as the connection was not understood, neither was the delay. Bonciani was indignant; he condemned the postponement as useless and amazing, supposing it to be irresponsible.137 Henry and Du Perron finally left Paris on 24 May 1595. They parted company at Troyes on 31 May. Du Perron set out for Rome, while Henry joined Biron at Dijon on 4 June.138 The very next day, 5 June 1595, Henry heard that Velasco and Mayenne had crossed the Saône. Unaware of the arrival of the king, Velasco expected to recover Dijon after making short work of Biron.139 The unexpected proximity of the adversaries resulted in a battle, or major skirmish, at Fontaine-Françoise, on 6 June 1595, for which the king was as yet unprepared. Henry was exposed to mortal danger, and Biron was injured. Their success, however, was crucial, and Henry ensured that it was well publicised, especially in Italy. The Spanish were expelled from Burgundy in some disorder and, thereafter, Velasco refused to help Mayenne in France. This victory, therefore, had a lot to do with Mayenne’s submission. Henry took the citadel of Dijon on 17 June 1595, and Tallant submitted at the same time. The way was then open for the restoration of royal authority in the important frontier province of Burgundy. The ‘parlement’ of Dijon had recognised the king on 29 May 1595 and Biron was installed as ‘gouverneur’ in place of Mayenne. That projected the unequivocal message that Mayenne had finally lost the province he hoped to govern with sovereign powers. The royal courts were restored, municipal elections held, and the frontier consolidated. In July and August, Henry made war in Franche-Comté to ensure that Velasco did not trouble Burgundy again. Returning to France, Henry finally reached Lyon on 24 August and stayed for a month.140

136

Henry established a new ‘conseil de direction des affaires et finances’ in May 1595. Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Les Œconomies royales, ii, 6-8; Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 233-6, 19/29 April 1595, Edmondes to Burghley. 137 Bonciani had expected Du Perron to leave by 19 April 1595 and showed some knowledge of his intended instructions. Bonciani was doubtless inconvenienced, since he accompanied Du Perron to Rome in the service of Gondi. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc, v, 316-17, 15 April and 29 May 1595, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany. 138 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 240-2, 21/31 May 1595, Edmondes to Burghley. Edmondes travelled with the king. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 548-54, 27 June 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 365-9, 8 June 1595, Henry IV to Montmorency; Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘Lettres inédites de Henri IV au duc de Nevers’, Annuaire bulletin de la société d’histoire de France, xxxvii (1900), 206, 5 June 1595, Henry IV to Nevers. Henry claimed to have been received with great joy in Dijon where Mayenne was hated. 139 Mayenne left Chalons on 15 April 1595 and joined Velasco in Franche-Comté. Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 402. 140 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 363-5, 7 June 1595, Henry IV to his sister, Catherine, 365-9, 8 June 1595, Henry IV to Montmorency, 369-70, 8 June 1595 (2) Henry IV to Montmorency, 372, 8 June 1595, Henry IV to the grand duke of Tuscany. Maisse was sent to visit and inform the friendly princes in Italy of the king’s victory. Ibid., 372-3, 9 June 1595, Henry IV to Duplessis; Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘Lettres inédites de Henri IV au duc de Nevers’, Annuaire bulletin de la société de l’histoire de France, xxxvii (1900), 209-10, 17 June 1595, Henry IV to Nevers; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 421, 423; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 562; Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, ii, 44.


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Henry’s need to be everywhere at once, and to attend to everything himself had always been a problem. Although he had provided as thoroughly as possible for the defence of Picardy, he was acutely aware – while in Lyon – of the danger to the northern frontier. Now the Spanish objective was Cambrai, the recovery of which had featured in all their negotiations with the League. By mid-June, Fuentes, the provisional governor of the Netherlands, was at Valenciennes; he was poised for a preparatory campaign before the siege of Cambrai.141 While Henry had hoped to facilitate the negotiations in Rome by moving closer to Italy, the reverses in Picardy, inflicted in his absence, actually had an adverse effect. After ravaging the area, Fuentes seized le Catelet (19 June 1595). That was a fortress built by Henry II to counterbalance Cambrai, constructed by the emperor Charles V. Henry tried, from a distance, to contain Fuentes. He ordered Saint-Pol, Bouillon and Villars to co-operate with Nevers; but they failed to obey his orders.142 There followed a series of blunders and disasters involving the death of Villars, who had recently submitted, and of Charles d’Humières. Henry wept for the loss of that most faithful servant; there were not very many of them.143 In consequence, Fuentes took le Catelet (25 june), and Doullens (25 July) where the French were massacred. After a brief respite, Fuentes was in a strong position to besiege Cambrai (13 August to 29 October 1595).144 Henry blamed Bouillon for these calamities, believing that Picardy could have been defended had he only been there himself.145 These were serious losses which heralded a general deterioration in the king’s fortunes. Thereafter, it was uphill all the way.

X: The Submission of Mayenne During this anxious summer of 1595 Mayenne was cornered by the king; this was another reason why Henry’s presence was necessary in the south east. But Mayenne still hoped to obtain miraculous advantages by means of Papal leverage. After the battle of FontaineFrançoise, on 6 June 1595, Desportes was sent to the king. This did not mean that Mayenne had given up, but only that he sought, as usual, to dally about waiting to see what else might happen. Before long, however, he quarrelled with Velasco, who was only 141 The enterprise against Cambrai had been projected by the Spanish ever since the fall of Laon. Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iv, 262, 25 October 1594, archduke Ernest to Philip II, 303, 2 May 1595, Philip II to Fuentes (Pedro Henriques de Azevado, count) enclosing his patent. Mansfelt departed to fight in Hungary. Cambrai had been acquired by the duc d’Anjou, who appointed Jean de Monluc de Balagny as governor. Fuentes had intelligence in the city and was persuaded that the people hated the French. De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 594-7. 142 Saint-Pol had succeeded Longueville as ‘gouverneur’ of Picardy. Henri d’Orléans, duc de Longueville died of wounds at the end of April 1595. 143 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 573-8; Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘Lettres inédites de Henri IV au duc de Nevers’, Annuaire bulletin de la société de l’histoire de France, xxxvii (1900), 207-8, 8 January 1595, Henry IV to Nevers. 144 De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 583-90, 597. 145 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 414-16, 1 October 1595, Henry IV to the ‘parlement’; Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘Lettres inédites de Henri IV au duc de Nevers’, Annuaire bulletin de la société de l’histoire de France, xxxvii (1900), 210-11, 9 September 1595, Henry IV to Nevers.

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prepared to defend Franche-Comté. Without money or support, Mayenne was obliged to treat at least semi-seriously, while still keeping any options open. He accepted an offer from the king by which he might retire to Chalon unmolested.146 Despite Velasco’s refusal to help him, Mayenne had still not despaired of obtaining Burgundy from the Spanish, if not from the king. He was also determined not to submit before the king had been absolved. In this point of pure pride, Mayenne received the king’s unbelievable indulgence. Henry could have smoked Mayenne out of Chalon, forced him to his knees, or arrested him; but he chose otherwise. Henry had more urgent business, and he could now afford to wait.147 There is no coherent account of the last, protracted negotiations, which took place between June 1595 and January 1596, culminating in Mayenne’s submission. Previous talks are said to have been suspended on the eve of the FrancoSpanish war – which is vague – and resumed at Soissons, possibly in March or April 1595. Mayenne was apparently awaiting the arrival of Velasco in Franche-Comté. As usual he demanded a truce which Henry refused; he would renew the talks when he had mastered Burgundy.148 Once Mayenne was at Chalon, Henry sent Villeroy, Rocquelaure and Senecy (who had submitted) to deliver his conditions (24 June 1595). In lieu of Burgundy, Mayenne was offered the Ile-de-France – excluding Paris – which was not a frontier province. Mayenne was still defiant. Four days later, he sent Desportes to Dijon with a memoir. He not only claimed Burgundy – for his honour – but also ‘places de surêté’ for ten years. Furthermore, he still posed as a party leader, seeking four months in which to contact his confederates who had not yet submitted. In that length of time much might have changed. There is little information about the negotiations which continued during July and August 1595, while the king was in Franche-Comté.149 Henry understood that Mayenne was anxious to preserve his position as party leader. That would enable him, if he chose, to resume the war, but Henry wished to keep him out of it. On 20 July 1595, the king instructed his deputies to drop the negotiation if Mayenne persisted in his extravagant demands.150 When Henry returned, victorious, from Franche-Comté, Mayenne was obliged to behave more reasonably. Without precisely submitting, he consented to recognise the king, regardless of what his colleagues might do. That still preserved the possibility of holding a party together and, conceivably, of fabricating reasons for continued resistance. Mayenne also agreed to sign the articles accorded in respect of himself; but he wished to defer their publication and execution. In theory, therefore, they might be repudiated – albeit not with honour. Mayenne was making feeble excuses for not sending his deputies 146

Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘Lettres inédites de Henry IV au duc de Nevers’, Annuaire bulletin de la société de l’histoire de France, xxxvii (1900), 209 n.1. 147 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 423, 427, 430, 450. 148 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 448-50. 149 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 448-51, 452 n.2. Edmondes referred several times to talks in progress. Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 252-4, 30 June/10 July 1595, 254-8, 9/19 July 1595, 258-61, 6/16 August 1595, Edmondes to Burghley. Much more research is needed on Mayenne as a separate subject. 150 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 384-5, 20 July 1595, Henry IV to messieurs...


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to Lyon, possibly with an eye on events in Picardy; from long experience, Henry distrusted him. The deputies were, however, expected by 27 August to complete the matter – one way or another.151 Thereupon, on 25 August 1595, Henry learnt that the pope had agreed to proceed with his absolution.152 This report was certainly premature but, if communicated, it could explain why Mayenne’s deputies signed the agreement with the king on 29 August; they expected Mayenne to concur within four days. Just as he desired, the treaty was to remain secret for three months. The king was far from sure that his slippery adversary was serious, and may have feared that Mayenne still entertained reservations on account of the Spanish progress in Picardy.153 Only that dangerous situation can explain the extraordinary truce of Taisey, signed by the king on 23 September 1595, as he was leaving for Paris. The truce comprised not only Mayenne but also the League, and was to run for three months from 30 September. This exceptionally curious arrangement – a truce, following a suspended treaty – testifies to Henry’s desperation over the siege of Cambrai. As a result, there is some confusion as to when Mayenne actually submitted. Some date it from the truce; some from 28 October 1595, when Mayenne wrote to the king (no text) following a conference at Chauny. Others date his submission from the final agreement in January 1596.154 When Henry left Lyon on 23 September 1595, Mayenne was considerably chastened. He would not lightly forfeit an agreement by which he was rather rewarded than penalised for roughly a decade of rebellion. On the other hand, had there been some fresh chance to recover Burgundy, he would undoubtedly have seized it. The accord and the truce were a strange sort of half way house. While still in Franche-Comté, Henry had sought help from the United Provinces and England.155 Then he called out the ‘ban’ and ‘arrière ban’ as he was leaving Lyon. His purpose was to relieve Cambrai, and advance further into the Netherlands. Reaching Paris on 30 September 1595, Henry received a dispatch from d’Ossat confirming the news of his absolution.156 Yet this devoutly desired consummation was completely overshadowed by the siege of Cambrai and the danger to the north east of France. The absolution was no longer relevant to the war with Spain. This, as the pope had said, was a 151

Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 392-5, 24 August 1594, Henry IV to Duplessis; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 454. 152 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 396-8, 29 August 1595, Henry IV to the duchesse de Nevers. There is no sign of the text of this agreement. 153 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 262-5, 27 August/6 September 1595, Edmondes to Burghley; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, vi, 323-7, 24 August 1595, Henry IV to Duplessis; Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 405-8, 21 September 1595, Henry IV to Brèves, 410-11, 23 September 1595, Henry IV to La Châtre; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 454-5. 154 Villeroy, Jeannin, Cheverny, Schomberg and the ‘président’ du Harlay were all involved in the conference at Chauny. Jeannin withdrew in March 1594, not concealing his recognition of the king. It is uncertain when he became reconciled with the king who appointed him to the council on 8 January 1596. Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 445 and n.5, 447 n.1, 448; Dumont, Ed., Corps universelle diplomatique, v, 518-19, 23 September 1595, ‘trève générale’, fourteen articles. 155 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 254-8, 9/19 July 1595, Edmondes to Burghley, 258-61, 6/16 August 1595, Edmondes to Burghley. 156 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 324-6, 21 October 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate.

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‘real’ war, a dynastic war. Before the king could set off again, he learnt of the fall of the city on 2 October.157 He still hoped to save the fortress, but that also fell, just one week later. Henry’s presence in the area was again imperative in order to avert an invasion of Picardy. He therefore decided to retake La Fère, ceded by Mayenne to Parma in 1591.158 Allegedly Henry had intended to return to the south east, to make war in Provence and to invade Italy; perhaps that was what he wanted others to believe. He was already warning England that if she did not provide help, he would be forced to make peace.159 In the event, the wearisome siege of La Fère detained the king from 8 November 1595 to 22 May 1596. So it was from La Fère, and late in time, that Henry finally acknowledged the Papal bull of absolution.160 The strange process of Mayenne’s submission related both to the war in Picardy and to the king’s absolution. The ultimate agreement was an even more curious arrangement. The treaty of Folembray, dated 24 January 1596, was issued in the form of an edict on 31 January.161 The preamble is remarkable: it constituted an explicit rehabilitation of Mayenne, and testified to Henry’s unparalleled generosity. Mayenne was described as ‘chef de parti’, although Henry had always sought to detach Mayenne and treat with him alone. Mayenne was honourably deemed to have submitted as soon as the pope had absolved the king.162 Mayenne was praised for his zeal for religion, and for opposing the dismemberment of the state – for which he was actually quite prepared, given a large enough share for himself. Henceforth, Mayenne was deemed to be a good kinsman and a loyal subject. In this way, he was permitted to save face, to dissimulate his defeat, and to mask his abandonment by Spain. The treaty crystallised the complete myth that, to the very end, Mayenne had fought for religion. In fact it was the loss of Burgundy which had forced him to yield, not the king’s subsequent absolution which enabled him to do so. What Mayenne had actually done was to survive with skill, and supreme duplicity, apparently plucking chances from the air where none existed, up until the very last moment. The edict proper, which consisted of thirty-one articles, is detailed, complex and confusing. It was not a general peace with the Catholic League, some of whose leaders were still in arms. Yet it did provide for the accession of those who wished to submit. Only four articles referred to Mayenne, presumably items not previously settled. The first 157 Butler, Ed., The Edmondes Papers, 265-8, 12 September/22 September 1595, Edmondes to Burghley; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 597, 604-5. 158 Lefèvre, Correspondance de Philippe II, iv, 324, 23 October 1595, Fuentes to –, expressed his concern because Henry was at Péronne. 159 Birch, An Historical View, 24-36. 160 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 417-20, 5 October 1595, Henry IV to queen Elizabeth, 424-5, 8 October 1595, Henry IV to Montmorency, Pontoise, 425-6, 12 October 1595, Henry IV to Montmorency, Chaulnes, 445-7, 12 November 1595, Henry IV to Clement VIII, 450-3, 17 November 1595, Henry IV to de Brèves; CSPVen., 1592-1603, p. 205, 25 May 1595, Duodo to the doge and senate. 161 Dumont, Corps universelle diplomatique, v, 519-23. The secret articles for Mayenne are not included. Buisseret and Barbiche, Eds., Sully, Les Œconomies royales, ii, 41 n.1; de Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 736-9. 162 Henry received that information on 30 September 1595.


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article permitted him to hold Soissons in Picardy, and Chalon and Seurre in Burgundy for six years; only one religion was permitted within a radius of two miles of these towns. Article thirty debited the king with all Mayenne’s debts in respect of foreign forces. The last article validated other, secret articles which were not therein inserted. These must have included the ‘gouvernement’ of the Ile-de-France, 350,000 écus to be paid over two years in respect of debts, plus another sum of 27,000 écus. There is no sign, however, of the large annual pension Mayenne had always demanded.163 An intractable difficulty arose over Mayenne’s insistence upon formal disculpation for the murder of Henry III. Since no one believed Mayenne to be innocent, only the king’s personal intervention could suffice. But Henry’s preoccupation with the war superseded everything else. Consequently the treaty was delayed even though, it will be seen, its conclusion was urgent. Henry sent to the ‘parlement’ for the papers relating to the regicide. From his perusal of the dossier he concluded that La Chapelle-Marteau (i.e. the Seize) had been a principal accomplice. Consequently the blame was squarely pinned on him, while other complicities were fudged. Thus, article six of the treaty declared there to be no case against the princes or princesses who had rebelled against Henry III and Henry IV. This was rather a moratorium than a disculpation, but it effectively relieved Mayenne from the fear of prosecution which was thereby precluded. The rest, and the bulk, of the articles granted an amnesty to those who submitted, and structured the settlement of a multitude of civil causes arising out of the wars. The terms of this strange, hybrid treaty reflect Henry’s desperate need to terminate the civil war in as much of France as he possibly could; that is why it sought to facilitate the redress of wrongs and losses. The three months’ truce of Taisey had expired on 30 December 1595. Conclusion of the treaty was therefore essential to prevent Mayenne from re-entering the war. It is true that Henry had received the bull of absolution on 22 December which ought to have restrained Mayenne; Du Perron had been desperate for it to arrive in time for that very reason. The bull, however, was greeted with such a fury of opposition by the ‘parlement’ that Henry could not rely on the efficacy of that alone. Mayenne was down and out, but he was not defunct, and he could still have been playing for time; he had not ceased to be truculent, notably over the exoneration clause which had delayed completion. Without the treaty, it was to be feared that Mayenne might appeal to the archduke Albert, whose arrival as governor in the Netherlands was imminent.164 With Soissons in his possession – an extraordinary concession which argues necessity – Mayenne had something helpful to offer Albert, and could have created a dangerous nuisance in Picardy. Henry’s magnanimity is justly legendary. Any other monarch would have incarcerated for the duration the arch rebel and principal author of his miseries. Thereafter the ‘parlement’ would have ensured his execution on one of numerous capital charges. But, in January 1596, when the urgency was extreme, it was politic to humour 163

De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 739; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, ii, 461. In January 1596 Albert had already reached Luxembourg; he entered Brussels on 22 February 1596, just eleven days after the edict of Folembray. 164

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Mayenne in his hypocrisy, vanity, and greed. He therefore escaped with commendation and reward, deprived only of power and dominion. He even served the king at La Fère and Amiens. In poor health, the ‘fat duke’ suffered from some dropsical disorder and gave no further trouble. Nevertheless, Henry IV had the vision to perceive and the wisdom to accept that only forgiveness would prevail; and that is the hardest lesson. Not everyone saw things that way, and the astonishing edict of Folembray created an uproar of resentment. The ‘parlement’ objected to the assertion that Mayenne had acted from religious zeal. They were even more indignant at his exoneration from the crime of regicide. They wished to exclude him from their midst until he proclaimed the deed to have been performed by execrable traitors. He was also to declare that, had he known of it, he would have striven to prevent it. They possessed the evidence, and their demand reveals how they judged Mayenne. Only after three ‘lettres de jussion’ was the edict registered.165 These were the dramatic events in France which, after d’Ossat’s preliminary negotiation, closely influenced the parallel struggle in Rome for Henry’s absolution.

165

De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 739-41. ‘Lettres de jussion’ were royal orders to the ‘parlement’ demanding immediate and unqualified registration.

CHAPTER XVI: THE KING’S ABSOLUTION I: Du Perron’s Instructions Du Perron’s instructions, dated 9 May 1595, were prepared while the king was still at Fontainebleau; the date indicates when he had been intended to leave. Du Perron went to Rome via Florence to seek the advice, support, and intercession of the grand duke.1 The first part of the instruction was therefore addressed to the grand duke; and he was to bear three things in mind. Henry would agree to any worthy submission which was not contrary to dignity. But, regardless of the consequences, he would not accept absolution at the expense of his reputation or his affairs. Du Perron had express orders to quit if it appeared that the matter was to be deliberately protracted. There was, in other words, a limit to what Henry was now prepared to stomach. Secondly, Henry outlined his position in various theatres of war, drawing attention to the enormous difficulties and expenses engendered by Leaguer submissions. It was lack of money that had delayed his departure for Burgundy [hence that of Du Perron]. His continued presence in the north had, however, frustrated the Spanish and averted any major incident in Picardy. Now Henry welcomed the opportunity to confront the enemy – the constable of Castile – and within sight of Italy where he hoped one day to distinguish himself in arms.2 The instruction for the two envoys, Du Perron and d’Ossat, closely reflected d’Ossat’s advice. It will be recalled that he had defined the crucial points – the validity of the episcopal absolution, and rehabilitation – and eliminated certain non-negotiable conditions. The pope, however, insisted that Henry ought to have requested absolution. The envoys must, on no account, impugn, detract from, or permit the diminution of Henry’s episcopal absolution; its validity was the only plank under his feet. It must be protected, at all costs, as the unique guarantee of Henry’s catholicism lest the negotiation were to fail. Article one, relating to the request for absolution, had, therefore, to be very carefully phrased. Henry referred to the present and the future, not to past actions, to justify his intentions and to merit the pope’s benediction. He had, he said, been advised by Gondi to send an envoy to express this desire, to supplicate for his benediction, and to declare his confidence that, in renewing his request, it would be granted. This was not, however, the request that the pope wished to hear. Elsewhere Henry instructed the envoys to seek the pope’s sovereign absolution for the complete repose of his soul [like Henry 1

About the same time Henry wrote to the grand duke, and to the pope. Instead of sending three envoys, Henry appointed only d’Ossat, who had so deftly begun the negotiation, to work with Du Perron. D’Ossat spoke more fluent Italian. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 359-61 [c. 9] May 1595, Henry IV to Clement VIII; 361-2 [c. 9] May 1595, Henry IV to the grand duke of Tuscany; Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘Lettres inédites de Henry IV au duc de Nevers’, Annuaire bulletin de la société de l’histoire de France, xxxvii (1900), 209-10, 17 June 1595, Henry IV to Nevers. The king was delayed, for one thing, by the machinations of the comte de Soissons, a constant source of trouble. 2 This hint of war in Italy was not, apparently, only to provide the grand duke with what he wished to hear. Henry made the same point to de Brèves, meaning to return after succouring Cambrai. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 405-8, 21 September 1595, Henry IV to de Brèves.

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III] and the satisfaction of his subjects. This, therefore, would be to complement, not to negate or supersede the episcopal absolution. The envoys were to offer an account of the king’s instruction, conversion and ‘sacre’, and his perseverance in catholicism. To convince the pope of his sincerity, they might make expressions of contrition and humility. They received copies of the king’s abjuration and confession of faith; also of his undertaking to the prelates to send an envoy [Nevers] to Rome. They should stress the urgency of the matter, and the pressure on the king from the ‘parlements’ and other officials to redress the disorders of the church. So far, Henry had resisted that pressure, deferring an assembly of the clergy until after the return of Du Perron. Besides the two acts – the abjuration and confession of faith – Du Perron brought two procurations. The first was an order to seek Papal absolution, pure and simple. The pope’s supplementary grace, as a matter of form, was all the king desired or needed. However, this procuration was only to be used if it was clear that it would succeed. But, if the envoys were obliged to add the words ‘sovereign absolution for the repose of the king’s soul’, the second procuration provided for the necessary confirmation of past acts. That was the first, crucial point, and the core problem: how to obtain Papal absolution without invalidating that already obtained. The second crucial point was rehabilitation, which implied the cancellation of Henry’s exclusion from the French succession contained in his excommunication of 1585. As this Papal claim was totally rejected, the envoys were to demand absolution without any reference to rehabilitation. If necessary, however, Henry would accept d’Ossat’s clever, fudging clause, designed to annul the excommunication, so long as it did not feature in any document. The clause would establish that neither the bull of excommunication, nor anything deriving from it, could prejudice the king any more than if it had never existed. If the pope made a stand on rehabilitation, the envoys were to halt the negotiation and report to the king. This interruption was to serve as a warning, without suggesting that the king might yield. The four unacceptable conditions, already excluded by d’Ossat were reiterated in the instruction in order to emphasise that they were not to be reopened; Henry would not have his absolution attributed to weakness.3 Rather than accept anything prejudicial to royal dignity, he would adhere to, and rely upon, his first absolution, as he had already begun to do. The instruction also repeated the three concessions Henry was prepared to offer – relating to Béarn, Trent and Condé. But, as d’Ossat had advised, these were difficult matters which could more easily be accomplished after the absolution than before it. Finally, Henry wished the envoys to explain the just causes why the ‘parlement’ [not the king] had banished the Jesuits, since their return was likely to be required. Henry wished that the religious orders in France should cease to be under the direction of foreigners. In short, the absolution agreement was to be confined to the spiritual sphere; and Henry expected the Papal demands to be moderate. If it appeared that he was to be 3

The items were: a truce with Spain, Savoy or the League; war on the huguenots; the revocation of the religious edicts and the termination of protestant alliances. Without the edict of Poitiers 1577, for instance, there would be rebellion.

Chapter XVI: The King’s Absolution

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humiliated, and his patience tested, then Du Perron should stay for no more than thirty days. It would now be apparent that the prince de Béarn was Henry IV of France; and when Du Perron arrived in Rome, the king was in arms in Franche-Comté against the governor of Milan.

II: The Negotiation in Rome Doubt had persisted in Rome until late in June 1595 as to whether Du Perron was really coming, and what to do if he did not.4 Even d’Ossat was getting restive; further excuses simply would not do. Fever set in whenever the ‘ordinaires’ (regular mail services) arrived from Venice, Milan or Lyon. But the French had not obtained the assurance of absolution that Villeroy had declared to be necessary. Considering that substantive and procedural problems remained, Henry had probably been wise not to appear too eagerly compliant.5 If, as d’Ossat believed, Henry’s affairs would prosper in Rome according to their success in France, his appearance in the Spanish province of Franche-Comté, so close to Italy, could only be an advantage. Nevertheless, the delay and uncertainty had drawbacks in Rome; it provided too much time for reflection and intrigue. There was opposition – as d’Ossat had warned – from within the Papal court itself, and Paruta observed the pope to be depressed. Clement VIII was in an awkward position. He had come as close as he could to soliciting a French envoy, and would probably like, on balance, to be able to proceed to the absolution. But, before Du Perron arrived, Aldobrandini had returned from Spain (16 May 1595) with a negative message. Spain had no intention of making peace; she was expressly opposed to the absolution, and was poised for a new campaign of obstruction. If the Spanish could not avert the absolution altogether, they would try to stave it off indefinitely; and that spelt serious trouble.6 4

On 27 June 1595 d’Ossat acknowledged Villeroy’s letter of 31 May 1595 announcing Du Perron’s departure from Troyes that day. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 548-54, 27 June 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 5 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 477-93, 21 March 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy, 494-504, 14 April 1595, d’Ossat to Henry IV. On 30 March 1595 d’Ossat received Henry’s letter of 8 March 1595, saying that Du Perron would leave later that month. Ibid., 509-26, 20 May 1595, 526-32, 22 May 1595, 534-47, 23 June 1595, 548-54, 27 June 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 182-5, 24 June 1595 (3), 189-92, 1 July 1595, 198-200, 8 July 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 207-8, March to April 1595, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. Delmonte was unable to understand why Du Perron did not come. 6 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 207-8, March-April 1595, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany, 209-10, 2 May 1595, 16 May 1595, 212-14, 8-11 July 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, 136-9, 20 May 1595 (2), 139-42, 20 May 1595 (2), 146-51, 27 May 1595 (2), 169-72, 17 June 1595, 172-7, 24 June 1595, 182-5, 24 June 1595 (2), 192-5, 8 July 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 509-26, 20 May 1595, 532-4, 22 May 1595 (2), 548-54, 27 June 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. D’Ossat made the interesting observation that those who returned from Spain were usually disillusioned. They found there nothing of the majesty and splendour they had anticipated. The king was broken and moribund, failing in body and mind. He no longer knew what he wanted and no longer heard the affairs of France. Ibid., 548-54, 27 June 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. Nevertheless, Aldobrandini did see the king himself, partly about the affairs of France.

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In advance of Du Perron’s arrival, the Spanish worked away at eroding Clement’s favourable disposition, painstakingly achieved by Gondi and d’Ossat. All the old arguments were revived in a fresh outburst of controversy, propaganda and intimidation.7 The hostile theses of the Spanish theologians were resurrected, and the pope was threatened with retribution if he reneged on his promise – genuine or factitious – never to absolve Navarre. He was afraid of making a decision alone, and unable to decide whom to trust; he was disturbed and perplexed.8 Besides their aggressive propaganda campaign, the Spanish also created procedural problems. They conspired to preclude the absolution by suborning the college of cardinals. Those who aspired to the Papal tiara were particularly susceptible. Sessa even descended to trickery. His supporters would press the pope to bring the French matter before a full consistory, promising to submit to his will. Then, when it came to the point, they would reject the absolution, leaving the pope in a dangerous position. The cardinal de Florence employed Niccolini to convey a timely warning of this. Niccolini thought Clement should simply exert his authority, determine the matter himself, and have done with it. The French, he added, could be impatient. Although Clement did not see anything simply, that particular trap was successfully avoided. But the friendly ambassadors and other supporters had to be both vigilant and diligent in order to ensure that the pope felt sufficiently supported.9 This was the treacherous ambience which awaited Du Perron. Du Perron entered Rome on 12 July 1595 with both written and verbal instructions from the king and the grand duke. He was also armed with information and advice regarding the passions and concerns of the Papal court. When Du Perron had a private audience that same night, Clement wept with relief. Then he ordered prayers and processions every morning for the outcome of the negotiation.10 During the week after Du Perron’s arrival, Rome was plunged into turmoil; and Sessa spent all that night roaming about the city (‘andare in volta’).11 His purpose was to obstruct and delay the negotiation to such an extent that the French would abandon it.12 Given Du Perron’s instructions not to linger in the face of adversity, Sessa might well have succeeded. Clement himself was scarcely less of a problem because he refused to supersede theological and canonical considerations by the exercise of sovereign authority.

7

Sessa is said to have released 1600 thugs into the Papal states from the Abruzzi just when the pope’s forces were depleted by the war in Hungary. These undesirables were called ‘facinorosi’ and previously ‘banditti’. Galluzzi, Istoria del Granducato di Toscana, iii, 109. 8 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 139-42, 20 May 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate, 146-51, 27 May 1595 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate. 9 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 208, 26 April 1595, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany, 212, 24 June 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany, 212-14, 8-11 July 1595, 214-18, 14-16 July 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 10 Galluzzi, Istoria del Granducato di Toscana, iii, 109. The Spanish had two new propaganda papers printed to coincide with Du Perron’s arrival. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 214-18, 14-16 July 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 202-16, 15 July 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. 11 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 221-2, 14 July 1595, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. 12 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 214-21, 14-16 July 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany.


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The negotiations for Henry’s absolution took place in Rome between 16 July and 17 September 1595; the outcome was uncertain until the very last moment. Discussions were primarily conducted by Du Perron and d’Ossat with the cardinal secretary of state, Aldobrandini, and Toledo.13 D’Ossat later observed that secrecy had been the salvation of the affair, while Du Perron claimed to have relied upon resolution and silence. Although they drew on the help of the friendly ambassadors and other supporters, there was no general knowledge of the proceedings. Above all, their enemies were kept in the dark. Consequently we know more about the opposition to the negotiations than about the discussions themselves. The French put little in writing, both from fear of interceptions and to avoid being pressed to refer home over each disputed point. They only mention having had three audiences, on 16 and 30 July and 28 August 1595. These must, presumably have been formal reviews of progress; there is no information as to what was discussed when, or in what order. Shortly after the second of these audiences on 2 August, and again on 30 August, the pope made an announcement to the consistory. The first was largely procedural; the second was a declaration of his intention to proceed with the absolution.14 In his audience of 15 July 1595, Sessa reminded the pope of his statement in consistory upon the departure of Nevers: he would sooner be flayed than absolve Navarre. Sessa’s first and best hope was to procure a majority of the cardinals against absolution in any form. He therefore urged the pope to negotiate with the whole college of cardinals. As everything hinged upon who would support whom, the battle of the cardinals began. Every day, at the same time, Sessa conferred with some of them. The pope, however, did not consult them.15 Next day, the French had audience, which appears to have been largely formal. Du Perron expressed the king’s good will and his desire to obey the pope, if that was possible. He described the severe degeneration of the church in France and the difficulty Henry had had in persuading the ‘parlement’ to assent to his mission. Du Perron made sure the pope understood that this was, absolutely, his last chance.16 When, on 17 July 1595, Clement reported to the consistory, he referred only to the arrival of a certain Frenchman, whose business he had yet to learn; and he announced his intention to hold a general congregation.17 Furious at this decision, the Spanish thundered at Toledo that they would withdraw obedience to Rome, and other such extravagances. During this time, procedures were being examined. Upon the pope’s advice, the two Frenchmen visited all the cardinals, for whom Du Perron had brought letters. These visits, which lasted until 24 or 25 July, achieved a change of atmosphere, 13

Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 126. Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 22-3, [probably 6 November 1595], Du Perron to Villeroy; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 554-7, 29 July 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy, 559-73, 30 August 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 15 Leva, Ed., Paola Paruta, iii, 223-7, 22 July 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 214-21, 14-16 July 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 16 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 223-7, 22 July 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 17 The difference between a consistory and a general congregation was that in the latter the cardinals did not deliberate. The pope was therefore less constrained. 14

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and caused Sessa to lose ground.18 Nevertheless, he sustained the pressure, even sending theologians to tutor dissenting cardinals. He sought, in particular, to discover the form in which the king requested absolution, in order to be ready with arguments negating its validity. He hoped to be able to wreck the negotiation over rehabilitation, a sound approach since, in that respect, he shared common ground with the pope.19 One can see why the envoys and supporters were anxious to keep Sessa in the dark. Paruta perceived the opposition taking shape and technical arguments being marshalled, and he was anxious. He feared that Spanish reasoning would unnerve the pope and induce him to procrastinate. Like Niccolini, Paruta earnestly wished that Clement would, ‘de plenitudine potestas’, declare the king absolved, and so have done with it.20 But Clement did not dare; besides, he intended to extract the maximum possible advantages. It was possibly the news (received on 17 July 1595) that Mayenne was treating with the king, which emboldened the pope sufficiently to give Sessa a dressing down. Failing an act of sovereign authority, the only way to defeat Sessa was for Clement to consult the cardinals in camera. During the last week of July, Paruta, Niccolini and other supporters banded together to induce the pope both to act and to follow this procedure. As usual, he was timid and hesitant.21 However, on 29 July, d’Ossat, who was predominantly silent, expressed the opinion that the negotiations were well advanced, despite augmented opposition.22 Du Perron had been instructed not to use the first procuration – requesting absolution pure and simple – unless he was satisfied that it would succeed. Consequently he discussed his commission and the two procurations with Paruta before presenting the king’s petition. The pope must be made to understand that the cardinals were favourable. If, by lessening his fears, he was induced to adopt a positive approach, the cardinals would hesitate to oppose him. These moves of Du Perron suggest that, unlike the ambassadors, he did not have ready access to the pope. Cardinal Baronius, Clement’s confessor, emerged as a supporter at this time. He produced a written work proclaiming the pope’s powers to moderate and remit. He also dismissed the whole problem of the king’s ‘sincerity’, over which the pope agonised. It was quite appropriate, Baronius said, to accept appearances, since only God could read men’s minds.23 It was not until their second audience, on 30 July 1595, that Du Perron and d’Ossat presented the king’s petition. Du Perron had wanted Toledo to put their first procuration to the pope. Paruta believed that he had done this because of the length of time he had spent with the pope.24 Nevertheless, the petition, as presented, did not conform to the first 18 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 222-3, 15 July 1595, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany, 223-4, 18 July 1595, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany, 226-30, 19 July 1595, 230-2, 21 July 1595, 236-9, 26 July 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 19 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 230-2, 21 July, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 20 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 223-7, 22 July 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. 21 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 232-6, 24-28 July 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 22 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, 554-7, 29 July 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 23 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 233-6, 29 July 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. 24 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 233-6, 29 July 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate.


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procuration, but employed the alternative formula. The petition stated that having wanted to return to the Catholic Church for several years, the king had explored all possible means of being received by the authority of the Holy See. That was why he had sent Luxembourg to Sixtus V [in January 1591]. Thereafter, during a period of eighteen months, he had clarified points of difference [between his faith and Rome]. Then he had sent Gondi and Pisani to beg the pope [Clement VIII] to prescribe the form and the means of his conversion, so that everything should be done with his authority and good will. But, receiving no response, the king was obliged to turn to the French prelates [there was no mention of the ‘intimations’ from Rome]. Henry received instruction, and pronounced the customary abjuration and confession of faith. From one prelate, with the support of the others, he received absolution from the censures and excommunication incurred. Nevertheless, the prelates deferred to the pope to confirm what they had performed in circumstances of urgency. In order to comply with their requirements, Henry had sent Nevers and others to beg the pope to accord what he considered to be necessary. Although Nevers was refused, the king [now] sent again to request the pope’s benediction and sovereign absolution for the greater safety and repose of his soul for the good of his kingdom and its reunion with the Holy See. After seven years of rupture, religion was in great disorder and only the king’s absolution could restore Papal authority in France.25 This plain statement is significant in several respects. While the pope vigorously demanded the rejection of the episcopal absolution as inadequate, Henry sought only its confirmation. Nor was there, in the petition, any expression of penitence or obedience. If the petition is to be believed, then Henry was more than consentant to the mission to Rome of Luxembourg in 1591. It therefore follows that Henry had intended to abjure, at least since his accession, had he only been able to obtain Papal collaboration. That successive popes had declined to co-operate was almost entirely due to the politics of religion. Henry’s petition to the pope, however, was directed at achieving a specific purpose. Consequently one should not necessarily accept its every statement at face value; past events may assume a slightly altered complexion. D’Ossat reported only that the pope read the petition and would consider it. He asked some questions and raised some difficulties. There is no doubt that the form of Henry’s absolution was extensively disputed.26 The first breakthrough was procedural. On 2 August 1595, the pope assembled a general congregation. At great length, he expounded the whole French matter, as it had developed since his election.27 He explained that the ‘rigours’, namely the rejection of Gondi and Pisani, had been of no avail because the king had continued to prosper. Since then, Henry had abjured in France, upon condition that he sent to Rome for complete absolution and reunion. That phraseology was promisingly neutral. Nevers, however, was intercepted because he had come as an ambassador. Nevertheless, he did come to Rome. While he was there, Mayenne had sent Joyeuse and Senecy. They had both said that 25

La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 559 n.1-561, the king’s petition. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 559-73, 30 August 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 27 In some instances, Clement got the chronology wrong. 26

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France could not be wrested from Navarre. They therefore advised conferring benediction, together with a general peace upholding Mayenne in defence of religion. Others, however, had claimed that if Henry were not absolved, he would never prevail. So Clement had let Nevers depart dissatisfied. Then Sega sent Montorio [actually before Nevers departed], advising the pope not to snap the tenuous thread of relations with France, but to sustain a negotiation somehow. Consequently Clement had listened to cardinal Gondi [who had no commission]. Clement told Gondi that he would both receive and hear a further envoy. Stressing the supreme and unusual importance of the matter, Clement exhorted the cardinals to consider the issues dispassionately and to realise that Henry was not a private person but a mighty prince. It was necessary to look beyond him to the kingdom. Less rigour was required for censures than for sins. In short, the pope would have to accept that God had made Navarre the King of France, if schism and the loss of France were to be avoided. Two letters from the king, as well as his petition were read to the meeting. Then Clement announced that he would consult the cardinals separately, with a prohibition on their talking to each other. In this way, the voting need not be known to anyone but the pope himself. This was a serious blow to Sessa and his followers.28 In effect, the pope had declared the absolution to be necessary; and the supporters were satisfied that the crucial procedural difficulties had been resolved. Clement now meant to proceed; but that did not necessarily mean that he would conclude. The interviews with the cardinals began on 7 August 1595 and lasted for up to two hours each. They were heard, and they were also made to listen while the pope cited scripture as well as using verbal arguments. The cardinal of Verona, a supporter, confided to Paruta that the pope was displaying doubts. Verona mentioned two points – both of them difficulties raised by Spain: whether the absolution should be conferred in Rome or by a legate in France, and whether the king should be made to abjure a second time.29 Clearly this procedure was throwing up all the objections and difficulties which were likely to be raised. They could, therefore, be pre-empted. The disadvantage was that they worried the pope. Sessa did his best to fuel Clement’s discomfiture and impertinently asked him to delay the absolution until the arrival of a dispatch from Spain. Niccolini, on the other hand, thought it essential for Clement to act before the dispatch arrived.30 Many believed that the Spanish meant to introduce a new negotiation for a general suspension of arms – intended to disrupt the proceedings. Meanwhile they produced more tracts advocating absolution for sins only, without restoration. That meant that the king would not be recognised.31 Sessa tried to work on Delmonte, condemning Navarre’s conversion 28

La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 559-73, 30 August 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 243-8, 3 August 1595, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany, 248-51, 4-6 August 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 243-5, 5 August 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 29 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 251-3, 12 August 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 30 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 255-6, 11 August 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany, 259, 18 August 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 31 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 255-6, 11 August 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. Sessa may very well have been trying to find out when the archduke Albert was coming from Spain. Ibid., 259, 18 August 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. Niccolini reported that the people of Rome were sick of


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as feigned. Delmonte retorted that since God had made Navarre the master of France, the situation would have to be accepted. Sessa therefore proposed a suspension of arms for two years during which to observe Henry’s conduct. Then he proposed to demand a league of Spain, France and the Papacy, by which to expel the heretics from France and the Netherlands. Delmonte became increasingly anxious that the pope should stop dithering and act.32 Meanwhile Paruta and Niccolini also sustained their constructive efforts. Niccolini found the pope very much afraid of having to endure the resentment of Spain for the rest of his life. Niccolini replied with confidence that the Spanish would get used to the absolution; and they would not execute all their threats. He shrewdly proposed that the pope should address himself to the subject of peace soon after the absolution; that would be a way of diverting the Spanish displeasure – and so it was. Niccolini also advised Clement to make some suitable promotions by which to alter the disposition of the college of cardinals. All the supporters would welcome the revival of a French faction to counterbalance the predominant influence of Spain.33 By 19 August 1595, when only four cardinals remained to be interviewed, the signs were mainly discouraging. The pope had developed cold feet. Paruta declared the negotiation to have reached its crisis point, and Du Perron was so perturbed that he turned to Paruta for help. The Venetian ascertained that Clement was troubled and afflicted by having so much to consider. He feared that by removing one problem, he would simply create another; and he was still bothered by the possibility that Navarre might relapse again. Paruta said that was very unlikely. Henry’s absolution would alienate the English and some German states as well as the huguenots. If he were to relapse, he would forfeit catholic support as well. Paruta thought that Clement had become entangled over the terms by trying to cover everything all at once. This – as d’Ossat had already indicated – was impossible. Some things could only be accomplished over a period of time.34 The pope’s private consultations ended on 23 August 1595. More than three quarters of the cardinals were reported to favour absolution, although we know nothing of what they said about the conditions.35 In view of the cardinals’ support, Du Perron and d’Ossat evidently proceeded to negotiate the conditions of the absolution during the last days of August 1595.36 This was apparently the most difficult time of all, during which the pope turned to Paruta. The French had submitted in writing the maximum concessions they could accept. Clement, however, was so afflicted by doubts and difficulties that he could not bring himself to the Spanish and the daily processions were consuming too much wax. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 251-3, 12 August 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 32 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 257-9, 18 August 1595, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. 33 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 236-9, 5 August 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. Paruta was expressly commanded by the senate, on 29 July 1595, to put certain points to the pope in favour of Navarre. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 248-51, 4-6 August 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany, 254-5, 9-11, August 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 34 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 253-7, 19 August 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. 35 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 259, 18 August 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 559-73, 30 August 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 36 It is quite unclear what, and how much, had already been discussed.

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make a decision. He begged Paruta to persuade the French to climb down; he was neither to assure them of success nor to provoke despair. D’Ossat believed that the pope wanted more than they submitted, but he and Du Perron were determined not to yield. This was where Du Perron’s ‘resolution’ came in. After a long audience, on 28 August, he and d’Ossat made their final position clear. According to the instruction, Du Perron threatened to leave if the conclusion was to be delayed.37 One must therefore suppose that the pope’s next move was taken to prevent a rupture with the French, and to assuage the exasperation of others.38 On 30 August 1595, Clement held a consistory – in the form of a congregation. He announced the favourable opinion of the cardinals and his own intention to proceed with the absolution. He referred to nine conditions allegedly agreed – which actually appear to have been at a rudimentary stage – and he silenced those who attempted to speak.39 According to received opinion, the king’s absolution was established at this time, on 30 August 1595, the rest being mere formality. Nothing could be further from the truth. The pope had made only a declaration of intent, not a formal undertaking, and immense difficulties remained. They had still to agree upon an abbreviated form of the petition, the abjuration and confession of faith which the envoys were required to make, as well as the form of the absolution, wherein lay the two crucial points.40 Clement wanted all the details settled prior to the act. He still demanded the advance performance of those items which were going to take time – matters which did not depend upon the king alone. This condition, and a premature discussion as to who should be appointed legate, indicate a continuing disposition to delay. Sessa’s demand that Henry must be made to abjure over again, at the hands of a legate, would afford endless opportunities for obstruction. The French, on the contrary, had orders to complete everything themselves, there in Rome.41 The aim of the French and their supporters was now to build on the pope’s announcement, and induce him to proceed. Paruta suggested trying to bounce him with one significant concession; it is not clear, however, where the major sticking point currently lay.42 D’Ossat observed that it had been difficult to fend off the obstructions and conditions raised by Sessa, who still hoped that the absolution could be obviated.43 Sessa’s latest proposal was that Henry should be suspended from ecclesiastical censures 37

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, 267-9, 26 August 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 259-60, 26 August 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 38 Clement, for instance, authorised Paruta to communicate his announcement to the Venetian senate. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 273-7, 2 September 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. 39 Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 13 [early September 1595], Du Perron to Villeroy. Du Perron said that Toledo had performed miracles. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 559-73, 30 August 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 260-1, 30 August 1595, Delmonte to the grand duke of Tuscany. 40 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 574-80, 17 September 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 41 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 559-73, 30 August 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 262, 2 September 1595, 266-7, 8 September 1595, 267, 9 September 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Degert, Le Cardinal d’Ossat, 156. 42 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 273-7, 2 September 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. 43 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 574-80, 17 September 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy.


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until after the expiry of a truce and the conclusion of peace. His absolution could then be confirmed by a legate. All that could be made to take years. Sessa’s bottom line was that the absolution, if unavoidable, should at least be private – not public, solemn and unchallengeable. Clement was impressed, and perturbed by Sessa’s continuous clamour. Such was the degree of indecision, Paruta observed, that only the absolution itself would end it.44 The conflict reached crisis proportions about 12 September 1595. The French were becoming edgy and believed the residual opposition to be factitious. They suspected the pope of stalling until the arrival of some message from Spain, and until Mayenne and other League leaders had submitted on profitable terms. Rome was full of Leaguer agents who were manipulated by the Spanish and worked for delays. The French had begun to suppose – so Niccolini observed – that the pope intended Henry’s maximum harm; they were not going to be in the least grateful. Du Perron was, indeed, desperately anxious to extract the absolution forthwith. The bull, which would take substantially longer, would have to wait.45 Du Perron’s concern related to the impact on the negotiation of external events, which were currently being exploited in order to delay the absolution. Du Perron said that every day they were receiving unfavourable reports about the king and (writing later), were about to receive even worse news. He referred to the serious French reverses in Picardy and to the loss of Cambrai. The Spanish were trumpeting their successes as if the loss of every town were the conquest of a kingdom. All this could have fatal effects. The French tried to turn the situation, and to shame the pope. They stressed the opportunity to demonstrate that Rome did not accord the king absolution on account of the success of his affairs. But the grave news from Picardy was not all. What bothered Du Perron even more, if the absolution was not swiftly extracted, was the approach of the archduke Albert on his way to the Netherlands. Indeed, it was probably the coming of the archduke which motivated Sessa’s delaying tactics. Albert was shortly expected to land at Genoa and to proceed to Rome. If the pope was afraid of Sessa, he could never confront the viceregal authority of the archduke, who came with money and an army. Then the absolution would be lost; Du Perron was convinced of it. It was certainly not a risk the French could afford to take by insisting upon receiving the bull at the same time as the absolution. They were right: when he heard that the absolution was already granted, Albert changed his itinerary and avoided Rome.46 On the other hand, splitting what was really a single process caused some inconvenience, and further uncertainty, after the absolution. The French were displaying the resolution upon which Du Perron relied. On 14 September 1595, Benedetto Giustiniano (auditor of the rota) appealed to Niccolini to 44

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 280-3, 6 September 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate, 283-5, 9 September 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. 45 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 267-8, 12 September 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 46 The archduke Albert left Madrid on 22 July and reached Genoa by 25 October 1595. Birch, Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, i, 270; La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 591-8, 25 October 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 285-7, 16 September 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate; Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 22-3 [probably 6 November 1595], Du Perron to Villeroy.

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intercede with the unreasonable French. Niccolini disagreed, attributing Papal intransigence to external circumstances. The French, he said, were utterly sickened by the degree of pressure placed on the pope by the League representatives. Niccolini told Giustiniano to go to work on Toledo, and to induce the pope to act. He believed the ceremony was actually under preparation and that nerve and resolution would succeed. Besides, the court was becoming highly discontented and blamed the pope ‘non poco’. In these circumstances, the French issued an ultimatum: either the negotiations would be completed in three days’ time, by 17 September, or else they would leave. Nevertheless, they were made to sweat. Two days later, on 16 September, they went to see Aldobrandini, stood firm, and prevailed. Later that day, the absolution ceremony was announced for the following morning. It appears that the whole negotiation had nearly foundered over the modification of the clause on the publication of the decrees of Trent. Even then, the pope was agonising over how the Spanish would react. Niccolini told him crisply that there was nothing more they could do and they would get used to it.47 That night, following the announcement of the ceremony, Sessa led an imposing cortege through the city and read the pope a formal protestation, with ‘non poco rumori’. But Clement, decisive at last, merely intimated that he had heard.48 The formal and public ceremony of absolution took place under the portico of Saint Peter’s.49 Neither envoy wrote about this humiliation they endured for the sake of the king and the kingdom. Doubtless they were sustained by their achievement, relief and rejoicing. Now the king need only ratify the bull, when it came. Kneeling on the bottom step, the envoys (presumably one of them) read out the king’s petition.50 Henry was thereby declared to have been absolved in France by a French prelate with the advice and consent of others. He petitioned for the pope’s holy benediction and supreme absolution from the censures declared against him. There was no direct mention of excommunication and therefore not of rehabilitation; in this the French had yielded nothing. Next, they pronounced the formula of abjuration, which covered essential doctrine in some detail, and the profession of faith. The articles, or conditions of agreement were also read, followed by a promise to observe them. The envoys remained on their knees during a recitation of the miserere (psalm 50). After each of the twenty-three verses the pope lightly touched them on the shoulder with a small rod or baton. This procedure symbolised the restoration of Christian liberty to those who had been censured. This might, conceivably, be construed as an assertion of rehabilitation. If so, it could be endured in an arcane and symbolic form, which few would comprehend. Finally, there were prayers before the pope pronounced the absolution. The pope enjoyed his triumph, declaring the alleged absolution by a French prelate to be both null and annulled. Nevertheless, all religious acts performed by virtue of that episcopal absolution remained 47

Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 267-8, 12 September 1595, 268-9, 14 September 1595, 270-1, 16 September 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 288-9, 16 September 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate, 292-5, 23 September 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. 48 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 272-4, 20-9 September 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 49 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 272, 20 September 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. 50 Accounts vary somewhat as to the order of events, but it makes no substantive difference.


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valid, and were thereby ratified as if Henri de France had, originally, been absolved by the pope himself; this ‘saving clause’ was inserted precisely as the French had dictated it. Henry was, furthermore, absolved from the major excommunication and other ecclesiastical penalties and restored to the Church. The ‘saving clause’ had, in effect, backdated the Papal absolution to the time of Henry’s conversion. Thus the point of principle, the validity of the episcopal absolution, was both denied and sustained, and also rendered immaterial. Similarly, the ‘saving clause’ had circumvented the problem of rehabilitation, which was not mentioned. Henry was necessarily deemed to have been recognised from the moment he was deemed to have been absolved. That disposed of the problem of rehabilitation in a manner which was open to differing interpretations. In this shrewd and subtle way, both the principal problems were overcome. The ceremony ended with a Te Deum inside the great church.51 Later that same exhausting day – 17 September 1595 – d’Ossat dispatched one Batiste Mancini to France, to convey the good news to the king. He carried a copy of the petition, the conditions accorded, and those which had been rejected.52 Revealing his relief, d’Ossat observed that the cannonade from the Castel Saint-Angelo was earsplitting to the Spanish. Doubtless the lighted windows, and fireworks three nights running were equally offensive to their eyes.53 The Spanish were utterly disconcerted; and they could no longer defend the French war on grounds of religion. They had been unable to avert the absolution, and their attitude to peace with France, which could have been face saving, was ambivalent and confused. On the other hand, no one yet knew what the archduke Albert might achieve.

III: The Bull of Absolution The absolution was the essential thing; yet without the bull there was no formal evidence of it. Clement appeared to be in no hurry to proceed to the final stage. He was still afraid of incurring blame if Henry were to stray from the catholic path.54 Possibly exhausted, he went away to Frascati and remained there until late in October. The French waited impatiently, while Clement was pursued by Sessa. In fact, the Spaniard was deflated; he 51

De Thou, Histoire universelle, viii, 642-3, Féret, Henri IV et l’église, 201-9; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 574-80, 17 September 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 155-6, articles accorded in Rome. D’Ossat especially mentioned the help of Toledo; Aldobrandini and Morosini had also helped. Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 292-5, 23 September 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. Paruta reported that part of the rejoicing in Rome was because the pope had been freed from servitude, and the security of Italy was deemed to be assured. Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 136 seq. 52 Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 131-3, text of the articles agreed. Du Perron referred to eighteen rejected articles, which he declined to list. For the most part, however, these items have already emerged. One could add the restitution of the Jesuits, a crusade against the Turks (a French ally), and removal of the offending clause in the ‘arrêt’ condemning Jean Chastel. 53 La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 574-80, 17 September 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy, 580-90, 22 October 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 54 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 295-7, 23 September 1595 (2), Paruta to the doge and senate; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 580-90, 22 October 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy.

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could only reiterate Spanish claims to Brittany and Navarre. When his long-awaited dispatch from Spain arrived, he was permitted to relax. If the absolution had already taken place, Philip II would accept it. As Niccolini had always said, he had no choice.55 Thus, in effect, Clement’s years of trepidation were over, and the strident Spanish subsided with barely a whimper. But the pope had done little enough to attract either gratitude or esteem. While Clement delayed the bull, response from the king was also slow; that left Du Perron and d’Ossat in an uncomfortable position. By a strange coincidence, Henry held a Te Deum in Lyon on 17 September 1595, the very day of his absolution. On 24 September, during his return to Paris, Henry wrote to his envoys ordering them to convey his warm thanks to the pope. But he was referring to Clement’s announcement of 30 August 1595. The news that Henry had needed so badly for so long, reached him only on 30 September 1595, in Paris. He ordered prayers, and thanksgiving in the churches where he had so often been reviled.56 But – it has already been seen – this was a moment of crisis: Henry was striving to reach Cambrai in time to raise the siege. Having come too late, the danger to Picardy was all the greater. Henry therefore spent the whole of October moving about in the province. He was prevented from attending to political and administrative matters until the court rejoined him from the south east, about 10 November 1595. It was not, therefore, until 12 November 1595 that Henry himself wrote to thank the pope for his absolution – which, still unconfirmed by the bull was, in a sense, unofficial.57 Clement deferred both the delivery of the bull and the appointment of a legate; he wanted first to hear how the articles had been received. Now there was some uncertainty about what was supposed to happen next. The pope appeared to expect another ambassador to offer obedience. The conditions, however, required the king to ratify the bull in the presence of a legate.58 The pope’s delay proved Du Perron to have been right. Had they insisted upon receipt of the bull at the time of the absolution, several more weeks could easily have elapsed. The archduke Albert – with his men and money – had landed in Genoa some time before 25 October 1595. All could easily have been lost.59 Nor was Du Perron’s anxiety at an end. He had clearly been right to want the absolution 55

Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 324-6, 21 October 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 279-80, 16 October 1595, Niccolini to the grand duke of Tuscany. Spain later complained that Clement had not insisted upon peace as part of the terms of absolution. This, however, had been categorically rejected by Henry IV. La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, ii, 55-80, 29 February 1596 (sic) d’Ossat to Villeroy. 56 Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 14-16, 6 November 1595, Du Perron to Henry IV; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 612-19, 30 November 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 307-10, 7 October 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate, 324-6, 21 October 1595, Paruta to the doge and senate. D’Ossat informed the pope that Henry had received the news on 30 September 1595. Some sort of instant response must have reached the envoys. Paruta left Rome on 28 October 1595, his legation completed. 57 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 445-7, 12 November 1595, Henry IV to Clement VIII; 447-8, 12 November 1595 (2), Henry IV to Clement VIII, 450-3, 17 November 1595, Henry IV to de Brèves. 58 Leva, Ed., Paolo Paruta, iii, 297-300, 23 September 1595 (3), Paruta to the doge and senate. 59 Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 22-3, 6 November 1595, Du Perron to Villeroy; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 591-8, 25 October 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy.


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safely pronounced before the archduke Albert could march to Rome and intimidate the pope. Now Du Perron was similarly concerned that the bull should reach the king before the expiry of the truce of Taisey with Mayenne and the League. Then Mayenne would be deprived of any decent pretext for withholding his submission and appealing to the archduke. Consequently the envoys had been agitating for the bull, which they finally received on 1 November 1595. Feeling that he himself should remain in Rome to deliver the king’s ratification – about which there was some confusion – Du Perron asked Delbene to take the bull to France. Given the problems of distance and communications – especially in the winter – he did not travel very fast. Thus, it has been seen, he arrived on 22 December 1595, with only nine days to spare before the expiry of the truce; after so long a struggle the timing was alarmingly tight.60 Henry’s acknowledgement of the absolution, written on 12 November 1595, crossed with the bull dispatched with Delbene on 7 November.61 There was naturally consternation in Rome over the long silence from France. The atmosphere, however, was perceptibly eased when Henry’s messenger – Valerio – arrived on 1 December. Fortunately the autograph letter was highly acclaimed for its appropriate tone and content. It was read to the consistory on 4 December, and silenced those who had begun to speak ill of the king. Henry’s conduct, in the circumstances, was highly judicious. Although he had ordered prayers and thanksgiving for his absolution, he may be assumed to have withheld its conditions. Otherwise there would have been such a clamour of opposition in the strongly Gallican ‘parlement’ that Clement might well have suppressed the bull. That would have produced an appalling situation. D’Ossat, in fact, thought the king perfectly entitled not to reply at all before receiving the bull; he had, after all, heard nothing from the pope himself.62 Du Perron had intended to send a full account of his embassy together with the bull; only he was ill and unable to prepare it. Delbene, however, did carry an annotated version of the conditions.63 Pending his full report, Du Perron was anxious to convey the extreme difficulties he and d’Ossat had had to face. The negotiation had been tangled and 60

Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 14-16, 6 November 1595, Du Perron to Henry IV, 22-3 [probably 6 November 1595], Du Perron to Villeroy. 61 La Houssaye, Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 612-19, 30 November 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 62 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 445-77, 12 November 1595, Henry IV to Clement VIII. About the same time, Henry announced his absolution to various people. Ibid., 453-4, 17 November 1595, Henry IV to the grand duke of Tuscany. Henry sent Maisse to thank him. Ibid., 455-7, 17 November 1595, Henry IV to Toledo, 458-60, 22 November 1595, circular letter to the bishops, 468-9, 30 November 1595, circular letter to the ‘gouverneurs’, 475-9, 11 December 1595, Henry IV to de Brèves. Henry appointed d’Ossat to be his chargé d’affaires until the arrival of an ambassador and asked for Du Perron to be granted the provisions to his bishopric of Évreux. This was done on 11 December 1595. It was also reported at the same time that Condé had been surrendered to be raised as a catholic. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 61219, 30 November 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy, 620-9, 18 December 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 19-20 [December 1595], Du Perron to Henry IV, 20-1 [c. December 1595], Du Perron to Villeroy. 63 Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 157-61; La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, i, 609-12, 5 November 1595, d’Ossat to Villeroy. D’Ossat wrote as if they were also sending other documents – it is not clear what.

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complicated to the utmost degree. The envoys were therefore anxious that those articles which were less than ideal should not be misconstrued. In other words, they represented the best attainable compromise. Considering the complexity of the matter, and the extent of the opposition, they believed that they had escaped fairly lightly. They had accorded nothing contrary to their instructions; and the authority of the king and the ‘parlements’ remained unscathed. The articles and annotations were as follows: 1) Henry’s plenipotentiaries were to make the customary oath of obedience to the prescriptions of the Holy See and the Church. This was normal procedure.64 2) They were to abjure Calvinism and all other heresies in the presence of the Pope, and make a profession of the Catholic faith. That the envoys should make an abjuration and profession of faith in Rome was normal, even though the king had already done this in France. They had, however, rejected demands that the king himself should be required to repeat it in France. They advised him to sign a ratification of what they had done in Rome. 3) He was to restore Catholic worship in the principality of Béarn, and appoint bishops there without delay. They were to be maintained at his own expense, until such ecclesiastical property should be restored to them as would enable them to live in a fitting manner. The envoys could not do less than agree to this. They had done all they could to ensure that, in articles 3, 4 and 6, the king was only committed to acting in good faith and doing his best. The pope was displeased that they had refused to make an absolute undertaking. Nevertheless, the king was excused from the impossible. 4) Within a year, the king was to remove the Prince de Condé from the hands of heretics and entrust him to Catholics to be educated in the Catholic religion and Christian piety. This was agreed.65 5) The arrangements concerning prebends and other matters were to be maintained and observed. This article related to the concordat [18 August 1516] and was just and necessary. 6) In the case of bishoprics, abbeys, and other benefices to which the king had the right of nomination, he should not propose heretics or persons suspected of heresy. The same comment was made as for 5). 7) He was to publish and observe the Council of Trent, with the exception of such things as could not be carried into effect without disturbing the tranquillity of the kingdom, should there actually be any such. 64

This translation, verbally amended, appears in Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 131-3; Lists and Analyses, Foreign, 1595, pp. 239-40, prints the same articles in a slightly different order. 65 This matter was already in hand. Condé was shortly expected at Saint-Germain and was to be recognised as heir presumptive. Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 449-50, 17 November 1595, Henry IV to the city of Paris. Gondi was appointed to direct his religious instruction. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 318-19, 3 January 1596, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany.


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Publication of the decrees of Trent had long been demanded by Rome and resisted in France; it would never be sanctioned by the ‘parlements’. The saving clause had cost the envoys sweat and blood. This comment referred to the final conflict over which, on 14 September 1595, they had issued an ultimatum and risked all. They had tried, but failed, to include other exceptions which, however, could not be held to be comprised in the article. 8) The king was to take under his special protection the ecclesiastical body, and not to allow any of the clergy to be opposed or molested, nor have their property sequestrated, but was to provide that, throughout the kingdom, wherever it might be situated, it should be forthwith restored. This was just and necessary [and had already been undertaken by the king]. 9) If the king had bestowed on Catholics or heretics, property or castles belonging to the Church, he was to revoke such gifts. The envoys did not believe the king had seized any church property. There was some query about an abbey given to the [protestant] duc de Bouillon. 10) He was to prove by word and deed his favour towards the Catholics in his disposal of offices of honour and the dignities of the kingdom, so that all might realise that he wished but one religion to exist and flourish in France, namely the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion which he himself professed. This article had been very carefully phrased so as to avoid causing any disturbances. It was a compromise boiled down from extensive demands for action against heretics, the revocation of the edict of Poitiers, 1577, the exclusion of huguenots from offices, and for the imposition of one religion only [namely war on the huguenots] after the end of the foreign war. 11) He was daily to recite, unless legitimately prevented, a corona of the Blessed Virgin, and on Wednesdays the Litanies, and on Saturdays the Rosary in honour of the Madonna, his heavenly protectress; he was to observe the days of fasting and other commandments of the Church, to assist [attend] daily at Mass, and on feast days at a sung Mass. This was part of the personal penance imposed on the king, of which they had obtained some mitigation. 12) Four times a year at least he was to go to confession and publicly receive Holy Communion. No comment. 13) In each province of the kingdom, and in Béarn, he was to establish a religious house of men and another of women, either of some contemplative Order or of the reformed Mendicant Friars. The envoys regarded this clause as onerous and had tried to have it reduced or replaced; the pope had refused. 14) He was to confirm in France, at the hands of the legate or another representative of the Holy See, his abjuration and profession of faith, as well as the promises made by his representatives, and send the deed of ratification to the Pope.

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The last three clauses had been reduced to this form and were not otherwise contested. Difficulties arose over article 14. 15) He was to inform the Catholic princes of his joy at being received into the grace of the Roman Church, and that he had bound himself by oath to remain for ever in her bosom. 16) He was to order throughout the kingdom a day of thanksgiving for this great favour that had been granted him by God. Du Perron’s analysis also explains how the envoys had managed the two crucial points. The pope had tried to insist that the king should repeat his abjuration in France in the presence of a legate. Upon that occasion, he was to condemn as inadequate his absolution by the French bishops. This requirement was contained in the first of the nine articles allegedly agreed by the time of the pope’s announcement on 30 August 1595. Certainly the envoys had agreed to no such thing. Their brilliant solution to this problem, it has been seen, was the ‘saving clause’ which they dictated and appended to the Papal absolution. Consequently Henry was only required (article 14) to confirm what had been done and promised in Rome. Rehabilitation, which Du Perron called ‘une pierre de scandale pour faire rompre tout’ was similarly disposed of by the same ‘saving clause’. It would be found, Du Perron said, that Henry had received a full and complete absolution. Neither Spain nor the League could oppose or deny it in any way; nor could they refuse to recognise the King of France. Those who claimed that he required rehabilitation could be told that, in substance, he had it. To those who opposed its acceptance, it could be said that it was relegated. The ambassadors had followed their instructions minutely, and the agreement confined the pope to his proper sphere. It contained no political clauses, nothing impossible or even unreasonable. If the pope had finally come to need the King of France more than Henry IV needed the pope, this was still an immense achievement of patience, reticence, and consummate ability. Du Perron advised immediate ratification, and thanks. That would enable him to escape back to France.66

IV: Coda Delbene received a great welcome when, on 22 December 1595, he delivered the bull of absolution to Henry IV, who was still engaged in the siege of La Fère. The ‘parlement’, however, immediately created difficulties. That proved the king’s wisdom in concealing the conditions until he received the bull. The ‘parlement’ objected to the wording of the absolution because it explicitly annulled that of Saint-Denis. Since the envoys’ ‘saving clause’ was wholly adequate – indeed a masterpiece of diplomacy – this protest indicates the strength of the opposition to Du Perron’s mission. The incipient row was too dangerous to tolerate and was evidently suppressed. Gondi proposed that the king should simply retain the bull himself, and Bonciani observed that it was deposited in the royal archives. It was never registered by the ‘parlements’ and never published. This 66

Ligny, Les Ambassades, Du Perron, 14-16, 6 November 1595. The advice contained in this letter appears to contravene article 14; the intentions in respect of ratification are confused.


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remarkable and ironic situation might well have given rise to problems and legal difficulties, yet there are no apparent signs that it did.67 It was unclear whether Henry was expected to send an ambassador to swear obedience, or whether the pope should first send a legate who – according to article fourteen – must receive Henry’s ratification. The formal completion of this absolution process was curiously bungled. At first both Henry and the pope waited for the other to move. On Henry’s part this represented nothing more than his total preoccupation with the war. By the spring of 1596, Clement decided to wait no longer. On 3 April, he appointed the elderly cardinal de Florence as legate a latere. He left Rome on 11 May 1596 and entered France about mid-June. On 21 July the new legate made a solemn entry into Paris.68 Doubtless the pope was anxious for him to begin supervising both the execution of the conditions, and the essential reforms of the collapsing church. More onerous still, the legate was also charged with seeking peace between France and Spain.69 As the Spanish became increasingly overstretched, and the absolution was a fait accompli, peace became more desirable. Philip II was nearing the end of his life and was loath to bequeath too great a burden to his youthful heir. The Papal mediation – which Villeroy and Niccolini, in particular, had advised – therefore tempered the vexation of the Spanish, and helped to reconcile them to the absolution. In April or May 1596 – possibly at the end of the siege of La Fère – Henry sent Delbene back to Rome. He took with him a form of ratification, according to the advice appended to article two of the conditions. It was not until 20 June 1596 that he formally acknowledged the bull, with expressions of joy and gratitude, and acceptance of the promises made on his behalf. He apologised for the delay: it arose, he explained, from his having been continuously in the field since the arrival of Delbene with the bull (22 December 1595). Henry had been obliged to abandon all other business. He therefore asked the pope to accept this letter as a declaration of obedience, pending the dispatch of an ambassador. In the event the departure of the ambassador, Luxembourg, was delayed for some time.70 Shortly after the legate arrived in France, Henry provided him with a 67 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 317, 28 December 1595, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany, 318-19, 3 January 1596, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany; de L’Épinois, La Ligue et les papes, 634-6. Henry lifted the ban on sending to Rome for the provision to benefices. Isambert, Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, xv, 116, 22 January 1596. 68 Alessandro dei Medici, better known as the cardinal de Florence, was a former supporter and, at last, a suitable and constructive legate. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, ii, 98-9, 5 April 1596, d’Ossat to Villeroy, 120-1, 10 May 1596, d’Ossat to Villeroy; Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 320-1, 6 July-25 August 1595, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany. 69 Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 320-1, 8 August 1596, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany; Pastor, The History of the Popes, xxiii, 456-61, 10 May 1596, instructions for the legate. 70 Berger de Xivrey, Lettres missives, iv, 602-5, 20 June 1596, Henry IV to Clement VIII, from Abbeville. As early as January 1596, Bonciani expected Luxembourg to be the ambassador. But Henry wrote to him, on 24 June 1595, regretting that he had been unable to send him sooner, when he had first broached the matter. First, Henry said, he had been detained on the frontier. Then, when he heard that the legate was coming, he thought it better to wait. But he wished Luxembourg to be prepared and ready. Ibid., 607-8, 24 June 1596, Henry IV to Luxembourg. By the end of December 1596, Luxembourg was on his way to Rome, via Germany. He finally swore obedience on behalf of the king on 17 April 1597. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v,

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second, and fuller ratification. This was agreed between them early in August 1596, and was received by the pope in October.71 The protracted affair was finally over. D’Ossat remained convinced that they would never have obtained the absolution but for the pope’s own, essential interest in reconciliation with Henry IV.72 Henry, for his part, owed Clement no courtesies and little gratitude. The Papacy and the Catholic League – which Rome had rather exploited than supported – were both responsible for the terrible war which now engaged the king to the exclusion of all else. The bull of absolution, it has been seen, had arrived just nine days before the expiry of the truce with Mayenne. The treaty with Mayenne (31 January 1596) was signed only eleven days before the arrival in Brussels of the cardinal archduke Albert. A month later, by mid-March 1596, Albert had renewed the Spanish attack on Picardy with a fresh army of 21,000 men. He seized Calais on 17 April (the citadel on 24 April), followed by Ardres on 23 May, while Henry was still detained at the siege of La Fère. Such rapid action by the archduke indicates just how necessary it had been to complete the treaty with Mayenne. At the same time, Henry was increasingly menaced by the huguenots. Their already explosive discontent was augmented both by his absolution and by the removal from their midst of the young prince de Condé, who might have become their leader. Bouillon, who was blamed for the disasters in the north, went into open opposition and withdrew from the siege of La Fère. Although the still faithful Duplessis-Mornay strove to contain an increasingly threatening situation, the huguenots were virtually in revolt by the end of 1596. In the following year, the impious combination of Spanish and protestant pressure came very close to overwhelming the king at Amiens.73 After the long and tedious struggle to obtain the absolution, its promulgation was instantly eclipsed by the demands of war. Nevertheless, the French monarchy might not have survived without the absolution of Henry IV; peace in France and peace with Spain – deferred until 1598 – might also have proved impossible. The peace of Vervins between France and Spain (2 May 1598), was only obtained with the greatest difficulty, mainly on account of the problems of Henry’s protestant allies, England and the United Provinces. For both of them the war continued while, for France, Vervins was little better than a long truce. Notwithstanding twelve astonishingly constructive years of peace between 1598 and 1610, civil war problems of the sixteenth century were merely dormant, only to be 318-19, 3 January 1596, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany, 324-7, 30 December 1596, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany. 71 D’Ossat learnt of the first ratification from a letter of 22 May 1596, received by 16 June – nine months after the absolution. The envoys evidently sent the king the form of ratification with the bull. Even so, there was some confusion and dispute as to what it ought to comprise. These largely technical matters are fully discussed by d’Ossat. According to him, article 14 only said that Henry should send his ratification. La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, ii, 174-8, 16 June 1596, d’Ossat to Villeroy. Article 14, as printed by Pastor, required a more exacting procedure. The History of the Popes, xxiii, 132-3. Desjardins, Négs., Tosc., v, 320-1, 6 July-25 August 1596, Bonciani to the grand duke of Tuscany. 72 La Houssaye, Ed., Lettres du cardinal d’Ossat, ii, 17-34, 17 January 1596, d’Ossat to Villeroy. 73 Sutherland, ‘The Edict of Nantes and the Protestant State’, Annali della Fondazione Italiana per la Storia Amministrativa, ii (1965), 220-31.


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resolved by the passage of time and the process of evolution. The huguenots’ ultimate dispensation, the edict of Nantes (13 April 1598), was neither accepted nor honoured by catholic France. The ancient rivalry of the nobility, with their pursuit of profit and power, ensured the recurrence of civil strife whenever the monarchy was weakened – notably during the successive minorities of Louis XIII and Louis XIV. On the eve of renewed hostilities with Spain Henry IV fell by the hand of the ultimate assassin (14 May 1610), and with the perfidious duc d’Épernon at his side. Despite the tremendous achievements of Henry of Navarre, the comprehensive settlement of the affairs of church and state, to which he had so long aspired, always eluded him – after his absolution, and for ever. His ideal, like most ideals, was unattainable.

Appendix I The Government of Paris A basic knowledge of the government of Paris will make it a little easier to understand how a revolutionary organisation like the Parisian League, the Seize, could arise and exercise influence in the city. At the apex of the hierarchy was the king and, under him, the governor and the ‘parlement’, comprising several sovereign courts of justice, whose jurisdiction extended over a large area of France. The government of Paris proper was divided between the ‘prévôté’ and the ‘hôtel de ville’, which were rival authorities. The ‘prévôt des marchands’ (mayor) and the ‘lieutenant-civil’ and ‘lieutenant-criminel’ were royal officials, based at the Châtelet. That was the seat of the notaries, where there were courts and prisons. Under these officials were ‘commissaires’, and ‘sergents’, responsible for security and hygiene, fairs and markets etc., matters which the French called ‘police’. The ‘corps de ville’, based at the ‘hôtel de ville’, was elective and consisted of a ‘petit bureau’ and a ‘grand bureau’, known as the ‘bureau de l’hôtel de ville’. The ‘petit bureau’ was composed of the ‘prévôt des marchands’ plus four ‘échevins’. The ‘grand bureau’ was composed of five magistrates plus various officials, ‘procureur’, ‘greffier’ and ‘receveur’ plus twenty-four councillors. The councillors held office for life and were often magistrates of the sovereign courts. The ‘prévôt des marchands’ might be chosen from among the councillors, elected biennially by the general assembly; two of the four ‘échevins’ were elected annually. Paris was divided into sixteen ‘quartiers’, each under a ‘quartenier’ – hence the name Seize – and subdivided into ‘cinquenteniers’ and ‘dizeniers’. The general assembly of the ‘bureau de ville’ was composed of the ‘petit’ and ‘grand’ ‘bureaux’ plus the sixteen ‘quarteniers’, together with two bourgeois from each ‘quartier’. For the purposes of this study, matters of defence are of prime significance. This presents a picture of great complexity. Defence and law enforcement was the province of the governor and the ‘commissaires’ and ‘sergents’ of the ‘prévôté’. But, in each ‘quartier’ – which related to the ‘hôtel de ville’ – captains were grouped together under a colonel. Thus defence was divided between the rival authorities. It also came under the ‘chevalier du guet’, appointed by the king, who commanded his own guard. It is therefore not surprising that there were opportunities for subversion.

Appendix II The Parisian League or Seize The Parisian League, which came to be known as the Seize, took its name, in January 1589, from the revolutionary committees established in each of the sixteen ‘quartiers’ of Paris. For the sake of clarity, however, the later name is generally applied from the beginning, in 1584. The Parisian movement was, in a sense, an urban version of the better-known, aristocratic Catholic League, with which it always had links. Even the first, ephemeral, league of 1576, had its echoes in Paris. According to J.H.M. Salmon, at least

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Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion

three men involved in Paris in 1576 were among the early conspirators in the next decade.1 Religion and, in Paris, finance, were at the heart of mounting opposition to Henry III. If the kings of France could tax without consent, it was perilous to do so without assent. Favourites, neglect, prodigality and ostentation also became major grievances. While much remains obscure about the origins of the Seize, it is generally agreed that the initiative came – late in 1584 – from Charles Hotman, a magistrate of the ‘chambre des comptes’, and ‘receveur’ to the bishop of Paris. He therefore moved in both ecclesiastical and financial circles. Hotman consulted three clerics: Jean Prévôt, ‘curé’ of Saint-Séverin in Paris and canon of the cathedral, Jean Boucher, ‘curé’ of Saint-Benoît and rector of the Sorbonne, and Mathieu Lannoy, a canon of Soissons and an acquaintance of the duc de Guise. It is unclear whether or not this connection with Guise was important; it could have been, since Lannoy was evidently not employed in Paris. These four decided to found a League, and they recruited Louis d’Orléans, an advocate, Pierre Acarie, ‘maître des comptes’, Jean Caumont, advocate, Jean Campans, merchant draper, Minager, advocate, Odilon Crucé, ‘procureur’ and the sieur de Manoeuvre, who defected.2 In addition, Salmon lists nine others as early, if not founder, members: La Chapelle-Marteau, ‘maître des comptes’ – who succeeded to the leadership when Charles Hotman died in February 1587 – Nicolas Roland, ‘général des monnaies’, and his brother Jean Roland, also in finance, Bussy Leclerc, ‘procureur’, Pelletier, cleric, Guincestre, cleric, Louchart, notary, and La Morlière, notary. As the League expanded, it began to widen its base and create an organisation. A council of six was charged with recruitment and, under them a governing council, whose membership is variously given as eight to twelve, to oversee the business of the League.3 Paris was divided by them into five areas in which five members – La Chapelle-Marteau, Compans, Leclerc, Crucé and Louchart – each formed his own cell. They, plus Hotman and four others, belonged to the governing council. These five appointed assistants and retained an informer in each of the sixteen quartiers. Each member worked on recruiting from his own milieu. The council met frequently and very secretly in a succession of places. In January 1585, Nicolas Poulain, ‘lieutenant du prévôt de l’Ile de France’ joined the league and, because of his office, which permitted it, he was assigned to the purchase of arms. In 1587 he became disgusted and turned informer. He warned the king of all the major developments and frustrated each successive scheme; finally, he had to flee in May 1588. By the end of 1587 the council – presumably of six – had doubled its size to twelve. By April 1588 Bussy Leclerc claimed to dispose of 30,000 men, which must have

1

Salmon, ‘The Paris Sixteen, 1584-94’, Journal of Modern History, xliv (1972), 547. Peter Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen and the Paris League 1585-1591’ (unpublished Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1972), 50-2, refers to thirteen founder members, naming only eleven. Of the thirteen, he says that five were lawyers, and three nobles. 3 The distinction between the two councils does not clearly emerge; possibly it was a matter of function. 2

Appendix II

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resulted from recruiting from among the lower classes.4 One wonders how secret this can still have been? It became clear to Hotman, at an early stage, that they really required noble sponsorship, and it was evidently before the beginning of 1585 that they sent a deputation to the duc de Guise. Thus, while Guise was in the process of consolidating the Catholic League, he sent three confidants François de Maineville, the sieur de Beauregard, and Cornard to liaise with the Seize. It is worth considering whether the emphasis on finance in the declaration of Péronne, may not have been partly designed to accommodate the Parisians? Maineville remained in touch with them, and tendered advice, while they assisted Guise by smuggling arms. It was, apparently, upon his suggestion, that the League sent out Ameline, Crucé, La Bruyière, Louchart and Michelet, who toured various northern cities to establish similar urban groups.5 The power of the Seize in Paris was created and sustained by their remarkable and varied propaganda, producing an atmosphere of catholic fanaticism against heresy (this, of course, was nothing new) and of aversion from the king. Instead, they looked for leadership to the duc de Guise. This was clearly revolutionary and, for the most part, they traded in astonishing lies. Parisians were constantly cajoled from the pulpits and induced to believe that religion was in danger, that all huguenots were wicked, and that Navarre would seek revenge for the events of 1572; the massacre must still have been fresh in memory. These men were aware of the follies and exactions of the king, and so all royalists and so-called ‘politiques’ were targeted. In 1587 fiscal exactions coincided with famine, bread riots and terrible weather. The king’s excessive expenditure upon the marriage of Épernon in August 1587, just before the German invasion, was especially inept and harmful. Respect for the crown diminished, and the king began to be hated. Resentment took shape in a series of clumsy plots to capture the king without, apparently, any proper preparation or further objective. Probably some of the Seize were involved in a plot to blow up twenty-seven houses on 8 July 1586 – it is not clear what for.6 Some were definitely involved in a second, obscure, plot for 31 October 1586 when servants of the house of Guise spread rumours of an intended massacre by the huguenots. By 1587, the Seize were having difficulty in restraining some of their followers. It appears that a more radical and plebeian element was making itself felt.7 There was fear that the king had reached agreement with the huguenots and that the Seize might act if they did not. It was from some source below the leadership level that a violent plan emerged to ambush the king’s coach in the rue SaintAnthoine, as he returned from Vincennes, to kill his servants and seize his person. Upon this occasion they – whomsoever – were persuaded that they could not bring off such a coup without a leader of rank; the scheme was impossible. Clearly no one was in a 4

This figure would seem to be suspiciously high. Salmon, ‘The Paris Sixteen’, Journal of Modern History, 44 (1972), 549; Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen’, 67-8; Poulain, Procès verbal, Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses, xi, writes only of Ameline being sent out to recruit Chartres, Orléans, Blois and Tours. There is some discrepancy here. 6 Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen’, 80. 7 Poulain, Procès verbal, 297-8, said that the people themselves began to make plans. 5

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position to cope with the consequences. Up until this time, according to Ascoli, the Seize consciously maintained their independence. But when Mayenne arrived in Paris in February 1587, back from the campaign in Guyenne, some of them turned to him as the leader they required. They believed that they must act ahead of Guise – who had promised to help them – for fear of discovery. Consequently they devised a far-reaching conspiracy.8 The Bastille, Arsenal and Châtelet were to be seized, and various other places including the ‘hôtel de ville’. A number of persons were to be murdered, including the ‘premier président’ of the ‘parlement’, Achille de Harlay, the chancellor, Cheverny and the ‘procureur-général’, so that their houses could be pillaged. The Louvre was to be blockaded to starve out the guards before seizing the king. But because those not in the secret could not be trusted not to join in the pillage, which was reserved for an elite, chains, already in place, and barricades were to be erected in each street by members of the Seize in charge of spying. Only 4,000 Leaguers, who knew the password could move about. Nobles who sought to aid the king and all ‘politiques’ would be killed, and especially those suspected of heresy. Poulain referred, rather vaguely, to an army from Spain which would go to Guyenne, and to a generalised lust for murder and pillage. It therefore appears that, in less than two years, the leaders of the Seize, by means of virulent incitement and energetic recruitment, had unleashed forces they could not control. It was at this point – around 22 February 1587 – that Poulain, who was horrified, sought out the chancellor and informed him, the king, and Villeroy of what was projected – probably about 15 March. The king moved in forces to control various places and the Seize were astonished and afraid.9 Upon this occasion, La Bruyière was suspected. There was considerable consternation for a week or two. Mayenne tried to persuade the king that rumours of a plot were lies, but he had himself been implicated and the king received him coldly. He seized various soldiers who should not have been in Paris, and Compans, Louchart and La Molière were arrested. Mayenne succeeded in securing their release – but how? On 20 March 1587 Mayenne left Paris, after having tried to assist the Seize by organising a further plot. He stationed sixty captains in the faubourg Saint-Germain to surprise the king at dinner in the abbey, when he attended an annual fair. Poulain intervened and the king did not go.10 The failure of these two plots almost caused a rift between Guise, who was annoyed, and the Seize. According to Poulain, he sent Maineville to find out who had been behind it all. Ascoli says that he threatened to abandon them, which may account for their fear that he would do so in May 1588.11 They were submissive and the king appeared to be watchful. On 4 June 1587, Jean Roland (also called Martin Roland) was arrested for a subversive speech. If Guise was annoyed by developments in 1587, he nevertheless appears to have moved closer to the Seize, presumably in an effort both to exploit and channel their energies. He is said to have been involved in a (fifth) plot, this time to assassinate 8

Poulain, Procès verbal, 298, says that it was some leaders who turned to Mayenne. Poulain, Procès verbal, 298-305; Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen’, 83-6. 10 Poulain, Procès verbal, 305-6. 11 Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen’, 88. 9

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Épernon, but to have lost his nerve. What happened is not clear.12 During the campaign of 1587, Guise laid plans to seize Paris, if he himself succeeded in capturing the king in the field. The king’s forces were, however, always superior. Louchart was sent by the Seize to the Guise camp to maintain contact.13 Poulain, in Paris, remained in touch with the chancellor. Épernon’s part in disposing of the German and Swiss forces exacerbated hatred of himself and of the king. Thus, the events of 1588, too often treated in isolation, were a natural progression of the movement which had already begun; now it seemed to be unstoppable. It appears that relations between the Seize and Guise had been sustained but never close, and the unsuccessful intervention of Mayenne did not increase their cordiality. If the embryonic Parisian league needed noble leadership, most of the Seize, according to Ascoli, were biased against the nobility.14 The crises of 1587 and the mounting exasperation of the Seize and the Catholic League prompted a desire to expand and consolidate the league of affiliated cities, from which they might both benefit. However, their respective ideas on the subject reveal a divergence of objective and an incipient rivalry which, ultimately, in the reign of Henry IV, was to prove disastrous for them both. A project attributed to Guise (no date) called for a kind of clandestine estatesgeneral in permanent session in Paris, serving as a secret council. Each city concerned was to name a resident representative in Paris, to consult with the council of the Seize, at first as intermediaries only. United, the cities could more easily defend themselves, and Guise could more easily confer with, and control them. A similar model, he believed, could serve for the provincial nobility and the church. The Seize produced their own plan in the summer of 1587. This document, in three parts, gives little prominence to Guise, who was reduced to the role of commander. The principal part in opposing the protestants was allocated to the cities. Part one offered the king help against the huguenots, but with each city electing its own captain, which no monarch could accept. Part two fumbled confusedly towards a new government for the ‘kingdom’ in which the cities, each like Paris with a council of six, should play a prominent role; so also should an estates-[general]. Guise was to be obliged to swear never to abandon the League, while himself playing only a subordinate role. There could be no clearer indication of rivalry, which would inevitably have spelt trouble had he lived much longer. The purpose appears to have been to unite the cities politically and militarily and to diminish – one could well say destroy – the power of the king by depriving him of control over the military, finance and justice. If the king died without issue an estates-general was to meet to elect the cardinal de Bourbon. This involved rejecting the Salic law and certainly attributed to the estates powers they never had possessed. This is the first we hear of the principle of election versus heredity, which resurfaced in Paris after the contested accession of Navarre as Henry IV. Part one of the document ends with a promise to the cities of the benevolent 12

Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen’, 89-90. Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen’, 90-1. 14 Ascoli, ‘The Sixteen’, 108-9. 13

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concern of the pope and Philip II of Spain, the former to bless and the latter to provide! This comforting clause leads one to suspect the influence of Mendoza behind the scheme. The cities, which were to pay for the religious war, were an important part of his plan to create chaos in France, while the principle of election opened up the way for the advancement of Spanish claims to the throne.

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INDEX Material in the introduction and footnotes has not been indexed. Page numbers from 267 relate to volume II. Albert, of Austria, archduke: to succeed Ernest, 553; to marry the infanta, 553; caused alarm in Rome, 581; landed in Genoa, 584; arrived in Brussels, 590; attacked Picardy, 590

Armada, the Spanish: 118, 134, 142; correlation of with French affairs, 145, 166, 170, 176; failure of, 223 Arques, battle of, 21 September 1589: 276, 278

Aldobrandini, cardinal, secretary of state to Clement VIII: and d’Ossat, 543, 555-6, 55860, 582 Aldobrandini, Gian-Francesco, nephew of Clement VIII: extraordinary nuncio to Spain, 552-3, 559; carried two commissions, 552-3; is disregarded, 553; returned from Spain, 573 Alegria, Gabriel de, secretary to Tassis: sent by Parma to Mayenne, 237

Aumale, Charles de Lorraine, duc d’: seized towns in Picardy 1587, 142-3, 146, 167, 169-70; and Boulogne, 143, 173; ordered out of Picardy, 171; sent to Paris, 175; warned the king, 227; governor of Paris, 231 Aumont, Jean d’, marshal 1579: 185

Andrésy: peace conference at, 517

Badoer, Alberto, Venetian ambassador in Rome: reported on Caetani, 308-9; and Sixtus V, 309, 319, 328, 330-1, 335-6; favoured Navarre, 310, 331, 336; and the Spanish, 314, 320-4, 331; reported on Luxembourg, 314; lamented the death of Sixtus V, 339; criticised Gregory XIV, 380

Androgne, seigneur d’: sent to England, 1583, 55

Barricades, the day of, 12 May 1588: 166, 179-88

Angennes, Claude d’, de Rambouillet, bishop of Mans 1588: sent to Rome, 244-6, 253, 257, 500-1; quit Rome, 260; assisted with the abjuration, 492

Beaulieu, edict of, May 1576: see Monsieur, peace of

Alençon, duc d’: see Anjou Amboise, edict of, March 1563: 27

Anjou, François, duc d’Alençon, duc d’, 1576: 14; and the huguenots, 14-15; negotiations with queen Elizabeth, 14-15, 35; and the Netherlands, 15, 31-6, 41, 45, 46-9, 54, 56-7, 58, 64-5, 71-2; his coalition, 1573, 15; escaped from court 1575, 15, 28; manifesto of 1573, 15; and the peace of Monsieur, 16-17; relations with the Guises, 19, 32-3, 58, 60, 65; death, 10 June 1584, 65, 70, 103-4 Aragon, cardinal, president of the French congregation: advised Sixtus V, 323, 339; defended Mayenne, 327

Beaune, Renaud de, de Semblançay, archbishop of Bourges, almoner to Henry IV: favoured a patriarchate, 389; his role at Suresnes, 463, 468-9, 477-9; reported on the conference, 47980; directed the chapel royal, 489; devised Henry’s abjuration, 491-2 Beauvoir la Nocle, Jean de la Fin, seigneur de, French ambassador in England: sent to seek an alliance, 275; his instructions, 400-1; his flawed negotiation, 401, 404-6, 410-12, 413; protested to the queen, 421; pleaded for help, 455 Bec, Philippe du, bishop of Nantes: assisted with Henry’s abjuration, 492, 494

610


Bellièvre, Pomponne de, ‘surintendant des finances’: attended the assembly of Montauban, 69; at Blois, 1584, 75; and the Dutch commissioners, 81-2, 90; remonstrated with Guise, 146; received evasive replies, 146; sent to fetch Guise, 147; sent to Guise, 8 March 1588, 169; returned empty handed, 170; went to Soissons, 171; returned again, 175; sent back to Guise, 177; returned, 177-9; went to the Louvre, 180; mediated with Guise, 1856; consulted by Villeroy, 437; plotted the recovery of Paris, 531 Benoît, René, ‘curé’ of Saint-Eustache, confessor to Henry IV: instructed the king, 400; attended the assembly at Mantes, 490 Bergerac, Association of, November 1585: its purpose, 125-6; called for a council, 126, 129; ideals undermined, 133 Bergerac, peace of, September 1577: 31, 36 Birague, René de, chancellor 1573, cardinal 1578: Guisard, 18

the Guises, 143; approached the Loire, 151; commanded Navarre’s German army, 156-7, surrendered, 158; sent to Montmorency, 161; at Buhy, 367; began to resist the king, 475, 526, 528, 548; pressed for open war on Spain, 548; invaded Luxembourg, 562; blamed for losses in Picardy, 565; became a rebel, 590 Boulogne: 73, 75-6, 168, 170; desired by Spain, 143, 171, 173 Bourbon, Catherine de, sister to Navarre: 13, 51, Bourbon, Charles, cardinal de: 13; and the succession, 30, 61, 77, 79, 84; called for one religion, 54; and the treaty of Joinville, 79; titular head of the Catholic League, 84; arrested at Blois, 229, 237; proclaimed ‘Charles X’, 280-2, 285; died, 9 May 1590, 331 Brissac, Charles de Cossé, comte de, marshal 1594: opposed the king, 1588, 186; captured, 352-3; go-between, 352-4; governor of Paris, 531; conspired to deliver Paris, 532

Biron, Armand de Gontaut, baron de, marshal 1577: 185; self-seeker 269; undependable, 341; went to Normandy, 365; at Buhy, 367; favoured a siege of Rouen, 401; commanded to prepare the siege, 408; injured, 422; died, 429

Brisson, Barnabé, president of the ‘parlement’ of Paris: 74, 184; sent to Rome, 252-3; sent to Navarre, 352; murdered, 394-5

Blois: 24, 64, 69, 75; see also Estates-general

Buzanval, Paul de Choart, seigneur de: sent to Henry III, 89-90; sought help in England, 155

Bonciani, Tuscan agent: feared schism, 542; in touch with Villeroy, 545; condemned delays, 564, and the bull of absolution, 588 Bongars, Jacques de, seigneur de Bauldry et la Chesnaye: sent to Germany, 275 Borromeo, Charles, cardinal archbishop of Milan: mission to France, 1582, 42 Boucher, Jean, ‘curé’ of Saint-Benoît, member of the Seize: seditious preacher, 174 Bouillon, Henri de la Tour d’Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, duc de, 1592: and the conference at Saint-Brice, 135, 138, 140; broke off negotiations with Catherine, 139; opposed by

Buhy, Pierre de Mornay, seigneur de: sent to the king, 251

Caetani, Camillo, patriarch of Alexandria: 299; sent by the legate to Rome, 305-8, 326; wished the pope to head the League, 325-6; audience, 325; was detained, 333 Caetani, Enrico, cardinal, legate in France January 1590: 279-80, 282, 293; his legation confusing, 292-4; his abnormal situation, 293; believed to be pro-Spanish, 294, 344; uncertain instructions, 294-8, 309; and the nobles, 297-8, 301; his journey, 299; reached Paris, 299; legate of the League, 299, 302-4; condemned by the ‘parlement’ at Tours, 299, 301-2; manipulated by the Spanish, 300-2, 306; sought Papal help for Mayenne, 300;

Index condemned the king, 302; displeased the pope, 302, 305, 396, 320-1; disappointed the royalists, 303, 305, 312; forbade an ecclesiastical assembly, 303-4; ordered the recognition of ‘Charles X’, 304; reported to Rome, 305-7, 324, 328; urged the pope to assist Mayenne, 305-6; his alleged monitorium, 324-6, 344; misunderstood the pope’s intentions, 326; implacably opposed to Navarre, 330; negotiations, 343-4; wished to save Paris, 343-4; tried to detach Biron, 343, 345; proposed a truce and an estates-general, 343-4; his judgement on the siege, 359; visited Parma, 363; departed for Rome, 363; disappointed Villeroy, 345; joined the French congregation, 376; prepared instructions for Landriano, 382

611 in Rome, 114, 117-18; disturbed by talk of peace, 142; to attack Sedan and Jametz, 143; not in harmony with the Seize, 166; rebelled, 1588, 166, 171-9; considered seizing Paris, 1587, 174; orchestrated the estates-general, 216; reaction to the murders at Blois, 231-3; sent for Mayenne, 231; purged the ‘parlement’, 232; requested Papal support, 233 Cavriana, Filippo, Tuscan ambassador to France, 1584-9: 224; comment on the peace of Nemours, 111-12; feared assassinations, 142; feared for the king and his favourites, 171, 173, 181-2, 187, 208; left court, 250-1 Champernowne, sir Arthur: sent to France, 91 Charles de Valois: Charles IX of France, 13

Caetani, Pietro: Parma’s agent in Paris, 300, 302 Capizucchi, Camillo: sent by Parma to Paris, 300; reported to Parma, 300-1 Casimir, John, of the Palatinate: supported Alençon 15; and France, 71-2, 127; capitulations with, 11 January 1587, 136, 149; withdrew from the command, 156 Castelli, Giovanni Battista, bishop of Rimini, Papal nuncio in France 1581-3: opposed Anjou, 41-2, 47; urged publication of the decrees of Trent, 42 Catherine de Medici, queen mother: desired reconciliation, 13; favoured a council, 26-7, 28-9; negotiations at Épernay, 1585, 83, 87, 90, 107-8; negotiations suspended, 95; mission to Navarre, 133-4; declaration of 13 August 1586, 134; and the conference at Saint-Brice, 135-40; met the Guises at Reims, 146-7; unsatisfactory accommodation with Guise, 148; and the revolt in Paris, 1588, 180 seq; required to govern Paris, 194, 198; turned to Morosini, 198; proposed negotiations with Guise, 198-9; opposed Épernon, 200; joined the king at Chartres, 209 Catholic League, the: development of, 48, 72, 77, 103; served Spain, 71; and the Netherlands, 76-8; sought Papal sanction, 77; confirmed by the treaty of Joinville, 78-80; aspirations of, 104; boasted of Papal support, 105; discredited

Chartres, vidame de: sent to England, 462, 522, 534 Chartres, siege of: 365, 389-90, 399; the importance of, 390, 400 Chassincourt, Imbert de Biotière, seigneur de: 89: represented Navarre at court, 53, 57, 59-61 Châtillon, François: reported a conspiracy against the king, 56; escaped, 1587, 158 Châtre, Claude de la: preceded Guise to Chartres, 209 Chemerault, Méry de Barbezières de: Catherine’s envoy, 134 Cheverny, Philippe Hurault, comte de, chancellor, governor of Chartres: 181, 188 Clement VIII, Ippolito Aldobrandini, pope 15921605: 159, 429, 445; intimidated by the Spanish, 320, 438, 445-6, 452, 467, 481, 502, 504, 509, 518, 574, 581-2; a creature of Sixtus V, 445-6; his aversion from Henry IV, 446, 481, 499, 502, 512; named no candidate for France, 450; rejected Gondi, 450-1; intercepted Gondi, 450; duplicitous attitude to France, 451-2, 467-8, 502; and the Turkish threat, 453, 503, 505, 536, 543, 552; his irresolution, 467-8, 481, 499, 501-3, 509, 536, 561, 574, 576, 579-81; deceived Navarre, 468,

612


477, 480-1; disapproved of Feria, 485; and the abjuration, 502-4; objected to the mission of Nevers, 503, 505-10; reservations about absolution, 504, 506, 508, 512, 514; received La Clielle, 505-6; reasons for delay, 507, 509, 511-12, 514, 538; sent Possevino to Nevers, 507-9; meant to extort concessions, 511-13, 541, 576; singular treatment of Nevers, 51114, 516, 535-6; informed the consistory, 514; yielded to Spanish pressure, 516; anxious for Spanish co-operation, 536-8, 560; summoned Gondi, 537; feared the success of Henry IV, 536-7; desired a general peace, 544, 552-3; agreed to receive Du Perron, 543-4; sent Aldobrandini to Spain, 552; and d’Ossat, 5547; declaration of intent, 575; upbraided Sessa, 576; addressed a general congregation, 577-8; appealed to Paruta, 580; held a consistory, 580; granted absolution, 582-3; deferred the bull of absolution, 582-5; withdrew to Frascati, 583; appointed the cardinal de Florence legate a latere, 589 Clervant, Claude Antoine de Vienne, seigneur de, councillor to Navarre: 89, 90; took the huguenot ‘cahiers’ to court, 53-4, 61; complained of the peace of Nemours, 95; pleaded for English help, 95-6 Cobham, sir Henry, English ambassador to France: 37, 53 Coligny, Gaspard de, admiral of France: 14, 16, 21-2 Como, Ptolomeo Galli, cardinal, secretary of state to Gregory XIII: 30 Condé, Henri de Bourbon, prince de: abjuration, 14, 138; escaped from court, 14; excommunicated, 1585, 103, 115-17; at the conference at Saint-Brice, 135; sent to La Rochelle, 154; died, 9 March 1588, 165 Constant, Augustin, seigneur de Rebecque, ‘gentilhomme de la chambre’ to Navarre: 69; mission to Montmorency, 97, 127-8 Conti, François de Bourbon, prince de: abjuration, 14, 128-9, 147, 154, 157-8; attended the estates-general, 215; absolved, 218; turned against the king, 463

Coqueley, Lazare: sent to Rome, 232 Cossé, Artus de, comte de Segondigny, seigneur de Gonnor, marshal 1567: arrested 1573, 15 Councils, ecclesiastical: 24-5; the tradition of, 259; opposed by the Papacy, 101; a council proposed, 108; a council widely demanded, 1585, 119 Coutras, battle of, 20 October 1587: 153-4, 156 Crucé, Odilon, ‘procureur’: Seize leader, 184

Dale, dr., English ambassador to France: reported a secret catholic league, 17 David, Jean, advocate: mission to Rome, 18; his memoir, 18-20, 30 Davison, William, English secretary of state and diplomat: sent to the Netherlands, 75 Delbene, Tuscan agent: reported on Possevino, 510; took the bull of absolution to France, 388, 585; sent back to Rome, 589 Delmonte, Baldovino, Tuscan agent: comments on Papal policy, 322-5, 376; and Vendôme, 378; feared for the king, 549-50 Derby, Henry Stanley, earl of: mission to France, 1585, 80-1; conferred the Garter on Henry III, 81 Descars, Anne de Pérusse, seigneur de, bishop of Lisieux: sent to Rome, 442; opposed the king, 450, 452 Diou, Jacques de, commandeur de l’Ordre de St. Jean de Jérusalem, seigneur de Montcenis, servant of Mayenne: sent to Rome, 1589, 232, 235-6, 291; travelled via Savoy, 232; arrived in Rome, 243; instructions, 256-7; took the monitorium to France, 258, 260; objectives in Rome, 281, 291-2; his report, 312; opposed Luxembourg, 314; importuned Gregory XIV, 373-4; received orders from Mayenne, 374; lacked authority, 379

Index Dohna, baron von: to command Navarre’s German army, 156; his manifesto, 156; overwhelmed by Guise, 158 Dolfin, Giovanni, Venetian ambassador to France, 1584-8: 81, 136-7 Du Bray: intermediary between Guise and Mendoza, 170 Du Fay, Michel Hurault de l’Hospital, seigneur, secretary to Navarre: sent to England, 161; instructions, 162; his ‘discours’ after the edict of Union, 206-7 Du Perron, Jacques Davy, bishop of Évreux 1591: instructed the king, 472-3; attended disputations, 474, 490; chosen for Rome, 5435; his mission opposed in France, 544-5; departure delayed, 544-5, 550, 553-5, 558-9, 561-2, 571; instructions, 559, 571-3; departed, 564; went to Florence, 571; reached Rome, 574; his negotiation secret, 575-83; visited the cardinals, 575-6; consulted Paruta, 579; threatened to depart, 580; issued an ultimatum, 582; awaited the bull of absolution, 584-5; analysed the bull, 585-8 Duplessis-Mornay, Philippe: relations with Navarre, 21-3; huguenot leader, 21; early career, 21-4; supported the Netherlands, 21-2, 46-8; remonstrance to the estates-general 1576, 22-3, 29; sought religious peace, 24, 53, 79, 524-5; principal secretary to Navarre, 37; opposed Navarre’s return to court, 37-9; hopes for Navarre, 39-41, 47, 49-52; sought a protestant coalition, 48-52; sent to court, 15834, 56-7; ‘discours’ on the Guises, 60-1; second ‘discours’, 62-4; delivered to the king the protestant petition of 1584, 69; failed to win royal confidence, 70; at Blois, 1584, 75; reported to the huguenots at Sainte-Foy, 80; denounced the declaration of Péronne, 85-6; his vision destroyed by the excommunication, 121; called for a council, 122; outraged by Papal meddling, 123; sent to the king, 251, 253; concluded a truce with the king, 253; became governor of Saumur, 255; advised Henry IV, 274; changed relations with the king, 274; involved in peace negotiations, 345, 434-8; at Buhy, 367; denounced the prelates, 388; mission to England, 421; is rebuffed, 421;

613 blamed Villeroy, 438; proposals for the king’s instruction, 438; betrayed Villeroy’s trust, 439-40; organised a huguenot assembly at Saumur, 440, 473-4, 476, 525-7; his influence diminished, 442; opposed abjuration, 474-5; protected huguenot interests, 474-6, 525-8; remained loyal, 524; his complaints, 525-6; returned to court, 526-7; hoped for schism, 527; drafted a huguenot edict, 528; tried to restrain the huguenots, 590

Edmondes, Thomas, secretary to Unton: sent to England, 422; returned to France, 424; reports, 462, 471, 481, 518, 541, 544, 563; replaced Unton, 471; and the king, 522 Elizabeth I, queen of England: marriage negotiations with Anjou, 14-15; severed relations with Spain, 1584, 55, 75; and the Netherlands, 34-5, 48, 73-5, 81, 91; offered help to Henry III, 90; offered to help Navarre, 1585, 91; condemned the king, 93; allied with the Dutch, 103; alarmed by events in France, 193, 195-6; assisted Henry IV, 275, 298; scathing about Paris, 360; desired the revenues of Rouen, 398, 402, 404, 431; ambiguous attitude to Henry IV, 398, 401; her demands, 398; misunderstandings with France, 398-400, 409-11, 421, 423-4, 431, 523-4; threatened by the Spanish in Brittany, 398-9; concerns for the Channel coast, 398, 400, 523; sent Yorke to France, 399; sent Norris to Brittany, 400, 405; sent Williams to Dieppe, 400; and Rouen, 401-2, 424; her help undependable, 401, 404 seq., 422, 430-1, 455, 522-4, 534-5; her Normandy contract, 404-5, 410, 412-13; declaration of 4 October 1591, 411-12; recalled Essex, 412; sent Wilkes to France, 424-6, 436, 522; her contract for Brittany, 431; became wary of Henry IV, 522 Épernon, Nogaret de la Valette, duc d’, favourite of Henry III: 52; mortal enemy of the Guises, 52; sent to Anjou, 64-5, 71; mission to Navarre, 66-8, 70; a principal target of the Guises, 113, 175, 179, 190, 199-200; went to Boulogne, 170-1; at risk in Paris, 175-6; escaped to Rouen, 177-8, 188-9, 191, 195; summoned by Henry III, 182; joined the king in Chartres, 195, 197, 199-200; partially

614


disgraced, 200-1; failed to support Navarre, 269; turned against the king, 463 Épinac, Pierre d’, archbishop of Lyon: Guise confederate, 182, 184; advised Guise, 199, 210, 220, 225; preceded Guise to Chartres, 209; sent to the king, 221; employed by Morosini, 223; arrested at Blois, 229; released, 285; served Mayenne as ‘garde des sceaux’, 285; refused to help the royalists, 303; advised Mayenne, 342; assisted the defence of Paris, 342, 351; negotiator for Mayenne, 348-9, 352, 355, 360; betrayed Mayenne, 379-80, 389; and Suresnes, 468-70, 478; reported the king’s declaration, 478 Ernest, of Austria, archduke: proposed as governor-general of the Netherlands, 392; possible marriage to the infanta, 393, 480; his role, 497, 516-17; died, 30 January 1594, 536, 553; considered Mayenne’s demands, 547 Espesse, Jacques Faye, sieur d’, ‘avocat général’: defended Gallican liberties, 223-4 Essex, Robert Devereux, earl of: English commander in France, 403; his instructions imprecise, 405, 410; arrival in France, 406-7; met the king at Pierrefonds, 407; recalled, 412, 416 Estates-general, of Blois 1576: 19-20, 29-31, 34, 52; of Blois 1588, 215, 220-3; of 1593, 454-5, 482; announced, 456; deferred, 456; opened, 26 January 1593, 457, 459; harangued by Tassis, 478; rejected Feria’s proposals, 482, 484; voted for the decrees of Trent, 517; prorogued, 517; acts of annulled, 533 Este, Luigi d’, cardinal, French protector in Rome: opposed the excommunication of Navarre, 107; urged the dispatch of an extraordinary nuncio, 110 Excommunication, of Navarre and Condé: requested by the Guises, 77, 103; projected in the treaty of Joinville, 79; pressure for in Rome, 107; opposed by d’Este, 107; essential to the League, 112, 115-17; published in Rome, 117; its content, 117; raised profound issues, 118-21; and the peace of Nemours, 118; officially suppressed in France, 120, 130;

divided opinion, 130; annulment mooted, 130; of Henry III, 256-61

Farnese, Alessandro, cardinal: hostile to France, 110 Feria, Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa, duke of, Spanish ambassador to France: sent to supervise the succession, 332, 418; to dominate the estates-general, 392, 418; instructions, 6 November 1591, 392-3, 418; went to Paris, 561; and the estates-general, 461, 469, 478, 482; promoted the infanta, 469, 478, 480-2, 486; demands rejected, 484; offered to accept Guise, 484; expected regicide, 496; left Paris, 534; made La Fère the Spanish base, 534; recalled, 540; and Mayenne, 547 Fleury, Henri Clausse, seigneur de, brother-in-law to Villeroy: assisted peace negotiations, 366, 368, 433-4; visited Mayenne, 368; liaison with Duplessis, 434 Franceschi (or Franceschini), Alessandro, monk: intercepted Gondi, 450 Frangipani, Fabio Mirto, bishop of Nazareth, nuncio extraordinary to France, June 1585: 17, 28-9, 110, 134, 148; bullied the queen mother, 28-9; rejected by Henry III, 111; consorted with Olivares, 110; approached by Guise, 144; advised caution, 144-5 Frizon (Frisson, Frison), Pierre, dean of Reims: sent to Rome, 228 Fuentes, Pedro Henriques de Azevado, count: provisional governor of the Netherlands, 565; successes in Picardy, 565 Fumée, Nicolas, bishop of Beauvais: joined the king, 388; died, 1592, 489

Gesualdo, cardinal: 310, 320-1; defended Olivares, 323 Gondi, Albert, brother of Pierre: 343, 375

Index Gondi, Girolamo, Tuscan agent: met the king at Blois, 465-7; made conditional offers, 465-6 Gondi, Pierre de, bishop of Paris 1569, cardinal 1587: mission to Rome 1587, 18; summoned by Henry III, 174; targeted by Caetani, 297-8, 303; strove for peace, 343, 345, 351-2, 355-6, 360, 366; involved in peace negotiations, 435, 437; is proposed for the ‘voyage de Rome’, 438, 441-2; went to Florence, 447, 449, 466; nature of his mission, 447-8; undermined by Sega, 450; sent his secretary to Rome, 450, 452; is falsely accused, 450-1; promoted the absolution, 536; summoned by the pope, 537, 555; returned to France, 539-40, 548; sustained a link with Rome, 540; rejoined the king, 541; his advice, 541-3; reported to the pope, 543; returned to Rome, 545; assisted d’Ossat, 558, 560-1; and the bull of absolution, 588 Gregory XIII, pope 1572-85: ambivalent attitude to France, 17, 77, 104-6; supported Spanish projects, 18; enemy of England, 77; advised the arrest of Henry III, 77, 83, 105; resolved to excommunicate Navarre, 104, 106; replied to Matthieu, 104; constrained by Spain, 106 Gregory XIV, pope 1590-1: 325, 368, 370; nominated by Spain, 371; hostility to Henry IV, 371, 373, 380-1, 389-90; dissipated Papal treasure, 373, 446; inclined to the Spanish, 373, 380; his background, 373; importuned by League agents, 373-4; forbade support for Navarre, 376, 380-2; reconstituted the French congregation, 376; agreed to invade France, 377; appointed Landriano nuncio to France, 377; issued two monitoria, 1 March 1591, 380, 382; appointed a general, 380; addressed himself to the Seize, 380; inaccessible to the royalists, 380-1; his measures provoked opposition, 384-7; forfeited support in France, 387; died 15 October 1591, 388; supported Philip II, 417; sent two nuncios to Spain, 417 Grimeston, Edward, servant to Stafford: advised Henry IV, 401 Guadagni, Jean-Baptiste, abbé: Catherine’s intermediary, 1586, 134; reported Navarre’s desire for peace, 134

615 Guise, Charles de Lorraine, prince de Joinville, duc de, 1588: arrested, 229; escaped, 392; favoured by Philip II, 392; ceded La Fère to Parma, 395; negotiated with Spain, 420 Guise, Henri de Lorraine, duc de: 14; rejected the peace of Monsieur, 17; summoned to court, 78; sought to exploit royal authority, 104; went to Paris, 142; went to Châlons, 143; requested Papal sanction for civil war, 144; supported the Seize, 144; feared Navarre’s German army, 146; appealed to Spanish agents, 146; wanted Sixtus V to sanction a crusade, 146; distrusted the king, 147-8; went to Meaux, 148; commanded the vanguard, 148; criticised the king, 149; conduct in the field, 1587, 153; victory at Vimory, 156; victory at Auneau, 156, 158, 167; felt betrayed by the king, 157-9, 167-8; served Spanish interests, 166-7; sought revenge upon the king, 167; attacked Sedan and Jametz, 167; lacked money, 167; kept Mendoza informed, 168; formulated demands, 168; efforts to destroy Épernon, 168; ordered to break with the king, 170; encouraged the Seize, 174; projected rebellion, 175; obliged to change his plans, 176-7; intentions unclear, 177; and the barricades, May 1588, 179 seq.; rebuked by Morosini, 191, 198; in danger, 195; obtained control of Paris, 195-9, 201-2; asked Parma for money, 197-8; proposed petition, 199-200; advised by Épinac, 199; new dignity, 201-3, 206, 209; demands, 202-4; raided the Arsenal, 202; concluded the edict of Union, 15 July 1588, 204; returned to court, 209-10; attracted opposition, 211-12; and the estates-general, 215, 220-2; resolved to act, 220; kept Mendoza informed, 220-2; dismissed royal counsellors, 225; proposed to leave court, 225-6, 228; sought the office of constable, 225; received warnings, 226; murdered, 23 December 1588, 229 Guise, Louis, cardinal de: murdered at Blois, 229, 232 Guises, family of: relations with Gregory XIII, 16, 18, 43, 77, 103; relations with Henry III, 17, 77-8, 108, 112; ambitions, 17, 18-20, 32, 40; opposed the edicts of pacification, 17, 29, 83, 92-3, 96; relations with Spain, 18, 32, 76-7, 89; formed the first catholic league, 1576, 22; and the treaty of Joinville, 78-80, 96; and the

616


estates-general of 1576, 19-20, 29; and the succession, 30, 40, 60, 77; and the Netherlands, 32-3; intrigued in Germany, 53; rebellion, 1584-5, 58, 64, 69-71, 76, 78, 80-3, 92, 103, 105; hatred for Navarre, 91; demands at Épernay, 92; petitioned for one religion only, 95; relations with Sixtus V, 95; discredited in Rome, 113; helped by the excommunication, 118-19; pressed Mendoza for money, 119; disfavour with Spain, 142; new agreement with Spain, 142-4; assembled near Soissons, 143; their rebellion began, 1445, 173-9 Guitry, Jean de Chaumont, seigneur de: Navarre’s envoy to the Palatinate, 128; advised Henry IV, 269

Henri de Bourbon, king of Navarre, Henry IV of France: youth, 13; marriage, 13, 53; huguenot ‘protector’, 13, 116; first abjuration, 1572, 13; relapsed catholic, 13-14, 100, 117, 121, 126; escaped from court, 15-16; and the succession, 19, 30, 39, 40, chap. ii passim, 116-17, 121, 123, 126; returned to Calvinism, 20, 23; religious position, 23-5, 102, 116, 122-3, 472, 474; pressed to abjure, 23-4, 66-7, 70, 99-103, 119, 125, 133-5; desired a council, 24-5, 31, 97, 101-2, 112, 119, 122-3, 126, 248-9, 272, 385; and the estates-general 1576, 30-1; and the Netherlands, 46-8, 73, 75; solicited by Spain, 45-6, 48; proposals to save the kingdom, 1584, 61-4, 1586, 127-9; meetings with Épernon, 65-9; relations with England, 73, 91, 155, 162-3; willing to receive instruction, 25, 86, 101, 130-1; declaration of 10 August 1585, 98-9, 472; conferred with supporters, 89; offered to defend the king, 90; alarmed by negotiations at Épernay, 90-1, 93; called a conference at Guistres, 93-4; declaration of 10 June 1585, 94-5, 97, 99, 120, 151; obliged to take up arms, 1585, 97; concern for royal authority, 102; excommunicated, 20 September 1585, 103, 115-17, 119; robust reaction, 122-3; addressed the Sorbonne, 122; appealed to the three estates, 127; his German forces, 102, 127-8, 131, 133-4, 138, 140, 143, 145-7, 149-50, 152, 155, 158-9; unable to join the Germans, 156-7; withdrew to La Rochelle, 128, 139; proposed to approach Paris, 129; agreed to a truce, 134;

and the conference at Saint-Brice, 135-40; edict of 4 January 1587, 149; lacked money, 149, 152, 155; capitulated with Casimir, 11 January 1587, 149-50; proclaimed his position, 150-1; returned to La Rochelle, 152; victory at Coutras, 153-5; problems thereafter, 153-5; went to Béarn, 154-5; challenged by huguenot factions, 165; offered to help the king, 194-5; prepared for war, 195; hopes in the estatesgeneral, 216-18; ‘avis’ to Conti, 217; and the synod at La Rochelle, 218-19; declaration of 4 March 1589, 248-50; proposed a truce, 251; crossed the Loire, April 1589, 255; brief to the huguenots, 255; joined the king, 29 April 1589, 255-6; approached Paris, 256, 262; summoned by Henry III, 264; his accession, 2 August 1589, 269, 272; declaration of 4 August 1589, 269-72, 275, 316; only provisionally recognised, 270, 280-1; attitude to religion as king, 270-3, 276-8, 314, 328-9; announced an assembly at Tours, 271; speech of 8 August 1589, 271; peculiar difficulties, 272-4; the succession disputed, 272; recognition and peace his priority, 273, 27980, 346, 437, 449, 456, 468; desired a general settlement, 273, 276-7, 472, 524, 529; needed foreign help, 275, 362-3, 365, 373, 397, 399400, 402-3, 417, 425-6, 429-31, 455, 462, 522, 534-5; relations with queen Elizabeth, 275, 329-30, 398-9, 402-3, 407-13, 426-7, 431, 447, 462, 521; campaigned in Normandy, 2756, 279; victory at Arques, 276; looked to Paris, 276, 278-9; policy explained, November 1589, 276-8; declaration of 28 November 1589, 2789; campaigned in Touraine, 279; victory at Ivry, 279, 327-8, 341; problems relating to abjuration, 296, 314, 316, 327, 329, 334-5, 341, 346, 353, 382, 388, 432, 434, 443-5, 4489, 462, 464, 467-8, 471 seq., 479, 491, 495; condemned by the Sorbonne, 302; obstructed by the legate, 307-8, 328-9; conversion required by royalists, 312-13, 343; blockaded Paris, 341; offers to Mayenne, 346; and the siege of Paris, 348 seq., 365; unaware of Parma’s advance, 354-5, 359-60; sought battle, 356-7, 360; failure before Paris, 357-61, 362; army disbanded, 361; and the siege of Chartres, 365; willing to make peace, 366-8; threatened by friends, 368-70; problems with the huguenots, 369, 472-6, 489, 521 524-8, 543, 548, 590; and Gregory XIV, 371, 403; his excommunication renewed, 382-3; summoned

Index the council, 384, 386, 402-4, 406; annulled the Papal censures, 4 July 1591, 384-5; renewed the edicts of pacification, 386; consulted the ‘parlement’, 389; and Rouen, 397-8, 402-3, 413-17, 421-5, 427-9; Parma his priority, 399400, 402-3, 406, 408, 411; and the foreign troops, 398-403, 405-8, 410, 414-15, 417, 421, 524; met Essex at Pierrefonds, 407; his serious plight, 415-17; sent Duplessis to England, 421; wounded, 421-2; pleaded with Unton, 422-3; answered the English, 425-6; declaration to Wilkes, 426-7, 431, 447; held a council at Buhy, 430; sent for Unton, 430; peace negotiations in 1592, 431-2, 435, 437-8; approved the ‘voyages de Rome’, 440, 442, 444, 464, 473, 490; ill-supported by the royalists 440, 442-3, 447, 459, 495, 523; received instruction, 447-8, 472, 489-91, 577; awaited Parma, 455; threatened by the estatesgeneral, 456; is urged to make peace, 456-7; position defined, 29 January 1593, 457-8, 464; sought battle, 462, 483; sent the vidame de Chartres to England, 462, 522; cautious moves towards conversion, 463-4, 466, 470-4; needed Tuscan help, 464-7; the quest for a ‘firm foundation’, 466, 468, 470, 476, 479-82, 4867, 494, 496-7, 502, 519, 521, 529; summoned the nobles, 470-1, 476, 481; agreed to convert, 16 May 1593, 470-2, 474, 476-7, 480; confessed to Edmondes, 471; intimations from Rome, 468, 477, 479-80, 484, 487, 493-4, 499502, 519; sent Girolamo Gondi to Florence, 477; laid siege to Dreux, 479, 482; explanations to Pisani, 480; final plea to Rome, 480-2; captured Dreux, 482, 486; threatened Paris, 486; the abjuration, 25 July 1593, chap. xiv passim; proceedings at SaintDenis, 489, 492-4; petition to the pope, 489; speech of 15 July 1593, 490-1; coronation postponed, 494, 499-500, 529-30; danger from regicides, 496-7, 529, 533, 545, 549-52, 561; and the truce, 497, 517-21, 529; publicised his abjuration, 497-8; wished to restore relations with Rome, 498-501, 530; commented on his abjuration, 523, 529; lost English support, 524; summoned Duplessis, 526-7; attended a protestant assembly, 527; postponed concessions, 528; declaration of 27 December 1593, 529; his coronation, 15 February 1594, 531; entered Paris, 532; and the siege of Laon, 535; wished to avert schism, 543-4; agreed to send Du Perron to Rome, 543-4; authorised

617 d’Ossat to negotiate, 544-5, 549; successes in the north, 545; beset by problems 545-6, 549, 564; the decision to declare war, 548-9, 550-2, 555; reissued the edict of Poitiers, 548; the declaration of war, 551-2; military operations, 1595, 562-5; victory at Fontaine-Françoise, 564; recognised in Burgundy, 564; entered Lyon, 564; losses in Picardy, 565; offers to Mayenne, 566; a curious agreement, 567, 585; returned to Paris, 567, received news of absolution, 567, 584, 588, 590; lost Cambrai, 568, 584; besieged La Fère, 541, 568, 570, 588-90; treaty and edict of Folembray, 24 January 1596, 568-9, 590; delayed by lack of money, 571; petition to Clement VIII, 576-7; and the bull of absolution, 588-90 Henri de Valois, Henry III of France: accession 1574, 15; his qualities, 15, 31, 53, 72-3, 126; coalition against him, 1576, 16-17; relations with the Papacy, 29, 100-1, 106, 169; and the estates-general, 1576, 29-31; relations with Navarre, 29, 31, 53, 57, 65, 70, 89-90, 93, 97103, 130, 132, 161-2; relations with the Guises, 30-2, 38, 56, 58-9, 71, 98-9, 147-9, 157, 161, 164, 177; and the Netherlands, 32, 35-6, 58, 71-6, 80-3, 89; defensive measures, 59, 62; conflicting interests, 62, 89-96, 108; wished to see Navarre, 64; granted huguenot requests, 69; declaration of April 1585, 84; at risk of excommunication, 89, 95-6; lacked money, 90; desired peace, 1585, 92, 129, 1334; recognised Navarre as heir presumptive, 92; demands on the huguenots, 92-3, 96-7, 101; suspended negotiations, 95; evasive conduct, 99-103, 112, 119; feared foreign invasion, 102; incensed against the Jesuits, 105-6; unable to defeat the huguenots, 107; prepared for war, 108; dispersed the League leaders, 112; at risk of deposition, 120, 126-7, 174; sent three armies against Navarre, 128; feared urban revolts, 129, 164; urged to make peace, 1586, 131-3; urged Navarre to feign conversion, 132; and the negotiations at SaintBrice, 135-40; called an assembly of notables, 136-7; warned of conspiracy in Paris, 144; stunned by the failure of peace negotiations, 145-6; sent an envoy to Navarre, 145, 147; his dilemma, 146; planned to send forces to Picardy, 147; confabulations at Meaux, 147, 150; decided to take the field, 148, 151, 174; sent Joyeuse against Navarre, June 1587, 150-

618


3; controlled the Loire, 151-2, 155, 157-9, 174; capitulated with Navarre’s Swiss forces, 158; proposed further war in Guyenne, 161; frustrated by the problem of Navarre’s religion, 163-5; sought English help, 164; tried to negotiate with Guise, 169-70; appealed to Morosini, 170; and the revolt in Paris, 174-9; fled to Chartres, 188, 190-1; at a loss, 193; wanted an accord and an estates-general, 198; received the League petition, 199; his response, 200-4; capitulation with Guise, 2046; regretted by the king, 209; went to Blois, 215; and the estates-general, 1588, 219-22; under pressure from the pope, 222; refused to condemn Navarre, 223; worsening relations with Guise, 225, 227-8; warned of danger, 227; commanded the murders at Blois, 228-9, 231; declared excommunicated by the ‘curés’ and the Sorbonne, 232; removed the Paris ‘parlement’ to Tours, 232; ambiguous attitude to Mayenne, 234-5; quarrelled with Morosini, 239-40; explained himself to Pisani, 240; requested pardon in Rome, 241-2; his perdition plotted in Rome, 241-4; tried to secure Orléans, 246-7; hoped for an accord with Mayenne, 247, 251, 253-4; secret negotiations with Navarre, 251-6; moved to Tours, 251; sought help through Morosini, 251-4; concluded the ‘traité de la trève’, 253; summoned Navarre, April 1589, 255-6; his supposed excommunication, 258-61; demanded the recall of Mendoza, 262; entered Saint-Cloud, 30 July 1589, 263; assaulted, 1 August 1589, 263-5; summoned Navarre, 264; died 2 August 1589, 269 Hostage towns: 43, 45, 48, 53, 59, 69, 83, 96, 1012 Humières, Jean d’, governor of Péronne: his manifesto, 1576, 20

Ibarra, Diego de, Spanish ambassador in France: replaced Mendoza, 364, 392; sought to undermine Mayenne, 392; fomented trouble in Paris, 394; followed Mayenne to Paris, 395; went to Landrecies, 418; negotiations with Jeannin, 418-20; reports intercepted, 420; left Paris with the garrison, 534

Idiaquez, Alonso de, Spanish officer in Flanders: 347; sent to Spain, 364, 391-2, 417; returned to the Netherlands, 392-3 Innocent IX, pope, October-December 1591: adopted the policy of Gregory XIV, 389 Isabella, 286, 522, 332, 480, 450

Spanish infanta: marriage proposals for, 288, 392-3, 460, 463, 482, 484-5, 516, 551-3; proposed for the French throne, 335, 391-6, 443, 455, 459-61, 469, 478, 483-7, 519; not favoured in Rome, 334,

Ivry, battle of, 14 March 1590: 279; influenced Philip II, 279, 328; importance of, 324-7, 341; crystallized Philip II’s policy, 341 Jeannin, Pierre, president of the ‘parlement’ of Dijon, servant of Mayenne: negotiated with the Spanish, 285-6, 418-20; peace negotiations, 343, 345; resisted the Spanish, 345, 370; sent to the Netherlands, 347; mission to Spain, 364, 391-2, 417; his policy, 370, 392; returned to the Netherlands, 392-3, 418; joined Mayenne 392; wished to detach Vendôme, 432; confided the Spanish negotiation to Villeroy, 434; opposed the infanta, 438; disagreed with Mayenne, 438; rejected Villeroy’s proposals, 439; replied to the king’s declaration, 478-9; negotiated for Mayenne, 546-7; proposed a peace conference, 547 John, don, of Austria, governor-general of the Netherlands: mission to conquer England, 18, 32-3; died, 33 Joinville, treaty of, December 1584: 76-8; terms of, 79, 103, 172 Joinville, prince de: see Guise, Charles de Lorraine, duc de Joyeuse, Anne de, seigneur d’Arc, favourite of Henry III: 52; a principal target of the Guises, 113; sent to fight Navarre, 150-3; perished at Coutras, 153 Joyeuse, François de, cardinal de: defended the king in Rome, 242, 244-5; quit Rome, 260; supported Mayenne in Rome, 536; anxious to preserve the league, 537-8

Index Killigrew, sir Henry: sent to France, 410

La Boderie, Antoine Lefèvre de: 316; assisted Pisani in Rome, 312, 375-6; quit Rome, 377; returned to France, 520 La Bruyière: member of the Seize, 173 La Chapelle-Marteau, ‘maître des comptes’, leader of the Seize: begged Guise for help, 177; threatened by Henry III, 179; presented the Seize petition, 199; implicated in regicide, 263, 569 La Clielle, Brochard de, French envoy to Tuscany: sent back to France, 261; preceded Nevers to Rome, 498, 504; instructions, 498-9; travelled via Florence, 499; arrived in Rome incognito, 505; his secret audience, 505; is referred to Toledo, 505; is kept waiting, 506; dismissed empty-handed, 507; returned to France, 520; reported on the pope, 520; returned from Florence, 563 La Force, Jacques-Nompar de Caumont, duc de: sent to Catherine, 136 La Guiche, Philibert de, sieur de Chaumont, ‘chevalier du guet’: sent to Guise, 169, 181 La Marsillière, secretary to Navarre: sent to court and to Germany, 1586, 132 La Mothe-Fénelon, Bertrand de Salignac, seigneur de, diplomat: sent to Navarre, 92 La Motte, Valentin Pardieu, governor of Gravelines: appointed to support Mayenne, 284-5 Landriano, Marsilio: appointed nuncio to France, 377, 382, 417; to convey a general monitorium, 380, 432, 508; uncertain instructions, 382; went to Reims, 382, 390; published monitoria, 382-3, 390; went to Orléans, 383; outlawed in France, 384-6; his bulls burnt, 384; condemned by the king, 385; his recall demanded, 385; met the Papal army, 393 La Roche: Catherine’s envoy, 134

619 La Rochelle, treaty of, July 1573: 15, 22, 27 La Rochette, ‘maître de camp’ to Guise: captured and betrayed the rebels, 83 Latreul, Guise envoy: sent to Parma, 147, 167 La Tour d’Auvergne, Henri de, vicomte de Turenne: sent to England, 399 Laval, Urbain, sieur de Boisdauphin, servant of Navarre: 69; at Blois, 75 La Verrière, Philippe de Senneton, seigneur de, brother of Fleury: sent to Villeroy, 435 Lecler, Bussy, a Seize leader: at risk, 174; in touch with Poulain, 175, 177-8 Leighton, sir Thomas: sent to France, 410 Lenoncourt, Philippe de, cardinal 1586, archbishop of Reims 1589: 100; mission to Navarre, 1585, 101-2, 117, 119, 121; pleaded for Navarre in Rome, 162-3 Lilley, William, secretary to Stafford: stationed at court, 208; reports, 215, 341, 349, 358, 397 Lomellini, clerk of the apostolic chamber: his ‘discorso’, 295-8, 301 Longueville, Henri Ier d’Orléans, duc de: ‘gouverneur’ of Picardy, 283; ravaged Artois, 562 Lorraine, Charles de, cardinal de: 26; leader of the Guise faction 1563-74, 17 Lucinge, René de, ambassador of Savoy: opposed to the Guises, 96; comment on the peace of Nemours, 112 Luxembourg, François Piney, duc de: represented the nobles in Rome, 270, 272, 280-1, 312-13; arrived, 271, 296, 313; sought support in Venice, 309-10, 312; uncertain nature of his mission 312, 314-15, 577; his message from Navarre, 314; requested instruction for Navarre, 314-15; reassured the nobles, 316; reported to the king, 317; withdrew from Rome, 320; no commission from Navarre,

620


320; returned to Rome, 322-3; complained of Caetani, 325; delivered a message from Navarre, 328-9; demanded the recall of Caetani, 330; warned Navarre, 334; sustained the royalist cause, 375; tried to influence the conclave, 375-6; unable to help the royalists, 380-1; instructions for his return to Rome, 385-6; his mission aborted, 387; appointed ambassador to Rome, 589-90 Luz, Edmé de Mâlain, baron de, nephew of Épinac: warned the king, 227; sent to Mayenne, 235

Maineville, François de Rocherolles, sieur de: Guise go-between, 144, 178-9; presented the Seize petition, 199; escaped from Blois, 237 Maisse, Hurault de, French ambassador in Venice: supported Gondi, 451 Mantes, the assembly at: 490 Mary Stuart, queen of Scots: 18; conspiracy in favour of, 119; executed 8/18 February 1587, 146 Matignon, Claude de Goyon, comte de, lieutenantgeneral in Guyenne: 276 Matthieu, Claude, Jesuit, served Guise: mission to Rome, 77, 103-4; confessor to Henry III, 77; requested sanction for the Catholic League, 77, 103; advocated regicide, 77; supported by Philip II, 103-4; reported to Nevers, 78, 105 Maurier, Aubéry du, secretary to Bouillon: sent to England, 447 Mayenne, Charles de Lorraine, duc de: 14; campaigned in Guyenne, 128; returned from Guyenne, 173; approached by the Seize, 173; proposed to seize the king, 173; sidelined by Guise, 174; summoned to head the Catholic Union, 231-3; sent Diou to Rome, 232, 235-6, 239, 281, 291; his new position, 233-6; assumed arms against the king, January 1589, 234; principal enemy of Navarre, 234; went to Dijon, 234; purged the Dijon ‘parlement’, 235; dependent on Spain, 237-8, 367; sought a new agreement with Spain, 237, 262, 282-7, 291;

received offers from Henry III, 238; established control in Paris, 238-9; proposed to call an estates-general, 239, 285, 364, 366-8, 438, 441; rivalry with Spain over the succession, 243-4, 441; and Philip II, 252, 281-2; refused a truce, 252-3; sent Brisson to Rome, 252; took the field, 253; paid the ‘curés’ to slander the king, 256; massive demands on Sixtus V, 256-7; and regicide, 264, 280, 455, 568-70; defeated at Arques, 276; entered Paris, 276, 285; defeated at Ivry, 279, 289; declaration of 5 August 1580; is styled ‘lieutenant général de l’estat et couronne de France’, 280; would-be usurper, 280-1, 285, 288, 367-8, 370, 391, 441, 450, 459, 482; proclaimed ‘Charles X’, 281; uncertain of Spanish support, 284-5; abolished the Seize council, 285; sent Moreo to Antwerp, 285; failed to agree with Spain, 286-7; sought maximum profits, 288; conferred with Caetani, 299; rejected by Sixtus V, 326-7; problems after Ivry, 341-2; conferred with the Spanish, 342; sent Rossieux to Spain, 342; went to Cambrai, 343; desired revenge against Navarre, 345; spurious negotiations, 346, 348; met Parma in Hainault, 347; and the siege of Paris, 348 seq; entered Paris, 361; conferred with Parma and others, 364; sent Jeannin to Spain, 364; hopes of Gregory XIV, 366, 374, 377; favoured a truce, 366; wanted Caetani back, 368; exposed by intercepted letters, 368; sought to detach Vendôme, 370; his desperation, 378; betrayed by Épinac, 379-80, 389; disregarded in Rome, 379-80; sent SaintPaul to Parma, 389; his projected assembly at Reims, 390-1, 432; is joined by Landriano, 390; memoir of 22 May 1591, 390-1; awaited Jeannin, 391; met the Papal army, 393, 509; more negotiations with the Spanish, 393, 41820, 423, 429, 434, 560; suppressed the Seize, 393-6, 418; and Rouen, 418, 420-3; put pressure on Parma, 418; jealous of Guise, 420, 460, 482; ill at Rouen, 429; attitude to peace, 432-3, 436-42; opposed the king in Rome, 436-8, 441, 444, 458, 511, 520, 547; relieved by the death of Parma, 455; declaration promoting himself, 455-6; and the estatesgeneral, 459-60; met Feria, 459-60; feigned support for the infanta, 460; Mayenne’s price, 460; joined Mansfelt, 460; a bargain with Feria, 469-70, 482; put Feria’s plans to the estates-general, 478; proposed to elect a

Index French prince, 482; his predicament, 485-6; demanded Feria’s commission, 485; declaration to Feria, 487; renewed the oath of Union, 487, 517; agreed to a truce, 487; sent successive envoys to Rome, 498, 504-6, 511, 514, 519, 554; disregarded Henry’s abjuration, 517; duplicity over peace, 517-21, 529; his bid for maximum power, 519-20; left Paris, 532; visited the archduke Ernest, 532; his office revoked, 533; his role unclear, 534; defended Laon, 535; returned to Brussels, 546; and submission, 546-8, 564-5, 567-70; curried favour with Spain 546-7; returned to Burgundy, 547-8; bargained for himself in Rome, 554; lost control of Burgundy, 564; quarrelled with Velasco, 565; negotiations with the king, 566-7; made an accord and a truce, 567; subsequently served the king, 570; condemned by the ‘parlement’, 570 Mendoza, Bernadino de, Spanish ambassador to France, 1584-91: and Guise, 33, 55, 168-70, 201; expelled from England, 55, 58, 62; departed for Spain, 55; returned from Spain, 72, 74; bullied the king, 76, 80-1; devised the treaty of Joinville, 77, 80; concern for Antwerp, 80-1; fomented civil war, 143; fomented urban revolts 145, 190; sought to synchronise rebellion with the Armada, 145, 166-7, 170, 174, 176, 191, 197; worked with the Seize, 167, 179; plotted to seize Boulogne, 173; expected revolt, 175-6; hinted at the arrest of the king, 176; worried by the failed revolt, 197-8; and peace negotiations, 202, 204; sent the articles of ‘Union’ to Spain, 208; advised support for Guise, 208; feared for Guise at court, 209, 226; ordered to exploit Caetani, 300, 305-6; advised Mayenne, 324; assisted the Parisians, 344, 349, 353, 357; reassured by Mayenne, 346; departed, January 1591, 364 Mercoeur, Philippe Emmanuel, duc de: joined Joyeuse in Guyenne, 152 Milly, peace conference at, 10 September 1593: 517 Miron, François, physician to Henry III: 181; sent to Catherine, 199, 201

621 Mocenigo, Giovanni, Venetian ambassador in France: 165, 181-2, 187, 189, 232 Monglas, envoy of Navarre: sent to the German army, 152, 157 Monsieur, peace of, May 1576: 16-17, 27-8, 132 Montalto, cardinal nephew of Sixtus V: and the instructions for Caetani, 295-6, 298, 305-6, 316 Montauban, huguenot assembly at, 1584: 69; protestant petition of, 69 Montélimar, Jacques Colas, agent of Mayenne: 282-3; served Mayenne in Picardy, 284; sought help from Parma, 286 Montemarciano, Ercole Sfondrato, duke of: Papal commander in France, 380, 418; returned to Italy, 393 Montguyon, François de la Rochefoucauld, seigneur de Mentende et Montguyon, ‘commissaire’ to Navarre: 136 Montmorency-Damville, Henri, duc de: arrested 1573, 15, 138; suppported the huguenots, 17, 97, 99; declaration of [August 1585], 97; called for a council, 119; desired Navarre’s conversion, 130-1; supported Navarre in Rome, 131; tried to detach him from the huguenots, 133; enmity for the Guises, 133; his alliance pivotal, 141, 161; involved with Savoy, 141 Montpensier, Henri de Bourbon, duc de, ‘gouverneur’ of Normandy: 13, 128-30, 136, 147; attended the estates-general, 215; served at Rouen, 408; turned against the king, 463 Montpensier, Catherine-Marie de Lorraine, duchesse de, sister of Guise: tried to sustain rebellion, 178 Moreo, Juan de, Spanish diplomat: fomented war in France, 143; fomented urban revolts, 145; liaison work, 167-8, 174; met Guise at Soissons, April 1588, 170; conferred with Mayenne, 342; reported to Parma, 342;

622


conducted troops to France, 343; summoned by Mayenne, 347; betrayed Parma, 348 Morgan, sir Thomas, governor of Bergen-opZoom: 284; reported Franco-Spanish negotiations, 283-4 Morosini, Giovanni-Francesco, bishop of Brescia, cardinal 1588: 153; pursued reconciliation in France, 169, 182; summoned by Henry III, 174; approached by Guise, 186; advised Guise, 191, 198-9, 201; went to Rouen, 202; appointed cardinal legate, 213; instructions for the ‘conversion’ of Conti and Soissons, 21516; addressed the estates-general, 223; cautioned the king, 226-7; censured the king, 239-41; tried to keep the king and Navarre apart, 248; sent Rinuccini to Mayenne, 252; went to see Mayenne, 254; sent Francesco Sini to Rome, 254; sent Rinuccini to the king, 254; went to Orléans, 254; abandoned the court, 254-5

Nemours, Jacques de Savoie, duc de, Guisard: 17; arrested at Blois, 229; advised Mayenne, 342; governor of Paris, 342, 350-1, 353, 357; forbade negotiations with Navarre, 349-50; began to waver, 355, 359 Nemours, peace of, 7 July 1585: 84, 95, 134, 1378, 142; effects on the huguenots, 96-9; registered as an edict, 97-101, 103, 111-12, 129; influenced Sixtus V, 112-13 Nevers, Louis de Gonzague, duc de: 13; in league with the Guises, 18; doubts about the Catholic League, 105; mission to Rome, June 1585, 108-9; supported the excommunication of Navarre, 109; probably deceived by Guise, 109, 113; obtained a brief favouring the League, 109-10; critical of the League, 11415; sent to Navarre, 136; tried to advise the king, 211; campaigned in Poitou, 222; abandoned Henry IV, 269; gave trouble in Champagne, 406-7, 414; consulted by Villeroy, 437; mission to Rome, 497, 499, 505; instructions, 499-501, 514-15, 530; excluded from Rome, 503, 507; received mixed advice, 506-7; his report, 510, 518; admitted to Rome, 511; his protests, 511-12; tried to execute his mission, 512; opposed by

the Spanish, 512; demanded a written reply, 512-13; conned by Possevino, 513; declaration to the pope, 513; aroused controversy in Rome, 513-14; warned the pope, 515; departed 14 January 1594, 515; his ‘discours’, 515; his achievements, 516; warned the pope of schism, 540 Niccolini, Giovanni, Tuscan ambassador in Rome: 258; on the monitorium, 258-9; sought to restrain Sixtus V, 260; reported on Diou, 291; confidant to Sixtus V, 308, 315-16, 320; reported on Olivares, 323; supported Navarre, 325, 328-9, 338-9; reports on Sixtus V, 331, 334; aware of sinister rumours, 550; put pressure on the pope, 576, 579; observations, 581-2, 584 Nonesuch, treaty of, 10/20 August 1585: 103 Norris, sir John: sent to Brittany, 400

O, François d’, ‘surintendant des finances’, royal favourite: 176-7, 225; admitted troops into Paris, 182; sent to withdraw the troops, 185 Olivares, Enrique de Guzmán, count of, Spanish ambassador to Rome, 1582-91: 104; manipulated the pope, 109-10; urged the excommunication of Navarre, 109; heard of the Saint-Brice failure, 140; his opinion of Sixtus V, 140-1; defended Guise, 140; advocated the deposition of Henry III, 242; feared for Spanish influence in France, 243; opposed Navarre’s succession, 300; schemed for a Papal alliance, 300, 310-l2, 315; opposition to Luxembourg, 312-13, 315; commanded to ensure Navarre’s exclusion, 314, 317, 327-8; his ‘protestation’, 315, 31820, 322-3, 325, 332; threatened the pope, 31718, 320, 323-4, 327; restrained by the cardinals, 323 Orange, William, prince of: and the revolt of the Netherlands, 14, 21; and Anjou, 33-4; murdered, 14 July 1584, 71-2 Orbais, Nicolas de Pilles, abbé d’, Guise agent: 226; sent to Rome by the Sorbonne, 232; supported Mayenne in Rome, 536; reformulated Leaguer policy, 537

Index Ornano, Alfonso Corso, called Ornano: 181; sent by Mayenne to warn the king, 227; returned to Mayenne, 234-5; his mission uncertain, 235 Ossat, Arnaud d’, servant of queen Louise: assisted La Clielle, 505; corresponded with Nevers, 515; kept the Roman door ajar, 515; chosen by the king, 545; received instructions, 554; secret negotiations, 554-69; sent two reports, 554-7; was guided by Tuscany, 556, 558; the sticking points, 557, 559, 571-2, 582; appealed to Villeroy, 560; suffered a setback, 561-2; his advice adopted, 571-2; visited the cardinals, 575-6; worked with Du Perron, 57683; the sticking points overcome, 583, 588; sent Manciani to Henry IV, 583; awaited the bull of absolution, 584-5

Pacification, edicts of: 34, 43, 50, 83, 89-90, 92-3, 95, revoked by the peace of Nemours, 96, 100, 101-2, 107; reinstated, 386-87 Palavicino, Horatio, English financier: sent to raise money in Germany, 128 Paris: the rebels’ objective, 1585, 83; opposed the king, 90; incipient revolt, 1587, 139-40, revolt scheduled for March 1587, 145; linked to other cities, 145; revolt quickened, 159; became the radical centre of opposition, 166, 175; revolt in, 1588, 171 seq; lost to the crown, 191; the siege of, 1590, 331, 336, 339, 348 seq; relieved by Parma, 357; Spanish garrison in, 365, 376, 393; delivered by intelligence, 531-2 ‘Parlement’ the, at Châlons: declared Papal censures abusive, 384; demanded Sega’s arrest, 384 ‘Parlement’ the, of Paris: registered the peace of Nemours, 97; criticised by Navarre, 99; remonstrance against the League and the pope, 120, 123; purged by the League, 232; forbade negotiations with Navarre, 349; authorised the election of a king, 454; resisted Feria, 478; crucial ‘arrêt’ of 28 June 1593, 483; remonstrance to Mayenne, 483-4; ‘discours’ supporting Henry IV, 483; recognised the king, 530; annulled detrimental edicts, 533; expelled the Jesuits, 550, 561; objected to the absolution, 588-9

623 ‘Parlement’, of Paris, at Tours: edicts of, 5, 27 January 1590, 299; condemned Caetani, 3002; condemned Landriano, 386; returned to Paris, 533 Parma, Alessandro Farnese, prince of, duke 1586: conquests in the Netherlands, 32, 35; succeeded don John, 34; favoured by Sixtus V to command the Armada, 142; insisted upon the precondition of civil war in France, 142, 145; authorised to work with Guise, 143; instigated revolt in France, 166, 173-4; informed of the murders at Blois, 236-7; favoured Mayenne, 237, 239; failing health, 237, 283, 288-9, 393; sent help to Mayenne 1589, 283, 286; is commanded to intervene in France, 288-9, 332, 343, 347-8; sent Richardot to Spain, 289; critical of the French enterprise, 289, 350-1, 363; sent Capizucchi to France, 300; invaded France, 338-9; lacked instructions on the succession, 347; influenced by the death of Bourbon, 347-8; desired his recall, 348; undermined by Moreo, 348; his impending arrival, 350-1, 354; demanded the cession of towns, 350, 395; arrived at Meaux, 356; manoeuvres, 356-7, 363; and the relief of Paris, 360, 365; retreated to the Netherlands, 362-4; reported to Philip II, 364; conferred with Mayenne, 364; is ordered back to France, 393; feared a general rebellion, 393; returned to France, 408, 410, 416-17; and the siege of Rouen, 418, 420-3, 427-9, 433-4; frustrated by Mayenne, 418, 428; negotiations with Mayenne, 418-20, 423, 429, 433-4; Parma’s predicament, 419-20; his return expected, 443, 454-5; died, 3 December 1592, 455 Paruta, Paolo, Venetian ambassador to Rome: steadily supported the French, 451, 467; various reports, 451, 481, 542; advised Clement VIII, 451; his opinions, 452, 504, 539-40, 543, 552, 576, 579; received instructions, 504, 506; supported absolution, 504, 506; put pressure on the pope, 506-7, 510, 513, 537, 576, 579, 580; further instructions, 506; assisted Nevers, 511-12 Pellevé, Nicolas de, archbishop of Sens, cardinal de, 1570, archbishop of Reims: protector in Rome of France, Scotland and Ireland, 18, 140; agent of the Guises, 18; supported by Philip II, 103-4; ignorant of the peace of

624


Nemours, 114; excluded from the consistory, 333; at odds with the French congregation, 379 Péricart, secretary to Guise: 83; arrested at Blois, 229 Péronne, declaration of, March 1585: 84-7; denounced by Duplessis-Mornay, 84-5; raised serious issues, 86 Petition, huguenot, of 25 August 1573: 15 Petremol, Adrien de, finance officer: assisted Poulain, 176 Philip II, king of Spain: supported the Guises, 323, 78-80; hostility to France, 32, 35-6, 55-7, 78, 104, 130; tried to suborn Navarre, 45, 567; sought the French crown, 79, 115, 282, 2846, 332, 553; exploited the Catholic League, 115; required control of Picardy, 142-3; kept the Guises short of money, 142; made a new agreement with Guise, 142-4; reaction to the murders at Blois, 236, 288; is offered a Catholic protectorate, 237; refused to recognise Henry IV, 279; required Cambrai and other towns, 283-4, 332; France his principal objective, 288-90, 348, 363, 417; wished the pope to oppose Henry IV, 310, 328; ordered Parma to invade France, 327-8, 343, 347-8; sought an elected French king, 332, 335-6, 392; expectations of Parma, 363-4; sent Ibarra to assist Parma, 364; sent Feria to France, 392; decided to recall Parma, 392; his policy confused, 418; determined to make war on France, 516, 538-9, 559-60, 562, 573; refused to recognise Henry IV, 553; accepted the absolution, 584, 589; finally inclined to peace, 589 Pinart, Claude, French secretary of state: 74, 186, 188 Pisani, Jean de Vivonne, seigneur de SaintGouard, marquis de, 1586, French ambassador to Rome 1584-95: 140, 222, 224-5, 316; and the David memoir, 18; opposed Nevers, 110; urged the king to act, 110, 115; proposed the dispatch of an extraordinary nuncio, 110; supported Navarre in Rome, 110; opposed the appointment of Frangipani, 111; expelled from Rome, 111; hinted at a French schism, 111;

reconciled with Henry III, 115; sought to influence the pope, 141; sought the excommunication of Guise, 171; sought absolution for Henry III, 242; quit Rome, 260; sent to Rome, 312; proposed for the ‘voyage de Rome’, 441-2; his mission to request a legate, 448-50, 454, 467, 500-1; instructions from the royalists, 448-9; secret instructions, 448-9, 473, 480; arrived in Italy, 453; excluded from Rome, 453, 467; efforts to influence Clement VIII, 467; further instructions, 480 Places de sûreté: see hostage towns Poitiers, edict of: see Bergerac, peace of Possevino, Antonio, Jesuit: sent to intercept Nevers, 507-8; instructions, 507-8, 519; returned to Rome, 508-9; his juggling act, 50811; misled Nevers, 513; obliged to flee, 513 Poulain, Nicolas, member of the Seize, 172, 177-8; turned informer, 173, 175-7, 179, 181, 191; arrested, 173 Prelates, the French: assembled at Chartres, 387; declared the monitoria null, 387; called for the king’s abjuration, 387; sent a deputation to the king, 388-9 Pruneaux, Roch des Sorbiers, sieur des, servant of Henry III: sent to the Netherlands, 72-4

Ragazzoni, Girolamo, bishop of Bergamo, nuncio in France, 1583-6: called the king insane, 77; used his influence, 81; warned the king, 100, 102; negotiations with the Catholic League, 108; requested an extraordinary legate, 108; received the bull of excommunication, 117, 138, 151 Rambouillet, Nicolas d’Angennes, seigneur de: Catherine’s envoy, 136 Reau (various spellings), Antoine de Moret, seigneur de: sent to the king, 136; sent to Germany, 161; sent to England, 400; negotiations, 401-3; instructions, 402, 405; returned to France, 406; sent to greet Essex, 407; returned to England, 409; angered the

Index queen, 409-10; returned to France, 412; called on Unton, 416 Revol, Louis, French secretary of state: 312; sent to Mayenne, 253-4; on the Rouen campaign, 416; advised peace, 456; and Suresnes, 470

625 Sancy, Nicolas de Harlay, seigneur de: urged recognition of Henry IV, 269-70; sent to Germany, 275; sent to England, 430; concluded a contract for Brittany, 431 Santa-Severina, cardinal: 296

Richardot, Jean de Grusset, seigneur de, servant of Parma: sent to Spain, 288-9; detained by Philip II, 289; returned from Spain, 348; negotiations with Jeannin, 418-20

Santi-Quattro, cardinal: 295

Rinuccini: servant of Morosini, 252, 254

Schomberg, Gaspard de, comte de Nanteuil, ‘maréchal de camp’: sent to raise forces, 1467; sent to Catherine, 193; sent to Mayenne, 253-4; sent to Germany, 262; urged the king to make peace, 456; reported on Suresnes, 46970; went to Paris, 469-70; extorted the declaration of 16 July 1593, 477; plotted the recovery of Paris, 531

Rondinelli, Ercole, servant of Morosini: 254 Rose, Guillaume, bishop of Senlis: sent to Rome, 257 Rosny: see Sully Rossieux, Denis de, secretary to Mayenne: posted at Blois, 227; informed Mayenne of the murders, 234; negotiated with the Spanish, 283; sent to Spain, 342; returned with money, 343 Rucellai, Florentine banker: 227 Rusticucci, Girolamo, cardinal of Teodoro, secretary of state to Sixtus V: 144 Ruzé, Martin, seigneur de Beaulieu, French secretary of state: at the estates-general, 221

Savoy, Charles-Emmanuel, duke of: supported Spain, 56-8; invaded Saluzzo, 220, 224

Sega, Filippo, bishop of Piacenza (Plaisance), cardinal legate 1591: 111, 445; opposed a truce, 367; became hostile to Mayenne, 375; reassured the Seize, 377; conspired against Mayenne, 394; to direct the election of the infanta, 418; legate a latere 1592, 445; and the estates-general, 454; exhortation to the royalists, 456; mediator, 486; obstructed the abjuration, 489, 492-3, 495; expected regicide, 496; opposed the king in Rome, 504; influenced the pope, 509; recalled, 532; cautioned the pope, 536; advised Gondi, 541 Séguier, Pierre, president of the ‘parlement’ of Paris: 184

Saint-Brice, conference at, 1586: 134-41; ended in deadlock, 139-40, 161 Sainte-Colombe, François de Montesquieu, seigneur de, servant of Navarre: sent to the king, 162-3 Saint-Germain, peace of, 8 August 1570: 13-14, 27 Saint-Gouard: see Pisani Samier, Henri, alias Jacques de La Rue, alias Hieronymo Martelli, Jesuit: mission to Rome, 77

Ségur de Pardaillan, Jacques, servant of Navarre: conveyed proposals to court, 36-7; sent to England and elsewhere, 50-2, 55, 75, 161; sent to propose a protestant league under England, 91-2 Seize, the, a revolutionary Parisian league: se e app.ii; sought Guise as their leader, 145; exploits of, 171-9; recruited major cities, 171; sought to destroy the king, 171; their plans elitist, 173; their conspiracy betrayed, 177; appealed to Guise, 177-8; intended trouble, 182-3, 189; controlled municipal offices, 1967; petitioned the king, 199; saved by regicide, 272; pro-Spanish, 282, 286, 365-6; sought to

626


oust Mayenne, 365, 393-5; offered the crown to Spain, 394; adopted Guise as their leader, 394; conspired with Sega and Parma, 394-5; vanquished by Mayenne, 394-6; condemned the king, 462

Sidney, sir Robert: delivered Elizabeth’s bond of amity, 534-5

upon Gallican liberties, 223-4; and Saluzzo, 224-5; condemned Morosini, 241-2; hostile to Henry III, 242-6; issued a monitorium against Henry III, 5 May 1589, 257-61; and the death of Henry III, 264-5; appointed a legate, August 1589, 265, 291, 293-4, 298; and the regicide, 270, 291; and the French succession, 291, 298, 310-11, 331, 333-4; temporised in respect of France, 291-2, 294, 308, 316-17, 324, 330-3; refused to recognise Henry IV, 292, 319-21, 334-5, 339; disinclined to help Mayenne, 292, 298, 326, 333; bungled the legate’s instructions, 294-8; dissatisfaction with Caetani, 308, 328, 330-31, 333, 337; quarrelled with Venice, 308-10; ambivalent towards Navarre, 308-10, 317, 319-20, 324-5, 329, 330-1, 334; is pressurised into a Spanish alliance, 308, 310-12, 317-18, 331-4, 335-9; and Luxembourg, 313-16; replied to the royalist catholics, 316-17; quarrelled with Olivares, 317-20, 322-4, 327; sought an Italian league, 319; protested to Philip II, 320; obliged to explain himself, 321-3; worked for the release of Bourbon, 325, 327, 329, 337; his illness, 327, 335, 339; perplexed by the death of Bourbon, 331-2; his real attitude to Henry IV, 334-5; policy of evasion, 335-9; quarrelled with Sessa, 337-8; died, 27 August 1590, 339

Sini, Francesco, servant of Morosini: sent to report to Sixtus V, 254, 257-8; returned to Morosini, 259; went back to Rome, 259

Smith, Otwell, merchant, and agent of Burghley: promoted the siege of Rouen, 397-8, 401-3; encouraged support for the king, 401

Sixtus V, pope, 1585-90: 17; excommunicated the princes, 103, 115-18; blamed Gregory XIII, 104, 106, 113; his background, 107; unprepared for politics, 107; tightrope situation, 1585, 107; miserly disposition, 107; deprecated the state of France, 107-8, 110, 113-14; affected by Leaguer arguments, 110; his confusion, 110-11, 141; alienated from the League, 112-14, 119; inclined to support Henry III, 115, 119; hostile to Navarre, 116, 123, 131, 140, 162-3; needed to humour Spain, 118; his pretensions resented in France, 126; critical of Henry III, 141, 181; ambivalent about the Guises, 169; required the Guises to submit, April 1588, 171; appointed Morosini cardinal legate, 213; threatened Henry III, 21314, 224; appeared to conciliate Navarre, 222, 315; contradictory conduct, 222-3; hoped to exploit the estates-general, 223; impinged

Soissons, Charles de Bourbon, comte de: his abjuration, 13, 128-9, 147, 151-2, 154; suspected by Stafford, 165; approached by Navarre, 195, 212; joined the king, 212; attended the estates-general, 215; absolved and pardoned, 217; captured in Brittany, 262; assembled forces in Normandy, 463

Senecy, Claude de Bauffremont, baron de, servant of Mayenne: supported Mayenne in Rome, 536; submitted, 566; sent to Mayenne, 566 Séraphin, Olivier, auditor of the rota: Florentine agent in Rome, 505; French supporter, 505 Sessa, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, duke of, Spanish ambassador in Rome 1592: sent to clinch a Papal alliance, 328, 332-3; proposed war in France, 333-4; proposed a Papal alliance, 335-7; welcomed the election of Gregory XIV; bribed the cardinals, 452; threatened the pope, 509; sought to frustrate the absolution, 537, 539, 541, 554, 574, 576, 578, 580-1; his demands, 538-9, 579; expected regicide, 561; created problems for Clement VIII, 574-5, 578; mobilised the cardinals, 5756; protested to the pope, 582

Sorbonne, the: secret resolution against Henry III, 174; condemned Henry IV as ‘relapsed’, 302, 347; submitted, 533; recognised the king, 533 Stafford, sir Edward, English ambassador to France 1583-90: his opinions, 1583-4, 54, 56, 58, 60, 73-6, 138, 142, in 1585, 80-3, 89, 93, 153, in 1588, 179-80, 188, 193-4, 208, 210-12; wanted war on Spain, 89; denounced the king’s councillors, 90; feared a new Guise treaty with Spain, 143; noted the pressure on

Index

627

Navarre, 162-3; approached by the king 164-5; and Rouen, 397

Union, the edict of, 15 July 1588: 204 seq; declared fundamental law, 221-2

Sully, Maximilien de Béthune, baron, marquis de Rosny, duc de, 1606: Navarre’s envoy to court 132; advised the king, 154-5; sent to Bouillon, 548; opposed to open war, 548

Unton, sir Henry, English ambassador to France: various reports, 388, 414-16, 422, 430; instructions, 406; his anxiety, 413-14; good relations with the king, 414, 416-17; campaigned with the king, 415, 421; opposed Duplessis’ mission to England, 421; became ill, 422; despaired of Rouen, 422; delivered articles to the king, 424-5; went to Compiègne, 430; returned to England, 430

Suresnes, peace conference at: 454, 457, 460-2, 470-1, 475, 477, 502; conversion the core issue, 462; need to conciliate the ‘tiers parti’, 463; transactions of, 468-71, 479; deadlock at, 470; huguenot interests protected, 476; adjourned, 480

Valois, Marguerite de, sister of Henry III: married Henry of Navarre, 13 Tassis, Juan Bautista de, Spanish ambassador to France, 1580-5: 76-7; fomented war in France, 143; brought money from Spain, 342; lectured the estates-general, 478; went to the Netherlands, 517; despised Mayenne, 519-20; thought war ill-advised, 520; withdrew to Brussels, 532 Thou, Jacques-Auguste de: advised peace, 456; plotted the recovery of Paris, 531 ‘Tiers parti’, the: 369, 379, 423, 433, 494, 496; supported an alternative king, 370, 463; threatened the king, 467 Toledo, cardinal: pensioner of Tuscany, 468, 477; favourable to Henry IV, 502; involved in the absolution, 575 ‘Traité de la trève’, the, April 1589: 251-6; terms of, 253; confirmed, 270, 272, 472 Trent, decrees of: conflict over, 19-20, 27, 29, 424, 50, 223-4 Turenne: see Bouillon Tuscany, Ferdinando dei Medici, grand duke of: advice to Henry III, 261; his support essential to the king, 449; sent Vinta to Rome, 452; and Henry’s conversion, 453, 464-8; his wealth, 465; sought an anti-Spanish coalition, 465-6; pressed for the admission of Nevers, 509; his motives, 563

Vargas Mexia, Juan de, Spanish ambassador in France: 32 Vaudemont, Charles de, cardinal, brother of queen Louise: mission to Rome, 108-9; supported the excommunication of Navarre, 109 Velasco, Juan Fernandez de, duke of Frias, constable of Castile, governor of Milan: 562; entered Franche-Comté, 563; entered Burgundy, 564; expelled, 564 Vendôme, Antoine de Bourbon, duc de, cardinal de Bourbon, 1590: believed Navarre would convert, 100-1; called for a council, 119; possible candidate for the throne, 295, 369-70, 378-9; and Caetani, 301-5, 320-1; convoked the bishops to Tours, 303; sent an agent to Rome, 378; summoned by the king, 384; denounced the monitorium, 387-8; assembled forces in Normandy, 463; marriage to the infanta mooted, 463; opposed the abjuration, 489, 491-2 Vérac, Jean de Nesmond, sieur de: royal messenger to Montmorency and Navarre, 1334 Villefallier: betrayed the Parisian rebels, 83 Villequier, René de, baron de Clairvaux, governor of Paris: went to Reims, 147; constrained the king, 174; and the rebellion in Paris, 181, 1834

628


Villeroy, Nicolas de Neufville, seigneur de, French secretary of state: confidant of Henry III, 57; and the crisis of 1584, 57-8; assisted Catherine de Medici at Épernay, 92; illness, 92; sent to meet Catherine, March 1587, 145; observed the rebellion in Paris, 183-4, 186, 188; sent to negotiate with Guise, 202-4; feared Spanish domination, 287-8; advice to Mayenne, 287-8; alienated from Mayenne, 288; preparations for peace, 345; disappointed by the legate, 345; desired to exclude the Spanish, 345; met Duplessis, 345; refused the oath of Union, 345; feared the influence of Spain, 345; longed for the king’s conversion, 345-6, 432; laboured for peace, 345-7, 366-7; visited Mayenne, 346; went home, 366; is visited by Fleury, 366; visited Mayenne, 366; at Buhy, 367; deceived by Mayenne, 367; resumed peace negotiations in 1592, 432, seq; disagreed with Jeannin, 4324, 439; hoped for Papal support, 432-4, 436-7; warned the king of Parma’s negotiation, 435; desired Tuscan help, 435; met Gondi, 435; his ‘expedient’, 435-7, 444, 470; submitted the ‘expedient’ to Mayenne, 437; distrusted Mayenne, 438; drafted articles for peace, 4389; prepared a memoir for Duplessis, 439-40; summoned by councillors, 440; summoned to Rouen, 440; urged Mayenne to break with Spain, 440-2; delivered Mayenne’s final message, 441; negotiations suspended, 442; negotiations resumed, 517-18; quit Mayenne’s service; 521; on the absolution, 545, 554; is warned of the king’s danger, 550; negotiated with Mayenne, 566 Vinta, Belissario, Tuscan agent: sent to Rome, 452-3; called on Paruta, 453 Vitré, huguenot synod of, May 1583: 48, 53 ‘Voyage(s) de Rome’, the: conceived by Villeroy, 432-3, 436-7, 440, 447-50, 456, 489; supported by councillors, 440; became urgent, 441-2; doomed to fail, 447; supported by Tuscany, 467

Walsingham, sir Francis, English secretary of state: approached by Duplessis-Mornay, 48-9, 50; his policy, 75

Wilkes, sir Thomas, clerk of the council: sent to report on the state of France, 424-6, 436; instructions, 424-5; returned home, 426; sent to France, 522; his report, 523 Williams, sir Roger, English commander: sent to Dieppe, 400; favoured support for Navarre, 401, 403, 431; urged a siege of Rouen, 401, 403; military exploits, 402; met the king at Vernon, 402; his service restricted, 402; at the siege of Noyon, 411-12 Willoughby, Peregrine Bertie, baron, English commander: sent to France, 275 Wroth, John, English agent in Venice: 260

Yorke, sir Edmund, English diplomat: in Middelburg, 74; sent to France, 399; supported the king, 414

Zúñiga, Juan de: advised Philip II, 76

Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion 1572-1596

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