Hegel and Deleuze: Immanence and Otherness

Hegel and Deleuze: Immanence and Otherness by Christopher Groves

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy September 1999

Contents

Ch. I

Acknowledgernents and Declaration

III

Abstract

IN"

Abbreviations

v

Introduction:

Philosophy,, Immanence and Otherness

I

Ch. 2

Kant, Fichte and Schelling: The Trauma of Reason

16

Ch. 3

Deleuze-. Philos-ophy as Practice

79

Ch. 4

Deleuze and the Absolute

109

Ch. 5

Hegel's Critique of Representational Consciousnesss

140

Ch. 6

Hegel's Account of Absolute Knowing: Logic and Being

176

Ch. 7

Hegel's Concept as an Antifoundationalist

Principle

218

Critical Assessment

258

Ch. 8

Conclusion: Regel and Dkeleuze-A

275

Bibliography

11

Ac know ledgements I would Re to thank my supervisor,, Professor Stephen Houlgate, for all his during Thanks due the this thesis. to the writing of are also advice and support HmnairutiesResearchBoard of the British Academy, who provided me with a three-year ResearchStudentship; to the Deutscher Akadernischer Austauschdienst.whose provision in 1998 Hegelthe to three spend at of a short-term research grant enabled me months Archiv, based at the Ruhr-UniversitAt, Bochum, Germany. and to DT Wolfgwig Bonslepen, for his invaluable assistanceand readiness to discuss my work during my Bochum. stay in

Declaration Some material from chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis has been published in another form as 'Ecstasy of Reason, Cnsis of Reason: Schelling and Absolute Difference', in PLI-The Wanvick Journal qfPhilosopk-y, 8 (.1999), pp. 25-45. All matefial in this tbesis is my own woTk and has not been submitted for degree at another university. previously a

iii

Abstract The thesis critically analyses the dominant foundationalist tendency of modern foundational] to the with special reference philosophy, sophisticated anti st critiques of foundationalism,formulated bv G.W. F. Herzeland Gilles Deleuze. It begins by outlining a general methodological aspect of foundationalism. regarding the necessity of radical self-critique in philosophy, which directly connects Cartesianism, thought with contemporary via classical German philosophy. In the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Schelling, this self-chtical project is transformed: they undertake to show that reason can, by examining itself gpi an give is that account of expenence systematic, or consistent with itself However, each of these thinkers fails to accomplish this, and indeect the commitment to a priori foundations is itself undermined in Schelling's work, where a philosophical crisis of meaning (a 'trauma of reason', philosophical nibilism) emerges. Deleuze and Hegel's contrasting critiques of foundationalism, and their positive reconstructions of the standpoint of philosophy, are then interpreted as nonfoundationalist attempts to overcome this intemal cnsis of foundationalist thought as by Schelbrig. Both Cnticise certain subJective presuppositions inadvertently exposed foundationalist dogmatic to they common philosophies, which consider constitute a ,image' of philosophy, a kind of transcendentalillusion that is the guiding force behind foundationalism. Both also aim to replace this with a genuinely philosophical image. The thesis provides an original historical contextuali sation of Deleuze's thought in relation to Gen-nan Idealism, and Schelling in particular, with whom., it is argued, Deleuzehas much in common. Deleuze's conception of pure difference is treated in this kind knowledge'. i This 'absolute contextual sation also allows the regard as a of between be Hegel Deleuze to sometimes crudely understood antipathy and addressedin fashion, have in in thev that terms of more common a more penetrating which shows their critical orientation than is usually supposed. The thesis concludes with a cntical companson of these thinkers, which argues thaý although both succeed in their own tenns, in relation to a critenon of selfconsistency, Hegel's philosophy offers a more satisfactory treatment of the ontological and historical conditions of philosophical activity.

IV

Abbreviadons Standard AfB format is used for references to Kant's Crifique of Pure Reason. Other references are to the onginal text and the English translation as per the following abbreviations and the Bibliography. and

form: in the aregiven WS 178/168 In caseswhere no English version was available, translations are my own.

Deleuze.AA

naývsede Logique et existencepar Jean Hyppolite

AO

LAnlj-Oedipe, Antl-Oedipus

B

Le bergsonisme,'Bergsonism

CD

La conceplion de dýffijrence chez Bergson DialQguesDialogues

DR

Diffirence el rjpehljon, ýDifferenceand Repetition

ECC

EssaysCritical and Clinical

IL

L'immanence: une vie /Immanence: A Life ...

KP

La philosophie crilique de Kant, Kant's Cnti cal Philosophy

LS

La IQgjqueA sens.1be Logic of Sense

N

Pourparlers/Negotiations Cý

NP

Nietzsche ei la phi/osophieNietzsche and Philosophy

SP

Spinozzaet le proWme tie /expression, Expressionism in Philosophy Spmoza

V

SQ

Sur quaires formules poiliques qui pourraient risupier la philosophie kanlienne

TP

Milles Plateaux.A Thousand Plateaus

WP

Ou'est-ce que la philosophie, ý What is Philosophy?

Fichte: cc

(ýber den Begrýffder [Vi.vsen. the Concept of vchaftslehrelConcerninL,, the Wissenschaftslehre

DSL

Ober den Unterschied des Geisies und des Buchstabens in der PhilosophielCancernIng, the Difference between the Spirit and the Letter within Philosophy

RA

Rezensiondes Aenesidemus/Review of Aenesidemus

WL

Grundlage der gesamten WissenschaftslehrelFoundationsof the Entire

Wissenschaftslehre WLrun iw

Wissenschafislehrenow methodo,Wissenschaftslehrenova methodo Erster und Einleitungen zur Wissenschafi,glehre/Introduct* ions --weiter to the Wissenschaftslehre

Hegel: DS

Differen.-

ties

Fichteschen

und

Schellingschen

ývstem der

PhilosophielThe Difference between Ficbte's and ScbellMg's System Philosophy of EL

Enzyklopddie

der

philosophischen

Wi.ý,ýenschqfien

Enter

Ted Encyclopaedia Logic FK

Wauben und Wissen/Faithand Knowledge

PR

Gnindlinien der PhilosophiedesRechisElementsof the Philosoph-Y of Right

vi

Ps

Phdnomenologie des Geistes/Pbenomenol ogy of Spirit

SL

Wissenschaftder LoVk/Science of Logic

Kant: ci

Kritik der (IrteilskrajiCritique

CPrR

Krifik der praldischen Vernunfit,Critique of Practical Reason

CPuR

Kritik der reinen VernutýftCnÜque of Pure Reason

GMM

GrundleguW

zur

of Judgement

Melaphysik

der

SjuenG-rou-ndwoTk of

the

Metaphysics of Morals p

Prolegomena.,'Prolegomena

Schelfing: des philosophischen Empirismus

DPE

Dantellung

EE

Einleitung zu seinem erster 1,,ntwurfeines SysIemýder Nalurphilosophie

WN

Ideen zur einer Philosophie der NaturlIdeas for a Philosophy of Nature

LMP

Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der neueren PhilosophielLectures on the History of Modem Philosophy

PO

Philosophie der Ofjýnbarung

SPL

Stuttgart Pri-tat-vorlesun-aenIStuttgartSenunars

STI

System des transzendentalen IdealismusISystem of Transcendental

Idealism THF

(ýber das Wesender menschhchenFreiheill7reati se on Hurnan Freedom

WA

Die WellallerrMe

WS

Svstemder Philosophie überhaupilSvstem of Philosophy in General

Ages of the World

('Wiirzburg System')

11,11

Chapter One Introduction:

i)

Philosophy,

Inimanence and Otherness

Preliminaries

Thus, becauseour sensessometimes deceive us, I decided to suppose that nothing was such as they led imagine. because And to there are people who make us mistakes in reasoning, committing logical fallacies concermimgeven the simplest questions in geometry, and just I I that as judged was as prone to error as anyone else, I rejected as unsound all the arguments I had ' demonstrative previously taken as proofs.

With these lines from the Discourse on Method, Descartes announced the Reformation of Scholastic philosophy and a decisive redefinition of philosophy's conception of itself The modemity of Cartesianismties in its confidence in the ability of the individual reasoning subject to determine the truth about being, and further, in its in individual it the the to that confidence ability of prove possessesthis truth. It is this latter assurance that represents a direct assault on medievalism, for it confers final faculty from it hegemony the the thus authority on of reason, and removes of tradition and its institutions, the ultimate sources of all Scbolastic arguments previously accepted as 'demonstrative proofs'. At the close of the twentieth century, such confidence seems to be at once an feature familiar of the way we imagine ourselves. and yet somehow outdated. intimately to be spoken of With ironic, even cynical detachment. Over two hundred years of 1 Descartes, 1966, p. 59.

from American the relentless criticism of traditional accretions of authority. stretching and French Revolutions, and taking in the nse of mass industrial societies and the social and political convulsions of the twentieth century, have seen Cartesian confidence long-farniliar by listens the the the to and accepts replaced riven stanceof individual who believing claims of reason, without ever genuinely in them, seeing reason instead as simply another traditional authority to be criticised, without knowing where the resources for such a cntique are to be found. This condition, which Nietzsche referred to as 'modern nihilism', finds a particularly suitable home in the twentieth century, the time of by bureaucratic that carried out regimes genocide employed reason exclusively in the service of their 'passions'. How does this situation make itself felt in Western philosophy? One definition of its violently altered self-image is given by the British philosopher Gillian Rose. Commentating on a selection of modern Jewish thinkers within the pantheons of from Martin BubeT to theory existentialism, critical and post-structuralism, ranging JacquesDerrida, Rose wrote that 'their different ways of severing existential eros from 1

logos amount to a trauma wilhin reason itsef philosophical

.2

The meaning of such a

immediately its Trauma statement is not apparent. in usual meaning refers to the experiencing of a violent physiological or psychological shock that induces a pathological condition within the orgamc or the psychic system. What can it mean to say that reason expenencessuch a shock and is confined by such a condition? One thing is clear from Rose's remarks, however. This trauma cannot be reduced to an effect of conditions external to the activity of philosophy. Philosophy, in some little, To the anticipate a sense,inflicts wound on itself we can say that the trawna of because the modem age of the nature of the vocation that philosophy reason appears in Cartesian for the itself namely, epistemological prOject. whose goal is the assumes discovei-v of incomgible criteria for objective knowledge, and along with this, the I Rose, 1994, p. I-

2

firstly The to outline a thesis is justification of the autonomy of pure reason. goal of my convincing definition of the philosopbical provenance of the trauma of reason, and then, in the main part of the thesis, to assessthe work of two of the most trenchant critics of the modem Cartesian project, G. W. F. Hegel and Gilles Deleuze, considered as ways of 4working through' this condition that provide resourcesfor reconceiving the vocation of pbilosopby.

ii) The Ambition of Philosophy: Immanence Our first object of enquiry has to be the Cartesian revolution itself, with the aim deeper into little of penetrating a its meaning as a philosophical event. The sceptical is metbod a way of redefining pbilosopby according to Plato's question in the Theaeletus: 'what is knowledgeT. Descartes' vision thus still affirins philosophy as the highest discipline of human knowledge, that is, as the knoWing of the meaning qj knowledge. Critical epistemology, despite its modernity, remains knotted to the longest threads of Westem thought. A constitutive element of its definition is the distinction between philosophy, which deals with knowledge as such, and specific sciencesthat deal knowing: natural science, psychology, political science, with particular modes of economics and so on. Behind this privilege accorded to philosophy is still the complex Greek notion of 1090s, the 'gathering' of being that inforrns Plato's conception of dialectic and Aristotle's view of metaphysics as first philosophy. Philosophy remains the discipline whose eros for being is pure, and which consequently possessesthe logos for being knowledge absolutely, gathering without presupposing anything specific about the nature of being. This is what divides philosophy from, for example, the natural for be their the purposes existence of assume a matter nature can sciences,which whose

describedmathematicallyor empirically. The Aristotelian and Platonic legacy to philosophy is this faith in the essential in discovers the of and universality what it. when unhindered, purity of reason, of being.

0

There is an affinity between reason and being. Reason is the most direct form of access to being, a purer mode of seeing. Being is a medium within which reason moves without hindrance. That which actually exists, the world that enfolds everyday life and constantly upsets our plans and evadesour predictions, possessesan essential, internal order which because it reason can reveal precisely corresponds to the internal structure of reason itself

the discursive interconnection of

orderly

entailments, of

grounds and

language, being. Reason, Platonic It is to the true consequences. is suitor of use more in being. In relation to reason, our other immanent in always already union with, is faculties through which we become aware of the world, such as our senses,our memory judged found be being. 'seeing Tbrough on, must and and so wanting as modes of into' them, the world is necessarily distorted, for being resists them. This does not simply be that occasionally we may mean rmstaken about the world, but more radically, that the itself appearsthrough our sensesand memory as shiffing, provisional, elusive world in short, without certainty. Through our other faculties, the unity of reason with being is lost, and we become aware of the world as an opaque honzon of awareness; we is before however, Reassurance, through provided reason, recognise it in its otherness. being belonged because This, to always already which othernessrecedes. we are sure, is reason anyway. It is reason, for example, that allows us to correct the mistakes we make through relying too much on our senses. The idea of philosophy as an activity intimately bound up With the internal order do being, therefore without presuppositions about specific modes of of and which can being, already constitutes an attack on such particular presuppositions. From Parmenides in despite their the subordinate sciences, that, the necessity onward, implication is being the essenceor meaning of cannot ultimately result in specific assumptions about knowledge. distortion The than of pure a role of philosophy is therefore a anything more for In in 6-science, to the other sciences. claiming itself role of arch sceptical one relation from disciplines the possibility of withholds subordinate philosophy simultaneously

4

justifying their own claim

about knowledge. Each 'inferior'

science is linked to a

specific region of being, which is cut out of the whole, as it were, through the acceptance of axiomatic presuppositions. In relation to the fundamental philosophical faith in reason, Scholasticism for Descartesa negative development. Scholastic philosophy, frorn his point represented of view, did not allow itself to be guided solely by the reason of the individual, but was instead assured of its status by Church dogma, a corpus of traditional beliefs whose authority was simply assumed.Consequently, the idea of the purity of the philosophical for being takes on an active, ascetic aspect in the Cartesian sceptical method. The eros certainty of reason's immanence in being cannot be secured sIM-Plythrough traditional doctrine and belief It has to be demonstrated, and this can only occur through a ftee is beliefs, that process of reasonmg sceptical about all accepted and which results in the discovery of an ob,9.ective foundation of the unity of reason and being. Unless this certainty is secured in this way, then it will itself remain a belief, a matter of faith. If this

is the case,then the Cartesian view of philosophy as arch ofLscienceis no different from that which it cnticises. The need to prove that indiVldualsý siMPly becausethey reason, have a priori knowledge without the need to rely on tradition, thus addressestwo issues: belief be b) tradition, taken and a) whether a critical viewpoint can and upon accepted legitimacy it has the the this issue of of common raised whether viewpomt can, once the beingjustify its of of reason and own assumption unity assumptions, Importantly, this unity is interpreted by Descartes as the correspondenceof the (sensory, ) the conceptual of mnemonic, etc. world With a subject's own representations

knowledge is All the to than that subject. of the world, of reality really external or o1her the soul or of God necessarily implies the presenceof subjective representationalcontent it from foundation forrn Thus be this that is content a or another. must extracted. of one No specific content (do-va)can be assumedto be such a firm foundation until it has been

5

subjected to a test, designed to expose any content whose correspondence with reality could be conditional or accidental. It is Descartes' third methodological hypothesis. the excessive gesture which (temporarily) transfonns God (the theological guaranteeof correspondence)into an evil, deceiving demon, that makes the question of conditional knowledge decisive: anything that objectively (in all casesof its occurrence as an opinion or doxa) presupposeseither pre-given conceptual knowledge, as in the case of a proposition like 'man is a rational 3 anima ', or the intervention of faculties other than thought, as with all opinions that rely be be doubffuRy Such to sensory evidence, upon can considered only opinions are valid-

dependent for their validity upon conditions, and as long as this is the case, objectively know that we know thern to be true, for the possibility of deception is held we cannot open as long as there remains a difference between an opinion and the criteria of its truth. This problem of cerlainty requires its solution to be in the form of uncondifional knowledge, foundational knowledge that we immediately know to be true without further cnteria- The Cartesian cogito is supposed to serve as such mitnediate knowledge by

both its virtue of content and its form- the proposition 'I am thinking' Ue pense) together immediacy the of the self-reflection that constitutes this thought is indubitable proof with know When 'I I I the thinking' this without of my existence. entertain proposition am referenceto criteria that may be doubted, indeed, to doubt the truth of this proposition is to produce a contradiction. Thought and the nature of an existent here correspond for temporarily, the immediate certainty that guarantees the cogno, perfectly, if only because it is be direct that to constituted in an act of attending is supposed precisely a long the as this attending is maintainedseeing into soul, only enduresso It is thus necessaryto go fin-ther. The cogilo grants fon-nal certainty, for it gives for the objective correspondenceof representationand reality, narnely 'clanty' us criteria by different 'distinctness', are possessed which classesof representation in various and 3 Descartes, 1996, p. 17.

6

degrees,with the highest degree belonging to concepts. The move from the cogilo to the for by God is the the proof of thus motivated needs of method, in addition existence of to formal criteria of certainty, it is necessaryto establish the necessaryexistence of an objective ground of the necessarycorrespondencebetween all clear and distinct ideas and 4 reality. Again, this can only be achieved through the exarnination of subjective however, it Now, representations. is possible to go directly to the subject's store of conceplual representations, for these possess the reqwred degree of clarity and distinctness.The notion of God, Descartesreports, is unique among these concepts, for it being. Through the notorious 'ontological proof Descartes alone represents a perfect , connects the idea of the infinite perfection that necessarily belongs to the idea of God idea be God he the to thought then of necessaryexistence: if with were as non-existent, be imperfect be God. Given that this premise produces a and would not would contradiction, God necessarilyexists, as a real ground of the objective correspondenceof our clear and distinct representationswith reality. Descartes believes that this result is a justification of the unity of subjective by ftdl the this restriction of senseto representation and reality, qualified unity in its it is Cartesian If this then so, reason proves its autonomy: will representationsof reason. have demonstratedthat it possessesgenuine knowledge of being (of the res cogiians and God), Without requiring specific presuppositions about being M order to do so. The have have been been in being and otherness proven, will will immanence of reason domesticatedThe charge made against Descartes' rationalism by those who brought a parallel fi-uifion, form thought to of namely empincism, and also characteristically modem however, is that his critical method is not critical enough- Despite beginning correctly, fails the to adequately addressthe question of its the of subject, it representations within begin for does, Descartes to order in as it is necessaryabove all to own presuppositions, SeeCottingham, 1995, ppý 64,70-1.

7

maintain a faith in the autonomy of reason in order to eventually demonstrate it. This faith is not simply a temporary postulate, but is, in the fonn of Descartes' reliance on innate ideas as tools of method, actually an assumption that goes acknowledged. The ideas of the res cogitans and the infinitely perfect God are held to have a natural, a priori

being becauseof their content, for the content of either, when doubted, to relation produces a contradiction. However, the idea that such concepts, because of their representative content thereby possess a special ontological status, is placed under 5

suspicion by the emphicists, and above aUby Locke and Hw-ne.

This idea is itself, for the empiricists, an unwarranted assumption about the indicating nature of reason, a residual and reassuring faith in the immanence of a priori reason that remains unquestioned,which means that effectively Descartesalready knows the answerto his enquiry when he setsout upon it. Pure reason only graspsbeing because being has already been gathered by reason, via an unacknowledged presupposition, and the boldness of the reason that makes God into a devil is simply sbow. Against this background assumption of the immanence of reason in being, the empiricist method The the of concerns genesis of representations,and concepts in particular. question of how representations come to be present in the mind at all is privileged as more fundamental than the problem of how it is possible that these representations could knowledge. bemg, be adequatelyrepresent and a source of objective Tbrough his account of the origin of ideas in sensibility, the passions, and the laws that of the mind, Hume above all others act as natural associative principles beliefill basis the concerned only of reason as with a notion constructs on an empirical knowledge to objective of the regularity of our subjective experience, as opposed heteronomous, being. Reason therefore the a order of external is uniformity of function 'gathering', its instead subspeciesof passion, an eros without any overtones of being to support those beliefs about experience that are based upon good e-vidence As when Hume (1990, Bk 1, pt 3, §1) disting"I ishes matters of fact from relations of ideas. I

8

(constant conjunctions of impressions). Ile

longer the correspondence of no issue is

representationswith what exists outside the subject. For Hume. the meaning of the idea of necessaryconnection is not dependent upon its reference to, say, a causal power that inheres in substances.Instead, its meaning comes from the relations that exist between ideas imprinted in the memory by constantly repeated instancesof pairs of impressions. The only relation of representationexists between unpressions and the ideas that literally re-present them .6 Hence reason confronts mental contents that retain f or it a certain

opaqueness or otherness, for they are somehow given to it, and are indeed its own idea The that it can overcome this opaqueness is the result of a wellspring. misapplication of reason beyond the bounds to which it is limited by its confingent, merely given origin. The empincist critique of Descartes' defence of the immanence of reason in being is important for our tbeme of the trauma of reason. For Hume, reason is dependent on an empirical contingency that it cannot itself account for. The possibility of there being a regularity that is internal to the source of impressions, whatever it may be, cannot be thought without abstracting from the contents of the mind. The othernessof external is here itself, for the reality seen as genetic condition of reason it somehow provides an opaque stimulus that gives nse to the habit of reasorung. With Kant, the validity of a priori reasoning is defended in a way that cedes but then goes on to undermine it. The methodological to the empiricist critique, ground in itself is longer Descartes' to takes sceptical no sense,where stancereason respect with has to nd oneself of the conditionally certain m order to ascend without one only difficulty to the unconditional. Krilik as method signifies that the very capacity of reason for knowledge must itself be examined and criticised. Kant agrees widi the empiricists that pure ideas alone cannot provide an adequate measure of what constitutes genuine knowledge of objects. Sensibility has to have a role, and so if reason is to be Hume, 1979, §2, §4,1990, Bk. 1, Pt 1,

& Pt 3, §§2-8.

9

autonomously capable of providing a priori knowledge, it must itself be the condition of possibility fOTmaking judgements about the exte-mal woTId to whicb sensibility gives access.Hence Kant, in agreeing with the empincists, simultaneously turns against them. For Kant, it is the spontaneous and discursive-rational structure of the representing subject's consciousnessthat makes possible the kind of discriminating power that enables Hurne's subject to even tell the difference between two impressions. For Kant, transcendental subjectivity is necessary in order to make subjective presentations possible, without which the thought of real extemality and of re-presentationswould be impossible. For Descartes,the immanence of reason in being (the autonomy of philosophical had be demonstrated to reason) with reference to the content of our representationsof is. This provoked the empiricist response. Kant, however, understands the what demonstration of the immanence of reason in being, of the right of reason to deten-nine in fon-nal a what is, sense. Our very consciousnessof external objects, and even of impressions, is only made possible by the structure of our reason. If we can individual determine this conditioning structure, we will have proof of the autonomy of reason. The capacity of reason to determine 'what is' is thus conditioned by its capacity to deten-nine be itself In this way, Kant sees reason as having the power to to to itself !I immanent recognise its own limits as immanent to it -

as necessitatedby its own structure, rather

than being forced upon it from outside, as in Hume's account. Reasonhas the right to a because it has legislate forms knowledge . the to the also power of possible ph ori be forms Knowledge these thus alone objects can presented. of experience, under which knowledge Once has been this of experience. right constitutes objective a priori proved, have, demonstrated it through that consistent a Critical epistemology, pure reason will being. has truth-claims to the about assess right alone Reason is thus, for Kant, immanent to our experience of objects, and this is demonstrated by an immanent self-examination on the part of reason. But this

10

deten-ninationof 'what is' is our experience, our presentationsof objects: an element of is Ding-an-sich, thing-in-itself, the externality or othernessremains, in the ýNhich never an object of expenence, only a limit on the extension of objective knowledge and the source of sensation, the material of experience.7 Nevertheless, this limit is immanent to reason's own structure, for it establishesthe boundaries of objective knowledge. While has (de limit, it jure), this reason proper autonomous or immanent neverthelesstends to transgress it and mire itself not in error, but in transcendenial illusion, by claiming knowledge of the nature of the thing-in-itself, as in the modem rationalist tradition from Descartesto Wolff. However, reason is sovereign within its own limits, and must defend its domain (ditio) (CJ 174/13) by showing how it is possible to determine concrete a knowledge both (what is and what theoretical priori of and practical or moral matters be, finite freedom) limits, dernonstrating to these thus ought necessity and infinite within that both natural scienceand ethical life can be accountedfor by self-critical reason. Kant's defence of a priori knowledge develops as a response to the Gennan Enlightenment (A ujkldrung), by taking a stand against the resurgence of an unprincipled fi7ith in reason. As such it is coeval with a more direct and negative reaction against the

Enlightenment, beginning with Hamaim and Herder. Nevertheless, Kant remains allied independent, Aujkldrer, the the protestant reason against all standard of raising with traditional forms of authority, whether Church, State or academy. The struggle for the dimension implicit light brings the to to of the political right use one's own reason before themselves to tradition: must present authority all claims modem epistemological the tribunal of reason and be judged. But first, as Kant acknowledges,reason has first to be by its to claims can illegitimate which own excesses,in order provide criteria criticise This tribunal. the the to is central of own authority its justify order and in exposed, import of our presentation dius far.

See P §9.

Despite Kant's restrictions on reason's right to detennine 'what is', however, the problem of presuppositions returns, concerning the self-consi steincy of the cntical method. If Critical reason alone is to determine the validity of its claim to a priori knowledge, then a question arises: bow is reason's right to criticise jiselfjustified. 1Chief among the tenets of critical reason is that everything can be criticised, except the immanent relafion of reason to itself that defines the very concept of criticism. 8 This relation seemsto testify to a residue of otherness, for reason's right to examine itself is acceptedas given. The immanence of reason to itself has not been demonstrated,and so has the right of reasonto determine 'what is', even within certain limits. neither Massing behind the vanguard of the direct reaction against the Enlightenment and its supporter Kant, and appalled at the political and theological consequencesof unrestrained critique, opponents of the critical turn gave a different forni to the sceptical question: they raised doubts about the supposedly singular right of reason to question One everything else. such thinker, F. H. Jacobi, gave a name to a pathological condition by defined by Kantian thought, philosophy and a need always to of modem exemphfied 9 for beliefs: The to major symptom nihilism. provide sufficient reasons validate values, from justifications, is infinite the attempt to this which results regressof of condition an locate a first prmciple capable of grounding knowledge. Reason's right to critique must be established, and then the right of reason to establish the right of critique, and so on. This impossible labour creates an abyss of meaninglessnessinto which all beliefs and 10 disappear. values At this point, the question of a trauma of reason that is truly might say -a

immanently, one

be 'Me modem epistemological tradition. raised. pathology of reason can

by allying itself at a fundamental level with scepticism, has courted this condition in 8 Beiser, 1987, pp. 1-2; Cutrefello, 1994, pp. 1-5. Beiser, op. cit., pp. 81ff.

10Ibid., pp. 30-1.

I')

various partial forms. We have still not yet arrived, in this account, at the point where it insinuates itself into reason itself, perhaps finallY SeN'ering,in Rose's words, eros ftom logos. We have, however, seen reason driven back into itself, from an initially assumed position of confidence, forced to become ever more wary of its own pretensions, until, with the reaction against the mlightenment, the political and philosophical desire for freedom from illegitimate autho-ritybecomes paralysed by the self-defeating attempts of justify itself to reason as a universally competent judge, capable of stopping the desire for freedom from becoming arbitrary and mired in violence and cynicism. Nevertheless, a further step remains to be taken in this narrative. Almost a century after the sftuggle between Kant and his opponents reached its height, Nietzsche, described 'modem thernatising the the nihilism' as most pressing problem of age, it as in between two tendencies-'not an antagonism

to esteemwhat we know, and not to be

allowed any longer to esteem the lies we should like to tell ourselves', a 'process of dissolution'. II The philosopher finds herself faced with a fabricated world to which she has 'absolutely no right' sIMPly by virtue of her reason,12and must confront it through the medium of a force that is Ike a surging 'odierness' at the heart of reason itself, how Western The the of give an account next chapter will namely will-to-power. height by how faced by be the this to reason, at of showing situation, philosophy comes its deepest As German Idealism, to this pathology. own we subjects itself its ambition in will

foundational Schelling's Fichte to provide attempts and see, the result of

discovery itself in for the to the of an result examine right of reason justifications irrational 'remainder' that is not simply other than reason, but is an otherness that is 'inside' reason, and indeed is its own condition- This will threaten reason with the be that immanent even to itself. it cannol possibility

" Nietzsche, 1968, §5. 12

Aid., § 122 -

13

Before we take this step, a word about the choice of Hegel and Deleuze as mediator-, between otirselves and tbe trauma of reason. The sIgnIficance of this choice can only ultimately be proven by the rest of the thesis. However. a few preliminary remarks about the general approacb I am taking in relation to these figures are in order. Given that my presentation of the trauma of reason is completed with an examination of Schelling, with whom the development of the trauma is consummated, the penod of

historical time in which the trauma could be said to be the central if not always acknowledged problem in Western thouglit is one in wbicb Hegel and Deleuze stand at opposite ends, and also one in which Hegel's influence has, up to the present, been largely decisive. Deleuze's desire, to break radically with the Hegelian tradition is, I dunk, difficulties faces the that thought particularly suggestiveof philosophical M the wake of Schelling's critique of a priori reason, for the redefimtion of critique that Deleuze directly is, in (as I shall show), method, execution and result related to the undertakes in Chapters Four Deleuze's Schelling's I Three that and of critique. shall argue results its legacy) (and Kantianism turn in general phenomenological against ontological Fichte. My Schelling's turn to against ontological perforrns a similar philosophical role from 'historical' be Deleuze's thought, the the early on continuity of emphasis will is in it What Philosophy?, the is to an attempt at a way which more specifically, writings fully rigorous meditation on the role of the Absolute in philosophy. This stress on is Absolute, foregrounding the the in my opinion absolutely necessary of continuity, and in French Deleuze's philosophy as the post-war position uniquenessof in order to grasp difference. For this concentration on given thinker of space, reasons of an ontological had have the I to of specific extended investigation omit any unfortunately continuity, Schizophrenia, Caphialisni the two and volumes of social-theoretical concems of doing Deleuze's believe, to I multifaceted oeuvre, in so excessive any violence without,

far as its developmentis concerned.

14

The relationship between Hegel and Deleuze has often been viewed, by both 13 Hegelian and Deleuzean commentators, as one of utter incommensurability. Ho%N ever. by reading their work together in the context of a common thematic territory, I hope to dispel inaccuracies, or rather, illusions emanating from both camps. The notion that Deleuze is simply a bad reader of Hegel, and the opposed idea that Deleuze gets Hegel absolutely right and can thus dispense with him, both evince equally Oedipal attitudes (widi a conservative and a radical inflection, respectively). Deleuze's own remarks on the him Hegelianism (D 21-3/12-15) should alert us to the aesthetic effect of upon his 'creative Spinoza Nietzsche that possibility misreadings' of philosophers such as and might stand alongside an equally strategic treatment of Hegel. This means that, in rereading Hegel, it is necessaryto point out how Deleuze distorts his work, but this does for ne immediately justification discarding Deleuze. oveffiding issue will not serve as a be the trauma of reason, and how this crisis which, as I suggestedat the outset, has become intimately familiar to Western philosophers, might be overcome. Hence the in be Deleuze Hegel themselves relation to this and must understoodfor philosophies of issue, before they can be assessedin relatiol.n.to ench other.

" See in particular Williams, 1997 (Hegelian), and Hardt, 1993 (Deleuzean).

15

Chapter Two Kant, Fichte and Schelling: the Trauma of Reason

Introduelkin For Kant, the emphasis placed by the Enlightenment upon the entitlements of pure,

disinterestedreasonrequiresthat theseentitlementsbe proven. Hume's accountof the empirical origin of ideas, and his distinction between mere relations of ideas and matters of fact compromiseany rationalist faith in pure reasonand mea-nthat a justification of the valldity of a judgements priori is neededbefore the Enlightenment'sall-encompassingcritique of tradition can claim any degree of success. I'he political content of this Critique has been welldocumented: a revolution directed against 'superstition' by a freethinking 61ite in the tiaine of

the powersof universalreason.But in order not to contradictits own aims,the political CrItique requires an epistemology founded upon an objective foundation of reason's authority in disputes concerning legitimacy. This project of justification drives Kant's mature thought... throughout the three Critiques and beyond. By outlining Kant's crItical project, and the ways in

which Fichte and Schellingaddressissuesarising out of this project,this chapterwill determine A-

has been 'trauma to the meaning of already referred what as of reason'. the

ii)

-

Kant's Cri4me of Knowledge Kant's famous remark that it was the philosophy of Hume that first causedhirn to awake

from the 'dogmatic slumber' into wbicb Wolffian rationalismbad cast bim gives us a starting denial judgement, for Hwne"s to of objective a priori rm-, our enquii-y. validity and nt Výi keystone,, both (in the the to of or of pTinciple causality sufficient reason rationalist particularly

its "strong' md "weak' senses)exemphfiesfor Kant the dangerradical scepticismposesto its 1 On the 'weak' sense (every event has a cause), see Hume, ) 983, §§ 4-5,7, on the 'strong' sense (similar

Hume, 111. Pt. 1990, have see similar causes), events

16

parent, philosophy: an 'anarchy' (CPuR Aix) of the kind he himself was subsequently accused of creating, wbere,no sure foundations of knowledge exist. With Hume, psychology becomesa sceptical weapon: reason's functions are constituted according to habit and the rationally unaccountable and contingent passions. An adequate responseto Hume must show that knowledge through reason alone does necessarily or de.jure possess objective validity. Thus Kant's 'subjective turn' entails an examination of reason

conductedby reasonitself in order to, following Locke, 'examineour own powers,and seeto ' ddngs fare] they what adapted'. The first move is to distingwish between this preliminary task-

immmient of critique and real knowledge (metaphysics)itself the possibility of objective a priori knowledge must be established by enumerating all the principles without which such

knowledge would be impossible, a negative canon of principles as opposed to a positive organon of actual knowledge (CPuR A 12/B25-6; A62-3/B87-8). or example, Hume argues that the principle of causality cannot be objectively valid

independentof empirical experience,given that it is only through recurring expenencesof conjunction that we become conscious of it in the first place. This principle is thus only an idea., the means by which consciousnessrepresentsto itself a feeling connectedwith the abstract character of its experiences, and is thus only contingently valid. Kant questions the

Buine's by 'feeling' the presuppositionsof genetic account of ofTeason, asking how it is itself be that possible consciousexperienceshould of sucha characteras to containsuchthings as conjoined representations. The empiricist labula rasa brackets out the question of the

formal favour in that constituents, of the question possibility of experience, is, of its necessary for Kant, Leibniz, For its the tabula rasa must itself already as origins. of actual, contingent if it is be to capable of representationalconsciousness,i.e., possessa certain structure fact 'niis be by presupposed real externality. structure in would any enquiry consciousnessof

like Hume's.

Locke, 1990, Introduction, §7.

17

Kant entities this deep structure the irameentlental region of subjectivity, through which the deten-ninationof the empincal, ConscioussubjeM the object of psychology. is itself made possible. The miciples

that govem transcendental subjectiN

are the necessaiy

conditions of any expenence of real existence. whether that of an independent object or that of ) and the subject itself If these principles can be completely enw-nerated(CPuR Al'-,')fl3217. proven to be necessary formal constituents of experience, then reason"s nght to a priori knowledge, and hence its autonomy, will have been iustified.

Important to both the Lejbnizian and empiricist lines of post-Cartesiandescentis the distinction between knowledge of matters of fact and knowledge of relations of ideas- The former in the problem of objective validity only arises case,,as relations of ideas mere]), iinply anaývfic relations of entailment, whereas synihefic propositions about matters of fact have a bea-fing on the actual content of expenence, wbich is given io the subject it) some sense,and Hume be be to therefore assumed in particular emphatically points out, cannot which, as formal, determine in discursive the that conscious reasoning. structured accordanceWith rules Kant's responseis that the very Presentation(Darstellung) of the content of experience itself is only made possible by formal transcendentalprinciples or structures. 'Mese structures knowledge knowledge thus of objects and our of are necessaryconditions of all actual empirical them constitutes foundational knowledge of the nature of all possible expenrience.Our knowledge of them will be both ývnlhetic, in that the structures that are its object purport to describe the inner structure of the given., and yet o priori, in that these structures are the knowledge knowledge. If through oblective necessaryconditions of all empirical experience and formal discursive had, be these then the or rational components of pure reason alone can be the necessat),conditions of the possibility of the non-discursive structui-esmust ultimately formal components. While Kant affirms the traditional diebotom), of reason and intuition, via his methodological distinction between spontaneousand receptive faculties (CPuR A5 I/B75), he also affinns the inseparability of their respective funefions in relation to kno-odedgeunder the dominance of reason. overall

is

This is not the limit of Kant's project. if reason must determme what it can know about real entities, and thereby lin-ýt itself it must also establish its own freedom, by shoNNingthat it

can prescribeforms of principled action beyond the limits imposed on human beings by the present.This practicaldimensionis both moral and political, for it implies both regulationof an individual's own actions,and the possibility of criticising prevailing institutional constraintson individual agency.Humanbeing hastwo major aspects,the powersof cognition and desire(C.1 167/3-4), each related through reason to a different object: the theoretical object, which is given to the subject as actually existikp- and the practical object or end, that wbieb ought Io be, wbicb

the subject produces(CPuR Bix-x). Reasonthus has a theoreticaland a practical fonn, and Kant's project must be to determine two sets of conditions, for cognitive and for moral full justification A in both cases, the conditions under that, experience. of reason must show whieb an object can be objectively known are themselves uncondjfionalýy knowable tbTougb pure reason alone, an aim that Kant sometimes describes as the discovery of the ultimate unity forms final its CPuR A326/B382-3, (e. A3333these two of reason.,a proof of autonomy g. of 4/B390-1).

a) Theoretical Knowledge The ultimate conditions of theorefical knowledge are those discursive forms which

Objective (darstellen) in to subjectivity general. in an object as existiAg relation alone present for determined knowledge is knowledge the subject under thus theorefical of objects as only

these forms. To represent(vorslellen) an object as it is in iiselj'is not at all conhwlictory. However, preciselybecausethis representsthe object without relating it to the discursiveand it Kant knowledge, to the the status of purely assigns of real objective conditions non-discursive ihinkable., that which accords with the rules of

formal logic but not with those of the

(CPIuR A50logic dental the the that of experience of possibility conditions governs iranscen,

19

7/B74-82). Nevertheless,Kant does not entirely follow Hume's injunction to commit such ideas

3 DVnes,, to the aswe shall see. Rationalistmetaphysicsassumesthat reasonis immanentin being-aswe saw in Chapter One with respectto the doctrine of 'innate ideas'. The ontological proof is the capstoneof this assurance- metaphysics, down to Kant's own day, is satisfied that its objective validity is ultimately analyfic. It believes it can have objective and a priori knowledge of a thing-in-itself,

because,above all, the ontological proof demonstratesthat reasonis capableof proving flie existence of the bigbest entity by simply examining it-self and its own idea of God. But the forces empiricist critique a re-evaluation of this assurance,by pomtmg out that the mere analysis of an idea, even wben this is an idea of G(xt can only evaluate its logical validity and not its relation to matters of fact. Kant's response is to give ground to empiricism. by denving objective validity to representations of things-M-themselves. Metaphysics assumed that reason,

considered as an 'intellect"

intuition' independent of sensibility, can objectively represent

ForKant, this is a wholly unrestrainedand thereforeIranscenidem tbings-in-themselves. use of demed. A569/B597), be (CPuR to pure reason which objectivity must With this in-mind, we can now examine Kant's attempt to Inventory the conditions of fonns inherent For Kant, beginning to intuition the the non-discursivepossible experience, with

in both to to ourselves empirical experienceas something a given sensation allow us present intuitions These differentiated, to objects, as geometry. of in and present a priori manifold or forms are a priori becausethey cannot be abstracted from empirical objects-Iinstead, they are it is If be is be if to to possible even possible. necessary any presentation of an empirical object

first be including from distinct ourselves, must else, it anything consciousof an object as distinguishableaccording to its spatial and temporal location, miiiimafly, we must be able to The divisible A-10-1/B46-7). A23-4/B38-9, (CPuR it 'now' 'here" unities of space and mark as

first" intuition 'come they to of an objea and so must and time are thus not given us widiin an

3 Hume, 1983, § 12, FIL 3, p. 165.

20

intuition. I'lus formal the as possibility of any intuitions, constitutingthe a priori conditionsof means, tbough, that they are simply forms of our intuitions, and that the manifold of iritultion is

being (phenomena). (Erscheinung) the to only while still appearance of objects in relation us given to intuition and not somehow generated subjectively as an illusion (Schein.) (CPuR B6970).

Kant needsto show, however, that it is reason that legislatesthe forms of possible The fact demonstrate by this to that the possibillt), of The experience. opportunity is offered fonnal intuitions, Le., intuitions of the forin of space and time in general, cannot be explained intuition. From is to the solely with reference standpoint of Mtuition, it not possible to exafniiie its essential forms in order to account for them in any way. This is becauseintuition, being nondiscursive and passive, is only 'In' its forms. Reason, on the other band, is spontaneousand

develops Deduction', Kant itself In CPuR's 'Transcendental capable of reflecting upon formal intuitions from to that the are only made of standpoint reason, reflexive arguments sbow possible by reason's own structure. If this Is so, then certain discursive determinations will be necessaryto stabilise any

lawlike finite be These intuitive of principles, )n order to must a set presentation. possible finite limits. Kant differentiates it definite by these safeguardthe regularity of experience giving

by (but from infinite knowledge thougbt the afforded pure posSibilities unsecured) principles of f

CUltieS: between distincition Wolff t wo spontaneous, the rational a s aid of with

4

Understandi

(Yerstan(l)and pure Reason(Yernunfl). The Understanding'sa priori elements,the rules that Kant's intuitioný table of twelve a priori concepts or comprise stabilise the manifold of formal ftmetions logic, the transcendental of judgement purely categories, which mirror, within in general logic (CPuR A70/B95, AgO/BI06). The transcendental synthesesof the manifold

in be by they the constitute these sense: will an analogical synthetic rules will made possible discursive. A79/B (CPuR 104), the the and identity of heterogeneous non-discursive of elements

Ckygill, 1995, p. 347.

it

Kant's use of Deduktion as the title for the cenwal section of CPuR does not, then, imply a deductive argument based on an unconditionally true proposition. Instead, the senseof this term as employed by German jurists of Kant's time is intended: the tie jure right of reason to the matter at band, objective knowledge, must be proven or deduced (CPuR A84-5/B] 16-7).

The deduction of the categorieswill be completed by a final, discursive foundation of possibility: a condition of all the other conditions that requires no ftu-tber proof of its own

possibility. The A and B versions of the Deduction, despite differences of approach and emphasis, both argue that the discursive concept, as a predicate of synthetic judgement, is a necessary condition of both the unity of the maMfold in the presentation of an objectý and of the possibility of its being subsequently recomsed by the subject or reproduced in acts of remembering. Each version also proposes that a foundational condition of possibility must entail the necessary formal unity of all possible contents of consciousness.Kant calls this condition the transcendental unity of apperception., a thought or representation of the

fimdamental unity of the subject With itself that is necessaryif consciousnessis to be determinate at all. This unity is thus the UnIty of all the possible presentationswhich the subject have in a1l the these contents (whether a priori or empirical) of an object or can sense which for belong in to the them to be synthesisediii the fust place. same subject order must necessarily

This unity cannotbe explainedas either a product of mechanicalcausationor as an attributeof it is logical by a any representation,including those noumenal substance,as unity required detertnined it As the to categories of causation and according substance. such, is representations the most fundamentalform of regularity to which the intuited manifold is subject,and can only be a relation of the subject to its own activity that does not itself presupposeany of the for far. Kant in be thus that, there to shows order experienceof conditions enumeratedso be implicitly for its determining is it to the subject conscious of own activity necessary objects, fact it itself be determining 'takes' that the that to the of to is, obje4 an object in with respect

22

' such-and-such a way. This self-consciousness is neither knowledge of the subject as a

pbenomenalobject nor some'intellectual intuition' of the.subjectasit is in itself Kant remarks in the secondedition of CPluR that the representafion 'I think', which can potentially accompany all repTesentationsas a mark of self-consciousnessand thus identify

them as belonging to a single subject, is always itself accompanied by the subject's )6

indeterminate empirical senseof its own existence(CPuR B42.6. This nituition of existence -3n, .

is, unlike empirical intuitions of subiective states,not given through the mediation of other forinal conditions Cexistence' here is 'not a category'). Neither, however, is it an intellectual

intuition of a thing-in-itself. Instead.,it is representedby thepureývintellectual representation'I think', a representationthat denotes(bezeichnel)the reality of the foundationalspontaneityof 7 the subject. The 'I think' does not thereforeexpressa priori knowledgeof the essenceof a for it did Descartes.It simply points to an actuality that can neverbe determined substance,as for consciousnessunder the rules that make objects of experience possible, as it is itself the A This logical condition of conscious representation. and negative (as opposed to metaphysical,

formal first deduction the the the of categoriesand substantialand positive) result completes Kant's i ustification of reason. of F---

part

The Deduction, however, only demonstratesthat a certain formal unity of the subject is

in be It does for to the general possible. not sbow of an object consciousexperience necessary that this unity is actually specifiedas synthetica priori knowledgeof the determinateform of an Principles, Schernatism be in Analytic Kant the task this the and of wbere object. undertakes functions do determinate logical the that to purely provide as categories understood aims show This demonstrate intuitions. for that the rules of synthesis they the would synthesis of rules

5 Pippin, 1987, pp. 459-60.

'' Seealso Makk-red 1991, P. 10-5 pippifl, ()P. cm, pp- 454-5-

233

representare aciualýv transcendentalconditions, and not merely logically possible modes of synthesis.

Time is the form of inner intuition in which all appearances Each are given. categoryis thus shown to represent a general rule for a synthesis of time. The applicability of this rule to

particularintuitions hasto be established., in order to knot togetherthe facultiesof intuition and Understanding within a synthetic unity. This is ensured by the role of the productive imagination, a mediating faculty that partakes of the natures of both the other faculties (CPIuR A] 38/B]77), and which produces a schema, a determination of time that is given a priori by

the imagination to each category. For example, the schemaof pernianenceapplies to the category of substance,while that of im-versible succession applies to causality. Insofar as the

schemaparticipatesin the sensible,intuition gives it specificity in time or particularity; insofar as it participatesin the conceptual,the Understandinggrantsit universality.The sebematashow that the categoriesdo, in actuality, constitutea priori knowledgeof the form of an object in general.

The Ideas of Pure Reason The forms of in-tuition, the categories, the spontaneousunity of consciousness,and the

inventory Kant's of the transcendentalconditionsthat are wwwneni it) or schemata,complete consfifulAwqf*possibleobjective experience(appearance).The first Critique's 'Transcendental Dialectic' uses this inventory to criticise the Understanding's natural tendency to extend the use beyond limits forms intuition legitimate the the their the or categories of employment to of of

This in fonnal tendency the that the consists conviction conditions appearances or phenomena. judgements in knowledge to things-in-themselves the about apply or also nouniena, as of is basis To the that of consciousness an enduring soul-substance. claim either that proposition forms being intuitions) in (instead of time our of actually inhere the substanceof spaceand do that they not although we can neverthelessobjectively determine. things-in-themselves,or is .. to contravenethe immanentrestnctions or substances, causes say, things-in-themselvesas,

24

von valid a priori knowledge.Such contraventionsare not, therefore,erroneousjudgements about real thing-in-thernselves.For Kant flxy are distortionsof the HnManentrole of reasonin experience,or tramcendenial illavions that illegitimately presupposean entitlementfor reason that it cannot justi fy. Despite this, representationsof thing-in-thernselves do have a transcendentalrole with

respectto objective knowledge.This concernsthe sensein which, as a conceptof an object isolatedfrom the conditions(Bedingutýgen)of obiective knowledge,the conceptof a thing-initself is connectedto the logical value of the unconditional(dw Unbedingle).FolloWingPlato, Kant entitles such a representation.an idea (ldee) rather than a category. Whereas the category bas objective validity becauseit determines the intuited manifold, the Idea by definition does

not relate to any possible intuition. As a concept of pure reason,it is only related to other concepts,via generallogical PfInciples. However,Kant finds that he hasto give an epistemologicalrole to the Idea in order to provide a truly comprehensive answer to flume. By denying objective validity to the pnneiple of necessaryconnection, Hume attacked the notion of causality on two fronts. The prInciple of necessary connection, for Hume, conceals the presupposition of the uniformity of nature. Behind the 'weak" senseof causality, i. e., that every event has a cause, hes the 'strong' sense, i. e., that effects of type y necessarily have causesof type x, and so future occurrencesof x will followed by Kant be cases of Y. reeWises necessarily

these two aspects, arguing that

&appearmcesare themselvessubject to ta fixed] rule, and that in the marnfold of these in takes place conformity with certain rules [ I' representationsa coexistenceor sequence (CPuR A 100). In order that experienceshouldnot be, at bottorn,essentiallychaotic,it is necessarythat it it formal be fixed, both to and material: should subject a generalorder, and possessa unity In 'in happen conformity with certainrules'. other words, experienceshouldexhibit shouldalso Kant's Transcendental together a concretely specified with uniformity. an overall regularity,

Deductionand the schernatismof the categoryof causalityin the SecondAnalogy demonstrate

25

A-

formal from to regularity. moment, a H= conscious experience exhibits, moment -

8 However,

Hus only demonstrates that causality in the 'weak' sense is a principle that Is constitutive of have does It that similar events experience and therefore objectively valid a priori. not show similar causes, and cannot therefore demonstrate that the uniformity of nature is a necessary

condition of experience. A further problem is that a proof of the transcendentalstatusof the uniformity principle

would require that natureis in Usetfuniform. Kant's restriction of properly a priori knowledge to the canon of conditions that make experience possible means that such a proof could not be given a priori, as the entirety of nature cannot be given to the subject as the object of a single In it justification (CPuR A328/B384). this that intuition case, seems a complete of the principle is Nevertheless, in Second Analogy the the of necessary connection not possible. arginnent from be last Kant has the outset that the critical philosophy must the cannot stated word, as bow is BI 7-18). Science. (CPuR presupposesthe possibility of the natural possible show science

by is objective existenceof a regular or unified empirical maMfold, which guaranteed the category of causality. What the category of causality does not guarantee, however, is the actual or material is There thus no guaranteethat empirical nature exhibits an overall the manifold. regularity of have in that necessary empirical concepts of nature can other words, systematic regularity, or interconnections. As John 11. Zannnito puts it, while Kant 'argued against Hunie that the he level, the transcendental acknowledged at the same concept of causality was necessaryat

time that Hw-ne bas every rigbt to consider any empirical application of that principle 9 based firm is indeed has Kant Hence ' tlwon not shown natural science contingent.

foundations,and has thus not shown that reasonis capableof a priop! knowledge.Unlessthe be deduced the the manifold can as a u-nifoniiity or ývstematic unity of assumption of 8 On the alm and scope of Kant's argument in the SecondAnalogy, seeAJ)Ison, 1983, Pt. I 11,Ch. ) 0, esp. 216. p. Zaniniito, 1992".P. 159.

26

transcendental condition of the achial employment of the Understanding- then, as Kant recooses, not only will there be 'no coherent employment of the Understanding', but also 'no sufficient criterion of empirical truth' (CPuR A65 I /B679). Kant attempts to solve this problem in CPuR by showing that pure reason is the faculty

that directs the empirical use of the Understanding.This would prove that the a posieri.ori. discovery of the real forms of the uniformity of nature is possible for science, wbile avoiding

the illegitimate conclusion that these forms can be known a priori. In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant tries to show that the Idea of the uniformity of natureis a necessarycondition of any empirical use of the Understanding. If this is successfW,then Kant has demonstratedthat

fumisb the a prio?! principlesof naturalscience. pure reasoncan Because the thought of an object in general depends upon the a priori concept of causality, Kant can argue that reason,understood as that faculty whose role in general logic is to determine the analytic relations between pure concepts, has the transcendental vocation of

be deterMined between to enabling specific empiTical Telationsof ground-and-consequent objects of the Understanding, with, the overaH purpose of unt6ring empirical scientific knowledge.Generalor formal logic relatespropositionsto eachother by meansof syllogisms. In any given syllogism, the truth of its conclusion is conditioned by the truth of its prenfises,

infinity. But have determMed by be to thought a so on other syHogisms,and we of as which can finther itself is idea to the totality truth-conditions, subject no of of which non-contradictory

be distinguisbed from bas logical Idea This A321/13377ff). (CPuR to unconditional condition functions logical Whereas the transcendental the categoriesare of the categories. versionsof formal basis logical Idea is transcendental the three the pure the of uncondifional judgement, forming independent We Ideas. the objects, stateof are awareof our own stateand conceptsor Idea (soui determinations. We and an can representwith two seriesof conditioned objective the totality of conditions each also represent in case, and can unity of the cosmos) unconditional (CPuR A333-4/13390-1), Idea (Goa) in preserving the overall unity of the the two series another

naturalorder.

27

The unconditionalallows, in formal logic, the constructionof seriesof syllogisms in ascending or descending directions. Ascending, these detemune the conditions of the premises at increasing levels of generality; descending, these situate each conclusion as a premise of a new syllogism. In its transcendentalrole, reason determines appearancesin a similar twofold way -

subsurning them under empirically determined principles of classification at levels of

future basis be to the increasing generality, or enabhng of previous cases inferred on regulanties. However,, Kant is careful to withhold from the Ideas the objective and conslifulive epistemological status attributed to the categOnes.The unconditional totality of conditions cannot be given in an intuition, for the Idea of it represents.,not just a finite aggregateof objects, but a unity with infinite extension that cannot itself be conceived of as conditioned by, or fonns illegitimate do Hence Ideas to, the time. the subject of spaceand not representan use of for but instead the svstematic investigation and mapping of regulafive rules reason, are but A664-5/13692-3), (ICPuR In they the this., are analoguesof schemata empincal expenence. from derived they the merely subjectively valid principles of general are are not constitutive as logic, which operates independently of intuition (CPuR A336/B393). It is thus a necessary condition of empirical science that we sbould assume that the order of nature is structured to in itself know do We that therefore to systematically nature is not our reason. conform discovering (the Ideas) do know but that that conditions reason is capable of we structmv4 discover to that this actual regularities in nature a we go on so can justify our assui-ning, being Ideas The .. constitutive conditions of any possible of pure reason, wbile not posleriori experience, are regulative conditions of empirical experience.

Knowledge Practical c) Kant sets out to explain the possibility of the objective validity of representational divide be domain into the that actual experiential experienceof consciousness,wbieb requires Experience that to of objects oughl exist. of existing objects objects that exisl and experience

28

requires consciousnessof necessaryconnection to be a condition of the manifold of intuition.

which would prove that naturalscienceis possible.The secondkind of experiencedemandsthat it be proven that consciousnessof freedom is a condition of purposive action, which would demonstrate that morality is possible. Kant's analysis of the practical employment of pure reason in CPrR and GMM is

intendedto demonstratethat thereare securefoundationsfora priori knowledgeof an objective morality, which would both prescribe a universal duty for all rational beings, and demand that the authority of this moral order be reccgnised as supreme over and above that of existing political arrangements. A universal morality would only be objectively possible if reason possessesby right a concept of causality that is objectively valid wilhow the schema of free succession,an unconditional, and purposive mode of causation(GMM 397-400/10-13).

The Idea of purposive or rational freedom is central to Kant"s resolution of the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason in CPuR, where it is discussedas the purely thinkable, hypothetical causality that we can attribute to the unconditional or flfing-in-itself (CPuR A538/B566). The Third Antinomy is an undecidable conflict between two theseson causality a) that freedom is

the necessmyground of appearance,and b) that the only form of causationis mechanical.The first thesis dogmatically posits the Idea as an objective ground of existence, while the second

Kant's former that to this the conflict refuses assumes such a ground cannotemst. answer as transcendentand the second as against the interest of reason in morality. Inste4

he gives a

freedom fliinkable Idea the of as merely of the regulative unity of all negative presentation discussed in in the previoussection. the manner causalconditions, If this negative, formal definition of freedom could be objectively justified in the spbere

be have to then shown an ob*tive practicalcomponent pure reasonwould of practical reason, that would buttressthe regulativerole of pure.reason.The assumptionthat the natural order is inherently uniform would therefore not only be theoretically necessaryin order for empirical

It be indefeasible be duty investigation to to assumethe also an possible. would moral scientific implies but a which not merely such unity,, of mechanical uniformity, a overarchingexistence

29

purposive totality. Kant thus refers to freedom as 'the keystone of the whole architecture of the ). explicitly system of pure reason and even of speculative [theoretical) reason' (CPrR 4.13. elevating practical reason above the theoretical form (CPrR 120-1/124-6). 'Me final unity of reason would thus consist in this hierarebir-alrelation. So Kant must show that we can know a priori that we can act freely to produce real effects in the world, independently of natural causal series. All motivations that prescribe particular goals, such as hunger.,sexual desire and so on, belong to such natural causal series.

Theseseriesgeneratesubjectiveinclinationstowardsthe satisfactionof needs.Suchinclinations are heteronomous motives for action to whick for Kant we fi-eely accede. They are actual

determinationsof the empirical subject,ratbe. r than transcendentalconditions of all practical expenence. A determining motive with an absolute, objective value as opposed to a conditional, bave itself for A through this role is the love of subjective one would candidate value only duty, a will to act in accordancewith the moral law out of respect for the law alone, rather than

in the serviceof a particular goal -a

disinteresledpractical interestto rmrror the theoretical

interest in disinterested, objective truth. For this motive to be objectively possible, reason must

be able to freely determinethe will to act without imposing a particular contentupon it as its "I In the other conditioned object. words,

must be capableof being given a purely formal

determination.Kant formulatesthis condition of possibility as the 'categoricalimperative' in its first, canonical fonn: 'Act only according to that maxim, whereby you can at the same time Will that it should become a universal laV

(GMM 421/30). The only condition to which this

fortnal, is the and thereforeunconditional,rule of non-contradiction. purely principle refers The categoricalimperative plays the role of foundational condition of possibility for in does for It Kant, just to that which the relation apperception science. is, as unit), of morality, free, freedom 5/4) (CPrR the that that are ralio cognoscenth to of we assw-ne enablesus its The foundation both further possibility. of imperative operates as a explanation requiresno the the criterion of objectively, universality it presents is condition subjectively: and objectively

30

of action as such, for it expressesthe ultimate necessity of an action, the rule that something forms In be 449-50/51)(GMM the unconditional Oughl objectively to the case such wise, it condition for any action, whether autonomous or heteronomous, for all willing aims to create an

fonn ftirther it bas because be Its the objective existence. possibibty cannot explained of pure formal because is definition is binding the universality, which a priori on all rational subjects it

fact itself, is 'an thus of pure reason and apodictically certain as it were,of pure reason'(CPrR 47/48)Subjectively speaking, the law is a disinterested motive, determining the will to want felt CPrR 75/77). This is (GMM 401/14n; the as an immediate, only affin-nation universal determination, directly (Achtung), the subject nwnely respect or reverence unconditioned which Respect is [its) (CPrR 162/166). 'with the the consciousness of own existence' associates duty, the and affmns that no obligation outweighs of of subjective recognition unconditionality that to obey the moral law. It is also the feeling 'that it is beyond our ability to attain to an idea that is a lcmjbr us' (CJ §27,257/114). Thus Kant's defence of freedom is simultaneously a defence of an indefeasible

Kantian fundamental The methodological principle, that experiencenecessarily obligation. for is dependsupon the structureof the transcendental the practical sphere transformed subject, is In this the self-legislation implied concept of notion of a self-legislatingmoral subject. via both a) the free causalityof the will, that is, the nournenal.subjectiveagencythat gives the law, fact b) law deduction by the is the the and a of reason, as of objective and whieb guaranteed feeling, the through the of an obfigation which affirmation reverential receptivity of moral into law, is to, the suppressingInclination. and constrained phenomenalself given, or subjected .-I-

Kant derives from the law itself conditions of possibility for the fulfilment of the background for, take it that of against a all action must place given stands obligation 1-1 -

These inclinations. incorporating nahn-al needs and ,imperfection'. the realm of nature, freedom God) longer (immortality, regulative and are no &postulates of practical reason' but for that theoretical Ideas they presuppositions reason, are were as transcendental

31

give objective reality to the ideas of speculafive reason in general (by means of their relation to the practical sphere,)and they

it in holding to concepts even the possibility of

which it could not otherwise venture to affirin. (CPrR 132/137)

Therefore, Kant's justification of practical reason and objective morality is meant to make the regulative Ideas not just regulative conditions of empirical scientific investigation, but objectively valid., constitutive conditions of the possibility of moral experience.The assumption of the uniformity of nature, and the affimnation of the ultimate unity of reason, are both demandedof us insofw- as we are conscious beings.

Fichte: the Grculari4, of Transcendental Philosopky That Kant was not himself satisfied with his achievementsin the first two Critiques is

by his attemptsin the third Crifique to redefine the unity of reasonin terins of a indicated principle of reflective judgement to which both theoretical and practical knowledge are isternically Perbaps impoirtant bowever., historically spea-ing, were the epi related. more for-ward by thinkers identified with the Sturm und Drang such Kant's to objections method put first The both Herder Hamarm. C'n'liques and second attempt to sbow that a pri .on . as and is They by formal knowledge that the proceed proving of objects possible. synthetic conditions for itself de that or moral experience are structures speculative reason possesses of possibility jure. Kant thus demonstrates that experience is only possible becausethe intuited manifold is

subjectto the discursivestructureof transcendentalsubjectivity. The othernessof the manifold. its stable objectivity, is thus shown to be made possible by reason itself "' Kant admits that his project begins from empincal expenence. and is bound up with

fundamentalinterestsof reason.In this.,it is not piresuppositionless Descartes' but sense. this in is not a problem insofar as Kant is not attempting to begin from metaphysical first pnnciples, but is instead tying to show how metaphysics is in fact possible (CPIuR BxXji-X-XjjI). However,

Kant has assumed a certain content for the term 'metaphysics'. by assuming that the field of .Ipossible experience is restricted to the experience of an object as defined by Newtonian natural science, or the experience of a moral object as defined by a Protestant morality. When the

foundational conditions for the possibility of a metaphysicsof nature or of morals are determined,they are presentedas facts whose possibility needsno further epistemological Bowever, the content that they condition has simply been assurned,and their own explanation.

fonnal structuresreflect this content(Deleuze,as we shall see,points this out). For exmnple, the first Critique's inventory of constitutive transcendental conditions

comprisesthe divisible unifies of spaceand time, togetherWith the table of twelve categories. These fonns are derived from Newtonian science and Aristotelian logic respectively. Kant's

foundational fonna. deduce Uy it is to conditions, such as necessary possible arguments show that

the interplay of intuition,,ima0ation andUnderstandingassubjectto the unity of apperception, that make possibletheseparticular accountsof what experienceis like. What they do not show is that theseaccountsof experienceare anythingmore thanparticular descriptionsof the nature be They be to certainly can shown universally of the content of representational consciousness.

been be have but forms therefore to they shown not unchangingand of experience, possible for beings. Hamann Herder's Kant forms rational and critiques all of experience of necessary

forms in that the the to experience of critical philosophy set out the which way concerned

This reading of Kant is not uncontroversial,Afflison(198JI) ins sts on a different interpretation of Kant's focusing 'pure the intuition, of possibility intuitions'. on of account

3

historical by be be preconscious.social or ground could themselves said to made possible ' 1 fact heteronomous be If Kanfian m-din conditions. uncritical. this were so, then methodwould insofar it would be incapableof knowing the sourceof its own interests. The first generationof Kants sympatheticcritics linked the weaknesses of the critical philosophy to two related problems- Firstly, by linýiiiting philosophy to the negative task of enumerating a canon of the necessaryconditions of experience,Kant was unable to demonstrate the real necessity of scientific and moral experience. In order to prove their necessity and

universalityas modesof experience,an organonof principleswould bave to be constructed,a complete system of all the forms of experience that are inherent in representational faculties Secondly,, difference between intuition the the consciousness. real of and reason,wbicb is a condition of the specific problem identified by Hume that Kant's project is meant to solve, is heterogeneous. But that this that they epistemological suggests are really is an presupposition happy both Christian Kant is Newtonian to assume to perfectly common science and morality: that a thing-in-itself influences the receptive faculty of intuition in some occult way (P §91

CPuRA 19/B33), in both speculativeandpracticalexperience. r*%.

his Kant the of overall epistemological recognising validity while Omeway of criticising -

intuition difference between foundations be the the to and of question aims would Understanding, given tbat, in conscious experience, both are subject to the unity of

for had begin Reinhold, K. L. This is to the with whom philosophy approachof apperceptionitself, the as the objective presupposition of all unity of apperception self-consciousness,

fact from from forms derive this then the as of experience and representationalconsciousness, first an unconditional

PM

12 Ciple(GnindvaL-).

This effectively turns the critical philosophy upside down., as it makes the unity of

formal by it both into the the ground of as prMCIple positing an unconditional apperception

11SeeBeiser, op. eil., pp. 17-22 and pp. 142-4. 12

Seeibid., Ch. 8.

possibility of experience, and the material ground of its actuality. Formally or negativelý

speaking,expefienceis impossiblewithout it and matenally or positively speaking,if this unity is above all rational, then the forms that knowledge and experience take must follow necessarily from the actual nature of consciousness,wbich can be discovered via an immanent examination of self-consciousness.This would., it was hoped, avoid the Kantian problem of heteronomy, as no determinate or positive content would have been assumed as essential to expenence. Philosophy would begin from a wholly indeterminate first principle.

Fichte differentiateshis own stanceregardingthe foundation-of an organonfrom that of Reinhold in responding to criticisms of Reinhold advanced by G. E. Schulze in 1792. Fichte agreeswith Scbulze that theffiel of the unity of consciousness,as deduced in CP'uR, cannot be foundational as there is no absolute certainty that such a pure fact does not depend on a further material or formal condition. To define the unconditional, Fiebte follows Spinoza in talking of that which is the formal condition and material ground of itself only then to invert Spinoza's " by it in tems of subjectiv4. concept of substance recasting For Reinhold, the fact of consciousnessis meant to remove Kant's division between intuition and Understanding, which is still haunted by the thing-in-itself Yet the pure fact of consciousnessis only the abstracted subjective half of this opposition. For Schulze and Fichte,

Reinbold,like Kant, is still guided by presuppositionsaboutthe essentialnatureof experience. His unconditional principle is still detennined in opposition to the object and represents foundation form For Fichte, the of a particular of experience. abstract merely consciousnessas

formal this representsa regression,insofar as the abstractionof consciousness as a condition is freedom. The from entire practical spberewould thus remain subjective also an abstraction Kantian for. his In the at critique and successfulcompletion of earliestattempts a unaccounted Absolute is Fichte truly the that or unconditional essentiallya principle of stresses project be The that must conceived of as genuine unconditional which underliesall reason. praclical

13Gu6roult, 1974, p. S.

35

representation, the Absolute Subject 'the representing subject which would not be represented' (RA 9-10/65). Mis Absolute Subject would be the ground of all the fonns of consciousnessby virtue

of the free causalitythat definesthe practicalwill. As a principle, it would be

a transcendentalidea which is distinguished from other transcendental ideas by the fact that it is realised, through intellectual intuition., through the I am, and indeed, through the

I sjmpývam, becauseJam JJchbin schlechthin,wed ich bin] (RA 16/70)

'Intellectual intuition'

designates the mode, of this subject's indeterminate and

familiarity detenninate is to immediate unity or itself. prior any with representation, and thus 'that whereby I know something because1 do it' (-%VL463/38). The 'I think', as a representation depend indeterminate to the subject's own spontaneity and syntbetic Lmity, is seen of upon an is 'I and absolute am", which a synthetic unity produced through the subject"s own act. 'I'his is

the practical essenceof apperception:the Absolute Subject producesitself through its own freedom,bringing itself into existenceor enactingitself. The subject's'being entirely depends 14 is Spinoza's (unlike free its ', the substance)a selfnot subject aC,. and so absolutely upon

it is directly Instead. 'being' to or givennessas a pure opposed grounding metaphysicalenti(y. '5 For the early, Fichte, this practical causality on the part of the deed of brin&g-into-being,

by theoretical theoretical consciousness the practical making and reason of unity secures subject dependenton the practical subject.The self-generatingsubjectis thus genuinelyunconditional,

14

Mid, p. 8.

I-' Seewilliams, 1992, pp. 36-7.

36

for Fichte, unlike Reinhold's subject, determined like Kant's, in relation to which remains.

assumptionsaboutwhat constitutesthe essential.positive contentof consciousexpenence. Intellectual intuition is not, then, an expression of dWnatic faith in the existence of an lute but fiv the substance, of absolute certainty ab

the subject of the sub ect's o%-., n

indeterminate existence as a knowing. The existential proposition it implies 'is valid onlyjbr the I itself. rather than being 'valid in itself (RA 16/71). But by being absolutely c&rtam for the II

subject, it is therefore a formal condition of aH possible experience, as all forms of representational consciousness are deteffninations of the indeterniinate symbetic unity of

consciousness. Or put another way: every determinate synthetic proposifion about experience possesses mediated validity, -positing a state of affairs which can have meaning only relatively to other states of affairs represented by other propositions. The validation of such propositions, if it is possible only with reference to other such propositions., would have to be an infinite process in order to be complete, thus destroying the very possibility of adequate proof. The only if knowledge is be is foundation to that is the alternative, objective possible, a securerational 16 necessarycondition of any synthetic proposition. For Fichte, intellectual intuition provides

foundation, like it built 'I not a relative synthetic proposition of existence sucha as represents, 17 depends house', but this thefic of proposition existence, which solely rather an absoluteor further being 'I the objective condition. made, and not upon any am' proposition upon Nevertheless, this proposition is only valid for the subject who has the intellectual intuition, and

" is not an 'objecti4ring thesis" that posits the absolutesubject as a transcendentsubstance, is is Fichte how often misinterpreted. which

16Z6)ler, 1995, pp. II 9_,21D, 17pfaj, 1994, p, IT 4

18Makkreel, 1994,

37

Even though the subject as the absolute enactniew (TahandJ-, n9)'9 of itself is thus, for Ficbte, the formal presupposition of all representation,it cannot initially be understood as more than a postulated Vound of consciousness. Why is this? The individual sub*t

can be

absolutely certain that its experience of intellectual intuition shows it its own formal ground, but the uqv in which the absolute subject is a ground-,that is, what materially makes it a ground, remains unknown. The absolute subject bas not yet been posited for subjectivity-in-general, that is, in the totality of the forms under which it can determine itself At this point, the Kantian problem of theTelation between canon and organon is being raised. Postulating the absolute enactment as a thinkable 'notunenon" that underlies all representation provides representation

fon-nal foundation, forms but does demonstrate Kantian that the not of experience,or any with a others, are necessary,universal and unchanging conditions of objective experience.The absolute enactment may be the beginning of ali consciousness,but it remains an abstrael or subjective beginning until we can draw out the rational forms inherent in itý thus discovering the totality of detemiines Subject laws Absolute the through consciousnessas consciousness which necessary of something, and thus acts as a material ground of experience. Ficbte thus recooses that given Ilerder and Hamann's Cnticisms of Kant, if we are to demonstrate that reason can have synthetic a priori knowledge, we must deduce a complete be The foundational from forms principle. subject must a of experience system of the necessary fonns is, the the totality in thes. of and as widerstood two guises: as the unconditional, canonical

from The the transition synthe-sis. organic absolute theoretical an and practical experience. of is immediately. A be from required method to canon organon, cannot effected one to the other,

In Ficbte's foundational immanent the to in order to ensurethat this transitionremains pnnciple. in subjectiveunity represented this consists the analysisof the pre-representational early work, 191 have used 'enactment' as a translation of Talhandlung (fiteraBy ýdeed-act) to suggestboth the aci of Kantian bringing-into-being, decree the two its thus of selfmirrofing aspects of the subject and C9 legislation. 20Breazeale,1994, pp- 44-5.

38

follows that forms experience of deduction the necessary by the 'I am', and a subsequent of

fonns are experience of the that thus showing firom derived the analysis. preliminary rules forms Subject, own its of Absolute the to because they immanent are on-ns necessary appearance. Kritik, than a Kantian in rather deduction of be the sense But would this really a first In the of version entities? the derivation of existence that assumes of method metaphysical

Completion entails WL, Fichte endows his method with a specific criterion of completeness. This is consciousness-in-gencral. the of condition the objective that enactment absolute proof for form is the forms, in the possibility of condition where each proof will consist a system of in to the it, absolute enactment movement circular that a grand returns, and precedes wbich one

itself, understoodnow, not as a postulate,but as an objective foundationand real ground.This its is status as indeed self-groundin& proving will show that the principle of the system Absolute by actually demonstrating that it is the ground of all fon-ns of experience. There is no hypothetical is its here: the principle can only possess complete, system metaphysics until for is 54/113), (CC The the criterion method an epistemological experiment objective validity. deduced from first implies in interim, the the that that, of circularity wbat is we can only assimie

principje is objectively vali(t and that the principle is indeed capable of serving as the GrundsaLz of a system: 'There is thus a circle here from which the human mind can never It its in is to escape. good concede presenceexpficitly, order to avoid being confused later by its

discovery' (CC 61-2/119) unexpected Fichte's method aims to demonstratethat the absoluteenactmentmust supportrelative become determinate forms discursive thus as and consciousness,and that this follows synthetic The from indeterminate its identity as a nature wfity. analytically of the subject expressed by

the thetic proposition 1=1('l am F), is the absolutebeginning. Ficbte claims that this unity, formal law identity (A=A), be the the source of of thought without cannot represents which

formal law the thought the the to opposite, source of its of of non-contradiction passing (A; &-.A), i. e., the proposition 1*--l (I am not not-I'). The I cannot at one and the same tilne posit

itself absolutely as both I and not-1. The second proposition thus represents a necessary,,but its by anfithefical the act own outside as absolutelý, or posits absolute subject produces wbicb , independent of it. This absolute other is the postulate of the enactment of the not-1. the basis of all knowledge or consciousnessof the objective world, which follows necessarily from the freely posited unity of the subject. The independence of the second postulate anses as the result of a necessary contradiction: the 1,quo absolute, cannot be simultaneously I and not4, for then it would not be 111%so, lute. But

,,,

this independenceproducesanothercontradiction:if the absolutesubjectand the

not-] are both posited absolutely, then they are absolutely external to each other or incommensurable, and would be equiprimordial. However, the absolute other depends upon the absolute subject, and so cannot be absolutely different and equipn.mordial. Paradoxically, if the is independent not4 of the 1, then it must simultaneously be absolutely dependent upon utterly it, as the two postulates are linked by analytical necessity. A third act of the I is the condition needed to make the positing of I and not-I possible. It cannot be fonnulated, via fin-ther analysis, given that an absolute contradiction has arisen.

Instead,it is thoughtas a freely generatedsyntheticproduct of reasonthat relatesI and not-I to each other in a non-contradictory way. This new relation is one of opposition, where each term has a limited degree of reality with respect to the other: each is insofar as the other is noi. This

generalsynthesis,which completesa triad of postulates,statesthat in generalsubjectand nonin be limitation. subjectcan only relatedwithout contradiction a relation of mutual quantitative Ficbte"smethod, thm defersto Kant by recognisingthat the restdt of attemptingto NA the Like Kant Fichte holds is be that an antinomy. an antinomy necessarily can unconditional

dialectically resolved once the terins under which it is conceivedare explicitly related to the Unlike Kant however., Fichte dialectic having experience. of sees conditions as a subjective in these exactly conditions are what elucidating role positive

Ilmitation. relation of reciprocal

40

initially, simply this general

With respect to the Absolute Subject itself, these three postulates show that. in order to itself as relatively different to and relatively posit itself fTeely at all, it must necessan posit 1-1 . identical with something else. Synthests In general, as the form of positing fliat subsumes relative difference and identity, is thus deduced as the necessan,form under which the Absolute Subject.fýeeýy determines itself Each deten-nination of the Fichtean organon will, within the hypothetical he the ! transcendental subject, constitute a synthetic overall activity of unity of relation between a finite, conscious subject and a presentation of an object -a

fon-n of

oblective experience or knowledge. The philosopher must methodically reconstruct the totality of forms be postulated as posited simultaneously within the unity of the Absolute -

which must all

in deduction, via a

fime, of the series of triads that constitute these modes, repeating the initial deduction of deduction (necessary) the postulates-. analytic of antinomically related opposed terms, and the fonn (free) that the spontaneous generation of a synthesis resolves antinomy With a new of experience. Each triad thus reflects Kant's conception of practical autonomy, bv embodying, freedom In the and necessity. each and every case, the autonomous self-legislation, unity of fuTther be is the the thesis and antithesis, yet can itself possibility of synthesis a condition of demand into In this way, successive thesis that also reconciliation, a and antithesis analysed being conditions of the manifestation of the absolute enactment, are syntheses, as well as conditions of previous syntheses. Reconstruction begins with the third postulate, the most general and least determinate foun of sýmtheSls.I and -not-] are posited as limiting and determining each other, and so either Ii the not-I limits the 1,or ii) the I limits the not-I (WL 125-6/121-3). This antinomy is the basis of

the distinction betweentheoTetiadand pTacticalphilosophy.In thefiTStcasethe consciousI will feet itself determined by an object, while in the second this I will come to know itself as the Fichtean In be the determinations Ibis the ewly otject. antinom,, can only in ý cause of system, by d the systemthe of completion resolve,

in other words, only the absolute relation between

]edge be kno, forms can a synthesisadequateto the resolution of the of " the totality of necessan,

41

by determined The know I the presentedobject, antinomy. conscious must come to itself not as or as that which determines the presented object but as the absolutely free act that determines all presentation in consciousness,the subject-in-itself 'Me early system begins With the theoretical porfion of philosophy, as the propoSifion that the not4 determines the I assumesonly that the I fteA itself to be determined.,rather than asswTdngthat the 1, as practical philosophy always already does, is opposed to an independent object. The very objecthood of the not-1, and afl the forms under which this can be determined (the forms of intuition, the categories) will be deduced from the bare awarenessof limitation or deterimnation as such (the Anslofl or 'check). Nevertheless, it is necessarythat a trmsition to

practical philosophy should eventuallyoccur, so that practical, active synthesisin generalwill be deduced as a transcendentalcondition of extemally-delimited theoretical knowledge and the system can ultimately return to the absolute subject. At the end of the theoretical portion (WL 227-46/202-17), the finite, conscious I is for different from This itself the the ground as essentially presented object. prepares aware of practical philosophy where the finite I is aware of being divided internally between the theoretical 'intelligence", and the active practical subject that transcendsthe 11MItationsof the intelligence simply by being aware of it (WL 247/218-9). This internal division is a basic by final the system returning to the unity resolution would complete practical antinomy wbose deduction depend Crucially., the the of the completion will not only upon of absolute subject. be law, but the can acwalýv realised among moral conditions under whicb it also on moral forms be history that the must realised in in order to create a rational necessary subjects,namely

Kant's postulatesof practicalreason. constitution,and wbieb replace The practical portion revas two fatal weaknessesin the system, however. Firstly, the

impossible formulate The from to to proves theoretical satisfactorily. practical transition unity law is Fichte's deduction Kant's the to to moral sought establish of vital early of reason that Subject Absolute be be the to activity of must proven system, as the practical, self-generating

foundation thus that theoretical. showing experience, of reflective reason the unconditional

4'.2

dependsupon practical,productivereason.However,the first principle of the systemturns out to unden-ninethis overaU aim: the way in which Fichte detennines the postulate of the absolute I that he takes to be necessary for consciousness-in-generaldestroys the coherence of the two

halvesof reason. As Frederick Neuhouser has noted 21Fichte's 'transition' is only necessaryif the end result of the theoretical portion directly contradicts the first principle of the. system, thus maintaining the essential disunity of the finite subject. Otherwise the practical portion would be unnecessary,as the conditions of the unity of consciousnesswould be exhausted within the bounds of the general relation between an 1 and a not-! that determines it. The theoretical

portion endsby showing that the inteHigenceknows itself to be separatefrom the object that determines it (WL 249/220-1); for this to directly contradict Fichte's first principle, the Absolute Subject must from the outset bave been known to be. the ground of both object and finite intelligence. But this knowledge is what the system is supposed to demonstrate. A distinction must be drawn again between the canonical form of the Principle and its positive form, whose validity remains to be proven. in its canonical form, the principle is, for the be first the the thus to necessmy condition of all consciousnessand claims right a subject,

form, from it is different but insofar it has this the unity of apperception,which no principle, as free, The its but is be ground of consciousness. prooj'of not a sufficient status may spontaneous, is depends first it i. that a self-producing grouwL as principle, e. proof upon the completion of the system. Hence the content of the real beginning of the system (the canonical principle) is the

failed Reinhold forrn does that to transcen(L theoretical of consciousness and not same No the transitionis necessitated. the theoretical the part of system. contradict end of The second difficulty concerns the possibility of completing the system.,even if the

is Practical the reallsationof ends within the natural world. activity transition were necessary. Activity, as an ozqhl, is a striving (Streben) that aims to overcome the division between the

21Neuhouser,

1990, pp. 49-52.

43

finite intelligence thatfeels itself to be detennined by the natural world and the infinite practical, purposive activity that aims to realise absolute freedom witbin this world. However, this striving is necessany unending. Even if the formal conditions of possibility for the realisation of freedom (legal institutions, the State, etc.) can be deduced, this does not itself complete the system, This is becausepractical knowledge entails the reafisation of its conditions, mid hence the activity of real subjects. The divided subject can only know itself as absolutely free if it

freedom. The systemis seenin the historical contextof a nation of subjectsstriving this reallses in unison to realise a single grand practical synthesis.Becausethe very basis of practical activity is a real difference between the autonomous desire for a practical end and one's beteronomously-determined consciousnessof -natural Mclinations that limit practical activity, the realisation of final unity is infinitely postponed. At every level of practical philosophy, any

realisation of a purpose depends upon a difference that escapesthis unity, given that a difference itself is necessary for any practical activity to begin. The absolute unity of consciousnessbecomes impossible to reach: once the system opens onto historical time it be The demonstration cannot completed. of the objective validity

of the postulate of the

absolutesubjectremainsinfinitely deferred,the higbestpractical 'ought. In later versions of the system constructed from 1796 to 1802, the primacy of practical displaced by is, in Kant's to these to response problems, a new principle closer one philosophy its 391/4), fundamental in (GMM 'differentiated the application' solely notion of a reason 'self-positing'. subjective activity of

Firstý the beginning of the system is reworked in the two

'Introductions' to the WL composedin 1797.The questionof beginningis now addresseAnot in tenns of the quest for an objective beginning or conscious certainty (Geuyj heit), but in tserm belief freedom. beginnin& (Glaube) in This a necessary reorientation also of a subjectively

Fichte for his the antinorny sees to which as universal philosophy methodological of a responds

22

Ibid. pp. 11-12.

44

time: whetherto begin with a subjeefiveGrund5a1z.or to revert to a realist first PrMCIple'idealism' or 'dogmatism'. Neither position can establish its validity agwnst the claims of the

other. In both cases,the validity of any systemproducedfrom the first principle is only relative to the overall validity of the principle (freedom or causaldeterminism),wbicb the systemitself cannot prove but has to assume.For Fichte, the only factor behind choosing one over the other must be a subjective one: a practical faith m freedom or determinism. ne implication is that the WL's first principle cannot be an absolute confirmation of the subject's freedoirn, and that the beginning of the WL is in fact mcompatible with its aim, despite being a condition of consciousness-in-generalthat could be affinned by any subject. Instead, the system will begin with a principle that only ought to be affirmed by any subject, itself that the i-neaning system will be genuinely circular, grounded only upon the practical 23 belief freedom affirmation of the value of a M . The changesin Fichte's method are exemplified by the WLm-n of 1796-99. Here, Fichte begins from the postulate that the absolute subject, wbether determined tbeoretically or from itself That be I to the the Practically, always posits which is not-I cannot simply opposed deduction 1, WL. Instead, the to the as must remain wboIIy immanent self-positing and outset, in deduce the conditions that make it possible for the I to ]unit Uself. rather than show how the I from This duplicity' itself be limited 'original know to of opposed without. will entail an can its 1, 185/365) (WLnm the the ground of all self-positings or representations within as activities of

itself.

24The

WLmn explicitly shows that 'differetticceis not rnerely the opposite of identitv-. it

is the wndition

of its possibility

25 -) .

Fichte argues that self-positing is that by which, when one thia-s 'I arn', 'one feels 28/110). determined (V&nm feeling be This to a particular manner' in can one,s consciousness feelmg however 32/116), (WLnm in felt be to repose or indeten-nination. of a opposition only "' On Fichte's 'antifoundationalism' seeRockmore, 1994, esp. p. I 24 See Z61jer,

1995, pp. 116,123.

45

f being bare In intuited from figure the eeling of as if one which it emerges. a against the pyound detennined, then, is a difference between that which is merely pirivento consciousness, Or positedfor it, and the Absolute Subject that posits the determination fi)r itsetf(WI-nm 20/112. 37/124). This is the difference between the theoretical and the practical, given that it comprises free, a actualising activity (practical.), and an ideal (theoretical) consciousnessof this activity (WLnm 47/140,49/142-3). In the feeling of being-determinect the most abstract synthetic form of experience, the subject's nnmediate intuition of itself wavers between the repose that feeling, the precedes which is representedin consciousnessby the concept of the indeten-ninate. and the feeling itself, representedby the opposed concept of the determinate. For the feeling to

be posited in consciousness,the passagefrom indeterminateto determinatemust be made first delenninable. is become The deterMMable-as-such the possible: consciousness must first the thus the content of the systemproper. of absolute"s self-determination, and condition This condition is now analysed in order to deduce the further conditions which make

the I detenninable,i. e., capableof being hrMted.This musthappenthroughthe I ý'sown activity. is from The doctrine it is deten-nined Anstofl the that of without. we cannot simply assume Dame] key happens. Breazeale 'check' how that translates this this to points out show revived term inadequately, as it denotes both an obstacle, and an original unpetus that allows the I to

26 become determinate. Feeling (GeftiW as a power of the transcendentalL can serve as an Ansto,# as it is purely subjective and yet is not finally produced by the 1,27being composed of .F

limitation Y's infinite together the that activity, or the cba-racterises absolute with a expansion

1. So, immanent depend the the that examination of the on cannot ultimately contraction detern-tination Subject Absolute that, to the all posits a condition of conditionsthat must pertain because it is basic to the system, cannot itself be analysed further within it. For theoretical both invigorate For that restrict and consciousness. practical philosophy, it is senseimpressions 245 . Breazeale, 1995, p. 100.

Ibid., P. 88. '-7lbid, p- 94.

46

philosophy it is the impression of the freedom of other human beings, the 'demand' or

4summons'(Aufforderung) that restrictsone's own actionsout of respect(Achning) for others' autonomy by stimulating the will. The

feeling Fichte the emphasis now changes as analyses of determination itself

deducing from it the vafious tbeorefical and pTactical modes of the Fs activity. Once the Absolute Subject has become determinable, it then takes on determinations that are the different modes of experience, freely posited in conformity with its own nature, and beginning with the

positing within consciousnessof a representationof that feeling which initially made it determinable (-WLnrn 65-7/171-3). Feeling is the condition of the fact that the I determines itself, an opposed synthesis within the absolute subject conditions the what of the act of

positin& the representationalcontent of the deten-ninationof conscious experience.This synthesis, the ultimate condition of being able to represent feeling as dependent upon an object that is, the condition of our notion of object-bood itself -

belongs to the productive

imagination, 'the power to grasp absolutely opposed things in a single act' (WLnm 201/399.),

discrimination judgement by renders and possible providing a whole, an overall context which 201/398-9). (WLn-m of relatednessas such As a condition of any representation, this power immediately grasps the totality of forms of conscious experience inherent in the absolute subject. This conscious thought 'cannot do, since thinking is purely discursive' (WL-nm 202/401). Feeling and imagination are

within the equiprimordial, non-discursivepowersthat are ultimate conditionsof consciousness transcendental subject. The imagination is especially important: it 'creates the material for

found is it that empiria consciousness is and the within representation: aloneshapeseverything 2/193). Ficlite identifies itself it Spirit (DSL Kant's (Geiv), this with consciousness creatorof 'animating principle in the mind [ ...1, the ability to exhibit aestheticideas' (CJ 313-4/181-2). The imagination, seemsto be a symbol for the Absolute Subject, for it has an autonomy of the

kind attributed to the Mlhan(llung: imagination'obtains its rules from within itself It needsno Yet despite 71198)itself (DSL law it ]a,%-,,; is a its non-discursv%rity, it remainssubjectto unto

47

the inherentrationality of the absolutesubject,and to determinationvia the discursive.analytic power of judgement, wbich sequentially dismembers the syntbesis of imagination (WLnm 2014/403-4). Throughout the system, feeling and imagination allow consciousness to become

determinatetbrougbjudgement:awareof its object awareof itself as awareof the object and awareof itself as positing determinationswithin the object. Consciousness can thusbe awareof an object that limits it, in variousforms; it canalsobe variouslyawareof its own acti-6ty.But in it is either case aware of itself only as determinate, as limited from without or within, and as such remains different from the Absolute Subject which, being the totality of these detenninations (the subject-in-itself), can alone be fimly self-detennining. To know the Absolute Subiect as absolute remains an infinite task: the imagination provides us with an Idea of the whole, giving to judgement a rule or schema which it is to follow in reconstructing the instantaneously-graspedwhole in time, this rule being that of striving for unity within a consciousness split between theoretical and practical activities (WLnrn 415/208). This 'striving" is now a generalised rule of self-positing, by which the Absolute Subject determines itself according to ever more comprehensive syntheses(the forms

itself itself intuition, the posits as aware of as containing,as categoriesand so on), until it of transcendentalstructures, these forms as conditions of the experience of an independent object. For this practical self-consciousness.,striving is the dernand that absolute freedom, the unity of

WL. This in in be the the the subject vision of mfmite practical striving realised world, as demand freedom began, demand the to the to the affirm system as the with which returns us

However, the demandis onýva demand.,a Sollen, and beginningand end of all consciousness. beginnin& is by the conditioned the of a theoretical which the question of objective validity foundational be justification the the status of absolute subject, cannot settled of criterion, i. e. the

i. fmedorn The that to ftafilment I--criterion, e. prefer we eed om. unfr of a merely practical Dy the kingdom by WL. decided be the the the of Perfect realisation of ends, as in questioncould only

48

Fichte's failure to demonstrate the foundational status of the Absolute Subject depends upon a contingency his method cannot eradicate. The Subject always needs feeling In order to become determinate, for feeling introduces deten-ninability, potentially determinate difference. into the absolute act's indeterminate identity. Now feeling is entire]y subjective Or Private, yet does not depend entirely on the subject. The 1, in becoming determinate, 'is not the sole author of its own being"g. Consequently.,feeling, as a condition of all consciousness,cannot itself be explained by something like a determinate form of consciousness.In other words, the fact that the subject is divided from itself and is actually deten-ninateis, as far as consciousnessis concerned, entirely contingent, and not caused by any necessary law, as was the case at the beginning of WL. But if this is the case, all consciousnesshas for its necessary condition its own contingent or unexplainable division from itself This means that in actuality, it will be divided from itself, necessarily always as the practical part of the systernshows. Early and later versions of the system encounter this same problem- The WL attempts to avoid it by using the analytic identity of the absolute I as the means of deriving the difference between I and not-1, but this makes the absolute too much like the merely theoretical unity of

faibng to go beyond the Reinholdianposition that Fichte himself Cnticlsed.The apperception, problem really surfacesin the practical portion, and is still not solved in the WLnm. Real individuals the part of actual is necessaryto realise the goal of the system, to make striving on the Absolute itself an object of knowledge, but this fulfihnent of philosophy remwns infinitely deferred. For exwnple, the creation of a legal order derives from the conflict of individual wills,

freedom, between fi-eedom thus the to contradiction reconciling and seeks preserveUniversal A But in domination the that of against all. as an actual, and not merely war prevails and

depending internal is diNision the this project a piecemeal on of the possible mode of action, in determinate depends between turn and natural ends inclinations, which on practical subject

28 ibid,

9.88.

49

the moral feeling of real differencesbetweenone's own will and that of others-Every attemptto reconcile a difference with a synthetic identity itself depends upon a further difference, and it is this dynamic that infinitely postponesthe full presenceof the Absolute. Reasonnow finds itself faced witb an aporia that is no longer Kantian. Wbereas Kant"s transcendental metbod contingently assumes the necessity of certain actual forms of empirical experience, Fichte's project appears to show that Reason,,no matter how far it goes In deduCMg and realising determinations that are actual forms of experience and conditions of its own employment, must always presuppose,a contingent difference that it cannot legislate for. Reasonbas been placed in a position where it must bear the burden of an infinite labour, without ever knowing for sure at if it has indeed any stage proceeded correctly.

iv)

Schelling: The 'EcstmWof Reason'

Reason Absr, the a) and -Imte:Negalive Philosophy Fichte takes up Kant's central contention that objective knowledge depends fon-nally Herder Hamann's the the transcendental to structure of subject, and attempts answer and upon objections by boldly making this fi-anscendental subject the sufficient condition of all

foundations for falls., bave knowledge As to this seen, attempt provide secure consciousness. we for it setsup a project that is de.jure impossibleto complete.However,Fichte's failure changes the orientation of foundationalist method. Kant begins With the assumption that reason is

but its to this assumption empirical experience, of relation capableof an immanentexamination is qualified by the furtber assumption that empirical experience is itself always already known. Fichte argues that, because reason can determine what is fundamentally necessary in any

it is foundation, Subject by Absolute this the necessarily Di=anent in that and is, experience, deduce forms demonstrate it, the totality that the can systematic reason of of will analysing

experience. But the quesfionof criteria of certainn, of knowledgeremains.The systemis complete is knoim have the that subject absolute as absolute., when we its whole only when we are certain

50

content before us. But finite consciousnessis posited as doubly conditioned- It is conditioned by

the self-groundingidentity of the canonical unconditioned,but also by an 'original duplicItY (WLnm 185/365) of feeling. Hence the attainment of absolute knowledge (when the content of the system is completed and utterly certain knowledge of the unconditional achieved) is infinitely postponed. An other (feeling) that necessarily escapesbeing fully determined within the system proves in fact to be a condition of the system itself The failure of reason to prove its autonomy by fulfilling its own criteria of certainty can be seento be at the heajl of the reaction of the Romantic movement against Kantian philosopby, which, among other things, centres upon questions regarding the relation between the foundation knowledge. The Romantics the took- up of experience unconditioned and subject of themes which we have already encountered in relation to the leaders of the Sturm und Drang, Herder and Hamann. Chief among these was what we n-figbt call the 'situatedness' of reason, the way in which any account of the foundations of knowledge depends upon histoncally linguistic historical by that specific conventions and wider conditions are presupposed any

is. Epistemology determine knowledge to the may seek actual account of what genuine but doing has in this to the it conditions of validity of synthetic a priori propositions, forms (natural the the science, morality) whose of experience presuppose universality of

in There is it is to an essentialcIrCularity the epistemological attempting ground. possibility in Fichte attempting to explain why certain rational terms are universal clearly saw. as project

conditionsof our expenence,philosophy assumesa pre-givenset of meaningsthat enableit to get started, a set of subjective presuppositions -

just as, for Fichte, Kant assumed the

differencebetweensubjectand object without showinghow this would necessarilyanse given for its first Ficbte's In to own principles, account epistemology the nature of reason. attempting had to impose a doctrine of activity upon practical reason, and the motivation behind this by 'governed itself cboice caprice, and since even a capricious a practical: imposition was

by is it (lW 4-3)3/18). Fichte baNe decision must governed inclination and interest' somesource,

51

thus recognised that critical philosophy must begin with faith, but this left his own project ungrounded. The problem of the historical conditioning of reason led the Romantics to consider the possibility of a non-rational grounding of reason in a higher, primarily aesthetic faculty. This ideaý as developed by Jacobi and H61derlin, proved decisive in breaking Schelling's earl),

attachmentto Fichte, as it seemedto promisea meansof leaving behind the circle of subjecti%, e presuppositions- Scheffing's earliest work as a student of Fichte concerns itself largely With the defence exposition and of Fichte's system and method. During the mid- I 790s, however, a

decisive change in orientation occurs, with Schelling proposing not a single organon of knowledge founded upon the Absolute Subject, but tivo parallel systems, one dealing With the Absolute Subject, the other With the unity of nature. This move away from Fichte's refusal to I be the to the to assurne not-I as a posit parallel may appear a regressionto a pre-Mtical realism (which is largely how Fichte interpreted it). However., the reasons for Schelling's change in

forced from Fichte 'criticism' the that the approachstem sameproblemsregarding meaningof to rework his system in the WLnm. As we saw above, Fichte found that if he insisted on the practical, essentially free be faced his Grundsal. then the an antinomy conceming the objective system subject as - of beginning of philosophy. The Absolute could be consistently defined as either essentiaflyreal or being idea either principle capable of accordingly, constructed Without and a system essentially

Schefling (as. 'criticism" 'Dogmatism' the called them) were incapableof and other. refuting for Absolute the the clanined itself wd as each with philosophically, other each contending with

intuition. of an immediate Whereas Fichte sought to resolve the antinomy by preaching an affimnation of idealism by Scbelling freedom, in thatý the proposed antinomy, it redefining the of interests and criticism

be 'critical" Absolutes 'dogmatic' The together two be can and viewed in opposed could solved. different contextsthat correspondto differing basicphilosophicalquestions.The antinomy itself dependsupon a pre-Kantianontological questionregardingthe essentialnatureof Being. But if

51% I

the two absolutes are seen in the light of a specifically Kantian epistemological problem, namely jblow

do ideas of external things anse in usT (IPN, 15/12). the antinomý- necd not

come about. If this question is asked, then nothing, is assumedbeyond the defixio and formallý non-contradictory assertion that the independence of entities can be conceived, whereas the ontological question assumestheir existence, and then posits an Absolute as a highest entity. Two systems could be constructed as solutions to the Kantian problem, one based on the concept of a real Absolute, the other on the basis of an Absolute Subject. Both would have

the sarne explananduni, the emergenceof consciousnessof objects.,wbile eacb utifising a different principle as explanans. The system of Naturphilosophie would entail a deduction of

the actual natural forms necessary for the emergence of consciousness,while the G-'eistesphilosophiewould follow the Fichtean model of the Wissenscht1fislehrein deducing forms necessary of consciousnessfrom the Absolute Subject. Neither system can be constructed fact limitations Given to the the that of consciousness,and so each is circular. without reference ideas have of external objects, Nalurphilosophie constructs, on the basis of the concept of a we self-determining Absolute Life, a natural history of the role of nature in determining

fornatuTal Geistesphilosophie, organon of general principles science. on the consciousness, an for freedom, for hand, the realisationof an organon practical other constructsa programme detemiines the object. that the the asswnption subject philosopby, on Neither system could contest the claims of the other, as each has a different perspective Each holds between distinction the the and object. sway over its own subject on ground of

domain, the one beginning from the perspectiveof preconsciousfomis of 'experience' from thereby the philosophy, emerges in course of natural and consciousness, which representational

itself Both systemsgive a geneficaccount history, and the other beginning from consciousness from beginning the that principle, and reacb same conclusion: absolute an consciousness of for It Schelling 1797 this that the in themselves is reason swne. in calls subject and object are fact 'the that that the absolute-ideal is which assurnes the higher or true philosophical viewpoint difference between Just 59/44). in (IPN the the as relative subject and object the absolute-real'

53

either system depends upon a higher identity, so the Gnindsdize of either system are actua]INý subsumedby a higher principle that is the indj&rence of both nature (Absolute Life) and spirit (Absolute Subject). While the principle of a system can be either subjective or objective. the principle of principles, Absolute Indifference, is simultaneouslY both subjective and Objective,

and neither subjective nor objective. This true Absolute is without a unique essential determination, and Sebelling calls it the absolutely necessarypresupposition of all philosophy. the necessarycondition of all. knowledge. Sebelling's concept of the true Absolute th-us initially plays the role of a negative in the same way as Fichte's Absolute Subject and retains the same condition unconditional hypothetical validity. Positing the Absolute as Indifference

in no way proves anything as to the reality of this idea

being I ) the ground of all eVidence,can only prove wbieb ... Our inference hy itself is merely ypothetical. - if philosophy is its then that exists, necessaTy presupposition. (IPN 59/44)

However, Schelling conceives of the Absolute as 'higher' or more inclusive than the Absolute Subject, for it subsumesboth Natur- and Geislesphilosophie. Fiebte"s major objection to his former disciple's foundational concept is that it must necessarily collapse philosophy into dogmatism or realism, as it appears to result in a system that, by VNing a genetic account of dependent that on natural process, actually reduces subjectivity to this natural, is subjectivity 29 freedom. destroying Schelling's But the Possibility of real necessarily mechanistic process,,

indifference, is indifference Absolute, the of the subject of consideredas point is that the knowledge and objective being, and is reducible to neither. Hence both subjectivity and

29See Vater, 1994, pp. 198-202.

54

objective being have a common root that expresses itself immanently in bo& as different polencies (Polenzen) of itself. Subjectivity expresses this root with a higher exponent, as it were, given that the forms it takes on express a reflexive awareness of both nature and itself Hence a relation between subject and object in the theoretical portion of the Geivesphilo.sophit! cannot, for example, be reduced to a relation between expansive and contractile basic forces in the Nalurphilosophie, wbereas a lawlike relation between bodies can be reduced to a relation

betweenforces. Like Fichte's hypothetical postulate, Absolute Indifference must prove itself If systems

of natureand spirit canbe completedupon this basis,tbe.n this Gnindsal.- Will show itself to be the necessaryand sufficient condition of all knowledge and existence. However, the philosophy is based of nature on a misconstrual. The Naturphilosophie purports (unlike, say, Spinoza's

philosophy) to describe what nature must be like in order f or there to be representational consciousness. In such wise, while positing the Absolute Life as a unifon-n whole, Naturphilosophie only renders this whole determinate in relation lo consciousness.If a genuine deduction of nature in-jiselj'is not possible, then Nalurphilosophie is not a separatesystm-nas suck but remains immanent to the general viewpoint of Geistesphilosophie. The 'two-system'

Nalurphilosophie in be itself if can reduced this way to part of the viewpoint cannot sustain for it derives have A the the merely subjective status of then principles system of subjectivity, 30 detemfinations being fictions, than of nature. necessary rather speculative After 1800, a methodological shift occurs. hi 1800, Schelling's STI, the second half of bis double system and his attempt at a Fichtean Geisiesphilosophie, ends by foHOWingNovalis

in making aestheticintuition a privileged mode of accessto the Absolute.The final condition of is deduced Subject In Absolute the the practical the as of art. work the practical realisationof infinite dangerous labour lays the Schelling STI, the consequences of practical of out of part r--The lack final fulfilment Fichtean in by the of a promise of system. results calf-positing required

30Seeibid., P. 201, on Fichte's view of accountsof nature as 'fictions.

55

a finaJ dichotomy vvithin consciousness:the entirety of the history of the reallsatiOn Of the Absolute is conceived as either being detennined with a prion ., pire-given necessity or being utterly indeterminate, and subject to no law (STI 601-2/209). The categorical imperative of Streben both fatalism Jamnite results either in equally and accedia, or anarchism and chaos, destructive of the polifical and legal order that strives to reallse the Absolute. The only way of redeeming practical subjectivity of its ultimate diVidednessis if the Absolute can actually be present in consciousnessas a 'providential' unity of necessity and freedom. Schelling recOgnises that the truth of Fichtean, subjective self-legislation is the

unending Streben to fulfil an abstract practical doctrine, and proposes instead that true experience of the absolute unity of freedom and necessity lies In artistic production. Art unites both conscious, subjective activity (the artist-subject's grasp of a lelos) and unconscious, objective activity (the meaning of the artwork is lnexbaustible). Art can representas an aesthetic historical humanity,, in its division disunity: '[sIcience and the situation of all and whole 31 forever forever possesses'. Importantly, the expenence of aesthetic creation morality seek; ail

just is instead is longer but that the unity of subjective, or reception expressesa unity no which

determinate differentiation, This is and is thusa productive spirit. experience natureand without intuition of the absolute unity rather than of the merely relative unity of consciousness,which always rehes on differenfiation,, and can thus never be at rest. Already in the earlier bi-perspectival system the postulate of a 'higber' Absolute

divided into natural and spiritual principles demonstratedthe presenceof a non-Fichtean inspiration in Schelling's work. After 1800, Schelling's attemptsat constructingan organonof foundation first higbeT detenninations this theiT as pnnelple, the necessmy of expenence utilise from intuition This into intuition STI's turn the away an of reason. aesthetic transfonning the

FichteanSubjectcan be understoodin relation to the critique of transcendentalphilosophy that

3( Fackenheim, 1996, p. 89. 32Frank, 1995, p. 75-6.

56

is furnished by HbIderlin, Novalis and above all, Jacobi, and initiated by Jacobi's rediscovery " Spinoza. Jacobi argued that the genuinely unconditioned presupposition of Imowledge has Of to be thought of as transcendent to all conditioned forms of knowledge. and thus cannot be reduced, as Fichte had argued, to the subject's knowledge of itself3" Fichte's Absolute is posited as a subject opposed to the abstract thing-in-itself of realism: it is a form of knowing that is defined over against a being, and is thus conditioned. For Jacobi, if the unconditioned be known, then it is in an intuition that is utterly immediate. Our experience of this can transcendent Absolute would thus be indeterminate, being an intuition, not of an object 35 by but conditioned a category, of primordial Being. H61derlin concurred with this view in the fi-Vnent

'Judgement and Being' (c. 1794-5),

arguing that Fichte's intellectual intuition cannot be unmediate, for it is supposedto represent the subject's intellectual 'perception' of itself, yet this perception of subjectivity cannot be defined without mediation, without presupposing a relation between subject and object.36The absolute knowledge spoken of by Jacobi and H61derlin, however, is a certainty that is radically bjj,,

(Iý

37

The circularity that Fichte acknowledgesas a necessaryfeatureof his systemcan thus

be criticised from a 'higher' standpointas a kind of transcendentalillusion in Kant"s sense(see 25 above). The unconditioned is meant to allow the possibility of eXPenenceto be explained Fichte's foundation. flowever, to a secure unconditioned cannot explain this with reference is by difference If the charactensed awareness of representational consciousness possibility. between subject and object, then Fichte's Absolute cannot account for this difference, for the definition of it as a subject already presupposesthe distinction between subject and object. It is from is (this, only an abstraction our experience and as we thus not genuinely unconditioned, 33SeeBeiser, op. cii., Ch. 2 on Jacobi's discovery of Spinozaand his early critique of Kant. 34Frank, op. cii., pp. 66-7. 35 I&L,

67,74. pp.

pp. 17-25. Holderlin, 1988, pp. 37-8. Seealso Bowie, 199-3), 37 IýMp, 12/48, on the nature of absolute certaintv Cf

57

shall see, anticipates Deleuze). The Absolute is thus assumed to be a substantial image of the fori-ris of expenence with which we are familiar. Whereas Kant gave a merely formal deduction of the possibility of certain varieties of experience whose universality he simply presupposed, Rebte assm-nes,that the Absolute resembles in its internal articulations our familiar (and historically situated) experience. Hence he posits the Absolute as having an internal or necessary 'r.chl *

is be to that representational consciousness only assumedand cannot proven. ,elation Once Schefling had attained a 'hip-her' point of view on the Absolute afforded by the

non-Fichteanelementsof his Nalurphilosophie and the accountof art in STI, he could attempt to remedythesedeficienciesof Fichte's approach.DespiteagreeingWith Jacobi and H61derlin on the transcendenceof the Absolute with respect to all conditiomng relations, Schelling still demonstrate to the autonomy of pHosophical reason by using this Absolute as the wanted

foundation for an a priori system.But in order to do this, this foundation bad to proVide a genuine explanation of the possibility of experience, and this, as we shall see, raises real

Jacobi H61derlin had if that, problems. and argued it is possible,then all conditionedknowledge must presupposethe immediate identity of the knowing subject and the Absolute- But this only foundation had been Like Fichte, Schelling that adduced. meant a negative, canonical saw that derived from foundation knowledge this only a complete organon or system of immanently knowledge to synthetic and secure the autonomy of reason. ground a prion would suffice Hence the necessary relation between the Absolute and the genesis of representational difference between The had demonstratedbe be had to to subject and object consciousness in itself detennination Absolute immanently be that transcendsall of an necessary an shown to knou, be Absolute In forms. the this n rather than simply would way, such conditioned

Tathandlung. Fichte's unlike presupposed., With this changein viewpoint Scbelling developswhat would becomeknown as the 'Philosophy of Identity.

The dual system is replaced by a single system based on the

Identity,, Absolute of out nature and subsequent], which consciousness of postulate ontological -v be deducedSchelling's fonns have having to its projectin rejected the theoretical and practical

58

flavourSpinozistic have ichtean standpoint, now seernsto taken on an explicitly pre-Kantlan, However, the Pbilosophy of Identity is not dopriatic in Kant's sense, it does not claim a Superior intuition of the nature of the thinig-In-it-self Like Fichte's system, it remains hypothetical and circular until it is complete. In order to explain the possibilitN, of experielice. the unconditioned foundation or in-itself of expenence, the indeterminate Absolute Identity of all conditioned forins must itself be shown to be inherently rational. This rationality of the Absolute is the assumption with which the system begins. It can only be proven by a system that returns to its beginning, as Fichte's was supposedto, and thus completes and grounds itself Despite its SpinoZistic overtones, then., Schelling's approach remains critical, as it makes the objective validity of its assumption (that the Absolute is rational and can thus be known as the sufficient ontological ground of all determination) dependent upon the proof of this assumption, rather than dogmatically assuming that the Absolute Is necessarily rational. To is Schelling, if knowledge Absolute, the paraphrase philosophy, articulated a priori of real, then the absolute identity is its objective presupposition (IPN 59/44)ý but this means that the reality Absolute thus the the as unconditioned, positive and necessary and existence of of philosophy, longer be has be demonstrated. in Absolute the this to only -i will no ground way, The begiii its but have then, system must itself, proven absoluteness. with presupposition, will the hypothetical proposition that, if the Absolute is indeed ontologically absolute or selfgrounding, fliis self-grounding is also absolute self-knowing. For Schellin& this means that the antinomy of 'dogmatism' or 'criticism' that the finally be While the unity of reason properly. to addressed solve can now earlier system set out (whether is Absolute realist or idealist), in order to philosophy the all of presupposition and both be this that out of encompasses unity unfolded resolve the antinomy a system must fTeedom be be to the than The Absolute of and necessity, rather unity shown must viewpoints. 38 deduced be From Nan. detemiinacy i that must a philosophie it mr simply a pure, self-abidmg

3"' On the importance of this chtenon

for Schelling, see NA-liae, 1983b.

.; Q

gives wi a priori account of the determinations of nature in itself, independently of the subject, and a Geivesphilosophie that accounts for the actuality of bw-nanfreedom. 'Experience' noNý, is r to be understood as including, not only the practical law, the categories and the forms of intuition (Kant), and their internal, preconscious articulations (Fichte.) but the unconscious determinations of nature out of which subjectivity has to be thought as emeTVing. In this way, the subject of 'experience' is no longer the finite, human subjectper se. Hence the new system, in its higliest stage of development in WS (1804), takes on an increasingly theol091 ical as well as epiistemol091 "cal aspect: the analysis of the Absolute will denve the detenninations of subjectivity out of nature, but this nahn-al history will simultaneously be the histoiy of the IlVing Absolute"s own progessive self-revelation, its experience of itself, in a universe that it createswhile still remaining etemally united with itself above this process as its transcendentor unconditioned condition and ground. The Absolute is, for Schelling, Immanent in the uttiverse, but is also irreducible to it and thus trmscends all Its detemunations and the conditioning relations between them. However, at this most developed begins Philosophy Identity. Schelling the the to of of stage of articulafiotiý abandon standpoint The reason for a further change in Schelfing-s approach concerns, as we shall see, his ow-n failure to provide a genuine explanation of the possibility of experience. Schelling begins by acknowledging that reason must presupposethat it is identical With the Absolute. To reiterate, this unity has always already overcome all oppositions between ktioirs (WS from 'only totality the the me' system, in perspective of subject and object, and so 140/143). Hence reason, in its identity with the Absolute undergoesa kind of ecstasy,as Jacobi knowledge, knowledge but had H61derlin this identity is not conditioned already noted; and beyond all mediation. I'lie Philosophy of Identity has been interpreted as proto-Heideggerean for this reason, given that such an ecstatic unity of reason and Absolute, beyond conditioned knowledge, seems to be reminiscent of the primordial openness of Dasein to the Being of

39See Schulz, 1954, esp. pp. 349-50. on this transcendence as e\eniplified in Schelling'., later philoophy,

60

beings.'

Schelling's intentions remain tied to the idea of an absolute system however: he

assumesthat puTereasonis the essentialmode of the Absolute's self-exPressiOn, throughwhich be it immediately knows itself (WS 151/149-50), and thus it claims a certainty tliaL whilst I Ing blind, is still 'an intuition of reason or [ I an intellectuol intuition' ...

(WS 153/151). Philosophy

can thus begin without having to first hone its methodological tools and searchafter detenninate grounds for its claim on a prior! knowledge, as in Kant and Fichte. This is becausethe positing of the universe is grounded in the very nature of the presupposed identity., or so Schelling

proposes.However,ibere is a crucial ambiguity in this idea that endangersSchelling'sproject, one with which he would wrestlethroughouthis career.We will now draw this out. Schelling begins by analysing the Absolute. Its defining feature is its immediacy: hence the Absolute or God, considered in itself as the condition of all difference, is the pure affirmation of itself (WS 164/158-9), and this affirmation is the Absolute's knowledge of itself (WS 154-5/152). The Absolute is thus implicitly that which is affirmed of it and that which affirms itself

On this basis, Schelling argues that the Absolute is implicitly

completely

differentiated. It contains within itself an 'ideal universe' or 'first creation' of its logically follow fTom detenninations, the implicit opposition possible whicb with analytical necessity between its affirming and affmned aspects. Its eternal unity, Schelling argues, necessarily

its unity containsthis negativeopposition, implies its differentiatim because.

the arclietypeof

(affirming in term and affmned) requires the other in order all conditional relations, which each to be what it itself is. This ideal differentiation is only ideal, bowever, representing the formal or Kant had The to only subjective allowed validity. purely reflexive side of pw-e reason which first creation is a totality of etemal Ideas, and is thus the merely formal or possible aspectof the Absolute (WS 204/187) -

it does not explain the emergenceof any actual difference within the

knowledge. With dimension to this regard Absolute, and thus cannot ground syntbefic a priori

describes in himself later his Schelfing 'ecstatic, 37. 29-0, absolute reason as much 1975, Ohashi, pp. -7 its (PO is, i 162-3). this outside elf, posited I absolutely ecstatic' positing, q... I I therefore reason in c.areer

61

of the Absolute, we should note that, in addition, ow knowledge of it can only be histOncally, rather than logically, empleted. We will only find within it content that reflects our histOncally situated expenence back to usThere is still, thenýthe question of how the Absolute actualty differentiates itself If the

Absolute is a genuinely transcendentcondition, then it is the unity of all conditioned determinations. In order to enter into a determinate relation with itself, to become known to

itself (and to our reason),it must divide itself. But if it is a genUlnelytranscendentunity of all conditioned determinations,then the processof division cannot be understoodin terms of --I .relations

familiar from experience that are themselves conditioned. We could, for example,

imagine that the formally necessary logical determination of the Absolute (the first creation) explains the emergenceof real difference. But this would be to posit a purely ideal or subjective for the Absolute that, as in Fichte, presupposesthe reality of a conditioning relation. content Here, this relation is that between necessity and freedom, each of wbieb can only be understood be difference Such the to the of real other. explanation of emergence an would with reference like Fichte, for illusory, it Absolute the that thus is itself circular and would simply presuppose, image beliefs but (e. being the our about experience g., our conviction of nodfing conditioned,

that experienceis characterisedby necessity).Hence,Mowing JakobB6hme, Schellingbegins in the Philosophy of Identity to dfink of the Creation in Christian terms as the FaIL a disruption 41

freely is both God"s that enactednecessaryand yet of unity

In order for real difference to

free hence be be there ungrounded positing of what is already and a must posited., actually h1t

it

4ý If

formally imphcit in the Absýo e se .,

Importantly, Schelling conceives this ungrounded act as an absolute positing of

determinationthat is grounded only in the Absolute as an umnediately affin-nativeunit-y. in in Subject's Fichtean the is it of a not-L positing negative, the which unlike other words,

41 See BroWn, 1977, pp. 107- 1 -1.

42Carl Eschenmayer,a student of Schefling's, madethis point in 1803; seeEsposito, 1977, p. 141, 11

62

limiting relation between I and not-I that is the necessarybasis for all determination of consciousnessis supposedly freely posited. This would simply assw-nethat the freedom of the Absolute or its transcendenceis identical with the relation of opposition between the subject and the object that is constitutive of representational consciousness. By arguing that negatiNe opposition is the archetype of necessity that determines the merely ffirmal

first creation,

Schelling has refused to take this view. The actual, rather than merely ideal or possible, positing of opposition requires that the Absolute introduce within itself and through its pure immediacy an ontologicA difference (WS 174/165). This posifing is described by Scbelling as the potentiation or raising-to-a-power of the Absolute: the differences that constitute the actual universe are powers (in the mathematical sense) of the Absolute, for the Universe and everything in it can only exist because the Absolute affims itself in them, even though they themselves are detennined through negative conditioning relations, from the basic opposed forces that produce matter, up to the subject and its object (WS 210/191). In this sense, the being of the Universe and its constituents is identical or univocal (WS 187/174-5), and actual difference is thought of as having its basis in pure affirmation rather than negation., being identity identity' infinite [Polenzierung] by 'an the of of produced potentiation

43

even thougb

being. this negative relations are comprised within unity of However, with this recognition of the difference between possible and actual differentiafion that is necessaryin order to effectively overcome Fichte's position, the ambiguity nere becomes Schelling's apparent. own position and circularity of

are, in effect two

is hand, On Schelling's in there the the Absolutes purely affirtnative one system. postulated Absolute in whieb all distinctions are dissolved, and whicb putatively serves as the ungrounded

its determination through affin-nation simply of of all ground ontological and unconditioned itself On the other, there is the Absolute as rational, as immediately self-knowing, which serves

frOfn has Schelling knowledge. to the that these two foundation PrlýýsuPPOse outset all of as the

43Von Uslar. 1968, ppý 503,507.

63

aspects are united, and acknowledges this assurnption. However, his account of the ecstatic unity of reason and Absolute allows the latter aspect to predominate. Absolute reason is literally beyond itself in that which ti-anscendsall mediated knowledge. Tbis is the first Absolute, the purely affirmative aspect the distinctionless unity of itself and reason, an arahonal unity. But insofar as the Absolute is the unity that is the foundation of genuine knowledge and the autonomy of pure reason, the unity whose necessaq consequenceis the first creation, then is reason assumedto have found itself again in this distinctionless Absolute, as it were. But this

presupposesthat the detenMate conditioning opposition between relations of necessary entailment and relations of contingent juxtaposition is already known, and that the relation of the Absolute to itself is known to be characterised by necessary entailment. But reason's immediate unity with the Absolute cannot provide any such knowledge of determinate difference and identity, by definition. Mence the presupposition that the transcendentAbsolute is neverthelesspredominantly rational is as subjective and as circular as Fichte's postulate of the Absolute Subject. In order to explain and ground experience, it seems,,we need to presuppose that our foundation or explanans always already reflects essential features of expenence, and determinately itself in But through them. this cannot provide us With a real and must posit explanation of the actuality of experience, as it supposes that the real substantiality or transcendence of the Absolute is constituted by its rationality. This, however, is not real transcendence:as we have seen, the transcendenceof the Absolute and the 'higher' nature of Sebelling"s viewpoint are to be constituted by the arationality of the Absolute. Only by taking

determination. hope Yet by doing Schelling higher to actual this explain Viewpointseriouslycan foundationalist jeopardy. he later in his the project in thought, as we sball see, places this In stunmary, Schelling cannot avoid positing an Absolute whose exact status ws-a-vis bas be band., Absolute On to the is the understood as a genuinely one ambiguous. reason

'higher" unconditioned,which unifies in itself all conditionIng relations,such as fi-anscendent, be defined by therefore cannot MY term that is part that between subject and object and which

by Schelling's is Absolute This talk the represented of purely affirmative relation. a such of

64

foundation desit-ned be On hancL Absolute the to unconditioned. the other of a system is if the to prove that a prioil

synthetic knowledge Is possible, and that reason is autonomous and

immanent to itself, then it has to be defined in terrns of one pole of a conditioning relation, i. e., as predominantly rational. But this determination of the Absolute is, therefore, no less subjeefive than Fichte's. The Philosophy of Identity simply assumes that the overall unity of the Absolute is rational, and necessa?!ýy gives rise to the actualisation of the totality of possibilities that follow logically from the very idea of the Absolute as an immediate unity.44The element of irreducible freedom has disappeared, and has been subordinated to a theological schema: the Absolute is

conceivedaspositing itself becauseof its internal teleologicalnecessity,a desireto know itself, implies distinction which within the eternal Absolute itself In order to demonstrate that reason knou, that the Absolute is the foundation of a priori knowledge, a complete system of the can Absolute is needed. But if this system is only subjectively valid, derived like the 'first creation' from a purely rational foundation, then it is not complete, even if it begins and ends With the idea of the Absolute. The only proposition to be extracted from such a system is hypothetical: if form is it knowledge through then this the pure reason alone exists, system synthetic will take. But does such knowledge exist? Can we know that 'the real and the ideal universe are but the be decided by This (WS 187/205)? taking up the genuinely except cannot same universe' 'hi,v,her' viewpoint on the Absolute. About thirty years later, in criticising Hegel's account in SL formulating fonner his Schelling Idea, Absolute collaborator of a wholly would accuse of the interpretation Absolute the the of as the source of negafive philosophy,, concerned only with forms the empirical mamfold as merely possible of categories that stand over against his Memadissivem by Schelling to This own earlier evaluation was also extended experience. (LMP

Schelling's 'highef', We to the 137/142). attempts adopt examine now will

Absolute as the foundation of his system.

44 On this necessary character of the actuallsation, see Fuhrmans, 1954, p. 42.

65

arational

b) Development Towards 'Positive Philosvopky' In the Philosophy of Identity, Schelling forsakes the Kantian and Fichtean emphasisoii reflexivity as the condition of knowledge, by positing a transcendent,non-reflexive ontological .... -Ii founda-fion of knowledge with whicb reason is immechalek united in an ecstanc mtuition. - In

this, as I noted, lie appears almost HeidetTerean: Schelling proposes that if finite beings are disclosed to us, then this necessarily requires in the background a primordial opennessto the 46 beings Being of these This ontological turn had been M evidence since the earlier . Naturphilosophie, where the unity of nature was conceived as a primordial, self-limiting Life (EE 287-8). However, the Philosophy of Identity is more radical in that it makes the Absolute fTom the outset a unity of natuTeand spifit that tTmseendsboth. Nevertheless, this move isdespite its theological character, epistemologically necessary,for this definifion of the Absolute for for Sebelling H61derfin, le itimate, Jacobi the only as and non-illusory or non-cli-culaiis, detenninate knowledge to that must presuppose. all way understand which Subsequently, however, it becomes apparent that the transcendentAbsolute itself needs to be thought as doubled: it has to have rational wid non-rational sides, wid also has to he the foundation it Only the these. then of a system of actual and not i-nerely can serve as unity of for first doubled This Absolute being. determinations time in the the also appears of possible divide NNature Sebelling Naiurphilosophie, to the that, of itself, it is notes if unity where early 2881), (EE both 'duplicity' be, time, primordial wiity and a primordial at one and the same inust like Fichte's Absolute Subject in WLnm. The problem is, how to take up the 'higher' together, Absolute two these think aspects without effectivel,, the and perspective on Identity Philosophy Here, transcendental the. produced a of the to other. subordinating one is Absolutes the illusion. It presupposesthat the unity of rafional and non-rafional itself rafional,

29. Frank, 1975, 135, p. ol., Bcvwie. See and pop. 46On Heidegger and Schelfing. see Box-oe, op. cil., pp. 53,64 and Sikka, 1994, p. 428 ff

66

positing this rationality in an emment, theological f6m

i-e., an inner telaý that necessitatesthe

self-diVision of the Absolute, thus leaving the actual self-di,.rision of the Absolute, which must be ungrounded., unaccounted for. Schelling has acknowledged that reason must presuppose from the outset that it is identical with the Absolute, but now this does not seem to be enough. His reiiwiciation of the viewpoint of the Philosophy of Identity leads to the middle penod of his career, and his most sustainedattempts to realise the higher perspective on the Absolute. Above all, then, the self-division of ffie Absolute cannot be conceived as a necesswy identity Absolute this the the the Calf-limitation, as simply affirm would of rational aspect witb se, of experience, i. e-, the conditioning relations of opposition between its determinations, whilst its transcendenceor otherness.In this way, no explanation of the actuality of division ignoring be happened in WS, the identity of Absolute and experience could only be given, and, would as beyond distinction by their secured presupposing a pre-existing lelos of complete divine selfknowledge, with this division then becoming merely a privation necessaryfor the realisation of A- :

higher Schelling Against this end. position, subsequentlyattemptedto think the self-division this its Absolute, the of and necessary consequences,as a positive reallsation of the Absolute's I,-- -

however, lapsing than as a self-limitation.., into arbitrariness rather negative without freedom iffationalityand From 1809 to about 1815, Schelling's preoccupation is with how reason is a priori

freedom into insight of without simply reducingit to the sucha positive notion capableof an by logical outlined possibilities purely

47 dius diat He the proposes negative philosophy.

free be its Absolute principle or will, yet a will conceived as a eternal unity must transcendent in foundation This the negative is now of all without subjectivity,, one which wills nothing. knowledge, being potentially a conscious will and thus potentially rational and free, or has how be Absolute However, to the still given of an account conditioned and unconditioned. 47VVM)eScheffing's works fi-om this period exhibit rea) and important differencesin their accounts of the features I if that they share, upon which will concentrate Absolute, there are equally, not more important in this SeCtiOn.

67

immanently, i. e., through itself, divides it-self If this higher Absolute transcendsall dualities, then how can it he thought as dividing itself without presupposing the implicit or pre-existing possibility of these dualities as the ground which necessilalestbe division of the AI)solute" Schelfing's attempts to solve this problem hit on a solution that recalls again Fichte's account in WLnm of the 'onginal duplicity' within the Absolute Subject. However, they also take on ever more esoteric, mythic forms. But this methodol091 ical shift is, paradoxicafly. epistemologically necessary:the higher perspective cannot deduce self-division from the idea of the Absolute -

rather, it must think a groundless act of differentiation that opens up the

narrative of the revelation of a transcendent God. Schelfing describes the state of the primal Will outside time as that of a restful unity that 'rejoices in its nonbeing' (AW 49/134.). In addition, though, he proposes that this eternal unity is implicitly differentiated. This implicit

differentiation bas two aspects: the Absolute is conceived as containing its possible detenninations, as in the earlier pbilosopby, as its own ideal and specifically eternal dimension. But the Absolute is also implicitly deten-nined in a pseudo-temporal fashion, containing the itself Schelfing 'after. In WS, 'before' shadowy presentiment of as split into a and was quick to identify the implicit 'affm-ned' and 'affirmmg' aspectsof the Absolute with logical constituents however, he knowledge-relation. Here, separatesthe rational and non-rational aspectsof the of a

is iiTu-nediately botb Absolute Will W)iI On distincfion. the the as as non-rationalSide., implicit the ground of its existence, and Will as its actual, detenninate existence (THF 357/31-2). Like 'feeling' in relation to the Ficbtean subject, the ýwill of the ground' here is witbin God, yei is distinguishable be but from from hH''n, himself, to God 'inseparable sure, nevertheless not truly bim' (THF 358/32). For Robert F. Brown, the nature of this 'dark" will of the ground is to be [it] therefore between and is a stnving that is , inten-nediate unconsciousnessand consciousness 48

frec' fully ncitheTrigidly neccssarynor .

Brown, op. c1l., P.

68

'Mis 'dark will' is what will serve as the ground of detennination within the Absolute. However, it is an odd sort of 'ground'. if we understand grounding in the senseof necessary entailment. Like Fichte's 'feeling'. it is a problematic term that introtluces determfnabllftý into the indeterminate Absolute unity. But here, it is an onto]Clip ical factor, the 'incomprehensible basis of reality in things' (THF 360/34.). And consequently, and again like Gý,6ihl, it is somehow 'in' the Absolute, but not entiTely 'of, it, for although it vvill becorne the &q-otindof the Absolute's determinate existence, it is not posited bv the Absolute through something like a conscious act. Within the Absolute, it emerges as a Iongingý' (',;ehnsuchl) without an objecl (714F 359/33-4.), and the belonging-together of this obscure difference with the pure unity of the Absolute can only be articulated as a paradox: 'the more this composure is profoundly deep and intrinsically full of bliss, the sooner must a quiet longing produce itself in eternity, without helping eternity either or knowing' (AW 53/136.). This disturbance introduces the impetus towards the act of creation. Hence, unlike Fichte, Schelling sees the problemafic, purely deten-ninable element as the posifive ground of all determination: precisely becai4se it is problematic, its essence(conscious or unconscious wiII9) radically undecidable, its presencein eternity creates an existential tension within the Absolute Identity. This tension propels the act division in of actual which the world is created...and which replaces the unresolved tension 49 Imear SPL 428/203 ). in time the progressivity of stable, UDIdirectional within eternity with ,

in first into Absolute 'dark the this act, the or posits itself potency. will' as its contracts itself Schelfing proposes that becausethe dark will and the opposed element, the will to deterrmnate Absolute, inseparable this contraction releasesthe will-to-existence, the within existence, are

it logical draws darkby the the out of actuality of possibilities 'Will, opposing the which, first (the in Absolute creation). eternal ideal universe or contained the in this way, the positing of actual detennination appearsas ungrounded. and as positive forced blind The Absolute Absolute the the and to contraction itself. of or affinnative in relation

49 on the po,. -t'

ý'ýek-, 1996, pp 31 of this act, see

69

is, as with the division of the arational Absolute In the earlier philosophy, its 'doubling' (Doublirung) or 'intensification" (Zunehmung) (SPL 424-5/200; AW 55-7/137-8). It posits the Absolute absolulety.,yet as actually differentiated. This difference is simply the affirmed will of the ground, however, and is thus problematic or determinable: it is only through the actiN, -e opposition of the will -to-existence (the second potency or difference of the Absolute) that a deterymnate synthetic product is produced, in which the overall unity of the Absolute is from (its difference third reasserted potency or itself). For exwnple, In the classic fonnulation of Nalurphilosophie, (first h& A') gravity -die potency, and

') (second potency, A' are the actual

conditions of the emergence of matter (third potency, A). In this way, Schelling en%, -Isions a

dialecticaldeductionof natureand spirit proceeding,onceagain,from the Absolute.In this way, the inherent rationality of the Absolute will exert itself through the second potency, and will

dark The is dominate Absolute to the the time thus conceivedas come self-unfolding of in V"ll. by different three epochs, each ruled one of the proto-temporal comprising qualitatively dimensions that are dimensions of the Abscdutein eternity, and each of which includes different human (Will-toforms: dark (the theoretical consciousness and practical nature will), synthetic SPL Will) (TIF 405/85-6, (tbe Absolute 'spi-rit -, unity of world' existence), and the yet-to-come 482-4/242-3). In this way, Schelling explicitly reintroduces the histonco-practical dimension of Fichte's system, but in a theological form analogousto the Joacbimite 'third disMsation'.

The

his inherent (his is God's Schellingian of own experience work system completion of the labours beyond the the this of is of system than completion so and ours, more even rationality), be the that the can only transformation of of condition world our reason, requiring an actual The human spoken of pro-vidential in effort. unity than practical through rather grace effected Sollen, Fichte's thus reappears as a had practical Schelling STI, which emphasised against THF Wk Absolute, Schelling"s by the the towards of end of This Sollen of faith. is underlined divine by Reason, but the Ungrun4, of not notion expressed a Absolute as unity higher or qua 404-8/84-90). (THF Love divine by that of

70

In this way, however, Schelling's attempts to resok,e the problem of circularity are iII thought of as having arational (the dark will. ) and rationa (the compromised- The Absolute is will-to-existence) aspects, but these remain united in a higher Absolute that is still not truly transcendent and unconditioned- Tbe Utignind in this period remains a teleological unity. in which the emergenceof the dark will within eternity, 'without eternity helping or knowing, is actually subordinated to the higher unity of the Absolute as Love. this expresses a higher necessity, through which the Absolute has to divide itself from itself in order to become what it only implicitly is (the first creation). The emergenceof difference within the Absolute, which also has to be an Ungrund, is actually grounded in a pre-given purpose, the 'final purpose of creation' (THF 404/85.). Once again, the Absolute is only illusorily

conceived of as

for it forms familiar, the unconditioned, reflects of expenence with which we are with this in Oos. higher 'grounded' The horizon of our theoretical and practical resemblance a expenetice withm the second epoch of the Absolute is thus fixed by the proVidetitial, is that always-to-corne. unattainable unity Yet again, we have to presuppose that the determinateness of our experience is in but the objective proof of this sulýjectlve postulate rational grounded a predominantly unity, for Schelling's Once deferred, be third the advent epoch. given with of is infinitely it will only foundationalist Schelling's in Flebte"s own earlier systems, a philosopby and in more, as is The Absolute leaves that the rafional is only an assumption reason ungroundedmethod It has However, appears that without this now emerged. another problem assumption. dissonance Absolute be based the on an unaccountable within presupposition, the system will dissonance) V)igmnd, (the If that is, not this is ground is an that equiprimordialwith its identity. based hence then the by system is on an arbiitrary determined unknowable, another term and for in Absolute, be knovn fon-ns the cannot It principle idenfification of our of experience v"th Yet (the the time, this them. same at require be we ground in to necessanly immanent being I 'ngrund to the be there explain possibility of in order anv dissonance) to an

71

deten-ninationat all, without getting caught in a circle of presupposing what we are meant to be y' explaining. The irony of Schelling's middle period is that, despite their theosophical works fail, they not through their obscurity., but because they are, in their own way. character, rigorously foundationalist. In attempting to prove the entitlements of pure reason.,Kant, Fichte and Schelling all try to show that reason is capable of immanently deducing the incorrigible foundations that are necessaryfor the possibility of knowledge. Yet each of these foundations finds proof of its own sufficjencýy as a condition knowledge

-

the criterion of genuinely objective

always displaced beyond the limits of the enquiry. Kant's unity of apperception

and categorical imperative are only abstracted from given forms of empirical experience that form the subjective presuppositions of transcendentalmethod. Fichte's self-identical absolute subject as the negative condition of all consciousness,is displaced by feeling, an element of actuality and difference that cannot finally be cancelled within the Fichtean organon, in order to complete the system and ultimately demonstrate that the subjective presupposition from which it began is in fact objective. And now, Schelling's Absolute Identity, the necessary,negative is displaced by determinate being knowing, 'will the all of the ground, the and condition of all determination, difference 'ungrounds' (subverts) the and which sufficient condition of real is Absolute that the essentially rational. subjective presupposition Reason is forced to recognise its own lack of autonomy, its dependenceon something that is not fully its own. Ile

however: have form the altered, problem of conditions and

forms historically had Kantý the to given of experience, reality of assume reason whereas, with is demonstrates jniernalýv foundationalist that reason Scbelling's version of the project Absolute that is incommensurable transcendent has It heteronomous. to presupposea genuinely immanent thus is the reason, in some and within way universe, within that yet and with reason determination, thought an of that unconscious Within all grounds activity as an unknowable

50Cf Bracken, 1972, P. 71

72

thought. Reason, it seems,is no longer even in principle immanent to itself Ilie final period of Sebelling's career, his 'positive philosophy'

for how this problem is ruinous shows

foundationallstthought. The purely 'negative' philosophy of identity was a dialectical system of possible fon-ns of the Absolute, leaving out the problem of actuality. To paraphrasea remark of Scbelfing's on E"rescartes (LMP 15/50), it showed that God, the actual unity of the world., exists necessarily in certain forms, but only if be actually exists. Earlier. we restated this critique of the ontological

in proof an epistemological form: a priori knowledge of actuality must conform to certain necessarydeterminations if it exists, but this itself is no proof that there is any such knowledge. If philosophy exists, then the pre-eminently rational Absolute Identity is its condition of possibility -but

does it indeed exist? Is the bypothetical system produced by reasonapplicable

to the actual world? This problem is, as we have seen, appears objectively iffesolvable, for an affirmative answer can only be based on assumption rather than proof And Schelling addresses

this problem onceagain,asdid Fichte,in ten-nsof faith. With respect to 'negative' philosophy, as Emit L. Fackenheimputs it,

The problem is that dialectic cannot understand the

for Schelling this that and means meaning of existence, dialectic cannot absorb existence into a system. Dialectic is fragmentary knowledge and must turn to experience for the 51 knowledge of act.

The okiective applicability of rationality to experience still presupposesthe original,

Existence, difference. for differentiation the that actual can ground alone of non-rational act Schelling of the positive philosophy, is thereforeprior to essence,or, the ground of conscious

'Fackenheim,op. ecit.,P.

73

experience and of our reason is itself incommensurablewith reason and conscious expenence. It is the meaning of the fact (Talsache) of the genesis of the world (DPE 228) that the positive philosophy takes for its object and this attunement to fact requires a methodological realignment: Scbelling, like Fichte in the WLnm, chooses to acknowledge the extent of his reliance on faith and the experimental nature of reasoning, referring to the basis of his new system as a 'pbilosopbical empiriClsm5. This new title signifies a real affinnation of the difference between thought and

existence,against those philosopherswho follow Descartesin collapsing being into thought (ýDPE233-4), like Fichte and Hegel. Reason may be capable of constructing an a priori system that begins from the presupposition of the unmoved Absolute, and sets out from the act of creation to cover the totality of nature, theoretical and practical spirit, and the futural period of

God's true existence,but thesethreepenods of revelationremain only possiblewithout actual experientialproof if God exists,he doesso necessarily,but he must be first shownto exist. The transcendental Idea of the unconditional ground is non-contradictory, but the fact of its existence is not demonstrable a priori. The reality of its ideal determinations has to be proven. Hence Schelling can no longer just employ dialectical constructions, which derive from a theoretical reason that merely conducts an a priori reflection upon the nature of the Idea of the Absolute. Instead, it is necessaryto asseTtagain the primacy of the practical, wb)cb here stands for a freely willed afffimation of God as the real, absoluteground, which ignores the inability of God in Fackenheim it As to this sense. puts this 'leap' is, wbile negative pbilosophy encompass being 'outside all reason', still not 'arbift-ary', as the 'predicament from which it arises is the .1 5ý human condition itseX in which rationality itself is rooted'. Schelling's positing of an ecstasy

is foundation the the the system now recast as practical, subjective and private of as of reason just historically human rooted the not character of exisienfialty and reason. which affirmation of

52ibid., p. H 5. On the fact that the higher Absolute cannot be reached through reason alone, see also Bracken, op. cit., p. 105.

74

is nevertheless simultaneously the affirmation of this existence as somehow rationally determinate, despite the lack of a priori foundations for this faith. The only gound for this affirmation is that it is in the interestsof the philosophical searchfor foundations and thus of the autonomy of reason. The experience of the affirmation is meant to add what reason alone could not produce: certainty In the validity of the purely hypothetical system. The second stage of the process now consists in carrying out an empirical confirmation of the system in detail, which entails the kind

of researebthat constitutesthe empirical part of the later Scbelling's histOncalphilosopby of mythology. The private, practical affirmation of the sufficiency of the Absolute would be by the elaboration of a positive, factual system, based on historical and publicly vindicated

anthropologicalresearch. The failure of this final effort of Schelling to construct a system upon a basis that denies neither necessity and theoretical knowledge, nor freedom and practical will, is not causedby the fact fails labour by In because the task empirical sets. infinite required it it it sets up a new antinomy of 'dogmatism'

and 'criticism',

ffireatens the posSibility of wbicb actually

foundationalist thought itself it is here that we finally encounter the 'trawna of reason' that we

from One. The in Chapter negativeto positive phflosophy,the momentof shift madeour object failure by from derives the that of negative philosophy is caused a crisis of reason affinnation, to encompassthe fi-eedorn of the Absolute. As such, the moment of affirmation presents,not a it but of this merely an acknowledgement crisis, solution to

fundamental hides a and

from Philosophy Identity Schelhng'ýs has the thought of on. threatened contradiction that

What is this conmadiction?Reason,in reflecting on knowledgein generaLis able to is Identity. Absolute the its immediate mdetenrdnate, unconditional negative condition state that

Nalurphilosophie, Jacobi insisted taking the has the Schelling on of insights This much on since bowever, that is that It the the reason is capable of sbowmg liblderlin. case, also and being difference, determination there that of any stable as such, is, of condition unconditional is The being that ground a positive not itself rational. all, is connection at rational any order, any

75

between this ground and that which it grounds is not itself rationally statable. given that the grounded ten-n here Is rationality itself. Schelling refers to this tqound as a problematic we On. or a non-heing, not in the senseof that which I-s wholly without an\! being at all (ganz und gar nichiSeyende), but that which is not ci being, as it lacks essence.(DPE 235-6). The problem is that the system of determinations reconstructed in thought out of the Absolute can only be objectively valid if the Absolute is inherently rational. But just as an arational and free act is presupposedas the oyound of difference that impels the Creation, the system itself a rational construction, paradoxically presupposes such an act as the condition of

its applicability to the real or actual world. So the validity of the system dependssimultaneously upon the essentialrationality of the Absolute, the necessityof a dialectical process of revelation (the position of the IdenfildissYstem)and upon the Absolute being essentially incommensurable with reason. As the positive philosophy shows, philosophical reason is faced with a choice: either the hypothetical system produced by a negative, theoretical reflection on the concept of the Absolute, or the practical affinnation of the real ground as commensurable with reason,

itself longer longer becoming to accountable no iminanent entailing reason utterly ecstatic,no to itself The inadequacy of the former is matched by the final impossibility of the latter as a leap Importantly, Mai for justt& the the to q1'reason. if is auiononýv seeks, a philosopkv route between flie the ground and reason is just as unstatable as then connection made,

if one

heteronomousiy Reason conditioned is rernams within the perspective of negative philosophy. by something that it cannot assimilate, but rather than impinging from without- as with Kant and Fichte, the otherness here is the existential ground of reason itself, internal to its own activity. Its the therefore of or opposite reasonrelation to negative The incommensurable ground is not far for the so as of reason in it is incommensurable ground only it is problematic, more is reason It detenninate thus stands outside relation. any system of in-educible conditioning to any with it.

7

rational relations, but as the ground of any such system, a ground whose relation to the system is unstatable in terms of any such system.

5-1

The choice of negative or positive philosophy thus becomes a dilemma: either there is no proof that the Absolute takes on determination according to the dialectical process considered as its own inherent law, or the sole grotmd of achiality is affirtned as that which need not give itself any specific law. the ground 'might express its Will in an indefinite nurnber of 54 being but ways, rationality one of them. This dilemm-acan be said to mark at once the highest

failure the point and of the modem philosophicalproject conceivedof as a searchfor a secure foundation of knowledge. The only possible Viewpoints seem to be either an utijustified

dogmatism the the rationalist affirmation of apodicticvalidity of reason- or an ungrounded epistemological scepticism. This latter option leads to relati"sm and ultimately to selfbe knowledge, because there theoretical the refutationcan no oklective either or practical, objective ground of reason is itself incommensurable with reason. But if theoretical reason

reachesits limit in this fashion,it forcesus into a crisis.If we go beyondthis crisis by affin-ning that this gyound.is non-rational, then we affinn that at least one proposition is objectively valid, i. e., that notliing is oklectively valld because of the nature of reason. We thus ignore the status

have de jure therefore this no right to either Viewpoint, and and can as a postulate, of ground thus no distinction between criticism and dogmatism can be made, for there is no way to tell if illusory as opposed to the other. is one viewpomt Wben the Enligbtenment staked its successon the discovery of secure foundations for for dilemma With this the were created. conditions the authority of reason over experience,

Schellln& the Idealist project seemsto have committed suicide, and its death has not simply Enlightenment in As the the the early reactions against caseof placed epistemology in question. in Revolution, French the the of pure primacy reason matter assumed of its the offsprin& and 53Bowie (,ry.). cjL) emphasises this point in arguig for Schelling's historical and philosophical importance 2& thought. 19'h century to and in relation

54Fackenlielin. op. cit.. P. ]-'I

77

judging

the legitimacy of traditional institutions is again placed under suspicion. If

philosophical reason is itself heteronomous, how can it assume the night to criticise existing political arrangements? We have reached a stage where, according to N4iietzsche,modern nihilism is born, where the highest values, such as objective knowledge. suffer a devaluation of themselves. The interest of reason in its own autonomy has, in taking up senOuslYthe ssue of the justification of this autonomy, shown itself to be ungrounded, requiring instead a faith in itself that takes the field against other forms of belief without being able to decide the issue of

its Tight to do so. The result of the immanentexaimnationof reasonby itself undertakenby Kant., Fichte and Schelling is that it becomes impossible to distinguish dogmatism from Schellin the trauma the and of reason pmlosophy, is embodied in 91ian epistemological dilemma. _I_:

78

Chapter Three Deleuze: Philosophy as Practice

Introduction The trauma of reason signifies, above all, a limit point in modern philosophy. In

examiningthe versionsof antifoundationalismformulatedby Deleuzeand Hegel,we Will discover how these thinkers attempt to account for this limit-condition, and thus surpass it, with reference to the Kantian notion of transcendentalIllusion, thus establishing that it is more than just a purely accidental historical phenomenon. Their own doctrines of transcendentalillusion, neither of which require the distinction between dogmatism and be fixed to philosophy with reference to an unchanging wmscendental or ontological foundation, also go beyond Kant by subjecting his influential model of critical thought to critique. In this way, the Enfightenment"s conception of reason, which affinns and it Descartes, be foundationalism the to of attempts extend Will undermined, and with the foundationalist from the that pro*ect. I cnsis results In my opinion, the importance of Deleuze in this -regard, which makes hirn his in his lies French throughout commitment, philosophers, unique among post-war career, to two seemingly incompatible

fon-nulate how to a consistent problems: a)

kind dogmatic the that that of posits an relativism a into collapsing avoids perspectivism for fact lack foundation (Ithe the that thought, genuine (i priori say) we nature of olýjective iven how Absolute, b) knowledge, that think the to 91 an ontological and synthetic for Deleuze, is, to order maintain philosophy's in necessary this order of commitment Deleuze's discipline. these two main inspirations in cntical a genuinely as identity unique I he but Bmson, the Nietzsche argue. next chapter, as in is also will and areas are. her' Schelfing's 'hig to Beqgson) to perspective on the adopt a (through attempts close , Deleaze I how Schellingto By explain conceives the this N"ll Absolute. tracing relation Deleuze's Absolute to conditlons. coinminnent that cntique it the which In of immanence

79

means that, as I will show, he remains a thinker of Enlightenment who wants philosophy This can on]v be done. to free itself from its intemal illusions conceming the -Absolute. however, by re-evaluating the t1jealling of philosophy as an ethos or way of living and

being. In a 1971 discussion with Foucauk Deleuze agreesthat the essenceof philosophN can no longer be considered to be disinterested knowledge of the universal. Philosophý as primarily theoretical and disinterested knowing bas undergone some kind of crisis in from derives Greek 'Theory' the iheoro.ý, a spectator at a festival, implying a modernity. ' disinterested being 'pure4- present to what is mily real'. For pure attitude of attention, Foucault and Delenze, the question of bow to think the situatednessof philosophy, its The faith Enlightenment has become to of modernity in relation real interests, urgent. for being these thinkers. reason, ungrounded, is implicitly contradictory and nihilistic, When pw-c reason wicovers the extent to which it is wigromided, alongside the it that possibility is merely the expression of certain existential conditions, the Enlightenment commitment to the uitical

dissection of dogmatism is in danger.

Philosophy can no longer be theory if by theory is meant 'an fliumination from a safe distance' (Foucault), a representation of the essenceof being. Instead, philosophy must

The to new ethos takeits situatedness, its relation as a practice other practices,seriously. It be It like box 'is be tools theory that must of a useful. exactly a of philosophy V"II ... 2 like Foucw-jlt, DeleuzeIn (Deleuze). function' this envisions the modermqWW must -y, be limits (lethos) that towards can reallsed at any its own of philosophy as an attitude development historical as a theoretical epoch in its objective time, rather than as a ' discipline. Only by changmg philosophy's image of what it means to philosophise, can I Deleuze's In be this chapter, Will examine analvsIs of truly established. this modernity 1GadanicT.1903.p. 124. 2 See 'Intcllcctuals

208. 1977. FoucaWL Pcn,. p, in -er' and

3 Cf. Foucault. Ak-hat I-,;Enlightenment',". In Foucault. 1984. pp. 32-50. at p- 39.

80

what lie considersto he the historical barriers to the realisation of this elhos, -,NIth reference to his notion of the -image of thought.

Circularitv, and Modern Critical Thought One important aspect of Deleuze's relation to Schelling lies in the way he appreciatesthe omnipresenceof circularity in philosophies that stand forth and proclaim their unique grasp of a foundation that entities them to mark boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate truth-claims. This is what I want to explore now, by presenting brief historical a necessarily oveMew of certain aspects of the post-German Idealist , -Iphilosophy

of

finitude

in relation to Schelfing"s inadvertent undennInIng of

foundationalism. As we shall see, post-Sebellingian developments reinforce the

epistemologicalnihilism of the traumaof reason,bringing out more ethical and political dimenSionsof this nibilism. We will focus initially upon Marx's thought, as the most influential post-German Idealist philosophy to have acceptedSebelling's entique of transcendentalthought, while between The for desire holding the to the similarities present. a nvorous critique of still Schelling's late critique of negative philosophy and Marx's critique of Hegel have been 4

Schelling's by The fashion Frank Manfred in of cnitique result of treated exemplary . in that the the existential, contingent ebapter, previous saw as is,, we pbilosopby negative being hwnan the factical than rational or essential. primary as more seen is of aspect or With Kant., thougbt loses its gfip on the infinite, becoming instead immanent only to human by definition T'his making of philosophy, pro,%ridesan anthropological itself by Schellingknowledge. to this overcome attempting the of measure reason further by definition, thought that things takes showing is a stage actually anthropological

CTom limitations but that to cannot conditions it receives its itself Immanent even not To this confingency requires an irreducible ungrounded overcome priori. a comprehend 4 Frank. )975.

81

and hencedogmaticfaith in reason-In this way. the foundationalistproiect, which sought to establish a grenuinelyuniversal meaning for human knowledge is rendered problematic by the notion that reason is itself rooted in obscure real processes that cannot be transparent to pure reflection. This relative -primacy of existence- over the 'essence' of the Absolute as delineated by the categories of pure thoughL was taken up as a major 5 by Left liegellans, Marx F is development means --Ini tbeme among the and parhcularly -. ., that the P-oalof knowledae of the Absolute is renouncedFor Marx, the real processes within which philosophical reason is rooted are

between material relations social classes.These classesare themselveshistorically differentiated by changesin the organisation of the material baseof a society5sexistence. the means of fulfilling its economic needs. 'Morality, religion, metaphysics [ I thus no ... longer -retain the semblance of independence. I ] Life is not determined by ...

but by consciousness consciousness,

lif

-)6.

e

Philosophy,which presupposesitself to be

fact has because the objective conditions in real of on pure reason, in absolute its reliance a interests of social classes.The subjective presuppositions of philosophy are thus rooted

base in the of a society. material in objectivereality, The meaning of history is vital for understanding this objective base of for consciousness,

itself consciousness is representational

the dividedness of

for Feuerbach Marx Hence CrIticises representative of the real structure of soclety. determinate Human bw-nan existence is essence. positing an abstract, ahistorical sensuous in but in that it terms, economic is also of sensuous conceived is or concrete only when between hu-mans by hurnans between by defined relations and nature, and relations as dependent historical to variation a process of constant themselves, that are all subject The the tied to meaning also critique is of meaning production. the of organisation upon has he but Critique to to this shown interest is interestecL itself this process. objective of 199 1. pp. 1' 4-5. Marx- 'The German Ideology'- in Mar.\- 1977- p- 164-

82

be more than merely subjective: the social relation its consciousnessrepresentshas to be the yet-to-be-realised objective resolution of contending subjective interests, and this is only possible if crifique is scientific, based on knowledge of the material basis of social existence. Pbilosopby, qua disinterestedknowledge. is illusory., as it does not take for its object the real matenal and social conditions of its own form of consciousness.The philosopber's role as a representative of the supposedly universal interest in objective, di.vinterested knowledge hides an ideological clam" given that 'disinterested' a priori statementsabout 'the way things are' seek to displace all interested claims about the way things oughl to be. In this way, a division between 'domatism" and scientific cnticism is set up, with Marxist 'theoretical reason' forming the basis for the prescriptions of

Marxist 'practical reason. The meaning of history has, then, to be based on empirical investigation into the real conditions of consciousness.In this way, the divisions of the present and the details However, Marx's history be determined. the critique of can of objective goal of bourgeois philosophy and its epistemological dilemmas can-notitself avoid the issue of 7

circularity.

Marx had to develop a positivistic

notion of science, as opposed to the

'absolute knowledge' of German Idealism, in order to get at the history of the real for facts die But believe themselvesremains an that to speak conditions of consciousness. facts faith Marx's for foundation The this in is assumption that requires justification.

definition of the 'species-being'of humanity.,the sensuoushumanbeing as homo-l,ýber. But then the question arises, which of these terms is the foundation of the other9 Do the former establish the latter, or does the definition of human being actually make possible the selection of the facts.) This question is not merely scholarly, but has had a real political and historical IN! Marxism The a the as international of influence enormous why reasons presence. One Way Second World began the to of ariousare way after %, wane movernent political 7 Cutrcfc)io. op. cn.. p. 9. quolinp Habemas. Knowle4ý,,,c andh:.,? ran

83

accounting for this change, though, would be to show how, in connection with real political events sucb as the Frencb colonial wars in Algena, much effort was expended on the Continent in drawing out Marx's own a priori ideological presuppositions. For example, in relation to the historicist orientation of Marxism, the definition of hw-nan beim, that serves as a foundation of history must rest on a non-ideologia

science of

natural distinctions between humans and non-bui-nans.But these distinctions themselves are either simply accepted, or derived from empirical, historical docwnents of the activity of human beings. Marx's deten-ninationof the real conditions of consciousness thus rests upon an abstract, unhistorical definition of hurnan essence, which simply reflects an interpretation of bistOncal experience that purpo-rts to ahvqvS alrea4y be The horizon science. of Marx"s conception of history is the human as homo-Mber, and this glVes impetus to his analysis of

I 91h

idea the century capitalism and of an objective

interest in critique. But this interest, from which Marx derives his Sollen, communist is if its foundation be defined The Fichtean society, ungrounded can only circularly. and Schellinglan problem of the inconsistency of foundationalism, of presupposing be demonstrated (in this case, that there is an objective to meant subjectively what was has been between distinction than and science) not ideology rather merely subjective solved. Mai-x's supposed foundation could be (and has been) situated as an ideological

form of consciousnesswithin other histories.The basis of thesehistories would be the difference between other interests, such as those of colonists and colomsed (a history of

These histories histoiy (a those of patriarchy). of men and women racist imperialism), or face in having however, the to problem of self-consistency thernselves would also, Nevertheless, Marxist for the their presuppositions. influential own subjective account distinction has between for the ideology and science conceiving of critique as paradigm Its but been circularitN, not only epistemologically also is thus placed in question. Marxists has theinselves, to the occupied regard relation of with wid suspect, politically

84

theory to practice: must the theory of capital wid its anthropologir-al underpinnings objectively Justifv practice, or will practice prove theory by bringing about socialism) How can we act without objective justificafion of our programme, given that we shall be opposed by other interests who claim absolute right for themselves9But how can we wait for the theorists to do their work, when we are oppressed? Other movements on the philosophical and political lek particularly in post-war France, have taken this problem of circularity to be defiiiitive

of the whole

Enlip-btenment paradigm of philosophical thinking that is established most firmly by Kant. This predominant modem paradigrn attempts to establish a distinction between knowledge and non-knowledge in relation to the freedoin of an agent. The interest of the Enlightenment in autonomv of thoup-htand action Is thus the justification for this attempt. Hence the issue for sorne currents in post-war French thought, under the influence of Nietzsche and Heidegger, became the possibility of a new paradigm of critique, which fi-eedom Enlightenment's the true to mterest in would remain Without getting trapped in the dominant paradigm's recun-ent epistemological circulanty. Central to this turn, I idea in is founded the to the that critique argue, are objections interest upon an would integrated subject of knowledge and action, whose unity is epitomised by the faculty of for Fichte, Schelling Marx, Descartes, Kant, This true and example. of reason. was This idea of a subject that ft-anscendsthe distinctions within the realloy that it is Nietzscbe Heideg In by both is this way, the ger. and conscious of In experience criticised . in by Marx begun 'the the the name of reaF is continued. of reason autonomy attack on For Heidegger, any clairn to possessa privileged, transcendentviewpoint on the world ' being Schelfing the of as sbowed., and reason. whicb, identity simply presupposes -I-, .philosophy

has to acknowledge as its own fundamental assumption. Such claims always

foundation hipokeimenon, (the 'what ) iheoros. subjectivity as or presupposea pri'vileged

faculty' Heidegger. ) 98 9. 7. -1 'presupposmg the See in as reason p. t)le on s, -ý remark

85

9 lies present in advance of everything, what already presencesand presencesin advance-ý Even Marx presupposes such a subjectiNity. governed by a positivistic 1090.s that performs a pre-gatbenng of what is to count as kiiowledge. This Heideggereanattack on the foundational subject is well representedby Foucault's denial of the Marxist idea that practice must seek to reallse the true essenceof the human being. no longer estranged frorn itself by the defon-nations of his.tory. 10 'ýijbjjecfivjty 1,; itselfTooted m existentia) conditions, modes of the disclosure of Being, that are pre-rational. This is the

Heideggereanreal 'beneath'consciousness. The influence of Nietzsche on the disparate thinkers known as 'post-structurallsts' " was perhaps even more decisive. -Tberesult was the adoption of "genealogy' as a rubric for a number of different ways of practising critique, whose difference from the dominant paradigm was marked by the inversion of the relation between theorýyand beginning I This the this practice, which mentioned at of chapter. represents,again, wi basis. for Genealogical to to critique, attempt relate consciousness its real vanous poststructuralist thinkers, posits the dependence of representational consciousness upon individual domain but the to to of subjects or to social refuses restrict interest interest, base These 'interests" the of consciousnessin that they are practices are matenal classes. being (elhoj), of in relation to whieb consciousness is an epipbenomenon. or ways Consciousness is, for Nietzsche, the product of forgetting the impact of practices of training and discipline upon the body. In this way, the idea of a transcendentsubject or fiction bom identity being thought the and is preserved is a of iheoros in which essential foundationalist Hence the philosophy is a practice that of insecuritv of consciousness. form fostering being by fi-agile of illusions, yet it gets caught up in aims to preserve a dilemmas such as the trauma of reason and those which beset the Marxist paradigm. 'ý Hcldcgger. 1989. p. 182. "Miller.

1993- p. 174ýp 336.

II Sce Smith. 1995. Ch- -;, esp. pp, 140 ff.

86

For the which render it impotent to resolve issues concerning status of subjectiviN!.

genealogicalcntique, issuesconcerningdomination and fTeedom.or doginatism and criticism, can only be settled by evaluating individual practices according to their own immanent tendencies. The inevitable epistemological rejoinder to both of these positions concerns the issue of self-consistency, pointing back to Schelling and the trauma of reason. If the con ition o consciousnessis the immanence of an opaque, pre-rational real In it, then the question is bow this relation between the real and consciousnesscan be known. If it cannot be known and is thus without foundation, then how can such cntiques of bave subjectivity any status beyond that of an mteresting fictionr) But if it is supposed that it can be known, does this not once again imply a transcendent conception of immanence, a conception of an identity of thought and being that is 'higher still'9 Does

the persistenceof a critical orientation towards the presuppositionsof truth-claimsnot testify to an implicit 'higher subject' whose interests drive the denial of transcendenceto identity becomes In The this the reason? question of of subject urgent. whose name are ISuspicions Cartesian, Kantian, that sucli cnfiques the etc. subject conducted? entiques of fascist totalitarian thus to the or potentially are not resistant emeigence of irrationalist and have been voiced. subjectivities It is from this point of view that we can approach Deleuze. I will contencl,in this and in the next chapter, that this problem of consistently grounding critique is a central Schelling. his is his. Central to the to this relation question of concern concern of Deleuze's Nietzschean emphasis on the question of how the primacy of practice over theory should be conceived is, I shall argue, due to his appreciation of the problems involved in constructing a discourse of the real once the issue of how this discourse can become has itself justify explicit ultimately

in Schelling's problems which. work.

between dogmatic traurna the reason and an ImPossible of choice rationalism produced ,ýE-,. Frank I (),S9. pp, 341-2.

87

and dogmatic relativism. Further, he attempts to overcome these problems by pursuing a recognisably Schellinglan strategv. conceming how the -hlgher' Absolute is to be thought, beyond the illusions of foundationalist philosophy. For Deleuze. only by reintroducing the theme of the Absolute can the suspicions regarding the cli-cularitY Of both the Marxist and post-Marxist paradigms of critique can be addressed.As we saw, These positions, from an epistemological point of Niew, seem to renounce the transcendenceof reason in favour of its finitude, only to smuggle in a transcendent subject without realising it. Deleuze wants to establish a post-Marxist paradigm by, in a sense, returning thought to the infinite. This, as we shall see, relies on BergsonIs transformation of Scbelling's conception of absolute intuition. Deleuzean cnfique, then, is neither Kantian foundationalism nor a Niet! schean doctrine of pure 'fictions, but a

knowledge. paradoxicalversionof absolute

iii)

The Trauma of Reason aN 'Double-Bind'

Given that Deleuze remains committed to a notion of philosophy as ciitique, and 13 thus in a certain sense, to the goals of the Enlightenment as expressedby Kant, we by it be basis his first that the to understand a cannot grounded of orientation, given need transcendent foundation. Deleuze's stance can be refeiTed to as antifoundationallst, in influence image it 'philosophy" thus the that refuses a certain means, reflecting of what "' being first We Nietzsche. Heldegger exactly erstand reftised is rmist what up-dand of here, and why it should be refused, which I will examine in the rest of this chapter.

Cf the remarkson Delewc and the EnlightenincritIn Hallmard, 1997.p. 17. On the connectionbetwecrithe Enllphtcmncni and the 'ne-,N,paradigm. of critique see e.g. Miller. ap. cit., pp. 301-4. on Foucault's

'Qu'est-cequela cnliquO'. "' The ideaof sucha refusal. aswe shall seein ChaptersFive to Seven-is also ýýhat connectsDeleuzeto Hegel.

98

'Die meaning of philosophy ffiat Deleuze questions is that which has been central to the foregoing chapters, namely that philosophy is a discipline of pure knowledge. for which immanence is the identity of reason and being in some form. To jusfiN, this assumption is what foundationabst thought attempts to do. N-ow, the.OnIN!Proof Of thj'-ý immanence can be a secure foundation that transcends all conditioned cases of

knowledge. Without this foundation, there could be no sure means of distinguishing between knowledge and mere belief In this way, foundationalist thought presupposes that there is an oNeclive difference between genuine knowledge and dogmatism, i. e., between securely grounded knowledge and conditioned or subjective knowledge that simply believes itself to he objective. This has been the case, as we have seen, V"th Descartes,Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Marx: the distinction has had to be presupposedin order to be proven, but it eventually becomes apparent that if we have to presupposean objective distinction of this kind., we cannot prove it. For Deleuze, these thinkers posed the distinction as if it could be made by a iheoros, the perfect disinterested observer of being. Following Heidegger and Nietzsche, he refers this hypothetical perfect observer back to The 'real' of its preconscious orientations, the realm of practice or actIVIty. in illusory We have it becomes, Deleuze's thus to to posit. in relation view, an which distinction level. becomes dogmatism/CrItique the this of if it is made at consider wbat Can this be done without presupposing a foundation of our 'knowledge' of the practical realin? This is a complex quesfion and one which will have to be approached by Deleuze A Firstly, turn to means practice. parfial answer to what we circumspectly. be, the to that is, what activity meanjtýg of an this question concerns what we assume Foundationalism is it thus a certain practice or acfivities. other against off rules mark follows defines thus certain philosophy as outlined above, and which acfiVit),, one which This to the tratima than enables re-examine others. us of reasm rather conduct of rules below', as it were, and discover it's mechanics. 'flus dilenrima, as we saw in

89

Chapter Two, is Inherent in Schelling's philosophy, and anses from a meditation on what foundationalist method requires in order to be able to explain the possibility of knowledge or expenience. It presents us with two incompatible options' either affirrn the identity

of

reason and the Absolute

(dogmatic

rationalism.), or

affirm

the

incommensurability of reason and the Absolute (dogmatic relativism). Tlils choice is a dilemma due to two feattires: a) both options advance truth-claims that are meant to be objectively valid., yet b) we are only forced to choose because the possibility of a foundation for any trutb--claimbas been denied. As with Fichte's 'idealism' versus 'realism', neitlier option cwi be Justified against the other. Although the relativist option has the appearance of a limited, fior know, that, there are no secure epistemological scepticism, one suggesting a// ive foundations, it actually contains an ontological claim, namely that it is because.of the it Reason, be that to consistent, of objectivejustification is if nalure reason impossible. is has to affin-n that to choose either option would be actually irrational. Worse still, if we opt to deny both options as unjustified, and thus remain nominally rational and critical, fate, faced Philosophy have thus to caught ]n anxiety over its is with its nowhere go. we is Nietzsche As the the crucial aspect of nihilism suggested, own nothingness. " it finds that in real -suffering. meaninglessness The idea of a trap that confines thought is often evoked by Deleuze, with the because thinking. the that traps an activity of that govern of rules arise such implication A clue to how we can understand the trauma of reason as such a trap is offered by Andrew Cutrefello's use of a relevant Foucauldian notion, 'discipline', in examining the 16 legitimacy of Kantian en ti qUes The cenval tenet of the modem epistemological One, Chapter discussed is the idea of the self-iustification of in tradition, as previously E.g. Nietzschc. '1994. Ill. '08. For a different analysis of the a,"fccuvc aspects of nihilism in tcmis of an

127. 1999, Ansell-Pearson"ovdcd-e. p. see excessof 1 16 CUtrefel

10. )P

&Chs. I 5 cit.. esp.

90

reason, which assumesthat there is a distinction between knowledge and dogmatic belief. Kant's concept of a Dedukhon gives this notion its purest form. that of a legal or Juridical proof of objective entitlement derived as Cutrefello notes (cifini-I Dieter Henrick), from the real pracfices of German ju-ii,-.t--,,17 Cutrefello themafises this -! institutional connection in order to make plain that there is at the heart of Kant's project an unexaminedprciefice of thought, that of legal justification. If Kantian philosophy presupposesthe universality of certain forrns of experience is and thus circular, this is only a secondary phenomenon. It is heteronomous primarily because it models itself upon another practice that thus determines its own meaning. Philosophy has thus already accepteda method or set of procedural rules as given, rather "' being than truly self-legislating and autopomoti-s. Consequently it busic--s. itself with a tortuous and circular task without ever actually questioning the le itimacy of this task-as a proctice. In Foucauldiwi language, thought has been disciplina

has become and

dominated from Without. Discipline is a process whereby a body, the material and existential precondition of thoupJit,is 'trained' by historically specific practiceswhich force its capacitiesto function according to certain babits and rules. There is, then, a here between a material ground that operates on producfive and reproducfive relafion bodies ('power) and thought, conducted through empirical practices. Once the capacities harmless have bodies been to them to and complicit with real trained as render so of becomes dominationdiscipline them The exercised upon structures of power,, Tlus kind of conception of domination also plays a role in Deleuze's work. A domination desenbed Deleuze AO, delimited technique of is and in example of a clearly

Guattari's fierce enfique of the disciplinary force of psychoanalysis. [Jsing Gregorv Bateson's concept of 'double bind', they describe the wider socio-historical condifions by the the that social structure subjecting underlying reproduce society capitalist within 17Culrcfcllc). (1p.cn.. pp. 5-6. CPuR A 84-5jB I 10-

is CLtrefclio- ()p. c-il_ p. 8 &- Ch- 5. passim-

91

individual psyche to the Oedipus complex. The nature of these conditions need not concern us now. The structure they produce is more important for our parposes. this being the 'double bind' itself, a psychic. existential dilemma which forces the individual to accept that his/her very individuality depends upon the choice between the constraints on sexual desire that exist within the capitalist family (prohibitions on incest), and neurotic fantasies about breaking these taboos (AO 93-4/78-9). The dilemma is that even if one 'resolves' the Oedipus complex and avoids neurosis. one internalises the desire constimints on and thus reproduces the complex itself in a new mode, witli an extenial authotity-figure as object. Hence the problem of individual psychic development as constituted by capitalist Oedipus the society, complex itself and its resolution, sets up a situation similar to the

classic prIsoner's dilemma. Either the individual acceptsthat the restrictions on desire are relevant to bim/ber and that sfhe is thereby guilty, tbus effectively affirming the irresolvability of the complex even as it is 'resolved', or one becomes neurotic. Neither be though the chosen, given that the problem, even one i-nust option really resolves by desire family the the subjecting creates complex capitalist actively itself. structure of 19 foi-ms does it incestuous The to certain constraints. eitber takes on not. or it siftiation is

one where

disjuncfion is an alternafive, an exclusive defined in ten-ns of a principle which, however, constitutes its two tenns or underlying wholes, and 1 1. the alternative where the principle itself enters into (AO 95/80)

19Sce also Bell, 1995ý p. I

pp. 3,5-6.

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The structure of this ongoing emotional crisis also recalls that of the trawna of reason: an irrational eboice between -two te,11s' or illusory solutions is rendered necessary by an underlying 'principle' -

not a principle in the sense of an objecfive

foundation, but rather aprm-lical imperafive of desire or a subjective presupposition. i. e.. a presupposition on the side of desire, that is merely given to desire. Here we can make a liný witb the trauma of reason. Psycbic identity is constituted via the imperative oedipal crisis of incestuous desire must be resolved', modern epistemology. epitomised by Kant, assumesthat 'Reason must ustify its a priori employment. In either case,a set of practices, rules or procedures is given that must be mastered in order to resolve the problem. However, if one plays by the rules in accordanceWA the 'principle', resolution actually becomes impossible, and the choice, together With the practice that forces it, is faced with a Crisis of meanim,. Given a capitalist familial structure, either another neurotic is produced, or Oedipus is internalised.(thus producing another neurotic who Oedipal imperative foundationalism If the that the crisis). practical remains Within of

foundation for distinction between discover the that philosophy an objective requires we and dogmatism, the result of this imperative as it plays itself out is the trauma of reason: its it denies dogmatically (inconsistently) own priori or a assertsit either reasoti validity, (IthusSimultaneouslydenying it). Delcuze and Guattaii remark, in a manner reminiscent of both Marx and Wittgenstein, that the oedipal problem 'is not resolved until we do away With both the be 97/81). That (AO the the the is, rules of gaine must refused solution' problem and Cutrefello in but to order the escape, as narne of an alternative practice, in outright, 20 dileMMa, Ln Oedipus to the to order avoid or the prisoner's points out vNithrespect desiring fall does thinking that of or mode not victim traw-naof reason, we require a new distinction between 'dogmatism' 'nus double-binds. that new a and means to these be. in What The being this to are might not a position we. yet ýýcesuggested. 'critique" is '(1()p. cii.. pp.

93

first step towards understanding Deleuze's version of this distinction will be to examine the practical elements of 'dogmatism', i. e., the rules of the foundationallst 'game5.

66

iti)

The Image Offhought For Deleuze, philosophical anxiety is a product of a dogmatic or heteronomous

fon-n of philosoph that is no longer able to function (N 186/136). As we saw in the last .y definition this section, practical of heteronomy implies the unquestioninp, acceptatice of

problems and methods that reflect those that define other practices. In this stress on the connection between the acceptanceof problems from elsewhereand philosophical cnsis, Deleuze is, above alL Bergsoman ' For Deletwe, it is the history of pbjlosophy as a ý2 scholarly sub-discipline that works to reinforce and reproduce this state of heteronomy around the repetition of problems that are themselves never questioned -

in fact, it is

philosophy's own version of the Oedipus complex' (N 14/5). This emphasis on the history of philosopby as a scholarly practice, ralber tban, say, a universal narrative of the 'forgetting

Repressed Foucault 'great Being' that, there is no of puts it, means as of

Western philosophy' for Deleuze-, instead the history of philosophy is understood in 22 forces dominate local, that. to thought. to seelagreed cornprornises with parti-Ja relation , to If pbilosophy unquestioningly takes Up pToblemsthat are nDt Its own, then 11will develop an image of itself, of what it rneansto do philosophy, based on these problems. For example, we saw In the last section bow Cutrefello's reading of Foucault makes the

link betweenjUndical practiceand Kant's image of the 'tribunal' of philosophv: in this botb defendant. being This divided and iudge image of against itself, image, critique is basis fornis 1) the the 172/133 (DR of unquestioned practical imperative that thought 21Scý:Be, g-, ni. ) 9(-ýO. 105.

22Foucault. 1970-890-A72. modified.

94

drives a heteronomous philosophy. and the rules that it gives itself The history of philosophy, in Deleuze's view, functions to consolidate this image of thought as an

imaginedtimelessessenceof philosophythat is subjectto ininor vanafion throughoutits bistory, as the basic problems of pbIlosopby are subjected to different treatments and different solutions are proposed. In this way, philosophy is reproduced as an actual. empiric

practice that is defined by certain subjective (i. e., on the side of thought.)

presuppositions (DR 169/129)., which philosophy reflects back to itself in an illusory

imageof its timl-Ilessessence. What

are these presuppositions? Deleuze characterises his

'transcendental empiricism'

thought as

(DR 79-80/56-7). which already contains echoes of

Schelling'.--r-philosophical ern-piric. 11.

23

Aga]in, this i is a complex term that needs

unpacking. In the present context, it is enough to note that 'empinclsm' here means that the subjective presuppositions of a philosophical elho.v or practice are to be discovered in

its empirical products, i. e., philosophical texts. In this way, the real, i. e., the practical form preconditions of a of philosophical experience or consciousnesswill be laid bare. Although Deleuze produces differing empirical analyses of the same philosophical his idea invariant throughout the career, practices of an essentially and reproductive image of thought reinforced as an 'essential' elhos by the history of philosophy remains a by di-rectly, him, Deletwe self. affLrmed continumg mportance constant, its i

24

Dunng the late 60s, Deleuze identifies this ethos in DR and LS as 'Platonism'. He Plato's is that there philosophy a moment where the practical imperative suggests within its essential or transcendent image of that pbilosopby will subsequently consolidate as 2ý 82-3/59), (DR itself can be discerned clearly and related to other practices. Plato's

philosophy takes up a specifically political problem, which Nvecould relate to the :ý; Sec Baugh, 1993, P. 26 and Boundas. 1996. p. S7.

74On the importanceof the 'ima ge of thought'- seeMartin- 1993-'Uttre-PrUace dc Gilles Delcu/c- r) 25On Deleuz.c and Plato- see also Patton, 1994

95

instability in Athens following ffie PelopponesianWar. This concernsthe mediation of competing claims on authority within the polis, and desires an ultimate and universal standard by wbicb the validity of such claims can be measured.Plato's philosophy takes up this problem, binding the destiny of thought to the task of differentiating good claims from bad ones, and thus securely distinguishing the meantngs of 'pure' and 'Impure'. 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' (LS 293/254). The Platonic imperative, which already suggests the need for a foundationalist method, reflects the assumption that the most desirable State would be one wbere individuals., instead of being free to usurp power through violence or cunning, are allocated the roles they are nattirally or essentjalýysUIted to. Plato's philosophy thus simultaneously transforms this political problem into one

that exists for pure thought whose eros is supposedly directed Iowards that which is highest desire, Good therefore the the object of unchanging, universal, and itself as a higher ontological unity. In this way, the political project receives legitimation fTorn the -Iphilosopher,

the friend (phdos) of wisdom, who claims access, through his mental

discipline, to that which alone is truly transcendent and foundational, above the distinctions and confusions of polis and pkvsis. For Deleuze, Platonic philosophy thus field to the the of contesting claims and gather them, placing them, claims right survey

togetherwith the particular desiresto which they give expression,in hierarchicalorder, bow to close they approacb to the universa the model of whicb they are only according dialectic is by Platonic less the method which claims are related to exact copies. more or the specific Idea Oustice, love etc.) they refer to., and by which questions such as 'who is be The Idea has is 'who loverT the true answered. can a positive statesmanT the true and basis to their the their the model on of refer actual copies status: ontological

jusL but Justice Only being. fimly the is vanous claimants who its in participation being-just the for possess each quality of the of Judge In varY.Ing position contend

96

degrees,a distribufion that is decided according to the content of their claims. and what this reveals about their way of life or elhos (DR 84-5/60, LS 293-4/2-53-4). Platonic philosophy is thus defined as a practice by a political problem which it accepts, and in ten-nsof wbieb it imagines itself In reflecting on the possibility of a real, stable political unity that would be governed according to a higher criterion, it imagines itself as a search for that which is genuinely trmscendent, a puTe unity of thought and

being that is known as suchand which can thus function as a foundation,a criterion for jud&g

contending claims. In this way, Platomc thou;gbt 'borrows its properly

philosophicalimage from the Stateas beautiful, substantialor subjectiveinterionty', and thus 'invents a properly spiritual State,like an absoluteState' (D 20/11). Later.,Deleuze. Guattari Platonic foundationalist this and call and image that of 'State philosophy',, is fiction State is 'capable by the that of inventing of a whieb universal ngbý of elevating the State to the level of de jure universality' (TP 465,1375).This illusory meaning of L

-. .philosopbical

activity is thus forced upon tbougbt, and interionsed by it.

This 'forcing' is important; the adoption of an image of thought is not just an decision by implicitly thinker,, a an autonomous (and thus transcendent)subject., arbitrary but is forced by the relation between thought and other practices extant within a society, a relation which is mediated by the body of the thinker. Hence the notion of habit is by forces, Bodies for Deleuze. trained a process in which are educated or central fimctional habits that are needed to regulate humans Within a unitary social order are 26

for Bergson, discursive Nietzsche for Deleuze This, true the and as of as is inculcated. faculties and consciousnessas mueb as it is of the non-discursive faculties of sensibility,, With Platonic 128-9/96-7). (DR to the respect philosophy, and imagination intuitioti is bound The body the also political philosopher up with interests. the of training of forms State for that desire physical the in realised imply specific spatiois nnlifical its (TP 483-4/388-9). body The between the environment and physical temporal relations 26 Cf Nietzschc. op. cit., 11. §sý 1.16.

97

spaceOf ffie P(diSis consolidatedas a geometricalspaceof extension,a diVIsIbleunity defined by the city's limits, which acts as a material boundary of inclusion for the citizens (TP 483-4/388-9). The citizens themselves are distfibuted within the polis according to a process of division that assigns them subordinate unities or territories within the city (DR 53-4/36). Time in turn is administered in terms of spaceas a divisible unity, and thus subordinated to it. Means of measuring time depend upon a linear and iffeversible model of the repetition or addition of smallest units defined by movement in an extended spacebetween two fixed points (DR 367/287; B 7-8/18-19,22-3,131).

The role of Platonic philosophy is, in essence,to securethe best division of the establisbedspace and time of the polis: Plato's dialectic, for example, attempts to establish differences within an undifferentiated yet divisible material unity, the polis as a (TP DR 82-4/59-60), 484/389; mass of people according to the natuTesof classes of

people and their proximity to an Idea...differenceswhich then form, for example, the basisforprescriptions concerningthe generaladministrationof taskswithin thepolis and in particular, the organisation of work. In this way, the rules that govem Platonic thougfit q fimctions (DR 54/36) be "sedentary' the of spatio-temporal conditions of pbySlca] will

formed is In through the the this the practiceof philosophy polis. existencewithin way, forms between body. Deleuze th-us the training of certain of posits a genetic relation Platonic (such the (such time) and and others as ordering of space as practice heteronomous Hence philosophy's unquestionmigaeceptanceof certain a philosophy). R] 'objective' imphes the that practices consfitute real and a clusterof pre-existing problems (i. e., external to thougbt) preconditions of this pbilosopby's image of tbougbt (its inscribe habitual thought. a orientation upon and which presuppositions), subjective The dogmaticimageof thoughtis constitutedby a set of rules, the 'institutions' of derive from the State, to modification, samecondition, yet subject are the spiritual which for itself. does In DR Deleuze thought that not set extractsthe the presenceof a problern Plato, from Aristotle Aristotle than these that fon-ns rather gl*ven basic rules of

98

consolidates die doWatic

image for thought by intellectuali sing it. For Deleuze,

Aristotle's criticisms of Plato centre on the perceived inadequacy of the Idea as a ground

of difference. The allocation of degrees of participation in the Idea is based on an esoteric insigbt expressedby a myth of metempsychosis(DR 85-6/61. LS 293-4/254-5), in which the souls of the various claimants approach or recede from the perfection of the Idea according to their eihos in life. When it is asked wlýy a given claimant is assigneda particular rank, only a circular justi fication can be given, one which relates the hierarchy in the polis to the mythological heavenly order. The polis should., according to the

Platonist,reflect the ideal, substantial,spiritual State,and thusreallseits essentialrelation to the ground of its being. Against this concept of division, the Aristotelian notion of contrariety is an attempt to give, in every case, a reason for the differences between entities, namely a genus be defined 'animal', the species cati as contraries: e. g., genus within which specified as 'with feet' and 'with wings' (DR 45-6/30). 'llie ground of difference is thus to be found

in the intellect. However, this completesthe col()Msafionof thoughtbegunby Plato, by making the 'spiritual State' completely internal to thought, rather than positing it as dependenton an unaccountableintuition. Aristotle thus presupposesand reinforces the image, demonstrating dogmatic that the role and the subjective presuppositionsof definition of the State within thought is the same as that of the State per se: the TP (DR 441/357) 172-3/1-')2; being conservabon of away of

Deleuze analysesthese subjective presuppositionsof thought as follows. The into indeterminate itical the turning mass of people a self-sufficient unity of problem po Fýl is reflected in the philosophical State by the assumption that 'thinking is the natural is faculty faculty, this that possessedof a good nature and a good Will' and exercise of a (DR 173/132). Everyone can think, and this means that everyone essentially thinks in the

is thought implies the that true that source of and this unity, it presupposition sameway,; Therefore the the by the true. universal, unchanging, affinity with an possesses right

99

desire inherently The thought, everyone is its affinity and a theoros. virtuous eros of pure

for the universal, is reflected in its good sense(bon sens) and common vense(.,wnx commun), the French senv here designatingboth a mental faculty and a direction of activity common to all minds, a supposedly universal context or horizon of meaning (DR

171-2/131). When thought conceives of an object, it is determined by two assumptions: that

this object would be conceivable for any other thinker (good sense)and that it is in conceivable the same way, or is essentially the same for any thinker (common sense).

The harmonyof thesetwo practices,which constitutesthe generalform of the activity of State-philosophy,is recognifion-good sensein reciprocity with common sense,as when one greets firiends, engagesin debate, or advancesa claim to be judged (DR 174-7/113-

5). Recognitionassumesthat individual experiencesarerepresentative of the universalor Recognition itself takesplace within an encompassing essentialcharacterof expenence. horizon of thought. Platonism assumes an external and an internal essential form of borizon. final being Wbole 'the the of or all-encompassing and the ground as unity,

Subi ect as the principle that convertsbeingeinto being-for-us' (TP 469/379), with the latter deriving its affinity for the former from the virtuous eros of thougbt. Tbese forms

define a milieu. co-extensivewith cosmosand polis, in which State-philosophycan be fonn is the of philosophical consciousness as practiced, that of represenlation,which determinate it four by to that possible construct relations make principles such,governed interior. between identity difference the the exterior and object and subject and of First and foremost, the identity qf the concept, the unity of the thinking subject as fimdarnental fonmal Kant's this Like integrity of reflects a unity of apperception., such. discursive is Platonism, for thought prior condition of any a necessary the subject which,

does (Deleuze not consider this a to the work of common senseand good sense Oppovilion the thought, see shall tn next chapter). as we fundamentalcondition of any differentiation determination the the empty concept of via and makes possible the

100

faculty the of comparison of possible predicatesand their opposites, and regulates imagination. Analogv allows the faculty of judgement to deten-nine objects with concepts, by making possible the apprehension of the difference-in-identity that charactenses synthetic knowledge- the object is and is not identical to the concept. Finally, the resemblanceof the object with respect to itself, its continuity across time, is a necessarycondition of the application of concepts to objects (DR 44-5/29,49-5 1/331 -4, 179-80/137-8,337/262). For Deleuze, the model of representation can be clearly discerned beneath Aristotle"s notion of contrwiety. I'lie specification of real differences can only take place

according to the principle of contrariety (perfect opposition), and this only within the identity of a higher concept, the genus., a third term that establishes the ground of difference for its species: birds and men are different insofar as they are both animals (DR 45-9/30-3). Whereas the Platonic mode of determining difference is circular, esoteric and 'capncious' (DR 83/59), the Aristotelian mode affirms the real autonomy of finite, into identity determinate by the ground tbought the the concept making of rational

is This internalisation State difference. the a more efficient meansof of complete of bad destabilise denounce it thought that the that claims regulation, as means will not only in its intemal itself, become but the and engrossed own polis, will also police unity of

dramas, sucb as periodic epistemologicalcrises that render it temporarily unable to function: minor double-binds that act as blockages. In this way, it will eventually come to history its history, its to the of uncritical compromises or rather. what amounts own write

don-fination. heteronomy its and withexisting practices,of The type of dogmatism Deleuze finds in Plato and Aristotle constitutes an organk form of representation (DR 44/29), part of an ethos of contemplation (WP 11/6-7,

its historical concretenessas a unique 21/15). This specificity of the eihos constitutes it it has Contemplation that assumes an esential is a meta-physics: forin of compromise. its difference the real ground object, of all thus as real within possesses and with, affinity

101

the pkvsis or physical universe.This ground cannotbe part of the universe,and is thus Posited as transcendingits tangled distinctions and confusedmixtures. Platonism thus posits its relation to this universal, its idenfity with IL as being beyond spaceand time. We now need to explicitly relate this analysis of the dogmatic image of Platonic, foundationalist philosophy to the traurna of reason.For Deleuze, the Christian era, within which modern philosophy is firmly rooted, seesthe image of thought's outline shift, as

the form of the identity of thought and being that it presupposeschanges from contemplative identity to reflective identity,, moving from the relative priOnty of the finite the object and concept, to that of the subject and the infinite concept (WP 11/6-7). Reflection as the new elhos of Platonism unplies a cbangein the practice of pbilosopby. This is brought about by a consciousnessof the separationof thought from the universal that has to be overcome. Cartesian doubt, as a variation on this ethos, presupposesa

representationalconsciousnessstructuredaccordingto a presentationof a unified space (as and time, con-n-non senseand good sense presuppositionsof the scepticalmetbod), identity, the and postulates of opposition, analogy and resemblance.But now knowledge

has to be guaranteedby the subjectitself as a ground of reflection, in relation to both a (the cogilo) that provides unchanging and transcendent ground of certainty subjective

formal criteria for objective knowledgeof the woTld throughreasonalone ('clarity' and 'distinctness'), and an objective ground of being that acts as an unchangingand is for knowledge this transcendentreal criterion and thus the true universal (God).

It is clear, I think that in the post-Enlightenmentperiod, the difference between for is Fichte Scbelling, truth explicit and who subjective certainty and objective distInguish between formal and material criteria of truth. The distinction of reason betweenthesecriteria has to be reducedto an identity, and this is supposedto take place by fonnal begins journey. the intellectual reflecting upon ground of wbich via an

it i then t turn t ground, and matenal attempts o re o postulated a via certainty undastood as forms knowledge the thus of all are encounteredL which upon path circular a well-marked

102

-Isnowing

it to be the true universal. The formal departure point is defined by a moment of

absolute experience (common sense) that connects the finite subject to its absolute precondition, the foundation of the difference or mediation that charactenses representative consciousness.'I'lie moment wben the circle is closed, bowever. is always postponed, because the difference between the necessarily transcendent ground (Tathandlung or Absolute Identity) and that which it is the foundation of is in practice

infinite. That the foundationcan be knownas the groundof all actualexperience,the true universal,can only be presupposedandnot proven. The trawna of reason arises in relation to Schelling's philosophy when we realise that negative philosopby cannot make the connection between the transcendent selfidentical ground and real difference without a practice of affimnation that actually makes L--

'Me intellectual of sueb a connectionImposSible. Knowledge Intuition or experienceof a Absolute is rational presupposedas the inner, common sense(meaning and which direction) of representationalconsciousnesscannot ground the deten-ninatedifferences that are subsequently deduced 'from' it. Both the Fichte of the WLnm and (more later Scbelling inadvertently the radically) sbow that a purely transcendent,self-identical diffirrence if though, even philosophy univers9 cannot serve as a sufficient ground of

difference. it Tbc it is that sufficient ground of a modem exists, must presuppose Platonic project of justification must therefore fail. The real existence of the true

knowledge it, be Absolute) (the of can only ever and reason's rational universal ffices double-bind Philosophy know-nthus the than of the traumaof presupposedrather be for by its Deleuze's from trap a prepared it ero.v point of view would reason,whicb for the universal. This desire for the true universal, in which all differences are unified and which by Deleuze, is difference, to related as saw, the of we a political ground tbus as serve can

forced from by desire thought This problem a which is upon other stems project. heteronomous transforms, then creating a philosophicalpractice. it which and practices,

103

In this way, Platonism or fbttndationallsniý as the dominant tradition of Western philosophy, assumesthat the destiny of thought is to detein ine the essentia timeless and

transcendentmeaningof the universal.In relation to other disciplines, philosophy sees itself as setting out to give final unity to burnan knowledge, by detennining the transcendent meanin& the Truth, of what is. Deleuze, following Bergson, enticises Platonism, not for being a 'bad claimant' with regard to its conception of the True, but for begmnmg with a problem which is SIMply assumed to be universally relevant, the 27 problem of problemS. It is fliis pToblem flud, along with its various solutions, Deleuze will try to 'do away with' (AO 94/8 1). The traumas that Platonic/foundationalist tbought undergoes are not wholly They from illusion for Deleuze, as we shall see in thought that accidental. result an within

the next chapter,is a transcendentalillusion (one immanentto ontological conditionsof determination). This illusion, which marks the sens (meaning/direction) of Platonist thought arises fi-om the 'social problern' that defines Platonism, and is an illusion of thought's transcendence.That is to say, Platonism seeksthe true, timeless Universal that for difference. Because foundation knowledge this searcb will of real all will act as a

define philosophy as the discipline that unifies all human knowledge,Platonism thus is Universal itself, this to true that thought's seek essenceand meaning within assumesa) implicitly Universal. dwells For b) this thus that thought within always already and but in Descartes to the the reach method order universat a method constructs example,

(innate ideas) Kant that common sense exists. alreadypresupposes a mediumof universal . has that show pure critique reason a right Will methodof proposesthat the transcendental he but knowledge, that the tr-anscendental also presupposes to claim objective a priori the de. jure. medium of as such common given within sense. universal, itself is method

27BergSon.1962.pp. 355-6.

104

The content or meaning of the Universal will thus secure the horizon of meaning 28 embodied in the presupposition of a common sense.

This meansthat Platonic thought is subject to a constrainingdouble movement. wbicb is exemplified by the Ficbtean and Sebellingian systems. in particular, Scbelling's system shows an appreciation of this double movement as a necessity for thought (though Deleuze would ask for what kind of practice this movement becomesnecessary). As we saw M Chapter Two, Schelling's Philosophy of Identity recognised that the

knowledge presupposition ultimate of all was the immediateunity of knower and known, in itself could be reduced to neither subject nor obj ect (WS 137/141,145-6/146). which itself bas be inberently i. to postulated as unity rational, e., as an ontological unity I his that is also an immediate knowledge, a blind certainty. However, as we also saw, this foundation be fact, if In the Absolute was postulated could not posited as simply rational.

neither subject nor object its content was also neither simply rational nor simply irrational. I'lic task Scbelling undertook in bis middle period was thus to demonstratethat this Absolute had an inherent tendency to become more and more rational through positing itself But this tendency itself was presupposed in positing the Ungnind as divine love. Schelling's prqjectý to prove that reasoncould know ffie Absolute foundation inadvertently demonstrated Universal, that reason the true eventually of experience., it. Foundationalism knowledge this prove and could neier could only ever presuppose

has to presupposethat the timelessessenceof thoughtis to know the universal.It cannot for for is the thought's the universal search this that case, show distinctions -

the unity of all

distinction between itself the the thought of reality presupposes within

distinction is The this (its reality of what and its implicit essence real unity with what is).

foundationallst tbougbt cannot itself account for, even v"th Teferenceto Scbelling's distinction do that this is a necesswy Absolute, All it can is illegitimately posit 28 Cf. Hei&v_,, m's

dismers the -mctaphýsjcs' as inquiry %khich of presentation

(vorm-cgnehmen),1976,p. 108.

105

only bý anticipating

consequenceof the Absolute, as when Sebelling posits a concephial 'first creation' as the basis of deten-nination. But this positing of the distinction as necessary can only be circular and hence subjective. To reiterate, for Deleuze such traps result from the illusions of transcendencethat ebaracterise foundationallst thought. As we have just seen. the pnmarv aspect of such

illusions is to posit an essential,timelessinner resemblancebetweenthat which is to be conditioned, i. e., the real distinctions within the physis and polis, and that which is to act

as the foundation of thesedistinctions,proViding an explanationof their possibility (LS 128/105).The foundation is thus posited as the substantialaspectof thesedistinctions, securing them within itself and abiding immanently within them in their real

But separateness. all that this meansis that a transcendentcondition has been posited is distinctions familiarIts the only content are already only whose with which we additional determination is formal- it is a "higber' unity of these distinctions. If it itself inherent distinctions, tendency to to these this give nse possesseswithiti an real

itself bas to be presupposed,as was sbownby Scbelhng'sidentification of the possible (the 'first civation') and actual dialectics of the Absolute's self-determination. The crucial aspect of the illusion of transcendencefor Deleuze is the way in which it posits the Universal as a reflection of real practices. These practices are those real,

habitualmodesof being that regulatethe behaviourof humanbeing as socialhabits,such functioning intuition, harmOnlous the of memory and as common senseand recognition, fimes. different Such habits identify the at are not to swne objects thought that allows us innate, but are inculcated in us by flie material limits of our social existence. Opinion and judgement, practices that seek to detem ine what the meanings of these unitary objects follow really are,

in the wake of recognition,

regulated by common sense and the

from habits Platonic thus these the abstracts philosophy representation. of principles Universal as that which is meant to perfectly regulate opinion, Judgement and

judgements bad be distinguished bad from In and can opinions this way. recognition.

106

good ones according to a timeless, invariable standard. The transcendent Universal is thus an imagined pure caseof recognition on the part of a virtuous thinker who attends to

thought itself in order to trace the Universal Within it and discover its essential determinations. For Descartes, the Universal was God conceived as the real ground of being and knowledge, a role secured for the concept of God by analogical argument. God is the supreme being and real ground becausehis nature is infinitely per&ct. In other words, he possessesin an eminem sense real finite qualities whieb denve their meaning from

familiar opinions, suchasgoodness,wisdom and power, and it is this eminenceof God's nature that makes him God (SP 45-6/54-5,60-2/70-3). For Kant the Universal was the transcendental subject, whose determinations (such as the categories and forms of intuition) reflected the most general constituents of our received opinions about the nature of experience. This subject thus represented a tautological, formal abstraction from Newtonian science and Christian morality, an 'originary consciousness'at the base of consciousness(LS 128/105). These elements of eminence and tautology represent respectively the essential difference of the Universal from that wbicb it conditions and its essentialidentity With it.

This equivocal senseof the Universal is best expressedby Fichte's Absolute Subject, indeed.,it is just this equivocation that Jacobi, H61derlin and Schelfing reproach him for.

The Tathandlungis postulatedas a) an absoluteand thus self-producingact, and b) as implies for be is impossible, however, T'his, to subjective self-consciousness subjective. The Talhandlung this relation. a conditioning is thus is over against an object, and (self-producing (self-knowing both and conscious or erninent) unconscious postulatedas is Schelling's definition definition This the present also in of equivocal tautological). or difference, for if Schelling's project is to Absolute as the already rational unity of all be both Absolute. has 'higher' Absolute to essentially a neither rational nor the succeecl,

This Absolute. requirement of thinking the irrational, and a predominantly rational

107

Absolute as simultaneously radically different from and identical With the field of

experiencealso meansthat Sebelling'sproject must fail, however.as we saw. Ilie abstraefion that charactefises Platonism/foundationalism is thus a supreme analoff posited between the Universal and that which it is meant to condition, the real differences that make up the world. In this way, the transcendentUniversal is posited as immanent in the conditioned while still transcending it: like Sebelling's Absolute, it posits itself in finite things while remaimm, above them as their eminent foundation. But

this relation is only presupposed,being securedonly by the tautologythat is also posited between condition and conditioned- the Absolute always already contains lust those deten-ninationsthat we are familiar with, and thus fori-nally justifies tbeir possibility, but

leavesthe real ground of their necessitystill to be discovered-The fact that for Platonism the stress is on the tautological aspect makes the analogy between condition and conditioned a bad one. The problem that we discovered in Kant's philosophy, the merely formal tracing of the conditions of experience that assumes the universality of a definifion of experience ('psychologism'), is discovered by Deleuze to be a recurrent problem for the dominant tradition of philosophy. There is always an internal relation of

being between Universal it transcendent that posited a and which is supposedto unity Universal that the the content of only repeats that of 'received opinion', condition, sucb the product of given, empirical practices that goes unquestionedby Platonism. In the next justifies Deleuze distinction between bow illusoiN this makes and a chapter, we will see belief or dogmatism and a non-illusory critique or philosophy, without making a similar Deleuzean be distinguished In himself 'Enligbtem-nent' the this of ethos will way, move r-.

dogmatism Platonism, heteronomous, of the unenlightened which cannot from -

i. degree it lack the transcendence, to of e., which is genetically acknowledgeits own bodies disciplining the and of thought. to of related

108

Chapter

Four

n-1Absolute the and , emuze

i) Inlroduclkm At the beginning of the previous chapter, I noted that for Deleuze- as for

Foucault, understanding modernity or Enlightenment philosophically becomes. not a defining matter of a historical evoch containing, specific modes of reflection upon the timeless problems of philosopby, but one of reafising an eihos, practice or 'attitude' defined

over

against

other

elhoi,

Predominant

among

which

Is

Platonism/foundationalism. This indicates a refusal of any timeless essential and universal meaning that has been posited for philosophy, with the consequencethat that the task of 'modern philosophy' is the renverwmenl of Platonism (IDR 82/59, LS 292/253). On the one hand, renversementmeans 'overturnlin"'. This is the task taken up by Deleuze in his analyses of the dogmatic lynage of thought, showing how Platonism be can referred back to subjective presuppositions (Internal to thouglit) and okiectiN,e presuppositions (external to tboug-bt) tbat, as components of practices, i-ernain itself be that to it., given assumes a transcendentpractice capable of it unadch-essed within into however. Remersement 'inversion', Deleuze's seeing, also means procedure what is. how he Platonism be to traced this chapter, in order show of inverting in redefines will the task of pbilosopby in terms of non-Illusory problems witbout appealing to a transcendent foundation in order to justifY this redefinition. Against the model of by Enlightenment, the to in which a mind is putified of its illusory education appealed foundation Universal, to the the the genuine of true opinions about world in order reach knowledge, Deleuze constructs a model of training or apprenticeship designed to reshape the meaning and onentation (sens) of the subject and thus overcome habituated modes of in for implicated loss The that nihilism, of all meaning, philosophical thinking thinking are

109

that is experienced in the traurna of reason. Deleuze thus aims to restore meaning to this 4suffienng'of tbought. This chapter will thus show how, even though he provides (as we saw) an Deleuze does define Platonism, that the the account of real, genetic grounds of illusions not simply repeat Marx's mistake, by relying in this account on a presupposed and knowing'. On definition before buman 'knowing tbus on a essence,and unprovable of a the contrarv, Deleuze, M his inversion of Platonism, remains true to Schellitig's MsMhts

into the impossibility of foundational philosophy. MoreoveT, his Bei-gsonian and Nietzscheanreinventioti of philosophical modernity is consonant with certain tendencies I draw Schelling's Absolute, the thinking own of shall out in order to within which Deleuze's lon. defined as the identity of notion of immanence,which is no per understand being and thought in knowledge. In this way, we shall progress towards an understanding between dogmatism distinction Deleuze draws the and genuine philosophy, illusory of and non-illusory modes of thought.

ii)

Towards Thinking Absolute Difference The key to my interpretation of Deleuze is the conViction that, with bim,

distinguish doginatism, in Absolute to to the order with its concern philosophy returns for the transcendentUniversal, from philosophy. It is this attention to a theme that is bea Deleuze that by 20"' to allows notion mvorn-ouft century philosophy often understood to carry out a radical excavation of the presuppositions of philosopby. In addition, bow the Absolute or unconditioned has to be thought in order to 'modemise' and restore draNN In I I tbis, to concern. sboNVIng voll philosof)by is, as Will sbow, a constant meaning

first Bergson lie from his announces early work on where on various sources, ranging

110

that '[tlbe Absolute is difference' (B 27/35) to his final published essay on the meaning

' Guatt--M. of the notion of absohiteimmanence,developedwM I referred previously to Deleuze's thought as 'trwiscendental empiricism', and to the positing of a transcendent Universal as the foundation of real difference as the primary "transcendentalillusion' of Platonism. The senseof 'empiricism' was related to Deleuze's investigation of actual philosophical pmctices which allowed him to define Platonism. What, though, does 'transcendental' mean in these two expressions? In the first case, it does not, as with Kant, refer to that wbieb is the essential condition of the possibility of experience and which can thus be known as such independently of Instead, it experience. refers to those conditions of experience which thought must presuppose as real but also as being, actually incommensurable With thoughtý and yet fin-n 'objective Here, (its tbought try to tbink must presuppositions). a connection whicb be Schelling's irreducible 'higher' Absolute, to concept of a our concept of it, can with In Kantian 'transcendental' the the reflects sense, thougb modified made. second case, through a reading of Berpon, pertaining to a tendency within the real conditions of experience to give rise to illusions within thought. Transcýmdentalempincism, as it has the goal of dispelling Illusion, Will as we see constitute a kind of absolute knowledge, thougb in a very special sense,wbicb owes more to Bergson than to Schelling. Like Marx's analysis of bourgeois philosophy, Deleuze's attack on Platonism

in If Platonism, positing the accusesit of reversing an actual, empirical relation. Universal as the object of a privileged thoughtý thus abstracts its obiect from real

life inion judgernent, that and reco9111 nition regulate OPI within the secure, practices of for it Deleuze, bounds the real conditionsof expenence, the polis, of ignores, sedentary incommensurable Platonic defined by thought the themselves above all with which are identity being. These the the of of concept real conditions with subjective presupposition from dt&rence by Platonism. Deleuze defined the their thinking thus regulated of are ' Sec IL 3-4i3-4 (on the diffcrcnec bct,%vocnimmancncc and transccndcnccas a djffcrcncc bctx,, -ccn

ill

Platonic the to differences thus claims that they are real that are transcendentally prior image of thought, in that they can explaln the genesisof such practices. and thus account for real fonns of experience. To asswne that these differences are reducible to being thought in terms of the identitv of the concept, which seeksto regulate difference within the polis so as to secure its overall unity, is the fundamental subjective assumption of Platonism, which is incarnated in the positing of a Universal. Of course, Deleuze's claim he how We this stage. itself appears simply a presupposition at will now examine by beginning it just than to that returning to an assumption, attempts show is more Schelling's 'hi p-her' Absolute, throuA Deleuze's late di stinction in II. between 'relative' immanence. This 'absolute' attempt will require that thesereal conditions, which are and basis into by Platonism. the of a new image of thougk not positive are made suppressed is For Deleuze, Universal, but knowledge only througb sucb a as creenjon. it as of a 2 it be positive mversion of Platonism that a true c-Tifiqueof can- cons"cted. Deleuze's critical distinction between 'relative' and 'absolute' immanence 0L 34/3-4) distinguishes two fonns of philosophical tbinking of the relation between thoup-bt band, being: the immanence of the transcendent, and on the other the on one and immanence 'in itself, which 'is not in something, not to something' 0L 4/4)- The first, Platonic form, seeks the Universal that is to serve as the ground or explanans of difference. This ground is therefore posited as being immanent in or to what it it. Kant's bevond difference, while nevertheless subsisting conditions, i. e., real transcendental subject is immanent to the empirical, expeniential medlwn

of

Schelling's be experienced. representational consciousness, and yet cannot itself Absolute expressesitself in the determinations of its finite and infinite potencies, yet it 34/1261). (AW in-itself these the potencies other of or essentially neither one nor remains For Deleuze, even I-leideggerdoes not escapethis illusion, for lie relies on the notion of a fn. /321 11). In Being 188 169/120(DR each case, n. of pre-ontological understanding

unconditionedand conditioned).

112

the condition is posited in an equivocal relation with the world that we experience as a differentiated manifold, i. e., as simultaneously separatedfrom and immanent in it. Looking back on the issue of the consistency of historical versions of critique, as discussed in the previous chapter, it seemsthat we can say that in a eeneral theoretical sense,critique after Kant came to refer to the practice of demonstrating the dependence deten-nination that bad been posited as absolute upon a of a

-around

of explanation, an

For ii objective presupposition example, explanatory power. with greater or more general . in evistemol%,-y Jacobi, H61derlin and Schelfing showed that Fichte's Tathandlung was a priori dependent upon a more comprehensive unity. In political economy, Marx showed that bourgeois economic theory was dependent upon specific empirical social fonnations, and that a history of these formations could be constructed on the basis of a for foundational lies, The this model of critique general anthropology. inconsistency of Deleuze, in its repefifion of a basic illusion of transcendence.In this way, the cnfique of by fon-n by by demonstrating that thought the principle adopted one of another operates the fon-n to be critiqued is itself based upon distinctions that it cannot explain, as is Fichte's Tathandlung. The discoveiy the of a new pnnciple is meant to c1mly case with for determination by the and relation to those accounting its old principle undercut deten-ninations that condition it, as when Schellinp, posits the Absolute as neither both. For Deleuze, (somehow) in as expressing itself subjective nor objective, yet however, the universality of this principle in relation to real difference is in every case is This be another way of expressing justified or provenonly assumed and cannot Schelling's insight that

the essential connection between the Absolute and our

foundationalist Such demonstration. faith than a of rather experience is a matter of from be illusion, for Deleuze, the accepted an result of abstracfion only principle can, form ive to philosophical thus these 91 pre-philosophical presuppositions pracfices: thought, and tio-ra becomes reflected as ur-dava (DR 175-6,1134).

See Hm-dt- 1991- ;,-sp. pp. xm-x%iii.

113

Deleuze aims, like Marx's critique of the model of exchange proVided by bourg,eois political economy, to explain the fact that an abstraction has been posited. In this sense, he seems to approach the model of critique just discussed- in aiming to explain the determination of a practice. However. the 'gound' he appeals to does not imply the Presupposition of a Universal that somehow enfolds or subsumes the

determinationof that which it is meant to explain by transcendingit. The difference between his critique and this 'relative' mode lies, as we shall see, in his conception of the relation between real difference and thought, which does not presuppose that thought, thanks to its supPOsedly unique identitv with being, is capable of transcendingdifference f towards that wbicb, remaining eternay independent of difference, contains it in its totality. Although Platonism is that ethos of thought that in affirming certain problems, drives the history of Western philosophy and thus dominates OUTimage of what 6philosophy' means, Deleuze refuses to posit philosophy as such as monolithically

dogmatic. He is enthusiastic about an alternative tradition, including Lucretius, Spinoza, Hurne, Nietzsche and Bergson (N 14/6) who manage to resist thinking grounds in terms of their relative immanence, and instead promote a different image of thought, which knowing, but These the the affirms centrality of problem, not of of creation. are thinkers from do illusory image thought pre-philosophical eihoj and model of not adopt an who concepts upon it, rather. they invent concepts that are not posited as transcending difference, but as following its real articulations, as being absoluleiv immanent. For Deleuze, thinkers who are otherwise Platonic in the extreme occasionally fonn invention. firne, An 'pure the the and empty of example is achieve such conceptual Kantian the ego's empirical self-perception, which ensures that the medium of transcendental ego and empirical ego can never be identical in and for consciousness (DR 81-2/58,116-8/85-7,

KP vii-viii. SQ Another such, even more emphatic 219-30).

be Schelling's I suggest, would vision of the 'higher' Absolute. Mv case, would

114

discussion in Chapter Two of the 'two Absolutes' in Schelfing is reflected by Deleuze's brought he hand, 'difference out of Scbelling's assessmentof achievements:on the one the night of the Identical' (DR 246/191 but on the other the Absolute Identity remains _), 354/276). difference' (DR 130/107) 'nothing' 'cannot (LS an abvssal that sustain be between that to made now want an important connection can suggest Schelfing's account of the Absolute as primordially dissonant Within itself and the nofion help Deleuzean to this of absolute immanence, which will idea. As we saw us understand at the end of the previous chapter, Platonism believes that the Universal internally Deleuze Kant., that the error of to resembles which it conditions: as writes with respect transcendental philosophy is to 'think of the transcendental in the image of and in resemblanceto, that which it is supposed to around' (LS 128/105). Schellina, however, be It that there to that the this shows us is no a priori reason assume case. can only is justified) is faith (which to to jusfified say. not m the autonomy of with reference our reason. Schelling proposes that the presupposition of all philosophy is this faith, the fon-nal Identity. However, Absolute this the transcendent oniv is unity of reason with a does demonstrate It that philosophy, qua absolute not presupposition of philosophy. knowledge, in fact exists. In other words, it does not show that this Universal is the real Schelling is difference. To this the that case, attempts to think the show ground of Absolute as different within itself at the same time as thinking it as a transcendentunity. These two aspects prove ultimately irreconcilable, however. In fact, the obscure difference within the Absolute, which reason needsto presupposein order to account for functions like Fichte's GýMhl, difference, making a system impossible to complete. real Becausethe difference is itself non-rational and unaccountable,an (Ingnind, it cannot be taken up into the systern. which means that the systern is incomplete and not absolute. Reason thus has to presuppose a primordial difference that it cannot subsume under the identity the the relying concept. instead on presupposed of of the eminent identity

115

divine is love. An a pathological itself, reason as wilhin active otherness ýAbsolute condition that makes absolutely a priori synthetic knowledge imf)ossible. For Deleuze, Kant's moment of true invention lies in introducing a problematic. purely determinable term (the empty form of time) as constitutive of the relation between the indeterminate condition and the conditioned it deternfines. Fichte and Schelling, are forced to introduce their own versions of this determinable term, thus effectively remoVing the possibility of grounding difference in a higher identity. In this way, a radical or priimordial difference is introduced into philosophical thought: as Deleuze puts it with respect to Kant, this moment in b-anscendentalphilosophy is 'a matter of establishing the difference and inleriorising

it within being and thought' (DR 117/86, my

emphasis). Schelling actually goes further than Fichte or Kant, however, something which Deleuze does not explicitly acknowledge. He tfies to think a higher Absolute, one that transcendsreason, not as an eminent fomi of identity. but as incommensurable with it, foundation the and yet which can still serve as of a system. The former requirement is by necessitated the need to explain detennination but, as we have seen,it upsetsthe latter requirement. Nevei-theless,Schelling still attempts to think the relation between this Absolute and creation throupili his theory of potencies, as a positive dialectic of produefion-,an Erzeugungsditilektik

3

In Chapter 2 (pp. (2-. 3above), I noted that the ungrounded act of the Absolute that posits actual difference is conceived in the Philosophy of Identity and thereafter as an absolute positing that is grounded only in the Absolute as an immediately affin-native from disfinguisbed This has be Subject's Fichtean the to positing of a not-1, in unity. between is for limifitig, basis I that the the relation and negative, not-I necessary all which deten-nination of consciousnessis supposedly freely posited. Here, Fichte has merely fteedom that the of the Absolute is identical with the relation of opposition assumed

3 This is Ilic icrm cmploý cd by Bcach- 1994, pp. 84--:,.

116

between the subject and the object that is constitutive of the conditioned un1tv of theorefical and practical consciousness.Schelling, had argued that negative opposition was the pureiv necessarvmode of dIfferentiation that determines the merely Possble first creation, and wants to think the freedom of the Absolute differently, so as to avoid positing it under the fonn of a conditioning relation that simply reflects the constitution of the finite. Schelling's doctrine of potencies is thus an attempt to understand the immediacy Absolute for the the emergence to of such unconditioned in a way as account of real difference with sole reference to this pure immediacy. Difference is thus to be thought Without negation, that is, without self-limitation as conceived either on the Fichtean model or as in Schelling's more Neoplatonic moments, when the positing of difference in the Absolute appears to be necessary.'Me emergenceof difference has to be thought of as the realisation of the Absolute and not as its degradation. In Schelfing's middle period, this requirement is fulfilled. 'Me act of posifing Is an utterly blind and describes from Schelfing the that the to as a actual non-actual spontaneous passage from It Absolute. the initial the allses contraction, self-doubling., or intensification of impulse provided by the 'dark will', which emergesunaccountably in eternity. within the fully fully The dark Absolute. or conscious unconscious,and thus peaceful Will Is neither indicates a problernatic. Primordial and pseudo-temporal ('before and after') dissonance itself Absolute the within

In relation to the actual temporality of the world, this

dissonanceis always already past, a substantial rather than vanished past that continues to blind In 24-5/120-1). (AW the the contraction, act of the actual universe influence Absoltite posits itself through this dissonance. I'he theory of potencies indicates how this affirmafive positing is camed over into Creation. The first potency intensifies rather than negating or firnitim4 the Absolute, Bi The it. first or tension produced. in potency as actuall--v within I creating a real

4 On the -ict of contraction. sce Zukck- 1996, pp- -, i-2.

117

Schelling's notorious shorthand. is the affinnation of the disturbed Absolute (A) in which the dark will and the will -to-exi stence have begun to emerge. and so it repeats and

intensifiestheir differencewitifin it-self,which Schellingrepresentswit-b Aý (A=B) or N' (SPL 440-1/211-2). Ilie process continues lil,-e a series of li ghtning- flashes: the tension n A' is the difference between-it and the A (the initialt state) that it augments. N' is not identical with itself but implicates this difference within it as its condition. and so its is the original, unactualised difference between itself and the second condition ultimate potency. the unrest that paradoxicaliv anses within that which is etemaliv at rest, which the first votencv britw-,s to life and active1vexpresses.Hence A is intensified through the first potency again, this time in another direction or mode, that is, in the second potency, the will-to-existence, posited alongside the finst as A' (SPL 425-6/200- 1). V----N

The third potency, that of absolute indifference, is posited next in sequence,as a relative identity of the first two potencies. At this point, Schefling is concerned to reassert the overall priority of the Absolute Identity. The positing of real difference from Within the Absolute 'awakens' the Oterund understood as eminent ident1tv, the Absolute-inGod Love, thus subduing the ray-ing individual powers within a synthetic unity, itself, as making them into opposites. Like the Fichtean I and not-1, they limit each other, but Fichtean do the they postulates, so actively, as they each internalise the potential unlike have Nevertheless, limitation Absolute. the they that power of entered a relation of defines a synthetic identity. and in this way a 'cooling' of the process of Erzeugung is effected. This third potency is the stable relation of mutual limitation between the other two. With the positing of A', the absolute attains a stable form of actual existence, but thk vý it idenfity. for implicates its it still as condifion, the primordial oniv a relafive within dissonance of the Absolute. As such it cannot be equal to the L)ngrund. In so far as difference this in itq own existence, A-' remains.on1v relativeiv stable. The implicates lowest Absolute levels the the once again augmented is of within of material power

118

nature and so on, towards the point where, in human consciousness.the prionty of the first potency, that of nature, is subvertedbv the developed secondpotency. that of spint. The irreconcilable tension in Schelfing's work has been traditionally understood as

that betweenfTeedomand systern.or that betweenthe unification of the absoluteand its falling asunder into simply opposed real mid ideal principples-5However, if we read Schefling as proposing that philosophy, in order to explain real difference, has to presupposea primordial dissonancewithin the Absolute, then the tension in his work is difference identity "higher' Absolute that transcends positing a all as an emment between (and which thus illegitimately resembles that which it is supposed to condition and cannot tberefore explain its emergence)or positing a 'bigber' Absolute as a problematic difference that createsreal difference absoluleýy,that is, through its own relation to itself The self-ldentical Ungrund suffers fi-om the disadvantage of relative immanence. It is be difference, foundation, be but there to the to transcendent assumed measureof real its is no wav of demonstrating that this is the case. To explain real difference, an equiprimordial, pseudo-temporal difference has to be presupposed,but this means that the self-identical Ungrund cannot serve as a foundation without a difference that it does difference URgrund In the this conceived as primordial can not itself produce. way. only be Absolute, that is, a self-related condifion of actual difference, for as we have seen,it is itself higher difference, to this through the of a power, that raising of its only affirmation is betweenA A' distinction 'Me and not therefore one of relation real is posited, differences between difference but two posited internalised one of pure resemblance without relation to Identitv. flie onlv ground for reducing this relation to one of resemblance would be our

has faith but in thought that this an itself, our conviction 'faith the autonom of reason, Deleuze's for Universal terms, only a product of our attachment to the in is, affinity habituated ethoi or forms of experience. fin this way, it can be seenthat our positing of a

5 Seee.g., Wlitc- 1983b.

119

transcendent,sell'-identical Universal, and of an internal resemblancebetween it and what krzzeupmgýidialektik, The it conditions. is relative to our experience and not absolute. however, is a construction which. thouO, it is meant to explain real difference. implies an In difference. difference, to this that only positing relation is, in vay. it is of absolute irreconcilable with foundationalist thought for it appears to posit the Absolute as in from incommensurable infmitely different principle unknowable, as or with the concept. It also seems to be self-contradictorv, proposinu that we can know the Absolute to be Nevertbeless, immanence disturbed in dissonant Absolute the the of and its unknowable. products is not relative immanence. It is, on the con",

the univocal and unilateral

difference further difference that it produces. of one problematic a immanence in It is this kind of relation that Deleuze descnbes as absolute immatience, which 'is in itself (IL 4/4), rather than being the relative immanence of a transcendent term iti something else. As we saw in Chapter Two, Schelling cannot sustain this thought, however. It is opPOsed, even in his middle rwriod. by his commitment to foundationalism, which requires that the Absolute be posited as an ernment identity (Ithe Ungrund as Love). 'Mis un1tv is assurnedto remain 'above' the real dissonanceof the Absolute, making sure that things turn out alright, as it were. Schelling thus remains Deleuzean immanence, from thinker point of view. a of relative primarily a We now need to exannne the evisternolowcal status of this Deleuzean absolute determinable from the the that within thought as its absolute positing of results relation by Two, in Chapter Schelling, means of posits a special intuition as we saw ground. literally higher Absolute, thought the outside is and in which which thought is united with (potencies) determinations for basis As the of the constructing a itself or ecstatic. \bsolute, this ecstatic intuition is simply the immediate identity of thought and Absolute. ,, 6 Schell' his into In thinker the middle period, ing through which nature. ga-ins in'sight its I -'unconsclous' thought the the of the of pw-tido-tempOral as With unity conceives intuition

6 See von Uslar. op. cit.. P. ; o8. ,

120

Absolute before time (AW

12-13/116-7,27/122).

The exact meaning, of

the

transcendenceor ecstasy involved in this intuition is still ambiguous, however. Schelling describes it as access to an 'essenceoutside and above the world' (AW 5/114). which might be thought to imply the Ungrund as eminent identity or as Universal. What this essenceis, however, is the substantial past. the problematically differentiated Absolute. is qualilalively distinct from 'the world', i. e., the time of the present (Alvk' 24which 5/121), which differs in nature from the past because of its unifineanty, the fact that time

as we commoniv or habitually expenence it is a successionof instants. If Schelling, in thinking the absolute positing of difference soleiv with reference to

difference, a problematic can be said to have gone beyond relative immanence (Ito an extent), it should he noted that this is becausethe role he asslamsto intuition is connected firne. be fin Bergson, this, a concept of a connection should pointed with out with one of the most important of Deleuze's lPfluences or 'mediators'

7

Bergson had accused the

post-Kantians of positing a 'timeless intuition' as the basis of philosophy, which. although it goes beyond Kant's stresson the finite Understandingand thus his fonnalism, false in to the connected goal of a arch4ý-science grounded a remains unitary

8 transcendentUniversal. This, however, is not entirely tnie of Schelling. Each epoch of time, for him, is a qualitatively distinct mode of being. The present exists, ansing and being is because but the this of substantial of the past the vanishing constantiv. differentiated Absolute, problematically whicb is immanent in the present as its ground. Schellitig thus tlies to think the relation between past and present without reducim-,it to a temporal scbema of succession that would depict the relation between Absolute and

In he between two this, temporal instants. relation world as an already unifinear Deleuze duration Bergson's notions of and virtuality, which provide Ith a N% approaches DR. model of absolute immanence in

On Bergson and Schell]ing, sce Io%cloy, 196) and Mcrjcj,, -P0nt%-, ' Berg-son. 1%2. p. 361

121

pp. 14-5-6.

For Bergson, duration, as qualitative temporal distinction. is the Absolute itself the ground of real differentiation. He proposes that knoVAIedpeof this Absolute is possible via an 'tiltra-intellectuatl intill

Q

C that wo-i-i-ldenable us to re-live the abs-olute"9

'Ultra-intellectual' here refers to an intuition that takes representational consciousness (the realm of V"erstand)beyond itself into its inner lived expenence of fime, whicli Kant descnibedfon-nally as the 'pure and empty fon-n of time'. This intuition gives knowledge. not of the transcendent, Universal foundation of determination, but of the 'virtual tendencies' that are immanent in the present existence of a phenomenon and mark the process of its evolution--10The Absolute here is not the transcendentGround of whicb all things are internal determinations. Duration does not lie beyond all things, but rather can be traced in them as their own 'lived time. It is problematically differentiated and thus internally different in kind from itself, or self-differentiafinp- like Schelling's disturbed Absolute. Because it is internaliv different from itself, it is incommensurable With identity and thus with representationalconsciousness.It is thus transcendenton1v in this in sense, that our habitual practical orientations (representational consciousness)do not allow us to trace its influence. It is transcendental,in that it is the condition in principle of differentiation. yet is also empirical, in that it can only be traced in actual phenomena. Dele-uze's'Wanscendentalempinclsm' thus begins with Bergson. As with Schelling's dialectic of potencies, Bergsonian duration explaitis differentiation as the congelation of its own internal activity. Yet the virtual or pure past as the bemg-m-itself of the present does not possess the same substantiality as is Stich Universal, Schelling's Umversal. the to transcendent g., a e. earlier a attributed detenninations Absolute, thought is of as containing all internal to eternal, self identical detenninations, This to reahse. which somehow it comes itself as its own possible between I the previously, existence of an resemblance internal assumes, as noted Schelling he The as conditioned, which, shows. cannot justified priori. and a condition '4Ibid.. p. 359. p. 157.

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idea of a Substance as that in-itseif which contains within itself all determinafions as possible, and which then realises them by limiting, itself. like Fichte's Taihandlung. is opposed by Schellinp_'ssubversive thought of the dissonant Absolute. even though this conception is thought alongside that of a transcendentSubstance(the Unkninti as Love. which supposedly belongs to the future and the past). From a Deleuzean point of View, Bergson opposes this transcendenceand the it relative immanence implies more consistentIv. Duration. being, different from itself has a power of variation which is intfinsically infinite. as each singular duration is different from ) quahtafiveýv all others, and in this, its problematically (for consciousness. differentiated nature, resides its substantiality and thus its suitability as an evlanans. Extension in the phenomena]realm as presentedto representationalconsciousness,which is only infinite quanfilative difference under a general fon-n of unity (113 22-3/31). can thus he explained w-ith reference to duration, which 'includes' it. All extension can be duration the as phenomena] product of contingent modifications of in the viewed temporal order of the present (in which time and space are constituted as Infinitely divisible unities): a Bergsoman piece of wax is not defined, like Descartes, by the stable by that it possesses virtue of its extension and which allow it to inathemafical properties be recognised, with the alterations it undergoes being modifications of extended 'marv: the instabilltv Instead, the melting the alterations are pri of substance. wax and its duration. The difference, front fire is temporal the the a wax itself, a pure of of wax in by a contingent modification of a expenence produced qua extended substance, is an collection of such variations, which constitutes a threshold of consciousness. The substantialitv of a transcendentUniversal that contains all determination under the form of possibilit-v is illusory for Bergson, and for Deleuze. The idea that this Possibilit-v that supposedly pre-exists all actualltv can thus ground actualitv is cn*ticised by Bergson as an illusory projection inlo the past of the familiar image of the real that is

't) Scv Hardt- i 993. pp. 4-7

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11 produced in intuition and thought by our habitual ethoi. it is thus an image abstracted frOm empirical practices in the sense that we have traced in Deleuze's crifique of Platonism. Duration, on the other hand, includes in its virtual dimension a tendency to congeal as extended matter, so that actualisation is a matter of duration becoming external to itself rather than, as with a trwiscendent Universal, limiting itself Duration, becauseit is internally qualitatively different from itself, is infinitely determinable being,. As such, the being of Bery-sonian substance is radically unstable, rather thati being eternally self-identical. Deleuze suggeststhat sucb problematic being be written '9-being' (DR 89/64) or as 'non-being'. thouOmnot in the sense of ouk on, that which has no but reality, rather m4iýon (DR 253/196), that whose essenceor senseis undecidable and Schelling himself, Deleuze 246-7/190-1), (DR as unstable. recognises refeffed to the incomprebensible ground of real existence as a me on, a non-being that is without stable essencerather than that which is without any being Cizanzundgar nichi Sevende)(DPE 235-6).

12

If this dimension of the real is incommensurable with consciousness,however, bow can it be known? Where is the certainty that is demanded by foundationalism and knowledge? Universal Will that transcendent the it seeks a secures of in not which unity the method of inwition only produce arbitrary explanations of phenomena?For Bergson, the intuition of duration is continuous with sensory intuition, being simply a higher form dimensions duration it beyond to that to which takes of of consciousness us being fied to the temporal order of the present and the consciousnessand sensibility, " Bergsonian intuition, as ordering and perception of extended matter, is inferior, form Deleuze 'pure to the time' that of seesas the and empty previously noted. is related difference Kant's thought, that the truly transcendentalmoment of introduction of a pure from knowing the itself as it is in itself and which is nevertheless subject prevents But for being Bergson, the this intuition is elevated to the the suýject. of of constitutive " Bcrgson, i 960. p. I 10.

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foffn of a method, in which the incommensurability of different durations. the 'lived time' of different phenomenais experienced directiv (as with the melting wax). Absolute Difference can be 'known' becauseit can be felt in this way. 'flits does not. however. mean it can be represented, for it k still incommensurable with the identit-v of the concept. We now need to explore this notion of absolute knowledge as Deleuze uses it, in order to understandbis distinction between doematic and cnticai images of tbought.

iv)

Thinking Immanence Platonism's faith in the 'good will' of thought, i.e., In the essential unity of

thought and being is, for Delcuze, testimony to Its basis in a false problem, that is, how to achieve knowledge of the transcendent universal, the foundation of the good order. I'lils goal is assumed to be the essential and definitive philosopbical expenence: Enlightenment Deleuze Guattari parousia, and invoke another kind of expenence, however, which testifies to the necessity of reinventing philosophical practice, that of a paihos of thought (TP 368/377-8), in which thought fuids itself suffel-ing a breakdown ill find longer This being, itself meaningfifl. which it can no mode of which I earlier definitive suggestedwas of the trauma of reason. our philosophical double-bind, suggests another image of thought and different subjective presuppositions about what it meansto think. This other image is that of the 'ill will'

froin thought, the arises of which

is 'malefic thinker' experience of a who actually ýpowerlessto think' either naturally or Only (DR 171/130). 'WIlthout thus the thinker philosophically and presuppositions' is begin intense intellectual finds to thinking Crisis and it impossible who undergoessuch an despite many again

frustrated efforts

has achieved the Cartesian goal of

14 presupposilfionlessness, Such a thinker no longer has an image of what it means to think. IAke Artaud, definite, for but 'simply to manage to think predefined any goal, she stlives not )ý Sccalso Scidcl, 1976.pp.

.;-15-6.

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something' (DR 191/147). There is no longer anywhere to begin from for all the habitual practices of thought have broken down. Sinving, to regain the shattered perspective of the good will of thought would be a memingless act. The trauma of reason tinden-ninesthe Platonic/foundationalist image of thought itself, and with it. the unif,ving, Universal as the destitiv of thowht. The trap set for thouOmtbv external forces (the objective presuppositions of Platonism) has been sprung. But this nihifistic overcoming of Platonism contains the seedsof something,else. The problem that thought has to take up now is one thatis not given to it firom without, but one that is related only to its own destitute mode of being: how to carrv on thitiking without an image of thought? Referring to the difference between Eudoxus, the Idiot of Descartes who representsthe innate good will of thougJit, mid Dostoevsky's Idiot, Delcuze and Guattan but idiot 'tt]he that the truth, old idiot wanted new write wants to tum the absurd into the highest power of thought -

In other words, to create' (WP 61/62).

Importantly. this experience constitutes for Deleuze a different forrn of knowledge to that fetishised by Platonism. The trauma of reason arises becausethought forced deten-nination that to the is propose necessary condition of any is that the Absolute is incommensurable With rational thouuht. Philosophy is thus forced to conceive its own existence as ungrounded, that is, as dependent upon a difference that This be thought. taken cannot is a conclusion that overturns up into rational foundationalist presuppositions about the essenceof thought, for here thought is without from derives The thought thus the negative proposition pathos of any stable meaning. that the existence of thought is dependent on and constituted by the infinite internal difference of thought from itself This proposition gives rise to the dilemma between double-bind. Nihilism that the trauma constitutes as a is the rationalism and relativism difference from living thought this of with itself- the effort to think is not condifion of living but the reasserled a-, conditions constantly of continue to make renounced, " Bcrgson. 1962. p. 3,59

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demands upon thought. But no beginning with any enduring consistency can be made. Nihilism but is by lack by ised. \irvana-like IIIII i absence, a a pure, of meaning characten not ,,. a continual activity that fails to constitute anv stable distinctions that constitute meaning. In this way, nibilism partakesof the nat-ureof chaos as Deleuze and Guattarl define it, 'an infinite speedof birth and disappearance'(WP I 11/118). In using the trauma,of reason to throw a little light on the role of the paihos of thoup,bt, I waint to suggest here that the aforementioned negative proposition conceming the existence of thought would be, for Deleuze, knowledge of nihilism. It is not objective knowledge that can be shown to rest on a transcendentfoundation, but it is knowledge of the existential condition of thought, of the mode of being of thought. And not just of the for Deleuze, if foundafionalism is based on an image of thought that subjects it to mode: an impossible task (as Schelling shows), then the idea of a transcendentUniversal as the being beyond its paiticular modes has to be suspended.Hence the knowledge essenceof of the mode of being (eihos) of thought counts for Deleuze as knowledge of ffie being of thought as such. To reiterate, however, this is not objective knowledge of the essenceof thought, but knowledge of its eihos, of the style of lik of thought. Further, it is not the pure insight of a theoros into the essentialmeaning of this eihos, but is knowledge that is bound up with the affective side of nihilism, the senseof constraint, of being unable to go on, the pathos of thought. For Deleuze, it is this aesthetic dimension that, pat-adoxically. makes this knowledge absolute knowledge, i. e., practical knowledge of the real, inescapable forces that drive a heteronomous philosophical practice. Foundafionalist thought cannot deny its dependence upon a radical difference that it for. In this way. the exPerlience of nihilism contains practical cannot consistently account knowledge of the constraints of an ethos of thought and thus of the uneaning,of nihilism form is Kant's time of another instance in %vhichthis nihilism of pure and empty itself thought becomes known. In arguing that the empi6cal subject can only knoNNitself as

14See also Murphy. 1`993.pp. I 10- 1-

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determined under the form of time as the a prion, form of inner sense, Kant effectiNcl\ denies the subject knowledge of itself All it can know it that it is determinate. and in k,",

dejure determinate determitiation it Ile determined this is source of somehow. is weing

Kantian however. limits This the to testifies the unknowable, critique. of practice of which then becomes dogmatic in positing a unified transcendental subject on the 'far side' of the crack of time that prevents the empirical subject fi-om becoming present to f (DR 116-8/85-7). tsel i Deleuze's argument witli respect to the practical knowledge of a malefic thinker is that what it presents is a mlnflnal in'lage of thought. one without Orientation (sens). It has thus partially freed itself from the heteronomous problem that drives Platonism, desire the to represent in thought the best order of the polis (DR 170-1/130). It namely., has discovered another problem, one that-is immanent in its own minimal image of itself -

in fact, the problem of all problems for philosophy in DeleuzeýsView: how to create a

For Deleuze, has been thinking. this new ethos of alreadv part of the education of thought towards 'Enlightenment', or rather, disillusionment. However, it seernsto have left thought without any resources to create with. The education of thought is thus but, for do by Thought Deleuze, this it can only staging must create itself, unfinished. encounterswith other modes of being. ne Nietzschean and Bergsonian model of education that Deleuze fon-nulatesis fragmented and aesthetic. The question is how to force thought to begin anew and how that to revitabse to is, its chaotic state, continue without immediately returning thought? The key to this model is the paihos of thought, i. e., reconceiving thought, not as but that transcends iheoros all pbysical interaction, as itself irnbued with a a pure be from be This to to thought of affected capacity without. is not sensibilitv, an aesthetic f6tindationalist has be Instead. to presuppositions. it mechanistically, which would imply

found difference has thought that the ternis of within itself and yet cannot conceivedin forrn has be Thought for. to to a of violent undergo paideja in order re-educated account

128

('NP 123-4/108-9). This requires a specific kind of singular. sensory -encounter' v-ith an object, one in which we are faced with an object thm is incommensurable with the supposedly universal contexts of meaning associated with good sense and common sense. Deleuze refers to Plato's distinction in the Republic between encounters with objects that can in principle he recognised and those which cannot (DR 180-1/138). If an is it is consfituted for the subject as commensurablewith object in principle recOWUsable, good sense, common sense, and well-trained faculties of intuition. If it is not, then it belongs to that order of obiects that Plato called simulacra, and which do not belong to either the order of the Idea as transcendentUniversal, or to the order of the copies of the Idea that participate in it (DR 167-8/128, LS 295-6/256). The simulacrum is a habituated difference, does to the thresholds of the problematic which violence individual in Dcleuze learning to the swim order to clarify sensibility. example of an uses the conception of education implied by the encounter with simulacra. It is only upon

becoming by learns to the that overwhelmed a swim suddenly one really entenng water This (DR being lifted by the encounter sense of vertigo on waves -35/22-3,214/165). forces force the the sensibility of throu0i the propagated waves infinite vanations of with the swimmer to become habituated to new thresholds of actiVity. There is thus no lead Deleuzean to education, one us to the truth of which would essential method Enligbtenment. Instead it Is expenmental, based on the determination to risk unforeseen Celine's Bardamu, be An this rather model of education might exemplar of encounters. tiMle than Rousseau's or Goethe's Wilhelm Meister*

Still, I believe I gained strength listening to such ffirther, to the things, go a strange sort of strength deeper be down I'd to time able Po even strength, next listen I hadn't heard befoi-c lower, to that plaints and and

129

beyond because had had difficulty or in understanding., the plaints we bear there always seem to be others that we haven't yet heard or mdersitood-'ý

Philosophy, then, has to consist initially in forcing thought to risk encounters with other modes of being that are incommensurable with it, that is. in findinp 'mediators' for thougbt (N 168-71/123-5). In order to be sufficient to force thought to think and give itself meaning and direction, these mediators have to be either practices that are external to pbilosopby (as wben Deleuze encounters Francis Bacon and comes away with the new concept of the 'percept' and new analyses of the funcfioning of sensibility) or philosophical practices that attempt to think an ontology of Absolute Difference, as opposed to Platonic practices that think being, in terms of transcendent identifies. Nibilism forces tbouat to recognise its real dependenceon difference, and this recognition as we saw constitutes a kind of practical knowledge. The only operation

is this consistent with insight to realise philosophy as an ontology of the kind of being that is encounteredin nihilism. I'lus would be to transfonn passivephilosophical nihilism into activity. Hence thought has to seek out among philosophical practices those ethoi incommensurable Platonic to thitilk that thought. In this way, which attempt which is with pbilosopbical concepts wiU be encounteredthat act as simulacra, forcing tbougbt to tbink Absolute Difference, which appearedto be the basic presupposition and thus the internal hi-nit of Platonic tbouebt, and therefore literally imtbinkable for it. bi this way, and as I Bergson's 'Intuition", that which seemsto transcend thought to above regard noted with as unknowable (the Absolute) is not essentially unthinkable (which implies contradiction) but only unthinkable in relation to a specific heteronomous practice. If this practice is transfon-ned, then the immanence of the unconditioned (.Absolute Difference) in that be (DR 182/140). Deleuze Bergson, thus grasped can seeks out conditions which it

15

pp. 318-9.

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Spinoza, Nietzsche ei al., in order to pass through a philosophical apprenticeship in faced The thus whicb a new practice of thought Is engendered. problem of creation is head on. 11inking will thus pass fTom a state of lack (the knowledge of the absenceof foundation.) to a new and singular thought of Absolute Difference in which thinking has affin-ned its own difference from or lack of identity with itself as its own excessive being. 'Mis occurs a) through exPenmenting With mediators and b) reallsing the thought of Absolute Difference in a new fon-n. The inequality of thought with itself remains, but is lived differently,

16 In this way, thought thinks the according to a new ethos.

unconditioned transcendental condition of its activity immanently, that is, without presupposing that this unconditioned real difference is itself conditioned by a transcendentUniversal. In this way, the new ethos of thought that develops an ontolop, difference be both its of capable of explaining own emergence and that of other will Platomsm. Consequently, distinction between dogmatism practices, such as a new and its be iven Platonism that established, always presupposes own reality philosophy can and thus cannot explain it. An ontology of difference is a thinking of being as Owund,

that which is

Difference In Absolute transcendent as its unique object, ground. affirming without a thought is claiming not the transcendent,but the purely immanent, not the eternal, but that which moves with infinite speed (i. e., that which cannot be arrested in a single but is Deleuzean Hence juris, there thought). one that quid a quaestio perception or by Kantian 'What (Platonic) thought the claims right, what it selects,is versionsubverts 4-0/'37). Thought (WP the the claims the movement of infinite' infinite movement or Universal, but be determine to the the transcendent to essential meaning of right, not without essence, instead of interminablv seeking its essenceposited as a transcendent foundation of real difference. The objective (i. e., external) condition of determination is

131

no longer thought of as a fixed transcendent.but as a movement of difference acro,ýs a tTanscendentalfield of conditions, as when Platonism is linked with the training of bodies in the polis. The new direction of thought presupposesonly the I 4ýgrund of the nfinite variation of Absolute Difference as the movement from which thought begins: Deleuze concurs with Schelling, that, before any thought of being, there is the beine of thought, difference from itself (DR 183-4/141'). This claim to be able to trace the which is its itifinity movement of real difference will serve as the 'foundation' for an evaluative distinction between a 'beteronomous' (dogmatic) and an 'autonomous' (ICntical) image of thought. As Deleuze put it in an interview, 'if we're so oppressed, it's becauseour movement's being restricted, not because our eternal values are being violated' (IN 166/122). A thinking that thinks its own limit in such a way as to be able to immanently trace its real conditions has much in common with Bergsonjan intuition. In thinking, this limit, it retains a connection to its pathos, and thus refuses to renounce its aesthetic aspectin favour of the 'innocent' thought of a theoros. It thus exceedsits own habituated thresholds: in tracing the real movements of difference that give rise to phenomena,i. e., itself ically, be The ontology upon to ecstatic in analySing,phenomena onto]091 it will Hence based thought. the this are ecstatic such analvses establish will ethos within which be thinkable according to this aesthetic objective conditions of phenomena will known foundationalist if be thought, they objectively as even cannot remodelling of 17 Absolute Difference does In this thinking the as method intendsunconditioned way, fliings-In-fliemselves. knowledge Kanfian Absolute of restrictions on not infTinge Difference is not a concept of the Absolute as such, which reduces it to a transcendent incarnated form knowledge being Rather, the of as a of practical of it is always unity. To tracing. thought, an activity of mark this absolute knowledge as different from that

16On these two modes of mcquality. and the -crack' separating them. see CARI 19- " '13,x8-9 1. and cf. Ni w-ph% ff. 06 op. Cit. esp. pp 17Baugh. op. cit p, 17.

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claimed by the theoros, which is rooted in the supposedly wanscendentun,tv of the concept, Deleuze and Guattan refer to it as a djogram (.TP 176-7/141-2,). We now need to consider some aspectsof the ontology Deleuze develops in DR. in order to see bow the analysis of phenomena can proceed, and to thus flesh out the meaning of transcendental empiricism so we can understand how Deleuze secures his distinction between dogmatism and this ahos of pbilosopby. Deleuze follows Scbelling and Leibniz in seeing conscious experience as the outgrowth of problematically differentiated unconsciousforms of 'expenence' that are u-nmanentin Consciousness,and 18 developing thus a natumra-listic ontology, However, in DR this ontology is developed Bergsonjan lines as a novel account of the relation between virtual conditions of along differentiafion and actual differenciation, a philosophical practice driven by the problem of how to constitute a creative eihos of thought.

Deleuze's differential ontology is basedupon the Berusomannotion of tendency, 19

which it employs to explain real difference- A tendency of development js the past of a phenomenon which, in line with Bergson's thought, is immanent in or actively continues to insist in the present of the phenomenon.As suck the being of a tendency is Virtual (the being of m6 on) rather than actual or possible- Such a tendency is the movement of Absolute Difference, which differentiates itself as a line of development from other tendencies, and differenciates itself as the actual detenninations of a phenomenon that, history There linear, their the the thus own, on constitute of phenomenon. viewed no is temporal ground-cmisequentrelation here between virtual and actual, as if the virtual was

a transcendentSubstancethat enfolded all the possibledeterminationsof itself, positing them through a negative operation of self-limitation. 'A thing in itself and in its true before 83). (ICD tendency the the of a of a expression it effect cause' nature is is Deleuze adopts from Bergson the charactensation of tendenciesas supenor and differences Difference. depending (. Absolute they ) on Implicate whetheiin nature inferior,

133

or differences in degree (relative difference). The fonner are superior because they are themselves the sufficient reason of differences in degree. This Is because they include within themselves their own difference in nature from differences in degree, whereas the

converseis not the case.Differencesin nature externallsethemselvesin differencesin degree: duration 'relaxes' and becomes spatialised or extended. The virtual past is thus not an inert entity witbout an internal active principle, unRe a transcendentSubstance.

Tendenciesactively differentiate themselves from each other, because they differ internally from themselves, and this virtual activity is thus the sufficient reason of actual

phenomena. Nevertheless, the passage of the virtual into actuality is thus not predetermined by the content of the virtual, as there is no transcendent content to the is its differentiation. There is thus no relation that the given outside virtual of process of internal between the virtual and the actual (organisms do not, for of resemblance exwnple, resemble theff genetic codes (DR 239-40/184-5))., whick as we have seen, is not the casewith the circular explanations of determination provided by foundationalism. There is no necessary development of the content of the act"

from rwming past to

future, for the future unfolding of the virtual depends solely on the difference in nature

betweenwhat is actualand the virtual dimensionof this actual,and is thus unforeseeable. This allows us to understandthe senseIn wbich Deleuze'sontology is a transcendental flie be The that traced in actual tendencies empiricism. make up virtual can only -I.phenomena.

Nevertheless,

these

tendencies

remain

transcendental,

being

differ from in different in they themselves the actual, as nature incornniensurable with or

kind from themselves.,whereas the actual tends to externalise these differences as differences in degree. In this sense,the actual is determined by the virtual, or the determined by but by the the the transcendental, virtual is simultaneously empirical become Given do 'visible'. tendencies that through actualisation virtual actual, as only

lg On Lcibruz, sec esp. DR '175-W 134,325W253, on the gencsisof consciousexpcnenccsce also Smith, 2 1996.pp. 35-9. For fullex wcounts. seee g. Anscll-PcarsorL1999,and Boundas. 1996. 1

134

the sufficient reason of the actual is Absolute Difference, Deleuze's ontology in DR is not an ontology of knowable essences,but one of creative being. Further, if thought is tracing these tendencies through its own being, which is Absolute Difference, then it is not simply 'dmen' by the virtual past, but is itself acfiN-e differentiating those tendenciesthat are already active. Thought does not, then, belong in to the past or to eternity, but to the future, for it intervenes in the past. This is for instance, by Deleuze's ovai philosophical differentiation of thinkers in exemplified, be from takes their 'official' existence as historical figures whose value an interest whom derives from their 'participation' in the essence of philosophy, with Spinoza being perhaps the pnme example. By making connections between empirical philosophical practices without regard to the necessaryprocessesof descent that have traditionally been traced by philosopbers of history. Deleuze clianges an image of thouglit in the present by Thought has the tendencies the the ability, by thinking the internal retracing of past. difference of its own being, to ascendto a thought of difference, as expressedin the idea of a virtual tendency, that in turn allows it to 'descend' to the actual, tracing its genesis and thus accounting for its determination. By affin-ning, the substantiality of Absolute Difference, thought thus becomes an agent of change and creation in the present At the ý2" same time, this can only occur in relation to tendencies that are afready present and are 21 difference. actualised.in 'mediators, practices which are am-enableto the thinking of In this way, Deleuzean thought, like Bergsoman intuition, claims to be tracing is difference. The this tracing of neither a concept of essence product real movements of for diagram becoming but history, the of a phenomenon, which a of nor a concept of Deleuze is real in that it affinns the incommensurability that thought finds within its own being as the meaning of being itself, yet is at the same time fictive in that the interventions of thought within the actual are creative retracings of the becoming of the

Nietzschmn DR 3 11 Sce Dcleuzz's (esp. the cternal of -durn in wcoynt -20 -1 thought of the future.

41 -44),

'untimck uh-c-,,

21CF Bell, 1993,p- 379 on ffic needfor a thougM of botb future and paq for a creative'imageof thought, and -. Dclcuz-c'sremarkson his own 'history' of philosophy in N 15/0-7.

135

aettial,that makenew distinctionsvisible in what hasbeenacceptedas the history of a set of phenomen&22Tbenew image of thought that Dejeuzeseeksto realise is a thought without essence, and the actual reallsatiOn of this image we have surveyed is his ontology, a doctrine of being without essencewhich allows accounts of real phenomena to be given. Tracing the becoming of phenomena in this way is thus to explain their genesis by 'subsuming' them under a 'higber' point of view. This pomt of view is not, however, that of a theoros who possessesthe perfect concept of a transcendentUniversal

in which all real difference can be shown to be included, but that of a malefic thinker who traces the immanent movement of real difference in a diagram. The difference between these two elhoj is thus a matter of their respective fitness to think immanence, the infinite movement of difference in virtual and actuaL which is complicated by the tracings of thought. Whereas the former can only follow the pre-given and thus heteronomous orientation of a problem that forces a double movement away from and towards a transcendentfoundation, the latter, by affirming witb the aid of mediators the problem of creation, rises to diink the unilinear movement of real difference. Thanks to the fact that thouglit is capable, in moments of crisis, of discovering its difference from itself as the internal limit of its activity, it is capable of affirming the problem of how to

its de createas own jure problem, a problem that is Immanentin it as its onentation towards a (for Deleuze) genuinely self-determining diinking. Hence the Deleuzean distinction between dogmatism and philosopby can now be basis Difference. 'Philosophy' Absolute the the on of ontology of is the understood becoming the the of phenomena so as to retracing of realisation in praclice of virtual

distinguish them from eachother, not accordingto their essence,but accordingto their dominant Platonism tendency immanent in real philosophical tendency. is a overall

Fichte Schelling is (as Kant, tendencies also mixed other and with practices,which when

I On this fictive aspect, see Deleuze-s remmts on die triumph of simulacra over essences (DR 1678/128), and tmnscendental empiricism as 'a kind of science fiction' (DR 3,,,x-x), or, as Ronald Bogue (1989, p. 159) has )'t, the modelling of 'imaginary woTids' based on parado: ucaJ concepts.

136

posit a transcendental difference within the subject), which can itself be related to real non-philosopblcal practices that constitute its own tendency of becoming (the processes in which bodies are trained, the political tendencies of a society is in which phi-losophy practised, etc.). 'Modern', 'enlightened" philosophy is also a tendency, whicb Deleuze differentiates from Platonism by an active tracing of its becoming, through Lucretius, Spinoza, Bergson ei al., and whose tendency is marked by the thinking of differences in nature as absolute, i. e., as constituting the nature of being-in-itself PlatoMc philosophical practices on the other band are marked by their thinking of differences in degree as absolute: 'real' difference is thought of as being established between entities or forms I-

CLU

that realise,to a degree,the UnItyof a transcendentUniversal. Their resemblanceto this Universal, the amount of its perfection they express, is hierarchically ordered, and maximised in philosophy, whose essencesupposedly contains the Universal itself Deleuze's claims that his ontology (transcendental empiricism) enables the differences between actual practices to be traced via the transcendental movement of difference, which allows local, non-transcendent explanations of their genesis to be constructed. I'lie genesis of practices which are illusory, i. e., practices that take the reality of their own internal Absolute Difference to be unreal (e.g., Schefling's negative -1philosopby),

is a process that is thus immanent to the internal movement of being itself,

for Deleuzeargues,like Bergson,that differencesin nature(AbsoluteDifference) are the 23 identity. differences degree defined Such that are sufficient reasonof In in terInSof illusory practices produce illusions that are both ontological and transcendental, for they

in itself Nevertheless, difference being is the this thinking of are immanent paradox of that although, for Deleuze, it t1finksthe real, it only does so insofar as it is simultaneously

intervenes in in fictive that the thinking, one past order to recreatethe present.it thus a 'objective" (i. the thinks conditions of phenomena e., the active virtual or the only far it does difference) 'subjectively', in that so as in so of is, order to realise a movement

13

5,125 HardtSee n-2. pp. op. ca. also -

137

new difference, such as that between Platonism and Deleuze's modemism'. I would argue, then, that Deleuze's disfinction bet\ýeen philosophy and doi4matism seeks to overcome the trauma of Platonic or foundationalist reason Via a

perv,erwýv foundationalist move. The traumatic discovery by philosophy of thought's lack of coincidence with itself can actually enable thouOt to realise itself as a selt'determining practice on the basis of a problem that is immanent in this discovery itself. This problem is how to give meaning to a thought without essence,or more simply, how to reallse pbilosopby as a crealive actiVltv. Hence Deleuze's new image of tbought, he differential his to attempts realise in a ontology, and manifold tracings of the which becomings of phenomena, both on his own and with Guattari, are practices which, as dogmatism. difference between Tbey to the practices, are meant realise philosophy and are thus exemplars of a practical attitude, rather than representationsof a universal which between Deleuzean The difference have by texts. to access simply reading we can .philosophy -I-,

and dogrnatism is a problem of the creation of meaning, not of the

ktiowledge of essence,mid is only realised as a difference when it is practically reallsed: Lit is not enough to say, -Loný, live the multiple", difficult as it is to raise that crv [ ] The ... displaced Deleuze's be I I' (TP 13/6). Foundationalism thus is in made ... multiple must fact Ungrund, is foundation by that true a a selfpositing, as ground a practice differentiating difference. The making of the difference between philosophy and dogmatism requires a practical construction of the meaning of this distinction, wbich can but difference, be longer one which is no viewed as an eternally secure. essential continualiv subject to practical vanation. To sum up: Deleuze seesnihillsm as the outcome of a partictilar tendency within thinking, which manifests itself in Platonic philosophical practices that are not equal to Schelling difference that, the showed, is their own as probleinafic the task of thinking difference, Nbsolute In 'tarne' that the to assume sucli practices is order condition. But the traurna the thought. of reason, expenence of as nihifism. in commensurable with

138

where this assumption is overturned, leads for Deleuze to a potentially positive outcome. When thought finds itself confronted with its A itself, it faces the (for " own dissonanceVIII Deleuze) undeniable fact that this difference is the minimal presupposition of any practice of thinking. To supposethat the essentialtask Of thought is to understandin what disinterested knowledge consists is to ignore this fact. The problem that confronts thought in the experience of nibilism is, for Deleuze, an autonomous and immanent one, as opposed to the heteronomous tasks accepted by Platonism. This is because it is immanent to the experience of difference that constitutes the basis of nihilism. Nihilistic thought has to try to create itself anew according to a stable practice of thinking, which be irreducible difference that the can only one cbaracter of recognises and attempts to construct a philosophical practice that can trace the movement of real difference within empirical phenomena. Such a practice would be absolutely immanent to being, ratbeithan positing be'Ing under a transcendentform of identity and as relatively immanent in is by his Hegel, As taken often critics empirical phenomena. we shall now see, who (including Deleuze) to be a foundationalist, a Platonic fliinker of relative immanence, in terms of absolute immanence, of a thinking that also conceives of genuine philosophy avoids positing transcendence.

139

Chapter Five Hegel's Critique of Representational Consciousness

i) Introductkm Deleuze, as we have seen,attempts to overcome foundafionalism and its doublebinds by renouncing, like Bergson, and like Scbelling in his more anfifoundationalist, 'Deleuzean' moments (see previous chapter), the Kantian paradigm of transcendental in favour determination. the conditioningof an ontological account of real geneSisof This was in one sensea response to the recurrent difficulties that critical thinking has faced in the post-Gen-nanIdealist pefiod right up to the present, causedby its failure to take the nibilism of the trauma of reason seriously enough. Taking Marx as an example, bow difficult we saw

foundationalist 'image' of what philosophy. it was, given a ceTtain

4science'or critical tbinking essentially is, to avoid simply presupposing absolute or a pri .ori knowledge of the real, wben any n Ot to such knowledge was precisely wbat was Deleuze by at issue. responds viewing this image of philosophy ('Platonism') as an illusion inherent in the existential conditions of thought, which can be overcome by changing our model of philosophy as a practice of thinking. The task for Deleuzean thoup-btis to avoid all presuppositions about the nature Universal, knowledge desfinv transcendent thoup-ht that the of a and of impIv which is Instead be their the the to of this real as ground. articulations of supposed immanent in a-, in 'relative the the phjlosophcr is required the r posited immanence" of unconditioned to force thougbt to become equal to the absolute immanence of real difference itself, bv for difference Deleuze, that, terms the of ungrounded movement of recasfing ontology in determination, by tbe of all and using this ontology as a means of sufficient reason is bv This 'descent' the tracinR the of empincal phenomena. requirement is grounded' negative, stiýjective experience of I foundationalist

the difference of

thought from

itself that

thought undergoes when approaching its limits. The rc,ýulfini-,,decav of

140

the meaning of foundationalist philosophy presses home the task of using this vendirection) tbougbt. (meaning,! basis into expenience as the of a re-injection of sens Pbilosophy becomes a matter of affirming throuO practical acti. 1ty the immanence of the incommensurable 'hiOer'

Absolute in experience. with this redefinition of

in but being Universal, timeless a singular expenence of philosophy grounded, not in a knowledge' loss kind 'absolute that possible. cnsis, a of essence, of nevertbelessmakes a now want to argue that, if we go back to the beginning of tbc bistorical period find foundationalist has been the crisis, can conception of philosophy in we in which foundational to another example of an attempt reabsean anti ist version of critical thought that remains committed to the idea that thia-ing the Absolute is necessaryfor any sucb Schelfing This by Hegel. the time at same as endeavour. attempt was made was ftom Chapter foundationallsm I Hegel in Within. omitted any mention of undermining Two so as to be able to trace cleariv this intemal dvnamic of foundationalism which I have used to elucidate Deletize's thought. In the course of this and the next two chapters I features in has Hegel's to that common with many strategic approach crifique will show Deleuze's, before examining the differences between their respective critiques of

foundationallsmin the concludingcliapter, in order to assesstheir respectivesuccessin overcoming the trauma of reason. Central to this re-examination of Hegel is the clwm that Hegel's Kantian

logic, to the as againstthe specialintuitions of importanceepistemological commitment Kant by Scbelling Fichte, of to also critical in a way and others, is nevertheless appealed by Schelling, Bergson turn the that is consonant with camed out variously ontological 1 Hegel distinguish between This Deleuze. the that of reading claim requires we and fail his influential here to take the that interpretations of work pre,, lous and purstied I The for by Rose Hegel 11 98011, Kant ( affirmed such as recent is interpreters of importance floulgate (1986,1991),

ki2ek (19933), Maker (1995), Pinkard (1995) and Dusing Pippin (1989),

(1995,1977)ý

141

did. himself Hegel I incoherence foundationalism think problem of the as senously as of In addition, we must take into account the enticisms of Hegel advanced by both Schelling and Deleuze and respond to them, In order to delineate Hegel's unique reply to foundational ism. Hegel's Absolute Knowing is not, I shall maintain, mere knowledge of the forms under which thought must necessarily think being. This would be to agree with the later Sebelling's assessmentof flegel, and to reduce Begelian logic to the status of being deduces determinations the negative philosophy, which of possible real without it knowledge 41_2 Nor that they to are alsoable show actu. Is

of a transcendent

metaphysical substance, which, like the Absolute as Schelling conceives it in the -Pbiloscohy of Identity, grounds all real difference as internally related to it through the its is necessaryprocess of self-limitation, and which somehow given to thought as a 3 foundation Hcgel avoids these alternatives becausehe sees Absolute Knowing positive as knowledge of the structure of Being that does not posit Being as only determinate Ibr Kantian determinate (as a phenomenon), or as a metaphysically us substance,a thing-initself of some kind. Our first task is to show how such a non-foundational, ontological reading of Hegelian Absolute Knowledge can beemeaningful. nis

Will require that we

is in foundationallst his the theory. conducted examine extended critique of which Phenomenologv.

.6

The Idea Phenomenolo& of a ii) For Hegel, Absolute Knowledge, the standpoint of genuine philosophy, is first has be begins logic. This in to that standpoint system embodied a philosophical with habitual This however. the entails a process of educatior4 aimed at overcoming attainecL

is definitive its the that consciousness of world view of assuranceof representational 2 For a seminalversion of this negative reading, seeHartmann, 1976,esp. p- 106. This is the Hegel of the British Idealists (see Russe-fl'scomments(1995, pp. 701-1-5)),but is also Hegel's Absolute 1975) ( Taylor's of reading as a real, substantiallZrOund. reminiscentof

142

experience. Hegel tbus affirins that a critique of presuppositions is a necessan, part of attaining a genuinely pbIloso-pbleal viewpoint. He also anficipates Deleuze by arguing that this critique will entail overturning, not certain accidental errors or partiCular unquestioned babits, but a whole 'imnc'

be to think, thought, and of what it means of

affirms that this image infects both 'natural' consciousnessand philosophy. Further. this image is akind of transcendentalillusion: as with Deletize's account of Platonism, Hegel for domatism Cabstract' or finite thinking that takes itself to be absolute) account will ontologically as an illusory aspect of being itself, as we will see in the following chapters.I'lie education of representationalconsciousnessthat takes us to this standpoint is undertakenIll the

p&4

Hegel begins the Introduction to the PS by meditating on the requirement that for thought, the discovery of trutb, should be Critical of itself critical as an instrument above all. This already assumesa difference between thought and what it knows. It is this consciousness of

distinction

between subject and

object

that

characterises

It representationalconsciousness. was the conditions of possibility of this consciousness form as a of real knowledge that Kant, Fichte and Schelling were concernedwith, as we saw. Witb this in n-tind, Ficbte and ScheUMP-responded to Kant's formal deduction of these conditions by affin-ning the need for a decisive break ývith the standpoint of it. in Without the unconditioned as the to ground representational consciousness order Kant's predicament, in whicb the remain in ultimate condition of possibility, we wotAd forms However, this move proved the of our experience was unknowable. necessity of form it determined because the as the was problematic unconditioned, in wbatever be presupposedas this necessan, ground in necessaryground of experience, could only forms known familiar than to of experience, rather unconditionally as such. relatioin our 4 The role of the PS in relation to the Systernhas, histoncEdly,been an object of controversy see P6ggeler, 1993, pp. 174-85. Even Hegel's own view altered somewhat (ibid. p. 224) However,

for a statementthat remainedunalteredeven in the final version of the SL, seeSL 1,421-3/48-9ý

14"

This inevitable circularity became in Deleuze's thought charactenstic of a -N-holc recumng practice of tbought, in wbicb the Absolute Is posited as resembling the content of familiar beliefs about experience. For Deleuze, the issue regarding the Absolute is how to th, tik it as a Schelfingian 'bigher' Absolute, that Is, as incommensurablewitb that wbich it conditions, as genuinely neither subject nor object, etc., and yet how this thought can be a kind of 'knowing' that is creative rather than contemplative or reflective, where both these latter images of thought imply a transcendent Ufflversal that thought strives to know but can only illusory presupposeas an ground. For Hegel too, tb-evl standpoint of philosovily requires a refusal of

the distinctions

consciousness. This will

and oppositions

that characterise representational

enable us to comprehend the Absolute as a 'neither-nor'

structure (Spirit), not because thoug-lit has discovered a transcendent, substantial Universal that grounds the possibility and necessity of real difference, but because genuinely philosophical thougbt knows itself to be being that is insofar as it immanenfly

deteri-ninesitself (PS 25/14 §25). As we shall see in the next chapter,the relation of structures of otbemess to this immanent process of self-detennination will be crucial for this study. Unlike Fichte and Schelling, Hegel sees the turn against representational consciousnessasjustified, not by an appeal to a special intuition in which the Absolute is known immediately, but by the structure of representational consciousnessitself This structure is self-contradictory, for it is characteristic of all detenninations of (EL both they that are immediate and mediated consciousness

PS 57-8/41, §67, SL

66/68). For example, if an object is known, then this k-nowledge has to include both between The these two aspectsis necessarib.,circular, as the relation proof and certainty. Fichtean and Schellingian systems demonstrate. In these systems, the intuitive certainty Absolute the the qua condition of experience requires proof if this nature of as to Absolute is to tv olýjectivelv known as the ground of the necessityOf OUTexpenence. Yet

144

the method of proof turns out to be an infimte deduction, and possessesno foundafion except the initial certainty. In this way, the mediafion of the intuitive certainty by proof and the immediacy of the certainty that justifies the method of proof are both needed as foundations of knowledge. But if both are essentialand foundational. then neither can be, for tbey are eacb posited as the foundation of one another, as the means througb wbicb the other is known. This circularity, which gives rise to the traurna of reason in which foundationalism finds itself unable to continue, is, for Hegel, based on the conviction that the structure of representational consciousnesswhich cbaracterisesall our familial, conscious expeiience, and which

be could said i to constitute the 'famil' iahity' of

this expenence itself, i. e., the fijndamental ftarnework in wbich expeneince makes sense

for us, must be relied upon as the basis of philosophy's image of itself It can be argued that Hegel was even in his earliest Writings interested in the possible untenability of foundational]sm, given its dependenceon habitual, unquestioned structures of expenence. From bis FrankfuTt penod (1797-1799) on, be was, along WItb his fiiend Schelling, concemed with the legitimacy of Kant's distinction between Vernunji and Vervand., and the possibility of oklective knowledge of the unconditional. In this period, Hegel and Schelling were influenced by their colleague H61derfin's Hegel deten-nined Fichte's definition Absolute the the also of absolute suý:Ject. critique of

it Being (Sein), a systematic role as the unconditional and gave as immediate 5 Chapter As Two, knowledge. this saw III and analyfic we of synthetic presupposition leads to the view that all detertninate knowledge, even the Fichtean subject's supposedly depend itself determinately subjective, must upon a selfas immediate recognition of first di'vision identity Absolute the that makes act of and an absolute abbiding deten-ninable. As Klaus DfiSing shows, the central problem for Hegel throughout this fliit in before PS hlch Jena lie to time the one is a similar spent writing %-., period and how defined demonstrate Scbelling: Absolute, Fichte to that the as the and plagued 5 Dusing, 1976, pp. 43-4,49- 50, Fujita, 1985, pp. 79-8 1.

145

unconditional condition of all knowledge. can be known immediately or in itselfbeyond this relation to determinate forms of knowledge. as a genuinely immediate unity that is also the real foundation or ground of experience.6 In the Frankfurt ftagment 'Glauben i und Sein', for example. faith is assigned the role of kno wing the Absolute. But th'is repeats in another form the Fichtean and Schellingian aporia: one must presupposethat the Absolute is known immediately (but subjectively) as the unconditional foundation in order to begin, but by doing this, one indefinitely postpones the final, objective for the immediacy of the beginning simply reinforces the justification of this beginning, 4 difference between mediated, conditioned fon-nsof proof and unconditioned immediacy. This problem of the circular interdependence of immediacy and mediation is thus of primary concern to Hegel, as a basic, inescapable difficulty

for the

foundationalist philosophies of his time, 7 To understand how the PS addresses this problem Ma way that owes much to Kant's influence, we must bepin with the early Jena period (1801-4), wben liege] becomes explicitly interested in this problem, and wben bis critique of his contemporaries, and particularly of Fichte and Schelling, begins to develop as a Kantian reflection on the i-ole of logic in relation to a system of knowledge, ' being bound foundationalist KantiaMsm. wMst also aspectsof up with a entique of the Hegel later cbaracterised.Kantianism as being 'overawed by the object', which resulted in it being 'left with the residue of a thing-in-itself, an infinite obstacle, as a beyond' (SL 1,45/51). Hegel alludes here to certain presuppositions about experience,

is left by Kant think, the to the and post-Kantians. meaning of what unquestioned about ý1ý

The central asswnption bere is that of the ultimacy of representationalconsciousness,or

6

DUsing, 1976, pp. 51-), 81-3,14-37-5,also 1969, p. 118-9.

7 Hegel's awarenessof this problem thus led him away ftom HoldeTfimseeMenTich,1971a-,p- 11, p. 29., pp. 35-6. On begins 109ff. Schellingy here, liegelýs DiIsing, I Q76.pp. 211 the that e\idence critique of see ). --3 Fujita, op. cit., pp. 149-50,156-60.

146

in other words, that this structure is representative of the meaning of thought as such. This leads to the assumpfion that thought is essentially finite, defined in opposition to an object of which it is neverthelesssupposedto have knowledge. Out of this contradiction J anses the question of the unity of representationand reality. and an image of pbIlosopby as the search for an immediately certain foundation of this unity is therefore necessary. But bow, Hegel asks, can this vocation of philosophy itself, based on a structure of experience which is simply accepted as givem be justified? For Hegel, this selfunderstanding of pbilosopby is well representedby its image of itself as an ultimately impartial, critical judge of the legifimacv of representations of the real, which was by the Enlightenment's critique of traditional authority. In 1802, he consolidated describes contemporary philosophy as 'nothing but the culture of reflection raised to a system' (FK 322/64). In the Enlightenment, the emphasis on the empincal, intended to combat the excessesof rationalism as well as those of superstition, means that wben thougbt inevitably turns to self-reflexively critique its own representations,tbe criteria for this critique are derived from familiar empirical experience (IFK 318-9/60). Kant and Ficbte reacted to this movement by redefining, the task of philosopby on the basis of altered conceptions of the nature of thinking. For Hegel, however, each in his own way defines thought as deterinined by the empirical. Their respective philosophies base themselveson notions of a self-Idenfical.and universal concept that, by fonnally rigbt,

but incal instances, subsumes all empi wbicb is still opposed to finite

empirical content to which it, in terms of its content, can only be approximate. There is always a contingency or difference which these stndpoint-s cannot in principle account for (Kant's reliance on presuppositions about the real content of experience or Fichte's Gcffihý. Reason thus acquires what it takes to be its essential task by accepting its difference from the empirical as given, thus subjecting itself to an infinite labour (FK 320-2/62-3') that can never be complete. For Hegel, this purely conceptual infinite 'is itself not the truth since III

unable to consume and consummate finitude [die

147

Endlichkeii aqf-4uzehrenl'(FK 324ý"66).The distinction between infinite and finite reason here, or between pure and empirical reason is weighted in favour of the finite or empincal. The infinite concept is infinite because it is not finite. and is therefore conditioned by the finite, rather than being genuinely infinite or unconditioned. Consequently we can see that, for Hegel, if we attempt to reflexively detennine the conditions of possibility for expenence, the result Will necessarily reflect our assumptionsabout experience. Primary among,these assumptionsis that of the difference between subject and object that defines repi-esentationai consciousness. It is this assumption that, as noted above, creates an epistemological problem that seems to require a foundationallst solution. In this way, the foundation will inevitabiy reflect in its form the identitv of subject and object, and in its content, modes of objectivity and subjectivity that we are familiar with from experience. Like Deleuze, tben, Hegel discovers that the positing of a relation of resemblance between a transcendent or foundationalist is For thougbt. the of conditioned cbaracteristic abbstractcondition and formal Kant's the identity of subject and obiect example, unity of apperception reflects but fori-nal knowing, the the thus possibility of establishes in my consciousness,and determinations of this unity are simply read off other accounts of experience that are Schelling, Fichte Absolute And the is posited as the and as Vven. accepted with but between foundation distinctions subiect and object, of all unconditional unity and forms (the it deriving totality the to of of our experience,) that Will content when comes foundation the of all experience, this process is unending,,with objective establish it as it identity distinction between the the pure and real is meant to that the result relation in flunkers Both becomes terms then this of a concelve of relafion problematic. ground leaving difference, that their they the project, content undennines which primordial familiar Absolute for the as a merely subjectively valid reflection of our construct 'first Schelling"s of a creation'. construction experience, as in

149

For Hegel, then, foundationalism, in remaining tied to the structure of representational consciousness,must always presupposesomething about the constitution of experience, an unquestionednominal definition of experience that

be reflected in

the foundation that it deduces. If this is the case, thinks liege]. then the only alternative for thought is, instead of beginning with a relation to something simply 0ven to it, to . take up an active relation to jiself, wbieb nevertbelessallows it to provide real definitions (EL §24 Zus. 2). All justifications of objective knowledge m relation to experience can be oniv valid relative to that content and therefore Hegel's radicai conclusion is that the foundationalist it thought, the that model of whole and assumptions underlie (the given difference between subject and object), must be done away with, for so long as foundationali sm remains a blueprint for philosophy, ffiought will be unable to deterimne itself, that is, to stand in a truly infinite and autonomous relation to itself As noted is for for Deleuze image Hegel of thought that we must reject, rather previously, as it an than ceTtain configurations of this image. This image is that of foundationallsm, the Lphilosophical' transposition of representational consciousness into a supposediv transcendent realm (cf DR 173-4/132-3). Hence Hegel's first task, as set in the early Jena writings, is to overcome the temptation to construct an image of philosophy out of be describes PS Later, the accomplishment of this in about experience. presupposifions task as the 'way of despair' (PS 69/49 §78) for representational consciousness. In if, finite 'feels together with the mode of the as consciousness genuine philosophy, is has been horne, it the pulled very ground where stands solidly and at representation, from undeT it' (E L §31).

If this overcoming is to be genuine, then Hegel's properly philosophical If itself thought. the of object any presuppositions about rely upon perspective must not failed have be Hegel to transcend the to turned present out would such presuppositions

by to tied of a consciousness, remaining a conception representational of standpoint determinate object that is somehow givel, to thought a,ý determinate. This would mean

149

that Hegel makes the same mistake as the early Schelling. by presupposing that the object of tbought is an absolute unity of subject and object that is given to us as inherently rafional, and thus that negative philosophy alone is sufficient to know the Absolute. Despite the fact that the later Scbelling cnlhcises Hegel for just this error (L\IP

",14*.

6/147-9), Hegel is aware of the dariger of positing the Absolute under a conditioned forin 9 fiLshion, both denunClation ]atter Jena EL (bis in this of III the early and m writings,

formalism in §12). His attempt at a solution to this problem centres on the thought that the attainment of a truly pbilosophical perspective must be dependent upon concrete forms of experience that constitute the living present of thought, and yet at the same time, this very dependence can be the means of overcoming representafional consciousnessper se, tbus providing a total critique of representational consciousness that does not fall into a foundationallst aporia by presupposing that it is based on a foundation that is somehow immediately known as such. In DFS (1801),, which may have had a decisive influence on Schelfing's development of the Menfildi.vsystem,10 the difference between the actual, present Condition of philosophy and its eternal truth in absolute knowing is presented as the difference between a finite, reflexive Verstand, and an infinite, speculative Vernuqfi. Here, ]Hegel affinns that the genuinely pbilosophical standpoint requires a radical 'In order to reach the essence of consciousness: overcoming of representational into it it is to throw a corps perdu oneself necessary philosophy

meaning by "bod.v"

bere, the surn of one's idiosyncrasies' (DFS 111188).-nie question of the possibility of Jena Schelling finite the then answerswith the arises, reflection which such a rejection of is For Jena Hegel, intellectual the intuition. it already the case that notion of an absolute the solution must involve a meditation on method, and the question of immediacy and 9 See DUsing, 1976, pp. i,;. -3 on Hegel's cntique of Fichte- s one-sided Absolute, and p. 1-33 1 on -14

how this reflects Jacobi's Fichlekrilik. "' Dtisirig, 1976, p 139 and 1968, esp. pp. 95-6, pý 114, pp 119-20

150

mediation, which distances him fTom Fichte and Schelling and their idea of an intellectual intuition in which the Absolute is kno,.Nrnin-itself, although be still employs

the notion of a 'transcendental'intuition in a systematicrole in the 1801,ý02)lectureson lo 91 ic and metaphysics in order to make the leap into philosophy a corps perdu. a move he would later rej ect,11 In the pre-Jena period, Hegel had determined the relation between immediacy and mediation as a relation between an ultimately presupposed unity O'Nein)and 'antinomies' produced by reflection, 12 In the Jena penodý Hegel, in a similar way to Fichte, interprets the dichotomy tEnt-n-vejung] that 'is the source of the need for philosophy' (DFS 12/89) as an apparently irreconcilable antinomical relation between different definitions of the Absolute that is definitive for flic present culture of reflection its and plillosopby. The Absolute, the in-itself of being, appears in this milieu as either the diversity posited by the Understanding, or the unity desired by Reason. In relation to the wider intellectual culture, the history of philosophy is seen here as a series of dichotornous definitions of the real that anse through to attempts reconcile various

reflection on familiar experience(Spint'Extension,Subject/Objectetc.). Theseattempts 'have not resulted in a final and absolute reconciliation (for then there would be no history

instead identities but have that posit a a plethora of relative of philosophy), produced Reason between Absolute continually identifies itself Witb and conditioned. resemblance the conditioned term that represents unity within the dichotomy (e.g., Spirit, Subject), from its it 13/91), (DFS abstracting it relation to the otber terin. and posits as absolute Tbe Enligbtenment culture of reflection presents a special opportunity to overcome this tendency, howeveT, even as it confinues it, for its own intemal dichotomy, which is

'' Cf DUsing, 1976, p. j 40-3 on Hegel and Scheiling's use of intuition in the Jenaperiod. 12See.jbid, pp. 60-1, on Hegel's non-Kantian interpretation of 'antinomy'. from the Frankfurt Hegel uses this term to refer to the relation of contradictory predicates to a period onward, betv, jud. lhing-jn-ýself the to than een contTadictor-y relation s and a rather subject, -gernem

151

between for by Fichte's Jena Hegel the exemplified the thought, concerns veiA relation difference and identity. According to Hegel, irreconcilable dichotomies anse for reflection becauseit is its is than of representational consciousnessas such that contradictory. rather just some definitions of expeiience. The very fact that to represent something is to be aware of a difference between relative identities (e.g., subject and object), means that representation finds that it is dependent on contradictory presuppositions, in the folio Will ig way. On the ,

band, one consciousnessof the relative difference that defines representationpresupposes the absolute unity of the differentiated tenns (e.g., subject and object) (DFS 15/93), for only then could they be known as different. On the other hand, the 'el-nergence [Herausgetrelensein] of consciousness from the totality,' (DFS 15/93), and thus the difference lack between the subject and what it is conscious qJ absolute or of relation is forced both be Representational thus to assumed. consciousness posit must presuppositions as essentialto it. When it becomes explicitly foundationallst, and reflects foundational for it, it forced to affirm the or on which assumption is more essential is

it determinateness Subject, (as to a pTesupposed unity, wbicb TepTesents itself as given Knowledge, etc.). Without this recogmition and this representatton,it would be unable to 13 posit an essential relation at all, But this means that the absolute unity of the differentiated tenns is representedas a relative identity, one whose positive content is a implies deterininateness, therefore conditioning relations With other and given which deterrninatenesses.This representation, assumed as given, is thus conditioned by determinate relations that are derived from our familiar experience. A conditioned been has therefore posited as corresponding to the content of the unconditioned content background lies, the of representational consciousness. unexpressed, in or absolute that T'his positing of a relative content for the Absolute means that a resemblance has been 13As we'will see in the next nko chapters, this foundationalist requirement of determinatenessin is by in Heg SL's foundational Doctrine of Essence. critici sed relation II the essentialor zel _

1-;-)

posited between the Absolute and the relative

T111s.for Hegel. is necessanly

contradictory. The absolute difference wbich has to be presupposed is supposedly negated in a relative identity, which has its source in one pole of the difference. This is. however, just testifies to the unjustifiable foundationalist assumption (present in 'Fichte's philosophy, as we saw in Chapter Two) that the relation and lack of relation between two terms can both be grounded in one of theseconditioned terms. We have discovered here Hegel's account of a 'double movernent'. comparable Deleuze that suggestsis charactenstic of Platonism. Hegel, however, posits with which this tendency as an iflusion constituted by the movement of reflection, rather than as the product of a non-conscious ontological tendency. Hegel concurs With Deleuze, thougii, in

seeingfoundationallstphilosopby, understoodas the tendencyof reflection to posit the absolute in relation to the relative, as presupposing a subjective orientation that it cannot justify (DFS 16/94), an interest of reason (in Kant's sense)in unity. which arises out of forins of non-pbilosopbical experience in wbicb diebotomies that appear irreconcilable to foundationalist reflection are continually encountered.The trauma of reason representsa internal is bare, being dichotomy dynamic laid this philosophical in which Without focus For Hegel, long the as of philosophy falls elsewhere than entirely understood. so lack this the of of understanding will reflection, on inherently contradictory nature '111hilosophy be driven beyond dichotomies thus continue, and will Will persist in arising.

dichotomy: later Schelling's 'solution' the to to the problem an of again itself again and implicit or explicit act of faith In which the reconcilability of the dichotomies of Absolute, the the of rationality is affirined Without or inherent representationwith reason, being proven. For Hegel, the difficulty

for philosophy is ulfimately that of articulating a

difference bemeen belween that the them sucb contradiction and can tmity relation Ilie Absolute be to element oi'the essential itself major obstacle as an grasped actually the success of any such atilculation is the stubborn ngidity

I Z,-1

of representational

consciousness. For representational or 'natural' consciousness. the subject of a Proposition is ruled by the principle of non-contradiction: if opposing predicates are posited in the swne subject (e.g., the Absolute, x, is both absolute ident'ity and absolme difference), then the result is a disjunction. X can be either, but not both. Ho-*N: e,,er. as we saw in Chapter 2 in relation to Schelling's acceptanceof 1161derfinand Jacobi's critiques of transcendental idealism, for objective Imowledge of disjunction to be possible, one must presupposean Absolute that does not obey this law of disjunction. Hegel's attempt to provide a critique of consciousness must sbow bolx one can articulate sucb an Absolute in consciousness,without simply dogmatically presupposing that the essenceof the Absolute in-itself is knowable, and without imposing the burden of pToVing the validity of this account of the Absolute as an infinite Sollen upon consciousness. So the Hegelian Absolute must be understood as inclusive of absolute contradiction, as both 'Subject' and 'Substance' (PS 20/10 § 17), and therefore cannot be articulated in opposition to the finite, for then it becomes the source of a Sollen, a merely Lconceptual' infinite conditioned by the fitilte. Further, an account of the Absolute, for liege], cannot be based on something like a Schellingian ecstasy of reason in which representational consciousness is annihilated in favour of pure immediacy,

14 for

this

option, by pointing to the 'outside' of reason, reinstates a disjunction between infinite (immediate) and finite (mediated or conditioned). Instead, critique must focus oil the fixity of representational consciousness,the way it, as a babitual mode of tbinking, between thus the to the to of non-contradiction, and opposition principle remains wedded Hegel difference. will not rigidly oppose the immediacy of an intuition to and identity the mediatednessof thoughtý but will instead demand of philosophy that it render finite

14Cf, letter to Hegel, 04.,"02.ý)7795,in Fuhrmans, 1973, p. 65 'f.. I we should break- down these

). This barriers, i. e. we should leave behind the finite sphere for the infinite (practical philosophý,, finitude [Zerxii. destruction demands the of and vvill take us therebv to the supeTsensible )ning] also

world'.

1 4 -5

thinking itself fluid, 15 i. e., capable of comprehending Its own contradictory structure, which would mean that, in transcending the sphere of representational consciousness from within, thought has discovered its own genuinely infinite aspect. In the later Jena period (1805/06), Hegel moves decisively away from the Schellingian theme of intellectual intuition and towards a theory of what might (despite the Ficbtean connotations) be called absolute suklectivity, and thus away ftom the division lie had hitherto made between a preparatory, critical Logik in which finite is reflection undermined by showing bow its determinations are inherently contradictorv. and a subsequent, positive organon or Metapkvsik in which the Absolute is kiiown througb its reflections in consciousness. This division is dissolved in a Logik that considers absolute knowledge, not as intuifion, but purely as cognition, Erkennen. It is this move that sets the scene for the development of the model of absolute knowledge 16

presentedin the PS.

How could an idea of self-grounding, absolute cognition, however, be anything determination determinations being, than a negative of merely posSible of other which

forms be being these to true of in itselP As previously noted, narcissistically assumes this was the charge brought by the later Scbelling against Hegel: the notion of a pure thinking of antinomies as identical With absolute knowledge seems simply to have ignored Kant's distinction between intuition and the understanding, and Schelling's own disfinction between the purely rational Absolute and the problematic, 'higher' Absolute. liege] thus appears to be a kind of dogmatic Fichtean who assumesthat being-In-Itself has the same 'contradictory'

17 structure as thought, By turning now to directly examme

the PS, we will discover how liege] at least anticipates such olýjections.

I; Cf Fujita, 1985, pp. 156-8. 16SeeMsing, 1976, pp. 156-7, p. 198. 17It is such a 'dotginatic' reading that IfI n orms Wiffianis' (1989, p. 43) and Marc-use's (19,97, p. 10.

between Hep-el's Hegel the Marman of 38) account Telation of subject and object is assessments p.

1Z,ý

For Hegel, it is foundationalism that Is narcissistic or. in his teii s, fon-nalistic, for it is nothing but the reflexive. methodological expression of the 'natural'. or rather, familiar and accepted, perspecfive of representational consciousness. and thus it presupposes the ultimac,,,, of the divisions that cbaractense this consciousness. Fowidationalism

understood as an expression of representational. and therefore

contradictory, consciousness,will itself tberefo-rebe a contradictory position (PS 656/46-7 §73). Hegel's response seems Cartesian: he asserts that absolute knowledge or , --I-

pnilosopby is absolute (and non-fo-rmalistic) because it is presuppositionless (SL 357/43-5), i. e., it does not begin from a positive, determinate definition of the meaning of 18 experience, The presuppositions of foundationalism concern the modes of experience

that representationalconsciousnessis familiar With, and are extracted from accepted accounts of the inner structure of these modes such as natural science. Foundationalism then attempts to show how such accounts are themselves possible as universally fonns of experience. Giving an account of the genesisof thesepresuppositions necessary (which as we saw in Chapter 3, is central to post-Hegelian thought.) that foundationalism for finally becomes But is done, then this then a cannot account necessary. if Schellinglan objection suggestsitself any attempt to objectively explain the genesis of known. Before that their are already presupposes conditions somebow presuppositions

the enquirybegins,a foundational,transcendentsubjectivity(Deleuze's'common sense') been being has thought presupposed. are unified already and in which In relation to this problem, Schelling made the important point that, if foundational i sin is to be self-consistent, then the diversity of presuppositions about fundamentally based be on a non-discursive, non-representational experience must all

(and non-articulable) form of experience-a

foundationalistproposition that places

he dialectical because the that 'absolute in-itself possesses a objectassumes structure. idealist' an As we shall see,this is inaccurate. 18Cf Butler, 1996, p 1, and Maker, 1995, Ch I eip pp- 59-60

I ; (,

foundationalism itself in jeopardy. However, for Hegel this appeal to an ineffable immediacy only repeats the reflexive principle that the mediated must rely on the immediate, and therefore ignores the fact that the converse is also true. Schelling does not consider bow the act of abstracting the Absolute from the finite as its unconditioned. which is a form of reflexive mediafion, inevitably implies the quesfion of how the 19 Absolute itself be This difficulty possibility of an actual inlififion of this can proven. necessarily resurfaces later in the systematic problem of the Sollen, which implies the subjection of the finite to the 'bad infinite' of an abstract concept in the effort to pi-ove the objective validity of the intuition from which the system begins. This imperative places the finite under the domination of the tbougbt of Absolute Identity as real ground, 20 deten-ninateness finite the against which the of cannot endure.

If we aTeto bave any bope of fon-nulatinga successfulresponseto the pToblem of overcoming the circle of presuppositions without positing the existence of a special intuition, we must Tecognise, liege] argues, that Absolute Knowing cannot begin otherwise than with both immediacy mid mediation: its beginning must be both pTesuppositionless and bistorically conditioned. This bistoncal conditioning bas its for it Kant's thought proximate philosophical expression in is the modes of experience intellectual bistorical enIvITonmentin Kant's that the pbilosopby provide reflected in is Hegel's Knowing Knowing Absolute Absolute that assertion can exist. will which flwefore include or comprebend the dicbotomies of Kant's tbougbt. The first intimations dichotomy diversity Preface, PS the this the a outlines of wider are in which of process in

19Diising, 1976, p. 21, p. 142-11977, p, 120, p, 122, p. 127. 20Hegel's cl-ItIcIses theSollen becau-seit implies an infmite division of concept and reality (EL §55,

§60), and through this division, creates an ethical relation in which the concept of the absolute Terror 416/174, PS (FK 413-22/355-63 the revolutionary as in the world, natural clorninates. §Z §"582-95).

Cf Rose op. cil., pp 100-1, pp 171-4)

157

and unity: the cuffent historical situation of philosophical thought is opposed to anticipations of the new Absolute. is true that these anficipations can easily be misunderstood as unjusfifiable abstractions about the nature of the absolute, that are somehow rneant as foundations that will justify Hegelian Science from the outset. However, they appear in the midst of a discussion of wbat Hegel bad eaTher in Jena called the 'culture of reflection". Hegel

discussescontemporary views on the relation between the subject of knowledge and the Absolute that sbow Kantian, Ficbtean and Schellingian influences. These are abstract reflections on familiar forms of experience (science-,Chrisfian morality, pietist faith), and have themselves become familiar tendencies within the wider intellectual culture. That

is merely familiar (lbekanni), however, is through its very familiarity which

or

immediacy, not mediated or genuinely known (erkanni) (PS 31/18 §31). This Hegelian disfitiction is not a difference between something, mifially accepted on the word of another, subsequently doubted, only to return as a ceriainty grounded in one's own reason (PS 69/50 §78_).Such a Cartesian model of doxa versus knowledge is itself a foundationalism, wbicli begins from accepied definitions of wbat is to be doubted. As previously noted, Hegel agrees With Deleuze that it is the horizon of 'familiarity'

as

inberent the tendency of reflexive thougbt to rely upon the structure of such,

representationalconsciousness in defining the relation of thoughtto being, that must be different its totality to image of philosophy. crificised in in order present a However, the familiar cannot be negated by immediately proclaiming a new Absolute. This would simply reject previous versions of the Absolute in favour of a neNNdetermination, which would once again reflect dichotomies ansing from a definition of be from 'shot 28i2l (PS §37, SL 1, that merely given or a pistol' itself would expene-nee 65/67). Representafional consciousness,when it becomes foundationali st, demands that fied Hegel be this that, and or proven, means as justi recognises, simply all tnith-claims between knowledge difTerence Absolute the the proclaimed of and accepted insisting on

18 -1;

Sci opinion will not suffice. This would simply mean that Absolute Kno%vledge or ience Lwould be declaring its power to lie simply in its being, but the untrue ti. e.. familiar] knowledge likewise appealsto the fact that it i,ý, and assures us that for it Science is of no account' (PS 68/49 06). And a vindication of the possibility of Absolute Knowledae, if it is also to be a critique of foundafionalism, must recognise the central Hegelian paradox in the PS, i. e., that representational consciousnesscan only be related to the Absolute through its own overcoming of itself

Any attempt to specify a new beiond of

representationalconsciousnessas its negative simply binds philosophy anew to representational consciousness, especiafly when this beyond is defined as utterly transcendent of consciousnessas sucb (as wben Sclielling makes an ecstatic 'Intuition' and a Sollen equally essential to philosophy). Hegel's goal is to allow representational consciousness, as concretely defined by

bistorically-prevalent

dicbotomies, to

demonstrate that the Absolute is not external to it. This demonstration must therefore foundational be to consciousness,involving no itself immanent method that has to be

demonstTation-21 to the prior juss6fied This enables us to addressthe apparent inconsistencv that results from a Preface that reinstates a duality of diversity (fmiliar

dicbotoniies.) and unity (the new absolute).

This apparent inconsistency will turn out to be consistent in relation to the requirement of finite in distinctions by A the made reason an immanent method. consciousnessschooled its lose be to rividity and reject the supremacy of the PrInciple of noncannot persuaded forced be immanent In by to to think talk method. order of an contradiction simply be di Junctively, to than such a consciousness must subiected I Si inclusiveiv, rather its habitual that orientation towards an object of thought, examples erode paradoxes

"' Ohashi, (.)p cli., p. 21, points out that, for the early Schelling, the absolute had also to be

But Schelling, like H61derlin than to as rather opposed it. conceived of as wilhin consciousness, (Henrich, 1971a. pp. 16-17) conceived of this internal relation as one between productive for be Hegel, a peftho would, principfi. tendencies, which ontolosucal

I -;()

familiar. forms from the whose among of expression are themselves selected abstractly

but which neverthelessforce a consciousnessused to abstraction to see itself and its truth in the paradoxes they

Co

in. 22

Pta -

H farn-fliar the Preface present the ab.-stractions of as its - -ence

mathematical reasoning, formalism, and 'enthusiasm'. before gomg, on to present. equaliv abstractiv, the paradoxical 'speculative proposition' (PS 52-6/35-40 §§58-65) in which, for Hegel, the Absolute is expresse& and finally, in the Introduction, -,Ne find Kantian within and Reinholdian aspectsof the relation between the 'for itself' and the 'in itself the paradox of 'detenmnate negation. So the purpose of these initial moves cannot be to determine the objective difference between a condition of 'fallenness' cbaractensed.by our reflexive awareness of difference and an intuition of the Absolute, for such a distinction would then itself in The Introduction Preface (which was composed the require grounding. and, particular, book for the the tempting after rest of was complete) constitute an apparatus representational consciousness,not to reject the familiar in favour of the claim of a but itself in initially to recognise somefliing magisterial intuition, utterly unfamiliar to it for it. Thus be induced therefore to see itself as consciousnessmust and without meaning

bening than the oppossedto as absolute, rather containing

23 it.

This will subsequentlygive

in fact. is Hep-el, demonstration It this tben, that to opposition of clear, wav an nnmanent to Schelling, grants representational consciousnessqua consciousnessof difference an for desire Absolute 'opposing tendency', the the ardent over against inalienable right §26). 26/14-15 (PS unity This immanent demonstration, the 'method" of the PS, cannot then be based

24 1-ni foundafion detefrmnate that expeficnce in fernams unquestioned. ste,94 it can. upon a be nothing other than a descriptive method, beginning WIlththe experiential assumptions 22Cf Rose, 1980, P. 151 23Seealso Lamb, 1980, pp- 15-16. 24

30. Lamb. o,,, p. cii-, i?

160

that charactenserepresentational consciousness.and criticising them systematicalIv. thus remaimng i; i

15 begin has 'method' Yet to somewhere. to anent its -subjectmatter. such a

We could begin abstractly by enumerating (to use a Kantian tenn.) the historically deten-ninatepresuppositions of a consciousnesswhich Hegel charactensesas 'natural' so as to sketch its 'Ideological'

familiar its convicfions about NNhatis merely character,

4natural'. We migbi include in this list of assumptions the followlng: that there Is an essential relation of correspondencebetween the subject's representation and the nature of the object, that this relation can be articulated, and that the validity of this relation can I--

And basic, ditlerence there the the proven a priori. even more assumption of is be

-I,_

itself is And the the then there the subject and object self-sufficiency of the between

reason of the individual: there may be many doxai about the nature of the world, but the individual has the capacity to sort the true frorn the false (an assumption Deleuze also points to). These opMlons may be basic to the modem 'Image of thought'. But there remains the problem of the necessity and completeness of our investigation of tbern. Kant's enumeration of the conditions of the possibility of expenence was cnficised for precisely its abstract and contingent cbaracter. In attempting to overcome tbis, a finds itself begin by Fichte Schelling having by to as employed and genetic method forms deterrmnation Absolute that the the the of of in order assurning validity of a from But be deduced this necessity is consequently only necessity. experience can it with from Absolute, flow the the to nature of and nofliing is thereby genuinely assumed in the deduction. In this connection, there gum-antee, of completeness no is explained, as PS, its System, Hegel's is the the to to in role as introduction as a it necessary understand Knowing, Absolute by detluclion the of of idea operates which iranscendenial

15DON, 17-19. 1970, pp. c,

161

progressively deducing the conditions of a basic fonn of consciousness,ending with the 20 uncondifional, There are thus two interpretative issuesto be decided: a) the question as to where the PS must begin, and b) bow the complete deduction of Absolute Knov,"Ing is to be understood. Beginning with the latter, we should note that Hegel's solution to the problem of presuppositions is Fichtean, in that be envisagesa systematic deduction that is self-enclosed, requiring no externally given presuppositions. TbIs influence is, bowever, tempered by that of Kant. Hegel refuses to begIin from an intellectual intuition of the Absolute in itself, qua ground of determination. Yet, given Hegel's denunciation of Kant's critical philosophy as a merely finite form of reason, bow can he affirm the

foundationallstidea of a L)eduklion?Does this not repeatthe division of consciousness that Kant assumesas ulfimate? We should note that what Hegel sees as important in Kant's transcendental

deduction is not the synthetic unity of consciousnessdefined over against the transcendental object, which was transformed by Fichte and Schelling into different forms of productive intuition, but rather the ltýgical relation between consciousnessand self-consciousness that is essential to Kant's

argument. On Robert Pippin's

27 Kmft's CPuR B138) for Hegel (at takes that it is argmnew example, up interpretation, only In relation to the unity of self-consciousnessthat even any presentation of an object is "pure therefore there that are intuitions' without and no possible, made in intuition for for Kant Hegel, Experience, to and is therefore not self-consciousness. relation in simply a change the state of a subject, the reception of stimidl or the currency of a 28 In Kant Hegel), (for but this of existing object. an way, is consciousness mental state,

: ('On the importance of the specifically Kantian notion of a deduction for Hegel, see Pippin, 1989,

6 and p. 19. Again, this roie of the PS has not beenuncontroversial-seen. 4 above. 27Qp. cit., pp. 20-31and 27-9. Mid, p. 116.

I 62

,ihows that all experience of objects arises through a certain mode of self relation on the part of the subject. The question is. bow must this self-relation be conceived9 Is it absolute knowledge understood as the self-presenceof the sub,ect, ts knowledge of tself

as it is in itselP This cannot be the case, for this supposedly a priori knowledge would be an illusion of the kind that Kant refutes in the Paralogisms. Hence the self-relation here does not entail that we are intuitively present to ourselves alongside every case of presenting a syntbesis of an empirical manifold to ourselves. The Kantian 'I tbink', in terms of

logic, indicatesan alwayspotentialrelation of knowing (the representation transcendental 'I think' can accompanv all my presentations): it is this potential knowledge of the discursive rules of synthesis for a mwilfold of intuition that is the condition of the difference between a merely subjective association of mental states and the consciousness of an object29 Kant's insight is thus that any knowledge-claim

must

it is become discursive that to the presuppose possible conscious of rules that allow the 30 claim to be made in the first place. In order to presentx to ourselves as an objectý it is necessarythat we should be able to become conscious of the rules, ffic practice or 'point of

VieW",

31

" knowledge Importantly. to to employ present x ourselves, of these which we

for but is knowledge the of an object, of conditions of presentation an object. In rules not it knowledge is as arises only through a relation of the unconditioned, a sense, such intuition itself but to of the subject in itself it is neverthelessnot an subject Just as some of the assumptions, characteristic of flie fmiliar

or "natural'

in PSs deduction Absolute the that of appear systernatically will consciousness, Knowing are first dealt Witli abstractly in the Preface, so is the Introduction an abstract

29Ihid, p, 19, Diisin_, 491) 1993, p, g

30Pippin, 1989, p. 23. 31Pinkard, 1995,52, 12jhj4j_ p, 46, Pippin, 1987, pp 459-60

16

form for deals itself. deduction dynarnic the presentation of the necessary with it of the of this self-relation of the subject. It explicitly discusses this issue in terms of the necessaryrelation between any intended object and self-consciousness.s1iowing that this relation is a necessaryinternal movement of self-consciousness.rather than an intuition. This movement is a process of E'rkennen,co&mition.but also (to employ another of this word's meanings in German) recognilion, or rather re-cognition, a necessaryprocess of re-thinking a relation. This movement of re-cognition is a logical movement from an object to the rules that allow it to be posited, i. e., from conditioned to condition, ratbeithan being a psychological act of matching up diverse contents with the aid of a concept 33 Unlike logical 'psycbological' that wb, them the all. recognition, movement of -, -umes . recognition actually prevents self-consciousness from affirming that the object it reby inifially the cognises as conditioned certain niles is same object of which it was conscious. It is this process, through which the object becomes unfamiliar, that the Int-t-oductionpresentsas the inner 'experience' (Eýfahrung) of natural consciousness(PS 75/55 §86). In this way, the independenceof an object is undermined, and consciousness becomes aware, not of the object as an independent entity Simply given to it, but of the It the as subject in positing it independent. Is this movement that will, in the role of levels Absolute deduction, develop the througb several of complexity into course of

Knowing. We now need to examine the nature of this movement as the Introducfion

has for its basic describesit. As we have seen,for liege] representationalconsciousness immediately it. being The the conscious of an object opposite of awareness structure be be Absolute, immediacy takes to the to the or consciousness this is what content of in-itself But it this consciousness is also aware of itself as is the h-uth of object as different from the object, as the knower of the object, and thus in relation to it. The fbr Thesc defined is two only aspect as consciousness. a second aspects thus in object 33Pinkard, op. cil., P. 3622n. 10. For the p.,.rchological usage, cf. CNR A 103-) 0.

1(14

reflect Kant's account of the two modes of representingan object via Reason and .,-]a the Understanding. The difference between these two aspects is thus one between: a.) consciousnessof the foundation of truth, and b.) consciousnessof the mode or method vla which this foundation is known (PS 72-3/52-3 §§82-4). If consciiousnessre-cognises this difference, it alters its perspective on itself effectively comparing one moment of itself (tbe definition of the foundation or of trutb) with anotber moment (the knowledge of method or of the difference between consciousnessand the truth.), and thus becomes aware of the difference between a moment of immediate idenfitv and one of mediated difference. This difference between moments does not become fixed, however, creating an either/or disjunction between the immediate and the mediated, as both thesemoments themselves 'are_/,br the same consciousness,this consciousnessis itself their comparison, it is for the same consciousnessto know wbether its knowledge of Theobject corresponds to the object or not' (PS 74,154ý'85). The awarenessof the difference between the two is latter, disjunctive demonstrates this that the comparison, which inevitably moments supposed 'in-itself

is, fbr that that the veiýy consciousness, is only an immediacy

immediacy of the obiect is only possible tIm-ougba relafion to consciousness.Througb this experience, which is necessitated by the dualistic structure of representational

a further changeoccurs: consciousness,

Since

consciousness thus

finds

that

its

I -. -

its does to object, the object not con-espond Knowledge itself does not stand the test, in other words, the

for it is for that testing altered when which was criterion fails been have to pass the test, and the the cntenon to

know, but is testing also a of what we testing not only a knowing the of is. testing of critenon what (PS745/

g5ý 4-5 ýý, -5

165

The supposedly immediate foundation and the conditional knowledge are not absolutely negated in this process, as in the kind of superficial scepticism Hegel denouncesearlier (PS 52/56 §59) that knows how to point out the necessarydifference between the two moments of consciousness but cannot pToduce anything positive thereby, and seesonly a circular either/or, where each term is the foundation of the other. Sucb a capricious and subjective scepticism is opposed to the necessaTN! and absolule for Hegel, is that, scepticism absolute becauseit is immanent to 'natural' consciousness. This absolute scepticism does not place in question our knowledge of objects, by raising the spectre of the unknowable foundation of knowledge or thing-in-itself, but rather idea the questions of the possibility of defining a thing-in-itself, or self-subsisteint foundation, as such. The in-itself is not iust defined formalIv as 'external' or other, but also, seeing as foundation, defined as a it is it must have a specific content. The difference between the two moments of identity and difference is thus itself comprehendedwithin a new unity, a foundation The in-itself, definition the of object. content of this new new or a new definition will follow necessarily from the difference between the two previous moments before. delerminaie is And again, thus negation of what went of consciousness: it a through its own fon-nal relation to the subject, the content of this definition will prove to be afflicted with the difference between in-itself and for-another. This, then, is what logical re-cognition initially amounts to: consciousness recogmses that the 'familiar' in-itself between for difference fact in the there to moments of is a it, unfamiliar object is knowledge, from knoWlng, for-another the that and of of crIterion prevents unity and b ei

34

sl

and immediate

Consciousnessthen fi nd,; that another object bas ansen

behind its back., as it were. In this way,a definition of experience, NvInchimplies a 34Cf Rose, eV. cil., pp. 48-9.

166

specific practice, viewpoint or rule through which a particular obiect is constituted, undermines itself As observersof the phenomenological development of recognition. we simply contribute to this process the tracing of the necessary connection between the content of one 'shape' of consciousness(the moments of identity and difference) and the one that replaces it (PS 76/55-6 §87')-35That is, we can see new objects ansing out of the contradictions IIi

ci in the old ý30 -Nat cnnsciou..,mess,itself can-not become aware of __Mal

the necessitvof its iournev until it reachesthe end, whereit reflectson its own progress. This movement, wbicb Hemel must simply desCnbe (as a phenonienological observer) while at the same time pointing out the necessity with which each new object is dialectic. formulated Dialectic the thus arises, phenomenological on is inot a method,

the basis of assumptionsabout the contentof expenenceand then applied reflexively to 37 expencnecas to an extcrnal ContCnt, bUt is a movcTnentthat ansesimmancntly witbin is The 'antinomy' thus that consciousness of consciousness representational itself between the object defined as in-itself and as for-anodier: the only way to resolve an antinomy. as for Kant, is to re-latethe opposing terms to their conditions of possibility, difference both This the to third terin that possible. and of active a makes identity i. e., behind back The that the the of consciousness. progression of occurs process relating is 'sbapes of consciousness' that is the PS is thus the va-netv of immanently-unfolding foundation for its determine knowledge finite to the a consciousness part of attempts on fact in between And difference identity it is only when subject and object. and of the these moments of

determinate, relative

difference

and idenfitv

that define

PS been have the the that this movement end of cast off at representationalconsciousness have become By be finally this time. consciousness will uttefly understood. can

'5 Dove, op. cif-, p. 26. 36This is why it is difficult to appreciatethe necessityof the movementonk, with referenceto the follow. being to Introduction. only a7mcipme whai Is abstract, can which, abstract 37Cf Bialer, 1996, p 12

167

unfwniliar to itself, precisely because these constitutive moments will have been exhaustively critiqued. Instead of focusing on a determinate object posited opposite it, consciousness will have transcended its representational structure. having attained a perspective where the process of its own movernent. or its developed relation to itself. is its 'object.

This movement, bowever. is not a determinate object but the Process

through which objecti"ty

for If be the this itself is constituted subject. viewpoint can

attained from within the PS, then the structure of representational consciousnessNvill have been completely comprehended as a product of this movernent itself T'his, for Hegel, is Absolute Knowing. The issue of the completenessof the deduction brings us back to the problem of beginning. Comprebending the difference and identity of the moments of in-itself an(i for-another means that consciousnesswill gradually come to understand its own role in the constitution of'both. The definitions of the in-itself as critenon and of the moment of knowledge, which show themselvesto be conditioned by a new in-itself Will eventually change so that the moment of knowing itself becomes the criterion. In this way, consciousnesswill gradually recognise (as will we) that only through the mediation of discursive rules can the immediate (the in-itself) be constituted for consciousness.Selfconsciousnesswill thus be re-cognised as the condition of possibility for consciousness development Self-Consciousness), At (Itbe this the of cbapter of an object. point on have Kantian Fichtean been reached.This fonn consciousnesswill and general pattern of however, already presupposesvarious complex assumptions of abstract consciousness, difference between (the the theoretical the nature of intuition, about nature of experience ). To PS how the the these anticipate next chapter, show etc. will and practical reason presuppositions, as deten-ninate relations

historicallyto objects. already presuppose modes of relating 'bct-,,,, cen suklects. Intersubjectivity,

rather than absolute

But because be the thus of self-consciousness. condition of the relative subjectivity. will it be in PS to the necessary these is ofk-no,. modes Ning, prope-relsewhere. complexity of

169

This is because the PS must be exhaustive. and the criteria for this exhaustiveness cannot be given outside of the phenornenolo&qcaldevelopment Itself (otherwise the foundationalist problem of circulantv would return). The critique of the

multiplicity of 'familiar' prejudicesthat constitutephenomena]kno-iodedge in the present can only be consistent with itself if it proceeds with necessity, and begins ftom the most basic fonn of immediate identity that is possible for representationalconsciousness.The inconsistencv' of beginning from the sIMPle and immediate fonn of consciousness that

Hegel calls 'Sense-Certainty', rather than from a historically contemporary Kantian or Fichtean presupposition, is thus consistent when -vie-wedin the fight of the reqtitrenients of an absolute critique

of Tepresemation.

38 Crucially,

tbis basic form of consciousnes. s

be can neither consciousness of an object as it is determined for us, nor can it be consciousnessof an object in itself Any sucb beginning would already presupposea pregiven foundation and would thus still be cIrCular: either a deten-ninationof a thing-inis 'for to the object itself in relation us' constituted, or the unitv of consciousness whieb beginning be The the thing-in-itself and can only understood, I would argue, in relation to a moment in Kant's pbilosopby wbere the distinction between pbenomenal objects and becomes As between problematic. an obiects-for-us and objects-in-themselves, notimena, Descartes) Kant (including his to notes that the adjunct Critique of rational psychology 'indeterminate 'I think' empirical intuition' whose exact status an expresses proposition

is ambiguous:it

fliat something real is given, given siofies only indeed to thoubt in general, and so not as appearance, but (nounienon), thing-in-itself as something nor as der [in Tal] bicb exists, and N-,, in the whicb actually denoted 'I think' is as such. proposition 3ýRose, op. cil., PP 150- 1 -

169

(CPuR B422-3)

The intuition bere is an undeniable, thouO, indetenninate, feeling, of existence associated with consmousness, rather than Descartes' ffilly detenninate intuition of a thinking thing. Its exact status in consciousness is problematic, being neither a representation of an intuited phenomena] object, nor a presentation ý-, Iven througli a special form of h1gher intuition. It can only be called consciousnessof being further detennination. In has that this, no without it is unconditioned, given it determination eitber as for-us or as an in-itself It does not presupposeany foundation in order to be known as this Indeterminate terrn, whether this foundation be discursive (i. e., intuition), determinate intuition) (a a categorial synthesisof or non-discursive special and consciousnessof it does not therefore presupposea circle of conditions. This immediate, indeten-ninateconsciousness,in which there is no determinate distinction between our consciousnessof being and being itself, is the 'pure Being' with find begins. Upon PS this that it splits nito two simple the reflecting on unity, we which Sense-Certainty detenTdnafion the that of proper, opposed to eacb otber constitute unities being the the awareness of conscious and immediate as immediate awarenessof an object Ilowever, of an object.

these terms are not tbemselves opposed to the initial

is initial both fact Being. In to the that their problernatic: relation unity indeterminate dem Sein 1... 1 herausfallen]' beinglaus happen hemerge to terms reinen out of pure §92, (PS 80/59 From iii Sense-Certainty diversity' ). 'cnicial this the modified. constitutes initial diNision, the dialectic of PS begins: each opposed tenn is posited in tum by iction foundation the the results of other, and resulting contradi consciousnessas the

the

fon-n immediate knowledge Sense-Cei-twnty " supposediv consistent of I as a overcomin-P-of deduction Hegel's Knowledge Absolute The thus of of rests completeness object. of an being that educated consciousness so it is aware, not of 'natural' represcntational or on a) itself is but through that onk, as constituted a process of objectivity a particular oklect

170

intenial to consciousness,and b) bewnnimý with a fonn of consciousnessthat is utterly basic in lacking the determinate structure of difference and identity that characterises representationalconsciousness. In the next chapter, we will examine the processlaid out in the PS in more detail, before turning to the SL, which for Hegel elaborates the standpoint of Absolute Knowledge as an ontolouv. Now, in concluding this chapter, we will re-viewthe project that PS is meant to fulfil. The immanent dynamic of the PS is, as we have seen,a process in which consciousnessfinds its unacknowledi4edpresuppositions being laid bare, these presuppositions being rules that are constitutive of subjective perspectives on the world In of objects. this way. this process (understood negatively) can be called deconstructive, since it consists of an immanent exat-ninationof the claims of consciousnessabout the objective nature of experience that demonstrates that they are only made possible by unTecognised rules that are constitutive of objects

-for

consciousness. However,

acknowledging these rules makes the objeefivity of the claIMS that depend upon them link between bas been for to the maintain once rules and claim recognised, impossible the apparent givenness of the object has been undermined, and a PreVlouslv' bas been brougbt lip-bt. to element of constitutive subjectivity unacknowledged While this negative process is vital in demonstrating that the claims of representational consciousness about experience are ultimately illusory,

it must

deduction be a or of the perspective as re-construction simultaneously viewed positively deduction (i. demonstration Formally, Knowing. Absolute as a e., as a of it operates of but because Knowing), Absolute materially, it is a reconstruction, the possibility of it 'it [consciousness] to object in getsTld of which presentsa new relation of consciousness is for it burdened being that alien, only and as an other', with something its semblanceof for when consciousnesscomes to reflect upon self-consciousnessas the condItion of the

object.

171

becomes appearance idenfical where

with

essence,l ...I its exposition wfl] coincide at just this point finally, Spirit. Science And the with authentic of when consciousnessitself grasps this as its own essence,it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself (PS 77/57 §89, modified)

This is a reconstruction because the Absolute, the enfireiv new and unfamiliar 'object' of thou-gbtpresents an actual task, ratber than a mere bypothesis that remains to I-

The deduction Absolute Knowing proven.. of would show that all representational be

consciousnesspresupposesan autbentic and absolute unitv of subject and object, which is itself the negation of the structure of representationalconsciousness,and therefore also '9 for foundationalist the Tlivs final stage will pT-cwM a of need a image of nbilosaphy.

conception of the object defined as in-itself for consciousnessthat is actually consistent HoweveT,

definition its the of relation to coos6ou-"-e., with ---s4) there is no longer Imowledge'

this will ako entail that

as it has been understood by representational

consciousness,for in order for there to be representationalknowledge, there musi be both detenninate difference and ide-ntitv between subject and object. Absolute Knowing, then,

be in ill embodied a negativeunity of W1

39

40

"' 'neitber-nor' objw, a el structure, ýsmbjcct -and

Pippin, 1989, pp. 10-1-5; Houlgate, 199.1-,p- 71.

Westphal, 1979, pp. 11-11

41 Cf

-

Maker, 1995, Ch, 3, on this difference between representationand absolute knowledge

Maker, however, stressesthe pure negativity of absolute knowing (pp. 78-82")too much, for it is (the this too the to of positivity result way in which it servesas the element understand necessary it dogmatic Schelfing's Science), thought transfonning a into unity of and intuition as in without of

Ideiiii0tv.wstem .

172

But this gTasp of the fluidity

or the 'x-mishing' of the structure of

representational consciousnessstill belongs to the perspective of a rigidly disiumfive consciousness that cannot tolerate paradox. and that- despite itself finds its content perpetually disappearing in its intemal dialectic. Like Deleuzc, Hegel holds that it is also necessaryto comprebend this loss of meaning as a positive result. Absolute Knowing, is self-conscious knowledge of consciousness as that which only coincides -,N-itb itself insofar as it always changesits limits, insofar as it differs from or exceedsitself It is not knowledge of a foundational, transcendentmeaning that fixes the horizon of a common sense.Instead, it is consciousnessof the negative movement of the PS as being its own lacks foundational 'essence' transcendent, innermost meaning, an any moment of which fomi The PS the thus presence. end of contains a of knowing that is equal to the problematic, basic consciousnessof unity that marks its beginning in Sense-Certainty. Self-consciousness as Absolute Knowing

knows the logical

condition

of

the

determinationof its object and of itself vis-a-vis each other insofar as this condition is in its like its 'failure' to a own coincide itself something simply self-differingWith intuition plenary -

its fluidity or constant vanishing. The difference between negative

for difference between dialectic knowledge Hegel, the is, and positive views of absolute finite Versiand between or consciousness,and a sceptical oveTcomingof and speculation, a comprehensive overcorning, which grasps the positive meaning of the instability of §§81-2), (EL an instability which is implicit in the representational consciousness beginning of PS and which reflection upon it draws out. As witb Deleuze, the minimal presupposition of deterymnateconsciousnessis from here difference But difference the be thought itself is a conceptual the of shown to being thought that the terms of as thematised Nkhichis utterjv other of in one relation, not difference for this And the is therefore of itself comprehensible, structure than thought. difference. However, jdentjýý, the Knowledge this of Absolute identity and presents still back Hegei, for into a relative identity of concept and intuition, does not, collapse

173

subordinated to the concept. In order for there to be even the most minimally determinable difference between subject and object (as presented in Sense-Certainty). Hegel suggests,consciousnessmust be capable of knowing itself as self-diffenng- and with this knowledge one has authentically broken through the limits of representation, without giving up the idea of knowing. Absolute Knowledge is not the abolition or destruction of finite consciousnessm the name of a presupposed absolute t, nitVz42 I.-,

In4

il"Ite d f consCl qtca it repre. wnts r-ý-.. 3.

its renunciation of own fixity, even though finite consciousnesswill inevitably remain the medium through which human beings habitually relate to objects. The Absolute here is not an unjustified, one-sidedly practical commandment, whicb subordinates all being to the project of its realisation. Instead, it constitutes an insight, won not through immediate intuition but through the labour of the negative' (PS 21/10 § 19), into the non-subjective in sense whicb self-consciousnesscould be said to be a condition of objectivity as such. This is self-consciousnessas the movement of what Hegel calls Absolute Negafivity, in behind the the positing of specific objects are revealed. subjective which presuppositions This mode of knowledge tums out to be the negation of all foundationalism, becauseit is inberently without positive representationalcontent and yet it is the positive truth of the 'way of despair', because it comprehends what Hegel in the Preface called the 'tremendous power of the negative' (PS 32/19 ý02) which gains expression in the deten-ninationof the different moments of in-itself and for-another and in the negation of this difference. In this way, Absolute Knowing comprehends the whole movement and therefore the totality of consciousness,for it discloses a non-representationallogical selfconsciousnessthat is immanent within the negativity of representationalconsciousness. To recap: Hegel opposesthe foundationalist notion (affirmed bv both Ficbte and Schelling) that the object of philosophy is a ground of representationalconsciousnessthat is essentially opposed, as infinite or absolute, to all finite consciousness.Instead, Hegel 47 Rose, 1980, p. 150.

174

arizuesthat the Absolute is immanent to finite consciousness.and shows that this Is so bv

Presentingin PS an internal, deconstructivecritique of the structureof representational consciousness, in wbich Absolute Knowing emerges as knowledge of the movement

fixity its This througbwbicb consciousness the of own structure. meansthat undermines Absolute Knowing is not Presupposed as detennined relative to our experience (which, Ficbte as and Sclielling sbowed, requires an infinite deduction to prove that it is more than just a presupposition), but is demonsirated. Hegel, like Deleuze, thus critiques a whole 'image of thought', and does this by tracing the immanent movement of the

internaldifferenceof consciousness from itself

175

Chapter 6 Hegel's Account of Absolute Knowing: Logic and Being

i) Introduction The result of the PS is the dissolution of the basic certainty possessed by representational consciousness,namely, that the essential structure of experience is the opposition between subject and obj ect. Hegel believes that with this basic certainty for foundationalist for image the the philosophy, as a secure need a of need vanishes foundation only ariseswhen we are conscious of a distinction between the object-in-itself and the object-for-us. Instead, we can now take up the standpoint of Absolute Knowing, in which the nature of the genuine, non-foundational unity of being and thought can be determined, or rathei-,allowed to deten-nineitself tbrougb our tbinking. Representational having been consciousness exhaustively deconstructed, self-consciousnessis not now die it, but Absolute (Gegensiand) the trutb, over against aware of as an object as its own Sache selbst. Reflection is no longer finite, related to a given foundation, but infinite,

SL itself, immanent have The to thus to thus to thought think aims only and itself related begin from fixed being. does For Hegel, this not a supposedly process its own unity with foundation determined reflexively in relation to a definition of experience wbich is accepted as given, and is in this sense non-foundational. PresupPOsitionlessand selfdetennining. The idea of an Absolute that is identical with self-determining thought is the kev SL The be Hegel's the of not merely of immanence pbilosopby. a of will aspect Vision logic that details the inner determinations of thought, for then it could not be absolute. For Hegel's reconstruction of philosophy to be successful, the SL must also be an being however. I'lus has been details the the that nature of itself strong claim, ontology

176

' In Schelling. begmning the Hegel's main target of succeedinggenerationsof with critics. i last chapter, I noted that Schelling was critical of Hegelian logic for being what. In Schelling's view, could only be a negative pbilosophy that deducescatmorial conditions be SL. for In being be detenninate the fhougbtit will assessing witbout wbicb cannot being determine logic Hegelian to itself. or whether necessary consider whether can also this rational unity of thought and being can only be an unprovable assumption for has Schelling it is just Hegel If then philosophy, as argued. an assumption, not overcome foundationalism, and bas in fact merely regressedto Schelling's foundationalist position in the Philosophy of Identity. My strategy in this chapter wifl be to defend Hegel's account of Absolute KnoWing, against vanous objections that are eitber implicitly or explicitly dependent Scbelling's This deeper Absolute Knowing a position. consideration of upon will entail before focusing PS, SL By flegel's deconstruction the to going on examine in itself on in the transcendent of notion of a ground the SL's Doctrine of Essence,I will then show bow Hegel reads foundationalism as a transcendentalillusion rooted in being itself The Schellingian objections to Hegels position will thus be unden-nined,given that all of them rely on Schelling's own account of what reason must presuppose in order to get in deconstruction Hegel's started philosophy. of grounding will show how Schelling's foundationalism is inherently self-contradictory, and based on the unquestioned In I Hegel's the assumptionsof representationalconsciousness. next chapter, will pursue claims further by examining, in relation to objections advanced against Hegel by Deleuze, the non-foundational ontological account of deterimnation in SL which, I shall argue, operateswithout reference to transcendentgrounds. 'Mere now follows a summary of the objections I will be considering here, whicli bave been raised by Klaus Msing, Walter Scbul7. Manfred Fran'k-and Andrew Bowie. 1 Qv. Bowie, ) 993, Chs 5 and 6. Frank, 1975 gives a good account of Schelling's influence on Feuerbachand Marx.

177

a) Dfising Provi

both SL Hegel, an as reading a 'strong' interpretation of

ing, DU For the negatiN, e unitN? of sl account of absolute subjectivity and an ontology. both be j PS to of consciousnessof an the a condition subject and ob ect at end of is meant in itself, determinateness that and this way, the manifold intuited manifold and of the of Kantian distinction between intuition and understanding disappears Ddsmg relates this ý2 between CPuR B132-6 but Kant's Ficbte, two the to to of relation move, not account at in For Kant the a synthesis consciousness aspects of synthetic unity of consciousness. however, be by the unitv of this synthesis the only can produced productive imagination, is contributed by the svnthetic unity of apperception. As Dfising notes, the second edition ' of CPuR makes the work of the imagination dependent upon the unity of apperception. There is an opening here for the idea that one could go beyond Kant by thinking the unity determining is that ase/fin the of apperception as manifold synthesised.But this would, for Dfising, only be a self-thinking apperception, not a self-knoulptQ one, which for DOsing would be one that knows its own determinations to be identical WItb those of being-in-Itself Hegel assumes in the SL that self-determining thought will in fact be 4 Substance, that whicb truly exl--, fs. Thai one can thin1c,the identical with real deten-ninationsof what, jbr us, appears to be the only self-consistent candidate for the does Absolute of not prove that these are themselvesabsolute: this thinking remains role hypothetical

Hence, the SL can only be Circular., In a stMilar way to Schell'in 9s' negati .5 ive

pbllosophy. b) Schulz focuses on Hegel's formulation of the speculative proposition, e.g., Substance is Subject, whicb is meant to express the true unity of subject and object achieved in Absolute Knowing, i. e., the dissolution of the fixity of representational

00sing, 1995, p. 2-335.

3 Ibid. pp. 237-8. jbid

23Q-40. pp. .,

5 Mid, pp. 226-7.

178

consciousness.This unity only arises through natural consciousness'sexperience of the forms of the difference between in-itself and for-another. Schulz thus terms the speculative proposition the 'unity of the related terms an(J their relation" that has been developed through reflection on what is given in consciousness,with the final unity of the two ten-ns being the Absolute that constitutes and is immanent in the whole pbenomenological senes. He sees Schelling's essential objection to the SL as being directed against the idea that reflection can ground itself by simply reflecting on this result. Reflection cannot ground itself in this way and be genuinely absolute, becauseit has, for Schulz, to recognise that there is a minimal difference between the process of reflection and the verv-fficl that a process of reflection exists. And so this tbat-ness of reflection is not an arbitrarily posited being, but is reflection's mm condition, in which it 7

is 'always already inserted' , As we saw in Chapter Two, Schelling claimed that it was

necessaryfor reason to presupposea 'hip-her', non-rational Absolute in order to ground reason. This Absolute is thus posited as transcendentto reason, as more than simply the totality of possible rational determinations of the Absolute, and vet also as somehow internally related to reason as its ground. Schulz agrees with Schelling that Hegel, by

arguing that the fixity of the distinction implied by such transcendenceis based on the betrays basic dogmatic prejudices of consciousness, a assumption, that unprovable and is reason identical v"th being. by Schulz is Frank Bowie. The related to the positions c) and critique presented held by Frank and Bowie, which again focus on the issue of the absolutenessand selfScbulz's, Scbelling's like 'hip-her' Absolute. Frank to of and, refer sufficiency reflection, Knowing be Absolute that to cognition of the immanence of the true reco&Mises is meant finite, is both Fichte the that this and a cnfique of infinite or Linconditioned in and

6 Schulz, 1954, pp. 340-1. jhjd_ pp. 144-5

179

H61derlin.8 "c understands Hegel as wanting to show that the independence of that finite because illusion the that of persists only which exists outside the subject is an 9 by begins SL. Hegel Here. this subject itself, and argues that move is repeated in thinking the Absolute as an indeterminate unity (Being) and subsequently shows that this immediate unity requires as its condition of possibility a self-related, reflected untN! (Essence) like the finite subject. But, for Frank and for Bowie, the problem %viththis kinds immediate fails distinguish between Hegel that two to of move is unity: an immediate unity posited in relation to self-consciousness,and a real immediate unity (Scheffing's higher Absolute)-lo An un-mediate unity that is the relative other of thought,

finite be in to the said such as an object posited relation subject, could unproblematically to be conditioned by self-related reflection. A real ground that is irreducible to reason, on the otber band, is the necessaryground of sUbjectiVity wbicb it can only presuppose,as Schulz., following Schelling, has already argued. As Bowie points out, Schelling here follows Kant by 'Introducing a non-reflexive fbird ten-ninto the structure of knowledge', is being-in-itself the the as against subject and phenomenal object which i. e., nournenal 11 onlyfi)r the subject. That reason or reflection is identical with the real ground can only be an be Knowing I'legel's Absolute presuppositionless or truly cannot assumption, and so " by Hegel's follow Schellmg both Frank Bowie that suggesting mistake k absolute. and the same as Ficbte's: imagining that the unconditioned must resemble the finite, selfHepel kind thus produces an of reflexive self-relation. conscious subject as an eminent

Yrank, 1975, p. 29. Ihid., p 30

10Bowie, 1993. p. 135. 11Ibid. p. 1314-5. ý

12Frank, op cil., pp 51 55 -2N

180

account of the Absolute that simply determines it in relation to the subject, rather than

determiningit asit is in itself

The Ontological, Venseof Absolute Knowing I'lie question concernIng the account of Absolute Knowing in the PS that we in is light Hegel's to the these need pose of phenomenological project objections whether implies unacknowledged foundationalist assumptions.These assumptions would concem a fonn of determinate knowledge that the PS has to presuppose in order to attain the knowledge that it claims is absolute. In otbeTwords, I-legel's proposition that Substance is Subject would, from this perspective, imply that the actually appeanng detenninations Substance in itself Subjectthe that objectivity of are manifestations of a is identical With being by this in-itself, expressed the concept of Absolute Negativity. 'Spirit' would unity then refer to this certainty of essential unity. But, from Schelling's point of view, this be it is first be PS this that the can only attained if presupposed, and unity means would circular, and thus unable to achieve a total critique of representational consciousness. Hegel's acknowledgement of histofical conditioning would thus only he a negative deconstruction of the subjective presuppositions of consciousness,and could not be knowledge be the absolute, as only provided would relative and negative, concerning the inability of representationalconsciousnessto proV]de foundations for knowledge. Can Absolute Knowing be characterised in this way? I want to argue that this Absolute Knowing the that cntique is misplaced, given attainment of involves acknowledging the utter collapse of any foundational. transcendent conception of in before knowing". 'knowing suýjectiVlty, whicb is presupposed as given advance as a Absolute Knowing is not a process in which the subject becomes alienated from itself only to eventually return to its essence,the subject as it is in-itself This NNouldbe to Schellingian Fichtean foundafionalist PS the the and on conceive model, as systernafic knowledge of the unconditional based on a special intuition of the non-reflexive unih- of

181

the subject and object in themselves. I will now nwx the development of Absolute Knowing as a progressive decentring of consciousness,wbicb will demonstrate bov.,the Schellingian critique misses its taraet.

Consciousnessis first decisively decentred when it discovers that it cannot itself serve as a transcendent foundafion of knowledge. This occurs in the sections on SelfConsciousnessin PS. The transition from Consciousnessto Self-Consciousnessoccurs becauseof natural consciousness'sdiscovery that it is itself responsible for the positing of its object. The question that then anses for natural consciousnessconcerns its own determinatenessas a foundation. Why does it posit objects in certain ways? This question bebind Ficbte's critique of Kant: what is the sufficient reason, the real necessity, was bebind the specific detenninations of transcendental subjectiVity? How can a " defined consClousnessthat is essentially by an activity of positing itself be detent 1-ned? Hegel shows that this question forces us to recognise that the idea of a foundational, transcendentalsubjectivity is not enough to explain its own determination. The sections on Self-Consciousnessbring out the previously implicit historical dimension Self-consciousness, and social of subjectivity. as it tums out, is only capable for itself if it of constituting objects is conscious of itself as being as other subjects view it through its actions. Initially, self-consciousness is undeveloped, conscious of the I (PS 133/105 067), but 'an enduring existence' also sensuousworld confronting it as conscious of itself CI am F) as an undetermined existence. The consciousness of Sense-Certainty being, noumenal, neither phenomena] nor With which problematic begins, has become this consciousnessof ni-vexistence. The subject now posits itself as the foundation of objective detennination. The criterion that would prove this from independence the sensuous thereby, self-consciousness's constitutive relation, and for by Desire to then-La relation the objects constituted practical relation its world, is througb wbicb it acts to negate the independenceof objects and tbus sbow its power over II Pippin, 1989, ppý 146 ff, pp. 154-5.

182

them. Desire is thus the subject's active attempt to realise the determination that it posits as its essential oT in-itself side. Crucially, this self-awarenessturns out to be the subj.ect's awarenessof itself as lacking knowledge of its supposedly essential, foundational dimension, subjectivity-initself Its active relation to objects is a practical attempt to establish its own difference, from the objective world, whieb would not be necessaryif it was somehoNN: qua subject, itself it is in-itself fails, This however, to already present as attempt as the subject ends up ideniffiving itself witb the objective world, making itself dependent upon impulses it lead (PS the towards these anse in as given, and upon objects which impulses which 138/109 §175). Simple Desire, then, cannot be the foundation or essence of selfconsciousness,but appears as a minimal, relatively asocial and ultimately untenable '4 If consClo-usne&sis to become a self-consciousness certain strategy of self-confirmation.

just itself desire but to of its constitutive role, it cannot relate natural objects, must and bave contact witb objects that are not just objects, but are also self-conscious, in wbicb it can find confirmation of its own freedom. Again, however, encounters with other do in back the to subjects not simply result mifforing, of natural consciousness'sessence free, foundational The subject's positing of itself as a subject it as in a passive medium. aggaingoes awry. Self-consciousnessas such, it turns out, is only made possible by a relation to at least one other self-consciousnessthat is recognised as sucb in this relation: this relation is what Hegel means by Spirit, the "I"

that is "'We" and the "We" that is 'T" (PS

139/110 § 177). 'Mis is a relation to self that is onýv constituted through one's being-for-another. However, once self-consciousness encounters a consciousness of being that it posits or re-cognises as self-conscious, it discovers that this %,, er-v,act of in This has be to act reciprocal, order that the posititig entangles it in new problems. 14 This counts against Kojeve's anthropologica) reading of PS (1980, pp. 3-4) On this- See Williams, 1997, p. 12,

183

relation-to-other can ground the relation-to-self (certainty of one's independence) that self-consciousnessposits as its own essence.The initial phase of the sections on the Lord and Bondsman, the struggle to the death for re-cognition, is the first of the IncreasIni-fly intersubjective procession of attempts to reallse reciprocal re-cognition that form the rest of the PS. It fails becauseit representsan attempt on the part of two self-consciousnesses to prove, each to the other, their freedom, and thereby the fact that they are able to recognise each other. But this can only occur through wl attempt to kill the Other, and because of the need for reciprocity, through each risking his or heT own life (PS 1445/114-5 §§188-9). This strateizv,however, is completely self-defeating, for re-cognition knowledge freedom is impossible and of my own if I kill the Other or the Other kills me. To resolve this problem, one self-consciousness must capitulate, losing the but freedom keeping life, the struggle its re-cognismg of the Other and thus coming to know itself as unfi-ee. T'his situation is that described in 'Lordship and Bondage. The importance of this 'advance' is that it introduces the idea of a shared social project (even if this project is not based on perfect reciprocitv), in whicb an imperfect relation of re" facilitated by cognition is social practices, These social practices, of labotu and consumption, transform re-cogMtion through the medium of objects that are transformed into raw material for labour and goods for consumption. The Lord (re-cognised selfknows itself free through consuming the object that the Bondsman as consciousness) works on. The Bondsman (Itbe re-cognising consciousness)knows itself to be unfi-ee

becauseof its semce. As is well known, however, this situation is upset: the Lord comes to re-cognise itself as dependent upon the Bondsman's labour (and thus as unfree), whereas the Bondsman comes to understand itself as responsible for the determinations of the object free. Crucially, however, thereby partiafly neither discovers itself to be genuinely and

15Pinkard, op. cil., p. 56.

194

free, for neither other-relation can ground reciprocal re-cogrutiom16and so the Bonds-man

17 for from ne is not as often thougM, the victor. social relations, result is a retreat consciousness now posits pure thinking. its ability to reflect upon its relation to *

-Iobjectivity,

independence, foundation thus metamorphosing the true as and expression of

into those forms that Hegel calls Stoicism and Scepticism. This new direction of desire in turn proves inadequate, ending in the Internally riven forin of the reli ious Unbappy Consciousness. Here consciousnessis forced to re-cognise that pure thought is a selfcontradictory foundation of the certainty of one's fTeedom, and that in order to resolve this contradiction, it is necessaryonce again to actively take up a relafion to others as the means of understanding one's freedom. But this relation is one in wbich the individualistic understanding, of freedom is again shown to be inadequate, for the Unhappy Consciousness, which posits the unity of Its thinking outside itself as the divine freedom, its is forced to recognise an Other as a priestly ground of unreachable mediator between it and the divine (PS 168-9/136-7 §§227-9). This means that a different object, the impersonal unity of thought has now replaced the natural object that fortned the third term of the Lord-Bondsman relation. It is this irnpersonal viewpoint by itself in the now serves as means natural consciousness recognises which which an Otber, namely, in the unity of the priestly mediator with the diVine (PS 170/138 §230). The new object-in-itself, the new foundation of freedom, is this universal thinking. It is for desires, the the interrelated a common object posited as unity of all individual wills or being initial The 'We. the indeten-ninatecertainty of with which PS social subjects of beganhas thus been transfonned into Substance,a foundation posited by representational initially in deten-ninations: the subject's certainty to this consciousness relation other was have be foundation. Now, it is the impersonal unity as seen, cannot a of itself, which we 16Pinkard, op. cit, p. 6'3.

17This claim is above all Koj6ve's (op. eir, p. 20). For a different refutation of this claim, see Rose, 1980, pp. 120-30.

185

Substance. divine (Reason) thought true of rather in-itself which is take to represent the than the indi,,idual subject. The process of re-cognition that takes us from Consciousnessto Reason cannot be reduced to the common misrepresentationof Hegellan phenomenology that views it as a process of simple reflection in which the subject finds, through its 'self-alienation'. confirmation of what it presupposed about itself. In fact, the subject's attempts to find such confin-nation are continually ftustrated. Simple reflection on an objIect simply renders explicit wbat was implicitly

be to the case, thus preserving the assumed

foundational unitv of the subject throughout a inerely illusory moment of difference. Recognition, however, includes a moment of real difference, through which the subject's relation to its own certainty of being- and later, its consciousnessof its own existence, is transformed -a

movement which constitutes Hegelian 'experience.

Just becauseself-consciousnesshas become aware of itself as Spirit, however, its be frustrated its It to education is not over, continues attempts to establish a stable in foundation. At the end of the sectionson Reason,it finds itself once again opposed, as an isolated consciousness,to a body of historically given norms that constitute the being, Substanceor actual Spirit of the society to which it belongs. These non-nscondition the its desire Passing them. through the although it cannot rationally justify content of determinate historically life Spirit that the ethical proper, concrete, sections on is, (Sildichkeu) of the society (wbicb tell once more the same story from a more inclusive finds freedom decentred its within a context perspective), naturW consciousness vet more it is The for to that not responsible. wb-Icb itself society, of ends and values specific transfort-nation of natural consciousness into the subject of Religion produces a new Spint, developed Now, opposes consciousnessof self-consciousness,as a object again. life lived 476/412 (PS body through to the is of actual practices which its ethical itself §678), and reflects on the purposes that these practices express.It thus representsto itself life, foundations highest their ethicai and reflects the of its on consistencv as of ends

186

knowledge. 18 These purposes are now taken to represent the Substance of socl2l has become Self-consciousness its foundation being. that existence, and essential religious Spirit, which reflects on such ends, is thus reflecting upon their self-consistencV for In Substance, when considered as action. positing them as objects as ultimate grounds of reflection, it represents them as divine, firstly as part of the natural world, then as stemming from the 'life of the people'. The tbird stage, the self-consciousness of Christian 'Revealed Religion', is when Spirit represents itself to itself as neither given, nor simply posited, but as self-renewing, as 'tbe universahtv of the Spirit who dwells in this community, dies in it every day. and is daily resuffected' (PS 547/475 §784). Reflecting on the consistency of a notion of actual Spi-fit that finds its ends extemal to it, and then upon one that creates its ends, self-consciousnessfinds that Spirit the otberrelation that constitutes all self-relation, must be a self-renewing positing of and its reflection upon ultimate ends, if it is to be self-consistent. nere is still a difference present bere, bowever, between subject and object. This difference represents the infinite

ditTerence between the Substantial ground of

determinations (God as the infinitely

mIgbty Lord)

and the representational

consciousness(fallen humamtv) through which reflection uncovers these determinations. In the Revealed Religion, the time of reconciliation between the self-consciousnessof Spirit and its Substwice is thus infinitely deferred (PS 549-50/477-8 §787), as was the case with Schelling's postulated third age of revelation (SPL 482-4/242-3). 'Me transition between Revealed Religion and Absolute Knowing

in consists self-

becoming awareof itself as Spirit's oun self-consciousness: the in-itself, consciousness the representedhighest end (self-renewing and self-reflexive Spirit), is not itself different from that which posits and reflects upon it. It is different only-ffir natural consciousness. Again, it must be stressed that this event is not the becoming-conscious of an intuited Instead, Absolute. the phrase 'Spirit's own self-consciousness' defines metaphysical I.x Nd,

P. -1-11,

187

Absolute Knowing as a self-consciousnesswhich is aware of the presuppositions behind levels different detem desires the of its own inate or practical interests, namely. Spirit Spirit, thus as its of actual aware intersubjective mediation that constitute and is own being or Substance. In other words, it becomes conscious of the development of Spirit in PS as its t)wn devekýpment,and turns to examine the hision, of this development (PS 552-3/480-1 e790,565-6/492 e808). Hence, self-consciousnesscannot be thought of at the end of PS, as coming to know itself as a putative 'in itself,

as a Wmscendent, foundational and substantial

forced Wben itself history, to turn subject. self-consciousnessis and re-cognise it in its finds itself at the end of the path of despair: its formeT finitude and fixity has been given for fluidity, for its being determinations total the the it re-cognises as movement of of up Spirit. It bas discovered that its initial, indeterminate and problematic being becomes developed as a foundational relation between a constitutive finite subjectivity and its objects, and which then becomes a relation between this subjectivity and intersubjective structures that act as its foundation. The initial indeterminate being of consciousnessis thus determined as Spirit, a decentred structure of mediation in whicb self-consciousness itself proves itself to be the force behind its own decentring. But in thus re-cognising have been left have lost if to to itself, self-consciousnessappears itself: it is with nothing, but determined, it is the through then nothing movement inwhich subject and object are itself neither the finite subject nor the object. Absolute Knowing is therefore, from the but deten-ninate the collapse of all perspective of representationalconsciousness,nothing, itself in 'Me this the content of its structure. subject relations into neither-nor re-coonises development as 'its own restlesssublation of itself (PS 564/491 §805, modified), that is, Absolute finite be 'cannot negativity, an absoluie or self-related stated' in a wbicb 19 synthetic proposition that would expressa relative unity,

It.) Rose, op. cil.. P. 18).

188

Nevertheless,self-consciousnesshas thereby come to comprehend jtseýfin a way that is neither expiressiblein finite propositions nor grounded In an infinite intufion, but is not therefore simply nugatory. The distinction introduced bv Hegel in the Preface between the finite synthetic proposition and the speculative (,ýpekulahve, but also begreýfende)proposition can now be regarded as non-abstract, from the viewpoint of self-consciousnessthat bas,comprebended(begnffi(en)Absolute Negativity as the process ý -, of its own development. If the standpoint of Hegelian Science is expressed bv the propositions 'Substance is Subject' and 'Being is Tbought' (PS 48/33 §54.), then we finite Science this to as might understand reducible synthetic propositions that would deten-nination by be Substance have in-jlseýf to to exhibit a need grounded. would virtue of which it could be identified with Subject -

but then the certainty or knowledge of this

deten-ninationwould itself require justification from within the Subject, and we would thereby be caught up again in the contradictions of representational consciousness. However, Hegel's account of tbespeculalive proposition concerns,not a fixed, synthetic relation of two deten-ninate ten-ns, but the experience of the developing difference between two terms which is itself finally comprehendedas their developed identity (PS 20 Knowing is the comprehension of the unity 54/38 §6 1), The emergence of -Absolute Negativity, difference, Absolute 'barmony' the this as emerges a of which unity within (PS 54/38 §61) of

histoncally

determined Substance or objectiVity-in-general

('thingbood', Dingheit) witb Subject or subjectivity-In-general (PS 551/479 §788). Absolute Negativity or as it will be called in the SL thought or philosophical .,

determinate, the overcoming of all consciousness,appears in a positive sense as intuition, between differences thought and and thus subject and object, representational from fixity breakdown And knowledge this the the their of of unity results of unity. as finite consciousness.It has not been abstracted from finite consciousnessaccording to a foundationalist method, and posited as its absolute presupposition. 2oSee also jbid, pp. 48-9.

189

To understand this overcoming- the sensein which Absolute Negativity can be knowledLe or Absolute Knowing or 'absolute reflection', as opposed to finite negatIN-1ty. reflection, this unitv of objectivitv and subjectivity must be compared with its Kantian analogue, the relation between the transcendental object, the 'concept of something in g,eneral' (-CPuR A251). and the transcendental subject or unity of apperception (CPuR A-346/B404) 1 The status of these transcendental forms rem3j -nsproblematic in Kant's ý2 account of the two 'regions' of exverience. The transcendentalobiect is not a noumenon,

but neitheris it a phenomenon,for it is the form of appearances in general(ICPuRA253). And the spontaneous transcendental subject is not the ground of freedom which the subject as thing-in-itself can be thought to be (CRuR A538-41/B566-9), and nor is it an is for itself, for deten-nined the appearancein which subject it is the condition of the synthesisof appearances(CPuR A354). These unities are required by transcendentallogic as ultimate formal conditions for-anotber determined of experience, unities only comprehensible as neither nor inthemselves.For example, the transcendentalobject, as the form of an object in general, is for necessary the synthesisof -particularempirical objects under the universal categories. The formal conditions of unitv are also a limit relative to the subject for they define the for Knowing knowledge it Hegel's Absolute of the relation is us. object as appears between these formal constituents of representationalconsciousnessin general. It is not a 'for-another" the aspect of objects that is supposed, or conditioned reflexive negation of does in-themselves, know them to to through and not therefore simply negation, allow us

intuition Absolute identification or of a postulated real V"th of reasonwith entail an knowing. Thus far, it remains Kantian, for its is simply knowledge of the conditions of kind knowing. But and not a special of intuitive at the representational consciousness, from has knowledge this resulted an exhaustive critique of the verv idea of a sarnetime, If 2i2ek (1995) has pointed this out in his innovative and illuminating account of the relation

between Hegel and Kant, which I have madeuse of in the discussionthat follows.

190

thing-in-itself It is knowledgethat Spirit quo AbsoluteNegativity. the negativeunity of all determinations of representational consciousness.is identical WItb the problematic being of Sense-Certainty. Hegel thus discovers that Kant's indeterminate empirical detennined. becomes being througb its the the intuition of of subject necessanlY mediation as Spirit as the identity of the formal unities of the subiect- and object-ingeneral. More evidence concerning the radically negative (neither nor) character of ... Absolute Knowing can he found in EL §44, wbere Hegel dismisses the idea of an he 'T'his dismissal does thing-in-itself that thereby affinns that we mean not unknowable know He the tbing-in-itself, througb can eitber pure reason or in intuition. notes that it is ftom for-another, is detenninations to the the easv object abstract of until only what totally 'empty' is left, or at least, what is empty fior-us. namely the 'beyond' of the initself, that which we cannot know. But secondly Hegel points out that it is equally easy to 'Me thing'beyond' 'only 1he tbinking'. this pr(.-)ductof see qua problematic existent as in-itself as a 'negative determination' is a product of thinking, for it is the reflection of the 'empty self-idenfitV of the transcendentalsubject. It is a product of the empty unity being, in by indeterminate Kant's empirical intuition of expressed wbich there is no deten-ninatedifference between subject and object or tbouOt and intuition. Here, Hegel does indeed go further than Kant does, but not in the direction of the positive identification of reason with an intuition of a putative thin g-in-itself, Kant pointed out

that the ftmscendentalobject is coffelative to the ftmscendentalsubject (CPuR A10910). Hegel argues that the emptv fbing-in-Itself is simply the reflected fon-nal unity of the beyond. It is a negative than still positively existent an unknowable yet object rather

foTit is not found in expenence detenninationof the simple unity of self-consciousness, but is 'listed among the Kantian categones' (EL §44, modified) as a concept of an object in general, a concept of rqlectjon (CPIuRA290/B346).

191

For Hemel,this identification of the negative unity of the thin g-in-itsel f with the

absolute reflection or self-determinationof the transcendentalsubject is Immanently justified by Absolute Knowing. where the movement of self-consciousnessin PS is recognised as the condition of any positing of a determinate object. '[I]t

is the

externallsationof self-consciousness that posits the thinghood [Dingheifl' of the object (PS 551/479 §788). Self-consciousness does not, by knowing itself as Absolute Negativity, know itself as a putative subject-in-itself as the Substantial ground of the exisience of an object, but rather as the condition of the very externality or othernessof the object of expenence. Absolute Knowing

has a conlem which it diftrentiales from itself for it is pure negativity or the dividing of itself it is consciousness.This content is, in its difference, itself

the T, for it is the movementof self-sublation,or the T that the samepure negativity is. (PS 559/486 §799, modified)

No positive determination of the object as it is in itself (even if this positivity is but be that thing-in-itself) of an existent just possible without this unknowable would negative tinih, of subjectivity and objectivity as a 'blank' wbicb can never be directly It experienced in representational consciousness. is itself the condition of any by being througb at all, simply moving all representations ever representation Witbout fixed in a definite 'place' and becoming known in a positive, essentialdetennination. As the positing of an external unity is not a reflection of any positive. finite but content it is not a or given an absolute reflection of the presupposed When the suýject. self-consciousness re-cognises itself in the indeterminate unity of it 'at home in its Otherness [in and objectivitV. is subjecfi, of %-Ihf itself I with y negative unit

192

But 'being-atAndensein 559/486 beisich, (PS §799, this is/1' veinem modified). wlbsl home' is not a confirmation of the finite subject's assumption that it is the foundation of the detenninations of the object, which occurs through the subject's 'self-alienation'. Sueb an externalisation would be relative to the presupposition that the finite subject could be posited as the foundation of the object, and would belong Within the early sections of PS on Self-Consciousness,before sucb presuppositions are deconstructed in the emergenceof Spirit. Absolute Knowing cannot fix the content of the Absolute as a foundational subject or object for it is the moment when self-consciousnessre-cognises fluldity. is determinate the itself in absolute negation wbicb of all content.

'Me true radicality of Absolute Knowing, tben, is the speculativetrutb that the identity of Substanceand Subject can only be grasped when they have been shown to be different, absolutely as never coinciding VVItheach other or themselvesexcept insofar as they are always moving, always negative, always internally different from themselves. 'Me Fichtean and Schellingian assumption that the Absolute is a positive, fixed essence in itself which then somehow becomes split, reflected in another or 16r itve//' and eventuallv becomes conscious of this fixed essence,is unden-nined.Substanceactually suffers the absolute loss of itself as a self-subsistent, positive unity: it turns out to be Subject, but this subject is not itself foundational or substantial, but is the decentred

movement of self-consciousnessexpressedby Absolute Negativity. My claim is, then, that Absolute Knowmg is absolute because it expresses, logic, Kant's h-anscendental the ontological umtv of subject and object as unlike Absolute Negativity, but that it only has this ontological aspectbecauseit is a unity that arisesout of an exhaustive crifique of a) the idea of any knowledge, whether reflexive or b) the very idea that a thing-in-itself (Viven as such tbing-in-itself, and intuitive, of a be ically the of self-consciousness) activity of could ontolo 91 real. Here, independently Hegel allies himself with Kant against Fichte and Scbelling, who both find themselves having to posit a special intuition through which the Absolute can be known as it is in

193

between difference This this Fichtean-Schellingian itself move introduces an infinite Absolute known in itself in intuition and the Absolute determined for us by reason. The tbing-in-itself as the unknowable 'beyond' of the limit set by the transcendentalobject on our faculties of knowledge, is the Kantian element that is absent from Absolute Knowing at the end of the PS. For Hegel, even the delineation of a posiliieýy unknoulable thing-in-

4-enceof a Ding on the othercide of a itself irWolvespositing the real exi..

1, Mit.

22

';nlik-e

many interpreters of Kant, Hegel does not believe that the thing-in-itself is only present in the critical philosopb .y

ical as a subjectively necessary posit. The epistemolo91

difference Kant insists on between receptive and spontaneous subjective faculties reflects, for Hegel, an assumption that there is an ontological difference between the subject and the thing-in-itself, the objective 'coffelate' (CPuR A30/B45, A19/B33) of sensation: 'It]be capacity (receptivity) for receiving representationsthrougb the mode in by [Gevensidnden], objects whicb we are affected is entitled sensibility' (CPuR A]9/B33). For Hegel, Kant's faculty-model is based on the unaddressed,contingent i assumption that there is a difference between the subject and the object that 'causes' its sensations(P §9). Kant's deduction of the conditions of experience cannot account for this assumption, given that this deduction remains consistent only insofar as this presupposition remains unaddressed.'Kant's method is thus itself conditioned by his For hand, Hegel, the the on other assumptions about structure of experience. selfitself be (Absolute Negativity) that absolutely can sbown consciousness reflects or repels to be the condition for the positing of an existent something-or-other that is implied by Kant's assumption. Absolute Knowing thus expresses the unitv of being and thought, but Hegel detenninations the to of thougbt witb the posifive essenceof a putative refuses identify being-in-itself, which would mean that he had produced a merely negative (in Scbelfing's knowledge, one wbieb rested on an unprovable presupposition. sense)model of absolute 22Nd., p, 37.

194

The unity of being and tbought in PS begins with the indeterminate. problematic unit-\:of Sense-Cenainty I-

indelermmate being- which is the minimal determination of any

consciousness.On being reflected upon, this splits itself mto,two aspects.This negativltv of simple being is eventually comprehendedas identical with the immanent movement of 1-1.1

,elf-consclousness Itself

Being is understood by self-consciousness as existence,

expressedby the 'motionless tautology' I am F (PS 133/105 ý167'). a merel-v 'passive [ruhigel unity' (PS 132/104 ý'166). Later, it becomes the unity of actual Spirit, before finally becoming the unity of Absolute Negativity, in which self-consciousnessknows its own incessant self-differing

movement as the negative unity of the opposed aspects of its

is This on-ly constituted through The experience of real, internal objects. unity, wbich

difference, expressesboth mediation and an immediate certainty of being. This being, however, is neither simple Being nor Existence, but the Actuality (Wirkhchkeit) of selfconsciousness(PS 559/486 §800). Consciousness,in all its developments, is awareness from full being, but develops being PS this to actuality, of in simple, indeteTminate is distinguished from bemg by developed pure its explicitly content, i. e., selfwhich from itself being different knowledge Absolute Knowing of as always consciousnessas lacking knows has become being that itself as an inonce it self-consciousness is pure Subject knows that that a itself as a transcendent would mark It as itself aspect, an aspect Substancethat grounds all deten-nmationsas Its own inner possibilities. And precisely becausethis supposedly foundational aspect,whicb was still posited in the early sections itself knows has Self-Consciousness, as alwavs collapsed. self-consciousness on being ne actual of self-consciousnessis a movement that externallsing itself absolutely. lacks a positive content and is also constantly exceeding itself I-I

Absolute Negativity,

first determinations through they through as an empty space which all which passes become determinate. Being, is thus nothing beyond consciousness,existing as some sort detenTimation this the if givemess is just of urtknowabilm of in-itself or givenness, even

195

Givenness itself has been shown to be an illusory determinatiom one %vhichdoes not include any recognition of the role of self-conscious activit-,- in its positing.

The Science of Logic as Absolute Knowing Absolute Negativity thus expressesthe knowledge consciousnesshas at the end of PS of its own uncondifioned presupposifion. For there to be representational consciousness,that is, any determinate relation between the subject and an object \\,blcb is defined as having positive content both for the subject and in itself, there has to be an absolutely negafive relafion of self-consciousnessto itself, through which it repels its empty form out beyond itself We can now see whv the first of the objections to Hegel's Absolute Knowing listed beginning by the this that model of at of chapter, advanced Dfising, is mistaken. Dfising claimed that the identity of Subject and Substance in Absolute Knowing representedthe certaMty that the Subject u,as Substance,as if Hegel's finite Tliis, speculative proposition were a straightforward synthetic proposihon. as we does identify be Hegel the the Subject WItb Substance, case: saw, cannot not p0sifively tbus assuming that the Subject is some kind of transcendentmetaphysical foundation or do in Ficbtean Sebellingian To Hegel Absolutes. this, the the and ground, manner of being, difference between have thought to that the the object-for-us and assume would and the object-in-itself, can be erased in an intuition in which the thing-in-itself, Substance, is somehow known to be identical with the Subject. This he does not do, between difference the object-for-us and the that any epistemological sbowing instead form difference the ontological of experience in which object-in-itself presupposes a between subject and object is accepted as real. Further, the PS shows that the

distinction is the negative relation of selfontological presupposition of any such be to cannot identified witb either a phenomena]or nournenal consciousness itself which being but the actual of self-consciousness. constitutes subject, whicb

196

As noted in the previous chapter, Absolute Knowing is. for Hegel, knowledg-eof

knows decentred, However, transcendental a this subjectivityis radical],,, yet subjectivity itself as such. This unity of self-consciousnesswith Itself is what Hegel calls the Concept (PS 34/20 §34). Absolute NegatiNity is not posited by self-consciousness as a transcendentfoundation, rather, self-consciousnessknows it as its own movement. This form of knowing marks a point wbere,foundationali sin bas been exbaustively critiqued becausethere is no longer a difference between for-us and in-itself, knowledge and truth, foundational This claim and criterion. relation has been what the PS has sought to from is The Concept Knowing Absolute the outset. or not the thought of a undermine foundation, a positive in-itself Instead, it is the thougbt of pure negativity, the loss of all foundations that is vet the ultimate presupposition of all representationalconsciousness. With the Concept, all distinctions between subject and object, including that

betweenpossibleor hypotheticalknowledgeand actual truth, have decisively collapsed for self-consciousness. No sucb distinction, even tbougb it may be necessary for everyday life, can be thought of as absolute. Hence the Concept is not a hypothetical form of knowledge of the real, as flaTtmann's 'negative' reading of Hegel suggests.It does not impose a Sollen upon thought in the same way as Schelling's or Fichte's just Concept When Absolute. the the negatively as the is grasped, not concept of

but loss of itself, also positively as the consciousness" s consummationof representational for has itself, it thought task, an actual it with -presents unity of self-consciousnesswith led finite consciousnessto the point where it has become philosophical consciousness. This task, which SL is intended to fulfil, concerns the further determination of the being Kantian Fichtean PS While that representational shows or of self-consciousness. foundation the that of real objects is only conceivable as posits itself as consciousness

later determined and as the movement of negafix-ity that is intersubjectively

determination has Concept, the this the of not vet negativemovement comprehendedas been understood. In other words, self-consciousness does not ý-now it-hy it always

197

23 for Hegel ledge kn(-)x-. lIMIt,, tassk To that, the this exceedsits own positive is am au restoresmeaning to philosophy after the prolonged journey through PS. Given that, for Hegel, the Absolute must be the Concept, in which the negative movement of self-consciousness is not simply posited as a foundation, but is comprehended as self-consciousness'sown being, the SL can only begin with this unity. It is this being that the SL will analyse. At this point, Pippm's understandingof the SL as in PS the the senseof being an analysis of the logical rules that we a continuation of in require order to posit any object at all is inadequate, and, in Schelling's terms, too 24 SL for The Hegel, determine th-essurum-re negative. will, of being itself, where being is by is PS. SL In the the this the in radically negative sense elaborated sense, understood historically conditioned: its standpoint presupposes or is justified by PS insofar as Absolute Knowing emerges as self-consciousness's 'liberation from the opposition of consciousness5(SL 1,43/491). However, this is not a justification in the foundationalist sense,any more than Deleuze's positing of Absolute Difference is. Hegel notes that the PS is not a 'grounding' (Begrfinduýkg)of Absolute Knowing (SL 1,42/48). Absolute Knowing is not knowledge of a positive foundation, a transcendentSubstancewhich has its being in-itself, and for determinations. determinations knowledge It the are its internal is which all phenomenal that the fixity

been has overcome, Dven that of representational consciousness .

bv determinate structures of relative identity and representation is characterised difference that give

stability

to expenence, and whicb make foundationalist

knowledge. in true to that these represent structures order show methodologies necessary Ilie PS is thus not the foundation of SL in that it Justifies its validity Nvithrespect to an Such foundational deten-nination. to the true notions object of which it purports represent

been by have PS. Instead, be inning S1, Justification the oveTtumed of 91 is immanentin of 1 ý3Cf Rose, op. -jL, p. 183. 24 Cf

Pippin, 1989, p. 176.

198

the PS. The 'object' of SL is not a Gegensland over against consciousness.but is die Sache selbst witb respect to consciousness,its internal negativity, its being. In ihis sense, the SL is presupposifionless, as its bimprining has not required to be jusfified in a foundafionalist fashion. by a determination of being-in-itself that is assumed to have been simply given to consciousness,e.g., throup-ban ecstatic or supenor intuition. Hence the beginning of SL is both immediate and mediated, for it begins immediate]), with being, yet does so in actuahýy only by sublating the whole of the PS, the developed actuality of self-consciousness (SL 1,68/69'). The Concept includes Witbin it or comprehends the mediated existence, the actuah(v of self-consciousness,yet does so iii an inunediate way (SL 1,66-7/68-9ý in 'the meradicable thouot that thougbt is" If all that philosophical self-consciousness-

or more simply, thought -

can do

is Absolute Knowing in analyse simple being, then all it can do is begin with the sti-nple Concept of itself, which cannot be distingiusbed from the empty unity of its beting.This be for bas that there tbougbt means can no critenon wbetber proceeded correctly except that of self-consistency. In the Fichtean and Schellingian systems, this cntenon was applied in ten-ns of the grand circle wbich was to connect the Absol-ute qua formal postulate with the Absolute encountered again in the culmination of philosophy, this time

be SL, however. The difference No distinction made in as objective ground. such can between bypotbesis and objective knowledge

is

simply

a determination of

be The 'on therefore of cc-] only cnten representational consciousness. scif-consistency can itself. just PS the the thought to as allowed consciousnessto compare applied content of itself with itself, so philosopbical consciousnesswill compare itself with itself in SL. Pbilosophical self-consciousnessthus simply refuses to intervene in the process Knowing Absolute that witb any subjective assumptionsabout the nature of is of analysis the Absolute, allowing instead the matter that tbougbt bas in band (die Sache selbst) to

determineitself ne necessityof the consequentstagesof the processthus ansesout of 25Houlgate, 1992, p. 50,

199

the immanent self-refutation of Inadequate determinations of the Absolute. Inadequacv here can only be indicated by the inconsistency of a determinafion of Absolute Knowing In this way. philosophical self-consciousness observes itself becomiing

itself with

conscious of its own ontological content. Ber-ause'tbe beginning of pbilosophy' remains ccompletely immanent in its furtber determinafions' (SL 1,71/71 ), the process Is, like in . the PS, self-consciousness'sown experience of itself, the experience of its actuality (the

Concept) as mediated by consciousness'sreal difference ftom itself A closer examination of the beginning of SL will show bow this immanence operates. The beginning is without 'any deten-ninatenessrelatively to anything else, and Lcannotcontain within itself any detenninateness,any content' (SL 1,69/70). Hence the beginning is made with a determination of the Absolute which is not known through any deten-nination. Such determination or method any other a non-foundational yet necessary be itself is by the that can only expressed Hegel as the unity of self-consciousnesswith Concept, and which cannot be distinguished from the being of self-consciousness.The beginning is thus made with the determination of Being as such, a simple, indeterminate be beginning has Dieter flenricb that, the to argues while unconditioned, and thus unity. it has be initial determination be to this that, nor also can only negative, neither its positively

26 beginning be the grasped or taken up in order to .

enrich sees t.'his as

it is be for beginning has to the and as grasped absolutely, insofar problematic, absolute SL, between is difference the the there rest of it and which a real grasped absolutely, 27 it-follows from it and is relative to if it is, grasped as the absolute begi-nmingat the beginning, f7henthis gmsping seemsto be intuitive. If the beginning is intuited and the subsequent steps arise in thought as a consequence of thinking the content of the beginning,, then we are close to the Scbellingian objections advanced by Fran],, and Bowie. SL would be founded on the difference between a superior kind of intuition and 2" Henrich, 1971, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', pý '17

lbi, l., P. 93.

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thought, which it then attempts to sublate in thought, thus presupposing that the hN: o are somebow ýpvento us as identical. Ilis

determination determinafion The however. the a is of inifial case, is not

tbougbt in wbicb there is no determinateepistemologicaldifference bet-weenintuition be for distinction 1,82-3/82). Such (SL thougbt and can only made or m relation to a consciousness, but the basis of sucli distinctions, our conviction that the fixit-,, of is representationalconsciousness basic to all experience, has been deconstructed.The act of beginning can be identified with the first of three moments of thought described by Hegel in EL. Thought, in thinking the Concept as simple Being, operates as Undervanding, which, in thinking the Absolute, 'abstracts a particular category fi-om its 28 its The beginning only occurs when thought context and clarifies specific meaning',

from Understanding the the qua abstracts simple, absolute unity of self-consciousness developed actuality of self-consciousness,and holds it fast as a determination of thought (SL 1,71/71-2, EL §80). Here, then, it is apparent that the fixity that cbaracterises has in consciousness an analogue philosophical consciousness or in representational being itself The illusory fixity of representational consciousnesswill tbus reappear and be comprehended in SL as an ontological detennination, as characteristic of being. Becausethis is a necessarydeten-ninationof bein& illusion is not simply accidental, but Hegel Like Deleuze Bergson, and will thus identify the internal is ontologically rooted. being. tendency the of appearing of a illusions of consciousnesswitb The inconsistency of the initial detennination with itself (wbicb we will exwnine fully Absolute failure Understanding in the to the render of a moment), i-nore closely deten-ninate, is the second moment of thougk

thought as dialectical. This is not a

different subjective faculty. but a relation of thougbt to itself that develops out of the It Understanding. is thus not external reflection, which transcends what is moment of

it but by to transcending the to as an object, Itself immanent opposing it given 28Burbidge, 1995, p. 42,

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[Hinausgehenl' of Understanding. and 'the genuine nature that properly belongs to the detenninations of the understanding' (FL §81). Through this self-transcending of thought 'immanent coherence and necessitv enter into the content of Science' (EL §81, Hegel's

empbasis). This negafive moment in which thought experiences its real difference from itself is itself immanently transcended in the third moment of thought, thought as In difference from this the thought authenticallyspeculafive. moment of itself is grasped as the reconstituted unity of thought with itself This unity is no longer simple, like the from Being beginning but has itself different PS, the of at of experienced as itself unity it is "something-concrete [ein Konkreles]' (EL §82)1 like self-consciousnessas and so actual at the end of PS. This result has emerged analytically from the initial, abstract it for itself Understanding, has thought experienced as unity of yet is a synthetic result, from different itself Through development, itself this thought really recognises again, but also re-cognises itself, as altered from what it expected to find, for new content has emerged out of the preceding difference. The names used for the determinations of the Absolute that are arnved at in this way may be contingent fi-om the standpoint of Science, for they are taken from a vocabulary that has developed historically. However, their scientific meaning as determinations of the Absolute, is not abstract, as it arises immanently within thought. The transition from Being to the determination of Beconung,provides a concrete

is Being thougbt. this of internally undifferentiated,and example of self-transcending is inconsistent detennination. But Being thus to with itself, externally unrelated any other for its content turns out to be Nothing, absolute nullity, empty thiný-jng, lack of content (SL 1,82-3/82). There is nothing in Being to determine it as the grasping of content as lack Similarly, the of content. of a wben tbougbt considers the grasping against determinafion of Nothing, there is no positive content to mark it off against the content detennination is Nothing, because the Being, thought this of although noxv of

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determination still js thought (SL 1,83/82). Every fime thought tries to separatethem, it cannot find anything in its content to distinguish them. yet is sifill a-wareof them as different. Attending to itself as Being and as Nothing, presentsa difference. but one that immediate. it This distinction disappears is as soon as appears: even- tiine Being or Nothing, is grasped, it immediately passesover mto the other, or rather, 'has passedover' (.SL 1,83/83) into the otber, for eack insofar as it is gi-aspedas what it is, Being or Nothing, is always already its other. This paradoxical result is the dialectical moment of thought that results.from the initial deteimiination of the Absolute as Being. But the difference of each from itself and its vanishing into the other cannot be separatedfrom the vanishing of the other In it. This means that the difference of each in thought, but one that has been constituted through a moment of from itself is a unity difference. Thougbt re-cognisesitself in this new unity, Becoming. as the restlessrelation of Being and Nothing (SL 1,83/82-3). This speculative moment comprehends the two determinations by Becoming as the totality, initial within a which is constituted determination that includes both their identitv and their difference. However, this is an open totality, for Becoming is itself the negative unity of Being and Nothing, only gmped as a positive, immediate unity of the inconsistenciesof each. Becoming contains itself, itself be tbus to and will also sbow negatiVity witbin inconsistent witb itself wben it is isolated as a positive, fixed determination. The process of determining the Absolute in SL can ordy be complete wben this for determinations itself becomes the explicit inconsistency or negativity of various

thought or being as a dimension of itself, comprehendedor included within a deten-nination that is not inconsistent with itself

The positive immediacv of the

determinations of the SL's Doctrine of Being and their immediate difference from other detenninations will themselves be understood in the second division, the Doctrine of Essence, as detenninations of a foundation or ground that lies behind or within foundafionalism head for Hegel 'essential Here this on, attacks relation' will immediacy.

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itself turn out to be an inconsistent or illusory detennination of being. This is finally demonstrated in the Doctrine of the Concept. where thought comes to comprehend its unity with being (the Absolute) as a self-determining unity, which is determined neither by its immediate difference from other, 91 iven determinations, nor by the mediation 1 of an 1

essence.

iii)

Positing, Presupposing and Grounding in the Logic of Essence The argument of SL is thus that the absolute umty of tbougbt and being cannot

be consistently determined as either a simple, immediate unity, nor as an essence,ground foundation, because of the negatiVity that these determinations imply in different or TbIs, I directly Hegel to that argue now, means ways. want addresses Schelfingian objections to the absolutenessand presuppositionlessnessof Absolute Knowing in SL. jWe have already seenhow Absolute Knowing, as introduced by PS, emerges out of the deconstruction of finite consciousnessand foundationalist method, and is not dogmatic it Dfising being. We have the to consider the objections advanced in accuses of now way by Scbulz, Bowie and Frank, all of wbicb focus on Schelling's positing of a 'higber' Absolute, an immediate non-rational unity of thought and being that is posited as the Hegel's Absolute Knowing), (including and which ultimate presupposition of all reason but through cannot know directly as an ecstatic intuition reason can experience

determinate. This unity is, as we saw in Chapter Two, posited as transcending even reason, becomes Its becoming the subject of a mythological narrative. and so eventually detenninate for itself cannot be regarded as necessary, and so it is ungrounded, inexplicable. In the PS, Hegel treats the positing of i-'ust such an uttefly transcendent in it Revealed the immanent produces, nevertheless what sections on in unity, which is Religion. I'lie religious consciousnessposits God as the foundation of determinafion, his be However, becornes through to the that relation self-conscious creates. world who

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the creation itself is inberently mysterious. The sense in wbicb God is immanent in or related to the world is impossible for representational consciousnessto understand: the relation between them appears as an 'incomprehensible happening [Geschehen]', with God, the in-itself of religious consciousness,assuming 'the fon-n of jndýfferenl being' (PS 543/471 §780). Elsewhere, Hegel distinguishes philosophical cognition from Lnarration[s] of happenings lwas geschiehtl', foT philosophy must 'comprehend that in the narrative, appears as a mere happening [bloOes Geschehenl' (SL 11, which, 260/588). Recourse to such 'happenings' in philosophy in order to explain deten-ninations idly representationalconsciousnessto think the represents,for Hegel, the inability of a ri 91 Absolute successfully. Difference is posited as simply suddenly appearing in the Absolute, an event which can only be understood in tenns of the 'before' and 'after' of a narrative, as in Schelling's mythology of creation. The positing of an utterly transcendent,indifferent term as the presupposition of philosophy which is known as this presupposition tbrougb a superior intuition means that knowledge of its immanence in the world becomes problematic. There is no way of making a necessary or essential connection between the Absolute and the relative without simply illegitimately internally Absolute that the presupposing or essentially resemblesthe relative. Hegel sees the positing of a higher Absolute in which dissonance is simply an illusory has 'event' the that a consciousness as product of not comprehended ungrounded the negativity inherent in the detennination it has posited in the Absolute. In the Doctrine from immediate difference determination is Being, the of one of as we saw, another it. happens Doctrine Essence, however, 'llie to that simply of comprehends something this negativity as an effect of an essence,foundation, or ground. But this relation between immediacy itself has form, deten-ninations of intemal negativity In a new and essenceand I beyond leads now want to show bow Schelling's positing of a higbeT thus itself Absolute can be read as inconsistent with itself by relafing it, not to the Doctrine of

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Being and Hegel's account of immediacy. but to the determinations of PresupposinL,and Positing Reflection in the Doctrine of Essence.In this way, the objections of Schulz, Bowie and Frank will be shown to be dependent on a definition of the Absolute that cannot explain finite deten-nination. In SL, Being, and its subsequent determinations are immediately unequal to tbemselves:as soon as tbey are graspedpositively, they differ from themselves.Being,is immediately Nothing; later, Something is immediately Other (SL 1,125-7,1117-19) and first deterrninations In Doctrine the the the so on. place, all of of Being simply are, yet through being deten-ninateas themselves,they are also something other than themselves. All detenninations of Being are tbus inadequate to tbemselves, as they cannot basic instability deten-ninations their comprehend own as of Being, which contains negativity and hence instability, but as undevelopedor implicit negativity. The end of the Doctrine of Being sees Being itself sublated: rather than one beconling Being another category and thus sublating immediately unstable category of itself, all deten-ninationsof Being are sublated in the categorv of Absolute Indifference, insofar it detel-minations Being. But this the as is of it is unity only wbich is unity of all the negam,e unity of their internal movement, that is, of the immediate transitions that

it is PS, Like different determinations Being the to a result end of of eacbotber. relate that comprebendsthe beginning of its development, but knows it now as posited througb inherently As the totality of the transitions that make up the movement. an negative Doctrine of Being, Absolute Indifference is therefore not itself an immediate transition (Ilbergang), but a -negatively self-related and i1whicitly differentiated unity which detenninations. foregoing the comprebendsall If Indifference is this unity, then the Being, Determinate Being etc. of anything js be being Indifference. because to thought the of and shows itself absolute unity only Indifference is the condition of the stabilitv of Being and of its instability (SL 1, 457/385). I'lie detennination of Indifference is 'a simple and infinite, negative relation-

206

to-self, its inherent incompatibility with itself a repelling of itself from itself' (SL 1,4567/384.). Hence Indifference is not, for Hegel, the uttefly transcendent 'iffeflexive' determination of the higher Absolute that it is for Schelling.29 it is a unity that is understood a) as the unity of the deten-ninationsof Being- and then b) as that which is other than Being and posiis its determinations, which now appear as being what they are because they are mediated (SL 1,457/384). Indifference has a further determination only in b), and is consequently graspedas Essence. Essence is not therefore simply an immediacy over against Being, and determined in relation to it as the immediate Other of Being. Instead, it Is an 'advance' Being, from the sublation of the spbere of Being or of inmediacy as sucb. on resulting Essenceis what Being tums out to be when the inconsistency of the immediate with itself bas been fully comprebended as that wbicb defines all determinations of Being, (SL 11, 14/390). Hegel's claim is thus that any immediate determination of the absolute unity of being and tbouglit presupposes Essence as the determination that renders immediacy thinkable or determinate. The determinations of Essence will

comprehend the

determinations of Being as mediated througb Essence,as reflected, opposed, grounded, is into Essence that conditioned and so on. self-related negativity, which all immediate

determinationsof somethingare reflected.717bis mediatedunity of Essencewith itself (as immediate itself) is Essence Being's to opposed inequality with is also unstable (SL wby 11,16/391). Schulz, Frank and Bowie all read Schelling's higher Absolute as a critique of this Hegelian claim. Frank and Bowie, like Schulz, argue that reasonhas to presupposethat it itsexistential inserted -00 'always ground, with which it is united in a superior in already is intuition. This around is an utterly immediate, untbinkable unity that is radically otber '9 Cf Frank, 1975, pý 148 and Schulz, op. cii., p. 347 on the Absolute as an wivordeiiA-licher

G,rliiid that is neverthelessthe ground of reason. 30Schulz, op. cit., pp. 3344-5.

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than thought, while sfill being the ground of though and thus somehow immanent in it. In this way, the relation between the Absolute and reason cannot be reduced to a rational relation: the Absolute is not simply the relative other of thought. for this would concevve their relation as one of mutual negative conditioning, like that between the Fichtean I and be defined To has Absolute through such a negative relation. or to that the not-1. assume even as such a relation itself, is nothing more than an assumption which cannot be The has For Frank Absolute true to transcend proven. al-I such relations. example, acknowledgesthat Being in the SL is implicitly self-relation, and thus requires a negative its of reflection as conditionunity

31

But the idea that this is absolute knowledge means

that, for Frank, liege] moves in a circle. Irnmediacy is re-cognised as conditioned by mediation onlv because the immediacv that fonns the beginning is a mere concept of immediacy. 'Me identity of the Absolute and the concept of immediacy can ordy be presupposed. We now turn to the Doctrine of Essence in order to assessthese criticisms. Essenceinitially emerged as the negative movement of immediate Bemg, but defined fast Being. This held Being Essence over against as immediately nol is as a qualitatively distinct kind of Being, as essential Being over against inessential (immediate) Being (SL 11,18-19/394-5). But Essence has already been shown to be the negation of all immediacy as sucb. Essence,as negative movement.,tbus expressesthe self-nullification illusory for immediacy but Being, Being, 'show' nothing of immediate is now which all longer be is Schein "sbine' (Schein). that self-subsistent simply or can no immediacy tbrough being immediate. Being turns out to be a moment of Essence,distinguished from it through Essence'snegative relation to itself, and then sinking back into Essence,as this but Essence 11,20-1/396-7). (ISL the negative nothing movement of is itself immediacy As Being is now conceived of as the 'shining' oj'Essence, Essencehas shown itself to be from longer different Bei itself, no simply a negative into unity which ing internally 31Frank, 197-5,pp 33-4.

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collapses, but also Reflection, its own internal movement of posifing and return (SL 11, 23-4/399; EL § 112). Being is not therefore simply nothing. It is an immediacy that is nothing but a movement of absolute negativity, yet is distinguished from Essencethrough Essence's own negative relation to itself (EL § 112 Zus.). Hence there is nothing outside reflecfion 32 to negate: there is no longeT any munediately given otherness(SL 11,25j400) Essence., . as that which Being shows itself to be, "I

turn out to be a reflection that excludes itself

from itself, or Opposition (SL 11,59/427),33It will thus posit itself as being,, througb its different from own self-relation, reallv or other to itself This will be important, as we sball see in the next cbapter, for Hegel's account of the emergence of real difference from unity in the Doctrine of the Concept. But with absolute or self-related Reflection, there is no real difference between Essenceand its 'sbining'. onlv a distinction which is posited through or for Reflection, and is therefore not real, but constantly collapsing. '17hisisbecause absolute Reflection has two moments, each of which thought isolates and internally Positing is Reflection the sublation of the restless each of which is unstable. negative movement that is Essence,and the positing of Being, or immediacy in general, Essence that through the positing, occurs movement i. e., one of which is an absolute itself But it is simultaneously Presupposing Reflection, as it requires that there be an immediacy that is dissolved into the restless movement of Essence that sublates,all So the positing of immediacy througb reflection only occurs in relation to a immediacy. but is only relative (SL 11,26-7/400-1). Essenceas a given immediacy, and not absolute Being This Fichte the that posit absolutely. problem was self-related unity cannot simply free by has be I WL, the the the to positing of not4 reconceived as encounteredin where the necessary,negative conditioning of each by the other, becausean absolute positing of

31Schmidt, 1997, p. 59 n. 80. 33

lhid, p 71

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difference is inconceivable in terms of abstract unity -a

proposition with NNhich

Deleuze would agTee. Hence Essencebas sbown itself to be that througli whicli Being is posited, but only insofar as this positing of immediacy is also the presupposing of immediacy. Essencethus presupposesitself as its own Icendation',

its own 'in-itself,

for it only

emergesfrom Being if Being has already been posited as InbeTentlynegativity, Inherently circular, Reflection will turn out to be an inadequatedetermmation, but not in relation to

a foundationthat is given to thougbt, sucbasthe Scbellingianbigber Absolute.Instead,it be will inadequatelo iiself, for the incessantto-and-fro movement whereby it posits only because it presupposes and vice versa will

be actually constitutive of a un,IN,

(Determining Reflection) in which thought comprehends this internal difference of Reflection in a new determination. Initially, the presupposing side seems more stable. It may begin from an is (Geselzisein), but detenninate that this immediate only as positedness immediate is over against Reflection, as nol Reflection. Reflection therefore appears as External Reflection, becauseit presupposes,not an Irm-nedlatelydifferent other, whose difference from it would be vanishing or illusory, but i1self as other, as an entirelv sublated or n) (SL 11,27-8/401-2). negated movement of negativity

Reflection's I own otber,

is difference between from internal difference, here Reflection there so a real resulting its 14Precisely because thisdifference immediacy and '.

illusory, however. it and real is -not

but be the the otber, presupposed irnmediacy is not of an immediacy, cannot maintained: bas been (i. It Reflection that posiled as an immediacy is absolutely e., througb of as such. Reflection's own self-relation) other than reflection, or as presupposed (SL 11,28-9/402-

3). The apparent stability or full detertmnatenessof External Reflection is only apparent: External Reflection presupposes itself as absolutely subiated, as the negative of

34

Ihid, p. 49.

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negativity.but this itself ansesthroughthe self-relationof Reflection.Even thought it is the negation of all positing, it is still posiled as this negation. Extemal Reflection too is not what it was taken to be. It is re-cognised as Determining Reflection, in which the immediate is constituted through the negative relation-to-self of essence,as being itvetf related-to-self. Here the immediate is posited as being related-to-self and thus as self-subsistent, and as related to another negative selfrelation (SL 11,30-2/404-5). In this way, Reflection becomes determinate in relation to itself positing itself as determinations (identity, Difference etc.) which, becausethey are posited as related-to-themselves,subsist as really different to other Concepts rather than simply passing over immediately into tbem. It is this whole sequence, from Positing through External to Deten-nining Reflection, that Frank and Bowie make the object of a detailed critique. The pivotal issue for them is whether or not thought can be genuinely infimte and comprehend an absolute immediacy that is in-itself neither thought nor an object posited relatively to thought and is They be the this the case, that presupposifion of all reflecfion. all argue which cwmot that thought can only presupposethat it can comprehend the Absolute. For them, Hegel's logic/ontology is purely negative, for it is a kind of presupposingreflection that assumes, finite be did Fichte, Absolute that the the must resemble subject, and a reflexive selfas Bemg, "higher' Absolute. transcendmg truly than the relation rather all reflexivity as a immediacy witb whieb SL begins., is notliing more fban a reflection of the unity of thought, rather than being a true immediacy, which could only be known in a superior Positing Consequently, Frank that thougbt the cannot of argues recognise unity intuition. but External Reflection in thought, can only presupposethat this unity is as absolute and fails difference between And to the acknowledge presupposition real a sucb absolute. self-related reflection and reflection that is related to a true immediacV given through an Schulz immediacy is because, This intuition. true as argues, is that .N-hicbis ecstatic fTom that self-groundingwhich any reflevve reco-Wition positively and substantially

211

begins. The immediacy that reflection posits. being a negation of the restless movement of negativity, is notbing positive, on])- hTtmediatenon-being or Schein in relation to the ie notes that the true, iffeflexive and real immediacy that conditions the movement. BoW1 Extemal of unity and Positing Reflection in thought would have to include the real difference between a posited immediacy and the real immediacy of Absolute Identity. and their identity. This is not possible in thought, however, for any conceptual unit.%, would simply be posited by thougbt, and would thus be negative in Schelling's sense. This Cntique is, in Hegelian terms, advanced from the perspective of representational consciousness,and posits an illusory distinction between the Absolute and the relative, and between intuition and tbought. As we saw, the PS ends Witb the dissolution of all distinctions between objects-for-us and objects-in-themselves. Absolute is dogmatic therefore the not certainty of the unity of reflection with a superior Kjjowing intuition of the in-itself of obj-.ects. Instead, it is knowledge of the decentred.mode of selfis for be determinate that there to relation required any positing of an object-]n-itself or object-for-us at all. A possible Schellingian objection to this notion would be that the PS itself simply assumesthat the real difference between an object-for-us and an object-mffir difference itself is a

in fact it implies consciousness, when an irreconcilable

difference between thought and intuition. The PS thus relies on an identity in consciousnessof the object-for-us and the object-in-itself that is merely posited. and which thus does not acknowledge the absolute presupposition of all reflection. Hegel's for-another difference in-itself this the objection simply repeats of responseis clear: and it it is ignore And fact to to to the that comprehend refuse comprehending all without ý36 for-us between in-itself difference the and experience of is consciousness's own real difference from itself its own mode of existencewhicb it knaws as its own.

li Bowie, op. a.t., p. 142

A6Pippin, 1989, pp. 94-6.

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The difference between Schelling's positing of a higher Absolute as the ground follows. The distinction Hegel's of and immanent overcoming of consciousness is as for Schellingitself from the difference is, repeated experience of consciousness's Absolute, between difference the experience of an unsublatable self-consciousnessand higher be in the a wlilcli can only identity through which overcome ecstatic experience of the reality of the distinction is destroyed. For Hegel, this experience of difference constitutes the actuality of self-consciousness,and can only be overcome through itself by in than rather positing, addition to this reality, a superior intuition which gives access to the true unity that grounds all experience. This intuition of an indetenninate unity that deten-ninate be be to that is nevertheless as ground can only posited as something ougghi 37 possible, but cannot in principle be kni-, mw to be possible. It can only be postulated as the equivocal ground of knowledge, as knowledge that is not-knowledge. The bigber Absolute, as we saw in Chapters Two and Four, becomes posited in Schelling's more dogmatic moments, not as genuinely absolute, but as resernbling in itself the relative. For Sebelling, the relafion between self-consciousness and the Absolute is a contradictory one: an absolute opposition that neverthelessincludes a ground of identity. Self-consciousness is an inessential, negative self-relation that produces nothing but Schein, whereas the Absolute has substantial, positive existence. From a Hegelian it between is that, the them standpoint appears cruciafly. ground of identity merely posited: the Absolute is not just an indeteffninate unity, but the indeten-ninateunity that is determined immanent This the as ground of reason. problematic groundsimultaneously relation is required in order not to reduce the Absolute to a relative other of thought.,an does have deten-nination is Hence Absolute by the that not a presupposed object-for-us. by foundation. further, it detennined And this positing is posited or reason as a reason, is for it happens terms a presupposin& only in relation to given or also on its own immediate determinations of experience. The positing of an Absolute which is utterly 171 Cf Dusing, 199-5,pp. 21,142,197 7, pp. 1-20,122,12T

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transcendent yet at the same time immanent in reason as its own condition is made necessaryby presuppositions about experience. Primary bere is the assumption that the difference between subject and object is the internal limit of consciousness that determines what will constitute meaningful expenence for us. and that consequent]-yall consciousnessis representational. Hence the positing of a higher Absolute is relative to these assumptions. Scbelling's reliance on a superior intuition is meant to break the circle of Presupposingand Positing Reflection, for reason is understood as only presupposing this if But this presupposed intuition is knowledge of the Absolute determined as intuition. the foundation of all detennination, then Scbelling contradicts bimself. The Absolute that be in intuited, be experienced would such an intuition could not as previously noted. as the ground of reason. Sucb an intuition could only contain the dissolution of all

determination,as Schellinginsistsin his more consistentmoments.In order to knoir the Absolute as the ground of reason, Schelling, like Fichte, has to take on the impossible task of constructing a complete system of the Absolute in order to fully determine this grounding relation. Ile pm-adoxical intuition througb whicb reason becomes ecstatic in knows determined its is Absolute to the relation as as ground thus merely itself and yet foundation Schelling himself the of philosophy. affin-ns this when he tiies to posiled as think the Absolute in his middle period as genuinely 'higher. outside all relation to the finite yet still as the ground of determination. But this just affirms that the relation between the transcendent Absolute and determinate experience cannot in principle be knowm jJust liik e the relation between the ftmscendent God and the world that is posited by the religious consciousnessin PS. We thus have to consider two points: a) Hegel's model of Absolute Knowing does not function as Scbelling and his interpreters believe it does, and b) Scbelling's own is Absolute (the the contradictory, and afflicted with a negativity relation conception of between Absolute and relative) that it cannot comprebend, but can on]Nr poO.i as

214

further demonstrated be The Schelling's Absolute unknowable. can in inadequacy of relation to Hegel's explicit attack on the idea of a transcendent foundation in flic subsequentsections on Ground, in which the illusory basis of foundationalist thought is furtber undermined. Ground is the consequenceof the collapse of the determination of Opposition itself, because it inadequate be to to Opposition. proves remains determined by the contradictory relation between self-subsistenceand positedness(Ire]ation-to-otber.) that first ariseswith Reflection. The positive and negative poles of an opposition, sucb as Absolute Identity and self-relation, are simultaneously self-related and related to an other. This relation is asymmetric4 however, for the positive (Absolute Identity), insofar

as it is positive, is opposedto the relation of opposition itself or is independent(SL 11, 58-9/426). The negative (self-related reflection) is the negation of the positive, and is thus the relation of opposition itself (St It, 59/427). In this way. eacb is related to the

other through itself the positive is the exclusion from itself of the relation of opposition, and the negative is the exclusion from itself of the positive that is negated opposition. Here, the difference of thought from itself is no longer that which was known as Positing 38

or Detennining Reflection, but is now Excluding (auvvViý, 0enkle)Reflection.

Essenceis itself insofar as it excludes itself from itself or is external to itself this is the result of Opposition, in which is made explicit the previously implicit detennination of Contradiction, in which neither side, positive or negative, is positive or is its insofar both. Each negative, or rather, each pole pole excludes own self-subsistence as it is self-subsistent (SL 11,64-5/431) and is reflected into its other. These opposites thus ceaselessly collapse into each other (SL 11,70/4351). This negative unity is Contradiction, but grasped as a unity that excludes itself from itself, thus positing the In between Identity it Ground. Absolute tenns the of relation and selfopposition, is is Absolute Absolute Ground the the postulated as of and self-relation, or unitv relafion, 11,84/447). However, (SL Absolute it is no more stable than the relation and relative of 38Schrmdt,op. cjt,, pp, 74-5.

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contained in Opposition, for the contrad,ctory relation between self-subs,stence and poS]tednessstill determines it. Ground is the unity of itself and that which it grounds. However, as ground of a grounded tenn, that is, asJust this ground, the ground has both form and content, and is determinate, for it is Ground in relation to an opposition (.SL 11,94-5,455-6). From tiow on, the problem of the circle of self-subsistence and positedness arises again. For example, witb the Concept of Formal Ground, the grounding relation is consfituted by the fonnal reflexive relation of Cirround to itself, whereby the content of Ground is

reflected in the grounded (SL 11,96/456-7) (Absolute Identity qua ground of knowing is posited as positing itself in and tlirouO the relative). However, in this way, the Ground is just as mucli posited as Ground by the grounded. The notion of an undifferentiated Ch-oundthat is the unity of itself and the grounded itself turns out to be alreadv the grounded of another Ground. There is no stable difference between the posited tenn (initially., the grounded) and that which is presupposed (the ground'), as they stand in the samerelation to each other. In relation to this development, Schelling's account of the Absolute as an be from presupposition can only consistent unconditioned witbin representational consciousness.Hegel shows that the idea that detennination can be explained solely with is Ground to transcendent thougli reference a ground illusory, even arisesas an immanent (thougb incomplete) determination of the meaning of the Absolute. Ground can never be if it is it Hegel, then, argues simply presupposed: is only ground understood as a ground, because of its determination in relation to that which it is supposed to ground. In this is distinctionless, Absolute transcendent the of as either posited a conceived as nonway, in it case cannot serve as a ground, or it is posited as a which rational substantial unity,

in Schelling's first first In the the account as of creation. unit-v, case,it rational substantial for is formal determination, determinate it posited as a unity without any cannot stil)port latter determinate In bet,, the the case, to the relative. relafion -,-een it and the relafion

216

Scbelling's breaks own relative is simply posited in relation to experience, whicb restriction on positing an internal resemblancebetween the Absolute as an ontological unity and that which it conditions. The only other option consistent with representational consciousnesss awareness of diff erence is to think the Absolute itself as internalIN. different from itself, but this also cannot, for Schellmg, ultimate]y explain determination. as it undermines foundationalism from within. Hegel's deconstruction of the structure of Ground is vitally important, as we for SL, for his the the shall see in meaning of enterprise in it next chapter, understanding marks the point at wbicli his critique of the ontologically-rooted illusory nature of

foundationalismbegins to becomeexplicit. Through it, he shows that foundationalism itself is based on a circular, intemally negative structure of being and thought. A transcendent in-itself cannot serve as an unconditioned ground of deten-nination, for insofar as it is unconditioned, it is Without determination, and insofar as it is determined foundation it is determined in be to the of something, relation subject and cannot as a it is it Further, distinctionless simply understood as a if unity, is neither unconditioned. for-us, nor in-itself

And if this is so, then we are dealing With the thought of a

begins both PS SL, Being Hegel and and which problematic, positive unity of with which turns out to be internally negative. Begel's model of Absolute KnoWing can be defended

it, firstly because Schelli-rigian these then, objections misconstrue and objections, apainst foundationalist for itself because the the of position structure account secondly it can behind these objections, shoWing it to be illusory or self-cancelling. In the next chapter, his bow Concept, Doctrine Hegel's to the order see it realises goal, of in we will examine to formulate an antifoundationalist philosophy.

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Chapter Seven Hegel's Concept as an Antifoundational Principle

i)

Introduction Contrasting with the view that is commonly taken of the relationship between

Deleuze and Hegel, namely, that they are thinkeTs whose visions of the task of incommensurable, four the philosophy are previous chapters have laid out a thematic territory common to both. A central feature of this territory is the idea that transcendental illusions native to reason are the sources of all philosophical misdirection. This ideafrom Kant's Copernican Revolution. replacesthe Cartesiannotion of error (DR resulting 195/150), just as Kant's notion of Darvellung undercuts Descartes' representationalist theory of truth. Both Dele-uzeand Hegel take Kant to task, however, for failing to I-adequately understand the nature of transcendentalillusion. For these thinkers, illusions from destiny the nature and arise unquestioned presuppositions about of thought. These foundationalist force to presuppositions philosophy produce a model of thought, exemplified by the models of critical thinking that dominated the Enlightenment. Enlightenment thinking, in attempting to establish a rigorous distinction between justifiable knowledge and mere belief was forced to fight a rearguard.action against the distinction it had deployed. The of such a was seen to possibility veqv scepticism itself depend upon the possibility of proving that theTeis a priori svntbetic knowledge. which, by in Kant, Fichte, Chapter Two, and.,above all, was undermined successively as we saw by Schelling, despite their intentions. I have tried to show that the trauma of reason, a philosophical crisis of meaning foundations, be be Enlightenment to the obsession with that is the iresult of can said an important point of orientation for both Hegel and Deleuze. Both attempt to construct foundationalism be the that to enable presuppositions will of models of philosophy Both for that the only adequate. non-circular also affirm criticised. and accounted

218

focuses be these on the account of presuppositions will an ontological one. which meaning of the Absolute as the 'object' specific to philosopby. Hegel and Deleuze see transcendentalillusion as rooted, not in accidental deten-ninationsof consciousness,but in being itself For Deleuze, as for Bergson. Illusion Is the product of .,-Irtual tendencies being that are actualised as differences of degree and which thus distort the nature within of being, which is to be different in kind from itself For 14egel,illusion is rooted in the negatiVltv of being, and its immanent determination as immediacy, and as mediated immediacy or Essence.

We still needto considerthat determinationwhich Hegel considersan adequate expression of the Absolute, wbich will require us to examine the Doctrine of the Concept SL. Chapters In Three and Four, we traced Deleuze's development of an image of in philosophy that affinned the lack of incomgible foundations as a positive state of affairs. We need to consider now the fulfilment of Hegel's own antifoundationali st ontology in SL. I aim in this chapter to exarnine Deleuze's Schellin&"an denunciation of Hegel's 'hidden' fbundafionallsniý and to show how Hegel can be read against this interpretafion,

further concentrating upon the critique of the idea of a substantial, transcendent foundation that is developed in SL. In this way, the antifoundationalism of Hegels be brought ontology will out, and allowed to stand alongside Deleuze's. In the next, concluding chapter, their respective versions of antifoundationalism Will be clIfically

examinedin relation to eachother.

ii) Deleuze's Critique of the Immanence of the Pure Concept Many of Deletize's criticisms of flegel share their orientation with those Schelling, Both Deleuze Hegel by Schelling. and accuse of not acknowledging advanced that the Absolute is incommensurable with thought. As we have seen,theN7argue for this different different intentions. Nevertheless, both and ways with in inconunensurability For construct that cannot a presuppositionles& philosophy absolute system. affinn

219

Deleuze, as for many post-war French thinkers. the ideal of an absolute, self-grounding Scbelling As is target. tbus saw, we and self-enclosed philosopbjcal system a primary first undermined this ideal from within. by arguing that philosophy has to presuppose.as the ultimate condition of real determination, a 'hiaer'

Absolute that cannot in principle

be comprehended within thought. This means that there can be no a priori conceptual basic Schelling Absolute. the the tbus assumption exposed system capable of containing

foundationallst of philosophy, i.e., that the Absolute is identical With reason, as an for Deleuze's the to attempt account ungrounded and unprovable subjective conviction. origins of this belief follows Schelling's general line of thinking by, after Bergson,

determining foundationalism (Platonism) as a transcendentalillusion that expresses certain virtual tendencies within being. He argues that foundationalisin always has to knows transcendent that the unity of reason and Absolute, i. e., presupposea subjectiVity an act of 'knowing before knowing'. This presupposition is what Schelling makes explicit as an act of faith. Deleuze's deten-ninationof the Absolute, the movement of Absolute Difference, higher be determined Absolute to think to the in relation is an attempt without allowing it to experience. As we saw in the previous chapter, the wnbivalence of Schelling's higher Absolute can be understood vnth reference to Hegel's deconstruction of ground-relations had be Absolute SL. We that the to posited as the transcendent,substantial ground saw in bad be illegitimate detennination. But to this that an resemblance posited meant of between Absolute and relative, with the detenninations of the relative being presupposed

its inner deteffninations. Hence Scbelling does Absolute the as necessary as inherentin definitions Kantian that the problem of assuming certain of the meaning of not solve for Deleuze, betrays true that, of all expenence, an assumption experience are universally the deeper assumption of a transcendentsubjectivity, a common sense,a shared context

horizon i Deleuze's the of meaning always is already estabil universal sbed. in wbich implied disavow bv Platonic the to the of a common notion sense image of response is

220

before 'knowing in hope transcendent thought the of avoiding the presupposition of a knowing', wbich forces foundationalist thougbt to move in a circle. Instead. he attendsto for . thinkingthe minimal presupposifion of philosophy considered as a pracu ce of which bim is the internal difference of thought from itself. This, for Deleuze, is the inner limit of thought, which cannot be comprehendedby a concept. It is thought's transcendental being. limit, by because that contingent object, it is its own its own which is its nght, Deleuze thus takes up Schelling's prq:ject of detennining the Absolute-in-Itself without positing

It as internally

resembling

presupposed

structures

of experience.

For Deleuze,

all

is, thinking, that thinking that seesthe identity of the concept as the measure conceptual of genuine knowledge, must presuppose the movement of the internal difference of thought ftom itself as a minimal condition of any activity of thinking. As this movement

incomprehensible for is conceptual thought, Deleuze concurs With Scbelling that the Absolute is encounteredinitially by philosophy as the contingent being of thought itself As with Scbellmg- this contingency is an irreduCible ontolo 91 .cal presupposition that is forever impossible for foundationalist thought to comprehend, even though the tendenciesthat bring tbougbt into existence are absolutely immanent NVItbintbougbt. Deleuze's criticisms of Hegel centre on the idea that the Hegelian svstem aims to

ic and Realphilosophie. In this, be a total, closed ontological system, including both lo 91 he follows his teacher Jean Hyppolite in taking seriously Hegel's claims about the import Deleuze, Knowing. For liege] Platonist Absolute then, of is a or ontological foundationalist, who presupposes the existence of the priNrileged perspective of a transcendent subject, a lheoros. Deleuze reads SL as purporting to deduce the inner form logical Being, an a priori grammar of the Absolute, and whicb will articulations of determinafion. fact The the that ouT conscious thus of all condition actual constitute will is it is be Being, thus the the as structured will grounded of world in nature of experience The fixed have horizon thought. to thus pure system will a accessible of which is ineaning

or common

sense within

which

we can

221

think Being, that of the self-relation of

the Concept or self-thinking thought. Any talk of Being that defines it as infinitely other than thought, or incommensurable with itself posits it illegitimately as really existing beyond this horizon of meaning. Thus far, Deleuze concurs with Schelling's reading of SL as a negative philosophy that identifies. the inner meaning of an absolute unity with the conceptual unity of thought, and supposedly grounds itself by retuming immanently through the analysis of this umtv to the point where it began, havmg unfolded its whole content. To assume that this content comprises anything more than merely possible determinations of Being is, for Deleuze and for Sebellim,, to posit an illusory unit-v of being and thought. In an early review of Hyppolite's Logique el existence, Deleuze points out that Hegel determines the absolute borizon and meaning of experience by proposing that Absolute Knowing is not knowledge of things-In-themselves beyond the veil of ical grammar of the appearance. Instead, it is Simply knowledge of the internal lo 91 familiar meaning of our experience (A 458). Deleuze thus agrees with Schelling and Marx that Hegel's analysis of the Concept of pure Being reverses an actual relation between consciousnessand its real, matenal conditions. This analysis analyses nothing but our presuppoSitionsabout the meamng of our own experience, a procedure that can only reveal the internal structure of these presupposedmeanings, rather than accounting for their existence. Hegel determines this structure through the self-relation of the Concept, which for Deleuze is a relation that embodies in Hegel's thought the foundationalist assumption of a transcendentsubjectivity. Deleuze suggeststhat Hegel's fundamental assumption, that the minimal meaning of Being is as simple, indeterminate

Being (DR a philosophical reflection simply of an empirical and so on, is image of 169/129) that posits it as identical with the pure Concept. The real source of interest, for Deleuze, is thus bow to explain the genesis of these presuppositions. which be attempts to do by leaving behind the intenonty of the self-tbink-ing Concept.

222

Deleuze then, like Schelling, arguesthat Hegel simply assumesthat Being is. like This means that the inner to reflexive self-consciousness, related itself negatively. determinations of Being anse through its inconsistency with itself, i. e., through the logical operation of contradiction. For Deleuze, this determination of difference as for is difference highest degree that thinkable the representational contradicfion is of degree determined difference It tbus of in relation to a consciousness. remains a for kind), identity difference, difference (rather than it a of an absolute presupposed representsa unity that is itself only insofar as it differs from all it is not, a negative unity. The Absolute, for Hey-el, is that which expresses the contradictorv nature of all fact that, in relation to consciousness,any appearanceis both itself and the phenomena., Hegel Kant's the the two. thus tied to and negative something else unity of remains transcendental Ideal of the complete determination of a self-identical individual in relation to the totality of other individuals (DR 65/45). The reallsation of this Ideal would mean that the real, internal relations between phenomena would have been fully determined. Such an Ideal would therefore be a transcendent substance, for which all be itself full This to pbenomenal relations would aspectsof its internal relation goal of determination is, according to Deleuze, meant to be fulfilled by the Doctrine of the Concept, where the Concept becomes the Absolute Idea, the transcendent 'ground' and substanceof all difference (DR 61-2/42). But this whole image of philosophy is basedon image is difference by Absolute the that the empirical of reflected contradiction, an into ahos of thought known as Hegelian Science.

Ilis absolutisationof a self-contradictoryunity is further reflected in the aspect is his Hegel's Deleuze, historv. that to treatment most repugnant of philosophy namely of Deleuze reads this treatment as proposing that the hidden motor of historv. namelv the Being, logical of is gradualiv revealed through the historical process as grammar inner

through philosophy of Absolute Spint. In other words, the the becoming-self-conscious Hegelian horizon of meaning, the common sense behind Absolute Knowing, is our

223

historical knowledge of previous systerns of philosophy. The Absolute is thus analytically determined in thougbt as a set of possibilities that are notbing but a reflection of a particular domain of historical experience. For Deleuze, Hegel sees history as determined by a single transcendent problem: how to disclose the implicit content of Being for us through thinking and thus render the Absolute self-conscious and thus fully reconciled to itself in a supreme Science. As in Scbelling's PbIlosopby of Identim', history would be conceived of as the unfolding of a merely possible first creation that is derived in its totality from the pure concept of the Absolute. If the Absolute is a selfcontradictory unity. then its determinations must be thought as subsisting eternally within it in the same manner as the determinations of Schelling's ideal universe. History is tbus the external appearanceof the Absolute, its becoming for-itself, 'a continual progress ' is the "regress that at same time a into the ground"', a gradual realisation of the internal possibilities of a transcendentsubstancethrough its autonomous self-]iml tation. For Deleuze, Hegelian onto-logic thus claims to be the condition of all determination, but can only do this by assuming that its immanent. supposedly presuppositionlessexamination of the category of Being realýv delineatesthe contours of

actuality.The oppositionbetweenthoughtand being is, from Hegel'spoint of view. only an illusory one, as the ground of the opposition, the negative self-relation of the Concept, remains transcendentto all deten-ninationsof thought and being as their foundation.,thus Deleuze their securMg agrees With BerWn resemblance or mner umty.

that Hegel's

philosophical ethos 'believes itself to be reunited with the real when it compensatesfor the inadequacy of a concept that is too broad or too general by invoking the opposite concept (B 38/44). Hegel's assumption of the transcendenceof the Concept preserves,in pbilosopbical consciousness,,the interiority of representational consciousness,,for even

I Balke, 1998, 24, quoting SL, 1,70j"71. p.

224

beginning between largest in the difference Hegelian that the immediate thought posited .-1

Concept System, the the to itselt. and end result of the v; internal

iii)

Hegel, Deleuze and KanIian. Se#-Con-vciou.vnexv

As we have seen, Deleuze's central objection against Hegel is similar to Schelling's, i. e., that Hegel can only presupposethat his analysis of the concept of simple Being is a real deduction of the necessarydeterminations of Being. Deleuze adds to this Schellinglan objection the observation that the reason for this predicament is Hegel's foundationalist assumption that the essential meaning of philosophy is tied to the transcendenceof thought. Hegel cannot for Deleuze, what Lessing called the 'broad, between ditch' hypothetical detennination the of the Absolute and its real ugly determination (DR 254 fn/325-6 n. 15). This question of this distinction between bypotbetical and absolute knowledge first be Our be briefly to to the similarities and addressed. step Will return will now differences between Deleuze and Hegel's respective accounts of reflexive subjectivity. Both accounts, I want to suggest,are intimately related to the ambiguous Kantian account first Chapter Five. Kant I of self-consciousness affirms, against the introduced in rationalist tradition, that the validity of representations of pure reason can only be for . hypotbetical, Understandmg the the or only syntheses of camed out upoin sub ective the intuited manifold can possess objective validity. This epistemological distinction between pure thought and thought as related to intuition is problernatised, however, by Kant himself As noted in Chapter Five, Kant holds that there is an immediate form of is 'indetenninate that embodied in an empincal, intuition' given to self-consciousness 'thought in general' (CPuR B422-31). The epistemological status of this Intuition Is It that represents neither it a noumenon given nor a phenomenon. ambiguous,, is an feeling of existence associated with consciousness, undeniable, though indeterminate,

ibid., P. 26.

225

For fully determinate Descartes' thinking thing. than of a rather intellectual intuition Deleuze, Kant's insistence that this intuition is only determinable under the form of time feeling T The bis thougbt the the marks of is genuinely Critical moment of pbilosophy.

known itself that through or in than existence is rather representinganything substantial the feeling, suchas a soul. Any determinatecontentof the 1,including the proposition 'I for form tbinking' the exist is only given as an appearanceconstituted inner senseunder of fime (CPuR B430). Thus my appearanceto myself cannot be identified with whatever feeling denoted by T that the it is refers to, the entity that thinks. The connection between the feeling marked T and the determination of thinking is thus unrepresentable, foundational that thing the that thinks presuppose unless we is a spontaneous, subject, is continuous with the phenomena] subject that is determined for itself in selfwhich

consciousness. This Kantian notion of a unified transcendentalsubject is, for Deleuze, simply a presupposition, a retrospective positing of the unity of the passive, detenninate empirical form. The identity of the phenomena]ego and subject as its own condition, in an eminent that to which the indetemmnate feelmg of existence is understood to refer is purely hypothetical. Hence Deleuze reads Kant as assuming that the identity of passive subject fact the thing to that thinks, and subject in-itself, is given us, when in it is not and is in fact impossible to establish. Deleuze constructs an alternative account of subjectivity, however, based on the idea that the "thing that thinks" is a dispersed plurality of differences, or the movement of Absolute Difference itself insofar as it is actualised as a faculties in body Deleuze Rimbaud's the system of mental rooted of an individual. uses fundamental 'crack' in the subject that 'I to this express proposition is another' discovery Cýapter for Kant's bim As Four, the transcendental. of constitutes we saw in determinable, the constitutive role of a purely problematic element is filled bv GeIiihl in Fichte"s account of subjectivitv, and bv the 'dark will' in Schelling's middle-penod in Absolute. between basic three the all cases, a relafion is established of a accounts

226

differentiated element, prior to any intuition of existence and a problematic, internally actual, stable determination of this existence for-us. Deleuze affirms the prionty of this is bemg 80'56-'/ý by (DR Difference Absolute the the that of relation sensible proposing 182/139-40)ý3This goes for the feeling of existence associated with consciousnessas mucb as for sensibility per se. Hegel too, however, affirins the Kantian difference between transcendental subjectivity and the pbenomenal subject, and even goes so far as to sbow M PS that the proposition, T is an Otber.,representsa necessarydetermination of Spirit, given certain

I describes intersubjectiverelations. is another' accuratelythe structureof consciousness in the secfions of PS on the world of Self-Alienated Spirit or Pure Culture, in which the subject's earlier loss of certainty as to its transcendence of the world (in the SelfConsciousnesschapter) becomes explicit. The subject finds that its 'true original nawre §489, Spirit being' 348/298 (PS the and substanceis as alienation of natural modified). What 'I am' here is not the certainty of myself as my own foundation, but the difference in nature of what I am for myself (finite consciousness)and wbat I posit myself as being in truth (the in-itself, natural being, the supposedly substantial. essential or transcendent 'thing that thinks'). Spirit alienated from its own being is an intersubjectively determined dynamic Scepticism: itself ftorn that the consciousness repeats earlier of it repels itself, from difference or is only aware of its itself Tbis subject is., as a detemiination of Spirit, doubly decentred. Firstly, it has come to understand itself as Spirit in gener4 that is, as a relation to self that is this its is Secondly, itself to through relation only relation other subjects. it aware of as a

movement of negativity without a substantialnatural foundation, and this movement identical be Substance. This latter as re-cognised With itself Will eventually identity of Subject and Substance is not simply posited as given, unlike the Kantian identim, of detennining Instead, free the subject. activity. the 'thing that thinks' passive subject and See also Baugh, 1993, p. 18,

227

Subject Substance PS the the of and as unity is which is re-cognised at the end of Absolute Negativity. the actuality of self-consciousnesswhich has developed out of the simple beginning of the PS. 'Mere is no longer a substantial 'thing' posited behind the activity of deterrmnabon, in fact, the absolutenessof this negativity consists in its being both subject and obje4 and neither. It thus representsa complete loss of any dimension of givenness,positivity or substantiality,,and constitutes the overcoming of the rigidity of representational consciousness only because of this lack of an in-itself dimension. Deleuze's reading of Absolute Negativity as the embodiment of the transcendenceor substantiality of the Concept which will eventually become the ultimate transcendent ground, the Absolute Idea, is at odds With this result. The PS thus overcomes the transcendentalillusion representedby the refusal of natural consciousnessto see beyond the fixity of the distinction between subject and .ect. As we saw in Chapter Six, this empirically appearing illusion is, as in Deleuze's ob9for However, Hegel it is rooted in ontolo91 ical structures analysis, ontologically rooted. in analysed the Logic of Essence,which appear in histoncally concrete fonns. Absolute Negativity is. in addition, not only the truth of self-consciousness.As noted in Chapter Six, it is the trutb of the beginmng of PS, the mdetenninate being of Sense-Certainty. 'Phisbeing, wbich, as I argued m Cliapter Five, must be identified witb the ambiguous yet feeling B CPuR, Kant to the of existence refers edition of in is itself neither undeniable being This subject nor object. is not the certamty of my existence as a substantial self, but

for bare feeling be to that a comes eventually marked me as T, and thus becomes the This latter transcendent self. representation 'I am' is made illusion of a substantial or but by this is not all-, it is also made possible by the possible intersubjective recogMtion, Absolute Negativity. This is the result of PS. The Being that is, itself, structure of Hdduiýg of the subject is not a process whereby it rediscovers its substantialitV on the from difference itself other side of its

In fact, the resulting actuality of self-

loss dimension The Unconditioned the of any absolute of substantiality is consciousness

228

is not an actual, empirical self-consciousnessposited illegitimately as its own condifion. Instead, PS ends vntb the aclualitv of self-consciousnessin Hegel's senseof Wirklichkeir through the educative expenence of its own difference from itself self-consciousness comes to know this difference as its own condition and truth. Deleuze, as we have seen,insists Ue Schelling that the dialectical Authebung of simple Being requires the assumption that thought is identical With the substantial or initself aspect of Being. If one disregards this assumption, then the absolute, undeniable thesis, the feeling of existence, cannot be mediated through antithesis and synthesis,it is not taken up or 'does not follow' (DR 74/52). However, Deleuze makes this point by, again like Sebelling, relying on a somewhat crude reading of the dialectic of immediacy PS in and SL. In order to grasP the relation between the beginning and end of PS, for example, we miust attend to the specific relation between the initial indeten-ninateBeing from the two that terms and opposed emerge it. These two simple unifies, opposed as I-

"

objective and subjective or as tbesis and antithesis, are not tbernselves opposed to the

initial indetenninate Being. Each of these unifies is unsuccessfiffly posited in tum as the foundation of the other, before any further distinction between subjective and objective is posited. However, their relation to the initial, indetenninate Being is problematic that both terms happen to 'ernerge out of pure being [aus dem reinen Sein [ ] herau.ýfallen1' ... §92, diversity' in 80/59 'cnicial Sense-Certainty (PS the constitutes modified). The movement of emergencehere does not subsequently become known as the activity of a substantial, self-positing subject, as was Fichte's goal. Instead, this movement, and the simple unity fTom whicb it begins, is known at the end of the PS as Absolute Negativity, an unconditioned that remains unstatable in terms representational consciousness(being attached to simple positiVity, substantiality and transcendence) would understand, ltýgical (philosophical) exposition. a requiring instead In the PS, simple indeterminate Bejýkgis re-cognised in the assertion of Existence before (I becoming am') eventually recognised as the Actuality in self-consciousness

229

that is Absolute Negafivity. Deleuze's assertion that Hegel's beginning with Being. whether in natural or philosophical consciousness,is not presuppositionless, because it assumesthe identity of being-for-us ('sensible, concrete. empirical bemg', DR 169/1291) and being-in-itself, is mistaken. flegel does not begin vAth concrete being, but with problematic being, the ambiguous Kantian feeling of existence that Deleuze himself affirms in his account of the transcendentaldifference at the heart of thought. Here, there are no distinctions between subject and object., phenomenon and noumenon, or bypothetical and categOncal.Hegel's accotint of Absolute KnoWIng does not purport to describe what the determinate, positive unity of thought and being-in-itself must be like.

Instead,it is knowledgeof what the unity of thoughtand being must be if the difference between being-for-us and bemg-m-itself can even be presented in consciousness.In this way, Absolute Knowing undercuts the foundationalist model of knowledge and its aporia.,for it is not knowledge of a foundation, but of the simplest possible beýginningof

thougbt.

iv) Immanent 'Ungrounding'and

the Immanent Concept

Botb liege] and Deletize employ accounts of self-consCiousnessin order to foundationalist the undennine image of thought, in such a way that the unquestioned foundationalism light. brought For both thinkers, the problem to presuppoSitionsof are foundationallsm is it for detennination that tries to the possibility of with account with the aid of a transcendentfbimdation. This proves to be a self-destructive orientation, as Schelfing shows, for foundationalism can only presupposewhat it sets out to prove, i. e., that knowledge of the real through reason alone is possible. Deleuze accusesHegel too of being a foundationalist, for assuming that the Concept is identical with the putative dimension Being. But have is this of as we seen, substantial or in-itself not an accurate

230

4 account of Hegel's Absolute KnoWing. Absolute KnoWing is knowledge of the structure of the immanent, negative movement of consciousness,in which there is no possible determinate distinction between thought and being. It is thus the result of the collapse of' any possible distinction between for-us and in-itself now want to sbow bow Hegel develops an ontology in SL that accounts for determination without referring it to a transcendent ground posited as Internally it that resembling which grounds. This will entail a further examination, following the previous chapter, of Hegel"s deconstruction of foundationalism in the Doctrine of Essence,before we pass on to the Concept. This examination will show how the Concept comprebendsan absolute difference that results in stable determination. Our survey will take in the categones of Existence, the Absolute and Actuality, before moving on to that of the Concept itself My argumentbere,is that the n-reducibility of the categoriesof Existence, Actuality and Concept to that of Ground demonstratesthat liege] leaves behind fou-ndationalism and all illusory methods of explanation ftom grounds. His account of the relation between Possibility, Contingency and Necessity demonstrates that Hegel's ontology does not presuppose a transcendent identity form the preposited under of possibility or eminent identity. Finally, the Concept itself is explicated as a self-deten-nining principle wbose activity is not one of grounding in the foundationalist sense, and in which is realised Hegel's Critique of the notion of a transcendentand substantial Absolute. The relation between thought and beingfOTHegel,

4 Given the

for his Deleuze texts reads philosophical own purposes(a in strategically way which

it being his Koj6vean PS NP), the on reliance a reading of would perhaps be in good example for interpretative him 'errors'. figures His to cntiques of within the tradition mistaken reproach

deliberate in driven by be and creative exercises as n-ýsdirection, a sensationof could understood his the need, and acknowledged in accounts of the process in which philosophical oppression, difference between to the transformed. thought Tnark such negative 'mediators' and are imagesof those he found more conducive to creative thinking.

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by Concept the transcendence the as we shall see, is not an internal relation secured of qua Ground, for the Concept cannot be understood through this illusory category. As we saw in Chapter four, Deleuze's ontology presentsthe relation betN%een the transcendentalor virtual, and the empirical or actual. in terms of Absolute Difference or their mutual incommensurability The virtual is in-itself different in kind from itself, and becomes for-itself in actuality by externalising itself Like Bergsonian duration, the virtual tends botb to 'relax' itself tbrough actual differences of degree in extension, and to remain immanent or implicated within differences of degree as Absolute Difference. In this way, the relation between virtual tendenciesand their actual expression is external and contingent, unlike the necessaryand internal relation that is posited in Schelling's Philosophy of Identity as existing between the substantial unconditioned and the for This Deleuze, conditioned. externality, gives real, creative explanatory power to philosophy. As we shall see, Hegel's own account of the ontological principle of determination refuses all transcendenceto this principle, describing it in terms of internal difference and externalisation, rather than ascribing to it substantiality and a transcendent limiting becomes detenninate by through itself self-relation which it We begin in the Doctrine of Essencewhere we left off in the previous chapter, by Groiind The detenmnation Ground. of is cbaractensed a relation of two terms in witli

intemaliv thev are relatedto which their mutual exclusivity is necessaryor essential,i.e., determination, The this to which is each other. instability of each other as external fixity insistence beyond the the to thinking that of ground and on stubborn goes apparent

in Chapter As from 'shining-into-other'. this saw we mutual relation of grounded,results Six, any Ground can only be a Ground if it presupposesan other that it grounds. Ground itself Grounded, logical the structure thus includes within its and its and their unity of distinction. This distinction is the Form (SL 11,86-7/449-50) of the Ground, and the unity becomes determined as the specific determinafion of the Ground, its Content. Given a Grounded in first its Formal Ground, to the its is relation instance a case of specific

232

Grounding- in which the inner unity of the two. their common Content, is posited in a doubled form (SL H 97-8/457-8). An example of this logical relation menfioned by Hegel is the notion of attractive force in physics. where a phenomenon is explained by

referenceto a groundthat is Simplythe particularpbenomenonpositedas existing under the fonn of universality or abstract possibility (SL 11,98-9/458-9). Hegel is tbus directly criticising the type of explanation of determination that Deleuze accuseshim of giving, is the wbere actual assumed to pre-exist its actualisation as a possible. internal

5 For Hegel, this type of explanationis determinationof a transcendentunconditioned. because logical the illusory structure of Ground is not self-consistent. This lack of is consistency the result of a failure to comprehend adequately the structure of Absolute Negativity, for Formal Ground is a determination which still requires that an external term, the Content, is presupposed as given to thought, which then inscribes a merely fon-nal or accidental distinction within it. The instability of Ground and Grounded is repeatedin Formal Ground, WItb the Formal distinction presupposing the unity of Content rather than being genuinely it. identical WItb The result is an attempt to tbink the unity of Form and Content anew. Real Ground is the result, where the distinction of Fon-n is internal to Content itself, such that Ground and Grounded are external to each other, not solelv becauseof their Form, but due to their Content. However, the insufficiency of Formal Ground, which was due to the inessentiality of the Foirmal distinction, is now matched by the excessive

distinction internal Content Real (SL 11,103-5/462-3).That to the externalityof which is if to say, is we simply posit the ground of a phenomenon in another phenomenon external to it that we simply associate with it, there is no ground of unity between the two except in the merely subjective judgement throligh which we link them. In this wav. it becomes impossible to say what it is in the phenomena themselves that constitutes a Any be phenomenon could adduced as a ground of any other (SL 11, relation. grounding 5 On Deleuze's critique of this type of explanation, seeChapter Four above, pp. 123-4

233

106-7/465). Here, the unity of the two Contents is presupposedrather than posited, and again.,no explanation is produced The overcoming of the inconsistenciesassociatedwith Ground really begins with the determination of Existence (SL 11.125/481). With Existence, there Is no Ions-,, er a § (EL (Grundlage) 123 between terin grounding relation essential substrate and its a 7 ZUSý).

Ground relies on the given externality of two terms,, whick for representational

consciousness, implies both spatial and temporal externality. However, the logical structure of Existence is not that of grotind and consequent,but implies the totality of

Conditionsthat haveto exist for one existentto be the Groundof another.A Condition is bas, be in for be to there to precisely wbat present order a relation of grounding- an immediacy which is simply present, rather than being posited bv the Ground. The deten-nmation of Condition thus acknowledges the insufficiency of Ground, which is that given two phenomena,it is impossible to explain the necessarydetenninafion of one by the other simply by considering the phenomenathemselves.The necessaryrelation of grounding requires certam contingent Conditions in order to exist. The necessary billiard ball between Humean the of one and that of anotber connection movement Conditions be totality to of established, which are unified in or related requires a whole to just this ground-relation: a level surface, the absenceof strong draughts, and so on. Tbe determination of Condition marks the comprehension of this fact, in which the presupposition of Ground is determined as immediately other., as an Etwas (ISL 11, 113/469). Yet, as has been the case in the Lojdc of Essence from External Reflection onward, this external relation to a Condition cannot be understood without relating it to

the internal self-relationof Essence,which in this caseis that of Ground.

6 On the Ground, Formal Real of and see also Mure, 1984, p. 108, Taylor, 1975, insufficiencies 1910. 120-2. McTaRgart. 263-4 pp. and pp. 7 See

109. Mure, p. op. cu, also

234

A Condition is a Condition, and not just something immediate without further

Grotmd the content.becauseit is relatedto a Ciroundand a Girrounded, yet relation on]v exists under certain Conditions. Each side is both immediately itself and mediated with respect to the other, or is a posited Contradiction (SL 11,114-5/471-2). Given that Grounding and of Condifioning are each both itself and its other, they are idenfical, collapsing into a negative umty (SL 11,116-8./472-4.), i. e., the active Emergence (Hervorgang) of an Existent Fact (SL 11,119/474). An Existent contains or implies both Ground and Condition, but as internal moments of its own Form or Show (&hein) (SL 11, H 8-19/474). The overcoming of the mutual externality of Ground and Condition does not., however, imply that Existence is reabsed in a sole Existent. a theological. transcendentunitv that acts as a Ground of the relation between conditioned Grounds and Conditions. Existence is the immediacy, the Being, of all actual empirical grounded things when we consider them as relation4 as inseparable ftom other things. And the important point to bear in mind is that the Existence of any thing can-notsolely be by finite explained grounding relationships that only exist under certain specific Conditions. Existence is not a ftirtber determination of Ground, but the overcoming of its supposedself-subsistence. Why is this? The extemal Conditions of a thing are its own Form, a lo 91 ical/ontoto 91 ical stnicture that allow certain temporally and spatially determinate between be discerned from ExIstents to the perspective arounding relations it and other of a fimte consciousness.The detenmnation of Existence means that the idea of an implies Ground Conditions illusory. Each Existent absolute without is a totality of Conditions without which it would not exist. But it is this totality of extemal Conditions that brings something into Existence, and not Ground. In this way, Ground appearsas an illusory

determination of

the Absoltite,

one that embodies the structure of

finite representational consciousnessand reason. The real explanation for the Existence

Condition& to must refer and the elementof necessityhere lies in the fact of somethiiig

235

that they must be just this something's Conditions. The confingency of any Oven thing is for Kant, finite the then, not, case wltb wbom an effect of our understanding- as was knowledge of the true necessity of any given object (Its complete determination) could only be a regulative goal for fimte consciousness.Infinite knowledge, for Kant. involved the unending hnking of judgements of experience that connect objects to each other, bv judgement. Bowever, deduction Hegel's reflective within networks inscribed of the determination of Existence shows that the contingency of any thing, its externality to the totality of its conditions, is not due to the inadequacy of our faculty of knowledge, but is a necessarydetennination of Being itself For Hegel, there is, pace Deleuze, no Ideal of complete determination In genuine philosophy. The Ideal is a construct produced by finite consciousness. Such an Ideal, posited as the regulative goal of theoretical knowledge witb regard to my particular thiiig, is itself finite. This is becauseit fails to comprehend the irreducible contingency of any given thing, representing instead the fhing-M-Itself the in relation to the IndiVidual phenomenal object, as the unity of substantial, transcendent UnIty of appearance. This would, in Schelling's philosophy, become the real Absolute Identity., qua Ground of all determination, defined as a Sollen for reason. For Hegel, the totality of conditions of an Existent is a totality only becauseall Existents transcend their conditions as negatively self-related terms. Every Existent is the Condition of other Existents, and as such is equaUy irnmediate, or external to them. In other words, the basis for thinking all Existence is, according to Hegel, externality, rather than an essential, internal, and necessary relafion between empirical reality and a 8 Substance. Each Existent is grounded in relation to other Existent-s,but transcendent

Faylor (op. cit., p. 289) makes this point, yet his discussion of the 'inner umty' of the effectivity

is Concept the shot through with ambiguities regarding the mode of this effectivity-. is the of Concept still an 'underlying reality' (p- 262, p. 279 ffi. 1) or is there nothing behind Show (p, 262)?

236

finite from illusory the of a only consciousness, which perspective incomplete and Idea. From the a properly philosophical projects unity of these relations as a regulative perspective, the problem is to understandin what way the ungroundednessof an Existent is a necessarvelement of its Being. By unden-nining the notion of Ground, Hegel also distances himself from the illusory distinction of real and possible that Deleuze crificises, as we shall see now in deten-ninations Absolute to the the relation of and of Actuality

If the idea that all

Existents are necessarily Grounded is illusory, then so is the idea that the difference between Essence and Existence is one between a possible detennination and the same determination witb reality 'added' to it. This illusory difference determines, for example, Sebelling's account of the relation between the first creation and the Absolute's real selfdifferentiation. For Hegel, bowever, Essenceis Existence. This speculative proposition (Eniduperung) 'emptying' the total turning-inside-out expresses or of Essence into Existence (SL 11,128/483). The idea of internal relation has, by deconstructing itself shown its truth to be Existence, the unity that implies a totality of external relations in its own self-relation. '11e Conditions of an Existent are not possibilities abstracted from is but Existents, Existent by reality, other real empirical and a given not only conditioned these Existents, but also transcendsits relations with them, for they are UsConditions. As elements of the Existent's relation to itself, its Conditions are its Appearance, Sbow. difference between Erscheinung Schein Erscheinung The and consists or real its in the stability of the Conditions. The Conditions have been shown to be, not merely Essence. but Existences, thus self-tiegating vanishing products of a self-related and from deconstruction determination has the terms of the idea of immediate resulted whose 'Mere here, Existents Essence. thus two totalities that transcendent and that of are of a Condifions. or in other words, that of the Existents considered as immediate, and that of

their externalmediation. One seemsto be the Ground of the other, but this repeatsthe

237

form. The in unstable ground-relation a new result is the collapse of these totalities into a negative unity, i. e.. Being determined as the Absolute. The Absolute here means at first the sublafion of Reflection through itself (SL 11,187-9/530-1). In this way, it is similar to the Absolute as Schelling understood it- the foundation necessary of any reflexive distinction., arrived at through reflexlve reason's affirmation of its own inability to act as foundation. ne deten-ninationsof Essenceup to this point in the SL have been comprehended here as partial attempts to grasp the Existent and its totality of Conditions. The relation between the totality of Existents and that of Conditioning relations has collapsed mto the unity of the Absolute, which again has an appearance of transcendent Ground about it. The Absolute grasped as this positive, indifferent unity is the end of Reflecfion and is opposed to it, in the same way became Matter Forrn SL (ISL 11,89-901451-2):'there is nothing to as opposed earlier in in the finite which could preserve for it a distinction against the Absolute' (SL 11, 190/532). This is also, for Hegel, the prime characteristic of Spiinoza's Absolute (SL 11, 197/538). This Absolute-as-Ground,,however, is only relative to the process of reflection, the 'negative exposition tAus1gguikg]of the Absolute', that sublates itself in it (SL 11, 189-91/532-3). If we understand the Absolute not only as the vanishing of the two totalities, but also as the truth of Being or of immediacy as such, then the exposition of the Absolute through Reflection is in fact the positive exposition of the positive, pure itself Absolute In Being Absolute, the this the as immediacy of is compTehended way, that is, as related only to itself not as passing over into another because of its own Existents but iiself as instability, nor as shining-into-another, and ratber as manifesliiýg their Conditions. What does this mean? We saw in Chapter Two that Schelfing's Absolute, as reflexively or negatively expounded, was the Absolute of purely negative hypothetical determinations, the 'first creation, had to be philosophy, whose merely

sublatedin order to passover to the affirmation of the Absolute as a rational Ungrund.

238

The positive exposition of the Absolute lay, for Schelling, outside the Absolute itself difference Absolute the that, as the works of in relying upon an unthinkable positing of his middle period showed, had to be thought as equiprimordial with the unified Absolute. Schelfing's problem is that the Absolute, in its substantial, grounding role. that is, as transcendentto all its modes of expression, including reason, has been abstracted

from thesemodes,its own content,which thenhaveto be thoughtas somehowmigrating it dissonance. deten-nination That through a primordial into rather than indeterminate identity exists Is, as noted in the previous ebapter, an 'incomprebensible bappening' (PS 543/471 §780). For Hegel, however, that the Absolute is related, not only to Essenceand Reflection, but to Bein& means that the real content of the positive, immediate. abstract Absolute is its own ontological content or its developed logical structure, that Is, thefiki that it manifests itself in a totality of Existencesrelated to a totality of Conditions (SL IL 194/536). Therefore the real content of Being comprehended as the Absolute is not an abstractly conceived predicate or positive content, attached to the Absolute as to a pure finally be No such predicate could justified against the opposed predicate that substance.

implies, Absolute-as-freedom Absolute-asthe against as case it reflexively is witb definition Schelling's Absolute the of as necessity, or as subject against object. transcending all predicates acknowledges this. For Hegel then, the content of the Absolute is, in fact, the intemal negati%rityof Bemg, the vejy fact that it mamfests itself logical PS from itself different This the the more comprehensible in as renders result of terms, for Absolute Knowing there arose as consciousness of the whole process of from be identity difference 911111 Ing WItb the itself, natural consciousness's with and immediacy The deterrnmation Absolute Being. the shows that the process of of simple of becoming external to itself and only thus becoming identical With itself, or Absolute NegatiVity, is the logical content of umnediate Being itself The developed tinity of the second Absolute with itself is the mith of its Being. It is Being and its inberent instability, the ceaselesstransitions of the Logic of Being and

239

the circular sbining-into-other of Essence, comprehended. As such, it is not just Absolute, a unity 'absolved' of reflexive difference, but Actualav, a unity that includes both Fxistents itv the totality of mutually-external within it, as moments of self-relation., determination Existence. Conditions. In than the their this of and way, it contains more Pure Being is comprehended, then, as implicitly Actuality

Actuality explicates and

expressesthe meaning of Beirig- whereasBeiiig cannot even explicate its own meaning, for its sense is inseparable from Nothing. Bemg is revealed, not as a transcendent substanceposited outside thought, but as the process of internal difference, 'the activity becomes Actuality, grasped abstractly or through of self-development' which immediacy § (EL 124 Zus.). subjectively as a positive unity The internal dissonance of Being and its resulting retum to immediacy in Actuality is thus ii-nplied, for Hegel, by the intemal structure of H=ediacy

itself, in so

far as it is thought through. As a logical structure, the Absolute is its own reflexive exposition as detem-tmateExistences and their detenninate Conditioning relations. As A thought, posited oulside outside reflexive relation, as an alogical ontological identity, it is posited by the Understanding as removed from any determinate relation with the in is detennined that reflexively sublated it. But this relation cannot reahn of experience be denied: it turns oa

SIX, be Chapter the mutual implication of to as we saw in

Presupposingand Positing Reflection. Indeed, it resurfacesin the problem of circularity that afflicts Sebelling's Absolute, Wherethe Absolute as alogical umty bas to be posited as a ground that resembles the realm of experience even though it is also posited as it. In this result, the transcendent transcending it, as utterly not resembling utterly Absolute turns out to possessordy illusory being. Schelfing's foundationalist project can by detenninate be the only explaining rescued real, substantial genesis of relations via a

Absolute, incamates Absolute Difference, Absolute the that genuinely non-rational form the of an externality that nevertheless 'Insists' or 'persists' (to use immanence in

240

Deleuze's terminology) in its products. This, as we saw in Chapters Two and Four. proves in fact to be the undoing of foundationalism. So, to recap: In trying to tbink sometbing as determinate througb its simple Being

(wbieb refers not to concrete, empirical Being, but to Kant's 'indeten-ninate empirical intuition'),

find have that to think its content, not as substantially or we we

Grounded, but logical determination metaphysically as a processof in which its simple Exisis in relation to other Existents. And theseExistents are related to it as its immediacy Conditions only because of their real externality This process is Actuality, which is subsequentlygrasped as its positive, immediate unity, that is, pure or abstract Possibility. For Hegel, what for Kant were still only modal categones,that is. relations not between (as but between the objects case with substantiality and causality) was objects and the faculties knoWIng, subject's of are determinations of Actuality itself Possibility is not the truth of Actuality, however. Hegel does not here revert to a conception of the Substantial

Conditioning hole Existents of and relations as a possible unity that pre-exists w does Actuality. Possibility distincfion, but empirical as mean such a unity, without real

is such it abstract and illusory. As an abstract, transcendent identity, it is an unstable

determinationof reflection, and implies both its own differenceand the developmentof logical If A that possibility, we simply state that no a pure or an opposition. we state is contradiction is involved in thinýg

hold But to pure possibility in this way is to to it.

is implied by A, impossibility the the the equally of opposed state, wbich ignore is believing be Given A. the there to no real necessity in it conception of merely possible, impossibility (SL 11,202-4/5 than any more real its

9

In relation to an Actualltv. this means that, although it is related to other Existents as its Conditions, it is also immediate, an Existent u-nity that transcends its Conditions. Hence it canjust as well not exist. Tbe Existence of amActuality. then, is not

Groundedby the internal unity of a substantialwbole, but can be or not be, and is thus 9 Houlgate, 1W.

P. 39.

241

Contingent: 'necessityis inifially nothing necessarily,or as a result of its own content. but the necessity of contingency It is a contingent fact that A rather than something ." else is Actual, but the fact that A is either impossible or possible. and is thus really. and just not merely, possible, is Grounded in other Actualifies. Nevertheless. Actuality is both is Possibility Possibility determination thaii more a abstract and real of Actuafitv rather than the other way -round, and 'points to another, to actuality in which it augments and completes Isich ergan.-Ij itself (SL

11# 11,203/543,

modified). Real Possibility thus

extemallsesitself in Actuality. Actuality always includes Contingency, whereas pure Possibilitv seeks to

it is exclude and tbus illusory. That an Actuality exists implies a totality of Conditions, the assembling of which is not guaranteed by the internal le/os of some substantial but Contingent. What Contingent, for Actual thus there is no transcendent is whole, is is Ground or timeless reservoir of Possibility

that pre-exists it and guarantees its

implies Possibility production. nothing but the potential of the Actual as it (the Actual) is assembledaccording to the logical relationships of Conditioning in wbich it exists. The Actual is potentially other Actualities, but what these shall be when they emerge into

Existence is Contingent. Real possibility, then, does not transcend 'the whole set Idas Game] of conditions, a dispersed actuality which is -notreflected into itself [ ]' (SL 11, ... 209/547). Real Necessity is not internal to a transcendent principle, but is instead the Existing between Actualities that are, in anotber Wect, relations working-out of themselvesdeterminants of real Possibilities. (SL 11,210-11/548-9). This reinforces the idea is illusion 'first that the transcendental conclusion of a creation' a of the Understanding, which, as the static, abstract unity of all possible detemiinations of

actuality, assumesthe existenceof a positive Substance,a transcendentthing-in-itself Actuality is determined then, not by metaphysical Grounds, but bv the Necessarv 10]hid.,

) -4

242

Contingently Real Actualifies that those really, exist. manifestation of the potentiality of Necessity thus presupposesContingency. Looking back, we seethat the Being of the given has been deten-ninedas its own its becoming ical becomIng, i. in thougbt and av tbouat, but also onto-lo 91 process of e., -I-Iit is determined In this and process, in as aclualilv. as an Actuality, that is. a self-related Existent that includes in this self-relation its mediation by otber FxIstents, its Conditions. This self-relation, its unity as an Actuality, is necessarily Contingent, but Contingency here expresses the cliance assembly of its Conditions as the Conditions of just ih4s, Actuality. However, when these Conditions are assembled. then the Actuality of which

they are the Conditions emergesNecessarily into Existence. Real Necessity, the unity of a set of Conditions as expressedin their resultant Actuality, is thus inseparablefrom their Contingent be Existence. It cannot own understood as transcendingit in any way, as predetennination. Substance. The tinltv of Real Necessltv and the existing it as inner of a Contingency is Absolute Necessity. the movement of Being to Actuality itself its unity itself from internal dissonance Absolute grasped once again as resulting or its with NegatiVity. Being is, in Actuality or in thought, constantly destroying itself and yet in destruction. Contingent, It to this is constantly external itself or and maintaining itself for it this is also the manifesting of yet is in very externality always identical with itself Real Necessity, the appearing of Actuality out of the potential of wbat is already Actual.

In this way, Being qua Absolute Necessityis shown to be 'simple immediacy that is (SL 11,215/552). absolute negafiVltv' nlý

In Being qua Absolute NegatiVity, finite flungs emerge out of the productive, Contingent Yet ExIstents. (Real Possibility) Actuality tbey as immediate, active side of itself, Existence its Bein& their the and so excess over is are thus self-externality of ftom This dissonance is their own productive actiNity, and negativity. internal inseparable disintegrating become to themselves turn, they external as their potentialities in so

243

" between -Me Absolute Actualities. by themselves relation complete emergmg as other Necessity and Actuality is not therefore a relation between a transcendent Ground that determinations its lelos, produces, according to actual out of the totality of its internal limitation. determinations Their possible operation of an relation expresses not via internal limitation, but a.) the self-externalisation of Actualities through their internal, Absolute Negativity, b) the emergenceof their potential as other Actualities, and c) the ' Being through them. self-transcendenceand self-augmentation of We now turn to the Doctrine of the Concept, in which the self-determining aspectof Actuality becomes fully manifest. As I noted earlier, the way in which Ground began 'shining-into-other' be to structured is as u-ndennined witb Existence, which 4containsthe [ground] within itself, and the ground does not remain behmd existence' (EL § 123 Zus.). The determinafions of Substanceand Causality are the final incarnations Ground-structure Logic the the of of Essence,and their overcoming constitutes the within

final sublation of the residual elementsof this structure within Being understoodas Actuality. In the final determination of Essence,that of Reciprocity, the relation between two Substancesdeterrmned as Cause and Effect, the last manifestation of the implicitly temporal and spatial Ground-relation, collapses. In Reciprocity, the Cause and the Effect from be to are shown indistinguishable each other (and thus indeterminate), as each is necessanly both Cause and Effect of the other (SL 11,237-8/569-70). The same thing

in Chapter for Ground Six, to occurred,as we saw and similar reasons,, With respect and Grounded. A third term.,a negative unity, is thus implied., which determines itself In both II for Substances,a 'context' (Ziisammenhang) their respective processesof change.

11Cf ibid., pp. 46-7.

12Cf. Hegel's remarks on theories of emanation,regarding their lack of 'reflection-into-self (SL 11,198/539)or self-related negativity, i. e., Absolute Negativity. 13Schick, 1994, p. 180-

244

Ilis negative unity of the two Substancesis the sublation,of their Substantiality Substance is Absolute Necessity grasped abstractly as a positive, self-mediated unity, 'beink that is becauseit is' (SL 11,219/555), recalling Spmoza's definition of Substance. In Reciprocity, however, the internal, causal relation between Substancesthat appearsto he Essence Actuality the to constitute of is sbown illusory, a subjective metapbysical attempt to maintain the independenceof both which does not acknowledge their mutual (SL Necessity, 11,252/582). Absolute the their shining-into-each-other and negative unity logical movement through which Being determines itself as its Actuality, thus tums out to be, in truth, this unity or third, which Hegel calls the Concept. As in the relation between Form and Essence, where both terms lose their independence, becoming

'momentsof a singgleactivit),. 1-

14 determining dynarnic the of-fornting', the Substances

become moments of the ConceM a 'comprehensive dynamic activity. 15 The recursivity of the logical movement of SL that began to become explicit

in Essence, witb w-hicb Bemg was explicitly included as one of its moments, is now

foregoing All Concept, from the the reallsed. moments are moments of just as, from Actuality, leading Being thTough Existence and the peirspective of moments Condition are elements of its appeanng. The movernent that begins witli Being and is by itself Absolute Necessity therefore the self-externallsation whose UMty expressed is Concept. Actuality the of

its and appearing are equally moments of the Concept

of

thought which knows itself as thought, that is, not as immediate Being, nor as posited outside itself as Essence or as Ground, but as the unity that comprebends all the determinations of immediacy and of relation. All attempts to sustain difference and

determinationthrougb some internal relation of Groundingbave proven inadequateand self-cancelling, and thus illusory. Categories such as Existence and Actuality, on the higher have hanoý status in relation to the Concept for they foreshadow its nonother a 14

Burbidge, 1981, p- 8-

15Ibid-, pI

11,

245

foundational nature, in which the unity and internal difference of Being are However, Concept the only itself. comprehended as moments of one negative unity. along witb its subsequentdeterminations. will prove truly adequateto sustaindifference. We saw that Absolute Necessity was the inner logical movement of the Actual, deployed both Contingency Real Necessity Nevertheless. this through and itself which Mrough it Actual, the occurs in it, because of the negatiNity, the movement moves Actual Real Possibility. the positedness or relation-to-other withm which constitutes Hence the Actual suffers Absolute Necessity Without compi-ehendingit. The significance of the Concept is that it transcends the movement of Absolute Necessity, in that it develops through or attains to itself Absolute includes it as a moment of itself, which it Necessity is primarily the immanent development of SL itself. ne inner negativity of the finite, its incessant ansing and perishing, is thought in the Concept as its own moment. The characteristic of the finite, as it is thought in the determination of Opposition, for is be both both to the time: the positive same positive is example, itself and its other at and negative, and vice versa. In this way, it excludes itself from itself and collapses. The fiMte both la&k-s Bemg thus the the exceeds and expresses in negativity of which way itself at the same time when it is embodied in finite determinations, whether these are immediately self-related (Beirig) or related to themselves through an other (Essence). Neither Being nor Essenceare stable in relation to themselves,and this instability is also their self-externalisation, as when, for example, Essencepassesinto Existence. The Concept, on the other hand, has a stable self-relation. This is not, however, becauseit knows itself as Essence,Ground or Substance,subsisting beyond the flux of Illusory Being, Reflectiort, or Accidents as a thing-in-itself

On the contrary, such

foundations are, as we have repeatedly seen, transcendental illusions. As transcendent for Ground detenninate illusory, 'lacks that thus a content is in and itself, and 'and §121 itself bring foi-th' it does Zus. (FL As ). of and not act previously consequently

Schelfing's Absolute, difference true that this of which requires is a somehow noted,,

246

has Concept But determination. the a content as part of Its anse in it in order to explain been has Negativity, Absolute thought as the internal self-relation, namely which Concept Hence Necessity finite determination Absolute the movement of the of in the develops itself through the internal movement of the finite detenninations. This development occurs through its becoming-external to itself in both the abstractly positive

determinationsof Being,,and in those of Essencein wbich it finds itself expelled out from its abstract unity. It subsequentlypasseson to determinations in which it determines but Actuality., (self-related'), that as stable itself as is, perisbing, self-externality.

In this

finite the the movement of way, is within the Concept, and through it, thought comes to determine itself as Concept. Just as simple Being was the abstract presupposition or beginning of the PS whose meaning for natural consciousnesswas explicated in the Concept, became Absolute Knowing, Being SL by that the movement in is explicated itself beginning, Being, the as posited in an abstract, externallsed which comprehends form. Being is, in effect, the self-detennining activity of the Concept -

is which

Essence Concept Logics the throughout the comprehendedever more concretely of and -

form, the puTe unity of the activity of self-development grasped in its most abstract

(EL § 124 Zus.)The Concept that has left behind Substancewill thus come to comprehend itself itself, beyond the activity of presupposing not as given, as positive, all its accidental as deten-ninations,but rather as posited external to itself The Concept is not, then, a knowilirig that retroactively

i AI presupposes self in its own ground,

i the that is. In

foundationalist sense that Schelling, Deleuze and Hegel all denounced in one way or another. It does not presupposethat the in-itself, ground or condition resembles that of foundation. On logical the the the contrazy, genesis of the Concept always which it is determilled forms through such illusory presupposesitself as of fou-ndationalist relation (as Presupposing and Positing Reflection, as Opposition. as Ground and Grounded), and also presupposes itself as the gradual overcorning of illusion, througli Existence,

247

Actuality and Absolute Necessity It presupposes itself as posited as the implicit actiNity of self-determination (the purely affirmative

determination of Being), which explicates

itself with fully immanent, Absolute Necessity, and then explicates this Intemal nega,hvity as itv own, in the determination of Concept.

Hence Logic is not, for flegel, self-grounding. The self-grounding system as developed by Fichte and Schelling is M fact the highest contradiction that foundationalist involves It method can express. a thinking that presupposesitself as giren, as abstract Substance, and wbich then tries to deny its own negativity, its own reflexivity or difference from itself in order to become, finally, abstract Substance. For Hegel, only the Concept and its determinations express the tnith of philosophical thinking, because they express, not a self-grounding thought, but an actively self-delerminhýg and thus autonomous one. However, the Logic of the Concept is not a final resting-place. Hegel envisaged it as the gateway into the Realphilosophie, the philosophy of Nature and of Spirit. The reasonsfor this Will hopefully become clearer as we examine the nature of the Concept a little closer, for they concern again the meaning of the Concept as the actiVity of tbinking

by internally different in from being detennined being that nature or is itself The Concept, as the unity of positing Essenceand posited Being, is first of all Universal, the is determined its determinations (SL 11, that them negative unity of all and in which 274/601). But as such, it remams mfected, %qtbAbsolute NegatiVity, and so presupposes itself, the result of the movement of the SL, as posited in its various determinafions. It is it SL, It the this the that the movement itself of is not only compTehends movement unity [Scheinen Concept, 'shining deten-ninate Particular the the thus as outwardv nach is Universal. This Essence, 11,281/606) 'sbining" (SL the of as onl"' 111tisory. is, in au#en]" The illusory fixity of the Particular Concept is that of the Understanding (St. 11,2856/610-11), in which the Universal appears as the Ground of the Particular. This Concept deconstructs Ground-relation did the the on itself, as perspective in subjective

248

the Logic of Essence.In relation to the Ground, the Grounded is a vanishing term that Substance, Ground, Accident returns into its and similarly the abstract of a or an Particular vanishes into the Universal (SL TI, 296/618). Hegel's point here is that, in order to sustain real difference, the relation between a substantial Universal and its Particulars is not enough.16The transcendent Universal of traditional realism is thus as powerless to sustain difference as is a metaphysical Substance, such as Schelling's Absolute Identitv. However, the Particular is also inwardly determinate, as well as determinate over the Concept in its Schein as a Grounded. This is becauseit is identical witb the against C Concept. As we saw with respect to Actuality, the externallsation of potentiality through Contingency is itself identical With Absolute Necessity, the logical movement of Absolute Negativity. The negativity of Actuality entails its movement outwards into real but Actual externality, it remains in this externality, rather than simply dissipating. Likewise, the Particular Concept is still Universal, and thus a negative unitv with itself constituted through mediation and thus unlike Ground or Substance,for example, which illusory inwardly As deten-ninate are negafive unities posited as outside all mediation. itself, to the Particular Concept, with its illusory reference to what is thus and external outside the Concept, is itself immanently the Singular Concept, which has a real 17

reference outwards.

The Singular Concept is Vitally important. becauseit marks the point where the Concept begins to move outward beyond itself, discovering that explicitly

real

mediation, mediation with that which is really outside it is its own immanent meaning. It is, firstly, the positing of the unity of Universal and Particular, the emergence of the

dimension of Universality (Absolute Negativity). within the Particular. The Concept thus 16Cf Winfield, 1998, p. 11. 17Seethe Introduction to the English translation of EL, pp. xlx--vc, on some reasonsfor preferring 'the Singular' to 'the Individual' for translating Hegel's das Eimelhe.

249

returns to unity witb itself a real unity constituted throuO, mediation ratber than an illusory

one, posited in opposition to all mediation.

However. a paradox1cal result

into Concept itself, but immediately Singularity 'not the the occurs. return of its only is loss' (SL 11,299/621). The Concept, as we shall see,marks the point of development for philosophical consciousnessthat is simultaneously its 'highest mawrity, and where 'its downfall begins' (SL 11,287/611). This downfall will be the passage from Logic to Nature, in which the Concept externalisesitself as absolutely different from itself With the Singular Concept, the Concept has deterinined ilse/fas a totalm. This Ufflversal... Particular and Singular is immediately Identical With that means each moment, itself the all others, or presupposes as posited in and through them. Each is Universal, or simple negatiVity. each is Parficular, or posited as an illusory determination in relafion to a Ground (the Concept determined illusonly as Ground), and eaeb is Singular, a real Concept the externalisation of qua activity of thinking in which the Concept is identical itself In turn, looking back, all the deterrmnationsthat make up the SL,,having been witb comprehendednow as deten-nmationsof the Concept, are themselveseach of these three A That determination their therefore and otherness simply a aspects is of the unity. Concept as a self-enclosed totality (and is thus merely apparent otherness)seemshard to deny at this point. If this is so, then the suspicion that the Concept is an expression of a dogmatic image of thought must resurface. But when we turn back to the Singular Concept, we find Hegel describing it as the realisation of the unity of Universality and Particular, but oniv in so far as it is the 'posited separation [Abscheidung]' (SL 11, 300/622) of the Concept from itself

Wbereas Particulanty

implies only an illusory

implies is Concept, Singularity beyond Universalitv that the the something of i-eference distinguished [monsirierl 11,300/622), (SL 'pointed in Actuality. This is out wirdl' really not an illusory relation of self-excluSion or self-repulsion, as was encountered in the Logic of Essencebefore the emergenceof Existence as the En0u, #erutkg of Essence.

250

Singulanty )s thus the final term in the totality of the pure ConcepL and also this totality's transcendenceof itself towards that which is absolutely external to thought. -N,, in Existence, Essence Fntdu#erum-, the that saw realised such, it recalls the of we Absolute, and in Actuality. Looking back once more over the progress of SL. it becomes has be difference, thought the the to that, to of given apparent in order sustain immediacy

as Universality (its Being), then as Particulansed,in terms of Quality. Quantity, and the from that the collapse of Essence,such as Existence and Actuality. self-relations result But it is only really differentiated when it is thought in terms of the Concept, which is itself identical i itself, Hence to the thus absolutely extemal and only immanence of with

aLy

III

the self-determining activity of tbougbt only remains immanent to itself by being absolutely external to itself It Is not simply opposed to itself for here there is no Essence

that excludesitself from itself in a relafion of Opposition. And m this way, the immediate is only fully differentiated when it is the Singular Concept. As Universal, or simply immediate, and Parficular, or mediated by others, its self-relation is still illusory. In thesedeterininations, it is still under the domination of the Grounded, Identical, Substantial, Understanding, the given as or subjective which views in Only its self-relation. i. e., as posited outside all mediation, as not including mediation

is is by this illusory secured a relation of absolute exterionty when its relation-to-self Schelling aspectremoved. and Deleuze maintain that the immediacy of the given is only immediacy Concept, the that this is thus illusory and all reflection of real outside

(Schelfing),or that this immediacyis real becausethe being of the sensibleis Absolute Difference and thus outside the Concept, (Deleuze., DR 80/56-7,182/139-40). Ig The define be immediacy to to that any attempt as self-related is enslaved by a implication is transcendentalillusion that dominates Difference. But this does not take into account the determination of the Concept, according to SL. It is the activitv of thought or being that Substance, it difference from than only insofar as rather realises is activity, its absolute 18See 18. 1993, Baugh, p. also

251

itself Its self-relafion is thus comprehended as a dimension of its irreducible internal difference, its Absolute Nlep-afi"ty. This is emphatically demonstrated by the passagefrom SL into the Philosophy of Nature, which has perhaps been the most controversial aspect of Hegel's ontology. Like other a priori philosophies of nature, including Schelling's, Hegel's has been often dismissed as the product of rationalism gone mad. But recent interpreters of German Idealism have sought to rescue Nalurphilosophie, by showing that it is not necessarily dogmatic or hubristic, 19 The crucial question is whether A'aiurphilosophie must be determine to necessarily an attempt nature as it must be in-itself As we saxv in Chapter Two, Scbelling's early Nalurphilosophie proposed instead to determine nature in relation to our experience, in order to show what nature must be like in order that we should have representations of Objects outside us. Hegel rejects both options. Whether in-itself, be like for-us, or we ask what nature must we are working with a foundationalist image of philosophy. From the perspective of flegel's Absolute Knowinal the question has to be whether or not the immanent determinafion of the absolute unity of thought and being as the self-determining, Concept also requires that the Concept deten-nineitself as Nature, as that which is genulnely other than thought. If this is the case, then a philosophy of nature has to determine what is entailed in such a determination, which embodies the self-transcendenceof self-determining thought. As William

Maker 'has pointed out, the transition from onto-logic to

Naturphilosophie cannot mean that Nature is a) posited by thought.,so that Nature is not Both itself ontologically real, or b) that Nature has all along been determining thoUgbt_2() these options remain illusoqv, foundationalist determinations of the Absolute. This is, again, becausethey imply the structure of Positing and Presupposing Reflection without 19In intended Guattari's last Deleuze and project was tfie construct on ot d addition, Alaturphilosophie. 20Maker, 1998, 8,11 pp. -14

252

immediacy by be it. Nature thought an as comprehending absolutely posited cannot Reflection. be Positing for Concept did the this. outside it, an unstable it would simply if This instability is caused by its failure to acknowledge its necessarypresupposition. an immediacy that would have to be piven to it so that it can posit another such immediacy relative to the first. Nor could Nature simply be presupposed by thought., for it would bave to be presupposed in a determinate form abstracted from accepted data. and -I] have been therefore would just as much posited as presupposed.ý B oth these optionss between thought and nature, wbose absolutenesscould would simply posit a resemblance only be assumed. These options may be incoherent, but this alone does not mean that an alternative is possible. The quesfion is whether or not Hegel's immanent determinafion of the being and thought as the self-determining Concept will immanently absolute unity of detennine itself further as absolutely other to itself as the idea of Nature. As argued Concept dividing itself from the that through is which is itself only itself utterly "above, Its negativity is thus comprehended as constitutive of its self-relation. Even the Absolute

Idea, the final determination of the Concept.,is constituted as identical with itself through its intemal negativity, or is in unity witb itself only InsofaTas it loses Its unity witb itself The negative unity of thought and being includes Absolute Negativity. or is just as much 22 lack between being, And the Concept is explicitly the utter thought and of relation detennined as this internally dissonant unity. So, if the Concept is that which only determines or realises itself through its utter difference from itself, then it must transcend determination towards the itself of a genume other. If this other is to be immanent be for detennMed Concept, be then through the genuinely other, it must it cannot assumed to be other because of some merely given determiation, as then the circle of

Positing and PresupposingReflection would arise,again. So it must be determined 21Ibid., p. 13. 22 Miller, 1998, p. -441.

253

tbrough the Concept, but it must be thus determined as absolutely unlike the Concept. As Maker notes, Naiurphilosophie implies the 'radical nonidenfiýv" of thought and nature: 'thought and nature do not even resemble one another.

I,

The thought of Nature that anses immanently from the Concept is thus one of

Jven that this radical externalltv,a mode of deten-ninationthat is not self-determination-, gj . Concept. Nevertheless, is fiAly determinate, for it is an expression the characterises it still of the absolute uMty of being and thought, rather than being determined in relation to Nature being-outside-jiself being which is always something acceptedas given. is simply immediately other to itself. yet which subsists as such being, rather than losing its determinatenessbecauseof its sheerimmediacy, as did the determinations of pure Being. Naturphilosophie for Hegel has then to take up the task of immanently determining this deterrmnation,, different to that of tbought, but whicb is still mode of whicb is utterly capable of being determined in thought, given that the very idea of this mode only arises through the self-determination of the Concept.

v) Concluding Summary Deleuze's image of Hegel's thought has thus been shown to be illusory on four Concept, key the the the of of self-relation 1j) the characterof related points: 1) meaning the Concept as 'self-grounding", 111)the reality of the Concept as a "totality', and vv) the difference. To Concept I to this the think end chapter, real will of consequentinability foregoing. in light four the these of reassess points

For Deleuze, the Concept interrially resembles the phenomena]

0

Self for it, like Kant's simply reflects notion of a spontaneous subject, the presupposition that the conditions must resemble the conditioned, illusion. have However, thus transcendental a as we seen, the and is 23Maker, 4. cii., p. op.

254

Concept does not resemble the pbenomenal subject. In fact, as we saw

Self bow Kant's PS the spontaneous is an illusory posit earlier, sbows that denves, from a cnsis within consciousness.At the end of the PS. Absolute Negativity. it is true, retains the

charaCtCT

of a ground or

from but the perspective of the natural consciousnesss conditioned, only that views it as an abyss, similar to Schelling's Absolute, into NN-hicb its determinations disappear. From the perspective of pbilosophical own consciousness,which takes it up as identical with the ambiguous Being beginmng the presented in of PS, this opposition does not exist. And further, it is shown to be an illusory or non-Actual difference. Hegel notes that Kant's transcendental unity of apperception is a genuinely speculative moment of his thought. But as we saw in the previous chapter, Hegel means here Kant's definition of apperception as neither phenomena] or noume-nal.Only by beanng this definition in mind Will it for be to means apperception aclhlýv, rather than we understandwhat For Hegel, the 'thing which thinks' is not a appearanceor substance.

thing, but a non-foundationalactiVity,the 'existentConcept' (ISL11,2534/583-4). It is a mode of determining (self-deten-nination)that the finite fact explicates the utter ontological subject cannot possess.and which in decentring of the finite subject in the Doctrine of Essence. 0

The Concept does not presuppose itself in the form of a

transcendentSubstancewhich is somehow deterrfflnately given to thought, and which securesthe inner meaning of thought and of being as For Deleuze, Hegel Concept the the saw absoluteness of as one tmity. deriving from the fact that it expressed the contradictory nature of all In this way, it supposedly cwi adequately , appearance. pbenomenal Kant's Ideal transcendental of complete determination, in whose express

255

reallsation

the

real

relations

between phenomena would

be

for be Ideal Such a substance which all would an comprehended. itself be to aspects of its internal relation pbenomenal relations would However, this means that Deleuze has assimilated the Concept to the self-groundingfoundationalist systemsof Fichte and Schelling. Both of these presuppose that the Absolute can be given through a superior intuition as a substantial or transcendentfoundation, which must then be deduced as a full ground by a metbod that, beginning from the absolute Substance.eventually retums into it. But this method means that thought has to both presuppose and disavow its ow-n negativity (tbe difference between Substance and finite reflection cannot be crossed; only subjectively cancelled by an act of faith). The Concept, on the other hand, presupposes itself in its beginning, but as posited by itself as is, difference That between begirming the to external itself and end arises, in light of the survey of its own development taken by the Concept at the end, from the negatiVity comprehendedby the Concept as the implicit determination of the beginning. w)

The Concept is thus -nota totality in the metaphysical sense,i. e., an internally differentiated Substance.As the transitions ftom Essenceto Existence, from -Universalto Particular Concept, and firom Absolute Idea to Nature demonstrate,the Concept determines itself as a totality only in

the momentwben it exceedsitself as toudity. Existenceis iffeducible to Essence,and becomesa dispersed set of Conditions, which from a subjective standpoint,'ought to' return to unity (SL It 209/547). The SinguharConcept is the moment in which the intemal relation of the Universal Concept becomes realised or positecL only insofar as it is

divided from itself Nature is that which is determinedthrough utterly

256

the self-determining, Concept as being utterly other than the Concept. 'Me Concept is thus not in pnneiple a closed systern, but a system xvith the power to transcenditself to lose itself and only thus to be itself Difference is, in relation to the Concept, ungrounded. It is not Opposition or Contradiction, for both of these presuppose a Ground. It dimension 'however, Concept being the than is still, a of itself rather simply given to thought in some determination or other. The Concept is thus shown to be that which requires its own Aciual and absolute

difference from itself in order to be fully itself This is shown by the transition to the idea of Nature, in which the Concept detennines itself as that which cannot and does not resemble thought, yet is still deten-ninate

in and for itself as a uniquemode of determination,rather than being a simple indeterminate negative of thought. The Concept maintains itself in 'destruction, but this can never be given in advance as an assurance. It can only be shown by expenence itself The negativity of thougbt, its Substance, in doubts lack transcendent expressesitself perpetual of pure, about thougbt's power of self-determination, by feeding the desire for fact is This thouglit the can attain to its own only in way expenence. Difference by finding that reality, itself in which is absolutely outside it. but is intemal this to thouglit as activin,, not the same as saying that is

Differenceis internalto thoughtasSubstance.

257

Chapter Eight

Conclusion: Hegel and Deleuze -A

Critical Assessment

i) Introduction The trauma of reason, as we have seen. is a dilemma that arises because of Both define 'image' that a specific of philosophy. or Orientation certain presuppositions Hegel and Deleuze take this view. They also affirm that, if the crisis of meanmg implied by the trauma is not to paralyse philosophical thought. this image has to be criticised as illusory by representation of philosophy, and overcome an a new. anfifoundational model of philosophy that conceives of the immanence of thought in a way that adequately explains the production of determination, externality, or otherness.In the last three chapters, I have defended Hegel's version of an-fifoundationalism against objections raised by various thinkers, including Deleuze, all of which share their Schelling's critique of Hegel. To conclude, I want to bring the orientation with foundational i have Deleuze Hegel I anti st positions of and as presented them here together in a brief critical dialogue, in order to sketch the advantagesand disadvantages of their respective positions. The Deleuzean solution to the double-bind presented by the trauma of reason by be involves Gregmy 'counteractualisation'. Bateson's This termý can summed up an force dilemma, in Deleuze's the the ten-nsImplies which explicit acknowledgement of of foundationalist internal the thought practice of an encounter on part of a with its own llmlt

the infinite difference of thought from its own being, which foundationalist

thought cannot think. This experience itself becomes *inDeleuze's thought the means to forces internal It difference. but the thus recognition of a real reinvi,gorate philosophy. is iII that thought a problem I immanent to this undeniable limit: flie task of With presents how to create a stable thinking qj'this difference that remains immanent to it. Thought is

thus provoked to cbangeits image of itself. becominga,practice that creaieýknowledge

258

of the real, rather than hoping to discover it as given through contemplation or Teflection. In this way, the crisis of meaning is not resolved- but remains as the basis or non-foundational foundation of new creation, through which philosophy gives senseto itself by selecting mediators and analysing the virtual tendencies of actual phenoine-iia. To reiterate, the justification

for this new image of thought is. for Deleuze. immanent to

the trauma itself, for the inability of foundationalist thought to think its infinite

difference from itself is not accidental. It results from an encounter with the transcendental oklect of thought, that which belongs to thought by Tight, a minimal presupposition that all actual practices of thought must, for Deleuze, acknowledge. Hegel's solution, Absolute Knowing. is not really a resolution of the crisis either, given that it recognises this tendency of nihilism as inherent in representational consciousnessitself For Hegel, pbilosophy cannot orgaruse itself around the fantasy of dissolving the intemal divisions of consciousness.For him, philosophy has to re-cognise bow self-consciousnessis detemined, both intersuýjectively and ontologically. In this is immanent determination the way, philosophy of the being of self-consciousness, is being is that neither phenomenal nor noumenal. The Concept provides the which (Icontext' in which the trauma of reason can be re-cognised as ansing out of transcendentalillusion. And this context is neither presupposednor simply posited, but a self-determining unity that is constantly moving beyond itself through its own internal

differencefrom itself The failure of foundationalism to buttress the autonomy of reason is thus confronted by both thinkers. Both critique the very idea of an incorrigible, transcendent foundation for the constraints that it places on thought. Foundationalism, as we saw in Chapter Three, presupposes above all the existence of a transcendent subject in some forni, which fimctions as a 'knowing before knowing' and gives philosophy a secure becaine begin. This to explicit in the thought of Fichte and Schelling. where this place faitb: knowledge subject is a subject of is explicitly posited as 'grounded' in an

identitv Absolute. Here, the the the goals of conviction in of reason and urljustifiable 259

Enlightenment, which were set solely in relation to human reason. are placed beyond the reacb of reason. The anainment of Enlightemment in the senseof secure knowledge of the distinction between dogmatism and genuinely self-critical philosophy is made impossible. due to the image through which 'self-criticism' is understood.

ii)

Deleuze and Hegelian 'Reconciliation' As we saw in Chapters Three and Four, Deleuze reconceives the goal of

Enlightement as the attainment of a specific practical attitude in thinking, which, like thel'ationalist Enlightenment, demands a Te-educationof the subject. This education is however, through a regulated method that functions within the not conducted, interpretative horizon of a common sense,but by forcing thought to undergo encounters witb practices botb philosopbical and non-pbilosopbical that drive it to tbink its internal limit. have We immanent or seen in the previous chapter how Deleuze's distorted image Hegel readings of often present a of his philosophy. -1-hereremains. however, a dimension of Deleuze's critique of Hegel that can, I think, be separatedoff from the 'Schellingian' criticisms addressedin the last chapter. This aspect has to do with the very immanence of negativity In flegel's philosophy, and the theme of reconciliation between thought and being that it implies. Deleuze's critique of reconciliation is inseparable from his model of education, and his account of the subject of this education. As we have seen, he accounts for selffaculty is the thought, consciousnessas a pathos of of which deten-ninedby the work of the movement of difference that acts upon and through it. There thus persists a 'crack' difference be heart that the the cannot overcome, and which at of subject, an irrimediale therefore remains as an immanent otherness within thought. We learn to think, as we learn to do mything else, by taking on habits that both 91ive an onentation to our activitv I1 ""'learning" always takes place in and through the unconscious, therebv and constrain it: bond between the thought and nature' (DR a of profound complicity establishing 214/165). Hence the re-education of thought demands a cntique of unquestioned habits.

260

the 'crack' the be based in of which can only on an acknowledgement and affin-nation is be the has thought This to Idea re-educate to order that In subject. rejected means what faculties for Deleuze. Methodthe of the mind within of a method. always only regulates the boundaries of common sense in order to achieve a result that is essentially knowledge i. that transcends the empirical content of experience. predetermined, e.,

Kant's Criticalmetbod,for example,reflectspresuppositionsabout experiencethat Imply a common sense, such as the idea that Newtoman science and Christian morality are

detenninations knowledge The of it achieves is conscious experience. universal knowledge of transcendental apperception, of the fonnal conditions of possibility for these determinations, but this, for Deleuze, simply hypostasises.the formal unity of

and determinesits categoriesin relation to thesepresuppositionsabout consciousness, expeTience.

Method, then, is the meansto a predeterminedend whosevalue is related to a common sense. The value and validity of the end (transcendent knowledge) is thus hand, is Deleuzean 'learning' 'training' (dressage), the or simply presupposed. on other it This that an end-in-itself means is not relative to a presupposed common sense,,a transcendent subject or 'knowing before knowing'. Instead, it fimctlons through the affirmation of Deleuze's 'higher' Absolute, the rninimal presupposition of thought, the difference that traverses the entire subject and prevents it from really coinciding with in is 'ours' Learning the sense of possession thus throkgh not and itself occurs us. by in Kant's established unity of apperception relation to the content of consciousness. Kant, for Deleuze, shows in his account of the 'crack' that we do not autonomously orient ourselves in thought as subjects whose essencetranscendsthe practical exigencies life. Thinking is not something that takes time; instead, 'time takes thought' (DR of our 216/166). Elsewhere. Deleuze notes that 'ftlhere is no more a method for leanung than there is a method for finding treasures,but a violent training, a culture or paideia which

individual' (DR 215/165), ffiat jt1hought the entire and affects never thinks alone and bv itself (NP 1231108). 261

Deleuzean learning is, therefore. a matter of becotmng equal to the difference of thought from itself, a process that requires encounters with 'mediators' (intercesseurs). In this way, Enlightenment understood as the autonomy of philosophy, is for Deleuze an attitude that is only established by becoming equal to movements of difference that traverse the body of the thinker., and this cannot be realised by the indiNidual alone. As a response to double-binds such as the trauma of reason, Deleuze's model of education thus disavows the Kantian, self-conscious aspect of the double-bind, the awarenessthat it is a product of my actuality (the rules out of which it is generated are, as in Kant's

account of the categories, an aspect of my self-consciousness), and that it thus deten-ninesin turn my actuality as a thinking being in the present. In this way, Deleuze implicitly acknowledges Adorno's observation that the transcendental dimension of subjectivity (the Kantian unity of m_Yconsciousness) is a posited reflection of the powerlessnessof the suklect. The trauma of reason, for example, subjects thought to domination on the basis of a presupposed image of philosophy, one which implies the for transcendence the now-farniliar of subject whom everything that is thought is an itself The that to be transcendent object of unobscured observation. subject presupposes thus has no resources to deal with the trauxna of reason. It experiences itself therein as from its by it this that infinitely separated essence,and is accompanied affects cannot accommodate, as it undergoes a crisis of meaning. Deleuze accusesdogmatic images of thought of narcissism, and solipsism in the senseof a lack of belief in 'the world' (ECC 87-8). The transcendentunity of thought with being is a presupposition that simply gives

is [ones] (ECC 58). 'a to one reason Mflate own ego' as the crisis that resultswhen this for assurnption is revealed what it is. Learn-ing works against such tendencies, by affirming directly that which exceeds thought, precisely through being immanent in it (Absolute Difference). '

1 On the

banality, or the negative aspect of thought's difference frorr. Itself, and of overcoming

the reinvigoration of 'belief in the world', seeToole, 1993 esp-pp. 239-42. -

262

Learning in Deieuzeis thus firstly learning about the realltv of double-binds. i. e., about the internal limits of acceptedpTactices,and affinning these limits as Internal. rather than as external limits imposed by accident on a theoros who, in principle, remains united with its essence. Secondly. it is learning about the singular. local interventions that may be carried out in thinking in order to free it from traps. In both for learning for Deleuze, knowledge. But is knowledge. cases, is it absolute which Deleuze means practical knowledge, the inculcation of habits that create unforeseen and

novel responsesto situations. Absolute knowledge is th-ussynonymouswith training, with the accumulation of augmentation of 'good habits' and the active forgetting of bad

ones. In this light, we can read Deleuze's critique of Hegel as a critique of Hegelian education, and thus of the PS above all (DR 215/166). 1 would suggestthat, for Deleuze, Hegel still sees education as a matter of method, in the sense that the goal of PS is foreseen in its beginning -

even if we understand this beginning, not in terms of a

being-in-itself, but kind thought the of positive unity and as of immediate consciousness of being that Kant refers to as an 'indeterminate empirical intuition'. Absolute Knowing is nothing but the reconciliation of self-consciousness with its being, with its own dividedness. Even if Hegel deconstructs all oppositions between subject and object, he for between Deleuze, that the that actuality, still assumes, including possibility and problematic being of self-consciousness is identical with the negatively self-related

characterof reason. Hegel claims to have overcome the internal divisions of consciousness, including

those

within

Schellingian

self-consciousness, between

faith

and

foundationalist reason or between absolute and relative, that give rise to the trauma of be, from Deleuze's point of view, an incomplete overcoming. But this would reason. The historically determinate presuppositions of representational consciousnessmav have

been deconstructed,but the result of this. the idea that self-consciousnessis the movement of

Absolute Negativity,

does not enact the full

263

renversement of

foundationalism. It comprehends the movement of self-consciousness in terms of its internal dividedness, but becausethis movement is observable, or nij, internal negati%-ityit implies once again a theoros who recognises the drarna of the PS as her own. This in tun implies a common sense,a horizon of meaning in which the drama Will be enacted. is by the negative unity of the Concept. The nihilistic tendencies of which represented representational consciousnessare not thereby overcome. only internalised. It conserves the present by baptising it as 'my' actuality (NP 185-6/16 1). Hence, in order to -understandhow Deleuze does more than sIMPly accuseHegel of a foundationalist conflation of hypothetical with absolute determination, I think we he has to that need emphasise criticlsed Hegellan education as a process of leaming to live with' nihilism. This conservesthe past as the underlying necessity of the present, by trying to sbow that the way to overcome the present is to grasp the bistory of a common

sense(of the Concept) as one's own actuality. In Nietzscheanterms, Hegelian education is a vast prcject of remembering the development of the Concept as 'my wound'. It is a titanic effort to bear the present by affin-ning one's own complicity in it (the dividedness is dividedness), is thus the partial, reactive affirmation of of consciousness nýy and Nietzsche's ass or came] (NP 207-9/180-2). Tbs is the only 'absolution' achieved by Hegel's Absolute, according to Deleuze (DR 61/42), an absolution in which the internal differences of self-consciousnessfrom itself (the shapesof consciousnessin PS) vanish inner, identity Subject the them, the transcends that negative of supposedly as into which their Whole. The self-transcendenceof this whole at the end of PS is thus illusory. There for in Eacb Deleuze. Hegel, totalities moment of self-b-anscendenceare no open

at

the end of PS, at the end of the Doctrine of Essence,at the end of SL in the transition to Nature -

Subject, the transcendent, the negative unity of is simply a reaffirmation of

difference' (DR 62/42). The 'the of production evanescence and which grounds immanence of the Subject is thus a relative immanence, which presupposesthe negative its Subject/Concept Hegelian 'Enlightenment' can onIN, the as common sense. unity of

264

be an acquiescence in the present that cannot respond creatively to the divisions or blockages that it encounters. but can only relate them to the unified, negatively selfdiffering Subject of which none can be an adequaterepresentation, and thus deconstruct

them Adorno's observation about transcendentalsuklectivity !s thus confirmed. for .2 Deleuze. bv Hegelian Absolute Knowing, which he denounces as a refinement of nibilism that retains unquestioned subjective and 'objective' practical presuppositions.

iii)

Hegel contra Deleuze: Absolute Difference and Experience This Deleuzean critique of Hegel's I-Mageof thought as 'reconciliation' goes

further than those criticisms we examined in the previous chapter. It claims that Hegel's --Iphilosophy

is epistemologically (and politically) suspect, not just because it confuses a

negative, hypothetical mode of determination with an absolute one, but because it deten-ninesthe Absolute as negative difference. Although Hegel acknowledges that the Absolute is internally different from itself

he still assumes that the process of

differentiation here can be observed., and thus presupposes a transcendent subject capable of being a theoros. For Delettze.,the negative character of Hegelian difference arises precisely through its being difference posited for a self-identical subject that kind possessesnegativity as a of transcendent essenceupon which it can reflect. This difference is not a truly internal, immediate difference, as it remains related to a suýject that posits itself as the transcendent measure of difference, i. e., as absolute. Difference from for determination HegeL a process of mediation. Difference arises from and arise, self-relation, but this relation is itself mediated by other-relation. Deleuze, on the other band, argues tbat, unless differentiation is understood as unmediate or absolute, it will be always posited as occurring within or for a transcendent subjectivity, a common foundationalist the error. The epistemological sense. which repeats once again

2

See Rogue, 1989, p. 159, on this reactive character of deconstructlon from a Deleuzean point of

limitations Ansell-Pearson, On 1999, pp. 207-8 thought, the a conciliaton, of model of see view.

265

for foundationallst Hegel's thought reveal a assumptions of eihos that, as always Deleuze, is driven by a moral and political imperative, namely the reconciliation of for It thus the conflicts even at an obfuscating philosophical shell expenseof nihilism. is ýAL an essentially political

difference. Deleuze envisions the project: suppression of real

Hegelian autonomy as self-imposed complete subordinafion to the Absolute Idea, which. as the System reveals, is perfectly incarnated in the fon-n of the State. Reconciliation. in deconstruction reality, means a narcissistic of antinomies u-nmanentin experience that is perfectly corrunensuTablewith political domination. The centrality of reconciliation as a theme in Hegel's thought is clear. However, the exact meaning of this ten-n is as ambiguous as any other supposedly firW definition of his thought. Hegel uses it, for example, in EL with reference to Absolute Knowing, be to not phenomenology, when statesthat the goal of philosopbv Is the reconcillatIon of setf-deiermining lhoughi 'with the reason that is [mii der seienden Vernunfil, or actuality' (EL §6). Reconciliation has, then, to be understood in the first place, I would ar9ue, with reference to Hegel's onto-logic, and the deten-ninationsof Possibility and Actuality. Reconciliation here is not simply the phenomenological result of a negative unity into which A shapes of consciousnessvanish. This, as we saw in Chapters Five

from SIX, PS theTesull the viewpoint Of Tepresentational and is only of consciousness. Another view of this result is possible, as we have seen,in which the structure of Being itself is comprehended, after the possibility of a distinction between hypothetical and absolute thinking has been undermined. The fact that Being is immanently detemiined in SL as the self-detennining Concept does not immediately Imply anything about Hegel's evaluation of political actuality. Without going into the much-debated details of Hegel's politics, I want to light Hegel's (In)famous proposition that the actual ad the the that. of in argue now IIn identical 24/20), in (PR determination the to and are relation onto-logical rational of Actuality, that Deleuze's interpretation of 'reconciliation'

266

is mistaken. Further, the

relation between thought and actuality that emerges in Hegel allows some criticisms of Deleuze's vim of the heteronomy and autonomy of philosophy to be advanced. In Hegel's view, the actual is not that which is simply accepted as given in experience. Actuality in SL emerges out of a long, complex dialectic in which the immediacy of experience is deconstructed. It has for its content the relations between

existentsand their existent conditions, which are not relations internal to their tenns. instead, they are external. 11iis means that Actuality is not thought of in terins of metaphysical notions of grounding or causality, but in terms of thinl6ng or big

tat

determines itself through self-externalisation. Actuality is thus a dimension of the Concept, and is rational, whereasimmediacy is abstract and irrational, i. e., indeterminate and uncomprehended. Empirical reality. for Hegel, whether conceived of as natural or social, must tberefore be conceived in terms of Being, Existence and Actuality, It will include within it elements that are relatively abstract and others that are relatively if is But that concrete. which genuinely Absolute for Hegel is self-determination, as embodied in the Concept, then there is, as we saw in the last chapter, a real difference between the Concept and being determined as Nature (or as Spirit). Although the Concept is self-determinmg, it is relatively abstract. The Absolute Idea in SL is not known as containing Within it, as a substantial unity, all the deterrninations of reality under the form of possibility. It is the negative unity of the Theoretical and Practical Ideas, or the abstract unity of thougbt and actuality in generat' The Concept may be absolute in the sensethat it is a self-deten-niningactivity (rather than a Substance),but it fully in that concrete as this activity. it is not is also not-absolute, It is thus internally negative, with the result that it passesover into Nature and System, but Hegelian Spirit. This the pTocess at the same time, this is eventually yields the system in thokizht. Tle political Act"ity

detailed in PR, for example., is not

Prussia Hegel's liberal the time, totalitarianism, either of with modern or identical

3 Rose, 1980, p. 186-7.

267

democracy. If this is the case, then the immanent necessity of the Concept can be

expressed as 'reconcillafion', but this has a specific mearting. Reconciliation means, would argue, that thought becomes acquainted with the immanent determinations of the self-detennining Concept, with the historical Actuality of its own present. and with the identity and difference of the two. Philosophy has to reconcile itself with the identity of thought and reality and their difference. This means that there is a kind of Sollen in Hegelian thought, without which it would risk becoming purely acqmescent.ThisS'o/len lies in the re-cognition of the difference between the Concept and reality, which implies the abstractnessand irrationality of reality, and which dernandsreal action in the present. However, the determination of this Sollen, of what 'ought-to-be', is not based on a foundational, abstract presupposition, which makes Hegel different from Fichte and Schelling. Instead, it is grounded in a re-cognition of the rational elements of the real or its Actuality, those elements that accord with the immanent determinations of the Concept. Actimlity is, as Hegel notes, a dispersed set of conditions that 'oughl to return into itself (SL 11,209/547, my emphasis). Hence the Sollen is an tmmanently necessary consequenceof Hegel's ontology. If the re-cognition of the real in relation to Reason implies knowledge of the conditions of Actuality, then it always implies a perspective on the real and its conditions taken by consciousness. The totality of conditions, being 'dispersed' cannot be known as a totality. To imagine that this could be the case would be to posit an abstract,,subjective regulative Ideal. It is a consequenceof the nature of Being, for Hegel, that existents imply an element of contingency, rather than being an limitations faculties. Hence the re-cognition of the the effect of internal of our mental Actual on which the Sollen is based is mevitably partial, foT it will be a pTocess between conducted as a negotiation a histoncally detein inate consciousness and its between it the social real relations awareness of and other subjects. So the attempt to

Actual feature an of political reality is both required by the make self-determinafion

268

Concept and problernabsed.bv it for the re-cognition of the Actual elements n th'Is but has is by Concept, the reality made possible also its reachi-estricted. From the practical side, the re-cognition of the Actuality of the present implies a

determinationof the Practical Idea.,the Soflen,in relation to wbat can be re-co

sedas

the Real Possibilities of the Actual. Again, this orientation of action will be negotiated, just as the re-cognition of the conditions of the -presentis negotiated. And if it too is a " is partial re-cognition, then the outcome of any practical action unforeseen. In this way, Hegelian 'education' does -notend with the -negativeunity at the end of PS, or with the completion of a System. It is an immanent consequenceof the nature of the Concept that its concrete meaning sbould be negotiated by reai subjects wbo determine and are determined by real political structures. The Absolute Idea is not absolute because it is deten-nined at the end of SL: it is absolute because it is concretised a) through real for both in determined processesof negotiation, which possibilities action are in relation to the immanent determinations of the Concept and in relation to existing political intervenes b) in Actual. The the ceaseless structures, and practical activity, which in detemnnation of the Absolute is thus a task for existin& fmite consciousnesses,and this Concept Hegel] 'an is direct the the thus of itself. education II consequenceof nature is a 'im the world', and there is no guarantee that its activity inconceivable without real its for be Actuality be re-cognition of will always a subject's outcome will successful, limited. partial and This education is also Absolute Knowing. It can only be conducted once the between Hence PS SL has been Being the transition and cogrUsed. is internal structure of for it makes possible the theoretical and practical orientation toward the a real advance, does have I Hegel's I that philosophy sketched above. present -not, would suggest, if does And to the the present. education of consciousness not end even simply capitulate

4 Certain currents -within Marxism reflect this strand Hegelian of thought. Seee.g., Debray, 1975, ppý45-6,

269

with the System, then there is no transcendentsubjectivity embodied in the Concept. The Concept is indeed a kind of conu-nonsense-in that it is a 'context'5 in which meaning is detennined. But this context is without any foundational determination. 'Negativity'

be cannot regardedas transcendentor foundational,as it cannotbe statedor represented finite in a proposition. It is not hypostasised, for it is graspable only as process, not as atffibute or predicate. The Concept is not therefore, a transcendentsubjectivity. because its self-deteffnination occurs through its internal negativity, and not because i is a positively detennmate Ground. It does not possessa transcendentperspective on its own being or on external being. It is at once the result of the deconstruction of the antinomies of representational consciousness, and the reconstruction, througb its immanent selfdetermination, of an ontolo gy that demands that finite theoretical and practical perspectives on the real be developed that can acknowledge the meaning of Actuality. The supposed transcendence of Absolute Knowing is, viewed ftom the broader perspective on the System I have sketched above, an illusion. The articulation of the Systern and its relation to the real does not detennine a presupposed transcendent it determines the context in which the relation of an intrinsically divided Rather, subject. finite subject to the real (Bemg- Nature and Spirit) must be understood. This sketcb of the relation between onto-logic, System and empirical reality direct suggests a critical response to Deleuze, regarding his model of absolute immanence. Absolute Difference is, for Deleuze, the absolute presupposition of thought. the expression of the othernessthat is unmanent within thought and which is its genetic condition precisely becauseit prevents it from coinciding with itself The tracing of the tendencies that constitute this difference is, as in Bergson, the work of a superior it is forced becomes thought to encounter its identical when intuition, with which difference from itself This is reminiscent. once again, of Schelfing's position. However. it resuits from affin-ning that which Schelfing cannot truly affirm, that the being of

5 Schick, 1994, p. 180.

270

limit. has Once difference from this its thought is its thought internal encountered itself transcendental object, it is capable of altering its image of itself, and affirming that the sole problem of philosophy is the creation of concepts. The requirement of a new image of thought based on the minimal difference from itself for Deletize, immanent to the thought presupposition of of is, certain experiencesof this difference as the internal limit of thouglit. It is not tberefore a transcendent requirement that reflects Platonic assumptions about the unity and difference of thought and being. I have suggested that the trauma of reason is one example of this experience, which is encountered by foundationalist thought as a crisis. Deleuze does not argue that Absolute Difference can be known by a superior intuition

that is simply other than thought. This intuition is in fact a higher power of thought by tbougbt itself, wbicb can attain undergoing certain encounters. The exPerience of for for it subverts settled habits of thought that become this crisis is vital power, in living. A crucial element of Deleuze's to the sedimented response exigencies of is double-bin& thus the position acknowledgement of a real which, as I argued in Chapter Three, is a double-bind because it depends on certain rules that create a dilemma. Deleuzean ontology refers these rWes back to objective conditions, practices it, become filnction that training to thouglit to immanent in external ne-vertheless it in become But there of which can we conscious. This certain ways. are rules, nonetheless, dilemma. As the actually creates conscious recognition of constraining rules with the trauma of reason,we become conscious that, becauseof the way the game is set up. once

filrtber. Once longer be have it can no can P-o no played, the certain moves, made we we 6

loses game' its value or meanmg, It is in relation to this experience that Deleuze sets up the requirement for a new

image of thought. He does not, then, try to think the opposite of Platonism, which would be a dogmatic relativism. Instead.,he tries to think the inverse of Platonism, where unity is an effect of difference rather than the other way around, and where all virtual and SchellIng's 'higher' Absolute relations. external are positing relations of a actual Is, as I

271

argued in Chapters Two and Four, an unsuccessful attempt to realise a sirrular account of the Absolute, in which there is no internal resemblance between condition and conditioned. When such a resemblance is posited, the result is a relative identity, which can only be posited by thought and cannot be known. The need for an unconditioned I ground of knowledge, i. e., a 'higher' Absolute that is still a ground of knowledge, is determined in relation to experience. It has to be a unity of all determinations. for only then will it be unconditioned, but it has to still be a predominantly rational unity in order to be a ground of knowledge. Schelling is defeatedby these two criteria. Deleuze. however, appears more successful in thinking the 'higher' Absolute, determined without resemblanceto that which it conditions. However, the move towards Absolute Difference in thought is, as I have argued, inseparable from a certain kind of experience, wbere thougbt becomes conscious of its difference from itself, Deleuze argues that, to escape the trap with which this experience threatens thought, this difference cannot be understood as mediated by a prior identity. It must be affirmed as 1 .1 immediate, which makes thou6t

incommensurable with itself

By thus inverting

Platonism,,Deleuze believes he has avoided simply positing the Absolute in resemblance to that which it conditions. But the initial impetus here is not from the "higher power' of thought, but from the experiences of a foundationalist or representational consciousness, as with Schelling. We saw in Chapter Six that Schelling's conception of the Absolute as a pure it implies. dimension The Absolute failed the to of positing acknowledge presupposition detennined Absolute be or unconditioned except in relation to expenence, as could not be it that to that which it was meant was inevitably posited as resembling which meant the condition of The positing of this Absolute was guided by a foundationalist image of thought, NNqtbtranscendent knowledge as its goal. With Deleuze, however, a different The difference thought us. guides or immediate of incomprehensible ii-nage of from Kant"s 'cracked" the as embodied itself of in account subject, is to consciousness

be positedas absolute.By simply inverting the procedurethrough which the Absolute is 272

determined, however, Deieuze fails to recognise that his version of the unconditioned is for by theTequirement that to the it. also just as much conditioned gives nse experience The difference of consciousnessfrom itself gives us a different image of thought, and ical and Deleuze, in my opinion, works out with utter consistency what the epistemolo91 Iimplications image this ontolo 91 tical of are. However, this consistency is in relation to a

detennination of representational consciousness.The procedure of renversement involves a recognition of the actimlity of consciousness (Its deterymnatlon by cert., rules that constitute a suklective practice of thinking) that cannot itself be recolgnised, because Deleuze, in his zeal to overturn transcendence and return effectivity to philosophy, posits the immediate difference of consciousnessfrom itself as its immanent 'foundation'. Hegel, on the other hand, deals with the relation between representational consciousnessand philosophical consciousnessin a way that allows the relation between the former and the latter to be acknowledged and understood immanently, as well as immanence in fmite Absolute the the enabling of consciousnessto be comprehended. Deleuze effectivelv

hvpostasises the expen'ence of crisis that is immanent i to ,

fiffly consciousness,,without acknowledging the role of self-consciousness(knowledge of the 'rules of the game') in constituting this crisis.

iii)

Concluding Remarks I would suggest that the Deleuzean Absolute tends to fefishize the experience of

fetishize foundationalism identity. in difference The tends to the that sarneway abstract

its identity in, for hasty too of and refusal mediation, operationof renversemeniis rather Absolute does that is utterly unconditioned, the that positing of an even it not recognise utterly unlike what it conditions, is still a positikg that presupposes a self-conscious

deten-ninationof expenence. In fact Deleuze's Absolute must, I think, be judged as the product of an illusory practice of thinking,, one that remains tied to an image of the Absolute as Substance,utterly removed from negatiNity and mediation.

273

The epistemological issue concermng whether difference must be thought as positively immediate or as mediated turns, I believe, on the crucial antifoundationalisi question of the relation between the positing through which the conditions of difference

are establishedand what in expenencedetenninesthis positing. I have suggestedin this Conclusion that Deleuze's version of this positing cannot comprehend its own determination. I bave also suggested that Hegel's conception of the relation between relative and Absolute can do this more successfully, becauseit recognises the aspect of identity in representational consciousnessas well as its internal difference. Because does this, with the result that the unitv of self-consciousnessis the decentred unity of I Absolute Negativity, it is immanent to experience in a way that Deleuze's new image of thought is not. Consequently, Hegel advances a version of antifoundationall sm that I

believe empbaticallydemandsconsiderationtoday Nevertheless, it is also necessary to recog-nise that the issue of the determination the acknowledgement of of thought demands fuTther examination, beyond the scope of this investigation. For instance, the question of Hegel's relationship to sophisticated materialist accounts of social relations. such as the later Marx's dialectical materialism, or the libidinal materialism of Deleuze and Guattari in the two volumes of Capiialism and Schizophrenia, could be addressed, in order to deter-minejust what dimensions of social reality 'acknowledgement' should refer to, and in what it should itself be interesting latter from between The the two positions consist. would relationship this point of view. But such concems would take us beyond the limits of this enquiry'image focused has of thought, and into political and social philosophy's upon which theory proper.

274

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