Heidegger Reexamined, Volume 1: Dasein, Authenticity, and Death

Heidegger Reexamined Edited w i t h introductions by Hubert Dreyfus University of California, Berkeley Mark Wrathal...

Author: Hubert L. Dreyfus | Mark Wrathall

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Heidegger Reexamined

Edited w i t h introductions by

Hubert Dreyfus University

of California,

Berkeley

Mark Wrathall Brigham

Young

University

A R O U T L E D G E SERIES

Contents of the Collection Volume 1 Dasein, Authenticity, and Death Volume 2 T r u t h , Realism, and the H i s t o r y of Being Volume 3 A r t , Poetry, and Technology Volume 4 Language and the Critique of Subjectivity

Heidegger Reexamined Volume 1

Dasein, Authenticity, and Death

Edited w i t h introductions by

Hubert Dreyfus University

of California,

Berkeley

Mark Wrathall Brigham

Young University

Published in 2 0 0 2 by Routledge 2 9 West 3 5 t h Street N e w York, N Y 10001 www.routledge-ny.com Published in Great B r i t a i n by Routledge 1 1 N e w Fetter Lane L o n d o n EC4P 4EE www.routledge.co.uk R o u t l e d g e i s a n i m p r i n t o f the T a y l o r & Francis G r o u p . C o p y r i g h t © 2 0 0 2 by T a y l o r & Francis B o o k s , I n c . P r i n t e d i n the U n i t e d States o f A m e r i c a o n acid-free paper. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or r e p r o d u c e d o r u t i l i z e d i n any f o r m o r b y any e l e c t r o n i c , m e c h a n i c a l , o r o t h e r means, n o w k n o w n o r hereafter i n v e n t e d , i n c l u d i n g p h o t o c o p y i n g a n d r e c o r d i n g , o r i n any i n f o r m a t i o n storage o r r e t r i e v a l system, w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n i n w r i t i n g f r o m the publisher. 1 0

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

L i b r a r y o f Congress C a t a l o g i n g - i n - P u b l i c a t i o n D a t a H e i d e g g e r r e e x a m i n e d / edited w i t h i n t r o d u c t i o n s b y H u b e r t D r e y f u s , M a r k Wrathall p. cm. I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 1 - 9 (set : a l k p a p e r ) — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 2 - 7 (v. 1: a l k . p a p e r ) — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 3 - 5 (v. 2 : a l k . p a p e r — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 4 - 3 (v. 3 : a l k . p a p e r ) — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 5 - 1 (v. 4 : a l k . p a p e r ) . 1 . Heidegger, M a r t i n , 1 8 8 9 - 1 9 7 6 . I . Dreyfus, H u b e r t L . I I . W r a t h a l l , M a r k A . B3279.H49 H35228 2002 193—dc21 2002005873

Contents vii

Series I n t r o d u c t i o n

xi

Volume Introduction

1

The Young Heidegger and Phenomenology John

35

van

Dasein, the Being that Thematizes Robert

73

R.

Brandom

Heidegger on Being a Person John

85

Buren

Haugeland

H e i d e g g e r a n d Dasein's ' B o d i l y N a t u r e ' : W h a t i s t h e H i d d e n Problematic? David

R.

Cerbone

107 Being and the L i v i n g Didier

Franck

1 2 1 I n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d the S e m a n t i c s o f ' D a s e i n ' M.

Roderick

Stewart

1 3 5 H e i d e g g e r ' s C r i t i q u e o f t h e Husserl/Searle A c c o u n t o f I n t e n t i o n a l i t y Hubert 157

L.

Sexual D i f f e r e n c e , O n t o l o g i c a l D i f f e r e n c e

Geschlecht: Jacques

177

Dreyfus

Derrida

E x i s t e n c e a n d S e l f - U n d e r s t a n d i n g in Being and Time William

D.

Blattner

191 Heidegger's " A u t h e n t i c i t y " Revisited Charles 211

B.

Guignon

I n d i v i d u a l a n d C o m m u n i t y i n E a r l y H e i d e g g e r : S i t u a t i n g das Man, the M a n - S e l f , a n d S e l f - o w n e r s h i p i n Dasein's O n t o l o g i c a l S t r u c t u r e Edgar

C.

Baedeker,

Jr.

2 4 8 H e i d e g g e r o n the R e l a t i o n o f O n e s e l f t o Oneself: C h o o s i n g O n e s e l f Ernst

Tugendhat

2 6 7 H e i d e g g e r a n d the Sources o f I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y Pierre Keller and David S. Weberman

ν

Contents

VI

285

Social C o n s t r a i n t s o n C o n v e r s a t i o n a l C o n t e n t : H e i d e g g e r o n Rede a n d Gerede Mark A. Wrathall

3 0 7 T h e C o n c e p t of D e a t h in Being and Time William

D.

Blattner

330 Dasein, Existence, and Death Carol J. 345

White

M e t a p h y s i c s , M e t o n t o l o g y , a n d t h e E n d of Being and Time Steven Galt Crowell

371 Acknowledgments

Series Introduction M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r i s u n d e n i a b l y one o f t h e m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l p h i l o s o phers o f t h e 2 0

t h

c e n t u r y . H i s w o r k has been a p p r o p r i a t e d b y s c h o l a r s i n

fields as diverse as p h i l o s o p h y , classics, p s y c h o l o g y , l i t e r a t u r e , h i s t o r y , socio l o g y , a n t h r o p o l o g y , p o l i t i c a l science, r e l i g i o u s studies, a n d c u l t u r a l studies. I n t h i s f o u r - v o l u m e series, w e ' v e c o l l e c t e d a set o f articles t h a t w e believe represent some o f the best research o n the m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g a n d d i f f i c u l t issues i n c o n t e m p o r a r y H e i d e g g e r s c h o l a r s h i p . I n p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r t h i s c o l l e c t i o n , w e h a v e q u i t e d e l i b e r a t e l y t r i e d t o i d e n t i f y the papers t h a t engage c r i t i c a l l y w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t . T h i s i s n o t just because w e w a n t e d t o focus o n " l i v e " issues i n H e i d e g g e r s c h o l a r s h i p . I t i s also because c r i t i c a l e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the t e x t is, i n o u r o p i n i o n , the best w a y t o grasp Heidegger's t h o u g h t . Heidegger is a n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t r e a d — i n part, because h e i s d e l i b e r a t e l y t r y i n g t o b r e a k w i t h t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , i n p a r t , because his w a y o f b r e a k i n g w i t h the t r a d i t i o n w a s o f t e n t o c o i n n e o l o g i s m s (a less s y m p a t h e t i c reader m i g h t d i s m i s s it as o b f u s c a t o r y j a r g o n ) , a n d , i n p a r t , because H e i d e g g e r b e l i e v e d h i s task w a s t o p r o v o k e his readers t o t h o u g h t f u l n e s s r a t h e r t h a n p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h a facile a n s w e r t o a w e l l - d e f i n e d p r o b l e m . Because o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n r e a d i n g H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , w e believe t h a t i t i s i n c u m b e n t u p o n t h e c o m m e n t a t o r t o keep the m a t t e r f o r t h o u g h t i n t h e f o r e f r o n t — t h e issue t h a t H e i d e g g e r i s t r y i n g t o shed l i g h t o n . W i t h o u t such a n e n g a g e m e n t i n the m a t t e r f o r t h o u g h t , Heidegger scholarship all t o o often devolves i n t o e m p t y w o r d play. So, t h e f i r s t a n d m o s t i m p o r t a n t c r i t e r i o n w e ' v e used i n selecting papers i s t h a t t h e y engage w i t h i m p o r t a n t issues i n H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t , a n d d o s o i n a clear, n o n - o b f u s c a t o r y f a s h i o n . N e x t , w e h a v e b y a n d large a v o i d e d r e p u b l i s h i n g articles t h a t are a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e i n o t h e r c o l l e c t i o n s o f essays o n H e i d e g g e r . W e h a v e m a d e e x c e p t i o n s , h o w e v e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n t h e essay i s l o c a t e d i n a v o l u m e t h a t w o u l d easily b e o v e r l o o k e d b y Heidegger scholars. Finally, as o u r p r i m a r y i n t e n t was to collect and m a k e r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e w o r k o n c u r r e n t issues a n d p r o b l e m s a r i s i n g o u t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t , w e have t r i e d t o select recent r a t h e r t h a n d a t e d a r t i cles. I n selecting t h e m e s f o r each v o l u m e , w e h a v e , i n g e n e r a l , been g u i d e d b y t h e o r d e r i n w h i c h H e i d e g g e r , o v e r the c o u r s e o f h i s career, d e v o t e d extended a t t e n t i o n to the p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d . T h u s , the first v o l u m e c o n vii

Series

Vitt

Introduction

t a i n s essays f o c u s i n g o n D a s e i n — t h e h u m a n m o d e o f e x i s t e n c e — a n d " e x i s t e n t i a l " themes l i k e a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d d e a t h , because these w e r e p r o m i n e n t c o n c e r n s i n the years l e a d i n g u p t o a n d i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n o f Being and Time i n 1 9 2 7 . T h e s e c o n d v o l u m e centers o n H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f t r u t h , a n d his c r i t i q u e o f the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y , because these w e r e areas o f e x t e n d e d i n t e r e s t i n the 1 9 3 0 s a n d 1 9 4 0 s . T h e t h i r d v o l u m e i s o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d themes i n d i g e n o u s t o the ' l a t e ' H e i d e g g e r — namely, Heidegger's w o r k on art, poetry, and technology. B u t t h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t the v o l u m e s are g o v e r n e d b y a s t r i c t n o t i o n o f p e r i o d s i n H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k . I n the past, i t has been c o m m o n p l a c e t o s u b d i v i d e H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k i n t o t w o ( e a r l y a n d late) o r even three (early, m i d d l e , a n d late) p e r i o d s . W h i l e there i s s o m e t h i n g t o b e s a i d f o r s u c h d i v i s i o n s — t h e r e is an o b v i o u s sense in w h i c h Being and Time is t h e m a t i c a l l y a n d s t y l i s t i c a l l y u n l i k e H e i d e g g e r ' s p u b l i c a t i o n s f o l l o w i n g the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r — i t i s also m i s l e a d i n g t o speak a s i f there w e r e t w o o r t h r e e d i f ferent H e i d e g g e r s . T h e b i f u r c a t i o n , a s i s w e l l k n o w n , i s s o m e t h i n g t h a t H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f w a s uneasy a b o u t , a n d s c h o l a r s t o d a y are i n c r e a s i n g l y h e s i t a n t t o d r a w t o o s h a r p a d i v i d e b e t w e e n the e a r l y a n d l a t e . S o w h i l e the themes o f the f i r s t t h r e e v o l u m e s have been set b y H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n h i s t o r i c a l course t h r o u g h p h i l o s o p h y , the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f papers i n t o v o l u m e s does n o t respect a d i v i s i o n o f s c h o l a r s h i p i n t o e a r l y a n d late. W e have f o u n d instead t h a t the papers r e l e v a n t t o a n ' e a r l y H e i d e g g e r ' issue o f t e n d r a w o n H e i d e g g e r ' s l a t e r w o r k , a n d vice versa. 1

T h e last v o l u m e i n the series i s o r g a n i z e d less b y H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n t h e m a t i c c o n c e r n s t h a n b y a n i n t e r e s t i n H e i d e g g e r ' s relevance t o c o n t e m porary philosophy. Given mainstream analytic philosophy's preoccupation w i t h language a n d m i n d , h o w e v e r , t h i s v o l u m e does have t w o t h e m a t i c c e n ters o f g r a v i t y — H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k o n the essence o f l a n g u a g e , a n d h i s c r i tique of modernist accounts of subjectivity. I n its focus o n H e i d e g g e r ' s relevance t o o n g o i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e r n s , h o w e v e r , v o l u m e f o u r m e r e l y m a k e s o b v i o u s the i n t e n t i o n o f the series a s a w h o l e . I n his 1 9 2 5 - 2 6 l e c t u r e course o n l o g i c , H e i d e g g e r b e m o a n e d the fact t h a t p e o p l e " n o l o n g e r p h i l o s o p h i z e f r o m t h e issues, b u t f r o m t h e i r c o l league's b o o k s . " I n a s i m i l a r w a y , w e believe t h a t H e i d e g g e r i s d e s e r v i n g o f a t t e n t i o n a s a p h i l o s o p h e r o n l y because h e i s such a n e x c e l l e n t g u i d e t o the issues themselves. W e h o p e t h a t the papers w e have c o l l e c t e d here d e m o n s t r a t e H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n t i n u i n g p e r t i n e n c e t o the m o s t p r e s s i n g issues in contemporary philosophy. 2

NOTES 1

W r i t i n g to Richardson, Heidegger noted:

"The distinction you

make between

Heidegger I and II is justified o n l y on the c o n d i t i o n that this is kept c o n s t a n t l y in m i n d : o n l y b y w a y o f w h a t [ H e i d e g g e r ] I has t h o u g h t does o n e g a i n access t o w h a t

Series

Introduction

tx

is t o - b e - t h o u g h t by [ H e i d e g g e r ] I I . B u t the t h o u g h t of [ H e i d e g g e r ] I becomes possible o n l y i f i t i s c o n t a i n e d i n [ H e i d e g g e r ] I I . " W i l l i a m J . R i c h a r d s o n , " L e t t e r t o

R i c h a r d s o n , " in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought ( T h e H a g u e : M. N i j h o f f , 1963), 8. 1

Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit,

Klostermann, 1995), 84.

Gesamtausgabe 21

( F r a n k f u r t am M a i n :

Volume Introduction H e i d e g g e r ' s Being and Time w a s p u b l i s h e d in 1 9 2 7 a n d r e m a i n s one of the m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r k s o f the past c e n t u r y . I n i t , H e i d e g g e r u n d e r t a k e s a n a m b i t i o u s o n t o l o g i c a l p r o j e c t — t h e c e n t r a l task o f the b o o k i s t o d i s c o v e r the m e a n i n g o f b e i n g — o n the basis o f a s u b t l e a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the h u m a n m o d e o f existence. T h e articles c o l l e c t e d i n t h i s v o l u m e focus o n s o m e o f the m o s t v e x i n g p r o b l e m s t h a t g r o w o u t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f h u m a n existence. I n o r d e r t o set u p these papers, w e w o u l d l i k e t o offer a b r i e f i n t r o d u c t i o n t o H e i d e g g e r ' s w a y o f d o i n g p h i l o s o p h y , his a c c o u n t o f h u m a n existence, a n d the c o n c e r n s w i t h a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d d e a t h t h a t g r o w o u t o f t h a t a c c o u n t . H e i d e g g e r ' s e a r l y p h i l o s o p h y w a s p r o f o u n d l y shaped b y his s t u d y o f the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l w o r k s o f H u s s e r l , D i l t h e y a n d , t o a lesser degree, Scheler. B u t H e i d e g g e r b r o k e v e r y e a r l y o n w i t h any f o r m a l " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d " a n d e v e n t u a l l y d r o p p e d the t e r m ' p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' a s a s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n , w o r r i e d t h a t r e p r e s e n t i n g his t h o u g h t a s p h e n o m e n o l o g y w o u l d cause h i m t o b e associated w i t h H u s s e r l ' s s u b s t a n t i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w s . W i t h the o n g o i n g p u b l i c a t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s Collected Works, i t has b e c o m e possible t o d o c u m e n t the f o r m a t i v e i n f l u e n c e o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y on H e i d e g g e r (see J o h n v a n Buren's p a p e r ) , as w e l l as his e v e n t u a l break w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y . O n the l a t t e r p o i n t , see Steve C r o w e l l ' s paper, w h i c h explores Heidegger's struggle w i t h the l i m i t a t i o n s of p h e n o m e n o l o g y as a m e t h o d f o r m e t a p h y s i c a l i n q u i r y , a n d his m o v e b e y o n d H u s s e r l i a n phen o m e n o l o g y in the decade f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n of Being and Time. D e s p i t e his b r e a k w i t h the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m o v e m e n t , H e i d e g g e r c o n s i d e r e d his w o r k t h r o u g h o u t his life t o b e " a m o r e f a i t h f u l adherence t o the p r i n c i p l e o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y " ( i n his o w n loose sense o f the t e r m ) . F o r H e i d e g g e r , p h e n o m e n o l o g y i s a n ' a t t i t u d e ' o r p r a c t i c e i n 'seeing' t h a t takes its d e p a r t u r e f r o m l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e . I t a i m s a t g r a s p i n g the p h e n o m e n a o f l i v e d i n v o l v e m e n t i n the w o r l d , before o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the w o r l d becomes d e t e r m i n e d a n d a l t e r e d i n ' t h e m a t i c ' o r r e f l e c t i v e t h o u g h t . I n t h i s respect, H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k i s i n m a r k e d c o n t r a s t t o the m e t h o d o f c o n c e p t u a l analysis t h a t has c o m e t o d o m i n a t e p h i l o s o p h y i n the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g w o r l d f o l l o w i n g the " l i n g u i s t i c t u r n " o f the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . F o r H e i d e g g e r , o u r c o n c e p t s a n d l a n g u a g e c o m e t o o late, a n d have a d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r e t h a n o u r p r e - p r o p o s i t i o n a l w a y o f c o m p o r t i n g i n the w o r l d . I t i s 1

xi

xii

Volume

Introduction

t h u s n o t possible t o d i s c o v e r the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l features o f h u m a n e x i s tence t h r o u g h a n a n a l y s i s o f l a n g u a g e a n d c o n c e p t s . 2

T h e c o r e o f Being and Time i s a n analysis o f the h u m a n m o d e o f b e i n g , w h i c h H e i d e g g e r names w i t h t h e t e r m ' D a s e i n . ' D a s e i n means existence i n c o l l o q u i a l G e r m a n , b u t H e i d e g g e r used i t a s a t e r m t o refer t o t h e p e c u l i a r l y h u m a n w a y o f e x i s t i n g ( w i t h o u t , o f course, d e c i d i n g i n advance w h e t h e r o n l y h u m a n s e x i s t i n t h i s w a y ) . T r a n s l a t o r s o f H e i d e g g e r have elected t o leave the t e r m u n t r a n s l a t e d , a n d s o i t has n o w passed i n t o c o m m o n parlance a m o n g Heidegger scholars. O n e o f the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g features o f H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis o f D a s e i n i s the p r i o r i t y he discovers in n o n - c o g n i t i v e modes of b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . T h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l i n t e n t i o n a l states t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n has seen a s c o n s t i t u t i v e o f D a s e i n are, i n H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis, d e r i v a t i v e p h e n o m e n a . H u b e r t D r e y f u s ' s a r t i c l e , " H e i d e g g e r ' s C r i t i q u e o f the Husserl/Searle A c c o u n t o f I n t e n t i o n a l i t y , " explains Heidegger's practice-based account o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , a n d explores the i m p l i c a t i o n s of Heidegger's radical r e t h i n k i n g o f h u m a n b e i n g f o r m a i n s t r e a m a c c o u n t s o f the m i n d - w o r l d r e l a t i o n s h i p . J o h n H a u g e l a n d offers a defense o f the idea t h a t h u m a n existence c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d a s p r i m a r i l y p r a c t i c a l i n n a t u r e . T h i s v i e w o f h u m a n existence, f o r H a u g e l a n d , u n d e r w r i t e s a r a d i c a l d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e Kantian/Cartesian t r a d i t i o n of t h i n k i n g a b o u t p e r s o n h o o d . As a result, H a u g e l a n d argues, D a s e i n s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d a s a p a t t e r n o f n o r m s ( a n d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d m e a n i n g s t h a t are based i n s u c h n o r m s ) . O t h e r i n t e r preters o f H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , argue t h a t w h i l e H e i d e g g e r ' s a n a l y s i s cert a i n l y emphasizes n o n - c o g n i t i v e states, l a n g u a g e a n d c o g n i t i o n nevertheless p l a y a c r u c i a l r o l e i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f D a s e i n . I n " I n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d t h e Semantics o f D a s e i n , " f o r i n s t a n c e , J o h n S t e w a r t argues t h a t H a u g e l a n d ' s a n d Dreyfus's readings of Dasein underemphasize d e l i b e r a t i o n and other t h e m a t i c states. R o b e r t B r a n d o m s i m i l a r l y argues t h a t l a n g u a g e i s essential t o Dasein's b e i n g . C r i t i c i z i n g " l a y e r - c a k e " m o d e l s o f l a n g u a g e — t h a t is, theories i n w h i c h l a n g u a g e c a n s i m p l y b e a d d e d o n t o a n a l r e a d y h u m a n b u t n o n - l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t y — B r a n d o m argues t h a t a p r e - l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y w o u l d n o t c o u n t as Dasein for Heidegger. O t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t issues r e m a i n s u r r o u n d i n g the n a t u r e a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n of D a s e i n . A c e n t r a l a i m of Being and Time is to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t D a s e i n i s a m o d e o f existence d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t e n j o y e d b y objects i n the w o r l d , a n d t h a t i t c a n n o t b e reduced t o o r g r o u n d e d i n the m o d e o f being o f objects. I n s t e a d , D a s e i n i s essentially a l w a y s i n a w o r l d , w h i c h , i n t u r n , i s a l w a y s o r g a n i z e d m e a n i n g f u l l y . W i t h i n the w o r l d , D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s o t h e r Daseins, a n d also o t h e r objects w i t h m o d e s o f b e i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m D a s e i n . T h e o t h e r p r i n c i p a l m o d e s o f b e i n g t h a t H e i d e g g e r discusses i n Being and Time are t h e ' a v a i l a b l e ' ( o r ' r e a d y - t o - h a n d ' ) a n d the ' o c c u r r e n t ' ( o r ' p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d ' ) . E q u i p m e n t is p a r a d i g m a t i c of the a v a i l a b l e .

Volume

Introduction

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S o m e t h i n g i s a v a i l a b l e w h e n (1) i t i s d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f its place i n a c o n t e x t o f e q u i p m e n t , t y p i c a l a c t i v i t i e s i n w h i c h i t i s used, a n d t y p i c a l p u r p o s e s o r goals w i t h w h i c h i t i s used, a n d (2) i t lends i t s e l f t o such use r e a d i l y a n d easily, w i t h o u t need f o r r e f l e c t i o n . T h e c o r e case o f availableness i s a n i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t o f w h i c h w e have a p r i m o r d i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (i.e., w e k n o w h o w t o use i t ) , a n d w h i c h t r a n s p a r e n t l y lends i t s e l f t o use. T h e o t h e r p r i m a r y m o d e o f b e i n g i s O c c u r r e n t n e s s ' o r 'presence-ath a n d . ' T h i s i s the m o d e o f b e i n g o f t h i n g s w h i c h are n o t g i v e n a w o r l d l y d e t e r m i n a t i o n — t h a t is, t h i n g s c o n s t i t u t e d b y p r o p e r t i e s t h e y possess i n themselves, r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h t h e i r r e l a t i o n s t o uses a n d objects o f use. M o s t a v a i l a b l e t h i n g s c a n also b e v i e w e d a s o c c u r r e n t , a n d i n b r e a k d o w n s i t u a t i o n s , the o c c u r r e n t n e s s o f a n a v a i l a b l e o b j e c t w i l l o b t r u d e . A n i m p o r t a n t t h e m e in Being and Time is H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i e s a n d sciences have t a k e n the o c c u r r e n t a s p r i m o r d i a l , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y f a i l e d t o p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e o f the a v a i l a b l e . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , H e i d e g g e r argues t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n has also t r i e d t o i n t e r p r e t D a s e i n o n the m o d e l o f o c c u r r e n t e n t i t i e s . A c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , there i s n o w a y t o reduce the m e a n i n g f u l n e s s o f the w o r l d o r b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d t o a c o l l e c t i o n o f o c c u r r e n t entities w i t h o c c u r r e n t p r o p e r t i e s . A k e y e l e m e n t in H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t is the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the o n t i c a n d o n t o l o g i c a l . Being and Time is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the m e a n i n g of b e i n g — t h a t o n the basis o f w h i c h b e i n g i s u n d e r s t o o d . H e i d e g g e r argues t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l t r e a t m e n t s o f b e i n g have f a i l e d t o a d e q u a t e l y d i s t i n g u i s h the t w o k i n d s o f q u e s t i o n s w e c a n ask a b o u t b e i n g : the o n t i c q u e s t i o n t h a t asks a b o u t the p r o p e r t i e s o f beings, a n d the o n t o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n t h a t asks a b o u t w a y s o r m o d e s o f b e i n g . D a s e i n , the a v a i l a b l e , a n d the o c c u r r e n t are o n t o l o g i c a l categories. I f one o n t o l o g i c a l l y investigates a n i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t , say, a p e n , t h e n o n e asks a b o u t the s t r u c t u r e s b y v i r t u e o f w h i c h i t i s a v a i l a b l e o r r e a d y t o h a n d . I n a n o n t i c i n q u i r y , o n the o t h e r h a n d , one asks a b o u t the p r o p e r t i e s , a n d the p h y s i c a l a n d r e l a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s p e c u l i a r t o the p e n . H e i d e g g e r ' s c r i t i q u e o f the t r a d i t i o n c o m e s f r o m the s i m p l e observ a t i o n that an ontic i n q u i r y , no matter h o w exhaustive, cannot tell anyt h i n g a b o u t the o n t o l o g i c a l m o d e o f b e i n g o f a t h i n g . T h i s i s because a listi n g o f a pen's p r o p e r t i e s c a n n o t t e l l m e w h y i t i s a v a i l a b l e r a t h e r t h a n occurrent. O n e o u t c o m e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o n t o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f D a s e i n i s the c l a i m t h a t c e r t a i n features o f h u m a n existence are m e r e l y o n t i c p r o p e r t i e s — t h i n g s l i k e s e x u a l i t y a n d o t h e r features o f o u r e m b o d i m e n t , f o r i n s t a n c e — a n d p l a y n o role i n the o n t o l o g i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n o f D a s e i n . I n "Geschlecht," D e r r i d a q u e s t i o n s t h i s o u t c o m e , a n d uses i t t o e x p l o r e the v a l i d i t y o f the o n t i c / o n t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n . D e r r i d a , t o o , i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h the difference b e t w e e n e x i s t e n t i e l l a n d e x i s t e n t i a l features. H e q u e s t i o n s H e i d e g g e r ' s readiness t o t r e a t t h i n g s l i k e s e x u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a s o n t i c .

xiv

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Introduction

S i m i l a r c o n c e r n s are raised b y a n " o n t i c " feature o f h u m a n existence l i k e b e i n g e m b o d i e d (see D a v i d C e r b o n e ' s " H e i d e g g e r a n d Dasein's ' B o d i l y N a t u r e ' : W h a t i s the H i d d e n P r o b l e m a t i c ? " ) o r b e i n g alive (See D i d i e r F r a n c k ' s " B e i n g a n d the L i v i n g " ) . T h e r o l e o f l a n g u a g e i n Dasein's c o n s t i t u t i o n — a t o p i c w e ' v e a l r e a d y t o u c h e d o n — i s d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h the " e x i s t e n t i a l " themes o f Being and Time. It is s o m e t i m e s s u p p o s e d t h a t the source of Dasein's t e n d e n c y t o w a r d i n a u t h e n t i c i t y i s the i n h e r e n t b a n a l i t y a n d l e v e l l i n g o f p u b l i c l a n guage. D r a w i n g o n a n a l y t i c w o r k i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e , M a r k W r a t h a l l argues t h a t t h i s v i e w i s n o t s u p p o r t a b l e o n the basis o f H e i d e g g e r ' s v i e w s o f l a n g u a g e . E v e n i f Dasein's use o f l a n g u a g e i s n o t d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the f a l l i n t o i n a u t h e n t i c i t y , i t i s s t i l l possible t h a t i t p l a y s a r o l e i n i t . T h e p r o b l e m c a n b e p o s e d i n t e r m s o f the f o l l o w i n g p a r a d o x : to fail to acknowledge a constitutive role for language a n d public p r a c t i c e s t h r e a t e n s t o l e a d t o s o l i p s i s m ; t o give t h e m t o o s t r o n g a r o l e , o n the o t h e r h a n d , w o u l d e n t a i l t h a t there i s n o h i g h e r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y t h a n e v e r y d a y i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . Heidegger, h o w e v e r , b o t h denies t h a t his v i e w i s s o l i p s i s t i c , a n d , t h r o u g h his v i e w s o n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d his c r i t i q u e o f the b a n a l i t y o f das Man (the source o f p u b l i c i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ) , suggests t h a t there is a higher sort of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y uncovered in authenticity. We've included f o u r articles t h a t s t r u g g l e w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Dasein's i n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d its beholdenness t o p u b l i c sources o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y : " H e i d e g g e r a n d the Sources o f I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , " b y Pierre K e l l e r a n d D a v i d W e b e r m a n , E . C . Boedeker's " I n d i v i d u a l a n d C o m m u n i t y i n E a r l y H e i d e g g e r , " E r n s t Tugendhat's "Heidegger on the Relation of Oneself to Oneself," and Charles Guignon's "Heidegger's ' A u t h e n t i c i t y ' Revisited." T h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a u t h e n t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n arises f r o m the fact t h a t , u n l i k e o c c u r r e n t e n t i t i e s , t h e w a y t h a t D a s e i n takes u p its residence i n the w o r l d i s n o t f i x e d o r necessitated. T h a t i s t o say, the r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t D a s e i n enjoys w i t h o t h e r t h i n g s , a n d the s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t o t h e r t h i n g s h o l d f o r D a s e i n , are c o n t i n g e n t a n d a l w a y s subject t o c h a n g e . H e i d e g g e r m a k e s t h i s p o i n t b y s a y i n g t h a t f o r D a s e i n , " i n its v e r y B e i n g , t h a t B e i n g i s a n issue f o r i t . " A n o t h e r w a y o f d e v e l o p i n g t h i s p o i n t , h o w e v e r , p o i n t s o u t the p a r a d o x i c a l i t y o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t f r o m the a c c o u n t o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n : " T h e essence o f D a s e i n , " H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s , " i s its e x i s t e n c e . " In " E x i s t e n c e a n d S e l f - U n d e r s t a n d i n g in Being and Time," W i l l i a m B l a t t n e r helps d i s s o l v e the p a r a d o x b y u n f o l d i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s n o t i o n o f Dasein's existence i n t e r m s o f Dasein's s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t i e s . T h i s m e a n s t h a t D a s e i n , u n l i k e mere o b j e c t s , i s a l w a y s o p e n t o e x i s t i n g i n d i f f e r e n t ways. A consequence o f t h i s i s t h a t a n y p a r t i c u l a r w a y o f e x i s t i n g i n the w o r l d i s necessarily f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n g r o u n d e d — " i t i s the n u l l basis o f its o w n n u l l i t y . " T h i s i s a d i s q u i e t i n g fact, a n d o n e t h a t D a s e i n disguises f r o m 3

4

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Introduction

xv

i t s e l f — p r i m a r i l y b y t a k i n g u p societal n o r m s a s i f t h e y s o m e h o w r e v e a l e d the t r u t h a b o u t h o w one s h o u l d l i v e . B u t a n x i e t y i n the face o f d e a t h , H e i d e g g e r argues, i f faced u p t o , c a n o p e n the d o o r t o a n a u t h e n t i c existence: " A n x i e t y , " H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s , " l i b e r a t e s o n e f r o m p o s s i b i l i t i e s w h i c h ' c o u n t f o r n o t h i n g ' , a n d lets o n e b e c o m e free-for those w h i c h are authentic." 5

A l t h o u g h there c a n b e n o q u e s t i o n t h a t d e a t h p l a y s a c e n t r a l r o l e i n t h e a r c h i t e c t o n i c of Being and Time, c e r t a i n features of H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t of d e a t h m a k e i t u n c l e a r w h a t e x a c t l y i t i s t h a t ' d e a t h ' refers t o . H e i d e g g e r i s e m p h a t i c t h a t he d o e s n ' t m e a n a m e r e o r g a n i c d e m i s e — t h i s in i t s e l f is e n o u g h t o raise q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e d e a t h h e has i n m i n d , f o r s u r e l y ' d e a t h , ' a t least i n o r d i n a r y uses o f the t e r m , has o r g a n i c demise a s a n i n t e g r a l p a r t . A n d H e i d e g g e r i s clear t h a t d e a t h i s a c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h D a s e i n i s u n a b l e t o b e . A t the same t i m e , H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s t h a t d e a t h , a s " t h e poss i b i l i t y o f the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f existence i n g e n e r a l " i s a w a y o f b e i n g o f D a s e i n . W e have i n c l u d e d t w o d i f f e r e n t efforts a t r e c o n c i l i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s various c o m m e n t s o n d e a t h — C a r o l White's " D a s e i n , Existence and D e a t h , " and W i l l i a m Blattner's " T h e Concept o f D e a t h i n Being and Time." 6

7

8

NOTES Mn W i l l i a m J. R i c h a r d s o n , Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, ( T h e H a g u e : M . N i j h o f f , 1 9 6 3 ) , 4 . See a l s o " M y W a y t o P h e n o m e n o l o g y , " i n M a r t i n Heidegger,

On

Time

and

Being,

trans.

Joan

Stambaugh

(New

York: Harper

&

Row, 1972), pp. 74-82. 2

F o r a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e relevance o f H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k t o c o n t e m p o r a r y a n a l y t -

i c p h i l o s o p h y , see t h e essays i n v o l u m e f o u r o f t h i s c o l l e c t i o n . 3

Being and

Time,

trans.

John

H a r p e r & Row, 1962), p. 32. "Ibid.,

354.

'Ibid.,

395.

«Ibid., 2 9 1 , 2 9 5 . 7

Ibid.,

»Ibid.

307.

Macquarrie

and

Edward

Robinson

(New

York:

Man and World 2 3 : 2 3 9 - 2 7 2 , 1990. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Printed

in

the

Netherlands.

The young Heidegger and phenomenology

JOHN V A N BUREN

Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ottawa, 65 University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada KIN 6N5

Ways of t h i n k i n g - for w h i c h the past (Vergangenes) remains indeed what has past, but for w h i c h what has been (Gewesendes) persists in c o m i n g - wait u n t i l at some time t h i n k i n g goes along them. (VA, 7 ) 1

1. I n t r o d u c t i o n

In

h i s Being and Time, w h i c h appeared

in t h e

1927

issue of H u s s e r l ' s

Jahrbuch, H e i d e g g e r stated t h a t t h e " b a s i s " o f h i s w o r k h a d b e e n p r e p a r e d f o r by H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations. Being

and Time

was

the

result

(SZ, 5 1 / 6 2 ) He also i n d i c a t e d that

of a l o n g p e r i o d

of p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

a p p r e n t i c e s h i p a n d d e v e l o p m e n t . (SZ, 9 7 , n . 1/102, n . i ; 3 5 6 , n . 3 / 3 1 3 , n . 2

i i i ) T h e recent p u b l i c a t i o n o f m a n y o f h i s y o u t h f u l l e c t u r e c o u r s e s b e f o r e Being and Time n o w a l l o w s us to f o l l o w up these i n d i c a t i o n s , w h i c h he h i m s e l f l e f t f o r the m o s t part u n e x p l a i n e d b o t h a t the t i m e a n d a f t e r w a r d s . I w o u l d thus l i k e t o present a r e - c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g o f h i s y o u t h f u l p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p r e n t i c e s h i p b e t w e e n the years 1 9 1 9 a n d 1 9 2 6 . M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , I w a n t t o argue, f i r s t , that h i s y o u t h f u l , p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Denkweg i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s i s a u n i q u e p e r i o d i n h i s d e v e l o p m e n t a n d thus

cannot

be

absorbed

into

either

his

Being

and

Time

or

his

later

w r i t i n g s , a s h e h i m s e l f a n d others h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o d o ; s e c o n d , I w a n t t o argue f u r t h e r that the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r h a d a l r e a d y w o r k e d o u t the themes o f t h e " q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , " the " t u r n , " the " e n d o f p h i l o s o p h y , " and the " o t h e r b e g i n n i n g , " o f w h i c h t h e l a s t - m e n t i o n e d are o f t e n t h o u g h t t o b e l o n g e x c l u s i v e l y t o h i s l a t e r p e r i o d after 1 9 3 0 ; a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , I w a n t t o s h o w , w i t h o u t n e g l e c t i n g the o t h e r d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e s o n his y o u t h f u l t h o u g h t , h o w e x a c t l y i t w a s , t h e n , that h e o r i g i n a l l y w o r k e d o u t h i s question of being through a critical appropriation of Husserl's phenomenol-

1

240

o g y a n d e s p e c i a l l y the s i x t h

investigation

in h i s Logical investigations on

the " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " o f " b e i n g . " O n t h e w h o l e , I w i s h t o s h o w that, i n a l l o w i n g u s t o see a l l t h i s , h i s y o u t h f u l l e c t u r e courses o f f e r a n e w a n d m o r e adequate w a y o f r e a d i n g a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g h i s e n t i r e t h o u g h t . L e t u s b e g i n w i t h a n e x p l o r a t i o n o f the g e n e r a l " h e r m e n e u t i c a l situation"

within

which

the

young

Heidegger was

interpreting

Husserl's

phenomenology.

2. The hermeneutical situation

The

young

Heidegger's

preoccupation

with

Husserl's

phenomenology

w e n t , i n fact, a s far b a c k a s h i s e a r l i e s t p u b l i s h e d essays ( 1 9 1 2 - 1 9 1 6 ) , his 3

doctoral dissertation (1914), and his habilitation w r i t i n g (1916). ( F S ) It was

only

financial

reasons

that

had

prevented

him

from

going

to

Göttingen t o d o h i s d o c t o r a l a n d h a b i l i t a t i o n w o r k u n d e r H u s s e r l , instead o f s t a y i n g i n F r e i b u r g u n d e r the N e o - K a n t i a n H e i n r i c h R i c k e r t .

4

I n his

e a r l i e s t s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s , h e used H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y , a l o n g w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y N e o - K a n t i a n i s m , t o p u r s u e " p u r e l o g i c , " the " d o c t r i n e o f j u d g m e n t , " " a p r i o r i g r a m m a r , " the " d o c t r i n e o f c a t e g o r i e s , " a n d also the " d i v i s i o n o f the e n t i r e f i e l d o f ' b e i n g ' i n t o its v a r i o u s m o d e s o f r e a l i t y . " (FS, 186) H e later c a l l e d t h i s use o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y a m e t a p h y s i c a l " o n t o l o g i c . " ( F S , 55) I n the c o n c l u s i o n t o his h a b i l i t a t i o n w r i t i n g o n D u n s Scotus,

which

also

drew

on

Meister

Eckhardt,

German

Idealism

( e s p e c i a l l y H e g e l ) a n d R o m a n t i c i s m ( N o v a l i s , S c h l e g e l ) , a n d the c o n t e m porary

Neo-Hegelian

theology

of

Carl

Braig,

he

used

Husserl's

phenomenology in a speculative, religious "metaphysics," whose "genuine o p t i c " w a s " t h e t r u e r e a l i t y a n d the r e a l t r u t h " o f t h e " a b s o l u t e s p i r i t o f G o d . " (FS, 3 9 9 - 4 1 1 ) H e r e h e w a s a p p r o p r i a t i n g p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n the c o n t e x t o f w h a t h e w o u l d later c a l l " o n t o t h e o l o g y , " i.e., t h e a c c o u n t o f b e i n g a s a d i v i n e g r o u n d . I n spite o f a f e w i n t i m a t i o n s o f w h a t w e t o d a y k n o w o f a s h i s " q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , " h i s e a r l y s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s f r o m 1912 t o 1916 a n d h i s use o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n t h e m r e m a i n e d c a u g h t u p w i t h i n metaphysics. I n 1916 H u s s e r l t o o k u p the c h a i r o f p h i l o s o p h y i n F r e i b u r g . B u t d u e t o H e i d e g g e r ' s absence f r o m the u n i v e r s i t y i n 1917 a n d 1918 because o f h i s w a r service, it was not u n t i l

1 9 1 9 that h e r e a l l y " m e t H u s s e r l i n h i s

w o r k s h o p " (SD, 8 5 / 7 8 ) a n d a c l o s e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e m developed.

5

B y that t i m e H e i d e g g e r h a d d i s a s s o c i a t e d h i m s e l f f r o m b o t h

2

241

his N e o - K a n t i a n teacher H e i n r i c h R i c k e r t a n d his C a t h o l i c - p h i l o s o p h i c a l affiliations.

(BK,

541)

He

became

Husserl's

assistant

6

(1919-23),

his

7

" f a v o r i t e s t u d e n t , " a n d the " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c h i l d . " D u r i n g t h i s t i m e , 8

H u s s e r l o f t e n s a i d : " Y o u a n d I are p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " I n t u m , H e i d e g g e r w r o t e i n 1923 that " H u s s e r l g a v e m e m y eyes." (HF, 5 ) Because o f h i s c l o s e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y , the 1920s h a v e been c a l l e d h i s 9

"phenomenological decade," even though he ascribed to phenomenology b o t h b e f o r e t h i s p e r i o d i n h i s s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s a n d after t h i s p e r i o d i n h i s later w r i t i n g s , a l t h o u g h i n different ways. T h e titles t o r o u g h l y h a l f o f his l e c t u r e courses a n d s e m i n a r s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d c o n t a i n s o m e f o r m o f t h e w o r d " p h e n o m e n o l o g y " ("Phenomenological Exercises i n enological Interpretations o f . . . " , e t c . ) .

1 0

"Phenom-

A l t h o u g h his thought d u r i n g this

p e r i o d certainly w o u l d not have been possible w i t h o u t his dialogues w i t h o t h e r t r a d i t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y A r i s t o t l e a n d C h r i s t i a n a u t h o r s , his p h i l o s o p h i c a l l e x i c o n i s , a s w e s h a l l see, p r i m a r i l y a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l o n e . H i s n e w p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y after 1 9 1 9 w a s n o t a n u n c r i t i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f i t , a s h a d b e e n the case f o r the m o s t p a r t in his doctoral dissertation and habilitation w r i t i n g . He was n o w very m u c h concerned w i t h c a r r y i n g out a " d e s t r u c t i o n " of Husserl's p r i m a r i l y logical self-understanding of his fundamental notion of " i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " by t r a c i n g i t b a c k i n t o the concreteness a n d h i s t o r i c i t y o f " f a c t i c a l l i f e . " I n d e e d , a s e a r l y a s 1910, h e h a d w r i t t e n the f o l l o w i n g m a r g i n a l n o t e beside H u s s e r l ' s sentence i n h i s " P h i l o s o p h y a s a R i g o r o u s S c i e n c e " " N o t from

philosophies

but

from

issues

(Sachen)

and

problems

must

the

1 1

His

i m p u l s e t o research p r o c e e d " : " W e w i l l t a k e H u s s e r l at h i s w o r d . "

h a b i l i t a t i o n w r i t i n g h a d h i n t e d a t the necessity o f p u s h i n g H u s s e r l ' s " p u r e l o g i c " i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a " p h i l o s o p h y o r i e n t e d t o w o r l d - v i e w . " (FS, 2 0 5 , n . 10) I n 1 9 1 7 , h e w r o t e t o t h e m e d i e v a l i s t M a r t i n G r a b m a n n t h a t h i s m o s t i m m e d i a t e plans i n v o l v e d a " c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h v a l u e - p h i l o s o p h y and p h e n o m e n o l o g y from

the

inside

out."

(BG,

104)

Indeed,

we

find

him

c a r r y i n g o u t t h i s c r i t i q u e i n d e t a i l i n h i s f i r s t l e c t u r e c o u r s e o f 1919. (IP) I n h i s 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e , h e p r e s e n t e d w h a t e v e n t u a l l y b e c a m e " D i v i s i o n O n e " a n d t h e f i r s t t h i r d o f " D i v i s i o n T w o " o f Being and Time a s a "fundamental

critique

of phenomenological

inquiry."

(GZ,

420/304,

1 9 2 / 1 4 1 - 2 ) A s w e s h a l l see, h e also l a u n c e d t h i s c r i t i q u e i n o t h e r l e c t u r e courses i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s .

1 2

I t w a s n o t r e a l l y u n t i l 1919 a n d t h e years

f o l l o w i n g that his earlier suspicions about Husserl's p h i l o s o p h y were g i v e n actual expression in a full-scale c r i t i q u e . T h e later Heidegger c o u l d thus r e p o r t that at this t i m e he w a s e n g a g e d in a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l b a t t l e

3

242

o f t h e g i a n t s w i t h H u s s e r l a b o u t die Sache selbst, the " t h i n g " o r " t o p i c i t s e l f o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " I s i t c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d its o b j e c t i v i t y , " h e a s k e d h i m s e l f , " o r i s i t the b e i n g o f b e i n g s i n its u n c o n c e a l m e n t a n d c o n c e a l i n g ? " (SD, 8 7 / 7 9 , 4 7 / 4 4 ) Husserl's

Logical

Investigations

1 3

H i s s t a t e m e n t in Being and Time that

laid t h e

"basis"

for

this

work

must,

t h e r e f o r e , b e u n d e r s t o o d i n reference n o t t o his f i r s t n a i v e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s t e x t i n h i s e a r l y s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s , b u t r a t h e r t o h i s subsequent, v e r y c r i t i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n b e g i n n i n g around 1919. I n the l o g i c a l c o n c e r n s o f h i s d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n a n d h i s h a b i l i t a t i o n w r i t i n g , he had

relied

o n H u s s e r l ' s Ideas a n d e s p e c i a l l y

on the first

v o l u m e o f his Logical Investigations i n w h i c h H u s s e r l d e v e l o p s h i s i d e a o f a n a n t i - p s y c h o l o g i s t i c " p u r e l o g i c . " B u t his n e w r e t r i e v a l o f H u s s e r l ' s w o r k after

1919 t u r n e d t o w a r d t h e s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n the s e c o n d

v o l u m e . H e r e p o r t e d l a t e r that i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s h e " w o r k e d o n t h e Logical Investigations e v e r y w e e k i n s p e c i a l s t u d y s t u d e n t s . " (SD, 8 7 / 7 9 )

1 4

groups w i t h advanced

E v e n t h o u g h a t that t i m e t h e " m a s t e r n o l o n g e r

h e l d h i s w o r k i n v e r y h i g h e s t e e m , " H e i d e g g e r , s o w e are t o l d , h a d h i s " o w n reasons t o p r e f e r the Logical Investigations f o r the p u r p o s e s o f a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " (US, 8 6 / 5 ) I n d e e d , i n h i s 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e , w e f i n d h i m b o l d l y d e c l a r i n g t h a t H u s s e r l ' s e a r l y Logical Investigations, a n d n o t a n y o f h i s l a t e r ' ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " w o r k s , i s t h e "fundamental book

of phenomenology."

(GZ,

30/24)

He

came

to

see

Husserl's

later

"transcendental" self-understanding" ( G Z , 188/139, 124/91) of his earlier, "philosophically

neutral"

(SD,

84/77)

Logical Investigations

as

a

"fall"

(GZ, 1 7 9 / 1 2 9 ) i n t o m e t a p h y s i c a l p r e j u d i c e s , e s p e c i a l l y those o f D e s c a r t e s , F i c h t e , a n d N e o - K a n t i a n i s m (SD, 4 7 / 4 4 , 8 4 / 7 7 ; BR, x i v / x v ) . W h a t interested the y o u n g Heidegger in Husserl's s i x t h investigation w a s h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e "acts o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s " i n k n o w i n g a n d espec i a l l y the s p e c i f i c acts o f " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " i n w h i c h " b e i n g " i s " g i v e n " a s a n object o f consciousness. T h u s , i n his key discussions o f t r u t h and time

in h i s Being and Time, he c o u l d refer t h e reader to H u s s e r l ' s

sixth investigation.

1 5

In

1 9 7 3 , h e h e l d a s e m i n a r o n the i n f l u e n c e o f

H u s s e r l ' s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n o n h i s y o u t h f u l t h o u g h t (S, 3 7 2 - 4 0 0 ) a n d b r i e f l y s k e t c h e d o u t w h a t h e h a d m e a n t b y h i s e a r l i e r s t a t e m e n t i n Being and

Time

that

Husserl's

Logical

Investigations

had

provided

the

"basis"

(S, 3 7 8 ) f o r h i s w o r k . I n H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f t h e " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " o f b e i n g , h e h a d seen, w e are t o l d , t h e "essential d i s c o v e r y " a n d " b u r n i n g p o i n t o f H u s s e r l ' s t h i n k i n g , " s i n c e i t was here t h a t H u s s e r l " b r u s h e d against

the

question

of

being."

(S,

4

373,

376)

Husserl's

notion

of

243 " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " b e c a m e a n " e s s e n t i a l s p r i n g - b o a r d " (Triebfeder) f o r the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n p r o j e c t o f r e - t h i n k i n g the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g . (S, 3 7 7 ) I n h i s 1963 essay " M y W a y i n P h e n o m e n o l o g y , " h e w r o t e : A s I m y s e l f after 1 9 1 9 , t e a c h i n g a n d l e a r n i n g i n H u s s e r l ' s p r o x i m i t y , p r a c t i c e d p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l seeing . . . m y interest l e a n e d a n e w t o w a r d the Logical Investigations, a b o v e a l l the s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n in the first e d i t i o n . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h i s w o r k e d o u t there b e t w e e n sensuous a n d c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n r e v e a l e d i t s e l f t o m e i n its scope f o r the determ i n a t i o n o f t h e " m a n i f o l d m e a n i n g o f b e i n g . " (SD, 8 6 / 7 8 , 4 7 / 4 4 ; c f . BR, x i / x )

W e d o i n d e e d f i n d that i n h i s 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e , one o f m a n y f i r s t drafts

of

his

Being

and

Time,

Heidegger

presented

what

eventually

b e c a m e " D i v i s i o n O n e " a n d t h e f i r s t t h i r d o f " D i v i s i o n T w o " o f Being and Time a s a " r e t r i e v a l , " a n " i m m a n e n t c r i t i q u e " o f H u s s e r l ' s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , w h i c h w a s the f o c a l p o i n t o f h i s a l m o s t t w o h u n d r e d page i n t r o d u c tory discussion of Husserl's phenomenology. ( G Z , 32/26, 192/141-142, 4 2 0 / 3 0 3 , 124/91 ) draft

of his

"Dasein

1 6

Being

and

I n h i s 1 9 2 5 - 2 6 l e c t u r e c o u r s e (LW), s t i l l a n o t h e r e a r l y and Time

(primarily

Temporality"),

his

what

discussion

became

Division T w o ,

of human

existence

and

t e m p o r a l i t y w a s p r e c e d e d b y a n a l m o s t one h u n d r e d page d i s c u s s i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f " t r u t h . " I n o t h e r l e c t u r e courses h e h e l d b e t w e e n 1919 a n d 1926, o n e also f i n d s , a s w e s h a l l see, d i s c u s s i o n s a n d a p p r o p r i a t i o n s o f the basic c o n c e p t s o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y . The

y o u n g H e i d e g g e r saw

indication"

or "hermeneutical

H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations concepts"

(GZ,

58/44,

as " f o r m a l

109/79)

which

pointed interpretively to "the things themselves" and were to be c r i t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e d i n l i g h t o f a r e n e w e d s h o w i n g o f these " t h i n g s " a s the u l t i m a t e c r i t e r i o n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l research. (IP, 109; PA, 1 9 1 ; G Z , 103/75) (GZ,

"Phenomenology,"

178/128)

H e thus

he

maintained,

"is

unphenomenologicall"

felt c o m p e l l e d t o o u t s t r i p t h e " a c t u a l " "self-

u n d e r s t a n d i n g " o f the mens auctoris a n d p u r s u e H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n its " p o s s i b i l i t i e s . " ( G Z , 6 3 / 4 7 , 1 8 4 / 1 3 6 ) H e c a l l e d t h i s the " w o r k i n g o u t o f the h e r m e n e u t i c a l s i t u a t i o n " (PA, 3 ) , i.e., the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f past t h o u g h t i n l i g h t o f its f u t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h i n the present s i t u a t i o n o f philosophy.

His o w n philosophy was to be a "more radical internal

d e v e l o p m e n t " o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y (GZ, 6 2 / 4 6 ) a n d i n d e e d t h e " m o s t r a d i c a l p h e n o m e n o l o g y , w h i c h begins i n the g e n u i n e sense ' f r o m b e l o w ' " (PA, 1 9 5 ) , " i.e., f r o m t h e basis o f f a c t i c a l l i f e . " T h e q u e s t i o n o f

5

244

b e i n g , " h e w r o t e , " i s s p r u n g l o o s e t h r o u g h the i m m a n e n t c r i t i q u e o f the natural

trend

of phenomenological

research

itself."

(GZ,

124/91)

In

1 9 2 1 - 2 2 , he called his o w n philosophy "ontological phenomenology." (PA, 6 0 ) I n 1925, h e t o l d h i s s t u d e n t s that h e was s t i l l a " l e a r n e r i n r e l a t i o n t o H u s s e r l " a n d expressed t h e h o p e t h a t H u s s e r l , w h o s e " q u e s t i o n i n g i s s t i l l f u l l y i n f l u x , " w o u l d take u p his suggestions for radically transformi n g phenomenology. He understood h i m s e l f as a phenomenologist, if not a Husserlian phenomenologist.

(GZ,

1 6 7 - 1 6 8 / 1 2 1 ) T h u s , later i n

1931,

H u s s e r l c o u l d w r i t e t o Pfänder, e v e n i f s o m e w h a t i n e x a g g e r a t i o n , that, d u r i n g the early 1920s, H e i d e g g e r "behaved entirely as if he w e r e my f o l l o w e r a n d f u t u r e c o - w o r k e r , w h o w o u l d stand o n the g r o u n d o f m y c o n s t i t u t i v e p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n a l l essentials o f m e t h o d a n d p r o b l e m atic."

1 7

W h a t t o o k place i n the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s c r i t i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i s w h a t G a d a m e r has c a l l e d a h e r m e n e u t i c a l "fusion of horizons"

1 8

between Husserl's thought and Heidegger's o w n

c o n c e r n t o r e - t h i n k t h e q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f " f a c t i c a l l i f e . " I n k e e p i n g w i t h G a d a m e r ' s n o t i o n o f " f u s i o n , " the p o s i t i o n H e i d e g g e r o p e n e d u p b e t w e e n t h e t w o d i a l o g u i n g p a r t n e r s w a s n e i t h e r t h e one nor the other, but rather an agreement in w h i c h both had been, as it were, w o u n d e d i n the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l b a t t l e o f g i a n t s . were

motivated

o r i g i n a l l y had

not only been

by

the

tradition

1 9

Heidegger's concerns

of western

ontology

that

transmitted to h i m through Brentano's w o r k on

A r i s t o t l e a n d C a r l B r a i g ' s On Being: Outline of Ontology, b u t also v e r y m u c h by a cluster of anti-metaphysical traditions w h i c h consisted of D i l t h e y ' s philosophy of life, Aristotle's practical w r i t i n g s , skepticism, Confessions,

"original Luther's

Christianity"

"theology

of

the

(Paul's cross,"

letters, Pascal,

2 0

ancient

Augustine's Kierkegaard),

Jasper's " p h i l o s o p h y o f e x i s t e n c e , " D o s t o e v s k y ' s n o v e l s , a n d V a n G o g h ' s letters. W h a t these t r a d i t i o n s m a d e t h e m a t i c f o r h i m w a s t h e h o r i z o n o f concrete, h i s t o r i c a l l i f e i n terms o f w h i c h h e c o u l d r a d i c a l l y r e - t h i n k the traditional

question

of being.

If Husserl

could

say

"you

and

I

are

p h e n o m e n o l o g y , " Heidegger c o u l d w e l l have replied: y o u and I - and D i l t h e y a n d K i e r k e g a a r d a n d A r i s t o t l e . H u s s e r l l a t e r c a m e t o see that "unfortunately I d i d not determine his p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o r m a t i o n , o b v i o u s l y h e w a s a l r e a d y i n t o his o w n t h i n g w h e n h e s t u d i e d m y w r i t i n g s . "

2 1

The

y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s project o f r a d i c a l i z i n g Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g posed w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l l i f e is n o w h e r e m o r e c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d t h a n i n a passage f r o m

6

245 his

1919-21

essay on K a r l Jaspers' Psychology of World-Views;

I n the f i r s t b r e a k t h r o u g h o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n its s p e c i f i c g o a l o f o r i g i n a l l y r e - a p p r o p r i a t i n g the p h e n o m e n a o f theoretical e x p e r i e n c i n g a n d k n o w i n g ( L o g i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , i.e., p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the t h e o r e t i c a l l o g o s ) , there w a s t o b e f o u n d a w i n n i n g o f a n u n s p o i l e d seeing o f the m e a n i n g o f t h e o b j e c t s e x p e r i e n c e d i n such t h e o r e t i c a l e x p e r i e n c i n g a n d a l s o o f the h o w o f i t s b e i n g - e x p e r i e n c e d i n the g o a l o f research. B u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r a d i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a g e n u i n e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l t e n d e n c i e s d e p e n d s u p o n the fact that n o t o n l y the " o t h e r " d e p a r t m e n t a l i z e d " r e g i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e " ( t h e aesthetic, the e t h i c a l , the r e l i g i o u s ) c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o s o m e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n are t h o r o u g h l y researched i n a n " a n a l o g i c a l " w a y . R a t h e r , it d e p e n d s o n the fact that e x p e r i e n c i n g i n its f u l l sense is seen i n its a u t h e n t i c a l l y f a c t i c a l c o n t e x t o f e n a c t m e n t i n the h i s t o r i c a l l y e x i s t i n g self. T h i s s e l f i s s o m e h o w the u l t i m a t e issue i n p h i l o s o p h y . . . w h a t i s r e l e v a n t i s that the c o n c r e t e s e l f i s t o b e t a k e n i n t o t h e p o i n t o f d e p a r ture f o r the p r o b l e m s a n d i s t o b e b r o u g h t t o " g i v e n n e s s " a t the a u t h e n t i c a l l y f u n d a m e n t a l l e v e l o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i.e., the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h r e m a i n s r e l a t e d t o the f a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e o f l i f e a s such. ( A / , 3 4 - 3 5 )

H i s p r o j e c t o f r e - t h i n k i n g H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y w a s t o h a v e been s k e t c h e d o u t n o t o n l y i n his essay o n Jaspers ( f i r s t p u b l i s h e d o n l y i n 1 9 7 3 ) , b u t also i n a large b o o k o n A r i s t o t l e , e n t i t l e d " P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Interpretations of A r i s t o t l e , "

2 2

w h i c h he had planned to publish in H u s -

s e r l ' s Jahrbuch in 1 9 2 3 , as w e l l as in a s e v e n t y - p a g e essay e n t i t l e d " T h e Concept of T i m e " w h i c h was unsuccessfully submitted to a j o u r n a l in 1924.

2 3

When,

instead

of his

book

on

Aristotle,

h i s Being

and Time

appeared f o u r years later in H u s s e r l ' s Jahrbuch, it c e r t a i n l y p r e s e n t e d the results o f h i s " f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s " w i t h H u s s e r l ' s t h o u g h t . B u t i t p r o v i d e d few details about h o w

H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations a n d e s p e c i a l l y

his

s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n a c t u a l l y p r o v i d e d the " b a s i s " f o r t h i s w o r k . F o r o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l , w e h a v e been i n t h e past d e p e n d e n t o n h i s s k e t c h y r e m a r k s i n h i s Being and Time a n d i n his

later b r i e f a c c o u n t s o f t h e e a r l y d e v e l o p m e n t o f his

thought.

He

p u b l i s h e d n o t h i n g i n t h e years 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 2 6 a n d later, e x c e p t f o r h i s essay o n Jaspers, s t i l l d i d n o t p u b l i s h a n y t h i n g f r o m h i s y o u t h f u l p e r i o d . B u t H a n n a h A r e n d t has said that d u r i n g the e a r l y 1920s the r e p u t a t i o n o f the y o u n g Privatdozent M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r spread t h r o u g h o u t G e r m a n y l i k e t h e " r u m o r o f the h i d d e n

king."

2 4

F o r decades,

student t r a n s c r i p t s o f h i s

y o u t h f u l l e c t u r e courses c i r c u l a t e d f r o m h a n d t o h a n d a s " e s o t e r i c a " i n a

7

246

kind of philosophical underground,

2 5

s u r f a c i n g o c c a s i o n a l l y i n t o the w i d e r

p h i l o s o p h i c a l p u b l i c i n r e p o r t s g i v e n b y h i s earliest students s u c h a s O s k a r Becker, Helene Weiss, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah A r e n d t , and K a r l Löwith. U n t i l the p u b l i c a t i o n o f his early F r e i b u r g and M a r b u r g lecture c o u r s e s i n t h e last d e c a d e , h i s y o u t h f u l r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l (as w e l l a s o f A r i s t o t l e and K i e r k e g a a r d )

2 6

has h a d t o r e m a i n t o a great e x t e n t o n the

level of "rumor." I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o a t t e m p t , o n t h e basis o f t h e p u b l i s h e d t e x t s o f his l e c t u r e courses b e t w e e n 1919 a n d 1 9 2 6 , a m o r e d e t a i l e d r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e m a j o r d i r e c t i o n s o f the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s " f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s " w i t h Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y and especially the s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n in his Logical Investigations.

21

I

themes of his project

will

begin

with

a short sketch

o f the general

f o r r e - t h i n k i n g the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g a n d t h e n

proceed to show h o w he critically appropriated Husserl's phenomenology i n d e v e l o p i n g these t h e m e s . T h e y o u n g H e i d e g g e r saw h i s p r o j e c t a s that o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t the " e n d o f p h i l o s o p h y " a n d a " g e n u i n e b e g i n n i n g " f o r the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g .

2 8

By

" p h i l o s o p h y , " h e meant the w h o l e h i s t o r y o f western t h o u g h t , w h i c h h e u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f a " f i r s t b e g i n n i n g " w i t h the G r e e k s that u n d e r w e n t v a r i o u s " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s " a n d " r e - s t r u c t u r i n g s " i n the o t h e r t w o " e p o c h s " o f t h e M i d d l e A g e s a n d m o d e r n i t y . (PA, 2 - 3 , 170, 9 2 ; IP, 2 0 ) H i s y o u t h f u l

f o r m u l a t i o n of the Seinsfrage was "Seinsfraglichkeit," the " q u e s t i o n a b l e ness o f b e i n g . " (PA, question

of b e i n g

189) H e e x p r e s s e d h i s " g e n u i n e b e g i n n i n g " f o r the in t h e

following

formula:

"Leben

= Dasein,

in

und

durch Leben 'Sein'," " l i f e = t h e r e - b e i n g , 'being' in and t h r o u g h l i f e " . (PA, 85,

187) He c a l l e d this his " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l e x i s t e n t i a l t o p i c , " the

" p l a c e " (Ort) (PA, 3 1 ) o f " f a c t i c a l l i f e " a s the " o r i g i n " o f a l l m e a n i n g . B u t he understood this place of l i f e precisely as the " t h e r e " of b e i n g . He was not developing some f o r m of mere existentialism or philosophy of life. A l t h o u g h his t h o u g h t d i d c h a n g e after 1930, i t i s n o t the case that h i s t h o u g h t here u n d e r w e n t a m i r a c u l o u s c o n v e r s i o n f r o m a p u r e l y h u m a n centred philosophy to a Being-centred o n e .

2 9

A s w e s h a l l see m o r e c l e a r l y ,

m a n y o f the basic n o t i o n s w h i c h h e f i r s t m a d e p u b l i c i n his

1927 Being

and Time a n d i n h i s w r i t i n g s after 1 9 3 0 , e.g., the " q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , " t h e "first

beginning,"

philosophy,"

the

the

three

"step-back,"

"epochs" the

of

"turn,"

metaphysics, the

"other

"end

of

beginning,"

the

the

" m e a n i n g o f b e i n g , " t h e " t r u t h " c h a r a c t e r o f b e i n g , the " p l a c e " c h a r a c t e r o f b e i n g , " E r e i g n i s , " t h e " w o r l d i n g " o f the w o r l d w e r e e i t h e r a l r e a d y e x p l i c i t l y used o r else o p e r a t i v e i n his u n p u b l i s h e d y o u t h f u l t e x t s , e v e n i f

8

247

in a f o r m peculiar to this p e r i o d of his thought. F o r the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r , H u s s e r l b o t h b e l o n g e d t o the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h was to be b r o u g h t to an end, and was to occupy a special p l a c e i n the r a d i c a l r e p e t i t i o n o f t h i s t r a d i t i o n . A d o p t i n g the l a n g u a g e o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , he articulated his n o t i o n of " b e i n g - m e a n i n g " i n t o the three

intentional moments of "content-meaning" (intentional

object), "relational

m e a n i n g " ( m a n n e r o f i n t e n d i n g ) , and "enactment-

m e a n i n g " o r " t e m p o r a l i z i n g - m e a n i n g " (performance o f the i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n a s t e m p o r a l i z i n g ) . (PA, 5 2 - 5 3 ) B u t h i s " d e s t r u c t i o n " a t t e m p t e d t o " u n - b u i l d " (abbauen) within

"factical

Husserl's

life"

by

phenomenology back

exposing

the

into

"founded"

its

"origin"

character

of

his

" t h e o r e t i c a l " a r t i c u l a t i o n o f these three i n t e n t i o n a l m o m e n t s a s n o e m a t i c "objectivity,"

"noesis"

"making-present."

(to

use

Heidegger's

the

language

"retrieval"

of

o f H u s s e r l ' s Ideas), these

three

aspects

and of

intentionality attempted to re-think them more o r i g i n a l l y as " w o r l d , " " c a r e , " a n d " t e m p o r a l i z i n g " w i t h i n the " g e n u i n e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y p r i m o r d i a l s t r a t u m (life in and for itself)." (PW, 1 2 1 ) He thus d e s c r i b e d h i s radicalization Sprung)

o f phenomenology

as

an

"original

i n t o t h e " o r i g i n " (Ursprung), a " c r i t i c a l

(Erörterung)

(GZ,

phenomenology

178/128, back

140/102)

i n t o the

which

original

leap"

(ursprüngliche

p l a c i n g in d i s c u s s i o n " would

place

"phenomenological

t o p i c , " the " p l a c e " (Ort) o f f a c t i c a l l i f e .

3 0

Husserl's existential

Phenomenology was to be

r e t r i e v e d f r o m t h i s o r i g i n o f "'being' i n a n d t h r o u g h l i f e . " Let us n o w consider, in turn, Heidegger's destructive appropriations of the H u s s e r l i a n a r t i c u l a t i o n s o f the t h r e e i n t e n t i o n a l m o m e n t s o f " b e i n g meaning."

3. Intentional w o r l d i n g

I begin w i t h Heidegger's critical appropriation of Husserl's articulation of t h e i n t e n t i o n a l m o m e n t o f " c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g " (Gehaltssinn). M y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , here a n d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g sections, f o l l o w s the general directions o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n interpretation p r i m a r i l y , b u t n o t e x c l u s i v e l y , i n his 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e (GZ, 6 3 - 1 0 3 / 4 7 - 7 5 ) . I n c h a p t e r six ("Sense a n d U n d e r s t a n d i n g " ) o f his s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , H u s s e r l o v e r s t e p s the e m p i r i c i s t a n d K a n t i a n r e s t r i c t i o n o f " i n t u i t i o n " t o "sense i n t u i t i o n " o f sensual o b j e c t s . H e s h o w s h o w w e are a l w a y s p e r f o r m i n g acts o f " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " i n w h i c h the c a t e g o r i a l e l e m e n t s o f

9

248

p e r c e p t u a l statements ( e . g . , the ' t h i s ' a n d t h e ' i s ' i n ' t h i s p a p e r i s w h i t e ' ) are b r o u g h t t o o b j e c t i v e " g i v e n n e s s . " F o r H e i d e g g e r , w h a t w a s d e c i s i v e here w a s t h a t " b e i n g " i s c o n c e i v e d a s a " p h e n o m e n o n " o f l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e and as capable of b e c o m i n g an e x p l i c i t p h e n o m e n o n for p h e n o m e n o l o g i cal investigation. H u s s e r l e x p l a i n s that i n t u i t i o n i s a f u l f i l l i n g i n t e n t i o n w h i c h f i l l s a n e m p t y i n t e n t i o n w i t h the i m m e d i a t e g i v e n n e s s o f the m a t t e r i t s e l f . F o r e x a m p l e , m y i n t e n t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f w h i t e p a p e r ( e . g . , the i m a g i n e d p a p e r ) c a n b e f u l f i l l e d b y m y i m m e d i a t e p e r c e p t i o n o f the w h i t e p a p e r ( t h e p e r c e i v e d paper t h a t i s b o d i l y t h e r e b e f o r e m y e y e s ) . B u t H u s s e r l insists that t h e e m p t y m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n i n a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o f a n o b j e c t ('the paper is w h i t e ' , 'the w h i t e paper') cannot be f u l f i l l e d merely t h r o u g h my "sensuous i n t u i t i o n . " W h a t I understand and express in my statement 'the paper-fcemg-white',

'the paper-as-white' - cannot be

found

in the

sensuously intuited object, even t h o u g h it is g i v e n " w i t h " this object. H u s s e r l w r i t e s : "Being is no real predicate [ K a n t ] . . . I c a n see c o l o u r , b u t not being-coloured.

I can

feel

smoothness,

b u t n o t being-smooth.

I can

hear a s o u n d , b u t n o t t h a t s o m e t h i n g is s o u n d i n g . B e i n g is n o t h i n g in t h e object

...

being

31

is absolutely imperceptible."

Therefore,

he c a l l s " b e i n g "

a n "excess (Überschuss) o f m e a n i n g . " E v e n t h o u g h , i n m y s t a t e m e n t ' t h e p a p e r is w h i t e ' , I say o n l y w h a t I see, w h a t I see ( i n t h e w i d e r sense of i n t u i t ) i s also t h e b e i n g - w h i t e , t h e a s - w h i t e , w h i c h e x c e e d s the sensuous aspect o f the w h i t e paper. A g a i n H u s s e r l w r i t e s :

I see w h i t e p a p e r a n d say ' w h i t e p a p e r ' , t h e r e b y I e x p r e s s , w i t h p r e c i s e a d e q u a c y , o n l y w h a t I see . . . W e are n o t t o let o u r s e l v e s b e l e d astray b y s u c h w a y s o f s p e a k i n g ; t h e y are i n a c e r t a i n m a n n e r c o r r e c t , y e t are r e a d i l y m i s u n d e r s t o o d . . . I n this k n o w i n g a n o t h e r act i s p l a i n l y present, w h i c h p e r h a p s i n c l u d e s the f o r m e r o n e , b u t i s n o n e t h e l e s s d i f f e r e n t f r o m i t : the paper i s k n o w n a s w h i t e , o r rather a s a w h i t e t h i n g , w h e n e v e r w e e x p r e s s o u r p e r c e p t i o n i n the w o r d s ' w h i t e p a p e r ' . T h e i n t e n t i o n o f the w o r d ' w h i t e ' o n l y p a r t i a l l y coincides w i t h the colour-aspect o f the a p p e a r i n g o b j e c t ; there r e m a i n s a n excess o f m e a n i n g , a f o r m , w h i c h f i n d s n o t h i n g i n the appearance t o c o n f i r m i t . W h i t e , i.e., being w h i t e paper. I s t h i s f o r m n o t also repeated, e v e n i f r e m a i n i n g m o r e h i d d e n , i n t h e n o u n ' p a p e r ' ? (LU, 6 5 9 - 6 6 0 / 7 7 5 )

I n a n act o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n , I c a n b r i n g w h a t w a s p r e v i o u s l y o n l y e m p t i l y i n t e n d e d i n " t h e l i t t l e w o r d ' i s ' , " i.e., the p a p e r - " a s " - w h i t e , t o a n explicit

self-givenness.

"[The

is]

is,

however,

self-given

or

at

least

p r e s u m a b l y g i v e n i n the fulfillment w h i c h u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n v e s t s t h e

10

249 j u d g m e n t : i n the becoming aware o f the p r e s u m e d state o f a f f a i r s . N o t o n l y w h a t i s m e a n t i n the p a r t i a l m e a n i n g gold i t s e l f appears, n o r o n l y w h a t is m e a n t in the p a r t i a l m e a n i n g yellow, b u t a l s o gold-being-yellow appears." (LU, 6 6 8 / 7 8 2 ) F o r H u s s e r l , the " b e i n g " (Sein) o f a p a r t i c u l a r " b e i n g " (das Seiende) is able to appear, as it w e r e , " b e f o r e o u r e y e s . " (LU, 6 7 1 / 7 8 5 ) I n t u r n , m y h i g h e r l e v e l act o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n , w h i c h i s s t i l l f o u n d e d o n sensuous i n t u i t i o n , c a n b e c o m e the basis f o r a n o t h e r t y p e o f categorial i n t u i t i o n , namely, "universal i n t u i t i o n " o r " i d e a t i o n . " I n this u n i v e r s a l i n t u i t i o n , I n o l o n g e r c o - i n t e n d the f o u n d i n g sensuous o b j e c t ( t h e w h i t e piece o f paper) o f m y categorial i n t u i t i o n , but rather abstractively i n t e n d its a p r i o r i c a t e g o r i a l e l e m e n t ( b e i n g - w h i t e , w h i t e n e s s ) , w h i c h w a s p r e v i o u s l y o n l y u n t h e m a t i c a l l y u n d e r s t o o d . T h e " ' a s - w h a t ' , the u n i v e r s a l character of house,"

Heidegger comments,

"is

itself not expressly

ap-

prehended in w h a t it is, but is already co-apprehended in simple i n t u i t i o n a s that w h i c h t o s o m e e x t e n t here i l l u m i n a t e s w h a t i s g i v e n . " (GZ, 9 1 / 6 7 ; c f . LU, 6 7 0 / 7 8 4 , 6 9 0 / 7 9 9 ) H u s s e r l later c a l l e d t h i s i d e a t i o n " i n t u i t i o n o f essence" gives

(Wesensschau).

access

to

and

It

is

this categorial

organizes

the

or eidetic

various

intuition

"regional

which

ontologies"

of

p h e n o m e n o l o g y . (HF, 2; GZ, 9 3 - 9 7 / 6 8 - 7 1 ) H e i d e g g e r f o u n d H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f the c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n o f b e i n g s i g n i f i c a n t f o r a n u m b e r o f reasons. F i r s t , b e i n g i s freed f r o m its t r a d i t i o n a l c o n f i n e m e n t t o the f u n c t i o n o f the c o p u l a , i.e., the m e r e b i n d i n g t o g e t h e r o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d c o n c e p t s i n a j u d g m e n t . (GZ, 7 2 / 5 4 )

3 2

N o r is being

seen t o b e d e r i v e d f r o m r e f l e c t i o n o n i n n e r sense ( e m p i r i c i s m ) o r c o n c e i v e d a s a s u b j e c t i v e f o r m w i t h w h i c h sensuous m a t e r i a l i s o r d e r e d ( K a n t ) . (GZ, 7 8 / 5 8 , 9 6 / 7 0 ) N o r is it d e s c r i b e d as a r e a l part of an o b j e c t , a b e i n g , e v e n t h o u g h i t i s a l w a y s the b e i n g o f a b e i n g . (GZ, 7 8 / 5 8 , 2 3 7 / 1 7 5 , 362/262)

3 3

R a t h e r , b e i n g i s c o n c e i v e d here i n s u c h a w a y that i t i s able t o

b e b r o u g h t t o a n "originary self-giving

in corresponding

acts o f g i v i n g . "

(GZ, 8 0 / 6 0 ) B e i n g c a n b e c o m e a p h e n o m e n o n , s o m e t h i n g w h i c h appears, " s h o w s " i t s e l f . (GZ, 9 7 / 7 1 ) O n t h i s basis, o n e c a n raise the q u e s t i o n o f the "meaning" o f t h i s b e i n g , o f w h a t is meant b y the w o r d " b e i n g . " (GZ, 73/54,

193/143)

3 4

" B e i n g " is t h u s n o t a " m e r e flatus vocis." (GZ, 9 8 / 7 1 )

S e c o n d , H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s that H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n a s "universal

i n t u i t i o n " provides

investigating

the

categorial

the

empirical

structures

methodological

of being.

Husserl

basis

showed

for how

c a t e g o r i a l - o n t o l o g i c a l structures c a n b e b r o u g h t t o " e v i d e n t i a l " g i v e n n e s s . (GZ, 9 7 - 9 8 / 7 1 - 7 2 ) T h i r d , b y c o n s i d e r i n g b e i n g a s " o b j e c t i v i t y , " H u s s e r l ' s phenomenology

i m p l i c i t l y takes u p the research o f " a n c i e n t o n t o l o g y "

11

250

( G Z , 9 8 / 7 2 ) , the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g i n G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y . B u t p r e c i s e l y h o w H e i d e g g e r a p p r o p r i a t e d these three b r e a k t h r o u g h s b e c o m e s c l e a r o n l y i n t h e l i g h t o f h o w h e a t the same t i m e c r i t i c a l l y " u n b u i l t " t h e m back into their o r i g i n w i t h i n factical l i f e . He c l a i m e d to be d o i n g n o t h i n g other than f o l l o w i n g up D i l t h e y ' s critique and appropriation o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f his o w n project o f a " p h i l o s o p h y of l i f e . "

3 5

H e w r i t e s that D i l t h e y s o u g h t a " p s y c h o l o g y a s a d e s c r i p t i v e

s c i e n c e , a n d w e are i n d e b t e d t o h i m f o r v a l u a b l e i n t u i t i o n s a b o u t the i d e a o f t h i s science . . . T h e secret l o n g i n g o f h i s l i f e b e g a n t o b e f u l f i l l e d b y p h e n o m e n o l o g y . . . B u t he was no l o g i c i a n , and he saw i m m e d i a t e l y the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations

which

h a r d l y n o t i c e d a n d i n d e e d m i s u n d e r s t o o d . . . " (PW,

at that

time

were

164-165) Heidegger

f o l l o w e d D i l t h e y ' s a t t e m p t to use H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations n o t , as H u s s e r l h a d s o u g h t t o d o , f o r the sake o f a " p u r e l o g i c , " b u t r a t h e r f o r t h e sake

of a

"fundamental

" D i l t h e y , " he

science

maintained,

"was

of l i f e . " the

first

(GZ,

30/24;

PA,

to understand

the

80,

117)

aims of

p h e n o m e n o l o g y . . . t h e essential p o i n t here i s n o t s o m u c h t h e c o n c e p t u a l p e n e t r a t i o n a s the sheer d i s c l o s u r e o f n e w h o r i z o n s f o r the q u e s t i o n o f the being

o f acts

and,

164-165/118-119)

in In

the

broadest

sense,

the

this

passage,

Heidegger

being

of man."

mentions

what

(GZ, these

h o r i z o n s o p e n e d u p b y D i l t h e y are. A s w e s h a l l see, t h e y c o r r e s p o n d exactly

with

the three

"being-meaning,"

i.e.,

intentional moments of Heidegger's notion of content-meaning,

relational

meaning,

and

e n a c t m e n t - m e a n i n g . R e g a r d i n g the m o m e n t o f c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g p r e s e n t l y u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , h e paraphrases D i l t h e y ' s thesis that " t h e p e r s o n i n h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e l f h o o d f i n d s h i m s e l f o v e r a g a i n s t a w o r l d u p o n w h i c h h e acts a n d w h i c h reacts u p o n h i m . " H e r e D i l t h e y pushes H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f the i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t o u t o f the r e a l m o f l o g i c a n d i n t o the sphere o f t h e l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e o f the p r a c t i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l w o r l d . T h e y o u n g H e i d e g g e r f o l l o w e d h i m i n this project. T h u s he argued that Husserl's characterization of b e i n g is taken f r o m the s p e c i f i c w a y that i t i s e x p e r i e n c e d i n " t h e o r y , " the s i m p l e " g a z i n g " u p o n the w o r l d w h i c h c o n s u m m a t e s i t s e l f i n j u d g m e n t a n d a s s e r t i o n . T h e basic sense o f b e i n g here i s o b j e c t - b e i n g , t h i n g - b e i n g , r e a l i t y , n a t u r e , " b o d i l y n e s s " (Leibhaftigkeit). (IP,

108, 8 7 ,

100,

109; PA, 9 1 ; G Z , 8 3 / 6 1 .

1 6 5 / 1 1 9 ) H u s s e r l f u r t h e r sees v a l u a t i v e a n d aesthetic r e a l i t i e s a s f o u n d e d o n t h i s basic s t r a t u m . W h i l e a p p r e c i a t i n g H u s s e r l ' s passionate i n t e n t i o n t o w a r d s " t h e t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , " H e i d e g g e r nonetheless m a i n t a i n s t h a t h e has n a i v e l y t a k e n o v e r t h e t r a d i t i o n a l idea o f b e i n g a s present a t h a n d

12

251 t h i n g h o o d f r o m Descartes a n d u l t i m a t e l y f r o m G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y . (GZ, 1 3 9 / 1 0 1 ) H e f a i l s t o discuss e x p l i c i t l y " t h e q u e s t i o n o f the m e a n i n g o f b e i n g . " (GZ,

1 7 9 / 1 2 9 ) M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , H e i d e g g e r describes H u s s e r l ' s

approach

the

to

being

of

the

world

as

an

alienating

process

of

" t h e o r i z a t i o n " a n d " o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , " w h i c h l e a d t o the " e x t i n g u i s h i n g " a n d the

"de-worlding"

(Entweltlichung)

of

the

immediate

weitet) o f the p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l , p r a c t i c a l w o r l d .

3 6

"it

worlds"

(es

"The ' i t worlds'," Heideg-

ger w r i t e s , " i s a l r e a d y e x t i n g u i s h e d i n [ t h i n g h o o d j . T h e t h i n g i s m e r e l y s t i l l there as s u c h , i.e., it is r e a l , it e x i s t s . R e a l i t y is t h e r e f o r e n o t a charact e r i z a t i o n o f w h a t has t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e w o r l d a r o u n d u s (Umwelt), b u t r a t h e r a s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e o r e t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n , w h i c h lies i n the essence of t h i n g h o o d .

What

has

the c h a r a c t e r o f s i g n i f i c a n c e

(Bedeutsamkeit)

is

d e - s i g n i f i e d d o w n t o the r e m n a n t : b e i n g - r e a l . " (IP, 8 9 ) F o l l o w i n g u p D i l t h e y ' s c r i t i c a l r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l , H e i d e g g e r ' s basic i n t e n t i o n w a s t o reverse t h i s process o f t h e o r i z a t i o n a n d d e - w o r l d i n g a t w o r k in Husserl's characterization of intentional "content-meaning" and to b u i l d - b a c k " t h i s " c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g " i n t o its " o r i g i n " i n t h e "Lebenswelt," the " l i f e - w o r l d . " (IP, 4 ; PA, 6 , 9 4 , 9 7 , -115) H e r e w e c a n h i g h l i g h t three focal points of Heidegger's critical appropriation. First, Husserl's notion o f b e i n g a s o b j e c t - b e i n g (substance, a c c i d e n t , p r o p e r t y , e t c . ) w a s t o b e rethought as the " s i g n i f i c a n c e " ("being-ready-to-hand-there," " f r o m w h i c h , " " f o r w h i c h , " " t o w a r d s w h i c h , " " f o r the sake o f ) a n d the l i v e d " s p a t i a l i t y " o f t h e p r a c t i c a l w o r l d a r o u n d us, w h i c h i s t h e " e v e r y d a y w o r l d . " (HF, 8 5 , 9 3 - 1 0 4 ) " W o r l d , " H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s , " i s the f u n d a m e n t a l c a t e g o r y o f c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g i n the p h e n o m e n o n o f l i f e . " (PA, 8 6 ) Second,

Husserl's

"ideation"

was

"hermeneutical

to

theoretical be

intuition,"

method

transformed the

"lived

into

of

"universal

Heidegger's

experience

of l i v e d

intuition"

own

method

experience"

or of (IP,

117) w h i c h " i n t e r p r e t i v e l y e x p l i c a t e s " the f a c t i c a l " p r e - c o n c e p t i o n " o f being w h i c h belongs to factical l i f e .

3 7

"The phenomenological criterion,"

h e w r i t e s , " i s s o l e l y the u n d e r s t a n d i n g e v i d e n c e a n d the e v i d e n t i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e s , o f l i f e i n a n d f o r i t s e l f i n its e i d o s . " (PW, 1 2 6 ) T h i s c o n c r e t e , i n t e r p r e t i v e a p p r o a c h t o the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f b e i n g i s s u c c i n c t l y expressed i n the t i t l e t o his

1923 lecture course, " O n t o l o g y

( H e r m e n e u t i c s o f F a c t i c i t y ) . " H e was i n f l u e n c e d here also b y D i l t h e y ' s d e v e l o p m e n t o f " h e r m e n e u t i c s " a s the m e t h o d o f h i s t o r i c a l a n d i n t e r p r e tive understanding Moreover,

in the h u m a n sciences. (HF,

for Heidegger,

philosophy

was not

1 3 - 1 4 ; SZ, 5 2 6 / 4 5 0 ) to arrive at

3 8

Husserl's

a t e m p o r a l "essences" t o w h i c h a f i x e d p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l t e r m i n o l o g y

13

252

w o u l d correspond. He thought that p h i l o s o p h y is l i m i t e d to g i v i n g " f o r m a l i n d i c a t i o n " or "hermeneutical concepts,"

w h i c h can o n l y

p o i n t t o the

things themselves and have to be constantly re-appropriated,

since the

" t h i n g s " o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y are c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a r a d i c a l f a c t i c i t y a n d historicity. (PA,

3 9

A l o n g w i t h Aristotle's method of providing a rough "outline"

192) for practical life and Kierkegaard's n o t i o n of "indirect c o m -

munication" Husserl's

(AJ,

41),

notion

in

Heidegger his

Logical

"occasional expressions" (e.g., " i n d i c a t e " the e s s e n t i a l l y

T,

here

radicalized

Investigations 'here',

of

and

a

universalized

certain

' y o u ' ) , whose

class

function

of

is to

variable, situational m e a n i n g of such expres-

sions. T h i r d , Husserl's recovery of Greek o n t o l o g y was thus to be pushed in the d i r e c t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n e x i s t e n t i a l - p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l o n t o l o g y , w h i c h h e c a l l e d a " s c i e n c e o f the o r i g i n , " a " p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l o r t r a n s t h e o r e t i c a l , in a n y case a n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l science, a g e n u i n e t / r - s c i e n c e o u t o f w h i c h the t h e o r e t i c a l i t s e l f takes its o r i g i n . " (IP, 9 6 )

4. I n t e n t i o n a l life

Heidegger manner

in

(Bezugssinn)

likewise which of

performed Husserl

a

had

intentionality,

destructive worked

i.e.,

the

out "how"

retrieval the of

of

the

"relational the

specific meaning"

relation

to

the

intentional object. T h i s becomes visible w h e n we consider Heidegger's r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f " t r u t h " i n his Logical Investigations. T h e q u e s t i o n o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n w a s f o r H u s s e r l p r e c i s e l y the issue of

the

truth

present

in

the

sphere

of

categorial

intentions.

(LU,

6 5 1 - 6 5 6 / 7 6 5 - 7 7 0 ) H e d e f i n e s t r u t h a s the " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " w h i c h I a c h i e v e w h e n the object gives itself i m m e d i a t e l y in my i n t u i t i v e , f u l f i l l i n g intention just as I had signified it in my e m p t y intention: " W e experience h o w the same o b j e c t i v e s o m e t h i n g w h i c h w a s ' m e r e l y t h o u g h t ' i n a s y m b o l i c act i s n o w i n t u i t i v e l y p r e s e n t e d i n i n t u i t i o n , a n d that i t i s i n t u i t e d a s b e i n g p r e c i s e l y the d e t e r m i n a t e so-and-so that i t w a s a t f i r s t m e r e l y t h o u g h t t o b e (merely

s i g n i f i e d ) . " (LU, 5 6 6 / 6 9 4 )

He

identifies t w o meanings

o f the

t r a d i t i o n a l A r i s t o t e l i a n a n d s c h o l a s t i c n o t i o n o f " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h " (on hos alethes; ens tanquam verum): f i r s t , b e i n g i n the sense o f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the s i g n i f i e d a n d

the i n t u i t e d ( ' t h e p a p e r [ r e a l l y ]

is

w h i t e ' ) ; s e c o n d , b e i n g i n the sense o f the " t r u e - m a k i n g t h i n g , " the i n t u i t e d " b e i n g " w h i c h b e s t o w s fullness o n m y e m p t y s i g n i f i c a t i o n . H e p o i n t s o u t

14

253 that these t w o senses o f t r u t h u n d e r l i e the s t a n d a r d d e f i n i t i o n o f t r u t h a s the " c o r r e c t n e s s o f o u r i n t e n t i o n . . . the p r o p o s i t i o n ' d i r e c t s ' i t s e l f t o the t h i n g i t s e l f , i t says t h a t i t i s so, a n d i t r e a l l y i s s o . " (LU, 6 5 3 / 7 6 6 ) I n t h e case of c a t e g o r i a l i n t e n t i o n s , t r u t h is e x p e r i e n c e d as the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n I a c h i e v e w h e n i n m y f u l f i l l i n g c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n t h e t h i n g i t s e l f (paperbeing-v/h'ile,

paper-oj-white)

"appears"

in

its

"self-appearance"

(LU,

651/765) just as it was intended in my empty categorial meaning-intent i o n . O n H e i d e g g e r ' s r e a d i n g , t h i s m e a n s t h a t " t h e f o u n d e d acts disclose t h e s i m p l y g i v e n o b j e c t s anew

..." (GZ,

8 4 / 6 2 ) " C a t e g o r i a l acts," h e

e x p l a i n s , " c o n s t i t u t e a n e w o b j e c t i v i t y . . . [ C o n s t i t u t i n g ] m e a n s l e t t i n g the b e i n g b e seen i n its o b j e c t i v i t y . " ( G Z , 9 7 / 7 1 ) H u s s e r l m a i n t a i n s that e s p e c i a l l y i n the " s t a t i c u n i o n s " o f s i g n i f i e d a n d intuited, w h i c h we have already achieved and in w h i c h we habitually l i v e , we

"experience"

truth

as

"identity"

without,

however,

thematically

a p p r e h e n d i n g i t . (LU, 5 6 9 - 5 7 0 / 6 9 7 , 6 5 2 / 7 6 6 ) H e i d e g g e r ' s c o m m e n t a r y o n this Husserlian theme runs a s f o l l o w s : " I n the c o m i n g into coincidence o f t h e p r e s u m e d w i t h the i n t u i t e d , I a m s o l e l y a n d p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e subject m a t t e r i t s e l f . . . T h i s i s the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l sense o f s a y i n g t h a t i n e v i d e n t p e r c e p t i o n I d o n o t t h e m a t i c a l l y s t u d y the t r u t h o f t h i s p e r c e p t i o n i t s e l f , b u t r a t h e r l i v e in the t r u t h . B e i n g - t r u e is e x p e r i e n c e d as a distinctive

relation,

a

comportmental

relation

between

presumed

and

i n t u i t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the sense o f i d e n t i t y . " ( G Z , 6 9 - 7 0 / 5 2 ) I n m y disclosive categorial i n t u i t i o n of the t h i n g itself as-something ( b e i n g ) , I focus i n t e n t i o n a l l y o n the t h i n g itself w i t h o u t t h e m a t i c a l l y c o n s i d e r i n g m y c a t e g o r i a l m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n , w h i c h r e m a i n s i n the b a c k g r o u n d . I t i s o n l y i n a subsequent i n t e n t i o n a l act that I c a n m a k e t h e " i d e n t i t y " i n v o l v e d here i n t o a t h e m a t i c o b j e c t or, f u r t h e r , t h e m a t i z e the o p e r a t i v e a p r i o r i d i m e n s i o n o f the c a t e g o r i a l i t s e l f ( i d e a t i o n ) . W h a t captivated Heidegger's attention i n Husserl's analysis o f " t r u t h " w a s that t r u t h w a s i n v e s t i g a t e d here at a m o r e basic l e v e l t h a n its t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n a s t h e " c o r r e c t n e s s " o f p r o p o s i t i o n s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , H u s s e r l refers t o b e i n g i t s e l f a s " t r u t h " i n the sense o f the appearance o f beings in their b e i n g (the " t r u e - m a k i n g t h i n g " w h i c h is disclosed), a n o t i o n w h i c h , according t o Heidegger, i s first f o u n d i n the G r e e k meaning o f truth

as

aletheia,

169-182) Second,

i.e.,

literally

"unconcealment."

(GZ,

71/51;

LW,

H u s s e r l ' s c o n c e p t o f t r u t h a s b e i n g - t r u e ( t h e act o f

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ) p o i n t s t o the act o f " d i s c l o s u r e , " o f " l e t t i n g appear," w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , i s w h a t A r i s t o t l e m e a n t b y aletheuein, " b e i n g true," "unconcealing." (GZ, 7 1 - 7 3 / 5 3 - 5 4 )

15

254

B u t a g a i n H e i d e g g e r ' s r e t r i e v a l a t t e m p t e d t o trace these t w o m o r e basic senses o f t r u t h b a c k i n t o t h e o r i g i n a l sphere o f f a c t i c a l l i f e . H e r e , t o o , he was t a k i n g u p D i l t h e y ' s c r i t i c a l appropriation o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e s e c o n d basic thesis f r o m D i l t h e y , w h i c h H e i d e g g e r m e n t i o n s a s c h a r a c t e r i z i n g h i s o w n u n i q u e use o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y , i s " t h a t i n e v e r y aspect o f b e i n g the p e r s o n , the t o t a l p e r s o n , reacts, n o t s i m p l y i n w i l l i n g , f e e l i n g , a n d r e f l e c t i n g , b u t a l l t o g e t h e r a l w a y s a t the same t i m e . " ( G Z , 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 / 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 ) " [ D i l t h e y ] , " H e i d e g g e r also w r i t e s , " w a n t s t o get a t the t o t a l i t y o f the s u b j e c t w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e s the w o r l d a n d n o t t o a b l o o d l e s s t h i n k i n g t h i n g w h i c h m e r e l y i n t e n d s a n d t h e o r e t i c a l l y t h i n k s the w o r l d . " (GZ,

302/220)

H e i d e g g e r thus a t t e m p t e d t o s h o w t h a t H u s s e r l ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e " h o w " o f i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e w a s d r a w n o n e - s i d e d l y f r o m the a t t i t u d e o f ' " m e r e b e i n g d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s ' " (WU, 2 0 7 ) w h i c h b e l o n g s t o " t h e o r y " a n d its r e l a t e d c o m p o r t m e n t s o f " i n t u i t i o n " (PA, 1 5 3 ) , "sense p e r c e p t i o n " (PA,

40;

GZ,

"assertion" thinking

246-247/182,

(GZ, or

219/163).

objective

254/188), "The

"knowing,"

so-called

theoretical

logical

knowing,"

"judgment,"

and

comportments

Heidegger

" r e p r e s e n t o n l y a p a r t i c u l a r a n d n a r r o w sphere w i t h i n

of

criticizes,

the d o m a i n o f

intentionality . . . " ( G Z , 106-107/78; cf. 73/54, 124/91) A g a i n he writes: "Every

directing-itself-toward

(fear,

hope,

love)

has

the

feature

of

d i r e c t i n g - i t s e l f - t o w a r d w h i c h H u s s e r l c a l l s noesis. I n a s m u c h as noein is t a k e n f r o m the sphere o f t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w i n g , a n y e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e p r a c t i c a l here i s d r a w n f r o m t h e t h e o r e t i c a l . " ( G Z , 6 1 / 4 5 ) H u s s e r l , H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s f u r t h e r , v i e w s h u m a n b e i n g a s a present a t h a n d o b j e c t , s i n c e h e c h a r a c t e r i z e s the h u m a n b e i n g , w h i c h has i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f o r its basic s t r u c t u r e , p r i m a r i l y a s i t i s g i v e n t o t h e o r e t i c a l observation.

In

phenomenology

Husserl's under

later the

"transcendental" influence

of

self-interpretation

Neo-Kantianism

of

(GZ,

1 2 4 - 1 2 8 / 9 1 - 9 3 ) , t h e p e r s o n appears e x p l i c i t l y a s a t h i n g - l i k e c o m p o s i t e o f a p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l a n i m a l and an intentional consciousness, w h i c h c o n sciousness i s u l t i m a t e l y s u p p o s e d t o b e " a b s o l u t e b e i n g " i n r e l a t i o n t o the c o n t i n g e n t a n d f o u n d e d b e i n g o f the e m p i r i c a l self. T h e f a c t i c a l h u m a n b e i n g gets c h a r a c t e r i z e d

as ' " a real object l i k e others

in

the n a t u r a l

w o r l d ' , " a n ' " a n i m a l b e i n g ' . " ( G Z , 1 3 1 / 9 6 ) T h e g u i d i n g i d e a o f b e i n g here i s a g a i n that o f b e i n g - r e a l , b e i n g a n a t u r a l o b j e c t . ( G Z , 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 / 1 2 4 - 1 2 5 ) H u s s e r l f a i l s t o raise t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e " b e i n g o f t h e h u m a n , " " t h a t o f w h i c h i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s the structure." ( G Z , 6 2 - 6 3 / 4 6 - 4 7 , 148/108) T h e q u e s t i o n o f the " s u m " o f the t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n t e n t i o n a l " c o g i t o " i s left u n a s k e d . (PA, 1 7 3 )

16

255 H e i d e g g e r r e a d i l y a d m i t s that H u s s e r l ' s " r e d u c t i o n " f r o m o u r " n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e " b a c k t o p u r e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s does i n d e e d b e g i n w i t h a n attempted description o f our concrete being i n everyday l i f e . B u t t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , h e argues, i s a l r e a d y c o l o r e d b y a v e r y u n n a t u r a l t h e o r e t i c a l a n d o b j e c t i f y i n g a t t i t u d e . " I n t h e n a t u r a l w a y o f e x p e r i e n c e , does m a n e x p e r i e n c e h i m s e l f , to p u t it c u r t l y , z o o l o g i c a l l y ? Is t h i s a t t i t u d e a natural attitude o r i s i t n o t ? I t i s a n e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h i s t o t a l l y u n n a t u r a l . " ( G Z , 155/113) A f t e r such an unnatural description of natural everyday life, Husserl

then

performs

his

"reduction"

back

to

transcendental-eidetic

c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h , a s h e says, i s " n o t h u m a n . " T h i s r e d u c t i o n t h e r e b y i n v o l v e s "precisely g i v i n g u p the g r o u n d u p o n w h i c h alone the question o f the b e i n g o f t h e i n t e n t i o n a l c o u l d b e b a s e d . " ( G Z ,

150-151/109; cf.

157/113-114) H e i d e g g e r m a i n t a i n s , t h e n , that H u s s e r l ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f the p e r s o n i s derived not so m u c h f r o m "the things themselves" as f r o m his " f a l l i n g " t o w a r d s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l n o t i o n o f the h u m a n b e i n g a s the "rational a n i m a l , " w h i c h derives f r o m Greek thought and still prevails in Descartes

and

Neo-Kantianism.

(PA,

47,

173;

GZ,

147/107,

1 7 8 - 1 8 0 / 1 2 8 - 1 3 0 ) H i s emphasis o n the role o f " i n t u i t i o n " i n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s d e r i v e d f r o m the G r e e k o r i e n t a t i o n t o theorein ( l i t e r a l l y " g a z i n g " ) , w h i c h gets t a k e n u p i n A u g u s t i n e ' s n o t i o n o f the " e n j o y m e n t o f G o d "

(fruitio Dei), A q u i n a s ' "contemplation Descartes' "clara et distincta perceptio," K a n t ' s "intuitus derivativus," a n d the d i a l e c t i c a l "noesis noeseos'

1

of H e g e l .

(LW,

56,

115-123;

GZ,

381/276)

Heidegger

saw

Husserl's characterization of the "relational m e a n i n g " of intentionality as b e l o n g i n g t o o m u c h to what he at that t i m e ( f o l l o w i n g L u t h e r and K i e r k e g a a r d ) c a l l e d the " o c u l a r , " " a e s t h e t i c , " a n d " q u i e t i v e " c h a r a c t e r o f w e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s . (AJ, 2 3 , 4 - 5 ; PA, 1 1 1 , 1 4 0 ) He described (WU,

210)

practical

Husserl's

toward

mere

"modification to "objects"

"lived-experience"

as

theoretical

a "de-living"

(Er-lebnis).

In

theory,

comportment"

(Ent-leben) my

of o u r

"emotional

r e l a t i o n " (WU, 2 1 1 ) t o the w o r l d a n d m y p r a c t i c a l w a y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d s p e a k i n g are suppressed. T h e o r e t i c a l c o m p o r t m e n t i s a n act o f "selfa l i e n a t i o n " (HF,

1 5 ) , w h i c h d r i v e s a w a y t h e p e r s o n a l character o f m y

e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e w o r l d a s a n " o w n m o s t e v e n t " (Er-eignis), i n w h i c h "ich

selbst Idas Er-leben]

mir er-eigne,"

"I

event

(ap-propriate)

lived

ex-

p e r i e n c e t o m y s e l f , " a n d i n t u r n m y e x p e r i e n c e o f the w o r l d "er-eignet

sich seinem Wesen nach," "e-vents ( a p - p r o p r i a t e s ) i t s e l f a c c o r d i n g to its essence." (IP,

73-75)

"The lived-experience-of-the-environing

17

world,"

256

H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s , " i s d e - l i v e d t o the r e m n a n t : k n o w i n g s o m e t h i n g r e a l a s such

... Thing-experience

(Erfahrung)

is

undoubtedly

l i v e d experience

(Erlebnis), b u t u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f its o r i g i n o u t o f the l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e o f the e n v i r o n i n g w o r l d i t i s a l r e a d y d e - l i v i n g , u n - l i f e (Ent-lebnis)." (IP, 89-90)

Theoretical

comportment

is,

therefore,

a

"derived

mode"

of

intentional experience. ( G Z , 215/160) I t w a s o n t h e basis o f t h i s d e s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e that H e i d e g g e r ' s science o f the

origin

attempted

to

retrieve

Husserl's account

of intentional

" r e l a t i o n a l m e a n i n g . " He defined his task precisely as that of g o i n g back to the

original

starting

point of Husserl's

transcendental

and

eidetic

r e d u c t i o n s i n the " n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e " a n d here b e g i n n i n g a g a i n b y i n v e s t i g a t i n g the " b e i n g

o f the

w h o l e concrete m a n . " ( G Z ,

148-152/107-110,

173/125) In contrast to Husserl's " d e - l i v i n g " of factical l i f e , Heidegger's hermeneutics was to be a " r e p e t i t i o n " or " r e t r i e v a l " of factical life and thus an " e n - l i v e n i n g "

(Verlebendigung)

of phenomenological philosophy.

(PA, 8 0 , 166) H i s basic a p p r o a c h t o t h e H u s s e r l i a n t h e m e o f i n t e n t i o n a l t r u t h w a s t o investigate it not p r i m a r i l y as "the t r u t h of theoretical k n o w i n g , " but rather p r i m a r i l y a s the t r u t h o f " p r a c t i c a l i n s i g h t . " (LW, 8 ) H e r e h e w a s t a k i n g u p the A r i s t o t e l i a n t h e m e o f a d i s t i n c t i v e t y p e o f " p r a c t i c a l t r u t h " (aletheia praktike)

which

is

given

in

phronesis,

"practical

understanding."

(HF,

1 0 - 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 6 - 2 7 ) R e g a r d i n g H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h " as the "self-appearance" of beings in their o b j e c t i v i t y (the disclosed " t r u e - m a k i n g t h i n g " ) , H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t e d t o r a d i c a l i z e i t i n t o the n o t i o n o f the " d i s c l o s e d n e s s " o f the p r a c t i c a l " s i g n i f i c a n c e " o f " r e a d y t o h a n d " b e i n g s . (HF, 9 3 ; G Z , 3 4 8 - 3 4 9 / 2 5 3 ) H u s s e r l ' s o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h , " i.e., the i n t e n t i o n a l act o f d i s c l o s i n g b e i n g s i n the " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " o f t h e s i g n i f i e d a n d t h e i n t u i t e d , w a s t r a n s f o r m e d b y Heidegger in a number of ways. First, he placed Husserl's theoretically biased n o t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y as a d i s i n t e r e s t e d " d i r e c t i n g - i t s e l f - t o w a r d s " b a c k i n t o its o r i g i n a l m e a n i n g a s " b e i n g - i n - a - w o r l d . " (HF, 102) T h e basic c h a r a c t e r o f t h i s " b e i n g - i n " i s i n fact " c a r i n g " o r " c o n c e r n " (HF, 7 0 ; c f . AJ, 2 2 ; G Z , 4 2 0 / 3 0 3 - 3 0 4 ) ,

4 0

which

takes t h e f o r m s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , m o o d , a n d l a n g u a g e . I n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s s o m e t h i n g " u l t i m a t e , " H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s , b u t t h i s u l t i m a c y has t o b e properly characterized: W h a t has a l w a y s d i s t u r b e d m e : d i d i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f a l l f r o m h e a v e n ? I f s o m e t h i n g u l t i m a t e : in w h i c h u l t i m a c y is it to be taken? C e r t a i n l y not secured in a s p e c i f i c a l l y theoretical d i s c o v e r y and experience. T h a t I

18

257 must l i v e i n t e n t i o n a l l y and must ' b e ' i n t e n t i o n a l l y , ' e l u c i d a t e ' ! . . . i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s the f o r m a l and f u n d a m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e f o r a l l c a t e g o r i a l structures o f f a c t i c i t y . C a r i n g i s the f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g o f the r e l a t i o n o f l i f e

... F u l l

m e a n i n g o f intentionality i n w h a t i s o r i g i n a l ! T h e t h e o r e t i c a l a t t i t u d e f a d e d . {PA, 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 , 9 8 ) Second, H e i d e g g e r attempted t o r e - t h i n k Husserl's n o t i o n o f e m p t y and h a b i t u a l c a t e g o r i a l m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n such t h a t i t c o u l d n o w m e a n the unthematic

"prestruction"

being,

anticipatory

the

(Prestruktion)

or

"preconception"

"being-ahead-of-itself'

(Vorgriff)

(sich-vorweg-sein),

of

which

belongs to pre-theoretical, factical l i f e . In other w o r d s , he re-interpreted it t o m e a n the p r i o r n o n - o b j e c t i v e " d i s c o v e r e d n e s s " o f t h e " w o r l d h o o d " o f p r a c t i c a l " s i g n i f i c a n c e . " (GZ, 3 4 9 - 3 5 0 / 2 5 4 ; HF, 9 7 ; LW,

146-147)

He

w r i t e s : " P r e s t r u c t i o n . . . a s a n e x p r e s s i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y : the f o r m a l a n d p r i m o r d i a l s t r u c t u r e o f f a c t i c i t y ( o f the m e a n i n g o f the b e i n g o f l i f e ) . " (PA, 131) A g a i n h e w r i t e s : " W h a t i s m e a n t b y i n t e n t i o n a l i t y - the bare a n d i s o l a t e d d i r e c t i n g - i t s e l f - t o w a r d s - m u s t s t i l l b e set b a c k i n t o t h e u n i f i e d a n d basic s t r u c t u r e o f b e i n g - a h e a d - o f - i t s e l f - i n - a l r e a d y - b e i n g - i n v o l v e d - i n . " (GZ,

420/303-304)

Third,

he

pushed

Husserl's

notion

of

the

disclosing

activity

of

c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n , w h i c h f u l f i l l s the e m p t y m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n ( b e i n g t r u e ) , i n the d i r e c t i o n o f h i s o w n t h e m e o f the " i n t e r p r e t i v e " a c t i v i t y o f factical life,

w h i c h " f u l f i l l s " the p r i o r u n t h e m a t i c disclosedness o f s i g -

nificance ( w o r l d h o o d ) w i t h the interpretive disclosure o f beings i n their " a s " - s t r u c t u r e , s i g n i f i c a n c e , or b e i n g . (GZ, 2 2 6 / 1 6 7 , 7 3 / 5 4 , 3 2 8 / 2 3 8 ; PA, 3 3 ; HF, 2 9 , 8 0 )

4 1

H u s s e r l ' s static " a p o p h a n t i c a l ' a s ' " ( t h e a s s e r t o r i c paper-

as-white) was transformed into Heidegger's m o r e situational and interpretive

"hermeneutical

throwing,

etc.)

of

'as'"

(the

practical

interpretation.

(GZ,

paper-as-for-writing-wiping-

73/54,

116/85;

LW,

135-161)

M o r e o v e r , w h e r e a s , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , H u s s e r l v i e w s sense p e r c e p t i o n a s the basic s t r a t u m o n w h i c h c a t e g o r i a l i n t e n t i o n s ( e x p r e s s i o n s ) are f o u n d e d , H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f w i s h e s t o m a k e p r i m a r y p r e c i s e l y the p r i o r unthematic

categorial

"interpretedness"

or

"expressedness"

of all

ex-

p e r i e n c e i n p r e c o n c e p t i o n , w i t h o u t w h i c h the sensed o b j e c t w o u l d n e v e r h a v e been a c c e s s i b l e . W h a t i s p r i m a r y i s n o t sense p e r c e p t i o n b u t r a t h e r interpretation. F o c u s i n g o n the w a y i n w h i c h our i m m e d i a t e experience o f things is articulated in advance t h r o u g h public everyday understanding, he w r i t e s : " . . . o u r s i m p l e s t p e r c e p t i o n s a n d c o n s t i t u t i v e states are a l r e a d y

19

258

expressed, e v e n m o r e , are interpreted i n a c e r t a i n w a y . . . T o p u t i t m o r e p r e c i s e l y : w e d o n o t say w h a t w e see, b u t r a t h e r t h e reverse, w e see w h a t one says a b o u t t h e m a t t e r . " ( G Z , 7 4 - 7 5 / 5 6 ; c f . 6 5 / 4 8 , 3 7 3 / 2 7 0 , 4 1 6 / 3 0 0 ) F o u r , r e g a r d i n g H u s s e r l ' s t h e m e o f the h a b i t u a l , u n t h e m a t i c c h a r a c t e r of categorial

meaning

intentions

in

the

only

"experienced"

and

not

e x p l i c i t l y " k n o w n " identification o f signified and intuited, Heidegger t r a n s f o r m e d t h i s t h e m e i n t o h i s n o t i o n o f h o w f a c t i c a l l i f e has the t e n d e n c y t o " f a l l " t o w a r d s t h e b e i n g s i n w h i c h its " c a r e " i s a b s o r b e d , such t h a t its p r i o r discoveredness o f the w o r l d and i t s e l f i n p r e c o n c e p t i o n remains u n t h e m a t i c . F a c t i c a l l i f e has the t e n d e n c y t o i n t e r p r e t i t s e l f s o l e l y i n t e r m s of beings. T h u s , for Heidegger, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l " r e d u c t i o n " meant a l e a d i n g b a c k n o t t o the a p r i o r i o f a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l - e i d e t i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t r a t h e r t o t h e a p r i o r i o p e r a t i v e w i t h i n the p r e c o n c e p t i o n o f f a c t i c a l l i f e ( " h e r m e n e u t i c a l i n t u i t i o n " ) . H e i d e g g e r ' s notes f o r h i s course read: " T h e ruinant f l i g h t

into the w o r l d ;

p o s i t i v e m e a n i n g o f H u s s e r l ' s ' r e d u c t i o n ' . " (PA, 3 9 )

1 9 2 1 - 2 2 lecture

away

f r o m objects;

4 2

F i n a l l y , f o r H e i d e g g e r the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f f a c t i c a l l i f e w a s n o t t o b e investigated in Husserl's manner as an impersonal, thing-like " w h a t " (essence) b e l o n g i n g t o t h e e q u a l l y t h i n g - l i k e " t h a t " o f the p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l subject ( p a r t i c u l a r ) w h i c h has t h i s i n t e n t i o n a l reason a s its u p p e r s t o r e y . Rather, he wanted to understand the " w h a t " (intentional consciousness) a n d the " t h a t " ( e m b o d i m e n t ) u l t i m a t e l y i n t e r m s o f a " h o w " o f a p o s s i b l e " w a y to be" or "exist" for a personal " w h o , " w h i c h is always " m i n e " and is

characterized by

(GZ,

the

finitude

of temporal

"awhileness"

(Jeweiligkeit).

151-152/109-110, 205-207/152-154)

5. Intentional history

F i n a l l y , the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s d e s t r u c t i v e r e t r i e v a l w a s also d i r e c t e d t o Husserl's

characterization

o f the

"enactment-meaning"

(Vollzugssinn)

or

" t e m p o r a l i z i n g - m e a n i n g " (Zeitigungssinn) o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . T h i s t e m p o r a l e n a c t m e n t u l t i m a t e l y d e f i n e s the " h o w " o f t h e w h o l e i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n itself. I n h i s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , H u s s e r l refers t o the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h e f u l f i l l i n g intentions in w h i c h an identification of signified and intuited, i.e., t r u t h , i s a c h i e v e d . H e d e s c r i b e s the f u l f i l l i n g i n t e n t i o n a s a n act o f

" m a k i n g - p r e s e n t " (gegenwärtigen) or " p r e s e n t i n g " (präsentieren): " T h e intentional character of p e r c e i v i n g . . .

20

is making-present (presenting)."

259 (LU, 6 4 6 / 7 6 1 ) " T h e o b j e c t i s a c t u a l l y ' p r e s e n t ' o r ' g i v e n ' , a n d present a s just

what

we

have

"presents"

the

sensuous

"temporalizes

intended

(zeitigt)

it."

object

a

(LU,

anew

new

647/762) in

its

Categorial

categorial

consciousness

of

intuition

structure

objectivity."

and

The

c a t e g o r i a l l y s t r u c t u r e d o b j e c t , the b e i n g i n its b e i n g , b e c o m e s " ' p r e s e n t ' , "

is "set before our eyes." (LU, 6 7 0 - 6 7 5 / 7 8 4 - 7 8 7 ; c f . G Z , 8 5 - 9 0 / 6 3 - 6 6 , 9 6 - 9 7 / 7 0 - 7 1 ) I n t h e s e c o n d v o l u m e o f h i s Ideas, h e c a l l s t h i s m a k i n g present

"appresentation."

4 3

In

his

Logical

Investigations,

he

does

not

s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s c u s s the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f i n t e n t i o n a l acts, b u t i n h i s

early

Lectures

on

the

Phenomenology

of Internal

Time-Consciousness,

w h i c h w e r e later e d i t e d b y H e i d e g g e r , h e does g i v e d e t a i l e d analyses o f " m e m o r y , " "expectation," and "presentation." W h a t a p p e a l e d t o H e i d e g g e r i n H u s s e r l ' s d i s c u s s i o n s o f the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y w a s t h a t here " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h " p o i n t e d i n the d i r e c t i o n o f its basic m e a n i n g a s t i m e : T h e d i s c l o s e d " t r u e m a k i n g t h i n g " b e c o m e s " p r e s e n t " f o r the " m a k i n g - p r e s e n t " o f m y d i s c l o s i v e f u l f i l l i n g i n t e n t i o n . B u t a g a i n h i s r e t r i e v a l o f these i n d i c a t i o n s passed t h r o u g h the c r u c i b l e o f h i s d e s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e . H e r e h e t o o k u p D i l t h e y ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the t h e m e o f h i s t o r y i n t o H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e t h i r d basic thesis o f D i l t h e y , w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , w a s o p e r a t i v e i n the f o r m e r ' s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u s s e r l , w a s that " t h e l i f e c o n t e x t o f the p e r s o n i s i n e v e r y s i t u a t i o n one o f d e v e l o p m e n t . " ( G Z , 164-165/118-119)

4 4

H e i d e g g e r p o i n t s o u t that, i n h i s r e f u t a t i o n o f p s y c h o l o g i s m , H u s s e r l d r a w s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n " b e t w e e n t h e real b e i n g o f the p s y c h i c a l a n d the i d e a l b e i n g o f p r o p o s i t i o n s i n j u d g m e n t s - a n d m o r e o v e r , b e t w e e n the t e m p o r a l h a p p e n i n g o f the r e a l a n d the a t e m p o r a l subsistence o f the i d e a l . " (LW, 5 0 ) Thus,

in

h i s Logical Investigations,

Husserl

writes

that " w h a t is t r u e

is

a b s o l u t e , i s true ' i n i t s e l f ; t h e t r u t h i s i d e n t i c a l l y the same, w h e t h e r h u m a n s o r n o n - h u m a n s , angels o r g o d s c o m p r e h e n d i t i n j u d g m e n t s . " (LU, 1 2 5 / 1 4 0 ) H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t s t o s h o w that H u s s e r l u n d e r s t a n d s b e i n g a n d t r u t h w i t h i n the t e m p o r a l h o r i z o n o f the static " p r e s e n c e " o f i d e a l m e a n i n g o v e r against t h e t e m p o r a l

v a r i a n c e o f i n t e n t i o n a l acts. H e subscribes,

H e i d e g g e r m a i n t a i n s , t o the t r a d i t i o n a l ' " c o u p l e t s o f o p p o s i t i o n ' r e a l - i d e a l , s e n s i b l e - n o n s e n s i b l e , b e i n g s - t h e v a l i d , the h i s t o r i c a l - t h e t r a n s h i s t o r i c a l , the

temporal-the

atemporal."

(LW,

92-93)

For

Husserl,

the

acts

of

" m a k i n g - p r e s e n t " are thus a t b o t t o m i n d i v i d u a t i n g acts that i n s t a n t i a t e i d e a l m e a n i n g i n the s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l w o r l d . H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s t h a t i n t h i s regard

Husserl belongs to a t r a d i t i o n w h i c h begins w i t h Plato's and

21

260

Aristotle's notion

o f b e i n g a s " a l w a y s - b e i n g " (aei on)

(ousia),

correlated

which

is

to

"theorein"

"gazing."

and "presence"

(LW,

67-72,

56)

Husserl's notion of m e a n i n g as " i m m u t a b l e and invariant i d e n t i t y " is " i d e n t i c a l w i t h the d i s c o v e r y o f the c o n c e p t o f b e i n g i n P a r m e n i d e s a n d i n P l a t o . " ( G Z , 9 2 / 6 8 , 1 0 2 / 7 5 ; HF, 4 2 ) T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e i n g c o m e s t o H u s s e r l , h e f u r t h e r argues,

via L o t z e ' s n o t i o n of " v a l i d i t y " and

also

t h r o u g h the N e o - K a n t i a n i s m o f N a t o r p , W i n d e l b a n d , a n d R i c k e r t , w h o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n the v a l i d i t y o f t h e a t e m p o r a l , i d e a l c o n t e n t ( l o g i c a l t r u t h , v a l u e ) o f j u d g m e n t s a n d the r e a l t e m p o r a l act o f j u d g i n g .

(LW,

6 2 - 8 8 ; PA, 4 7 , 1 1 1 , 1 6 3 ) H e w r i t e s : " W h a t k i n d o f b e i n g stands here i n p r e - h a v i n g ? B e i n g p r e s e n t at h a n d , b e i n g p r e s e n t (Gegenwärtigsein) ..." "...

p u r e presence

(Gegenwart). T h i s

temporal

determination

comes

into

p l a y in the characterization of o b j e c t i v i t y . W h y this is so must be made u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . " (HF, 4 3 , 6 5 ) M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e s H u s s e r l ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f the i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n ( i . e . , the c o r r e l a t i o n o f t h e static presence o f i d e a l m e a n i n g a n d p a s s i v e o c u l a r m a k i n g - p r e s e n t ) a s t h e " e x t i n g u i s h i n g o f t h e s i t u a t i o n " (WU, 2 0 5 - 2 0 7 ) , t h e " d e - h i s t o r i c i z a t i o n " (Entgeschieht lie hung)

o f the

"ownmost

event"

of one's

lived

experience

a n d o f the " i t w o r l d s . " " T h e h i s t o r i c a l I , " h e w r i t e s , " i s d e - h i s t o r i c i z e d t o t h e r e m n a n t o f a s p e c i f i c I-ness a s the c o r r e l a t e o f t h i n g h o o d . . . " (IP, 8 9 , c f . 8 5 ) " T h e p u r e e g o , " h e s a i d i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n i n 1919, " w o u l d d e r i v e f r o m t h e ' h i s t o r i c a l e g o ' v i a the r e p r e s s i o n o f a l l h i s t o r i c i t y . " In

his

"critique

o f the

[Neo-Kantian

and

Husserlian]

4 5

critique

of

p s y c h o l o g i s m " (LW, 8 7 ) , H e i d e g g e r t o o k u p n o t o n l y D i l t h e y ' s t h o u g h t , b u t also t h e i m p u l s e s o f a n c i e n t s k e p t i c i s m a n d m o d e m p s y c h o l o g i s m , since

he

thought

that

they

made

problematic

precisely

the

relation

(methexis) o f t h e i d e a l t o " l i v i n g t h o u g h t . " (LW, 8 8 ; c f . 5 2 , 5 4 , 9 2 )

4 0

He

a t t e m p t e d t o a p p r o p r i a t e H u s s e r l ' s d i s c u s s i o n s o f the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e f u l l p h e n o m e n o n o f h i s t o r i c a l t i m e i n f a c t i c a l l i f e . F i r s t , h e r e - i n t e r p r e t e d H u s s e r l ' s P l a t o n i c n o t i o n o f the a p r i o r i ( l i t e r a l l y t h e " b e f o r e , " the " e a r l i e r " ) t o m e a n t h e f u t u r a l b e i n g a h e a d - o f - i t s e l f o f f a c t i c a l l i f e , its " n o t y e t , " a n d " h o r i z o n o f e x p e c t a t i o n . " (IP, 115; G Z , 9 9 / 7 2 ; AJ, 2 2 ) S e c o n d , h e t r a n s f o r m e d H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f " m a k i n g present," a s the act o f static i n d i v i d u a t i o n , i n t o h i s o w n n o t i o n o f the " t e m p o r a l i z i n g " o f one's futural understanding, w h i c h i n t e r p r e t i v e l y "presents"

(HF,

55-56,

79),

"makes-present,"

or

"appresents"

47

beings

w i t h i n a p r a c t i c a l " s i t u a t i o n " that i s shaped also t h r o u g h t h e past. ( G Z , 2 9 2 / 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 , 3 5 9 / 2 6 0 ; LW, 1 9 2 )

4 8

" T h e l i f e - r e l a t i o n o f the s i t u a t i o n - I , "

22

261

he writes, "is no mere being-directed to mere objects. E v e r y l i v e d experience is intentional, it contains a ' v i e w t o w a r d s ' something or other ( t h e v i e w w h i c h g r a s p s , foresees a n d r e m e m b e r s i n a v e r y p r e f e r e n t i a l m a n n e r ) . T h e v i e w has a ' q u a l i t y ' ( q u a l i t y o f the a c t - c h a r a c t e r ) . " (WU, 206-207)

4 9

F i n a l l y , H e i d e g g e r a c c o r d i n g l y saw the " p r e s e n c e " o f b e i n g s

i n t h e i r b e i n g n o t a s the i n d i v i d u a t i o n o f t i m e l e s s m e a n i n g , but r a t h e r a s e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e r p r e t i v e a n d h i s t o r i c a l presence. " T h e f u l l m e a n i n g o f a p h e n o m e n o n , " h e m a i n t a i n s , " e n c o m p a s s e s its i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n - c h a r a c ter, c o n t e n t - c h a r a c t e r , a n d e n a c t m e n t - c h a r a c t e r . . . " (AI, 2 2 )

5 0

6. C o n c l u s i o n

I n c o n c l u s i o n , I w o u l d l i k e t o s k e t c h b r i e f l y t h e fate o f t h e y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s w i t h H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n h i s subsequent d e v e l o p m e n t a n d f i n a l l y e n d w i t h s o m e c o m m e n t s o n the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f his y o u t h f u l existential-phenomenological way for our understanding of his w h o l e t h o u g h t . A l r e a d y a r o u n d the t i m e o f the c o m p o s i t i o n o f his Being and Time i n 1926, H e i d e g g e r b e g a n t o d i s t a n c e h i m s e l f f r o m h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y . F o r e x a m p l e , the a l m o s t t w o h u n d r e d p a g e i n t r o d u c t o r y discussion o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , w h i c h had o r i g i n a l l y appeared a t the start o f o n e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s f i r s t drafts o f " B e i n g a n d T i m e , " n a m e l y ,

his

1925 lecture course e n t i t l e d The History of the Concept of Time,

d i s a p p e a r e d in the p u b l i s h e d t e x t Being and Time in 1 9 2 7 .

S 1

H i s detailed

discussions o f h o w his c r i t i c a l appropriation o f Husserl was carried out a n d a l s o his a d o p t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s t e r m i n o l o g y s u f f e r e d the same fate. W h a t m a r k e d Being and Time as a d i s t a n t i a t i o n f r o m h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h H u s s e r l w a s h i s n e w l y e m e r g i n g p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h the t r a n s c e n d e n tal thought of K a n t .

His

1 9 2 5 - 2 6 l e c t u r e c o u r s e w a s t o h a v e been a

reading o f the n o t i o n o f t r u t h i n Husserl and A r i s t o t l e , but h a l f - w a y through

the

semester h e

instead

turned to an examination of K a n t ' s

t r e a t m e n t o f t i m e i n his " d o c t r i n e o f s c h e m a t i s m . " I n a l e c t u r e c o u r s e devoted

to

Kant's

Critique

of Pure

Reason

in

1927-28,

he

told

his

students: " W h e n I b e g a n a g a i n to s t u d y K a n t ' s Critique of Pure Reason a f e w years a g o a n d r e a d i t , a s i t w e r e , against the b a c k g r o u n d o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y , i t w a s a s i f t h e b l i n d e r s f e l l f r o m m y eyes, a n d K a n t b e c a m e f o r m e the c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e correctness o f the w a y f o r w h i c h I was s e a r c h i n g . " (IK, 4 3 1 ) H i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f K a n t ' s a n a l y s i s o f t i m e i n

23

262 the " d o c t r i n e o f s c h e m a t i s m " p l a c e d h i s w h o l e w o r k Being and Time i n the l a n g u a g e o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l t h o u g h t . H e c a l l e d t h i s n e w 1927 d r a f t o f "Being

and T i m e "

"fundamental

ontology," which

was

supposed

to

p r o v i d e "transcendental k n o w l e d g e . " (SZ, 51/62) H i s n e w l e x i c o n f o r the three

intentional

"structures"

moments

of "being-meaning"

(content-meaning),

a

transcendental

appeared "Dasein"

as

worldly

(relational

m e a n i n g ) w h i c h seemed t o b e a n e x i s t e n t i a l i z e d v e r s i o n o f K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and t e m p o r a l " s c h e m a t a " ( t e m p o r a l i z i n g - m e a n i n g ) . H e i d e g g e r ' s Being and Time is r e a l l y o n l y one i n t e r p r e t i v e d r a f t of h i s y o u t h f u l p r o j e c t o f e x p l o r i n g the r e l a t i o n o f " B e i n g a n d T i m e " - a n d a late o n e a t that. T h u s , O s k a r B e c k e r , w h o a t t e n d e d H e i d e g g e r ' s l e c t u r e courses f r o m 1 9 1 9 o n w a r d s , c o u l d say, e v e n i f s o m e w h a t i n e x a g g e r a t i o n , that Being and Time is " n o l o n g e r the o r i g i n a l H e i d e g g e r . "

5 2

T h e earlier drafts

o f h i s " B e i n g a n d T i m e " are t o b e f o u n d i n h i s l e c t u r e courses f r o m 1919 o n w a r d s , i n h i s 1 9 1 9 - 2 1 essay o n K a r l Jaspers, i n h i s p l a n n e d b o o k o n A r i s t o t l e i n 1 9 2 2 - 2 3 , and i n h i s 1924 essay " T h e C o n c e p t o f T i m e . " T h u s , I c o n s i d e r h i s 1927 Being and Time to be a l m o s t o n e of h i s ' l a t e r w r i t i n g s ' a n d c o n s i d e r the a u t h o r t o b e a l m o s t a l r e a d y the ' l a t e r H e i d e g g e r ' . T h i s m a k e s a mess o f o u r p r e v i o u s l y adequate d i v i s i o n i n t o " t h e e a r l y H e i d e g g e r " a n d the " l a t e r H e i d e g g e r , " b u t w i t h the o n g o i n g p u b l i c a t i o n o f his y o u t h f u l w r i t i n g s , I t h i n k w e w i l l be f o r c e d t o start r e - t h i n k i n g o u r m a n n e r o f m a k i n g d i v i s i o n s i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f his t h o u g h t . I n the 1930s, after h i s r e a l i z a t i o n that h i s a d o p t i o n o f the l a n g u a g e o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l t h o u g h t in his Being and Time was an a b e r r a t i o n w h i c h l e d to an "inadequate interpretation of my o w n

i n t e n t i o n " (BR, x v / x i v ) ,

H e i d e g g e r t u r n e d t o the e a r l y G r e e k t h i n k e r s , Hölderlin, a n d N i e t z s c h e a s his

preferred

allowed,

dialoguing

now

his

partners.

If such

n e w draft of " B e i n g

a crude

and

schematization

Time"

appeared

as

is the

" f o u r f o l d " o f " e a r t h a n d s k y , g o d s and m o r t a l s " ( c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g ) , p o e t i c "dwelling"

(relational

(temporalizing-meaning).

meaning),

and

the

"destiny

of

Husserl's phenomenology, along w i t h

being" Aris-

totle's practical w r i t i n g s and Kierkegaard's existential thought, slipped more

and

more

into

his eschatological

" f o r g e t f u l n e s s o f b e i n g . " (S, 3 7 9 , 3 8 7 - 3 9 4 )

n o t i o n o f the 5 3

history

o f the

I n h i s 1969 L e T h o r s e m i n a r ,

h e d i v i d e d the d e v e l o p m e n t o f h i s q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g

i n t o the

three

" t h o u g h t - p a t h s " o f the " m e a n i n g o f b e i n g " (Being and Time), t h e " t r u t h o f b e i n g " ( 1 9 3 0 s a n d 4 0 s ) , a n d the " t o p o s o f b e i n g " ( 1 9 4 0 s o n w a r d s ) . ( 5 , 3 4 4 ) H e m a d e t h i s d i v i s i o n r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y w i t h the t h e m e s o f h i s later t h o u g h t after 1 9 3 0 i n m i n d , i.e., a t a t i m e w h e n h i s y o u t h f u l t h o u g h t i n the

94

263 early twenties no longer interested h i m , a situation w h i c h is further i n d i c a t e d b y t h e fact that h e m a d e n o p l a n s t o h a v e h i s e a r l y F r e i b u r g l e c t u r e courses i n c l u d e d i n the Collected Edition o f his w r i t i n g s .

5 4

I a m a r g u i n g , t h e n , that a m o r e adequate r e a d i n g o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f Heidegger's

thought

involves

viewing

his

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l " t h o u g h t - p a t h " o f "'being'

youthful

existential-

i n a n d t h r o u g h l i f e " as at

least a f o u r t h w a y i n w h i c h h e t h o u g h t h i s e n d u r i n g q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , o r , better, a s the original w a y subsequent

which

thought-paths.

he t o o k up

Moreover,

a n d t r a n s f o r m e d i n his

his

youthful

existential-

phenomenological w a y provides us w i t h a different language for t a l k i n g a b o u t a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g h i s c o n c e r n s , one w h i c h i s n e i t h e r t h e q u a s i t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l a n g u a g e of Being and Time n o r t h e m y t h o - p o e t i c l a n g u a g e o f t h e H e i d e g g e r after 1 9 3 0 .

5 5

I n r e a d i n g a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g H e i d e g g e r i n these w a y s , w e s h o u l d n o t b e i n t i m i d a t e d b y the fact that h e h i m s e l f m i g h t n o t h a v e l o o k e d o n i n a p p r o v a l , p e r h a p s i n m u c h t h e same w a y that the l a t e r H u s s e r l l o o k e d o n i n d i s a p p r o v a l w h e n i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s H e i d e g g e r p r e f e r r e d h i s e a r l y

Logical Investigations to h i s later Ideas as an i n t r o d u c t i o n to p h e n o m e n o l o g y . (SD, 8 7 / 7 9 ) T o stress t h i s p o i n t , I w o u l d l i k e t o c l o s e w i t h t w o b r i e f passages. T h e f i r s t i s f r o m H e i d e g g e r , w h o states that the deeper m e a n i n g o f f i d e l i t y t o a t h i n k e r a l w a y s m e a n s f i d e l i t y t o the Sache, the m a t t e r o f h i s or her thought:

" W h o e v e r gets

involved

in

being-on-the-way

to

the

s o j o u r n i n the o l d e s t o f the o l d , w i l l b o w t o the n e c e s s i t y o f l a t e r b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d d i f f e r e n t l y t h a n h e m e a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d h i m s e l f . " (WM, i x ) T h e s e c o n d passage, w h i c h speaks f o r i t s e l f , i s f r o m o n e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s e a r l y students i n the t w e n t i e s , H . - G . G a d a m e r : " O n e needs t o h a v e a l o t o f c o u r a g e t o a d m i t t o o n e s e l f that a great m a n can h i m s e l f nonetheless u n d e r e s t i m a t e h i s o w n r a d i a n c e a n d a b o v e a l l the p r o m i s i n g r i c h n e s s o f h i s b e g i n n i n g s . . . I can e v e n i m a g i n e that H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f w o u l d h a v e found

many

new

things

in

this

his

youthful

text

[Phenomenological

Interpretations of Aristotle], h a d he been able to r e a d it w i t h the eyes w i t h w h i c h s o m e o n e reads, w h o i s n o t h i m . "

5 6

Notes 1. The f o l l o w i n g abbreviations for Heidegger's writings w i l l be used i n parentheses in the body of my essay (the page numbers given after the slash are those of the available English translation; however, I take responsibility for all translations appearing in this essay):

25

264 GA

M a r t i n Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am M a i n : V i t t o r i o Klostermann, 1976 - ) .

Earliest FS BG

BK

(1910-1917)

Frühe Schriften ( G A , v o l . 2). " B r i e f an G r a b m a n n " ( i n Hermann Köstler, "Heidegger Grabmann," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 87 [1980]).

Youthful AJ

Works

works

schreibt

an

(1919-1925126)

" A n m e r k u n g e n zu K a r l Jaspers 'Psychologie der Weltanschauungen" (1919-1921)" (in G A , vol. 9) " B r i e f an K r e b s " (1919) ( i n Bernhard Casper, " M a r t i n Heidegger und die Theologische

Fakultät

Freiburg,"

in

Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv,

1980,

Kirche am Oberhein, hrsg. Remigius Bäumer, K a r l Suso Frank, Hugo Ott [Freiburg: V e r l a g Herder, 1980]) Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs ( G A , v o l . 20; translated as History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, tr. Theodore K i s i e l [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1985]) HF Ontotogie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) ( G A , v o l . 63) IP " D i e Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem" (in G A , v o l . 56/57) LW Logic. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit ( G A , v o l . 21) PA Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung ( G A , v o l . 61) P W "Phänomenologie und transzendentale W e r t p h i l o s o p h i e " ( i n G A , v o l . 56/57) WU "Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen S t u d i u m s " ( i n G A , v o l . 56/57) GZ

Later BH

Works

(1927-1976)

" B r i e f an Husserl" ( i n Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, Husserliana, ΓΧ, ed. Walter B i e m e l [The Hague: M a rt in us N i j h o f f , 1968], pp. 600-602)

B K B " B r i e f a n Krämer-Badoni" ( i n Rainer A . Bast, " B e r i c h t : E i n B r i e f M a r t i n Heideggers an R u d o l f Krämer-Badoni über die K u n s t , " Phänomenologische Forschung, 18 [ 1 9 8 6 ] , pp. 175-182) BR " B r i e f an Richardson" (German and English) ( i n W i l l i a m J. Richardson, EM

Through Phenomenology to Thought [The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1963]) Einführung in die Metaphysik ( G A , v o l . 40; translated as An Introduction to Metaphysics,

GP

tr.

Ralph M a n n h e i m

[ N e w Haven: Y a l e University

Press,

1959]) Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie ( G A , v o l . 24; translated as Basic Problems of Phenomenology, tr. A l b e r t Hofstadter [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1982])

26

265 IK

Phänomenologische ( G A , v o l . 25)

KM

Ρ

Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik ( G A , v o l . 3; translated as Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. C h u r c h i l l [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1965]) Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz ( G A , v o l . 26; translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, tr. M i c h a e l H e i m [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1984]) " D i e Idee der Phänomenologie" ( i n E d m u n d Husserl, Phänomenologische

S

Psychologie, Husserliana, IX, ed. Walter B i e m e l , pp. 2 5 6 - 2 6 3 ; translated as "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. Thomas J. Sheehan, Listening, 12 [1977], pp. 111-117) Seminare ( G A , v o l . 15)

ML

SD SZ

Interpretation

von

Kants

Kritik

der

reinen

Vernunft

Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: M a x Niemeyer, 1976); translated as On Time and Being, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New Y o r k : Harper & R o w , 1972) Sein und Zeit ( G A , v o l . 2; translated as Being and Time, tr. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson [ O x f o r d : Basil B l a c k w e l l , 1967])

US

Unterwegs zur Sprache ( G A , v o l . 12; translated as On the Way to Language, tr. Peter D. Hertz [San Francisco: Harper & R o w , 1971]) VA Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1985) W M Wegmarken ( G A , v o l . 9 ) ZP

"Über das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im D e n k e n der Seinsfrage" ( i n Phänomenologie - lebendig oder tot?, hrsg. Helmut Gehrig [Karlsruhe Badenia, 1969], p. 47; translated as "The Understanding of T i m e in Phenomenology and in the T h i n k i n g of the Being-Question," tr. Thomas Sheehan and Frederick Elliston, The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 [1979]: 200-201) A shorter version of my essay was presented in June, 1988 at the Semicentennial Meeting of the North American Husserl Circle at W i l f r i d Laurier University, Ontario, Canada. I am grateful to especially Burt Hopkins for his helpful comments, as w e l l as for his m a k i n g available copies of Husserl's letters to Heidegger between 1916 and 1932, the originals of w h i c h are preserved in the Husserl Archives in Leuven, B e l g i u m .

2. For a list of his already published youthful writings, as w e l l as those planned for publication, see the publisher's prospectus: Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Stand: Juni 1989 ( V i t t o r i o Klostermann). As of 1988, his unpublished youthful writings planned for publication have been turned over to the respective editors and thus presumably w i l l all be published by the turn o f the century. 3. In his later reflections on the origins of his early thought, Heidegger reported that he had been studying Husserl's Logical investigations " f r o m 1909 onwards" and had expected "decisive a i d " from it for the question of being which he had discovered in Franz Brentano's On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle and in Carl Braig's On Being: An Outline of Ontology. (SD, 8 1 - 8 2 / 7 4 - 7 5 ; FS, 56/translated by Hans Seigfried as "A Recollection,"

27

266 in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Precedent Publishing, 1981], p. 21). 4. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1982), p. 340.

Sheehan

Movement

(The

[Chicago: Hague:

5. T h e i r philosophical collaboration p r i o r to 1919 was apparently restricted to some correspondence and Husserl's assistance in getting Heidegger's habilitation w r i t i n g on Duns Scotus published in 1916. (FS, 191) 6. Thomas J. Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical B i o g r a p h y , " Listening 12 (1977): 7. 7. K a r l Jaspers, " O n Heidegger," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 7 (1978): 108. 8. D o r i o n Caims, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, ed. Richard M. Zaner (The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1976), p. 9. 9. Theodore J. K i s i e l , "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," in A Companion to Heidegger's "Being and Time," ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington, D C : Centre for A d v a n c e d Phenomenological Research and U n i v e r s i t y Press of A m e r i c a , 1986), p. 24. 10. See "Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen von M a r t i n Heidegger," in W i l l i a m J. Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1963), pp. 6 6 3 - 6 6 5 ; K i s i e l , "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," pp. 2 8 - 2 9 . 1 1 . Quoted in Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years," p. 5. 12. For example, his unpublished 1923-24 lecture course The Beginning of Modern Philosophy (Introduction to Phenomenological Research) contains a detailed discussion of Husserl's Logical Investigations (see Theodore K i s i e l , " O n the W a y to Being and Time; Introduction to the Translation of H e i d e g ger's Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs", Research in Phenomenology, X V , p. 196). 13. Cf. SZ, 51/63; BR, x i i i / x i i ; S, 379; ZP, 4 7 / 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 . 14. In 1923, he held an o f f i c i a l seminar entitled "Phenomenological Exercises (Husserl's Logical Investigations, V o l . I I ) " and, in 1922-23, held another seminar entitled "Husserl, Ideas, I . " 15. SZ, 67, n. 9/75, n. x; 289, n. 15/261, n. x x x i v ; 480, n. 10/414, n. x x i i i . 16. Regarding p. 192 (lines 22-29)/pp. 141 (lines 3 9 - 4 0 ) - 1 4 2 ( I i n e s 1-5), see the "Errata" published at the beginning of PA, I I . 17. E. Husserl, A. Pfänder, "Fünf B r i e f e , " in Pfänder-Studien, hrsg. Η. Spiegel berg, Ε. Ανέ-Lallemant (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 345. 18. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger's Wege (Tübingen: J.C.B. M o h r , 1983), pp. 130, 118; Gesammelte Werke, Bd. II (Tübingen: J.C.B. M o h r , 1986), p. 484; "Der Eine W e g M a r t i n Heideggers," in Jahresgabe der MartinHeidegger-Gesellschaft, 1986, p. 13. Heidegger's interpretations of the history of philosophy in the early 1920s became a model for Gadamer's notion o f "fusion o f horizons." 19. When Husserl finally became aware of the differences between h i m s e l f and his "phenomenological c h i l d " Heidegger, he took up in his o w n way Heidegger's suggestions for r e - t h i n k i n g phenomenology in terms of "factical

78

267 l i f e " and undertook his o w n "fusion of horizons" w i t h Heidegger's new version of phenomenology. He d i d this in the r e w o r k i n g of his Cartesian Meditations and in his Crisis, w h i c h for the first time systematically introduced his notion of the " l i f e - w o r l d . " See Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 56; Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D o r i o n Cairns (The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1970), p. 158. In his later introduction to his Ideas, Husserl discussed Heidegger's new version of phenomenology and spoke of how "transcendental phenomenology" "includes all questions that are raised concerning concrete human l i f e " ( E d m u n d Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie and phänomenologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch, Husserliana, Bd. V [ D e n Haag: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1952), p. 141). Husserl once remarked that Heidegger's analyses of the environing w o r l d were rooted in paragraph 27 of Husserl's o w n Ideas (Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's ' I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Phenomenology of R e l i g i o n ' , 1 9 2 0 - 2 1 , " in The Personalist, 60 [ 1 9 7 9 ] : 318). 20. He maintained that " A r i s t o t l e [was] really in De A n i m a phenomenological (without the e x p l i c i t Reduction)" (quoted in Herbert Spiegelberg, "Husserl to Heidegger; F r o m a 1928 D i a r y by W . R . Boyce G i b s o n , " Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2 [ 1 9 7 1 ] : 73). 2 1 . Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, p. 4 1 . 22. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 118. See also Theodore K i s i e l , "The M i s s i n g L i n k in the Early Heidegger," in Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Lectures and Essays, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington, D C : University Press of America, 1988), pp. 1-40. 23. See Theodore K i s i e l , " W h y the First Draft of Being and Time was Never Published," in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 20 (1989): 3-22. Heidegger's essay was an expanded version of his 1924 M a r b u r g talk w h i c h bore the same title and w h i c h Gadamer has called the " o r i g i n a l f o r m of Being and Time" (Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 29). Cf. SZ, 356, n. 3/313, n. i i i . 24. Hannah Arendt, " M a r t i n Heidegger at E i g h t y , " in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. M i c h a e l M u r r a y ( N e w Haven and L o n d o n : Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 . 25. K i s i e l , "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," p. 24. 26. For a general account of Heidegger's youthful period, w h i c h also deals w i t h his readings of Aristotle and Christian authors, see my "The Y o u n g Heidegger: Rumor of a Hidden K i n g ( 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 6 ) , " Philosophy Today (1989) (forthcoming). 27. In addition to those already cited, the f o l l o w i n g studies of the y o u n g Heidegger's relation to Husserl have also influenced my o w n study: Jacques Taminiaux, "Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations: In remembrance of Heidegger's last seminar (Zähringen)," in Radical Phenomenology, ed. John Sallis (Atlantic Highlands, N J : Humanities Press, 1978), pp. 5 8 - 8 3 ; Theodore K i s i e l , "Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of the Categorial," in Continental Philosophy in America, eds. H u g h J. Silverman,

29

268 John Sallis, Thomas Μ. Seebohm (Pittsburgh: Duquesne U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983),

pp.

177-185;

Phänomenbegriffs,"

Otto

Pöggeler,

Phänomenologische

"Heideggers

Forschung

9

Neubestimmung

(1980):

des

124-162.

28. See PA, 35: "Skepticism is a beginning, and as the genuine beginning it is also the end of p h i l o s o p h y . " In a 1919 letter to Engelbert Krebs, his Catholic patron at the university in Freiburg, Heidegger wrote that "epistemological insights, extending to the theory of historical knowledge, have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me - not, however, Christianity and metaphysics (these, though, in a new sense) . . . " (BK, 541) He w r o t e to K a r l Löwith in 1921 that he was "not a 'philosopher' in any sense at a l l , " but rather someone " w h o has the single task (completely unsuitable for the schoolroom and progress) of c r i t i c a l l y destroying the traditional conceptuality of western philosophy and theology, where it can indeed also turn out that sometimes he is o n l y threshing ' e m p t y straw'." ( K a r l Löwith, Heidegger:

Denker in dürftiger Zeit,

2.

Aufl.

[Göttingen:

Vanden-

hoeck & Ruprecht, I 9 6 0 ] , p. 106) In his 1923 lecture course, he told his students "that, as far as he was concerned, philosophy was over." (reported in Thomas Sheehan, " T h e ' O r i g i n a l F o r m ' of Sein und Zeit: Heidegger's Der B e g r i f f der Zeit ( 1 9 2 4 ) , " in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 10 [ 1 9 7 9 ] : 82) 29. In his letter to W i l l i a m Richardson, Heidegger explained that there was a " b e n d " or " t w i s t " (Wendung) in his thought around 1930, w h i c h , however, was not really a " t u m " (Kehre) or "reversal" (Umkehr) f r o m a "Heidegger I" to a "Heidegger I I . " (BR, x v i i ) "Heidegger Π , " he insisted, was already contained i n " H e i d e g g e r I . " T h a t i s t o say, the basic " i n t e n t i o n " (Vorhaben) (BR, x v ) of his questioning remained the same f r o m the early 1920s onwards, namely, to ask what "'being' in and through l i f e " means, or, put in other words, to think the relation of being and factical life. Since this intention originated in the early twenties, one can rightly conclude, in the words of one commentator, that "Heidegger I I put i n a n appearance before Heidegger I . " (David

Farrell

Heidegger's

K r e l l , Intimations of Mortality:

Thinking

of

Being

[University

Time, Park:

Truth,

and Finitude

Pennsylvania

in

State

U n i v e r s i t y , 1986], p. 180, n. 3) The " b e n d " in his thought after 1930 concerns not so m u c h a transformation in the basic intention of his thought as rather the realization that the quasi-Kantian, "transcendental" language of his Being and Time led to an "inadequate interpretation of my o w n i n t e n t i o n " (BR, x v ) , w h i c h realization forced h i m to search for new and what he though! were more adequate ways of realizing his intention. If there is anything l i k e a basic " t u m " in his development, it is to be found rather in his y o u t h f u l turn away from the " o n t o - l o g i c " and the " o n t o t h e o l o g y " of his doctoral dissertation and his habilitation w r i t i n g . In his 1920-21 lecture course, he thus spoke of the necessity of a " c o m p l e t e tuming-around (Umwandlung) of p h i l o s o p h y . " He also

spoke

of his

philosophy

as

"the

going-back

(Rückgang)

into

the

o r i g i n a r y - h i s l o r i c a l . " (reported in Sheehan, "Heidegger's ' I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Phenomenology o f R e l i g i o n ' , 1 9 2 0 - 2 1 , " pp. 316, 317) T h i s notion o f " g o i n g back", along w i t h that of phenomenological " r e - d u c t i o n " as a "leading back"

30

269 from beings to being, are his first appellations for what he later called the "step back" out of metaphysics into an "other b e g i n n i n g . " After 1919, he turned away f r o m his earlier metaphysical lexicon of being as objectivity and value (content-meaning) for a transcendental consciousness (relational meaning), both of w h i c h were conceived w i t h i n the horizon of the fixed presence of l o g i c a l atemporality and the eternity of G o d (temporalizingmeaning). As I attempt to show below, what he turned towards was the "genuine b e g i n n i n g " of being as the " i t w o r l d s " of the w o r l d (contentmeaning) for the factical self (relational meaning), w h i c h happens as an " e v e n t " {Ereignis) (temporalizing-meaning). T h i s " e v e n t " o f the " i t w o r l d s " is more being than consciousness. As Gadamer has said, this is "the t u m before the t u m . " ( " D e r Eine W e g M a r t i n Heideggers," pp. 14-15) For Heidegger's

critique of m o d e m

"ego-metaphysics" f r o m

Descartes to

G e r m a n idealism and N e o - K a n t i a n i s m , see PA, 173, 88, 9 1 ; IP, 7 1 - 7 3 . For his critique of m o d e m technology, where he discusses Spengler's Decline of the West, see PA, 26, 74; PW, 130, 136; LW, 37; cf. AJ, 9. 30. Cf. Heidegger's later discussion of his early appropriation of the theme of intentionality as a " r e v o l u t i o n in the place of t h i n k i n g , " a "shift of place" from "consciousness" to " D a s e i n . " (S, 379-385). 3 1 . E d m u n d Husserl, Logische

Untersuchungen, Husserliana,

(Den

Bd. ΧΓΧ.Ι2

Haag; Martinus N i j h o f f , 1984), pp. 665-666; translated as Logical Investiga tions, Vol. 11, tr. J . N . Findlay ( L o n d o n : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 7 8 0 - 7 8 1 . A l l further references to this w o r k w i l l be given w i t h the abbrevia tion LU i n parentheses i n the body o f m y essay. 32. For a f u l l discussion of the traditional restriction of being to the copula in judgment, see Chapter 4 of Heidegger's 1927 lecture course (GP), w h i c h undoubtedly draws on his early reading of Husserl's s i x t h investigation. See also SZ, 212/202, 476/411. 33. In a later seminar, Heidegger described the Greek experience of being as a "superabundance" (Überfülle) and "excess (Übermass) of presence" (S, 331), thereby echoing Husserl's notion of being as an "excess" (Überschuss) (S, 334). Husserl's notion has to be seen as the precedent for Heidegger's talk of "transcendence," the "ontological difference," "ecstasis" and "existence" in Being

and

Time

and

his

1927

lecture

course

Grundprobleme

der

Phänomenologie (GP) (see especially Chapter 1 of the latter, w h i c h discusses Kant's statement that "being is not a real predicate"). See also Jacques Taminiaux, Likewise,

"Heidegger

and

Husserl's Logical Investigations," pp.

Heidegger's description of being as

77-83.

the " n o t h i n g " and

his

preference for saying of being not being ' i s ' , but rather es gibt, there is/it gives/it is given hearken back to Husserl's discussion of how, even though being is " g i v e n , " it is not a thing w h i c h is (SZ, 281/255; GP, 13-14/10). For other passages w h i c h hearken back to Husserl's notion of being as an "excess," see EM, 3 6 - 3 9 / 3 3 - 3 6 ; SD, 3/3. 34. See also .9, 3 7 7 - 3 7 8 : "Husserl's accomplishment consisted precisely in this m a k i n g present of being, w h i c h is phenomenally present in the category. T h r o u g h this accomplishment . . . I finally had a basis: ' b e i n g ' is no mere

31

270 concept, is no pure abstraction, w h i c h arises in the course of a derivation." (cf. 334) 35. For a discussion of D i l t h e y ' s influence on the young Heidegger, see Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983), pp. 3 0 - 3 6 ; K i s i e l , "Heidegger ( 1 9 0 7 - 1 9 2 7 ) : The Transformation of the Categorial," pp. 173-176; Gadamer, "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers" pp. 11-12. See also SD, 48/45. 36. IP, 7 1 - 7 3 , 8 8 - 8 9 ; WU, 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 ; PA, 9 1 , 97; GZ, 266/196, 300-301/219. 37. See also SZ, 67, n. 9/75, n. x: " B u t disclosing the a p r i o r i is not 'a-prioristic' construction. T h r o u g h E. Husserl we have once again learned not only to understand the meaning of all genuine philosophical e m p i r i c i s m , but also to make use of the necessary tools. ' A - p r i o r i s m ' is the method of every scientific philosophy w h i c h understands itself. There is nothing constructivistic about it. B u t for this very reason research on the a p r i o r i requires the proper preparation of the phenomenal basis. The horizon w h i c h is closest to us, w h i c h must be made ready for the analytic of Dasein, lies in its average everydayness." 38. See K i s i e l , "Heidegger ( 1 9 0 7 - 1 9 2 7 ) : The Transformation of the Categorial," pp. 173-176. 39. IP, 13-15; PA, 3 4 - 3 5 , 47, 88; HF, 10, 16, 7 1 ; GZ, 190/140. 40. See also Oskar Becker's report on Heidegger's 1923 lecture course in his "Mathematischer Existenz: Untersuchungen zur L o g i k und Ontologie mathematischer Phänomene," Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung, 8 (1927), p. 626. 4 1 . See also SZ, 201/193: "Dasein o n l y 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be ' f u l f i l l e d ' through the beings w h i c h are discoverable i n i t . " For Heidegger's acknowledgment o f Husserl's sixth investigation as the "basis" for his long discussion of " t r u t h " in Being and Time, see SZ, 289, n. 15/261, n. x x x i v . 42. Cf. Heidegger's c r i t i c a l appropriation of Husserl's " r e d u c t i o n " in his 1927 lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GP, 29/21). 43. E d m u n d Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch, Husserliana IV (Haag: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1952), pp., 161-169. 44. In his Being and Time, Heidegger presents his analysis of " h i s t o r y " as an "appropriation of D i l t h e y ' s w o r k " (SZ, 525/449). 45. Quoted in Thomas Sheehan, ' " I n t r o d u c t o r y N o t e ' to ' T h e Understanding of T i m e in Phenomenology and in the T h i n k i n g of the Being-Question," The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1 0 ( 1 9 7 9 ) : 199. 46. The lecture course w h i c h Heidegger scheduled for the winter semester of 1922-23 was entitled Skepticism in Ancient Philosophy (Phenomenological Interpretations of Sextus Empiricus, Hyporyposeon, I I I ) . See also W i l h e l m Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," in Martin Heideggers Einßuss auf die Wissenschaften (Bern: A. Franke A G . Verlag, 1949), pp. 7 5 - 7 6 . In his 1921-22 lecture course, Heidegger calls his o w n philosophy "skepticism." (PA, 35, 197) H i s interest in ancient skepticism belonged

32

271 together w i t h his interest in ancient rhetoric and the ethics of Socrates-Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, since all these have the virtue of making "factical l i f e " thematic. 47. In his 1925 lecture course, Heidegger notes that he has been studying the unpublished manuscript of the second v o l u m e of Husserl's Ideas (GZ, 168/121), in w h i c h the term "appresentation" occurs. He uses the terms "making-present" and "appresentation" interchangeably throughout this lecture course. 48. In his Being and Time, Heidegger acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl's notion of "making-present": "Husserl uses the expression ' m a k i n g present' to characterize sense perception . . . The intentional analysis of perception and i n t u i t i o n in general must have suggested this ' t e m p o r a l ' description of the phenomenon. That and h o w the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded i n the ecstatical temporality o f Dasein w i l l be shown in the f o l l o w i n g [never published] section" (SZ, 480, n. 10/414, n. xxiii). 49. Cf. Heidegger's comment in his 1928 lecture course (ML, 264/204): "That w h i c h Husserl s t i l l calls time-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of time, is precisely time itself, in the p r i m o r d i a l sense . . . Temporality in its temporalizing is the p r i m o r d i a l i y self-unifying unity of expectancy, retention and making-present." 50. In GZ, 106/78, Heidegger says thai the "matter itself" of Husserl's phenomenology is "intentionality in its apriori, understood in the t w o directions of intentio and internum." Here, in a glance, we can see his f u l l description of the "matter i t s e l f to w h i c h phenomenological i n q u i r y is supposed to be directed in accord w i t h Husserl's slogan " B a c k to the things themselves": first, the intentio-intentum relation is to be studied w i t h i n the sphere of factical life; and, second, the t h i r d moment of historical "temporalizing-meaning" is to be e x p l i c i t l y added. Here we n o w have the f u l l "matter i t s e l f o f the "phenomenon" o f intentionality. Heidegger's insight into especially the intentional moment of "temporalizing-meaning" is the genesis o f his life-long "matter" or " t o p i c " (Sache), w h i c h he w i l l pursue on his many later "thought-paths" ( p r i m a r i l y "the meaning of being," the "truth of being," and the "topos of being"). 5 1 . The general plans in Heidegger's t w o texts, his 1925 lecture course and his Being and Time, are v i r t u a l l y the same. 52. Quoted in Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 3 5 1 . Cf. HansGeorg Gadamer, Philosophische Lehrjahre: Eine Rückschau (Frankfurt: V i t t o r i o Klostermann, 1977), p. 173. 53. The w o r d "phenomenology" no longer occurs in the titles of Heidegger's lecture courses and seminars after 1929 ("Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen v o n M a r t i n Heidegger," pp. 6 6 3 - 6 6 5 ) . The later Heidegger does still consider his thought to be some form of phenomenology, e.g., a "phenomenology of the inconspicuous" (S, 399, cf. 288, 297; SD, 48/45, 90/82; BR, x v / x i v , x v i i / x v i ; WM, 357; ZP, 4 7 / 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ) . See also Bernard Boelen, " M a r t i n Heidegger as Phenomenologist," in Phenomenological

33

272 Perspectives: Historical and Systematic Essays in Honor of Herbert Spiegelberg (The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1975), pp. 9 3 - 1 1 4 ; Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 4 0 1 ^ t 0 7 . But the later Heidegger reads Husserl's phenomenology no longer in the light of D i l t h e y , A r i s t o t l e ' s practical thought, and Kierkegaard, but rather in the light of especially the Pre-Socratics. See his 1973 seminar on his youthful appropriation of Husserl's Logical Investigations, in w h i c h he concludes by retrieving Husserl's notion o f truth f r o m the point o f v i e w o f Parmenides' concept o f aletheia (S, 133-138; cf. SD, 7 1 - 8 0 / 6 4 - 7 3 ) . Husserl's thought is here v i r t u a l l y eclipsed. One of the participants of Heidegger's 1973 seminar, Jacques T a m i n i a u x , found " s u r p r i s i n g " Heidegger's "reservation" and "silence" regarding the "extent of insight that this fascinating text had exerted on h i m " ( T a m i n i a u x , "Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations," pp. 75, 82). 54. Friedrich W i l h e l m von Herrmann, " D i e E d i t i o n der Vorlesungen Heideggers in seiner Gesamtausgabe letzter H a n d , " Heidegger Studies 2 (1986): 154. 55. See my " D e m y t h o l o g i z i n g Heidegger," in Philosophy in Canada, V o l . 1, ed. Fiore G u i d o ( M i l l i k e n , Ontario: A g a t h o n Books, 1989) (forthcoming). For an example of e m p l o y i n g Heidegger's y o u t h f u l language in an interpretation of his w h o l e thought, see John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, De construction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1987). 56. Gadamer, " D e r Eine W e g M a r t i n Heideggers," p. 9.

34

Dasein, the Being that Thematizes

ROBERT B R A N D O M

I . Background

D

OES t h e s t r u c t u r e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t c o m m i t h t m to understanding

D a s e i n a s i n v o l v i n g language

in

p r i n c i p l e ? I w i l l argue h e r e t h a t h e is c o m m i t t e d t o

t h e c l a i m t h a t the sort o f l i n g u i s t i c assertional practice h e

c a l l s " t h e m a t i z i n g " i s a n essential feature o f D a s e i n , a n d so, t h a t n o t h i n g c o u l d b e D a s e i n unless i t t r e a t s s o m e t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t . T o see w h y t h i s w o u l d b e a n

interesting and

i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t , i t i s necessary t o rehearse some o f t h e basic features t h a t m a k e Heidegger's a p p r o a c h d i s t i n c t i v e a n d o r i g inal.

Being and T i m e c a n be u n d e r s t o o d as p r o p o u n d i n g a

n o r m a t i v e p r a g m a t i s m . T h e e x p l a n a t o r y strategy i n v o k e d b y this expression comprises t w o d i s t i n c t c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e first regards t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d t h e f a c t u a l

'"Das thematisierende Seiende, das Da$em" (364; English 415). A l l references w i l l be given i n this form: the page numbers i n the German original ot the Gesamtausgabe ( v o l . 2) are given first, and the Macquarrie and Robinson English translation page numbers or Being and Time are given thereafter, e.g., (364; English 415).

35

1

realms; t h e s e c o n d regards t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n n o r m s t a k i n g t h e e x p l i c i t f o r m o t rules a n d n o r m s t a k i n g t h e i m p l i c i t t e r m of proprieties of practice. I n e a c h case t h e q u e s t i o n i s o n e o f c o n c e p t u a l a n d e x p l a n a t o r y p r i o r i t y . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n treats t h e f a c r u a l a s t h e basic f o r m o f t h e r e a l a n d seeks t o e x p l a i n t h e n o r m a t i v e b y adding s o m e t h i n g , w h i c h m i g h t g e n e r i c a l l y b e c a l l e d v a l ues. W h a t i s o b j e c t i v e l y r e a l has a c l o a k o f s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e s o r s i g n i f i c a n c e s t h r o w n o v e r i t b y its r e l a t i o n t o h u m a n i n t e r ests or desires.

2

By c o n t r a s t , H e i d e g g e r t r e a t s as p r i m i t i v e a

c e r t a i n k i n d o f s o c i a l n o r m a t i v e a r t i c u l a t i o n a n d seeks t o d e f i n e t h e f a c t u a l as a s p e c i a l case p i c k e d o u t by subtracting something, namely certain kinds of relations to h u m a n projects. A g a i n ,

the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n treats n o r m s as

c a n o n i c a l l y c o d i f i e d i n t h e f o r m o f e x p l i c i t rules w h i c h d e t e r m i n e w h a t i s c o r r e c t b y saying o r d e s c r i b i n g w h a t i s c o r r e c t . E a c h p r o p r i e t y o f practice,

t h e grasp o f w h i c h consists

k n o w i n g how t o d o s o m e t h i n g c o r r e c t l y ,

in

is c o n c e i v e d as

u n d e r w r i t t e n b y a pnnciple, t h e grasp o f w h i c h consists i n k n o w i n g thai a p a r t i c u l a r s o r t o f p e r f o r m a n c e i s c o r r e c t . B y c o n t r a s t , H e i d e g g e r treats a s p r i m i t i v e a c e r t a i n k i n d o f n o r m t h a t is implicit in p r a c t i c e a n d seeks to d e f i n e explicit r u l e s , principles, and claims in terms of the practical proprieties o f using t h e m . H e i d e g g e r sets o u t these c o m m i t m e n t s i n t h e f o r m o f a n account of the relations between three fundamental o n t o l o g i c a l categories, o r m o r e o f f i c i a l l y , r e g i o n s o f b e i n g w i t h i n which

different

sorts

of entities

Zuhandensein, a n d Vorhandensein.

2

are

disclosed:

Dasein,

Dasein is the k i n d of b e i n g

Heidegget formulates his view by opposition to this: " I n inter-

pretinE we do not.

so to speak, throw a 'signification over some naked

t'hin^ which is p r e s e n t - a t - h a n c i , we do nor stick a value on i t " (150; English 191). See also (68; English 97) and (99; English 132).

36

w e ourselves h a v e . ' A l t h o u g h t h e task o t t h e w h o l e b o o k i s t o l a y o u t t h e basic make-Lip (Cmmdverfassung) o f D a s e i n , t w o features m a y b e s i n g l e d o u t b y w a y o t i n t r o d u c t i o n . F i r s t , D a s e i n is an e s s e n t i a l l y social sort of b e i n g . H e i d e g g e r ' s t e r m 4

(cir o u r s o c i a l i t y is .Mitsein, or b e i n g - w i t h . S e c o n d , an essent i a l s t r u c t u r e o f D a s e i n i s t h a t i r a l w a y s alreadv f i n d s i t s e l f i n a worlds To say t h i s is to say t h a t t h e o n t o l o g i c a l categories of D a s e i n a n d Zu/iandensein ( a v a i l a b i l i t y ) are i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d .

6

F o r apart f r o m o t h e r s w h o s e w a y o f b e i n g i s also t h a t o f D a s e i n , t h e w o r l d consists o f w h a t i s zuhanden, t h a t is, readyto-hand,

or

available.

The

available

comprises

what

H e i d e g g e r c a l l s e q u i p m e n t ( Z e u g ) — t h i n g s t h a t are used o r d e a l t w i t h i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s a n d s o are t h i c k w i t h p r a c t i c a l proprieties or significances that d e t e r m i n e h o w it is appropriate t o t r e a t t h e m . T o c a l l s o m e t h i n g a v a i l a b l e i s t o t r e a t i t a s s o m e t h i n g t h a t c a n b e used c o r r e c t l y o r i n c o r r e c t l y , a c c o r d i n g t o proprieties i m p l i c i t i n practices i n s t i t u t e d a n d pursued b y D a s e i n . H a m m e r s are a p a r a d i g m o f a k i n d o f e n r i t y t h a t e x h i b i t s t h i s sort o f b e i n g — t h e y are p r o p e r l y used i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f d r i v i n g n a i l s , a l t h o u g h i t i s possible t o use t h e m a s

'The section titled "The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein" states "We are ourselves the entity to be analyzed" ( 4 1 ; English 67). '"Dasein in itself is essentially Being-wirh" (120; English 156). "So tar as Dasein is at all. it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being" (125; English 163). s

"'Being-in' is thus the formal existential expression for the Being ot

Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state" (54; English nö). "'Dasein' means Being-m-ilie-woud" (165, English 208). 6

1 use category here not in Heidegger's technical sense (for Existenz is

not in that sense a category), but in the sense of "ontological category" 'hnt I detail in "Heideggers Categories in Being and Time." which was reprinted in Heidegger A Ctiu'iui Rcudey. pages 45—64· This essay, to which the present one is a companion, is hereafter referred to as "HCBT."

37

ballast o r weapons.

7

T h e practical norms d e t e r m i n i n g the cor-

rect way o f u s i n g bits o f e q u i p m e n t t y p i c a l l y reiate t h e m t o o t h e r hits o f e q u i p m e n t — h a m m e r s t o nails, nails t o boards, tires to cars, cars to roads, a n d so o n . T h e w o r l d is a h o l i s t i c t o t a l i t y o f such p r a c t i c a l n o r m a t i v e e q u i p m e n t a l i n v o l v e m e n t s . " V'or/ujndensein ( o c c u r r e n c e ) is t h e r e a l m of o b j e c t i v e facts. It consists o f o b j e c t s t h a t are m e r e l y present a n d o f t h e i r m a t t e r of-factual,

non-normative

properties.

Treating

things

as

vorhanden i s t a k i n g t h e m t o b e w h a t t h e y are, i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any p r o p r i e t i e s o f p r a c t i c e i n s t i t u t e d b y Dasein's a c t i v i t i e s . T h u s o c c u r r e n c e i s Heidegger's w a y o f t a l k i n g a b o u t w h a t t h e p h i l o sophical t r a d i t i o n talked about under the h e a d i n g of Reality. W h a t i s o c c u r r e n t differs f r o m w h a t i s a v a i l a b l e i n t h a t i t i s n o t made t o b e w h a t i t i s b y b e i n g c a u g h t u p i n n o r m a t i v e s o c i a l practices, w h i c h situate i t w i r h respect t o D a s e i n ' s p r o j e c t s . '

'"But the 'indicating' of the sign and the 'hammering' of the hammer are not properties of entities. A n y t h i n g ready-to-hand is, at the worst, appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others" (83; English 114-15). "Serviceability, too, however, as a constitutive state of equipment . . . is not an appropriateness of some entity; it is rather the condition (so far as Being is in question) which makes it possible for the character of such an entity to be defined by its appropriatenesses" (83; English 115). s

" A s the Being of something ready-to-hand, an involvement is itself

discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements" (85; English 118). "Being-in-the-world, according to our interpretation hitherto, amounts to a nonthematic circumspective absorption in references or assignmenrs constitutive for the readiness-tohand of a totality of equipment" (67; English 107). 'These projects are not to be understood as explicitly conceived and adopted. "Projecting" is an implicit practical attitude or orientation: "Projecting has norhing to do w i t h comporting oneself towatds a plan thar has been thought out. The character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects—thai is to say, possibilities" (145; English 185).

38

ι - ft ft ι

M«-

l A u e m . ihe Being injc Tncrr,.'/

Dasein. ?·ν D€>ng ;h^ii TVunmiij.'ö

ι-

involvcmenf.

1 6

I n s t e a d o f t r e a t i n g t h e t h i n g a s a v a i l a b l e for

v a r i o u s sorts o f p r a c t i c a l uses, o n e treats i t a s a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e s p o n d e d t o only b y m a k i n g a s s e r t i o n s a b o u t i t . t h e o r e t i c a l r a t h e r t h a n a p r a c t i c a l response,

1 7

T h i s is a

t h e difference

b e i n g m a r k e d o u t b y t h e fact t h a t t h e assertional o r j u d g m e n t a l responses are themselves available or serviceable

18

for f o r m u l a t i n g

t h e u p s h o t o f p e r c e p t i o n , u s i n g a s f o d d e r for i n f e r e n c e s , o r f o r

" " I f knowing is to be possible as a wav of determining the nature of the occurrent by observing it, then there must be tirsr a deficiency in our having-to-do-with the world concernfully. W h e n concern holds back from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside. T h i s kind of being towards the world is one which lets us encounter entities withm-the-world purely in the way ihey look" (61; English 88). "Thematizing Objectifies. It does not first 'posit' the entities, but frees them so that one can interrogate them and determine rheir character 'Objectively'. Being w h i c h Objectifies and which is alongside the occurrent within-the-world, is characterized by a distinctive kind of making-present. This making-present is distinguished from the Present of circumspection in that—above all—the kind of discovering which belongs to the science in question awaits solely the discoveredness of the occurrent. We shall not trace further how science has its source in authentic existence. It is enough for now if we understand that rhe thematirmg of entities within-the-world presupposes Being-in-the-world n< the basic state of Dasein" (363; English 414, translation tevised). 1

Thus one can themati:e (make assertions about! what is nor present-

ar-hand "Even that which is ready-to-hand can be made a theme for scientific investigation. The teady-to-hand can become the O b j e c t ' of a science without having to lose its character as equipment" (361; Enuli^h 413). M u c h of Being and Time does just that (cf. the title of section La: "The task ol a themanc analysis of Being-in"), "'"The assertion is something available" (224; English 267, translation revised)

41

L\'iSL'in

inc' B o n g irml i h i ' m a t i i v i

c o m m u n i c a t i n g t o o t h e r s . T h e assertions w i t h w h i c h i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o respond t o s o m e t h i n g p e r c e p t i b l e d o n o t d e p e n d on the particular practical projects t h a t a n i m a t e the a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e assertor ( a l t h o u g h t h e p r a c t i c a l i n f e r e n c e s i n w h i c h o n e goes on

to

use

those

assertions

as premises

may

well

so

depend). T h e h o l d i n g - b a c k t h a t underlies treating something a s m e r e l y occuiTent, t h e " j u s t l o o k i n g " a t i t , consists i n m e d i a t i n g one's p r a c t i c a l responses b y a l e v e l o f a s s e r t i o n , t h e p r a c t i c a l p r o p r i e t i e s o f w h i c h s w i n g free o f p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i c a l p r o j e c t s . T h i s i s w h y " o c c u r r e n c e . . . i s t h e s p e c i a l t y o f assert i o n " (158; E n g l i s h 2 0 1 ) . " I t i s i n this way t h a t k n o w - h o w , p r a c t i c a l mastery o f w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s s p e c i f i c a l l y l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e , distances o b j e c t s a n d states o f affairs f r o m t h e p r o j e c t s o f D a s e i n b y r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e m ( f o r i n s t a n c e , perceptually). Knowing-that is founded on knowing-how. A s p e c i a l case o f t h e t h e m a t i z i n g use o f s e n t e n c e s i s t o state rules. W i t h respect t o t h i s p r a g m a t i c c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e e x p l a n a t o r y p r i o r i t y o f n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n practice over those e x p l i c i t i n rules, H e i d e g g e r belongs i n a b o x w i t h t h e later W i t t g e n s t e i n . F o r i n t h e investigations, W i t t g e n s t e i n argues t h a t e x p l i c i t rules c a n n o t b e t h e o n l y f o r m t a k e n b y n o r m s , o n t h e basis o f t h e regress t h a t i s r e v e a l e d w h e n i t i s n o t i c e d that f o l l o w i n g a rule is itself s o m e t h i n g t h a t can be done correctly or incorrectly. C a l l i n g a rule t h a t governs the a p p l i c a t i o n of another rule

an "interpretation," Wittgenstein

argues t h a t " t h e r e m u s t b e s o m e w a y o f f o l l o w i n g a r u l e t h a t does n o t c o n s i s t i n a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , b u t i n f o l l o w i n g o r

" T h e whole passage reads: "This leveling of the primordial 'as' of circumspective interpretation to the 'as' with which presence-at-hand is given a definite character is the specialty of assertion. Only so does it obtain the possibiliry ot exhibiting something in such a way that we just look at it." (See also 162; English 89] concerning the relation between perception and assertion, which is discussed below in connection w i t h curiosity.)

42

1 • ι > < > I 11 < -

U a s c m . ihe Being th*u

g o i n g against

i t i n p r a c t i c e " (Phibsophical investigations 2 0 1 ) .

T h e p o s s i b i l i t y o t m a k i n g n o r m s e x p l i c i t i n t h e f o r m o f rules, w h i c h determine

what

is correct and

i n c o r r e c t b y saying

w h a t does a n d does n o t q u a l i f y , d e p e n d s o n a n u n d e r l y i n g possibility o f d i s c r i m i n a t i n g n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n t h e practice o f doing t h i n g s c o r r e c t l y a n d

incorrectly and responding

to such performances n o n l i n g u i s t i c a l l y as correct and incorrect. W i t h o u t s u c h p r a c t i c a l a b i l i t i e s , rules c o u l d n o t b e a p p l i e d — i t c a n n o t b e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( i n t h i s sense) a l l t h e w a y d o w n . 2 0 These,

then,

are

the

two

n o r m a t i v e p r a g m a t i s m : first,

components

of

Heidegger's

understanding the factual

in

t e r m s o f t h e n o r m a t i v e ( v i a t h e n o r m s g o v e r n i n g t h e use o f assertions, w h i c h

are

t h e o n l y a p p r o p r i a t e response t o t h e

o c c u r r e n t as such); a n d second, u n d e r s t a n d i n g g o v e r n m e n t by n o r m s e x p l i c i t i n t h e f o r m o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y s t a t a b l e rules i n terms o f g o v e r n m e n t b y n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n the f o r m o f skillful practical discriminations of appropriate and inappropriate performances ( i n particular, applications to i n d i v i d u a l unre p e a t a b l e cases o f t h e r e p e a t a h l e s e n t e n c e s t h a t express g e n e r a l rules).

T h e first

is

u n d e r s t a n d i n g Vorhandensein

in

terms of

Zuhandensein, a n d t h e s e c o n d is u n d e r s t a n d i n g Zuhandensein as i n t h e first i n s t a n c e a m a t t e r o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e r a t h e r t h a n individual propositionally contentful cognition or intellectual a c h i e v e m e n t ( " t h e m a t i z i n g " ) . I t i s n a t u r a l t o u n d e r s t a n d these p r i o r i t y claims in terms of a "layer cake" m o d e l , according to which

there

could

be

Dasein

and

Zu/ianaensem

without

Vorhandensein, w h i c h arises f r o m t h e m o n l y i f D a s e i n a d o p t s c e r t a i n o p t i o n a l practices a n d p r a c t i c a l attitudes, i n v o l v i n g t h e use o f c e r t a i n sorts o f s o p h i s t i c a t e d e q u i p m e n t , n a m e l y sentences used

t o m a k e c l a i m s a n d state

rules. T h i s

is an

u n d e r s t a n d i n g a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e c l a i m t h a t "assertion i s

discuss this line of thought in more detail in the first chapter of Making It Explicit.

43

I r^cmauiei

:Λζν:η

epoch*

[ho fvir.i; thai nwmdli^e^

derived f r o m i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g " (160; E n g l i d i 2 0 1 ) i n v o k e s d e r i v a t i o n i n a sense i m p l y i n g t h e autonomy o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g layet o t " c i r c u m s p e c t i v e ' ' ( t h a t is, p t a c t i c a l ) acknowledgments of proprieties in dealing w i t h equipment. T h e l e v e l o f assettions. a n d s o o t a d o p t i n g t h e p t a c t i c a l a t t i t u d e o f t r e a t i n g t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t , l o o k s l i k e a n o p t i o n a l super structure, w h i c h m i g h t b e erected o n t o p o f h u m a n existence (Dasein) and the being of equipment

(Zutanderisein),

but

w h i c h equally w e l l m i g h t n o t b e found along w i t h t h e m . 2 1 I n a n s w e r i n g t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n " B y what existential-

ontological modifications does assertion arise from circumspective interpretation?" ( 1 5 7 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 0 ) , H e i d e g g e r a p p a r e n t l y says n o t h i n g t h a t w o u l d i n d i c a t e t h a t , g i v e n t h e sort o f b e i n g f r o m w h i c h t h e y are d e r i v e d , a s s e r t i o n a n d presentness must arise. I t w o u l d seem possible, a n d i n t h e s p i r i t o f t h e e n t e r p r i s e , t o sup pose t h a t o n e c o u l d c o h e r e n t l y t a k e s o m e c o m m u n i t y t o consist o f e n t i t i e s w i t h Dasein's k i n d o f b e i n g , i n s t i t u t i n g b y t h e i r p r a c t i c e s a w o r l d o f zuhanden e q u i p m e n t , w h i l e n o t supposing t h a t they c a n talk, a n d do so w h i l e d e n y i n g t h a t t h e y t r e a t a n y t h i n g a s vorhanden. O n t h i s r e a d i n g , H e i d e g g e r portrays

an

autonomous,

preconceptual,

prepropositional,

prelinguistic level of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y — n a m e l y practical, skillladen, n o r m - g o v e r n e d directedness t o w a r d e q u i p m e n t treated as available. As b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , Dasein can already be d i s c e r n e d a t t h i s l e v e l . I t m a y o r m a y n o t b e t h e case f o r a n y particular c o m m u n i t y o f e x i s t i n g entities, entities whose way o f b e i n g i s t h a t o f D a s e i n , t h a t o n t h i s p r a c t i c a l base a t h e o r e t i cal superstructure of c o n c e p t u a l , p r e p o s i t i o n a l , linguistic, or i n Heidegger's t e r m i n o l o g y , t h e m a t i c i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , i s e r e c t e d

: i

l n tact, 1 endorse priority of implicit practical norms over the

capacity to make anything explicit ;r. Mating Ii Explicit. Bur 1 have come to believe that, tempting as it is to attribute this view to Heidegger, as I argue below, he is in fact committed to rejecting i t .

44

'-A^cir. iMe Bern? inc.: i ncrr.,inzL.

«' ρ 4 (October 198 I ) . 5361 3. By "Wittgensteinian," we mean interpretations that stress the linguistic and social d i mensions of Dasein. The following works are representative of Ibis interpretation: KarlO l i o Apel, "Wittgenstein und Heidegger. Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein und der Sinnlosigkcitsvctdachl gegen alle Metaphysik." i n O l l o P t i g g c l c r (ed.). Ilcidcggci (König stein. Athenäum, 1984). 358-396; Robert Brandom, "Heideggers Categories in Being and Time',' in Hubert L. Dtcyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.), Heidegger. Λ Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackweih 1992), 45-64; Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World (Cambridge, Mass.: M I T . 1991): Charles Guignon, Heidegger and tlic Problem of Knowledge (Indi anapolis: Hackcll. 1983): John llaugchmd. "Heidegger on Being a Person" in Dreyfus and H a l l , Heidegger: A Critical Reader, 1-26. 4. Heidegger's "Rede" has been translated as "discourse," "discursiveness," "talk." and "telling." We shall translate il as "discourse" throughout. 5. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, 111. 6. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge.

115.

7. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge,

118.

8. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge. 118, 126. For a very helpful dis cussion of the constitutive view of language in later Heidegger, see Charles Guignon. "Heidegger: Language as the House of Being" in Chip Sills ( e i l ) . The Philosophy of Discourse (Portsmouth. N . H . : Boynton/Cook Publishers. 1992), 163-187. esp. 177 183. 9. Heidegger: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeilbegriffs: Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 20 (Frank furt a. Μ.: Vittorio Klostcrmann, 1979), 365; English trans, by Theodore Kisiel, I he History of the Concept of Time (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). 265. 10. Heidegger. Prolegomena, p. 361; English trans.. 262. 11. Dreyfus uses different words at different times. "Everyday" is sometimes replaced by the term "average." In place of "social," Dreyfus occasionally says "shared" (terms rarely em ployed by Heidegger) or "public." Dreyfus sometimes attaches to "practices" (rarely used by Heidegger) Ihe word "background." For convenience, we slick to Ihe phrase "everyday social practices." 12. Dreyfus, Being-in-thc-Woiid, 154, 161. 13. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 154f., 161. 14. Dreyfus even goes so far as lo identify "being" with "the intelligibility correlative w i t h our everyday background practices." See Being-in-the-World, 10. 15. Frederick Olafson, "Heidegger ά la Wittgenstein or 'Coping' w i l h Professor Dreyfus." Inquiry 37 (1994): 4.5-64, here 55. On Ihe differences between ihe interpretations of Dreyfus and Olafson. sec Taylor Carman. " O n Being Social: A Reply to Olafson." Inquiry 37 (1994): 203-223. 16. Olafson, "Heidegger ά la Wittgenstein," 55. 17. On "deficient modes," see Klaus Hartninnn. "The Logic of Dclicicnt and Eminent Modes in Heidegger," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 5 (1974): I 18-134 and David Wcberman, 7/ir Pragmatic Turn in Early Hcitleggrr, Ph.D. diss., Columbia U n i versity. 1990, 23-29

282

385

:

HEIDEGGER A N DTHE SOURCElSi OI INTELLIGIBILITY

IS 19

20.

O l a f s o n . "Ilcitl«?(ijz

Heidegger Reexamined, Volume 1: Dasein, Authenticity, and Death

Heidegger Reexamined

Heidegger Reexamined